Economic policy and equality: neoliberalism and gender equity in Latin America since the 1970s

Donnett Annmarie Lee

University at Albany, State University of New York, dalee@albany.edu

The University at Albany community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/legacy-etd

Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation


This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. Please see Terms of Use. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Economic Policy and Equality:

Neoliberalism and Gender Equity in Latin America since the 1970s

by

Donnett A Lee

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
In Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy

Department of Political Science

Winter 2022
Abstract

Neoliberalism has been a persistent concern for policymakers, scholars, and the general public in Latin America due to its negative effects on women. This paper examines the relationship between neoliberal economic policies and gender equality from the 1970s to 2003 in the region. I use a mixed-methods approach to test the two major competing theories from the literature that discuss women’s status under neoliberal reform. I find that neoliberal economic policies did not improve the status of women but reduced gender disparity. Neoliberalism led to the worsening of men’s status, which caused the status of women to seem better. Overall, education was more beneficial to enhancing the status of women than neoliberalism.
Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to my committee chair and members, Dr. Matthew Ingram, Dr. Patricia Strach, Dr. Timothy Weaver, and Dr. Gabriel Hetland, for their encouragement and support throughout the years. I am especially appreciative of their assistance at every stage of my dissertation and their unwavering support and belief in me. I would also like to thank the Carson Carr Graduate Diversity Fellowship Program and especially God for believing in me and giving me the opportunity to fulfill my lifelong dream of achieving my Ph.D.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures</th>
<th>page</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Theoretical Frameworks and Working Hypotheses</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Data and Methods</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Quantitative Analysis</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Argentina Case Study</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peru Case Study</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Appendix: Case Selection Diagnostics</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figures

1.1 Female Labor Force Participation Rate  page  5
1.2 Female Employment in Manufacturing  6
1.3 Gender Inequality Index  7
1.4 Neoliberalism  11
4.1 Level of General Reform  113

by Country Overtime

A.1 Residual of Countries Overtime – Model 7:  246
Female Labor Force Participation

A.2 Residual of Countries Overtime – General  247
Reform: Female Labor Force Participation

A.3 Average of Residuals by Country – Model 7  248

A.4 Average of Residuals by Country – General  249
Reform
List of Tables

Tables

3.1 Measures of Gender Equality 103
3.2 Measures of Structural Adjustment Policies 105
3.3 Control Variables 105
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 116
4.2 Dependent Variable: 118
Female Labor Force Participation Rate
4.3 Dependent Variable: 124
Female Employment in Manufacturing
4.4 Dependent Variable: 130
Gender Inequality Index
5.1 Female Unemployment Rate, 170
Argentina 1991-1995
Chapter 1

Introduction

What is the relationship between economic policy and equality? This is my research question in its broadest sense. This project examines this relationship in the context of the Latin American region since the 1970s. My research question is, what is the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality in Latin America from the 1970s to 2003? More specifically, I examine the relationship between the five distinct policies of neoliberalism: trade liberalization, financial liberalization, capital reform, privatization, tax reform, and gender equality. I also analyze the relationship between the aggregate measure of these policies and gender equality. This project contributes to the debate in the literature on neoliberalism and democracy, which explores the tension between neoliberalism and political equality of disadvantaged groups or the masses (Crouch, 2015; Slobodian, 2018; Weyland, 2002; Holzner, 2007; Mudge, 2018). Specifically, it highlights how neoliberalism contributes to increasing economic inequality, which has implications for the quality of democracy (Roberts, 2014; Mudge, 2018).

Argument

I argue that neoliberalism does not improve the status of women in Latin America, although it reduces gender disparity in the labor market. Initially, neoliberalism seems beneficial to women, but the effect is dubious when I look more closely. The status of women appears to be better because men’s status worsens. In addition, while women do get jobs, those jobs are of poorer quality. Instead, education has a more considerable and beneficial impact on women’s status in the labor market.
Neoliberalism is a widely used concept in academic works and popular debate, but it is often defined imprecisely or left undefined (Stedman Jones, 2012; Weaver, 2016; Peck, 2010). Therefore, the increasing popularity and use of neoliberalism require me to provide a more precise definition. I define neoliberalism as an ideology that emphasizes the role of individual economic freedom and entrepreneurship in the market, with the state having a limited role in the economy. The state’s role involves creating and maintaining the economic system for individual transactions (Harvey, 2005). The Washington Consensus and structural adjustment refer to policies used to implement the ideas surrounding neoliberal reform. These policies include the following: fiscal discipline, reduction in public expenditure, competitive exchange rates, deregulation, privatization, tax liberalization, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, capital liberalization, and property rights (Williamson, 2009; Peck 2010; Harvey, 2005; Beneria, 1999). I will use the terms Washington Consensus and structural adjustment policies interchangeably in the rest of the text. I operationalize neoliberalism using privatization, tax liberalization, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, capital liberalization. These five policies reflect the main elements or core policies and practices of neoliberal theory (Williamson, 2000; Morley, Machado, Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009).

Aside from the definition of neoliberalism above, I acknowledge the dominant definitions of neoliberalism in the literature. British Marxist geographer David Harvey explained in his famous works, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* and “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,” that neoliberalism is about the restoration of class power is one of the few authors who explicitly defines the concept. Harvey defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political-economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state was to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey, 2005, 2). My definition of neoliberalism echoes Harvey’s explanation of the concept in that state has a minimal role in the economy. He suggests that the state’s role is to create and preserve the institutional framework of the market. Also, once the institutional framework for the market is created, the state should have a limited role (Harvey, 2005, 2).

My definition of neoliberalism contrasts with the intellectual and Chicago School economist Milton Friedman who wrote *Capitalism and Freedom*, which mentions that the state has a central role in the economy. Friedman states that, “Neoliberalism would accept the nineteenth-century liberal emphasis on the fundamental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth-century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal of the competitive order. It would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves. The state would police the
system, establish conditions favorable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress. The citizens would be protected against the state by the existence of a free private market; and against one another by the preservation of competition” (Friedman, 2009, 3). Friedman’s definition of neoliberalism highlights that the state should not have a limited role in the economy but a central role in establishing and maintaining the free market. The explanation of the proper role of the state in the economy is where my definition of the concept conflicts with Friedman’s. In addition, he emphasizes that citizens should be protected against other citizens in the market (Stedman Jones, 2012; Weaver, 2016; Burgin, 2012). Therefore, Friedman illustrates the distinction between classical liberalism and neoliberalism.

The relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality is highly contested in the literature on structural adjustment policies and women. Neoliberal theorists assert that neoliberalism is gender-neutral and indirectly beneficial for women. They explain that structural adjustment policies contribute to economic growth, which indirectly benefits the individuals in the country, including women (IMF, 1999; Friedman, 2002; Hayek, 1944). In contrast, feminist theorists state that neoliberalism is not gender-neutral and adversely affects women. They mention that structural adjustment policies affect men and women differently. Feminist theorists contend that structural adjustment policies disproportionately place heavy burdens and costs on women compared to their male counterparts (Sparr, 1994; Sadasivam, 1997; Eastin and Prakash, 2013).
Outcomes of Interest

The outcome of interest for this project is gender equality. Scholars highlight the multidimensional nature of gender inequality, which means that it covers both material and non-material aspects of society, such as income, employment, health, education, political representation, trade union membership, and corporate leadership (Sen, 2001; Robeyns, 2003). For this project, gender equality is the difference in economic or material wellbeing between men and women in the labor market. Gender equality is measured using several indicators: female labor force participation rate, female employment in the manufacturing industry, and the gender inequality index. Gender equality is also based on the quality of employment women
receive in relation to the one percent or wealthy class. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate gender equality in terms of the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector across various Latin American countries. As a third measure of gender equality, I add the United Nations gender inequality index, as shown in figure 1.3. The gender inequality index is an aggregate measure that looks at three aspects of gender inequality: health, empowerment, and the labor market (UNDP, 2019).
I define equality as the reduction of the income and wealth gap between men and women in the top and bottom percentage of the population. In other words, equality refers to class inequality or the wealth gap between subordinate and dominant classes (Michaels and Reed Jr., 2020; Harvey, 2007). Expressly, Michael and Reed Jr. refer to equality or class inequality as “the difference between the wealthiest and everyone else across the board” (Michaels and Reed Jr., 2020, 5). Therefore, equality looks at income and wealth distribution among classes, which is essentially economic inequality. Harvey explains that neoliberalism contributes to a restoration of class power and greater inequality. The author states, “Neoliberalism has not proven effective at revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded in restoring class power. As a
consequence, the theoretical utopianism of the neoliberal argument has worked more as a system of justification and legitimization. The principles of neoliberalism are quickly abandoned whenever they conflict with this class project” (Harvey, 2007, 29). Therefore, neoliberalism leads to greater economic or class inequality, which has political implications. Dumeil and Levy also emphasize the effects of neoliberalism on equality in American society. The authors point out that from the 1980s onwards, the wealth of the one percent or the wealthiest income earners in the United States helped restore class power (Dumeil and Levy, 2004).

The literature on neoliberalism and democracy also highlights that neoliberalism contributes to both economic and political inequality (Mudge, 2018). Holzner explores how neoliberalism affects the economic and political status of individuals in Mexico. The author expresses that the implementation of neoliberal reform contributes to greater income inequality, impacting how the poor participates in the political sphere (Holzner, 2007). Holzner points out that neoliberal reform deteriorates the income of the poor, which increases the opportunity cost of participating politically (Holzner, 2007). Weyland also highlights that neoliberalism affects the quality of democracy by lowering citizen participation in politics (Weyland, 2004). In other words, neoliberalism leads to less government responsiveness towards the poor, reducing electoral participation (Weyland, 2004). In addition, neoliberalism also weakens unions that the poor usually uses to organize politically (Weyland, 2004). Crouch also mentions that neoliberalism contributes to an increase in economic fortune for corporations, which contributes to a decline in political equality necessary for democracies (Crouch, 2014). Other scholars highlight that democracy might benefit the poor or masses adversely affected by neoliberalism (Weyland, 2002; Slobodian, 2018). Weyland states, “…democracy makes drastic change difficult because it institutes a separation of powers and thus deconcentrates political authority.
Furthermore, by allowing for widespread political participation, it gives the sectors who lose from market reform political voice and potentially the capacity to hinder or block further change” (Weyland, 2002, 2). Therefore, democracy helps offset the economic inequality that individuals experience in the market economy, which allows for political equality and opportunities for changes that benefit the masses through the political system.

**Theoretical Approaches**

This project evaluates the two main theoretical approaches that frame the debate about neoliberalism and gender equality. A debate exists between neoliberal and feminist theories regarding the positive and negative effects of structural adjustment policies on gender equality. Feminist theorists contend that structural adjustment policies negatively affect gender equality due to privatization, tax liberalization, capital liberalization, financial liberalization, and trade liberalization, which further exacerbates the unequal position of women relative to men in the labor market. They highlight that these policies contribute to a large section of the population becoming poorer, specifically women. In addition, feminist theorists assert that structural adjustment policies focus mainly on the productive economy and ignore the reproductive economy, which meets and sustains human beings (Sadasivam, 1997). In contrast, neoliberals from the Chicago School of thought explain that structural adjustment policies indirectly improve gender equality due to the economic growth created when these policies are adopted. The neoliberals maintain that economic growth from structural adjustment policies improves women’s economic status. Economic growth from these policies leads to more employment opportunities, which benefit women (Eastin and Prakash, 2013). Neoliberals mention that economic growth from privatization, tax liberalization, capital liberalization, financial
liberalization, and trade liberalization indirectly leads to increase female employment overall and in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, they explain that the increase in female employment overall and in the manufacturing industry due to these policies also allows for an absolute rise in women’s income (Sadasivam, 1997). While the two theoretical approaches sought to explain whether women are doing better off or worse off, the literature has yet to agree on how structural adjustment policies affect women. Although structural adjustment policies were put in place in the 1970s and 1980s, we still do not know its effects on gender equality and equality more generally.

Figure 1.4 shows the distribution and intensity of structural adjustment policies or neoliberalism across the different Latin American countries from 1975 to 2003. The graph indicates that most Latin American countries increase the intensity of neoliberal reform overtime during this period. Although the countries adopt neoliberal reform at different levels of intensity, the level of liberalization rises with time. Despite this observation, there are variations over time across different countries. For instance, Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile are a few countries that reduce their intensity of neoliberal reform over time, while others such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Ecuador increase the level of liberalization. This means that Argentina and Chile increased the degree of liberalization or freedom from government intervention in the early 1990s and reversed this trend by the early 2000s (Morley et al., 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009). In other words, both countries allow for more government control in the individual policy areas of neoliberal reform by the 2000s. Also, some countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru vary in their level of neoliberal reform during this period. In other words, these countries increased and decreased their neoliberal reform level several times throughout this period.
In this study, I contribute to the literature by testing the neoliberal and feminist theories against each other to see which part of each theory might be correct and under what conditions. By testing the two major existing theories against each other, I identify in what sense they are competing, complementary, or contradictory. This allows me to synthesize or build a new and more comprehensive account of the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality.

Concept Definitions

In this section, I clarify key concepts, which include the following: tax reform, financial reform, international trade, privatization, and capital reform. Tax reform involves broadening the tax base through value-add taxes and cutting the marginal tax rate on corporate and personal
income (Morley et al., 1999). The aim is to sharpen incentives for businesses and improve horizontal equity. To improve the tax base, tax reform requires that the tax administrations improve. In addition, taxing income on assets abroad is another priority of tax liberalization (Williamson, 1993).

Financial reform means domestic and international financial liberalization. Expressly, domestic financial reform refers to “the amount of control the government has over bank borrowing and lending rates and the reserves to deposit ratio” (Morley et al., 1999, 8; Kingstone and Young, 2009, 33). Morley and his co-authors emphasize that financial reform is measured on a continuum scale from zero to one, where one is based on whether the market determines the interest rate, while zero is whether it is controlled by the government (Morley et al., 1999). International financial reform is government control over foreign investment, profits, interest repatriation, external credits by national borrowers, and capital outflows (Morley et al., 1999).

International trade or trade reform entails the reduction of tariffs for imports or exports. According to Beker, trade liberalization means import liberalization or lowering tariffs that protect labor-intensive industries (Beker, 2012). Williamson suggests that tariffs should be progressively reduced until they reach a low range of 10 to 20 percent (Williamson, 1993). The author also expresses that there are disagreements as to what time period tariffs should be phased out. However, recommendations for tariff reductions fell in the range of between 3 and 10 years (Williamson, 1993).

Privatization involves transferring public enterprises ownership to private individuals (Morley et al., 1999; IMF, 2000). The idea behind privatization is that private individuals are more efficient than the state in competitive industries. Thus, private ownership is better and more efficient than public ownership of enterprises. The objective of privatization for some
governments is to generate revenue for public debt and create more efficiency. The International Monetary Fund state, “Governments undertaking privatization have pursued a variety of objectives: achieving gains in economic efficiency, given the extensive prevalence of poor economic performance of public enterprises in many countries and limited success with their reform; and improving the fiscal position, particularly in cases where governments have been unwilling or unable to continue to finance deficits in the public enterprise sector” (IMF, 2000, 1). Furthermore, governments use privatization for various reasons to attain specific goals. However, privatization also entails restructuring the newly privatized companies, reducing the labor force, and creating more efficiency and economic growth (IMF, 2000).

Capital reform is the liberalization of international capital flows. That is, the increased levels of capital inflow and outflows from countries. (IMF, 2020) The International Monetary Fund explains that capital reform is the free movement of capital across borders without restrictions (IMF, 2012). They state, “In its broadest sense, it means the elimination of measures that could hamper international capital flows. Full convertibility with respect to capital flows is often understood as the absence of any limitation on capital flows, including the transaction and the related payments and transfers” (IMF, 2012, 6). Therefore, capital liberalization allows for the free flow of capital from countries that are capital abundant to those that are not. Capital flow could range from foreign direct investments to capital machinery used by domestic companies to improve their efficiency or even property acquisition by a resident from another country (IMF, 2020).
Data and Methods

I used a mixed-methods approach, which took the form of a nested analysis. I first conduct a large-N statistical analysis using regression models. For the outcome variables, as shown above in figures 1.1 to 1.3, I collect data from the International Labor Organization (ILO), which consists of information on the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing industry. I also gathered data on gender inequality from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which contains information on the gender inequality index. For the explanatory variables, I use the indices of neoliberal reform developed by Samuel Morley, Roberto Machado, and Stefano Pettinato, later used by Peter Kingstone and Joseph Young, which include information on the degree and type of neoliberal policies implemented. Aside from the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender inequality, this analysis accounts for potential alternative explanations that affect the outcome. These potential alternative explanations include the level of economic development, level of democracy, religiosity, and female educational attainment. The variables that account for the potential alternative explanations are the gross domestic product, polity, religion, and education. For the control variables, I gather data on the following variables: religion from the World Religion Project: National Religion Dataset, education from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, polity from the Polity Project at The Center for Systemic Peace, and Peter Kingstone and Joseph Young’s replication dataset, and GDP per capita from the World Bank.

Using these variables, I conduct a multivariate regression analysis to see whether women are affected positively or negatively by structural adjustment policies in the Latin American region. I had several models from my regression analysis, from which I identified the most complete one and focused on the results of this model to generate conclusions from the
quantitative stage. I then use the diagnostics of this model to help guide case selection for the qualitative stage.

I use Lieberman’s nested analysis approach (Lieberman, 2005) to guide the overall research design and Seawright and Gerring’s case selection techniques (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) to identify typical and deviant case studies to use for the qualitative portion of the paper. Therefore, I selected two case studies (typical and deviant) from my regression model to conduct online archival research using newspapers to better understand the underlying causal mechanism for the well-predicted case and identify potential alternative explanations for the poorly predicted case. This enables me to trace the causal process for the typical case and pay closer attention to violence in my deviant case, which is an existing alternative explanation not included in my original model. The qualitative analysis helps me see what is taking place on the ground to create the results observed from the model. Furthermore, the information from the newspapers allows me to check or triangulate the regression model results to see if they are consistent with each other to confirm or disconfirm aspects of the two theories. I contribute to the literature on neoliberalism and democracy by shedding light on the relationship between structural adjustment policies and gender equality.

**Significance**

The results of my study serve several purposes. The ongoing debate between neoliberal and feminist theories in the literature stems from the use of different indicators of gender inequality. Therefore, I feel that combining the various measures of gender inequality from both sides enables me to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between
neoliberalism and gender equality. Second, Latin American countries are plagued by the persistent and widespread problem of inequality. Therefore, comprehending how neoliberal policies help or hinder inequality in the region is significant to improving this problem. Third, equality is directly linked to economic development. Therefore, knowing how neoliberal policies pose a barrier to gender equality enables countries’ economic growth and advancement. Fourth, when women cannot participate in politics due to perpetual inequality due to neoliberal policies, it prevents the innovation of new and better policies that could benefit everyone. Fifth, poverty affects women at a higher rate than their male counterparts. Therefore, considering whether neoliberal policies help or worsen female poverty is the key to improving their living conditions. Sixth, women are essential for maintaining a healthy family. Therefore, seeing how neoliberal policies affect female poverty is crucial for reducing child poverty.

First, conducting my research on structural adjustment policies and gender equality clarifies the current theoretical debate in the literature. Neoliberals emphasize that women are better off, while feminist theorists assert that women are worse off with the adoption of structural adjustment policies (Eastin and Prakash, 2013; IMF, 1999, Barritteau, 1996). The neoliberals utilize indicators of employment, income, and unemployment to show that women are better off, whereas the feminists use measures of types of employment, the number of hours work, and income to indicate that women are worse off under structural adjustment policies (Sadasivam, 1997; Sparr, 1994). Therefore, the two sides use different measures to support their perspective, contributing to the continual debate in the literature. This project helps mitigate the debate between the neoliberals and feminists by combining the indicators from both sides to better understand how women are faring with the adoption of structural adjustment policies.
Second, conducting my research on structural adjustment policies and gender equality allows me to examine the broader relationship between economic policy and equality in the Latin American region. Over the last century, Latin America has experienced significant transformations in economic policy, and the advent of neoliberalism is pronounced in the region. There has been much debate about neoliberalism in Latin America, so evaluating the impact and implications of these policies remains important (Holzner, 2007; Stokes, 2001; Weyland, 1996; Weyland, 2002). It enables me to understand how economic policies affect equality in the region. Furthermore, we can better understand if these policies contribute to further equality or inequality, especially among vulnerable groups, such as women. This enables policymakers to further research which policies aid with or contribute to equality or equity in their societies in general. Therefore, this research will help to inform policy decisions that can aid with equality in society.

Third, equality is directly related to economic development. Therefore, if women are at an economic disadvantage due to certain types of economic policies, they cannot contribute to their household and the economic development of their country (Lee, 2013). According to the World Bank, “Gender inequality retards economic growth and poverty reduction…there is growing evidence that several aspects of gender relations: gender-based division of labor, disparities between males and females in power and resources, gender biases in rights and entitlements act to undermine economic growth and reduce the wellbeing of men, women, and children” (World Bank, 2002, 23-24). Therefore, ensuring that women receive equal pay and employment opportunities with the adoption of structural adjustment policies would contribute to the country’s economic advancement (Lee, 2013).
Fourth, inequality is directly related to politics. If women are poor, they are unable to become full participants in their country’s political process. According to UN Women, “There is established and growing evidence that women’s leadership in political decision-making processes improves them. Women demonstrate political leadership by working across party lines through parliamentary women’s caucuses, even in the most politically combative environments, and by championing issues of gender inequality, such as the elimination of gender-based violence, paternal leave and childcare, pensions, gender equality laws, and electoral reform” (UN Women, 2019, 1). Therefore, if women are at an economic disadvantage due to structural adjustment policies, they cannot participate and contribute to necessary changes in the political system. This would contribute to the perpetuation of discrimination, inequality, and poverty in society.

Fifth, scholars suggest that economic policies impact women differently than men because poverty affects women and men differently. Therefore, we need to understand the gender effects of structural adjustment policies. Women are more predisposed to experiencing poverty than their male counterparts due to discrimination in the labor market. According to the World Bank, “Gender relations affect all aspects of poverty, including income, opportunity, security, and empowerment…rigidities in the labor market; discriminatory practices; lack of access to land, credit, and other productive resources; and the heavy time burden of poor women all lower their economic opportunities compared to men’s opportunities” (UN Women, 2019, 7). Therefore, if women are already at a poverty disadvantage due to discriminatory practices in the labor market, we need to understand how these policies may aid or exacerbate women’s conditions contributing to increase poverty rates.
Sixth, women are often the heads of households in Latin America and the Caribbean region. Therefore, if women are poor, they cannot help their children become healthy and productive citizens (Lee, 2013). The United Nations state, “Lone mothers with children represent three-quarters of all one-parent households and women’s vulnerability in this type of living arrangement has important implications for children’s well-being: In 17 out of 27 developed countries with data, poverty rates are more than three times higher for children in lone-mother households than in two-parent families” (UN, 2015, 1). Therefore, poverty among female-head households is linked to child poverty. This means that if women are worse off with the adoption of structural adjustment policies, so are the children. As a result, women are important for maintaining a healthy and sustainable family structure (Lee, 2013).

**Dissertation Outline**

I use the following outline for the rest of my dissertation. In Chapter 2, I discuss the two major theoretical frameworks, the neoliberal and feminist theories, and the working hypotheses derived from the theories. Neoliberal and feminist theorists have competing theories on whether structural adjustment policies affect women negatively or positively. Neoliberal theorists explain that structural adjustment policies are gender-neutral but have practical, de facto benefits for women. In contrast, feminist theorists contend that structural adjustment policies are formally gender-neutral, but they are implicitly and inescapably gender. Based on these two theories, I develop the working hypotheses stemming from each theoretical perspective to test.

Chapter 3 presents the data collection and methodology for this project. I first explain the data collection process, which includes the data or variables collected, time frames, country identifiers, and data sources. Then, I discuss my application of the mixed-methods approach
based on Lieberman’s nested analysis approach, a unified approach that joins statistical analysis with case study analysis. Specifically, I use a large-N statistical analysis to help guide my case study selection for a small-N qualitative case study analysis. In Chapter 4, I discuss the findings from my large-N statistical analysis. I utilize several multiple regression models to analyze the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality. Based on the results from these models, I use Seawright and Gerring’s case selection techniques to choose cases for my qualitative study. In Chapter 5, I conduct the qualitative case study using the model testing approach for the time period 1975 to 2003 to see what the relationship is between neoliberalism and gender equality and present my findings. In Chapter 6, I perform a second qualitative case study using a model-building approach for the time period 1975 to 2003 to see what the relationship is between neoliberalism and gender equality and present my findings. In the final chapter, I conclude by summarizing my findings. In addition, I explain the limitations of my study along with the possibilities for future research. In the appendix, I explain the process for qualitative case selection. Specifically, I describe the charts and graphs or diagnostics I use to choose my case studies.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Frameworks and Working Hypotheses

This chapter consists of the two competing and, at times, complementary theoretical perspectives that explain the status of women under neoliberal reform, known as the neoliberal and feminist theories. I also discuss the working hypotheses I develop from each of the two theories. The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the general theory about the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality. Second, I explain the expectations regarding the relationship between the individual policies and individual outcomes, with attention to empirical implications and analytical weight.

Implications

Stephen Van Evera’s article on strong vs. weak tests discusses testing a given theory based on its predictions (Van Evera, 1997). The author emphasizes that when testing a theory, not all evidence is equal. In other words, evidence is categorized into several different groups, which include straw in the wind, doubly decisive, hoop, and smoking gun test (Van Evera, 1997). Therefore, the researcher must distinguish between the evidence collected to test the given theory and properly eliminate rival explanations. Van Evera highlight that certain types of evidence are necessary or sufficient based on the theoretical propositions that we collect that could invalidate the primary theory or rival hypotheses (Van Evera, 1997). Following Van Evera’s perspective, I develop empirical implications and discuss the analytical weight assigned to each prediction based on how unique and certain each of the empirical implications is to the neoliberal and feminist theoretical arguments.
General Reform

Neoliberal Perspective on General Reform

The neoliberal perspective asserts that structural adjustment policies are gender-neutral because they do not target women but improve the economy. Structural adjustment policies are a set of policy reforms that include trade reform, capital reform, tax reform, financial reform, and privatization developing countries must implement to secure a loan from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Williamson, 2009; Weaver, 1995; Harvey, 2005; Murillo, 2000; Roberts, 2014; Peck, 2010). Neoliberals mention that structural adjustment policies focus on economic performance and debt reduction, where neither men nor women are the focus (Krueger et al., 2003; Friedman, 1951; Hayek, 1944; Weyland, 2002). Friedman highlight that, “Neoliberalism…would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves” (Friedman, 1951, 3). Therefore, structural adjustment policies or neoliberalism are not gender-focused and deal with abstract suppliers and consumers of resources and other economic concepts such as gross domestic product and balance of trade (Sadasivam, 1997). In other words, neoliberals explain that the macro-economic policies set forth through structural adjustment policies are focused on economic growth and not gender (Mudge, 2018).

Neoliberals maintain that the indirect consequence of economic growth from structural adjustment policies benefits everyone, including women (Hayek, 1944; Friedman, 1951). They explain that structural adjustment policies contribute to businesses’ economic growth (Mudge, 2018); this growth is assumed to benefit social groups such as women who make up the poor
population. According to the International Monetary Fund, “Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility supported policies raise output growth, and output growth usually benefits the poor” (IMF, 1999, 5). The higher levels of economic growth are anticipated to expand employment opportunities for both men and women, specifically women who are not adequately integrated into the labor force (UN, 2010).

Neoliberals explain that growth from structural adjustment policies is assumed to benefit everyone in the manufacturing industry, including women (Weaver, 2016). The World Bank points out that women often hold mostly semi-skill employment, while men comprise the most skill and management positions (The World Bank, 1992). Therefore, the manufacturing employment created in the export processing zones requires primarily unskilled labor, which means that women especially benefit from these policies. This means that previously unemployed women, due to a lack of skill, now have an opportunity to make an income.

The gains from structural adjustment policies are expected to secondarily lead to increase employment and income opportunities for everyone, including women (Weaver, 2016; Friedman, 1962). Therefore, these increases in economic opportunities contribute to decrease gender inequality in the labor market. In other words, neoliberals assert that under structural adjustment policies, gender inequality decline because women have more opportunities to become integrated into the labor market (Friedman, 1962). Furthermore, if more women are hired due to structural adjustment policies, they are more likely to increase absolute income.

**Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective**

**Hypothesis 1:** Structural adjustment policies increase female employment overall

**Hypothesis 2:** Structural adjustment policies increase female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Structural adjustment policies decrease gender inequality between men and women

If neoliberals are correct, we should expect to see female employment increase with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This empirical implication is the weakest test for the neoliberal argument because neoliberals do not necessarily focus on improving female employment overall. In other words, they emphasize that we will directly see economic growth and indirectly an increase in female employment overall. It is not certain that we would observe an increase in female employment overall. Besides, various explanations contribute to female employment overall.

We also expect to observe an increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry by adopting structural adjustment policies. This empirical implication is the weakest test or evidence for the neoliberal perspective because it is not a factor that is necessary or unique to the theory. Neoliberal theorists do not confidently state that we would observe an increase in female manufacturing employment. This implies that there is no near-certain expectation that we would see evidence supporting this argument in my analysis. I also note that this proposition is also not unique to the neoliberal perspective because competing explanations account for the outcome of interest.

Neoliberals contend that we will also see a decline in the gender inequality index with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This prediction is also the easiest test for the neoliberal theory because it is not necessary or unique to this perspective. Gender inequality is not tied to the neoliberal perspective directly, but only indirectly; therefore, we should not expect to see it. Also, gender inequality is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because other factors contribute to this outcome.
Neoliberals contend that we will also observe a decline in the rate of female unemployment overall. This prediction is the easiest test for the neoliberal theory because it is not necessary or unique to the perspective. Neoliberals explain that the reduction in the female unemployment rate indirectly occurs due to increased economic growth, but there is no guarantee. A decline in female unemployment is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because other factors account for this outcome.

Neoliberals suggest that women’s absolute income will increase in the manufacturing industry and overall because it is an expanding industry. This prediction is considered the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is not something the neoliberals state that we must observe. This prediction is also not unique because many factors contribute to a decline in female unemployment.

Neoliberals also suggest that we will see an increase in female consumption and poverty reduction. In addition, we also see a decline in childbirth rates and female and child mortality rates. We should also observe an increase in female property ownership and savings. These propositions are all weak tests for the neoliberal perspective because they are neither unique nor certain. Numerous factors account for these outcomes, aside from what is indirectly proposed by the neoliberal theory.

In sum, if we observe an increase in female employment and income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, property ownership, savings, and a decline in female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, female mortality, child mortality, birth rates, and poverty among women when structural adjustment policies are present, this will support the neoliberal perspective that women are better off.
If the neoliberals are incorrect, we should find that the number of women employed in this specific industry and overall decreases after neoliberal policies are implemented. We should also expect to see an increase in gender inequality. Female unemployment should be on a gradual rise since the implementation of structural adjustment policies. We should expect to see women’s income overall and in the manufacturing industry decrease. We should expect to observe a decrease in female consumption and increased poverty. We should also see increased childbirth rates as well as female and child mortality rates. We should also see a reduction in female property ownership and savings. In sum, if we observe female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, property ownership on the decline when structural adjustment policies are present, and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, female poverty, female and child mortality all increase during this time, this undercuts the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on General Reform**

Alternatively, feminist theorists maintain that structural adjustment policies are not gender-neutral and negatively affect female employment in the labor market. Bharati Sadasivam, a regional gender advisor at the United Nations Development Programme states, “Some features of orthodox reform packages, such as the shrinking of public enterprises, state sectors, and traditional industries that employ large numbers of women, affect wage earners directly” (Sadasivam, 1997, 637). Therefore, structural adjustment policies through the shrinking of the state sector reduce overall female employment. Feminist theorists emphasize that the persistence of gender inequality in terms of overall employment in the labor market contributes to less
economic growth (Kabeer and Natali, 2013). More equality in employment in the labor market contribute to a more equal, happier, and productive society, which leads to more economic growth. Therefore, feminist theorists stress that gender equality is the main factor that leads to economic growth, not the reverse.

Feminist theorists contend that structural adjustment policies increase female employment in the manufacturing sector and reduce overall female income, which contributes to further gender inequality. Joshua Eastin and Aseem Prakash, Professors at Portland State University and the University of Washington, Seattle who wrote the article, “Economic Development and Gender Equality: Is there a Gender Kuznets Curve?” which explains that the relationship between economic development and gender inequality is curvilinear with three separate phases state, “Feminist scholars suggest that contemporary development strategies can strengthen patriarchal institutions, expose women to exploitative production practices, and force them into low paying jobs – all of which undermine gender equality” (Eastin and Prakash, 2013, 156). Therefore, feminists highlight that even though structural adjustment creates more employment for women in the manufacturing sector, they are paid low wages. Guy Standing, a British professor of development studies at the University of London who explained that market-oriented policies globally from the 1970s led to a rise in the female labor force participation rate and a decline in male employment, adds that “This has boosted additional worker effects – pushing more women into the labor market in recessions and inducing more women to remain in the labor market because of the growth of income insecurity” (Standing, 1999, 584). Therefore, the low wages they receive in the manufacturing industry cause them to work longer hours to make up for the loss of household income.
Feminist theorists express that structural adjustment policies lead to an increase in gender inequality. They emphasize that women’s low wages in the manufacturing industry cause them to be at a more significant disadvantage (Standing, 1999). Feminist theorists also point out that women’s income insecurity causes them to be more prone to poverty than their male counterparts (Campbell, 2010). Therefore, the cuts in public services women rely on cause their incomes to be stretched even further. As a result, women often must choose between paying for the previously provided services or buying food for the household.

*Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective*

Hypothesis 1: Structural adjustment policies decrease female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Structural adjustment policies increase female employment in the manufacturing industry

Hypothesis 3: Structural adjustment policies increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see an increase in the gender inequality index with structural adjustment policies. The gender inequality index combines three major areas of human development: health, empowerment, and the labor market (UNDP, 2020). Specifically, the gender inequality index focuses on reproductive health (maternal mortality and adolescent birth rates), empowerment (parliamentary seats and educational attainment between men and women), and economic status (labor force participation rate between men and women) (UNDP, 2020). The rise in the gender inequality index classifies as a medium test for feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. Therefore, we strongly expect to see evidence supporting this argument in the analysis because this is emphasized by the feminist theory. Despite this evidence, it may also be consistent with several arguments that lead to the predicted outcome.
Feminist theorists explain that structural adjustment policies lead to a decline in overall female employment. This empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. The feminist perspective focuses on the gender implications of structural adjustment policies on women, which means that different measures of gender inequality are aspects they are focused on. This means that we have strong expectations to see evidence of declining female employment overall. Despite this high certainty, the predicted outcome may also be consistent with several other explanations, which contribute to the low uniqueness of the feminist theory.

Feminist theorists explain that structural adjustment policies lead to an increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector. This empirical implication is also considered a medium test for the feminist perspective because it is necessary but not unique to the theory. The predicted outcome flows from the feminist explanation regarding gender inequality and structural adjustment policies, which means we should strongly expect to see this evidence. However, the predicted outcome is not unique because several explanations account for a decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector.

Feminist theorists explain that we should also observe the female unemployment rate in the labor force increase by adopting these policies. This empirical implication is another medium test for feminist theorists because they are concerned with gender equality, which means that it is necessary to see this evidence of an increase in the female unemployment rate. However, various arguments are present as to why we saw this outcome aside from structural adjustment policies.

Feminist theorists explain that we should see women’s absolute income decreased in the manufacturing industry and overall. This proposition is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because this is one aspect of gender inequality that feminists focus on, so we should
strongly expect to see this evidence. However, many explanations attribute or account for the rise in female absolute income.

Feminist theorists maintain that we should expect to see a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. These predictions are considered a medium test for the feminist perspective because they all have to do with gender equality but are not unique to their theory. In addition, these factors or outcomes are not exclusive to the feminist theory, which means that other explanations account for these outcomes.

In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall, female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when structural adjustment policies are present. This would support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.

If the feminists are incorrect, we should see increased levels of female employment rate with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. We should also see the female unemployment rate decrease. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should decrease. We should see the absolute income of women increase in the manufacturing industry and overall. Feminist theorists maintain that gender inequality contributes to less macroeconomic growth. Therefore, we should expect to see an increase in the country’s or expect higher growth than other non-neoliberal economies by implementing structural adjustment policies. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decrease. In addition, we should also see reduced female and child mortality rates. We should also see an increase in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, economic growth, consumption, female ownership, and investments increasing and female
employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all decline (lower levels than would otherwise occur) with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This undercuts the feminist argument that women are worse off.

Hypotheses Related to Specific Policies

In the previous section, I discuss the broad perspectives of the neoliberal and feminist positions. This section shifts to discussing the five individual policies that made up neoliberalism and their anticipated effects on gender equality. The outline of the rest of the chapter is as follows. I discuss the neoliberal and feminist perspectives for each of the five individual policy areas: trade liberalization, privatization, financial liberalization, tax liberalization, and capital liberalization, as well as their potential effects on gender equality. I highlight the working hypotheses for each perspective within the policy areas. I also outline the observable implications for each perspective within the policy area.

Trade Liberalization

Neoliberal Perspective on Trade Liberalization

Neoliberals affirm that trade liberalization policies are gender-neutral with a methodological individualism that does not distinguish between men and women. Trade liberalization removes or reduces tariff protections on goods and industries between nations (Roberts, 2014; Weyland, 2002; Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003; Beker, 2012). Neoliberals mention that trade liberalization policies aim to use all resources efficiently to maximize economic output (Friedman, 1962; Stedman Jones, 2012; Sadasivam, 1997). Neoliberals explain
that trade liberalization contributes to economic growth by removing trade restrictions, which will shift resources from import substitutes to the production of export-orient goods (Friedman, 1962; Stedman Jones, 2012; Harvey, 2005). Therefore, removing tariff barriers on import goods through trade liberalization enable the industry to become more competitive against foreign companies (Weyland, 2002). This competitiveness or comparative advantage allows the country to increase its economic growth.

Neoliberals express that economic growth due to trade liberalization increases the female employment rate (IMF, 2001; Weyland, 2002). The International Monetary Fund state that trade liberalization is necessary to sustain economic growth, leading to increase living standards for women. They explain, “Policies that make an economy open to trade and investment with the rest of the world are needed for sustained economic growth. The evidence on this was clear. No country in recent decades has achieved economic success, in terms of substantial increase in living standards for its people, without being open to the rest of the world” (IMF, 2001, 2). Trade liberalization increases the country’s macroeconomic growth, indirectly leading to more employment creation to benefit women.

Neoliberals mention that trade liberalization indirectly enables businesses to create new employment in the manufacturing sector, which benefits everyone, including women (Weyland, 2002; Aguayo-Tellez, 2013). Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez, a professor of labor economics at the University of Nuevo Leon who finds that trade liberalization contributes to a rise in female income in the manufacturing industry, explains that these new jobs are created by acquiring more capital and technology, which made unskilled workers capable of gaining these new types of employment in manufacturing under trade liberalization (Aguayo-Tellez, 2013). Furthermore, the new technology gained under trade liberalization led to more women gaining employment
because it requires less manual labor allowing employers to consider women to fill these positions more.

Neoliberals argue that economic growth from trade liberalization is expected to reduce gender inequality (Friedman, 1962). By absorbing the previously unemployed female workers into the labor force, trade liberalization provides new income that these women did not have before. As a result, it reduces the gender disparity based on income between men and women because women now have an income that allows them to move closer to economic independence. Aguayo-Tellez notes, “The Heckscher-Olin model predicts that when different economies open to trade, unskilled wages should increase in less-skilled labor abundant economies but decrease in skilled labor abundant economies” (Aguayo-Tellez, 2013, 13). In other words, as women who were previously unemployed before trade liberalization began to be employed under these policies, their absolute income increased. The increased income for women decreased gender inequality in the labor market.

*Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective*

Hypothesis 1: Trade liberalization increase female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Trade liberalization policies increase female employment in the manufacturing industry

Hypothesis 3: Trade liberalization decrease gender inequality between men and women

If neoliberals are correct, we should observe an increase in the number of women employed overall. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is not necessary or unique. This means that increasing female employment overall is not a factor we must see since neoliberals are not focused on this aspect. They emphasize that the economic growth from trade liberalization may increase female employment overall, but there is no
guarantee of this occurring. In addition, the predicted outcome is not unique to this perspective, which means that other contributing factors exist.

Neoliberals contend that we should see an increase in female employment in manufacturing by adopting trade liberalization policies. This prediction is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective since it is neither necessary nor unique to the theory. Neoliberals are not emphasizing that we would definitely see a rise in female employment in manufacturing. Instead, they highlight that whatever improvement in female manufacturing employment we observe results from the economic growth from trade liberalization. The predicted outcome is also not unique to the neoliberal perspective because several explanations account for the rise in female employment in manufacturing.

Neoliberals assert that the economic growth from trade liberalization indirectly leads to a decline in the gender inequality index. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique to this theory. Therefore, this is not a primary prediction for neoliberals. In addition, the forecast of a decline in gender inequality is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because other known theories discuss this same outcome.

Neoliberals also contend that we should also observe a decline in the female unemployment rate overall with the adoption of trade liberalization policies. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because there is low certitude and uniqueness. Therefore, the prediction of a decline in female unemployment due to the adoption of trade liberalization policies is loosely connected to the neoliberal perspective. Consequently, it is not a factor that we expect to see. In addition, various factors lead to the decline of female unemployment overall.
Neoliberals expect that we should see the absolute income of women increase in the manufacturing industry and overall because it is an expanding industry. This is also a weak test for the neoliberal perspective because it is not necessary or unique. In addition, the predicted outcome is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because many factors account for this outcome.

Neoliberals also suggest that trade liberalization increases female consumption, property ownership, savings, and a decline in poverty, childbirth rate, and female and child mortality. These are the weakest tests for the neoliberal perspective because these are neither certain nor unique. This means that these propositions are loosely connected to the neoliberal perspective, which means we should not have near-certain expectations to see them in my analysis. These outcomes are also not exclusive to the neoliberal theory, which means that other explanations contribute to these outcomes.

In sum, if we observe female employment and income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, and property ownership on the rise and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, poverty, and child and female mortality on the decline when trade liberalization policies are present, this will support the neoliberal perspective that women are better off.

If the neoliberals are incorrect, we should definitely see that the number of women employed in this specific industry and overall decreases over time after trade liberalization policies are implemented. We should also expect to see an increase in gender inequality. Female unemployment should gradually rise since the implementation of trade liberalization policies. Women’s absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry should decrease. We should expect to observe reduced female consumption and increased poverty. We should also see
decreased childbirth rates as well as increased female and child mortality rates. We should also see an increase in female poverty and a decline in female ownership and savings. In sum, if we observe female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, property ownership on the decline when structural adjustment policies are present, and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, female poverty, female and child mortality all increase during this time, this will undercut the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on Trade Liberalization**

Feminist theorists convey that trade liberalization is not gender-neutral and leads to harmful effects on female employment and other outcomes, exacerbating gender inequality. Hildegunn Nordas, a professor at Orebro University in Sweden and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs who finds that women are more likely to be hired in export-oriented industries than import-competing industries, explains that women benefit from trade liberalization based on their concentrated sectors and the country’s abundant resources (Nordas, 2003). Therefore, if a country has women concentrated mainly in the import sectors, women will most likely lose their positions with the adoption of trade liberalization. Nordas also adds that, “there is a positive and statistically significant relation between exports and women’s share of employment while there is a statistically and negative correlation between women’s share in employment and imports” (Nordas, 2003, 230). Therefore, feminists highlight that where women are located in the labor market matters how trade liberalization affects their employment.

Feminist theorists state that trade liberalization leads to a decline in female manufacturing employment, contributing to further gender inequalities. Therefore, technological improvements
by employers under trade liberalization require more skilled and fewer unskilled workers. This causes women who represent a large majority of the unskilled workers to become unemployed. Gupta explains that firms or industries that experience increased foreign competition due to lowering tariff barriers engage in more skill upgrading, which works against women who are less skilled in measure education (Gupta, 2015). Purna Banerjee and C. Veeramani explain that, “While cost reduction and resource reallocation effects may imply an increase in female employment intensity, rapid inflow of foreign technology, via FDI and increased imports of capital goods, may create a bias in favor of male employment. This bias could arise because the new technology mainly designed in the skill abundant industrialized world, is skill-biased and exhibits capital-skill complementarities in production” (Banerjee and Veeramani, 2015, 5). Therefore, the influx of new technology and capital in developing countries leads to companies changing their labor force to more skilled labor, which causes women to be at a disadvantage.

Feminist theorists contend that trade liberalization negatively affects gender inequality due to the low wages that women receive. Women’s wages under trade liberalization are low due to employers’ or companies’ arrangements with the host governments to create jobs. Standing states, “Trade and investment have been directed increasingly to economies in which labor costs have been relatively low or where they have been expected to be relatively low, putting a premium on the level of wages, nonwage labor costs and labor productivity” (Standing, 1999, 584). Furthermore, women who took these employment opportunities created under trade liberalization usually made low income, increasing the gender wage gap. Feminists also highlight that women are at a disadvantage due to trade liberalization because they are not fully integrated into the labor market due to the low wages (Standing, 1999).
Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective

Hypothesis 1: Trade liberalization decrease female employment overall
Hypothesis 2: Trade liberalization decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Trade liberalization increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see a rise in gender inequality during this period. This is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. In other words, feminist theorists emphasize gender equality as their direct focus, so this factor is directly tied to their theoretical explanation. Therefore, we have high expectations of seeing this evidence in the analysis. However, gender inequality is not unique to the feminist perspective because other factors account for this outcome.

Neoliberals explain that we should observe a decline in overall female employment. This empirical implication is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. Since feminist theorists focus on gender equality, which their explanations emphasize, female employment overall is directly related to their argument, which means that we should have strong expectations of seeing this evidence in the analysis. Despite this idea, the predicted outcome is not unique to feminist theory. Other theoretical explanations account for the predicted outcome. For instance, female employment is affected by fertility rates (Engelhardt and Prskawet, 2004) and education (Buchmann, 1996).

Feminist theorists maintain that we should see a decrease in female manufacturing employment. This empirical implication is another medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. Since the feminist theory focuses on gender equality, we must also see evidence of female employment in the manufacturing industry if this theory is
valid. However, this evidence could be consistent with several other explanations that account for this outcome.

Feminist theorists also contend that we should also observe an increased rate of female unemployment overall. The higher layoffs in public and traditional sectors increase the female unemployment rate. Again, this empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it is directly related to their theoretical explanation. Therefore, we should have high expectations for seeing this evidence. However, various factors account for the predicted outcome.

Feminist theorists emphasize that we should see the absolute income of women decrease in the manufacturing industry and overall. This empirical implication is also considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. In other words, women’s absolute income is directly tied to their explanation of more gender equality, so we should have a strong expectation of seeing this evidence as well. However, the decrease in women’s absolute income could be caused by numerous factors outside trade liberalization.

Feminist theorists maintain that we should expect to see a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. Again, these empirical implications are considered medium tests for the feminist theory because they all have to do with gender equality, which is the theory’s primary focus. However, many of these outcomes have numerous causal factors outside of the proposed predictor.

In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall,
female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when trade liberalization policies are present. This would support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.

If the feminists are incorrect, we should observe an increase in the female employment rate with the adoption of trade liberalization policies. We should also see the female unemployment rate decrease. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should increase. The absolute income of women in the manufacturing industry and overall is expected to grow. Feminist theorists maintain that gender inequality contributes to less macroeconomic growth. Therefore, we should expect to see an increase in the country’s economic growth by implementing structural adjustment policies. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decline. In addition, we should also see a reduction in female and child mortality rates. We should also see an increase in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, consumption, female ownership and investments increasing and female employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all decline with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This will undercut the feminist argument that women are worse off.

**Privatization**

**Neoliberal Perspective on Privatization**

Neoliberals articulate that privatization has genderless implications and its primary goals are to promote economic efficiency and growth in developing countries (IMF, 2000; Mudge, 2018). Privatization is defined as the sale of public enterprises to private individuals (Weaver, 2016; Roberts, 2014; Peck, 2010; Weyland, 2002). The International Monetary Fund explains,
“The microeconomic evidence indicates that private firms are operationally more efficient than those held by the state, particularly in competitive industries. A strong correlation is also found for the case study countries between privatization and growth” (IMF, 2000, 1). This information suggests that private firms are more economically efficient than public enterprises. Therefore, the transfer of ownership from public to private leads to greater economic maximization, leading to improved economic performance at the macro-level (Mudge, 2018; Harvey, 2005; Roberts, 2014).

Neoliberals argue that improved economic performance from privatization is expected to secondarily benefit women in employment and other outcomes of interest. If the economy is strong, this growth will trickle down to the workers by companies creating more jobs and potentially increasing workers’ income (Harvey, 2005). The International Monetary Fund state, “At the same time, new ownership and management may lead to an expansion of activities. Hence, the workforce may actually increase over time” (IMF, 1999). Therefore, the growth from privatization leads to an expansion of new employment that benefits women. These jobs allow women to become integrated into the labor force by providing skilled and unskilled workers with employment opportunities. The International Monetary Fund adds, “In Chile, employment in the telecommunication and electricity companies increased by 10 percent, due to overall improvements in the economy and the companies’ new investments that accompanied privatization” (IMF, 1999, 5). Therefore, the improvements in the economy due to privatization indirectly lead to new employment growth.

Neoliberals assert that the indirect consequence of economic growth from privatization leads to increased female employment in the manufacturing sector (Harvey, 2005). They explain that privatization contributes to the closure of less efficient sectors such as public enterprises
where the government is involved and creates more employment in the private sector with the rise in economic growth (Harvey, 2005; Stedman Jones, 2012). In other words, privatization cause public sector employment to decline while employment in the manufacturing industry increase. This allows more women to be absorbed into the labor market because of the increased opportunities for women classified as unskilled labor. The International Monetary Fund suggests that privatization’s impact on employment is a U curve where the first period has job losses, but then employment increases again (IMF, 1999).

Neoliberals proclaim that the economic growth from privatization indirectly reduces gender inequality based on employment and income (Harvey, 2005; Friedman, 1962). The Bretton Woods Projects explain that the World Bank uses privatization to promote gender equality in the labor market. The institution state, “Privatization has been touted as a means of advancing gender equality in low- and middle-income countries, particularly by the World Bank. It argues that the private sector is more efficient in delivering services and that private investment is necessary because it frees up public money for other uses, enabling scarce state resources to be reserved for where there is no private sector interest to invest” (The Bretton Woods Project, 2019, 3). Therefore, the private sector is better at creating employment for women because it is more efficient and profit-driven, which means that women benefit economically as the private enterprise grows (Harvey, 2005; Weaver, 2016). This further reduces the gender gap in employment and income between men and women because private enterprises create more new employment opportunities that women can take advantage of.

**Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective**

Hypothesis 1: Privatization increase female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Privatization increase female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Privatization decrease gender inequality between men and women

If neoliberals are correct, we must expect to see a rise in the number of women employed overall with privatization policies. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique to the theory. Furthermore, if it is not at the forefront of their theory, it is not an aspect they said must occur every time privatization policies are implemented. In addition, the predicted outcome is not unique to the neoliberal perspective. Various factors account for this outcome.

Neoliberals assert that privatization policies contribute to an increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique to the theory. We cannot have a strong expectation to see the predicted outcome when privatization policies are adopted because it is not a focus of the neoliberal perspective. In addition, various factors or explanations account for the predicted outcome outside of the neoliberal perspective.

Neoliberals assert that privatization policies lead to a decline in the gender inequality index. This prediction is also the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because neoliberals do not guarantee that we would see a reduction in the outcome. They merely suggest that economic growth may affect other outcomes, but it is not certain. In addition, the predicted outcome could be caused by numerous factors aside from privatization policies.

Neoliberals contend that we should also observe a decline in the rate of female unemployment overall. This is related to the higher demand for female labor in the manufacturing industry and reduced female unemployment. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal argument because it is neither necessary nor unique. The neoliberals do not emphasize this factor as something that must be present when privatization policies are adopted.
In addition, the predicted outcome is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because other factors account for this result.

Women’s absolute income in the manufacturing industry and overall should rise because it is an expanding industry. This is also another weak test for the neoliberal perspective because the prediction is loosely tied to the neoliberal perspective, which means we could not have a strong expectation to see this evidence in the analysis. Also, the predicted outcome is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because many factors account for this result.

Neoliberals also explain that the economic growth from privatization increase female consumption, property ownership, savings and lead to a decline in childbirth rates, female poverty, and female and child mortality rates. Again, these are the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because they are neither necessary nor unique to the theory. This means that these factors are not decisive evidence for the theory to be correct and are not directly tied to the neoliberal explanations. In addition, these factors have many causes that are not exclusive to the neoliberal perspective. In sum, if we observe female employment and absolute income in the manufacturing and overall, female consumption, savings, property ownership on the rise and gender inequality, unemployment, poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality decline when structural adjustment policies are present, this will provide support for the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

If neoliberals are incorrect, we should definitely see the number of women employed in the manufacturing industry and overall decrease after implementing privatization policies. We should also see the female unemployment rate in the labor force increase. Female unemployment should be on a gradual rise since the implementation of privatization policies. We expect to observe women’s absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry fall. We should see
a decrease in female consumption, property ownership, and savings. We should also expect to observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. In sum, if we observe female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, property ownership, and savings on the decline when structural adjustment policies are present, and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, poverty, and female and child mortality all increase during this time, this will undercut the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on Privatization**

Alternatively, feminist theorists assert that privatization contributes to reducing female employment, which undermines gender equality. They argue that privatization reduces public expenditure, which causes governments to sell public enterprises where women are overly represented in terms of employment. As a result, the sale of these public enterprises causes women to get laid off and become unemployed (Murillo, 2000). Furthermore, the privatization of public enterprises causes the female unemployment rate to increase while the female employment rate in the public sector decline. Jane Stinson states that, “The privatization of public services has tremendous implications for women who account for the majority of public sector employees whose jobs are being privatized, especially in the health and social service sectors. Governments are keen to privatize almost any public services, claiming greater efficiency will be achieved through the private market” (Stinson, 2004, 18). Therefore, women are disadvantaged due to privatization because they account for most employees in this sector, which gets restructure.
Feminist theorists proclaim that privatization contributes to a decline in female manufacturing employment, which does not lead to gender equality. They explain that public enterprises are restructured into private enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which leads to a decline in female employment in this sector. Feminist theorists state that the manufacturing industry’s privatization has led to massive layoffs for men and women and a restructuring where fewer employees are rehired or employed due to the employer’s technology or taste (Azmat et al., 2011). Therefore, when the manufacturing enterprises get privatized, workers may often be replaced by the increased technological equipment, which causes the workforce to become limited.

Feminist theorists contend that privatization leads to more gender inequality. They mention that privatizing other state-owned industries left women to fend for themselves, leading to worsening workplace conditions (Prizzia, 2005). Ross Prizzia, a professor at the University at Hawaii, who examined the adverse effects of privatization on women workers, states, “It should be noted that market reforms driven by privatization increased disadvantaged status of women relative to men with regard to workplace conditions” (Prizzia, 2005, 57). In other words, privatization contributes to more employment with lower job security and pay to reduce costs. This leads to more worsened workplace conditions for women because they work longer hours to make up for the lower wages and fewer benefits, which means more job insecurity. Prizzia adds that, “…women disproportionately depend on the public sector for jobs that pay decent wages and offer benefits…higher wages and better access to health and pension benefits in the public sector can be attributed to higher rate of union coverage which is lost in privatization” (Prizzia, 2005, 59). Therefore, privatization leads to worse workplace conditions for women and reduced job security than their male counterparts.
Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective

Hypothesis 1: Privatization decrease female employment overall
Hypothesis 2: Privatization decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Privatization increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see a rise in gender inequality during this period. This is considered a medium test for the feminist perspective, with high certitude and low uniqueness. The feminist perspective focuses on gender equality in their theoretical explanation, so this evidence is directly related to their explanation. Therefore, we should expect to see this evidence in the analysis. However, the predicted outcome of gender inequality is not unique to the feminist perspective. Several explanations account for this outcome.

Feminists explain that we should observe a decline in overall female employment with the adoption of privatization policies. This empirical implication is a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. The feminist perspective focuses on gender equality, which means that the factors affiliated with this idea must be observed for the theory to be considered plausible. Furthermore, we should have high expectations of seeing evidence that female employment declines. Despite this, various factors contribute to a decline in female employment overall outside of privatization policies.

Feminist theorists also maintain that we should observe an increase in female manufacturing employment. This empirical implication is also a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. We should have a high expectation of seeing this evidence of a rise in female employment in manufacturing because it is closely
connected to the feminist explanation of gender equality. However, it is also not unique to the feminist perspective because other explanations can account for this outcome.

Feminist theorists contend that we should also observe an increase in the female unemployment rate overall. This prediction is also considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it is necessary and not unique. The increase in female unemployment directly connects to the feminist propositions of gender inequality, which means that this is evidence we should have high expectations of seeing if the theory is valid. However, various explanations are connected to the predicted outcome.

Feminist theorists indicate that we should observe the absolute income of women increase in the manufacturing industry and overall. This empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because there are high certainty and low uniqueness. The rise in the absolute income for women is directly connected to the feminist explanation for gender equality, which is evidence that we must expect to see in the analysis. However, the rise in women’s absolute income has many contributing causes outside of the privatization explanation.

Feminist theorists mention that we expect to see a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates with privatization policies. These are a medium test for the feminist perspective because it also has high certainty and low uniqueness. Since the feminist perspective highlight that we would observe gender inequality, the factors directly connected to this explanation should also be observed. This means that we should have high expectations of seeing these factors directly related to gender inequality that the feminist perspective focuses on. However, these empirical implications and outcomes are not unique to the theory, which means that other factors account for these results.
In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall, female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when privatization policies are present. This will support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.

If the feminists are incorrect, we should find an increase in the female employment rate and other outcomes when privatization policies are adopted. We should also see the female unemployment rate increase. Female unemployment should be on a gradual decrease since the implementation of privatization policies. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should increase. We should see the absolute income of women rise in the manufacturing industry and overall. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decrease. In addition, we should also see an increase in female and child mortality rates. We should also see an increase in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, consumption, female ownership and investments increasing and female employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all decline with the adoption of privatization policies. This will undercut the feminist argument that women are worse off.

Financial Liberalization

Neoliberal Perspective on Financial Liberalization

Neoliberals state that financial liberalization is gender-neutral, and the main goal is economic growth and expansion (Weyland, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Mudge, 2018). Financial
liberalization is the government’s level of control over the borrowing and lending rates (Morley et al., 1999; Williamson, 1993; Stedman Jones, 2012). However, Morley and his co-authors’ definition of financial liberalization also includes the level of government involvement over foreign investment, profit and interest repatriation, as well as external credits by national borrowers and capital outflows (Morley et al., 1999). The International Monetary Fund state, “…through financial liberalization developing countries can stimulate domestic savings and growth and reduce excessive dependence on foreign capital flows” (IMF, 1998, 2). Therefore, financial liberalization was adopted to improve domestic savings and stimulate economic growth (Weyland, 2002). Financial liberalization also allows firms to have more financial resources available for investment and economic growth (Bumann, 2013).

Neoliberals maintain that the economic growth from financial liberalization policies indirectly affects female employment and other outcomes of interest (Weyland, 2002). Stephanie Mudge, a professor at the University of California, Davis, who discussed how the leftist party adopted socialism, Keynesianism, and the third way in the United States, states that neoliberals’ explicit aim is to keep inflation low and profits high by using financial liberalization (Mudge, 2018). Therefore, financial liberalization provides firms with resources to invest and grow economically, circuitously creating more employment opportunities for women (Weyland, 2002).

Neoliberals indicate that the economic growth from financial liberalization secondarily contributes to increase female employment in the manufacturing industry. They mention that increased credit availability through financial liberalization enables the manufacturing sector to attain economic growth. Therefore, the availability of credit and economic growth in this sector raises employment demand. Women comprise the large majority of workers in the
manufacturing industry, which means that they will benefit from employment growth. The World Bank states that, “The overall conclusion is that shifting from administrative toward market-based allocation of credit has increased borrowing costs, particularly for smaller firms, but, at the same time, has benefitted firms by giving them widened access to finance” (The World Bank, 1994, 17). Therefore, giving firms or industries the finances they need to conduct their business allow them to create greater demand for their products and services, causing the industry to grow and develop more employment for everyone, including women.

Neoliberals mention that the economic growth from financial liberalization leads indirectly to a reduction in gender inequality (World Bank, 1991). They highlight that the economic growth from financial liberalization allows women to increase access to the financial sector, reducing the gender gap between men and women in this area. Also, increased access to the financial industry allows women to become entrepreneurs and employed. As a result, this reduces the entrepreneurial, employment, and income disparities between men and women (World Bank, 1991). The World Bank also adds that, “Regulated interest rates deter credit to poor people because rationed credit tends to go to those who are better off and knowing the system. Poor people, women, in particular, do not meet collateral requirements, and the valuables to which women may have access may be accepted as collateral by money lenders and pawnbrokers but not by formal institutions. Poor people’s low level of literacy and numeracy and their unfamiliarity with formal banking make it difficult for them to overcome the procedural barriers of taking out a formal loan” (The World Bank, 1991, X). Therefore, financial liberalization reduces the gender inequality between men and women concerning access to credit or capital.
Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective

Hypothesis 1: Financial liberalization increase female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Financial liberalization increase female employment in the manufacturing industry

Hypothesis 3: Financial liberalization decrease gender inequality between men and women

If the neoliberals are correct, we must expect to see an increase in female employment overall when financial liberalization policies are present. However, this is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. This means that there is no certainty that we would observe a rise in female employment overall. In addition, the predicted outcome is not unique to the neoliberal perspective. Many factors account for the increase in female employment overall that is not connected to financial liberalization policies.

We should also expect to see a rise in the number of women employed in the manufacturing industry when financial liberalization policies are present. This is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because this empirical implication is neither necessary nor unique. We should not have strong expectations of seeing because this is not directly tied to the neoliberal theory. In addition, female employment in manufacturing has many causes attributed to the predicted outcome the theory suggests.

We should expect to see a reduction in gender inequality when financial liberalization policies are present. This proposition is another weak test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. We should not have high expectations of seeing this evidence in the analysis. In addition, numerous factors lead to gender equality, aside from the proposed predictor.

Neoliberals also contend that we should also observe a decline in the rate of female unemployment overall. This is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither
necessary nor unique. Again, neoliberals are not concerned with gender equality, so it is not certain that we would see these results because that is not their focus. Also, the decline in female unemployment overall is connected with financial liberalization and various other explanations.

Since the manufacturing industry is expanding, neoliberals state that we should see the absolute income of women increase. This is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor certain. We should not have a strong expectation to see this specific evidence in our analysis since it is not directly part of the neoliberal perspective. In addition, the predicted outcome of a rise in female absolute income could be the result of numerous factors or explanations.

Neoliberals indicate that financial liberalization policies increase female consumption, property ownership, savings and lead to a decline in female poverty, childbirth rate, female and child mortality rates. These are also weak tests for the neoliberal theory because these are not decisive factors to prove the neoliberal perspective and are not unique to the theory. We should have low expectations of seeing them and confirm the neoliberal perspective. In other words, these are not one of the primary criteria that the neoliberal perspective lays out. In addition, these factors are not exclusive to this perspective because many other explanations account for this outcome.

In sum, if we found female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, property ownership, and savings on the rise when structural adjustment policies are present, and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, poverty, and female and child mortality all declined during this time, this will support the neoliberal argument that women are better off.
If the neoliberals are incorrect, we should see a decrease in female employment overall and in the manufacturing industry when financial liberalization policies are present. We should also see the female unemployment rate in the labor force increase. Women’s absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry should be on the decline. We should find decreased female consumption, property ownership, and savings. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality. In sum, if we observe macroeconomic growth, female employment, and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, property ownership decline when financial liberalization policies are present, and female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, female poverty, female and child mortality all increase during this time, this will undercut the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on Financial Liberalization**

In contrast, feminist theorists explain that financial liberalization reduces the female employment rate, undermining gender equality. Financial liberalization causes employment mainly export-orient or connected to the international market to become vulnerable to financial crises contributing to greater unemployment among women. Folor and Schaefer state that, “the inability of the Philippine macroeconomy to provide adequate employment opportunities and skills development, combined with occupational segregation, has led to the concentration of female nonagricultural labor in jobs in the sales and community, social and personal service sectors” (Lim, 2000; Folor and Schaefer, 1998). Furthermore, women are highly concentrated in the most vulnerable sectors to financial crises, leading to high unemployment among women (Lim 2000; Hoeven and Lubker, 2006).
Feminist theorists emphasize that financial liberalization causes female employment in the manufacturing industry to decline, which undermines gender equality. If the manufacturing industry does not have access to the necessary financial credit it needs to conduct business, then the employment in this sector will begin to contract. Joseph Lim, a professor at the University of the Philippines who explained the effect of the East Asian Crisis on male and female employment in the Philippines explains that, “Financial liberalization consisted of lifting of interest rate ceilings, and removal of most credit subsidies and rediscount windows from the Central Bank, except for a few windows used for lending to agricultural and export industries” (Lim, 2000). Therefore, financial liberalization allows specific industries such as the manufacturing industry to borrow loans to sustain businesses to expand and profit. As a result, financial liberalization will enable women in the manufacturing industry to keep their employment as long as these sectors have access to credit to maintain their businesses. However, economic crises caused by financial liberalization cause industries to access limited amounts of money (Lim, 2000). Overlending and overborrowing under financial liberalization contribute to currency depreciation and the deterioration of the bank loan portfolio, causing a financial crisis (Lim, 2000). This leads many industries, such as the manufacturing industry, to contract due to their lack of access to the financial sector’s funds during the crisis. Therefore, many companies in the manufacturing industry began to reduce their workforce to maintain their business and profits.

Feminist theorists contend that financial liberalization contributes to an increase in gender inequality. The adverse effects of financial liberalization left many women in particular vulnerable and at a disadvantage. Specifically, when women are concentrated in the economy’s tradeable sectors, they are more prone to job loss when an international financial crisis occurs.
(Seguino et al., 2009). Therefore, financial liberalization leads to many women becoming unemployed due to their concentration in specific sectors such as the manufacturing industry, which is dependent on demand from other countries. As a result, when those foreign countries experience a financial crisis, it affects their product demand with the manufacturing industry. Therefore, the gender disparity in employment between men and women increases because women become more susceptible and lose their jobs due to the financial crisis that occurs with financial liberalization. The loss of employment is also directly or indirectly related to other gender inequality areas such as health, education, mortality, and so on. These are all captured in the gender inequality index.

*Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective*

Hypothesis 1: Financial liberalization decrease female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Financial liberalization decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry

Hypothesis 3: Financial liberalization increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see a rise in gender inequality during this period. This is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. This means that we must observe the evidence of gender inequality if the theory is valid. However, gender inequality is caused by numerous factors outside of the theoretical perspective, which make it not unique.

Feminist theorists explain that we should observe a decline in overall female employment with the adoption of financial liberalization policies. This empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. The decline in overall female employment is directly connected to the feminist explanation about
gender inequality or gender equality, which means we should have high expectations of seeing this evidence supporting their argument in my analysis. However, the evidence of a decline in female employment overall could be consistent with several other arguments.

We should also expect to see that the number of women employed in the manufacturing sector decline when these policies are present. This empirical implication is also considered a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. If the feminist argument regarding gender inequality is correct, I should have high expectations of seeing evidence of a decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector due to financial liberalization. However, the evidence of the decline in female employment in manufacturing is also consistent with several arguments.

We should expect to see fewer women employed overall. This proposition is also a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. Again, this indicator is directly connected to the feminist argument on gender inequality. Therefore, we should see evidence of this indicator supporting the feminist argument. However, as mentioned previously, there are many contributing causes to a rise in the female unemployment rate.

Feminist theorists suggest that we should see the absolute income of women decrease in the manufacturing industry and overall. This prediction is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it directly connects to the feminist argument on gender inequality. Therefore, we should have strong expectations to see this evidence in support of the feminist perspective. However, many factors contribute to a decline in female absolute income, aside from financial liberalization.
Feminist theorists mention that financial liberalization leads to a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. These empirical implications are a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. These indicators are all aspects of gender equality, which is what the feminist argument directly focuses on. Therefore, if the feminist argument is correct, we must see this evidence supporting the feminist argument. However, these factors may have many causes outside of the theory of financial liberalization and gender inequality.

In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall, female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when financial liberalization policies are present. This would support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.

If the feminists are incorrect, we should find that the female employment rate and other outcomes increase when financial liberalization policies are present. We should also see the female unemployment rate decrease. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should be on the increase. We should see the absolute income of women increase in the manufacturing industry and overall. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decrease. In addition, we should also see a decrease in female and child mortality rates. We should also see an increase in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, consumption, female ownership and investments increasing and female employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all
decline with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This will undercut the feminist argument that women are worse off.

**Tax Liberalization**

**Neoliberal Perspective on Tax Liberalization**

Neoliberal advocates stress that tax liberalization is gender-neutral, and its primary goals are economic growth and expansion (Prasad, 2006; Stedman Jones, 2012; Weyland, 2002). Tax liberalization is the broadening and efficiency of the tax system that focuses on value-add taxes instead of income and corporate taxes (Morley et al., 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009; Focanti et al., 2013; Weaver, 2016). Neoliberals explain that government intervention and high levels of taxation negatively affect the country’s economic performance (Prasad, 2006; Tanzi, 2006). As a result, adopting low taxation allows businesses to prosper economically, which leads to economic growth and expansion (Sanchez, 2006; Prasad, 2006; Weyland, 2002).

Neoliberals claim that tax liberalization’s economic growth contributes indirectly to an increase in the female employment rate and other outcomes. They explain that a lower tax rate allows businesses to progress economically, create more employment, and enable people to pay their taxes (Weaver, 2016; Prasad, 2006). Omar Sanchez, a professor at Iowa State University known for his work on how the international pressures from the International Monetary Fund led to tax reforms in Latin America, states, “It held that high marginal rates and high levels of taxation distorted rational economic decision-making and were thus damaging to economic growth…The supply-siders maintained that fiscal revenue lost via a lower overall tax level would be more than offset by the added revenue obtained from the higher economic growth stimulated by that lower tax level” (Sanchez, 2006, 782). Therefore, neoliberals explain that
governments lower taxes to allow businesses to grow economically and contribute to the country’s economic growth. This economic growth help to substitute for the lost revenue in terms of implementing higher taxes. In addition, as businesses expand, they are more likely to create more employment that benefits women.

Neoliberals contend that the economic growth from tax liberalization indirectly leads to increased female employment in the manufacturing industry. Sanchez adds that, “Tax cuts were self-financing because they would change the economic behavior of households and businesses in favor of work, savings and productive investment” (Sanchez, 2006, 782). Therefore, tax liberalization on businesses in manufacturing allows employers to change their behavior to create more employment due to the lower levels of taxes and the potential for economic growth (Weaver, 2016). Furthermore, women benefit significantly from tax liberalization in the manufacturing industry because it allows companies to keep their costs low and profits high, enabling them to grow economically and expand to create more jobs.

Neoliberals affirm that the economic growth from tax liberalization circuitously reduces gender inequality between men and women. They claim that women are indirectly afforded new employment opportunities and income due to the economic growth from tax liberalization (Weaver, 2016). As a result, this allows for the gender gap in the labor market and elsewhere to decline because tax liberalization allows more women to be integrated into the labor force. Sanchez states, “If vertical equity was not enhanced, horizontal equity was also compromised by the pervasiveness of tax incentives. Tax systems were abusively used to discriminate in favor of certain economic sectors (for example, industry vs. agriculture), certain firms, as well as to help domestic producers over foreign ones. Particular sectors and individuals were granted special rates and exceptions by virtue of their political clout with authorities, compromising the goal of
horizontal equity” (Sanchez, 2006, 774). Therefore, the lack of tax liberalization contributes to further inequality because individuals avoid paying their taxes, and other individuals are given preferential treatment. The adoption of tax liberalization where taxation is lower and the value-add tax system replaces domestic taxes leads to fewer tax evasions and more incentives for businesses to expand and create more employment for women.

*Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective*

Hypothesis 1: Tax liberalization increase female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Tax liberalization increase female employment in the manufacturing industry

Hypothesis 3: Tax liberalization decrease gender inequality between men and women

If neoliberals are correct, we should observe a rise in the number of women employed overall when tax liberalization policies are present. This is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. This indicates that neoliberals assume that economic growth might increase female employment overall, but it is not certain. In addition, this empirical implication is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because various other explanations account for a rise in female employment overall.

We should expect to see an increase in the number of women working in the manufacturing industry when tax liberalization policies are present. This empirical implication is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. Therefore, we should not have high expectations of seeing this evidence in my analysis. In addition, this prediction is not unique to the neoliberal perspective because other alternative explanations account for it.

We should observe a reduction in gender inequality when tax liberalization policies are present. This is another weak test for the neoliberal perspective because this is not a factor that
the neoliberals emphasize that we must observe to confirm their theory. In addition, it is not unique to the neoliberal perspective. Various alternative explanations account for the decline in gender inequality, even when tax liberalization policies are present.

Neoliberals also contend that we should also observe a decline in the rate of female unemployment overall. This empirical implication is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. The female unemployment rate is loosely connected to the neoliberal explanation, so it is not certain that we will observe this outcome. In addition, numerous factors contribute to a decline in female unemployment, aside from the predictor.

The neoliberals note that the expansion of the manufacturing sector should contribute to a rise in the absolute income of women in the manufacturing industry and overall. This is another weak test for the neoliberal perspective because they do not promise a rise in women’s absolute income. In addition, the predicted outcome is caused by numerous alternative factors outside of tax liberalization policies.

Neoliberals also explain that the economic growth from tax liberalization policies increases female consumption, property ownership, savings and leads to a decline in female poverty, childbirth rate, female and child mortality rates. This prediction is also weak because it is neither certain nor unique. In other words, these are not factors that the neoliberal perspective directly focuses on, so there is no guarantee that these factors would occur. However, various explanations account for all these factors outside tax liberalization.

In sum, if we observe an increase in female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, property ownership, and savings when tax liberalization policies are present, and a decline in female unemployment overall and in the
manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, poverty, and female and child mortality during this time, this will support the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

If neoliberals are incorrect, we should see a decrease in female employment overall and in the manufacturing industry. We should also see the female unemployment rate in the labor force increase. Women’s absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry should decrease. We should see female consumption, property ownership, and savings fall with tax liberalization policies. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality during this period. In sum, if we observe a decline in employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, property ownership when tax liberalization policies are present, and increase female unemployment overall and the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, female poverty, female and child mortality during this time, this will undercut the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on Tax Liberalization**

In contrast, feminist theorists maintain that tax liberalization negatively affects female employment and other outcomes, undermining gender equality. They explain that reducing income and corporate taxes and increasing value-add taxes contribute to fewer employment opportunities in the formal sector. Eduardo Lora and his co-authors from the Inter-American Development Bank, who explored the relationship between value-added taxes and labor market outcomes, state, “Value added tax base broadening increases informality and reduces welfare because the production of the goods previously excluded from the tax base becomes informal” (Eduardo et al., 2012, 10). In other words, the number of employment opportunities available for women in the formal sector declined due to the increased taxes on goods and services produced.
The authors also highlight that when value-add taxes substitute for other taxes on production or businesses, firms choose to go informal to evade these taxes (Eduardo et al., 2012). Therefore, women do not benefit from tax reforms because employment in the formal sector has declined, leaving them to find work in informal sectors where employment is precarious (Piggott and Whalley, 2001; Eduardo et al., 2012).

Feminist theorists claim that tax liberalization negatively affects female employment in the manufacturing industry, which weakens gender equality. They proclaim that value-add taxes contribute to employment informality in the manufacturing sector. Aureo de Paula and Jose Scheinkman, professors at the University College of London and Columbia University, look at the relationship between value-added taxes and informality. They explain that, “…various measures of formality of suppliers and purchasers (and its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a firm. These findings survive when we use instrumental variables to control for possible simultaneously. Even more interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian firms are not subject to the credit system of value-added taxes, but, instead, the value-added taxes are applied to some stage of production at a rate that is estimated by tax authorities, this chain effect vanishes” (Paul and Scheinkman, 2010, 196). In other words, value-add taxes increase employment informality in the manufacturing sector for women (Paul and Scheinkman, 2010; Eduardo and Gonzalez, 2016).

Proponents of feminist theory emphasize that tax liberalization leads to further gender inequality. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that, “The value-added tax can exert a gender bias because of women’s different consumption patterns. Women in developing countries tend to purchase more goods and services that promote health, education, and nutrition compared to men. This creates the potential for women to bear a
larger VAT burden if the VAT system does not provide for exemptions, reduced rates or zero-rating. The same applies to ensuring a sufficiently high tax-free allowance for small entrepreneurs” (OECD, 2020, 2). In other words, the tax system imposed by tax liberalization creates a value-added tax system that contributes to disparities between men and women. This results in women having lower incomes to spend or save overall, making them worse off economically. This system causes women to be more susceptible to poverty.

_Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective_

Hypothesis 1: Tax liberalization decrease female employment overall
Hypothesis 2: Tax liberalization decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Tax liberalization increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see a rise in gender inequality during this period. This empirical implication is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. We should have strong expectations of seeing this evidence supporting the feminist argument if the feminist perspective is correct. However, gender inequality is consistent with several other explanations, which is not unique to the feminist argument.

We should observe that the number of women employed overall declines with adopting tax liberalization policies. This proposition is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. In other words, female employment overall is directly related to gender equality, which means that we should have high expectations to see this evidence supporting the feminist argument.
We should observe the number of women employed in the manufacturing industry on the decline. This empirical implication is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it is necessary but not unique. Therefore, we should have strong expectations to see this evidence support the feminist argument if the theory is valid. However, various explanations account for the decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector, which means it is not unique to the feminist perspective.

Feminist theorists also contend that we should also observe an increase in the rate of female unemployment overall. This empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. Female unemployment is directly related to gender equality, so we should have strong expectations of seeing this evidence support the feminist argument. However, the predicted outcome is not unique to the feminist theory because it is consistent with several other arguments.

Feminist theorists maintain that we should expect women’s absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry to decrease. This prediction is also a medium test for the feminist theory because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. This means that we should have high expectations of seeing this evidence supporting the feminist perspective if their argument is correct. However, various factors account for the decline in absolute female income, aside from tax liberalization policies.

Feminist theorists mention that tax liberalization leads to a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. These predictions are considered medium tests for the feminist perspective because they are necessary but not unique. Again, the feminist perspective focus on gender equality, which is directly related to all these factors, which
means that we should have strong expectations of seeing these factors supporting the feminist argument. However, these outcomes could be accounted for through other explanations outside of tax liberalization policies.

In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall, female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when tax liberalization policies are present. This would support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.

If feminists are incorrect, we should definitely see an increase in the female employment rate. We should also see the female unemployment rate decrease. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should increase. We should see the absolute income of women grow in the manufacturing industry and overall. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decrease. In addition, we should also see a decrease in female and child mortality rates. We should also see a rise in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, consumption, female ownership and investments increasing and female employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all decline with the adoption of structural adjustment policies. This will undercut the feminist argument that women are worse off.
Neoliberal Perspective on Capital Liberalization

Neoliberals emphasize that capital liberalization has genderless implications, and its main purpose is to improve economic growth and expansion (Slobodian, 2020; Harvey, 2005). Capital liberalization eliminates barriers that hinder capital flow into and out of the economy (IMF, 2020; Kingstone and Young, 2009, Slobodian, 2020, Harvey, 2005). The flow of capital into developing countries reduces capital cost, which triggers increased investment and growth (Henry, 2006). Stanley Fischer adds that, “Put abstractly, free capital movement facilitates a more efficient global allocation of savings, and help channel resources into their most productive uses, thus increasing economic growth and welfare. From the individual country’s perspective, the benefits take the form of increases in both the potential pool of investable funds, and the access of domestic residents to foreign capital market” (Fischer, 1997, 3). Therefore, capital liberalization enables businesses to become economically prosperous by reducing costs and increasing productivity, contributing to growth in the overall economy.

Neoliberals proclaim that the economic growth from capital account liberalization indirectly leads to an increase in female employment and other outcomes. According to the International Monetary Fund, “In theory, capital account liberalization should allow for more efficient global allocation of capital, from capital-rich industrial countries to capital-poor developing economies. This should have widespread benefits by providing a higher rate of return on people’s savings in industrial countries and by increasing growth, employment opportunities, and living standards in developing countries” (IMF, 2020, 2). Therefore, access to capital in
developing countries allows for economic growth, which is anticipated to contribute to employment opportunities for everyone, including women.

Neoliberals assert that the economic growth from capital liberalization indirectly leads to increase female employment opportunities in the manufacturing sector. Ajit Singh and Ann Zammit, professors at the University of Cambridge and the University of Chile who explore the relationship between capital reform and gender equality, state, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is related to manufactured exports or export processing zones in developing countries, it is likely that in a number of semi-industrial countries more women than men will be employed…it may lead to more technical progress and greater productivity growth and hence greater employment for both women and men in the long term” (Singh and Zammit, 2000, 9). Therefore, the economic growth generated from capital liberalization policies leads businesses to create more employment opportunities. It allows women more employment opportunities, especially in the export-orient industries previously unavailable to them before the adoption of capital liberalization.

Neoliberals claim that the economic growth from capital liberalization secondarily contributes to a reduction in gender inequality. They state that capital liberalization is beneficial for women because it leads to economic growth, indirectly contributing to women’s employment opportunities. As a result, the gender disparity between men and women in the labor force participation rate and the gender wage gap is reduced. In addition, for those women already in the labor market, if the economy is doing better, the growth of average incomes will increase. Kang-kook Lee and Arjun Jayadev, professors at Ritsumeikan University and the University of Massachusetts, explore the negative effects of capital reform on the labor share of income, state that, “…open capital accounts should increase growth by enhancing the potential for risk
diversification. As a result, one should expect both an increase in the growth rate across all countries and a reduction in macroeconomic volatility following capital account openness” (Lee and Jayadev, 2005, 46). Therefore, capital liberalization reduces the economic instability of external shocks over time by diversifying the economy. This helps with economic growth, which also benefits those in the labor market by increasing their incomes.

*Hypotheses from the Neoliberal Perspective*

Hypothesis 1: Capital liberalization increase female employment overall
Hypothesis 2: Capital liberalization increase female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Capital liberalization decrease gender inequality between men and women

If neoliberals are correct, we should observe an increase in the number of women employed overall when capital liberalization policies are present. This proposition is a weak test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. Female employment overall is not a necessary factor that we must observe for the neoliberal perspective to be plausible. This means that it is not certain or necessary for this outcome to occur, but it is assumed it should. In addition, this empirical implication is not unique to the neoliberal perspective, which means other factors lead to the outcome.

We should also observe a rise in the number of women working in the manufacturing sector when capital liberalization policies are present. This prediction is a weak test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique to the theory. The predicted outcome is not a focus of the neoliberal perspective, which means that it is not certain that we would always observe this outcome. In addition, the rise in the number of women in the manufacturing industry could be the result of numerous competing explanations aside from capital liberalization.
We should observe a decline in gender inequality when capital liberalization policies are present. This prediction is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. Neoliberals are not focused on the gender impact of capital liberalization on women, which means we could not expect to see this factor if they do not emphasize it in their theory. In addition, this empirical implication is not unique to the neoliberal perspective. Several alternative explanations account for the proposed outcome.

Neoliberals contend that we should also observe a decline in the rate of female unemployment overall. This proposition is the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because it is neither necessary nor unique. The decline in female unemployment is not a factor that neoliberals emphasize that we will find when capital liberalization policies are present. This predicted outcome is also not unique to the neoliberal perspective because several factors account for the decline in female unemployment.

The neoliberals clarify that we should observe the absolute income of women grow in the manufacturing industry and overall because it is an expanding industry. This empirical implication is also a weak test for the neoliberal theory because it is not necessary nor unique. Since neoliberals do not emphasize that we must see a rise in female absolute income overall, it is not a factor that we should have strong expectations to observe. In addition, there are various factors or alternative explanations that account for the rise in female absolute income outside of capital liberalization policies.

Neoliberals also claim that the economic growth from capital liberalization increases female consumption, property ownership, savings and declines female poverty, childbirth rate, and female and child mortality rates. Again, these predictions are the weakest test for the neoliberal perspective because these are neither necessary nor unique to the theory. In other
words, these predictions are loosely connected and assumed by neoliberals but are not essential to show that theory is plausible. Also, these predictions have various alternative factors that contribute to the outcome that is proposed.

In sum, if we observe an increase in female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, property ownership, and savings when capital liberalization policies are present, and a decline in female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, poverty, and female and child mortality during this time, this will support the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

If neoliberals are incorrect, we should see a decrease in female employment overall and in the manufacturing industry. We should also observe that the female unemployment rate in the labor force increases with structural adjustment policies. We should expect to see women’s income in the manufacturing industry decrease since the industry is expanding. We should find that capital liberalization policies decrease female consumption, property ownership, and savings. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality during this period. In sum, if we observe a decline in female employment and absolute income overall and in the manufacturing industry, female consumption, savings, property ownership with the adoption of capital liberalization policies, and an increase in female unemployment overall and in the manufacturing industry, gender inequality, childbirth rates, female poverty, female and child mortality during this time, this will undercut the neoliberal argument that women are better off.

**Feminist Perspective on Capital Liberalization**

Feminist theorists declare that capital liberalization contributes to a decrease in the female employment rate, destabilizing gender equality. Singh and Zammit state, “…FDI in the
commonsense use of the term, involving additions to a countries’ production capacity, may take place in activities where women are as or more likely to be employed than men. For example, as noted earlier, to the extent that FDI is related to manufactured exports or export processing zones in developing countries, it is likely that in a number of semi-industrial countries more women than men will be employed” (Singh and Zammit, 2000, 1253). Therefore, women are more likely to be negatively affected by capital liberalization because they are overly represented in the export-orient industries, which are more likely to experience economic downturns.

Feminist theorists explain that capital liberalization contributes to a reduction in female employment in the manufacturing industry. They highlight that capital liberalization leads to increasingly sophisticated capital or technology, requiring skilled workers (Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996). However, women comprise the majority of unskilled workers in developing countries. Therefore, technological change or increased capital through capital liberalization leads to more women being out of work and demanding more skilled workers like men. Revenga also adds that, “Capital-intensive firms may actually benefit from the removal of barriers to imports, which lower their production costs. And some firms may respond to increased competition by upgrading productivity and the skills of their workforce, hence leading to a paradoxical association between lower trade protection and higher worker earnings” (Revenga, 1997, 23). Therefore, capital-intensive industries like the manufacturing sector increase the amount of technology they use to be competitive but also higher-skill workers and pay them higher wages to continue to operate their business. This means that low-skill workers become excluded from the manufacturing industry, causing a decline in employment for low-skill workers, specifically women.
Advocates of feminist theory affirm that capital liberalization leads to an increase in gender inequality. Singh and Zammit state, “...at the macroeconomic level women lose more than men from slow and or unstable economic growth, financial crises, meltdowns, the more so the longer and deeper the economic downturn” (Singh and Zammit, 2000, 10). Therefore, Singh and Zammit highlight that capital liberalization makes developing countries more susceptible to external shocks, leading to financial downturns that negatively affect women’s employment and incomes. The loss of jobs and income leads to more significant disparities between men and women. Andrew Charlton and Joseph Stiglitz, academics at the London School of Economics and Columbia University who explore the relationship between capital liberalization and economic growth and poverty, agree that capital liberalization contributes to an economic downturn that dramatically affects the poor, especially women. The authors mention that, “These features of financial markets cause instability; and by increasing the domestic economy’s exposure to them, capital market liberalization may exacerbate economic fluctuations. Instability often has marked distributional consequences since, even in the rich countries like the United States, the poor bear a disproportionate burden in terms of increased unemployment, and this effect is only stronger in poor countries where there are fewer automatic stabilizer” (Charlton and Stiglitz, 2004, 4). Therefore, capital liberalization contributes to economic fluctuations in the economy, which cause women and the poor to be worse off due to the loss of employment. Charlton and Stiglitz highlight that the burden of increased capital liberalization is not distributed evenly, causing further economic inequality (Charlton and Stiglitz, 2004).

Hypotheses from the Feminist Perspective

Hypothesis 1: Capital liberalization decrease female employment overall

Hypothesis 2: Capital liberalization decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Capital liberalization increase gender inequality between men and women

If the feminists are correct, we should expect to see a rise in gender inequality during this period. This is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it comprises high certitude and low uniqueness. Therefore, if the theory is correct, we must find that this evidence supports the feminist argument because it is directly related to their theory. However, the outcome of gender inequality is not unique to the feminist theory, which means this evidence might be consistent with several other arguments.

Feminist theorists explain that we should observe a decline in overall female employment. This empirical implication is considered a medium test for the feminist perspective because it is necessary but not unique. Therefore, we are certain that we would see the female employment support their perspective if their argument is valid. Despite this idea, various factors contribute to female employment overall besides capital liberalization policies. Therefore, this evidence is consistent with several arguments.

We should also expect to see the number of women in the manufacturing sector on the decline. This proposition is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it consists of high certitude and low uniqueness. Since feminists highlight gender equality as their direct goal, we should expect to see evidence affiliated with gender equality support their argument if it is valid. Despite this, a decline in female employment in manufacturing could have numerous causes, consistent with several arguments.

Feminist theorists also contend that we should also observe an increase in the rate of female unemployment overall. This proposition is also considered a medium test because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. This means that female unemployment overall is directly
connected to the female argument regarding gender inequality. Therefore, we should have strong expectations of this evidence supporting the feminist perspective if the theory is valid. However, the increase in female unemployment could have many causes consistent with several explanations. Therefore, it is not unique to the feminist perspective.

Feminist theorists highlight that we should notice the absolute income of women decline in the manufacturing industry and overall. This empirical implication is a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certitude and low uniqueness. That is, feminist theorists emphasize that gender equality is their direct goal. As a result, we must see if women’s absolute income decline as evidence because it directly connects to their argument. However, the decline in women’s absolute income in the manufacturing sector has many causes outside capital liberalization policies.

Feminist theorists mention that capital liberalization leads to a decline in female consumption, savings, and property ownership. We should also observe an increase in female poverty, childbirth rates, female and child mortality rates. Again, this is considered a medium test for the feminist perspective because it has high certainty and low uniqueness. In other words, if the feminist argument is correct, I would have strong expectations to see all this evidence supporting the argument. However, these factors all have numerous factors that lead to their results, which means that these outcomes are not unique to the theory.

In sum, we should expect to see gender inequality, female unemployment overall, female poverty, childbirth rates, and female and child mortality rise while female employment overall, female consumption, female property ownership, and savings decline when capital liberalization policies are present. This will support the feminist perspective that women are worse off.
If the feminists are incorrect, we should see an increase in the female employment rate overall. We should also see the female unemployment rate decrease since the implementation of structural adjustment policies. Female employment in the manufacturing industry should increase. We should see the absolute income of women rise in the manufacturing industry and overall. We should expect to see consumption increase and poverty among female-head households decrease. In addition, we should also see a decrease in female and child mortality rates. We should also see a rise in female savings, ownership, and investment. In sum, if we observe female employment overall, consumption, female ownership and investments increasing and female employment in the manufacturing sector, gender inequality, female unemployment overall, poverty among female-head households, female and child mortality all decline with the adoption of capital liberalization policies. This undercuts the feminist argument that women are worse off.

**Alternative Explanations of Gender Equality**

This study account for several potential alternative explanations of how gender equality is achieved aside from those mentioned above. These potential alternative explanations include the level of economic development, level of democracy, religiosity, and female educational attainment. These four factors are discussed in further detail below, explaining their relationship to the outcome variable in my study.

**Education**

The first potential alternative explanation for gender equality is education. Numerous studies highlight that education is a significant determinant of gender equality (Morrison et al.,
The World Bank highlight that education contributes to a considerable boost in women’s wages than their male counterparts. The institution states, “Education is an important component of opportunities and empowerment. A number of empirical studies find that increase in women’s education boosts their wages and that returns to education for women are frequently larger than the returns to education for men” (World Bank, 2007, 1). In other words, education allows women to have better income in the formal labor market, which reduces gender inequality in terms of income or wages. The World Bank emphasizes that education is one element of opportunities and empowerment for women.

Buchmann explains that education enables women to have a better chance of finding stable and paid employment opportunities in the formal labor market. (Buchmann, 1996). These employment types have a higher chance of offering women the benefits needed to sustain themselves and their families economically. Buchmann adds that, “Educated women are also likely to stay in the labor market longer. On average, an extra year of schooling results in two more years of labor market participation. In many societies where women are expected to stay at home, those who work in the public sphere are often viewed as challenging traditional norms. Therefore, women need self-confidence, knowledge of opportunities, and credentials to gain access to wage employment. For these reasons, education may be a factor that is more important to women than to men, as they enter the labor force” (Buchmann, 1996, 1). Furthermore, education acts as an equalizer between men and women in the labor market to allow more equal opportunities to make a decent living.

The World Bank also adds that education improves women’s labor market outcomes and positively affects other related areas such as child survival, health, schooling, and the household (World Bank, 2007). They also explain that education help boost women’s incomes, leading to
more decision-making power in the household. Therefore, education for women improves gender equality in the labor market and has implications for the household and children’s wellbeing. Buchmann states, “Educational equality is a prerequisite for gender equality for women. Previous research shows that education affects women’s lives in terms of their fertility, their health and the health of their children, and their access to employment” (Buchmann, 1996, 1). This indicates that education is necessary for women to achieve gender equality in the spheres directly and indirectly related to the labor market.

**Level of Democracy**

The second potential alternative explanation for gender equality is the level of democracy. Various studies explain that the level of democracy in a society directly affects gender equality. These studies argue that democratic states are more likely to better gender equality indicators than those not democratic (Beer, 2009; Inglehart et al., 2002). Beer mentions that democracies have many consequences, one of which is gender equality (Beer, 2009). This suggests that gender equality results from a more democratic society, even though the relationship could be reversed. However, it is more likely that there needs to be a more democratic society for more gender equality. Inglehart and his co-authors explain that gender equality is an integral part of democratic societies. They state that, “In a sense the link between women’s representation and democracy should be self-evident, since women account for over half of the population of most societies: if the majority doesn’t have full political rights, the society is not democratic” (Inglehart et al., 2002, 2). Therefore, a more democratic society allows for more individuals to have rights, including women. This factor is what leads to a more gender-equitable society. Beer suggests that democracy creates conditions that are favorable to gender equality (Beer, 2009).
In contrast, non-democratic countries contribute to conditions that are not beneficial to the development of gender equality in those societies. This can be attributed to the lack of political and potentially economic rights for women in non-democratic states. Beer clarifies that in authoritarian regimes, women are often excluded from public life (Beer, 2009). The author mention that while the relationship between authoritarianism and gender equality is complicated, these regimes discourage women’s equality (Beer, 2009). Beer express, “The regime of General Francisco Franco of Spain provides a classic example of how a dictatorship based on conservative, religious, and nationalistic ideology may institute policies unfavorable to women’s equality. Franco’s policies were meant to promote women as a housewife with many children. When Franco took power in 1939, he overturned many progressive reforms from the Second Republic and instituted laws to keep women at home and subservient to their husbands. In 1942, Franco made it illegal for married women to work outside the home” (Beer, 2009, 215). This information indicates that authoritarian regimes tend to promote ideas that hinder the formation of gender equality in society. In these regimes, women are often perceived as subservient, which means they are less likely to be provided with equal rights in the political and social spheres.

Religiosity

The third potential alternative explanation for gender equality is religiosity. Numerous studies highlight that religion directly affects both the micro and macro-level indicators of gender equality. Seguino emphasizes that research has shown that more religious individuals were more likely to have more conservative attitudes towards gender equality. The author states, “…religiosity is strongly correlated with gender inequitable attitudes across countries” (Seguino, 2010, 1308). Seguino notes that the negative relationship between religion and gender inequality
could be attributed to the formal religious institutions that shape the cultural norms, social rules, and behaviors that affect individuals’ attitudes towards gender equality (Seguino, 2010). This information indicates that at the individual level, religion affects gender equality in some instances negatively. In other words, an individual’s religious affiliation influences their attitude towards gender equality on the micro-level. Schnabel also found that individuals who are non-religion tend to be more egalitarian in their attitudes towards gender equality (Schnabel, 2015). Therefore, the primary distinction in how religion affects gender equality at the individual level is whether it is religious or non-religious instead of their religious faith.

At the macro level, studies find that the more religious the particular state or country, the more conservative the individual’s attitudes are toward gender equality (Schnabel, 2015). Schnabel states, “Macro forces influence religious beliefs and practices, gender beliefs and practices, and other attitudes and behaviors in important ways. State-level research in the United States has shown that the more religious fundamentalism in a state, the more conservative the individual gender attitude of the people who live in that state, even apart from the individual’s own religiosity” (Schnabel, 2015, 894). This information suggests that the country’s religious composition at the macro-level strongly influences an individual’s attitudes on gender equality. The macro-forces of religion substantially impact the micro-forces, which are the individual attitudes on gender equality. Schnabel also indicates that research shows that countries with more religious than non-religious populations are more likely to have a higher proportion of individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender equality (Schnabel, 2015). The author state, “But because research has shown that religion is associated with traditional gender attitudes and practices and because beliefs can have important material effects, I expect that higher proportions of non-religious people in a country will be associated with more material gender
equality” (Schnabel, 2015, 895). Therefore, the number of religious adherents in a country affects individuals’ attitudes on gender equality.

**Level of Economic Development**

The fourth potential alternative explanation is the level of economic development. Studies show that economic development level directly affects gender equality (Inglehart et al., 2002; Eastin and Prakash, 2013). Both studies find that as economic development improves, issues of gender equality are also addressed. Inglehart and his co-authors found that economic development contributes to cultural changes, which lead to the transformation of gender roles in society (Inglehart et al., 2002). The authors note, “Evidence from more than sixty societies suggests that economic development propels societies in a roughly predictable direction, changing prevailing gender roles in virtually any society that industrializes” (Inglehart et al., 2002, 11). Inglehart and his co-authors also add that the level of development is closely linked to the erosion of male superiority (Inglehart et al., 2002). As economic development improves, there is more likely to be a path towards a more gender-equitable society.

Although the relationship between the level of economic development and gender equality may seem straightforward, it is very complicated. Eastin and Prakash highlight that the relationship between economic development and gender equality is not monotonic. They mention that three phases need to be considered and that the relationship between economic development and gender equality is an S-shape curve rather than a straight line or invert U-shape curve (Eastin and Prakash, 2013). Eastin and Prakash explain that, “Rather than an inverted U with two stages, we suggest that development’s effects on gender equality should resemble an S shape, proceeding in three stages: first increasing equality, then decreasing or decelerating equality, and finally increasing again. These findings raise important theoretical and policy
issues pertaining to the consequences of economic development on gender issues” (Eastin and Prakash, 2013, 157). Therefore, the authors stress that although economic development improves gender equality in the first stage, this is not the precise or consistent relationship between the two variables throughout. Instead, they found that economic development contributes to a decline in gender equality in the middle stage, which should be accompanied by policies to reverse this trend. However, economic development improves with gender equality again in the final stage (Eastin and Prakash, 2013).

My research suggests that education, level of democracy, religiosity, and economic development all offer essential insight on gender equality but alone cannot account for the research question or problem under consideration. Although education contributes to the improvement in the economic status of women, it cannot explain the declining status of women in the labor market. Scholars highlight that a more democratic society leads to more political rights for women (Beer, 2009; Inglehart et al., 2002). However, the increased political rights that women have do not automatically lead to economic equality. Therefore, democracy is vital for women’s political equality but cannot explain the economic inequality that women experience in the labor market. Scholars mention that democracy should be limited to prevent it from affecting the market (Hayek, 1944; Weyland, 2004; Crouch, 2014; Slobodian, 2020). Religion may explain some of the gender equality or inequality we observe in different countries, but it cannot account for how men’s status is affected. Although economic development leads to cultural changes that promote more gender-equitable societies, it still does not explain the economic inequality between men and women in highly developed societies.
Summary of Arguments

In sum, as stated previously, the neoliberals contend that structural adjustment policies increase macroeconomic growth that leads to indirect benefits for women. Specifically, the economic growth from structural adjustment policies contribute to more employment for women overall in the manufacturing industry and reduce gender inequality. Neoliberals also explain that economic growth could have a broader effect on women than those mentioned above. They note that it increases female absolute income, female consumption, savings, investments, and property ownership. Neoliberals also state that the economic growth from structural adjustment policies leads to a decline in female mortality, child mortality, childbirth rates, and poverty.

In contrast, feminist theorists argue that structural adjustment policies contribute to women’s exploitation in the labor market and offer fewer employment opportunities, increasing gender inequality. Therefore, structural adjustment and its five individual policies decline female employment overall and increase gender inequality. However, all four individual policies except trade liberalization lead to fewer employment opportunities for women in the manufacturing industry. Feminists point out that structural adjustment policies lead to a less equitable society, which has a broad and direct effect on women, resulting in less economic growth. Therefore, feminists assert that structural adjustment policies increase female mortality, child mortality, childbirth rates, and poverty. In addition, feminists also state that structural adjustment policies decline female absolute income, female consumption, savings, investments, and property ownership. For feminist theorists, gender equality is the primary goal. In an equal society, there will be more happiness and productivity, leading to more economic growth. How these propositions are tested is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Data and Methods

This chapter lays out the methodological approach I use for the empirical analysis. I utilize a mixed-methods, nested analysis approach, which consists of sequencing a large-N statistical analysis with a more in-depth qualitative analysis (Lieberman, 2005). I use the large-N statistical analysis to generate statistical findings about the relationships of interest and then use diagnostics of the large-N analysis to help guide my case selection for a more in-depth qualitative research. I use Lieberman’s nested analysis approach to guide the overall research design and Gerring and Seawright’s case selection techniques to help identify typical and deviant cases to choose for my qualitative analysis (Lieberman, 2005; Gerring and Seawright, 2008).

After I select my case studies, I conduct a qualitative analysis, which consists of online newspaper analysis organized by using a process-tracing approach. Specifically, I utilize content analysis to code and analyze the information from the newspapers to better understand and trace the underlying causal mechanism between neoliberalism and gender equality in Argentina (typical case study) and identify potential alternative explanations in the case of Peru (deviant case study).

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the data gathering process. Specifically, I describe the data I gather for the independent, dependent, and control variables along with their source and varying time frames. Section 2 focuses on the overall research design of multi-methods, nested analysis approach, where I first discuss the large-N statistical analysis or quantitative analysis. I explain the different statistical models I create and how I choose the best model to guide my case selection for qualitative analysis. Section 3
focuses on my case selection for qualitative research. Specifically, I show how I apply Gerring and Seawright’s as well as Lieberman’s approach of how to do case study selections for more in-depth qualitative research. Lastly, Section 4 explains how I conduct my qualitative analysis. That is, how I search and analyze online newspapers through various databases and apply content analysis and process tracing to better understand the underlying casual mechanism between gender equality and neoliberalism in my typical case and potential alternative explanations not included in my model in my deviant case.

**Data Gathering Process**

This section turns to the data gathering process for the empirical analysis first introduced in chapter 1. The purpose of the data collection process is to build a time-series cross-sectional data set that could later be analyzed using a large-N statistical analysis. This is the first step in the statistical analysis process. Therefore, this section provides a detailed description of the data gathering process for the time-series cross-sectional data set, which utilizes neoliberal reform as my independent variable and gender equality as my dependent variable along with several control variables. It highlights the data time span, measurements, coverage, and sources.

I gather data on gender inequality from the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2019). These indicators primarily focus on the economic status of women in the labor market, specifically women in the manufacturing industry. As shown in Table 3, the data on gender inequality include female labor force participation rate, female manufacturing employee per capita, and the gender inequality index. The overall female labor force participation rate consists of data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2018. It is
measured as the percentage of women in the labor force population out of the working-age population. Female manufacturing employee per capita cover data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay from 1975 to 2018 and is measured as the number of female manufacturing employee per 100,000 population. I also collected a composite measure of gender inequality from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) known as the gender inequality index (GII) (UNDP, 2019). The gender inequality index comprises data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1995 to 2018. GII is an inequality index that measures disparities between men and women in three areas: health, empowerment, and the labor market. Specifically, the GII measures maternal mortality, adolescent birth rate, female and male with at least a secondary education, female and male share of parliamentary seats, and female and male labor force participation rates. The gender inequality index ranges from 0 to 1, where one is the highest level of inequality between men and women in a country. In the dataset, the GII is broken down into five-year intervals starting in 1995. I interpolate the dataset to help fill in missing data for the years in between these time intervals.

I gather data on neoliberal reform from Peter Kingstone and Joseph Young, initially developed by Samuel Morley, Roberto Machado, and Stefano Pettinato, who later provided an additional few years of data coverage through 2003 (Machado et al., 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2008). The dataset consists of a composite measure of neoliberal reforms and the five separate policies that made up this variable. The five different policies that made up neoliberal reform are trade reform, privatization, financial reform, tax reform, capital reform. The composite measure of neoliberal reform consists of data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2003. The five separate policies that make up neoliberal reform comprise data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2003. However, for unknown reasons, capital reform is missing the year 2003 from the dataset on the separate policies that made up neoliberal reform. This means that all data after the year 2002 is dropped for all models that include capital reform. The individual and composite measures of neoliberal reform are measured on a scale of 0 to 1, where one is the highest level of liberalization. However, for the ease of interpreting the model results, I later transform this measure of neoliberal reform on a scale of 0 to 100.

I collect data on religion, education, GDP per capita, and polity from various sources to use as control variables in my statistical analysis (Kingstone and Young, 2008; Maoz and Henderson, 2013; Barro et al., 2013). I gather data on polity from the Polity Project at the Center for Systemic Peace and replication data by Kingstone and Young (Center for Systemic Peace, 2018; Kingstone and Young, 2008). The data on polity consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2002. For unknown reasons, polity is missing the year 2003. This means that all data after the year 2002 is dropped for all models that include polity. Polity is measured on a scale that ranges from -10 to 10, where positive ten is high democracy. I collect data on religion from the World Religion Project: National Religion Dataset (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). This dataset measures the percentage of religious adherents in each country. The data on religion consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from
1975 to 2010. It is important to note that the religion dataset contains data for every half-decade for each country starting in 1975. I interpolate the dataset to help fill in missing data for the years in between these time intervals. In other words, I use the sequences of the known values around the missing data to estimate the unknown data points. Religion is measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, where one indicates that one hundred percent of the population is religious. I collect data on education from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (Barro et al., 2013). Education is measured as the female average years of total schooling. The education data cover the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2010. The dataset on education also contains data for every half-decade for each country starting in 1975. I also interpolate the dataset using the same procedure as above to help fill in missing data for the years between these time intervals.¹ I gather data on the gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) from the World Bank (WB). According to the World Bank, GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the gross domestic product by the mid-year population of the designated country. This variable is measured in current US dollars for each country. The data on GDP per capita cover Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela from 1975 to 2018.

Using the data on gender inequality, neoliberal reform, and the control variables, I built a time series, a cross-sectional dataset using the R software. First, I transform the data collected on neoliberal reform, gender inequality, and the control variables from a wide format to a long

¹ I install both the dplyr and zoo packages and use the following R code snippet: new dataset <- old dataset%>%group_by(Country)%>%mutate_at(vars(matches("column name")), na.approx, na.rm=FALSE).
format so that the first two columns would be country and year. Second, I select the relevant countries from each dataset, which are the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, due to the lack of data on neoliberal reform from the 1970s to the present, I could only use the dataset originally developed by Morley, Machado, Pettinato, and later used by Kingstone and Young, which started in 1975. As previously mentioned and shown in Table 3, this dataset contains fifteen Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela from 1975 to 2003. Therefore, I select relevant countries from the dataset on gender inequality and my control variables using the countries included in the neoliberal reform dataset. Third, I merge all the datasets into a larger dataset consisting of twenty-six variables and six hundred sixty-one rows. This dataset includes data on my dependent variables (female employment, female employment in manufacturing, and the gender inequality index), the key independent variables (general reform, trade reform, privatization, financial reform, tax reform, and capital reform), and control variables (education, religion, GDP per capita, and polity). The individual rows in my dataset are labeled for the Country and Year of the observation. It is important to note that my dataset has unbalanced panels. The number of time points with available data varies across countries.

Quantitative Analysis

This section details the procedures undertaken to conduct the quantitative analysis for the empirical research, which is the first part of the larger nested analysis strategy. In the large N statistical analysis phase of the study, the unit of analysis is “country-year.” The unbalance panel dataset consists of 660 observations and 42 variables, including explanatory, outcome, control
variables, and identifiers. These observations are from the fifteen major countries in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The time span generally ranges from 1975 to 2003. I utilize the unbalance panel dataset to build several multivariate regressions, including ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and random effects in the R software. I create these regressions to help me test the stability of my results to determine which model is the most reliable to analyze an unbalance panel dataset to better understand the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality. I build 45 multiple regression models for my three dependent variables: female labor force participation rate, female manufacturing employee per capita, and the gender inequality index. The model results indicate that the fixed effects models are the most appropriate for reporting my core results.

First, I create five OLS regressions to analyze the relationship between neoliberal reform and the female labor force participation rate. I also add a country dummy variable to see the individual effects of neoliberal reform on the dependent variable for each country for all the OLS models. The first regression analyzes how the female labor force participation rate is affected by tax reform, financial reform, international trade, privatization, capital reform, and the composite measure of these policies (general reform). The second regression analyzes the same relationships as the first model, with religion added as a control variable. In the third regression, I add religion and education as controls to study these relationships. The fourth regression adds GDP per capita as the control, and the fifth regression adds polity as a control.

Second, I create five fixed-effects regressions to examine the relationship between neoliberal reform and the female labor force participation rate. These five fixed effects regressions have the same composition as the five ordinary least squares regressions described
above. I add a sixth fixed-effects regression model known as model 7 for each of the outcome variables to get a more accurate picture of the relationship between the five individual policies of neoliberalism and each of my outcomes. This new model allows for the reduction of multicollinearity in the results because general reform, which encompasses all five individual policies, is excluded from the model. Third, I create five random-effects regressions that look at the correlation between neoliberal reform and the female labor force participation rate. Again, the five random-effects models have the same composition as the models before. To create the multivariate regressions for the other two outcome variables (female manufacturing employee per capita and gender inequality index). I repeat steps one through three, as stated above.

Following Lieberman’s nested analysis research design, I chose the three most complete and well-specified models to help guide my qualitative study (Lieberman, 2005). I settle on the fix effects models as my best models.

The fixed effects models are the most useful approach to provide precise and unbiased model estimates about the relationship of interest. The diagnostics from these models help guide my case selection for qualitative research. Fixed effects models are the most commonly used estimators among researchers for panel data because they improve the estimates of cluster data (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). These models account for time-varying variables and remove the effects of time-invariant variables that could lead to inaccurate results. Bell and Jones explain that time-invariant variables affect the time-varying variables in the model (Bell and Jones, 2015). This could lead to bias estimates or results if the model does not include the time-invariant variable. Therefore, the fix effects models remove any effects of the time-invariant variable from the model as a whole. Bell and Jones state, “Fixed effects models attempt to do this by cutting out much of “what is going on,” leaving only a supposedly universal effect and
controlling out differences at the higher level” (Bell and Jones, 2015, 139). Furthermore, the fix effects models control for the effects of the time-invariant variable in the model and allow the researcher to observe the net effects of the explanatory variable on the outcome variable. This means that the fix effects model is not prone to the heterogeneity problem that the random effects models experience.

The ordinary least squares models are not useful for analyzing panel data because they produce biased results (Beck and Katz, 1995). Beck and Katz explain that the ordinary least squares regression models do not account for the temporal and spatial properties of the panel data. As a result, the results from these models lead to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. This means that these models’ results lead to bias estimates, imprecision, and violation of the ordinary least square assumptions. Dieleman and Templin also add that the ordinary least squares model does not model the unobserved group effects, which lead to heteroskedastic residuals and bias estimates. The authors note, “Clustered data become problematic when unobserved group-level characteristics affect the outcome… This characteristic, known as unobserved heterogeneity, violates an assumption necessary for OLS to be the best linear unbiased estimator, leading to inefficient estimation and biased inference (heteroskedastic residuals) and potentially biased estimates” (Dieleman and Templin, 2014, 3). Therefore, using ordinary least squares regression to analyze the panel data would not allow me to account for the unobserved group effects that could imprecise and bias my results.

The random-effects model is also not appropriate to analyze the panel data due to omitted variable bias, leading to unreliable results. Clark and Linzer highlight that random-effects models include the effects of time-invariant variables (Clark and Linzer, 2015). Therefore, these models account for both the effects of time-varying and time-invariant observations. Bell and Jones
mention that random effects are more flexible and generalizable due to their ability to account for variables that are measured at the higher and lower levels (Bell and Jones, 2015). However, variables measured at the higher levels, meaning time-invariant variables, must be specified in the random-effects model. Therefore, the researcher must account for all time-invariant variables that could affect independent and or dependent variables. In other words, if the researcher thinks they have a complete model and account for everything, a random-effects model is appropriate. However, I acknowledge that I do not have a complete model or cannot be sure, so a random-effects model is not helpful because it would introduce bias. Aside from evaluating which models provide the least bias estimates for panel data, I also conduct a diagnostic test known as the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). Bell and Jones explain that the Hausman test is used to choose whether the random effects or fix effects model estimates are more reliable (Bell and Jones, 2015). The authors add that the Hausman test is not only choosing between the estimates of the random or fix-effects models but also examine whether the between effects are significantly biasing the results of the model (Bell and Jones, 2015). In other words, the tests allow the researcher to explore whether higher-level variables are biasing or having a significant effect on the results. Dieleman and Templin mention that the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that both the random and fixed effects models have reliable and unbiased results (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). Therefore, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, the random-effects model is the most reliable estimator by default (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). The random-effects model is often chosen when the null hypothesis is not rejected because it is efficient (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). However, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model is the most reliable estimator (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). Based on these ideas, I conduct the Hausman test in R using the command phtest with the name of the random and fixed effects models in
parentheses. The results from the Hausman test show that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the fixed-effects model.

**Case Selection for Qualitative Analysis**

This section relies on nested analysis and quantitative tools for case selection, which integrates quantitative and qualitative analyses (Lieberman, 2005; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Following Lieberman’s nested analysis approach, once the quantitative analysis is complete and we are confident in its results, we should use a statistical plot that models the actual versus the predicted scores to help illustrate what a model-testing and model building case study might be (Lieberman, 2005). This plot helps me visualize well-predicted and low-residual cases that provide support or help clarify the causal hypothesis or poorly predicted and high residual cases that may help me better specify measurements or omitted variables from the model. In addition to Lieberman’s approach, Seawright and Gerring also provide statistical tools to help identify well predict and poorly predict cases from model results. The authors highlight that calculating the typicality scores (the absolute value of the residuals) for each case allows you to see which cases are typical or deviant (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In other words, the typicality scores for each case will enable me to identify model testing and model building case studies for more in-depth qualitative analysis.

Following both Lieberman and Seawright and Gerring, I use the results from my fixed effects regression models to guide my case selection for qualitative analysis. Using Lieberman’s approach for case selection, I first use the residuals from the large-N statistical analysis to create spaghetti plots for each country over time. This helps me identify one country that generates a pattern of well-predict or typical observations and another that generates a pattern of poorly
predicted or deviant observations based on whether the country’s residuals are consistently low
or high (Lieberman, 2005). These patterns suggest candidates for typical and deviant case
studies, respectively. Following Seawright and Gerring’s approach to case selection, I create bar
graphs for each country using the absolute value and average of the residuals for each country to
denote a typicality score to ensure that my case studies are properly selected. Finally, I choose
my two promising case studies based on their consistently low or high residuals based on the
spaghetti plot and typicality scores based on the bar graph across all models. Therefore, I utilize
visual inspections of the spaghetti plots and bar graphs I generate from the models to choose my
typical (Argentina) and deviant (Peru) case studies for more in-depth qualitative research.

Qualitative Analysis

Now that I discuss the large-N statistical analysis and case selection process, this section
focuses on the procedures I utilize to conduct a more in-depth qualitative analysis of my two case
studies, Argentina and Peru. Therefore, this section focuses on tracing the causal process and
identifying intermediate evidentiary markers along the way to identify the sequence of events
that connect the independent to the dependent variable. The qualitative process-tracing approach
draws on online newspapers supplemented by peer-review journal articles for evidence for my
two case studies based on their specific analytical goals. Argentina represents my well-predict,
typical case study, which means that I look for newspaper articles that discuss the relationship
between neoliberalism and gender inequality. In contrast, Peru is my poorly predicted, deviant
case study, which means I look for newspaper articles that best explain why this case does not fit
my model. In other words, I look for newspapers that explain what other factors in Peru might be
contributing to the outcome of interest. Once I find newspapers for both cases, I conduct a
content analysis to retrieve information explaining both countries. I use process tracing to
organize the information better to understand the underlying causal mechanism in Argentina
better and identify potential alternative explanations in the case of Peru. Furthermore, relying on
the online newspapers supplemented by the peer-review journal articles helped me construct an
analytical narrative that traces the causal process in each of my two case studies, which identify
key actors, moments, strategies, as well as sequence and timing.

The main analytical goal of my typical, well-predict model testing case study, Argentina,
is to confirm or disconfirm the results from my model regarding the relationship between
neoliberalism and gender inequality and uncover the underlying causal mechanism. Therefore, I
gather newspapers from the Lexis Uni database and the Buenos Aires Times that describe
women’s lived experiences in Argentina. I collect information regarding how women are faring
under structural adjustment policies over time and which specific policies affect them.
Furthermore, when searching for newspaper articles in the Lexis Uni database, I use various
search terms when looking at the relationship between general reform and the three outcomes of
interest such as the following: Economic w/3 policy and women and Argentina (All Fields) with
223 results, Economic adjustment and women and Argentina (All Fields) with 52 results, and
Economic adjustment and women and employment and Argentina with 85 results. When
searching for articles for the relationship between privatization and the three dependent
variables, I apply the following search terms: Privatization and women and Argentina with 85
results, women and privatization and employment and Argentina and privatization and women
and employment and Argentina both with 173 results. When I search for articles for the
relationship between capital reform and the three dependent variables, I utilize the following
search terms: Capital liberalization and women and Argentina, which retrieve 3 news results.
When I look for articles for the relationship between financial reform and the three dependent variables, I employ the following search terms: financial liberalization and women and employment and Argentina, which result in 5 newspaper articles. When I explore articles on the relationship between trade reform and the three dependent variables, I use the following search terms: Trade liberalization and women and employment and Argentina with 55 news results; Trade liberalization and women and manufacturing and Argentina with 53 news results; and Trade liberalization and gender inequality and Argentina with 2 news results. For each search, I use the period from 1975 to 2003, but the years vary by search. As a result, I utilize the earliest time available for each search with the end year of 2003. I select articles to analyze for each search based on the keywords.

The main analytical goal of my deviant, poorly predicted case study, Peru, is to find any potential alternative explanations that help theory development. In other words, Peru is poorly predicted by the models, which means that the explanations captured in my model do not explain what is going on in Peru. I also consider measurement errors in my existing variables and search for better data. Therefore, I gathered newspapers from the Lexis Uni database that describe women’s lived experiences in Peru. In other words, I use the three dependent variables to guide my search for how women are faring in Peru and why. When I search for what is affecting female employment in Peru, I use the following key terms: Employment and women and Peru (in all fields), which retrieve 1552 news results, Employment (in all fields), and women and Peru (Subheading and heading) which retrieve 9 news results. When I look for newspaper articles on what is impacting female manufacturing employees, I utilize the following search terms: Women and manufacturing and Peru (in all fields) with 1432 results, Women and manufacturing and employment and Peru with 265 results, Women and manufacturing sector and Peru with 39
results, and *Manufacturing sector and Peru* with 307 results. When I explore newspaper articles on what affects gender inequality in Peru, I apply the following search terms: *Gender inequality and women and Peru* with 42 news results; *Gender equality and women and Peru* with 205 news results; and *Gender equity and women and Peru* with 44 news results. For each search, I use the period from 1975 to 2003, but the years vary by search. As a result, I use the earliest time available for each search with the end year of 2003.

After retrieving these articles from the database and the local newspaper, I gathered and coded the results. I gather approximately a sample of thirty newspaper articles for the period (1975-2003) and country. Furthermore, I have roughly a total of thirty newspaper articles for each country. I read and code each newspaper article regarding Argentina using the observable implications derived from each theoretical framework of the neoleibals and feminists. As stated by Epstein and King, the researcher needs to list all observable implications to properly test theory and its power and usefulness as a theory (Epstein and King, 2002). The authors state, “…list all the possibilities even if only a small subset of them are actually observed in the course of the research. The more implications scholars identify, the more powerful and useful their theory. And the more of these implications they can evaluate against real data, the more confidence can have in their conclusions” (Epstein and King, 2002, 73). Therefore, listing all directly and indirectly observable implications allows me to test the neoliberal and feminist theories to see which may be correct or if any aspect of either theory is valid. For Peru, I code for potential alternative explanations not included in the models. Therefore, this allows me to look for new or existing alternative explanations that explain the deviant case study of Peru and why it does not fit the current models.
I code the newspaper articles for Argentina based on the observable implications. More specifically, I unpack the specific hypotheses for the composite and individual measures of neoliberalism. Based on these specific hypotheses, I derive the observable implications related directly and indirectly to the hypotheses of each theoretical framework. Furthermore, I explain what I expect to see in the real world based on the hypotheses of neoliberals and feminists. Therefore, if female employment overall is increasing, I would also expect that female unemployment is decreasing. This would support the neoliberal perspective. In contrast, if female employment is decreasing, I would also expect unemployment to increase. This would support the feminist perspective. Therefore, I code based on these criteria to test the neoliberal and feminist perspectives using data from Argentina.

I code the newspaper articles for Peru using an exploratory method. Once I gather the newspaper articles on the three dependent variables for Peru, I code based on which explanatory factor affects the outcomes. Therefore, I look for other explanatory variables that affect the three outcome variables. As a result, I code for each of the variables in the newspaper to highlight which explanatory variable is contributing to an impact on female employment, female manufacturing, and gender inequality. The newspapers help me identify potential alternative explanations missing from the model and how it affects the outcome variable in the case study of Peru.

To organize the qualitative section of this project, I use process tracing to gain insights into the causal mechanism between structural adjustment policies and gender inequality in Argentina and to discover new hypotheses in the case of Peru. Bennett and Checkel explain that process tracing entails tracing the causal mechanism or process with a single case study by gathering evidence (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). Specifically, the authors describe process
tracing as, “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, 212). Therefore, process tracing is the gathering and analyzing of evidence to trace the causal process that fully connects the explanatory variables to the outcome variables. It traces a logical causal pathway between the independent and dependent variables that help to explain how and why these factors are related to each other (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Lieberman, 2005). Therefore, it helps the researcher provide a detailed narrative of how the two variables connect in a logical and causal fashion by identifying intermediate evidence that helps to lay out the sequence of events. This approach allows the researcher to develop or test theories specified by a particular statistical model (Lieberman, 2005). Therefore, process tracing helps me by enabling me to gather evidence from within the case to make inferences about the causal direction and mechanisms of the empirical study.

This approach enables me to gather and analyze evidence that clarifies the direction of the causal influence and process between structural adjustment policies and gender inequality in Argentina and assess whether the correlation between the two variables is spurious (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). Process tracing enables me to gather evidence to understand the sequence of events that fully connects neoliberalism to gender inequality. Therefore, it allows me to understand the start, end, and intermediate steps that connect the explanatory to the outcome variables. In addition, it enables me to see how and why these factors are related to each other, not just the cause and effect.

In the case of Peru, process tracing allows me to gather evidence that points to a new causal process that highlights potential alternative explanations that are missing from the model.
This enables me to examine potential alternative explanations that better explain the case of Peru. Using process tracing to organize the information from the online newspaper articles allow for increased confidence in the causal relationship in both of my case studies. Furthermore, processing tracing helps to clarify the current causal mechanism between structural adjustment policies and gender inequality and find potential alternative explanations.

To analyze and present my data from the content analysis, I look for recurring themes in both case studies based on the observable implications to best explain what is happening on the ground. Therefore, I use these recurring themes to confirm or disconfirm aspects of the two theories in the case of Argentina. In the case of Peru, I look for the recurring presence of certain variables that affect gender equality. I use a narrative format to present my findings from the content analysis. Therefore, I identify the core theme or variables from the sample of newspapers I select for both case studies. The core theme or variables enable me to trace the causal mechanism between each of my variables and explain the narrative of what is taking place in each of my cases. In addition, it allows me to select and use information based on how the rest of my sample look. Drisko and Maschi state that, “Researchers must take great care to show the reader that such quotations or text passages are typical of the entire data set. Narrative presentations may hide the impact of limited or selective sampling (Drisko and Maschi, 2015, 77).” Therefore, narrative forms of data presentation could introduce biased findings regarding my case studies. However, utilizing the approach of selecting the most frequent theme or variables for my cases contributes to reducing bias findings. In addition, seeking out and presenting any information that may go against my findings also ensures that my findings and samples are unbiased. The narrative form of data presentation also allows me to reframe from making sweeping claims based on my sample by presenting the quotation and text that I am
discussing. This will enable readers to be critical of my narrative analysis on the present topic and either point out information that is unsupported or supported to help build credibility for my findings (Drisko and Maschi, 2015).

*Table 3.1 Measures of Gender Equality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Time Span</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Inequality Index (GII)</strong></td>
<td>The GII measures gender inequalities in three areas: reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males age 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status, expressed as labor market participation and measured by labor force participation rate of female and male populations</td>
<td>1995 - 2017</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td><a href="https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-disparities-between-male-female-populations">UNDP Gender Data</a> <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/methodology">UNDP GII Methodology</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Force Rate, female</strong></td>
<td>Female labor force participation rate of the total labor force</td>
<td>1980-2017</td>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>International Labor Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>ILO Employment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employees by sex in Manufacturing (Fem.Man.Employees)</strong></td>
<td>Employees by sex in Manufacturing (Thousands)</td>
<td>1975-2017</td>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>International Labor Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>Employment in Manufacturing by Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employees by sex and sector</strong></td>
<td>Employees by sex in service, industry, agriculture (Thousands)</td>
<td>1990-2017</td>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>International Labor Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>Employment, Sex, Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate (Fem.Unemployment.Rate)</strong></td>
<td>The unemployment rate is the number of persons who are unemployed as a percent of the total number of employed and unemployed persons (i.e., the labor force)</td>
<td>1975-2017</td>
<td>All countries in Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>International Labor Organization (ILO)</td>
<td>Female Unemployment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female Manufacturing Employee per Capita (Fem_Man_Emp.Cap)</strong></td>
<td>Female Manufacturing Employee divided by the total population</td>
<td>1975-2018</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,</td>
<td>ILO and World Bank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.1 indicates the data for the outcome of interest, gender equality for fifteen Latin American countries with years that vary. Gender equality is measured using the indicators mentioned in the table, which are the following: gender inequality index, the female labor force participation rate, female employment in the manufacturing industry.

Table 3.2 Measures of Structural Adjustment Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Time Span</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Reform</td>
<td>Structural Reform: Tax Reform, Privatization, Trade Reform, Capital Reform, Financial Reform</td>
<td>1975-2003</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>Robert Machado, Samuel Morley, and Stefano Pettinato</td>
<td><a href="#">Roberto Machado, Samuel Morley, and Stefano Pettinato</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 3.2 presents the data for the explanatory variable, neoliberal reform for fifteen Latin American countries from 1975 to 2003. Neoliberal reform consists of the aggregate measure (general reform) and the five individual policies: tax reform, privatization, trade reform, capital reform, and financial reform.

Table 3.3 Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Time Span</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Current U.S. dollars (GDP.Per.Capita)</td>
<td>Measure of all goods and service in a country annually (size of the economy)</td>
<td>1975-2018</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td><a href="#">GDP Per Capita</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>divide by the population</td>
<td>Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>Measures the degree of democracy of a state. The level of autocracy is subtracted from the level of democracy to produce a value that represents the level of democracy (POLITY). Scores range from −10 to 10 (−10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy)</td>
<td>1975-2003</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>Robert Machado, Samuel Morley, and Stefano Pettinato</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female Average Years of Total Schooling age 15 and above (Fem.Avg.Yrs.of.Tot.Sch)</strong></td>
<td>Education: Female Average Years of Total Schooling</td>
<td>1975-2010 (5-year increments)</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Sumreligpct)</td>
<td>Sum of Religious percentages</td>
<td>1975-2010 (5-year increments)</td>
<td>Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>World Religion Project: National Religion Dataset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 3.3 illustrates the data for the control variables: GDP per capita, polity, education, and religion for fifteen Latin American countries with years that vary.
Chapter 4
Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, countries in the Latin American region adopted structural adjustment policies or neoliberal economic policies commonly known as the Washington Consensus or neoliberal reform (Williamson, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010; Weyland, 2002; Murillo, 2001). Structural adjustment policies are a set of policy prescriptions mandated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for countries to qualify for a loan to help stabilize the country’s economy (Harvey, 2005; Handa and King, 1996). These policy prescriptions consist of the following policies: trade liberalization, tax liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, and capital liberalization (Williamson, 2000; Mudge, 2018; Weaver, 2016; Handa and King, 1996). Policymakers expect that these policies' aggregate or individual measures would improve the dire economic condition that plague the region. However, the gender implications of these policies became a persistent concern for policymakers, scholars, and the general public in the region (Alarcon-Gonzalez and McKinley, 1999; Campbell, 2010). Some scholars assert that structural adjustment policies improve gender inequality in the region, while others contend this is not the case. Neoliberals proclaim that structural adjustment policies contribute to economic growth, which could indirectly reduce gender inequality (Friedman, 2009; IMF, 1999). In contrast, feminists argue that structural adjustment policies contribute to more gender inequality in society, leading to less economic growth (Beneria, 1999; Afshar and Dennis, 2016). I find that structural adjustment policies and several of their individual policies lessen the gender disparity in the labor market in Latin America. Specifically, general reform, tax
reform, international trade, and privatization increase the female labor force participation rate. General reform and tax reform lead to a rise in female employment in the manufacturing industry. General reform and privatization contribute to a decline in the gender inequality index. However, the different policies’ small, unstable, and varying effects illustrate a less meaningful effect on the outcome. The policies’ changing effects on the outcomes do not lend consistent support to the neoliberal and feminist accounts. The evidence also shows that education has consistently stable and helpful effects on gender inequality. Therefore, education is the most compelling evidence for reducing gender inequality as opposed to neoliberal policies.

**Literature Review**

This project builds on extensive literature that analyzes the consequences of structural adjustment policies on the status of women, as discussed in-depth in Chapter 2. I summarize the main points of each theoretical framework here. However, for a fuller discussion of each theoretical perspective, please see Chapter 2. A debate exists in the literature between neoliberal and feminist theorists regarding whether structural adjustment policies negatively or positively affect gender inequality. Neoliberals assert that structural adjustment policies positively affect gender inequality (Friedman, 1982). That is, structural adjustment policies contribute to economic growth. The economic growth from structural adjustment policies leads to the creation of employment for women, which enhances the status of women, contributing to a reduction in gender inequality (Friedman, 1982). Friedman notes, “Similarly today, governmental measures constitute the major impediment to economic growth…Tariffs and other restrictions on international trade, high tax burdens, and a complex and inequitable tax structure, regulatory commissions, government price, and wage-fixing, and a host of other measures give individuals
an incentive to misuse and misdirect resources…What we urgently need, for both economic stability and growth, is a reduction of government intervention, not an increase” (Friedman, 1982, 38). Furthermore, the focus of the neoliberal perspective is on how to achieve economic growth (Hayek, 1944; Stedman Jones, 2012; Peck, 2010). They explain that economic growth could only be achieved by adopting more free market or neoliberal policies which reduce government intervention (Hayek, 1944; Friedman, 1982). Therefore, structural adjustment policies originated from these core ideas adopted to improve economic growth (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals add that improving the country’s economic performance leads to more employment creation by the private sector, which ultimately reduces gender inequality. In other words, if the economy is doing better, then women also benefit from this improvement in economic growth.

Hypotheses from Neoliberal Perspective

Hypothesis 1: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies increase female employment or female labor force participation overall
Hypothesis 2: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies increase female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies reduce gender inequality

In contrast, feminist theorists contend that structural adjustment policies negatively affect gender inequality. They explain that structural adjustment policies expose women to exploitative production practices, forcing them into low-paying jobs, undermining gender inequality (Eastin and Prakash, 2013; Standing, 1999; Afshar and Dennis, 1992). Standing clarifies that structural adjustment policies lead to a feminization of labor in the manufacturing industry where wages are low and poor conditions. The author state, “Some of the most rapidly growing forms of flexible labor increasing feminization in both senses of the term – they are absorbing more
women than men and involve less secure working conditions” (Standing, 1999, 593).

Furthermore, the author explains that these changes in employment in the labor market put women at a disadvantage because they are not fully incorporated into the labor force but instead are exploited. Standing highlights that women who work in these areas are unable to survive on their incomes alone. Eastin and Prakash also express that structural adjustment policies strengthen the patriarchal institutions because women are still disadvantaged due to their lack of full incorporation into the labor force to make a decent wage like their male counterparts (Eastin and Prakash, 2013). This causes women to still depend on their male counterparts and does not provide the economic independence they need to support themselves. Feminists assert that all these factors cause women to be at an economic and social disadvantage undermining gender equality (Eastin and Prakash, 2013; Standing, 1999; Afshar and Dennis, 1992). Therefore, the primary focus of feminist theorists is addressing gender inequality in society. In other words, feminists argue that if gender inequality is mitigated, then it is assumed that countries would begin to experience better economic performance. If more women are fully integrated and equal in society with their male counterparts, that means they would also be more productive and contribute more to the economic growth of the society. Furthermore, if half of the country’s population is at an economic disadvantage, they cannot contribute to the growth and betterment of society. Therefore, reducing gender inequality in society leads to an improvement in economic growth.

_Hypotheses from Feminist Perspective_

Hypothesis 1: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies decrease female employment or female labor force participation overall

Hypothesis 2: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies decrease female employment in the manufacturing industry
Hypothesis 3: Structural adjustment and its five individual policies increase gender inequality

**Discussion of Data and Methods**

**Data Gathering Process**

This section of the project turns to the data gathering process for the statistical models, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. I gather data from various sources for both my independent and dependent variables. For the independent variables, which comprise both the aggregate (general reform) and five individual measures of neoliberal reform (trade liberalization, tax liberalization, financial liberalization, capital liberalization, and privatization), I use data developed initially and updated by Roberto Machado, Samuel Morley, and Stefano Pettinato and later collected by Peter Kingstone and Joseph Young (Machado, Morley, Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2008). The data for both general reform and the five individual policies are continuous measures ranging from 0 to 100, where the latter is considered the empirical maximum relative to the most liberalized country in the region. Specifically, the empirical maximum means that the country is the most reformed or free from government intervention in the specific policy area.
Figure 4.1 shows the different levels of general reform by country over time. Guatemala has the highest level of general reform, with an index of 88 percent in 2003. However, Venezuela had the lowest level of general reform with an index of 60 percent in 2003. The other countries fell in between Guatemala and Venezuela in terms of the general reform index. We observe from the graph that in 1975 the countries began at varying ranges of the general reform index. All the countries started at low levels of general reform and gradually increased the levels between 1975 and 2003. We also saw that in 1975 almost all the countries had a general reform index of between forty and sixty-five percent. In 2003, nearly all the countries, except Venezuela, had a general reform index between seventy-five percent and approximately eighty-
eight percent. Furthermore, countries increase their intensity of general reform over time between 1975 and 2003. However, it should also be noted that countries increased and decreased their general reform index during this period. Even though countries increase their level of general reform from 1975 to 2003, there are times during this period when some countries decrease their level of general reform. For instance, Venezuela reduces its level of general reform from 1995 to 1996 by 4 percent. In addition, Chile also decreases its level of general reform from 2000 to 2003 by approximately 2 percent. Chile also declines its level of general reform substantially between 1982 and 1983 by 17 percent. Other countries in Latin America follow a similar pattern of increasing and decreasing their level of general reform during this period.

In this section, I summarize the information for my dependent and control variables. For an extensive discussion of the data, please refer to Chapter 3. For the outcome variables -- which consist of female labor force participation rate, female employment in the manufacturing industry, and the gender inequality index --, I gather data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the first two variables and The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the third (ILO, 2020; UNDP, 2019). The data for the female labor force participation rate covers 15 major Latin American countries from 1975 to 2018 and is measured as the percentage of women in the labor force population (ILO, 2020). Female employment in the manufacturing industry consists of data for 13 Latin American countries from 1975 to 2018 and is measured as a percentage of the number of female manufacturing employees per 100,000 population (ILO, 2020). Lastly, gender inequality comprises data for 15 Latin American countries from 1995 to 2018 (UNDP, 2019).
The control variables consist of education, gross domestic product per capita, religion, and polity from numerous sources, which cover the 15 major Latin American countries as in the previous datasets. These control variables are relevant to this study due to their relationship to the outcome variable, discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. I use female average years of total schooling from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset to account for female education (Barro et al., 2013). The data for education cover countries from 1975 to 2010 (Barro et al., 2013). Education is a continuous variable measured in terms of female average years of total schooling, which ranges from 0 to 10.4. I use polity to measure the degree of democracy in the different countries. The data for polity consists of countries from 1975 to 2002 (Center for Systemic Peace, 2018; Kingstone and Young, 2008). Polity is measured on a scale that ranges from negative ten to positive ten.

I gather data for religion from the World Religion Project: National Religion Dataset, which covers countries from 1975 to 2010 (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). Religion is measured on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 100, where the latter indicates that one hundred percent of the population is religious. I collect data for GDP per capita from the World Bank to account for the size of the economy. The data for GDP per capita consist of countries from 1975 to 2018 (WB, 2020). GDP per capita is measured in current U.S. dollars for each country. This means that GDP is also a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 17,278 dollars. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the different variables in my study.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Reform</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Reform</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Reform</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Reform</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force Participation Rate</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Employment in Manufacturing</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Education</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>356.5</td>
<td>17,278.0</td>
<td>3,802.1</td>
<td>3,505.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>−9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics for the explanatory, outcome, and control variables. The table shows the number of data for each variable, minimum and maximum values, the mean, and standard deviation.

Modified from: Kingstone and Young, 2009


Methods

I utilize a nested analysis, a mixed-methods approach that joins a large N statistical analysis with case study analysis to guide the overall research design (Lieberman, 2005). This section focuses on the quantitative portion of this design. For the large N statistical analysis, I use the data gathered to create an unbalanced panel dataset. The structure of this imbalance came from the varying data time periods and the number of countries across the different variables in the dataset. Following the creation of the dataset, I created several different types of multivariate regressions using the R software, which includes ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and
random effects regressions. Specifically, I built 45 multivariate regression models of the three major types mentioned above using my three outcome variables: female labor force participation rate, female employment in manufacturing, and the gender inequality index. I created five multivariate regressions of the ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and random effects type for each of my three outcome variables. For example, the first ordinary least squares regression analyzes how neoliberal reform's aggregate and individual measures affect female employment. I add a country dummy to see the individual effects of neoliberal reform on the outcome of interest for each country. The second ordinary least squares regression analyzes the same relationship as the first regression with religion as a control variable. In the third ordinary least squares regression, I add religion and education as control variables to study the same relationships as the previous models. For the fourth ordinary least squares regression, I add GDP per capita as a control, and polity is added as a control for the fifth regression. I follow the same layout for all the other regressions that consist of fix effects or random effects and my other outcome variables.

Using Lieberman’s nested analysis approach, I choose the most complete and well-specified regression to guide my qualitative analysis. I use the Hausman test in the R software as a diagnostic test to help me decide which regression type is the most reliable for my panel data. The results from the Hausman test show that the fix effects model is the best regression to analyze my data compared to the ordinary least squares and random effects regressions (Bell and Jones, 2015). Dieleman and Templin also explain that the fixed effects are best used for panel data because they improve the estimates (Dieleman and Templin, 2014). All findings reported in the upcoming tables are a result of these fixed effects models.
## Findings

### Table 4.2

**Dependent variable:** Female Labor Force Participation Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Reform</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Reform</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Education</td>
<td>4.82***</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>6.00***</td>
<td>5.88***</td>
<td>5.91***</td>
<td>6.31***</td>
<td>7.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>−0.0002</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust R2</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Table 4.2 displays the model results for the relationship between neoliberal reform and the female labor force participation rate from 1975 to 2003.


Table 4.2 analyzes the relationship between neoliberal policies and the female labor force participation rate. Specifically, model 1 evaluates the relationship between the aggregate measure of neoliberalism known as general reform and its effect on the female labor force participation rate with religion, education, GDP per capita, and polity added as control variables. Model 2 examines the relationship between tax reform and the female labor force participation...
rate. Model 3 looks at the relationship between financial reform and the female labor force participation rate. Model 4 investigates the relationship between international trade and the female labor force participation rate. Model 5 explores the relationship between privatization and the female labor force participation rate. Model 6 considers the relationship between capital reform and the female labor force participation rate. Model 7 inspects the relationship between the five individual neoliberal reform policies and their effect on female labor force participation.

The control variables mentioned above that are added to model 1 are applied to all models.

The results from models 1 to 6 show that the female labor force participation rate increased for all policies except for capital reform. In other words, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of general reform, tax, trade, financial, international trade, privatization policies on the outcome, which lends support to the neoliberal argument. In model 7, privatization and tax and trade liberalization policies have a positive and statistically significant effect on the female labor force participation rate. This also supports the neoliberal perspective. Yet, financial liberalization does not affect the outcome. Capital reform has a negative and significant effect on the female labor force participation rate, supporting the feminist account. The diverse effects of the policies on the outcomes show that there is no consistent support for the neoliberal or feminist arguments. However, the small and varying effect of the policies on the female labor force participation rate is less meaningful than the consistent and helpful effects of education on the outcome.

Model 1 shows that a one-percent increase in general reform leads to a 0.21-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. Although this is the most significant effect on the female labor force participation rate of all the explanatory variables that capture reform in models 1 through 7, education has a more enormous and more beneficial effect. The policy
variables’ minor effects on the outcome are demonstrated by the fact that the reforms taken together versus any individual policy contribute to more women being active in the labor force. A country would have to achieve the empirical maximum of eighty-eight percent in all policy areas except financial and capital reform to see a twenty-one percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. The R-squared for model 1 is 0.59, which means that the model explains fifty-nine percent of the observed variation in the dependent variable.

We now turn to the results for the individual policy variables. In Model 2, the results illustrate that tax reform is positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in tax reform contributes to a 0.1-percent rise in the female labor force participation rate. This means that a country would need to deeply liberalize tax policy to see a slight increase in the female labor force participation rate. Specifically, the country would need to reach levels of reform in the area of tax policy between 70 and 80 percent to see these results. In comparison to models 2 through 6, model 7 analyzes the same relationships, but all the individual policies are included in the same model. Model 7 shows that a one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.08-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. Tax reform and the female labor force participation rate are positively correlated but statistically significant only at the 0.05 level. The results for this relationship are stable across models 2 and 7. However, the results demonstrate that education contributes to a more considerable boost in the outcome than tax reform. The R-squared for model 2 indicates that the model’s input explains fifty-seven percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

The results for model 3 show that financial reform has the most negligible effect on the outcome of interest. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.06-percent increase
in the female labor force participation rate. Therefore, financial reform does not contribute as much to the female labor force participation rate as the other individual and aggregate policies. However, the model demonstrates that financial reform is statistically significant and positively correlated with the outcome of interest. In Model 7, the results indicate that a one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.02-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate, but this finding is not statistically significant. The results for financial reform are not stable across models 3 and 7; therefore, I am less confident in the nature of this relationship. However, model 7 is the better, more complete model, so financial reform likely does not affect the female labor force participation rate. The R-squared for model 3 is 0.58.

The results for model 4 confirm that international trade is statistically significant and positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate. It also has one of the most prominent effects on the outcome of the policy variables, with a coefficient of 0.14. This means that a one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.14-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. Nevertheless, compared to the effects of education on the outcome variable, the effects of international trade are minuscule. The results indicate that one year of education contributes to a 5.91-unit increase in the female labor force participation rate. In model 7, the results show that a one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.16-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. The results for international trade are stable and robust across models 4 and 7, even when I control for other policy areas. The R-squared for model 4 reveals that the model’s input explains fifty-nine percent of the observed variation.

For model 5, the results display that privatization is also statistically significant and positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate. As an individual policy, it has the most significant effect on the female labor force participation rate, which means that
privatization contributes the most to women being active in the labor force compared to any other single policy. However, education has an enormous effect on the outcome than any variable in the model. Despite this outcome, a one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.15-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. The results for model 7 show that a one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.18-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. The results for privatization are stable across models 5 and 7. The R-squared for model 5 is 0.58.

The results for model 6 reveal that capital reform is negatively correlated with the female labor force participation rate and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.01-percent decrease in the female labor force participation rate. This means that capital reform does not seem to exert a statistically meaningful effect on the female labor force participation rate. In model 7, the results show that capital reform is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the outcome. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.08 decrease in the female labor force participation rate. The effects of capital reform on the outcome are minor when compared to the impact of education. The results for capital reform are different across models 6 and 7, which suggests that the results are also unstable. However, model 7 is a better and more complete model, which means capital reform is likely harmful to the female labor force participation rate. The R-squared for model 6 is 0.56. Model 7 has the highest R squared of all the models in table 4.2. The adjusted R-squared for model 7 is 0.61, which means that the additional explanatory variables improve the model compared to the other models in the table.

The results for the control variables from table 4.2 are mixed. The results for all models show that religion is not statistically significant but is positively correlated with the female labor
force participation rate for all cases except for international trade and capital reform. Education is statistically significant across all cases and positively correlated with the outcome variable. Therefore, education contributes to growth in the female labor force participation rate at a much higher rate than neoliberal reform. A one-year increase in education leads to a 4.82 to 7.07 unit increase in female labor force participation. This indicates the consistently helpful effects of education on the outcome variable when compared to neoliberal reform. However, GDP per capita and polity are not statistically significant, and their association with the outcome variable varies from positive to negative across the models.
### Table 4.3:

**Dependent variable:**
Female Employment in Manufacturing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Reform</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Reform</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Reform</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Education</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>-0.0000*</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust R2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Table 4.3 shows the model results for the relationship between neoliberal reform and female employment in the manufacturing industry from 1975 to 2003.


Table 4.3 examines the relationship between neoliberal policies and female employment in the manufacturing industry. Specifically, model 1 analyzes the relationship between the aggregate measure of neoliberal reform known as general reform and its effect on female
employment in the manufacturing sector with religion, education, GDP per capita, and polity add as control variables. Model 2 explores the relationship between tax reform and its effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector. Model 3 looks at the relationship between financial reform and its impact on female employment in the manufacturing industry. Model 4 assesses the relationship between international trade and its effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. Model 5 examines the relationship between privatization and its effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. Model 6 inspects the relationship between capital reform and its effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector. Model 7 explores the relationship between the five individual policies of neoliberal reform and their effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. The control variables mentioned in model 1 are applied to all models.

The results from models 1 through 6 show that all policies contribute to increase female employment in the manufacturing industry, except for international trade and privatization results. Specifically, general reform, tax, financial, and capital reform policies have a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome. This lends support to the neoliberal perspective. However, privatization has no effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector. International trade has a negative and statistically significant effect on the outcome. This supports the feminist argument. In model 7, tax reform has a positive and statistically significant effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. This lends support to the neoliberal perspective. Nevertheless, international trade has a negative and statistically significant effect on the outcome. This supports the feminist perspective. Financial reform, privatization, and capital reform have no effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. The various effects of the policies on the outcomes illustrate that there is no strong association between the variables.
that provide firm support for neoliberal or feminist perspectives. However, the magnitude of the results is small, which suggests a less meaningful effect on the outcome variable. In addition, education has a more significant, more beneficial effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector than all policy variables.

General reform is statistically significant and positively correlated with female employment in the manufacturing sector. A one-percent increase in general reform leads to a 0.02 unit increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry. This effect on the outcome is minuscule compared to one-year education, which increases female employment in manufacturing by 0.26-units. The model’s input explains twenty-nine percent of the observed variation in the dependent variable. Thus, relative to similar models in the same table, the regression line accounts for much variance in the outcome variable. Other modeling concerns include the reduced time span of the data and the number of observations available. The number of observations for female employment in the manufacturing industry is reduced to 201 compared to observations in the previous table. The time span for female employment in the manufacturing industry is from 1975 to 2018, with some variations among the different countries.

Now we turn to the results for the individual policy variables. The results for model 2 show that tax reform has the most considerable effect on female manufacturing employees per capita than all other individual policies. It is positively correlated with the outcome variable and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.02-percent increase in female manufacturing employees per capita. The effects of tax reform on the outcome are minor when compared to those of education. For countries to achieve this result for female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita, there needs to be deep liberalization of tax reform.
Compared to models 2 to 6, model 7 controls the other policy variables, while the former models do not. In model 7, the results show that a one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.02-percent increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita. Tax reform is positively correlated with the outcome and significant at the 0.01 level. The results for tax reform are stable across models 2 and 7. The model’s input explains thirty-five percent of the observed variation in the outcome.

Model 3 results reveal that financial reform has one of the most negligible effects on female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita of those independent variables positively correlated and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.01 unit increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita. This means that financial reform is not as effective in increasing female manufacturing employees per capita as education. The results for model 7 show that financial reform is negatively correlated and not statistically significant with the outcome of interest. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.001-percent decrease in female employment in the manufacturing industry. The results for financial reform vary across models 3 and 7, which means they are unstable. Therefore, I am less confident in the nature of this relationship. However, model 7 is a better, more complete model, so financial reform likely does not affect female employment in the manufacturing sector. The R-squared for model 3 is 0.29.

The results for model 4 illustrate that international trade is negatively correlated with female manufacturing employees per capita and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.02-percent decrease in female manufacturing employees per capita. This means that countries opening up their markets to international trade are more likely to see a reduction in female manufacturing employees per capita. Model 7’s results show that
international trade is negatively correlated with female manufacturing employees per capita. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.02-percent decrease in female manufacturing employees per capita. International trade is significant at the 0.01 level. The results for international trade are stable across models 4 and 7. The model’s input explains thirty percent of the observed variation in the response variable.

For model 5, the results confirm that privatization is also negatively correlated but is not statistically significant with the outcome variable. A one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.001-percent decrease in the female manufacturing employee per capita. This means that privatization has a smaller and more negative effect on the outcome than education, which contributes to a more significant, more beneficial impact. The results for model 7 show that privatization is positively correlated but not statistically significant with the outcome of interest. A one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.002-percent increase in female manufacturing employees per capita. The results for privatization are different across models 5 and 7. This means that the results are unstable, and as a result, we are less confident in the nature of this relationship. However, model 7 is better and more complete, so privatization does not affect female manufacturing employees per capita. The R-squared for model 5 is 0.25.

The results for model 6 shows that capital reform is statistically significant and positively correlated with female manufacturing employees per capita. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.01-percent increase in female manufacturing employees per capita. Like financial reform, capital reform also has one of the most miniature effects on the outcome of interest, especially when compared to education. Countries would need deep liberalization of capital reform to achieve better results for female manufacturing employees per capita. For model 7, the results indicate that capital reform is positively correlated but not statistically
significant with the outcome. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.01-percent increase in female manufacturing employees per capita. The results for capital reform vary across models 6 and 7, which means that these findings are not stable. However, model 7 is more complete, so capital reform likely does not affect female manufacturing employees per capita. The R-squared for model 6 is 0.28. The results for model 7 show that the adjusted R squared is 0.38. Although model 7 has more covariates than all other models in the table, it still has an adjusted R squared larger than any other model.

The results for the control variables in table 2 are mixed. Religion is consistently negatively correlated with the outcome variable and not statistically significant for all policy areas. In contrast, education is consistently positively correlated with the outcome variable and statistically significant for all cases. A one-year increase in education leads to a 0.26 to 0.45 unit increase in the outcome of interest. Therefore, education has a more beneficial impact on female manufacturing employees per capita than neoliberal policies. Educating women is better than applying neoliberal reform to improve female employment in the manufacturing industry. GDP per capita is negatively correlated and statistically significant at varying levels for all policy areas. A one U.S. dollar increase in GDP per capita leads to a 0.0001 unit decrease in female manufacturing employees per capita. Polity is statistically significant in half of the cases, and its association with the outcome variable varies from positive to negative across the model. A one-unit increase in polity leads from a 0.002 unit decrease to a 0.002 increase in the outcome of interest.
Table 4.4

**Dependent variable:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Reform</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Reform</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin Reform</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Reform</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Education</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust R2</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Table 4.4 demonstrates the model results for the relationship between neoliberal reform and the gender inequality index from 1995 to 2003.


Table 4.4 analyzes the relationship between neoliberal policies and the gender inequality index. Specifically, model 1 examines the relationship between the aggregate measure of neoliberal reform known as general reform and its effect on the gender inequality index with religion, education, GDP per capita, and polity add as control variables. Model 2 looks at the relationship between tax reform and its effect on the gender inequality index. Model 3 explores...
the relationship between financial reform and its effect on the gender inequality index. Model 4 evaluates the relationship between international trade and its effect on the gender inequality index. Model 5 investigates the relationship between privatization and the gender inequality index. Model 6 assesses the relationship between capital reform and its effect on the gender inequality index. Model 7 tests the relationship between the five individual neoliberal reform policies and their effect on the gender inequality index. The control variables mentioned above in model 1 are applied to all models. The time span included in the models for the gender inequality index is from 1995 to 2003. This means that these models have fewer observations per country. The number of observations in the models is 125, which is less than the observations in the previous tables.

The results from models 1 through 6 show that general reform, international trade, and privatization are the only policies that contribute to reducing the gender inequality index. This lends support to the neoliberal perspective. Tax, financial, and capital reform do not affect the gender inequality index. In model 7, privatization reduces the gender inequality index. This supports the neoliberal argument. In contrast, capital reform increases the gender inequality index, strengthening the feminist account. Yet, tax reform, financial reform, and international trade policies do not affect the outcome. The diverging effects of the policies on the gender inequality index show that there is no consistent and strong relationship between the two variables that provide firm support for the neoliberal and feminist perspectives. However, the model results are much smaller than education, which means the statistically significant effects of the policy variables are trivial.

The results for model 1 indicate that general reform is negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and statistically significant. This means that a one-percent increase in
general reform leads to a 0.002 unit decrease in the gender inequality index. The model’s input explains forty-six percent of the observed variation.

We now turn to the results for the individual policies. The results for model 2 illustrate that tax reform is negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.001-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. When we compare models 2 through 6 to 7, we saw that the latter controls for all individual policy variables while the former only looks at a single policy in the model. For model 7, the results indicate that tax reform is also negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.0003-percent decrease in the outcome variable. The results for tax reform are stable across models 2 and 7. The R squared for model 2 is 0.44.

For model 3, the results illustrate that financial reform also is negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.0003-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. The results for model 7 reveal that financial reform is negatively correlated with the outcome variable and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.0004-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. The results are stable across models 3 and 7. The model’s input explains forty-four percent of the observed variation in the outcome variable.

The results for model 4 demonstrate that international trade is negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. International trade has some effect on the outcome variable, but minute compared to the effects of education. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.002-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. However, one year of education contributes to a 0.03 decrease in the gender inequality
index. For model 7, the results show that international trade is negatively correlated with the outcome variable and not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.002-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. The results for international trade differ across models 4 and 7. This means that the results are unstable, and I am less confident in the nature of this relationship. However, model 7 is better and more complete, so international trade likely does not affect the gender inequality index. The model’s input explains forty-five percent of the observed variation in the dependent variable.

For model 5, the results indicate that privatization is also negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.001 decrease in the gender inequality index. Privatization has the smallest effect on the outcome variable of those considered significant, especially when compared to education. Although international trade and privatization seem to be the driving factors in the results for general reform, these results are so small that they are trivial. The results for model 7 reveal that a one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.001 decrease in the gender inequality index. Privatization is negatively correlated with the outcome of interest and beneficial to gender equality. Privatization is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results for privatization are stable across models 5 and 7. The model’s input explains forty-nine percent of the observed variation in the outcome.

The results for model 6 indicate that capital reform is positively correlated with the gender inequality index but not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.0004-percent increase in the outcome variable. For model 7, the results suggest that capital reform is positively correlated with the outcome variable and statistically significant. A one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.001-percent increase in the gender inequality
index. Capital reform has a positive and statistically meaningful effect on the outcome variable. However, education has a larger and more helpful effect on the outcome than capital reform. The results for capital reform vary across models 6 and 7. Therefore, the findings for capital reform are unstable. As a result, I have less confidence in the nature of this relationship. However, model 7 provides a better and more complete model, so capital reform harms gender inequality. The model’s input explains forty-five percent of the observed variation in the outcome. The adjusted R square for model 7 is 0.41. This means that even though model 7 has the most explanatory variables of all the models in the table, it still has the largest adjusted R square.

The results for the control variables in table 3 are mixed. Religion and education are consistently negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and significant across all cases. A one-unit increase in religion leads to a 0.002 decrease in the gender inequality index. This means that religion is beneficial for improving gender inequality. A one-year increase in education leads to a 0.03 decrease in the gender inequality index. This finding suggests that education is more beneficial for gender equality than neoliberal reform. Therefore, the stable and consistent effects of education on gender inequality show that it is beneficial to women. GDP per capita is not statistically significant, and its association with the outcome variable varies from positive to negative across the model. However, polity is positively correlated with the gender inequality index in all cases but not statistically significant. GDP per capita and polity do not seem to have a statistically meaningful effect on the gender inequality index.

**Discussion**

The models all reveal that countries need to achieve close to maximum liberalization except for financial and capital reform to see a negligible effect on the female labor force
participation rate. The minor effects of neoliberal policies on the outcome suggest that they may be weakly related and less meaningful when compared to the results for education. In terms of female employment in the manufacturing sector, countries would need to increase neoliberal reform by the same level with only international trade and tax reform to see a slight increase in the outcome. The models also show that countries would need to increase privatization to one hundred percent to have a minor reduction in gender inequality. Thus, the results from the policy models are so small that they seem inconsequential. In addition, the inconsistent effects of the policy variables on the outcomes suggest no findings or support for the neoliberal and feminist theories.

In Table 4.2, model 7 illustrate that the relationship between neoliberal reform and the female labor force participation rates is mainly about tax reform, international trade, and privatization. In other words, the results show that these individual policies have the most considerable statistically significant effects on the outcome variable of the five individual policies. However, these effects of the policy variables on the outcomes are minor when compared to education. The results for model 7 indicate that tax reform is positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate and statistically significant. The coefficient for tax reform is 0.08, which means that it exerts the third-largest effect on the outcome variable of the individual policies. International trade is also positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The coefficient for international trade is 0.16, which is the second-largest coefficient compared to the five individual policies in the model. This means that international trade exerts the second most significant effect on the outcome variable of the individual policies in the model. Privatization is also positively correlated with the female labor force participation rate and statistically significant. The
The coefficient for privatization is 0.18, which means that it has the most significant coefficient of the five individual policies in the model. This means it exerts the largest effect on the outcome of the individual policies. The divergent effects of the policy variable on the outcome do not support neoliberal and feminist arguments. However, education has the largest effect on the outcome of all variables in the model. One year of education contributes to a 4.48-unit increase in the female labor force participation rate.

In Table 4.3, model 7 suggests that the relationship between neoliberalism and female employment in the manufacturing sector is mostly about tax and trade reform. Tax reform and international trade exert the most prominent and statistically meaningful effect on the outcome variable. Again, the effects of tax reform on female employment in the manufacturing sector are minor that it is also less meaningful, especially when compared to education. Tax reform is positively correlated with female manufacturing employees per capita and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for tax reform is 0.02-percent which means that it has the most significant coefficient of all the five individual policies in the model. In contrast, international trade is negatively correlated with the outcome of interest but statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for international trade is 0.02-percent which is the largest of all the individual policies in the table with the exception of tax reform and statistically significant. This means that international trade and tax reform exert the largest effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector but in opposite directions. The inconsistent support among the policies on the outcome variable demonstrates that there is no consistent support for the neoliberal and feminist perspectives. However, education has a more enormous and more beneficial effect on female employment in manufacturing than tax reform and international trade.
In Table 4.4, model 7 indicate that the relationship between neoliberalism and the gender inequality index is mostly about privatization and capital reform. In other words, privatization and capital reform exert the most extensive and statistically meaningful effect on the outcome variable. However, the relationship between neoliberal reform and the gender inequality index is trivial, especially when compared to education. The results show that privatization is negatively correlated with the gender inequality index and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient for privatization, which is 0.001, is the most prominent and statistically meaningful effect of the five individual policies. Privatization exerts the largest effect on the outcome of interest in a negative direction. In contrast, the results illustrate that capital reform is positively correlated with the gender inequality index and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient for capital reform is 0.001, which is the largest and statistically meaningful of the five individual policies except for privatization. Capital reform also has the largest effect on the gender inequality index in a positive direction. The dissimilar effects of the policy variables on the gender inequality index show that there is no consistent association between the two variables that lend strong support to either the neoliberal or feminist theories.

When we compared the results across all the outcomes, we found differences between the same individual policy variable results. The different effects of the policy variable on the outcomes suggest that this variation does not lend any support for the neoliberal and feminist perspectives. Model 7 for all tables shows that international trade increases the female labor force participation rate but contributes to a decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector. However, international trade does not seem to affect gender inequality. The results indicate that a one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.16-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. However, the results paint a different picture in terms of
female employment in the manufacturing sector. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.02-percent decrease in female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita. When we look at the gender inequality index, we find a different result. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.002 decrease in the gender inequality index. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. These results indicate that international trade contributes positively to the female labor force participation rate, negatively to female employment in the manufacturing sector per capita, and does not likely affect the gender inequality index. This difference in results may be attributed to the fact that international trade or increased foreign competition is not beneficial to the manufacturing industry, even though the literature suggests it.

The results for model 7 illustrate the different effects of capital reform across all three outcomes. Again, the varying support of the capital reform on the outcomes demonstrates that there is no consistent and strong support for the neoliberal and feminist theories. Tables 4.2 and 4.4 indicate that capital reform declines the female labor force participation rate and increases the gender inequality index. Table 4.3 shows that capital reform likely does not affect female manufacturing employees per capita. The results show that a one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.08-percent decrease in the female labor force participation rate. However, a one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.001-percent increase in the gender inequality index. These findings suggest that capital reform is harmful to the female labor force participation rate and gender inequality. However, the results for capital reform are so small that they are less meaningful when compared to the effect of education on the outcome.

The results from all models reveal that education is statistically significant for the outcomes of interest. Education has a helpful, beneficial effect on gender equality. As previously
stated, education is measured in female average years of schooling while all policy variables are measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100. The model results show that countries significantly reduce gender inequality at the maximum level of reform except for capital reform. This means that countries would need to be at their most liberalize state to achieve these results. However, the results show that countries achieve the same level of reduction in gender inequality or more with two to five more years of schooling. In other words, the results indicate that it is more feasible to add a few additional years of education than for countries to achieve the maximum level of reform to reduce gender inequality. Therefore, education is a better alternative to reducing gender inequality than neoliberal reform.

**General Reform**

The results for all models reveal that general reform has a small but helpful on the female labor force participation rate, female manufacturing employee per capita, and the gender inequality index. All these findings are statistically significant for the outcomes of interest. That is, general reform has a minute but beneficial effect on gender equality. Again, general reform is measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100. This means that the model outputs for general reform are translated into percentages. With the exception of financial and capital reforms, general reform improves the female labor force participation rate. A one-percent increase in general reform leads to a 0.21-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. Countries need to increase the intensity of general reform by 11 percent of the most liberalized state, Argentina, at 89 percent in 1994 to see a 2.1-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. In other words, the country would need to reduce government intervention minimally in the different policy areas to see the results mentioned above.
Although general reform is beneficial for female labor force participation, it still has a more negligible effect on the female labor force participation rate than education. This is also shown by the fact that when countries increase the intensity of general reform by fifty percent, the resulting increase in the female labor force participation rate is 9.3 percent. Nevertheless, education achieves this same result or more with just three additional years of schooling. Furthermore, countries need to implement the maximum level of general reform based on the most liberalized state, Argentina, at 89 percent, with the sole exception of financial and capital reforms to see a substantial increase in the female labor force participation rate. The broader significance of this finding is that general reform is only slightly effective in improving the female labor force participation rate compared to education. It took one year of education to increase the female labor force participation rate by 4.82-units whereas, general reform needs to be increased by approximately 23 percent to achieve the same results.

When we examined the effect of general reform on female employment in manufacturing, we found that it is beneficial to improving the outcome. However, we should keep in mind that policymakers need to implement tax reform as the primary policy to improve the outcome variable. A one-percent increase in general reform leads to a 0.02 increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector. It takes more intensity in terms of general reform to increase female employment in manufacturing than it would if policymakers use education. If general reform is increased by ten percent or 8.9, we would only see a 0.2-percent increase in female employment in manufacturing. This means that general reform contributes to a small percentage of female employment in the manufacturing industry.

Similar to female employment in manufacturing, general reform contributes an even smaller percentage to gender inequality. However, general reform needs to consist of only
privatization policies to reduce gender inequality. The results from table 4.4 indicate that a one-percent increase in general reform contributes to a 0.002 decrease in the gender inequality index. This means that if general reform is increased by ten percent, it would only contribute to a 0.02 percent reduction in gender inequality. A ten percent increase in general reform means a slight increase in the absence of government control in all policy areas. Expressly, a ten percent increase refers to the most liberalized state in data which is Argentina, with approximately 89 percent liberalization. Thus, a ten percent increase would be an 8.9 percent increase in liberalization for the specific country. An example of this is Bolivia from 1970 to 1986, where liberalization increased from 47.1 percent to 55.5 percent. A 0.002 decrease in the gender inequality index means a less than one percent improvement in the outcome, similar to Argentina’s gender inequality index from 2016 to 2017. Furthermore, we see from all three models that general reform is beneficial for improving gender inequality but only slightly. It will take a larger intensity of general reform for there to be a greater reduction in gender inequality.

Neoliberal reform help reduce gender inequality in the labor market by providing employment opportunities for women that they would not have otherwise had. Sadasivam states, “In many adjusting countries, however, women have gained new employment opportunities in the large export processing zones that have developed in response to the globalization of production and the reconfiguration of the international labor market” (Sadasivam, 1997, 641). Therefore, neoliberal reform provides employment opportunities for women, which help reduce gender inequality in employment and other directly and indirectly related areas. Eastin and Prakash state, “Neoliberals or growth optimists suggest that economic development should enhance women’s status because it encourages social integration, supports women’s investment in human capital, and creates employment opportunities for women in relatively higher-paying
nonfarm sectors. Similarly, as growth drivers, international trade and foreign direct investment diffuse productivity-enhancing and labor-saving technologies and encourage norms of gender equity” (Eastin and Prakash, 2013, 157). Therefore, neoliberal reform contributes to increasing gender equality because it provides employment opportunities for women and their investment in human capital.

**Tax Reform**

All the models except for the gender inequality index indicate that tax reform is statistically significant. However, the statistically significant results from the models are small, and their effects became negligible. Tax reform is beneficial for the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector but does not have a statistically meaningful effect on the gender inequality index. In terms of female labor force participation rate, the results for model 7 in table 4.2 show that a one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.08-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. This means that to have a one-percent increase in the female labor force participation, the level of tax liberalization would have to increase by 16 percent. This means that tax reform has a negligible effect on the female labor force participation rate. Furthermore, even if tax reform increases to its maximum level of 78.5 percent, as seen in Bolivia in 1994, it would still only increase the female labor force participation rate to 6.3 percent. Similar to the general reform, tax reform has a small but helpful effect on the outcome, but it is less meaningful when the results for education are compared.

When we look at female employment in the manufacturing industry, the effect size is even smaller than that for the female labor force participation rate. A one-percent increase in tax reform leads to a 0.02 increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry. It would
take a sixty-six-percent increase of the most liberalized state in tax liberalization to a one-percent increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector. This suggests that tax reform also has a small effect on female employment in the manufacturing sector, especially when compared to education. In terms of the gender inequality index, the results show that tax reform reduces gender inequality but has no statistically meaningful effect on the outcome variable. Therefore, tax reform is beneficial for female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector but is not statistically meaningful for reducing gender inequality.

Tax reform contributes to increasing female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector but has no statistically meaningful relationship with gender equality. Tax reform has a significant effect on women in the labor market but does not have a statistically meaningful effect on reducing gender inequality. Scholars point out that tax reform has no statistical association with gender equality aside from women’s labor force participation rate, which can be affected by tax policy changes (Grown and Komatsu, 2010). Grown and Komatsu notes, “Explicit forms of gender bias refer to specific regulations or provisions in tax law that treat men and women differently. They are more common in personal income tax arrangements than other forms of taxation in developed and developing countries. Implicit forms of gender bias, on the other hand, relate to provisions in tax systems that, because of systematically gendered social and economic customs and arrangements, have a different impact on men and women. These may be found in personal income tax system if they have joint filing requirements that tax secondary earner income (primarily women) at a higher marginal tax rate than primary earner income, thus affecting women’s labor supply and other decisions” (Grown and Komatsu, 2010, 6). Therefore, the evidence suggests that tax reform or policies do not directly target issues of gender equality. However, it affects female labor force participation
and female employment in the manufacturing sector due to the second earner tax, which affects women’s labor supply. It seems that the removal of the second earner tax, which taxes women at a higher rate than their income, contributes to an increase in the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector. This is related to the idea that women have more disposable income when they are not taxed at a rate higher than their incomes, which helps incentivize them to work in the labor market. Lalumia found that removing the second-earner tax encouraged female labor force participation rates (Lalumia, 2017). The author asserts that, “In addition to causing an inefficient distortion in the labor supply decisions of men and women, the current tax treatment of married couples lowers married women’s labor force participation and impedes their labor market progress relative to men” (Lalumia, 2017, 2). Therefore, tax reform mainly affects the supply of women in the labor market more significantly than gender equality.

**Financial Reform**

The models illustrate that financial reform is not statistically significant across all outcomes in model 7. However, financial reform is beneficial for the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector when the other individual policies are not accounted for. The different effects of financial reform on the outcome show that there is no consistent support for the neoliberal and feminist perspectives. In terms of the female labor force participation rate, the results show that a one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.06-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. This means that it would take a fifty-percent increase of the most liberalized state Argentina in 1995 at 98.6 percent in financial liberalization to contribute to a three-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. This means that financial liberalization contributes to a slight but positive
increase in the female labor force participation rate. Financial liberalization does not significantly affect the outcome variable when the other policies are introduced into the model and held constant.

When we look at female employment in manufacturing, we see that the effect size is even smaller when compared to those for the female labor force participation rate. A one-percent increase in financial reform leads to a 0.01-percent increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry. Financial reform would need to be at its maximum level of 98.6 percent to see a one-percent increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry. Again, it seems that the effects of financial reform on the two outcome variables illustrate a minuscule effect. Financial reform would need to be at its maximum level to see a small increase in the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing sector.

In terms of the gender inequality index, the results show that financial reform contributes to a decline in gender inequality, but it is not statistically significant. These findings conclude that financial reform does not affect female labor force participation, female employment in manufacturing, and gender inequality.

Financial reform likely does not affect the female labor force participation, female manufacturing employee per capita, and the gender inequality index. Baden highlight that, generally, financial reform has no apparent connection with gender equality. Baden states, “How do gender issues relate to financial liberalization? At first sight, there is no clear connection. Financial liberalization means the removal of government ceilings on interest rates and other controls on financial intermediaries. It is concerned with macro-economic aggregates (interest rates, savings, and investment) and conditions in formal financial markets…From this viewpoint, particular patterns of aggregate savings and investment, for instance, might be associated with
underlying gender-related variables such as the feminization of labor force” (Baden, 1996, 1). This means that financial liberalization might not be directly connected with gender inequality, but it is indirectly related to the female supply in the labor market. The author suggests that financial liberalization could be connected to gender inequality based on credit allocation between the different sectors. For instance, if credit is allocated to the sectors where women are concentrated, financial liberalization is directly connected to gender inequality (Baden, 1996). However, it seems that women are concentrated in the informal sector of the economy, where they could not apply for resources provided through financial liberalization. Thus, these women turn to alternative sources of credit, such as family members, for assistance. Furthermore, the lack of connection between financial liberalization and gender inequality may be explained based on where women are concentrated in the economy and the lack of credit in the informal sector.

**International Trade**

The models illustrate that international trade is helpful to the female labor force participation rate but harmful to female employment in the manufacturing sector and is statistically significant. However, international trade likely does not affect the gender inequality index. The differing effect of international trade on the outcome illustrates that the evidence does not support the neoliberal and feminist theories. In terms of the female labor force participation rate, the results show that a one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.16-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. This means that international trade would need to be increased by 10 percent of the most liberalized state, Costa Rica, in 2003 at 99.78 percent for a 1.6-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. This means that international trade has one of the more significant effects on the outcome of the individual
policies. Therefore, it would take a minor increase in international trade to see a higher result for the female labor force participation rate, but not when compared to education.

When we examine female employment in the manufacturing industry, we see that international trade has a negative effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry. A one-percent increase in international trade leads to a 0.02 decline in female employment in the manufacturing industry. This means that it would take a fifty-percent increase in international trade for a one-percent decrease in female employment in manufacturing. Although international trade contributes to a decline in female employment in the manufacturing industry, it has a tiny effect on the outcome, compared to education that contributes to more extensive and beneficial effects. It would take the maximum level of international trade at approximately one hundred percent, as seen in Costa Rica in 2003, to be a 2-percent decrease in female employment in the manufacturing industry.

When we look at the gender inequality index, we see that international trade does not likely affect the outcome. A change in international trade does not correlate with a shift in the gender inequality index. In other words, international trade reduces gender inequality, but the effects are not statistically significant.

International trade increases female labor force participation and decreases the female employment rate in the manufacturing industry but does not statistically associate with the gender inequality index. This suggests that international trade connects with the female labor supply in the labor market but not gender equality. Saure and Zoabi suggest that international trade and female employment are connected. Swamy also agrees and states, “Has trade benefitted female workers in developing countries? Evidence from a number of countries showed that export growth had created wage employment for women in large numbers. Their incomes,
quality of life, and status have improved. However, gender equality has not always improved” (Swamy, 2004, 1). Gaddis and Pieters suggest that the rise in female labor force participation is associated with increased male unemployment (Gaddis and Pieters, 2012). The authors state, “…trade reform did create new opportunities for women, but increased labor security and male unemployment most likely also induced women to join the labor force” (Gaddis and Pieters, 2012, 27). In addition, international trade contributes to a decline in female manufacturing employees per capita due to increased foreign competition, which causes businesses to close. As a result, the closure of businesses in the manufacturing sector due to greater trade openness contributes to a decline in male and female employment in this industry. Despite these connections, there is no statistically meaningful association between international trade and gender equality.

Privatization

The models establish that privatization is statistically significant for all models except for female employment in the manufacturing industry. The different effect of privatization on the outcomes does not lend to the neoliberal and feminist perspectives. In terms of the female labor force participation rate, the results show that a one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.18-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate. To observe a 2-percent increase in the female labor force participation rate, we would need to increase privatization by 12 percent of the most liberalized state, Bolivia, in 2000 and 2001 at 100 percent liberalization. An example of this increase is approximately Argentina from 1975 to 1995. Similar to international trade, privatization has the largest effect on the outcome of the individual policies. This means it took fewer increases in privatization to achieve a more considerable increase in the female labor force
participation rate, but not when compared to education. The relationship between privatization and the female labor force participation rate is the most stable and robust.

When we examine female employment in the manufacturing sector, we see that privatization is not statistically significant. A one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.002 increase in female employment in the manufacturing sector. In other words, privatization increases female employment in the manufacturing sector when the other individual policies are held constant. However, the results are not statistically significant, which means that there is no correlation between the two variables.

When we look at the gender inequality index, we see that a one-percent increase in privatization leads to a 0.001-percent decrease in the gender inequality index. This means that if privatization increases by 10 percent, we will only see a 0.01-percent decline in gender inequality. Furthermore, privatization would have to be increased to its maximum level of 100 percent to see a 0.1 decline in gender inequality. This suggests that the result for privatization is substantively non-significant. Even when privatization increases to its empirically maximum level, it still does not reduce gender inequality substantially. Therefore, privatization only reduces gender inequality by a small percentage, especially compared to the effects of education on the outcome variable.

Privatization contributes to an increased female labor force participation rate and a decreased gender inequality index. However, there is no statistical association between privatization and female employment in the manufacturing industry. Therefore, privatization is beneficial for gender disparity which means that countries that implement these policies should improve this outcome variable. Stintson states that, “…there is alarming evidence that privatization is eliminating and eroding good jobs for women in the public sector as well as a
range of public services designed to support women’s participation in the labor market” (Stinson, 2004, 18). While privatization does cause women to lose their employment, men are also suffering the same job losses. This means that women are often replacing men in the new employment created through privatization, which reduces gender disparity. Geldstein found that both men and women are fired from their positions in Argentina, and younger women are the ones who are being rehired (Geldstein, 1997). Geldstein states, “Thus, a replacement process has been occurring within privatized companies in which older workers with on-the-job training are replaced by younger, formally qualified unprotected non-union workers” (Geldstein, 1997, 552). He highlights that these workers that are rehired are primarily women. The author mentions, “In the specific case of women hired for customer service and sales, or promoted to front office positions such as secretary, additional criteria have been introduced; the women should be “young and beautiful”; that is, a potential sexual or, at least, ornamental object” (Geldstein, 1997, 562). Therefore, in this way, privatization contributes to a reduction in gender disparity. However, privatization also increases the female labor force participation rate based on the rising unemployment rate among men. Geldstein highlights that increasing female labor force participation is a strategy for household survival (Geldstein, 1997). This means that women are entering the labor force in increased numbers due to the massive layoffs from privatization among male heads of households (Geldstein, 1997). Therefore, privatization is improving economic opportunities for women at the expense of men and the household.

**Capital Reform**

The models demonstrate that capital reform is harmful to the gender inequality index and female labor force participation rate. However, capital reform likely does not affect female employment in the manufacturing sector. The findings for the female labor force participation
rate and the gender inequality index are statistically significant. These findings suggest that the different effect of capital reform on the outcomes does not lend support for the neoliberal or feminist theories. Regarding the female labor force participation rate, a one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.08-decrease in the female labor force participation rate. This means that it would take a ten-percent increase of the maximum level of 100 percent, as seen in Costa Rica in the late 1980s to early 2000s, in capital reform to lead to a 0.8-decrease in the female labor participation rate. Therefore, it would take the maximum level of capital reform to achieve an 8-percent decrease in the female labor force participation rate. This means that capital reform reduces the female labor force participation rate slightly but is also not beneficial for the outcome.

When we look at female employment in the manufacturing sector, we see that a one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.01-increase in female employment in manufacturing. However, the results are not statistically significant.

