What kind of is-ought gap is there and what kind ought there be?

Authors

P.D. Magnus, University at Albany, State University of New YorkFollow
Jon Mandle, University at Albany, State University of New YorkFollow

Author ORCID Identifier

P.D. Magnus: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2446-3494

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-2017

DOI

10.1163/17455243-46810072

Abstract

Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.

Comments

Publisher Acknowledgement:

This is the Author's Accepted Manuscript. The version of record can be found here: Magnus, P.D., & Mandle, J. (2017). What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(4), 373-393. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810072

Recommended Citation

Magnus, P.D. and Mandle, Jon, "What kind of is-ought gap is there and what kind ought there be?" (2017). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 56.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/56