A Swot analysis of community policing as a reform schema for the Egyptian National Police to counter violent extremism

Daniel Waddington Waddington
University at Albany, State University of New York, dan.waddington@gmail.com

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A SWOT ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY POLICING
AS A REFORM SCHEMA FOR THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL POLICE
TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

by

Daniel Waddington

A Dissertation
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Abstract

Like much of the Middle East and Africa, Egypt has been experiencing increasing incidents of extremist violence and terrorism in recent years. However, an effective methodology for addressing this violence has not been identified. One approach that has been promoted internationally is countering violent extremism through community policing.

This paper will assess the merits of community policing as a methodology for countering violent extremism in post-revolutionary Egypt. For the purposes of this paper, countering violent extremism was conceptually defined as policies and preventive strategies employed with the intent to hinder the progression of terrorist groups and their activities. To provide context I included a working definition of community policing based on historical implementation of the practice. The characteristics of Egypt and its culture were outlined as they relate to Egypt's susceptibility to community policing principles and programs, based on both research and from personal experience living in Egypt and working with the Egyptian National Police Force for two years during the transition from the Hosni Mubarak regime, through the revolution, and subsequent overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president. I categorized my research into four key areas – Post-Mubark Egypt, the Egyptian National Police, Community Policing, and Countering Violent Extremism.

In order to better formalize my analysis and validate subsequent deductions, I integrated my research data into a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) matrix. Ultimately, I found that the Egyptian National Police are ill-prepared to implement community policing, whether it would be effective in countering violent extremism or not. However, through my research I was able to identify key areas that could be addressed. The paper concludes with
implications and recommendations in two key areas: a) Implications for Egypt and the Egyptian National Police, and b) Implications for program design for police reform efforts.

Descriptors: Community Policing, Egypt, Countering Violent Extremism, SWOT.
Dedication

There are many who have contributed to my academic career, some of whom I will try to thank in the acknowledgements section. However, there is only one person who stands above the others, to whom this paper must be dedicated – my wife Tauna. Tauna has been by my side and supported me through three college degrees, in three different states, and over three decades: a Bachelor’s degree in Justice Administration at Brigham Young University when we were first married; a Master of Public Administration degree at California State University Long Beach while I was working full-time as a police officer and she was trying to raise our young family; and finally a doctoral degree in Criminal Justice at the University at Albany in New York. My doctoral program took a disconcerting sixteen years to complete, as I spent much of the time working on police reform projects overseas. Throughout it all however, Tauna not only supported me, but told me to “hang in there” the many times I had considered quitting. She encouraged me, she pushed me, and even served as my proof-reader through many iterations of this paper. This dissertation is as much Tauna’s effort as it is mine.

Thank you Tauna.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Like much of the Middle East and Africa, Egypt has been experiencing increasing incidents of extremist violence and terrorism in recent years. However, an effective methodology for addressing this violence has not yet been identified. One approach that has been promoted is community policing to counter violent extremism. This paper will assess the merits of community policing as a methodology for countering violent extremism in post-revolutionary Egypt. For the purposes of this paper, countering violent extremism is conceptually defined as policies and preventive strategies employed with the intent to hinder the progression of terrorist groups and their activities. To provide context I will include a working definition of community policing based on historical implementation of the practice. The characteristics of Egypt and its culture will be outlined as they relate to Egypt’s susceptibility to community policing principles and programs. This will be based on both research and from personal experience living in Egypt and working with the Egyptian National Police Force for two years during the transition from the Hosni Mubarak regime, through the revolution, and subsequent overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president. I will evaluate international research related to the principles/practices of community policing in order to contribute to understanding the merits of community policing as an apt approach for the Egyptian National Police to counter violent extremism.

In order to better formalize my analysis and validate subsequent deductions, I will integrate my research data into a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analytical matrix. With this collective information, I hope to develop some conclusions as to whether or not there are justifiable merits for implementing community policing, specifically in Egypt, for contending with violent extremism.
Background of the Study

From 2011 to 2013, I had the opportunity to work for the US Department of State (DOS) managing a project in Egypt to introduce community policing to the Egyptian National Police. The project was initially proposed by DOS to the Egyptian National Police towards the end of the regime of former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak in the last quarter of 2010. However, before the training was able to get under way, the Egyptian revolution of January 2011 toppled Mubarak, and the ensuing chaos exposed the brutality of his security force to international scrutiny. This game-changing event created a whole new stage for community policing training to be introduced in Egypt. The training was under way by June 2011. However, it was implemented during a very tumultuous period that included the first free elections in Egypt, and a new president – Mohamed Morsi; and ultimately a second revolution and a “coup” that ousted Morsi after only one year in office. Because of the challenging social and political climate, the training was only provided to select executives, mid-level managers and instructors from the Egyptian National Police. Although the training project was very limited in scope, it was gratifying to witness the principles of community policing being received with great enthusiasm by training participants.

Unfortunately, by June 2013 only about 450 Egyptian National Police personnel were provided community policing-related training (Waddington, 2013), out of a commissioned police force that numbers in the hundreds of thousands (almost a million more non-commissioned). Consequently, other than anecdotal incidents of community policing efforts, no comprehensive community policing-focused police reform was evident and DOS determined to end its funding of the community policing training project.
Since the overthrow of Morsi in June 2013, the security situation in Egypt has deteriorated such that the Egyptian National Police has not felt the time has been right to embrace community policing. I was told by one Egyptian National Police official that “with all the violence, now is not the time to be soft on policing, we need to demonstrate a strong hand.”

Prior to June 2013, it was rare to hear of any incidents that could be categorized as terrorism or violent extremism in Egypt (although the revolutions were accompanied with many protests, riots, and violent skirmishes with the Egyptian National Police). However, since Morsi’s ouster, attacks and bombings by radical Islamic fundamentalists (particularly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, or ABM) have significantly increased, totaling thousands of police and civilian deaths and injuries. The levels of violence since 2013 and the diverse composition of the groups taking part are unprecedented in Egypt’s modern history (Awad & Hashem, 2015; Dunne & Williamson, 2014b).

In the face of this violence, the question remains as to whether or not community policing can/should be a legitimate reform methodology for the Egyptian National Police, even in the midst of the current state of violent extremism. Noteworthy is that over the past several years, there have been admonitions that community policing may be strategic to addressing violent extremism (Newman & Clarke, 2010; Spalek, 2010; Stohl, 2008).

After the tragedies of 9/11 the United States and its allies implemented a military campaign, or “War on Terror”, to try and eradicate radical Islamic terrorist organizations. However, changing international political and social exigencies have dictated that the War on Terror give way to a less aggressive approach. Subsequently, an approach of “Countering Violent Extremism” has evolved (Holmer, 2013). Instead of military targeting of terrorists and their organizations, countering violent extremism employs preventive strategies intended to
hinder the progression of terrorist groups and their activities. International agencies, including the United Nations and the United States Government, are focusing more funding and effort toward countering violent extremism projects, and have even created a countering violent extremism section within the State Bureau of Counter Terrorism (Hudson, 2016). Additionally, international organizations focused on countering violent extremism, such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (Hedayah), have emerged to provide countering violent extremism dialogue and training.

Countering violent extremism projects include police training/reform, community engagement and empowerment of women, to name a few (Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, 2014). Due to the nature of these goals, community policing has been seen as a logical construct for police reform efforts to counter violent extremism (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007).

A community policing approach goes beyond a narrow focus on crime; the philosophy proposes that police and communities work together in partnership to address community concerns (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). Unfortunately, although on its face community policing would appear to be a logical model for implementing police reform in support of countering violent extremism, community policing is difficult to implement. In truth, it is challenging in the best of circumstances, but particularly in these troubled Islamic countries. The social, political and security challenges in these countries make mutual cooperation between communities and the police as necessitated by community policing very difficult to achieve.

Egypt is not alone. On the heels of the War on Terror, authoritarian leaders have been deposed or challenged throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Major protests have broken out in other countries as well, including Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sudan – all primarily Islamic societies.
This wave of revolution has been referred to as the “Arab Spring” (Dalacoura, 2012). This revolutionary process has destabilized internal security in these countries and made them more susceptible to the influence and actions of radical Islamic groups. The United States, United Nations, and other foreign donors invest billions of dollars to assist in police reform efforts and to address terrorism and extremism in these countries. However, little has been done to systematically assess if there is a likelihood of success of these investments.

**Problem Statement**

The problem under consideration is that terrorism/extremism is a growing threat in Egypt. Global fatalities from acts of terrorism rose 30% in 2014, compared to the previous five-year average, according to a global risk analytics company, Verisk Maplecroft. They also identified Egypt as one of the countries seeing the most significant increases in the risk of terrorist attacks (Maplecroft, 2015).

International donors invest heavily into security sector reform (SSR) efforts with the hope of countering this threat. However, the threat and associated violence in Egypt continues to grow rather than subside (Awad & Hashem, 2015). The United States has funded community policing training programs for the police in Egypt, but have been hesitant to invest more if there is no evidence of return on its investment (Waddington, 2013). If there is any hope in countering terrorism and extremism, a more thoughtful approach must be taken. Comprehensive assessments of their potential value to the targeted locale should be attempted before implementing security sector reform methodologies.
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this case study is to explore and understand Community Policing as an approach for Countering Violent Extremism in Egypt. Since starting this dissertation journey and focusing on the potential of community policing for countering violent extremism in Egypt, I recently came across an article whose author underscores the need for the research I propose here. Brian Katulis, a senior fellow for national security at the Center for American Progress states:

“One country that needs to move to the top of the agenda in the effort to counter violent extremism and defeat terrorist networks is Egypt. Egypt’s the most populous country in the Middle East with a population pushing up to close to 90 million, and it has had a historical role as an incubator of some of the radical Islamist groups and opinion formers that helped create the global al Qaeda movement. Egypt is geographically central in the region – between Israel and the Gaza Strip to the east and a disintegrating Libya to the west, it faces regional security pressures... [In Egypt] there are institutions to work with and a certain sense of national unity that is lacking in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen... In the broader fight against violent extremists, Egypt is a key centerpiece of the struggle and we need to get this right.”(Katulis, 2015)

A reform strategy that has been “vetted and tested” as proposed in this paper can provide impetus for change that could potentially reduce violence and extremism in Egypt. In addition to the significance to Egypt itself, Egypt’s ability to stabilize and successfully emerge from the Arab Spring could provide a pivotal example to other countries in the region suffering from post-revolutionary violence and extremism.
Research Questions

My research is multi-faceted. Several important variables must be considered, as well as how they potentially impact each other. This leads to several research questions. The following questions will guide this study:

1. Does international research related to the principles/practices of community policing and reported outcomes associated with its implementation support community policing as an apt approach to counter violent extremism?
   - There have been numerous studies that analyze community policing implementation and outcomes. Additionally, there has been a substantial amount of writing promoting community policing as a methodology to counter violent extremism. I will look to those to determine whether or not existing research can support the premise of community policing as an appropriate security sector reform methodology to counter violent extremism.

2. Is the Egyptian National Police force capable of implementing community policing principles and programs?
   - Egypt has gone through substantial political and internal upheaval since the revolution of 2011. I will assess police capabilities as they relate to community policing, as well as the susceptibility of Egyptian culture and people to community policing.

3. Does community policing have the potential of stemming the tide of violent extremism in Egypt?
   - I will look not only at current capabilities, but the greater potential of community policing as a means of countering violent extremism in Egypt.
The intent is to develop conclusions as to whether or not there are justifiable merits of community policing as a reform schema for the Egyptian National police to counter violent extremism. This will be based on both research and personal experience living in Egypt and working with the Egyptian National Police on a community policing project over a two-year period.

**Conceptual Framework**

When a patient is ill, doctors assess the symptoms and draw on their experience and the research that has been conducted related to the illness to prescribe the best possible treatment. This process, which is not limited to the medical field, has been referred to as abductive reasoning (Magnani, 1992). Abduction is “characterized by a ‘backward flow’ of inferences across a chain of directed relations that identify initial conditions from which the current abstract representation of the problem originates. This provides tentative solutions to the problem at hand by way of hypotheses” (Patel, Arocha, & Zhang, 2005, p. 730).

Such is the nature of my study. If one were to look at Egypt as a patient and I as her physician, it would be incumbent upon me to consider existing research and studies that have been conducted with various treatments/remedies for “patients” with similar ailments. I would take into consideration my understanding of my patient, her medical history and specific needs. I would draw on personal experience working with other patients with similar symptoms. I would take this data *in toto* to determine if the standard prescribed treatment is appropriate for my patient. For example, if a patient has symptoms indicating an infection, a standard medical response would be to prescribe one of the many forms of antibiotics. However, there are those who are allergic to some antibiotics, such as penicillin. So, penicillin would not be an appropriate treatment for such an individual. Understanding the patient is critical to treatment.
For most scientists, abductive reasoning is a natural and instinctive process, a series of educated guesses, building upon observed phenomena and previous studies. For my study I will draw on a number of analyses and conclusions, from a multitude of sources, such as literature reviews, related research and personal experience and observations, and consolidate them into a comprehensive assessment. With that I hope to determine if community policing is an appropriate prescription for Egypt to address its ailment of violent extremism.

**Nature of the Study**

My research is a qualitative case study assessing the Egyptian National Police force, existing research on community policing, Egypt culture, and countering violent extremism. I compiled international research findings as they relate to community policing implementation and outcomes. I evaluated them from a viewpoint of implementation in Egypt. Accordingly, I also compiled research related to Egypt and its national police force so as to consider community policing implementation in a more specific, rather than a generic context. Additionally, I drew significantly upon personal experience implementing community policing programs internationally and working with the Egyptian National Police for two years immediately after Mubarak’s resignation as Egypt’s president.

**Limitations**

There are several limitations that I must take into account in going forward with my research. First, there are a couple of considerations inherent in case studies.

1. *Concern that case studies lack rigor*: Case studies have been viewed in the evaluation and research fields as less rigorous than surveys or other methods. Reasons for this
include the fact that qualitative research in general is still considered unscientific by some
and in many cases, case study researchers have not been systematic in their data
collection or have allowed bias in their findings. In conducting and writing case studies,
care must be used in being systematic in data collection and steps must be taken to ensure
validity and reliability in the study.

2. Not generalizable: A common complaint about case studies is that it is difficult to
generalize from one case to another. But case studies have also been prone to
overgeneralization, which comes from selecting a few examples and assuming without
material evidence that they are typical or representative of the population (Neale, Thapa,
& Boyce, 2006, p. 6). However, as Bennett and Elman have noted, qualitative research
methods presently enjoy “an almost unprecedented popularity and vitality…”, such that
they are now “indisputably prominent, if not pre-eminent” (Bennett & Elman, 2010, p. 499).
They suggest that this is due to the considerable advantages that case study methods
in particular have to offer in studying the “complex and relatively unstructured and
infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield” (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 171).
The nature of my study is much like this, in that it attempts to address a unique
unstructured phenomenon, which has no hard data from which to draw. Consequently, I
will rely on a variety of sources (similar research, peer review literature, personal
observations, etc.) to build my case study.

3. Researcher bias: My own subjective feelings and observations could influence the case
study. A lot depends on my interpretation of the information acquired. By necessity my
assessment was a solo one. A “real world” assessment such as the one presented here
should be by committee and include not only technical expertise by law enforcement
officials, but also input and oversight from public officials with political experience and engagement at high levels in government (Lewis, 2011).

I also understand that incorporating a SWOT matrix into the research itself has potential limitations. SWOT organizes the data in such a way as to identify internal and external factors favorable/unfavorable for the program to succeed; however, the categorization of the data into the matrix will necessarily be somewhat subjective (the SWOT analysis is discussed in greater detail in the Research Method section in the following chapter).

Another limitation is that I am attempting to analyze something that, as of yet, has not been implemented to a degree that it could be directly assessed. Community policing has not been implemented in any meaningful way in Egypt so as to measure its effectiveness as a countering violent extremism methodology. The essence of my research is to provide predictive analysis for the potential of community policing as a countering violent extremism methodology in Egypt.

**Significance of the Study**

One of the more unique characteristics of my study is that it is presumptive in nature. Typically, dissertations and associated research evaluate the possible effects that independent variables may have on dependent variables, whether incorporating a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods approach. However, these studies are conducted after the fact by using available data, or developing new data that assess effects related to phenomena.

For my study, I evaluate a program for a locale in which it has not been meaningfully implemented. I am looking at the potential of the program. I am accumulating the research and findings on Egypt, community policing, and countering violent extremism to structure
reasonable assumptions as to whether or not community policing could be effective if implemented.

**Significance to Theory**

Current theory espouses community policing as a viable methodology for countering violent extremism (*Workshop to Develop a Plan of Action for Community-Oriented Policing as a Tool for Countering Violent Extremism*, 2014), but limited research has been published that breaks down the viability of community policing in a specific context/locale such as Egypt in advance of implementation. My research should either help to substantiate the viability of community policing for countering violent extremism, or bring into question the validity of this theory.

**Significance to Practice**

For many years I have worked directly on security sector reform projects that have been funded through various means of foreign assistance. I have evaluated a host of other government funded requests for information (RFI) and requests for proposals (RFP) as well. Rarely were these efforts premised upon research that validates the proposed reform methodology. More typically they are based upon political (both donor and host country) and budgetary exigency.

My paper introduces a different approach in security sector reform projects. It suggests the value of substantial research and assessment prior to launching such programs. This has the potential of:

- Greater understanding of the target environment and capabilities of the host country/agency.
- Establishing a sounder foundation for project implementation.
- Adding greater value to the financial investment.
- Augmenting likelihood of project success.

**Significance to Social Change**

The true significance of this study is that it can potentially provide insight and guidance for police reform and a viable approach for countering violent extremism in Egypt. And, as Katulis stated, “One country that needs to move to the top of the agenda in the effort to counter violent extremism and defeat terrorist networks is Egypt” (Katulis, 2015). Additionally, the research approach can be replicated to provide a methodology for assessing the feasibility of reform efforts around the world.

**Summary**

Egypt has undergone a historic transition over the last several years. With that transition has come significant unrest and an increase in violent extremism and acts of terror. Foreign donors and partners, such as the US have invested billions of dollars to assist the transition, particularly in the security sector. Unfortunately, that assistance has been primarily based on what has been done in the past in other countries (whether it worked there or not). This study will attempt to take a more scientific look at the potential of community policing as a viable prescription against violent extremism in Egypt.

Chapter Two will introduce the methodology I use for my study. I will explain my specific role, as well as the specific instrumentation for organizing and analyzing my accumulated data and information.
Chapter 2: Research Method

As stated, the purpose of this research has been to explore and understand Community Policing as an approach for Countering Violent Extremism in Egypt. A reform strategy that is vetted and tested, as is outlined in this paper, can provide impetus for change that could potentially reduce violence and extremism in Egypt.

Research Design and Rationale

To restate, my research questions are as follows:

1. Does international research related to the principles/practices of community policing and reported outcomes associated with its implementation support community policing as an apt approach for Egypt?
2. Is Egypt susceptible to community policing principles and programs?
3. Does community policing have the potential of stemming the tide of violent extremism in Egypt?

In order to answer these questions, I have incorporated a qualitative case study methodology. This approach is merited because a meaningful community policing implementation effort has never been attempted in Egypt, which undermines any worthwhile attempt at a quantitative assessment. Further, this research takes a rather unique approach to considering a problem. I try to take a more proactive approach to research and determine – what would happen if...

Subsequently, I evaluate the successes and failures of previous community policing implementation efforts, and the various findings of the associated researchers. I take that information and apply it in an Egyptian context by including a review of writings on
contemporary, post-Mubarak Egypt and its susceptibility to the precepts of community policing and the issues of its successful implementation. I also include personal observations and interviews conducted during a two-year assignment as an adviser and intermediary between the Egyptian National Police and the US Embassy in Cairo.

**Role of the Researcher**

My role in this particular research is probably best described as “participant as observer”. Gold in his oft-cited paper, *Roles in Sociological Field Observations*, described this as one in which the researcher gains access to a setting by virtue of having a natural and non-research reason for being part of the setting (Gold, 1958). My role in Egypt was one that was focused on implementation of a community policing training program, and to assist the Embassy in developing a working rapport with the Egyptian National Police. The intent was not specifically for me to conduct research on the effectiveness of the effort. However, I did have an obligation to report regularly to the US Department of State on any observed issues and outcomes.