When we examine the gender inequality index, we see that a one-percent increase in capital reform leads to a 0.001-percent increase in the gender inequality index. This means that capital reform is not beneficial for gender equality. Furthermore, when countries implement capital reform, it increases gender inequality rather than decrease. The results also illustrate that capital reform contributes to a slight increase in the gender inequality index, which means a ten-percent increase of the most liberalized state at 100 percent in capital reform leads to a 0.1-increase in the gender inequality index. If countries increase liberalization of capital reform by fifty percent, they would observe a 0.5-percent increase in gender inequality. This suggests that countries would need to adopt the maximum level of capital reform to see a one-percent increase in gender inequality. This means that countries that adopt complete levels of liberalization in
terms of capital reform would see a small and unhelpful increase in gender inequality. Therefore, capital reform is not beneficial for gender equality.

Capital reform decreases the female labor participation rate and increases female employment in the manufacturing sector and the gender inequality index. Therefore, capital reform is not beneficial for gender equality and helpful for countries that implement it. Studies highlight that capital machinery becomes cheaper when capital liberalization is adopted and replaces people in their employment. Beker states, “This phenomenon was favored by a drastic shift in the relative price between labor and capital: the radical reduction of import tariffs significantly reduced the price of imported capital goods and this induced a sharp process of capital deepening” (Beker, 2012, 10). Furthermore, capital liberalization reduces the female labor force participation rate because of the restructuring of the jobs to capital machinery, which demands more skilled workers. Since women are often concentrated in unskilled labor jobs, this change in the labor market contributes to most women seeking employment, possibly in the informal sector. Some women obtain these positions in the manufacturing industry due to their prior work experience or education. However, capital reform is not beneficial for gender equality because it divides skilled and unskilled workers, which might be between men and women. Furthermore, it contributes to further wage inequality between the genders in the labor market because men who previously held capital-intensive positions are more likely to get hired than women who held unskilled work. Komura and Ogawa explain that, “Specifically, we describe how, in terms of capital market integration, globalization alters the gender gap in wage rates through changes in labor demand for capital intensive sectors” (Komura and Ogawa, 2019, 1). Therefore, capital reform leads to further gender inequality in terms of wages between men and women.
Education

The results from model 7 across all tables show that education leads to a 0.19-decrease to a 4.48 increase in the outcomes. Table 4.2 indicates that education contributes to a 4.48 increase in the female labor force participation rate. Table 4.3 reveals that education leads to a 0.31 increase in female employment in the manufacturing industry. Table 4.4 illustrates that education leads to a 0.19 decline in the gender inequality index. Education is measured as female average years of total schooling. In other words, a one-unit increase in education translates to one additional year of female schooling. In contrast, it took a fifty-five to one hundred increase in tax reform of the most liberalized state at 78.4 percent to achieve these same results for the outcome. A country will have to achieve a little over half of the maximum level of reform in that region to improve the female labor force participation rate. Therefore, it is not practical for a country to achieve a little over half of the maximum level of reform for that region as it is to add one more year of education. Furthermore, it is more feasible to add three to five years of education to achieve the same increase in the female labor force participation rate that we would observe from having a maximum level of general reform. The results show that it might be easier for governments to invest in more education than increase policy reform. These findings for education are the most robust and stable across all models.

Education is an important determinant of women’s economic status because it helps reduce overall gender inequality (Buchmann, 1996). Buchmann states, “education greatly improves a woman’s chances of finding stable, paid employment. In Brazil, for example, women who completed secondary school were eight times more likely to participate in the formal sector than those with little educational training” (Buchmann, 1996, 1). Therefore, education reduces gender inequality because it enables women to enter and stay in the formal labor market and be
economically independent. In addition, female education is also directly related to better nutrition, health, hygiene, and child survival rates (Browne and Barrett, 1991). Therefore, female education is beneficial to women and their families and the country’s overall economic development. Education provides employment opportunities for women, as does neoliberal reform. However, education provides these employment opportunities to women more efficiently than neoliberal reform. Buchmann also adds, “On average, an extra year of schooling results in two more years of labor market participation…In many societies where women are expected to stay home, those who work in the public sphere are often viewed as challenging traditional norms. Therefore, women need self-confidence, knowledge of opportunities, and credentials to gain access to wage employment. For these reasons, education may be a factor that is more important to women than to men, as they enter the labor force” (Buchmann, 1996, 1). Therefore, education enables women to formal employment and economic independence in the labor market. These opportunities reduce gender inequality and increase economic development. Therefore, governments should consider investing in more education instead of more liberalization to improve gender equality and the economy. Governments in the region often report that liberalization does not improve equity in the region and are hesitant to implement the policies. As a result, investing in education is a possible alternative to liberalization since education allows for more opportunities for women and the country’s economic development.

Conclusion

In sum, the results from the statistical analysis illustrate that general reform is beneficial for gender equality. Therefore, general reform with the sole exception of financial and capital reform contribute to reducing gender inequality. However, general reform leads to a negligible effect on gender inequality. It is more effective to utilize education to reduce gender inequality.
than it is to rely on general reform. In other words, it took one year of education to reduce more gender inequality than is provided by general reform. This means that education provides a beneficial and more significant effect on gender inequality than general reform. When we analyze the individual policies, we observe that international trade and privatization are the two central policies driving the effects of general reform when we look at the female labor force participation rate. In other words, these policies contribute to the reduction in gender inequality in terms of the labor force participation rate between men and women.

When we look at female employment in the manufacturing sector, we see that tax reform and international trade are the driving forces behind the effects of general reform on female employment in the manufacturing sector. Tax reform contributes to a reduction in the gender disparity in terms of employment between men and women in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, international trade increases the disparity between men and women in employment in the manufacturing sector.

When we analyzed the findings for the gender inequality index, we saw that privatization and capital reform are the driving forces behind general reform. Privatization leads to a reduction in gender inequality, while capital reform increases the same outcome variable. Overall, neoliberal reform has a small and helpful effect on gender equality, but education is more effective at reducing gender inequality than the general reform and its five individual policies. However, the differing effects of the policy variables do not support the neoliberal and feminist perspectives.
Implications

The policy implication for the female labor force participation rate is that policymakers should prioritize education to see women become more active in the labor force. Policymakers in Latin America should avoid neoliberal reform because it has a small and insignificant effect on women’s participation in the labor market. Although the focus of the study is on economic policy, one core finding is that education is significant for the female labor force participation rate. Therefore, policymakers should focus on investing in programs that boost educational opportunities for women instead of adopting neoliberal reform.

The policy implication for female employment in the manufacturing sector is that politicians should not prioritize tax reform. The results indicate that tax reform has a negligible effect on the outcome variable. Therefore, policymakers should not focus on adopting tax reform to improve employment opportunities for women in the manufacturing industry. I recommend that policymakers not adopt trade liberalization policies because these seem to be harmful to female employment in the manufacturing industry. Although tax reform help improves the outcome, one core finding from this study is that education is more effective. Therefore, policymakers’ interest in improving female employment in the manufacturing industry should focus on improving educational opportunities for women.

The policy implication for the gender inequality index is that policymakers should not prioritize privatization. The findings show that privatization has a trivial effect on gender inequality. Therefore, representatives who want to reduce gender inequality in their society should not adopt more privatization policies. Legislators should avoid adopting capital reform policies because this proved to be minuscule to improving gender equality. Although the focus of
this study is economic policy, education is more effective at improving gender equality than privatization. This indicates that policymakers' interest in improving gender inequality should invest in more educational opportunities for women.

Outline of Future Chapters

Now that I selected my case studies for more in-depth qualitative analysis (as shown in the appendix), in Chapter 5, I discuss the first case study, which is my well-predict, model-testing case study, Argentina. I traced the causal mechanism underlying the statistical relationship between neoliberal reform and gender equality. Therefore, I traced the causal process or sequence that connected the explanatory variable to my outcome variable. To do so, I use online newspapers from various databases to develop an analytical narrative as to how neoliberal reform is related to gender equality in Argentina. In Chapter 6, I examine my second case study, my poorly predicted, model-building case study, Peru. I also traced the underlying casual process but instead looked for new or existing alternative explanations or better measurements for my explanatory variables. I traced the process from my dependent variable to other potential independent variables that better explain what is occurring in Peru and why it does not fit the current model. I also use online newspapers to trace the sequence of events that connect gender equality to other possible explanatory variables. Both chapters 5 and 6 confirm or disconfirm the findings from the quantitative analysis. In addition, they enable me to clarify the causal pathway in the typical case study and provide new or existing variables or clarify the measurement for the existing variables.
Chapter 5

Argentina Case Study

The goal of this chapter is to conduct a model-testing case study analysis of Argentina. The model results show that Argentina is a well-predicted or typical case study, which means the current theory applies well to this case. Furthermore, I conduct a confirmatory analysis to probe for the causal mechanism that may either confirm or disconfirm the results from the regression models (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).

To do this, I conduct online internet newspaper research using various newspaper databases supplemented by peer-review articles to better explain the underlying causal mechanism between neoliberalism and gender inequality. I utilize process tracing to organize the information from newspapers to better understand the causal pathway linking the cause to the outcome in the case of Argentina. I also examined any rival hypotheses I could not analyze in the large-N quantitative analysis. Also, I clarify the causal direction between the explanatory and outcome variables. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to either confirm or clarify the theory and results from my models.

The findings for the qualitative analysis complement the results from the models. The main qualitative findings show that trade reform is beneficial to the female labor force participation rate but harmful to female employment in manufacturing. However, privatization is helpful to the female labor force participation rate and gender equality. In contrast, financial liberalization likely does not affect either of the outcome variables. Tax reform is beneficial to the female labor force participation rate and female employment in manufacturing. Still, capital reform adversely affects the female labor force participation rate and gender equality. I organize the rest of the chapter as follows. First, I recall the results from the statistical analysis to remind
readers of the key statistically significant findings from the models. Second, I trace the causal pathway for the key statistical findings to uncover how the explanatory variables connect to the outcomes. Third, I summarize the findings from the qualitative analysis to highlight which aspects of each theory are correct in explaining the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality in Latin America.

**Recalling Results from Statistical Analysis**

The results from the statistical analysis reveal several core findings surrounding the relationship between neoliberalism and gender inequality. As a reminder for the reader, I highlighted the core results from the statistical analysis related to each of my explanatory variables, which include both the specific policies and aggregate measure of neoliberalism, before I began the qualitative analysis.

Table 4.2 analyzes the relationship between neoliberalism and the female labor force participation rate. The results for all the policies, with the exception of financial and capital reform, show that neoliberalism contributes to an increase in the female labor force participation rate. However, education has a more consequential impact on the outcome than all the policy variables.

This section now turns to the individual policies and their relationship with the female labor force participation rate. The results indicate that tax reform, privatization, and international trade positively correlate with the female labor force participation rate. International trade has the second largest effect on the outcome variable of any of the individual policies. Privatization has the most significant effect on the female labor force participation rate of all the individual policies. Capital reform is negatively correlated with the outcome. Financial reform likely does
not affect the female labor force participation rate. Education is positively correlated with the outcome.

Table 4.3 analyzes the relationship between neoliberalism and female employment in the manufacturing sector. General reform is positively correlated with the outcome of interest. The results indicate that tax reform is the only individual policy driving the results behind general reform.

We now turn to the individual policies and their relationship with female employment in manufacturing. Tax reform is positively correlated with the outcome of interest. It has the largest effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry than all other individual policies. However, international trade also has the most significant effect on female employment in the manufacturing industry but negatively correlates with the outcome. Financial reform, privatization, and capital reform likely do not affect female employment in the manufacturing sector. Still, education is positively correlated with the outcome variable and has the largest effect of all policy variables. However, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with female employment in the manufacturing industry.

Table 4.4 analyzes the relationship between neoliberalism and the gender inequality index. The results indicate that general reform and the gender inequality index are negatively correlated. This means that general reform is beneficial to gender equality. The findings show that privatization is the only individual policy driving the results for general reform.

This section now turns to the individual policies and their relationship to the gender inequality index. The results show that privatization and the gender inequality index are negatively correlated. This finding highlights that privatization is helpful to gender equality. However, capital reform and the gender inequality index are positively correlated. Therefore,
capital reform adversely affects gender equality. Tax reform, financial reform, and international trade likely do not affect the outcome. Religion and education are both positively correlated with the outcome. Education has the most beneficial effect on gender equality than all policy variables. I now turn to the qualitative analysis for the empirical study of my typical case study, Argentina.

**Content Analysis and Data Presentation**

**Trade Reform**

**Female Labor Force Participation Rate and Female Employment in Manufacturing**

This section turns to the relationship between trade reform and the female labor force participation rate as well as trade reform and female employment in the manufacturing industry in Argentina. The statistical analysis results indicate that trade reform increases the female labor force participation rate. However, the model results show that trade liberalization contributes to a decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector. Evidence from the online newspaper articles research shows that the Argentine government adopted trade reform policies that reduce tariff barriers for the manufacturing industry. The reduced tariff barriers increase foreign competition against large and small domestic businesses in the manufacturing sector, which causes a reduction in employment and the closure of these companies. The decline in employment in the tradable sector leads to men and women losing their jobs, but primarily men because of their overrepresentation in the industry. The decline in male employment in the tradable sector forces women to enter the labor force to provide for household survival. The increased number of women entering the labor force reduces the disparity between men and
women in the labor market. However, the reduction in gender disparity does not contribute to improvements in gender inequality.

Many empirical studies indicate that Argentina pursued unilateral trade reform related to structural adjustment policies in 1991 under the Convertibility Plan created by Domingo Cavallo (Pastor Jr and Wise, 1999; Cerrutti, 2000; Beker, 2012). Pastor Jr. and Wise explain that, “Like many Latin American countries since the late 1980s, Argentina has pursued its trade liberalization goals unilaterally, through the multilateral Uruguay Round, and within a sub-regional context…The reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers was then escalated in 1990 and 1991 as Argentina followed in Mexico’s footsteps, seeking to link trade liberalization with a fixed exchange rate as the centerpiece of a stabilization strategy” (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999, 486). Furthermore, Argentina pursued trade liberalization strategies besides those that comprise the structural adjustment packages, including Mercosur (free trade agreement comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Pastor Jr. and Wise express that Argentine officials committed to further trade liberalization and deregulation under the agreement, adopted in January 1995, after structural adjustment policies were implemented (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). Therefore, various policies surrounding trade liberalization are present before and during the period of structural adjustment policies. It should also be noted that Argentina adopted a combination of stabilization policies in 1991, which consist of a currency board system, privatization, deregulation of markets for goods, capital and labor, fiscal reform, and stronger regional integration in Mercosur, among others (Cerrutti, 2000; Acosta and Montes-Rojas, 2014). Therefore, keeping in mind the potential interactions among these policies and their effects on the indicators of gender inequality is significant.
Trade liberalization in Argentina means import liberalization (Beker, 2012). That is, “the lowering of tariffs which protected labor-intensive industries” (Beker, 2012, 1). This is related to the overall pattern of the dismantling of import substitution industrialization, which is the dominant paradigm in the 20th century. Furthermore, these formally protected labor-intensive industries were now exposed to increase foreign competition. As a result, trade liberalization leads some businesses in the tradeable sectors to close while others adapt to their new environment. Several studies highlighted that the large firms in the tradeable sectors could compete with foreign businesses while the small and medium firms suffered economic losses and closed (Cerrutti, 2000; Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). Pastor Jr. and Wise state, “The top conglomerates in the main tradeable sectors have indeed increased efficiency and consolidated their assets and ties with foreign capital, but in a highly capital intensive and concentrated manner. By 1994, the 30 largest exporting firms-controlled 55 percent of all exports, and in just four sectors (petroleum, foodstuffs, steel products, and motor vehicles)” (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999, 486). Furthermore, the large companies in the tradeable sectors increase their efficiency by adopting capital machinery, which reduces their workforce. It should also be noted that these companies employed only twenty percent of the workforce in Argentina (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999).

The small and medium-sized firms lack the technology, skills, and market information to compete in this new environment (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). Cerrutti report that, “From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the number of small and medium-size manufacturing establishments decreased by approximately 24 percent representing a loss of approximately 140, 000 jobs” (Cerrutti, 2000, 882). This information suggests that roughly one-quarter of small and medium-sized businesses closed due to the increased competition from foreign companies. In addition, these small and medium-sized businesses account for many of the jobs created in the tradeable
sector in Argentina (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). The authors explain that this reduction in the number of small and medium-sized businesses in the tradeable sector due to increased foreign competition contributed to an unemployment problem in Argentina. Since the small and medium-sized businesses comprise most employment in this sector, their closure contributes to many unemployed individuals (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). The authors note, “A special difficulty has been the limited availability of reasonably priced credit with which to finance modernization: in late 1996, large companies in Argentina’s highly segmented credit markets reported paying 8-10 percent interest on business loans, while smaller firms paid between 15 and 30 percent interest. Equally important has been the lack of integrated ties between small and large firms, links which in East Asia and elsewhere have provided the large exporters with service inputs and flexibility and benefitted the small firms through increased demand” (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999, 487). Therefore, small and medium-sized firms were forced to pay different and more expensive interest rates than large businesses. Also, the small and medium-sized firms were not integrated with large companies to benefit from this new environment. Furthermore, the small and medium-sized firms in the tradeable sector and employment in this area were significantly affected by trade liberalization policies.

Many workers employed in these businesses (small and medium-sized firms in the manufacturing industry) lost their jobs due to the adoption of trade liberalization policies. Inter Press Service report that, “The small and medium-sized enterprises that these banks have historically served have been undercut by cheap imports that have flooded the country as a result of the trade liberalization component of Argentina’s adjustment program. And many firms cannot repay their loans” (Inter Press Service, 1995, 1). Therefore, the inability of small and medium-sized firms to repay their loans due to increased foreign competition from trade
liberalization leads to many workers being laid off in the tradable sector. Valente explains that trade liberalization led to the closure of many small and medium-sized manufacturing companies, contributing to increased unemployment. Valente notes, “Local toy makers are an endangered species as trade liberalization had forced the closure of 170 of the 200 toy factories in Argentina. Now 80 percent of everything sold on the market comes from China or Hong Kong. Since 1991, when the free Convertibility Plan was brought in for the Argentine peso, jobs in the Argentine toy industry have fallen from 12,000 to 2,400. The few toy shop owners who have survived now import from Asia, competing with big stores. The toy makers are only one group in the small and medium business sector of Argentina that provides between 45 and 55 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and absorbs between 70 and 90 percent of the workforce. The toy makers have lost out to the stabilization model and other groups such as small textile factories, making anything from school clothes or umbrellas also have felt the effects of liberalization” (Valente, 1997, 1). The evidence indicates that trade liberalization leads to a decline in employment opportunities in the tradable sector due to increased competition from foreign competitors.

Before the implementation of trade liberalization in Argentina, employment in the tradable sector seems relatively stable. Data from the International Labor Organization show that total employment in the manufacturing industry stood at 22.6 percent in 1982 and increased to 24.7 percent by 1990 (ILO, 2020). However, total employment in manufacturing declined with the adoption of trade liberalization policies. The data show that total manufacturing employment declines slightly to 24.2 percent and 14.5 percent by the end of the decade (ILO, 2020). The evidence indicates that trade liberalization is a significant factor responsible for the decline in employment in the tradable sector and not any other factors.
Another possible explanation for the decline in employment in the tradable sector is that the lack of economic growth contributes to fewer employment opportunities (Eastin and Prakash, 2013; Friedman, 2009). However, during trade liberalization, the Argentine economy grew except for specific years that consisted of financial crises that affected economic growth (Taylor, 2002). Taylor reports that, “These market-oriented reforms produced very impressive results. Hyperinflation which had risen to over 3000 percent, was brought to a quick end by the convertibility law. Economic growth turned around sharply: after falling during the 1980s, real GDP began growing at over 4 percent per year. Investment and exports grew particularly rapidly. The sharp increase in economic growth was even more remarkable given the very rapid disinflation that was occurring at the same time” (Taylor, 2002, 2). The evidence reveals that trade liberalization and market reform as a whole contribute to improvements in the economy. This suggests that economic decline is not responsible for the decrease in employment in the tradable sector. Taylor highlights that the low inflation rates of the 1990s lead to persistent deflation, which still affects economic growth (Taylor, 2002). However, it is the appreciation of the peso in conjunction with the lowering of trade barriers that leads to the declining employment in the tradable sectors (Taylor, 2002).

Data from the International Labor Organization support this claim that trade liberalization leads to a decline in female employment in Argentina’s manufacturing industry. The data show that both male and female employment in the manufacturing industry declined starting in 1992. This is one year after trade liberalization is adopted as part of the structural adjustment package in Argentina. In 1992, female employment stood at 18 percent of all manufacturing jobs while male employment was 28.8. In the following year, female employment declined to 15.6 while male employment decreased to 27.2. By 1996, female employment stood at 11.7 percent, while
male employment was 19.8 percent. The data illustrates a persistent decline in both male and female employment in the manufacturing sector due to the industry’s overall decline due to trade liberalization. Beker adds that, “Approximately 30 percent of the employment in the manufacturing sector was destroyed between 1992 and 1996. Since the industries that experienced a larger reduction in protection levels employed a greater proportion of low-skilled workers, trade liberalization was the obvious candidate to blame for that outcome” (Beker, 2012, 12). Therefore, Beker highlight that trade liberalization is responsible for high unemployment levels observed in the manufacturing industry. He also adds that the manufacturing industry experiences the most considerable reduction in import tariffs compared to other industries, leading to greater foreign competition and the destruction of a third of the employment in this sector (Beker, 2012).

Male workers comprise most of the formal manufacturing jobs lost due to increased foreign competition from trade liberalization. Geldstein explains that Argentina’s manufacturing industry mainly employed male workers (Geldstein, 1997, 547). This information suggests that the majority of the laid-off workers due to trade liberalization are primarily men. Data from the International Labor Organization show that in 1991 men consisted of 27.3 percent of all manufacturing jobs compared to women, who only make up 18.6 percent of these positions. In 1992, male employment in this sector stood at 28.4 percent, while women comprised 17.2 percent. In the following years, we observe female and male employment in the manufacturing industry on the decline. In 1993 and 1994, male employment in manufacturing stood at 26.9 and 25.8 percent. In those same years, female employment comprises 15 and 13.3 percent. In 1995, male employment in manufacturing declined to 23.7, and female employment in this sector also decreased to 14.1 percent. These numbers indicate that both men and women suffer a loss in
employment in the manufacturing sector. However, men comprise most of the employment in this sector, which means they are more at a loss than women due to the industry’s declining nature. Valente explains that the total number of manufacturing jobs declines over time because of the increased foreign competition. The author report that Francisco Dos Reis of the Assembly of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses state, “…the opening of trade overwhelmed the small companies and, in some cases, nearly wiped out entire sectors of industry. As far as toys, textiles and shoes, there are practically no national companies left. And other sectors are not much better off. Currently there is not one single sector that competes with imported products, not in agriculture, industry or retail” (Valente, 2000, 3). Therefore, the evidence suggests that increased trade openings contribute to the deterioration of employment in the manufacturing industry over time. The loss of employment in the manufacturing industry may have contributed to a response from women.

Despite the decline in employment among small and medium-sized businesses in the tradeable sectors, female employment has consistently increased since 1975 in Argentina. Following the implementation of structural adjustment policies, specifically trade liberalization in Argentina in 1991, female employment increased, and unemployment declined slightly. Lee and Cho explain that GDP also grew at a high rate of 8 percent per year through 1994 after these policies were implemented (Lee and Cho, 2005). This information suggests that the economy and female employment improved following the adoption of trade liberalization policies. However, the authors highlight that in 1995, the Mexican crisis, also known as the tequila effect, affected gross domestic product and female employment (Lee and Cho, 2005). The Mexican crisis affected Argentina based on the longstanding financial sector problems the country faces, including low mobilization of bank deposits, scarcity of credit, the prominence of public sector
banks, and the inefficiency and segmentation of private banks (Carrizosa et al., 1996). Furthermore, the devaluation of the Mexican peso leads to a lack of confidence in Argentina’s financial sector leading to a dramatic reduction in financial resources in the banking sector (Carrizosa et al., 1996). However, the government initially sought to correct these problems in the banking sector through the Convertibility Plan. It should be noted that the government made significant progress in mitigating these problems in the banking sector, but the Mexican crisis still took a toll on the economy (Carrizosa et al., 1996).

When analyzing female employment during this same period, women also suffer a loss in terms of employment. As shown in Table 5.1 below, the International Labor Organization data illustrated that female unemployment increased to 22.3 percent in 1995. When this information is compared to the earlier years when trade liberalization was first implemented, female unemployment stood at 5.8 percent in 1991 and grew to 6.7 percent in 1992, 12.7 in 1993, and 14.1 percent in 1994. Although female unemployment steadily increased since the implementation of trade liberalization policies, it reached tremendous levels during the Mexican crisis. It is also during this period that we observe a decline in female employment overall. Lee and Cho state that, “For women, however, most of the increases in labor force participation rate reflected a practically constant employment component and a significant increase in the unemployment component during 1991 to 1995” (Lee and Cho, 2005, 430). This rise in female unemployment during this period is attributed to the reduction of overall formal employment in the tradeable sectors, explicitly manufacturing during this period.
Table 5.1
Female Unemployment Rate, Argentina 1991-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FEMALE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 5.1 illustrates the female unemployment rate in Argentina from 1991 to 1995.
Source: International Labor Organization, 2020

Women may enter the labor force to make up for this loss of employment in their household. Acosta and Montes-Rojas suggest that, “During the 1990s in Argentina there was an increment in the number of informal jobs in the service sector and a reduction in the number of formal jobs in the manufacturing sector, suggesting that this could have been an important channel of adjustment of the labor market to trade liberalization” (Acosta and Montes-Rojas, 2014, 1116). My reason for stating that the decline in employment in the manufacturing industry may have prompted a response from women is because many of them enter the labor force for the first time during this period. Lee and Cho state, “…most unemployment occurred among new entrants to the labor force. This trend was more clearly demonstrated among former housewives” (Lee and Cho, 2005, 430). This information suggests that women who were not previously seeking employment were now looking for work during an economic decline in 1994 and 1995.

Acosta and Montes-Rojas indicated that trade liberalization contributed to a rise in employment in other sectors, like the service industry (Acosta and Montes-Rojas, 2014). Data from the International Labor Organization show that female employment increased both in the
service industry and overall employment from 1991 to 1995 and after. In the hotel and restaurant sectors, female employment grew by 1.4 percent while male employment only rose by 0.5 percent between 1991 and 1995. From 1996 to 2000, female employment in this sector surpassed male employment. In 1996, female employment stood at 2.7 percent while male employment was 2.9 percent. By 1997, female employment rose to 2.7 percent while male employment declined slightly to 2.6 percent. In 1998, female employment reached 3 percent while male employment decreased to 2.6 percent. In 1999, female employment increased to 3.3 percent whereas male employment remained at the 1998 level. By 2000, female employment rose to 3.4 percent, and male employment increased to 2.9 percent (ILO, 2020). These figures remained consistent until female employment slightly declined in 2003. Female employment overall also follows a similar pattern of increasing from 1991 to 1995 and then increased even more after 1995. In sum, it seems that trade liberalization led women to enter the labor market to make up for any lost income from the household due to a declining industry and possibly other coinciding factors.

Privatization

Female Labor Force Participation Rate

The results from the statistical analysis indicate that privatization leads to an increase in the female labor force participation rate. Evidence from the secondary sources confirms that the Argentine government adopts privatization policies. The adoption of privatization policies contributes to the increased private ownership of public enterprises, which leads to the labor market restructuring. The restructuring of the labor market by private owners reduces
employment opportunities and salaries for male breadwinners (Geldstein, 1997; Cerrutti, 2000). This led to increased women seeking employment to reduce the economic instability these policies contribute to the household. Although privatization reduces gender disparity in the labor market, gender inequality does not improve due to the low-quality jobs women were forced to obtain for the household’s survival.

In 1991, Argentina pursued privatization policies as part of a larger structural adjustment package. Burke states, “Privatization gained urgency with the 1991 elevation of banker Domingo Cavallo to the post of economics minister. Privatization is one of a series of reforms pushed by Cavallo in an effort to restore the pre-Depression prosperity this country enjoyed” (Burke, 1993, 2). In 1991, the government instituted a new economic plan known as the Convertibility Plan, which consists of numerous neoliberal policies: privatization, deregulation, trade, financial, and capital liberalization (Acosta and Montes-Rojas, 2014). Some scholars point to privatization as the most detrimental to the labor market and households of the several neoliberal policies mentioned above but beneficial to the economy (Geldstein, 1997; Cerrutti, 2000; Valente, 1997).

The privatization of public enterprises began during the 1980s but became a national policy after the 1989 election, increasing the number of private owners in the economy. Burke explains that, “The spin-off of Ferro Expreso Pampeano (FEPSA), a 3000-mile rail line that began private operation on November 1, 1991, provided one of the first tests of privatization in any industry. With FEPSA, it was not a question of when but of if, Paul Victor says of the uncertainty that surrounded the earliest moves to the private sector. We were completely off the map in terms of Argentine experience. Victor, then with Iowa Interstate, now a consultant to Burlington Northern Argentine commuter concession, worked with Techint, the country’s largest economic group, to win privatization of this part of FA” (Burke, 1993). Therefore, the Argentine
government began to privatize the railroad as its first test of any industry in the country. After the privatization of the railroad system, the government began to sell off other industries such as airlines, utilities, steel, phone companies, and many more (Burke, 1993). In other words, the government invests in a vast privatization program. Burke states that, “Victor and others involved in the revamping of Argentina’s railroads draw distinctions between rail restructuring and the vast privatization during recent years of state-owned airlines, utilities, steel and telephone companies, ports, and water systems. They point out that, unlike other industries, the government retained ownership of the underlying asset – the roadbed” (Burke, 1993, 2). The evidence indicates that even though the Argentine government’s privatization program increases private ownership of state enterprises, they still retain involvement in these industries.

The increase in private ownership by businesses from the vast privatization program implemented by the Argentine government led to a restructuring of the labor force. In order words, companies that became privatized laid off their workforce and rehired fewer workers to become more efficient and competitive. Valente explains that Argentina's telecommunications companies reduced their workforce from approximately forty thousand to twenty-seven thousand employees when privatization began. The author also adds, “Between 1992 and 1996, YPF increased annual oil exports from 674 million to 1.755 billion dollars. In the same four-year period, the company fired tens of thousands of workers, many of them in remote provinces” (Valente, 1997, 2). The evidence indicates that when these businesses became privatized, they underwent restructuring the labor force, where they first laid off all the employees and rehired a small percentage. Burke also expresses that, “Unlike La Fraternidad, whose leadership is close to the Menem government, Union Ferrovaria supported privatization because union officials recognized that the railroad would die without a reduced workforce, according to restructuring
chief Kogan” (Burke, 1993, 4). The evidence shows that privatization leads to a restructuring or reduction of the workforce to improve efficiency and profit margins for businesses.

Privatization increases the unemployment rate overall for both men and women in Argentina, but primarily male breadwinners. Valente states, “Unemployment started to grow in Argentina in 1993, following the application of a neoliberal reform plan which contemplated the privatization of public companies, free trade, and public debt reduction” (Valente, 1998, 2). Therefore, privatization leads to the unemployment rate for both men and women to rise following its adoption in the early 1990s. Although privatization led to the rise of unemployment for both men and women in Argentina, it should be noted that these outcomes are for different but related reasons. That is, privatization leads to more men and male heads of households being laid off. Geldstein notes, “The first component of the increase in total unemployment has been the rise of unemployed male heads of household, which includes mainly older males. While the unemployment rate for males in general increased from 9.8 percent to 17.4 percent between May 1994 and May 1995, for male heads of households ages 46 or more, the rate doubled from 8.3 percent to 16 percent in the same period” (Geldstein, 1997, 550). Therefore, men suffer a loss of employment due to the workforce’s reduction in newly privatized companies. Many of the laid-off workers are men over the age of forty years or older males. The New York Times reference several stories of males affected by the adoption of privatization in Argentina. Sims from the New York Times noted, “Richard Oscar Avendano, 50, worked for the state-owned gas company for 27 years until he was laid off in 1993 when it was privatized. Mr. Avendano says money is so tight that he cannot even afford to go for coffee at a local café. He invested his 19,000 severance in a small printing business that failed to take off. Today he does whatever odd jobs he can find”
(Sims, 1995, 1). This illustrates one of the many stories of men who became unemployed due to the privatization of different companies in Argentina.

Geldstein highlight that before privatization, employment reduction in public enterprises was achieved through retirements or deaths. However, since privatization began, the reduction has been carried out through firings or lay-offs with the employees given severance packages (Geldstein, 1997). Sims highlight this point by mentioning another unemployed male known as Mr. Grassi. The author state, “Many of the unemployed, like Mr. Grassi, are in their 40s and 50s. They spent the last two decades working in specialized jobs for companies and now lack marketable job skills. Former bureaucrats now work as waiters and taxi drivers. Some have used their severance packages to open street corner sundries and small businesses, though many have failed because there is so much competition” (Sims, 1995, 1). This information indicates that privatization has not been beneficial to the older males even after being laid off from their jobs. In addition, some sources indicate that it is more difficult for these older men to re-enter the labor force because of the stigma placed on individuals who previously held government jobs. Sims recounts that Mr. Avendano said, “Nobody wants to hire me because when they find out I used to work for a government company, they think that I’m lazy and will not be a good worker” (Sims, 1995, 2). Therefore, it seems unlikely that many of these laid-off men could re-enter the labor force and regain some of these old positions with the same benefits or security.

Women enter the labor force because of the declining employment and income of the male breadwinners in Argentina due to privatization. Geldtein states, “The second component of the increase in total unemployment can be attributed to the increasing number of wives and adolescents both sons and daughters that entered the labor market in order to augment family incomes that had fallen with the unemployment or lowered the income of male breadwinners”
(Geldstein, 1997, 551). Therefore, the increase in female unemployment is a reaction to the reduction of employment opportunities for male heads of households due to privatization. Furthermore, women enter the labor force to reduce the economic uncertainty or instability of the household. Cerrutti also found that the rise in the labor force participation rate for women during the adoption of privatization policies stemmed from increased unemployment and job instability associated with structural adjustment policies, specifically privatization. The author states, “Firms downsizing, the proliferation of temporary employment, privatization of public enterprises and, as a consequence, growing unemployment increased both the real and perceived economic vulnerability of households. In this context, women who were out of the labor force decided to look for work to reduce economic uncertainty through diversification of their household economies” (Cerrutti, 2000, 880). Therefore, the increase in the female labor force participation rate is a reaction to the reduction in employment opportunities for male breadwinners due to privatization. Geldstein provides further context by highlighting that during that same period, “women aged 15 to 64 increase their labor force participation rate from 45.9 percent to 51.7 percent…people ages 15 to 19 increased from 16.3 percent to 41.8 percent” (Geldstein, 1997, 551). This highlights that women sought to enter the labor force to reduce the economic impact of privatization on the household. During this period, the overall unemployment rate for women ranged from 5.8 percent in 1991 to 17.5 percent in 2003 (ILO, 2020).

A potential alternative explanation for increased female labor force participation is that the economic growth or the economy, in general, leads to women’s employment opportunities (Eastin and Prakash, 2013; Friedman, 2013). However, the evidence reveals that even though Argentina experienced economic growth during the period of privatization, that does not
translate into more employment opportunities for anyone, including women. Valente mentions, “There is a common belief among economists that investment promotes growth, employment, and wellbeing. Argentina, however, provided an exception to this rule, for a while investment has grown significantly there it has neither created jobs nor diminished poverty” (Valente, 1997, 1). Furthermore, the adoption of privatization policies in Argentina led to increased investments, but not many jobs were created. Valente states, “Argentina’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 18.3 percent from 1991 to 1995 due to the liberalization of the market, privatization, cutbacks in the public administration and fiscal adjustments” (Valente, 1997, 3). Valente further explains that the privatization of these state industries is more of money-changing hands instead of contributing to the productive sector to generate employment opportunities. Lascano states, “that in the case of stock market investment, we are seeing a lot of paper changing hands without any correlative increase in production or employment…Lascano says that a lot of foreign investment simply substitutes what’s already been put in place without adding anything new. As an example, he points to the privatization of Argentine public service companies, sales of which brought twenty billion into the country between 1992 and 1996” (Valente, 1997, 2). The evidence highlights that the economy and job creation were not potential factors that could account for increased female activity in the labor market.

