Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2008
DOI
10.1080/02698590802567373
Abstract
It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive.
Recommended Citation
Magnus, P.D., "Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference" (2008). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 34.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/34
Terms of Use
This work is made available under the Scholars Archive Terms of Use.
Comments
Accepted for publication by International Studies in the Philosophy of Science on 10/09/2008.