Expanding our vision: an empirical examination of security sector reform

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EXPANDING OUR VISION:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

By
Andrew Vitek

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy
Department of Political Science
2018
Dedicated to my father Bill. The finest scholar, teacher and mentor that I have ever known.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of many extraordinary people, the most important of whom I would like to acknowledge here. I would first like to recognize my advisor and dissertation committee chair Victor Asal, whose influence as a scholar, teacher and professional over the past six years cannot be overstated. I would not be who I am today without your knowledge, patience, and commitment to excellence. To my other committee members, Brian Nussbaum and Eric Stern, your guidance and support have been invaluable, and I cannot thank you enough. To my parents Bill and Maria, who instilled in me both a hunger for knowledge and the necessity of empathy and an open mind. To my Albany family, your friendship, laughter and comradery have been gifts that I will cherish forever. And last but by no means least, my partner Melissa. Without your love and support none of this would have been possible.
Abstract:
This dissertation contributes empirical analysis on the dynamics of security sector reform and aims to establish an understanding of the interplay between civilian governments, security forces and international actors in attempts to reform the security sectors of transitioning or reconstructing states. The need for reform programs aimed at boosting civilian control over state security forces has gained increased attention following the end of the Cold War, especially for states during regime transitions or post-conflict reconstruction. The record of success for these programs however remains inconsistent, and empirical scholarship aimed at the process at the time of writing is problematically sparse.

This dissertation is developed across three interconnected questions. The first examines the means by which states can initiate security sector reform with an analysis of aggregated data from 1990-2015 and modeled via quantitative hazard models. The second builds on this and examines the means by which states can achieve a measure of success once reform is initiated via a comparative analysis of Haiti and Sierra Leone. The third focuses on the activities of the donor community, long considered to be an indispensable aspect of the process and utilizes aid data in conjunction with social network analysis to determine the drivers of donor activity and why they get involved where they do.

The dissertation presents evidence that the process of security sector reform has historically been too narrow in its scope, and that both initiation and success are strongly dependent on a far more holistic approach. This approach not only seeks to reform the security forces but also develops and strengthens civilian governance to ensure the existence of a state that can effectively manage those forces. Security sector reform often involves curtailing the worst instincts of the security forces because initiating and managing that process requires not only well-constructed reforms,
but also a state with the strength to see the process through. Evidence is also found that suggests that donor activity has been misdirected in many ways, and that their operational priorities have been at odds with the needs of the process and actively degraded and undermined in some cases.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction .......................................................... 1

Chapter 2 - Missing the Forest for the (Armed or Uniformed) Trees:  5
  Security Sector Reform and the Need to Prioritize Civilian Political Capacity

Chapter 3 – Stable Foundations: ............................................... 34
  Security Sector Reform and Governance in Sierra Leone and Haiti

Chapter 4 – Members Only: ..................................................... 64
  Using Social Network Metrics to Map and Analyze Security Sector Aid

Chapter 5 – Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research 87

Appendix .................................................................................. 90
Chapter 1

Introduction

The question of the relationship of the state with its security forces is one supported by a rich history of scholarship within political science. From Plato to Huntington, it had been widely acknowledged that civilian governments must contend with the challenge of not only creating security forces with the ability to exercise their function, but also ensuring that, once empowered, those security forces only wield their potent coercive abilities in ways that are in line with the wishes and interests of the government that oversees it. While the specifics of the supporting scholarship vary, the underlying solution is generally the same: the creation of a principal – agent relationship between the state and its armed forces, characterized by both institutional and normative mechanisms that effectively bind the security sector to the state and ensure its obedience. This issue continues to be one of immense contemporary importance, as conflicts born from poorly managed, insubordinate or politicized security forces (with military coup d’états being among the most dramatic) unfortunately remain prevalent across a range of contexts.

Despite the clear and continuing importance of this dilemma, the question of how to translate the concepts laid out in the scholarly research on civil-military relations into concrete policy tools that can be instituted in states that need them is a relatively new undertaking. Beginning in the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the wave of state transitions (to say nothing of civil wars) that followed it brought a new emphasis on security among development practitioners who began to view the security sector as a critical target for reforms in the wake of
regime transitions and post-conflict reconstruction. Coalescing under the moniker of “security sector reform” (SSR), practitioner and donor circles have become increasingly involved in advancing a wide range of reforms and policy instruments in developing and reconstructing states aimed at addressing the above issues and spreading the principles of democratization to the armed forces. While the character of these reforms has varied, they have largely centered on boosting training for both rank-and-file members and officers, overhauling oversight mechanisms, and enhancing local ownership, all aimed at building up the principal-agent relationship highlighted by previous scholars.

Despite substantial engagement from states, practitioners, and scholars, not to mention massive financial buy-in on the part of donors, the overall record of SSR efforts to date have been mixed at best. While some states have experienced limited success in terms of SSR programs, many more have seen SSR stall or fail outright, and far more states in dire need of reform have been unable to even start the process. This has led to a growing consensus among both scholars and practitioners that the SSR practices that have emerged over the past decade and energetically driven by the donor community are lacking in terms of their ability to establish SSR’s stated goals. Most surprisingly however, despite the continued need for SSR and the overall poor track record of existing programs, extant empirical scholarship on SSR is sparse at best.

This dissertation aims to help remedy this issue, and in addition to providing exploratory empirical analysis in the hope of spurring additional research, advances the argument that many of the failures of security sector reform are rooted in too tight a focus on the security sector itself while neglecting the civilian government that will ultimately be tasked with managing it. Historically, security sector reform efforts have been highly singular in their focus, often
operating as standalone reform agenda pursued in practical isolation from other areas. The analyses presented here indicate that successful security sector reform requires a far more holistic approach. Specifically, an approach which takes into account the needs of the principal in addition to the agent and ensures both a professional and accountable security sector as well as a civilian government with the ability to use the tools of control that SSR aims to create.

This argument will be laid out in the following three chapters. Chapter two takes up the question of SSR initiation and is rooted in the previously mentioned fact that in addition to SSR’s inconsistent record, many states in dire need of comprehensive SSR have been unable to even initiate the process. The chapter uses unique quantitative data and analyzes it via a proportional hazard model to determine which variables impact why states initiate SSR when they do. This chapter’s analysis produces two significant findings: the first being a statistically significant increase in a state’s probability to initiate SSR produced by an increase in governance capacity, and a similarly significant decrease in the probability of SSR caused by increases in security focused aid. Both of these findings serve as the respective basis for the subsequent chapters.

Chapter three takes up the relationship between SSR success and governance applies it via a similar-systems design to the cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone. Despite highly similar histories of predatory governance, political violence and international intervention, SSR in Haiti has consistently failed while Sierra Leone is held by many to be the paradigmatic success case of SSR. This chapter comparatively illustrates how Sierra Leone was able to achieve comparable success by pairing SSR with aggressive reforms aimed at Sierra Leone governance mechanism and the civil service, while Haiti’s trouble with SSR has been rooted in the narrow scope of its reforms and inability to address the problem of Haitian state capacity.
The fourth chapter takes up the question of donor involvement in SSR and aims to map out the major drivers of security focused aid. As with chapter two, chapter four leverages unique data and uses social network and multivariate regression analysis to both map the greater network of security aid and analyze the variables that work to determine what drives donors to get involved where they do. The results indicate that donors are primarily drawn to conditions favorable to ease of operations as opposed to those associated with states in dire need of SSR. This not only helps to contextualize the aid findings in chapter two but provides a potential explanation for the relative rarity of comprehensive SSR in states that clearly need it and is consistent with more recent critiques of donor driven SSR among scholars.

The final chapter offers both some concluding remarks as well directions for future research, as it is my hope that, if anything, these proceedings help to spur additional scholarship into this critical and timely topic.
Chapter 2

Missing the Forest for the (Armed or Uniformed) Trees:

Security Sector Reform and the Need to Prioritize Civilian Political Capacity

Abstract:

How and under what conditions are new and reconstructing democracies able to initiate large-scale reforms of their security sectors? While security sector reform has made great strides as far as establishing itself as a key development goal for states in various stages of regime transition or reconstruction, analytical literature focused on the process itself remains somewhat sparse, in particular, literature neglects the key procedural questions of how comparatively weak states are able to initiate wide-reaching reforms of security institutions with unique tools to resist. Utilizing a unique dataset and analyzed via a proportional hazard model, this chapter finds empirical evidence that supports a growing number of recent critiques that call into question the somewhat narrowly focused, donor driven model of security sector reform that has largely characterized the process since its inception. Specifically, it finds evidence that the initiation of security sector reform is linked to the building of civilian political capacity, while foreign aid specifically targeted for security purposes in fact reduces the probability of reform. The results indicate that focusing first and foremost on the security sector itself in effect puts the carriage before the horse, when a focus should be placed on simultaneously ensuring the state has the necessary capacity to meet the uniquely high demands of comprehensive security sector reform.
**Introduction**

How and under what conditions are new democracies able to initiate large-scale reforms of their security sectors? One of the core challenges for states transitioning out of autocracy and towards democracy or recovering from a civil war is extending the core principles of democratization (accountability, transparency, establishing rule of law, etc.) to the military and other aspects of the security sector. Conceptually rooted in scholarship on civil-military relations, transitioning and developing states are tasked with confronting the classic question of “who guards the guardians?” and the supposed paradox of creating an institution designed to protect the state while at the same time imbuing it with the power and coercive capacity to threaten it. Building on this concept, the development community has increasingly prioritized security sector reform (SSR) as an essential policy, which emphasizes the criticality of consolidating civilian control over a state’s armed forces and security institutions through policies aimed at boosting professionalization, efficacy, and efficiency. The logistics of initiating such broad ranging reform raises unique and consequential challenges however, given the unique nature of the security sector’s coercive capacity compared to other domestic actors and the potential conditions that arise as a result. These risks have been and remain very real, as the occurrence of military coups and other activities related improperly controlled security sectors remain prevalent across a variety of regions and contexts.

The prevailing logic among SSR practitioners and the larger development community for much of the past two decades has been that reform initiation has largely hinged on donor activity and aid targeted at security institutions themselves to effectively import the necessary state capacity necessary for initiating wide ranging reform (Laipson, 2007; Peterson, 2009). This conclusion remains untested in any empirical fashion however, and more recent scholarship has
begun to question and even repudiate this approach (Serta, 2017). To address this, the analysis presented here utilizes unique data to quantitatively test and make the case that a state’s ability to initiate comprehensive security sector reform hinges upon strengthening state capacity outside the context of security institutions, ensuring that the state is capable of effectively managing the security sector both prior to and after the initiation of reform. In addition, this chapter aims to aid in the development of a body of empirical and quantitative literature on security sector reform, with aim of generating a degree of generalizable theory focused on a subject area that greatly warrants it. The findings presented here indicate that the initiation of security sector reform hinges specifically on strengthening and developing civilian political stability and capacity, in effect anchoring the costly and often difficult process of reforming security institutions. In addition, analysis also finds empirical support for researchers who have critiqued the aid-driven model of SSR, with the results indicating that higher volumes of security-based aid stymie the reform process rather than enable it.

I will begin by laying out key literature before moving on to a discussion of the chapter’s research design, hypotheses and results.

Civil-Military Relations and the Evolution of SSR

As a development goal, security sector reform (SSR) is conceptually and theoretically rooted in early work on civil-military relations. Most clearly articulated by Huntington and Janowitz, this literature conceptualizes civil-military relations in any state (democracy or otherwise) as an attempt to answer the classical question of “who guards the guardians?” and the supposed paradox of creating an institution designed to protect the state while at the same time having the power and coercive capacity to threaten it (Feaver, 1996; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Despite divergences between Huntington and the more sociological approach of Janowitz
and his contemporaries, the answer presented to the problem is largely uniform: the creation and fine-tuning of instruments that promote civilian control and security personnel professionalism to ensure the security sector is both strong enough to do its job but subordinate enough to only do what its civilian overseers tell it to do (Bermeo, 2003; Feaver, 1996).

Stemming from this, civil-military relations and potential conflicts that arise therefore, generally feed into a question capability and intent on the part of both the civilian government and the security sector. Drawing from advances in intelligence analysis in the late 1950’s, conflict between the state and the security sector is conceptualized as “a situation of armed hostility, in which each body of policy-makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further each assumes that such will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seems to outweigh estimated loses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its security, and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent (Singer 1958, pg. 94).” The process of developing civil-military relations therefore requires the state to address both the capability and intent of their security sectors, which can be roughly grouped into policy measures and instruments that (1) affect/reduce the ability of the military to subvert control from the civilian government, and (2) affect/reduce the disposition of the military to be insubordinate (Finer, 1962; Welch, 1976).

It must be noted however that this literature fails to situate civil-military relations and the challenges of security sector reform within the broader processes of democratic consolidation and regime transition and how nascent states can go about crafting the kinds of instruments detailed above. As Finer notes, civilian control of the security sector is not natural given the security sector’s political and coercive capabilities, meaning that civilian governments are not merely faced with the question of what kinds of instruments to create but how to create them at
all in the face of a security sector with the capability and (potential) intent to resist (Finer, 1962). Starting in the early 1990’s, security sector reform began to coalesce as a practitioner driven approach that addresses many of the issues of implementation via policy packages built around the development of an effective, affordable and efficient security sector that facilitates and strengthens democratic control of the overall domestic security apparatus, often with a heightened emphasis on local ownership and increased accountability built into the security process (Schnabel and Born, 2011).

