"Tye'S Intentionalism: Representationalism & Bivalency Of Transparency" by Ryan Skunda

Date of Award

12-1-2023

Language

English

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

College/School/Department

Department of Philosophy

Dissertation/Thesis Chair

Ron RM McClamrock

Committee Members

P.D. P.D.M Magnus

Keywords

Bivalency, Intentionality, Representationalism, Transparency

Subject Categories

Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper I examine the intentionalist theory of phenomenal consciousness articulated by the philosopher Michael Tye. Tye’s theory is also considered a representationalist theory, representationalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind that argues that we have internal representations in our mind that allow us to represent things that are in the world. Tye presupposes a connection between representationalism and intentionalism, which I challenge as part of my argument against him. I use his commitment to transparency and its bivalent nature to illustrate a conundrum for Tye and argue that an enactivist approach to phenomenal consciousness is superior to his own representationalist theory.

Download

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS