Date of Award
Spring 2026
Language
English
Embargo Period
4-28-2026
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
College/School/Department
Department of Political Science
Program
Political Science
First Advisor
Bryan Early
Committee Members
Christopher Clary, Cheng Chen
Keywords
China, Economic Statecraft, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Supply Chain
Subject Categories
International Relations
Abstract
The global economic order is undergoing a profound transformation as China increasingly leverages its vast commercial resources not merely for market expansion, but as strategic instruments to reshape global governance and secure its national interests. Moving beyond traditional analyses that rely on aggregate macroeconomic indicators, this dissertation investigates the targeted, highly asymmetrical mechanisms of Beijing’s economic statecraft. It systematically examines three specific instruments – institutional, financial, and trade – through which China projects structural power and constructs an alternative economic order.
The first empirical study explores China’s institutional statecraft by analyzing its bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Drawing on Chinese-language policy documents and scholarly analyses before and after the 2017 U.S. withdrawal, the research demonstrates a strategic shift in Beijing’s perception. Rather than seeking immediate market access, China views the agreement as a critical arena for a “regime takeover,” aiming to shape twenty-first-century trade standards, particularly concerning digital trade and state-owned enterprise governance, and transition its role from a rule-taker to a normative rule-maker.
The second study investigates the financial dimension by modeling the geopolitical determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Utilizing both official aggregate data and transaction-level records, the analysis reveals that state-backed capital actively targets non-OECD countries exporting the critical raw materials necessary to fulfill the high-tech industrial policy. Furthermore, Chinese investment systematically flows into developing nations experiencing democratic decline, functioning as a geopolitical lender of last resort in illiberal environments where Western investors retreat.
The third study tests the coercive potential of China’s structural dominance by expanding the theory of weaponized interdependence to physical manufacturing supply chains. By isolating bilateral dependence on critical chokepoints, the research uncovers a distinct developmental bifurcation in foreign policy alignment. Developed nations actively balance against these vulnerabilities both ideologically and behaviorally. Conversely, the Global South exhibits “reluctant compliance”: structural reliance on these assets increases their latent ideological distance from Beijing while simultaneously compelling tactical voting convergence on the United Nations floor.
Ultimately, this dissertation contributes to the fields of International Political Economy and foreign policy analysis by mapping the operational contours and fundamental limits of Chinese grand strategy. While Beijing successfully utilizes its economic dominance to extract transactional concessions and secure long-term resources, these actions concurrently provoke deep-seated resentment and structural balancing. The findings demonstrate that while coercive economic power is a potent tool for tactical leverage, it remains insufficient, and sometimes counterproductive, for constructing a genuinely aligned and ideologically cohesive global order.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Han, Wilson, "The Instruments of Chinese Economic Statecraft" (2026). Electronic Theses & Dissertations (2024 - present). 402.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/etd/402