The idea of security sector reform in the context of development politics was first articulated by the United Nation’s Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report which highlights the necessity of building “human security” as part of the greater development process and aim to imbue the state’s security sector with the resilience and oversight to counter both “chronic threats” such as repression and corruptions as well as “sudden and hurtful disruptions” such as civil conflict, terrorist attacks and other manifestations of political violence (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). SSR as a development goal was given increased nuance in 2005 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2005), describing it as one piece of the process of developing management and dispute resolution mechanisms that are both democratic and peaceful.

They go on to distinguish the key sub-sectors involved in and adjacent to the SSR process. (1) **Core Security Actors:** armed forces, police, intelligence forces, border guards, etc. (2) **Security Management and Oversight Bodies:** the executive branch, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, and civil society organizations. (3) **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions:** judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen. (4) **Non-**
**statutory Security Forces:** liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, political party militias (OECD, 2005).

Therefore, in a theoretical sense the scope and aims of SSR are relevant to all developing countries and, issues of will and resources notwithstanding, any transitional or post-conflict state is a candidate for security sector reform of variable scale (Andersen, 2006; Schnabel and Born, 2011). As Edmunds (2002) points out however, there is no clear consensus on the definitions of SSR and its necessary activities and is often dictated by particular concerns of individual academic or practitioner communities. He highlights two primary approaches: “The first is concerned with those militarized formations authorized by the state to utilize force to protect the state itself and its citizens. This definition limits SSR to organizations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services. The second approach takes a wider view of SSR, defining it as those organizations and activities concerned with the provision of security (broadly defined), and including organizations and institutions ranging from, for example, private security guards to the judiciary” (Edmunds 2002, pg. 45-46). However, he goes on to highlight that definitional arguments can obstruct meaningful analysis, and this chapter will proceed along similar lines.

SSR: What the Literature Does and Doesn’t Say

Given the roots of SSR in the development practitioner community, much of the extant literature on SSR has reflected this focus, with a large portion eschewing empirical analysis and theory building, and its treatment and conceptualization of specific policy instruments has tended to focus on tradecraft, intelligence failures, or advocate specific policy positions via case studies, NGO white papers, and evaluation criteria and metrics (Bruneau and Matei, 2008). This has begun to shift in recent years however, and while large-n studies on SSR remain almost non-
existent, a body of qualitative literature has begun developing from which several conclusions can be drawn regarding how states are able to initiate the process. The factors relating to SSR initiation can be grouped into four general categories: foreign aid, domestic governance\textsuperscript{1}, security and conflict, and ethnic relations. It must be noted however, that much contained within this literature tends to be either deduced from particular cases, or is highly abstract (Heupel, 2012).

Until recently, aid and developmental assistance has occupied a privileged position among both scholars and practitioners. It is inferred that, in order to compensate for weak capacity on the part of transitioning states, developed nations and the greater donor community (who have a vested interest in creating stable democracies) are able use a combination of policy frameworks and incentives tied to potential access to Western institutions and alliances to effectively import state capacity in order to circumvent domestic barriers and kickstart and guide the reform process (Laipson, 2007; Peterson, 2009). External assistance becomes even more critical in the context of states transitioning to democracy from modes of authoritarian rule, as protracted periods of authoritarianism have the potential to leave the state effectively hollow and with little in the way of linkages to civil society. As Kartas highlights in his study on the prospect of SSR in post-transition Tunisia: “Fifty years of de facto single-party, repressive rule have left state and society – from political parties to journalists – with little to no notion of accountable security institutions and even less ability to develop their own expertise in the security field…. (and further) suggests that the sluggish reform of the security sector reflects the

\textsuperscript{1} While conceptually broad in its scope, governance in this context is taken to be “the action or manner of governing – that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating individuals, organizations, or nations in conduct or in actions” (Lynn 2010, pg.671). For a more detailed examination of the possible dimensions of governance see Robichau, 2011.
‘successful’ resistance of the security forces to reform and accountability. (Kartas 2014, pg. 374)”

However, this aid driven approach has drawn several recent critiques. In his 2017 book, Mark Sedra offers compelling evidence for what he describes as the key failings of donor-driven SSR, specifically highlighting donors with principles too abstract or diluted to actually implement, stalled negotiations due to concerns of NGO conduct and financial controls, and coordination issues between donors and state ministries (Sedra, 2017). In addition, donors can at times even undermine already ripe conditions for reform initiation through supporting overly narrow political coalitions and maintaining discretionary control over revenue streams (Berg, 2012) This speaks to widespread issues stemming from the misdirection and mismanagement of aid flows, especially when one considers the fact that the lion’s share of the attention, cooperation, financial support and technical assistance in the field of SSR is directed towards the armed and security forces, before even the mere rudiments of oversight and counterbalance exist within the state and the society (Kartas, 2014). This is extremely problematic, as it not only effectively treats the security sector as an island (despite the fact that it is almost universally linked to a range of external institutions and existing societal cleavages), but it puts the carriage before the horse by attempting to create a well-functioning security sector before first ensuring the existence of a strong, consolidated state that actually has the means to manage and oversee it.

This emphasis on state capacity as a crucial starting point leads into factors related to governance and is echoed by extant literature on state formation that in many ways is conceptually and theoretically adjacent to questions of security sector reform. These works stress the constant process of negotiation between state and military elites over the former’s need to effectively utilize the security sector both domestically and internationally and the latter’s need
to maintain access to revenue streams essential to its continued operation (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994; Snyder 1992). This conceptualization of civil-military relations as a consistent negotiation has major consequences for modeling the process of security sector reform. Given that nearly all major SSR packages involve re-organizing and ultimately shifting or reducing the resources available to the security sector, any state seeking to initiate SSR would require a strong negotiating position in relation to security sector elites. This conception of state capacity additionally extends to levels of political consolidation and penetration, as regimes characterized by weak or fragmented consolidation will be more vulnerable to pressure and potential defections from opposition forces from within the state. As Berg writes in his 2012 piece examining intersections between SSR and rule of law: “As leaders seek to secure and maintain the political and financial backing they need to consolidate their authority, the sources of revenue and the configuration of political factions constrain the options available to them and shape the development of institutions. Especially in the security and justice sectors, which are central to the exercise of state power, the responsiveness of state institutions and the distribution of public services depend on whose interests they were built to serve and the source of funds available to maintain them (Berg 2012, pg. 9).” These concerns gain additional salience when one considers the range of shocks that have often been weathered by developing states that have significant consequences for both ruling political coalitions, security sectors, and necessary revenue streams, such as rapid regime transitions and, in particular, civil wars and other protracted episodes of political violence (Weinstein, 2007).

The issue of governance is echoed when the above factors are paired with those relating to regime type and other aspects of institutional design. Given that many states grappling with the prospect of security sector reform are either in the process of or have recently transitioned
from some form of authoritarian rule, pre-transition legacies are seen as highly problematic. Factors such as continued modes of authoritarian political leadership, nepotism across multiple institutions, military/police involvement in criminal activity and corruption and an overall lack of civilian oversight across the regime pose major difficulties for any kind of major reform agenda (Wulf, 2004). These legacies characterized several cases in the former Soviet Republics, where security sector reform was (by necessity) driven by bilateral and multilateral agreements that leveraged institutional benefits tied to NATO and the European Union (International Crisis Group, 2002). Furthermore, institutional division of powers historically associated with liberal democracies, specifically the need for an impartial and accessible judicial system to act as a legal mediator/adjudicator in times of inter-governmental dispute, are key as they work to set a model of democratic governance that the security sector can be modeled on (Ball et al, 2003).

As is hardly surprising, literature examining the effects of security related variables on the process of SSR is well developed. Most prominently is the difficulty associated with attempting substantive security sector reform during active episodes of large-scale political violence, known more simply as “SSR under fire.” This is due to the fact that the general model of security sector reform was largely developed for post-conflict and post-authoritarian environments featuring favorable political conditions for reform (Mackay et al, 2011). Such a claim is relatively intuitive, as the prospect of having to reform security instruments that are currently engaged in protracted conflict poses numerous difficulties, ranging from basic logistics to institutional opposition to any attempt to divert resources when conditions enable them to make a credible claim to need them. As Wulf lays out in his 2004 piece: “Reforms to introduce civil control of the military, the growing influence of civil society or demobilization and disarmament cannot be expected in countries at war, or can be expected only on a limited scale.
Nevertheless, this is the very situation in which civil society is needed as a watchdog or whistleblower (Wulf 2004, pg. 6).”

Furthermore, this conclusion is also born out in other extant works on international development, which stress that the solving of outstanding security issues is often viewed as a necessary prerequisite for democratization and larger development processes (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). It does bear noting here that much of the data on “SSR under fire” is drawn from the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan and the US lead effort to reform their security sectors following the 2001 and 2003 invasions, and it reasonable to classify both cases as being outside of the norm when it comes to SSR efforts. In addition, the focus of this literature tends to be more on the effects of protracted conflict on the achieving of SSR goals once begun, as opposed to its ability to stymie the initial formulation and initiation of reform which is the focus of the analysis here. That being said, it would be remiss not to elaborate on this particular strand of literature and it will be appropriately reflected in proceeding research design.

The last area of literature germane to the question of SSR initiation concerns the question of existing ethnic tensions and pre-existing histories of ethnic conflict and discrimination. Drawn primarily from the European Union’s experiences with security sector reform in the former Yugoslavia following the conclusion of the ethnic wars of the 1990s and early 2000s, these studies stress a nuanced view on ethnic representation in the context of reform in order to account for the everyday perceptions of local people (Gray and Strasheim, 2016). Given the visibility of the security sector in day to day life, particularly in the case of police and institutions that fill the role of the police, the disposition of these forces in the context of ethnic violence and discrimination become highly salient (Wiatrowski and Goldstone, 2010). This creates the need to not only address ethnic issues in the design of any comprehensive SSR package (Brzoska and
Heinemann-Gruder, 2004), but also raises the possibility of generating grassroots support for security reform into to facilitate a “clean break” from a potentially violent past (Peake et al, 2005). Like the preceding questions of the salience of security environments, these questions of ethnicity are outside the scope of this particular analysis but are elaborated here for the purposes of comprehensiveness and will be controlled for appropriately in the analysis.

To sum up, the extant literature on security sector reform, while significantly limited in its scope, is fairly consistent in terms of highlighting (albeit indirectly in many cases) primary areas of interest in regard to SSR initiation, namely aid, governance, security and ethnic relations. However, the lack of empirical analysis makes the actual degree of influence each of these areas have on the process difficult to determine, as illustrated by growing degree of disagreement highlighted between qualitative researchers. The proceeding analysis will attempt to provide a degree of structure that the literature currently lacks and argue and test quantitatively that strengthening governance must serve as the primary objective when pursuing SSR, as it will act as the foundation that all future reform efforts will rest on.

Hypotheses

The above literature has informed several hypotheses aimed at capturing the influence of governance and state capacity on the ability of states to initiate security sector reform, with detailed descriptions of the data and operationalization to follow. The quantitative model tests four distinct hypotheses built around chapter’s overall argument on the salience of civilian governing capacity regarding a state’s ability to initiate security sector reform. Each hypothesis is designed to capture a particular aspect or indicator of effective governance that is conceptually germane to security sector reform, namely: volume of security focused foreign aid, level/quality of democracy, state fragility, and independence of the judiciary.
Hypothesis one focuses on the degree of aid impact. Despite the longstanding emphasis on the importance of foreign aid, the process has fallen under increased scrutiny in more recent years. The analysis here will hypothesize that increased levels of security focused aid will increase the likelihood of a state initiating SSR. While the growing disagreement between those on both sides of the donor-based approach is noteworthy, neither have extant empirical testing to direct this hypothesis. In addition, as the variable of interest here is the initiation and implementation of SSR programs, it is theoretically reasonable to infer that if aid and donor engagement are salient variables anywhere in the process it would be at the onset where states are tasked with getting large-scale policy packages off the ground.

_Hypothesis 1: States receiving greater levels of security directed aid will be more likely to initiate SSR._

Beyond the capturing of aid inflows, the analysis utilizes three additional metrics for state capacity. The first is the state’s quality of democracy as measured by the POLITY project. It is hypothesized that states characterized by well-functioning democratic institutions will be well positioned to move against entrenched interests both inside and outside the security sector and will be able to better marshal civil society to amass sufficient political capital to get the process moving.

_Hypothesis 2: States with a higher level of democracy will be more likely to initiate SSR._

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2 Elaboration: this is rooted in the historical assumption that foreign aid is needed to compensate for deficiencies in state capacity that often characterize transitioning or post-conflict states, with aid in effect importing the necessary capacity for reform initiation. For additional detail see Laipson, 2007 and Peterson, 2009.

3 Elaboration: This hypothesis is rooted in the assertion made by Wulf (2004) that authoritarian institutions/modes of governance, and the activities that typically accompany them (corruption, nepotism, etc), actively stymie attempts at substantive reform programs. By this logic, states characterized by higher levels of democracy will be better positioned for reform. See also, Ball et al (2003).
Beyond democratic consolidation, it is also hypothesized that states characterized by greater degrees of internal stability, which is to say their ability to pass and implement public policy, deliver services, and maintain institutions, will be more likely to initiate SSR. While often grouped alongside quality of democracy, these characteristics are not unique to consolidated democracies and are more than capable of being characteristic of less democratic regimes.

Hypothesis 3: States with greater internal stability and capacity will be more likely to initiate SSR.\(^4\)

Lastly, the analysis also hypothesizes that states with well-functioning and independent judicial systems will be more likely to initiate security sector reform. This is due to the capability of an independent national judiciary to act as a mediating entity between different wings of the government as well as instances of conflict between the civilian government and security institutions in the lead-up to and during the process of reform.

Hypothesis 4: States in possession of an independent judicial system will be more likely to initiate SSR.\(^5\)

The analysis also includes several control variables to account for other factors highlighted in the preceding literature review as being consequential for the initiation of security sector reform. Most notably, it makes use of a range of security variables intended to capture the overall security environment, specifically episodes of political violence and geopolitical rivalry and confrontation. This is aimed at capturing the well documented difficulties associated with

\(^4\) Elaboration: Hypothesis 3 is rooted in the complex costs and complexity associated with comprehensive SSR and asserts that states require significant capacity in regards to policy implementation and service delivery in order to attempt any major SSR. For additional detail see Berg (2012).

\(^5\) Elaboration: Hypothesis 4 serves as a conceptual continuation of hypotheses 2 and 3, as judicial functioning is conceptually linked to both democratic quality and governance capacity, while additional being uniquely positioned to serve as a moderator in institutional disputes (see Ball et al, 2003). While including it as a stand-alone hypothesis may appear redundant, limitations of large-scale quantitative data necessitate casting the widest possible net.
“SSR under fire” and the prospect of reforming a security sector that is actively engaged across numerous possible fronts and potential protracted conflicts. In addition, the analysis also controls for the presence of ethnic discrimination and ethnic groups that are forcibly excluded from the political process. As was previously mentioned, in addition to the documented cases of ethnic tensions and discrimination underlying the reform process in states like Bosnia, the theoretical implications of substantially reforming the security sector on the backdrop of ethnic conflict necessitate its inclusion in the analysis. Lastly, the analysis also controls for situations where members of the military or other security institutions hold positions of significant power within their civilian government. While such a situation would certainly indicate an environment ripe for security sector reform, it is not reasonable to assume regimes more or less under military rule would be in any position to initiate it.

Data Description and Research Design

The main variable of interest for this paper is the actual initiation of substantial SSR programs or activities. ‘SSR’ is coded as a dummy variable with a value of ‘1’ for state ‘x’ at time ‘t’ denoting the initiation of an SSR program. To qualify as full initiation (and thus a score of 1), each program must be clearly laid out, have obtained necessary funding commitments, and have a comprehensive scope for at least one wing of the security sector (ie. all of the military and/or law enforcement). For example, Belarus in 2001 instituted a series of wide-ranging military reforms that included the Belarussian army’s downsizing from 85,000 to 65,000.

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6 Note on the Strengths and Limitations of the Research Design: While this project’s quantitative methodology provides a range of analytical advantages, namely the ability to examine the universe of cases and directly measure the effects of individual variables, its limitations bear noting. As the analysis utilizes data amalgamated from multiple distinct data projects, there is no way or controlling for data quality. In addition, the included variables utilize a range of raw data (ex. aid total) and transformed data (ex. POLITY), further complicating data validation. For additional information see Creswell, 2009.
transitioning from a conscript to a contract force, and modernizing the command and control structure (BICC, 2006). As a result, Belarus was coded as 1 for year 2001. Those states included in the analysis are those who have undergone or are host to conditions that theoretically necessitate SSR. In most instances this involves cases of nominal democratization and transition away from civilian or military authoritarian rule, but also includes transitions away from democracy into civilian or military authoritarianism, post-communist transitions in ex-Soviet bloc and client states, independence from a colonial power, and political re-constitution following a civil war or protracted civil conflict.

The timescale for the analysis is 1990 – 2015. 1990 is used as the starting point due to both the large number of regime transitions that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that SSR as a development goal began to coalesce in this period in large part due to the waning of Cold War geopolitical strategic goals. This period saw 116 total instances of SSR initiation. This data was collected exclusively for this analysis and stems from a variety of sources. The vast majority of these data were sourced by the Bonn International Center for Conversion, a conflict oriented thinktank which complied a comprehensive inventory of SSR programs from approximately 1989 – 2006 (BICC, 2006). Data for 2007 -2015 was compiled through a combination of sources, such as the SSR country profiles maintained by the Geneva Center for the Control of Armed Forces’ International Security Sector Advisory Team as well as open source media articles (ISSAT, 2018).

The domestic functionality and capacity of a given state regarding potential SSR implementation is measured through three primary variables. Firstly, a state’s level of democracy is measured via scores from the polity project, which ranks regimes on a 0-10 scale where 0 is the least democratic and 10 is the most. This variable also makes use imputed values calculated
by regressing Polity on average Freedom House measures to address instances of missing data (Marshall et al, 2009). This is supplemented by data from the Center of Systemic Peace on state fragility. This is associated with the capacity to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises and sustaining progressive development. This is an aggregate of a state’s effectiveness score (13 points) and its legitimacy score (12 points) for a potential range of 0 – 25 (Marshall, 2014). This is included to measure a state’s overall capacity for engaging in large scale policy implementation, security focused or otherwise. In addition, the analysis incorporates data on judicial independence which, as was noted earlier, is often seen as a necessary mechanism for initiating and sustaining SSR. Taken from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, the judicial variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military, and can take a value of “0”, “1” and “2”, indicating “not independent”, “partially independent” and “generally independent” respectively (Cingranelli et al., 2014).

Domestic SSR capacity captured by these three variables is supplemented with a variable capturing security based foreign aid. Data on aid relevant to SSR was sourced from the Michael et al AidData project, which is a comprehensive, dyadic time-series collection of foreign aid disbursement which is further categorized via aid purpose/target, and the data of interest being aid dispersed for either for the development of security institutions and instruments or post-conflict peacemaking. While peacemaking does not explicitly entail security sector reform activities, it does denote an environment where state security forces or aspects thereof lack the ability to perform key functions, indicating that security sector reform is almost assuredly
necessary, most often via SSR activities such as rebel disarmament and demobilization. Lastly, the analysis includes a control variable taken from the World Bank Economic Review denoting whether the state’s chief executive is a military officer. Coded as a dummy variable, ”1” indicates that the chief executive is an active duty military officer, and ”0” otherwise. If chief executives were described as officers with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office, they are always listed as officers for the duration of their term. If chief executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then it is coded as ”0” (Beck et al, 2001).

The analysis also incorporates a range of internal and external security-oriented variables as controls. Domestic episodes of violence are captured by the Center of Systemic Peace’s variables on ethnic violence, ethnic warfare, civil violence and civil warfare. Each of these variables capture the magnitude of episodes of civil and ethnic violence/warfare respectively, with “1” being the lowest and “10” being the highest. Major episodes of political violence are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode, and magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. (Marshall, 2015). Data on occurrences of military coup d’états from Powell and Thyne is also incorporated (Powell and Thyne, 2011). For the purposes of this analysis, the data was re-coded into a dummy variable denoting states that have experienced three or more successful military coups since 1950, which can reasonably be used as a metric for the existence of militaries that have a history of dramatically intervening in civilian politics.

Note: Aid values are logged for ease of analysis, with a total range of 0 – 20.
In addition, this is further supplemented with data on ethnic discrimination taken from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset developed by Vogt et al. The data was re-coded for the purposes of this analysis and denotes the percentage of a state’s population that is subject to discrimination in any given year, with “discrimination” corresponding to environments where group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics (excluding discrimination in the socio-economic sphere) (Vogt et al, 2015).

Lastly, external security factors are captured through rivalry and militarized inter-state dispute data taken from the Correlates of War Dataset, with both being coded as count variables. The former, compiled by William Thompson, is simply the number of geographically contiguous rivals present for a given state in a given year (Thompson, 2017). The latter indicates the number of militarized inter-state disputes in which a state was involved in a given year. These encompass cases of conflict in which “the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state, and are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Zeev et al 2019; Jones et al. 1996: 163).

Analysis of the SSR data proved to be somewhat challenging, as the observations indicating SSR initiation accounted for only four percent of the dataset’s total observations. As a result, logit models, and even those specifically designed for comparatively rare events (ie. rare-event logits and Firth models) proved inadequate for the purposes of this analysis. As a solution, I opted to use a proportional hazard model to analyze the data. Initially designed for medical and
drug studies, proportional hazard models, also known as time to event analysis, focus on the effects that individual independent variables have amount of time that occurs between time \( t \) and the event of interest, in this case the initiation of a substantive SSR program. In the case of this analysis, the model analyzes the effect each independent variable has on the probability of a given state initiating security reform starting in 1990 up until 2015. In addition, given that the analysis utilizes panel data where country specific factors are theoretically consequential, the analysis utilizes a semiparametric Weibull distribution to plot a random effects model in order to account for this. It must be noted however that this analytical approach is limited somewhat by incomplete data. Also referred to as “right censoring,” this issue stems from the fact that not all the states being analyzed actually initiate SSR during the time period under analysis, similar to a medical study not lasting long enough to observe effects in all participants. While by no means unusual in the context of hazard models, it bears noting here as it ultimately limits the ability of the data produced here to be analyzed by other means, such as conventional linear regression models, as it violates the normality assumption utilized by these models.

**Results:**

The analysis provided several results of interest. Perhaps most unsurprisingly, the presence of active duty military officers in control of the executive branch was highly significant in the negative direction, and overall reduced the probability of SSR initiation by approximately 82%. Again, this does not come as any surprise, but does serve to anchor the validity of the model somewhat. Most intriguing however, are the results in relation to the chapter’s four hypotheses. Somewhat surprisingly, little support was found for hypotheses two and four, as both

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8 See Figure 1 in appendix for full model results.
a state’s level of democracy via its POLITY scores and well as the measure of the independence of the judiciary came back as statistically insignificant. Conversely however significant support was found for hypothesis three, as the measure of a state’s political capacity via the state fragility measure came back as not only statistically significant but also as having a strong positive affect on the probability of SSR initiation. The results indicate that a one-unit increase on the state fragility index, again with 0 being the minimum, 25 the maximum and an average score of ~12, correlates with an 8% increase in the probability the state will initiate security sector reform. The implications here are significant and gives support to the overall hypothesis presented here that SSR requires the development strong domestic political capacity to manage institutions before, after and during the reform process. The range of potential scores in this area taken in conjunction with the average score of state analyzed also indicates ample room for growth and political traction in regard to SSR initiation.

These results are made even more interesting by those for hypothesis one and the effects of security-based aid. The influence of the logged values of aid totals, ranging from 0 – 20 and an average score of ~7, was not only found to be highly statistically significant but influential in the negative direction, with each unit increase in a state’s logged aid value corresponding with an approximately 7% decrease in the probability of SSR being initiated. These results speak to several conclusions of note. It firstly provides a degree of empirical support to the previously illustrated critiques of the largely donor driven approach to SSR that has in many ways characterized the process since its inception. Second, given that the degree aid captured by the analysis is exclusively security focused, it provides an additional degree of support to the hypothesis that directing attention to security institutions before first developing civilian political
capacity is akin to putting the carriage before the horse, as the state lacks the ability to spearhead a highly demanding and comprehensive reform agenda.

The findings lend themselves to a range of potential explanations. As is established in extant work on organizational theory, any type of large-scale organizational restructuring carries with it unintended consequences that were not foreseen by its managers (McKinley et al., 2000), and it is possible that dynamic is present in the context of SSR aid. These consequences could range from domestic policy makers seeing sustained aid as a viable alternative to substantive reform to aid inflows being captured by security actors resulting in security sector retrenchment, with both inadvertently resulting in aid causing regimes to become largely inoculated against reform. Conversely, these results could also be a result of aid patterns that cannot be adequately measured in this context, such donors potentially prioritizing particularly “hard” or challenging cases where the prospects of security sector reform are and remain low regardless of aid inflows. These questions however are beyond the ability of this particular chapter to answer and should be taken up in the context of additional research.

In addition, it does bear noting that the lack of statistical significance for the entirety of the political violence variables, as the difficulty of “SSR under fire” is one of the few empirically supported hypotheses within the extant SSR literature. The results here could be the result of a wide range of factors, such as issues of measurement and variable operationalization in the context of the model, or a preponderance of scholarly attention given to a narrow range of post-conflict cases, namely Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslav republics. Regardless, these questions would be well served in the context another project and additional empirical research.
Conclusion

The results presented here represent a good first step in terms of empirically grounding a growing body of donor-critical scholarship, as well as building a body of quantitatively focused security sector reform literature. The statistical results give strong support to the argument that donors have, at best, been misdirecting their resources and attention when it comes to initiating and managing the security sector reform process, and at worst potentially stymying it and preventing it from getting off the ground in the first place. Rather than narrowly focusing resources on the institutions of interest, security sector reform requires a broader approach to building governing capacity, in effect to create a strong foundation capable of supporting the weight of security institutions and the unique capabilities that characterize them. These findings not only represent a potential contribution to academic understandings of the security reform process, as well as foreign aid strategies more generally, but may also serve to be consequential for practitioner communities working in and adjacent to the security sector reform process going forward.

