Nationalism from above in narratives: a comparison between Britain and China

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NATIONALISM FROM ABOVE IN NARRATIVES:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA

by

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Abstract
Comparing political speeches and history textbooks in Britain and China from the twentieth century, this study explores the symbolic construction of Chinese and British national identity after the downfall of the empires. In both cases, the decline of the empire and the imperial identity had given the room for the uprising of narrow nationalism, which could be seen respectively in English-centric narratives and Han-centric narratives in the data before and during the World War Two. However, a key difference lay in the building of English nationalism and Han nationalism. The growth of English nationalism was accompanied by a shrinkage of identity, which was brought into the post-war period and pose significant challenge to the integrity of British national identity. In contrast, Han nationalism was strengthened by a belief in the expansiveness of the superior Han culture, which was used to justify the solidarity between Han and non-Han people to legitimize the multi-ethnic concept of modern China. This framework was well-inherited by the Communist regime after 1949, though the name of Han is hiding behind the banner of Chinese nation. This study is an example of how historical perspective can be compatible with the paradigm of social constructionism.
Chapter 1: Introduction

China and Britain are two peculiar cases with regards to their shapes of national identity in that for both cases, the symbolic justification of significant ethnic diversity is embedded in the construction of nationality. Taking the symbolic interaction between solidarity and diversity as the central issue on nation building, this dissertation focuses on a key difference between the two cases on the level of integrity of Chineseness and Britishness. While China as a nation is usually considered as a holistic entity, British identity is competing against English identity, Welsh identity, Scottish identity, and Northern Irish identity in the British Isles. Consequently, British people to a much less extent take Britishness for granted than Chinese people do for Chineseness. In official definition, there are fifty-six ethnic groups among Chinese citizens, with Han people being the majority. The national unity between Han and non-Han peoples and the integrity of the multiethnic territory are sacred and inviolable, not only as stipulated by the Constitution but as insisted by the ruling Party and the public. While the legitimacy of Chineseness is unquestionable regardless of the demographic diversity for the Chinese, it is not for the British. British people who are more likely to question any overarching identity above local identities because of the strength of Englishness, Welshness, Scottishness, and Northern Irishness, if they see China from their approach, would be skeptical on the legitimacy of the inclusion of non-Han regions, such as Tibet and Xinjiang, into China.

The gap between the two cases, which is extensively analyzed in this dissertation, serves as the cultural background on which the ethnic issue in China is incomprehensible in some Western countries where the value of multiculturalism is, if not above, on a par with the need for national solidarity. For instance, while Dalai Lama gains his popularity in the West not only because of his religiosity, but also for his leadership of Tibetan separatist movement, in China he is a notorious
figure threatening the territorial integrity of Chinese nation and core national interest. Similarly, after its report of the mass attack in Kunming Railway Station committed by extremist Uyghur separatists which killed 28 and injure 113 people [2014], the BBC added that “Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uighur minority group which has a long history of discord with Chinese authorities.” (BBC, 2014), which implied that the incident may have something to do with the unpopular ethnic policy of China in minority regions. Not surprisingly, this type of narratives further provoked the Chinese public, who was resentful of the tendency in Western media to attribute this incident to the ethnic policy and perceived it as an evil justification of terrorism.

To fully explain the gap between Chinese and Western political discourse on ethnicity and nationality, the constant skepticism and criticism among Westerners on ethnic policies in China, or the presumption that there are always unrests in ethnic minority areas and the will of independence because of the wrongdoing of the Party that leads to erosion of ethnic culture, violation of human rights, or political suppression, is beyond the scope of this study very much. This study, however, assumes that a cultural and historical approach is helpful in making sense of these issues. With this perspective, this project is designed to compare influential political discourses regarding issues of nationality in China and Britain. Collecting national leaders’ important speeches and popular history textbooks for pupils, I am interested in this question: how are the Chinese nation and the British nation constructed differently or similarly in relation to ethnic diversities from the twentieth century onward? The next section is a brief review on both cases in this study.

**China and Britain: post-imperial nations with noticeable diversity**

Although it would be interesting to see how Chinese and Westerners react differently to the same issues, considering “the West” as an analytical unit is improper as there are relevant variations
among the Western countries. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a Western nation as the counterpart of China. However, not every Western country are comparable to China. Most of the European nations does not inherit the historically established condition of multi-ethnicity after they are built. America, Canada and Australia is too special to be comparable to China because they are former white colonies and are formed out of immigration processes. Although in the globalization era, China is not immune to immigration, the great deal of its demographic diversity is the legacy of the long history of multiethnic, imperial state until twentieth century. Modern China is built upon the territory of Chinese Empire that had shrank from its maximum. Considering the imperial-based ethnic diversity, it seems that Great Britain is the only Western nation that could be perceived as the Western counterpart of China.

Britain and China are two multiethnic societies in two senses. First, their territories are multiethnic: while the English people are the majority in England, non-English Britons are the majorities in Wales, Scotland and Irish; while the Han people are the majority in East China, non-Han ethnic groups are disproportionately concentrating in northern and western regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Yunnan. Second, the ethnic diversities in the England and East China increases because of the intensification of geographic mobility of population from the 1970s. A large number of non-British labors came from former colonies and dominions of the British Empire, some of them voluntarily seeking job opportunities in England, while some of them were expelled by or simply running away from local authorities (as African Asians in Uganda). Since the start of the Reform and Opening in China in the late 1970s, the ban on population movement across the urban-rural boundaries was lifted, which gave non-Han people, most of whom lived in rural areas that were also Han colonies, access to urban areas in the East in which the major residents were Han people. The post-reform era also witnesses the return of some Chinese who
migrated to South Asia centuries ago. This lead to the cultural diversification in urban areas in the China.

The British and Chinese deal with ethnic diversity in different perspectives, which could be reflected by the ways in which the minorities are identified or identify themselves. In the case of UK, the ethnic identities are on par with overarching British identity. Although they identify themselves as British, many Scots, Irishmen and Welshmen sometimes call themselves Scottish, Irish and Welsh instead of British. Immigrants from outside the British Isles often use “hyphenated identity” e.g. British-Indian, British-Chinese or British African Caribbean etc. when they are introducing themselves. The emphasis on ethnic particularity corresponds to the British “state multiculturalism” regarding policies of immigration and cultural diversity. The new immigrants from former colonies, along with other minorities were equally entitled to social rights as the English majority, as racial, ethnic and religious discriminations were made unlawful. Also, the minorities have cultural status equal to that of English majorities, and a variety of ethnicities is considered as a component of national culture. The British society reaches a consensus that Britain is a multicultural society where the respect for diversity is a virtue and embedded into the national character.

In contrast, although Chinese people keep their ethnic identities in mind, many of them prefer to call themselves Chinese rather than emphasize their ethnicities when introducing themselves to foreigners (an exception may be the oversea Tibetan secessionists). The state acknowledges the diversity of ethnic culture and defines China as consisting of fifty-six ethnicities, but it gives the unity of the Chinese nation the priority over ethnic particularities. In practice, the former is often stressed even at the expense of the latter. The enhancement of social-economic rights of ethnic minorities are often reduced to their economic gaining, sometimes at the expense of minority
culture. Although the “Great Hanism” is condemned by the Party at the time when they were seeking the support from non-Han people before and after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, from 1957 to 1976, “the Party policy with respect to national minorities saw a rather drastic reversion toward assimilation of minorities” (Wu, 2014, p. 67), and the cultural and social assimilation were implemented in the name of socialist transformation, under the social-Darwinist view that non-Han ethnicities were “backward” and had the will to accept sinification (Hyer, 2006). The aggressive assimilation ended as the Cultural Revolution ended, and the policy was switched to the preservation of cultural plurality. But it would be too optimistic to assert that China is as pluralist or multiculturalist as Britain. In fact, there is a clear nationwide tendency of diminishing of cultural diversity. Tibetans and Uighurs are under pressure from the authority to curtail their cultural particularity (Davis, 2012; Hyer, 2006). Mongolian youngsters today speak less Mongol than their parents, and most of them had abandoned the traditional pastoral way of life (Han, 2011). Returnees from Southeast Asia “are assimilating a national identity that subsumes their overseas Chinese cultures” (Ho, 2015, p. 525).

The difference between Britain and China regarding diversity is more evident on identity formation than on ethnic policies. This study provides a close look at the ideological basis for a mainstream understanding of the nations. The outline of the national identification is sketched out by popular materials on national histories, which is corresponding to, if not directed by, the official narratives from the state. Assuming that a coherent framework of national identity could not be formed without institutionalization of collective memory, this study focuses on the stories of China and England told in the educational historiography. It traces the evolution of history textbooks back to the genesis of their modernization i.e. the beginning of the twentieth century. A large part of this project could be considered as a history of history textbooks, offering new insights into how the
national identities were symbolized in response to the falls of empires and the buildings of the nation-states. The research will then include the important public addresses made by the presidents of China and the prime ministers of the United Kingdom from the twentieth century. The research question of this dissertation is: how do history textbooks and political speeches in Britain and China construct national identities with the discourse on ethnic relationship?

This research on the symbolic construction of national identity is set up in the context of falls of empires, which is the reason of its time span i.e. the twentieth century onward. The modern China and the modern Britain are residuals of their empires which experienced their disintegrations from the twentieth century. According to Kumar (2003), the fall of empire leads to the dissolution of imperial nationalism and leaves room for developments of local nationalisms. The first half of the study will test this thesis by content analysis of the textbooks and the speeches in the first half of the twentieth century. Given that the post-war era witnessed the cultural struggle in Britain and China in building the modern nationality in response to local nationalism, the second half of the research explores how the education historiography and leaders’ speeches construct the main features of British multiculturalism and Chinese assimilationism, and what is the key feature upon which the major difference between the two cases rests.

A Justification of the Case Selection

The comparison between China and Britain appears to be counterintuitive. One may consider the different perspectives on ethnic diversity in China and Britain as due to nothing but their political systems. The authoritarian state of China can realize political, economic and ideological assimilation process in non-Han regions without serious consideration of cultural rights of ethnic minorities. The ethnic groups who feel their cultural rights violated have difficulty to have their voices heard. On the contrary, in the British and any other democracies, a proposal of cultural
assimilation may face strong objection from the multicultural constituency. The ethnic minorities have the freedom to express themselves on cultural policy in public sphere.

The attribution of the political system seems plausible. However, one cannot ignore the existence of counterexamples such as France and Singapore. The French assimilation model, in which immigrants are only granted full citizenship rights after they abandon their ethnic lifestyle and adopt the French culture, is well defended by the conservatives. Singapore is proud of its success in building a multiculturalist society. Multiculturalism policy in Singapore is a means of governance of the authoritarian state. In the sociological level, the Chinese intellectuals in post-war period embraced multiculturalism for the imagination of Singapore as a Malayan nation (Quah, 2015). In the psychological level, a study found that in Singaporean context “there were significant, positive relationships between authoritarianism and multiculturalism and between authoritarianism and positive attitudes about out-groups” (Roets et al., 2015, p. 1973). So it would be too simplistic to equate multiculturalism to democracy and to reduce assimilationism to authoritarianism. Different models of diversity are due not so much to political systems as to the distribution of power among defenders and protestors of assimilation or multiculturalism. This explains why sometimes it is difficult to identify a consistent perspective on diversity from the state, as the state policy changes as the power relation changes. A democratic state can have assimilation or multiculturalism or both as for its main policy, depending on who have the stronger power in the policy-making. Same thing happens for an authoritarian state such as China. In fact, in ethnic autonomous regions where more political positions are assigned to non-Han cadre, the minorities have the room to mobilize or manipulate state policies to promote minority culture (McCarthy, 2009), without explicitly violates state regulation.
Also, in both countries, regardless of the variety of opinions, power holders are seeking the coherence between theirs and the general publics. This is expected to be achieved by the public speeches from national leaders and in public education. China has been had national curriculum since the ROC time; Britain did not have a national curriculum until 1991, but there were dominating syllabi of history teaching as important guidance for textbook writings for secondary education from the beginning of the twentieth century. This study will focus on the influential curriculums and educational materials for history classes in China and English middle schools from the 20th century, which are respectively guides and cultivators of national identities. It also analyzes speeches made by the presidents of China and the prime ministers of the United Kingdom. We could expect a greater variance of opinions in the British case due to rotation of ruling parties. But this does not make China and Britain incomparable to each other because the change of ruling party means the shift of dominant opinions in the nation, which is exactly what we want to see.

Furthermore, this study places the narratives of national histories in the context of the empire-to-nation transitions, since both Britain and China were empires before they shrank to hybrids of empire and nation. However, a lot of scholars do not consider China as a typical example of empire, because of the small number of military expansion perpetuated by Chinese emperors (most western scholars did not consider the war-making committed by Genghis Khan as part of Chinese history; modern Chinese history textbooks, however, take a different opinion). When looking back to Chinese imperial history, they often found China as always being a peacekeeper in East Asia (Kelly, 2011). This explains the unpopularity of the term “Chinese Empire”, as war-making and territorial expansion are important features of empire.

On the other hand, some others claimed that the conquest of territory was also evident in the Chinese case (Purdue, 2005). However, the imperial rule of China seldom reached overseas, and
the Chinese Empire was an example of continental empire (Steinmetz, 2014). The “tribute system” that was fully fledged in the Ming Dynasty [1368–1644] did not resemble a typical overseas imperial system because military coercion and the exploitative relation between metropole and periphery were inconspicuous compared to imperial projects in Western cases. “Hegemony” may be a better term, but even this is questioned. “Sinocentric tribute system was based neither on brute domination nor on the kind of soft power that made the use of force irrelevant”, and China’s East Asian Neighbors had their choice to accept, ignore or even challenge Chinese “hegemonic” identity (Lee, 2016, p. 321). Kang (2008) argued that Chinese hegemon is remembered as benevolent by her East Asian neighbors: “China’s decline led to periods of generalized chaos and conflict in East Asia. When China is strong and stable, the order has been preserved” (p. 24). In his view, the tributary system was not so much a manifestation of interstate hierarchy backed by military coercion as a stepping-stone for Asian countries to the lucrative Chinese market. Also, the hierarchical relationship between China and her vassal states was not accompanied by the encroachment of the latter’s autonomy. The obedience to China was more symbolic and paid by the kings out of the consideration of cultural superiority of China, than political and maintained through military coercion. He may be unwilling even to perceive China as a continental empire because he claimed that “at its core, the Chinese-nomad relationship was about trade” (Kang, 2010, p. 618). Accepting Kang’s arguments, one may conclude that China only enjoyed hegemony inland and overseas. Accommodating Steinmetz’s approach (2014) and Go’s (2011) clarification that hegemony “refers to a relational economic position in the world system” and “is therefore distinguishable from empire, which is a political relation” (p. 104), one may consider China as a continental empire with overseas hegemony. Either possibility would make China less comparable with the British Empire.
These arguments were in line with “Chinese exceptionalism”, supporters of which tend to consider Chinese imperial history as unique and unexplainable by Western theories of empire. However, proponents of Chinese exceptionalism often ignore the coercive and aggressive side of the Chinese empire. Callahan (2012) argued that some proponents of Chinese exceptionalism “ignore one of the most violent acts of the eighteenth century: The Qing state’s ‘extermination’ of the Zunghar Mongols as it pacified its Central Eurasian frontier” (p. 42). China also invaded its Asian neighbors such as Vietnam and Korea. Although it did not form an overseas empire as the British did, and its hegemony was more cultural and economical than political, it is undeniable that this hegemony was backed by overwhelming political and military power that has actual or potential repressive influence to other nations.

It is useful to distinguish imperial rule from hegemony as Go (2011) does, but hegemony could not be sustained without imperial rule or the potential to impose the imperial rule. In other words, political power and cultural influence go hand in hand. Every empire not only “expand its control by conquest or coercion”, but also “control the political loyalty of the territories it subjugates” (Maier, 2006: 24-5). The latter is both manifested and reinforced by economic and cultural influence. There was no doubt that trading and cultural communication shaped relationship between the Han and the others, but they were intertwined with the political relationships between the states, even between the central Chinese state and those appeared to be too remote to be politically controlled i.e. Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Southeast Asia. This is not to say that we have to discuss economic and cultural communication around China within the boundary of empire, nor we should equate all the tributary states to the subjects of imperial rule. However, we should not ignore that there was a fluid sphere of political influence of China to other nations, whose boundary was determined by the power relation at a given time. The belief that China’s influence
over other nations was legitimatized solely by cultural and economic superiority were corresponding to, if not result from, the modern reinterpretation and reshaping of the imperial history of China, which would also be explained by this study.

Given the aggressiveness and expansiveness of Chinese imperial state, Chinese Empire is not so much a unique case as the Western ones. More importantly, the “peaceful” side of the empire i.e. her cultural and economic influence does not make it incomparable to the British Empire. What is found in the “benign” or non-political “soft” aspect of the Chinese Empire could be found in the British case. It had been argued that the main goal of British military aggression was to find new markets for the British goods and to “civilize” the human beings, rather than territorial acquisition or political ruling over indigenous people and governments. The apologists of British Imperialism often emphasized the British contribution to the modernization of its colonies. Some even argued that British Empire was exceptional and was not an empire in the classic sense because it was free trade instead of military aggression that played a supreme role in the imperial policies.

Apologists of the British Empire and supporters of “British exceptionalism” may go too far in emphasizing the benign and “soft” side of the empire, and in arguing that the British Empire cannot be compared to China. However, although trade and settlement in its early time might not be organized by the British imperial state, they were facilitated by chartered companies such as British East India Company “charged with the political and repressive functions of government” (Steinmetz, 2014, p. 82). Also, the British trade empire approached an empire in classic sense “in which colonial dependencies were ruled directly from London and Amsterdam” (Barfield, 2001, p. 36) after the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, imperial rules could be both benign/decentralized and repressive/centralized, and neither China nor Britain was exceptions. Concluding the feature
of an empire by either one side or the other, and saying an empire was too unique to be compared with others by exaggeration of one feature would always be biased.

I am not arguing that the structure of Chinese imperial rule is similar to that of British Empire. Compared to the Chinese case, the establishment of the British Empire was largely driven by economic profit and involved much more imperial subjects. It is also safe to say that the British rule is more political than the Chinese influence. However, the main purpose of this research – to discover national identity as a cultural product – makes the comparison immune to the structural inconsistency of the Chinese Empire and the British Empire. Regardless of the actual practice of imperial project, the Sinic culture had the strong expansive power within the continent and overseas, though the latter only reached as far as East Asia. The boundless identity rendered by a sense of universalism with the ambition of constructing a Chinese world order is salient in main elements of Chinese culture represented by Confucianism. Levenson (1964) used an odd term “culturalism” to describe the sense of community in China to emphasize the uniqueness of China as neither being a nation-state nor having a national identity. But if compared with other political entities precedent to the nation-state system, China is not that unique with regards to the communal identity. At least in both the British and Chinese case, we could perceive the pride from being the bearer of superior culture and missioner who are disseminating that culture across borders. Also, the lack of coercive power directly pushing the dissemination of the Sinic culture does not lead to the absence of structural influence. In fact, the Sinic cultural practices were functional in providing a source of the legitimacy of Vietnamese regimes, and some overseas Chinese acted as “shapers of ceremonial transition and as advisors and agents of state consolidation” (Wills, Jr, 2012, p. 476). In other words, China resembles British Empire culturally.
However, all states that are called empires share these features. Why does this study focus on China and Britain particularly? What makes the comparison between them, instead of among others, important? To answer this question, it is necessary to emphasize the theoretical goal of this study: to explore the symbolic justification of ideological frameworks for ethnic/national diversity in relation to social solidarity. Therefore, to observe this cultural process, it is necessary to select those cases that are experiencing this process. In the context of the empire-to-nation transition, instead of looking at those nations that have already gained independence from the empire, or those empires that have become a nation by assimilation, it is much more useful to analyze those post-empire nations that are experiencing the empire-nation transition. As two exceptions to the empire-nation dichotomy, Britain and China are still experiencing their national building, which is not (or not yet) accompanied by a substantial reduction of the significant difference between ethnic groups. Diversity does not go (or have not gone) away with the shrink of the empires.

More importantly, both diversities in Britain and China today are legacies of the empires. If they were downplayed or even ignored in the era of English and Han superiority during the declinations of the empires, they have to be taken into consideration in the constructions of the multi-national nations. Britain and China are certainly not the only two post-empire nations with imperial legacies of diversity. But what makes their diversity issues special is the coexistence of the regions where non-Han and non-English disproportionately inhabit. For Britain, there are Scotland, Welsh, and Northern Ireland; for China, there are inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi and Tibet. Both China and Britain can be understood not only as nations with multiple ethnicities but also “nations of nations”, because “nations occupy the homeland, whereas ethnic communities may be only linked – symbolically – to theirs” (Smith, 2010, p. 14). The attachment of territories makes the identities of Chinese and British minorities more likely to challenge the integrity of the overarching national
identity of Chinese and Briton and adds more complexity to Chinese and British nationalism. Also, neither Britain nor China is immune to the increasing diversity of the population contributed by immigration, to which their models of nationalism serve as the ideological response.

**Method and Data**

Modern national history writing has been framed in the nationalist doctrine so much so that it is meaningless to examine the authenticity of national history. “[T]he sense of unique descent, need not, and in nearly all cases will not, accord with factual history” (Connor, 1994, p. 202). The task for sociologists is to explore the particular narration strategies used by history writers to construct a nationhood, because the most relevant quality of national identity’s components is “not whether they are or not subjective, rather what matters is whether they are felt as real by those sharing a common identity” (Guibernau, 2004, p. 135). Taking this view, this study demonstrates the ways in which history is forged in the textbooks and the nation’s present is constructed in the leaders’ speeches, without considering whether the image of the nation accurately reflects the reality.

To sketch out the evolutions of shapes of national identities requires comprehensive analysis not only on the symbolic construction of core nations but also on how they are allegedly interacting with peripherals. Among the large collection of textual materials, this dissertation focuses on the issues about the core nations i.e. Han and England/Britain and the peripheral nations and ethnic groups i.e. the Scots, the Irish, and the Welsh and non-Han Chinese. Moreover, based on the assumption that imperial past could play a role in construction of modern nationalism, and the fact that for both British Empire and Chinese Empire had reached overseas albeit in different levels, the analysis also includes the narratives and opinions on the historical overseas influence. In practices, from the analysis of textbooks and speeches, this research finds the answers to the following questions:
1. What is the name of the main player in British history, “England”, “Britain”, or the Empire? Who did the Prime Ministers speak to, the English, the British, or all the people in the British Empire?

2. Who is the name of the main player in Chinese history, “Han”, “China”, or “Tianxia”? Who did the national leaders speak to, the Han, the Chinese in China, or all Chinese including those living in oversea?

3. How are Han and English defined in the history textbooks and in leaders’ speeches?

4. How did the history textbooks and leaders’ speeches describe the economic and cultural communication between the core nation and those at the periphery?

5. How did the history textbooks and leaders’ speeches describe political relationships between the core nation and those at the periphery?

Particular phrases or expressions in the materials indicate certain answers to these questions. For example, if in the texts England is equivalent to “our nation”, then it is likely that England is the protagonist of British history and that students are expected to identify themselves more to England than Britain. Also, if the emphasis on the brutality of an ethnic group are likely to correspond to the label of “alien” “foreigner” or “national enemy” attached to this ethnic group, which harden the national boundary symbolically. However, it should be noted that the nationalist features of a historiography may be located within a spectrum, and a lot of the narratives could be interpreted as in somewhere between two poles. The frequency of mentioning with particular features might be a good measurement, and it works in a single-book case study or in a multiple-book study where the books are in similar format. However, for this study that is comparing Chinese and British textbooks and tracing the evolution of textbooks, the format, length, and content organization vary
from book to book. Therefore, the frequency of mentioning is not used as a major measurement, though it may help in some units of analysis. Inspired by Smith (2010), the study indicates values of the variables by the degree of historical continuity. Smith (2010) was right that the concept of continuity is ambiguous. “It can denote something akin to the generic concept of identity, sameness over time…But it can also signify a gradual movement of change and transformation, or an accumulation of layers of past states”. From the latter perspective, “continuity is not opposed to change, rather, change is continuous” (pp. 32-33). For this study this point needs further clarification: I distinguish change from continuity unless the change or the evolution of a particular feature is demonstrated as a continuing historical development that produced the nation. The measurement of continuity is also applied to the analysis across the leaders’ speeches.

Data Selection: History Textbooks

This study analyzes the history textbooks used in public junior middle schools in England and China from the twentieth century. The reason to select textbooks published after the twentieth century is that for both cases the modernization of history education and history textbook writings did not fully take place until the beginning of this century. “The teaching of history in English state schools first became widespread as the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth” (Cannadine, 2012, p. 18) and it was at this time when so-called “readers” “whose main purpose was…to improve the reading skills of boys and girls” (p. 44) were widely supplanted by textbooks. Similarly, in premodern Chinese education, history was not a separate subject and was taught and read as nothing but an instrument for digestion of Confucius ideology and Chinese literacy. It was not under in the end of the nineteen century that history emerged in “new schools” as a separate discipline, and a growing number of history textbooks were published and used in the classroom (Wang, 2005).
Also, the reason why only textbooks for junior middle school teaching were included in this study is that for both cases history education universally existed throughout the twentieth century until today. History teaching in senior high schools, by contrast, came on and off as curriculum and school system changed. Therefore, to acquire a systematic comparison and consistent data analysis, this study mainly analyzes textbooks for junior middle school (which resembles the Key Stage 3 in England). In addition, this study also reduces the variety of textbooks by limiting data to those adopted by public schools, with the notion that the history education in public schools may be closer to the official or mainstream understanding of national identities.

But this does not mean that the history writings were always controlled by the governments, especially in England before 1980s because there was no national curriculum by then. Although the first national curriculum for history teaching in England came out in 1989 and updated several times until today, writers of history textbooks had significant freedom in organizing and wording as long as they included the contents required by the curriculum. The Chinese governments had better control on textbook writings by the national curriculum, but during the ROC time [1911-1949], the Chinese writers had a similar level of freedom to that enjoyed by the English writers after 1989. It was only from 1951 to the first decade of the twentieth-first century that the history writing was so strictly controlled that there was only one version of history narratives under each curriculum. But after this was a diversification of history textbook writings, and more than one version of history textbooks are allowed to be sold on the market as long as they meet the requirement of the curriculum. In light of the vast variety of English and Chinese textbooks, the major standard of data selection for this study is the popularity of textbooks.

Fortunately, the project of history in Education conducted by David Cannadine and his colleague provides me with the reliable guidance of textbook selection for those published before the time
of national curriculum. Among those published and used under the national curriculum, because the data of textbook market is inaccessible, I have to choose those from influencing publishers, granted that their textbooks may have larger market share. The following is the list of English textbooks analyzed in this study. All of them are available for purchase online from Abebooks.co.uk.


C Linklater Thompson, A First History of England, 1902

T.F. Tout, An Advanced History of Great Britain, 1909

C.R.L Letcher and Rudyard Kipling, A School History of England, 1911

R.B. Mowat, A New History of Great Britain, 1926


Peter Moss, History Alive, 1976

P.J. Larkin, Britain’s Heritage, 1980-1983


John D. Clare, Options in History, 1996-1997

Martin Collier, Think History!, 2003-2005

Martin Collier, History in Progress, 2009-2010

For the analysis of Chinese textbooks, the major challenge comes from the selection from those published during the ROC time. In their works on the history education during this period, Wang (2005) and Liu (2016) provide valuable information on the popularity of history textbooks in China. For those published and adopted for the history education after the 1950s, I include all the history textbooks published by People’s Education Press which nearly monopolizes the textbook market in China even after the diversification of textbook writing in the twentieth century. One exception
to this is for textbooks during the Cultural Revolution when the history education and textbook writing were paralyzed, I choose the one used for the middle schools in Beijing and some other regions. The following is the list of Chinese textbooks analyzed in this study. All of them are available for purchase online from www.bookinlife.net.

夏曾佑, 最新中学中国历史教科书, 1904-1906
陈庆年, 中国历史教科书-中学用-师范用, 1911
钟毓龙, 新制本国史教本, 1917
赵玉森, 新著本国史, 1923
傅运森, 新学制历史教科书-初中用, 1926
吕思勉, 白话本国史, 1933
周予同, 本国史, 1947
人民教育出版社, 初级中学-中国历史课本, 1951
人民教育出版社, 初级中学-中国历史, 1955
北京市教育局教材编写组, 北京市中学试用课本-中国历史（第一册）, 1973
人民教育出版社, 初级中学课本-中国历史, 1986-1987
人民教育出版社, 九年义务教育三年制初级中学教科书-中国历史, 1992
人民教育出版社, 义务教育课程标准实验教科书-中国历史, 七年级上册, 七年级下册, 2006

In addition, along with the analysis of textbooks, the study will also discuss the evolution of national curriculum. For the English part, this includes the National Curriculum for History published in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2007. They are available in the database administered by the Georg Eckert Institute which is accessible. In China, the guidance from national curriculum in history teaching ran through the whole twentieth century, as shown below. By analyzing the evolution of the curriculum, this study is capable of demonstrating the pattern of change in Chinese nationalist history education in the twentieth century and to the twenty-first century. The
curriculum and related materials before the year of 2000 are included in Li (1999). The new
curriculum in the twentieth century is available online.

1902 年 钦定中学堂章程（摘录）
1904 年 奏定中学堂章程（摘录）
1909 年 学部奏变通中学堂课程分为文科实科折（摘录）
1912 年 中学校令施行规则（摘录）
1913 年 中学校课程标准（摘录）
1923 年 初级中学历史课程纲要
1929 年 初级中学历史暂行课程标准
1932 年 初级中学历史课程标准
1936 年 初级中学历史课程标准
1940 年 修正初级中学历史课程标准
1941 年 六年制中学历史课程标准草案
1948 年 修订初级中学历史课程标准
1956 年 初级中学中国历史教学大纲（草案）
1956 年 初级中学世界历史教学大纲（草案）
1963 年 全日制中学历史教学大纲（草案）
1980 年 全日制十年制学校中学历史教学大纲
1986 年 全日制中学历史教学大纲
1990 年 全日制中学历史教学大纲（修订本）
1991 年 中小学历史学科思想政治教育纲要（试用）
1992 年 九年义务教育全日制初级中学历史教学大纲（试用）
2000 年 九年义务教育全日制初级中学历史教学大纲（试用修订版）
2011 年 全日制义务教育历史课程标准
Data Selection: Leaders’ Speeches

The analysis of history textbooks in this study will be accompanied by a survey on presidential/prime minister speeches in Britain and China from the twentieth century, the latter of which could also serve as empirical evidence of officially recognized national identity. At times the British and Chinese leaders would feel the need to address the problem of nationality in order to dispel people’s doubts on national identity and diversity. It could constantly be a sub-topic in all important national addresses, and would be emphasized especially when the society are divided along with the opinions of national question e.g. the Irish question, potential integration of the commonwealth, and the problem of Scottish independence etc. and/or the national sovereignty is under domestic or foreign threats i.e. the power of local warlords, the Tibetan independent movement, foreign invasions during World War Two. Presidential or prime minister speeches at these times are not only the governmental gestures with the purpose of unifying the country but also the clarification of the official version of national identity with the usage of multiple linguistic symbols. It is not uncommon that speeches by national leaders are closely analyzed to demonstrate the face of national identity (see Kalenda and Karger, 2016 for a Czech case; Mpofu, 2016 for a Zimbabwean case). For British case, Loughlin (2002) studied Joseph Chamberlain’s sharp changes in his attitude toward the Ulster Question and in his concept of English nationality by analyzing his public statements and speeches. Uberoi and Modood (2013) utilized British politicians’ speeches to show a multiculturalist advance in policies. Atkins (2016) made an interesting comparison between the speeches made by Gordon Brown and David Cameron, demonstrating how the prime ministers defined Britishness with their interpretation and evaluation of the historical myth of Magna Carta. There are not as many works in English about the Chinese leaders’ speech and national identity, but Esteban (2006) included some of Jiang Zemin’s speeches in his
study on how the rise of affirmative nationalism reinforced the legitimacy of the Communist regime especially against domestic liberals.