On its face it may appear that I would have a vested interest in ensuring that a study such as the one I am providing here would present a positive spin on the implementation of community policing in Egypt. However, I am no longer under the dictates or compensation of that contract and can speak without bias. My only bias would be in the guise of hope for effective change in Egypt.
Instrumentation

The principle source of data comes from published peer-reviewed research. I also incorporated government documents and similar reputable sources. Finally, I drew upon personal experience in Egypt and in implementing community policing programs around the world.

In order to better formalize my research, I chose a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) Analysis Framework as the methodology for organizing my data. By its nature, SWOT focuses on opposition variables – Strength versus Weaknesses and Opportunities versus Threats (Tsvetkov, 2014). SWOT has proven to be a useful tool for organizational assessments. The use of SWOT analysis has also been substantiated by academic peer-reviewed literature. In their research on SWOT analysis across a variety of industries and interests, Helms, et al, found that research supports SWOT analysis as a tool for business planning purposes (Helms & Nixon, 2010). A SWOT Analysis Framework has also been recommended as a direction to profile organizations as they first begin to craft and defend new strategic alternatives (Kessler, 2013). Although initially developed as a tool for private sector business ventures, SWOT is also being increasingly promoted as a tool for decision-making in the public sector (Prowle, 2016).

It should be noted that some authors challenge the relevance of SWOT. In their analysis, Hill and Westbrook asserted that SWOT was ineffective, particularly when implemented in such a way so that it is nothing more than lists and descriptions (Hill & Westbrook, 1997). I would concur with Hill and Westbrook that SWOT has limited analytical value if used simply as a tool to organize information. Frequently, individual factors in SWOT are expressed briefly, and in a very general nature and brief. Subsequently, the result of SWOT analysis is too often only a superficial and imprecise listing or an incomplete qualitative examination of internal and external
factors. However, if it is introduced into the research using sound analytical processes, I do believe that a SWOT matrix can provide value and meaning to my research. In order to augment my SWOT analysis I am also incorporating an Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix, as well as an External Factor Evaluation Matrix (explained in greater detail in Chapter 7).

SWOT analysis involves the collection and portrayal of information about internal and external factors which have, or may have, an impact on an organization (Pickton & Wright, 1998). Stacey describes SWOT analysis as a list of an organization's strengths and weaknesses as indicated by an analysis of its resources and capabilities – plus a list of the threats and opportunities that an analysis of its environment identifies (Stacey, 2007). Strategic logic obviously requires that the future pattern of actions to be taken should match strengths with opportunities, ward off threats, and seek to overcome weaknesses. Consequently, a SWOT analytical framework is well-suited for structuring my research in such a way so as to make reasonable conclusions from the accumulated findings.

Incorporating a SWOT analysis approach to assessing the viability of a countering violent extremism methodology is not a unique concept. Specifically, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) suggested in their workbook, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, that a SWOT analysis be used as part of the situational assessment for incorporating community policing as part of a broader effort to counter violent extremism (OSCE, 2014, pp. 90-91). In their quantitative assessment of violence in Nigeria, Taft and Haken recommended that a comprehensive qualitative assessment also be conducted, specifically recommending that SWOT analysis be incorporated as part of the process (Taft & Haken, 2015). Stenning and Shearing’s paper on police reform is also worth mentioning, because although they
do not categorize their assessment as a SWOT analysis or catalog their points into an analytical matrix, they do incorporate a fundamental aspect of SWOT; they consider the opportunities, drivers, and challenges – both internal and external, that drive police reform (Stenning & Shearing, 2005).

Ultimately, I believe SWOT can provide an organized approach for analyzing community policing as a potential reform methodology to counter violent extremism in Egypt. If the compiled strengths – matched with opportunities – of community policing outweigh the threats and weaknesses, within a countering violent extremism context in Egypt, then I will be able to conclude that the approach is justifiable.

**Structure**

I will structure my research into four key areas, which will be introduced in individual chapters:

- Chapter 3 – Post Mubarak Egypt
- Chapter 4 – Egyptian National Police
- Chapter 5 – Community Policing
- Chapter 6 – Countering Violent Extremism

For each topical area I will draw on peer-reviewed literature, government reports, and personal experience to paint a picture which defines and illustrates the topic. Using this approach, it will be more practical and meaningful for each chapter to include its own literature review (although there will inherently be overlap in the topics). At the conclusion of each chapter I will identify the key findings. These key findings will be incorporated into a SWOT matrix and
analyzed in Chapter 7. The matrix will be used to organize, compare, and contrast the findings to produce some final conclusions, which will be presented in Chapter 8.

**Issues of Trustworthiness**

**Credibility**

The credibility of my research is founded in the peer-reviewed studies on which my research is based. I include in my paper the published findings of multiple qualified academics to build a foundation for my analysis of the appropriateness of community policing for Egypt’s efforts to counter violent extremism.

The credibility of my research is further enhanced by my personal experience of prolonged engagement over a two-year period with the Egyptian people and the Egyptian National Police. This provided sufficient time for me to overcome any preconceptions I may have had so I could objectively understand Egyptian culture, as well as the dynamics of policing in Egypt. Additionally, much of my experience has been documented in official government reports that will be appropriately referenced.

Finally, my personal experience/prolonged contact, along with the findings of multiple researchers on community policing and Egypt, will provide a triangulation effect which add greater robustness to my research.

**Transferability**

The transferability of my research has a couple of dimensions. Although the context is very specific (suitability of community policing as a strategy for countering violent extremism in
Egypt), the methodology of assessment introduced here has the potential of significant value in policy development and security sector reform efforts.

In order to enhance transferability, one methodology I will incorporate will be to provide a “thick description” of the phenomenon researched using personal observations and interviews with Egyptians. Although he was not necessarily the first one to coin the phrase, Geertz endorsed thick description in qualitative research in 1973, particularly for ethnographers (Geertz, 1973). Since then it has been more generalized as a tool for sociologists, psychologists, educators, and qualitative researchers. In his assessment of thick description Ponterotto provides the following elucidation:

“Thick description accurately describes observed social actions and assigns purpose and intentionality to these actions, by way of the researcher’s understanding and clear description of the context under which the social actions took place. Thick description captures the thoughts and feelings of participants as well as the often complex web of relationships among them.” (Ponterotto, 2006)

Thus, I believe providing a thick description will allow the reader to better contextualize my research within the appropriate Egyptian setting.

Additionally, I will draw on the findings of a number of researchers in various venues to add variation and multiple perspectives to my research

**Dependability**

Dependability involves participants’ evaluation of the findings, interpretation and recommendations of the study such that all are supported by the data as received from informants of the study (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2013). As previously indicated, my personal
experience/prolonged contact, along with the findings of multiple researchers on community policing and Egypt, will provide a triangulation effect to my research, which will support its dependability.

**Confirmability**

Given that I also draw on personal experience/engagement, there would be an inherent concern for the objectivity of the research. However, as stated, as much as possible I will incorporate those personal experiences that I documented in official government reports in order to strengthen their confirmability. Also, the bulk of my research is based on the findings compiled from a variety of peer-reviewed research. I consolidate those findings into a meaningful construct within an Egypt context.

**Summary**

The purpose of this chapter has been to delineate how I would accomplish the objectives of my research that were outlined in Chapter 1. My approach is assessing program potential, as opposed to measuring program results. To accomplish this, I am incorporating a well-used tool from the business world, but which is seeing increased application in the government sector – SWOT analysis. SWOT will provide a structured approach for compiling relevant information and organizing it in such a way so as to assess the potential of a community policing approach for countering violent extremism in Egypt.

In the following chapters I will look at four broad features of my research – Post-Mubarak Egypt, Egyptian National Police, Community Policing, and Countering Violent Extremism. Each of these will provide key points/inputs for my SWOT analysis.
Chapter 3: Post-Mubarak Egypt

As previously outlined, the problem under consideration is that terrorism/extremism is a growing threat in Egypt, and Egypt is one of the countries seeing the most significant increases in the risk of terrorist attacks (Maplecroft, 2015). In addition to the significance to Egypt itself, Egypt’s ability to stabilize and successfully emerge from the Arab Spring could provide a pivotal example to other countries in the region suffering from post-revolutionary violence and extremism. The purpose of this case study is to explore and understand community policing as a viable approach for countering violent extremism in Egypt. In order to provide an accurate and contemporary context for my research, it is first necessary to understand Egypt – its people, its leadership, its politics, and its security sector.

Egypt

Egypt, officially the Arab Republic of Egypt, is a transcontinental country that bridges Africa and Asia by way of the Sinai Peninsula. Consequently, Egypt has great significance both geographically and diplomatically. It has long been seen as a pivotal and vital state to US interests in the region (Chase, Hill, & Kennedy, 1996). Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel continues to be one of the single most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace (Sharp, 2015).

Egypt has one of the longest histories of any modern country, one of the world's first nation states (Teeter, 2011). It was evident in my experience working with the Egyptian people that their long history brings with it a significant amount of pride in their country. Frequently, when I would discuss policing in the USA with Egyptian police officials their response would be something like, “Yes, but America is a babe compared to Egypt. We have millennia of
experience.” This prideful attitude is both understandable and significant, in that it can provide context for potential reform efforts. Can an old dog learn new tricks?

One of the first things I learned in working with Egyptians, is that it is necessary to demonstrate a basic understanding and appreciation for Egypt and its people before they would be receptive to any foreign programs. Although it will not be necessary to provide a comprehensive review of Egypt (it would literally fill libraries to do so), it is important to provide some basic demographic and historical context.

**Demographics**

The CIA World Factbook provides the essential demographic information for getting a general picture of Egypt. Egypt is the 16th largest country in the world with a population of almost 87 million (2014 est.), with the ethnicity being 99.6% Egyptian. The people are 90% Muslim (predominately Sunni) and 10% Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox). Approximately 74% of the population is considered literate, and 22% fall below the poverty line (*The World Factbook: Egypt 2014-15*, 2015). All of these issues play a part in assessing the viability of community policing to counter violent extremism in Egypt, as will be discussed later in this paper.

**Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak**

Although long and storied, for the purposes of my paper the significant chapter of Egyptian History with which I will begin is the era of Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak. In his book *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square*, Cook describes the rise to power of Mubarak and his election to the presidency after the assassination of then President
Anwar Sadat. Mubarak came up through the military ranks, and was a commander in the air force eventually tapped to be Sadat’s vice president. The trust that Sadat placed in Mubarak, his military stature, and sympathies garnered by his being wounded while seated next to Sadat at the time of the assassination resulted in Mubarak being unopposed in the subsequent election with 98.4 percent of the votes submitted (Cook, 2011).

The 1971 Egyptian constitution designated the president of the republic as the chief commander of police forces. Under Mubarak, the president was the head of the Supreme Council of the Police (SCP), a body composed of senior police officials responsible for formulating broad policies, determining priorities, and managing the operations of the Egyptian police. This gave Mubarak complete control of security forces within the country, which he used to maintain his power and control. Mubarak was able to enjoy a honeymoon of popularity initially, but his lack of political experience or prowess eventually showed him to be ill-prepared for the presidency (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012).

Galal Amin, professor at the American University in Cairo, provides four perspectives of the Egyptian state in the era of President Mubarak (Amin, 2012):

1. First, Egypt became a “Soft State”. A soft state is a country where privileged people have money and power to protect themselves. Protectors of laws, such as the police, are typically less privileged and subsequently susceptible to receive bribes to turn a blind eye on those who break the law. Thus, corruption prevails everywhere. The soft state encourages corruption, and the spread of corruption increases its softness.

2. Second, corruption evolved beyond politics to an endemic cultural dilemma. Bribes, large and small, came to be widely expected. More and more employees
came to consider them as part of their monthly salaries and those obliged to pay bribes regarded them as associated fees. Add the government’s indifference toward complaints of corruption and it becomes institutionalized.

3. Third, the disparity and unjust distribution of wealth continued to grow. The poor got poorer and the rich got richer. The seizure of state funds became the most significant source for personal enrichment. Mubarak’s growing wealth, as well as his elite, grew at a disturbing rate.

4. Fourth, the alienation of the people grew as well. The ruling elite who surrounded Mubarak had no political experience before assuming power. They lacked interest in politics or public affairs. The majority of those assuming the post of prime minister under Mubarak behaved more like government employees than they did of politicians. As time passed, people lost interest in whoever took the post of a cabinet minister. Most of them had become mere employees, who had neither real interest in politics nor personal charisma – not unlike the archetypal bureaucrat in the US government.

Mubarak’s autocratic control and the conditions of his era, as described by Amin, disillusioned and frustrated the Egyptian people. That, along with the regional uprising (which came to be known as the “Arab Spring”) created an environment which led to Mubarak’s ultimate downfall (Cook, 2011; Filiu, 2011; Iskandar, 2013). On February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned as Egypt’s president after almost 30 years in power. This was a historic political transition that was the result of popular revolution, which began on January 25 in Tahrir Square in central Cairo (Sharp, 2011). However, this revolution was more than a spontaneous uprising. It was due to years of mounting tensions, which were the result of serious indictments
against the Mubarak regime, such as hoarding wealth and resources, silencing opposition, abuse of authority and violence against its citizens (Khalil, 2012).

Mohammed Morsi

Mubarak’s resignation and eventual imprisonment for crimes against the Egyptian people created a period of instability and turmoil that led to Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, which was won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi (Sharp, 2012). But the process of transition to a democracy was poorly designed, providing strong incentives for the country’s diverse political actors to behave in ways that undermined democratic development (Brown, 2013). Morsi’s presidency was subsequently short-lived. Comparisons between Mubarak and Morsi quickly arose and Morsi was seen as just another authoritarian – no better than Mubarak (Monier & Ranko, 2013). This led to a “second revolution” and the overthrow of Morsi. Compounding these political mistakes was a heavy authoritarian legacy of division, mistrust, and unaccountability. While elections were not the cause of Egypt’s political turmoil, voting only clarified and sometimes aggravated the growing fissures in Egyptian politics. And those divisions have not only sabotaged Egypt’s post-revolutionary democratic hopes but also have undermined the prospects for future democratic development (Brown, 2013). This instability of the government and its immature democracy has created an environment in which security sector reform would be challenging at best.

Even though Morsi’s presidency was brief, the ascension to power by the Muslim Brotherhood marked a significant change in the political climate in Egypt. Under Mubarak’s regime Egypt’s role was seen as a security guard for the Arab world. Notably, among the enemies Mubarak claimed to be securing Egypt and the Arab world against were Islamists
(Brownlee, 2002). With the dismantling of the Mubarak regime, and Morsi’s subsequent election, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism were emboldened in Egypt. (Monier & Ranko, 2013). In his article on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Walsh referred to this transition as the “Brotherhoodization of the state” (Walsh, 2003).

The Muslim Brotherhood has been called “the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization” (Leiken & Brooke, 2007, p. 107). However, in their paper describing the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood, Leiken and Brooke also explain that the various international factions of the Muslim Brotherhood vary in their Islamic radicalization and capacity for violence. In fact, Leiken and Brooke assert that there are those within the Brotherhood who attempt to dissuade Muslims from violence and encourage involvement in politics and charity.

The efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood to become more involved in politics and charity were evident during the post-Mubarak campaign period. I lived in Cairo during this political turmoil and observed the Brotherhood giving out food and supplies to the poor and needy, using it as a platform to encourage the recipients to vote in support of Morsi and the Brotherhood (Armanious, 2013; Hope, 2012; Shenker, 2012). Although detractors saw these offerings as bribes, the effort nevertheless demonstrated an initial non-violent approach to influencing the new government of Egypt.

The critical point with regards to the study at hand is the loosening of the restraints that had been placed on Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt during Mubarak’s reign. Although Morsi was pulled from power and imprisoned after barely a year in office, Islamic fundamentalism had reasserted itself into Egyptian politics and culture.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Although a perspective of contemporary Egypt and the regimes of Mubarak and Morsi are important to provide context, it is perhaps more important to consider Morsi’s successor, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the current leader responsible for reform and the future of Egypt.

In his brief, “Deciphering Abdel Fattah el-Sisi: President of Egypt’s Third Republic,” Aly suggests that el-Sisi was relatively unknown prior to August 2012 when he was appointed Minister of Defense (Aly, 2014). As such, when he took responsibility for deposing and arresting then president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, el-Sisi literally burst onto the national and international stage. With this sudden prominence, Aly describes four different images that have been associated with el-Sisi. First, because of indications of being devout Muslim, el-Sisi was seen by many of the youth and liberal revolutionaries as being a “sleeper” member of the Muslim Brotherhood plotting to take over the Egyptian military. Second, as a professional soldier caught in Egypt’s domestic struggles and committed to restoring Egypt’s armed forces. Third, as a Nasserist – someone whose agenda is in line with former President Nasser, who has been described as a neo-socialist (Abdel-Malek, 1964). Fourth, in the aftermath of the Morsi debacle el-Sisi was seen as a savior to protect Egypt from becoming a hardline Islamic state (Aly, 2014, p. 3).

Ultimately, these diverse images of el-Sisi have undermined him. After once enjoying widespread public backing, el-Sisi has faced mounting criticism (Elabd, 2016; Staff, 2016). In his paper recapping el-Sisi’s first year as president, Winter maintains that from the beginning of his presidency, el-Sisi has faced a difficult political public relations dilemma. On one hand, he took action to remove the Muslim Brotherhood from the political arena and prevent it from utilizing the democratic process as a means of gaining power. On the other hand, el-Sisi attempted to take on the role as a champion of the 2011 revolution, and as someone committed to
its liberal values. El-Sisi’s apparent dichotomy was to demonstrate a commitment to democracy, while still attempting to regulate it in such a way as to control groups like the Muslim Brotherhood from coming into power. Winter also explains that el-Sisi’s means of escaping this predicament was to subjugate democracy to two other revolutionary values: security stability and economic welfare (Winter, 2015).

In their introductory chapter *Egypt in Revolution*, Rougier and Lacroix assert that el-Sisi’s regime has so far been characterized by heavy security sector involvement in politics that exceeds that of even the Mubarak regime (Schoch, Angell, Rougier, & Lacroix, 2015). While this characterization may be debatable, the ouster of Morsi by military coup certainly gives it credence.

**Rise in Terrorism**

One of the issues that has plagued Egypt since el-Sisi’s election has been a rise in acts of terrorism. In the most recent report by the US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Egypt has faced an increase in terrorist activity, threats, and security challenges. The security situation in Egypt has declined greatly since the overthrow of Mubarak. It continued during the Morsi regime, and has increased under the el-Sisi regime. The Institute for Economics and Peace reports that terrorist activity increased in Egypt in 2014, with the country jumping from 27 to 13 on the global terrorism scale, and among the countries in the region is ahead of Lebanon, Libya, and behind only Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (*Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 2015).

Hundreds of civilians and scores of security forces (police and military) have been killed by terrorists. The Egyptian forces have had little success in combatting terrorist groups, and the
country has suffered from both local attacks, and high-profile attacks (i.e., the downing of the Russian chartered aircraft in October 2015, killing all 224 on board) (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016).

Figure 1 illustrates the increasing numbers of reported terror attacks in Egypt since the ouster of Mubarak in January of 2011. The data were extracted from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), sponsored by the US Department of Homeland Security.¹ For purpose of data-gathering, the GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” In order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present, as outlined in the Global Terrorism Database Codebook (Global Terrorism Database Team, 2016, pp. 8-9):

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence - including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:

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¹ It should be noted that statistical information contained in the Global Terrorism Database GTD is based on reports from a variety of open media sources, including electronic news archives, existing data sets, secondary source materials such as books and journals, and legal documents. However, GTD researchers assert that information is not added to the GTD unless it has been determined that the sources are credible.
• **Criterion 1**: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.

• **Criterion 2**: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

• **Criterion 3**: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).

It is recognized that terrorism has many definitions and that the nature and causes of terrorism are contested by both governments and scholars. However, the GTD criteria as outlined above serve my purposes of assessing the trend of terrorism in Egypt.
The data indicate that terror attacks were rare leading up to the revolution that deposed Mubarak in January of 2011, but increased dramatically in 2013, which was the year that new elected president Mohamed Morsi and his Islamic fundamentalist government was overthrown (Dunne & Williamson, 2014a). There was a stabilization period during El-Sisi’s first year in office, but in 2015 there was another sharp increase in terror attacks. The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy reports that these terror attacks in Egypt have become more pronounced and more organized as well (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016).

So, what has el-Sisi’s response been to the rise in terrorism? His focus has been a military response, understandable given that he is a career military officer. In fact, he has thrown his support behind General Khalifa Haftar, a former senior Libyan military officer. Haftar is violently anti-Islamist and views military force as critical to achieving order—a worldview

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shared by el-Sisi. El-Sisi maintains that the best way for Egypt to fight terrorism is to support Haftar’s army (Cook, 2016).

Additionally, el-Sisi and his regime have also enacted a controversial counter-terrorism law to grant his security forces additional power and authority. “The law makes it a crime to publish or promote news about terrorism if it contradicts the Defense Ministry’s official statements and would allow the courts to temporarily ban journalists from practicing their profession for doing so. It also makes anyone judged to have facilitated, incited, or agreed to a vaguely defined terrorist crime – whether in public or in private – liable for the same penalty that they would receive if they had committed that crime, even if the crime does not occur. The law eliminates any time limit for bringing terrorism prosecutions” (Abrams, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2015a).

Some observers believe that el-Sisi’s approach has been detrimental to the fight against terrorism. Ahmed Maher is one who has shared this view. Maher was a protest leader in Egypt’s rebellion against Mubarak—but not a radical and not part of the Muslim Brotherhood. He founded the April 6 Youth Movement, which advocated democracy in Egypt. In a 2015 interview by Atlantic reporter Elliot Abrams, Maher states:

“The current regime, structured as it is around the military and security apparatus, is cutting all ties with youth and treating them with hostility... Everyone is accused of being either a terrorist or a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is turning the people arrested by mistake who don’t belong to any movement into jihadists. Moreover, Muslim Brotherhood members are gradually becoming radicalized, since they suffer from inhumane treatment in the prisons. The authorities treat the prisoners like slaves, and this inspires a thirst for revenge, not to mention the undignified treatment that
the families face when they visit. ISIS has exploited the situation. The Arab uprisings are not the cause, but rather the bloody authoritarian regimes that resisted change and resisted democracy, true justice, and concepts of tolerance, co-existence and freedom. This is what gave rise to ISIS and continues to drive it. ISIS found fertile ground because of Bashar al-Assad’s brutality in Syria, Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarianism in Iraq, Iran’s ambitions in the region, and the oppression and authoritarianism that people are suffering from. So long as authoritarianism and sectarianism exist, you will find extremism as a response. Extremism found a foothold in Egypt because of Sisi’s brutality and authoritarianism. The more the oppression and authoritarianism increased and the more freedom and democracy vanished, the more justifications ISIS and al-Qaeda have. ISIS is saying that your regimes are corrupt, unjust failures and we’re the alternative. This is a disaster, because injustice generates extremism. For this reason, neither the coalition’s strikes nor Sisi’s raids will stop ISIS. Defeating ISIS requires freedom, democracy, justice, and a culture of tolerance, co-existence, and acceptance of the other.” (Abrams, 2015)

Maher’s point that fighting terrorism requires “freedom, democracy, justice, and a culture of tolerance, co-existence, and acceptance of the other” is at the root of my research. However, is Egypt capable of this type of an approach to fighting terrorism? These issues will be discussed in the following chapters.

Summary and Key Points

This chapter on Post-Mubarak Egypt established a general understanding of the current situation in Egypt, as it relates to the study at hand. The following are the key points from the
chapter that contribute to my analysis. Each point is numbered with a chapter indicator that will be useful as a general reference within the analytical matrix in Chapter 7. I also identify the appropriate locus for each of the chapter points within a SWOT framework (either an internal strength or weakness, or an external opportunity or threat). As explained in Chapter 2, SWOT analysis involves producing a list of an organization's strengths and weaknesses as indicated by an analysis of its resources and capabilities and weighs them against a list of the threats and opportunities identified by an analysis of its environment. However, individual strengths weaknesses, opportunities, or threats should not necessarily be afforded the same regard or weight. Some are more substantial/important than others. My chosen methodology entails a subjective categorization, so it would be insignificant to have a very detailed scale of the importance of the individual factors. Consequently, I have limited the assessment to a dichotomous variable – major or minor – for each of the factors to provide some additional illumination for each point (i.e., major or minor strength, major or minor weakness, etc.). This dichotomous valuation is used recurrently in SWOT analysis (Maxi-Pedia, 2016).

With regards to internal factors, in assigning an assessment value of major strength or minor strength, I considered the potential impact that particular factor might have on implementing community policing to counter violent extremism. If it directly related to possible success, I rated it as a major strength. However, if it was more indirectly related, I rated it as a minor strength. A similar consideration was applied to weaknesses. If it had the potential to directly undermine implementing community policing to counter violent extremism I rated it as a major weakness. If it could indirectly undermine the effort I rated it as a minor weakness.

With regards to external factors, in assigning an assessment value of major opportunity or minor opportunity, I considered the potential value that opportunity might provide to support or
enhance the implementation of community policing to counter violent extremism. If it had significant value, I rated it as a major opportunity. However, if it was more indirectly related, I rated it as a minor opportunity. As for threats, if it was a significant threat to implementing community policing to counter violent extremism I rated it as a major threat. If it was more indirectly related, but could still undermine the effort I rated it as a minor threat.

Ideally, the factors are identified and ratings are assigned by a committee consisting of a number of key individuals who are familiar with the organization and its environment. Unfortunately, key personnel from the Egyptian National Police, or experts on the organization were not available to me for this research project. However, for the purposes of this exercise, my own assessments and ratings can provide a reasonable analysis of the organization and its environment. Although these are my own subjective assessments, they are based on many years of personal practical experience and field research.

**Key Points**

3-1:  *Egypt and its successful transition from its revolutionary efforts has significance, not only locally, but regionally, and internationally as well.*

**Minor Opportunity:** This is an external opportunity for the Egyptian National Police. With local, regional, and international interest in a successful post-revolution transition, there are greater opportunities for investment and support for a reform effort such as this.

3-2:  *The Egyptian people are 90% Muslim.*

**Minor Opportunity:** One of the chief criticisms of a community policing approach to countering violent extremism came out of programs in the United States where Muslim
communities felt they were specifically targeted and prejudiced against, where other non-Muslim groups were less-likely to be pursued. They saw it as simply a ploy to get evidence against friends and family (Weine & Younis). However, in a predominantly Muslim culture such as Egypt it is less likely that the effort would be seen with as a Muslim bias.

3-3:  Approximately 74% of the population is considered literate.

**Minor Opportunity:** The fact that the Egyptian population is predominately literate enhances the potential success of implementation. Community policing requires engagement by members of the community. Although literacy is not a prerequisite, being capable of understanding the precepts of community policing facilitates participation in the associated projects and programs.

3-4:  Approximately 22% of the population fall below the poverty line.

**Minor Opportunity:** Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that people are motivated to achieve certain needs, and that some needs take precedence over others. Our most basic need is for physiological survival (things like food, water, shelter), and this will be the first thing that motivates behavior (Maslow, 1987). The fact that the majority of the Egyptian citizenry are considered above the level of poverty, allows one to assume that these basic needs are being met. Had this not been the case, garnering the cooperation and participation of communities would be difficult or impossible, as their primary motivations would be basic survival. The second level on Maslow’s hierarchy is safety/security needs. As the majority of Egyptians are having the basic needs met, they
are in a position to be motivated by opportunities to see that safety/security needs are addressed. Community policing allows them to do so in an interactive way.

3-5: *There is a history of distrust in the government that is not easily erased.*

**Major Threat:** The revolution was the result of years of tension and resentment against a government that hoarded wealth and resources, silenced any opposition, abused authority and committed violence against its citizens. The police are the most visible/tangible representatives of the government and any programs initiated by the police will initially be viewed with skepticism and distrust.

3-6: *The Egyptian people demonstrated a willingness to standup against the government.*

**Minor Opportunity:** Although on its face this might be categorized as a threat, I propose that it can be appreciated as an opportunity. The events leading up to the demonstrations in Tahrir Square and ultimately the revolution proved that the Egyptian people can be proactive and come together to induce change.

3-7: *Poor transition efforts led to a failed presidency under Morsi and added distrust in the government and its processes.*

**Minor Threat:** The history of distrust in the government noted in point 3-5 is underscored here. Little changed to encourage the public to work with the government (police).

3-8: *General rejection and resentment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism.*
Minor Weakness: This is a two-edged sword. A general rejection of Islamic fundamentalism by the Egyptian citizenry could lead to supporting efforts to counter radicalization and extremism. However, the el-Sisi regime has been leading an all-out assault on the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism and shows no signs of shifting toward a policy that would foster cooperation between the government and local residents against terrorists (Dunne & Williamson, 2014a).

3-9: *The “coup” by el-Sisi resulted in another military regime (reminiscent of Mubarak)*, although democratically elected.

Minor Weakness: The concern here is highlighted in the previous point. El-Sisi is career military, whose experience and nature is to attack problems kinetically and tactically. A community policing approach would be outside his established rubric.

3-10: **Significant increase in terrorist acts.**

Minor Opportunity: The Egyptian public has been concerned with the rise in violence and terrorism. This concern can lead to greater support of proactive efforts to minimize the extremism and violence.

3-11: *Primarily military/kinetic response to terrorism.*

Minor Weakness: This point is evidence of the concern alluded to in point 3-9, a military regime is more likely to have a military response as their default response.

3-12: *Indications that a solely military response to terrorism is fueling additional terrorist acts.*
**Major Opportunity:** A shift toward an environment of “freedom, democracy, justice, and a culture of tolerance, co-existence, and acceptance of the other” (Abrams, 2015), which is more representative of a community policing response than a military response, could help reduce the growth of extremism.
Chapter 4: Egyptian National Police

Although Egyptian historical, social and political contexts have importance in assessing the proposition of community policing to counter violent extremism in Egypt, perhaps the most critical variable to such a program may be the Egyptian National Police. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the nature and structure of this organization.

Under Mubarak, the Egyptian police were traditionally viewed as brutal and corrupt, ill trained, and to have no regard for basic human rights. (Spindel, 2011). This assertion is supported by Mona El-Ghobashy, an Egyptian by birth who has written extensively on its politics. She contends that under Mubarak Egypt was a police state. However, it was not a police state because of its brutality and corruption (which she contends was unchecked); it was a police state because this “coercive apparatus had become the chief administrative arm of the state” (El-Ghobashy, 2011).

The review of post-Mubarak Egypt in the previous chapter provided several important insights. First, that it continues to be a country in transition. The 2011 revolution and Mubarak’s ouster has not erased the decades of corruption and brutality cultivated during his regime. Although corruption has been prevalent throughout government and business, it has been felt most keenly by Egyptian citizens through their contact with the police. As indicated by numerous sources, police corruption continues to be a concern. Police are given the responsibility for numerous functions typically assigned to other government agencies. Police deal with, among other things, markets, transport, roads, food supply, public utilities, public morality, and taxation, in addition to public security and national security (Said, 2012).

The Egyptian National Police is a very large organization under control and authority of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). It grew exponentially during Mubarak’s presidency. It was his
means of controlling the populace. Egyptian Political Economist Samer Soliman wrote the number of police personnel in Egypt rose from 150,000 in 1974 to more than a million in 2002 – more than a five-fold increase (Soliman, 2005). The precise size and scope of the police force is difficult to pin down, for several reasons:

1. The environment of secrecy within which it operates. They do not want anyone (even ranking officers within their own agency) to know their true strength.
2. Multi-layered functions, some of which fall outside of traditional policing activities (intelligence regarding persons of interest and foreigners; immigration; customs and fire service).
3. Regular flow of “conscripts” in and out of the MOI/Police Service (more discussion on conscripts later in the chapter).

That said, officials within the MOI with whom I have spoken have placed the total number of police at a minimum of 500,000 and some say as many as 1.5 million, depending on which personnel you add into the count. Analysts have estimated that the MOI commanded as many as 1.7 million employees, including some 400,000 State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) officers, 850,000 regular policemen and interior ministry staff and 450,000 Central Security Force (CSF) troops (Dunne & Revkin, 2011). Regardless, it is a sizable contingent for a country of just over 80 million people.

Organizational Structure

In Appendix A, I have provided a copy of the most recent organizational chart for the Ministry of Interior available, which helps illustrate the broad reach and control of the police in Egypt ("Egypt Ministry of Interior Organizational Structure," 2007). It should be noted however
that the organizational structure of the Ministry is very fluid. New units and sectors are created regularly to deal with problems, or to handle issues that were not addressed properly by the unit originally assigned to the problem. Unfortunately for the sake of organizational efficiency, these units created to handle an immediate problem are never dissolved and continue to exist within the organizational structure. Consequently, the organizational chart is only provided to illustrate its complexity, not necessarily a representation of the hierarchical structure in accurate detail.

Within the Ministry of Interior, there are three primary police “Sectors” and numerous specialty areas and smaller sectors. The three principle police sectors are described as follows:

Central Security Force (CSF)

The CSF appears to be the largest of all five sectors. Their responsibilities are to man the numerous guard posts located throughout Egypt and conduct foot patrol of buildings, public areas and perimeters in and around official sites or locations. They provide crowd control and also have several units that would be similar to police SWAT units in the USA, representing backup to the military when needed. CSF would also be called in if there is a situation that goes beyond the control of General Security, National Security, or one which requires additional manpower. The majority of their personnel are conscripts with little training beyond a rudimentary orientation to the post or location to which they are assigned.

General Security

The General Security Force is responsible for service calls, deployment to the scene of crimes, arrest, detention, prevention and investigation of minor crime(s). The GSF functionally resembles what a westerner would typically associate with a police force. It consists of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The commissioned officers are four year graduates of the Police College. Uniformed officers manage police stations, and respond to calls
for service. The uniformed officers are typically non-commissioned officers. The plain clothes investigators are typically commissioned officers who follow-up on crimes reported, do investigations or are assigned to watch high-risk areas for suspicious activity.

**National Security Sector**

The National Security Sector (NSS) is the most prestigious of the three main groups, and consequently the most sought after assignment. Formerly known as the State Security Investigations Service (or SSIS), the name was changed after the revolution to appease those who saw the SSIS as a brutal, corrupt arm of the Mubarak regime. The NSS and its operations are highly classified. Its duties and activities are not general knowledge outside of the NSS. However, from working with them I learned that their primary duties are to gather intelligence, investigate and monitor subversive groups, managing counterterrorism functions in Egypt, and ultimately to protect the government from destabilizing forces both outside and inside the country. Most NSS personnel are plain clothes officers. NSS also has its own Training Department, which conducts all in-service training for officers of rank, and hosts all international training (including our Community Policing project).

In addition to the CSF, NSS and GSF, there are smaller specialized sectors, a few of which are identified below:

**Airport Police**

Airport police guard and patrol the various airports in Egypt. Duties are security, law enforcement and general control of people coming in and out of the country. Airport police are also either directly or indirectly under the control of NSS since people coming into and going out of the country are of great interest to the counter espionage efforts of this organization.

**Tourism Police**
Another sector which is directly or indirectly under the control of NSS is the Tourism Police. They are usually in uniform and provide security to hotels and antiquity locations that attract numerous visitors. Because of the high volume of foreigners frequenting these locations, the Tourism Police are monitored by the NSS.

Traffic Police

Traffic Police is a large organization separate and distinct from GSF, CSF, or NSS and jointly under the control of the regional authority (equivalent of a mayor) and MOI. Duties are traffic control, enforcement and accident investigation. Traffic police operate out of the many local precincts/police stations in and around Cairo and other cities/communities in Egypt.

Religious Police

While in Egypt from June of 2011 to June of 2013, I would regularly attend a Christian congregation, in a suburban district south of Cairo. On occasion it would be visited by several uniformed police officers who identified themselves as representatives of the Religious Directorate of the Egyptian National Police. Although it is not a large unit of the police force, it does help illustrate the scope of influence of the police in Egypt. It was their duty to observe religious practices and ensure that nothing was done or taught that was contrary to the interests of the state. Although they were typically courteous and just observed activities and what was being said, it indicates a level of control by the police not found in western countries.

Commissioned/Non-commissioned

It is prudent to provide a brief explanation of the make-up of the security sector in Egypt, and how the Egyptian National Police is staffed. All male Egyptians are required to perform service in the security sector, either for the military or the police. If an individual has not
graduated from high school, he is required to perform 3 years of service. If he graduates, he is to perform 2 years; if he has a college education 1 year of service is required. However, this service can also be provided through conscription in the police service. Military conscripts who have not completed basic education usually serve in the lower ranks of the police (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012).

The Police structure is divided into two general categories, commissioned and non-commissioned. Commissioned police obtain their commissions by applying to the police college. They typically enter as civilians but upon graduation are commissioned at the rank of captain. All police executives, middle management, investigators and instructors are commissioned police. Non-commissioned police are those who enter the police by way of mandatory service via the military. Since the police have fewer benefits and lower pay than the army, the “less desirable” military conscripts end up being assigned police.

The creation of the Egyptian Police as a two-tier security force of commissioned and non-commissioned officers has created a bipartite organization. While commissioned officers are well educated, cultured and capable, almost the exact opposite could be said of the non-commissioned officers. This is particularly acute with the military conscripts who populate most of the security checkpoints and other less desirable yet very visible posts and locations in Egypt. Because of their high visibility and access, in an emergency the public turns to these conscripts for direction, assistance and protection. It is not uncommon for many of the conscripts to be illiterate and unable to offer assistance when presented with an address or location to read off a piece of paper. Conscripts operate under tight control of the officer corps supervisors who delegate little or no authority, leaving them with nothing to do but wallow in boredom and monotony. Despite their large numbers, these conscripts have not proven effective or even
responsive to emergencies or similar situations of need. To add to these concerns, these conscripts have no police career path in front of them – they are just serving their time. As an illustration, their low pay and indentured-like employment conditions resulted in the conscript riot of 1986 when they mutinied over an announcement of extending their service to 4 years (Gotowicki, 1997; Ismail, 2012). Unfortunately, these unmotivated, uneducated police conscripts are also the ones who are responsible for traffic and crowd control, sit security posts, and have the highest visibility to the public. These are also the police personnel who were most visible at the frontlines of confrontations with protesters during the 2011 uprising (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012).

On the other hand, because they have higher rank and status, commissioned officers are not typically seen in public. They spend most of their time within the confines of government buildings, out of the eye and direct contact with the people they serve. Deservedly or not, because of their public exposure the temporary and disgruntled conscripts become the face of the police to the Egyptian people.

**Police Corruption**

As has been stated, in addition to the structural/organizational issues, corruption within the Egyptian police has been a substantial concern. Police corruption in Egypt is based on years of institutionalization, privilege and expectation. In his book *Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*, Khalil provides excerpts from interviews with many Egyptians who have suffered from police corruption. He cites examples of individuals who have been beaten and tortured to “typical” experiences with the police where they expect payment for common services, such as taking reports or demanding payment for returning an
identification card (Khalil, 2012). In fact, “baksheesh” is a common practice and one of the first Arabic terms I learned while in Egypt. It typically refers to giving a payment or a bribe to an official. In my own experience, parking illegally and blocking traffic in Egypt was prevalent. However, it was not unusual to see the drivers walk up to the local traffic officer and offer baksheesh to avoid getting a ticket. My Egyptian drivers would tell me baksheesh is just part of the culture and practice in Egypt.

It should be noted that concerns of corruption have not been limited to the police in Egypt, but has been prevalent in the highest levels of government and business dealings. Between 2000 and 2008 it is estimated that corruption cost Egypt approximately US $58 billion (Schenker, 2011). In 2009 Transparency International ranked Egypt 111 out of 180 on its corruption index, 180 being the worst (“Transparency International - Country Profiles,” 2009). In the way of comparison, the United States ranked sixteenth.

However, Egypt is not a rich country by Middle Eastern standards. Subsequently, it does not have the financial resources to pay sufficient wages to the vast numbers of police that would allow for a standard of living consistent with their position and responsibilities. Therefore, an elaborate maze of fees, gratuities, privileges and perks have developed over the years to compensate for salary shortcomings (Winslow, 2009).

Unfortunately, bribes and gratuities have not been the only measures of corruption within the police force. Human Rights Watch is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on human rights. Its surveys and research have reported that the police in Egypt have continued to use torture in police stations and during arrest. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that, “police and prison authorities often failed to provide proper medical care to prisoners, leading to death. In some cases of deaths in detention, lawyers and relatives
alleged that authorities had tortured the victim. Detainees also described severe beatings during arrest, arrival at police stations, and transfer between prisons. Scores detained during the Tahrir Square protests complained of torture, including electric shocks, to coerce confessions. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights documented the enforced disappearance and torture of dozens of civilians in military detention” (Human Rights Watch, 2015b).

In their report on security sector reform in Egypt, Brumberg and Sallam state that the unprecedented mobilization of Egyptian citizens during the uprising that toppled Mubarak was principally due to the growing unpopularity of the police and the humiliation and injury that Egyptians suffered at the hands of security personnel (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012). It has been reported by many authors that the Egyptian revolution of 2011 was in fact a culmination of concerns of police corruption. Probably the most noteworthy incident was the beating of Khaled Said (Alaimo, 2015; Brumberg & Sallam, 2012; El-Ghobashy, 2011; Lesch, 2011; Lynch, 2011; Rougier & Lacroix, 2016; Wickberg, 2015).

Khaled Mohamed Said was a 28-year-old Egyptian who had been beaten to death by the police in June of 2010. The incident was witnessed by many as Khaled was dragged from a coffee shop in Alexandria. The incident resulted in the establishment of a Facebook page, “We Are All Khaled Said” as a memorial to Khaled (Lesch, 2011). Using a content analysis of posts on the Facebook page before and throughout the Egyptian revolution, Kara Alaimo conducted a case study that found that the exchange of frustrations and demands for change via the Facebook page helped its followers to gradually become more comfortable with political activism. The powerful images and message of a young man beaten and killed by the police elicited emotion and helped others identify with the cause (Alaimo, 2015). Nonetheless, the issue of whether or not the Khaled Said was the match that ignited the fire of the revolution is not as significant to
my research as was the embodiment of public perception of police brutality and corruption in Egypt that it represented.

Understandably, the Egyptian people have hoped that the challenges of the revolution and its aftermath will eventually culminate in an end to the brutality and corruption that has been endemic within the police. In truth, Egypt’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has improved since Mubarak’s ouster. In 2014, Egypt ranked 94 out of the 175 countries assessed, with a score of 37 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean). This is a slight increase in score compared to the previous years when it scored 32 (Wickberg, 2015). This at least indicates that Egypt is heading in the right direction.

However, despite the improvement in perception of corruption overall in Egypt, public opinion continues to view the police as one of the country’s most corrupt institutions, with 80% of respondents to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer categorizing the police as corrupt or extremely corrupt. Almost 40% of those who had encountered the police in the previous twelve months indicated they had to pay a baksheesh, or bribe (Wickberg, 2015).

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has stated in their program overview for Egypt (INL, 2013, p. 127):

“Recent unrest in Egypt calls attention to the important role of police services during the post-Mubarak transition and the need for effective criminal justice institutions oriented toward public service and crime reduction. The Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the institutions they oversee - especially the police - suffer from a deep credibility deficit with the public.”

**Police Reform**
The distrust of the police, and concerns of corruption and brutality, are strong indicators that the police in Egypt are in need of reform. However, what should be done, and what can be done? First it is important to consider the challenges and potential of police reform in general, and then look at its specific application in Egypt.

“We are in a period of unprecedented effort to expand democratic institutions around the world, with the explicit recognition that reform of the police, and of the larger criminal justice system, is a critical component” (Bayley, 2006, p. 6). Bayley made this statement in his oft-cited book on police reform, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad. Through decades of reform efforts, it has become evident that security and development are fundamentally linked. The single largest obstacle to development and the establishment of democracy is a lack of security. However, development cannot take place without a safe and secure environment for states, businesses, and their citizens to function (Hermsmeyer, 2010). With Egypt and the Arab Spring, as well as the evolving political situations in many other countries in recent years, the struggles toward the stabilization of the security sector in many countries continue.

First, it is important to establish a baseline as to what is meant by “police reform”. Bayley explains in Changing the Guard that the primary objective of police reform has been conveyed by international organizations as “democratic policing”, with specific focus on established human rights principles and practices (Bayley, 2006, pp. 7-8). So what is democratic policing? In their paper on democratic policing Aitchison and Blaustein posit that democratic policing is best disaggregated into two constituent parts: policing for democracy and democratically responsive policing (Aitchison & Blaustein, 2013, p. 498). They further suggest that policing for democracy is policing which actively supports “the development of the core elements of democracy and
democratic consolidation.” It relates to the police role in securing and maintaining broader democratic forms of government (Aitchison & Blaustein, 2013, p. 499). On the other hand, they submit that democratically responsive policing refers to the police role as first-responders. Both policing for democracy and democratically responsive policing are critical issues for post-revolutionary Egypt. Policing for democracy is important for maintaining order and the rule of law, and stabilizing the country as it attempts to spread its democratic wings. It should also be noted that democratically responsive policing is essential to develop greater public trust in the police. The Egyptian people need to know that the police serve and protect them, and are not merely an enforcement arm of an authoritarian regime. Unfortunately, despite the revolutionary efforts to bring true democracy to Egypt with the ouster of Mubarak, there are many Egyptians who feel that the police abuse and corruption suffered under Mubarak has continued under President el-Sisi (Elabd, 2016; Hashem, 2016; Staff, 2016).

So what should be done in Egypt to address police reform? In one of Bayley’s many books on security sector reform, he stated that a key lesson learned has been that “Police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citizens and private groups” (Bayley, 2001, p. 13). An effective methodology for focusing on the needs of the community is community policing, where the community has meaningful input to policing priorities. However, Bayley also clarifies in a subsequent paper on police reform that democratic policing should not be construed as being simply another term for community policing, in that much depends on how community policing is implemented (Bayley, 2005). Even so, I believe that community policing can be a useful tool in the democratization of a police force if implemented appropriately (community policing will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter).
In the aftermath of the January 2011 revolution, the United States Department of State – Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) funded a program to introduce community policing to the Egyptian police in an effort to initiate more democratically responsive policing. The program was contracted to and implemented by a private firm, The Emergence Group, for which I was a director and project manager. The project ran from June of 2011 through June of 2013 and introduced 550 Egyptian law enforcement officials to principles of community policing by providing short courses on community-based, problem-oriented policing (INL, 2016; Waddington, 2013).

Having been personally involved in reform projects in several police departments in the US, and in at least a dozen developing and post-conflict countries, I can attest to the fact that attempting to implement a reform project is a challenge in and of itself. However, successful reform is even more elusive. O’Neill writes that police reform is one of the most important and complex challenges in any environment, and it is particularly challenging in post-conflict situations where the police have often perpetrated serious human rights violations, which has been the case in Egypt (O’Neill, 2005). Skogan delineates a number of obstacles to successful police reform, including resistance to change from managers, supervisors and the rank and file. Lack of public support can be a problem as well (Skogan, 2008). These reform obstacles are true even in the US and other progressive Western cultures, but even more so in developing and/or post-conflict countries.

Even more challenging is attempting to measure effectiveness (if any) of the reform effort. William Cameron succinctly acknowledged the challenge of sociological research when he wrote, “...not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted” (Cameron, 1963, p. 13). Parks and Mastrofski experienced this in their attempt to
measure the effects of a well-structured police reform effort in Trinidad and Tobago by incorporating an experimental model into the project, to include appropriate controls into the methodology. The project, “Policing for People”, included some basic tenets of community policing and police problem solving. Although some measure of effectiveness was found, perhaps the most telling finding was how extremely difficult it is to accurately measure change wrought directly from police reform efforts (Parks & Mastrofski, 2008). As a member of the Parks and Mastrofski reform and research team, I experienced firsthand the challenges of cultivating meaningful data for analysis in a developing country. Data capture methodologies available to the Trinidad Tobago Police Service were antiquated when they existed at all. We had to rely on makeshift strategies developed in such a way as to cultivate at least a basic understanding of the effects of the reform efforts. Some evidence of success was found, however, the data gathering processes were wrought with challenges making it difficult to develop clear conclusions (Waddington, 2009).

This challenge of measuring reform effectiveness was one of the key issues that lead to the demise of the community policing training program in Egypt. INL regularly asked for “proof” that the training was making a difference. Unfortunately, only anecdotal evidence of community policing efforts was ever observed and INL was not able to justify additional investment in the training program without proof of actual reform. Also, relations with the US and Egypt were strained, due to the instability of the government and evidence of ongoing human rights violations. Brumberg and Sallam asserted in their report that, “It is tempting to characterize Egypt as a country undergoing a democratic transition and as a candidate for SSR. On closer examination it is clear, however, that the political will to undertake such reforms is
tenuous because the political struggles required to pave the way for meaningful change remain unresolved” (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p. 11).

**Personal Perspective**

As indicated previously, I had the opportunity to live in Egypt and work directly with the police, under a US government contract, from 2011-2013 during the turmoil of the revolutionary forays. I served as the director of training for a US-funded community policing training program, and also as the principle liaison for the US Embassy in Cairo to the Egyptian police. This assignment provided a great deal of exposure and insight into the Egyptian National Police. My assignment required that I learn as much as possible about the organization to better address logistical issues and training needs.

In July of 2010, prior to the revolution, I presented a training course on Interview and Interrogation to a group of senior Egyptian police officials. The intent of the course was to introduce and promote investigative techniques consistent with international human rights principles. During the training it was disconcerting to initially hear participants’ comments such as, “You must use physical force to elicit confessions from suspects. They will not tell you the truth unless you do.” However, as I began to introduce them to proper skills, such as indicators of deceit, reading body language, etc., and how to use those to determine truth, the participants were very receptive and eager to learn more.

I saw the same type of understanding come to Egyptian police officials when we introduced our community policing training in August of 2011. Initially, they did not see any value in working with citizens, or making them part of the policing effort – the “us against them” mentality. But again, after they had an opportunity to see the value and potential effectiveness of
police/community partnerships during the training process, their attitudes changed completely. I watched them draft sample projects and programs with the potential of implementing them back in their various sectors/districts. Unfortunately, we had no control over who was invited to the training, other than stipulations as to who could not attend established by the US Department of State, based on Leahy vetting issues. More on my experience with the Egyptian police will be discussed in the following chapters.

**Leahy**

Another complication that hindered the police reform project in Egypt were the constraints imposed by the “Leahy Law”, named after its principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy. The Leahy Law (or also referred to as Leahy amendment) is a U.S. human rights law that prohibits the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense from providing security sector assistance to foreign security units that violate human rights (HumanRights.gov, 2016). The part of the law which covers State Department funded aid is found in Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It states: “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Further in subsection (5) “ensure that when an individual is designated to receive United States training, equipment, or other types of assistance the individual's unit is vetted as well as the individual.” (Leahy, Amended 2014)

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3 “Leahy vetting is a process through which the U.S. government vets U.S. assistance to foreign security forces, as well as Department of Defense training programs, to ensure that recipients have not committed gross human rights abuses” (HumanRights.gov, 2016). More on Leahy in Chapter Four.
Subsequently, when an individual security force member is nominated for U.S. assistance (i.e., a member of the Egyptian National Police), the Department of State vets that individual as well as his or her unit. Vetting begins in the unit’s home country, where the U.S. embassy conducts consular, political, and other security and human rights checks. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is then responsible for completing the vetting process in Washington, DC. DRL evaluates and assesses available information about the human rights records of the unit and the individual, reviewing a full spectrum of open source and classified records (HumanRights.gov, 2016). If the candidate does not pass the vetting process, he or she is excluded from training.

Although the intent of the Leahy Law is commendable, I learned from experience that the vetting process and the application of Leahy can potentially undermine US efforts to reform police abroad. As explained previously, I had been the project director and US Embassy liaison to the Egyptian Police. With that assignment it was my responsibility to implement a community policing training program in Egypt, proposed by the Department of State as a police democratization/reform effort. The first scheduled training was a week-long seminar in September of 2011 designed to introduce police executives to the principles of community policing and fundamental human rights in police practices. The intent of this initial seminar was to get top Egyptian police officials to support these philosophies and principles, then expand the training to middle managers and police trainers. Consequently, this first seminar was critical to the success of the program and ultimately the reform effort.

Prior to the seminar, Leahy procedures were followed and names of proposed participant Egyptian police officials, as well as their assignments and a list of personal identifying information were submitted via the US Embassy in Cairo to DRL for final vetting. Policy
dictates that the vetting must be completed prior to the training or the training must be cancelled. Unfortunately, DRL must vet thousands of individuals from hundreds of training programs around the world and subsequent backlogs occur. Such was the case for our first seminar for the police executives in Egypt. The seminar was to begin on Sunday, September 4, 2011, but as of Saturday September 3, we had not received the clearance from DRL that the names had been vetted. Strictly following Leahy policy, I should have contacted the liaison within the Office of International Cooperation and advised him that we would have to cancel the class. The liaison was an Egyptian police colonel who was very supportive of our program but who regularly reminded me how offensive it was that the US government would do background checks on high-ranking Egyptian officials for them to attend training in their own country. The situation was tenuous at best. Additionally, police officials had traveled to Cairo from all over the country for the seminar, and if it were cancelled at the last minute, it would have been very disconcerting to the Egyptians and potentially damage our relationship and the future of the police training/reform effort.

Rather than risk undermining relations and the reform project I did not cancel the seminar but let it go forward with the hope that all names would ultimately be vetted. The Egyptians are a proud people and must be managed carefully if there is an expectation of working with them in a reform effort. Fortunately for my precarious position and the future of the project I received a message from DRL during the opening ceremony of the training that all names had been vetted and the training could proceed. Conversely, had I followed the Leahy Law as outlined, the training should have been cancelled since the vetting had not been completed prior to training. It would have resulted in angry, offended police officials whom we were trying to win over to support the reform effort. Providentially, the seminar turned out to be a great success and
received high accolades from both the Egyptian training department and the police officials in attendance. They expressed appreciation for the potential value of the principles being introduced.

Over the ensuing months there were unfortunately a number of individuals and groups who were excluded from subsequent seminars due to the Leahy vetting process. The situation resulted in on-going strained relations with the Office of International Cooperation through whom we were obligated to work. They were responsible for advising participants who failed vetting that they would not be able to attend the training. These notices typically came to the Egyptian police officials a day or two prior to the seminar, after they had been planning for weeks/months to attend. It served as a personal/professional slap in the face to the excluded training candidate.

If these candidates had been guilty of gross human rights violations, it is perhaps understandable that the US government would not want to offer them the privilege of attending US-funded training. However, in my experience with the program, there are no set standards as to what constitutes credible evidence of human rights violations. Nor is there any due process for the excluded candidates. When they receive these informal accusations of some human rights violation, they would then be excluded without being questioned about the alleged incident or provided any opportunity to provide counter-testimony. I had one candidate who had been excluded from training because of an accusation that had been placed against him on a Facebook posting. What is more disconcerting is that the vetting process is rarely able to confirm that the candidate was actually the one who was accused. Many times it was someone with a similar name and assignment. However, they were not able to confirm exact identity. Even so, those
responsible for the vetting preferred to err on the side of caution and exclude anyone who might have been involved in the human rights violations.

The spirit and intent of Leahy is to force foreign governments, and in particular security agencies within those governments, to take responsibility for, investigate, and prosecute human rights violations. In practice, however, the sanctions affect individuals. It is these same individuals who are going to be the next generation of police leadership, yet we undermine their confidence and support (Comer, 2010).

Despite frustrations with the process, there is another aspect of the Leahy Law which is perhaps even more vexing. The intent of this training project in Egypt, and other reform efforts like it in many developing and post-conflict countries, was to introduce more contemporary and human rights-oriented policing practices. However, as implemented, the Leahy Law prohibits those who are most in need of the training to receive it. Those who commit human rights violations are not allowed to be trained in how to do their jobs within a human rights rubric. It creates a paradoxical double standard, particularly when training candidates who are not afforded basic due process consideration when accused. Comer wrote of the same frustration in his paper on US training in Indonesia. He suggests that the application of Leahy damages US bilateral relationships with many valuable allies. Further, it reinforces the opinions of many foreign nations that the United States routinely practices a double standard in its views and practice of support for human rights (Comer, 2010).

Summary and Key Points

This chapter on the Egyptian National Police has outlined the positive and negative aspects of the organization, as they relate to the study at hand. The following are the key points
from the chapter that contribute to my analysis. Again, each point is numbered with a chapter indicator that will be useful as a general reference within the analytical matrix in Chapter 7. I also identify the appropriate locus for each of the chapter points within a SWOT framework (either an internal strength or weakness, or an external opportunity or threat). I have again included a relative degree of importance – major or minor – for each of the key points.

**Key Points**

4-1: *The Egyptian police are traditionally viewed as brutal and corrupt, ill-trained, and to have no regard for basic human rights.*

**Major Weakness:** This image is difficult to overcome, and the Egyptian people will not be anxious to work with an organization they see as brutal and corrupt.

4-2: *The Egyptian National Police is a very large, unwieldy organization.*

**Minor Weakness:** The implementation of community policing requires a lot of time on the part of police personnel. The fact that there are a lot of personnel available to the Egyptian National Police is a luxury that most police agencies do not enjoy. However, community policing also necessitates fundamental changes in the structure and management of police organizations (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). The larger the organization, the more difficult it is to implement comprehensive, meaningful change. So, overall I see its size as a weakness to the Egyptian National Police.

4-3: *The Egyptian National Police is made up of multiple sectors whose responsibilities/assignments overlap and are not always clear.*
**Minor Weakness:** Effective organizational communication is an essential element for successfully implementing community policing. Communication must be timely, comprehensive, and direct. Communication is difficult at best in an organization with a dysfunctional structure.

4-4: *The Egyptian National Police is militaristic in structure with commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

**Minor Weakness:** The entire police organization must be structured, managed, and operated in a manner that supports the efforts of the patrol officer and that encourages a cooperative approach to solving problems. Under community policing, command is no longer centralized, and many decisions come from the bottom up instead of from the top down. This is contrary to a militaristic structure.

4-5: *The non-commissioned officers are primarily uneducated, poor, involuntary conscripts.*

**Major Weakness:** Community policing requires that the police be self-motivated problem solvers, something that will not be likely with un-motivated, unschooled personnel. Granted, the commissioned officers are intelligent and educated, but their duties are more oriented to management and to headquarters.

4-6: *Conscripts operate under tight control of commissioned officers who delegate little or no authority.*

**Minor Weakness:** One of the basic tenants of community policing is that the police officers are provided autonomy and a level of independence for problem solving.
4-7: *Conscripts are unmotivated, uneducated, but are the ones who are responsible for traffic and crowd control, sit security posts, and have the highest visibility to the public.*

**Major Weakness:** Conscripts are those who have the most contact with the public, and as such, have the highest visibility. Accurate or not, non-commissioned conscripts provide the broadest public image of the police in Egypt. If the public sees the police as uneducated and lowly in status there will be little or no respect for the police.

4-8: *Conscripts make up the vast majority of the police force.*

**Major Weakness:** All of the issues described under the previous points with regards to conscripts are emphasized by the fact that they make up the bulk of the police force in Egypt.

4-9: *More educated commissioned officers with greater autonomy spend most of their time within the confines of government buildings and are not typically seen in public.*

**Minor Weakness:** The bulk of community policing efforts is typically accomplished by line officers working directly with the public, not police officials, detectives, etc. However, individuals in these positions must be in line with community policing principles and practices as well, even though they do not have the same level of contact with the public. Furthermore, those who have been exposed to community policing have been very receptive. So, I see this as less of a weakness.

4-10: *Corruption (bribes and gratuities) is endemic to the police in Egypt.*
**Major Weakness:** Corruption is one of the greatest impediments to successfully implementing community policing. From a perspective of countering violent extremism, common citizens will see the police as no better (or even worse) than the extremists they are trying to stop.

4-11: *Brutality and violations of human rights continue to be reported against the police in Egypt.*

**Major Weakness:** Like corruption, brutality is another major impediment to successfully implementing community policing. Again, under these circumstances they see the police as no better than the violent extremists.

4-12: *Police reform in Egypt is needed.*

**Minor Opportunity:** The Egyptian National Police is an organization that is ripe for reform/change, which creates opportunities for external investment and support.

4-13: *Successful/measurable police reform has proven to be elusive throughout the world.*

**Minor Threat:** True change/effective reform is very difficult to achieve, and reform efforts have seen very little measurable success, particularly in post-conflict/transitional countries. This does not bode well for efforts in Egypt. Not only does it reduce the potential of success in Egypt, but if meaningful change cannot be proven, Egyptian officials may not support reform campaigns, and international donors may not be as willing to invest, or continue to invest.
The political instability in Egypt adds difficulty to any meaningful police reform.

Major Threat: As long as there is political instability, it will be very difficult for either the police, or the Egyptian citizenry to be actively involved in any joint reform effort. Implementing community policing is a long process that takes a lot of commitment from both sides. There will be limited commitment until the government under which they are trying to operate is able to stabilize.

When Egyptian police officials and commissioned officers were exposed to new policing philosophies, they were receptive and responsive, indicating susceptibility to reform.

Minor Strength: The willingness of the police force, at least at the management level, to accept and commit to change is one of the prerequisites for successful reform.

International reform efforts and training has been limited to commissioned officers and police executives.

Minor Weakness: As has been discussed, non-commissioned conscripts make up the bulk of the Egyptian National Police and as such are not currently eligible for training programs offered by international donors (like community policing). However, this can be overcome by training commissioned Egyptian police trainers, who then pass the training on to their non-commissioned conscripts. I categorize it still as a weakness because training is most effective when provided by those who have actually done it, and it will be some time before the Egyptian police will be able to train from experience.
4-18: For any US assistance/support of reform efforts in Egypt, Leahy vetting will continue to be an obstacle to implementation.

Minor Threat: Although Leahy vetting, under its current implementation, is a large obstacle to US assistance to the police in Egypt, Leahy does not apply to other international donors. US led the first major effort to introduce community policing to Egypt, but that does not preclude other donors from taking up the effort.
Chapter 5: Community Policing

At the 2007 International Police Executives Symposium in Dubai, representatives from countries as diverse as Australia, Belgium, China, Russia, India, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe all declared that community policing was core to their future operating philosophy (Davidson & Martellozzo, 2007). This international commitment to the principles of community policing endures as its introduction to post-conflict and developing countries continues. In the previous chapter on police reform, I suggested that community policing can be a useful tool in the reform and democratization of a police force if implemented appropriately. Indeed, international donors, civil society organizations, and policing consultants working in the developing world have adopted community policing as an archetype for democratic reforms. It is widely referenced as a descriptor of either current operations or as the primary goal of policing reforms (Casey, 2010). Goldsmith and Sheptycki confirm that whether or not it is the best approach, community policing continues to be the preferred model for international police reform (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007). One of the reasons community policing is valued as a reform strategy is that it can be useful in improving public perception of the state/government, as well as public perception of the police. Sozer asserts that community policing strategies can improve government legitimacy, particularly at the neighborhood level (Sozer, 2009).

The Inter-American Development Bank, a leading source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean, has invested heavily to support the introduction of community policing as a suitable path toward more democratic policing (Frühling, 2012). I can also attest from personal experience as a principle participant in over a dozen international police reform projects on four continents that community policing continues to be advocated throughout the world as a key strategy for reform and democratization efforts.
Community Policing Defined

But before delving deeper into the role community policing plays in police reform, it is essential to establish a foundation for what is meant by community policing. Unfortunately, since its inception community policing has not been understood or implemented consistently. One conspicuous example of this was in Guyana. As I just noted, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has been actively invested in and advocated community policing in the Caribbean and South America. In 2009-10, I worked on a project funded by the IADB to develop a community policing training program for the Guyana Police Force. In the early stages of the project we met with the Commissioner of Police, his executive staff, and police academy officials to discuss the project. We were told that Guyana had already implemented community policing, but it had been a complete failure and they were not interested in trying it again. After a series of follow-up questions to better understand how they had implemented “community policing” we learned that the government had taken handguns seized by the police in criminal cases and issued them to local community members in troubled neighborhoods. The idea was that the community members were in a better position to protect themselves and create a deterrence to local criminals. These community members were even provided some compensation. However, the project was predictably met with scorn by both the police and many communities. Ultimately our training program had to be re-branded from “Community Policing” to “Quality Service” and re-introduced, at which point the training was fully embraced.

From its inception, there have been a wide array of opinions as to what “community policing” actually means. Indeed, one of the great challenges of community policing has been the lack of a consistent definition. It even comes with varying nomenclature, such as community

There are literally many thousands of books, articles, and reports written on community policing and its various iterations, (community-oriented policing, etc.). However, the fundamental precept that appears consistently in community policing literature is that it is an approach to policing that is inclusive of the community in addressing crime and problem solving efforts. In 1994 a consortium of policing experts and executives from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Police Foundation convened to define and characterize community policing, and to assess its potential for the future of policing. The consortium’s characterization of community policing has particular value, primarily because it was developed by a number of seasoned practitioners from a variety of police organizations, with the support and consultation of academicians. This helps to provide a “real world” perspective of community policing. They summarized community policing as “in essence, a collaboration between the police and the community that identifies and solves community problems” (Community Policing Consortium, 1994, p. vii).

Within this rather simple definition provided by the consortium are principles central to the intended goals of community policing. Skogan and Hartnett go further and suggest that within a simple characterization such as this are the following essential components of effective community policing (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997, pp. 6-8):

1. Organizational decentralization in order to facilitate two-way communication between the police and the public.
2. A shift away from “crime fighting” to a commitment to problem-oriented policing.

3. To be more responsive to the public and allow them to participate in setting police priorities and developing tactics.

4. A commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own through community organizations and crime-prevention programs.

The US government has been a strong advocate of the principles of community policing. In 1994 the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) was established under the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act. The COPS Office is a unit within the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing. Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to help advance community policing ("COPS: Community Oriented Policing Services," 2016). Consequently, COPS is committed to providing a deep understanding of community policing, as well as its objectives and the success of its implementation. It is the position of the COPS Office that “community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014, p. 1). The COPS office identifies three key components to implementing community policing:

- **Community Partnerships**: Collaborative partnerships between the law enforcement agency and the individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.

- **Problem Solving**: The process of engaging in the proactive and systematic examination of identified problems to develop and evaluate effective responses.
- **Organizational Transformation**: The alignment of organizational management, structure, personnel, and information systems to support community partnerships and proactive problem solving.

**Community Policing Implementation**

It should be noted that public perception and commitment can greatly influence the implementation and potential success of community policing. Community policing requires as much commitment on the part of the community as it does the police (Skogan, 1995). Consequently, the adaptability and capability of the community and its constituents must be taken into account if community policing implementation is to be successful. Additionally, the adaptability and capability of the government and police organization itself are essential components of successful implementation as well. The organizational change required of the police agency to effectively adopt community policing cannot be accomplished without the requisite attitude shift of the police personnel. In their book *Community policing: How to get started*, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux provide a comprehensive checklist of things to be considered and initiated as part of a successful community policing implementation (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998). The sheer magnitude of their list helps to illustrate the challenges and complexity of the endeavor.

Given its complexity and challenges, it is understandable that one might doubt the potential of successful community policing implementation. Mastrofski, et al., evaluated community policing implementation in the US, and from a national survey of police departments within the US they found that challenges persist, particularly in regards to organizational change (Mastrofski, Willis, & Kochel, 2007). Now, if these challenges persist in the US, what does this
suggest as to the potential of implementing community policing in less-developed countries? In their review of community policing models and practices internationally, Brogden and Nijhar found that the importing and exporting of community policing has largely been unsuccessful, most notably in societies they describe as transitional. (Brodgen & Nijhar, 2005).

However, some researchers have found that community policing has merit as a reform effort in developing societies. An example of this would be the research that was conducted by Riccio, et al, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Although the police have been historically corrupt and brutal in Rio, researchers found the local community to have a very positive response to community policing efforts (Riccio, Ruediger, Ross, & Skogan, 2013).

In reviewing community policing literature, I found the essays compiled by Nalla and Newman as particularly thought-provoking. The compilation consisted of assessments of community policing efforts in some 36 diverse countries around the world, all from different contributors. Although a variety of challenges and obstacles to community policing are described by the various contributors to the compilation and very little is provided in the way of empirical evidence of success, Nalla and Newman offer a summation that indicates inherent value in community policing efforts, whether or not that value can be measured:

“In almost every case, authors concluded that community policing would be continued and that its objectives were laudable and desirable, even if their effectiveness could not be verified. We take this as evidence that community policing in the communities covered in this book is accepted on faith, and that is an idea with intrinsic merit.” (Nalla & Newman, 2013, p. xxx)

But, is it enough that the objectives of community policing are “laudable and desirable”, with no other empirical evidence to support it? In the case of the community policing training/reform
project in Egypt described in the previous chapter, the donor agency (INL) could not quantify the “intrinsic merit” in the objectives of community policing. They wanted greater justification to continue the investment in the training program.

Community Policing in Egypt

In May 2010 I presented a workshop, Data Based Decision Making for Police Executives, to a cross section of Egyptian Police leadership. One module of the workshop included a discussion of community policing and its value in generating meaningful data and information. The community policing module generated considerable discussion and interest, as it was a relatively new concept to the police, which at that time was still under the Mubarak regime. Several of the participants expressed a desire to have community policing principles and practices be made a part of the basic police training so that officers could understand and embrace the concept before deploying to their respective units and assignments. This dialogue eventually led to a project funded by the US Department of State to provide community policing training to the Egyptian Police (INL, 2016). Timing was such that the actual training did not begin until the summer of 2011, six months after the revolution and removal of Hosni Mubarak. The country was in a major upheaval, but the police were desperate to improve their image and relations with the public, and they saw community policing as a way to accomplish that. This was especially critical after the violence of the revolution between Egyptian security forces and citizens (Ismail, 2012).

During the course of the training program, we saw great enthusiasm for community policing from course participants. In the previous chapter, I reported that approximately 550 senior police officials were trained over the course of the community policing program. They
represented sectors and divisions from throughout the Egyptian National Police and from across the country. Table 1 lists the various assignments of those trained (Waddington, 2013). The list has significance in that it is an indication that the observed positive responses were not the result of one particular region/sector or division, but somewhat representative of the organization as a whole. It did not matter where they came from, when they learned the principles of community policing, they saw great value to their organization and to Egypt. Unfortunately, the Egyptian Police Training Department would not allow us to conduct pre/post assessments of the participants so we were limited to observation of the participants and their comments. However, it does indicate a general willingness to change, at least at the individual level.

Table 1 - Regional assignments of Egyptian police officials trained in community policing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPANT ASSIGNMENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Security Sector</td>
<td>National Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Narcotics Department</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officers Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assuit Security Sector</td>
<td>North Sinai Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan Security Sector</td>
<td>Police Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Sweef Security Sector</td>
<td>Police Sport Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beheera Security Sector</td>
<td>Port Said Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo Security Sector</td>
<td>Prisons Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Security Sector</td>
<td>Probation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakhalia Security Sector</td>
<td>Public Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domiat Security Sector</td>
<td>Qalyobia Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayoum Security Sector</td>
<td>Qena Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Security Sector</td>
<td>Red Sea Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharbia Security Sector</td>
<td>Sharqia Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza Security Sector</td>
<td>Sinai Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismalia Security Sector</td>
<td>Sohag Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Care Sector</td>
<td>South Sinai Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor Security Sector</td>
<td>Suez Security Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrouh Security Sector</td>
<td>Training Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menia Security Sector</td>
<td>Vice Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monefia Security Sector</td>
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</table>
We also observed during the course of our project indicators that Egyptian Police leadership were moving to adopt community policing as an organizational philosophy in Egypt. Table 2 outlines specific events/episodes/examples that illustrate how the Egyptian Police made some anecdotal but meaningful progress toward community policing during the project (Waddington, 2013). If nothing else, these examples illustrate a certain susceptibility to the precepts of community policing in Egypt.

Table 2- Egyptian police progress toward adopting community policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing Pilots (June 2011)</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior attempted pilot implementations at ten stations across the country. The initiative was “aimed at engaging citizens in what's called ‘community policing,’ in coordination with the police force.” (Solayman, 2011) Unfortunately, the program was implemented as part of a public relations campaign, and not based on sound community policing strategies, and was not very effective. However, the fact that they even attempted the program indicates that they see value in community policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Conduct &amp; Ethics (October 2011)</td>
<td>The Egypt Ministry of Interior issued its first-ever Code of Conduct &amp; Ethics to guide police personnel, and it is published on its website. It includes a commitment to community policing principles (Appendix B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing Directorate (November 2011)</td>
<td>A proposal was submitted by the Brigadier General over Policy Oversight for the Egyptian Police to the Ministry of Interior to initiate a new police directorate to promote, oversee and support community policing across Egypt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 The indicators reported in Table 2 were drawn from monthly Progress Reports submitted by the author, Dan Waddington, to the Egypt Project Management Team, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State.
In addition to the examples outlined in Table 2, another illustration of Egypt’s susceptibility to the precepts of community policing is in the academic evolution of the police. A year after our community policing training program began, we were informed by the Brigadier General over the police university that many dissertation and thesis topics being submitted were addressing the introduction of Community Policing to Egypt (the Egyptian Police have their own university where police officials can receive advanced degrees in several topics). Prior to our program, they had never really seen community policing as a selected research topic from their students. I was able to obtain a copy of one of the research papers, which had been translated into
English. Although the English was somewhat broken, the paper, “Community Police and Its Role in Maintaining Security” provided local insight to the potential of community policing in Egypt. It was written by a Colonel Ashraf Abdel-Khalek, PhD, who had participated in one of our community policing courses. Khalek listed the following characteristics of community policing as potential value to Egypt, which I have paraphrased (Abdel-Khalek, 2012, p. 19):

1. Community policing provides an opportunity to intervene and solve social problems through daily interaction with the public and obtain feedback from them about those solutions.

2. Citizen participation in police work represents an important link between citizens and police institutions, which confirms the credibility of the police to the citizens.

3. To augment the lack of manpower faced by the police.

4. As the community is more involved in local security issues, the police can focus more time and attention on more serious crime threats.

5. Citizen involvement in the fight against crime provides the police with a more realistic sensitivity to the regional security problems, which allow the police to respond more effectively.

6. Working with the police provides citizens the ability to better endorse and support the police.

7. Work with families to search for solutions to their problems and improve their social conditions.

8. Identify the existence of appropriate services and facilities that can help improve neighborhood conditions.

9. Greater awareness of, and response to juvenile delinquency.
10. Create an environment where the spread of crime and drugs is less likely to occur.

However, Khalek also saw that despite the potential value of community policing, there would be challenges to implementation and potential drawbacks as well. He listed the following, which I have again paraphrased:

1. A broad deployment of community policing to the citizens of Egypt may not be welcomed. Many of the citizens themselves may not be interested in participating directly in the fight against crime.

2. It would be difficult to establish the rules, responsibilities and duties of community policing within the traditional Egypt police apparatus.

3. Many would see that there is no real legitimacy to the work of citizens. Authority and responsibility lie with the police.

4. Some citizens may participate in this effort solely to gain influence and to conceal criminal activity.

5. The work is voluntary; citizens cannot be forced to cooperate.

6. There is a current lack of awareness of the aims and purposes of community policing, which is reflected in the professional qualification for police officers.

Although there are methods that could be implemented to overcome many of these issues, Khalek identifies valid hurdles to comprehensively implementing community policing in Egypt that must be addressed if it is to be successful.

In their research, Davis, et al, determined that efforts to introduce community policing in developing countries frequently run into serious difficulties. Top police and government administrators are often not supportive of it. Further, police officials at lower levels are likely to be antagonistic toward a style of policing that contrasts with their training and experience under
authoritarian regimes. An additional obstacle to successful application is that citizens typically fear and dislike the police in developing countries. Finally, communities characterized by extreme poverty and lack of municipal services are unlikely to have well-developed networks or organizations that are vital to effectively implementing community policing (Davis, Henderson, & Merrick, 2003).

**Summary and Key Points**

This chapter on Community Policing summarizes its challenges, opportunities, and potential – particularly within an Egyptian context. The following are the key points from the chapter that contribute to my analysis. Again, each point is numbered with a chapter indicator that will be useful as a general reference within the analytical matrix in Chapter 7. I also identify the appropriate locus for each of the chapter points within a SWOT framework (either an internal strength or weakness, or an external opportunity or threat). I have again included a relative degree of importance – major or minor – for each of the key points.

**Key Points**

5-1:  *Countries around the world believe in the value of community policing and have indicated it is core to their policing philosophies.*

**Minor Opportunity:** It is said that there is security in numbers. Although not a huge opportunity for Egypt, there is significance in the fact that countries around the world with diverse cultures see value in and are committed to community policing.

5-2:  *Community policing continues to be the preferred model for international police reform.*
Major Opportunity: Not only has community policing been implemented around the world, it is specifically being used to reform police organizations.

5-3: *Community policing is an approach to policing that is inclusive of the community in addressing crime and problem solving efforts.*

Major Opportunity: Egypt is coming out from under decades of an autocratic regime that used the police force as a brutal enforcement arm, which created fear and distrust in the Egyptian people. Community policing provides an approach that can bring the community and the police together to work cooperatively.

5-4: *Community policing requires greater individual autonomy, decision-making, and problem-solving on the part of the police.*

Minor Weakness: The Egyptian National Police is a top-down organization with little or no individual autonomy for the police, particularly at the street level. This excludes the key element of autonomy and self-motivation necessary for effectively implementing community policing.

5-5: *Community policing requires organizational transformation, with alignment of organizational management, structure, and personnel.*

Minor Weakness: Many organizational issues of the Egyptian National Police would need to be addressed to ensure transformation within community policing paradigms; however, it is a massive organization, and its sheer size makes it highly resistant to significant change.
5-6: *The adaptability and capability of the community and its constituents are critical to successful implementation of community policing.*

**Minor Opportunity:** The Egyptian people, by the very nature of their revolutionary efforts, demanded change. As such, they should be amenable to supporting and contributing to change efforts as they relate to policing in their communities. Further, the energy and grassroots efforts exhibited by the Egyptian people to bring about the revolution could potentially be focused and used in conjunction with their community policing role.

5-7: *Successful implementation of community policing is rife with complexity and challenges.*

**Major Threat:** The very nature of community policing and the challenges of its implementation, that have been experienced by police agencies all over the world, create additional obstacles for the Egyptian National Police. These may not be insurmountable, but those obstacles must be acknowledged.

5-8: *The value of community policing is based on its professed intrinsic merits, not necessarily on empirical evidence.*

**Major Opportunity:** Even though empirical evidence as to the successful implementation of community policing has been historically difficult to come by, its fundamental principles may have value in Egypt. Fundamentally, it was what motivated the US Department of State to invest initially in the community policing training project for Egypt. They saw benefit in its elemental principles.
Community policing principles have been positively received by commissioned officers and executives of the Egyptian National Police.

Major Strength: One of the biggest hurdles to introducing a new philosophy such as community policing is getting the police organization to buy into it. These are conservative, para-military organizations resistant to change. However, the positive reactions from police executives and middle management when they were introduced to community policing were a key step in assessing its feasibility.

The police in Egypt have demonstrated circumstantial evidence of their ability and potential susceptibility to evolve to a more community policing-focused organization.

Minor Strength: Although evidence of community policing efforts in Egypt has been anecdotal at best, those experiences demonstrate a level of competency by the police (or at least some of them) to actually perform in a community policing context.

As a voluntary program, Egyptian citizens may not be inclined to participate in community policing or commit time and effort to its implementation.

Minor Threat: Although there are proactive ways to motivate participation, if citizens are not willing to participate, community policing will not materialize.

Egyptian citizens as a rule fear and/or disrespect the police, creating a challenging environment for change through community policing.

Major Threat: In software engineering, a relation between two or more modules which either directly or indirectly depend on each other to function properly is called a circular
dependency. That is one of the challenges of community policing, trying to build community trust through community policing, but requiring community trust to implement community policing.
Chapter 6: Countering Violent Extremism

I initially introduced the purpose of my research with a quote by Brian Katulis, who stated, “One country that needs to move to the top of the agenda in the effort to counter violent extremism and defeat terrorist networks is Egypt” (Katulis, 2015). Katulis cites several reasons for this, including its regional significance, its history as an incubator for radical Islamic groups, and that it is best suited as a test-case in the Middle East/North Africa for efforts and programs to counter violent extremism. I have attempted thus far to provide a foundational conception of Egypt, community policing, and police reform in the ensuing chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a similar foundation of the concept of countering violent extremism.

**Extremism**

First, it is important to establish a working definition of “extremism”. David Lake submits that extremism is somewhat hard to define, but can be characterized by two key attributes. First, extremists hold political beliefs that are not widely shared, even within their own societies. Second, extremists typically lack the means or power to obtain their professed goals (Lake, 2002). Gus Martin has written extensively on extremism and terrorism. He suggests that extremism is fundamentally a radical expression of one’s political values, and that it is a precursor to terrorism. He states that extremism is an “overarching belief system that terrorists use to justify their violent behavior” (Martin, 2015, p. 28). Sometimes the concepts of radicalism and extremism become conflated; but, radicalization is more typically associated with the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs (Borum, 2011). However, it is not clear how individuals move from simply being angry, frustrated or disaffected to accepting violence as an answer for their political struggles. In fact, Nasser-Eddine, et al., indicate that the majority of
people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalized (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011).

In their explanation of radicalization McCauley and Moskalenko describe it as a pyramid model. From base to apex, at each higher level of the radicalization pyramid there are decreasing numbers, but increased radicalization of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors. This provides a conceptual basis for understanding radicalization as a gradient that distinguishes violent terrorists from their base of sympathizers. They also maintain that radicalization can occur at individual, group, or mass-public levels (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 417-418).

Borum suggests that Social Movement Theory is relevant to the process of radicalization. Though social movement theory has been employed in social science analysis for many years, applying it to terrorism and radicalization is more recent. Social movement theory suggests that movements arise from irrational processes of collective behavior occurring under strained environmental conditions (i.e., Strain Theory), which produces a mass sentiment of discontent. Individuals join a movement because they yielded to these overwhelming social forces. (Borum, 2011, pp. 16-19). Agnew expanded on the concept of strain theory with respect to strain being a possible causal element towards a path of extremism or terrorism, but he also underscores the point that the general strain theory of terrorism is not a complete explanation of terrorism, but is likely only one of several causes of terrorism (Agnew, 2010).

It is also important to understand how radical groups recruit for their cause. Connecting with other individuals whose personalities would match an appropriate profile for their group is not always an easy task. They garner support using internet and social media, which is so ingrained in our culture today. Both sides of this fight benefit from utilizing the applications available through instantaneous messaging and videos. News anchors and Muslim extremist
alike have produced videos to recruit or warn the public according to their objectives. Briggs and Feve assert that, “While the quality of their output varies, a growing proportion is professional, well produced, contains compelling messages and is delivered by charismatic individuals. In short, it appeals to the new YouTube generation, which expects high-end products that are well-timed and effective” (Briggs & Feve, 2013, p. 1). Propositions that appeal towards the younger generation can be effective when used properly. For this technique to be effective, all sectors involved must correspond laterally in order to keep all relayed information consistent.

Communication is a critical part of this process. Gladwell examined the question of how innovations and/or information spreads in his oft-cited book, “The Tipping Point,” in which he studied the experiences of highly successful businesses. Gladwell describes three forces in the communication process that these businesses shared in the promotion of their products: 1 – the messenger(s), 2 – the message, and 3 – the context. Gladwell asserts: "Ideas and products and messages and behaviors spread like viruses do" (Gladwell, 2006). By this he means for the promotion of a narrative to be successful, there must be a virus (the message), a carrier of the virus (the messenger), and an environment in which the virus can effectively be transmitted (the context). When we examine the process by which a wave of radicalization and extremism spreads, we observe that this is a similar process in which ideas (or viruses) spread, some of which end up becoming global while others remain localized; some make a great impact, but many others disappear within a very short time.

In addition to the communication process as explained by Gladwell, it is important to understand, there are different “types” of individuals who are radicalized. Rieger’s research indicates that there appears to be strong evidence and corroborating support that understanding the causes of radicalism requires an understanding that not all radicals are the same, and that
individuals can become radicalized through one of at least two very different and complementary paths. Specifically, Rieger describes two types of individuals who are susceptible to radicalization:

- **Type One Radicals** are those who are highly intolerant mainstream individuals with little to no confidence in their current government’s ability to meet what they see as a desirable future.

- **Type Two Radicals** are lower-scale individuals (in terms of income) who view themselves as victims of the intolerance of others. They typically seek a strong leader and/or ideology for hope.

Rieger concludes that “by developing a deep understanding of these dynamics within a population, strategies can be developed that are specifically tailored to the most critical dynamics influencing a particular group to help counter emerging threats. And, if caught early enough, a population can potentially avoid becoming radicalized in the first place” (Rieger, 2010, p. 81).

**Countering Violent Extremism**

Martin in his book on understanding terrorism states that, “Extremism is a precursor to terrorism – it is an overarching belief system that is used by terrorists to justify their terrorist behavior” (Martin, 2015, p. 28). However, it should be noted that killing or capturing terrorists after they have been engaged in terrorist acts is reactive, and has not been an effective solution to maintaining security. Indeed, as opposed to having a deterrent effect, killing or capturing terrorists is oft cited as a mechanism for extremists to *mobilize* supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. The violent responses by counterinsurgent forces, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan or Coalition forces in Iraq.
generates resentment and anger that increase both passive and active support for insurgent groups (Condra, Felter, Iyengar, & Shapiro, 2010). In fact, violent, kinetic responses to terrorist acts have been used as a mechanism for recruiting new radicals to their cause. The most common argument used by extremists for their acts of violence is to claim that one's enemies have done the same retaliation in kind or actually to blame one's enemies for such actions (Oberschall, 2004). Extremist groups must garner public support, or at least a segment of public support, to be able to recruit additional devotees to their cause.

It would follow that if radicalization and extremism are precursors to acts of terrorism, then one coherent approach to eliminating or at least minimizing terrorist acts, as eluded to by Rieger, would be to curtail the radicalization and extremism that breeds them. It is this rationale that has incentivized the development of programs to counter extremism. As opposed to a reactive, counter-terrorism response meeting violence with violence, countering violent extremism is more proactive/preventive, attempting to interdict before radicalization progresses to violence. Its programs attempt to subvert extremism and the radicalization from which it spawns (Holmer, 2013).

Unfortunately, “countering violent extremism” is a term or reference that has no universally accepted programmatic clarity, despite the fact that it is increasingly included as a significant component of international policy, and was even the theme for a relatively recent international summit organized by the US White House ("The White House Summit To Counter Violent Extremism," 2015).

In the US Department of State publication on their strategy for countering violent extremism, they maintain that it refers to “proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific

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factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence” (Department of State & USAID, 2016). Holmer describes it as a domain of policies, programs, and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups (Holmer, 2013). It typically features proactive community-focused endeavors to undermine radicalization and extremism that can lead to terrorist acts, as opposed to the “search and destroy” approach of most counter-terrorism efforts. This approach has been widely accepted in war-averse political arenas as a preferred nomenclature and alternative to the “War on Terror” (Schmid, 2012).

Dr. Alex Schmid, a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative states that countering violent extremism focuses more specifically on the pathway to violence. Schmid argues that “its value lies in the concept of ‘extremism’ itself. The term ‘extremists’ covers not only terrorists but also some of their radical, but often not (yet) violent supporters who provide assistance and may also pose a threat to democracy” (Schmid, 2012). So what are the policies, programs, and interventions that propose to be effective in countering violent extremism? Perito and Parvez posit that the solution is to identify extremists before they commit acts of violence using information provided by citizens to the police. “To make this approach work effectively, the police must realize the importance of working with citizens. They must also adopt a citizen-oriented approach to policing.” (Perito & Parvez, 2014, p. 5). And, as discussed in Chapter 5, community policing is inherently a citizen-oriented approach to policing.

**Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism**
In August of 2014 the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, and the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism hosted a National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism. This group of practitioners, government officials, and researchers determined that police/community cooperation is essential to countering violent extremism. Further, they concluded that it incumbent upon law enforcement to take the first steps to establish the foundational relationships and programs prerequisite to this effort (Weine & Braniff, 2016).

From 2013 to 2015 I participated as a consultant and instructor in a series of international workshops on counterinting violent extremism. These workshops were sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Hedayah International Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism. The workshops provided participants an opportunity to examine best practices and mechanisms to establish cooperation between the police and the public, particularly as they relate to countering violent extremism. The purpose of the workshops was to understand more completely how community policing can be a useful strategy for countering violent extremism. Participants represented a variety of countries dealing with the challenges of extremism and terrorism, including Nigeria, Pakistan, Jordan, Northern Ireland, Japan, Qatar, Morocco, Somalia, Kenya, Tunisia, and others. They worked together to identify and mitigate challenges to community partnerships, using examples from their own countries. Several objectives related to community policing as a means for countering violent extremism were identified (Hedayah, 2013):
**Building Community Trust** – They agreed that community policing serves as a means to build trust and mutual respect between communities and law enforcement. It engages the community in a proactive as opposed to reactive way. It also encourages community involvement to solve problems and formulate security goals.

**Information and Warning Signs** – The community policing model encourages a more open, reliable and mutual flow of information between the public and the police. This information may help identify early signs of radicalization that leads to violence, or other risky behavior. Community policing ensures that police become an integral part of the communities in which they work, which allows them to be receptors for community intelligence, therefore providing better security against both crime and violent extremism.

**Preventing Violent Extremism** – Community policing also involves preventing and controlling violent extremism in three ways that are dependent upon supportive relationships between the police and the public: (1) taking preemptive action against violent extremists based upon information provided by the public; (2) investigating and arresting potential terrorists for commission of often petty crimes committed in the preparation for future attacks; and (3) protecting vulnerable people and places on the basis of assessments arrived at with public assistance of likely targets for attack.

There has been a growing recognition that “the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities” (OSCE, 2014, p. 20). Local police have a critical role to play working with local communities to increase their resilience to violent extremism and supporting individuals at risk of violent extremism.
In 1983, Brodeur introduced the concept of “high policing” and “low policing” (Brodeur, 1983). The term "high policing" refers to the fact that such policing benefits the "higher" interests of the government rather than individual citizens or the general public. Whereas the more operational "low policing" is public service, citizen-oriented. In a later paper by Brodeur, he explained how these concepts have even more significance in the post-9/11 policing. He believes that “the high policing-low policing distinction is instrumental in understanding certain practices developed in the context of the so-called war on terrorism” (Brodeur, 2007, p. 35). In their paper on the role of police in counterterrorism Bayley and Weisburd reaffirmed Brodeur’s concept of high/low policing, stating that high policing encourages a top-down command structure, with a focus on controlling the public, and broad, high-level crime such as drug trafficking and illegal immigration. On the other hand, low policing is service-oriented, routine policing, and is more likely to enhance relationships with communities and increase the likelihood that the public will assist the police by providing information (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). Ultimately, low policing is consistent with the service-oriented approach of community policing and potentially a more effective role than high policing for local police in countering terrorism.

Clarke and Newman point out that one of the key outcomes of community policing is that the police are more apt to talk regularly and informally with key members of the community. This creates opportunities to earn the trust of communities and potentially obtain vital information valuable in counter-terrorism efforts (Clarke & Newman, 2007). In their subsequent guide on policing terrorism, Newman and Clarke suggest that with the potential loss of life and injuries that can result from a terrorist attack, citizens may be more apt to pass on information about suspicious activity than they are for conventional crime. They also suggest that
information gathering through community policing has many advantages over traditional intelligence-gathering methodologies (Newman & Clarke, 2010, p. 80).

Additionally, by implementing appropriate communication techniques, officers and others involved in community policing are able to gather support for their cause and potentially get those being radicalized to question the motives behind the actions of their group. When the police engage with the community under a community policing paradigm, a primary focus is to uncover community concerns about crime and security and to build public confidence. As a consequence, community policing holds the potential to generate useful yet voluntarily-provided intelligence from those communities. Using this approach officers can gather intelligence through citizen’s trust, instead of using covert methods that can undermine trust (OSCE, 2014, pp. 82-84).

Qamar-ul Huda promotes the value of communication to counter radicalization in a different way. He recommends the use of “citizen messengers” who provide counter-narratives to prevent radicalism/violent extremism. These narratives help prevent individuals from developing a radical worldview or to extricate those who are already radicalized by disengaging them from extremism and changing their beliefs. The concept is for particular messengers to employ a variety of strategies to influence, delegitimize, and promote resistance to radicalization. Huda stipulates that these messengers should be upstanding citizens or role models, so as to provide both credibility and a broad base with which they connect (Huda, 2015). Unfortunately, this level of popularity and legitimacy is not enjoyed by many police organizations dealing with violent extremism. On the contrary, many police agencies suffer from a lack of trust or acceptance by the communities they are supposed to serve. It is incumbent upon the police to improve that trust and acceptance if they are to be seen as viable “messengers” of a more
legitimate narrative. As discussed in Chapter 5, community policing has proven to be a viable approach for gaining greater trust and approval of the citizenry, which can increase the perceived legitimacy of the message.

It is critical to engage the youth in any meaningful counter extremism messaging effort. Kundnani identifies specific examples whereby community policing can provide opportunities for positive interaction with the youth; getting young people to contribute to society and engage on a political level and providing a space for them to express their genuine opinions about the issues in government. Doing so will help young people feel empowered to continue their activities in helping their communities (Kundnani, 2009). This is one of the features of community policing that makes it a potentially valuable tool, as it focuses on bringing key players together, thereby creating a safe haven—especially for the youth. Through community policing programs, “police officers can provide sports coaching, fitness training, art and other youth-focused activities as means of initiating contact, creating a platform for regular interaction and promoting peaceful modes of expression” (OSCE, 2014, p. 138).

In March of 2014, I was invited to speak at and participate in a multi-national conference sponsored by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The intended goal of the conference was to identify some best practices as they relate to implementing community policing to counter violent extremism. Throughout the sessions and associated discussions, the inherent value of community policing was recognized. One interesting component that was introduced to the discussion of community policing was the use of Family Liaison Officers (FLO), for the very specific scope in which they can act. “FLOs know their communities and are often in prime positions to be the first to identify changes that may indicate the potential for violent extremist activities” (Workshop to Develop a Plan of Action for Community-Oriented Policing as a Tool
for Countering Violent Extremism, 2014). Family Liaison Officers can communicate more effectively with mothers and women in the community, fathers or heads of households, youth and even delinquents who are often most vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. Speaking with individuals and families as units is an excellent opportunity for officers, not only in prevention techniques but also in intelligence gathering. Relationships between the people and the men or women who protect them is a symbiotic relationship, thriving off each other.

“Removing the barriers that hamper the active participation of women in countering terrorism, as part of law enforcement, other public authorities and civil society, is indispensable” (OSCE, 2014, p. 142). Mothers and women in the society are in a unique position to convey feelings or emotions to their children, husbands, and others with whom the associate.

It should be noted however that not all researchers agree that community policing is the answer for countering violent extremism. In Bayley’s book on international police reform, he warned that consultation between the police and the public may be seen as “a thinly disguised mechanism for spying and surveillance, especially in countries with authoritarian traditions” (Bayley, 2006, p. 60). In their paper on the challenges of community policing to prevent violent extremism, Schanzer, et al, re-counted from Muslim American focus groups that Muslims feared police outreach, and engagement through community policing efforts were just a cover for conducting surveillance on Muslim communities and individuals. Relations with police suffered when the community believed it was being subjected to blanket surveillance instead of being treated by the same standards as other communities. Other concerns noted by the focus groups included the concern that broader community public safety fears are not typically treated as a high priority by police, even though the police ask for their cooperation in countering violent extremism. (Schanzer, Kurzman, Toliver, & Miller, 2016, pp. 25-30). These expressed concerns
undercut two primary motivations behind community policing; (1) to improve relations between the police and community, and (2) to work jointly to identify, prioritize, and solve community problems. An additional challenge identified by Schanzer, et al, was that community outreach efforts to counter violent extremism require a significant amount of time and resources, for which there are competing programs. The patience and support required for these slow developing community outreach programs are difficult to sustain.

It should be noted that, although recent literature has suggested CVE strategies can alienate youth and Muslim communities, these studies have been conducted in primarily non-Muslim countries, like the US, England, and other western European countries. Many of the concerns/issues that are brought up in these studies may not necessarily apply in the Egypt context where the population is primarily Muslim. However, it is noteworthy that concerns exist as to the validity of community policing as a strategy for countering violent extremism.

**Summary and Key Points**

This chapter defines extremism and terrorism and summarizes the challenges, opportunities, and potential of community policing to counter violent extremism—particularly within an Egyptian context. The following are the key points from the chapter that contribute to my analysis. Again, each point is numbered with a chapter indicator that will be useful as a general reference within the analytical matrix in Chapter 7. I also identify the appropriate locus for each of the chapter points within a SWOT framework (either an internal strength or weakness, or an external opportunity or threat). I have again included a relative degree of importance – major or minor – for each of the key points.
Key Points

6-1: *Extremism is an overarching belief system that terrorists use to justify their violent behavior.*

**Minor Opportunity:** If extremism is a precursor to violent extremism, then it would be cogent to implement practices and policies to counter extremism.

6-2: *Radicalization is more typically associated with the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, and is gradient in nature.*

**Minor Opportunity:** Since it radicalization is a process, if it is addressed in its early stages, progression toward violent extremism can be undermined.

6-3: *General criminology theories such as Social Movement Theory and Strain Theory can provide insight into radicalization and extremism.*

**Minor Opportunity:** By definition, social movement theory is communal/collective in nature. The cooperative nature of community policing would allow for greater comprehension of social/group trends, which could allow the police to be more proactive and effective in their problem solving.

6-4: *Radical groups recruit and garner support using internet and social media.*

*Communication is a critical part of the radicalization process.*

**Minor Opportunity:** More insight into sources of radicalization and extremism will allow for more effective opportunities to thwart them. Understanding the progression of radicalization will be key to addressing it. Community policing promotes more effective
communication between the police and the public and provides opportunities for counter-
narrative to that provided by radical groups.

6-5:  *Understanding the dynamics within a specific population allows for strategies to be*
*specifically tailored to influence a particular group to help counter emerging threats, and*
*if caught early enough, a population can potentially avoid becoming radicalized in the*
*first place.*

**Major Opportunity:** One of the basic precepts of community policing is that problem solving is
done at the local level, addressing specific issues with tailored solutions.

6-6:  *Countering violent extremism is preventive in nature, with the intent to curtail the*
*radicalization and extremism that breed acts of terrorism.*

**Major Opportunity:** More insight into sources of radicalization and extremism will allow for
more effective opportunities to thwart them.

6-7:  *Police must work with local citizens and adopt a citizen-engagement/problem-solving*
*approach as a key process in countering violent extremism.*

**Major Opportunity:** Community policing requires that the police and citizens work together in
an atmosphere of joint problem-solving.

6-8:  *Community policing helps to build community trust.*

**Major Opportunity:** Community trust in the police is vital to any effort by the police to counter
violent extremism.
6-9: Community policing encourages a more open and reliable flow of information between the public and the police.

**Major Opportunity:** The community is a crucial source of information and intelligence in countering radicalization and extremism.

6-10: Local police must work with local communities to increase their resilience to violent extremism and supporting individuals at risk of violent extremism.

**Minor Weakness:** Community policing requires that the police and citizens work together in an atmosphere of joint problem-solving. As has been discussed, the current atmosphere between the police and public in Egypt is not good.

6-11: Community policing holds the potential to generate useful yet voluntarily-provided intelligence from the community.

**Major Opportunity:** Intelligence/information is critical for the police effort in countering violent extremism.

6-12: Community policing can be effective in building safe havens, particularly for the youth, which provides a place for open communication and sharing concerns.

**Major Opportunity:** Creating environments for sharing information safely and effectively will be a critical component of efforts to counter violent extremism.
6-13: **Not all researchers agree that community policing is the answer for countering violent extremism.**

**Minor Threat:** There is no guarantee that a comprehensive effort would be effective in countering violent extremism. The fact that some researchers in the field doubt its potential effectiveness must be taken into consideration.