It must be acknowledged however that, given the dearth of empirical work done on security sector reform, the data presented in this paper can only truly be seen as exploratory analysis, and the hypotheses presented here greatly warrant a significant degree of additional analysis and testing in both quantitative and qualitative contexts, the latter of which this author intends to address in a forthcoming paper, which will aim at analytically isolating the crucial dimensions of civilian governance related to SSR as well as other good practices based on the results presented here. The hope is that this analysis becomes one of many future empirical security sector reform focused projects, as the risks of highlighted by civil-military relations
scholars are still very much present across the world and the need for a comprehensive understanding of security sector reform will only increase in the coming years.

**Sources:**


Chapter 3:

Stable Foundations: The Relationship Between Security Sector Reform and Governance in Sierra Leone and Haiti

Abstract:

Over the past twenty years, security sector reform (SSR) has established itself as a critical development goal among both scholars and practitioners. Yet the overall record of SSR in terms of providing its stated goals of extending the principles of democratization to the security forces is inconsistent at best, with many attempts at SSR failing or stalling despite heavy bilateral and NGO investment. This inconsistency is exemplified by the two cases examined here, namely Sierra Leone and Haiti. While both states have been characterized by predatory government, politicized armed forces, protracted episodes of political violence, and extensive international involvement in the SSR process, multiple reform attempts in Haiti have met with either failure or stagnation, while Sierra Leone has been able to make significant progress towards reforming its security sector and is held by many to be SSR’s standout success case. This chapter will argue that Sierra Leone’s success is rooted in the pairing of SSR with reforms aimed at rebuilding and expanding state capacity, effectively building foundational governance capable of supporting reform. Haiti conversely sought to engage in SSR in virtual isolation, largely ignoring the issues of predatory governance that have plagued the country throughout the entirety of its modern history. Comparison of these cases show that if security sector reform is to be successful in its long-term goals, it needs to situate itself in a larger process of political reform that acknowledges that a good security sector cannot exist without good government to manage it.
Introduction

Why, despite substantial international engagement and commitment of resources, have the results of security sector reform efforts been so inconsistent? Security sector reform (SSR), represents a holistic policy approach aimed at extending the principles of democratization to the security forces, as transitioning states and particularly those in post-conflict contexts are often host to security forces characterized by “politicization, ethnicization and corruption of the security services; excessive military spending; lack of professionalism; poor oversight and inefficient allocation of resources (Brzoska 2006, p.1).” While the specifics vary somewhat between cases, the overall approach to SSR has coalesced as a practitioner and donor driven approach that addresses many of the above issues via policy packages built around the development of an effective, affordable and efficient security sector that facilitates and strengthens democratic control of the overall domestic security apparatus, often with a heightened emphasis on local ownership and increased accountability and professionalization built into the security process (Schnabel and Born, 2011). For the better part of thirty years, both academic and practitioner circles have embraced security sector reform as a critical aspect of both development agendas and for establishing long-term democratic stability, and this interest has largely been matched by donor activity in support of fulsome SSR activities and policy packages.

Yet despite consistent engagement from scholars, practitioners, and donors, the overall record of security sector reform efforts thus far has been inconsistent at best. In his 2010 assessment, SSR scholar Mark Sedra even goes so far as to assert that “most SSR practitioners and analysts would readily admit that while the international community of practice has achieved high marks in developing and institutionalizing the SSR concept, it has received a failing grade
on implementation (Sedra 2010, p. 17).” This is a withering indictment, especially when one considers that there have been over 100 documented SSR programs initiated since 1990 (BICC, 2006) and upwards of 50 billion USD in related aid since 1999 (Tierney et al, 2011). Simply put, something isn’t right.

This inconsistency of results is illustrated by the two subjects of the analysis presented here, namely Sierra Leone and Haiti. Technically speaking, both of these states are remarkably similar in terms of their suitability and need for comprehensive security sector reform. Both have languished at the bottom of human development indexes for decades, been host to political regimes characterized by corrupt and predatory elites and state institutions, have endured recent and protracted episodes of political violence in which state security forces were extensively involved, and have received substantial external assistance to support SSR activities. Despite these similarities however, SSR efforts in Haiti have largely been considered a failure, with commentators citing the continued existence of a predatory state and political will for SSR being consistently undermined by corrupt elites (Meharg, 2010). Meanwhile, SSR in Sierra Leone has largely been considered successful, and while both scholars and practitioners admit there is much work still to be done, it is often held up as the ideal example of effective and sustainable security sector reform (Albrecht and Jackson, 2010).

This chapter will argue that the massive disparity in terms of the results observed in these two cases is due to SSR in Sierra Leone being paired with rigorous reforms aimed at rebuilding civilian governance, whereas SSR efforts in Haiti were undermined by attempting substantive reform without the necessary state capacity to support it. More specifically, I will make the argument that successful security reform requires a broader field of view than just the security sector, and in fact hinges upon strengthening civilian political governance to the point where the
state possesses sufficient capacity to not only initiate extensive and costly SSR programs but also
develop sufficient foundations for both managing the security sector rebuilding public
confidence going forward. Furthermore, despite the historic involvement of the donor
community in the SSR process, examination of these cases gives further support to the growing
consensus among SSR scholars that aid cannot substitute for governance, and that capacity
cannot be simply “imported” but rather has to be developed domestically.

This argument will be developed across four sections. The first will briefly touch on the
origins and development of security sector reform as a development goal as well as detail other
key concepts. The second and third sections will establish the backdrop of reform that has and
largely continues to characterize Haiti and Sierra Leone respectively, with special attention being
paid to recent political history and the overall state of the security sector following the civil war
in the case of the latter and the numerous coups and fraudulent elections in the case of the
former. Furthermore, each section will examine the character and strategy of the security sector
reform programs implemented in both cases and illustrate the governance-oriented reforms (or
lack thereof) that were occurring in parallel. The concluding section will reflect on the future of
SSR as a component of a much larger development agenda and argue that scholars and
practitioners must avoid missing the forest for the trees and take a much broader view if SSR is
to succeed going forward.

Terms and Concepts

Security Sector Reform: From Theory to Practice

As a development goal, security sector reform (SSR) is theoretically rooted in early work
on civil-military relations. Perhaps most famously articulated in Huntington’s The Solider and
State and Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier, this literature conceptualizes civil-military relations as an effort to address the supposed paradox of creating an institution designed to protect the state while also investing in it the power and coercive capacity to threaten it (Feaver, 1996; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). The answer presented by these men and their contemporaries is largely uniform: the creation and fine-tuning of instruments that promote civilian control and security personnel professionalism to ensure the security sector is both strong enough to do its job but subordinate enough to only do what its civilian overseers tell it to do (Bermeo, 2003; Feaver, 1996).

Stemming from this, civil-military relations and potential conflicts that arise from it, generally feed into a question capability and intent on the part of both the civilian government and the security sector. Conceptually rooted in advances in intelligence analysis in the late 1950’s, interactions between the state and the security sector can be conceptualized as “a situation of armed hostility, in which each body of policy-makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further each assumes that such will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seems to outweigh estimated loses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its security, and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent (Singer 1958, pg. 94).” The process of conceptualizing security sector reform therefore requires the state to address both the capability and intent of their security sectors, which can be roughly grouped into policy measures and instruments that (1) affect/reduce the ability of the military to subvert control from the civilian government, and (2) affect/reduce the disposition of the military to be insubordinate (Finer, 1962; Welch, 1976).

The idea of security sector reform in the context of development politics was first articulated by the United Nation’s Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report.
which highlights the necessity of building “human security” as part of the greater development process and aim to imbue the state’s security sector with the resilience and oversight to counter both “chronic threats” such as repression and corruptions as well as “sudden and hurtful disruptions” such as civil conflict, terrorist attacks and other manifestations of political violence (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). SSR as a development goal was given increased nuance in 2005 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2005), describing it as one piece of the process of developing management and dispute resolution mechanisms that are both democratic and peaceful.

They go on to distinguish the key sub-sectors involved in and adjacent to the SSR process. (1) Core Security Actors: armed forces, police, intelligence forces, border guards, etc. (2) Security Management and Oversight Bodies: the executive branch, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, and civil society organizations. (3) Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions: judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen. (4) Non-statutory Security Forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, political party militias (OECD, 2005).

Therefore, in a theoretical sense the scope and aims of SSR are relevant to all developing countries, and issues of will and resources not withstanding any transitional or post-conflict state is a candidate for security sector reform of variable scale (Andersen, 2006; Schnabel and Born, 2011). As Edmunds (2002) points out however, there is no clear consensus on the definitions of SSR and its necessary activities and is often dictated by particular concerns of individual academic or practitioner communities. He highlights two primary approaches: “The first is concerned with those militarized formations authorized by the state to utilize force to protect the
state itself and its citizens. This definition limits SSR to organizations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services. The second approach takes a wider view of SSR, defining it as those organizations and activities concerned with the provision of security (broadly defined), and including organizations and institutions ranging from, for example, private security guards to the judiciary” (Edmunds 2002, pg. 45-46). He however goes on to highlight that definitional arguments can obstruct meaningful analysis and given that SSR activities in Sierra Leone and Haiti contain aspects of both approaches, I will eschew pursuing it further.

Governance and Capacity Building as Concepts

The concepts of governance and state capacity, in particular how to measure and subsequently build them, continue to bedevil scholars despite their prominence in a wide range of development issues ranging from SSR to democratization. Rather than attempting to mediate these debates however, this section will merely detail how these concepts will be used going forward. From a conceptual standpoint, capacity and governance are both rooted in the same fundamental question, namely how states develop the ability to implement policy and deliver services, with capacity addressing the degree to which the state can extract and obtain resources and governance addressing how those resources are translated into public goods.

Speaking generally, state capacity refers to the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; p. 78). While this control can take a variety of forms, such as the traditional Weberian notion of legitimate monopolies on the use of force (Weber 1968) or simply the degree of tax compliance (Ottervik, 2013), the key aspect of state capacity is the degree to which the regime in question has established its ability to extract resources from its
governed population. In the context of Haiti and Sierra Leone, this capacity was markedly degraded by protracted periods of violence and predatory state behavior, with the government in the capital having little in the way of means of imposing policies on more outlying territories. Therefore, discussion of capacity building relating to these cases going forward will deal with those tools, programs and activities that assist in reintegrating the capital and core urban areas with the rest of the country and reestablishing the means by which the state can extract capital.

Flowing from this, governance deals with how states effectively utilize the resources gained via capacity across the entire spectrum of its operations. The Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi break this down into three key areas.

(1) **The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced.** This encompasses issues related to voice, accountability and the spaces provided for association and expression, as well as the degree to which the government can maintain stability and prevent political violence and terrorism. (2) **The ability to formulate and implement sound policies.** These metrics deal with issues ranging from the quality of public services, the competence of the civil service, regulatory quality and the government’s perceived credibility in these areas. (3) **Respect for institutions that govern economic and social interactions.** This area deals with overall perceptions regarding societal rules, and includes confidence in security and justice institutions, property rights, and the extent to which the state is vulnerable to corruption and capture by elites or private interests (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). Distilling this down for the purposes of simplicity, governance, as it will be used going forward, can be broadly understood as the ability of the state to consistently deliver goods, services, and security, as well as the ability to engender confidence on the part of the population that they will continue to do so in a proper, legal and ethical fashion.
It also bears noting that while both of these concepts appear on the surface to be essentially rooted in what is traditional known as the “public sector,” the realities of governance (not to mention the unique conditions present in reconstructing states) mean the lines between public and private when discussing capacity and governance are understandably blurred, with government, private enterprise and donors all involved varying degrees. This blurring also extends to the security sector, where private security companies are often integrated into larger security networks encompassing the government, local forces, donors and business interests (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). The naturally raises the issue of the unique role of private security actors in the SSR process, but such questions are beyond the scope of this analysis.

Research Design

The analysis presented here utilizes a most-similar-systems design. This strategy operates on the assumption that systems or cases that share as many features as possible make for optimal samples, as they share “many economic, cultural, and political characteristics; therefore, the number of ‘experimental’ variables, although unknown and still large, is minimized” (Teune and Przeworski 1970, pg. 32). Consequently, this method attempts to control for all but one independent variable at a time by using theories to create expectations about the dependent variable that can be compared to its actual value (Bennett and George, 1997). In the context of this chapter, this method allows for the controlling of as many unknown variables as possible due to the relative similarity of both Haiti and Sierra Leone in order to isolate the effects of the variables of interest, namely the impact of governance reforms on the success of security sector reform.9 These types of analysis are, as Ragin describes, both historically interpretive and

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9 For an illustration, see Figure 2 in the appendix.
causally analytic, in that they both seek to “account for significant historical outcomes or sets of comparable outcomes or processes by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to historical chronology… and produce limited generalization concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena” (Ragin 2014, pg. 35).

