Date of Award

1-1-2014

Language

English

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

College/School/Department

Department of Philosophy

Content Description

1 online resource (iv, 192 pages)

Dissertation/Thesis Chair

Rachel Cohon

Committee Members

Jon Mandle, Jason D'Cruz

Keywords

Humean Theory of Motivation, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Reasons Internalism, Ethics, Moral motivation, Ethical relativism

Subject Categories

Philosophy

Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that the Humean theory of motivation, and reasons internalism ought to be accepted and are compatible with moral objectivity. The Humean theory of motivation is the view that only desires, and not beliefs, are capable of motivating. Reasons internalism is the view that only those considerations capable of motivating can be reasons. The combination of these two views entails that we only have a reason for action when we have a relevant desire. Accordingly, if we hold both of these positions then we cannot have reason to be moral unless we desire to be moral. This seems to conflict with the idea that morality is objective and applies to everyone.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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