6-14: **Engagement through community policing efforts are sometimes seen as just a cover for conducting surveillance on communities and individuals.**

**Minor Threat:** If community policing was seen by the citizens as nothing more than an intelligence gathering/surveillance effort by the police, it would further damage any trust that might have been fostered.

6-15: **Some communities feel that police seek assistance on countering violent extremism while disregarding other public safety concerns.**

**Minor Threat:** If the communities are going to work with the police, they need to know that the police are working with the communities’ best interests in mind.

6-16: **Community outreach efforts to counter violent extremism require a significant amount of time and resources for these slow developing programs.**

**Minor Threat:** Neither the public nor the police in Egypt may have the patience and/or resources to commit to a sustained effort to fully implement community policing to counter violent extremism.
Chapter 7: SWOT Analysis

In Chapter 2, I introduced my intent to incorporate a SWOT matrix for analyzing the appropriateness of community policing as an approach for countering violent extremism in Egypt. In the way of review, a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis involves the collection and depiction of information about internal and external factors which have, or may have, an impact on an organization. The approach includes cataloging internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and threats) and incorporating them into a matrix for cross comparison and analysis. Then, one evaluates the fundamental strengths of the organization and the available opportunities and weigh them against the known weaknesses and potential threats that could impede the proposed agenda for the organization.\(^5\)

At the end of each of the preceding four chapters I extracted and summarized significant points that could be meaningful in my analysis and categorized them as strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, or threats. In Table 3, I consolidate and group the chapter points as the next step in the SWOT analysis. The first column, “SWOT Ref” is an identifier for each of the points in the table, and references them with an “S” designator for strengths, “W” indicator for weaknesses, etc. The second column is the specific chapter reference, to facilitate referring back to the chapter for additional information on the key point. The third column is the classification of each key point which was provided in the chapter summaries. The key points are summarized in the last column.

\(^5\) I should point out that, as part of my overall analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Egyptian National Police, I restricted my assessment to those factors that are directly related to their capacity for community policing. Consequently, many other inherent strengths of the organization and its people are not evident in this assessment.
Table 3 - Categorization of Key Chapter Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWOT Ref</th>
<th>Chap Ref</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Key Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S01</td>
<td>4-16</td>
<td>Minor Strength</td>
<td>When Egyptian police officials and commissioned officers were exposed to new policing philosophies, they were receptive and responsive, indicating susceptibility to reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S02</td>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>Major Strength</td>
<td>Community policing principles have been positively received by commissioned officers and executives of the Egyptian National Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S03</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>Minor Strength</td>
<td>The police in Egypt have demonstrated circumstantial evidence of their ability and potential susceptibility to evolve to a more community policing-focused organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W01</td>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>General rejection and resentment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W02</td>
<td>3-9</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>The “coup” by el-Sisi resulted in another military regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W03</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>Primarily military/kinetic response to terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W04</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>Major Weakness</td>
<td>The Egyptian police are traditionally viewed as brutal and corrupt, ill-trained, and to have no regard for basic human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W05</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is a very large, unwieldy organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W06</td>
<td>4-3</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is made up of multiple sectors whose responsibilities/assignments overlap and are not always clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W07</td>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is militaristic in structure with commissioned and non-commissioned officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W08</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Major Weakness</td>
<td>The non-commissioned officers are primarily uneducated, poor, involuntary conscripts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W09</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>Conscripts operate under tight control of commissioned officers who delegate little or no authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W10</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>Major Weakness</td>
<td>Conscripts are the ones who are responsible for traffic and crowd control, sit security posts, and have the highest visibility to the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W11</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>Major Weakness</td>
<td>Conscripts make up the clear majority of the police force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W12</td>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>Minor Weakness</td>
<td>More educated commissioned officers with greater autonomy spend most of their time within the confines of government buildings and are not typically seen in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Major Weakness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W13</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>Corruption is endemic to the police in Egypt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W14</td>
<td>4-11</td>
<td>Brutality and violations of human rights continue to be reported against the police in Egypt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>W15</td>
<td>4-17</td>
<td>International reform efforts and training has been limited to commissioned officers and police executives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W16</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>Community policing requires greater individual autonomy, decision-making, and problem-solving on the part of the police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W17</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>Community policing requires organizational transformation, with alignment of organizational management, structure, and personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W18</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>Local police must work with local communities to increase their resilience to violent extremism and supporting individuals at risk of violent extremism.</td>
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**EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Minor Opportunity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O01</td>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Egypt’s successful transition from its revolutionary efforts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O02</td>
<td>3-2</td>
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<td>Major Threat</td>
<td>The political instability in Egypt adds difficulty to any meaningful police reform.</td>
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<th>4-18</th>
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<tr>
<td>Minor Threat</td>
<td>For any US assistance/support of reform efforts in Egypt, Leahy vetting will continue to be an obstacle to implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Threat</td>
<td>Successful implementation of community policing is rife with complexity and challenges.</td>
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<tr>
<th>T07</th>
<th>5-11</th>
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<tr>
<td>Minor Threat</td>
<td>As a voluntary program, Egyptian citizens may not be inclined to participate in community policing or commit time and effort to its implementation.</td>
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<td>T08</td>
<td>5-12</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>6-15</td>
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<td>T12</td>
<td>6-16</td>
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</table>

When strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats are consolidated this way into a SWOT analysis format, a clearer picture is provided as to where the organization stands. It is immediately evident that the Egyptian National Police internally have far fewer identifiable strengths (3) as they relate to implementing community policing to counter violent extremism than they do weaknesses (18). Externally, the disparity is not as great, but there were double the opportunities identified (24) as there were threats (12).

**Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix**

I could have concluded at this point that the strengths of the Egyptian National Police are too few to overcome their weaknesses; however, depending on the nature of the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, it is feasible that, even though they are fewer in number, the intensity of their strengths might be enough to outweigh weaknesses. To know for sure, some additional analysis was required.

One popular strategic management tool rooted in SWOT analysis and commonly used for assessing strengths and weaknesses in functional areas of an organization is an Internal Factor Evaluation (IFE) matrix. An IFE matrix encourages a deeper analysis. On its own, SWOT is little
more than a cogent list. The methodology of an IFE matrix is, after identifying strengths and weaknesses of the organization, to assign weights for each factor or key point. These weights range from 0.00 to 1.00, with the sum of all weights (strengths and weaknesses combined) equal to 1.00. The assigned weight prioritizes the relative importance of the key point as it relates to my research parameters (community policing to counter violent extremism in Egypt). Zero indicates that key point has no importance. One indicates highly important. Whether a key point is an internal strength or weakness, factors with the greatest importance in the organizational assessment are assigned the highest weights (Kessler, 2013; Maxi-Pedia, 2016; Ommani, 2011; Sayyed, Mansoori, & Jaybhaye, 2013).

In addition to weighting the individual key points, the IFE Matrix also requires a rating. The rating refers to how strong or weak each factor or key point is in the organization. The numbers range from 4 to 1, where 4 = a major strength, 3 = a minor strength, 2 = a minor weakness and 1 = a major weakness. Strengths can only receive ratings of 3 or 4, and weaknesses can receive ratings of 2 or 1. Inserting the ratings into the IFE matrix for my study was fairly straightforward. It simply required transposing the key point’s classification from the SWOT matrix with the associated numeric variable, 4-1. The results of the IFE matrix are provided in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWOT Ref</th>
<th>Chap Ref</th>
<th>Key Point</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Weighted Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S01</td>
<td>4-16</td>
<td>When Egyptian police officials and commissioned officers were exposed to new policing philosophies, they were receptive and responsive, indicating susceptibility to reform.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S02</strong></td>
<td><strong>5-9</strong></td>
<td>Community policing principles have been positively received by commissioned officers and executives of the Egyptian National Police.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S03</strong></td>
<td><strong>5-10</strong></td>
<td>The police in Egypt have demonstrated circumstantial evidence of their ability and potential susceptibility to evolve to a more community policing-focused organization.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W01</strong></td>
<td><strong>3-8</strong></td>
<td>General rejection and resentment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W02</strong></td>
<td><strong>3-9</strong></td>
<td>The “coup” by el-Sisi resulted in another military regime.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W03</strong></td>
<td><strong>3-11</strong></td>
<td>Primarily military/kinetic response to terrorism.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W04</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-1</strong></td>
<td>The Egyptian police are traditionally viewed as brutal and corrupt, ill trained, and to have no regard for basic human rights.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W05</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-2</strong></td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is a very large, unwieldy organization.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W06</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-3</strong></td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is made up of multiple sectors whose responsibilities/assignments overlap and are not always clear.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W07</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-4</strong></td>
<td>The Egyptian National Police is militaristic in structure with commissioned and non-commissioned officers.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>W08</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-5</strong></td>
<td>The non-commissioned officers are primarily uneducated, poor, involuntary conscripts.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td><strong>W09</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-6</strong></td>
<td>Conscripts operate under tight control of commissioned officers who delegate little or no authority.</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>W10</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-7</strong></td>
<td>Conscripts are the ones who are responsible for traffic and crowd control, sit security posts, and have the highest visibility to the public.</td>
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<td><strong>W11</strong></td>
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<td>Conscripts make up the clear majority of the police force.</td>
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<td><strong>W12</strong></td>
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<td>More educated commissioned officers with greater autonomy spend most of their time within the confines of government buildings and are not typically seen in public.</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<td><strong>W13</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-10</strong></td>
<td>Corruption is endemic to the police in Egypt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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Brutality and violations of human rights continue to be reported against the police in Egypt.

International reform efforts and training has been limited to commissioned officers and police executives.

Community policing requires greater individual autonomy, decision-making, and problem-solving on the part of the police.

Community policing requires organizational transformation, with alignment of organizational management, structure, and personnel.

Local police must work with local communities to increase their resilience to violent extremism and supporting individuals at risk of violent extremism.

The weighted rating score is the result of weight multiplied by rating. Each key factor received a score. Total weighted score is simply the sum of all individual weighted scores. A total weighted score of 4 would indicate that the organization had all strengths and no weaknesses. On the other hand, a total weighted score of 1 would indicate that the organization had no strengths and all weaknesses. A score of 2.5 would be a median value (midpoint between a possible low of 1 and high of 4). A value lower than 2.5 would indicate that the weaknesses are greater than the strengths, and a value higher than 2.5 would indicate that the strengths are greater than the weaknesses.

Predictably, the Egyptian National Police received a score of 1.97, which would indicate that their identified weaknesses with regards to their current capabilities to implement a community policing initiative to counter violent extremism substantially outweigh their identified strengths. Although the results of the IFE matrix were not much different than a simple SWOT analysis on its own, the added scrutiny provides greater validity to subsequent conclusions.
External Factor Evaluation Matrix

A cohort to the IFE matrix is the External Factor Evaluation (EFE) matrix. The EFE matrix is very similar to the IFE matrix. While the IFE matrix deals with internal factors (strengths and weaknesses), the EFE matrix is concerned solely with external factors (opportunities and threats). Also, like the IFE matrix, the EFE matrix is an intuitive process.

Again, a weight is assigned to each factor. The value of each weight should be between 0 and 1. Zero means the factor is not important. One means that the factor is the most influential and critical one. And, like the IFE matrix, a rating is assigned to each factor. The rating refers to the significance of each opportunity or threat that the organization encounters. The numbers range from 4 to 1, where 4 = a major opportunity, 3 = a minor opportunity, 2 = a minor threat and 1 = a major threat. Opportunities can only receive ratings of 3 or 4, and threats can receive ratings of 2 or 1. Inserting the ratings into the EFE matrix was again fairly straightforward, transposing the key point’s classification in the SWOT matrix with the associated numeric variable, 4-1. The results of the EFE matrix are provided in Table 5.

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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<td>T01</td>
<td>3-5</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>T02</td>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>Poor transition efforts led to a failed presidency under Morsi and added distrust in the government and its processes.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>T03</td>
<td>4-13</td>
<td>Successful/measurable police reform has proven to be elusive throughout the world.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T04</td>
<td>4-15</td>
<td>The political instability in Egypt adds difficulty to any meaningful police reform.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T05</td>
<td>4-18</td>
<td>For any US assistance/support of reform efforts in Egypt, Leahy vetting will continue to be an obstacle to implementation.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T06</td>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>Successful implementation of community policing is rife with complexity and challenges.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T07</td>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>As a voluntary program, Egyptian citizens may not be inclined to participate in community policing or commit time and effort to its implementation.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T08</td>
<td>5-12</td>
<td>Egyptian citizens as a rule fear and/or disrespect the police, creating a challenging environment for change through community policing.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T09</td>
<td>6-13</td>
<td>Not all researchers agree that community policing is the answer for countering violent extremism.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>T10</strong></td>
<td><strong>6-14</strong></td>
<td>Engagement through community policing efforts are sometimes seen as just a cover for conducting surveillance on communities and individuals.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T11</strong></td>
<td><strong>6-15</strong></td>
<td>Some communities feel that police seek assistance on countering violent extremism while disregarding other public safety concerns.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T12</strong></td>
<td><strong>6-16</strong></td>
<td>Community outreach efforts to counter violent extremism require a significant amount of time and resources for these slow developing programs.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, like the IFE matrix, the weighted rating score of the EFE matrix is the result of weight multiplied by rating, and the total weighted score is the sum of all individual weighted scores. A total weighted score of 4 would indicate opportunities completely outweighed threats. A total weighted score of 1 would indicate that the organization was facing only threats and no opportunities. A total score of 2.5 would indicate an average score, whereby opportunities and threats basically balanced each other out. In this case, the Egyptian National Police received a score of 2.88, which would indicate that their available opportunities outweigh the identified threats, as they relate to implementing a community policing initiative to counter violent extremism.
Chapter 8: Discussion and Recommendations

Egypt has gone through a very significant revolution that has had local, regional, and international implications. One of the results of their transition has been a significant increase in violent extremism/terrorism that must be addressed. Community policing has been promoted as an effectual methodology to counter violent extremism. The intent of my research was to develop conclusions as to whether or not the professed merits of community policing justify its implementation in Egypt to counter violent extremism using a SWOT analytical matrix.

Findings

Through the progression of a SWOT analysis, incorporating both Internal and External Factor Evaluation matrixes, my study resulted in the following key findings:

1. The Egyptian National Police have far more identified weaknesses related to implementing community policing to counter violent extremism than they do identified strengths.

2. Even when prioritized and weighted for importance, the weaknesses of the Egyptian National Police exceed their strengths.

3. The potential opportunities community policing could provide to the Egyptian National Police to counter violent extremism exceed the threats the methodology could encounter.

Interpretation of Findings
Given my findings, I can draw some conclusions with regards to my research questions that were introduced in Chapter 1. The research questions and my ensuing conclusions are as follows:

1. Does international research related to the principles/practices of community policing and reported outcomes associated with its implementation support community policing as an apt approach for Egypt to counter violent extremism?

   When I examined the external opportunities and threats outlined in the SWOT analysis, I was able to gain some insight as to the aptness of community policing for Egypt. As noted in the analysis, the opportunities appreciably outweighed the threats. On its merits, community policing would potentially be an ideal methodology for encouraging police/community engagement and problem-solving, particularly in addressing concerns related to countering violent extremism. Community policing could nurture citizen support for the police, which has been nonexistent for many years in Egypt. Additionally, the proactive problem-solving approach that is inherent in community policing is vital to a proactive methodology for countering violent extremism.

2. Is the Egyptian National Police force capable of implementing community policing principles and programs?

   One of the challenges that has been observed with regards to implementing community policing is that it is most easily implemented where it is least needed, but where it is most needed it is extremely difficult to implement. Regardless, its intrinsic merit has continued to make it the preferred policing model for police reform around the world. Unfortunately, with all of the impediments facing the Egyptian National Police, whose weaknesses were outlined in the SWOT
matrix, it seems evident that community policing could not be effectively implemented in Egypt, at least at this time. Weighting their strengths against their weaknesses does not foster optimism for success. The endemic corruption and brutality reported within the Egyptian National Police would greatly impede the essential community support and involvement. Further, the nature of the Egyptian National Police force and its militaristic structure made up predominantly of uneducated, unwilling conscripts would make implementation of community policing programs extremely problematic.

3. Does community policing have the potential of stemming the tide of violent extremism in Egypt?

Essentially, this question weighs the response of my first research question against my second one. Yes, indications are that community policing has the potential for countering violent extremism; however, it would not be successful in Egypt at this time. The Egyptian National Police simply do not have the organizational structure or community trust to implement community policing in such a way so that it could be effective in countering violent extremism. As outlined in the SWOT matrix, there are a substantial number of opportunities which community policing could provide, but again, the Egyptian National Police are not currently in a position to take advantage of those opportunities.

Implications and Recommendations

I believe the implications of my research fall into two general areas:

1. Implications for Egypt and the Egyptian National Police
2. Implications for program design for police reform efforts
1. Implications for Egypt and the Egyptian National Police

My findings did not encourage much optimism for successfully implementing community policing to counter violent extremism in Egypt. However, this approach does provide some insight as to what the Egyptian National Police might do to improve their potential to be successful in a reform effort such as this. The process of going through a SWOT analysis, by its nature, identifies the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the organization. One way to improve the organizational outlook would be to identify its most glaring weaknesses and work to minimize them, or even turn them into strengths. As an example, two of the factors that were identified as their greatest weaknesses were referenced as W13 and W14. W13 stated that, “Corruption is endemic to the police in Egypt.” W14 stated that, “Brutality and violations of human rights continue to be reported against the police in Egypt.” The Egyptian National Police could potentially improve their chances of success by focusing in these two key points. They could initiate new policies and priorities, provide additional training and oversight to ensure that the police eliminated corruption from their ranks and that they were more human rights-oriented as individuals and as an organization. As they shifted the balance away from weaknesses toward strengths, they could improve their likelihood of success – at least as scored by the Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix.

Another prospect for improvement illustrated by the External Factor Evaluation Matrix is that it outlines and prioritizes potential opportunities available to the Egyptian National Police. Understanding those opportunities and developing the means to take advantage of them could also improve their likelihood of success. A TOWS analysis is used by some organizations as a follow-up to SWOT and used for strategic planning. A TOWS analysis is a complement to a
SWOT analysis and is an acronym for Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses and Strengths, the inverse of SWOT. It builds on the SWOT analysis and helps an organization understand how to make the most of its strengths, circumvent weaknesses, capitalize on opportunities, and manage threats. A TOWS analysis helps identify which options the organization could/should pursue. This is done by systematically identifying relationships between external opportunities and threats with internal strengths and weaknesses, and basing strategies on those relationships (Proctor, 2000; Ruocco & Proctor, 1994; Weihrich, 1982). However, the purpose of my research is analytical, and not for specific policy/strategy recommendations, so I do not include a TOWS analysis as part of my paper. However, its potential value for assisting the Egyptian National Police to develop future strategies for improvement makes it worth noting in this section.

2. Implications for Program Design for Police Reform Efforts

In Chapter 4, I discussed police reform and specifically some of my personal experiences while working on a project with the Egyptian National Police. In 2013, the final year of my direct Egypt involvement, The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) budgeted almost US$8 million for police reform and support efforts for Egypt (INL, 2013, p. 127). The principle focus of the funding was committed to train the police in community policing. As I outlined in Chapter 5, representatives of the Egyptian National Police unanimously accepted community policing in principle, and there were examples of efforts to implement it as well. However, it did not take hold as an institution, which is not surprising, given my analysis in this paper. INL could not justify ongoing community policing training, as there were ongoing reports of corruption and brutality. Furthermore, there was no significant evidence of intuitional change.
INL’s stated objective for Egypt were as follows (INL, 2013, pp. 127-128):

Objective 1: Support criminal justice sector reforms and develop institutions that are professional, accountable, and responsive to the public.

Objective 2: Enhance the ability of Egyptian criminal justice institutions to protect, and provide access to justice for, Egypt’s most vulnerable populations, including women, migrants, and juveniles.

Objective 3: To build civil society and legislative capacity to participate constructively in criminal justice reform processes and to monitor and conduct oversight of criminal justice institutions.