This study will analyze the important speeches made by British Prime Ministers and Chinese presidents from 1900s and especially focus on the nationalist discourse regarding national identity, ethnic minority, empires and foreign wars. For the British case and Chinese case, however, I apply different procedures of data collection with the consideration of data availability and other conditions.

The political speeches made by British party leaders’ after 1895 are well archived online in *British Political Speech* ([www.britishpoliticalspeech.org](http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org)). The study will select those speeches made by the party leaders while they were Prime Ministers, because those probably better reflect the major, if not mainstream, political opinions. But if the speeches were specifically targeting opposite opinions, those made by the leaders of the opposition will also be analyzed for significant comparison. The following is the list of the British speeches that will be analyzed in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury, Lord</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>London 1900/12/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balfour, Arthur</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Manchester 1902/10/14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Sheffield 1903/10/1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Southampton 1904/10/28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Newcastle 1905/11/14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Plymouth 1907/6/7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asquith, Herbert</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Birmingham 1908/6/19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Southport 1909/7/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Hull 1910/11/25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Nottingham 1912/11/22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Leeds 1913/11/27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, Andrew Bonar</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>London 1922/12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDonald, J. Ramsay</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>London 1924/10/7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin, Stanley</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Brighton 1925/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Scarborough 1926/6/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Cardiff 1927/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Great Yarmouth 1928/9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Bournemouth 1935/10/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamberlain, Neville</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Scarborough 1937/10/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churchill, Winston</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>London 1945/3/15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attlee, Clement</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Bournemouth 1946/6/11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Speech Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader's speech</th>
<th>1995/10/13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Bournemouth 1996/10/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Blair, Tony  

Labour

General election victory speech  
Leader's speech  
'Bringing Britain Together'  
Leader's speech  
"Doctrine of the International Community"  
Leader's speech  
Speech to the Global Ethics Foundation  
Leader's speech  
Leader's speech  
"Faith in Politics"  
General election victory speech  
Leader's speech  
Speech to TUC conference  
Speech at Labour's local government, women's and youth conferences  
Leader's speech  
"Prime Minister warns of continuing global terror threat"  
Leader's speech  
"Speech on improving parenting"  
"Speech to Faithworks"  
General election victory speech  
Leader's speech  
"Our Nation's Future - Social Exclusion"  
Leader's speech  
"Respect Agenda" speech  
Speech to the "Islam and Muslims in the World Today" conference  
Resignation speech  

Brown, Gordon  

Labour

Leadership acceptance speech  
Leader's speech  
Speech before the Church of Scotland General Assembly  
Speech at the Lambeth Conference  
Leader's speech
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008/11/18</td>
<td>Speech to the UN interfaith dialogue meeting</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/3/31</td>
<td>&quot;Global Rules, Global Values&quot;</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/5/12</td>
<td>Speech to the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership Conference</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/9/29</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Brighton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/5/11</td>
<td>Farewell speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/5/11</td>
<td>General election victory speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/5/28</td>
<td>&quot;Transforming the British economy: Coalition strategy for economic growth&quot;</td>
<td>Shipley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/7/19</td>
<td>&quot;Speech on the Big Society&quot;</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/9/19</td>
<td>&quot;Speech to Pope Benedict XVI&quot;</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/10/6</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2/5</td>
<td>Speech at Munich Security Conference</td>
<td>Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/10/5</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12/16</td>
<td>&quot;King James Bible&quot; speech</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/6/25</td>
<td>&quot;Speech on welfare&quot;, Bluewater</td>
<td>Kent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/10/10</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/10/2</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/10/1</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/10/7</td>
<td>Leader's speech</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many in the list are speeches given by Prime Ministers as party leaders in party conferences. They not only receive more media coverage and presumably more public attention but also reflect the dominating view from Cabinets on a variety of issues which may relate to particular policies advocated by the parties in power. Party leader’s speeches are generally made once a year, which allows us to trace the evolution of official values on nationality, diversity and foreign affairs closely. Another advantage of this digital archive is that it allows keyword search, which is very helpful to facilitate the content analysis. The keywords include but not limited to English/England, Scot/Scotland, Irish/Ireland, Welsh/Wales, British/Britain, Empire, Commonwealth, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, Hong Kong, Home Rule, War.
This study will also give special attention to Winston Churchill’s speeches during the World War Two, which were so important that they expressed the nation’s will to unite and fight against the common enemy and so influential because many of them were broadcasted nationwide through radio. The website of The International Churchill Society (https://www.winstonchurchill.org) provides a complete collection of Churchill’s speeches during the war, based on which I come up with the following list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give Us The Tools</td>
<td>1941/2/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Old Lion</td>
<td>1941/6/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance with Russia</td>
<td>1941/6/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Your Worst; We'll Do Our Best</td>
<td>1941/7/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Give In</td>
<td>1941/10/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas Message</td>
<td>1941/12/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address to Joint Session of US Congress</td>
<td>1941/12/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation - Liberation - Assault</td>
<td>1941/12/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bright Gleam of Victory</td>
<td>1942/11/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavier Work Lies Ahead (Second Address to US Congress)</td>
<td>1943/5/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gift of a Common Tongue</td>
<td>1943/9/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Invasion of France</td>
<td>1944/6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE Day</td>
<td>1945/5/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the War in Europe</td>
<td>1945/5/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is Your Victory</td>
<td>1945/5/8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Chinese side of the study, it is reasonable to have a different logic of data collection. Although the Qing Dynasty had been overturned in 1911 and the Republic of China was founded in 1912, for the first three decades of the twentieth century China did not have a centralized national government. As the founding father of the modern China, Sun Yet-sen had to concede the presidency to Yuan Shikai, the second and the last president of the Provisional Government [1912-1913]. The following Beiyang government [1913-1928] was run by warlords and power manipulators and was extremely unpopular especially after World War I. Although Sun was only the President of the ROC for three months, his ideological influence over China was undoubtedly
for the national building of modern China, and his political authority was mainly manifested in the
Nationalist Party that ruled China from 1928 to 1949. Sun died in 1925, after the failure of the
second expedition to overturn the Beiyang Government. His legacy was picked up by Chiang Kai-
shek, whose military ability was appreciated by Sun. The Nationalist Party, led by Chiang,
overthrew the Beiyang Government and nominally united the nation in 1928. Although he was not
the only person who ever became the head of state, Chiang remained the actual power holder of
the ROC government before he fled to Taiwan after being defeated by the Communist Party. The
party and national rulers of post-1949 China have had five generations that respectively led by
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, who left influential remarks
on national/partisan policy and ideology in their own times.

For the speech selection, this study follows the list of real power holders of modern China, which
excludes the speeches made by those unpopular presidents during the Beiyang period and those
who were not recognized as “supreme leaders” of the PRC such as Hua Guofeng. Most of the
important speeches from Sun Yat-sen were not made during his short presidency, but they had a
profound influence on the development of modern Chinese nationality. I follow the list developed
by Yu (2006) that includes ten Sun Yat-sen's speeches that are of great importance. They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Location and Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>《民报》创刊周年演讲</td>
<td>Tokyo 1906/12/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中华民国临时大总统宣言书</td>
<td>Beiping 1912/1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>南京同盟会员饯别会演讲</td>
<td>Nanjing 1912/4/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>改造中国之第一步</td>
<td>Shanghai 1919/10/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>广东旅桂同乡会欢迎会演讲</td>
<td>Guangdong 1922/1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>人民心力为革命成功的基础</td>
<td>Guangzhou 1923/11/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国民党一大讲话</td>
<td>Guangzhou 1924/1/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国民党第一次全国代表大会宣言</td>
<td>Guangzhou 1924/1/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>革命的基础在高深的学问</td>
<td>Shanghai 1924/6/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>上海新闻记者招待会讲话</td>
<td>Shanghai 1924/11/19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These speeches generally cover three grand topics in Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary ideology – Minzu (the nation), Minquan (the people’s right) and Minsheng (the people’s livelihood). Sun’s ideology was not only regarded as for the revolution but also the unshakeable principle guiding the early modernization of China which was claimed to be the soul of the Nationalist Party. This study mainly focuses on those sections within the speeches that are about the nation, which reflect his nationalist ideology. As a scholar, Sun also gave a series of lectures about his ideology of which nationalism was an important topic. His six lectures about the “right kind” of modern Chinese nationalism could be found in http://www.huanghuagang.org/. The titles of the lectures are 1. What is nationalism; 2. China’s national crisis; 3. Why does China lose nationalism; 4. Nationalism first, and then cosmopolitanism; 5. How to revive nationalism; 6. The national morality and spirit, and peaceful nationalism. These lectures are also subjects in this research.

Chiang Kai-shek made numerous speeches when he was the leader of the Nationalist Party. A complete compilation of his speeches is The Compilation of President Chiang’s Ideas and Speeches edited by Qin (1984), which is available on the website of Chongcheng Education Foundation (http://www.ccfd.org.tw). I select the speeches as the research subjects if they are: 1. for a large audience; 2. about nationalist ideology or; 3. about ideological education. Below is the list of Chiang’s speeches that will be analyzed in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>三民主義與五權憲法概要</td>
<td>1924/10/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>國民革命軍總司令就職誓師講話</td>
<td>1926/7/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>三民主義要旨與三民主義教育之重要</td>
<td>1927/2/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中國國民黨第三次全國代表大會開幕詞</td>
<td>1929/3/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中國教育的思想問題</td>
<td>1931/1/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中國的立國精神（要抵抗日本帝國主義先要抵抗日本武士道的精神）</td>
<td>1932/6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>教育與經濟為立國救國兩要素</td>
<td>1932/10/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>國旗與軍樂之意義</td>
<td>1933/9/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>紀念國慶要提倡禮儀廉恥</td>
<td>1933/10/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>復興民族之要道</td>
<td>1934/2/5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mao Zedong’s speeches are well compiled in volumes of *Selected Work of Mao Zedong*. This study uses volume five, six and seven because they are collections of speeches made after the Communist Party took the power of China. Most of Mao’s speeches served as general guidelines and advice for the Communist Party and the government, and many of them covered more than one topics. Also, if the speeches have concrete topics, “national building” or other relevant terms was not usually mentioned in the titles. To avoid missing important information, I acquire the digital books online, which allows me to do a keyword search in the text to locate the data points. The keywords include: 民族 (nation), 中华 (Zhonghua), 中国 (China), 边疆 (frontier), 统一 (unification), 分裂 (disintegration of the nation), 侵略 (invasion), 教育 (education).

The selection from the speeches made by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao follows the same step. For Deng’s speeches, I study *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, volume two and volume three; for Jiang’s speeches, I study *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, volume two and volume three; for Hu’s speeches, I study *Selected Works of Hu Jintao*, volume two and volume three. All of these are available for download online.

**Dissertation Outline**
Chapter 2 contains a brief review on the literature that is relevant to this study which mainly focuses on the three consequences of the dominance of modernism and social constructionism that may limit the perspectives of nationalism studies. It also discusses how this study can be a remedy to these pitfalls. Chapter 3 presents the result of the analysis of the Chinese data in the first half of the twentieth century, showing how Han was defined as the nation and how Han allegedly carried the assimilative feature in the textbooks and the speeches. Chapter 4 discusses the contemporary British data, showing that while the Prime Ministers generally expressed their loyalty to the Empire, English nationalism is found in the history textbooks. It also indicates the Prime Ministers’ attitudes to the local self-government and how did they correlate to the textbooks’ views on interethnic relationships in the past. Chapter 5 compares Chinese nationalism and British nationalism implied and demonstrated in the data from the second half of the twentieth century. The last chapter concludes the findings of this research, and discusses how the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodology

1. Modernism and Social Constructionism

This dissertation reveals how national identities are defined and depicted in elite discourses as a symbol of nation building in modern era. It is plausible to perceive this type of study as empirical research on how the image of nation is constructed by modern states for present needs, especially with the consideration that primordialist approach of nationalism has been subjected to extensive criticism. Primordialist believed that ethnicity and nationality are “deeply rooted in the historical experience of human beings to the point of being practically a given” (Llobera, 1999). Features of national identity, if perceived as primordial, would be understood as natural and given by pre-modern experience, and persisted even after modernization of the society as they are independent of the effect of modern social structure. Consequently, primordialism precludes the sociological approach in the study of national identity and nationalism, as the way in which people define and describe their ethnicities and nations are predetermined by traditions. For instance, with the belief that identities are natural or given, Geertz (1973) argued that identities “cannot be explained or analyzed by referring to social interaction, but are coercive” and understood identity as a type of sentiment or affection. Isaacs (1975) contributed to primordialism with the emphases on physical body, name, language, religion, history, ethnic affiliation, place of birth, and culture as the origin of one’s personal identity.

Primordialism is unable to account for the emergence, evolution, and dissolution ethnicity and nationality. It also easily falls into ethnocentrism under which racial inequality is justified as a natural product rather than analyzed as a social product. Due to the static and biased understanding of identity, primordialism is questioned and abandoned by most social scientists today who are trained with social constructionism. In this approach, cultural phenomenon such as national and
ethnic identity are products of social structure, and are shaped as social structure changes. In the realm of ethnicity study, social constructivist approach is taken by Instrumentalist theorists, whose studies are based on the idea that ethnicity is flexible and dynamic to be adaptive to the economic, social or political processes. For Barth (1969), the symbolic and social delimitation of boundary instead of the content of group culture is essential of ethnicity and hence should be the subject of identity research. The maintenance of ethnic boundary is not primordial but the depends on “specific ecological, economic, historical or political situations” (Llobera, 1999). In terms of the variables that affect boundary drawing of ethnic groups, there are four levels of analysis of ethnicity: micro, median, macro and global. Analyzing the cultural product by the state and intellectual elites, this study is closer to macro level in which the researchers are interested in how the state as “a vast machinery (schools, media, etc.) to control and manipulate information and to imprint particular ethnic/national frameworks” (Llobera, 1999).

Instrumentalism is an approach in the study of ethnicity, but it is also taken in the field of nationalism. A classic example of the application of Instrumentalism was the works collected by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), who defined nationalism as an “invented tradition”. For each nation-state, history functions as “a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion” (p. 12) and was harnessed by the state elites for present needs. A tradition is not primordial, but is invented to be seemingly primordial. Primordiality ceases to be facticity but is subjected to social processes. The degree and direction of primordiality determine the constructed history of a nation, hence the concept of this nation. Regarding the treatment of identity formation as dynamic process, social constructionism goes hand in hand with the modernist approach in nationalism study. Modernist theorists are exclusively interested in the effect of modern social structure on the formation of nation states, therefore they perceive nationalism as a modern product. According to the modernist
paradigm, the emergence of nationalism, taking the form of either homogenization of population within empires, or national independence movement against old empires, is considered as a product of modernization. Anderson (1983) argues that emergence of nations as 'imagined communities' results from the integration of dialects into new common languages and growth of print-capitalism and social media. Gellner (1983) attributed the emergence of nationalism to the larger demand for literate labor and therefore mass education in industrial societies than in preindustrial societies. Other scholars argued that political and economic factors jointly promoted the growth of nation-states and prevalence of nationalism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991).

'[N]ation derives from the political structuring of the world-system' (p. 80, emphasized by the authors), which roots in the 'axial division of labor within the world-economy' (p. 79). The modern state then must create a corresponding nation to achieve social cohesion and establish 'administrative uniformity that increases the efficacy' (pp. 81-82) of state power.

The camp of social constructionism and modernism lays the foundation of the field of nationalism study. However, its popularity leads to several tendencies of nationalism researches that may become disadvantages for the development of this field. First and foremost, underlying the modernist paradigm was Western-centric theory of modernization and modernity, which implicitly assumed “that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world” (Eisenstadt, 2000). In the context of national building and construction of modern national identity, this “classical” theory of modernity would assume that semantic constructions of nationalisms in different countries all over the world would have a high level of homogeneity, because they are cultural products of modern social structure formations of which are based on singular Western
model. Cultural projects of nation building in non-Western countries would presumably follow the Western model that is expected to be universally applicable; if a case fails to resonate, it would be considered as less modernized or unsuitable for modern nationalism. The western-centric view would limit the incentive to search for variation of the shape of nationalism from case to case; and if there are models of nation building alternative to Western one, they are subjected to normative judgment. The most well-known categorization of nationalism was contributed by Hans Kohn (1946) who differentiated old nationalism in the West and new nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia. Nationalism in the West was developed out of the modern progression of political and social organizations so that it was “connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century” (p. 67). The West is the teacher of nationalism for the rest of the world, but nationalism in the East, on the other hand, rouse in a different historical condition. With the “backward state of political and social development” (p. 66), nationalism in the East “found its first expression in the cultural field”, which led to glorification of the past as nation’s history instead of rationalist sense of belonging. Nationalism in the East is based upon elements that are believed to be naturally given, such as kinship, thus is in opposition to nationalism in the West that is liberal and rational. Kohn’s idea is developed into the binary of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Because of liberalist principle, a civic nation has high level of tolerance of race, ethnic and culture differences with inclusive immigration policy. People living in a civic nation has free choice to acquire or relinquish the citizenship and the national identity. In contrast, ethnic nationalism is “an ideology that construes a nation in terms of a common culture to be protected by the nationalist movement which establishes a nation-state for that purpose” (Ignatieff, 1995), thus it is usually accompanied with conservativism toward racial, ethnic and cultural diversity and oppressive assignment of national identity and belonging.
Civic nationalism is close to nationalism in the West in Kohn’s writing, while ethnic nationalism is more popular in the East. Furthermore, the emphasis on the divergence of these two types of nationalism, combined with the Western-centricism, leads to normative judgment in favor of civic nationalism while against ethnic nationalism.

However, many scholars (e.g. Brown, 1999; Yack, 1996; Spencer and Wollman, 1998) have found that the binary of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is problematic as there is no nation that is purely civic nor ethnic. No nation can be culturally neutral, including those known as “civic nation” such as France, Canada, and the United States. For example, a study finds that in the 1940s and 1950s the Canadian history textbooks 'drew on assumption that humanity was constituted by colour-coded divisions of people', and Canadian history was defined as the history of white settlers with 'colored' people were peripheral. Even history textbooks published and used after 2000s contained racist narratives (Montgomery, 2005). Similarly, in a discourse analysis on the leader’s speeches for the justification of the independence of Moldovan nation from Romanian, Iglesias (2013) found that the speeches demonstrated civic nationalism explicitly but ethnic and exclusive implicitly. Brubaker (1999) questioned the civic-ethnic framework systematically and comprehensively regarding its usefulness, objectiveness, and normativity. As a popular dichotomy, civic-ethnic distinction is “overburdened” because it is used to explain too much variations which is supposed to be analyzed separately in their own terms.

Secondly, nationalism in the shape of cultural products e.g. textbooks, museums, monuments are treated as the “dependent variable” shaped by the needs of contemporary society (state in particular), though its domestic and international influences were often emphasized. There is a tendency to form a causal relationship between the structural factors and nationalist ideology, and an underlying assumption that cultural products must serve certain interests or purposes. For
instance, the topic of “national humiliation” in history education in China gained interest from many because to place China as the victim of Western encroachment and invasion in early modern history appeared to serve the political interest of the Communist Party. Wang (2008) argued that the “national humiliation” discourse in political and popular culture was institutionalized in educational realm through the national “Patriotic Educational Campaign” from 1991. This campaign was launched as an ideological tool to solve the “three belief crises” i.e. “crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party” (p. 788). The concern that the belief crises would undermine the authority of the CCP was made convincing for the party leaders after the outbreak of the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. “In the 1990s, with the decline of Communist ideology as a source of legitimacy, the CCP leaders realized that history education on national humiliation was an effective device for the regime to legitimize its rule” (p. 789), and the “patriotic education stresses the role of the Communist state as the bearer of China’s historic struggle for national independence” (p. 790).

However, reducing nationalist cultural products to direct result of social and political process would run the risk of oversimplification. It is necessary to analysis the purposes of the key decision makers and degrees of autonomy of the practitioners if, say, the researcher wanted to contribute an accurate explanation of the features of history education. It would be a big and ambitious project, which may show that the Party’s desire for legitimacy did not necessarily determine the shape of history education. Also, even if the emphasis on national suffering from sovereignty loss could be well explained by the state’s will, it may not in other cases, such as Korea and other nations in South East Asia which perceived them as victims of the twentieth century colonization.

Lastly, under the modernist paradigm, premodern roots and concrete language of modern nationalism are often downplayed or even ignored, otherwise variation between cases may
outweigh their commonality, which is a violation to the Western-centric understanding of modern nationalism. However, this tendency would limit the scope of nationalism study, and exclude the possibility to categorize nationalism in the perspective of cultural sociology and historical sociology. Important information would be missed if the symbols that constitute nationalist culture are not analyzed in their own terms and if premodern social structure, such as imperial state are not taken into serious account.

Looking for the evolution of the narration of national history from one period to another, and using history textbooks published and adopted in the twentieth century as a symbol of modernization of education, this study follows social constructionism and modernism in its exploration of Chinese nationalism and British nationalism. Although this study follows the constructivist and modernist perspectives by focusing on how historiography and political speeches are produced in modern time, it attempts to avoid the three abovementioned tendencies by taking a cultural and historical approach. Firstly, this study moves away from Western-centrism taking China and Britain as two modernizing cases of nation building, which is inspired by the notion of “multiple modernities” from Eisenstadt (2000) who argued that the Western model of modernity is not the only model that are applied in the world. “The actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions” (p. 1) of the Western model of modernity. Eisenstadt also rejected the notion that modernity and Westernization are identical. Therefore, that social actors adopt modernization with distinctive interpretation compared to Western model does not mean that they do not modernize. In fact, the modernization processes in non-Western cases are often processes of selection. The appropriation of modernity’s “themes and institutions permitted many in non-European societies…to participate actively in the new modern universal (albeit initially Western) tradition, while selectively rejecting many of its aspects” (p. 14).
This study avoids the second tendency by refraining from making strong argument about the causal relationship between social structure and cultural products. But this does not mean that social structure is totally absent in the discussion. In fact, the data selection is predicated on that both China and Britain from the twentieth century experience the transition from being empires to nations. No clear causal line will be drawn between the fall of empire and the construction of national identity, but the former serves as the condition of the latter. The question should be asked is: “what are the conditions for the possibility of nationalism?” (Hirschi, 2012) The thinking on conditions rather than reasons is largely owe to Kumar’s (2003) argument that the collapse of British Empire gave room for the development of local nationalism among the English and the others. I am curious if the similar condition in China would also gave space for the uprising of local nationalism among Han and others that are considered legitimate.

And the consideration of the pre-nation condition is also fulfilling the need to avoid the third tendency. The analysis of social structure should be put in historical perspective, which is exemplified by Brubaker’s (1992) famous work of the comparison between French and German nationhood. although Brubaker (1992) argued that consolidation of nationhood was a result of the French Revolution, he also stressed that the ancient regime structure and pre-revolutionary ideology played fundamental role. He traced the historical root of jus soli nationalism to the “early consolidation and progressively increasing stateness of the French monarchy” and the “politicization of nationhood in pre-Revolutionary France” (Brubaker 1990, 388) to be crystalized by the idea of self-determination as the basis of collective self and as an expression of the desire for universal liberty after the Revolution. Premodern factors shape the foundation of Germany nationhood as well. Historically there was no fusion but conceptual differentiation between nation and supra-national Empire in Germany. The elites did not have the memory of strong German
imperial state. “The Empire lacked the integrative power of centralizing bureaucratic administration, failed to shape a firmly state-anchored national consciousness” (Brubaker 1990, 388). Also, the historical differentiation between nation and state gave the space for the development of an apolitical and ethnocultural understanding of German nationhood. In conclusion, Brubaker argued that different historical roots gave birth to the two types of nationhood, and the latter in turn lays the foundation for contrasting principles of citizenship policy and various degrees of citizenship inclusion.

My study of Britain and China does not analyze premodern social structure as comprehensive as did Brubaker (1992). However, to make sense of the different treatments of diversity in the Britain and China today, this dissertation takes the key difference between British Empire and Chinese Empire into account, which is inspired by the work from Maier (2006) who borrowed Geoffrey Hosking’s classification of empires i.e. being empire and having empire. “States that are empires usually rule most of their territory according to one encompassing authoritarian regime, which may, however, allow enclaves of semi-autonomy. Nations that have empires rule their possessions abroad by authoritarian methods while they often govern their homelands by representative systems” (Maier, 2006, p. 5). Applying this classification into our study, China was an empire, while Britain had an empire. The identity issue I am interested in, however, is less to do with political system i.e. authoritarianism or representative system but is related to whether metropole and peripheries were ruled under the same regime and in one encompassing structure. Probably because of various differentiation of ruling, British emperors identified Indians under their reign as cultural others to more extent than Manchu emperors would consider Zunghar Mongols or Chinese emperors would consider Vietnamese. I assume that different distribution of reign of
empires in the past may correspond to, if not the direct ancestor of, difference senses of national identity in present.

And therefore, the main body of this study is the analysis of symbol carrying nationalist meaning. Knowing that movie is not reality does not mean that movie is not worth watching. Similarly, the shape of nationalism is the result of social construction does not mean that features of nationalist doctrine is not worth analyzing. Hirschi (2012) stated that interpreting the conditions of nationalism one should not leave “nationalist language out of the picture” (p. 28), because different components of nationalist language would interact differently with social structure and then yield various configuration of nationalism, though it is very difficult to trace all the patterns. The analysis of the features of nationalism in China and Britain also shed lights on different modernization projects in the two countries. As Eisenstadt (2000) suggested, the embrace of modernity is also a process of combination. Non-West social actors especially elites and intellectuals “incorporate some of the Western universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of their own new collective identities, without necessarily giving up specific components of their traditional identities” (p. 15). The inclusions of pre-modernity and cultural elements goes hand in hand, in opposition to the ally between the reduction to social structure and pure modernist view in the understanding of nationalism.

Correspondingly, Smith (1986) stressed that the study on nationalism should not exclude ethnocultural roots, or “ethnie” that were constructed in premodern context. A nation-building process would be compromised by the lack of creation and crystallization of ethnic component. The building of a nation and the construction of its popular nationalism are modern phenomena, but they would not happen without the cumulative experience of ethnicity dated from pre-modern era. Intellectual and political elites are constructors of nationhood, but they do not fabricate a
nation out of anything. In fact, “the wide range and durability of historical ethnie in pre-modern eras…sets limits to elite attempts to manipulate and mobilize populations in their strategies of national construction”, and “there are ‘ethnic roots’ which determine, to a considerable degree, the nature and limits of modern nationalisms and nations, and which elites must respect if they are to achieve their short-term objectives” (p. 18). In addition, the fact that modern nationalism is a national, popular ideology does not invalidate the efforts by intellectual elites to educate the mass of national identity. In other words, the pre-modern, elite-based national identification is the historical source of modern, popular nationalism. The emphases on conditions and symbolic elements lead to the discussions below.

2. The Faltering Empires and the Promoted Nationalism

The modern China and the modern Britain are residuals of their empires. From the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century, as the British Empire and its global hegemony was seriously challenged by other modern imperial powers, the sovereignty of the Chinese Empire suffered from the encroachment of other imperial powers, which was signified by its failure of the two Opium Wars [1840, 1860]. Was the transformation in the structure corresponding to, if not a direct cause of, the transformation in the culture regarding national identity?

In his unique and inspiring work, Kumar (2000, 2003) offered an answer for the English case. The land empire i.e. Great Britain or the United Kingdom consisted by the East Atlantic archipelago, and the overseas empire “on which the sun never sets” operated in different ways, but they had similar effect in that “they made meaningless the development of a specifically English national identity” (Kumar, 2000, p. 589). This did not mean that English national identity did not exist during the imperial time. Kumar argued that the salience of Englishness was muted in front of the might of multi-ethnic Empire. “The English, as the wealthiest, most numerous, and most powerful
group within the United Kingdom, were aware of the need to restrain their claims and to mute assertions of ethnic diversity, among themselves no less than among other ethnicities in the kingdom”, as the loyalty to the British Empire was attached not to people but to its institutions, such as the Crown, the Parliament, the Protestant religion, and the British imperial, modernization projects (Kumar, 2000, p. 589). When the dominance of the English was secured, emphasizing the ethnic superiority was not only unnecessary but also dangerous, because it would “threaten the very basis of that commanding position, by reminding other groups of their inferiority and perhaps provoking them to do something about it” (p. 590). Kumar described this type of national belonging as “imperial nationalism” or “missionary nationalism”, in which the “state-bearing peoples…will be careful not to stress their ethnic identity” but “will stress the political, cultural, or religious mission to which they have been called” (p. 579-80).

However, from the second half of the nineteenth century, the English had been experiencing a decline in confidence in the maintenance of global hegemony, the continuation of the civilizing project and the Empire, facing the potential and real challenge especially from the United States and Germany. The religious basis of the ethnic coalition within the British nation and Empire – Protestantism – was also facing dissolution, not just because the Catholic powers i.e. France was no longer the only enemy against whom all the Protestant ethnicities in the British Empire could corporately fight, as both the United States and Germany were Protestant too, but also due to the overall declination of religion at the time. Additionally, this was also a time of the surge of nationalism, which in Britain was reflected by “the rediscovery, or reinvention, of a native culture and a national history” (Kumar, 2003, p. 200) for Welshness, Irishness, and Scottishness. Although these revived or reinvented nationalisms did not exert any political threat directly to the Great Britain, they indeed posed an ideological challenge to and cultural skepticism against the ever-
undoubted English dominance in the imperial nationhood. Kumar suggested that the English response to the instability of Britishness and imperialism by an unprecedented emphasis on the English national identity and the superiority of Englishness. “If others reject you, it is natural to play up your strengths, and to take pride in precisely those things that distinguish you from those others” (Kumar, 2003, p. 200). Kumar identified some attempts to discover the Englishness, and two of them are worthy of a closer analysis by this study: the Whig interpretation of English history and the racial understanding of Englishness i.e. Anglo-Saxonism.

Did the trade-off between imperial nationalism and narrow nationalism also happen in China? Similar to the British case, the falling of the Qing Empire (with Manchu Emperor) was also accompanied by the surge of non-Han ethnic nationalisms, which, however, posed more threat to the imperial identity than in the British case because they became more than cultural as Tibet gained unrecognized independence from 1912 to 1951 and Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang had several political uprisings against Chinese rule. Han nationalism surged as well and functioned as the sentimental and ideological basis for anti-Manchu movement in the first place. But the Han people in the time of Republic of China [ROC, 1911-1949] found they were challenged by non-Han ethnic nationalisms in inheriting the empire in one piece. Also, China’s overseas hegemon had almost annihilated by the Japanese in World War Two. The religious basis of the civilizing project and ethnic coalition in the Chinese Empire, Confucianism, was a victim of both Western, secular and scientific ideas and the humiliating defeat of the Empire by the Western powers and Japan. Among the Chinese intelligentsia who adopted Western ideas, there were prominent skepticism or even total objection on Confucianism especially during and after the New Culture Movement [1919]. However, was there any redefinition of Confucianism as a distinctive component of Han nationality, at least in the period from the declination of the Qing Empire to the New Culture
Movement? Also, did the disintegration of the Chinese Empire leave a room and a felt necessity for an emphasis of Han superiority, which may be supported by the Western ideas of race and ethnicity? These questions will be answered by the analysis of popular history textbooks used in Chinese schools during this period.