This approach is not without its weaknesses however, the most notable being understanding that these types of research design typically require vast amounts of information to facilitate both case selection and variable analysis (George and Bennett, 2005). In this regard, the analysis presented here had the advantage of having the results of the previous chapter’s quantitative models to contextualize the research design and guide the process of case selection. In many ways this chapter is meant to serve as a more focused examination of the relationship between SSR and governance reform indicated by the results of chapter two, which helps alleviate many of the traditional concerns associated with similar-systems research design. Additionally, as Sil and Katzenstein highlight in their work on analytic eclecticism, mixing methods in this fashion allows for a wider scope of formulation and “offer complex causal stories that extricate, translate, and selectively recombine analytic components – most notably, causal mechanism – from explanatory theories, models and narratives embedded in competing research traditions” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, pg. 411).

Haiti

Background: Trapped in a Brutal Cycle

The state of Haiti, ostensibly one half of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea, is home to 10.8 million people spread across roughly 27,750 square kilometers. The population is almost exclusively Afro-Haitian, and despite its historical reputation as being one of the only
Caribbean nations to overthrow its colonial overseers, it has sadly been trapped in what appears to many a never ending cycle of authoritarian politics, oppressive security forces and political violence.

There are two general periods of Haitian history germane to the problem of SSR, the first being its experience with French colonialism and the first period of independence that followed. Despite not being subjected to the more modern form of European colonialism experienced by Sierra Leone, Haiti in many ways has been host to very similar effects. After gaining independence from France in 1804, Haiti’s history has been marked by one security crisis after another, ranging from the decade long civil war shortly after independence, to extensive military conflict with the neighboring Dominican Republic throughout the middle 19th century, and capped by formal invasion and occupation by the United States from 1915 – 1934. This particular history distinguishes Haiti from Sierra Leone, for while the latter inherited an anemic and predatory state from the British colonial project, the former’s history of political violence, beginning with the brutal French plantation system up through to the early 20th century, meant that there was no Haitian state to speak of (Fatton, 2006). Consequently, this period served to establish a firm foundation for both authoritarian political practices and close ties between the autocrat and the security sector and marked the beginning of a cycle where Haitian governance would continually be “co-opted by political violence and endemic corruption” (Meharg, 2010).

The second period of note begins in 1957 when Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier became President of Haiti via military controlled elections. Duvalier went on to rule Haiti until his death in 1971, and his regime further refined the predatory and violent practices that had so prominently colored the country’s history. In his 1984 paper examining the regime, Lundahl writes: “Papa Doc was an innovator in Haitian politics, but a limited one, staying within the
framework of the predatory state, where one of the most important goals was personal enrichment. Within these limits he developed the predatory state into a full-fledged reign of terror, using sheer violence to create respect for his authority” (Lundahl 1984, pg. 40). Unsurprisingly, this period produced very similar conditions to those stemming from Sierra Leone’s authoritarian governance in this period under the APC. In addition to the continued trend of predatory rule described above, this period further hardened the status of the Haitian security forces as being far more prone to threaten human security rather than defend it (Donais, 2005). This period also produced results similar to those caused by the Sierra Leonean policies of political centralization, where the influence of the ruling elites is effectively confined to a handful of Urban centers, beyond which “there are rarely any state security posts, courts, paved roads, public hospitals or even clinics, agricultural extension services or secondary schools” (Baranyi 2012, pg. 3).

Haiti’s experience heavily diverges from that of Sierra Leone in 1986, when Duvalier’s son Jean-Claude is driven from power amid large scale social unrest. The next four years are characterized by a series of military coups until December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected in Haiti’s first truly democratic election, and for once featuring widespread engagement from the non-urban population (Donais, 2005). Also notable in this period was the 1987 passage of a new constitution, primarily built around the institution of democratic norms and putting in place mechanisms to prevent a backslide into authoritarian rule (Heine and Thompson, 2013). It soon became clear that the constitution lacked the ability to achieve these goals however, as Aristide held power for less than a year before being deposed by yet another coup in 1991 and forced to flee the country. This was Haiti’s bloodiest coup to date, resulting in approximately 1,500 deaths, 40,000 people fleeing the country, and a subsequent 200,000 – 300,000 fleeing into
the countryside (Faubert, 2006). The Aristide regime was re-installed on the back on the well-publicized US-led military intervention in 1994, and it is at this point that the first attempt at SSR in Haiti is initiated. While these efforts will be detailed more fully in a moment, it bears noting that they were ultimately undermined by Aristide’s attempt to subvert presidential term limits via a 2000 election with significant evidence of fraud. A wave a violence forces Aristide from power a second time in 2004, after which the UN authorizes the deployment of an interim force which was subsequenty followed by the more long-term United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The subsequent period kicks off yet another series of SSR initiatives, yet despite renewed engagement from the international community, it has thus far fared little better than the first.

*SSR in Haiti: Building on Air*

As was stated above, a discussion of SSR in Haiti necessitates an examination of policies both before and after the 2004 ousting of Aristide, despite both producing relatively poor results for nearly identical reasons. It also bears noting that four primary actors were, are and continue to be critical to understanding the process of SSR in Haiti, namely: political and economic elites, existing security forces, the international presence composed primarily of NGOs, and Haiti’s civilian population, the bulk of which remains outside the country’s urban areas.

The first drive towards security sector reform in Haiti began almost immediately following the US intervention and the restoration of the Aristide administration in 1994. Perhaps most dramatically, the entirety of the 7,000-man Haitian Army was abolished in 1995 under the auspices of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), comprising of 6000 troops and almost 800 police officers, and a new Haitian National Police (HNP) was subsequently inaugurated (Heine and Thompson, 2013). This is hardly surprising. Given the political and often bloody history of the
Haitian military, starting from scratch seemed a logical step towards building a new security sector capable of not only serving its function but also of rebuilding the near non-existent trust Haitians have historically had in their security forces. The architects of this SSR initiative were clearly cognizant of this, as the emphasis on policing served as the primary component of a general “judicial package” aimed at creating a functioning legal system (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). Consequently, a new police academy was formally opened in 1995 with the stated goal of producing a 5,000 trained and working officers by 1996. Unsurprisingly, the HNP prioritized basic training over specialized skills in order to get officers on the streets as soon as possible, and despite few political hiccups initial results seemed promising, as “the HNP proved early on to be a politically neutral civilian institution with a human rights record far superior to its military predecessor” (Stromsen and Trincellito 2003, pg. 10).

These early successes were soon undermined however, for while the SSR activities of this period were well supported, they encompassed the virtual entirety of the international mission’s focus, with piecemeal resources put into judicial and justice reform and nothing at all done to alleviate the endemic issues of predatory governance still very much present in the Aristide administration and the elites that surrounded him. It did not take long for these long-standing legacies of Haitian politics to seep into the newly formed police force. As James Dobbins puts it, “the HNP … became for a time the most honest and effective component of the Haitian bureaucracy, only to find itself slowly sucked back into the culture of corruption, incompetence, and politicization in which it was embedded” (Dobbins 2003, 77). These problems of governance would further confound any attempt to build up state capacity, as predatory practices continually pushed Haitians both away from the cities and into black/grey economic markets (Mendelson-Forman, 2006), further constricting the state’s access to resources
and spurring fresh rounds of elite predations. As Aristide continued to draw the HNP further into his sphere of influence, both the HNP and its reputation began to contract precipitously. Before long, politicization of senior leadership positions, politically motivated police violence, collaboration between police and pro-Aristide militants, and widespread attrition among those officers still committed to public service police all worked to support the conclusion that SSR had effectively failed (Lemoine, 2004; Donias, 2005).

This conclusion only gained further support as Aristide continued to consolidate power, culminating in the 2004 crisis which saw a combination of armed gangs, former combatants and police seize much of the northern part of the country and threaten to enter the capital in an effort to force Aristide from power (Meharg, 2010), hammering home the failure of both SSR and any substantive attempt by the Haitian state at capacity building. The uprising was ultimately successful, and Aristide was forced into exile, ushering in the arrival of MINUSTAH, a significant force of UN peacekeepers, and Haiti’s second attempt at SSR. Immediately, many were quick to distinguish how things would be different this time around. According to a United Nations Development Programme report compiled shortly after launch, “the numerous United Nations Missions that preceded MINUSTAH were rather limited in scope, addressing essentially the creation of a police force. They also suffered from the well-known weakness of such missions, their limited time horizons. In contrast, the mandate given to MINUSTAH in 2004 was much broader” (Faubert 2006, pg. 17). This optimism has yet to manifest into anything resembling tangible results in terms of renewed SSR efforts however, for while the scope and commitment of MINUSTAH represent an improvement on their predecessors, the mission continues to overlook the fundamental problems of Haitian state capacity and governance that ultimately must support any substantive SSR attempt.
Thus far, based on findings from The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’ International Security Sector Advisory Team, all SSR programs instituted after the arrival of MINUSTAH have failed to hit their targets. The five-year development plan adopted in 2006 failed to hit its target of 14,000 officers by 2011, and initiatives to remove suspect or corrupt officers have in many instances not followed through on their mandate. And while a second 5-year development plan was adopted in 2012 with a target of 16,000 officers by 2014, estimates are that a minimum force of 20,000 is needed to reach necessary security standards (ISSAT, 2015). And while SSR are efforts were not doubt substantially impacted by the devastating 2010 earthquake, the fact remains that achieving any amount of tangible progress in terms of SSR in Haiti appear elusive.

As was the case with the failure of SSR under Aristide, the cause is rooted in a failure to address governance beyond the scope of the security sector. The difference this time around was that rather than ignoring the problems of governance that have bedeviled Haiti since independence, the proposed solution has been to isolate the Haitian state to the point of near irrelevance and use a patchwork of NGOs to take the place of comprehensive governance reform and capacity building. To this day Haiti remains almost cripplingingly dependent on foreign support, with seventy percent of the state budget coming from external financing and a further 30 percent of GDP stemming from diaspora remittances, with much of the day-to-day business of governing done by foreigners. Since 2004, everything from public security to elections have been both financed and administered by international actors, which despite fostering a degree of stability, has only served to weaken the Haitian state further (Giraudy, 2012). The sheer size of the NGO footprint in terms of Haitian governance also produces a kind of localized brain drain, as state agencies are unable to feasibly compete with the salaries offered by NGOs which
effectively siphon off what few skilled Haitian personnel exist and stymie the development of a competent civil service (Zanotti, 2010). And while these measures may serve as an effective stop-gap that keeps the lights on, they actively obstruct efforts to build Haitian state capacity and governance, as there is no real incentive to expand state reach outside of the capital or develop domestic means of service delivery, including human security.

Efforts at security sector reform in Haiti, both under and after Aristide, have been fundamentally undermined by an unwillingness to address the problems of governance and capacity building rooted in the political elite. The central principle of security sector reform is the creation of effective democratic means of control over the armed forces, but such a principle presupposes the existence of a state with both the means and will to exercise that control. SSR is an extensive and costly undertaking and requires extensive buy-in from all of the key actors involved in the process, both materially and normatively (Bayley, 2001), and the Haitian state and its underlying elites have yet to get to the point where they are capable of providing either. Security sector reform in Haiti, if it is to be successful, must therefore take a more holistic view of the country’s larger development problems and seek to address the fundamental problem of a weak Haitian state. This imperative of governance and capacity building is illustrated further via comparison with this chapter’s second case of interest, Sierra Leone.

**Sierra Leone**

*Background: From Freedom to Failure*

Situated on the Northwest coast of Africa between Guinea and Liberia, Sierra Leone is a country of ~7 million people (per the 2015 census), spread amongst 18 ethnic groups and ~72,000 square kilometers. Despite possessing significant deposits of diamonds, gold and other
minerals, Sierra Leone was initially colonized by the British in 1808 to serve as a colony for freed or displaced slaves. The country would remain in British hands until 1961, when the country gained formal independence and elected Sir Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) to head up its first post-independence government.

The specifics of Sierra Leone’s colonial history are germane to the overall investigation of SSR in two regards. The first is the specific character of the Sierra Leone state that largely stems from British colonial policy at the time. The British approach to colonial administration in Africa was one of minimal involvement and indirect administration and is most clearly articulated in Frederick Lugard’s treatise “The Dual Mandate of the British in Tropical Africa.” Under this model, British authorities would rely primarily on existing native hierarchies (usually tribal) for everyday governance and utilize “a comparatively small educated class (that) shall be recognized as the natural spokesmen for the many” (Lugard, 1922). While this system was certainly effective at promoting its overall goal, namely allowing the British comparatively cheap and efficient means of administering their African colonies, it had the unintended effect of creating a state that was, for intents and purposes, hollow. Given that the colonial state’s only functions were to maintain British interests (primarily economic extraction) and perform cursory oversight of the native authorities that were engaged in the actual business of governing, the Sierra Leonean state under colonialism was not designed to engage in actual governance the way it was conceptualized above, insofar as it lacked the means or desire to distribute public goods and services.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^\text{10}\) For a more detailed description of colonial administration and legacies see Young, 1994.
The second key legacy of colonial rule for our purposes was its effect on the character of the armed forces. As was common among most colonial security forces, they were often viewed as a tool to be used against the native population rather than for their benefit. Osman Gbla describes the overall situation in his 2007 piece on SSR in Sierra Leone: “At independence in 1961 Sierra Leone inherited security forces that were incapable of meeting post-independence security challenges of a democratic, pluralistic and multi-ethnic country. The security forces, including the armed forces and the police that were established by the colonial authorities, were essentially tasked to protect British interests. They were required to maintain law and order with a view to preventing rebellion against the colonial administration. Unsurprisingly, the colonial authorities used the security forces as instruments to suppress the colonized people” (Gbla 2007, pg. 14). Therefore, like many of the post-independence governments in Africa, Sierra Leone was saddled with a problematic security sector from the first instance, and issues stemming from its politicized history continue to the present.