Another potential explanation for the increase in the female labor force participation rate is increased educational opportunities for women in Argentina (Buchmann, 1996). However, educational opportunities among women seem to be consistently higher than their male counterparts. In 1992, the World Bank reported that women in Argentina have 9.4 years of education compared to 8.8 years for men (Market Latin America, 1994, 2). Data from Barro-Lee indicate that average female years of schooling increased between 1991 and 2003 from 8.8 to 9.3
years (Barro et al., 2013). Although educational opportunities were on the rise for women during the period of privatization, I also found that the average years of female education grew since 1975. In other words, education has been on the rise for women since the 1970s (Barro et al., 2013). The Barro-Lee data show that average female education increased from 6.96 years in 1975 to 8.8 years in 1990 (Barro et al., 2013). Therefore, female education has historically been on the rise. However, the female labor force participation rate increased during privatization, where jobs were lost and became more precarious. This indicates that the need for household survival is more of a concern for women than obtaining well-paid jobs. Furthermore, improved educational opportunities do not account for the influx of women in the labor market.

Following the lay-off of many male workers and the increase in women entering the labor force to search for employment, it seems that many of these privatized companies hire young female workers. Geldstein mentions that before privatization, the selection or hiring criteria were more flexible and enable anyone to be considered for these positions. However, after the adoption of privatization, these criteria changed to hiring young, middle, and upper-middle-class candidates who were not associated with a union. Specifically, women were the focus of these companies. The author state, “Thus, a replacement process has been occurring within privatized companies in which older workers with on the job training are replaced by younger, formally qualified unprotected non-union workers” (Geldstein, 1997, 562). The author highlight that these factors were selected to reduce costs by providing more flexible and insecure employment. He mentions that many of those hired by these privatized companies do not receive labor benefits such as vacation, health insurance, or social security. In addition, these employments were temporary contracts. Geldstein provides various examples of companies that were privatized in Argentina than now hire primarily female workers. The author mentions that ENTEL, a
previously state-owned telecommunications company, became privatized in 1990 (Geldstein, 1997, 562). The author state, “In the newly privately-owned telephone companies, the young and beautiful are preferred; in the administrative and commercial offices, they are said to be the face of the company. Only attractive women have been hired for these jobs during the last several years. The majority of them are also university students, single and childless” (Geldstein, 1997, 562). These criteria seem to be consistent across other privatized companies in the telecommunications industry. Hiring more female workers enables the company to reduce benefits, provide low wages, and increase the workload. Furthermore, privatization increase the number of women employed overall in Argentina. However, the quality of jobs that women receive is inferior, which increases gender inequality.

**Gender Inequality Index**

The results from the statistical analysis demonstrate that privatization leads to a decline in the gender inequality index. Evidence from secondary sources also confirms that privatization contributes to a decrease in the gender inequality index. Furthermore, privatization improved gender disparity between men and women in Argentina. The data show that privatization leads to an increase in the female labor force participation rate. Specifically, women became more active during the period of privatization due to the dire economic conditions created by these policies. Geldstein explains that women’s labor force participation increased because they were forced to seek employment to help stabilize the household economic circumstances. The author note, “At the same time, the tenuous employment conditions of male heads of households have forced many women unto the labor market, where most face poorer working conditions and earn lower salaries than men” (Geldstein, 1997, 563). Furthermore, the unemployment rate for women
increase during the privatization period to help offset its effects on other household members, specifically the male breadwinner. Therefore, previously unemployed women and other household members enter the labor market to help prevent them from experiencing poverty. Geldstein explains that privatization affects both men and women, but men seem to be the most affected by private owners’ restructuring of the workforce. Therefore, male heads of households were severely affected by the adoption of privatization policies. The newspaper sources also seem to confirm this information that older men were the ones who were overwhelmingly affected by privatization. Valente of Inter Press Service highlights that, “Insecurity amongst young jobseekers and people aged 45 who lost their jobs is something you see every day, said Cavallo” (Valente, 1998, 1). This information suggests that older individuals who were most likely in secure employment were affected mainly by privatization. In addition, the majority of sources that explain how privatization impacts the labor market mainly interview men. This highlights that men's employment rate declines with privatization, while women’s employment rate increases slightly during this same period. Furthermore, this change in the employment rate between men and women reduces the employment disparity between men and women in the labor market, which contributes to the improvement in the gender inequality index we observe. Geldstein also expresses that these labor market changes allow women to have more autonomy in the household regarding spending decisions (Geldstein, 1997). This means that the labor market changes where women become the primary earners contribute to beneficial effects in other areas of gender inequality. Furthermore, this may be the change we observe in terms of the gender inequality index. The gender inequality index for Argentina in 1995 stood at 0.427 and decreased to 0.417 by 2000 (UNDP, 2020). By 2005, the gender inequality index reduces to 0.372 (UNDP, 2020).
A potential alternative explanation for the reduction in the gender inequality index is improv economic conditions (Inglehart et al., 2002; Eastin and Prakash, 2013). The Argentine economy grew following the adoption of privatization policies or neoliberal reform more generally. Sosa report that, “After four years of rapid growth, the Argentine economy contracted by 2.5 percent in 1995, according to the official estimate” (Sosa, 1996, 1). The evidence indicates that Argentina experiences economic improvements, but this is due to the inflow of capital from privatization (Valente, 1997). In other words, the economy does not experience improvement before the adoption of these policies. The Inter Press Service stated in 1991 that, “Decades of high inflation and budgetary deficit led to an absence of national credit and sustained growth in Argentina, and forced a program of privatization” (Inter Press Service, 1991, 1). The evidence reveals that even though improvements in the economy could account for reducing gender inequality in the labor market, this change is still connected to privatization and no other circumstances.

Another potential alternate explanation related to the economy is increasing new job opportunities for women (Cerrutti, 2000). However, the evidence indicates that employment for both men and women in Argentina is on the decline. Valente stated in 1996 that, “There are 14 million economically active people in Argentina, and according to Montuschi, 2.2 million are completely unemployed, 2.8 million invisibly underemployed in unstable temporary jobs and 1.3 million visibly underemployed, working less than 35 hours per week. The report “Employment in Argentina” warned there was an increase in what she termed the hopeless workers, those who give up looking for a job because they now have no hope of finding one and, thus do not appear in the official statistics” (Valente, 1996, 1). Therefore, the data show that job prospects in
Argentina do not improve during this period for women to enter the labor market. Instead, women were forced to seek employment due to male breadwinners losing their jobs.

**Tax Liberalization**

**Female Labor Force Participation Rate and Female Employment in Manufacturing**

The results from the statistical analysis show that tax liberalization leads to an increase in the female labor force participation rate and female employment in manufacturing. The evidence from the process tracing also confirms that the Argentine government adopted tax reform policies. The implementation of tax liberalization policies leads the government to focus on value-add taxes as a revenue source. However, the government reduces value-add taxes on capital goods, making it cheaper for domestic companies to import and buy industrial machinery. The reduction in value-add taxes on capital goods leads to decrease employment for male breadwinners. The decline in employment for male breadwinners forces women to enter the labor force and the manufacturing industry to reduce household economic instability and increase costs of goods due to value-add taxes. However, the quality of jobs that women obtain in the labor force and specifically in the manufacturing industry were of inferior quality and more precarious due to the increased reliance on machinery, which increased gender inequality.

Argentina implemented tax reform as part of a broader stabilization program in 1991 (Huber, 2005; Tanner and Sanguinetti, 1997; Rodriguez-Enriquez et al., 2010). Huber highlight that Argentina implemented various tax reforms before the one associated with the stabilization program. Some of the tax policies that the government pursued during this period include the increase in income and corporate taxes (Huber, 2005). The author explains that Argentina
implemented tax reform in the 1980s to increase its revenue (Huber, 2005). Huber expresses that the growing economic instability from inflation and debt forced the government to adopt tax reforms to increase their revenue. By 1985 and 1987, Argentina adopted more tax reforms to strengthen taxes on income and reduce export taxes (Huber, 2005). In the early 1990s, Argentina adopted tax measures that focused on increasing tax receipts and value-add taxes (Huber, 2005).

The tax reform of the 1990s mainly focused on value-add tax as a primary source of revenues (Valente, 1995; Goldman, 1998; Tanner and Sanguinetti, 1997). Tanner and Sanguinetti explain that value-add taxes are the primary form of tax liberalization policies adopted in Argentina. The authors note, “As a response, the Tax Reform Law contained some measures intended to broaden the tax base and improve enforcement. One base broadening measure was the extension of the value-added tax to food products (at a rate of 13 percent). At the same time exemptions on this tax were eliminated, reducing incentives for tax evasion. This resulted in an increase of the VAT’s base from 22 percent of GDP to 29 percent” (Tanner and Sanguinetti, 1997, 534). This information highlight that the value-add tax became the primary revenue source for the Argentine government to reduce its economic deficit. However, other taxes, such as payroll and income taxes, were also included in the tax liberalization package. Grown and Valodia explain that, “After the 1991 crisis, tax policies aimed to broaden the tax base through value-added taxes; reduced income tax rates; eliminate export duties; and modify fuel and gas taxes” (Grown and Valodia, 2010, 66). Despite these eliminations of certain taxes, by the mid-1990s, some of these taxes were reinstated due to the country’s economic crisis. Rodriguez-Enriquez and her co-authors state, “In the middle of the 1990s, however, financial turmoil resulted in another series of measures, some of which contradicted the previous ones. The VAT rate was increased from 18 percent to 21 percent and its base was broadened, import
tariffs were increased, tax refunds on exports and capital assets subsidies were reduced, and the tax base of income and personal assets were expanded” (Rodriguez-Enriquez, 2010, 66). Therefore, many of the taxes that were reduced following tax liberalization adoption were increased or expanded to increase revenue.

The Argentine government later reduced value-add taxes on capital goods to help companies increase their competitiveness against foreign businesses. Cavallo states, “To help companies,…slashing Argentina’s value-added tax on capital goods to 10.5 percent from 20 percent starting May 1. The cut ‘complemented’ the elimination of a 14 percent tariff on imports of capital goods, announced weeks earlier” (Agence France Presse, 2001, 1). Therefore, the reduction of value-add taxes on capital goods helps domestic companies, making it less expensive to purchase imports and industrial machinery. Cavallo explains that, “The move will make it cheaper to import and buy industrial machinery and other capital goods. The measure will allow for sustained economic growth in the Argentine economy” (Agence France Presse, 2001, 1). Therefore, reducing value-add taxes on capital goods enables some firms to become more competitive against foreign companies (BBC, 1994, 2).

The reduced value-add taxes on capital goods translated into increased investment in industrial machinery for domestic businesses, which contributed to a decline in employment opportunities, especially for male breadwinners who work in the tradable sectors (Geldstein, 1997). The manufacturing industry where men were overly represented benefits the most from reducing value-add taxes on capital goods (Carlino, 1996). Bruce explains that, “Mr. Volk said the administration of Argentine President Carlos Menem had taken a number of negative actions. These include blocking leather exports to Brazil; refunding value-added taxes paid by Argentine manufacturers on exported shoes; taxing imported Brazilian footwear; and allowing Argentine
footwear manufacturers who increase their exports to import the equivalent value duty-free, as long as the source is not Brazil” (Bruce, 1995, 1). The evidence highlights that the reduced value-added taxes were primarily geared towards the manufacturing industry to allow economic growth and competitiveness. However, as mentioned previously, male employment in the manufacturing industry declined as investments in machinery increased in these sectors. The increased investment in machinery led to less reliance on labor in the tradable sector, which means fewer employment opportunities were available for those concentrated in these industries.

A potential alternative explanation for the decline in employment for male breadwinners in the tradable sector is either the economy’s decline or specific sector. However, I mentioned previously that Argentina’s economy grew at a constant rate except for the years where financial crises occurred (Taylor, 2002). The evidence indicates that economic decline is not a factor for the decline in male employment in the tradable sector. Also, total employment in manufacturing increased slightly before the adoption of tax liberalization (ILO, 2020). Data from the International Labor Organization show that total employment increased from eight hundred forty-six thousand in 1982 to eight hundred forty-seven thousand the following year. By 1984, total employment reaches over nine hundred thousand jobs (ILO, 2020). Data for total employment is missing from the International Labor Organization’s database for the rest of the 1980s. Therefore, it is challenging to state whether employment continued to increase for the late 1980s. However, from the data shown, the manufacturing industry was not declining before tax reform was implemented.

The employment instability among male breadwinners due to tax liberalization leads to increase female labor force participation to make up for the lost income in the household. Women in these households enter the labor force in striking numbers to help reduce tax reform’s
impact on the household. As mentioned previously, increased numbers of wives and adolescents enter the labor market to compensate for the unemployment and reduced income for male breadwinners (Geldstein, 1997). Therefore, the increased female labor force participation rate is a reaction to male breadwinners’ employment instability because of tax liberalization, specifically the reduction of value-added taxes on capital goods. Geldstein also suggests that female labor force participation increases under tax liberalization to help maintain income levels and avoid poverty (Geldstein, 1997). Therefore, women increased their labor force activity as a survival strategy based on the decreasing income and employment instability from tax liberalization.

Women were hired either informally or with renegotiated contracts in the labor force, specifically in the manufacturing industry, to help companies become competitive. The increased investment in machinery for the labor force and specifically in the manufacturing industry also means jobs of inferior quality. Geldstein highlight that employment in Argentina’s telecommunications and airline industry shifted where it became common practice to hire younger women with lower pay and few benefits (Geldstein, 1997). The decline in job quality after the investment in machinery was also evident in the manufacturing industry. Cruces and his co-author express that some small firms in the manufacturing industry even fired and rehired informal labor to remain competitive in the sector (Cruces et al., 2018). This implies that male workers who previously worked in the manufacturing industry were laid off, and women were potentially rehired as informal labor. However, this means that the rehired workers received lower wages and no benefits since this is associated with labor informality.
Capital Liberalization

Female Labor Force Participation Rate

The statistical analysis results indicate that capital liberalization leads to a decline in the female labor force participation rate. The process tracing evidence also confirms that the Argentine government adopted capital reform policies. These policies increase foreign direct investments in domestic companies, which contribute to a growth in the gross domestic product, but not the economy’s productive sector. The increase in foreign direct investment in domestic companies contributes to a reorganization or downsizing of the workforce for both men and women. The reduction in employment opportunities leads to a decrease in the female labor force participation rate.

Capital liberalization in Argentina was adopted as part of an array of neoliberal policies in 1991 (Green, 2003; Taylor, 2001). Taylor states, “This package was instituted in 1991. It did reasonably well up to the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, then there was a shutdown” (Taylor, 2001, 30). Therefore, capital liberalization entails the inflow and outflow of capital in the Argentine economy. Wijnholds express that the free movement of capital worldwide allows for increased resources and economic growth (Wijnholds, 1998).

Capital liberalization leads to increase foreign direct investments in Argentina. Frenkel and Ross explain that the adoption of the neoliberal reform package in the early 1990s bought massive capital inflows to Argentina (Frenkel and Ross, 2004). The authors explain that, “Along with these reforms came massive capital inflows, predominantly in the form of financial investment. Our two countries (Argentina and Mexico) were the major recipients of capital inflows in Latin America from 1990 to 1993” (Frenkel and Ross, 2004, 3). Argentina became
one of the countries in Latin America to receive increased foreign direct investments due to its anti-inflation strategy, which would encourage capital investments from abroad (Taylor, 2001). Taylor explains that Argentina’s capital inflows were tied to privatization, which provided money to help maintain the exchange rates and keep prices low (Taylor, 2001). However, the surge in capital in Argentina was short-lived due to the Mexican financial crisis in 1994, which led to massive capital outflows and economic contraction from the country (Frenkel and Ross, 2004). However, the Argentine economy recovered after the Mexican financial crisis because policymakers convinced investors that they could fix the economic conditions. Therefore, investors gave policymakers the benefit of the doubt and extended their investments (Wogart, 2004).

The increase in foreign direct investments leads to a reduction in the size of the workforce to improve efficiency and competitiveness. Ernst explains that foreign direct investment is mainly tied to privatization in Argentina, which fails to improve the labor market (Ernst, 2005). Ernst states, “Most investment, in particular in Argentina and Brazil went into already existing companies as a result of privatization, deregulation, and increased M&A, especially in the service sector. FDI in the service and manufacturing sector was often combined with modernization and rationalization measures leading to labor shedding. Nevertheless, FDI contributed, to a certain extent, to the modernization of the economy, a rise in competitiveness and to a better integration into the world economy” (Ernst, 2005, 1). Therefore, capital liberalization contributed to a reduction in the labor force due to its connection to privatization. Ernst also adds that capital liberalization reduced employment in the labor-intensive sector by 10.9 between 1993 and 2000 (Ernst, 2005).
The decline in employment opportunities for men and women in the labor force due to capital liberalization reduces the female labor force participation rate. Valente expressed that the majority of individuals seeking employment during this period of capital liberalization were women. However, many became discouraged due to the lack of employment that capital liberalization provides (Valente, 1997). She notes, “Argentina’s official unemployment rate is 17.3 percent. The government predicts that this index may have declined a point in recent months, but most analysts believe this is wishful thinking. The decline could be merely a reflection of the number of job searchers, mostly women, who were so dispirited that they have stopped looking for work, analysts say. Similarly, indices of indigence and socio-economic inequality show that the nation’s expanding gross national product, which could grow 7 percent this year, is not creating any trickle-down effect” (Valente, 1997, 1). Therefore, the evidence reveals that the decreased employment opportunities due to capital liberalization lead many women to become discouraged and exit the labor force.

A potential alternative explanation for the decline in female labor force participation is the economic downturn (Eastin and Prakash, 2013). However, the Argentine economy experienced economic growth during this period of capital liberalization. In other words, investments flow into the Argentine economy without regulations that contribute to economic growth (Taylor, 2001; Valente, 1997). Valente reported in 1997 that, “Argentina’s gross domestic product grew 18.3 percent from 1991 to 1995 due to the liberalization of the market…” (Valente, 1997, 3). This information indicates that Argentina experiences substantial economic growth during the period of capital liberalization. In addition, this growth in the gross domestic product is tied to the increase in capital flow in the Argentine economy. The evidence reveals
that a decline in the economy does not account for the reduction in women’s activity in the labor market.

**Gender Inequality Index**

The results from the statistical analysis indicate that capital liberalization leads to an increase in the gender inequality index. The evidence from the process tracing confirms that capital liberalization contributes to increased capital investment in the different sectors. The increased capital investments in the different industries contribute to restructuring the labor force and increasing reliance on capital machinery. The restructuring of the labor force and increased reliance on capital machinery contribute to greater wage inequality between men and women.

It seems that capital liberalization increases wage inequality between men and women in Argentina’s labor market. Acosta and Gasparini found that wage inequality between workers in the manufacturing industry and other sectors increases with capital liberalization policies (Acosta and Gasparini, 2007). They explain that capital liberalization leads to increased capital and machinery in different sectors, which leads to a demand for skilled workers paid higher wages. The authors state, “…in sectors in which capital accumulation has been more intense, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has significantly widened. Although we cannot identify causal effects, we take the results as preliminary evidence for the major impact of capital accumulation on wage inequality in the manufacturing sector in Argentina” (Acosta and Gasparini, 2007, 795). Furthermore, capital liberalization contributes to increasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector.

Although men suffered a significant loss in manufacturing employment due to capital liberalization, more men filled these new positions requiring skilled labor in this sector. Sautu
explains, “Argentine women have been losing ground in the manufacturing sector except in administrative jobs. The new technologically advanced industries absorbed male labor, and the modernization of traditionally female activities, such as the making of textiles, have replaced women by men” (Sautu, 1980, 156). This indicates that men were replacing women in the manufacturing industry as it became more technologically advanced. In other words, the demand for skilled labor led to an increase in men applying for these new positions that offer higher wages. Furthermore, this demand for skilled labor in the manufacturing industry and other sectors that increase their capital accumulation contributes to more gender inequality in wages and employment. Women could not obtain these new positions that require skilled labor because they do not have the background or requirements to make them eligible. In addition, men work in these technologically advanced industries in Argentina, making them more likely to obtain these jobs. Therefore, the increased capital accumulation in the manufacturing industry and elsewhere contributes to further gender inequality in income and employment. Acosta and Gasparini explain that, “The skill premium decline until 1993, from where it started an ascending path, and returns to high school graduation increased by 48 percent between 1993 and 2001 in the manufacturing sector (47 percent for the whole economy). Changes for the rest of the urban areas also have been significant, although milder; the skill premium rose 15 percent in the manufacturing sector and 27 percent in the economy” (Acosta and Gasparini, 2007, 796). The information indicates that the same demand for more skilled workers with higher wages is not exclusive to the manufacturing sector. Specifically, it highlights that the entire labor market transforms with the adoption of capital liberalization policies. Therefore, the increased use of capital and machinery contributes to increased wage and employment disparity between men and women in manufacturing and the rest of the economy.
A potential alternative explanation for increased gender inequality in Argentina is the decline in education for women (Lama, 1999; UN, 1998). However, the educational data reveal that average female years of education have increased since the 1970s. Data from Barro and Lee indicate that average female years of schooling increased from 6.96 in 1975 to 9.3 in 2003 (Barro et al., 2013). The evidence shows that average female years of education improve over time. In fact, in 1994, the World Bank reported that women’s years of education surpassed men’s in Argentina (Market Latin America, 1994). Therefore, women should be obtaining equal or better employment to their male counterparts and income with this improvement. This suggests that women's decline in education cannot account for the wage or gender inequality women experience in Argentina.

Another plausible explanation for the rise in gender inequality in Argentina is the increased conservative or religious perspectives. Studies often discuss how religion influences women’s participation in the labor market or gender inequality more broadly (Dildar, 2015; Seguino, 2010; Schnabel, 2015). However, data from the World Religion Project’s National Religion dataset show that Argentina’s number of religious adherents fluctuate slightly from 1975 to 2003 (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). The data reveal that the number of religious individuals in Argentina decreased from 98.65 percent in 1975 to 94.82 percent in 1989 and increased to 97.42 percent by 2003 (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). The evidence indicates that the number of religious perspectives slightly decline during this period. The evidence suggests that religion may not account for the increased gender inequality.
In sum, the findings from the small-N analysis, model testing case study complement those from the large-N statistical analysis in that it provides clarification for the results from the models. The results from the model testing case study indicate the direction of effect between neoliberal reform and gender inequality and the causal process. It enables me to see how neoliberal reform based on the five individual policies connects to gender inequality. Therefore, it helps to explain the results from the statistical analysis with more in-depth information. Also, the model testing case study help to confirm or disconfirm the results from the large-N statistical analysis. It allows me to triangulate the information from the statistical results to the process tracing analysis to ensure that the results were valid. It also helps me see the logical causal pathway of the relationship between the two variables.

The combination of the two leads to a firm conclusion regarding neoliberal or feminist arguments. The results from both the large-N statistical analysis and the model testing case study showed mixed results across the different outcome variables. Evidence from the statistical analysis and process tracing reveals that all individual policies with the exception of financial and capital reforms were beneficial for the female labor force participation rate, specifically female employment. However, neoliberal reform is not beneficial for the welfare of women or gender inequality. The qualitative analysis results indicate that the female labor force participation rate improves with the individual policies. The qualitative analysis complements this finding by showing that the individual neoliberal policies except for capital and financial reform reduce male employment, causing women to enter the labor force to make up for household income loss. In other words, female employment improves with these neoliberal policies due to male job losses, which help counteract the adverse effects on the household.
In terms of female employment in the manufacturing sector, the quantitative analysis shows that tax reform is helpful to the outcome. However, international trade is harmful to female employment in manufacturing. The qualitative analysis reveals that tax reform improves female employment in manufacturing due to reducing value-add taxes on capital goods, which contribute to massive layoffs, especially among male breadwinners. This causes women to enter the labor force to find jobs in the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors to make up for the household income. For international trade, female employment declined due to the overall industry’s contraction from the reduction in tariffs and increased foreign competition, which caused many of these businesses to close. Furthermore, the finding for tax reform seems to support the feminist perspective, while those for international trade undercut both arguments.

The gender inequality index results from both the statistical analysis and qualitative analysis indicate that privatization is helpful to gender disparity. The qualitative analysis shows a similar theme as before, where men were laid-off, and women offset these losses by entering the labor market. In terms of capital reform, the results from both show that capital reform is harmful to gender disparity and equality. Based on the case study, the increased levels of capital contribute to increased demand for skilled labor and a rise in income inequality. The results for both privatization and capital reform support the feminist perspective.

To provide further context for my results on gender inequality, I analyze the effects of neoliberal policies on the overall economic shifts in Argentina. David Moberg of the Institute for Public Affairs reported in 2003 that Latin American countries experienced a decline in economic growth with the adoption of neoliberal policies (Moberg, 2003). Moberg states, “And starting in 1990, a boom decade in the United States, Latin American economies grew only an average of 1.6 percent a year. During even that period of growth, inequality and poverty in Latin America
remained extremely high or got worse” (Moberg, 2003, 2). The author mentions that the worsened inequality during the neoliberal period stems from increased unemployment due to neoliberal policies, which contributes to a widening gap between the rich and poor. Lewis Machipisa of the Inter Press Service states, “In the Argentine crisis, the problem is that over the last 10 years capital has increased its share, but labor has seen its share shrink, so the people lack purchasing power” (Machipisa, 2002, 2). Therefore, the increased demand for capital due to the adoption of neoliberal reform contributed to a shrunken labor force. The reduction in employment opportunities leads to a rise in unemployment and loss of income, contributing to a widening gap between the rich and poor. This highlights that the minimal economic growth experienced by most Latin American countries did not improve inequality overall and gender disparities specifically. Machipisa notes, “While quality employment declines in the relentless quest for profit, the gulf of inequality is widening between rich and poor, between women and men, and between the developing and industrialized countries” (Machipisa, 2002, 1). Therefore, employment opportunities decline for male breadwinners while women are hired for these restructured low-quality positions. As a result, the gender disparities increase due to these new positions that women gain. However, the quality of these new positions is not beneficial to women, and men also remain unemployed.
Chapter 6
Peru Case Study

The goal of this chapter is to search for potential alternative explanations not included in the model regarding my case study Peru. Furthermore, I confirm an existing theory that best explains the case of Peru. The model results show that Peru is a poorly predicted or deviant case study, which means the current theory does not apply well to this case. Therefore, I conducted online internet newspaper research using various newspaper databases to see which other explanatory variables explained what was occurring in Peru. I look for other explanatory variables other than neoliberalism and my control variables that best explain the case of Peru. After finding an already established explanatory variable, I trace the causal process from the outcome of interest to the explanatory variable to better explain what is happening in Peru and why it does not fit the model.

The main qualitative finding, violence against women, confirms an alternative explanation for women’s inequality. Specifically, violence against women contributes to an increase in the female labor force participation rate. In other words, the civil conflict in the 1980s in Peru caused male heads of household or men, more generally, to leave their household. This led women to take the role of economic provider, forcing them into the workforce. However, violence against women during the civil war contributed to a decline in female employment in the manufacturing sector. The civil war led to the closure of many companies in the manufacturing sector, contributing to a decline in women’s employment opportunities in this industry. Violence against women leads to an increase in the gender inequality index in Peru. Violence against women from the civil war helps to reinforce the gender stereotypes that
marginalize women. Therefore, this disadvantage in the labor market leads to more gender inequality.

The rest of this chapter is organized into three sections. First, I discuss the relationship between the female labor force participation rate and violence against women. Second, I trace the causal process between female employment in the manufacturing sector and violence against women. Third, I explain the causal pathway between the gender inequality index and violence against women.

Violence Against Women

Female Labor Force Participation Rate

The evidence from the online newspapers indicates that violence against women is one of the main explanatory variables that affect Peru’s female labor force participation rate. Peru experienced a civil conflict between 1980 and 2000, contributing to its current machismo culture and the significant levels of violence against women (Ostby et al., 2019; Leiby, 2012; Boesten, 2012). The insurgent groups involved in the civil war force men and women to join the war, but mostly men. The increased number of men joining the civil war led to the reordering of women’s role in the family to become the economic provider. This led women to enter the labor market to make up for the loss of household income.

In the 1980s to early 2000s, Peru experienced a civil war that included violence patterns against women (Leiby, 2015; Garcia-Ponce, 2017; Leiby, 2009; Ostby et al., 2019). Violence against women during this period is perpetuated by the state and insurgent groups (Boesten, 2012; Ostby et al., 2019; Leiby, 2015). Boesten notes, “During the internal conflict between Shining Path and the armed force, the state, through its military and police, proved to be the main
perpetrator of sexual violence against the Andean indigenous population, as well as against suspected and convicted members of Shining Path. In addition, a forced sterilization program in the mid-1990s victimized about two hundred thousand largely indigenous poor women” (Boesten, 2012, 3). Therefore, the state perpetrated violence against women during this period, but also members of the Shining Path insurgent group also inflicted harm on women. This period in Peru’s history contributes to the normalization of violence against women in the different spheres and the rise of the machismo culture (Boesten, 2012; Ostby, 2019; Lama, 1999).

During the civil war, men were separated from their families and forced to join the insurgency group. The civil war threatens the family space and reorders women’s role by separating men from their families, leaving women to become economic providers for the household (Garcia-Ponce, 2017; Presswire, 1998, Lama, 1995). The Salt Lake Tribune reported in 1994 that, “Waldi Geronimo Vilchez, a bilingual Ashaninka, was teaching grades one through three when a guerilla column entered the village of Quiriquiari in 1989. The rebels ordered him to stop classes in mathematics, Spanish and history and teach only Shining Path doctrine…Like many of the refugees, the teacher had to abandon part of his family. The Shining Path routinely separates family members, sending them to different camps to discourage escape and threatening to kill those left behind” (The Salt Lake Tribune, 1994, 2). Therefore, men were forced to join the Shining Path insurgency group and separate from their families to fight the civil war. The report also adds that a force member of the Shining Path, Pablo Mejia escape the group after watching his children die of malnutrition in the camp (The Salt Lake Tribune, 1994, 2).

The increased number of men forced to join the civil war caused women to enter the labor market to make up for the lost income of their husbands leaving the household. Carol states, “The profound imbalance between income and consumption needs, far more severe than
the gap that preceded the 1980s, brought about the massive incorporation of women into productive activities that generated family income. In the countryside, whether as a result of the absence of the male head or of family dispersal and migration, women took over much or all of family productive activity. In poor urban sectors, two-fifth of the families lived either exclusively or principally from incomes generated by women” (Carol, 1998, 357). This means that women became the sole providers when men were forced to leave their families and engage in the civil war. Therefore, women fulfill this need by seeking employment in the labor market to generate income for their families. Women also work with other women in their neighborhoods to create food sources that supply the family’s needs (Carol, 1998).

A potential alternative explanation for the increase in the female labor force participation rate is improvements in the economy. However, the economic conditions in Peru before and during the civil war were fragile (Three Star Edition, 1989; Saavedra and Torero, 2004). Saavedra and Torero explain that Peru’s economy fell into a deep recession before and during the war (Saavedra and Torero, 2004). This affected job growth and current salaries, which fell by fifty percent (Three Star Edition, 1989). The PRS Group report, “After growing by around 8 or 9 percent in 1986 and 1987, GDP contracted by 8.8 percent in 1988 and around 12 percent in 1989. Garcia has managed to engineer a slight turnaround in the economy, but his boom and bust approach means this unlikely to continue beyond the life of the present government” (PRS Group, 1990, 4). The evidence reveals that economic conditions do not increase female labor force participation rates since the economy is unstable.

Another potential explanation for the increase in the female labor force participation rate is education. However, female education is a constant struggle due to the macho culture in Peru (Lama, 1999). Valente explains that, “In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, more women are
overworked because, in addition to their already numerous family obligations, they have to engage in agricultural work and cattle raising to increase their daily income” (Valente, 1991, 1).

Therefore, education is not a priority for women in Peru because the culture associated them with the household instead of having a formal education to enter the labor. Despite the cultural effects on women’s education in Peru, data from Barro-Lee show that female education improved between 1975 and 2003 (Barro-Lee et al., 2013). Specifically, average female years of schooling increase from 4.69 to 8.54 (Barro-Lee et al., 2013). Although education data reveal that more women were in schools for a more extended period, this has historically been on the rise. Thus, female education does not account for the increase in female activity in the labor force since it is already on the rise while the economy declines.

**Female Employment in Manufacturing**

The evidence reveals that violence against women affects female employment in the manufacturing industry in Peru. The increased violence from the civil war caused many businesses in the manufacturing industry to cease their operations. This led employment in the manufacturing industry for both men and women to decline.

In the 1980s, Peru experienced a civil war that perpetrated violence against civilians as well as businesses. The Toronto Star reported in 1989 that, “Shining Path’s murderous campaign against Peru’s government, peasants, foreign development workers and local businesses had bloodied this ancient land of the Inca kings in a nine-year war that has left 15,000 dead” (Toronto Star, 1989, 1). Therefore, the civil war affects various sources in Peru, including business operations. IHS Global Insight also finds that, “The threat of terrorism in Peru was reduced significantly in the early 1990s under authoritarian ex-President Alberto Fujimori, but there have been fears in recent years that Shining Path members are regrouping. Captured
commander Zuniga is thought to have been behind a spate of terrorist activities including kidnapping of over 70 employees of Argentine company Techint, who were working on the construction of a gas pipeline connecting south-east Peru with the northern jungle region” (HIS Global Insight, 2003, 2). The evidence indicates that Shining Path causes businesses overall and in the manufacturing industry to be concerned with the increased violence inflicted on their employees.

The civil war violence leads to the closure of many manufacturing companies. Hernandez states, “Terrorism affected the Peruvian economy dramatically. The leaders of some of the biggest companies in Peru had to leave the country because their lives were being threatened. Business activities of most of the companies in the industrial and mining sectors were conducted in the mountains; since terrorists occupied these territories, the level of private and public investment decreased even more” (Hernandez, 2002, 6). The violence from the civil war resulted in a reduction in investments in the companies in the manufacturing sector, which translated into the closure of many businesses in this industry. Laurie explains, “One woman explained how many factories often went bankrupt” (Laurie, 1995, 139). Furthermore, the civil war does not provide favorable conditions for businesses in the manufacturing industry.

The closure of businesses in the manufacturing sector leads to a reduction in female employment. Although the distribution of female employment in the manufacturing industry was unclear during the beginning of the conflict in 1980, data from the International Labor Organization indicate that it declines in the latter part (ILO, 2020). In 1991, female employment in the manufacturing industry stood at 10.5 percent and declined by 0.1 percent in the following year. In 1993 and 1994, female employment declined again, also by 0.1 percent. This indicates that female employment in this industry is decreasing but at a slow rate. In 1995 and 1996, again
female employment in the manufacturing sector declined by another 0.1 percent. Between 1997 and 1998, female employment stood at 10 and 9.8 percent, indicating a slight increase in the number of jobs lost by women in the manufacturing industry. By 1999, female employment in the manufacturing industry declined by 0.3 percent, which shows another increase in lost jobs. In 2000, female employment in the manufacturing industry fell to 9.2 percent and 9.1 percent in the following year. In 2002, female employment in the manufacturing industry fell to 9 percent and declined by 2 percent in the following year (ILO, 2020). The data indicate that female employment in the manufacturing industry declined the most between 2002 and 2003. Overall, the data show that female employment in the manufacturing industry is on a slight but steady decline between 1991 and 2003. Therefore, the economic conditions exacerbated by the violent conflict led to a further decline in the manufacturing industry.

A potential alternative explanation for the decline in female employment in the manufacturing industry is an economic downturn. During the 1980s, Peru had some economic recovery, but it declined in the latter part of the decade. The British Broadcasting Company state, “In 1986, the Peruvian economy experienced a growth of 8.5 percent; in other words, it was the highest growth of the past 26 years…During the first five months of 1987, economic growth has reached 11 percent, and we are sure that by the end of the year it will be above 6 percent” (BBC, 1987, 1). The evidence indicates that the economy began to grow in the late 1980s, but this growth decreased afterward into the late 1990s (Agence France Presse, 1999). During this period of economic decline, female employment in the manufacturing industry grew. The International Labor Organization shows that female manufacturing employment rose from three hundred and two thousand in 1991 to three hundred and fourteen thousand the following year (ILO, 2020).
This rise in female employment in manufacturing continued to 2002. This means that the decline in the economy could not account for the outcome.