3. Nation Building and Ethnic Diversity

After the turbulent first half of the twentieth century, there was a reconstruction of the world order and the second wave of nation-building. The British Empire was significantly declining since the 1950s as its former overseas imperial power was either defeated by the post-war decolonization or reduced to the Commonwealth whose legitimacy was recognized more culturally than politically, and whose cultural legitimacy was dying out without structural support. But the United Kingdom survived the prophecy of the collapse of the British Empire that had its momentum in the 1970s, as the English now preserved a much smaller faction of the old empire, i.e. England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and some small overseas territories. For China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power and restored the political controls over some peripheral and minority regions some of which the Nationalists and the ROC failed to secure e.g. Tibet, but the territorial limit of the PRC was still smaller than that of the Qing Empire in its prime e.g. the independence of Outer Mongolia during the ROC time could not be reversed. Also, for decades China was unable to restore any of its hegemony over the South East Asia. In other words, both British and Chinese Empire had lost most of their overseas rulings while only sustained most of their inner ruling after their shrinkages.

So Britain and China today are “nations of nations”, and has experienced or may be still experiencing the transition from empire to nation-states under the wave of nationalism. The relationship between the nationalist doctrine and the empires is threefold. First, the modern
doctrine of nationalism stipulates that the boundary of a nation’s sovereignty should be clearly defined, and modern nation-states are expected to respect each other’s sovereignty. Violation of foreign sovereignty especially through military aggression is unwelcome for this world culture and is unlawful without international consensus. Also, every citizen in a modern nation-state is granted equal rights by its constitution. Unequal treatments along the ethnic, religious and cultural line are condemned. Both Britain and China conform to the nationalist stipulation, at least allegedly. China claims it is experiencing a “peaceful rising” and makes the promise that its economic hegemony overseas would not transform into political and military trespassing. By the same token, military expansion is by no means an option for British foreign policy after World War Two, and aggressive military action is rarely made to keep the old colonies from independence after its failure in dealing with the Suez Crisis (1956), though the Falkland Islands War (1982) is an exception and maybe the last one. Also, both China and Britain claim that all men, regardless of their ethnic background, are equal under their constitutions. Regarding foreign policy and civil rights, both of them is moving away from the imperial end to the national end.

Second, after it challenged the imperial rules of the English and the Han, the nationalist ideology regained its momentum, this time almost exclusively delivered by ethnic minorities in the British Isles and the Chinese mainland. The Tibetan independence movement and the Scottish independence movement had given the Chinese and the British authorities a tough job to sustain the national solidarity, respectively. The migration waves since the 1970s that further facilitating the ethnic diversities were also legacies of the empires. The approximate synchronism of the post-empire cultural diversification in England and China proper may be nothing but coincidence, but both have the root in the imperial rule of differences, and both pose a significant challenge to the integrity of national identity and social coherence. In light of the potential and actual strain between
social coherence and ethnic diversity, efforts are made to nurture the post-war British national identity encompassing the nations in the British Isles (Ireland excluded); China defines itself as a “united multi-ethnic nation” that consist of 56 ethnicities each of which is a member of Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation).

Third, if Kumar (2003) was right that the English identity came to the front stage during the Empire declination, and that the Han identity followed this path as I assumed, both the English and the Han, as the majority of the British nation and the Chinese nation respectively, were in a crossroad in how to deal with the English and Han senses of superiority which is contradictory to the national building of Britain and China. They could either hold on to them or abandon them and embrace the spirit that all identities are culturally equal. However, going in either direction, there will be a dilemma is awaiting ahead. If the sense of ethnic superiority is preserved or even reinforced, it would certainly clash with the rising nationalism among the minorities; if it is abandoned and all national identities are considered culturally equal, then there could be a vacuum in terms of national symbols, and an uncertainty to the question ‘who should represent the nation?’ That are critical for seeking the common ground of all who call themselves British citizens or Chinese people. China takes the first direction, while Britain takes the second.

It appears that the British perspective is more liberal than the Chinese option. The difference between them could serve as an empirical evidence of the liberal/non-liberal dichotomy of nationalism. “Non-liberal nationalisms tend to regard a given nation as not only valuable to the well-being of its members but valuable in itself, possessing an ‘organic’ existence separate from, and more important than, that of its individual members” (Crowder, 2013, p. 83). It comes with a strong sense of ethnic superiority and leads to aggressive programs of assimilation, as what had been committed under Nazism and Fascism that gave nationalism a bad name. Crowder named
this type of aggressive illiberal nationalism “totalitarianism”. The milder and common alternative kind of non-liberal nationalism is conservative nationalism. Rather than insistence of cultural superiority over others and a strong program of domination and assimilation, “the key conservative-nationalist commitment is to the nation-state understood as the principal bearer of a society’s tradition” (p. 84). Regarding ethnic diversity, cases of conservative nationalism are more accommodating than its aggressive alternative, “but the degree of accommodation will still be very limited…all citizens will be expected to pledge allegiance to a substantial national identity” (p. 84). However, Chinese nationalism seems to live in the balance between totalitarianism and conservative nationalism. On the one hand, the cultural symbols contributed by the Han (e.g. Confucianism, ancient political administration system, traditional Chinese literacy etc.) are mentioned especially in the narratives of the national history in which the non-Han people were Chinese partly because they learned Han culture. On the other hand, in light of the danger of Han Chauvinism confronting the growing local nationalism from non-Han people, the Chinese authority avoids the explicit emphasis on Han superiority in official cultural products. The result of this uneasy balance was a hierarchical relationship between the overarching Chinese national identity and ethnic identities i.e. one has to be Chinese before claiming himself/herself as a Han, Tibetan, Manchu or others. Han is closer to China than the others and the main representative of the nation, but this is expected to be overshadowed by the symbolic strength of the Chinese nationhood. The Chinese authority objects radical assimilation, while requires the loyalty especially from ethnic minorities to the integrity of the Chinese nation.

On the contrary, as the English superiority was abandoned, all identities, including the British identity, are put in the relatively equal cultural status. Some called the British model multiculturalism, while some others may prefer the term “liberal nationalism”. The divergence in
terminology is corresponding to the dilemma after the “liberal turn”: is multiculturalism going to cause the weakness of national solidarity? By definition, liberal nationalism “conceives the nation as valuable not in itself but as (at best) instrumental to the well-being of its individual members, its claims therefore subject to individual rights and liberties…Liberal nationalists combine a commitment to the central importance of national identity with a liberal insistence on the rights and liberties of individuals” (Crowder, 2013, pp. 81-85). Is this combination still maintained when multiculturalism is in dominant place? Is multiculturalism a kind of liberal nationalism, or “undermines the sense of common citizenship that is essential to social cohesion” (Crowder, 2013, p. 81)?

This is one of the main debates among theorists of liberal nationalism and multiculturalism, though most of them acknowledge that cultural rights of individuals should be protected in a liberal nation. On the one hand, liberal nationalists and multiculturalist may find their perspectives on diversity irreconcilable to each other. For example, although he argued that cultural diversity should be tolerated and accommodated in private sphere, J.S. Mill, a pioneer of liberal nationalism, was against official, public recognition and celebration of minority cultures and believed that it would lead to significant cultural divisions in the same society which were at odds with the need for social cohesion (Mill, 1859 [1974]). By the same token, Iris Marion Young, an advocate of “democratic cultural pluralism” (Young 1990, p. 163) in which minority culture should be publicly acknowledged and endorsed, believed that “the liberal ideal of impartiality masks the reality that putatively ‘neutral’ principles and policies always express the preferences and worldview of some privileged group – neutrality is really cultural imperialism in disguise” (Crowder, 2013, p. 126; Young 1990, p. 115). She might consider an overarching liberal nationalism to be a perpetrator of “cultural imperialism” making the minority culture invisible in public, therefore a foe of a
multiculturalist society. In other words, liberal nationalists may complain that radical public emphasis on minority cultures would post a threat to social solidarity, while multiculturalists may suspect that nationality resting on “difference-blind” liberalism can never be truly neutral and impartial to all cultural groups, especially those whose perspectives are at odds with Western liberal principles.

However, many theorists of liberal nationalism provided their approaches on reconciliation and coordination between liberal nationalism and multiculturalism. David Miller criticized Young’s model of multiculturalism as too fragmented and divisive (Miller, 1995), and he believed that “a core national identity is positively essential to a multicultural society in order to motivate a shared sense of justice, trust and co-operation” (Crowder, 2013, p. 88; Miller, 1995) across cultural differences. The content of national identity should be “thicker than a merely ‘civic’ commitment to a set of universally valid institutions and values”, and must be “stripped of elements that are repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more component groups” (Crowder, 2013, p. 88; Miller, 1995, pp. 141-142). The accommodation between nationalism and multiculturalism could be achieved by the efforts of cultural groups to “shed elements of their values which are at odds with” (Miller, 1995, p. 142) the principles in the encompassing nationality.

While Miller proposed that multiculturalism could be accommodated with liberal nationality “expressed partly through allegiance to a body of principles embedded in the Constitution, but also includes the more concrete ideas of common membership and shared history that is essential to nationality” (Miller, 1995, p. 141-2), Yael Tamir (1995) argued that a thin identity formed around civic and liberal principles is sufficient. And to pass this identity to next generation requires not national education but civic education “introducing children to the liberal discourse of rights and rationality” (Tamir 1995, p. xxix). Also, it should be particular cultural groups, rather than the
state, that are in charge of education on thicker national/ethnic identity given to members of in-
groups. Therefore, Tamir suggested that while multiculturalism and particular group identities
could coexist in different levels, it was liberalism rather than nationalism that could coordinate
with multiculturalism in state level. Therefore, the debates around this issue entail two questions:
could nationalism accommodate the principles of multiculturalism? If yes, how are nationalist
principles presented to achieve this?

In conclusion, China and Britain take different directions regarding the sense of superiority among
the majorities. As a result, they have different perspectives on ethnic diversity. The Chinese
authority, adopting the partially assimilative model, is hostile to the discourse of multiculturalism,
for fear that public endorsement of minority cultures would lead to social segmentation and ethnic
conflict; in the British mainstream ideology, illiberal understanding of nationhood is considered
as politically incorrect and as a violation of liberalism which appears to be the backbone of
multiculturalism. More importantly, neither of the cases could live with their models without
questions because of the logical fuzziness discussed above. Hence the analysis of the Chinese
textbooks will not only show the distinctiveness of illiberal nationalism in relation to liberal
nationalism but also provide empirical evidence for the theoretical division between
assimilationism and conservative nationalism within the category of illiberal nationalism. If the
Chinese textbooks do not imply aggressive assimilationism when describing historical China, how
do they justify “limited degree of accommodation” to address the need for social coherence? If
conservative nationalism “is strongly assimilationist” Crowder (2013) as well, how do Chinese
textbooks draw the line to keep themselves from implying “Han Chauvinism”? Differently, the
theoretical focus of the analysis on the British case is the relationship between multiculturalism
and liberal nationalism. Those who insist that multiculturalism is against the establishment of any
forms of nationalism, such as Mill and Young, may predict that the English textbooks would be much less nationalist than their Chinese counterparts, if not totally anti-nationalist. In contrast, those who believe that multiculturalism could promote liberal national identities, such as Miller and Tamir, may predict that the textbook writers would seek the common ground of all British people while celebrating the cultural diversity. But Miller and Tamir may provide different predictions on what the common ground would be like: while Tamir would say that the textbooks may reduce the British values to popular liberal elements, such as democracy, toleration, constitution and freedom, Miller would argue that these are not enough. The national identity celebrated by the textbooks could be thicker than “civic values” probably by containing ethnic elements that are friendly to each other while excluding discordant ones. The content analysis of history textbooks helps us to test these premises. This study sheds lights on these puzzles by looking at the extent to which the historical narratives in British and Chinese history textbooks could provide an ideological solution and legitimatize the semantic formation of nationhood, or generate more problems that make the nationalist ideology more untenable.

4. The Nationalist Symbols

The demographic structures determine that the focal point of the struggles around national identity and nationalism in Britain and China can be understood as the incarnation of the dynamic ethnic bases of the nations. It is possible that it is exclusively England that defines and represents the nation, thus English nationalism; it is possible that non-English people in the British Isles are included into the nationhood, thus British nationalism; it is also possible that the oversea colonies of the British Empire are also drawn into the picture of the identity which now demonstrates the concept of “Greater Britain”, thus probably imperial nationalism. Similarly, the construction of Chinese identity can also be seen through three possible levels: Han nationalism, Chinese multi-
ethnic nationalism, and Chinese imperial nationalism. From the historical perspective, Britain and China from the twentieth century would experience the decline of imperial nationalism and rise of either English/Han nationalism or British/Chinese nationalism, or both. To test the assumption that the dissolution of imperial nationalism is accompanied by the uprising of local nationalism, and to demonstrate how the narrower and broader identities are interacting against each other, it is necessary to identify useful symbols that indicate the three levels of belonging in the data. The existing literature provides important guidance in identifying these symbols in cultural products.

What are the symbols that indicate imperial nationalism? Kumar (2000) had given his answer. For the English case, The land empire i.e. Great Britain or the United Kingdom consisted by the East Atlantic archipelago, and the overseas empire “on which the sun never sets” operated in different ways, but they had similar effect in that “they made meaningless the development of a specifically English national identity” (Kumar, 2000, p. 589). This did not mean that English national identity did not exist during the imperial time. Kumar argued that the salience of Englishness was muted in front of the might of multi-ethnic Empire. “The English, as the wealthiest, most numerous, and most powerful group within the United Kingdom, were aware of the need to restrain their claims and to mute assertions of ethnic diversity, among themselves no less than among other ethnicities in the kingdom”, as the loyalty to the British Empire was attached not to people but to its institutions, such as the Crown, the Parliament, the Protestant religion, and the British imperial, modernization projects (Kumar, 2000, p. 589). When the dominance of the English was secured, emphasizing the ethnic superiority was not only unnecessary but also dangerous, because it would “threaten the very basis of that commanding position, by reminding other groups of their inferiority and perhaps provoking them to do something about it” (p. 590). Kumar also named this type of national belonging as “missionary nationalism”, in which the “state-bearing peoples…will be
careful not to stress their ethnic identity” but “will stress the political, cultural, or religious mission to which they have been called” (p. 579-80). Therefore, missionary nationalism or imperial nationalism for Britain could be observed through the ethnic-free celebration of the monarchical rules, the Constitution, Protestant religion, and the modernization projects in oversea colonies.

For Chinese case, the imperial identity is bore by Confucianism with a hierarchical conception of civilization. Confucius ideas encourage introspection and self-improvement in terms of morality and literacy, and those people who put its principles into practice are regarded as educated and civilized, and thus could stand in higher position of the hierarchy with the ability to take larger responsibility to make the community a more civilized place by disseminating Confucianism to barbarous others. The basic policy toward ethnic others is not exclusion, but acculturation and inclusion. The “transformability of one’s cultural affiliation…played a crucial role in facilitating the constant influx of the new ethnic groups into an ever expanding Chinese ‘nation’” (Pines, 2005, p. 91). The gaps between the civilized and uncivilized are “processual or dynamic” which means with acculturation they could be reduced to an acceptable level. The differences do not lead to exclusion, thus not intrinsic hostility. Based on these understandings, Xiang (2015) made a brilliant comparison between the Chinese view on diversity and Modern Racism. Racism is predicated on the “presumption of static categories or divides” (p. 397) which could be used to justify exclusion and hostility. Confucianism, however, allowed people born in alien territory to achieve higher cultural status. It “is not that the other was not perceived as a threat”, but the threat “was always political and pragmatic; otherness was never an ontological threat to selfhood” (p. 398).

The other element that represents Chinese imperial identity is the concept of Tianxia which literally means “under the heaven”. Tianxia “refers to the (Chinese) Empire as essentially neither a state nor a nation-state, but a sort of political and cultural system and a singular ‘world society’”
(Baik, 2015, p. 214). *Tianxia* manifests the imagination of a boundless world in which the civilization of the cultural center i.e. Confucianism is disseminated to peripheral others. In the identity framework, diversity is acceptable, which is notwithstanding conditioned on the ongoing process of acculturation, or in Zhao Tingyang’s (2005) term, transformation. Leibold (2007) identified two simultaneous tendencies of the Sinic identity formation. “The exclusivist or ethnocentric representation, in the pursuit of social order, stressed the fundamental and unbridgeable gap between *xia* (Chinese) and *yi* (barbarian), while the inclusivist representation, in the pursuit of social totality, emphasized the similarity of all practitioners of Confucian culture regardless of innate physical and environmental differences” (p. 22). Both could be found in traditional Chinese literacy and historiography. However, instead of uniqueness, this observation renders Chinese identity resembling an imperial identity: allowance of cultural diversity on one end and promotion of cultural assimilation on the other.

Imperial identity exists without serious challenge when the people have confidence on the might of the empire. However, when the fall of empire is felt, according to Kumar (2000), local nationalism would emerge to fill the void of people’s identity. Patriotism was undoubtedly raised and emphasized as a subject of education, and looking for “national characters” had been a norm that everybody followed when they tried to tell their nations from others. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a national history before the incoming of the anti-racialism era would address the issue of national character, attempting to answer the postulated question of “what kind of people we are”. And the answers are usually filled with exaltation expressing insurmountable national pride. A technique for this was alleging the nature or typical personalities of people, which was well-discussed by Chancellor (1970) in his study on the political, religious, and social opinions in the English history textbook published from 1800 to 1914. Approximately since the second half
of the nineteenth century, the Englishman had been portrayed as “brave and honest”, “truthful” or with “bold, frank, study character” (p. 118) which made him great sailors in the big maritime navigation era. In some historical narratives, the positive generalization of Englishman corresponds with the negative stereotypical descriptions of non-English people.

For instance, although the Scots “are described as mean occasionally...they are considered brave and independent” (p. 119) as most textbooks treated William Wallace as an admirable figure. The other two nations in the British Isles did not receive acknowledgment at this level. Although they in some texts received sympathy from the writers, the Welsh received little attention after they were conquered by Edward I. The attitude toward the Irish among the writers were more mixed. Some writers were reflective on the conflictual relationship between the English and the Irish, and they often attributed that to the wrongdoings from the English, especially by referring to Cromwell’s brutal policy in Ireland. However, “most writers who are sympathetic to Ireland unconsciously convey the impression that the Irish need to be protected and thus that they are incapable of taking care themselves” (p. 120). Some of them, when describing the Irish famine [1845-6] even claimed that the Irish showed little gratitude for the English aid, which was like “a spoilt child” (121) would do.

But the negative connotation in the descriptions of other European nations was relatively mild than of African and Asian nations. “The most frequent impression conveyed about the Indians and their near neighbours, the Afghans, is that they are cruel and totally unfitted to rule themselves.” (p. 122) Intentionally or carelessly, this negative stereotype was reinforced by the textbook author’s reports on the conflictual events that took place in the overseas colonies that were biased against the non-English subjects. A textbook fabricated the ferocity from Indian indigenous power in its
narratives on the Black Hole of Calcutta; a majority of the textbooks at that time, regarding the Indian Mutiny, only stressed cruelty on the Indian side.

Similarly, the decline of the Chinese Empire, indicated by military failures and sovereignty loss from the 1840s, was followed by a momentum of rising ethnocentrism. This was also a time when the western theory of race was learned by some Chinese intellectuals. Therefore, some attempted to define the Han people as a race distinctive to the Manchus and other ethnic groups. This racial idea was utilized by anti-Qing revolutionaries, such as Zou Rong, who urged that the Han people should expel of Manchus from China and found a racially homogeneous Han republic for modern China. This racial definition of the Chinese nation, however, did not go unchallenged. Liang Qichao, a well-known reformer in the late Qing Dynasty, argued that the Chinese included six races (Han, Mongols, Manchus, Muslims, Tibetans and Miao), and advocated that the empire should be transformed into a multiethnic nation-state. His idea was inherited by Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the revolutionary and the founding father of the Republic of China. But that does not mean that this multi-racial/ethnic definition of China is totally immune to biological interpretation. In fact, Liang supported his idea by saying that it was the “mixed blood” of the six races that created the Chinese nation (Leibold, 2007). However, a pioneering work on the history textbooks used in twentieth century China (Baranovitch, 2010) suggested that the development of Chinese nationhood in educational historiography started from Han-exclusive definition of China which was accompanied by Han assimilationism. The latter strays from “acculturation with tolerance” principle in imperial understanding of belonging. In Liu Chao’s (2014) study on the history textbooks adopted during Republic of China [1912-1949], his analysis on those used during the reign of Nanjing Government [1927-1948] yielded similar result.
Neither British nor China, however, stopped at English and Han nationalism. From the second half of the twentieth century, both started to reconfigure the concepts of national identity that are expected to include multiple ethnic groups living in the territories. British historians in the post-war era felt the need to write national history different from traditional Anglocentric historiography where English stories were the main subjects of British history so much so that “England” and “Britain” were used interchangeably. Some scholars attempted to revive the nationalist interpretation based on institutional symbols, albeit without the Anglocentric obsession with the constitution nor the imperialist understanding on cultural superiority. For example, in her writing on the birth of British nation, Linda Colley (1992) not only acknowledge the openness of institution but also emphasized that the establishment of religion, parliament, imperial projects and military were the results of joint efforts by Britons. “She is no less indulgent to the excesses of the Protestant imagination: hatred for Roman Catholics, in her account of it, becomes the crucible in which a wider national consciousness is formed” (Samuel, 1999, p. 28), and she stressed the role played by the Scots in the royal military and the rule of Empire.

If the results yielded by Colley’s sociological study was suspected of “refurbish[ing] a unionist history” (Samuel, 1999, p. 28), the vogue of “four nations history” may be promoted by those who were more sympathetic to the local nationalisms and separationist movements. Although a “Britannic” or “archipelago” history was allegedly written, this new historiography was directed to tell four different histories. Unlike traditional historiography that tended to mention Scotland, Ireland, and Wales only when they were related to England, to follow this new perspective means to treat their histories equally, thus presents a “more pluralist conception of the national past” (Samuel, 1999, p. 21). The “four nations history” undoubtedly required a new chronology. For instance, the year of 1066 would bear a very different (probably smaller) significance for the new
history of Britain, and the Celtic stories before the Roman rule and the Norman Conquest would be presented. Four nations history does not aim at saving British identity from disintegration by imposing overarching elements that unified the four nations, but “proposes a non-teleological view of the past, and an anti-nationalist view of the future – a history that is ‘pluralist’ and ‘multicultural’” (Samuel, 1999, p.26). For the study of British nationalism, it is important to see to what extent the values of multiculturalism could have a unifying power in the narratives.

For some scholars, however, the four nations historians may still fall short of encouraging a multicultural perspective in history study, because they just replace one answer of history question by a less Anglocentric one, and still practice deliberate selection of historical topics, biased description of historical events, and teleological arguments on the development of the nation in the history textbooks. Also, the unitary narratives limited the range of interpretation of history, which is more likely if the cramming method of teaching is used. Some critics, therefore, advocates the notion of “new history”. Instead of a “knowledge” approach, the materials for “new history” would take “a ‘skill’ approach based on the critical reading of documents and original materials” (Samuel, 1999, p. 198). Instead of presenting the national history as evenly distributed in different time periods, “new history” adopt a “patch” approach that discussion in depth of particular moments in time is promoted at the expense of chronological description. Therefore, the symbols suggesting features of Englishness, Britishness, and the Empire would not be unitarily but dialectally presented, and would signify less degree of continuity.

For the Chinese case, Baranovitch (2010) found that the history textbooks published after the 1950s moved away from Han-exclusive definition of China to multi-ethnic definition, which was reflected by more space in the texts for the history of non-Han ethnic groups, the emphasis of peaceful communication between Han and non-Han, and the reduction of description on
interethnic conflicts in history. Furthermore, the radical term of “assimilation” was replaced by “ethnic merging” that is milder. Inspired by Baranovitch’s emphasis on interethnic relationships, this study assumes that the discussions on the relationship between Han and non-Han ethnicities in history, including peaceful communication and conflictual relations, are critically correlated to the shape of Chinese national identity demonstrated by the narratives. The next chapter shows how these two aspects of nationality symbolically correlated in the history textbooks and the leaders’ speeches in the first half of the twentieth century, which forge a peculiar Han nationalism out of the collapse of imperial nationalism.
Chapter 3

The Symbolic Growth of Han-Centric Nationalism

This chapter explores the changing picture of nationalist ideology in China during the great transitional era – from late Qing Dynasty to mid twentieth century [1840 to 1949] when more people in China (not just among the intellectual and political elites) were increasingly aware of the downfall of the Chinese Empire and the need to build the modern Chinese nation. Led by a discussion on imperial nationalism in China, the analysis consists of three parts: 1. The general background of the political debates around the question of “what the modern China should be” in the beginning of the nation building in China; 2. How did the national leaders’ speech, mainly those from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, response to those debates; 3. How the popular history textbooks used in middle schools during this time period reflected particular image of China in history and implied a model of nationalism for post-imperial China. This was an era when the narrow nationalism went on the stage of China’s history and took the role of imperial nationalism in the imagination toward the nation among Chinese elites and the public, which was similar to what was happening in the English case depicted by Kumar (2009).

As noted in the last chapter, although this study mostly analyzes cultural products in modern era and assume that nationalism is a fruit of modernity, it does not exclude the symbols manifesting pre-national identity out of the discussion. Therefore, for the Chinese case those implicating imperial identity are also the subjects as the precedents of nationalist symbols. Guided by the literature, the concepts of Tianxia and Confucianism are central to Chinese imperial nationalism, which is necessary to be discussed to shed lights on the resemblance between China and Britain with regards to the unquestioned confidence on imperial culture.
Tianxia, Confucianism, and Imperial Nationalism

The Chinese version of imperial nationalism entails two compatible concepts, “Tianxia” (all under the heaven) and the Yi Xia Zhi Bie (the difference between civilized and barbarians). As the construction and imagination of imperial identity does not entail the obvious clarification of the boundary of empire, the term “Tianxia” used to represent the perceivable large environment expressed a kind of universalism. On the other end, “Zongzu” (clan formed out of kinship) was used only to describe small community constituted by kinship. “Guo” (country) appeared to represent the middle level of identity, but it was actually closer to “the state” with political meaning i.e. the sovereignty of the king/emperor. Many scholars of historical China prefer “Central/Middle Kingdom” than “China” as the translation of “Zhongguo”. “Zhong” means central, and implies the political and cultural authority over the peripherals. But Zhongguo used today as the name of the nation does not have this level of meaning, and “China” is its modern English translation. In the past, however, Zhongguo did not represent an identity, but political or cultural centrality and authority. “The concept of Zhongguo for people in ancient China was often about a concept of civilization, rather than a geopolitical concept with clear boundary” (Ge, 2011, p. 45)

This leads to Yi Xia Zhi Bie, the second aspect of the imperial identity of dynastic China – the difference between the civilized and uncivilized. The civilized was called “Hua” or “Huaxia” in the central place, whereas the uncivilized was called “Yi” (barbarians) that were surrounding the perceived cultural and political center. Also, the center was believed to carry the mission to civilize the barbarians with Confucius ideology, and any people are considered civilized if they were educated. In other words, if the term “Zhongguo” suggests a cultural hierarchy between the center and the peripherals, the term “Tianxia” implies the boundlessness of the cultural influence i.e. anybody can be a member of Zhongguo if they are civilized.
What represented Chinese imperial culture was Confucianism which was contributed by Han people. However, the acknowledgment of Han as the producer and the recognition of the cultural hierarchy did not lead to ethnic exclusion, but was accompanied by a celebrated view of Confucianism in which all ethnic groups were the subjects of Confucius influence. On the other hand, the dissemination of Chinese culture would not result in radical assimilation, because the imagination of cultural universalism was enough to keep the legitimacy of central imperial government. Radical assimilation sacrificing non-Han ethnic identity would cause danger to the imperial rule. Thus, the ethnic differences were preserved but not emphasized in the Empire. To identify with the empire was in parallel with local ethnic identity (Zhang, 2015).

The Beginning of Chinese Modern Nationalism

This seemingly paradoxical balance was broken when people were losing the confidence of the Empire thus missionary nationalism. Under this circumstance, the ideals of modern nationalism gradually gained popularity among the elites. Within the modern nationalist doctrine, the need for homogeneity within a nation is either in line with ethnic assimilation or ethnic exclusion. This makes it almost the opposite of imperial ideology. As Feng Youlan (1996), a prominent specialist for Chinese philosophy, accurately said, “Chinese people lack nationalism because they are used to see the problems from the perspective of Tianxia or world” (p. 163). Theoretically, it was not until the decline of imperial dominance was the national/ethnic boundary hardened and then leading to nationalism. For the Chinese case, it was believed that this transition happened in late Qing (from 1840), when intellectuals, politicians and military leaders attempted to build a modern nation in imagination and reality (Xiong, 2016).

Not everybody agrees with the timing of nationalism in China. For example, historian Ge Zhaoguang (2011) argued that the national building in China, entailing the clarification of national
boundary, actually started from as early as Song Dynasty [960-1279]. Song Dynasty, founded by Han power, was constantly facing threats from neighboring non-Han regimes i.e. Liao (Qidan), Xixia (Dangxiang), Jin (Manchus) and Yuan (Mongols). That the mainland was occupied by separated regimes was the result of the collapse of the Tang Empire [618-907]. Therefore, the Opium War (1840) was not the first time when Chinese intellectuals feel the challenge from others. The Han power was constantly under the threat from non-Han powers: the Song regimes did not rule the north and the west, and was eventually overturned by Mongols who include China into the vast Mongolian Empire (the part in China is called Yuan Dynasty); Yuan [1271-1368] was replaced by Ming Dynasty [1368-1644], another strong empire ruled by Han. Han power was recovered by Ming, but it received another blow when Ming was defeated by Manchus, who founded Qing Dynasty [1636-1912]. For every time the Han’s imperial power was significantly challenged by non-Han, there was not only a surge of nationalist sentiment, but also a sharpening of national boundary between Han and non-Han within elites’ ideology, and probably a declination of imperial identity. The difference between Hua and Yi, once paralleled with open imperial culture, was now used to justify the sharpened boundary between Han and non-Han, as Confucianism was regarded as the representative of national culture of Han that set them apart from others, hence ethnic nationalism. For instance, Ge (2011) found that during Song Dynasty, “the state was on its guard against alien civilizations and their influence” (p. 59). From this time, Zhongguo “was no longer the egotistic ‘Tianxia’ that despised Yi. Under the suppress from increasingly strong Yi, this Han China rendered limited boundary and expressed the anxiety for existence.” Also, this concern among the intellectual and political elites led them to “seek the legitimacy of ‘Zhongguo (Song) and the rationality of ‘civilization (Han culture)’, which “became one of the sources of modern Chinese nationalism” (pp. 64-65). It was unknown if the surge of
Han nationalism could explain Chinese nationalism as Ge suggested, but it was the precedent of great resistance from Han people against the Manchus rulers that happened four centuries later and lasted decades even after Qing Dynasty ruled the whole China.

Zhang (2015) had an excellent conclusion on this: “when the power Huaxia civilization ascends, with the political pursue of grand unification, the cultural tie [connecting different ethnic groups together] would be in charge; however, when the power of the ethnic groups in periphery increases, those natural components lurking in the bottom of Zhonghua culture, such as lineage and geological connection, would come to the front again” (p. 7). In China, the latter occurred several times especially after the fall of the Tang Empire, and the revolutionary ideology in the late Qing Dynasty indicated the last time it happened.

It was the last occasion of Han nationalism this study focuses on, as the rise of nationalist sentiment and ideology from 1840 was the key period of the transition from imperial identity to national identity among Chinese, while the previous growths of nationalism among Han did not thoroughly question the legitimacy of “Tianxia” notion and the missionary feature of Han culture. The Manchus rulers, in order to pacify the local resistance from Han people, claimed that they were willing to embrace the Confucius culture and shared the power with some Han elites. After years of peace, Han intellectuals seemed to forget about that they were the victims of Manchus invasion and that their ancestors fought very hard to stop Manchus. They were complacent for still being the contributor of the imperial culture (Confucianism). The openness of Confucius culture was restored, as they regarded Manchus, who was once treated as barbarians in the periphery, as civilized in the cultural center. As Kumar (2000) rightly said, universal empires “do not always process…a more or less distinct ethnic group that identifies itself with the mission and acts as it principal ‘career’. Different groups at different times, or a mixture of groups that identify
themselves purely with the imperial cause, may take the lead in advancing the imperial mission” (p. 580). Without feeling the outside threats to the empire, the cultural superiority and boundlessness was secured, and people were still living in “Tianxia” as before. It was the failure in the Opium War that woke up many elites from the dream that they were the most civilized ones in the world. They started to realized that in the development of science, technology and political institutions the Qing fell far behind the West. As a result, the elites gradually admit that they were just one of the many equal political entities (not yet nation-states) in the world, and they stopped calling the Westerners “barbarians” as they used to do.

But that does not mean that nationalism emerged overnight in 1840. The establishment of Manchu ruling in China was both the apex of the empire and the starting point of imperial declination, which served as the background of the paradoxical ethnic policies set up by the Manchus rulers. On the one hand, lots of scholars regarded the ethnic policies during Qing Dynasty as benign as accommodating to local circumstances and different ethnic cultures. On the other hand, the ethnic differences were sharpened by wide range of policies that promoted ethnic segregation. The Qing rulers attempted to reduce the communications between different ethnic groups by posing limits on interethnic migration, interethnic communication among state officials, interethnic economical communication and interethnic cultural communication. Different from the general impression that Manchu rulers were happy to embrace the Han culture, the emperors were anxiety about the potential of Manchus culture being eliminated by Han culture. Qianlong Emperor forbade Manchus people use Han language in writing and speaking. In addition to limiting interethnic communication, the Qing rulers also strengthened the regional differences by enforcing household registration system (Xiong, 2016). The Qing Dynasty implemented the policies of ethnic segregation to reduce the likelihood that people in various ethnicities made allies against the Qing
court (Xiong, 2016), which suggested lower level of confidence of the power of the empire. Furthermore, these policies were themselves detrimental in that they did not strengthen but weakened the Manchus power (Xiong, 2016). The Opium War and succeeding failures in international politics in the nineteenth century expose the backwardness of the empire to more people in China.

The western powers in China from 1840s met significant resistance from people in various ethnic groups. At this time, common enemy had not led to common identity yet, but could motivate intellectuals and politicians to rethink the national problems - more specifically, on what ground people of different ethnic groups should work together to fight against the white invaders. Also, when the theories of nationalism were introduced into China, they were regarded by many intellectuals as an important tool to build a strong country and to resist outside threat. As famous late-Qing intellectual Liang Qichao (1989) said, “Nationalism is the brightest and fairest ism in the world. (It declares that) other nation cannot violate our nation’s freedom, and our nation cannot infringe on others’ freedoms.” (p. 20). Under the influence of social Darwinism, intellectuals believed that in order to make China stronger in international competitions, it was necessary to nurture nationalist ideology among Chinese people.

But what should be “the nation” people should be fighting for? Around this issue there were mainly two sides of opinions. Some people accepted the Western concept of nationalism which as noted above, stipulated that homogeneity within a nation must be achieved, either by ethnic assimilation or exclusion. Under this ideology, Han people were expected to form a nation with common blood, language and custom that set them apart from the Manchus, which served as ideological basis for anti-Manchus revolutionary led by Sun Yat-sen. The revolutionary “thought that the source of the strength of a nation-state was the sameness and homogeneity within the community, which had to
be built on the state established by one single nation” (Zhang, 2015, p. 32). With this understanding, the revolutionaries emphasized that Manchus and Han, as two ethnic groups, should belong to two different nations, so the territory of Han people i.e. China should not be ruled by aliens such as Manchus. At the beginning, the nationalist seemed to take the exclusionist path illuminated by the slogan of “Expel the Barbarians, Recover Zhonghua” with “Barbarians” being the Manchu rulers while Zhonghua being the Han Chinese. The other path of nationalism i.e. radical assimilation, was taken in practice by local Han warlords. These two paths, however, were not in opposite to each other, but two sides of one coin. Both incarnated exclusively Han-centric definition of China.

But it would be erroneous to presume that this, which I call “narrow nationalism” in my conceptual framework, presented the whole picture of Late-Qing nationalist thinking. Different from revolutionary’s claim that China should only belong to Han people and Manchu ruler should be expelled, the Reformists were looking for the possibility to peacefully transform the political regime and to change dynastic China into a multiethnic Chinese nation, which made their idea at odds with the Western “one nation, one state” nationalist ideal. Instead of narrow nationalism, they advocated “big nationalism” in which modern Chinese nation includes all the ethnic groups under the ruling of the Qing court. An important symbolic product of big nationalism was the concept of Zhonghua Minzu (Chinese nation) that was regarded as the ultimate goal of national building in China. The debates between Reformists and revolutionaries were not only ideological but also on political. Embracing the ethnic-centric definition of nation, the revolutionaries fought for the eventual collapse of the Qing Empire and hence advocated the independencies of non-Han ethnicities e.g. Mongols, Tibet, Manchus, Uyghurs etc. In contrast, Reformists who believed in the integrity of the Chinese nation advocated a much milder change that in the meantime could
preserve the authority of the Qing Emperor, which they thought was the legitimate source of the solidarity among various ethnic groups.

The propaganda for small nationalism was successful in mobilizing anti-Manchus powers, which helped the revolutionaries gain wide social support during the revolution. But this by no means secured its victory against Reformist view on Chinese nation. After the revolutionaries won the political struggle and established the first modern nation-state in East Asia i.e. Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, Sun Yat-sen and his followers gradually realized that small nationalism could be detrimental to unity of China (Zhang, 2015). In other words, they wanted to tell people in various ethnic groups that the corrupted Manchus court should be overturned, but they were unwilling to accept the potential danger of the emergence of multiple nation-states out of the Qing Empire, as they claimed that the multi-ethnic territory of Qing was legitimately inherited by ROC.

Sun made several attempts to deal with this paradox. During the late stages of the revolution, Sun specifically explained that by anti-Manchus they did not mean to eliminate all the Manchus people, but were only fighting against the Manchus lords. However, diluting the ethnic conflicts with class elements, Sun and the revolutionaries still insisted that the modern China should be a single-nation state and only Han people should hold the power. It was not difficult for them to see the weak point of this thought: it could not provide the ideological basis for the new government to inherit the Qing Empire’s vast territory in which more than just Han people were living. In light of this, Sun and revolutionaries, under the pressure from the reformists, resorted to republicanism, claiming that the modern national building aimed at establishing a “five-nationality unity for a republic”, which was written into the declarations for the founding of the Republic of China. Essentially, this idea reduced Chinese nationality to political principles, and reduce national solidarity to the recognition and acceptance of the state power.
However, the theory and practice of republicanism in China had several shortcomings that the nation builders could not circumvent. Firstly, the five-nationality republicanism in China emphasized the centralized power of the state in expense of the cultural particularity of the various ethnic groups. “The reformists…put the statism in opposition to nationalism, which would be unable to alleviant the tension among ethnic groups” (Xiong, 2016, pp. 38-39). Secondly, republicanism did not soften the historical gulf and discrimination among the ethnic groups (Xiong, 2016), and the sense of Han superiority was still too strong for the creation of a republic with equality of ethnicity. In other words, the republicanism failed to provide ideological basis for the broad definition of the Chinese nation, and was not enough to answer the paradox of why people with different ethnicities should unite as a same country.

With the recognition of the weakness of the five-nationality republicanism, after the founding of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen amended his nationalist theory with the “five nationality assimilationism” (Zhang, 2015) that all the ethnicities within China should merge and form a holistic Chinese nation. However, the ethnic merging Sun hoped for was one-directional rather than mutual, as he emphasized that Han people, being the most culturally advanced ethnic group, should take the responsibility to assimilate others and make all of them as the members of the Chinese nation. In conclusion, when imperial nationalism fell with the Chinese Empire, several attempts were made to reconstruct the identity of China and the Chinese people. At the early stage of the revolution, European model of nationalism was followed in that exclusively Han-centric nationalism acquired its popularity against Manchus rule. However, this model was soon found to be unsuitable to the proclaimed multi-ethnic Chinese nation. Sun Yat-sen and others were looking for a proper model, and their attempts, with limited success, included class-struggle theory, five nationality republicanism and five nationality assimilationism.
The transformation and variation of Chinese identity was also implied by a variety of terms used to indicate China/ Zhongguo, which was observed in the history textbooks. As imperial nationalism declines and China was newly defined in different ways, the imperial way of define Zhongguo which was accompanied by the concept of Tianxia in the texts was gradually replaced by either Han-centric or multi-ethnic definition of the nation. The three-level semiotic framework of the term Zhongguo is presented in the textbook analysis after the section shown below which analyzes some of Sun’s speeches that were of great importance and influence which implicated the evolution of his ideas about the national building in early modern China.

**Ideas of Chinese Nationalism in Sun Yat-sen’s Speeches**

The analysis of Sun Yat-sen’s important speeches, lectures and articles found that Sun’s nationalist ideas did not evolve as much as we may assume. Throughout his career as the leader of the revolutionaries and the Nationalists, Sun constantly held a narrow understanding of Chinese nation that Han was the only noticeable ethnic group in China so that only Han people should rule China. It was plausible that he made this kind of arguments simply because they could back the political slogans about “expelling the barbarians” that were inflammatory enough to mobilize in the movement against the Qing regime. In his speech (1906) for the first anniversary of the founding of Minbao (a newspaper), he made very clear that his belief in Chinese nationalism served the Han nation, as he emphasized the division between the Han majority and Manchus minority. “Our Han people…would not regard Manchus people as Han. This is the root of nationalism”. The division was not only cognitive but also political. “Nationalism does not mean that we exclude someone just because he is from a different nation, but that we should not allow people from different nations to take away our political power” (Sun, 1906). In light of this, he regarded the establishment of the Qing Dynasty as China being conquered by a foreign nation, and Han people
were subject to national subjugation. Also, the protests against the Manchu ruling were nationalist actions. “Since 260 years ago when China was conquered by Manchukuo, in the country there were endless actions for [national] recovery, and social parties emerged everywhere. All [these people] wanted to carry out nationalism” (Sun, 1912b).

However, it is not difficult to see a change of the definition of modern China in Sun’s inauguration speech in 1912 as he became the Interim President of the Republic of China. He stated that the first political agenda for his party was to pursue the national unification, which meant to “combine the territories of Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet as one country i.e. to combine Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans as one people” (Sun, 1912a). It appears that here the nation had switched from a singularly ethnic definition to a polyethnic definition. However, in terms of how this combination should work, Sun’s opinions were ambiguous. What was clear was his dislike of the so-called “five-nationality republicanism” explicit in his 1917 article on the Three People’s Principles, his ideological contribution to the Nationalist Party. “Soon after our revolution succeeded, some ignorant and absurd people created the idea of the republicanism for Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslim and Tibetans…And used the Five-color flag…as the national flag for our Chinese nation, thinking that five colors respectively represented, Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet”. Sun argued that this was the wrong flag to celebrate the victory of the revolution, because it signified that the political sphere was still haunted by the old powers (because the Five-color flag was used by military officials of the Qing Dynasty) which was dangerous to the unification of the Chinese nation. “The Republic, since its founding, was always being torn apart…Some of its unfortunate was caused by the Five-color flag” (Sun, 1917). In other words, if republicanism was an option, it was a wrong one to Sun due to his fear that mere political symbols could not hold the ethnic groups together as a nation.
Instead of Five-nationality republicanism, Sun advocated that the five nationalities should be assimilated into a new Chinese nation. But his idea of assimilation was ambiguous and had logical inconsistency. In some places in this article, he expressed an idea closed to civic nationalism. “The most civilized and noble attribution of nationalism is the will [to combine different peoples into one nation]”. To support this preference, he used the example of Switzerland. “The Swiss nation was combined by Germans, Italians and Frenchmen…Its will is to pursue the development of civil rights, which made it different from the Germans, Italians and Frenchmen in their own countries” (Sun, 1917). However, in the second example, America, Sun not only expressed his admiration to American nation as the father of contemporary civil liberty, but also suggested that the greatness of America came from the process of ethnic fusion and assimilation. In reality, Switzerland and American are two different examples, but Sun put them together as if they were similar. Actually, Sun preferred American experience than Swiss experience. As a fan of the American “melting-pot”, Sun believed that the national building in China should follow American experience. “Han ought to sacrifice [the purity] of its lineage, history and those arrogant names, be candid in front of Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans, merge them into one pot and govern them, so as to produce a new Chinese nation. Just like the United States combined blacks, whites and tens of races, and then produced American nationalism that is on the top of the world” (Sun, 1917). He recognized that the American nation was the product of multidirectional assimilation of a variety of ethnic groups. According to a speech in 1924, after the immigrants from different backgrounds “came to America, they melt together and became one nation…that could be called American nation” (Sun, 1924). Sun in his writings and speeches did not specify which ethnicity/race dominated the melting-pot. However, in his other speeches, his plan for national building of China did not clearly follow the American experience. In his ideas, Han was the
The predominant majority and the process of ethnic merging should be Han assimilating others rather than the mutual influence among all the ethnic groups (Zhang, 2015). In a 1921 speech, Sun emphasized that “our party should make efforts on nationalism and make Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans assimilated into our Han, and then [make us] a nation of big nationalism…When we are talking about nationalism, we cannot generally say the five nationalities, but Han nationalism” (Sun, 1921). Therefore, although he often regarded that national builders in China could learn the American experience of melting-pot, the American process of assimilation was ideally different from what he proposed for the Chinese case. In other words, mentioning civic values as the binding power of different ethnic groups and emphasizing American melting-pot does not change the fact that Sun’s nationalist idea was predominantly Han-centric. Furthermore, it is better to consider Sun’s idea as narrow nationalism with exclusionist approach, though he talked about assimilation constantly. Throughout his speeches and writings, he always equal Han to Chinese. Years after the anti-Manchu revolution, he still made this argument and justified it by saying that China had been a single ethnic nation from the past, and “generally speaking, all the four billion Chinese people are Han” (Sun, 1924), while the size of minority population were just too small to influence his general ideological framework. In terms of assimilation, its final product was supposed to be Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), but in Sun’s ideas it did not transcendent Han ethnicity. Instead, Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) was just the name for Han after it assimilates other ethnic groups.

Neither the claim that the Nationalist Party were looking for the “equal combination” of various ethnic groups (Sun, 1924) seemed influential enough in Sun’s nationalist ideas. In the Declaration of the First Nationalist Party Convention, the party only promised that it “recognized the right of self-ruling of the ethnic groups in China, and after the victory of the revolution against foreign
imperialism and domestic warlord, it would organize a freely unified Republic of China” (Sun, 1924). However, it did not specify the actual methods and procedures to achieve the unification of Republic of China, but only mentioned that the party would gradually find the methods to solve the national problems as the revolution went on. More importantly, the Nationalist Party at that time had close relationship with the Comintern, so much so that the representative of Comintern had influenced the drafting of the declaration especially about the part of self-ruling. Sun himself had expressed his objection to the Declaration (Xiong, 2016). The Convention took place in January 20, and a week later Sun started his series of lecture on the Three People’s Principles in which the nationalism he advocated for modern China remained Han-centric. In other words, the narrow definition of Chinese nation was not merely for gaining public support of anti-Manchus revolution, but was organic in Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist ideas.

In conclusion, what was essential in Sun Yat-sen’s definition of China was exclusively Han-centric, which means he took a European model to understand modern Chinese nationality. Other options of symbolic nation building were put on the table every now and then, but none of them stayed as regularly as Han-centricism. On the other hand, his idea on assimilation was relatively clear in terms of its direction than its degree, as he preferred Han people to be the one who assimilated others whereas to unclear extent. Besides the reiteration of the narrow definition of Chinese nationalism, Sun’s lectures also emphasized the practical function of nationalist doctrine i.e. to unite the Chinese people to resist the exploitation of foreign imperial powers. China was described as a victim of western imperialism, and anti-imperialism was the main topic of the lectures. Another symbolic element worth noting was Sun’s expectation towards China’s foreign policy in the future. “China has a great morality i.e. loving peace”, “since the Han Dynasty [202 B.C. – 220 A.D.], China did not advocate foreign wars, and ideology of peace has been sufficient”. Although
China had conquered other countries in history, “instead of the brutal method used by the Europeans today”, the Chinese “influenced others peacefully”. Sun stressed that peace-loving was an important moral treasure of the Chinese and the ideological basis of the status of China in the world.

**Ideas of Chinese Nationalism in Chiang Kai-shek’s Speeches**

In terms of the plan on the nation building in China, Sun Yat-sen’s framework was so complex and ambiguous that scholars had great disparity in their interpretations (See Zhang, 2015; Xiong, 2016). To decide Sun’s true attitudes toward ethnic diversity and national composition is beyond the focus of this study. I consider Sun as a proponent of exclusively Han-centric nationalism not because I think his probably less-radical opinions about ethnic minorities were of no historic meanings, but because I believe that the former had greater historical influence on subsequent state-level discussions on this issue, especially on Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches. Whether the influence was direct is unknown to us, but it is evident that Chiang claimed that he was the loyal follower of Sun’s ideology, and he did attempt to reinterpret and disseminate Sun’s ideas in his own works. An aspect where Chiang inherited Sun was anti-imperialism, which was considered to be the central task of Chinese revolution and the basis of national revival. In his speeches in 1920s, Chiang repetitively emphasized that China was a victim of foreign imperialism, and Chinese people should make efforts and sacrifice to achieve independence. “The target of nationalism is to defeat all foreign imperialism” (Chiang, 1927). He also expressed his agreement on Sun’s idea on the feature of peace-loving of China. “Our nationalism does not mean being greedy on the strength of the Chinese nation, or like other strong nations, to repress all other weak nations; otherwise it would be imperialism rather than nationalism” (Chiang, 1927). Another respect in which Chiang resembled Sun was the attitude towards the Manchu power. Like Sun, Chiang considered the
establishment and ruling of the Qing regime as the history of China being conquered by a foreign nation (Chiang, 1932), and Manchus was not part of the Chinese nation.

In his speeches in 1930s and 1940s, Chiang extended the exclusively Han nationalism by two symbolic strategies. First, with the help of Dai Jitao, who was the “actual controller of ethnic politics in the Nanjing National Government” (Xiong, 2016, p.75), Chiang put more weight on the traditional Confucius morality in his discussions on Sun’s “Three People’s Principles”, so much so that he tended to conclude and define Sun’s ideology with a reconstruction of Confucianism. When he also held the position of the minister of the Ministry of Education, he spared no effort in promoting Confucius morality as the key subject of citizenship education. In a speech taking place in the MoE, he asserted that “the Prime Minister’s (Sun Yat-sen) thought is to inherit the ideology of virtue and morality from Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu (names of ancient charismatic and political leaders) to Confucius, and to make them thrive and abound. The Three People’s Principle is originated from the ideology of virtue and morality” (Chiang, 1931). Furthermore, after the September 18th Incident and the threat from the Japanese Imperialism became unneglectable, Chiang started to promote a more active version of Confucius principle, arguing that to learn Confucianism was could not be only in books but should also in behaviors. Chiang believed that Confucianism was the essence of the national culture of China, and he considered the power of Confucius culture as indispensable in the anti-Japanese struggle. He criticized the traditional Confucianism in China for being too “static” and only learnt in Confucius classics but not carrying out in actual practice, which was detrimental to the maintenance of Chinese nationalist spirit. According to him, this was the reason why “Chinese nation was ruled by Manchus Qing for more than 200 years” (Chiang, 1931). To avoid the Chinese nation being conquered by aliens (Japanese) again, “we should set the moral spirit as the basis, and promote [the Confucius ideology] in the
active respect, by doing this we could build the intrinsic spirit for our nationality!” For Chiang, the war between China and Japan was not only the competition about hard powers but soft power (culture). Only by unleashing the Confucius culture in the public can “we revive our intrinsic national spirit and defeat Japanese national spirit” (Chiang, 1931). Specifically, the first step to strengthen the cultural power of China was to follow Confucianism in personal cultivation i.e. to internalize the principles of virtue and morality. Chiang’s emphasis on Confucius ideology as the national spirit corresponded to the exclusively Han-centric view on Chinese nationality, in which Confucianism was now nationalized.

Another symbolic strategy backing the Han-centric narrow nationalism was the generosity for national self-ruling expressed in Chiang’s speeches. In a 1934 speech, Chiang even advocated to learn the USSR experience, establish a “five nationality federation” and to carry out a policy that permits the self-ruling of the peripherals. Chiang defended this let-loose approach by saying that it was the result of the rational consideration on domestic and international conditions. “Under today’s situation, I have to let it go though I don’t want to” (Chiang, 1934). He said this was only the temporary solution to the current territorial crisis brought about by the Japanese. ‘For the request from the Inner Mongolia [of self-ruling], only accepting it and carrying out the open policies for self-ruling could help us deal with the problems in the frontiers”, and only in this case could the central government can recover the rule of the frontiers when the crisis passed. Otherwise Dewang (the leader of Mongolian) would “surrender to the Japanese at his will” (Chiang, 1934). Despite his reluctance, allowing this rational calculation indicated that Chiang was not firmly committed to the unification of the Han and non-Han ethnic groups.

But the compromise made by Chiang did not ease the tension in the frontiers and curtail the threat from Japan. Also, his approach of separate ruling was under intensive critique from within and
outside the Nationalist Party. In response to the suspicions, Chiang published the so-called “nation-clanism” theory in 1942, redefining the Chinese nation as a big clan and all ethnic groups including Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims and Tibetans were the members of a same family. In his theory, the ethnic groups shared the same blood, like brothers and sisters do. “The Republic of China was founded by the Chinese nation as a whole, and the Chinese nation is the name for the unified five clans i.e. Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans. I want to say that we are five clans rather than five nations, which means we are all the elements to constitute the Chinese nation, just like brothers constitute a family” (Chiang, 1942). With the help of Dai Jitao and other intellectuals, Chiang invented a *jus sanguinis* nationalism and constructed a blood-based symbolic Chinese nation. This suggested that Chiang was intended to move away from Han-centric model of Chinese nationality to the construction of a blood-based Chineseness that transcended ethnic differences.

But this theory was conditioned by his other ideas. As he was not fully committed to the political unification of ethnic groups, he did not show a strong belief on the new theory in front of new political reality after the war. In an important governmental speech in 1945, Chiang claimed that “for the frontier ethnic groups outside our provinces (Han residences), if they are capable of self-ruling and have the willing for independency…our state must voluntarily help them to gain liberty and independency” (Chiang, 1945). But that does not mean that Chiang absolutely renounce the “nation-clanism”. In fact, he used it to justify the conditioning of his approach of separate ruling. Chiang’s let-it-go rule only apply for the ethnic groups who had strong will and power for independency, which meant that he stayed on the track of exclusively Han nationalism.

“Nation-clanism” could have been a non-European model that differs from what Sun Yat-sen and Chiang previously took. However, Chiang’s treatment of those “weak” ethnic groups killed this
possibility. For those ethnic groups that were considered by Chiang as too weak to make their own political decisions, the “nation-clanism” was utilized to legitimize the blood-based, Han-centric assimilation (Xiong, 2016). This had been foreshadowed by his belief that the Confucius culture gave Han strong assimilative power over others. “Our nation was conquered for decades during the Yuan Dynasty, and was conquered for centuries during the Qing Dynasty. However, both Yuan and Qing were assimilated by us, so our nation would never die out…The reason why we can assimilate the foreigners is that our culture is more advance than their cultures” (Chiang, 1932). Although he was referring to culture here, to him the assimilation was, and should be, at the expense of other ethnicities. With this belief, Chiang stayed in narrow nationalism, albeit with a detour to Han-centric assimilationism. But this detour was widened into a highway in the history textbooks, as will be shown below.

The Construction of Chinese Identity in History Textbooks

Textbook is another cultural product that have great influence on people’s mind and reflect the state’s will on national building. In terms of cultivating pupil’s identification on the nation, history textbooks play a central role. In general, the state exerts its power in this process by giving certification to the textbooks after reviewing, and only those with the certification could be sold in market and adopted in classroom. It is worth noting, however, that the state department of the Republic of China did not have direct control over the writing of the history textbooks, because the editors and writers of the textbooks had certain level of autonomy as long as they generally follow the curriculum (and some of them even failed to follow), schools had the right to select course materials out of certificated textbooks, and the strength of the state influence varied from time to time (Liu, 2016). It was under this background why it was interesting to see how the editors and writers responded to the state leaders’ overall inclination to narrow nationalism and to the
terms such as “five nationality republicanism” “Chinese nation” that were vague but popular in the political sphere.

As the editors and writers enjoyed certain level of autonomy, the textbooks varied from one another with regard to content. Their popularity also varied largely because of different marketing capability of the publish houses. The textbook market in the first half of the twentieth century in China was dominated by four publish houses: Commercial Press, Zhonghua Book Company, World Journal Book Store and Kaiming Bookstore. The textbooks published by them were not only popular, but were usually reprinted for many times, and some of them were even used for decades until 1949. In order to reflect the popular understanding of Chinese history, this study selects a number of textbooks that had large market share and substantial influence.

The history education in the ROC time can be divided into four periods. 1. The interim period, when the government published the first curriculum (1912) which made the old history textbooks used in the latter years of Qing obsolete, while the writers and publishers had not finished their work to supply the demand of new textbooks. As a result, during this short period of time, history materials used in school were revised versions of some history textbooks used in the late Qing, and the revision followed The Interim Procedure of Normal Education (January 1912). Among the handful of history textbooks during the interim, I select the Chinese History Textbook written by Chen Qingnian (1911) because of its great popularity. Its original version was published in 1903, and was revised in 1911 to fulfil according to the regulation. I also select New System Chinese History reedited by Zhao Yusen (1911) that was also very popular, whose original version was published in 1907 and the revised version was published in 1911. Written during the late Qing period and republished in the interim period, they could present a mixture of imperialist and nationalist way of understanding of Chinese history. Also, although they were revised for the
transitional time, their popularity continued until 1920s as Chen’s edition was reedited for 16 times from 1912 to 1921 and Zhao’s edition for 29 times until 1926.

2. From the first curriculum until before the establishment of the new educational system [1912-1922], a number of history textbooks were written from scratch and were published after they passed the examination by MoE. This curriculum specified the history of the China as a nation, rather than as an empire, as the key subject of history education. For middle school, the history subject included Chinese history (first and second semester) and world history (third and fourth semester). The goal of the history education was to teach student “the important events in history, the evolution of the nation and society, and the rise and fall of the states. [The teaching] should especially pay attention to the continuity and change of the political system and the root of the establishment of the Republic” (Beijing, 1999, p. 11). The first public house committed to follow this curriculum was Zhonghua Book Company, whose “Zhonghua” series of textbooks “almost occupied the whole textbook market” as soon as it was published” (Liu, 2016, p. 83). Therefore, for the study of this period, I select Zhonghua Middle School History Textbook edited by Pan Wu (1913). I also selected Homeland History Textbook for New System written by Zhong Yulong (1917), which was not only popular (it was revised for over 20 times until 1920s) among schools but also highly regarded among the education observers from the MoE (Liu, 2016).

3. Under the influence of the New Culture Movement, the government started a reform on the school system and published a new curriculum for history education in 1923. This curriculum was unique in emphasizing the academic value over the political significance of history education. It did not have bullet point like “cultivating national spirit”, but “help students understand the truth of the contemporary problems” and “teach students with the method for history investigation”. It also suggested that for the middle school should teach the history of the world including Chinese
history, in order to “break the narrow idea about dynasties and national borders” (Beijing, 1999, p. 14). Although only some editors mixed the Chinese history into the world history in their productions, most textbooks allegedly aimed at cultivating world consciousness, played down the national consciousness, and emphasized social and cultural history over political history (Liu, 2016) as the guideline suggested. On the other hand, at that time the governmental examination of the textbook was actually “loosely in order”, and the editors and publishers had much freedom than they did in other periods. To show how textbooks answered the loose regulation, I select *History of China* edited by Zhao Yusen (1923) and *Homeland History for Junior* by Jin Zhaozi (1923), both of which were influential and repetitively revised until 1930s.

4. As soon as the Nanjing Government took the power and unified the nation in 1928, it started to formulate the new plan for education. In 1932 the new curriculum started to take effect and brought about another climax of textbook writing and publishing. Compared to the last curriculum, this curriculum defined history more as a tool of nationalist education than science. It stipulated that the main purpose of history education should include “studying the evolution of Chinese nation, especially elaborating the glory of its history and the reasons that [China] suffers from the invasion of imperial powers”, in order to “arouse the ideology of national rejuvenation” (Beijing, 1999, p. 43). Due to more detailed and stricter regulation, it also had stronger influence to the writers and publishers, so much so that the textbook composition followed a single model and the structure and the texts look alike gradually. The four big publishers produced most textbooks for the market, but they were not the only players. From 1940s, the government started to participate into the editing of history textbooks with the contribution of National Translation and Compilation Center. To make sure the study can reflect the materials most students used in this period, I selected the best sellers contributed by the big publishers. *Fuxing Homeland History for Junior*, edited by Fu
Weiping (1934), was published by Commercial Press; Homeland History for Junior, edited by Yao Shaohua (1934), was published by Zhonghua Book Company; Homeland History for Middle School, written by Zhu Lingxin (1933), was published by World Journal Book Store; Homeland History, written by Zhou Yutong (1947), was published by Kaiming Bookstore. The 1932 curriculum was the last one that led to vast publication of new textbooks, and after the 1936 curriculum came out, no publish house edited any new textbook accordingly (Liu, 2016). This was mainly because the interval between the curriculums were too short for the book houses to start new books according to each one. Also, the 1936, 1940, 1941 and 1948 curriculum were published based on the 1932 one, and the main framework of history teaching changed little. Therefore, the bookstore could meet the new demands by tiny revisions. The textbooks mentioned above were considered so important that they were reedited and republished for many times, and they dominated the market in the first half of the twentieth century.

1. Definition of China in the History Textbooks

The most obvious indication of an identity is the name that represents it. In premodern Chinese, no term is more widely used than “Tianxia” and “Hainei” in the description of the world people envisage – the former literally means “under the heaven” and the latter literally means “within the sea”. More importantly, they are also used to represent the place within the ruling of central governments in different dynasties. The two levels of meaning and usage actually conflate to each other so that they are almost undistinguishable if not understood in particular context. And this is the literacy face of imperialism – the empire is equivalent to cosmopolitan, which corresponds to the imagination of the boundless sovereignty enjoyed by imperial state and the confidence of the superiority of empire’s culture. On the other hand, this does not mean that people regard all entities in empire in an indiscriminative manner. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter,
“Zhongguo”, literally meaning “central state/kingdom”, used to be the name of the political and cultural center of the empire i.e. where the central government has direct control and where the advanced culture is originated from.

The national building of China account for the nationalist turn of the name of the country. “Tianxia” and “Hainei” have ceased to be the terms to represent the country. “Zhongguo”, on the other hand, is still used but in a different way – the literal meaning of “central” has been lost and the word has become the name of the nation. However, this does not lead to a complete fault between the past and present. The nationalist usage of Zhongguo actually ontologically inherits what it represented in the past, in that it means “China proper” where the majority of population is Han which is equivalent to the political and cultural center of the empire. But the change indeed happens: Zhongguo no longer represents a symbolic centrality and superiority, but instead represents a nation – in this case, a nation of Han people. And this is the symbolic background under which many nationalist textbooks have the tendency to conflate Han with Zhongguo (“China” is the English translation of the latter).

However, in a case where the founders of the nation are obligated to take over the main body of the multi-national imperial territory, the Han-centric meaning of Zhongguo was pernicious to the logical coherence of nationalization of identity in that the supporters of it was easily criticized for being “narrow nationalists”, who deliberately or unwittingly provide the separatism in non-Han regions with the reason to break away from China. And this danger is seen not merely by logic or in discourse but more vividly in reality considering there were foreign imperial powers which supported the separations e.g. the British were fueling the Tibetan nationalism, and the Japanese wanted to secure their interest by keeping the Manchuria out of reach of the central government (and they indeed established a puppet government over there after they invaded China in 1930s).
Taking the symbolic and realistic tension into account, it is not surprising to see another tendency in the evolution of the term Zhongguo – a wider connotation that covers the territory of Qing Dynasty including the non-Han areas. But this does not mean that the elites just invented the “big nationalism” out of nothing other than realistic consideration. In fact, they could easily find the legitimacy of the claim by the reference to the territory under Qing’s rule. The past (real, not imaginative) is powerful enough to ideologically rival against narrow nationalism. And this is contributed by the Manchu Qing with “the massive expansion of state territory…that established the geopolitical framework and international boundaries of the modern Chinese nation-state”, and with the “construction (building on the Mongol Yuan Dynasty) of a multiethnic empire of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Sino-Muslim peoples that provided the foundation for reconstituting the new Chinese nation as a unitary yet multiethnic state” (Leibold, 2007, p. 19).

But the use of Zhongguo as the whole entity under imperial authority is not modern. Since as early as pre-Qin period, Zhongguo had been used in dealing with foreign affairs while the dynastic titles were used in domestic contexts (with the term Tianxia or Hainei). Symbolically, soon after Qing occupied Beijing and establish their rule, the elites started to follow this tradition, using Zhongguo to refer to the Empire especially in documents dealing with foreign affairs (Zhao, 2006). This was when the elites gradually realized that Qing was only one of many entities in the world and the Empire should have a relatively clear definition of its territory, thanks to the territorial disputes especially against Russia. Eventually, Zhongguo “became coupled with the English signifier ‘China’ and its European-Langauge variants” (Leibold, 2007, p. 10). Regarding the demarcation of the imperial sovereignty, the empire started to act like a nation, at least rhetorically. If this usage of Zhongguo is the skeleton, then Liang Qichao, one of the most influential scholars in Late-Qing period, added flesh into the frame with the reference of mythical tradition. “In Liang’s
spatiotemporal definition of the nation, everything within the confines of Qing territory and stretching back to the time of the mythical Yellow Emperor was nationalized as part of the Chinese geo-body” (Leibold, 2007, p. 46). While the premodern and modern tradition serve as a tool kit for the builders of modern Chinese nation, the rivalry between the separatists and unionists accounts for the logical inconsistency founded in Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches, though both of the national leader are ideologically closer to narrow nationalism. So as in the history textbooks.

The textbooks used during the aforementioned interim period show a mixture of imperial and national definition of China. In the one edited by Chen (1911), there are at least 94 mentioning of “Tianxia” within the texts for the reference of the territory which the orthodox dynasties ruled in Chinese history. And the existence of this term has high degree of continuity in that it is constantly used in the narratives almost about all the historical periods. The term is included in the description of the phenomenon or events that are in imperial level. For instance, when a new power defeated others and gained dominance or absolute ruling over the country, “Tianxia” was unified. If the country was ruled by different regimes in the different places in particular period, “Tianxia” was separated. This type of express was everywhere in the textbook. The Yellow Emperor, a mythical figure who is regarded as the common ancestor of all Chinese people, “was very ambitious and wanted to unify Tianxia” (Chen, 1911, vol. 1, p. 1); The king of Qin “unified Tianxia and called himself ‘the first Emperor’”[B.C. 221] (p. 2); Liu Bang defeated Xiang Yu to “unified Tianxia” (p. 27) and became the first Emperor of Han Dynasty [B.C. 202]; After the Kingdom of Shu successfully withstood the invasion from the Kingdom of Wei, a “trisection of Tianxia occurred” [A.D. 208] (Chen, 1911, vol. 2, p. 16); After the Northern Zhou Dynasty was established in the northwest [557], “Tianxia was divided into three states” (p. 42); not long after, Wen Emperor of
Sui Dynasty defeated his enemies and “unified Tianxia” (Chen, 1911, vol. 3, p. 1) again [581]; the great Tang Dynasty was established after “Tianxia was pacified” [618] (p. 4); Song ended the post-Tang turmoil and “Tianxia was unified again” [960] (Chen, 1911, vol. 4, p. 10); after Mongol conquered China, Kublai Khan “owned Tianxia” [1271] (Chen, 1911, vol. 5, p. 17); so as Taizu Emperor of Ming Dynasty [1368] (Chen, 1911, vol. 6, p. 34). The change of political regimes is certainly not the only occasion where Tianxia is used. For example, during the Zhou Dynasty, “there are nine provinces in Tianxia” (Chen, 1911, vol. 1, p. 6); Wu Emperor of Han Dynasty “was fond of literacy, so he recruited literates from Tianxia and selected excellent ones” (p. 30) to work for him; during Tang Dynasty, “what administered Tianxia were three departments and six ministries” (Chen, 1911, vol. 3, p. 11); in later years of the Ming Dynasty, the court was almost under the control of Wei Zhongxian, a notoriously treacherous prime minister who held “the power over Tianxia” (Chen, 1911, vol. 6, p. 26).

Similarly, in the textbook edited by Zhao (1911), Tianxia and Hainei are regularly used in the narratives to refer to the society under the governance of the states with political/cultural superiority. The analysis shows that for every six pages in the textbook there is one page with at least one mentioning of Tianxia or Hainei. And the appearance of them have the same level of continuity as Tianxia in the textbook from Chen (1911). The mystical wise rulers in far ancient times provided good administration and Tianxia had peace and security (Zhao, 1911, vol. 1, p. 9); the king of Qin kingdom annexed other six kingdoms and unified Tianxia (p. 38) and divided Hainei into more than thirty counties (Zhao, 1911, vol. 2, p. 1); Wang Mang, who seized the throne of the Han Dynasty, caused upheaval in Hainei by waging war against Quting (a county in periphery) that caused casualty (p. 18); Taizong Emperor of Tang Dynasty pacified Hainei after he defeated other kingdoms (Zhao, 1911, vol. 4, p. 6); Hainei was unified again after Taizong
Emperor of Song Dynasty defeated Northern Han (Zhao, 1911, vol. 5, p. 3); when Song was facing imminent threat from Jin (the regime founded by Jurchen), the Emperor seek help from Tianxia (p. 21); during the Yuan Dynasty, the officials in court were so unpopular that their jobs caused resentment in Tianxia (p. 43); paper currency was widely used in Tianxia since Song Dynasty (p. 72); after Kangxi, the Emperor of Qing Dynasty, solved the domestic and diplomatic crises, Hainei was stabilized (Zhao, 1911, vol. 6, p. 32).

It is unlikely that the writers and audience would take the literal meaning of the terms i.e. under the heaven and within the sea – they would actually know what it refers to in particular context. Neither does Tianxia and Hainei indicate any geological entity with fixed boundary – it could be ruled under big empire such as Yuan or under shrunk empire such as Song. However, this does not mean that any regime can be considered as having the authority over Tianxia regardless of their locations. The only pattern implied by the historiography about the usage of this term is that only the regime occupies and secure the political and cultural center can its territory be called “Tianxia”, which leads to the analysis of the usage of Zhongguo, the name of the political and cultural center of imperial China.

But the meaning of Zhongguo is ramified in the textbooks and indicates different entities in different contexts. From the content analysis throughout the books edited by Chen (1911) and Zhao (1911), I found three connotations of Zhongguo occurred in the narratives. Firstly, in some sentences, Zhongguo bear the same meaning as it used to do – the political/cultural center. That Zhongguo refers to the political center can be interpreted within the description on those “orthodox” dynasties in Chinese history. The orthodoxy is the source of the symbolic legitimacy, and only with this can the regime be considered as a part of the main flow of Chinese official history and therefore could carry the name of “Zhongguo” other than the dynastic name. The complete
standard to determine whether a regime is orthodox is intricate, but the most obvious criteria of selection is its closeness to advanced Confucius culture and certain length of duration to make an impact to history. Except those short-lived regimes, if the rulers of the regimes regarded themselves to be a receiver of the Confucius heritage, or the territory they occupied included the cultural center, their regimes are considered to be orthodox in the history of China, therefore their name are the in the title of the twenty-five books of the official Chinese (Zhongguo) history. This standard corresponds with the Yi Xia Zhi Bie mentioned in the beginning of this chapter i.e. the binary model of civilized in center and barbarian in peripheral. Geographically, and ruling out those ephemeral regimes, the symbolic range of Zhongguo is wider than Han-founded dynasties, otherwise the term would be Han-centric nationalist. On the other hand, it is narrower than what is represented by “China” today as it does not include allegedly uncivilized or backward places. Consequently, while the Twenty-five History includes Yuan History, it does not put Tubo (a regime ruling Tibet) in the titles of the books.

In the textbook edited by Chen (1911), a number of mentioning of Zhongguo carry this imperial, cultural-centered meaning. For example, during the Zhou Dynasty [B.C. 1046 – B.C. 771], “Rong and Di (two clans of barbarians) in the Northwest “disturbed the frontier and cruelly invaded Zhongguo” (Chen, 1911, vol. 1, p. 9); during the Spring and Autumn Period [B.C. 770 – B.C. 476], the barons who were dominating others were recognized as the overlord of Zhongguo; “the ideology of Confucius is the root of Zhongguo’s polity and education” (p. 17); when the authority of the Han Dynasty was very unstable in its later years, Zhongguo is in turmoil (p. 23); the Emperor of Sui Dynasty liked to show off the prosperity of Zhongguo to the foreigners (Chen, 1911, vol. 2, p. 1); Qidan, an ethnic group in northeast, was under the control of Zhongguo during Sui and Tang periods (Chen, 1911, vol. 4, p. 5); Yuan Hao, the leader of Xia (founded by Dangxiang, a branch
of Tibetan, 1038 - 1227), coveted the throne to rule Zhongguo (p. 14). All these demonstrate the imperial connotation of Zhongguo with high level of continuity.

It would have been a perfect combination of Tianxia and Zhongguo that constitutes a good case of imperial definition of China. However, as imperialist as it could be, the textbook narratives did not imply a perfect ideal type of imperial nationalism, as they often called the whole multinational empires “Zhongguo” especially in the descriptions about their relationship to foreign entities. For example, Buddhism was introduced from India into Zhongguo (Chen, 1911, vol. 2, p. 1); When Tang Empire was weak because of domestic disorder, taziks (the Arabians) infiltrated into the western region of the Empire and planned to invade Zhongguo (Chen, 1911, vol. 3, p. 25); During the Yuan Dynasty, “the maritime transportation between Persia, India and Zhongguo” (Chen, 1911, vol. 5, p. 18) was gradually facilitated. The connotation of Zhongguo has similar level of continuity to the political/cultural one. However, whether the author actually use this to promote a multiethnic definition of modern China remains unclear. It was possible that he was a fan of Liang Qichao or other proponents of the unification of multiple ethnics into one Zhongguo nation (which developed into Zhonghua nation afterwards), but it was also possible that he just followed the tradition to call the empires Zhongguo in relation to foreigners without particular intension. He could have realized the first possibility in the narratives (as others did in newer textbooks), but he did not. This makes this connotation of Zhongguo less evident than the imperial one.

This two layers of meaning of Zhongguo also exist in the textbook contributed by Zhao (1911), but in a different manner. In contrast to what are found in Chen (1911), the multiethnic connotation of Zhongguo is more evident than the political/cultural definition in this textbook. Firstly, the imperial usage of Zhongguo is much less frequent than intermittent in the texts. It only concentrated on several contexts where the Confucianism, Chinese written language, scientific
achievement and agriculture - all of which were elements of the cultural center of the empire – as the culture that represent Zhongguo. Secondly and more importantly, this textbook not only use Zhongguo when discussing foreign affairs, but also clarifies the geographical boundary of Zhongguo and the multiethnic composition of the people in the introduction chapter. In the introduction, the textbook claims that geographically, Zhongguo (China) consists of several adjacent regions: Zhongguo-Benbu (China proper) where most residents are Han people, Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. Demographically, Chinese people includes six important sorts: Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese Muslim, Tibetan and Miao (Zhao, 1911, vol. 1, pp. 1-7). The introduction chapter is the evidence that the author of the textbook is a supporter of the multiethnic definition of China and tried to promote this idea to the audience.

Lastly, the Han-centric narrow definition of Zhongguo was implied by a few sentences but was not full-fledged into a full logical system. This implication scattered in the narratives. For instance, when discussing the thriving of a variety of ancient philosophies during the Spring and Autumn Period, the textbook says that scholars believed that this was a time when “the intelligence of Han people was developed in the competition” (Chen, 1911, vol. 1, p. 18); during the same period, most people who lived in the kingdom of Wu, Chu, and Yue (south part of China today) were not Han, “therefore at that time they were excluded by” Zhongguo (p.31); that the project to civilized the Xianbei people promoted by Xiaowen Emperor of Northern Wei Dynasty was carried out by Han people (Chen, 1911, vol. 2, p. 37) made relatively clear that Han bears the advanced culture, hence Hannization of culture; the Japanese learnt the literacy and advanced arts and crafts from Han people (Chen, 1911, vol. 3, p. 14). Other than these examples there are no clear trace of a narrowly nationalized definition of Zhongguo in Chen (1911). In Zhao (1911) this type of definition is even harder to find in the texts.
The symbolic framework depicting the boundary of historical community went through a significant change in the newly written textbooks in the 1910s. The popularity and continuity of the usage of Tianxia is lost in the textbook written by Pan (1913) who argued very clearly in the preface that the editing of this textbook, reflecting the revolutionary spirit at the time, would delete terms like “Tianxia” because they were “against the contemporary world view” (Pan, 1913, vol. 1, p. 2). This is a strong evidence that the use of Tianxia suggest an imagination of boundless world empire which was considered to be contradictory to the modern view of the world consisting of various entities that are supposedly equal to each other – and modern China should be one of them. Compared to Tianxia, “Hainei” survived better, though in much less continuity. This is probably because its literal meaning - “within the sea” at least roughly indicates an imaginary boundary of the country (this term is actually still frequently used in everyday conversation today, with its antonym “Haiwai” which means “outside the sea” indicating foreign countries).

Corresponding to this change, the tendency to use Zhongguo to represent cultural/political center in China is significantly weakened, as in most locations within the narratives it is much difficult to come up with this interpretation. In particular contexts what the term represents could be vague. For example, the period of Five Dynasties [907-960] is a period when northern part of today’s China was ruled by successive five regimes, Hou Liang, Hou Tang, Hou Jin, Hou Han, Hou Zhou. Although Hou Tang was founded not by Han people but by Shatuo, all the five dynasties are considered as orthodox in official history and by the author, who claimed that he did this because he followed the rule that “who enter into Zhongguo ought to be considered as [part of] Zhongguo” (Pan, 1913, vol. 2, p. 139). This narrative may imply the imperial understanding of this term. However, the author continued to say that “Shatuo had been assimilated at that time” (p. 139), which could be interpreted as a narrowly nationalist view on Zhongguo. This ambiguity is an
epitome of Han-centric nationalization of Zhongguo as a term. A lot of mentioning of Zhongguo that could be understood as cultural/political center could also be interpreted as only representing the Han residential area. This dual meaning is especially common when describing non-Han regime became the dominant power and became one of Zhongguo’s orthodox dynasties. Manchus “entered and became the emperor of Zhongguo” (Ru Di Zhongguo) (p. 135) is a typical example. This sentence could be understood as Manchus occupied the political/cultural center of the empire. However, reading the book from beginning to end, audience could find out this type of expression is only used for non-Han cases. In contrast, Han founded regimes taking over the political/cultural center seems to be taken for granted and no special expression is used. Moreover, in some places the meaning of political/cultural center is totally lost and replaced by Han-centric, nationalist one. For instance, in the discussion of the ethnic policies in the Ming Dynasty, the author says that the government “allowed intermarriage between Mongols, Semu people and Zhongguo people” (p. 164), which clearly demonstrates Zhongguo as a nation of Han and Mongols and Semu people are not part of it.

Besides the clear tendency of narrow nationalization, the use of Zhongguo in Pan (1913) inherits the multiethnic connotation in previous textbooks, similarly in the contexts about foreign relations. Without an explicit definition of the range of Zhongguo, however, Pan (1913) may merely do this to follow the tradition just like Zhao (1911) did. As a matter of fact, Pan (1913) promoted the multiethnic understanding of China, but with a different term: Zhonghua. How the meaning and usage of this term evolved throughout history is beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth noting that this term is actually the official name of modern China as a nation (Zhonghua Republic). The name of the nation is decided by the revolutionaries who “echo those reformers within the Manchu court who had called for the creation of a republic of five races” (Leibold, 2007, p. 38).
So it is not surprising that in the introductory section Pan (1913) not only said Zhonghua is the real name of the nation but also emphasized that this nation includes more than just Han people, but also Miao people, Mongols, Tungusic people and Tibetans. However, this multinational definition of the Chinese nation is demonstrated problematically in the texts. On one hand, Zhonghua bears connotation of multi-nationality in the discussion about China’s foreign relations. For example, during the Wei and Jin dynasties, “Buddhists migrated from Zhonghua westward to India for scriptures” (Pan, 1913, vol. 1, p. 157). In this sense, Zhonghua is just a replacement of Zhongguo when dealing with foreign relations. But this is not the only similarity between them. Our analysis finds that Zhonghua is also used for the special treatment to the non-Han regime who won the power i.e. “Mongol enter and became the emperor of Zhonghua” (Pan, 1913, vol. 2, p. 132) “Manchu Qing enter and became the emperor of Zhonghua” (p. 191). And this type of description is not shared by Han-founded regimes. Furthermore, the use of Zhonghua in some texts reflects the Han-centric definition of the nation even more evidently than that of Zhongguo. For instance, the author believed in the theory that Han people was not indigenous people in China, but migrated from west thousands of years ago. “Han came from the west to the east, and colonized the Yellow River Basin as the base for their victories over Miao people and Turkish people” (Pan, 1913, vol. 1, p. 5). But in the discussion of the change of the nation’s territory in ancient time, the texts say “Zhonghua nation came from the Pamir Plateau in the west, and initially use the Yellow River Basin as the colony” (p.40). The coexistence of these two descriptions clearly indicates the equivalence between Han and Zhonghua. Additionally, in a number of places, the narratives regarded non-Han ethnicities as “outsider” (Waizu), and those who once defeated Han powers as the invaders. “During the Song Dynasty, Liao, Jin and Yuan invaded Zhonghua’s land” (Pan, 1913, vol. 2, p. 177). In conclusion, although Pan (1913) attempted to promote the idea of “five
nationality republicanism” in the leading chapter, the narratives in the texts failed to accommodate. Both Zhonghua and Zhongguo have evident connotation of Han-centric, narrow definition of Chinese nation in history.

Compared to Pan’s work, the textbook edited by Zhong (1917) under the same curriculum probably made a better if not fully successful attempt to promote the five nationality republicanism. The author claimed in the preface that he would follow the principle of five nationality republicanism and treat Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans equally in the narratives. He realized this with a multi-national definition of China’s history, starting the discussion with “the origin of five nations” (Zhong, 1917, vol. 1, p. 2). In the same chapter, the author included a chart that separates the five nations and respectively outlines their evolution i.e. name changes and regimes founded by them in history (p. 3), indicating the boundary of storytelling. Additionally, unlike previously mentioned textbooks that were shy to use “national” language to describe the rise and fall of political entities, Zhong (1917) clearly concluded each historical period as power struggles between the five nations. In the remote antiquity, “Han had been advanced and civilized while others had not”, and this was because “Han nation occupied more land than others” (Zhong, 1917, vol. 1, p. 2). From the Qin Dynasty to the Northern and Southern Dynasty, the Han nation was firstly dominant the central plain and successfully expanded its territory, but afterward was challenged by the other four who learnt the advanced culture from Han (p. 38). From the Sui Dynasty to the Song Dynasty, the Han nation was so strong that they ruled over multiple ethnicities, expanded their territory, and established a massive empire. But afterwards its power was corrupted so as its national spirit, which made it the underdog in the competition against others. Eventually Han was conquered by Mongols (Zhong, 1917, vol. 2, p. 1). The period from Yuan to Qing had three stages: first, Han and others were conquered by
Mongols, second, Han became the overlord, and lastly, Manchu conquered the other four (Zhong, 1917, vol. 3, p. 1).

Furthermore, the author claimed that it was the fact that Manchu rule the others that functioned as the basis of five nationality republicanism. “That the five nationalities communicate and become one family was confirmed in this period” (Zhong, 1917, vol. 3, p. 1). This suggest the modernity of five nationality republicanism and its foundation, which is corresponding to the modernity of the term *Zhongguo* implied in the narratives. While this term was used throughout the textbook, its multi-nationality is only demonstrated in the narratives about the Qing Dynasty. Differently, in the narratives about the previous historical periods, *Zhongguo*’s meaning was as diversified as previously mentioned textbooks. For example, a traitor of the Han Dynasty taught Xiongnu how to deal with *Zhongguo* (Zhong, 1917, vol. 1, p. 51), which suggested that Xiongnu was a rival against rather than a part of *Zhongguo*; The development of academic knowledge was connected the natural environment of *Zhongguo* (p. 121), which indicates a cultural connotation of the term; *Zhongguo* was also the empire as a whole that received the influence of religions from foreign countries. For domestic issue, the textbooks used *Tianxia*, e.g. Wu Emperor of Jin defeated Wu Kingdom and “unified *Tianxia*” (p. 85). However, in the narratives about the Qing Dynasty, the pattern shifted. The establishment of the last imperial regime was neither equal to “unifying *Tianxia*” (the expression used for Han-founded dynasties) nor described as “enter and became the overlord of *Zhongguo*” (the expression used for dynasties founded by non-Han power), but was summarized as unification of *Zhongguo* (Zhong, 1917, vol. 3, p. 51). In other words, only under the narratives on the Qing Dynasty, *Zhongguo* as a term escaped from the trap of imperial and Han-centric definition of community, and landed onto the field of multi-nationality that was corresponding to five nationality republicanism. Consequently, for the first time *Zhongguo* means
the same thing in the discussions on domestic issues and foreign affairs: the “Zhongguo” as in “Qing unified Zhongguo” (p. 51) was equivalent to the “Zhonguo” as the destination of opium (p. 76) from the west.

However, a potential while significant weakness of the modern combination of Zhongguo and five nationality republicanism was that this symbolic equilibrium was too modern (as it did not appear until the last section) to bear historical continuity in the texts, which would probably make the textbook, allegedly following the principle of “Five Nationality Republicanism” and “arouse patriotism” (Zhong, 1917, preface), less propagandistic to the audience especially to non-Han students. As noted above, in the narratives on the preceding historical periods, “Zhongguo” means differently. Unwittingly or intentionally, Zhong (1917) included some discussions about the historical connections between Han and non-Han peoples that could be seen as the amendment to this weakness, which is demonstrated in the last part of the analysis.

As noted above, the 1923 curriculum, written under the influence of the New Culture Movement, suggested that the history education should put Chinese history as a part of world history, play down the significance of national division and focus on social and cultural history instead of political history. Considering the guideline, it is reasonable to expect that people who wrote history textbooks in the 1920s would be less nationalist and more academic than they used to be. However, the analysis on the textbook edited by Zhao (1923) implicates a mix and limited impact from the curriculum to the textbook writing. On one hand, this textbook placed more emphasis on the relationship between China and outside world, which is reflected by the title of the third volume: *The Era When the Culture of Our Nation is Merged into the World Culture (from the Middle Period of Ming to Present)*. According to the author, before this time, the cultural exchange between China and others had a very limited geographical scope, as only those who were close to China were
influenced by Chinese culture (like Japan and Korea) or influenced Chinese culture (like India). The Western culture and the Eastern culture (represented by Chinese culture) developed almost independently. It was not until the Portuguese and other European came to the coast region of China did the real “internationality” begin (Zhao, 1923, vol. 3, p. 2). Also, this textbook uses more spaces to describe the development of society and the evolution of culture throughout Chinese history, while describes political history more briefly.

But these two changes, albeit of great significance, not so much make the textbook less nationalist as became a vehicle for nationalist expression. With only two chapters (five pages) about how the western culture influence China, the narratives on the relationship between China and world in volume three still focused on the political relations between China as a nation and others, which by no means implicated cosmopolitanism. The division between China and western powers is symbolically hardened especially by the narratives on the losses of the sovereignty of Qing Dynasty to Britain and others with the unequal treaties that forced the government to opened the trading ports. This was considered as a humiliation, and the humiliation is on Zhongguo (China), not just the Qing court. In this regard, compared to the textbooks written under the last curriculum, Zhao’s edition is more nationalist than Pan’s (1913) and as nationalist as Zhong (1917). The author argued that the forcedly penetration of trading barrier could be understood as China following (albeit unwillingly) the trend of globalization (Zhao, 1923, vol. 3, p. 159), but this did not curtail the outward nationalism evidently, as in the texts the author even lamented that “there is no fair diplomacy in a world of strong power!” (p. 186) when Japan replaced China as Korea’s suzerain.

Neither did the emphasis on social and cultural development soften nationalism. Many legacies in history regarding the trace of technological and intellectual were assigned nationalist connotation. For instance, the invention of glass indicated “the ancient achievement on the material civilization
in *our nation*” (Zhao, 1923, vol. 1, p. 40). It appeared that the description the social and cultural development, by noting that the historical achievements were made by “our nation” or “China”, would probably make students more proud of their country. In fact, “our nation” as a phrase was frequently used in the texts, even more often than “Zhongguo”. Nearly 45% of the pages in volume one and two had at least one appearance of this term (which was much more than those in previously discussed textbooks). The prevalence of “our nation” and that it was used with Zhongguo interchangeably was constantly reminding the audience that the Chinese language is ours, the Confucius ideology is “ours”, the inventions of compass and paper are “ours”, the national humiliation is “ours”, and the national history is “ours”.

With the strengthening of a sense of national belonging being said, what remains to be analyzed is the definitional problem: what is Zhongguo or “our nation”? It is clear that this textbook inherited the multi-nationality of China in the textbooks contributed by Pan (1913) and Zhong (1917). The author shared the same idea that Zhongguo people initially came from the west, and it was the different places of residence that separated Zhongguo people into Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims, Tibetans and Miao people. The author emphasized the solidarity of the ethnic groups by saying that although these ethnic groups have different names, “they are like the brothers in a same family”, and “that the fellowmen constitute a great community is the most glorious and happiest deed” (Zhao, 1923, vol. 1, p. 4). The multi-nationality was implied in other places in the texts, and when summarizing the development of Chinese culture in the end of volume two, the author suggested that more than Han culture should be taken into consideration, especially for the periods when non-Han nations established orthodox dynasties.

However, some appearance of Zhongguo still left the mark of Han-centric, narrow definition of China. For example, in Zhong’s (1917) work, Xiongnu was regarded as the ancestor of Chinese
Muslim (Hui). But Zhao (1923) suggested that this ethnic group was foreign to Zhongguo in Han Dynasty. Xiongnu “had political intermarriage with Zhongguo on one hand while killed and robbed after they entered into the boundary” (vol. 2, p. 23). Similarly, although the author may disagree that Liao Dynasty, founded by Qidan, was not a Chinese dynasty, he said “Yelu Deguang [the emperor of Liao] imitated Zhongguo” (p. 123) in political administration, when he could have replaced Zhongguo by “Song Dynasty” as other historians did. The existence of this type of narrative interrupted the continuity of multinational definition of China.

The maps of the historical periods were also suggestive of the boundary of story-telling. However, the sizes of the maps varied from one to another and the boundaries were presented as different from time to time. In this respect, the author is more academic than nationalistic, as it seems that he did not attempt very hard to define the nation’s boundary by historical mapping. Most maps include more than the regimes in China, but also those which were considered as foreign nations, and it is possible that the author draw the maps according to the texts – only those who played a role in China’s history are eligible to be included. But no matter how fluid the boundary was, the author could not circumvent the question of “what is China”, otherwise he would have the freedom to draw the map of anywhere in the world. In fact, regardless of the variation of the map size and the boundary, the so-called “China proper” where most of the Han people resided was in every map. It was this geographical entity (roughly equals to the middle and eastern part of China today) that underpinned the location of China and kept the author from drawing the map of, say, Europe or Africa. No non-Han regime was mapped out without the existence of Han area. In other words, while the maps did not continuously demonstrate a multi-national, inclusive China, it consistently suggested that the Han nation was the fundamental component. Only Han enjoys constant representation in the maps. This is a significant mark of narrow, Han-centric nationalism.
Similarly, the textbook edited by Jin (1925) also began with the claim that “our nation is composed by five ethnic groups: Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans” (Jin, 1925, vol. 1, p. 1), and stories of interethnic relations between Han and others were told in the narratives. When describing foreign relations in history, “Zhongguo” signifying a multiethnic entity is still used as the name of the protagonist e.g. the receiver of Buddhism or the player of international diplomacy. However, like the textbook by Zhao (1923), Jin (1925) did not depict a consistent geographical and ethnical boundary of multiethnic China. The maps presented within the texts were as varying as those in Zhao (1923), and the variation was even more evident with the boundaries drawn more clearly. However, in Jin’s work, this inconsistency seems to be more a result of deliberation than a failure, as the narratives clearly indicated that China’s territory varied from time to time. For example, the territorial expansion of Zhongguo started as early as when mythical Huang Emperor defeated other powers and then became the ancestor of Chinese people; “Sichuan was not connected to Zhongguo in ancient time” (p. 22) but it was included into Zhongguo’s territory afterwards; the Qin Dynasty expanded the territory and set the foundation of the geographic range of China today (p. 40), but the change did not stop; the Han and Tang Dynasties witnessed the apex of territorial range of China; the territory of Zhongguo shrank during the Song Dynasty that “unified Zhongguo” but only had sovereignty over the China proper (Jin, 1925, vol. 2, p. 10); Zhongguo was taken by Mongol (p. 19), and then “recovered” by Ming (p. 36); Qing not only gained firm control in the west region but also included Tibet into Zhongguo’s territory (p. 48). So the author may not insist that “Tibet is part of China because it has been a part of China since ancient time” like politicians today who attempted to strengthen the legitimacy of national unity, but would probably say that “well, it was not until the Qing period”.

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Within the fluid extension of Zhongguo there is a constant Han-centric core. Similar to Zhao (1923), Jin (1925) used Zhongguo as the name of geopolitical entity only if this entity included Han residents. So Qidan was fight against Zhongguo, the latter of which had been “unified” by Han-founded Song regardless of the strong non-Han neighbors; before Kublai Khan took the power in Beijing as the capital to rule the China proper, Mongol was not a part of Zhongguo but an enemy of Zhongguo; Han-founded Ming not just defeated Yuan Dynasty but also “recovered” Zhongguo from Mongolian rule. The consistency in Han-centric definition of the nation corresponded to the inconsistency of multi-national definition of China.

If the textbooks from the 1920s only indirectly suggested Han-centralism within their promotion of five nationality republicanism, the ones from the 1930s were not shy to emphasize the centrality of Han people and culture in Chinese history. Probably following the 1932 curriculum’s suggestion that the national history should take Chinese nation as a whole in order to lift the nationalist spirit of students and strengthen the solidarity among Han and non-Han ethnic groups in response to the danger of China being dismantled by foreign imperialists, the textbooks picked up the term “Zhonghua” that had been used by Pan (1913) and expected it to represent the whole multinational China. Ideally, Zhonghua nation is equivalent to Zhongguo, both of which include multiple nations including Han and non-Han. However, in the texts, the authors did not relinquish but instead stressed even hardly on the centrality of Han in Zhonghua by emphasizing Han history’s continuity over others. This emphasis started from the beginning of the narratives. In the chapter titled “the Origin of Zhonghua Minzu”, Fu (1934) was actually discussing where Han nation came from. He said that “after Han owned the Yellow River Basin, [they] called this land Zhongguo, called their nation Hua, and called the other ethnic groups surrounding them East Yi, West Rong, South Man and North Di (Yi, Rong, Man and Di are different names meaning barbarians). This is the where
the term “Zhonghua” is derived from” (Fu, 1934, vol. 1, p. 9). Also, the first state for Zhongguo nation was established by mythical Huang Emperor, who was the ancestor of Han people (p. 10). Likewise, Yao (1934) stated that “the nation that constitutes Zhongguo is named Zhonghua nation” (vol. 1, p. 4). Although he continued to say that “the Zhonghua nation is composed by Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims, Tibetans, Miao, Yao etc.”, he emphasized that among all the nations, Han has the longest history (p. 4). Zhu (1933) argued that the establishment of a country always involved “a nation as the main body” who afterwards “absorb other nations gradually”, and “the nation that founded Zhongguo was Han; people who read history would not have any doubt [about this]” (vol. 1, p. 23). In the chapter about “the foundation of the state for Zhonghua nation”, Zhou (1947) clarified that the establishment of the state by Huang Emperor was for Han people to defend themselves against other ethnic groups (vol. 1, p. 7). Furthermore, there is a clear tendency with the narratives in all these textbooks: in the discussion of the development of Zhongguo culture, only those contributed by Han were mentioned. In the presentation of the ancient philosophies during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods [B.C. 770 – B.C. 221], Zhou (1947) claimed that this was a period when Han nation’s culture reached maturity.

The time when Han became the name of a nation is subjected to scholarly debate, and not everybody would agree with Chow (2001) who argued that it did not carry the modern national connotation until the late Qing period. The objectivity and subjectivity of Han nation is beyond the scope of this study, but what could be confirmed with my observation is that the term Han, being assigned as the name of a nation, originated from the name of an influential dynasty in Chinese history, Han Dynasty [B.C. 202 – A.D. 220]. In other words, Han started to be used as a symbol for community during Han Dynasty, at the earliest. And Han as a national name must be
younger than it being used as the name of an imperial dynasty. In fact, historians in the late Qing Dynasty had suggested that it would be anachronistic to use Han to present the nation. For example, Xia Zengyou, who wrote the first modern history textbook for schools in China, argued that Han was the name of a dynasty and should not be used to define the nation (Xia, 1901) in historiography, though in his time it had been popular. However, although the imperial narratives in the 1910s overshadowed the national connotation of Han, as early as in the textbook written by Chen (1911), Han as a nation had been mentioned in the discussion about the history before Han Dynasty. For instance, “the relationship between Han and various other nations” (vol. 1, p. 8) was a topic of the history of Zhou Dynasty [B.C. 1046 – B.C. 256], though Zhou is much earlier than Han Dynasty. And this type of wording was increasingly evident in newer textbooks, and eventually it was crystalized in the 1930s textbooks where the continuous history of Han people was fully extended back to the time prior to the national name was invented. This is an attempt to reconstruct Han nation into a primordial entity whose existence is immune from the historical changes and is eternal enough to be the equivalent of Zhongguo or China.

Taking Han-centricism and historical objective change of Han power into consideration, it is not surprising that the textbooks in the 1930s presented Chinese territory variously in different periods as previously discussed ones. The annexation of territory by Han-founded dynasties were often considered as the expansion of Zhongguo’s territory, the loss of territory to other nations were often considered Zhongguo’s territory being encroached by other nations, and taking back the territories from non-Han were presented as “recovering” Zhongguo’s land. If following this logic closely, Zhongguo perished when Han power was defeated by Mongols and Manchus, and Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty were not Chinese dynasties. But this would break the continuity of Zhongguo, which required the textbook authors to set Yuan and Qing as exceptions. So Zhongguo
was still used to refer to the nation, especially in the narratives about foreign relationships – following the above-mentioned tradition. On domestic issue, the frequency of Zhongguo was smaller than in the narratives on other dynasties, but Yuan and Qing were said to “unified Zhongguo” as Han-founded regimes.

Furthermore, Qing was considered more Chinese than Yuan. This is corresponding to Zhonghua as a term to signify a multinational, inclusive definition of the Chinese nation, which was said in the textbook to be realized with Qing’s endeavors of territorial expansion. For example, Yao (1934) argued that from the Qing era, “Han, Manchus, Mongols, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans started to belong to the same political entity, gradually accommodated and then merged with each other, and eventually became a Zhonghua nation” (vol. 3, p. 26). Similarly, Fu (1934) said that “the expansion of Zhonghua nation and Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans combined into a family should be attributed to Qing (vol. 3, p. 37). In other words, according to the textbooks, it is not until the victories of Qing Dynasty on territorial wars when Zhonghua nation took shape and the whole Chinese territory is defined. And it was the multinational Zhonghua nation and Chinese territory that should be inherited by modern China. However, the multinational Zhongguo, considered as a modern phenomenon, was overwhelmed by the evident continuity of Han-centric connotation of the nation. Consequently, Zhonghua is more consistently equaled to Han than to the five nationalities.

2. Conflictual Relationship between Han and Non-Han Nations

The symbolic boundary of a nation is often accompanied and supported by the description and opinions on others demonstrated in national historiography. An author would not include other nations and ethnic groups in the story unless the they are regarded as playing more or less role in the history of the nation. For the Chinese case, this study focuses on those events happened
between Han and non-Han in which the power relations are involved. More specifically, they can be divided into two aspects: interethnic conflicts and cultural influence. The narratives on both aspects are corresponding to the pattern of symbolic demarcation of national boundary analyzed in the last section. This section demonstrated two case studies to show how the story-telling in this regard evolved in the textbooks used in the first half of the twentieth century.

The ethnic conflicts in history can be roughly divided into two scenarios: where Han nation was victorious against others and where Han nation was losing the battles. There were numerous occasions of ethnic conflicts throughout Chinese history, but few of them included both types of scenarios like the long period of Song Dynasty that included numerous military conflicts between Han and non-Han powers that came with different results. I focus on ethnic conflicts during the Song Dynasty also because it was only since this time the non-Han regimes had political and military power at least comparative to the Han-founded regime. As noted above, the non-Han ethnic groups exerted political influence over Song so much so that Ge (2011) argued that the ideal of Tianxia was significantly challenged and the emergence of Han nationalism should be dated back to this time. If Ge was right, it would be valuable to analyze to what extent this nationalism was expressed in modern history textbooks.

This period roughly consists of three stages. Firstly, after Song Dynasty was founded by Han people [960], two major non-Han regimes existed adjacently: Liao [916 - 1125], founded by Qidan, was located in today’s northeast part of China and part of Inner and Outer Mongolia; Xixia [1038 - 1227], founded by Dangxiang (a branch of Tibetan), was located in middle west part of China. After series of conflict, Song managed to maintain a military stalemates and diplomatic solutions against Liao and Xixia. Secondly, Jurchen won their freedom from Liao, form Jin Dynasty in 1115, and eventually overturned and replaced Liao in 1125. Jin continue to invade Song, defeated the
Han power in 1127 and pushed the Song regime to the south. Lastly, Mongols came and annihilated Jin, Xixia, and Song in succession. In general, the analysis found that the narratives in the conflicts between Han and others during this period became more and more Han-centric and nationalist in the history textbooks.

The war-making resulting in the Chanyuan Treaty [1005] was a good example to examine the change of narratives. In the early years of Song Dynasty, the Han-rulled frontier was under intermittent but disturbing threat from Liao. The strength of Liao was felt by the Song court after the Song emperor’s multiple attempts to take the center of northern China proper were hindered by Liao. In the autumn of 1004, Liao’s army invaded into Song’s territory and directly threatened the Capital of Song. Most of higher officials in the court were afraid of Qidan’s army and proposed to escape to the south, except Kou Zhun, who urged that the Song should face the challenge from Liao. He encouraged the Emperor himself to go to the frontline to enhance the troop morale. His plan worked. The Song soldiers saw the symbol of the Emperor and then their spirit was roused greatly. They fought against the Qidan hard and earned a stalemate. Eventually, Song and Liao established a peace Treaty and ended the warring condition in Chanyuan in 1005.

This event, along with many other events that involved Han and non-Han powers, was not described as a conflict between different nations until the textbooks were written from scratch. The textbooks edited by Chen (1911) and Zhao (1911) generally described this type of event as conflicts that happened between different regimes without emphasizing that it is also the struggle between different nations. Also, there was no tendentious statement within the narratives, though the authors took Song’s standpoint in the descriptions, which was not surprising considering that the authors treated Song Dynasty as the orthodox regime in this period. However, as early as 1917, the nationalist symbols started to be infused into the narratives so that the Song-Liao war was also
framed as Han-Qidan national competition. And the national perspective came with tendentious statements in favor of Han and Song. For example, according to Chanyuan Treaty, Song would pay a large amount of silver and silk cloth to Liao in exchange for the peace. Zhong (1917) commented on this treaty by saying that “from now on Han was like the vassal who paid tribute” (vol. 2, p. 63), which suggested his discontent of this treaty. Jin (1923) expressed the similar view. Defining that the wars between the regimes in this period was “racial competition”, he suggested that the Emperor should have listened to Kou Zhun who advocated further attack on Liao when Song army had the momentum, and that the treaty did not prevent Qidan from being the threat in the frontier. But other authors believed that this was a good deal for Song. Describing Qidan as a nation, Zhao (1923) argued that the treaty was a positive diplomatic contribution from Kou Zhun, and the argument from other court officials that this treaty was shameful was ridiculous (vol. 1, p. 124). However, regardless of their opinions on this treaty, these authors expressed their concerns about Song with their own words. And this attitude was brought into the Yao (1934) and Zhu (1933) edited under the 1932 curriculum. Yao’s (1934) description on the war between Song and Liao and the Chanyuan Treaty was neutral, but he mentioned that Liao “extorted” territory from Song (vol. 2, p. 58) when Liao took advantage of weak Song and broke the treaty. Zhu (1933) concluded the Song-Liao struggle by saying that “Song was in the underdog status from beginning to end. But regarding the length of peaceful time, Song did not as suffer as it did from Xixia’s threat” (vol. 2, p. 14-16). The threat from Xixia was so overwhelming that Song did not have the chance to exterminate the danger from Liao (p. 17). Considering the military and diplomatic relations between Song and Liao as national relations between Han and Qidan, Yao (1934) and Zhu (1933) were writing on Han standpoint. But the strength of this attitude was not increasing compared to the 1920s textbooks. In fact, while textbooks in 1920s had extended (though not in
great detail) description on how the presence of the Song Emperor in the frontline enhance the
spirit of Song soldiers, which may give the audience the impression that Song soldiers fought
bravely as patriots, the textbooks edited by Yao (1934) did not elaborate this part, and Zhu (1933)
did not even mention the influence of the Emperor’s presence on the soldiers’ spirit. And it
appeared that the Song/Han standpoint was absent in the description from Fu (1934) and Zhou
(1947), as neither of their narratives were oriented toward Song.

Another good example is Song’s struggle between Jurchen-founded Jin that was full of ups and
downs. This period of war was actually one of the most dramatic in the modern understanding of
the history, as two characters are involved: Yue Fei and Qin Hui. After Jin defeated Song and took
the land in the northern part of China proper, Song court had no choice but moving to the south.
Thanks to the efforts of Song soldiers led a handful of good military officers, Song was capable of
resisting Jin’s further invasion to the south. Among these military officers, the most heroic and
legendary one was Yue Fei, whose troop was said to be most intimidating for the Jurchen army.
Yue Fei’s force gained competitive edge, and was able to recover the China proper from Jin.
However, at that time when Yue Fei was about to crash Jin’s power, the peace party, led by Qin
Hui, in Song court gained the trust from the Emperor. With the influence of Qin Hui, Yue Fei
received the orders from the court to retreat his troops from the area. After he loathly came back
from the battlefield, Qin Hui put him into jail and executive him for fabricated charges. In the folk
story, Yue Fei is highly regarded as the national hero for Han that was loyal to the court and the
country, fighting bravely and tactically against the national enemy. In contrast, Qin Hui was so
notorious for his insistence on the compromise and his plot against patriot Yue Fei that He was
one of the most well-known “traitor to Han” (Hanjian) in history.
The contrast between these two characters is probably so sharp and dramatic that even the textbooks written for the interim period had relatively evident orientation favoring Song. In the description on this event, Zhao (1911) did not explicitly express his attitude, but the detailed biographical introduction of Yue Fei attached to the main body of texts suggested that he considered Yue Fei as the protagonist in this story. Chen (1911) described Qin Hui as a person with dominating political clout in the Song court, who killed any possibility for Song to seize the opportunity to recover the territory from Jin by any means including political prosecution (vol.4, p.32). Considering this together with his emphasis on the cruelty of Jin’s army in the occupied areas (p. 28), it is highly possible that Chen did not support Qin Hui’s deed at all, though he belonged to the doves. The orientation toward Han power was more evident in Pan (1913) and Zhong (1917). Elaborating Yue Fei’s achievement in the battlefield, Pan (1913) lamented his death and the fact that the polity was controlled by such a treacherous person i.e. Qin Hui. After Yue Fei’s death, the voice advocating war against Jin was dampened. “In a court with such autocracy, crooked officials were playing politics and heroes were frustrated. Whose fault was this?” (vol. 4, p. 71). After Yue Fei was killed, Jin agreed to make a deal with Song to end the war. According to the treaty, Song would renounce its claim of the northern lands and pay large amount of silver and silk clothes, and Jin returned the coffin of Huizong Emperor of Song (who was captured by Jin and died). Zhong (1917) questioned the fairness of the deal made between Song and Jin (vol. 2, p. 84). Zhao (1923) commented this event in sorrow. “It was a pity that Song did not make use of such [good] soldiers and military officers and people with [patriotic] spirit, but instead bended to the enemy” (vol. 2, p, 138). Jin (1925) also praised the military discipline and might of Yue Fei’s army. However, similar to what the last example shows, the partiality of attitude was not more evident in the textbooks published in the 1930s. It was also mixed with more neutral
narratives on the event. Although still holding a Song standpoint, the tendentious statements praising Yue Fei or criticizing Qin Hui almost disappeared in the texts by Yao (1934), Fu (1934) and Zhou (1947). Although Zhu (1933) said it was “fortunate” (vol. 2, p. 29) for Song to have Yue Fei and other patriotic officers fighting off Jurchen army, and most of his description on Song-Jin war was clearly on Song’s standpoint, he did not blame Qin Hui for make the peace deal with the enemy. He even suggested that the choice of peace-making was rational, considering the financial crisis and social instability of Song (p. 34).

In conclusion, the struggles in history that involved more than one nation started to be described as national conflicts in the textbooks written under the first curriculum, which was a sign of nationalist interpretation of history. The Han-centric narratives in the texts became more evident and straightforward in the 1920s textbooks, which was at odds with the 1923 curriculum’s advocacy of academic-oriented history education. Interestingly, the textbooks written under the 1932 nationalist curriculum was actually less nationalist in that they tended to be more neutral toward the conflict between Han and non-Han. This was probably because of the increasing need for interethnic solidarity of the state against the imminent threat from Japan. However, the relatively neutral description did not dilute the overwhelming Han-centric definition of China, considering the way in which the textbooks made sense of the combination of different nations into one Chinese nation.

3. Confucianism and Cultural Transmission

Though Han-centric as they were, the textbooks newly written for modern history education could not escape from the official claim that China was a multiethnic nation. The non-violent relationship between Han and non-Han people in historiography is vital to make sense of this claim for multi-ethnicity. Central to the narratives on peaceful communication among ethnic groups is the role
played by the allegedly dominating culture and institution. An ideal-typically imperial description on the ethnic relations in the history of empire, while would take the superiority and universality of imperial culture for granted, would not use it to sharpen the ethnic boundaries within the empire. In contrast, narratives implying narrow nationalism differs in two aspects. First, with the historiography writers aware of the empire being in the process of collapse or has fallen, the dominant culture, which is one of the source of legitimacy for the cohesiveness among the ethnic groups within the empire, would be subjective of some degree of critical discussion. Second, the dominant culture would be nationalized to enrich the source of national pride, which is vital in the building of narrow nationalism. The nationalized dominant culture helps to build up narrow nationalism in two possible ways. It could be labeled as exclusive to the ethnic majority and not shared by others, or described as an instrument for the majority to assimilate the minority. Both possibilities lead to a singularly ethnic understanding of the nation, hence narrow nationalism.

For the Chinese case, the analysis of the transition from imperial to national understanding with regards to national relationships focuses on two elements: Confucianism and Examination System in dynastic China. Confucianism is believed to be the essential political and social ideology of imperial China, in that the education based on Confucius theory is what separated the civilized and uncivilized, and that it was considered to be the source of legitimacy of any political regime ruling China. Examination System is highly regarded as an important and special invention of imperial China to recruit people in any family background into the government. It was firstly put into practice in Sui Dynasty and went through evolution for centuries. Although it was repealed in 1905 by Guangxu Emperor of Qing for being unsuitable for modernization of China, it was believed to be one of the indicators of Chinese wisdom for social governance. Also, because the main subjects of examination were Confucius classics, people who had been selected by examination as political
elites for the states were good learners, if not true believers of Confucianism. In light of this, it is alleged that the morality in the Confucian ideological system affected the operation of the imperial states, strengthening the legitimacy of the imperial government. The legitimacy from Confucianism and social institution transcended ethnic differences in imperial time, which means any ethnic groups who were believers of Confucianism and practitioners of Examination were regarded as legitimate rulers. But when the empire faced challenges and threats from outside, the superiority and universality of Confucianism and Examination System would no longer be taken for granted. Instead, they would face criticism and be nationalized. This study finds that there were some traces of imperial understanding of ethnic relations in the textbooks during the interim era, while the ones written under the modern curriculums moved away to narrow nationalism, as the authors attempted to make sense of the multi-nationality of China by emphasizing the assimilative power of Han culture.

The textbook edited by Chen (1911) for the interim period highly regarded Confucianism as the essence of Chinese culture. According to the author, although Confucianism was born in the Spring and Autumn era when a number of ideology and schools of philosophy were competing for popularity, only the ideology of Confucius can overcome the weakness of the others. The reverence for Confucianism can be seen through the term “sage” (Shengren) the author used to refer to Confucius. The author also emphasized the continuity and centrality of Confucianism by saying that “from the past to present, when people are talking about morality, politics and education, Confucius is the one to whom they refer” (vol. 1, p.16), and “the Confucius ideology is the root of Chinese politics and education forever” (p.17). Zhao (1911) mentioned the evolution of the Examination System, and he praised the Qing Emperor for recovering the education and examination system and giving privilege to offspring of Confucius to stabilize the society after the
turmoil of dynasty change (vol. 6, p. 3). Moreover, although both authors sporadically mentioned the contribution from Han to the civilization of non-Han nations, suggesting the idea of Han superiority, they did not emphasize them as the historical trends that happened continuously and significantly. There are only two sentences implying nationalized imperial culture. The Spring and Autumn period when the various ideology and philosophical schools thrived during, “was the time when Han’s intellectual competence was the highest” (Chen, 1911, vol. 1, p. 18); Han people “was more intelligent than other people even today” (Zhao, 1911, vol. 1, p. 6). Besides these there are no clear indication of nationalist interpretation of cultural unbalance.

The imperial understanding was started to be replaced by nationalist interpretation in the textbooks written under the 1911 curriculum. Instead of treating Confucianism as sacred treasure of the history, Pan (1913) described it in critical tone. He attributed its popularity to its lucidity and its connection with politics (so that the ruler can utilize it in governance). He also criticized Wu Emperor of Han Dynasty for banning other ideologies and exclusively dedicating to Confucianism, for this policy obstructed the advancement of political and academic ideology in China (vol. 1, p. 85). Similarly, Zhong (1917) argued that emperors of China highly respected Confucius and Confucian intellectuals for nothing but sustain their power. Contrary to Zhao (1911) who praised the Qing Emperor for paying respect to Confucianism and reopening the examination system, Zhong (1917) argued that this was actually a method to tie intellectuals to the Qing regime (vol. 4, p. 67). And the influence of Confucianism exerted through the examination system, but not in a proper way because the examinations focused too much on literacy but not on the practical knowledge. This defect of examinations made Pan (1913) consider it “pernicious” (vol. 3, p. 169), and made Zhong (1917) regard it as the reason why the Han nation lost the competition against its rivals (vol. 1, p. 37).
But this does not mean that Zhong (1917) thought Confucianism totally useless. Instead, he believed that Confucianism is what made Han people more civilized than others, and is what made non-Han nations admire Han culture and willing to be assimilated into Han nation. According to him, although the emphasis on literacy and morality led to Han nation’s weakness in military struggle, Han people was the winner in cultural sense. “Manchus, Mongolians, Chinese Muslims and Tibetans did not have culture. But as soon as they enter into the China proper, they admired Han culture so much so that they were willing to abandon their bellicose quality and to learn literacy. Although they had their own regimes, they were still assimilated by Han people not long after” (vol. 1, p. 38). Same theory is proposed by Pan (1913) in his conclusion on national conflicts in post-Tang era (p. 134). Both Pan (1913) and Zhong (1917) emphasized three sets of historical events about the assimilation of non-Han into Han: the pre-Qin period when the barbarians were swallowed into Han; from the third to sixth century when the so-called “five barbarians” moved into the China proper, competed with Han and eventually assimilated by Han; and Song period when Han power was the underdog in military sense for the most time but able to absorb its non-Han rivals, such as Qidan, Jurchen and Dangxiang into Han culture. In the processes of assimilation, Confucius culture and institution played important roles. For example, Yelv Abaoji, the ruler of Liao (Qidan), assigned Han elite as his minister and then strengthened his regime (Pan, 1913, vol. 2, p.140), and use other policies to help Qidan to be assimilated into Han. The emperor of Jin imitated the examination system of Tang Dynasty (Zhong, 1917, vol. 3, p. 87). Although not all of the cultural and institutional transmission from Han to non-Han were clearly labeled as “Hannization” or “assimilation”, this type of narratives showed an inclination to nationalize Confucianism and other political and social institution, and to emphasize their assimilative powers. In light of this, the treatment of dominant culture in the history textbooks is twofold: the authors
criticized Confucianism and Examination System for weakening Han nation’s competence against other ethnic groups, but at the same time they believed that it was these elements that enabled Han to assimilate others, which was said to be the foundation of Han-centric treatment of the multi-ethnicity in modern China.

The nationalist interpretation continued into the textbooks published for the 1923 curriculum. Zhao (1923) and Jin (1925) was as critical to Confucianism and Examination System as previously mentioned authors. Jin (1925) argued that Confucianism and Examination System, restricting people’s freedom of thought, were the tools of despotic rule in dynasty China (vol. 1, p. 98). Compared with previously mentioned ones, the textbook edited by Zhao (1923) not only increase the continuity of the narratives on Han assimilation as Jin (1925) did, but also attached clearly positive attitude into the texts. For example, when discussing the national relations from the third to sixth century when “five barbarians” moved into northern China and lived alongside the Han people, he emphasized that “the positive side was the effect of assimilation in the north” (vol. 2, p. 73); and that Qing Dynasty inherit Ming’s political system provided a “good opportunity” of Manchus and Han being assimilated (vol. 3, p. 54).

The continuity of national assimilation reached its climax in the narratives in the 1930s textbooks. While previously mentioned authors were probably reluctant to use Hannization (Hanhua) or assimilation (Tonghua) which were suspected of promoting Han chauvinism, authors of 1930s textbooks not only increase the frequency of these terms but also attempted to describe national assimilation as a continuous, consistent and powerful trend in history of China that was applied to almost all the nations that had relation to Han. The clearest indication of this point is the introductory address from Zhu (1933): “The largest nation among the Chinese nations is Han. For thousand years, there were countless occasions where [Han] assimilated aliens. [The aliens that
were assimilated by Han] includes Man, Yi, Rong, Di during Spring and Autumn period and Warring period” and Xiongnu, Xianbei, Qiang, Xi, Hu, Tujue, Shatuo, Qidan, Jurchen, Mongols, Mohe, Gaoli, Bohai and Annan etc. At times some people [of these ethnic groups] changed their names [into Han names], learned culture and education, married to Han and assimilated into Han” (vol. 1, p. 6). Han culture’s influence had its widest coverage in 1930s textbooks, so it was not surprising that the subject of assimilation also included Japan and Korea especially during Tang Dynasty. In general, not directly under control of the empire, Korea and Japan were not as assimilated as the others, and the authors usually regarded them as under the influence of China instead of Han nation, but Yao (1934) used the title “the Hannization of Korea and Japan” (vol 2, p.39) to lead the discussion on this part.

Critical discussions on Confucianism and Examination System continues into the 1930s textbooks, so as the narratives on the roles played by them in the assimilation processes. However, within this twofold interpretation, there was a new phenomenon in the narratives, though only founded in the writing of Zhu (1933). Probably under the influence of Chiang Kai-shek who devoted himself in promoting traditional Confucius morality to the public in order to strengthen the national solidary against Japanese Imperialists, Zhu (1933) stated that “the solidarity of a nation requires morality that everybody believe and insist. The intrinsic morality of Chinese nation includes loyalty, love, trust and peace” (vol. 1, p. 7). He then continued to elaborate these elements of morality, drawing mostly from Confucius ideologies. He suggested that Chinese people should be proud of the traditional morality and philosophy, and that China “could become the best nation in the world” (p. 9) if people could bring these cultural elements into real life. The narratives show a third way of interpretation: a selective reconstruction of traditional values to legitimize multi-nationality of
China without clear reference to Han nation. Although this is a rare attempt, it was a precedent of the symbolic construction of multi-nationality of China in the second half of the twentieth century.

And this was not the only attempt to legitimize the combination of Han, Manchus, Muslims, Tibet and Mongols for modern China. Except for a few mentioning on Hannization during the Qing Dynasty, for most authors the combination of the five nationalities, a relatively recent thing realized by the territorial expansions of Qing Empire, could not be explained by Hannization. The discussion on Hannization stopped before Qing Dynasty. In light of this, the authors use different logics to make sense of the solidarity among the five nationalities. Besides Zhu (1933) who reconstruct traditional value and those who did not make any attempt to tie the loose end, Zhao (1911), Zhong (1917), Zhao (1923) and Jin (1925) explained the solidarity with western theory of race, stating that the five nationalities were all “yellow race”; Pan (1913) said the unity of the five nationalities was for the resistance against the imperial powers that were encroaching Chinese territory (vol. 1, p. 6); Yao (1934) suggested that the solidarity was inherited from Qing, where the five nationalities were ruled by the same government (vol. 3, p. 26). However, regarding the frequency and continuity, none of these theories played as significant role as the Han-centric narrow nationalism.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shows the declining imperial nationalism and surging Han-centric nationalism in the first half of twentieth century. The analysis of the speeches from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek indicates that Han-centric nationalism was the essence of their view on the symbolic nation building of China. The analysis also found both patterns of Han nationalism: Han exclusivism and Han assimilationism, though the former was more evident than the latter. Their attitudes toward the preservation of diversity in relations to multiethnic solidarity were not clear, but both Sun’s
proposal to build a “melting-pot” and Chiang’s principle of “nation-clanism” contained the trace of Han assimilationism. The steadfast Han nationalism was also evident in the history textbooks written under the modern curriculum. The textbooks written under the interim period had clear mark of imperial nationalism, with Tianxia being frequently used in the texts to represent the community, and with the universality and superiority of Confucianism and Examination system being unquestioned. From the first comprehensive curriculum for history education, the textbooks were written in a less imperial way than nationalist way. In terms of the definition of China, Tianxia lost its popularity, and the term Zhongguo were widely used with both Han-centric nationalism and the reference to a multiethnic community. However, like what was implied by the leaders’ speeches, the multiethnic imagination and the alleged republicanism still fell into the Han nationalism, albeit in the assimilationist path. This path was paved by the theory of ethnic assimilation into Han in interethnic communication. Imperial culture such as Confucianism and Examination System, when their universality is questioned in the imagination of post-imperial nations, were used to describe the assimilation processes.

The complex analysis shown in this chapter allows us to see the evolution of the definition of the Chinese nation from time to time. The evolution, however, was not the complete rejections of what came before, but included new shapes of combinations of the nationalist elements. Except for the textbooks adopted during the interim, the leaders’ speeches and the textbooks continuously implied the coexistence between Han exclusivism and Han assimilationism. While the early speeches and history textbooks indicated more Han exclusivism than Han assimilationism, the later ones demonstrated the opposite. This transition may have something to do with the general background of national building. In the early years of the modern China, the political sphere may still have traces of anti-Manchus aura, and the Han were anxious to regain and maintain their rule in their
nation, which was accompanied by a rejection to the non-Han rule in China. Therefore, in several years right after the collapse of the Qing Empire, Han exclusivism was in its prime. However, as the political elites found that this framework was at odds with the modern China’s need to legitimize the multiethnic territorial inheritance, a cultural and historical link between Han and non-Han must be forged. Because Confucianism and other Han cultural elements played central role in the interethnic exchange, Han assimilationism became the main framework of the nation building. But this did not mean that Han exclusivism was totally out of picture, otherwise there would be fewer logical inconsistence in Sun and Chiang’s speeches or few instances where non-Han ethnicities were called “foreigners” in the history textbooks. It was not until the Communist era when the equivalence between Han and China was abandoned and criticized as Han chauvinism, as the Party leaders believed Han exclusivism or radical assimilationism was a threat to national solidarity. However, the understanding of the expansiveness of Han culture was carried on to this time, though it was reshaped in a less Han-centric perspective. These are discussed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4

Imperial Identity and English Nationalism before 1950s

The relationship between ideas of nation and strength of empire, as has been shown in China by the last chapter, is also manifested, albeit in a different path, in British case. To ensure the comparability of the China and England with regards to textbook analysis, I set up the time range of the English case as from the twentieth century to present, because just like that in China, the modernization of history textbooks in England also started from the beginning of the twentieth century. The other reason of the timing is theoretical: though many believe that the last decades of the nineteenth century to first decades of the twentieth century witnessed the peakedness of the British Empire with respect to territorial span of the empire and the observations of celebration of imperial grandeur in various forms (such as Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee of 1897), Kumar (2007) reminded us of Hegel’s warning “that ideas and ideologies are at most fully elaborated at the time when their subjects, as practical concerns, are on the point of dissolution” (p. 197) which became the reality of the British case. From the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century, the declination of the global hegemony of the Empire was not only coming into reality but also was taking effect culturally.

However, to say that there was a convergence between Chinese and British case in terms of the correspondence between the fall of empire and rise of nationalism may be presumptuous. In fact, in the reality of China in Britain lays an nonnegligible difference. China experienced a drastic political change from integral empire to a collapsed one, in which foreign powers from the west played as stimulants of the domestic revolution. This was then followed by the building of modern Chinese nation in political and ideological senses in which the Nationalists attempted to pick up the pieces of the Qing Empire with limited success. Compared to what happened in China, the
transition in Britain was much peaceful. Although the Irish Revolution and Two World Wars were the real crises of the Empire and the growing needs for home rule from imperial subjects signified a weakening of imperial structure, the imperial state has never been toppled like the case of China. The real collapse of the British overseas Empire started after the end of the World War Two, but it was not until the 1970s when most people started to feel the danger of the total breakdown of the United Kingdom. The stages of the fall of the British Empire could be described more accurately like this: from the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century, the British power was challenged from outside, and many of overseas colonies were granted legislative autonomy while stayed as the members of British Commonwealth; from 1945 to 1997, British overseas Empire dissolved under the wave of decolonization; from the 1970s onward, the possibility of the disintegration of British inner Empire became closer to reality.

This chapter focuses on the first stage. On one hand, the faltering of the Empire was felt by intellectuals and writers of various kinds; one the other hand, the disintegration of the Empire was not a perceivable option in the London politics as the Government was always responsible for the interest of the Empire. Therefore, instead of a convergence between political elites and educational historians regarding the definition of the nation, this part of study reveals a divergence: while Englishness sneaked into the historian’s texts, it was generally absent in the Prime Ministers’ addresses. This reflects Kumar’s argument about the emergence of the emphasis on Englishness in cultural sense but not in political sense in this period. Englishness was not political enough, unlike other national consciousness in Celtic Fringe and in the European continent, to be English nationalism.

One cannot skirt around the question about the confusing connotations and usages of “Britain”, “British”, “England” and “English” in his/her discussion of the national identity among the English
people. Kumar (2007) in his study made a special contribution in pointing out the mixed-up nature of these terms. While the Scots, the Irish and the Welsh are fully aware of the difference between “British” and “English” in everyday conversation, most English people have the difficulty of “distinguish themselves, in a collective way, from the other inhabitants of the British Isles” (p. 2) in that they often say “English” when they mean “British”. The conflation between “English” and “British” reflects the former’s imperial feature. On one hand, it is the name of a culture that is regarded superior firstly over the Celtic others in the archipelago, then over its overseas colonies, and probably all the others in the world when the Empire became global. On the other hand, like the Chinese case, the cultural superiority did not lead to cultural exclusion. Instead, English culture was so aggressive that it submerged others in the peripherals. This leads to the arrogance expressed by English people when they use “English” to represent ‘British’, “thereby symbolically claiming possession of the whole kingdom” (p. 9). English language is an epitome of the imperial culture. English as noun for a language “exhibits the same striking elasticity” (p. 10) as English as an ethnic description. As the English nation conquered Celtic countries, English language was used by the Irish, Scots and Welsh.

But the stretch of English has its limit. When the English culture and language went overseas as the English established its global empire, there are people subjective to its influence but do not identify themselves as English. Therefore, “English as a badge of a specifically English national identity becomes increasingly problematic” (p. 11). The separation of cultural connotation and national identity of English continues until today. In this sense, English and Han resemble to each other, though the ranges of their influence are different: people who are under the influence of Han culture are not necessarily identify themselves as Han people, as people who are under the influence of English culture area not necessarily identify themselves as English people. But if
English is inapplicable to represent the various ethnic groups in the Empire, what is the term used for cultural identity, transcending national boundary? In the last chapter, I mentioned “Tianxia” as the term for the Chinese case to express the universality. But as a matter of fact, this term may be too broad to be realistic because the Chinese never had universal influence though they claimed they did. A more practical term is “Zhonghua” or “Huaxia”, representing the cultural circle dominated by Han (Zhonghua and Huaxia were nationalized to exclusively belong to Han when the empire fell, but this is a different story). Its counterpart in the English case may be “British”. Originated as the name of Celts, “Britain” came into common use as a shorthand for ‘Great Britain’ since the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707. The first “British Empire” was established in the archipelago and the first overseas colonies in the Americas. It ends in 1783 when Britain was defeated in American War of Independence. The second Empire was the vast expansion to the rest of the world, including the nationalization of British East India Company. The existence and emphasis of the overarching British Empire as the bonding force of various nationalities and ethnic groups under the Crown, parallel with, if not get in the way of, the process of the forging of “Briton” nation started from 1707 as suggested by Linda Colley (1992). But what forged the British nation was almost exclusively Protestantism that form the basis for solidary of Briton to fight against Catholicism:

Protestantism was the dominant component of British religious life. Protestantism coloured the way that Britons approached and interpreted their material life. Protestantism determined how most Britons viewed their politics. And an uncompromising Protestantism was the foundation on which their state was explicitly and unapologetically based (Colley, 1994, p. 18). Besides the religious bonding, the British nation also rests “on a common experience of constitutional monarchy, economic opportunity and empire” (Kumar, 2007, p. 146). So it is not surprising that Colley admitted that the forging of the British nation did not efface the “profound cultural and historical division” between English, Scotland and Wales, and their attachments were
“organic” (Colley, 1992, p. 53). Scholars on the theories of nationalism may not resist the temptation to group British national identity into one of those “civic nationalism” because of the tolerance of diversity of ethnic differences. However, this understanding can be challenged in two ways. First, the combination of the nations in the British Isles is not based on the civic principles, but on the common loyalty (alleged or real) on superior culture which every nation can take a part of its promotion. Second, the superior culture has no clear boundary of its application. In fact, the English and the others in the Isles did not settle for only carry on the cultural and institution in the British Isles. When they were successfully building the global empire, they carried the ambition to disseminate the cultural and institution to every corner in the world. Therefore, the British identity constituted from the eighteenth century was a product of imperial project, which could be supported by the fact that non-English others in the British Isles and even in the colonies such as India also participate into the dissemination of imperial culture and institution. For example, “The imperial army and police, largely scorned in the first half of the nineteenth century by English workers, were disproportionately drawn from ‘the younger sons of small peasant holdings in the Highlands of Scotland, Ulster and southern Ireland’, in addition to Indians and other colonial peoples” (Kumar, 2007, p. 170). Taking the superiority of culture, the diversity of ethnic groups and the ambition of diffusion of imperial culture, the British identity was another example of imperial nationalism, not essentially different from the Chinese identity in imperial time.

And the integrity of British imperial nationalism was also challenged by local national identity when the imperial structure was under the threat of dissolution. As the Chinese case shows, the loss of confidence of the empire opened the room for Han nationalism. However, as mentioned above, in the British case the concern of the empire was not immediately followed by an uprising of English nationalism in all fields – at least not in political sphere. The following section shows
that popularity of “Britain” and the absence of Englishness in the political discourse, regardless of
the reduced confidence on the imperial bond.

Celebrating the Empire with Worries

It is unsurprising that conservative Prime Ministers shown their dedication to the solidarity of the
Empire, considering that they were Unionists when the possibility of dissolution of the Empire
entered political discussion way before it became reality. From 1896 to 1897 “Indian had
experienced terrible feminine… exacerbated by plague and feeding uprisings and sedition” (British
Political Speech), which made a discordant sound in the celebrated Victorian Era along with many
other incidents not only in Indian but also from many other colonies. The high mortality, great
economic loss, and the social upheaval caused by the feminine widen the fissure between the
mother country and India. However, Lord Salisbury, the Conservative Prime Minster at that time,
concluded this incidence with celebrating tone in the speech in November 16th, 1897:

“…abroad our attention is drawn more than anything else to the splendid example of patriotism
and devotion which is being set before our eyes in India. There have been greater issues tried on
that soil, there have been greater dangers confronted; but I doubt whether at any period in the
history of the connexion of this island with India such splendid devotion to their Sovereign and
their flag has been exhibited, not only by those who belong to this country, but also by the loyal
and splendid races who inhabit our dependencies. It is a great subject of congratulation that, when
so many influences combine to tempt men to an easy and inglorious life, when there are so few of
those exciting causes which draw forth the heroic qualities from men, at such a crisis as this we
should be able to show a display of the highest virtues of a nation of which at any time Great
Britain or India would have been proud.” (Lord Salisbury, 1897)

He continued to say that “I feel bound, specially in the circumstances of the time, to pay a tribute
of respect and admiration to the statesman by whom these great operations are being conducted in
India” (Salisbury, 1897). Instead of questioning the Empire’s India policy and expressing concern
about the challenge to the imperial rule brought about by the feminine, Salisbury used this disaster
to highlight the solidarity between Britain and India, and probably, considering the context, to
promote the idea that the government had took effective measure i.e. relief aid to deal with the crisis. Bashing those who criticized the government as unpatriotic and irresponsible, the Prime Minister turned the bad disaster into a glorious deed. The disaster was a window through which people could/should see the success rather than the failure of the imperial rule.

But he shows no hesitance in emphasizing the threatening elements of the Empire’s integrity if they came from the other parties. In the same speech, he spent a lot of time talking about the threat posed by the advocacy of Home Rule. Although he celebrated the recent victory of Unionists, he stressed that “the dismemberment of the Empire was undertaken under auspices that might well make us fear” (Lord Salisbury, 1897), with the auspices being the growing strength of local nationalist organizations and those who were sympathetic to Home Rule. The “elements of discontent” on the objected bill of Home Rule were still there and would threaten not only the “integrity of the country” but also “the integrity of the Church of England” (Lord Salisbury, 1897). He then called upon the vigilance and preparation against the lurking danger of dissolution to preserve the cherished value and the Empire.

If the danger of the disintegration brought about by the request of Home Rule was not as conceivable, foreign wars that disturbed the British rule overseas demonstrated a real threat. The Second Boer War [1899-1902] started a year before the general election with the Conservative victory. In the 1900 conference of the “National Union of Conservatives and Constitutional Associations” in London, Lord Salisbury, having returned to Downing Street for a third time, responded the temporary victory of Britain with a much stronger and passionate tone:

“We have grave duties to perform and those duties must be fulfilled. They may require strenuous effort, they may require self-denial, but if you wish to uphold the reputation which has been handed down to us from our fathers, if you mean to sustain the Empire which they did so much to build up and which we have sacrificed so many things to maintain, if we mean that the
glory of England shall suffer no tarnish at our hands, we must not allow our efforts to slacken until the great enterprise in which we have engaged has been carried through. We are speaking now at a time of some anxiety. We do not know exactly what is taking place and we earnestly hope that the issue may be better than the beginning; but we have to push it through. It may be that there are matters which have not been explained and which ought to be explained. It may be that we have to scrutinise every step by which the present result has been reached; but whatever our attitude may be with regard to the efforts that have been made, to the failures or the successes of the past, we must remember that the one thing we have to keep before us is that on the issue of this great enterprise the glory and perpetuity of our Empire rest and that we must spare no effort and no sacrifice by which ultimate success may be achieved.” (Lord Salisbury, 1900).

It should be noted here that the mentioning of “the glory of England” does not suggest the emphasize of Englishness but only imply that the English should put the fate of the Empire on their shoulders. It signified the imperial feature of English as an identity as mentioned before in this chapter.

Not long after Arthur Balfour succeeded Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister, he found himself drawn into a fight around tariff reform. This issue could be interpreted as an epitome of the reduction of imperial confidence because it was brought onto table when people found that Britain was losing the competition against its industrial rivals i.e. Germany and American who implemented protective trading policy. Advocators of tariff reform, led by Joseph Chamberlain, started a political movement aiming at raising the imported good with trade preference given to the Empire, to recover the economic advantage enjoyed by the Empire in international trade. The interpretation of tariff reform as dwindled confidence on empire could be supported by the fact that tariff reform was popular among Unionists. Balfour joined the political debate around tariff reform with a peculiar stance. His attitude could be concluded as a middle way between Protectionists and free traders: on one hand, he proposed retaliation tariffs to punish those who set up trade barriers against Britain; on the other hand, recession of globalization was not his goal. The retaliation tariffs were implement to force other nations to return to the principle of free trade. Less ambitiously, he advocated to restore free trade among the nations within the British Empire.
His complicated attitude was demonstrated in the hourly long speech given in Sheffield on October 1st, 1903. He observed people’s concern over Britain’s economic standing in the world. He told the audience that considering “those speeches, delivered by men of all shades of opinion [on the issue of tariff reform], you will see that I am not exaggerating when I say that there has been or some years past a feeling of growing uneasiness as to the industrial place of Great Britain among the industrial nations of the world” (Balfour, 1903). He expressed his sympathy to this concern and his regret to the establishment of trading barriers by other nations. Interestingly, he attributed the recession of free trade to the growth of nationalist sentiments around the world, and expressed his unwilling acceptance of this reality:

“What has happened is that the sentiment of nationality has received an accretion of strength since that time of which no man then living can have dreamed for a moment, and that contemporaneously with this growing sentiment of nationality we have found Protection in foreign countries, not holding on as the creed of an obscurantist minority, but growing in strength day by day, and day by day more and more separating the nations commercially from one another. I regret it. I regret it. I think it is a matter of profound regret, but, after all, we have to take account of the facts of the world in which we are living, and neither an individual nor a nation can venture, with any prospect of felicity or success, to act as though he lived in an ideal world, and not in the world which actually, and, as a matter of fact, surrounds him.” (Balfour, 1903)

He suggested that people should accept the reality of higher tariffs everywhere, but at the same time he expressed his belief on free trade as the only principle that can produce desired economic result. He bridged this controversy by the reference to German and American models:

“I feel that they have a retort to which I, at least, have no reply. They may well say to us that, although they have been thus Protectionist, at all events within the limits of their own country they have established permanent Free Trade. And at this moment, within the circuit of the German Empire, and within the vast ambit of the American Commonwealth, all duty, all restriction upon Free Trade, everything which can hamper production, everything which can limit the increase of wealth, has been abolished by their patriotism and their foresight, and they may well ask whether we in the British Empire can point to a similar picture, and whether at this moment that Free Trade of which we talk so much, and of which we boast so justly, is a Free Trade extending beyond the limits of the four seas, and whether it even includes those great self-governing Colonies which we proudly boast are to be the great buttresses of our Empire in the future.” (Balfour, 1903)
His understanding on German and American trade policy corresponded to his opinion on the danger faced by the United Kingdom. Unlike those who believed that the economic threat came from the Protectionist Germany and America, he emphasized that the real danger came from the financial division among the nations within the British Empire. The trading barriers were not only set up by these two industrial powers, but were also implemented by Britain’s own colonies. Balfour argued that the inner barriers could function as the hindrance to the imperial cultural and institution. The fact that the colonies selfishly consider their own interest “will have made it as hard for us, their Mother Country – pledged to defend them, bound to them by every tie of affection and regard – it will make it as hard for us to export the results of our industry, enterprise, and capital” (Balfour, 1903). For Balfour, the fact that the economic power of the colonies which led to fiscal division within the empire, and the fact (alleged by him) that “the sentiment of a common interest of a common blood, and of common institutions is gaining strength” (Balfour, 1903), formed a discomforting contradiction. He proposed a fiscal unity within the Empire as the solution. This is the reason why his disagreement against Unionists who advocate Protectionism did not make him less Unionist and less of an embracer of imperial identity. Unlike those who dedicated themselves in building up the trade barriers to preserve the economic advantage, he emphasized on the value of free trade as a force that could strengthen the cohesiveness among the nations within the Empire. Free trade not only facilitated the diffusion of imperial cultural and institution from the mother country to the colonies, but itself was an element of imperial culture and institution, which should be put into practice in every corner in the world. The worldwide recession of free trade certainly halted this cultural ambition, but he was not so much anxious about Protectionist policy of Germany and America as concerned about fiscal division among the nations within the Empire. To him, it was the latter that would hurt the integrity of the Empire. The strength
of the British nation and Empire was not preserved by separation of economic life, but was based on a “closer, and more intimate union” (Balfour, 1903) with the fiscal union as the preclude.

The mindset of imperial way of perceiving Britain could be also seen through Balfour’s response to Dogger Bank Incident. On October 21st, 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War [1904-1905], a Russian fleet in open fishing waters, fearful of the presence of Japanese torpedo ships, opened fire on several innocuous fishing boats, which killed three British sailors and wounded many. This case was made more of a serious diplomatic crisis by the fact the Russian fleets left without making any attempt to rescue the wounded and drowning. This undoubtedly caused string nationalist sentiments in Britain from the top to the bottom. The sentimental speech made by Balfour (1904) in the meeting of the National Union of Conservative Association in Southampton was no surprise. He spent a lot of time deprecating the act took by the Russian fleet and bashing the original exculpating attitude of Russian Government on this incident. He even, albeit with hypothetical tone, said that “Now we are, it is true, the allies of Japan” (Balfour, 1904) though staying neutral was the basic principle of Britain. However, the sensational speech blaming Russians as uncivilized was not accompanied by an exclusive definition of Britain, as it could have been. In the beginning of his speech, Balfour defined the sentimental victim of the incident as more than the inhabitants in the United Kingdom. The incident also stirred the deep feelings of “his Majesty beyond the seas, all the great English speaking peoples of the world (cheers), and I think I may add the general sentiment of civilised Europe” (Balfour, 1904). The caring of humanity was superior to the Russians’ uncivilized manners and was shared by all the civilized people in and outside the Empire. This is another demonstration of imperial nationalism: the idea of superior culture corresponds to the imagination of boundless culture.
Balfour’s steadfast Unionist attitude was best shown in a conference speech made in Newcastle in 1905, when the Opposition started a new round campaigning for the implementation of Irish Home Rule. In the speech, Balfour questioned the integrity of the Liberal’s standing on the Home Rule: while the Liberal Party seemed to be active supporter of Home Rule, they shunned the question regarding the odd of the success. Balfour emphasized the self-contradictory view from an important Liberal figure, Herbert Asquith, saying that he never volunteer Home Rule because he realized that it “is not a question that the next Radical Government can deal with”, but at the same time he and the Liberal Party allegedly adhered “to the letter and the spirit of Mr. Gladstone’s statement upon Home Rule”. It was ironic that Gladstone’s attempt to pass Home Rule had failed, and that the Liberals refused to mention this failure in their campaigns:

“If Mr. Asquith were to get up and say, ‘Mr. Gladstone, a very eminent and very great leader of the Liberal Party, took a view with regard to an Irish Parliament, which experience has shown to be impracticable, and which although I once agreed with it, now I am prepared to abandon.’ I would say that was the speech of a perfectly direct, perfectly intelligible, and, of course, perfectly honest man. But they do not say that.” (Balfour, 1905)

Balfour suggested that Home Rule for Liberal Party was nothing more than a rhetorical tool for the election. Of course, his accusation of Liberal’s dishonesty could be equally considered as campaign rhetoric. But on the other side of his opinion, with supportive language on the Union, Balfour expressed his steadfast loyalty to the integrity of Empire. “[If] we could bring into some more organic union the disjointed members of the empire, we should in the eyes of our children and our grandchildren have done the greatest and most patriotic work ever attempted” (Balfour, 1905), and this could be done with the unity of the Conservative Party, “the party exists alone to serve” “the highest interest of the Empire” (Balfour, 1905). As other Conservatives, Balfour felt the danger of disintegration faced by the Empire and he called for a strong defense against what they perceived to be the separatists force that would be detrimental to the Empire.
No matter how the Conservative’s attack against Liberals resonated with voters’ minds, the Conservative Party was significantly weakened by the inner division around the issue of free trade especially between Balfour and Chamberlain and therefore was defeated by Liberals in the 1906 general election with a large margin. The landslide victory, which was one of the largest victories in British political history, was led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who became "Britain's first, and only, radical Prime Minister" (Morris, 2004). His ideas of social and political reform were so racial that in his speeches it was difficult to find an identification with the Empire. After the Irish Council Bill – a bill for the creation of an organization to control the spending of Irish tax – was defeated, he expressed his regret on the fact that the government’s scheme failed to resonate with the Irish people whose interested was said to be served by the Liberal Party. In addition to the regret was self-reflection instead of passing buck. “A measure which was pronounced to be out of accord with the wishes and ideas of the Irish people was not a measure which a Liberal Government could proceed with, and therefore, although with regret and reluctance, we had to abandon it.” (Campbell-Bannerman, 1907). Also, probably recalling the history that the Government of Ireland Bill 1893 was passed by the Commons but vetoed by the House of Lords, along with many other progressive reforms being halted by the direct and indirect influence from the upper house, he called for a substantial change of Constitution:

“I ask you now to turn to the constitutional issue involved in this controversy. And I will tell you at once that, in my opinion, the Lords have abused their powers within the Constitution, and that in assigning to them their proper place, as it is our purpose to do - and a very good, useful, and honourable place it is - so far from attacking the Constitution or setting up a revolution, it is we who are defending, it is the Lords who are straining, the Constitution.” (Campbell-Bannerman, 1907)

Radical was his proposal of constitutional reform, Campbell-Bannerman had to claimed that he was helping to preserve, rather than undermining, the British Constitution, one of the key
institutions and symbols of the Empire. But his sympathy toward Irish Home Rule set him apart from the rest of the Prime Ministers with his symbolic disconnection to the Empire.

Herbert Asquith, another liberalist politician who became Prime Minister after Campbell-Bannerman resigned, expressed his loyalty to the empire more explicitly despite his support to local autonomy and Irish Home Rule. He justified the pro-dissolution stance by Liberal principle which he believed could strengthen rather than weaken the ties among various nations within the Empire. For instance, on South Africa Act 1909 which was passed by British Parliament to create the Union of South Africa and thus to granted South African colonies some degree of autonomy, Asquith explained that what promoted this law was the aspiration for “the saving and sovereign principle of British rule - the union of freedom with responsibility” (Asquith, 1909). He also argued that the policy could alleviate the racial problem with the doctrine of Liberalism which gave statesmen the confidence to “trust the people to govern themselves according to their own ideas” (Asquith, 1909). For Asquith, the Home Rule would not undermine but strengthen the imperial union. He implied this compatibility in his discussion on the issue of Irish Home Rule and believed that the combination of local autonomy and imperial integrity was applicable in other colonies:

“In our efforts to secure self-government for Ireland in the future - efforts which I hope will be followed by further efforts to set free the Imperial Parliament from much of the local work which congests its machinery and which of necessity it does so ill - we shall have with us I believe the sympathy of the overwhelming majority of the great Dominions overseas, who have learned how easy it is to combine local autonomy with Imperial loyalty.” (Asquith, 1910)

Asquith believed that Liberal Policy could function as the tie uniting Britain to self-governing Dominions (Asquith, 1913). In the 1913 speech in Leeds, responding to the skeptics on his stance for dissolution (as had been put forward by Balfour), he eloquently clarified the Liberal’s opinion on the issue. To demonstrate the consistency of his attitude, he quoted part of his speech made in 1908 when he firstly took the office, showing that he never receded his belief on autonomy:
“For twenty years, and more than twenty years, I and many of my colleagues have steadily and consistently voted for propositions which, while explicitly safeguarding the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament, declared that the ultimate solution of the Irish problem could only be found in a system of self-government in regard to local affairs.” (Asquith, 1908, quoted in Asquith, 1913)

He then continued to argued that the crisis of Ireland was “the one undeniable failure of British statesmanship” which could only be fixed with Liberal policy. He repetitively stressed that the establishment of self-government could reinforce the imperial authority by “safeguarding the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament” (Asquith, 1913) while leaving the decision on local matters to local constituent.

Like Conservatives, Liberals considered their political attitude and policy as serving the interest of Empire, rather than specific nations. Facing the military threat from outside the Empire, Asquith was no different than his Conservative counterpart in calling for a unity of the Empire against the potential and actual danger. For instance, in the 1909 speech he expressed his support to the forthcoming Conference on Imperial Defence attended by delegates from colonies and dominions. He argued that not only the naval strength, but also the imperial union was essential to secure the extended imperial borders, and the Conference reflected the solidarity among the imperial subjects because

“we have received manifestations from fellow subjects in almost every part of the globe that they are conscious of the common end, and are not only prepared but willing and eager to share its difficulties and its burdens. In these circumstances it appeared to his Majesty’s Government that the time was ripe to bring all the great communities that constitute our self-governing Empire together to consider their relative responsibility. They have cordially responded to our invitation, and we look forward with hope and with confidence to the result of those common deliberations” (Asquith, 1909)

Liberalism in the beginning of the twentieth century did not weaken imperial identity among political elites. The Prime Ministers in both Liberal and Conservative parties pledged allegiance to the Empire. Although the political and social issues happened in the British Isles and especially
England naturally caught more attention in the Downing Street, Prime Ministers in their speeches rarely discussed about these issues as they were especially British or English. The full and real interest of British nation lied in the whole Empire, rather than specific nations. So even though Liberals were much sympathetic to the will of Home Rule of the Catholic Irish, they claimed that the beneficiary of the tolerance for local autonomy was the Empire, and inversely, failure in disposing Irish problem would hurt the overall interest of the Empire, as what had been done by the Government during and after the World War One. The Irish Home Rule was passed in 1914 but was suspended because of the Great War. The order to involve Ireland into the war had caused resentment from a proportion of Irish people, and attempts to fight against the British rule in Ireland were made. Facing the threat from German Spring Offence, the British government plan to apply military conscription to Ireland. The report of the Irish Convention outlined a proposal that combine the enactment of Irish Conscription to the activation of Home Rule. But the Government, as Asquith criticized with regret, “seized the opportunity for a blunder, and a blunder of the most colossal kind” (Asquith, 1919). The Government pushed through the Conscription bill in 1918 applying military conscription to Ireland while the Home Rule bill was stilled suspended. Military government was established in Ireland to suppress the revolt. Asquith argued that the coercive measure would never be helpful for the situation, after “the hopes raised by the Convention were ruthlessly wrecked” (Asquith, 1919). Asquith lamented that these measures were “done by a Liberal Prime Minister, by a Liberal Chief Secretary, and by a Liberal Home Secretary”, which was a “betrayal of their past traditions” (Asquith, 1919). The Government was responsible to the escalation of the conflict which led to Irish Independence War.

The turmoil and large casualty caused by the war made Liberals and Conservatives converge regarding their attitude toward Irish Home Rule, and the leaders of both parties declared that
tolerance for Irish autonomy was in line with the interest of the Empire. In the 1920 speech in Bradford, Asquith argued that the only remedy for the widened chasm between Ireland and Britain was the renewed knowledge on the nationalist sentiment and identity in Ireland:

“Nothing is more remarkable than that through the length and breadth of Ireland, with the exception of...Ulster, the feeling of a common nationality, common fraternity, common interests, both historical and actual, is far more widespread and deep-seated in Ireland today than it ever was at any period in her history.” (Asquith, 1920)

“That is the Ireland you have to deal with”, he said. With this understanding, Ireland should be granted the freedom to rule themselves, by which “a new sense of unity and brotherhood” could be created. In other words, the Irish Home Rule was an indication of the transformation of, rather than dissolution of, the imperial rule. Asquith also proposed that the Irish should be granted the status equal to other Dominions, with full autonomy on domestic issue and external relations while without their own military force. He believed that only with this generous disposition can the Government “get rid of this secular atmosphere of suspicion and persuade the Irish that you mean in good faith to make that country part and parcel of the British Empire” (Asquith, 1920).

Furthermore, he insisted that what holds the unity of the Empire was the value of freedom, and coercive, and retaliation policy would only lead to the “break-up of the Empire and of civilisation” (Asquith, 1921).

Austen Chamberlain, the leader of the Conservative Party, made a remarkable speech in Liverpool in 1921, in which he admitted that the intolerant attitude of Conservatives regarding the Home Rule in the past failed to solve the Irish problem. The conditions in the imperial subjects, not just Ireland, had changed:

“The growth of the Dominions, the new position which they had assumed the more vital, the most vital partnership of Empire already come to birth before the war, and developed during the war, offered a basis that had never before been at the command of any British statesman.” (Chamberlain, 1921)
These new conditions required a transformation of the way in which the mother country hold the Empire together. Regarding the request from the Irish people, Chamberlain said that “we invited them to take their place freely and voluntarily as loyal subjects of the King, a Free State in the great Commonwealth of nations that makes the British Empire.” (Chamberlain, 1921) Chamberlain argued that turning to voluntary solidarity with the establishment of Home Rule would strengthen rather than weaken the Empire. He supported this argument by case of the Union of South Africa which not only “led directly to the reconciliation of the races in South Africa”, but also “brought South Africa into the war with us” (Chamberlain, 1921).

The symbolic loyalty to the Empire was carried by Stanley Baldwin, a three-time Conservative Prime Minister who dominated the government during the interwar period. In his 1926 speech in Scarborough, he made a positive comment on the forthcoming Imperial Conference. That political parties in Canada united to facilitate the attendance of their Prime Minister immediately after the Canadian election was “a remarkable illustration of that spirit by which all over the Empire endeavour is now made to place the interests of the Empire above the interests of local party politics.” The objects of the Conference were “to promote to the utmost of our power wise development on the political side, consistent progress on the economic side and the relation between these many communities which together make up the British Empire” (Baldwin, 1926). In the same speech, Baldwin also criticized the Labour Party for not preventing the General Strike by labeling the movement as a practice of Socialism, which was an imminent threat to the establishment of Constitution. He emphasized that “the people of this country are profoundly attached to their Parliamentary institutions - institutions which are the very child of the nation” (Baldwin, 1926), suggesting that the General Strike was a symbol that violates the national spirit. His embracement to the continuity and centrality of Constitution reflected a Whiggish
interpretation which was corresponding to the loyalty to imperial institution. The same thought was expressed in his 1933 speech condemning the Labour Party’s attempt to take executive power away from the House of Commons:

“Our Constitution is no ready-made article. It has grown through the centuries, as native to our country and to our people as oak or ash or thorn. It has seen changes; it has seen revolutions. It has seen the country struggling against mighty forces; it has seen her triumph.

“It has given her people freedom and it has taught her people the difference between freedom and license. And this is the Constitution that is being threatened today, not quite openly yet, but tendenciously, by the sketching of a course of action by the Socialist Party in their conference that, if it takes place, means destruction of the Constitution.” (Baldwin, 1933)

The Conservative Party was defeated in the General Election of 1929. Baldwin spoke as the leader of the Opposition about the importance to promote the trade among the Empire’s Dominions with the concern of the decline in trade between Britain and Europe. After lecturing about the glorious history of the founding and expanding of the British Empire, he stressed that the next step toward success

“depends on our capacity to visualise the Empire, the Dominions and Colonies alike, as one eternal and indestructible unit for production, for consumption, for distribution, for the maintenance and improvement of the lot of those who under Providence are dwellers within the confines of our Commonwealth” (Baldwin, 1929)

The concern about the interest of the Empire was shared by Liberals in the interwar period. Liberals resigned from the National Government in 1932 because of their objection to the Ottawa Agreements, the product of Imperial Conference held to discuss the strategy to deal with the Great Depression. Sir Herbert Samuel argued that by the establishment of tariffs between Britain and the Dominions, the Agreements “do damage to Imperial interests and imperil the whole future of the British Empire” (Samuel, 1932). This arrangement would break the imperial interest into multiple separated considerations of national interest, which would dissolve the Commonwealth and bring “a disaster for us and an injury to the world” (Samuel, 1932). He also criticized the apologists of
tariff for placing Dominions’ interest in par with the Empire’s interest. Furthermore, he restated the Liberal’s loyalty to the Empire. “It is untrue that Liberals have been indifferent to the problems of Empire. Our Commonwealth has been built up on Liberal principles” (Samuel, 1932).

It would be biased, however, to assert that the emphasis on Britishness and Englishness was totally absent in the political speeches in the first half of the twentieth century. It usually appeared in the speeches made for national crises of different sort. For example, to rescue British agriculture from the damage done by fall of world prices and bad weather, Baldwin, in his 1927 speech in Cardiff, advocated the increase of credit to the farmers. He then shared a story with the audience:

“Two years ago there arrived for me in Downing Street a box, and on the box was a label, and on the label was a picture of a map of England and Wales, and in the centre of the map was a Union Jack and these words: ‘Produce of England and Wales.’

The box contained as fine a collection for grading and assortment of the best cooking apples that I have seen from any country for many a long day.

