Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2006

DOI

10.1007/sl 1229-004-6223-5

Abstract

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of the offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” [Sta01, p. S12]. This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it— like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes— merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.

Comments

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/sl 1229-004-6223-5.

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