Another potential explanation for the decrease in female employment in the manufacturing sector is the adoption of neoliberal reform. In the 1980s and 1990s, the government adopts trade liberalization policies to aid with the economic conditions. Pastor Jr. and Wise state, “The effects of trade liberalization policy were immediate. Lower tariffs brought a flood of foreign products into the domestic market. Some of the new imports were necessary industrial inputs, but the import of luxury consumer goods also skyrocketed. Losses resulting from increased competition gave rise to higher demands for credit on the part of the local industry. Because financial liberalization was also part of the program, credit became more expensive, and many firms that had been forced to borrow went into the red quickly. As a result, manufacturing output dropped by nearly 20 percent between 1980 and 1983, and idle capacity in industry rose to well over 50 percent” (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1992, 89). However, as previously mentioned, the manufacturing industry recovered in the late 1980s, suggesting that female employment in the sector would also improve. This suggests that the effects of neoliberal reform do not account for the outcome.

When female employment in the manufacturing industry declined in the 1980s and 1990s due to the economic conditions exacerbated by the civil war, women found employment in the service sector. Laurie states that, “MacEwan Scott indicates that the majority of informal jobs for women in Lima are in the service sector. Even in times of crisis, there is a demand for labor such as domestics as basic household reproduction has to carry on regardless: people need to be fed with cooked food and clothed with clean garments” (Laurie, 1995, 141). Therefore, women sought employment in the service sector to make up for declining employment in the
manufacturing sector. It also seems that this type of employment in the service industry fits the occupational stereotype of women in the labor market. In addition, during the civil war period, the government created an employment program known as PAIT to help households gain new formal employment due to the economic conditions that transpired (Laurie, 1995). The information from this program shows that women who lost employment, especially in the manufacturing industry, were willing to take on any type of employment outside of the manufacturing industry. Laurie mentions that, “PAIT work was carried out by gangs comprising approximately forty people mainly women. It involved heavy, manual tasks such as excavating rocks, transporting bulky materials or manually clearing land with a few crude tools” (Laurie, 1995, 144). Therefore, these employments often include manual labor that was outside of the manufacturing industry. Therefore, women gain employment to support their families but not in the manufacturing industry due to the decline of the overall sector following the economic decline and violence from the civil war.

While some women turned to the service industry for employment, others looked at self-employment as a viable option. Diaz and his co-author state, “Employment did not decline in absolute terms due to the growth of self-employment. Rising self-employment and slower output growth provoked a severe drop in productivity in line with a decrease in real income” (Diaz et al., 2002, 391). Therefore, some women sought employment in the service sector following the manufacturing industry’s decline, while others became self-employed. Coral states, “In the 1980s, the economic crisis had the effect of deepening and generalizing already existing social problems. In those circumstances, not only the problem of physical space and infrastructure development had to be addressed collectively. In addition, the problem of unemployment and personal survival also transcended the family sphere and demanded prompt and effective
solutions…Faced with a shrinking formal labor market, massive layoffs, and deteriorating working conditions, people tended to develop informal economic activities to attend to their basic needs. In the face of this problem, women gained valuable experience in self-employment and income generation” (Coral, 1998, 364). Therefore, women turn to self-employment to cope with the effects of the economic crisis and the civil war, which lead to fewer employment opportunities in the manufacturing sector. Women also put their resources together to generate more employment for women struggling through harsh economic times.

**Gender Inequality Index**

The evidence reveals that violence against women leads to an increase in gender inequality in Peruvian society. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, Peru experienced a civil war that perpetuated violence against women. The gender-based violence from the civil war reinforced male dominance over women, leading to a machismo culture (Flake, 2005). The machismo culture contributes to increasing gender inequality in terms of employment and income for women. Specifically, women were confined in labor market sectors related to the household that were of low-quality employment and wages.

During the civil war in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s, women experience high levels of violence. Kirk and Thomas explain that women were often the targets of violence from state and insurgent groups during the civil war (Kirk and Thomas, 1992). The authors state, “Throughout Peru’s 12-year internal war, women have been the target of sustained, frequently brutal violence committed by both parties to the armed conflict, often for the purpose of punishing or dominating those believed to be sympathetic to the opposing side. Women have been threatened, raped, and murdered by government security forces; and women have been threatened, raped, and murdered by the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path” (Kirk and Thomas, 1992, 1).
Furthermore, women experienced high levels of violence during the civil war to attack the opposing side. These types of violence against women produced a machismo culture in Peru, where women were considered subservient to their male counterparts in all parts of society.

The prevalence of gender-based violence from the civil war produced the machismo culture of men having more dominance over women (Flake, 2005). The violence inflicted on women during this period of internal conflict relay to society that women were subservient and should be treated as such. Press Wire report, “The Peruvian Government, the report says, has been making great efforts to eliminate the myths, beliefs, prejudices, as well as traditional and customary discriminatory practices, in order to promote a change in mindset that will pave the way for a new culture in which expectations, values, and functions of men and women are not conditional upon or predetermined by gender stereotypes” (Press Wire, 2002, 2). This idea of women being subservient in Peruvian society originates from the long-standing violence against women in the country and those inflicted by the state. Boesten explains that the state as the perpetrator of gender-based violence during the civil war helped undermine gender equality and any legislative efforts to combat this problem (Boesten, 2012).

The use of gender-based violence in the civil war led to gender inequality in employment in the labor market in Peru. Therefore, the effects of gender-based violence reinforce patriarchy or machismo culture, which means that women were limited to finding employment in areas in the labor market related to domestic activities while men work jobs that fit the male stereotypes. For example, women in Peru were primarily concentrated in the service industry, while men obtained jobs in construction (Laurie, 1995). These positions fit the gender stereotype of women filling jobs in the domestic sphere while men took on positions that were not feminine. Laurie states, “For example, in Peru, nearly half the female migrants to Lima are aged between fourteen
and sixteen and most of these girls migrate in order to combine work and study. On arrival, however, they are faced with a very limited job market and long hours of work, which makes adequate schooling difficult to obtain. These specific mechanisms, together with the fact that domestics are rarely unionized, seldom receive fixed wages and in general, terms become socialized as workers into private home spaces mean that domestic work, particularly that carried out on a live-in basis, rarely leads to upward mobility for women and often serves only to reinforce women’s domestic roles as they continue to do what they have always done: work in-home space for little reward or recognition” (Laurie, 1995, 42). Furthermore, women were confined to domestic-related employment, which provided little to no upward mobility and reinforced the gender stereotype of women being subservient.

Peru’s violent history perpetuates violence against women and the machismo culture (Flake, 2005). This suggests that the country's continual violence contributes to the normalization of violence against women along with the macho culture. Therefore, gender equality could not take root in Peru due to its history. Flake states, “The high occurrence of spousal violence in Peru is not surprising, given the country’s legacy of political and social violence. Beginning with the Spanish Conquest in 1532 and extending to its present conflict with the Shining Path guerilla organization, Peru’s history is marred by almost continual bloodshed. Societies with long histories of wars are vulnerable to outbreaks of social violence…Excessive political and social violence is associated with higher rates of domestic violence” (Flake, 2005, 354). The evidence reveals that Peru’s history of violence perpetuates gender inequality before the civil war, but also the conflict also helps to undermine gender equality. In other words, violence is a significant factor in why Peru continues to experience gender inequality.
A potential alternative explanation for gender inequality in Peru is the reduction in educational opportunities for women. The lack of education is often mentioned as a hindrance to higher female labor force participation (Lama, 1999; UN, 1998). However, educational data show that female educational opportunities increase between 1975 and 2003. Specifically, the data reveal that average female years of education increased from 4.69 in 1975 to 8.54 in 2003 (Barro et al., 2013). Therefore, the evidence reveals that average female education improves over time. This suggests that a decline in education for women does not account for gender inequality in Peru.

Another probable alternate explanation for gender inequality in Peru is increased religious adherents or conservative views (Schnabel, 2015; Seguino, 2010). In other words, a higher number of religious individuals or perspectives contribute to more gender inequality. Data from the World Religion Project: National Religion Dataset show that the percentage of religious adherents increase in Peru between 1975 and 2003 (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). The percentage of Peru’s religious population in 1975 stood at 96.69 percent (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). However, the percentage increase slightly in the following years to 99.9 by 1990. By 2003, Peru’s percent of religious individuals decrease to 97.13 percent (Maoz and Henderson, 2013). Therefore, the percentage of religious individuals increase overall during this period, but these numbers fluctuate slightly. The evidence suggests that religion could influence gender inequality but cannot fully account for this outcome.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes my conclusions on the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender equality. I organize this chapter as follows. First, I summarize my principal argument and the evidence from my large-N statistical analysis and case studies. Second, I recap the policy implications of my findings and the broader significance of this study. Third, I identify some extensions and possibilities for future work.

Summary of Argument

I argue that neoliberalism does not boost women’s status in Latin America, although it reduces the gender disparity in the labor market. Therefore, neoliberalism seems beneficial for women on the surface, but that is not the case when we examine this relationship more closely. The decline in the status of men in the labor market made women’s status look good. Also, the jobs that women do attain are precarious and of low quality. Instead, education has a more significant and more beneficial effect on the status of women in the labor market. The relationship between structural adjustment policies and gender equality is highly contested in the literature. Neoliberals argue that structural adjustment policies positively affect women in the labor market (Friedman, 2009). They assert that structural adjustment policies lead to more economic growth. Furthermore, the economic growth from these policies is expected to produce a more gender-equitable society. In contrast, feminists contend that structural adjustment policies negatively affect the status of women (Afshar, 2016). They explain that structural adjustment policies lead to women’s exploitation in the labor market, which increases gender inequality.
Feminists emphasize that a more gender-equitable society produces economic growth. Therefore, the focus of policymakers should be on gender equality instead of economic growth. Although structural adjustment policies improve gender inequality in Latin America, education is not just relevant but more important than any of the policy changes.

Evidence

The evidence shows that structural adjustment policies have a harmful effect on gender equality in Latin America. The findings from the statistical analysis show that all individual policies except for financial and capital reform contribute to an increase in the female labor force participation rate. Specifically, financial reform has no likely effect on the outcome. However, capital reform leads to a decrease in the female labor force participation rate. In terms of female employment in the manufacturing sector, tax reform is beneficial to the outcome variable. Conversely, international trade adversely affects female employment in the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, privatization, financial, and capital reforms likely do not affect the outcome. Privatization and capital reform are the only individual policies that affect gender inequality. Therefore, international trade, tax, and financial reform likely have no effect on gender inequality. Privatization seems to have a helpful effect on the gender inequality index, while capital reform is harmful to the outcome.

The case study analysis shows that the individual policies improve gender disparity in Argentina due to the displacement of men in the labor force. In other words, female labor force participation and female employment in the manufacturing industry improved due to male job losses. Therefore, women enter the labor force as a strategy at the household level for women’s
gains in employment to offset men’s losses. Women only seem to be doing better due to the displacement of men from the labor market. Also, the low-quality positions that companies force women into do not contribute to more gender equality. The combination of evidence from both the statistical analysis and case study, specifically Argentina, increases the validity of the conclusion and helps provide a fuller narrative of the relationship between neoliberalism and gender equality.

To provide context for my findings on gender inequality, I examined a few measures of overall economic shifts. Moberg explained that Latin American countries experienced average economic growth at a rate of between one and two percent (Moberg, 2003). Despite the slight growth in the economy, other indicators such as poverty and inequality worsened (Moberg, 2003). He highlighted that the growing unemployment due to the increased use of capital by businesses to become competitive led to these dire conditions (Machipisa, 2002). As a result, fewer employment opportunities were available in the labor force, leading to the rising gap between the rich and the poor (Machipisa, 2002). The new employment created was low quality, which led more women than men into the labor force to help the household income.

**Mixed-Methods Design**

Drawing on the large-N statistical analysis and small-N case study analysis, the results show that structural adjustment policies have a harmful effect on gender equality in Argentina. The large-N statistical analysis allows me to explore the relationship between the independent and dependent variables on a larger scale. It enables me to see how the different cases are in relation to each other, allowing me to view potential cases for qualitative analysis. Therefore, the large-N statistical analysis generates statistical findings of the relationships of interest. I then use
quantitative analysis diagnostics to guide my case selection for qualitative research. The small-N case study analysis complements the study by confirming or disconfirming the quantitative analysis findings. The evidence from the qualitative analysis provides insight into the underlying causal mechanism and direction of the results from the quantitative analysis. This enables me to see if the results are consistent across quantitative and qualitative analyses, which increases confidence in the study’s central findings and helps confirm the quantitative findings. Separately, Chapter 6 helps identify alternative explanations and improve measurements by enabling me to trace the causal process from the dependent variable to new or refine measurements of existing independent variables to better assess their relationship. This enables me to improve the model specification used in the large-N analysis and re-run the models to see if the results are consistent with the findings from the qualitative analysis. This study follows a nested analysis approach where the case studies are nested within a large-N statistical analysis. This approach provides opportunities for model testing and model-building case studies.

The large-N statistical analysis provides evidence that structural adjustment policies force more women to become active in the labor force and the manufacturing industry. Also, structural adjustment policies improve the gender inequality index. The small-N case study analysis confirms the findings from the large-N statistical analysis. In the model testing case study, Argentina, tax reform increases the female labor force participation rate and female employment in the manufacturing industry. The reduction in value-add taxes, which lead to increased demand for capital machinery, explains this. The rise in the use of capital machinery leads to an increase in male unemployment. Therefore, women enter the labor market to make up for their male partners’ income loss across the different sectors, especially in manufacturing. Financial reform has no statistically significant effect on any of the three outcome variables. However,
international trade has a helpful effect on the female labor force participation rate but is harmful to female employment in the manufacturing industry. I attribute the positive effect of trade reform on the female labor force participation rate to the loss of male jobs because of the increased use of capital machinery. The increased exposure of domestic companies to foreign competition, which leads to massive job destruction for both men and women, explains the negative effect of trade reform on female employment in the manufacturing industry.

Privatization has a helpful effect on the female labor force participation rate and gender inequality index. This suggests that privatization destroys male employment, similar to trade reform, which leads more women to become active. Privatization improves the gender inequality index because women are seeking employment to stabilize household income. For these reasons, privatization also leads to a decline in income disparity between men and women. Capital reform decreases the female labor force participation rate and increases the gender inequality index. The increase in capital explains this, contributing to growth in the economy but not the productive sector. The negative effect of capital reform on gender inequality is attributed to the increased use of capital machinery, which leads to a rise in demand for skilled workers and a decline in employment opportunities for unskilled laborers. Therefore, Argentina provides evidence that not only confirms the findings from the large-N statistical analysis but also provides insight that uncovers the causal process underlying the association between neoliberalism and the outcomes of interest.

In the model building case study, Peru, diagnostics of the large-N statistical analysis show that this case does not fit the core model. In this case, the analytic goals are to provide better measurement for existing variables and provide new or existing alternative explanations for this case study. To do this, I traced the causal process from the outcomes to the explanatory
variable. The results show that violence against women influences gender equality in Peru. Specifically, violence against women leads to an increased female labor force participation rate and the gender inequality index. However, violence against women is negatively correlated with female employment in the manufacturing industry. The relationship between violence against women and the female labor force participation rate is attributed to the reordering of women’s role due to the civil war. In other words, the civil war contributes to men deserting their families to fight in the war, causing women to take on the new role of economic provider. Thus, women are forced to enter the labor force to provide financially for themselves and their families. However, the civil war also contributes to a decline in female and male employees in the manufacturing industry because of many businesses’ closure. The civil war was expanded to the mountainous areas where businesses in the manufacturing industry were located. Therefore, the adverse effects of the civil war force companies to close, which reduces the number of individuals employed in the manufacturing industry. Still, violence against women does not reduce gender inequality because of the gender stereotypes that marginalize women in society. In other words, women are still concentrated in precarious employment with low wages despite the increased number of women in the labor force and various legislation on gender equality. The cultural stereotype allows women to be discriminated against because their perceived role is still associated with the household.

The findings from the mixed-methods analysis show that general reform is harmful to gender equality. The increased employment opportunities for women in the labor market are due to men’s loss of employment. Furthermore, neoliberal reform seems beneficial for women at the surface, but it came at the expense of male employment. In other words, women look good relative to their male counterparts because neoliberalism displaces men from the labor market. In
addition, women are forced into precarious positions to support the household. In Peru, violence against women adversely affects the female labor force participation rate, female employment in the manufacturing industry, and the gender inequality index. These conclusions would be difficult to reach in a traditional, non-nested analysis. This is because the findings from both the large and small-N analyses inform each other to provide the analytical narrative regarding the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender equality in Argentina. In the case of Peru, the small-N analysis helps with discovering new and refining existing variables.

Overall, the quantitative analysis provides mixed and inconsistent evidence regarding the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender inequality. The findings vary based on the policy and outcome, which does not support the neoliberal or feminist theories. However, the qualitative analysis helps to trace the causal relationship between neoliberal policies and the different outcomes. The mixed-methods approach illustrates the misleading nature of the dependent variable gender inequality, which can be operationalized using various indicators such as employment status, quality of employment, relative employment of men and women, and income. Specifically, the qualitative approach helped improve the measurement of gender inequality by looking at the quality of employment. Therefore, a better measurement of gender inequality will need to include income, relative employment of men and women, and the quantity and quality of employment women receive in relation to their male counterparts.

**Education**

**Female Employment**

Education is a significant causal factor that contributes to an increase in female employment in the labor market. Therefore, high illiteracy rates among women are directly
related to a decline in the female employment rate. Lama of the Inter Press Service state that illiteracy among women in Peru is a major problem. The reporter state, “In 1998, the rate of illiteracy among women was 15.3 percent, more than triple that of men, while the average number of years of schooling in the population over 15 was 7.7 for women and 8.3 for men. For every ten pupils who gain a higher education, only four are women. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Computing, between 1993 and 1997, the number of women with at least one year of college grew by less than one percent”(Lama, 1999, 1). This information indicates that women experience higher illiteracy rates than men in Peru. Studies point to the idea that illiteracy prevents women from receiving employment in the formal labor market. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women states that, “Peru’s objective in educational policy regarding women is to eliminate illiteracy and women’s disadvantage compared to men in access to education at all levels, says the report. The aim is to better integrate women into economic, political and social life, using integrated literacy programmes that have an impact on the job training for women, and to prepare them to take on responsibilities in daily life” (UN, 1998, 2). Therefore, reducing illiteracy among women allows them to be better integrated into Peru’s economic, political, and social life. In addition, it enables them to be better prepared for job training and the recommended materials needed to understand the employment they obtain.

Improvements in educational opportunities for women are an integral part of reducing the female unemployment rate. Lama explains that, “The educational disadvantage, along with macho prejudices, explain why wide unemployment among women is surpassing 11 percent, while that of men is 6.7 percent, said Vega” (Lama, 1999, 1). Furthermore, the high illiteracy contributes to the high unemployment rate among women because they could not obtain
employment in the formal sector. Women who experience illiteracy sought employment in the informal sector, where reading was not required to obtain a job. Lama mentions that these women enter the informal sector, where they obtain employment as domestic workers or shopkeepers (Lama, 1999). The reporter states, “The sociologist points out that women enter areas of low productivity or work in the informal sector as roaming street vendors or domestic workers” (Lama, 1999, 1). Therefore, the problem of illiteracy kept women at a disadvantage by keeping unemployment high amongst this particular group. As the illiteracy rate for women increases, unemployment also rises due to the barrier that illiteracy creates for women who try to enter the formal sector.

**Gender Inequality**

Education is also a key component of reducing gender inequality in the labor market. The high illiteracy rates among women continue to increase employment disparities between men and women further. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women mentions that literacy among women is directly connected to their integration into the formal labor market. Furthermore, they emphasize that illiteracy needs to be eliminated to allow women to be better prepared for job training and be better integrated into the economic sphere (UN, 1998). Lama points to the idea that the growing illiteracy rate among women directly explains the growing unemployment in Peru. The author states, “The educational disadvantage, along with macho prejudices, explain why wide unemployment among women is surpassing 11 percent, while that of men is 6.7 percent” (Lama, 1999, 1). Therefore, the disparity in educational opportunities directly translates into the unemployment rate we observed for
women. Furthermore, the more illiteracy increases among women, the more significant disparity we saw regarding the employment rate between men and women.

Lama also points to the idea that illiteracy is also directly connected to the income that women make. Therefore, the illiteracy rate among women also leads to a greater income disparity between men and women in Peru. The author states, “The same poll reveals that among wage earners, in both the formal and informal economic sectors, 70.9 percent are men and 29.1 percent are women” (Lama, 1999, 1). This information suggests that a disparity exists regarding the type of employment women could obtain and their wages. Furthermore, the high illiteracy rate causes women to be concentrated in the informal sectors, which often provide the least wage compared to the formal sector in the same industry. Therefore, greater educational opportunities allow men to access any employment, especially those in the formal sectors. However, women are not provided those same opportunities to access all sectors in the formal and informal labor market. Women are instead limited to the informal sector because of the lack of educational opportunities or literacy rate. The high literacy rate contributes to a barrier for women, preventing them from applying to formal sector employment. Since formal sector employment requires some form of educational or literacy background, this automatically eliminates women from being considered. As a result, the only other option for these women is employment in the informal sector, which often has poor working conditions and low wages. This means that the high illiteracy rate contributes to inequality between men and women regarding the type of employment they receive and income. Men are more advantageous since they are provided with the necessary requirements to obtain formal employment.
Policy Implications

The policy implications for the female labor force participation rate are that general reform, tax reform, international trade, and privatization benefit this outcome. Therefore, policymakers need to prioritize these economic policies to see improvements in women’s activity in the labor force. It should be noted that even though general reform is helpful to female labor force participation, policymakers need to use all individual policies affiliated with neoliberal reform except financial and capital reforms. Although policymakers use these policies to improve the female labor force participation rate, they need to consider the adverse effects. The negative effects of using neoliberal reform to improve the female labor force participation rate include the displacement of men from the labor force and the increase in more flexible and precarious employment for women. Since the harmful effects of neoliberal reform on the labor force outweigh the benefits, I recommend that policymakers seek other alternatives such as education. Although the focus here is on economic policy, one of the core findings is that education is more consequential. Furthermore, policymakers’ interest in improving gender equality needs to focus on educational opportunities and attainment for girls or women.

The policy implication for female employment in the manufacturing industry is that tax reform is beneficial for the outcome. Although the results indicate that general reform is helpful to female employment in manufacturing, tax reform is the primary individual policy driving these results. Furthermore, policymakers need to prioritize tax reform to improve female employment in the manufacturing sector. However, policymakers need to consider the adverse effects of tax reform on the labor force in general. Specifically, tax reform leads to male workers being displaced from the labor market and more precarious employment for women. Also, policymakers should not adopt international trade to improve the outcome because it harms
female employment in manufacturing. Although policymakers implement tax reform policies to attain improvements in female employment in manufacturing, they should not due to the adverse effects on everyone in the labor market. I recommend that policymakers seek alternatives to neoliberal reform, such as education. One of my core findings is that education is more effective at improving the outcome than the economic policies. Therefore, policymakers should invest in improving educational opportunities for women and girls.

The policy implication for the gender inequality index is unclear since the results are negligible. This suggests that policymakers should not prioritize neoliberal reform when they want to reduce gender inequality. Although the focus is on economic policy, education is more beneficial to improving gender inequality than neoliberal reform. This indicates that policymakers' interest in improving gender inequality should invest in more educational opportunities for women and girls to improve the outcomes.

To enhance equality in general, policymakers should invest in decent jobs. Investing in decent jobs provides opportunities for work that deliver a fair income and equal opportunities for all men and women (ILO, 2020). Therefore, policymakers should prioritize investing in decent jobs because it helps low-wage workers a decent standard of living when compared to the wealthy. In other words, providing decent jobs for everyone allows for the living standards and wages to be raised, reducing income inequality between the ninety-nine percent and one percent. Reducing the class structure by investing in decent jobs allows everyone to be raised out of precarious economic positions (Michaels and Reed, 2020).
Significance

There are several reasons this project is significant. First, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender equality, which is highly contested in the literature. This study clarifies the debate between the neoliberals and feminists regarding the effects of neoliberal reform on women’s status. Neoliberals assert that structural adjustment policies positively affect women. They explain that structural adjustment policies contribute to economic growth. Therefore, the economic growth from structural adjustment policies is expected to lead to more employment for everyone, including women. However, feminist theorists explain that structural adjustment policies negatively affect women. They argue that structural adjustment policies lead to women’s exploitation in the labor market, increasing gender inequality. Feminist theorists express that improving gender equality leads to more economic growth. Thus, the focus should be on gender equality instead of economic growth. This project helps mitigate the debate between neoliberals and feminist theorists regarding women’s welfare under neoliberal reform.

Second, this study enables me to understand better the broader relationship between economic policy and equality in Latin America. It helps me to understand how economic policies affect equality in the region. Therefore, we knew whether structural adjustment policies contribute to further inequality or equality in the region. This enables policymakers to see which policies contribute to greater inequality or equality in their society. Furthermore, this research helps to inform policy on how to achieve equality in society.

Third, equality is directly related to economic development. Furthermore, if women are at a disadvantage, they cannot contribute to their household and their country’s economic development. As previously stated by the World Bank, gender inequality retard economic
growth. Thus, ensuring that women receive equal opportunities in society enables society to achieve economic development.

Fourth, inequality is directly related to politics. Therefore, if women are poor, they cannot be full participants in their political process. Bartel explains that “Wealthier and better-educated citizens are more likely than the poor and less educated to have well-formulated preferences, significantly more likely to turn out to vote, much more likely to have direct contact with public officials, and vastly more likely to contribute money and energy to political campaigns—all characteristics differences that seem likely to produce greater responsiveness from elected politicians” (Bartel, 2002, 1). If women are poor because of structural adjustment policies, they cannot participate in the political process and contribute to changes in the political system.

Fifth, economic policies affect women differently than men. Furthermore, we need to understand the gender implications of these policies. Women are more predisposed to experiencing poverty than their male counterparts due to discrimination in the labor market. Therefore, we need to understand how structural adjustment policies affect women to prevent poverty exacerbation. In other words, if we knew how structural adjustment policies affect women differently than men, we could reduce these effects by adopting alternative procedures that can mitigate the problem.

Sixth, women are often the heads of households in Latin America. Thus, if women are poor, they cannot take care of their children and help them become healthy, productive citizens. The United Nations report that “Poverty affects children disproportionately. Around the world, one out of five children lives in extreme poverty, living on less than $1.90 a day. Their families struggle to afford the basic health care and nutrition needed to provide them a strong start. These
deprivations leave a lasting imprint” (UN, 2020, 1). Therefore, female poverty is connected to child poverty. Thus, if women are poor due to structural adjustment policies, their children are also at risk of experiencing poverty. Therefore, women are important for maintaining a healthy and sustainable family.

**Limitations of the Study**

The limitations of this study are several. First, the data for female employment in the manufacturing industry and the gender inequality index are limited. The data for female employment in the manufacturing industry began in 1975 and ended in 2003. However, the availability of data varies by country. This means that not all countries have data on female manufacturing, starting in 1975. The data for the gender inequality index began in 1995 and ended in 2002. This is the smallest number of observations for a variable in the study. Also, the data for neoliberal reform started in 1975 and ended in 2003. This means that the study only analyzes the relationship up to 2003. Second, the research primarily focuses on women in the labor market. This means we could not see the connection between neoliberalism and gender equality in a non-labor market context. Last, the study uses cases from the Latin American region, which means that my findings are generally only applicable to this area because of the diversity of historical, economic, political, and social factors that affect the results.

**Possibilities for Future Work**

If I return to this project in the future, there are several things I would like to pursue. First, I would like to explore the interaction effects of the five individual policies. The evidence
from the qualitative analysis shows that these variables often work together. In other words, trade and capital reform often combine or interact to produce an effect on the different outcomes. This suggests that the combination of trade and capital reform as one explanatory variable provides a different impact on the outcome than when used individually. Alternately, interactive relationships that condition the effect of one variable on the value of another offer an excellent opportunity for future research exploring how combining the other explanatory variables that make up neoliberal reform affects the three outcome variables.

Second, I would like to explore additional explanatory factors that give a fuller test of expected relationships. Therefore, I would test the relationship between trade liberalization and the size of the export sectors or the percentage of women employed in the export sector. I relate this to the literature on trade liberalization and female employment, highlighting that women are concentrated in the export sectors. This also helps me see if the percentage of women in the export sector changes the effects of trade liberalization. I also add this new variable as a control for trade liberalization policies. In terms of privatization, accounting for the size of the public sector also helps clarify the results from privatization in the model. I apply the same rationale for the other individual policies to fully explain their relationship to the outcomes.

Third, I also revise the models to account for specific time periods associated with financial crises domestically and internationally. This allows me to examine the short-term effects of the different crises on the outcome variables. For example, Argentina experience various financial crises throughout the study’s time span, including the Mexican, Russian, and Brazilian crises. Furthermore, this motivates me to revise the models to account for these periods compared to the baseline to examine the short-term effects of these crises. This is the kind of insight that the mixed-methods design affords me.
Fourth, I would like to collect data on neoliberal reform and the five individual policies and data on the three outcomes from 2004 to the present. This would enable me to extend the quantitative study to fully explore the relationship between neoliberal reform and gender equality from 1975 to the present. This would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationships of interest over an extended period to see if it would hold or change with more data. Furthermore, additional data would help to provide more information for my study over a long-time span.

Fifth, after I collect data on neoliberal reform and the five individual policies and data on the three outcomes from 2004 to the present, I will account for the changes in neoliberal reform. It seems that neoliberal reform changes slightly in Argentina, where the government increases state intervention in the economy. Therefore, I would need to revise the model to account for the shift in neoliberalism. I could also run a different set of models for 2004 to the present time to see whether there is a difference in outcomes between both time frames and whether the shift in neoliberal reform policies is attributed to this change. In other words, I would want to account for the post-neoliberalism period.
Bibliography


879–91.
Ebrill, Mr. Liam P., Mr. Michael Keen, and Ms. Victoria P. Perry. The Modern VAT. International Monetary Fund, 2001.


Grown, Caren, and Imraan Valodia. Taxation and Gender Equity: A Comparative Analysis of Direct and Indirect Taxes in Developing and Developed Countries. IDRC, 2010.


IPS-Inter Press Service. “Argentina-Finance: World Bank Loans Go To Privatize Banks.”


Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 294–308.


Appendix

Case Selection Diagnostics

As stated in Chapter 3, I conducted several diagnostic tests to choose two promising case studies for my qualitative analysis. For this section of the chapter, I illustrate and describe the charts and graphs I utilize to help choose my case studies. The first sets of graphs below in figures A1 and A2 are spaghetti plots that graph the typicality values of each country over time based on the results from fix-effects models that are the most complete. The graphs are organized by typicality values for each country over time by the outcome variable. I follow Lieberman’s approach for deliberate case selection, where I choose cases based on their distance from the regression line (Lieberman, 2005). Cases close to the regression line have low typicality scores and are typical observations; those further from the regression line have high typicality values and are considered deviant observations. Therefore, I extract and graph the typicality score for all the countries over time to show whether they would be considered a potential candidate for a typical or deviant case study, as shown below in figures A1 and A2. Furthermore, I select several cases based on these criteria of typical or deviant observations.

To help verify and narrow my case selections for typical and deviant cases, I create several graphs of the average typicality score for each country, as shown below in figures A3 and A4. These bar graphs are organized by country and outcome variables. Therefore, I calculate the typicality score for each country and for all countries by outcome variable using the R software. The calculation includes all observations, but the bar graphs include only observations with the top and bottom thirty typicality values for each country. This allows me to see which countries have an average low typicality score over time and those with high typicality scores across all
models using one value. Calculating the typicality value for all countries by outcome variable allows me to identify which countries are above the average typicality score for the regression and those below. The above-average typicality score cases are considered potential candidates for a deviant case study, while those with below-average typicality scores are potential candidates for typical case studies. I organize the average typicality score for all countries from smallest to largest to see which countries comprise above or below average residuals across each of the three outcomes. This enables me to better choose my two promising case studies for qualitative analysis. Below are the spaghetti plots and bar graphs I used to choose my case selection for qualitative analysis.

**Typical Case Study**

As expressed by Seawright and Gerring, typical case studies are observations that have low residuals and are close to the regression line (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Figure A1 identifies Argentina as a good candidate for a typical case study based on the above criteria. The graph shows the typicality score for each country over time based on the female labor force participation rate from model 7, which is the better, more complete model. As shown in the plot, fifteen countries are included in the graph, with the data points for the typicality values on the x-axis and the years listed on the y-axis. Based on the criteria stated above, several countries with consistently low typicality scores across the time span are potential candidates for typical case study. The countries include Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. I also examine several other spaghetti plots across the two other outcomes, which are included in the appendix to help narrow my decision. Based on these graphs, Argentina consistently has low typicality scores across all three outcomes, making it a good candidate for typical case study.
To help verify and narrow down my decision for potential candidates for a typical case study, I use the bar graph below in figure A3. Figure A3 displays the average typicality score for each country for the female labor force participation rate. As mentioned previously, potential observations for a typical case study are chosen based on the country’s low typicality score and whether their average typicality scores are below those for the regression. The graph shows that several countries are potential observations for typical case study, including Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. However, I narrow down the best candidate for typical case study by looking at the bar graphs with typicality scores across all three outcomes. This allows me to see that Argentina consistently has a low typicality score across all outcomes, which leads me to choose it as my typical case study for qualitative analysis.

**Deviant Case Study**

As stated previously, deviant case studies are selected based on their high typicality score. Figure A4 below illustrates that Peru is a good candidate for deviant case study. The graph shows the typicality score for each country over time based on female labor force participation from model 1, which has the most observations. There are fifteen countries included in the model, with the typicality values on the y-axis plot against the time on the x-axis. Based on the criteria for selecting deviant case studies, several potential observations include Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. I examine the several other spaghetti plots across the two other outcomes to further narrow my case selections, which show that Peru has consistently high typicality scores. Based on these graphs, Peru consistently has high typicality values across all three outcomes, which makes it a high contender for deviant case study.
Figure A4 helps me to narrow down and verify my decision for deviant case study. The bar graph reveals the average typical score for each country based on the female labor force participation rate. As stated above, the observations for deviant case studies are selected based on whether they have above-average typicality scores. The figure shows that several countries are considered good candidates for deviant case study: Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador. These countries all have typicality scores that are further away from the regression line. In addition, they also have typicality values that are above the typicality score for all the countries in the model. To narrow down and verify the deviant case study, I examine several other bar graphs with typicality scores across the other two outcomes. The graphs show that Peru consistently has average typicality scores across the three outcomes that are above average, which makes it a good candidate for deviant case study. Based on the graphs of the residuals and typicality scores below, Argentina was selected as my typical case study, while Peru became my deviant case study.
Figures A1 to A4

Figure A1
Typicality Scores of Countries Overtime Model 7: Female Labor Force Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figure A1 graphs the typicality scores overtime (1975 to 2003) for model 7 and the female labor force participation rate.

Source: Morley, Machado, and Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009; International Labor Organization, 2020
Figure A2
Typicality Scores of Countries Over Time
General Reform: Female Labor Force Participation

Note: This graph shows the typicality values overtime (1975 to 2003) across fifteen Latin American countries based on the model for general reform and the female labor force participation rate.

Source: Morley, Machado, Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009; International Labor Organization, 2020
The bar graph illustrates the typicality scores for each country overtime (1975 to 2003) for model 7 and the female labor force participation rate.

Source: Morley, Machado, Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009; International Labor Organization
Note: The bar graph shows the average typicality score for each country overtime (1975 to 2003) based on the model for general reform and the female labor force participation rate.

Source: Morley, Machado, Pettinato, 1999; Kingstone and Young, 2009; International Labor Organization, 2020