Date of Award

1-1-2012

Language

English

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

College/School/Department

Department of Philosophy

Content Description

1 online resource (ii, 39 pages)

Dissertation/Thesis Chair

Rachel Cohon

Committee Members

Rachel Cohon, PD Magnus

Keywords

Beliefs of Intention, Beliefs of Prediction, Causation, Damian Thibeault, Hume, Hume's Treatise, Motivation (Psychology), Reason

Subject Categories

Philosophy

Abstract

Is human reason capable of being the direct cause of an action? David Hume's answer to this question was an unequivocal no. He argues that "reason is perfectly inert," and instead claims that only our emotions are capable of moving us. The argument of this paper is that given Hume's empirical account of causation, as he establishes it in Book One of his Treatise of Human Nature, his inertia of reason doctrine fails. This paper will demonstrate that Hume has not shown--and perhaps cannot show--that reason is incapable of causing action.

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Philosophy Commons

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