Given these objectives, it is understandable why INL would select community policing as a vehicle to accomplish them. If implemented flawlessly, community policing has the workings to help accomplish those objectives. However, foundational capacity of both the organization and the people it serves must be established for community policing to be successfully implemented. Ultimately, INL gave up on the effort and halted funding, believing they were not getting a reasonable return from their investment (although not documented, this concern was reported to me directly by the INL Program Officer for Egypt). Thinking retrospectively, if a more comprehensive assessment (such as the analysis provided in this paper) had been conducted prior to attempting the community policing training, perhaps a different approach would have been taken. Perhaps it would have been more advisable to address specific weaknesses of the organization so that it was better prepared to adopt community policing as an organizational philosophy and policing approach.

I should also note, that in addition to my experience in Egypt, I have worked on police reform projects in a dozen countries around the world over a recent ten-year period. One
consistent element that I observed in all of those projects was that very little prior assessment was conducted as to institutional prerequisites for a recipient organization to be able to implement the intended programs. Typically, “international best practices” were thrown at these developing police organizations with hope that they would stick. But, they rarely made a significant difference. This has been the experience of most developing and post-conflict police reform efforts (Bayley, 2006; Hermsmeyer, 2010; Lewis, 2011; Wiatrowski & Pino, 2012).

In Bayley’s book, Changing the Guard, to which I have referred to throughout my paper, he states that a business plan must be in place if reform efforts are to be undertaken successfully (Bayley, 2006, p. 88). A SWOT analysis, such as the one I have presented here, can be used as a tool in the development of a meaningful business plan. As part of the planning process, Bayley also asserted that it may be necessary for specific pieces of the reform process to be in place before others are undertaken. Egypt is a good example of this, and I believe the results of my analysis support Bayley’s assertion. Through my analysis it became evident that Egypt must overcome some fundamental systemic problems before they can hope to implement community policing in any meaningful way.

This process can provide an example for other reform efforts in that an honest self-assessment must be conducted – either with a SWOT analysis, or a similar mechanism – in order to develop an effective plan for overcoming weaknesses and capitalizing on organizational strengths. The same process allows them to recognize and take advantage of opportunities available to the organization, and to minimize the threats it faces. Following a process such as this can help to ensure fundamental preconditions are in place before specific objectives/programs are implemented.
Conclusions

The Egyptian National Police force is facing some significant hurdles, including widespread allegations of corruption and brutality that would make implementing community policing a long term struggle. It may take some intermediary reform efforts, including professionalization of the broader police force, to include non-commissioned officers, and recognition of civil and human rights. In the United States, our policing history was such that our police had to go through a process of professionalism (1950s), and recognition and acceptance of civil/human rights (1960s), before community policing was able to evolve (1970s) (Walker & Katz, 2012). It would not necessarily take the three decades of evolution that was experienced in the United States for Egypt and its police to progress to the point that community policing could be effectively implemented – Egypt could learn from our history and experiences, as well as police organization in other countries that have gone through similar evolutionary processes. Still, Bayley has argued that any hope of effective police reform takes time. He suggests that it can take at least ten years before institutional change truly occurs (Bayley, 2005).

Despite the dire findings of my analysis, there is still hope for Egypt. Stenning and Shearing in their paper on police reform report that deep-seated policing paradigms can be changed, that police organizations can alter their course. Although their conclusions were primarily based on the Dutch police transitioning away from community policing, their point was that it suggests that similar reversals could also happen elsewhere, that “change is possible even in the face of mentalities and practices that appear deeply rooted and unchangeable” (Stenning & Shearing, 2005, p. 177). Additionally, my personal experience with the Egyptian National Police gives me hope as well. During my time in Egypt I worked with many hundreds of commissioned officers from the Egyptian National Police. I found them to be intelligent, professional, and
dedicated to the safety and security of Egypt. They are willing to learn and to change. Unfortunately, the dilemma of the non-commissioned officers will continue to be a challenge to their reform efforts.

It should also be noted that the police are not the only source for implementing programs for countering violent extremism. In fact, it is primarily a community-focused endeavor. Community-based programs are frequently implemented through religious institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGO). These programs do not necessarily include police involvement. Programs such as these may have greater chance for success at this point in Egypt. In fact, the Cairo Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) has recently conducted pilot training on “Preventing Radicalization and Extremism Leading to Terrorism”. The training is intended to “equip local leaders and influencers with the necessary knowledge and skills to refute extremist interpretations of Islam, while propagating an alternative narrative of peace and coexistence within their local communities” (Staff, 2017). This may well be a more effective avenue for Egypt to pursue at this point, to work with community and religious leaders to counter the narrative of violent extremism.

Although this paper has addressed Egypt specifically, the analytical process applied here can provide guidance and recommendations as to how police reform projects might be designed and prioritized. Police reform is a difficult and challenging process. Reform programs must be highly attuned to the local context and will require comprehensive organizational assessments such as the one presented here if they hope to be successful.
References

Abdel-Khalek, A. (2012). *Community police and its role in maintaining security*. (PhD), Post-Graduate and Research College, Cairo, Egypt.


Appendix A: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart

Appendix B: Code of Ethics & Conduct

Hard copy of Code of Ethics & Conduct provided by Brigadier General Asser Negm Eldin, National Security Sector, Ministry of Interior, for my work with the Egyptian National Police.
Code of Ethics & Conduct for Employees of the Homeland Security Sector
(English Translation)

Homeland Security Sector is one of the sectors of the Ministry of Interior established with a ministerial decree No. 445 for the year 2011, in order to maintain national security, and cooperate with state agencies concerned, to protect and preserve the safety of the home front. To collect information, and fight terrorism, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law and the principles of human rights and freedoms, officers are being selected based on the nomination of the sector.

Homeland Security Sector vision
"Homeland security sector pledges to protect the security and safety of the Egyptian citizen, ensure the rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution, fight against acts of espionage and terrorism by a group who is qualified academically and practically, in pursuant to the rule of law and human rights."

Goals:
• Protect the constitutional gains and fundamental freedoms of the citizen according to the Egyptian legal system and international standards of human rights.
• Protection of Egyptians and foreign nationals in the homeland from terrorist attacks and crimes.
• Protect the homeland in the face of acts of espionage.
• Fighting schemes to sabotage, the face of intimidation, and threats to national security.
• Fighting of organized crime across borders.
• Cooperation with all agencies and organizations, local, regional and international to protect national security, and fight against international terrorism.
• Collect information on national security threats, analysis and confirmed in the framework of legal controls.
• Support for all state agencies with all information and needs relevant to protecting the home front for the country.

Code of Conduct:
• Sector workers committed to rules set forth in code of behavior and ethics.
• Commitment to policy frameworks and procedures stipulated in the terms of reference for the sector regarding all aspects of the sector work.
• Current and former employees are prohibited from use of relationships or insider information on the job to achieve any interests or personal gain.
• Sector workers are prohibited from doing any act that would affect the democratic climate, or aligned to any political party.
• Commitment to honorable representation of the sector in and outside the scope of work, taking into consideration not to endanger the reputation of the institution inside or outside the country.
• Abide by the constitution and the law in all actions required for the work.
• Take all the precautions and preventive measures to ensure that no one is exposed to any danger during or because of the work.
• Maintaining all the rights and freedoms set forth by the constitution when dealing with citizens during or because of the work.
• Adhering to constitutional, legal, and human rights standards in dealing with suspects in cases that threaten national security.
• Respect the diversity of customs, traditions, cultures, ethnic backgrounds and beliefs of the Egyptian citizens and foreigners, while dealing with them.
• Abide by the rules of military discipline under the police act.

Code of Ethics & Values:
• Commitment to truth, honesty, integrity and transparency.
• Humility in dealing with others.
• Civilized when debating and interacting, acceptance of differences with others inside and outside the scope of work.
• Maintaining Egyptian community values, abstaining from any behavior that contradicts these values in core or substance.
• Maintain positive attitudes, and a role model for workers in the field of law enforcement at work, and off work inside and outside the country.
• Staying away from any situations that jeopardize integrity.

Guarantees for assurance of neutrality to the sector's role:
• The democratic system is the fundamental assurance of neutrality of the sector's role through the separation of politics and security, and activating the supervisory role of the legislative power, represented in the House of the people through control and accountability of the executive branches of government, including the Interior Ministry in all its sectors, and the National Security Sector.
• Activating the role of the judiciary, represented by the Attorney General in its supervisory role on the legal aspects of the sector work.
• Drafting a law that regulates all the actions in the sector and parliamentary oversight and jurisdiction over its work, and to take procedural steps to pass it.
• Selection of candidates for the sector, according to a number of security and behavioral criteria, passing a battery of tests to ensure the psychological balance, and social intelligence, and the ability to adapt to the doctrine of the sector according to its code of conduct and ethics.
• The allocation of a sufficient number of training hours to establish the concepts and values presented in the code of behavior and ethics, applying them in training, rehabilitation and periodic programs for the sector workers.
• The establishment of a special group of Homeland Security officers that report to the chief of the sector directly, their job is to evaluate the behavior of workers within and outside the scope of work to make sure of their adherence to the code of ethics and behavior.
• Shortcomings in the standards of conduct and behavior for security services will not be tolerated anymore.
Conclusion:

Although the workers who handle critical information are faced with the constraints of time and the crucial task of making the right decisions that deal with threats to national security, they are striving to keep up with code of ethics and behavioral standards.

We, the ones who are working for the homeland security sector are determined to uphold our values, and face all challenges through the arms of science and training, and we pledge that we are committed to our mission and our values derived from our code of ethics and behavior, and are committed to learn from lessons of the past so as not to repeat the mistakes that marred the work of the previous equivalent local and international organizations, even in the face of successful achievements of its staff without the commitment to ethical standards.
Appendix C: Al Wahda Interview with Brigadier General Asser Negm Eldin

A scanned copy of the original article, translation follows. The picture is of BG Asser.


Chants started by the Egyptian people in the January 25th revolution calling for the disbanding of the state security apparatus and with the mounting pressure from the public the decision was made to resolve this organization which had a notorious reputation and was replaced by another one namely, the National Security Sector, which was formed under the Ministerial Decree No. 445 for the year 2011 in order to maintain national security and cooperation with state agencies concerned to protect the safety of the home front.

Interestingly, the new sector needed to change the perception rooted in the minds of the public about the “monstrous” State Security, besides changing the organizational structure of the previous one, to deal with the new changes that were instituted by the democratic transition that was taking place in the country, we find the new organization adopting new standards that were not applied previously, and mainly derived from the “Code of Conduct and Ethics”, that the employees should adhere to.

Al Wafel here reveal the objectives of this sector and the guarantees that ensure the non-deviation of its role by interviewing Brigadier Asser Negm ElDin, Director of Training in National Security Sector and a member of the of the Experts Training Committee in the Interpol, who assured us
that they are laying the foundation about the role of the authority encompassed by the sector employees that is essentially geared for serving the citizens and the national security, and it is important to learn from the lessons of the past so as not to repeat the mistakes that marred the work of the previous corresponding organizations with great emphasis on adhering to ethical standards, and we started the interview:

Will the Sector's operational strategy be any different than it was in the former State Security?

BG Asser - A comparative analysis was carried out to compare different styles of work in all the security organizations in democratic countries such as the F. B.I in the United States and the M.I.5 in England and the BKA, in Germany and we chose the best style that will avoid all the negatives and criticism of the previous organization, we formed a working team that included all representatives from work force to develop a new strategy that aims to materialize the concept of “Democratic Policing”, which depends mainly on the application of the law and human rights standards, as well as applying the concepts of Community Policing with great emphasis on the basic standards applied in democratic institutions all over the world namely, transparency, integrity and accountability.

What are the guarantees that ensure the sector will not deviate from its role?

BG Asser - The democratic system is the best guarantee to prevent the sector from any deviation, by separating politics from security. As a result of the lack of a defined strategy and clear policies in the former State Security Service, it was exploited in achieving the political objectives of the former regime; add to that the deviation of some members from their real role. All that has changed now, as a law that regulates all the actions of the sector was drafted, in addition to parliamentary and judicial oversight. Any noncompliance of conduct and ethical standards in security forces will not be acceptable anymore.

What is the concept of community policing that the sector will adopt?

BG Asser - For the coming period, we are relying on the partnership of our community in finding creative solutions to address societal problems that may lead to crime problems that threaten the security of the homeland and the citizen, also we want to achieve psychological balance for the workers in the sector by building their capabilities, according to modern management methods, that include standards of human resources development and skillful communication with the community.

How you will observe the standards of human rights in the new strategy to prevent the mistakes of the past?

BG Asser - The standards of human rights came on the top of our priorities in the new strategy, as we stressed on the importance of adhering to human rights in all of our dealings, in both of the drafted law or in the Code of Conduct and Ethics. As for the mechanism to ensure the application of these standards, we have established an Internal Affairs Department that answers to the head of the Sector directly and its primary task to monitor the compliance of workers to what was stated
in the Code of Conduct and Ethics, which in turn stressed the need to respect all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution when dealing with citizens, and prohibits workers in the sector to do any work that would impact on democracy or taking sides politically with any group or entity.

From your point of view, how will the standards of transparency and integrity be applied in the sector?

BG Asser - The application of these standards is based on the selection of new employees. We have relieved about 500 officers who used to work in the former State Security Service out of 1,500 officers. Most of those relieved were at the leadership level, to change the doctrine of the new sector. In the meantime, the selection of new employees will be in accordance with the tests that have been developed by a number of experts in psychology, sociology, so as to ensure the suitability of the candidate psychologically to integrate with the new concepts adopted by the sector. We have already tested a number that exceeded the 3 thousand officers from different departments of the Interior Ministry as a prelude to combine a number of them to support the sector during the coming period.

What information-gathering mechanisms will you adopt during the coming period?

BG Asser - Our method in collecting information depends on a scientific approach that is applied by other corresponding entities in all other countries of the democratic world. It depends mainly on the cooperation of citizens and information analysis from the Intelligence Service. Arrest and interrogation have been excluded from the duties of current employees in the sector as these were the main focus of criticism by civil society towards the old state security apparatus with respect to human rights violations, both during the interrogation or by monitoring telephone communications. There is no doubt that there will be no return to the old methods. I would also like to refer here to the importance of agencies that collect information in all countries of the world to protect the national interests of these countries at home and abroad and even on the military level. In any country there are 3 different agencies –at least, responsible for external, internal and military intelligence. In the United States, for example, there are 16 different agencies to protect its national security, which the FBI comes at the forefront.

What is your perspective in building the new capacities of the new sector?

BG Asser - To achieve this, we need to progress training as an essential element for capacity building and a mean to fulfill the sector's objectives, as well as participation and partnership of society on the rules of the establishment through different seminars held by the sector with the participation of most of the forces of society and opinion leaders who were representing great sectors of the community. On top of that, adopting modern management techniques that strengthen and empower subordinates to take the appropriate decisions in a timely manner and encouraging horizontal communication in vertical institutions without bureaucratic hassles. Also, we held a number of rehabilitative and developmental courses, which aimed to change the doctrine of workers to fit in with the new strategy, as well as working according to the principles of human resources development starting by the selection of workers, their motivation and their evaluation
with the right assignment for each of them. We established an office for citizens' complaints regarding any issues of national security or human rights' violations. We had received many reports of citizens in this regard and we had responded and resolved most of them.

**What - in your view - are the challenges facing the sector at this stage?**

**BG Asser - The most important challenges is the legacy left to us by the former State Security, a lot of negative aspects that led to the deterioration of our image in the eyes of the citizens and the loss of trust in an agency that is supposed to be working to protect them, we still suffer from that image because some still falsely believe that we are an extension of the previous state security which led to the reluctance of most of the citizens to cooperate with us regarding national security, contrary to what happens in the democratic countries of the world. As an example, there was a well-known incident that showed the cooperation of the citizens with their domestic intelligence agency, in England, the citizens reported some changes in the color of some plants placed in one of the balconies in London and the appearance of a chemical odor which prompted MI5 to investigate the report which led to the discovery of a plot to plant explosive devices similar to the bombing incidents of London's subway.**
Appendix D: Kidnapping Newscast - Community Policing

The following is extracted from a Progress Report dated May 9, 2012. It was submitted by the author, Dan Waddington, to the Egypt Project Management Team, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State.

Kidnapping Newscast - Community Policing

We recently observed application of CP principles in the Beheera Security Sector. Precinct leaders and commanders incorporated CP principles to help solve a kidnapping. Significantly, they confirmed that CP principles were the key to their success in cracking the case. In addition to applying Community Policing to solve the case, the commanders acknowledge and credit Community Policing on the newscast. Doing so on a national TV news broadcast may be further evidence that the MOI/EP is moving towards Community Policing as accepted policy/doctrine/practice.

The circumstances were as follows. There is a regular TV show on the Egyptian National Network, called “Security for All”. On 4/22/12, they aired an episode which focused on a case in a jurisdiction near Alexandria (Beheera). In this case, a victim was kidnapped by a group of suspects demanding ransom. The victim’s family was initially reluctant to contact the police for fear of his life (suspects were related to the Bedouins of Sinai; difficult to locate; dangerous to apprehend them). Ultimately, the family paid the ransom. The victim was released, but the police pursued the suspects anyway, in spite of the difficulty of the case. The police began receiving tips from the community, which turned out to be the key in identifying, locating and apprehending the suspects.

General Mamdoh Hasan, Chief of the Beheera sector (pictured below), was interviewed on the program and thanked the community for helping the police crack the case and locate the suspects, citing that community policing should be the way forward to tackle security issues – working the community and other local agencies. He stated "If not for Community Policing efforts, we would not have been able to solve such cases."

A link to an online video of the program:

Significantly, eight senior police officials from Beheera have attended our Community Policing courses. This is particularly significant because the public in this region have not historically trusted the police (even less trust than in other areas).
Appendix E: Incentive Program for Community Policing Research Initiatives

(Original Arabic, English translation follows)

Hard copy of Incentive Program for Community Policing-based Research Initiatives provided by Brigadier General Asser Negm Eldin, National Security Sector, Ministry of Interior, for my work with the Egyptian National Police.
Incentive Program for Community Policing-based Research Initiatives  
(English translation)

Ministry of the Interior  
Sector of Officers’ Affairs  
General Administration of Promotions and Missions  
Training Department

Announcement to all employers in the ministry

The minister has agreed to organize a research contest about (The elements of trust and partnership between the police and the public) to all officers in the ministry.

The goals of the contest:

- Support for the elements of trust and partnership between the police and the citizens – supporting the police mission in servicing the people.
- Developing means for citizens to receive the police services in a professional manner.

Participants in the competition:

All officers in the ministry

Deadline for admission

Research should be submitted to the Police Research Center not later than Wednesday, 11/1/2012 and will not be accepted after this date

Research Topics

- Frameworks to strengthen the relationship between the police and the citizens.
- Social networking technologies and their impact on the relationship between the police and the people.
- Police service and its security and service dimension, to face the trends of crime in the community.
- Security measures developed to activate the slogan of the police which is “The Police in the Service of the People”.
- Police work between reality and the future.
- Police procedures in security calls.
- Facilitate and simplify procedures for citizens to access public services.
- The relationship between the individual and the society and its impact on committing community crimes.
- The relationship between the police and the community in the framework of community variables.
- Media and its role in community outreach.
- Coordination between government agencies and civil society organizations to achieve justice and equality in society.
- Future visions and proposals for security services in the field of community outreach
- The impact of reform and penal institutions on prisoners
- Procedures for activating departments and public relations sectors in police stations.
- Laws and measures and legislation needed to remove obstacles between the community and security service.

**Formal rules:**

- Requires that the research has not been previously published in any publication or periodical, or contest or conference or seminar within or outside the ministry.
- The rules and regulations used in preparing scientific research should be taken into account.
- Should not be less than 25 pages and not more than 50 pages and should be written on a computer on an A4 paper.
- Should deliver 5 copies of the research, in addition to a copy on a CD.

**Rewards of research:**

- Research grant of the first to the third financial reward amounts to one thousand pounds for each research.
- Research grant from the fourth to the sixth financial reward amounts to seven hundred and fifty Egyptian pounds for each research.
- Research grant from the seventh to the tenth financial reward amounts to five hundred Egyptian pounds for each research.

Please circulate, and take the necessary action towards notifying the officers about the competition.

First assistant minister, Sector affairs officers