What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know

Authors

P.D. Magnus, University at Albany, State University of New YorkFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2013

DOI

10.1086/673718

Abstract

There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture community opinion, especially in cases that matter to us.

Comments

© 2013 by Philosophy of Science Association.

Recommended Citation

P. D. Magnus. "What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know." Philosophy of Science 2013; 80(5), 840-849. DOI: 10.1086/673718