The post-independence period was primarily characterized by the political domination of the Sierra Leone All Peoples Congress (APC) party, and its figured head Siaka Stevens, who served as President from 1968 until his death in 1985. This period produced several consequences of note. The first was a process of continual political centralization and predatory behavior on the part of the APC government, which reached a formal peak in 1978 when the country officially became a one-party state, fueled in large part by the creation of an “atmosphere of violence against any form of organized opposition or dissent” (Abdullah, 1998). The second was an even further increase to the politicization of the armed forces through a variety of practices ranging from the appointment of police and military leaders to parliament, removing security sector budgets and transactions from the public accounting system, and the proliferation
of corruption at nearly every level (Gbla, 2007). Lastly, the push towards centralization of power and resources by the APC resulted in Sierra Leone largely mirroring the situation under colonialization, with a deep divide forming between the government in Freetown and the rest of the country (Albrecht and Jackson, 2010).

This period is bookended by start of the civil war in 1991, when fighters from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country from neighboring Liberia. While numerous factors can be highlighted as causes of the war, the failure of the state to provide public services and promote economic development stands most prominently (Bellows and Miguel, 2006), owing in the large part to the dynamics described above. The war would drag on until 2002, affecting the entirety of the country and resulting in an estimated 50,000 deaths, one million displacements, and thousands more suffering amputations, assault and rape assaults (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Sierra Leone also suffered two military coups during the war as security and justice institutions began to break down amid appalling violence. The final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Reports describes it thus: “Successive political elites plundered the nation's assets, including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national good. Government accountability was non-existent. Institutions meant to uphold human rights, such as the courts and civil society, were thoroughly co-opted by the executive. This context provided ripe breeding grounds for opportunists who unleashed a wave of violence and mayhem that was to sweep through the country. Many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, lost all sense of hope in the future” (TRC Report, paras 14-17).

With the assistance of UN and UK troops, the war was brought to an end in 2002, with elections and an extensive disarmament campaign following shortly after. Subsequent National elections for president and parliament were held in 2002, with local government elections
following not long after in 2004. And while security sector reform began before the war’s formal end, it immediately distinguished itself from the approach taken in Haiti in both scope and vision.

SSR in Sierra Leone: A Slow but Holistic Process

When faced with undertaking security sector reform, Sierra Leone was therefore in a very similar predicament to Haiti in terms of key variables, namely authoritarian and predatory governance, hyper-politicized armed forces, and an extensive history of protracted political violence. Initial efforts at security sector reform began as early as 1997, and while the ongoing concerns of the civil war made implementation problematic to say the least, it worked to establish key principles that would orient the process going forward. Namely, the new program aimed to combat the full range of issues highlighted above, though the decentralization of power away from Freetown and towards local authorities, building out the capacity and efficiency of a leaner public sector, and reforming security and justice institutions to boost accountability and transparency (Good Governance and Public Service Reform Programme for Sierra Leone, 1997). SSR would also feature prominently in the 1999 Lomé Peace Accords, which stressed a fundamental restructuring the of the Sierra Leone armed forces built around curbing their political tendencies and enshrining a constitutionally delineated role (Lomé Peace Accord 1999, article XVII). While these accords ultimately broke down over issues of disarmament resulting in Freetown again coming under siege and a further two years of war, these efforts indicate at the very least a degree of normative buy-in on the part of both Sierra Leonean elites and the international community in terms of a commitment to SSR. This is also not to say that not to say that no progress on SSR was made during this period, as in particular important groundwork on the re-organization of the army was initiated. Rather, SSR in Sierra Leone prior to the end of the
war 2002 understandably takes the form of a series of responses to multiple consecutive crises, rather than a coherent and sustained reform effort (Albrecht and Jackson, 2010). Important yes, but necessarily limited in scope and impact by the difficulties of launching a reform process in the midst of ongoing fighting.

On the back of significant buy-in from the UK, this commitment to SSR began to bear fruit not long after the formal end of the war in 2002. A new officer academy was officially opened in 2003 which aimed to transmit the principles articulated above to a newly constituted officer corps. As was the case in Haiti, special attention was paid to the Sierra Leone police force. Historically poorly trained and poorly equipped, the post-war reforms not only provided a significant boost to police training with a special emphasis on local needs, but also coupled this with improvements to uniforms, vehicles, wages, and equipment that understandably brought with it a healthy boost to morale (Gbla, 2007). When taken in conjunction with the drive to decentralize political authority back to local authorities, it is not surprising that these reforms have met with a great deal of success in terms of rebuilding trust and accountability in a security sector that has historically been devoid of both. These substantive reforms were also coupled with high level management and coordination tools, which not only conducted in-depth reviews that granted increased clarity to the security sector as a whole, but also built up the Office of Nation Security (itself established in 1999) to coordinate input from across agencies and help develop future strategies (Albrecht and Jackson, 2010).

In contrast to Haiti, the success of these reforms can be directly linked to the rigorous parallel programs aimed at rebuilding Sierra Leonean governance. Most notable of these efforts has been The Governance and Civil Service Reform Programme (GCSRP), the goal of which, according to the UK Aid Department is: “To enable the Government of Sierra Leone to Lead,
Monitor and co-ordinate Public Sector Reform activities consolidated under one umbrella/Strategy, with particular concern to strengthen capability of the civil service to deliver basic services more responsively to the needs of the poorest” (UK Aid, 2016). Unsurprisingly, Sierra Leone’s civil service suffered from many of the same issues afflicting that of Haiti (administrative bloat, poor training, brain drain). The GCSRP has worked to prioritize these issues going forward, and administrative reviews as early as 2006 have highlighted substantive progress towards overall reform of the Sierra Leonean public service (Coker, 2010). As mentioned above, these reforms to the civil service were complemented by aggressive decentralization measures, with the Local Government Act of 2004, which provides for locally elected councils and increased local authority over revenue expenditure, decision making, and perhaps most critically, elements of law enforcement (Sierra Leone Local Government Act, 2004). It must be noted however that this decentralization was facilitated largely through the integration of local governance with the traditional chiefdom system, which itself presents a range of issues, most notably issues of legitimacy between official and traditional institutions, as well as the wealth of cultural baggage associated with these traditional networks (Jackson, 2006). While this point is not without merit, I would argue that all things considered this policy is a creative (albeit imperfect) solution to the problem of re-building state capacity and engaging populations that have be largely separated from the core of the country for decades.

These measures are all indicative of the fact that security sector reform in Sierra Leone has, from the first instance, been conceptualized as part of a larger holistic development program aimed at the country as a whole. As opposed to SSR efforts in Haiti which sought to pursue reform in near isolation from larger issues of governance, the Sierra Leone experience shows an understanding of the firm interconnection between the functioning of the security sector and the
day to day business of governance. Even comparatively basic measures, such as the maintaining of drugs and equipment at police hospitals, were conceptualized as part of larger measures aimed at helping officers and their families out of generational poverty (Krostad, 2012). And while by any reasonable measure these represent first steps on a much longer road, as Sierra Leone continues to languish at the bottom of must human development indexes, its tangible progress in SSR and governance reform cannot be understated. Writing as scant six years after the end of the war in 2002, Wyrod highlights the fact that Sierra Leone managed to hold the freest and most participatory elections in its history, rapidly confront fraud in local elections with voter drives that registered ~90% of eligible voters in a matter of weeks, as well as stand among the less than half of African states that haven managed to hold more than two successive elections without a coup or renewed fighting (Wyrod, 2008). Much work remains to be done, but Sierra Leone is well on the road.

**Concluding Remarks and New Directions**

As was mentioned early, security sector reform has largely been conceptualized as a necessarily holistic process which must consider the full scope of the security forces and their reach, from the leadership, to the rank and file, to the communities in which they operate. What this comparative analysis has hopefully illustrated, is that scholars and practitioners have not taken this principle far enough and failed to consider how to situate security sector reform in the broader context and process of governance. It is not enough to ensure that officers are accountable, and the police are well trained, there must also be state that has both the means and the normative commitment to utilize the means of democratic control and management that SSR aims to create. Haiti has twice made the mistake of attempting security sector reform in a vacuum, and in attempting to create the means of security without a functioning democratic
government to manage it, effectively built a house without a foundation, and its results reflect this. Sierra Leone however, by contrast, through pairing SSR with aggressive governance reforms that addressed both its long history of predatory governance and deep divide between urban and rural populations, was able create the tools of governance capable not only of instituting reform, but guiding and managing it in a way that has worked to rebuild critical confidence in the security sector that was lost degraded by decades of abuse and violence.

The case of Haiti also illustrates difficulties stemming from an approach to SSR that is overly managed by donor activity, giving additional clarity to the results from the previous chapter that indicated the negative impact aid can potentially play in the process. This analysis gives further credence to the critique that has been developing among SSR scholars highlighting the difficulties stemming from donor-driven SSR, and that donor priorities are often at odds with the needs of comprehensive SSR programs. This issue will serve as the crux of the analysis in the following chapter.

It must be stressed however that this emphasis on pairing governance reform with SSR is meant to serve as the start of a new body of research as opposed to a blueprint that can be transposed onto one’s SSR candidate of choice. Despite the developmental similarities that have been highlighted over the course of this piece, both cases have been host to contextual conditions that can neither be predicted or replicated. Major and unpredictable events like the 2008 Haitian earthquake create a cascade of effects that devastate both governance and the security sector and speak to issues of crisis preparedness that even fully developed states are far from adequately addressing. Conversely, the degree of unilateral involvement in Sierra Leone on the part of the United Kingdom cannot be overstated, and the scope of the manpower, resources and time committed on the part of the UK make it a highly difficult model to duplicate, especially for
NGOs involved in SSR. Rather, my hope is that the analysis presented here works to expand what has thus far been the overly narrow scope of security sector reform research, and that future research with use the less than stellar record of SSR around the world as an inducement to look beyond its traditional boundaries and expand understanding of the process. SSR remains as critical as ever, and its supporting empirical research can no longer afford to remain in its infancy.

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Chapter 5

Members Only:

Using Social Network Metrics to Map and Analyze Security Sector Aid

Abstract
How do states acquire commitments from security donors and does the “security” dimension of security sector aid distinguish it from conventional lending? Past decades have seen the rise of security sector reform as a key development goal with international assistance playing a key role. This chapter aims to model and analyze the totality of the security lending from 1999-2013 via social network methodology, with the variable of interest being a donor state’s centrality within the greater aid network, integrated with existing datasets. Hypotheses from existing literature are supported, such as the salience of democratic political institutions and a focus on counter-terrorism goals. Other results however, which indicate a preference by donors for states with fractionalized elites and an aversion to states with a history of military coups, suggest an approach to security aid that prioritizes utility and ease of execution rather than those security forces that may need it most.

Introduction

How do states secure and maintain assistance and attention from the greater community of security donors? Beginning around the end of the Cold War and picking up in earnest in the early 2000s, there has been increasing focus in both developing states and the donor community
on the importance of the security sector (military, police, paramilitary forces, and all other armed organizations under the purview of the state) to the larger process and development and democratization. Building on concepts articulated in existing research on civil-military relations, the development community has increasingly prioritized security sector reform (SSR) as an essential policy, which emphasizes the criticality of consolidating civilian control over a state’s armed forces through policies aimed at boosting professionalization, efficacy, efficiency and local ownership. Since 1999, this interest has manifested in over 14,000 distinct donations, in total valuing nearly 50 billion USD (Michael et al, 2011). While theoretical and empirical studies on the workings of SSR remain sparse, there does exist a general consensus among the practitioner community on the criticality of international aid and assistance to drive the reform process forward (Laipson, 2007). What remains unexamined and untested however is how states gain and maintain the attention of security sector donors and why states enter and exit the ‘inner circle’ of aid recipients.

This chapter will therefore aim at determining how and why developing states garner the attention of the broader donor community for security development. Rather than using the amount of aid received as the primary variable of interest however, analysis will focus on security-based aid from the perspective of social network methodology, utilizing measures of an aid recipient’s centrality and position in relation to the greater network of aid recipients. It will quantitatively test hypotheses taken from existing work on more general foreign aid, as well as several derived from the limited theoretical work available on security sector reform.

The unconventional methodological approach aimed at this particular facet of foreign aid and security sector reform will serve to expand current understandings as well as stand apart from existing scholarship for several reasons. The first is that the unique roles and coercive
capabilities of a state’s security sector make it fundamentally distinct from other state institutions. Existing literature on civil-military relations that provide the theoretical underpinning for much extant SSR work highlight the fact that because of these unique capabilities civilian control of the security sector is not natural, meaning that civilian governments are not merely faced with the question of what kinds of instruments to create but how to create them at all in the face of a security sector with the ability to resist (Finer, 1962). Further, once the security sector’s unique functionalities and potent toolset is situated within the broader processes and demands of development, democratic consolidation, regime transition and post-conflict reconstruction, the challenges and pitfalls of security sector reform become abundant.

In regards to the chapter’s methodological approach, the primary variable of interest will not be the volume or amount of aid received by X state in Y year, but rather which donors a state is receiving aid from in a given year, its overall position in the greater network of security focused aid, its movement in and out of the inner circle of aid recipients, and a wide range of relational variables derived from these data. This approach offers a great deal of promise in terms of expanding existing understandings of security-based lending. Firstly, while work dealing explicitly security lending is virtually non-existent, the greater body of work on foreign aid from both academics and practitioners has yet to reach any meaningful consensus on the salience of aid volume when it comes to advancing a wide range of development goals. Secondly, while there are certainly high levels of financial costs to engaging in SSR, the process also requires extensive assistance in the form of expertise, advice and guidance from subject matter experts who can oversee activities such as the re-training of military and police officers and the demobilization of armed groups following civil conflict. In addition, the largely unique status of
each recipient states’ security sector, encompassing everything from the necessary scope of reform to the number of security personnel involved means that the material costs of SSR programs will vary greatly, further weakening the explanatory power of aid volume as an indicator. Contrary to aid volume, social network metrics bypasses these conceptual issues and provides a measure of which states are getting the most attention by the totality of donor states in relation to other.

What follows is a general overview of existing literature dealing with more general allocation of foreign aid, as well as existing work on security sector reform that will serve as the theoretical basis for the chapter’s research design.

*Foreign Aid: Who Gives and Why*

As there is a dearth of theoretical and empirical work examining the mechanics of security sector aid, I opted to build on more general theory on aid allocation. Prior to the end of the Cold War, most foreign aid flowing into the developing world, not surprisingly, was largely used as a foreign policy tool by the US and Soviet Bloc states aimed at broader security and geopolitical goals (Beim, 1964; Mckinley and Little, 1979). With the breakup of the USSR, the donor community was free to move away from the bipolar geopolitics and began to pursue more general development and democratization goals. Starting in the 1990s, the strategic focus of ODA began to give way to a focus on fostering good and accountable governance, poverty reduction and economic development, democratization and human rights (Dollar and Levin, 2006). While this shift did encompass the idea of security alongside more general capacity building and rule of law, a more nuanced understanding of security sector reform did not coalesce until some years later.
This transition from strategic aid to a more holistic development approach was also coupled with an increased emphasis on the accountability and efficacy of recipient states, and that aid should be prioritized to states that will make the most effective use of it rather than those that can only demonstrate a need for it. Articulated in a 1999 report, the World Bank asserted that aid will be most effective when directed to stable political and economic environments with generally effective and efficient public sectors and state institutions (Cooper and The World Bank, 1999). This increased emphasis on accountability makes sense when one considers the potential effects of corruption, rent-seeking elites and inefficient political and economic institutions on the effective direction of aid. In theory however this creates a potential paradox for recipient states, as those states in possession of weak institutions and most in need of assistance for political and economic development are unable to attract donors as they lack the preconditions for aid disbursement. This dynamic is supported empirically by Dollar, who establishes an increasing degree of selectivity linked to institutions on the part of donors post-1990 (Dollar and Levin, 2006).

When examined in practice, the effects of this stated prioritization on both building democracy and using state effectiveness and efficiency as conditionality have not manifested themselves on aid allocation. Empirical studies have found evidence that aid provision is still largely motivated by individual donor objectives rather than the developmental status and pursuits of individual recipient states (Ali et al, 2015). In addition, no evidence has yet been found that indicates donors systematically allocate aid to states with lower levels of political corruption (Svensson, 2000). Alesina and Dollar were able to establish that state’s which are, at the margins, more democratic receive additional aid, as well as states with a colonial background as well as the kinds of economic policies (ie. property rights and regulatory environment) that
allow for steady inflows of foreign direct investment (Alesina and Dollar, 1998). It bears noting however that colonial experiences are most salient in the context of bilateral rather than multilateral aid, as its mechanics hinge on cultural similarities such as language and legal structure that were cultivated during the colonial period (Schraeder et al, 1998). This is however conceptually problematic in the context of security development, given the strained and often violent history of colonial security forces in relation to their populations across a wide range of contexts.

While it bears repeating that these projects all examine foreign aid writ large, their findings will greatly inform the chapters’s quantitative models, as one of its primary goals is to determine whether security sector aid mirrors or diverges from the more general patterns of foreign aid, especially in terms of establishing a holistic, vis a vie pragmatic model of donor behavior. In addition, none of these studies utilize social network measures such as the ones that are used in this analysis. This approach will aim at circumventing both the previously mentioned conceptual constraints related to aid volume and SSR constraints as well as the at times contradictory empirical results of studies built around aid volume. In addition, network methods have already showed promise in this area as illustrated by a 2003 analysis of localized NGO disaster response utilizing centrality metrics similar to those used here (Moore et al, 2003).

**SSR: From Civil-Military Relations to Policy Packages**

Security sector reform (SSR) is conceptually and theoretically rooted in early work on civil-military relations. This literature conceptualizes civil-military relations in any state (democracy or otherwise) as an attempt to answer the classical question of “who guards the guardians?” and the supposed paradox of creating an institution designed to protect the state while at the same time having the power and coercive capacity to threaten it (Feaver, 1996;
Huntington, 2008; Janowitz, 1974). Despite divergences between Huntington and the more sociological approach of Janowitz and his contemporaries, the answer presented to the problem is largely uniform: the creation and fine-tuning of instruments that promote civilian control and security personnel professionalism to ensure the security sector is both strong enough to do its job but subordinate enough to only do what its civilian overseers tell it to do (Bermeo, 2003). These can be roughly grouped into policy measures and instruments that (1) affect/reduce the ability of the security sector to subvert control from the civilian government, and (2) affect/reduce the disposition of the security sector to be insubordinate (Finer, 1962; Welch, 1976).

While these principles did see a limited degree of implementation during the Cold War via security assistance and training extended to proxy states and former colonial provinces, the door for SSR wasn’t truly opened until the early 1990’s where the end of global bipolarity allowed states in the West to utilize a wide range security cooperation as a tool to drive democratization and promote broader security goals (Andersen, 2006). The idea of security sector reform in the context of developing politics was first articulated by the United Nation’s Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report which highlights the necessity of building “human security” as part of the greater development process and aim to imbue the state’s security sector with the resilience and oversight to counter both “chronic threats” such as repression and corruptions as well as “sudden and hurtful disruptions” such as civil conflict, terrorist attacks and other manifestations of political violence (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). SSR as a development goal was given increased nuance in 2005 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2005), describing it as one
piece of the process of developing management and dispute resolution mechanisms that are both democratic and peaceful.

They go on to distinguish the key sub-sectors involved in and adjacent to the SSR process. (1) **Core Security Actors:** armed forces, police, intelligence forces, border guards, etc. (2) **Security Management and Oversight Bodies:** the executive branch, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, and civil society organizations. (3) **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions:** judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen. (4) **Non-statutory Security Forces:** liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, political party militias (OECD, 2005).

Therefore, in a theoretical sense the scope and aims of SSR are relevant to all developing countries, and issues of will and resources not withstanding any transitional or post-conflict state is a candidate for security sector reform of variable scale (Andersen, 2006; Schnabel and Born, 2011).

Difficulty arises however due to that fact that while SSR as a development goal has gained considerable support among the donor community in recent years, and a variety of SSR packages have been launched across the developing work, the extant literature has done little in the way of theory building. This is due to the fact that the majority of SSR literature is not analytical and its treatment and conceptualization of specific policy instruments tends to focus on tradecraft, intelligence failures, or advocate specific policy positions (Bruneau and Matei, 2008). While the scope of the practitioner literature has begun to expand in recent years, is largely is built around supporting individual country aid and development packages/profiles in the form of case studies, NGO white papers, and evaluation criteria and metrics (Jackson, 2011; Muehlmann,
2008). This stems from the fact there is no clear understanding among its proponents as to what SSR actually is in terms of its key agendas or features beyond the general parameters described above, and as a result the reform process often takes the form of a long ‘checklist’ that countries’ security agencies need to complete for various policy reasons (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006). There also exists limited qualitative work that extends insights from literature on state building to the SSR process, citing the importance of accountability and elite power structures and the ability of overly centralized elite power and influence to stymie the reform process (Berg, 2012).

While not directly addressed, there is an implicit assumption within work on SSR that during the process of reforming the security sector, in order to compensate for weak capacity on the part of transitioning states, developed nations and the greater donor community (who have a vested interest in creating stable democracies) are able use a combination of policy frameworks and incentives tied to potential access to Western institutions and alliances to effectively import state capacity in order to circumvent domestic barriers and kick start and guide the reform process (Laipson, 2007; Peterson, 2009). External assistance becomes even more critical in the context of states transitioning to democracy from some form of authoritarian rule, as protracted periods of authoritarianism has the potential to leave both the state and civil society with “little to no notion of accountable security institutions and even less ability to develop their own expertise in the security field” (Kartas, 2014). This need for security assistance however has often in the past been at odds with the preferences of many in the donor community. As a result of this, the majority of the donor community opted to eschew security issues as recently as the late 1990’s, with many continuing to have “a strong bias against working with security sector players, particularly with the military” (Brzoska, 2003). While members of the donor community began overcoming their reluctance to work with security actors starting in the late 1990’s, post-2001
the global dynamics of the US led War on Terror has placed increasing pressure on the donor community to prioritize interventions that are focused on various aspects of counter-terrorism (Boutton and Carter, 2014).

In many ways the existing work on security sector reform mirror the general trends within the larger body of foreign aid literature. Reform of the security sector is seen as a critical aspect of the development process, while at the same time states that are perhaps in greatest need of SSR (those with politicized militaries, undergoing post-conflict de-mobilization, or weak civilian control) tend to repel donors who are themselves more beholden to larger political goals.

Data

This analysis utilizes a number of different data sources, with all variables aggregated at the state level. Using aid data compiled by Michael et al from the AidData project, which is a comprehensive, dyadic time-series collection of foreign aid disbursement which is further categorized via aid purpose/target, and the data of interest being aid dispersed for either for the development of security institutions and instruments or post-conflict peacemaking. While peacemaking does not explicitly entail security sector reform activities, it does denote an environment where state security forces or aspects thereof lack the ability to perform key functions, indicating that security sector reform is almost assuredly necessary, most often via SSR activities such as rebel disarmament and demobilization.

Once isolated, these data were converted into a yearly two-mode network dataset (ie. encompassing ties between two distinct sets of actors), denoting whether or not there was aid flowing from donor ‘x’ to country ‘y’ in year ‘z.’ This process visualizes the greater system of security aid as an affiliation network, where each observation is conceptualized as a potential
organizational relationship between donor and recipient states in a given year. Once constructed and sorted, UCINet, specialized network analysis software was used to both illustrate and visualize the data (Borgatti et al, 2002). See figure 3 in the appendix for an illustration.

The key measure for these data is each actors’ centrality within the greater network, which acts as an indicator as to which actors serve as focal points or are more “in the thick of it” than others involved in the network (Freeman, 1978). Two types of centrality data were generated and subsequently utilized in the analysis: two-mode degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality is a function of the number of ties to network nodes (ie. donor state) each actor (recipient) has, and is and captures the strength of each recipient’s connection to the donor community as whole in comparison to other recipients. UCINet operationalizes this by counting the number the number of connections each actor has to donors and divides it by the total number of possible connections, with possible values ranging from 0-1. Eigenvector centrality operates on the idea that central actors are those with links to other central actors, meaning that an individual actor’s eigenvector centrality is proportional to that of its neighbors within the network. See descriptive statistics below. Note: these statistics encompass scores for both donors and recipients.\(^\text{11}\)

Once generated, these centrality data variables were integrated with the Quality of Governance dataset in conjunction with coup data taken from the Powell et al collection of coup d’état dataset, and utilizes the following variables (Powell and Thyne, 2011).

\(^{11}\) See Figure 4 in the appendix for a description of the centrality data.
Variable Description

A state’s level of democracy is measured via scores from the polity project, which ranks regimes on a 0-10 scale where 0 is the least democratic and 10 is the most. This variable almost makes use imputed values calculated by regressing Polity on average Freedom House measures to address instances of missing data (Marshall et al, 2009). Terrorist activity is captured by rankings from the Global Terrorism Index, which aggregates the most authoritative data source on terrorism today, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) into a composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of nations on the negative impact of terrorism (Vision of Humanity, 2015). Government effectiveness is measured via the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators which combines into a single grouping, responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies (Kaufmann et al, 2010). Levels of state corruption are measured via the political corruption variable taken from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. In this case the final aggregations take into account both small scale (ex. bribes) and large-scale corruption occurring in the across the public sector as well as individual indexes from major branches of government (Coppedge et al, 2016). The model also incorporates measures of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows as measured by the World Bank, GDP data from the International Monetary Fund, as well as a dummy variable denoting states previously colonized by Western powers. Lastly, the state of a recipient’s justice system is measured via the independent judiciary variable taken from The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the
government or the military, ranging from 0 (not independent) to 2 (fully independent) (Cingranelli et al, 2014).

Analysis also make use of two variables taken from the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (Haken et al, 2016). The first operationalizes a state’s level of elite fractionalization and captures instances where local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract. These include pressures and measures related to power struggles, defectors, flawed elections, political competition. The second is a rating of a state’s control over its security apparatus, and captures pressures and measures related to groups competing with the state’s monopoly over legitimate force in regard to internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings, political prisoners. Special mention of these two variables is made as data from the Fragile States only becomes available in 2005, thus reducing the number of observations available to the model by around 30% (~900 -> ~600). To address this, two series of models are run, one which includes the FSI variables and one which does not.

Research Design

Based on these data and the previously detailed existing literature a number of hypotheses were extrapolated as to the contributing factors to an aid recipient’s centrality score (across one/two mode and eigenvector respectively), with a higher value corresponding to a more central and privileged position within the security sector donor network. Firstly, given the near universal prioritization of democratization within the greater donor community, as well as the previously cited empirical work indicating evidence for this occurring in practice, higher levels of democracy are expected to correlate will a more privileged position within the network.
Hypothesis 1: States that are more democratic will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network than less democratic states.

While a degree of divergence was highlighted between theory and practice in the more general foreign aid literature as to the need for donors to prioritize government effectiveness, given the nature of the security sector it is reasonable to assume this will be more acute in the context of security lending. It’s therefore hypothesized that donors will have a greater incentive to work with states characterized by higher levels of day to day functionality, captured in the model by measures for government effectiveness, corruption and elite fractionalization. It is projected that states seen as more effective will be more enticing to donors, while the brinksmanship, corruption and political instability commonly associated with elite fractionalization will act as a deterrent. Despite Svensson’s findings which indicated a lack of salience in terms of political corruption, the stakes and capabilities associated with the security sector would, in theory, cause donors to look at it more closely.

Hypothesis 2: States that are characterized by high levels of government effectiveness and lower levels of corruption will occupy a more privileged in the security donor network position than states with lower levels.

Hypothesis 3: States with lowers levels of elite fractionalization will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network than those with higher levels of fractionalization.\(^\text{12}\)

Continuing off findings from the foreign aid literature, it is assumed that stable economic environments will be more enticing to donors. This project uses net foreign direct investment

\(^{12}\) These hypotheses are separated due to the limited time scale of the fractionalization data.
inflows in conjunction with state GDP per capita to capture this, as it is assumed that states with comparatively low GDPs will have greater need of aid and higher levels of FDI inflows denote an economic environment stable enough for both donors and investors. In addition, while a colonial background dummy variable is included in the models for the sake of completeness, the conceptual difficulties associated with existing aid literature vis a vis the security sector discussed earlier preclude any substantial theorizing in the context of these models.

*Hypothesis 4: States with lower GDP per capita and higher net FDI inflows will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network.*

Finally, the remaining hypotheses will test variables theoretically critical to security sector reform. Firstly, given the political undercurrents of the US led War on Terror and the previously detailed pressure on the donor community to prioritize counterterrorism, it is hypothesize that states that are host to comparatively higher levels of terrorism and conditions that potentially allow terrorist organizations to operate will enjoy a more privileged position among donors, as such environments indicate a strong need for security based assistance.

*Hypothesis 5: States with higher levels of terrorism will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network.*

The final hypotheses will address the overall state of civilian control over the security sector both currently and historically, with the assumption being that a lack of control over the security sector, in many ways the conceptual foundation of SSR and civil-military relations, acts as the strongest draw to donors seeking to get involved in the SSR process. It is hypothesized that states with a history of successful military coups, which currently lack significant control mechanisms over the state security apparatus and are host to a judiciary/justice sector lacking in independence
and capacity (see below for operationalization details) will be seen as essential SSR candidates by the donor community and thus enjoy a more central position within the greater recipient network.

Hypothesis 6: States with a history of successful military coup d’etats will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network.

Hypothesis 7: States lacking an independent judiciary/justice system will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network.

Hypothesis 8: States with less control over their security apparatus will occupy a more privileged position in the security donor network.13

Results:

The results of the regression models were interesting, with many results falling within expected boundaries as well as several surprises (see figures 5 and 6 in the appendix for full regression tables).

In addition to variable significance largely remaining consistent across both dependent variables, a fair amount of support is found for hypotheses drawn from the literature on more broad-based foreign aid. Both levels of democracy (Polity Scores) as well as terrorism rankings within the GTI were found to be highly significant, lending additional support to effects of the twin pushes within the donor community towards democracy promotion and counter-terrorism. Likewise, Svensson’s findings on the effects of corruption are also supported, with corruption only cracking the 5% confidence interval in one of the four models and falling off completely in

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13 As with elite fractionalization, these hypotheses are separated due to the limited availability of security apparatus data.
the arguably more complete 2005-2011 models that included the FFP Fragile State variables. Interestingly, the significance of government effectiveness totally falls off in the second round of models, likely due to its salient aspects being more fully captured by the elite and judiciary variables (Note: post-model diagnostics show multicollinearity levels well within acceptable levels). In addition, the robust significance and coefficients of elite fractionalization in both models potentially indicate a desire by donors to seek out environments where they can “divide and conquer” in order to maximize their goals. This finding is particularly interesting as it suggests an approach to aid disbursement that is highly pragmatic, a stark contrast to the holistic one often cultivated by the development community. It would be potentially fruitful to test this hypothesis in regards to more general foreign aid to see if these results are unique to security sector work.

The influence of economic variables appears not to carry over to security-based aid however, with FDI inflows failing to reach the 5% confidence threshold in any of the four models, and while significant across all four models, the coefficients for GDP per capita indicate it effects are miniscule. In addition, the robust results for independent judiciaries, which in conjunction with its negative direction potentially suggests that states host to ineffective or non-independent justice sectors serve as strong magnets for security related donors. The exact nature of this relationship however, as well as the causal mechanism underlying it is unclear in the context of these models and will require addition analysis before any conclusions can be made with confidence. The same is also the case with the results for colonial background, which vary too greatly between models for any meaningful extrapolation.

Most interesting however is that the FFP variable control over the security apparatus was not significant across any model. Coup history, denoting states that had suffered at least 3
successful military coups in the past fifty years, was significant across all models but in the negative direction. These results have a number of potential theoretical implications. The first is that Brzoska’s 2001 outlining of donor skittishness in terms of working with security, especially military actors, is still very much present and influencing where donors opt to get involved. These results suggest a “U-shaped” distribution of donor preferences with regard to the state of the armed forces, prioritizing a “sweet spot” in the middle, with states at the outset either not requiring assistance or characterized by armed forces too far gone to save. This is given further support via the observed effects of the status of the judicial and justice sector, as its significance across all four models indicate a preference among donors for prioritizing working with actors closer to the civilian end of security operations. These results grant further credence to the depiction of a security donor network that is far more pragmatic than holistic in its dealings and often prioritizes ease of operations, whether that means leveraging local divisions or eschewing security sectors that could prove overly resistant to reform.

Conclusion and Directions for Further Research

Security sector reform as a development priority remains on the rise, both in terms of its level of interest among academic and policy circles as well as its appeal to donors, as evidenced by the steady increase in active donors in every subsequent year analyzed here. The pragmatic picture of the donor network produced by this chapter suggests an ongoing disconnect between theory, stated goals and practice when addressing security sector reform challenges going forward. In addition to its stated contribution, the above results suggest a number of possible avenues for expansion and additional research. The effects of elite fractionalization as well as judicial institutions on internal rather than external aspects of SSR is particularly interesting and would be well served by successive analysis. In addition, the inconclusive results regarding
colonial background could potentially be well served via a qualitative study of smaller scope to look more closely at how well donors work with the security forces of former colonies. Regardless, building effective civilian control over the means of security remains as pressing as ever, and many questions remain unanswered as to how best to go about it.

Sources


Chapter 5

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

It is my belief that the analysis presented in this dissertation provides several noteworthy contributions to our understanding of security sector reform. Independent of any theoretical contributions, the data collected and coded for use in chapters two and four represent a significant step forward in terms of quantitative analysis of security sector reform, the study of which thus far has been almost exclusively qualitative. These data not only enabled numerous noteworthy results here but have the potential to be utilized in a range of related projects and models going forward both directly and tangentially related to the study of security sector reform. My hope is that these collection efforts end up being among the first of many, as the development of SSR scholarship would be exceptionally well served by the cultivation of a rich body of quantitative data. Nuanced quantitative analysis also has the potential to enhance understandings of SSR outside the context of academic circles and help build a more fulsome understanding of the process among practitioner circles.

The findings presented here relating to the importance of pairing SSR with the strengthening of civilian governance stands as its most significant theoretical contribution. While the cultivation of a generalizable body of theory for security sector reform has thus far proven elusive, it is an essential activity if understandings of security sector reform are to improve. As has been stressed throughout this manuscript, the comparatively poor track record of the states that have been able to initiate SSR (to say nothing of the many others that have failed to even get that far) illustrates the pressing need to aggressively pursue a better understanding of the process that is both theoretically sound and empirically grounded. The support found here highlighting
the critical relationship between SSR and governance has the potential to provide an early contribution to this effort. Additionally, these findings work to contextualize the oft mentioned SSR track record and provide empirical grounding and a starting point for post-hoc analysis of reform efforts.

This dissertation makes further contributions to our understanding of the role and impact of donors and aid in regard to the process of SSR. As has been stated throughout the manuscript, SSR scholars have grown increasingly critical of the donor-driven model of security sector reform, highlighting the tendency of donor priorities to clash with those of states involved in or seeking to initiate reform. The findings presented here give strong empirical support to this critique and amplify the assertion that donor activity is at best, misguided and misdirected, and at worst, actively obstructing and undermining the process. My hope is that these findings, in conjunction with those mentioned above, work to spur a data-driven re-examination of the role of donors in security sector reform, and an increased focus how their activity can be formulated to best assist the process.

I must stress again however, that the analysis presented here is intended to be exploratory; a first step in the cultivation of a rich body of SSR literature, and the opportunities for further research are vast. Further development of quantitative datasets will open additional methodological doors, and increased availability of data will help to alleviate the data issues highlighted in chapter two and allow for a greater variety of quantitative modeling across a range of related questions. As was briefly mentioned in chapter four, the realities of public-private interactions in the context of security sector reform are potentially highly consequential, and a more detailed study on the effects of private security and governance networks on the process of
SSR would likely be highly fruitful. In addition, the findings relating to donors across the manuscript as well as those relating to elite fractionalization in chapter four speak to a nuanced and complicated relationship between that donor and elites that would greatly benefit from detailed analysis.

These avenues however represent only a fraction of the scholarly work left to be done on security sector reform. As has been stressed throughout this manuscript, security sector reform represents a policy area with real and potentially deadly consequences, and I am heartened that over the course of writing this dissertation I have begun to see growing interest in giving it the attention it so badly warrants. My hope is that this trend will only increase in the coming years and that the research presented here helps to establish a body of research that will enable both academics and practitioners to better understand and implement security sector reform around the world.
Appendix

Figure 1: Proportional Hazard Model Results (pg. 24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Haz. Ratio</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Aid (Logged)</td>
<td>.9339***</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>.9786</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Independence</td>
<td>1.1758</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility</td>
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<td>+8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup History</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Civil Violence</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Civil War</td>
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<td>Ethnic Violence</td>
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<td>Ethnic War</td>
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<td>Contiguous Rivals</td>
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<td>MIDs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Executive in Military</td>
<td>.18248***</td>
<td>-82%</td>
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N = 1,621

*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Figure 2: Haiti and Sierra Leone Comparative Table, pg. 42

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<th>Sierra Leone</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Per capita</td>
<td>$1,819 (2017)</td>
<td>$1,608 (2018)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Key Dates</td>
<td>1825: Recognized Independence from France</td>
<td>1808: Colonized by Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990: First election of Aristide</td>
<td>1991: Civil war begins with invasion of RUF fighters from Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991: Aristide overthrow via coup</td>
<td>1997: Initial SSR efforts begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995: Aristide returns w/ US assistance, Haitian army abolished, SSR is attempted</td>
<td>2002: Civil war ends with UN and UK assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004: Aristide ousted for 2nd time, SSR is attempted again under MINUSTAH</td>
<td>2004: Elections are held and SSR activities begin in earnest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Players</td>
<td>United Nations and United States</td>
<td>United Nations and United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Character</td>
<td>Police focused with many governance duties sub-contracted to NGOs.</td>
<td>Police and military (special emphasis on officer corps), paired with civil service and electoral reform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Visualization of 2006 Aid Network (pg. 74)

Figure 4: Description of Centrality Data (pg. 74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
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<td>0.068</td>
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Figure 5: Regression Models – 1999-2011 (pg. 79)

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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.0126***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial Background</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity Scores</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
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<td>-.0193***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.0345*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>.3223</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.0223</td>
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*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Figure 6: Regression Models – 2005-2011 (pg. 79)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Eigenvector</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
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<td>Elite Fractionalization</td>
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*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001