And with the box came a letter containing these words: ‘This box of apples, carrying for the first time a national label signifying quality and reliability, is sent to you, sir, in recognition of the work done by the Ministry of Agriculture to encourage better market-ing, and is a token of the intention of Worcestershire growers to support that work and to take a leading part in re-capturing British markets for British products.’” (Baldwin, 1927)

Free traders would have criticized Baldwin for being too nationalist regarding economic policy, whereas Baldwin would defend himself for being a patriot. In addition, his sense of the greatness of the Constitution coexist with the sense of national identity, when he felt that his belief in Constitution was significantly challenged by the policies from Labour Party. In the 1933 speech, he told his supporter that

“In the defence, the maintenance of the Constitution, you will be fighting for one of the fundamental principles of the Conservatism, of Conservatism since there was such a thing politically. But it is not only a fundamental principle of Conservatism; it is a principle deep down in the hearts of millions of Englishmen who do not belong to our party or any party.” (Baldwin, 1933)
But the simultaneous expression of imperial identity and national identity were more clearly found in the war speeches, probably because wars could produce more intensive uneasiness regarding the safety of the nation and the Empire. Immediately after the outbreak of World War One, Asquith appealed to the audience and the government to “make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale” (Asquith, 1914). But his Liberal colleague, David Lloyd George, in the famous Queen Hall speeches given in the same year, attempted to encourage the audience by referring to the power of “little nations” against the invasion of big empires, in this case the German Empire:

“The greatest art in the world was the work of little nations; the most enduring literature of the world came from little nations; the greatest literature of England came from when she was a nation of the size of Belgium fighting against a great Empire.” (George, 1914)

As a Welsh politician, George also appealed to Welsh audience to help fight the enemy by reaching back the Welsh history of struggling:

“I should like to see a Welsh Army in the field. I should like to see the race that faced the Normans for hundreds of years in a struggle for freedom, the race that helped to win Crecy, the race that fought for a generation under Glendower against the greatest captain in Europe – I should like to see that race give a good taste of its quality in this struggle in Europe; and they are going to do it.” (George, 1914)

In this speech, George mentioned that Britain an empire was superior to its enemy by helping little nations and restoring the world peace. But he simultaneously attempted to mobilize the audience by the reference to the national spirit and characteristics of the British, the English and the Welsh. Similarly, in his well-known speeches during World War Two, Winston Churchill acknowledged the contribution made by the Empire with the emphasis on the spirit of British people as if they were born freedom fighters. The spirit of British island nation received significant attention in many of his speeches. After the “Miracle of Dunkirk”, Churchill expressed his steadfast attitude toward the resistance against Nazi invasion, saying that “we shall prove ourselves once again able
to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone” (Churchill, 1940). To “defend our island” was “the will of Parliament and the nation”. When Nazi Germany was defeating other European nations, Britain became the last hope of Europe and the world. “If we can stand up to him all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad sunlit uplands” (Churchill, 1940). And Britain had the capability to shoulder this responsibility

“because we are the most united of all the nations, because we entered the war upon the national will and with our eyes open, and because we have been nurtured in freedom and individual responsibility and are the products, not of totalitarian uniformity, but of tolerance and variety.” (Churchill, 1940)

In Churchill’s speeches, Britain was regarded as a righteous power with the love of freedom and spirit of tolerance fighting against the Fascist, chauvinist axis powers. After “we British have stood alone” for a long time as “the faithful guardian of the rights and dearest hopes of a dozen States and nations”, Germany did not weaken “the spirit of the British nation”. London survived the massive bombing from German planes, which reminded Churchill of “the British squares of Waterloo” in Napoleonic War. Who formed the squares were not soldiers at this time, but were “just ordinary English Scottish and Welsh folk men, women and children-standing steadfastly together. But their spirit is the same, their glory is the same; and, in the end, their victory will be greater than far-famed Waterloo” (Churchill, 1941). It is worth noting here that the sense of nationhood expressed in in Churchill’s speeches was British rather than English, as he emphasizes the solidarity among the ethnicities in the British Isles. Hence on the Victory in Europe Day, Churchill (1945) said that the defeat of Germany was “victory of the great British nation as a whole”.

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However, it would be biased to assert that Churchill was a British nationalist in the era when the Empire was facing serious challenge. In fact, Churchill did not forsake his faith to the integrity and might of the British Empire. In his speeches, it was common that he mentioned both the nation and the Empire as what people were fighting for. “The British nation and the British Empire, finding themselves alone, stood undismayed against disaster.” (Churchill, 1940) The War was fought “by men of British blood and from the dominions on the one side and by Germans on the other” (Churchill, 1942). Churchill had faith in the strength of the Empire to turn the tide of the war in favor of the Allies because of “the fact that the British Empire stands invincible” (Churchill, 1940). Furthermore, he emphasized the solidarity shown by the Commonwealth nations in the Great War. “This is no class war, but a war in which the whole British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged without distinction of race, creed or party.” (Churchill, 1941) The current and former subject of the British Empire such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa made significant contributions to the British victory. In other words, at odds with the trade-off between imperial identity and nationalism presumed by Kumar (2007), Churchill’s speeches demonstrated the coexistence between imperial nationalism and British nationalism. The former made his identity close to that of other leaders in the first half of the twentieth century, while the latter could serve as a precedent of British national identity expressed by the Prime Ministers in the second half of the century.

**Englishness in History Textbooks**

Similar to the Chinese case, England was underdeveloped regarding history education before the turn of the twentieth century. Education for English pupils in the first half of the nineteenth century was mainly provided with religious instruction, and history textbooks, if any, were produced by religious bodies and “were acceptable as useful adjuncts to biblical instruction” (Marsden, 2001).
It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century, as the process of modernization of education began in Europe, when history was widely treated as a separate subject in classroom. In a time when international competition was more perceivable, more people realized that history education was important to impose a shared sense of national identity with the knowledge about British national past. The need to develop education system was felt by some politicians, whose efforts culminated in the passing of the Balfour Education Act of 1902. The Act signified a strengthened state regulation over education, as it “abolished the elected school boards…and placed education under the jurisdiction of the already-existing local authorities, namely counties and county boroughs” (Cannadine et al., 2011, p. 20). But the extent to which the central government could influence what was taught in classrooms was unknown, and it was only safe to say that if there was any, it was indirect and limited. The Board of Education, created in 1900, was in a marginalized position in the government. Before the World War One, there were as many as eight presidents of the BOE. It was not only because of this high turnout rate, but also because these people in charge of national education system did not have enough experience in education, let alone history education.

The Board of Education did make some effort in provide some general suggestions on history education, especially contributed by James Wycliffe Headlam, a Permanent Staff Inspector of secondary schools. As “one of the most influential figures in the teaching of history during the early twentieth century” (Cannadine et al., 2011, p. 25), he produced several proposals on the improvement of history education. Regarding teaching materials, he suggested history textbook, and prefer “those with ‘a well arranged narratives’” to “those that were ‘merely a chronological summary or compendium of facts to be used for reference’” (p. 27). He suggested that students should be able to walk out of classrooms with the ability to explain interconnected historical events.
His proposals were well-received in the Board of Education, but the civil servants in the government could not compel schools to adopt their ideas. Perhaps the organization that had more direct influence on history teaching was the Historical Association that was founded in 1906 by a small group of history teachers and history scholars and was expanded quickly into a national organization in years. It gave “history teachers a shared sense of identity and practical support, and to lobby central and local government on their behalf and on behalf of their subject” (p. 33). With the lobbying power, it made significant contribution to fill out of void of history education in England. As a forum, it gave teachers and scholars opportunity to exchange their ideas on pedagogical issues.

But the circulating ideas and opinions on teaching were diverse, and the Association did not produce a unitary suggestion on history teaching (perhaps the most notable consensus was that history education should be promoted in the education system). Neither the Board of Education nor the Historical Association had the authority to control the editing of history textbooks. They did not have the power to prescribe textbook for schools either. But that does not mean that teachers did not have any clue in textbook selection. It was plausible that some teachers get their ideas from the discussion organized by the Historical Association, and that some teachers were more influenced by academic historians. In fact, some of the popular textbooks in the beginning of the century was written by reputable academics, and this study selects the one from T.F. Tout (An Advanced History of Great Britain, 1909). Some other teachers might follow the general popularity in publication, and this study also selects School History of England (1911) written by C.R.L Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling who were famous writers at that time. According to Cannidine (2011), the most popular textbook in London secondary schools was A First History of England (1902) written by C. Linklater Thompson, and this study also includes it into the analysis.
As the First World War exposed the limitation on education and “strengthened the arguments that
the nation’s youth should be better trained and taught” (Cannadine et al., 2011, p. 63), efforts to
promote education were made in different levels. H.A.L. Fisher became the President of Board of
Education when the war ended, and proposed a proposal to develop public education in nearly
every aspect. He placed emphasis on history education, and suggested that the school leaving age
should be raised to 14 to make education accessible to more pupils in England. But most of the
points in his proposals were not realized, and throughout the first half of the twentieth century
“there was no effective reforming initiative in the Board at ministerial level” (p. 63). But the
innovation on educational policy and practice were happening, and in state level it was contributed
by the Board’s Consultative Committee, whose recommendation to the separation between
elementary and secondary schools were put into practice from the 1920s to 1930s, which
corresponded to the increasing resources put into secondary education. Although the fact that the
Board did not have the authority to tell what schools should do did not change, and the Board
admitted that the history education should be suitable to different circumstances of schools and
carried out differently by teachers with various personalities, it had a suggestion, albeit in general
sense, that the students should acquire a “tolerable connected view of the main outlines of British
history”, including “some knowledge of the government of the country, the growth of free
institutions, the expansion of Empire, and the establishment of our position among nations” (p.
71). It reflected an insistence on the traditional view that the chorological, national history was the
essential part of the history education. This idea was reflected by the fact that the history
examination at School Certificate level, sat by the 16-year-old, mostly were about English history
from 55 BC to 1914. This was probably part of the background against which the schools selected
textbooks for secondary education. Although the “progressive” way to write the textbooks and
teach history, favoring social and economic history arranged in topical framework, started to gain popularity, the textbooks used now largely followed the traditional way. The most popular ones were *Groundwork of British History* (1923) contributed by G.T. Warner and C.H.K. Marten and *A New History of Great Britain* (1926) written by R.B. Mowat, both of which laid down events in English history chronologically and focused more on political and military issues. They are both analyzed in this study as well.

1. Definition of the Nation: Britain or England?

No composition of national historiography could circumvent the problem of national identity i.e. whose history the audience are reading. Authors’ answers to this question could be discerned by the appearance of certain terms, which in this case include England, English, Britain and British. The result of the analysis surprisingly shows that the uses of these terms in the textbooks are not as chaotic as in everyday conversation like Kumar (2007) suggested. In all the textbooks under analysis, there was a discernible pattern of the use of these terms throughout the texts, and there was only small degree of conflation between them.

Regarding the appearance of terms denoting the senses of national or imperial identity, the narratives in the textbooks can be roughly divided into three parts. Firstly, for the period of the pre-historic time when Celts were major inhabitants of the island [up to 55 B.C.] and the period when the island was a part of the Roman Empire [55 B.C. to 449 A.D.], “Britain” was used to indicate the historical entity whose story was told, which was suggested by the titles of the relevant chapters. Thompson (1902) started her book with a chapter titled “Celtic Britain”, which was followed by the chapter about Roman conquest of Britain. Tout (1909) titled these periods “Prehistoric and Celtic Britain” and “Roman Britain” respectively; Fletcher and Kipling (1911) referred to “the British Islands” when they were telling the stories before Roman departure; Warner
and Marten (1923) did not include the period before Roman conquest, and they used “The Romans in Britain” as the title for Roman period; Mowat (1926) used “Ancient Britain” to cover the two periods. It should be noted, however, that “Britain” here was only a geographical name rather than a national name, and it was “British Islands” that were more frequently used. Inhabitants on British Islands were named “Britons” by the authors, albeit with different descriptions on the racial/ethnic composition of them. Tout (1909) outlined the complex processes of immigration of the Iberians, the Celts, the Goidels, and the Brythons into the island during the stone age, arguing that Scottish Highlanders, Irish people and the Welsh today carried their blood. Perhaps the most significant connection to modern Britain was established by the Celts, who was dominant among all the tribes in the island in the iron age. Fletcher and Kipling (1911) stated that the Celts was the most powerful in pre-historic time and was the common ancestor of Scottish, Irish and Welsh people. The Celts were equivalent to the Britons, who were the opponents to the Roman conquest of Britain. In the description of Warner and Marten (1923), Britons, facing the Roman invasion, was one of the two branches of the Celts. They occupied England and the Lowland of Scotland and they were the ancestor of the Welsh. For Mowat (1926), Celts was one of the two branches of the Britons, and the other was Iberians. Thompson (1902) had a straightforward introduction of the complexity of the naming of early inhabitants. She stated that all the tribes living in the island at this time almost “belonged to one big race called the Celts” (p. 3), and the most important of two were the Goidels and the Brythons. Most notably, she made a connection between the people and the land:

“Now you will guess at once that our land is sometimes called Britain because the Brythons or Britons lived there. Perhaps it will help you to remember these divisions better when you know that the Irish, and the Scotch Highlanders of the present day are descended from the Goidels, and that the Welsh are descended from the Brythons. But because these tribes were very much alike, and most of what we shall say about them is true of both, it will be best to call them all Britons.” (Thompson, 1902, p. 4)
If compared to her treatment of the English, it was not difficult to see that although Thompson (1902) attributed the concept of Britain to the name of a people, she only identified the land to the audience, and the Britons were just people who gave the land its name. While Britain was “our” land, the pronoun for Britons was usually “them” instead of “us”. Other authors did not make any significant attempts to identify Britons closely to the audience either, except for the only one from Mowat (1926), stating that the descendants of ancient Britons “may be seen any day in almost any part of the British Empire” (p. 1). In this regard, the description of Fletcher and Kipling (1911) was unique in that they use “we” and “us” for people all the time, but its reference was too inconsistent to be clear. On the other hand, it was Britain as a piece of land that carries identity. For example, “the Celts were the first inhabitants of our island to attain a respectable level of civilization” (Tout, 1909, p. 4); the Celts “land in our islands, not as traders, but as fighters” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p.15); “The invasions of Julius Cesar are generally taken as a suitable point from which to begin the history of our land” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 1); “We are accustomed to think of our country as an inviolate isle, but the truth is that until the time of the Normans it was invaded many times” (Mowat, 1926, p. 3). Besides “we”, “others” could also be the inhabitants of “our island”, and the Celts or Britons in this period belong to the latter.

Secondly, the people whose history are most completely told by the authors are the English. “English” and “England” became the major identity-indicating terms in the texts from the Saxon conquest all the way to the eve of the British Empire. “Britain” and “British” were much less used for this period compared to the last one. Also, the authors made the meanings of these terms very clear, as there was no indication of the conflation between British and English or between Britain and England. With smaller space, Fletcher and Kipling (1911) did not explain very much on their definitional difference, but they applied this separation to narratives like “the British made a very
desperate defence” (p. 28) against the English conquest. In all the textbooks, the stories of English conquest involved two protagonists – the English as the invader and conqueror and the Briton as the defender. The English drove the Briton to the forests and hills in the west and north, and occupied the land to which they gave the name of “England”. In the narratives of the following history until the eve of British Empire, “England” and “English” replaced “Britain”, “British” or “Briton” as the major identity indictors.

Additionally, acknowledging the diversity within English tribes when they first landed Britain, the authors rendered their opinions on the formation of the English nation in history. Some of them mark the beginning of the English nation with the emphasis on the significance of national historiography. For Fletcher and Kipling (1911), the English nation started by the contribution from Alfred the Great, who not only fought Danish pirates [871-901] but was also related to the composition of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.

“We may call Alfred the first real ‘King of England’; he picked up the threads of the national life which the Danes had cut into pieces. He translated good books into the Saxon tongue; he started the great history of England, called the ‘Chronicle’…” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 38)

Mowat (1926) had a different idea on the beginning of English history. He believed that the first contributor was Bede, “the greatest scholar of the eighth century” (p. 24), who wrote Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum (the ecclesiastical history of the English people). “Bede was the first to recognize that there was an English nation or people, divided though it was in the eighth century among several warring kingdoms. The Ecclesiastical History is the greatest record of our people, before the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.” (pp. 24-25).

This view was shared by Tout (1909, p. 35). But he brought the idea of English nation from epistemic level to empirical level with the discussion on the processes in which the English nation took shape. The so-called English conquest was jointly and successively done by the Jutes, the
Saxons and the Angles, but Tout (1909) considered these efforts as a whole, and marked it as the beginnings of England. To call these tribes “English” was not only “for convenience sake” (p. 17), but also for the understanding that English tribes had an evident tendency of unification from the very beginning, which made England stronger as a nation compared to its British neighbors:

“While the Celtic states, owing to the strength of the tribal system, seldom showed any tendency to be drawn together, the English tribes, on the contrary, began almost from the beginning to unite with each other, and so bring about the beginnings of greater unity. The Celts were Christians, and infinitely more civilized and cultivated than their enemies; but they lacked the political capacity and persistent energy which made the English stronger in building up a state. The result was that supremacy fell more and more into English hands. While the struggles of Celtic chieftains resulted in nothing at all save bloodshed and confusion, the equally cruel fighting between the English tribes led to the absorption of the weaker into the stronger kingdoms, and so prepared the way for the growth of English unity.” (Tout, 1909, p. 24-25)

Tout (1909) continued to stress that this tendency of national unity “became more active” (p. 25) when the English kingdoms were converted to Christianity. This view was shared by Warner and Marten (1923), for they also believed that it was the Christian church that legitimized the unity of English people. In the era of Roman conquest, Britons had accepted Christianity as their faith. But they were defeated and driven out of England by the English who were heathens at that time. Britons made some attempts to convert the English, but with limited success. Most English people especially those in the richest southeast kept worship their own gods, until Pope Gregory sent Augustine to the island to spread Christianity among the English, for the second time. Augustine tried to persuade British bishops to adopt Roman practices, but the Britons refused. But his efforts were successful in most English kingdoms. The difference between British Christianity and English Christianity “was no serious a matter, since it was the Britons who held to their own practice and the Saxons to the Roman teaching. However, some other kingdoms, who had already followed Christianity but under the guidance of British preachers, refused to adopt the Roman way, and the authors stressed that “when the Saxons became a house divided against themselves there
was grave danger” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 16). This description reveals the authors’
teleologically discriminative attitude toward religious divisions, in which the difference between
Britain and England was acceptable whereas the difference between English tribes and kingdoms
was not, because the latter was, or should be one people.

In this notion, Warner and Marten (1923) highly praised the decision of the King Oswy of
Northumbria to change his kingdom from British practice to Roman practice in the Synod held in
664 to settle down the issue. It was not only a critical step toward the unity of the English church,
but also necessary for national unity:

“When all met together in a national synod they no longer thought of themselves as men of
Northumbria, Kent, or Wessex, but as members of a United Church.

If we look for the results of the conversion upon our country, the first is here. A united Church
gave the example for a united people; union under one archbishop accustomed men to think of
union under one king; if they were alike in religion, they might well be alike in law and

The authors then concluded this chapter by saying that “the Church…gave us the beginnings of
our national unity; it did much to give us peace at home, and a better sense of what was lawful and
right; it gave us scholars, and it gave us statesmen” (p. 21). The frequent appearance of “us” and
“our” as the pronoun for English people in the citation above and other places in the narratives in
other textbooks implied the deliberately or unwittingly action to strengthen the Englishness to
students. Tout (1909) made multiple suggestion that “our history” was equivalent to English
history. Another notable symbol relating Englishness to the audience was the reference of English
people as “our ancestors”. In Fletcher and Kipling (1911) there were two mentioning of this type
(p. 31; p. 95). Acknowledging the diversity within the English nation, Thompson (1902) made a
firm statement that the students should identify themselves to English ancestors, not others:
“For you must remember that these were the men (i.e. Britons) from whom many of us are descended, and though we have British, Danish and Norman blood in us, we call ourselves English and speak the same tongue as those who landed in Kent (i.e. Saxon invaders) to help Vortigern nearly fifteen hundred years ago.” (Thompson, 1902, p. 40)

On the other side of coin, the authors strengthened the boundary of English nationality by indicating non-English people as “foreigners”, denoting their otherness. “Now, as we approach the end of the Saxon period of our history, let us take a look at our foreign neighbours” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 40). The list of neighbours included Denmark and Norway, Scotland, Flanders, and Normandy. The English were ruled by “foreign” kings after the Norman conquest (1066). The land and property in England were taken by Norman barons, “who soon formed a new foreign aristocracy of landholders” (Tout, 1909, p. 81). The English mass then “became the dependents of the Norman barons, and lost their tradition of freedom as they grew accustomed to serve foreign masters” (p. 86). The English kings dealt with the relationship with other countries with “English foreign policy” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 181). “English foreign trade and shipping” (Mowat, 1926, p. 191) increased during the peaceful years of King Edward. If we put the textbooks in the comparison with those that were used in the last quarter of twentieth century and today, we would find the use of “foreign” was surprisingly special for the English case. I will come back to this point in Chapter 5.

Just like the Mongolian conquest of China brought out the question on the integrity and continuity of Chinese national history, the waves of Danish invasion (802-901; 979-1042) and the Norman conquest (1066) of England raised the same doubt. Although the authors use substantial room for the English struggle with the Danes, the Danish rule of England (1013-1014; 1016-1042) was treated like insignificance in evolution of English nation probably because it was too short to left a mark in English history. Tout (1909) strengthened this impression by shortly after the invasion, the Danish conquerors followed English practice of Christianity, and gradually “abandoned their
own tongue and used the language of the English, which was not very unlike their own speech. The result was that English and Danes in the Danelaw were joined together in a single people” (p. 47). Other than “warlike and vigorous” characteristics in some places in the north and midlands and some Scandinavian place names, the Danes did not leave any distinguishable marks in England. They were nobody but foreign invaders who caused some troubles for the English but soon afterward absorbed into the English nation and disappeared from the sight very quick.

But it took more efforts to justify the appearance of the Normans to fit it into the history of English nation, because the Normans left a much deeper footprint in England. On one hand, the authors (except Mowat) were not shy away from the fact that the Normans were a different people, and the Norman kings were foreign kings of England. Fletcher and Kipling (1911) even had an English standpoint in their narratives of the Battle of Hastings, the decisive battle that ended the Saxon rule of England. However, unlike Danes, the Normans were believed to play a critical role in the development of the English nation, so much so that that the stories of Norman conquest and the rules of Norman Kings [1066 - 1154] were well-integrated into the history of England. The authors emphasized the institutions the Norman aristocrats brought to England, and they had a positive attitude toward Norman conquest overall. Tout (1909) stated that English church and culture was full of “sluggishness”, so “it needs the stern discipline of the Norman conquest to restore the vitality of the sluggish race, and direct England into new channel of progress” (p. 80). This description followed Stubb’s argument about constitutional development of English, in which the modern English constitution and parliament was originally constructed by Normans on the top of the English idea of freedom.

However, the Norman identity was not raised onto the national level on a par with English identity. The authors ceased to describe the stories of Normans after the Norman period, and English was
still the major identity of the history. They could have left the question like “how French are we” answered, but some explanations were made. Thompson (1902) argued that although after William the Conqueror established his rule on England, “the English strove with him for their ancient rights”, eventually “the English and Normans became joined together in one race, so that the ancient feud was forgotten, and all were proud to call themselves Englishmen” (p. 182). Fletcher and Kipling (1911) suggested that the assimilation of Normans into the English nation was possible because the number of Normans who migrated to England following William was small since most of them were “nobles, bishops, great abbots and other leaders of the people”. They did not bring Norman women with them, “so these men married English wives, and, within 150 years, all difference between Normans and Englishmen had vanished”. He also stressed that the “Norman Conquest of 1066 was the beginning of the history of the English race as one people and of England as a great power in Europe”, which suggested that Norman element was an indispensable part of Englishness. Mowat (1926) argued that “in Henry II’s time [1150-1189] with regard to freemen, you could not tell the difference between Norman and English. The villeins…could always be assumed to be pure English, for the Normans were all of gentle birth”, but after “Normandy was lost in 1204, the last sign of the difference between English and Norman under the English king was wiped away” (p. 58).

So if Norman element had effect on the value and integrity of Englishness, it strengthened them instead of weakened them, as suggested in the history textbooks. Other nations, including the Welsh, Scots and Irish, did not have this treatment. If compared to the realization of the concept of “four nations’ history”, it is safe to say that the authors did the opposite. They did not treat Scottish history, Welsh history and Irish history as separated entities. The Scots, the Welsh and the Irish were mentioned only when they had connection with the English events. In Thompson
(1902), Fletcher and Kipling (1911) and Tout (1909), Scotland, Wales and Ireland did not appear in any chapter titles. They were included in titles for a few chapters in Warner and Marten (1923) and Mowat (1926), and their stories were told separately, but this was because these chapters were about the relationship between them and England. For example, the stories of Wales were told in a separate chapter about how it was integrated into the rule of English king. And “Scotland” appeared in the title of the chapter that included the war of Scottish independence. The otherness of the Britons suggested that the main subjects of the textbooks were England and the English. The texts were dedicated to tell stories of the English and England, rather than British and Britain. And although “Britain” appeared in several chapter titles, it does not carry a meaning of nationality. For example, in the beginning of the chapter titled “Britain in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries”, Tout (1909) emphasized that “the period which we now have to study is that of the formation of the English nation and of the English constitution” (p. 238).

Thirdly, in the last phrase of historical description, the frequency of Britain being used as an identity-indicating term increased, albeit to different extents in different books. Although the authors drew the threshold separating this phrase and the “English-only” phrase in different places, Britain and British was frequently used after inner Empire started to take shape i.e. the union of English and Scottish crown under James I [1603-1625]. And Britain was increasingly used as the name of the entity whose stories where told after the parliamentary union of England and Scotland (1707). And this was also a time when England/Britain started to became a global power and establish its global Empire. This Empire was often named “British” Empire. However, “English” and “England” still played their role. In Tout (1909) they were often used interchangeably with the other two, with more frequency; In Fletcher and Kipling (1911) the conflation only ended in the description of the recent history i.e. the nineteenth century when Britain and British took over
the place; In Warner and Marten (1923) and Mowat (1926), British and Britain were more
frequently used, but “English” and “England” sneaked into some sentences. Overall, excluding
those about pre-Saxon period, in the narratives English and England as identity indicators were
mentioned with higher continuity than British and Britain. The descriptions on inner Empire and
global Empire tell how the English nation was separately defined against the others and how it was
in the central place of the story-telling throughout the texts.

2. Internal Empire

The history of British internal Empire involves four nations, England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.
Geographically, the land mass consisting England, Scotland and Wales was named Britain, which
is separated from Ireland. As suggested by Colley (1992), a new British identity was forged from
1707 when the English and the Scottish parliaments united. Briton or “British people” moved away
from its ancient Celtic-centered indication to the encompassing representation of the English, the
Scots and Wales as a people, and to a lesser degree includes the Irish. Colley (1992) and Kumar
(2007) stressed the importance of Protestantism in keeping the cultural unity of among these
nations and thus the integrity of British identity. Another element that combine the British together
was the joint participation into the global imperial projects, which gives the name of “British”
Empire. In other words, the term “Britain” or “British” implicates a sense of unity with a
recognition of diversity, and if taking the sense of English superiority into consider, it makes an
example of imperial nationalism.

The acknowledgment of imperial downturn opened the room for English nationalism (Kumar,
2007). Written under this background, these textbooks, as the analysis shows, expressed English
nationalism with various techniques. The last section has demonstrated that Englishness was
emphasized with continuous usage throughout the texts as the major identity-indicator. This
section shows another tendency to harden the boundary of the English identity at the expense of weaken the integrity of British identity: dominant emphasis on political conflicts between the English and the other three nations. Taking politics as the central parts, the authors inevitably spent a lot of ink on the wars fought between England and the other three nations. More importantly, the narratives on conflictual relationships between them were made for nearly all periods of the history after Saxon invasion, while those about peaceful relationship were much less in number and not in every chapters. In other words, symbols of conflicts achieved continuity in the texts. A perceivable result was that even for those times when the English monarchs put Scotland, Ireland and Wales under his/her throne, the textbooks often mentioned the restlessness of the rules because of the constant will of Scots, Irish and Welsh to get freedom from English rule, which implicates the weakness of the imperial union owing to the strength of local nationalism.

The level of integrity of local national identity varies among the non-English Britons. Welsh identity was demonstrated with the least evidence, mainly because it was subjected to the English rule from very early though in different forms. But according to Tout (1909), it was not until the time of Henry V (1413-1422) when “the Welsh troubles were completed ended” (p. 262). And this complete submission was not coming out of voluntariness of the Welsh, but was achieved by Henry V’s policy “to pardon all the Welsh in arms against him” (p. 262) because he was anxiety to put down the constantly happening Welsh revolt. A distinctive Welsh identity was presented throughout the texts, though to much less extent after Henry V. For example, for Norman conquest of South Wales, Tout (1909) emphasized that this was only achieved by Norman barons, who built numerous castles in frontier to keep their rule after they overrun the country (they were then called the “marcher lords”). “The Welsh princes remained as fiercely Celtic as before, and William himself did not manage to subdue conquest of the stronger of them in any real fashion” (p. 99).
Also, when the war between Stephen and Matilda broke out for the English throne, “the Welsh profited by England's anarchy to throw off the yoke of the marcher lords” (p. 115). Thompson (1902) even had a positive tone in her discussion about Welsh resistance against English rule. For example, after Edward I’s attempt to invade Wales, Llewelyn, the Welsh leader, “for his great love's sake, gave in to the hard conditions of his enemy” (Thompson, 1902, vol. 2, p. 3). Peace was afterward maintained out of the deal between Edward and Llewelyn in which Llewelyn held the title of Prince without the right to pass the title to his children, while his Welsh subjects were only allowed to hold estates from England but not from him, and he had to pay Edward yearly homage.

“But the peace did not last long. The Welsh, ‘an old and haughty nation, proud in arms,’ were restless under the foreign yoke, and persuaded David, who was famed for playing the fox, to become reconciled to his brother and join him in rebellion against the English king… Llewelyn felt that he had been badly used, and scornfully rejected the offer of an estate in England in exchange for Snowdonia; for was it not more reasonable and more honourable also for him to hold his lands in his own country and among his own people?” (Thompson, 1902, vol. 2, p. 9)

Fletcher and Kipling (1911) did not tell as many stories about Wales as the others, because of the smaller size of their book and to their overwhelming attention to England, but they acknowledged that although Edward I (1239-1307) eventually conquered Wales (1282), “the King stained his victory by the cruel execution of a Welsh prince, David, who, after all, had only done what all Celtic princes had been doing for centuries, namely, promised to submit and then rebelled again” (p. 85). “The tradition of national independence still lingered” (Tout, 1909, p. 257) in fifteenth century, as Owen Glendower, a Welsh landowner, escalated his fight against other landowners to a “national rising” (Warner and Marten, 1923, vol. 1, p. 204) against English rule. “Owen called himself Prince of Wales, made an alliance with Prance and Scotland, was sung by all the Welsh bards as a national hero” (Mowat, 1926, p. 167). Through this type of narratives, the national
division between the English and the Welsh was emphasized, and the mentioning of peaceful communication was too few to soften it significantly.

An even sharper line was drawn between Scotland and England by the emphasis on the constant hatred between the English and the Scots throughout history. Political connection between Scotland and England was firstly built under Henry II (1133-1189), whose territory was called “Angevin Empire” with hegemony extended to Scottish Highland. But Tout (1909) stressed that the English hegemony over Scotland was mainly achieved with military force and coercion, so the Norman influence was too “superficial” to bring the two people together as a complete union. So it was not surprising that the Scottish sense of national feeling was constantly in place, even though “every subsequent Scottish king had done homage to the English king” and they “possessed large estates in England”, “it was not always clear whether their submission was for their English estates or for the Scottish throne. As Scotland grew stronger her kings became more unwilling to acknowledge their subjection to a foreign king” (p. 188). This served as the background of the strong resistance of Scots against Edward I’s attempt to annex Scotland. Despite Edward I’s early victory over Scottish power (with the sacred stone being transferred to Westminster Abbey), “he only succeeded in rousing every Scottish heart to desperate resistance” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 86). His subsequence rule was never accepted as legitimate in Scotland, as “the Scots hated English domination even when it was fair and just” (Tout, p. 193). “Although the Scottish barons, who were generally English barons as well, did not oppose the rule of the king's governors, the common people were very bitter against them” (Thompson, vol. 3, p. 36). Another war broke out against the English rule, this time led by two legendary figures, William Wallace and Robert Bruce. No figure was more depicted as a Celtic hero for liberty than these two, and the authors expressed their sympathy to Scottish independence through the narratives with exaltation, which was well-
exemplified by Warner and Marten’s illustration of the Battle of Bannockburn, the decisive battle of which the victory gave Scotland freedom:

“The English knights fought fiercely, but with no common aim, and so far as mere valour went were matched by the Scots, who had taken the field determined to conquer or die. They were burning to set their country free; they fought to protect their homes, their wives, and their children, and to pay back the terrible wrongs they had suffered. The English attack was beginning to waver, and the Scots themselves were advancing, crying: "On them, on them; they fail!" when a body of Scottish camp followers were seen pouring down from the Gillies Hill. The English, already disheartened, took them for a fresh force arriving to support their comrades. They fled in terrible confusion. The king himself rode in hot haste to Dunbar, and took ship to Berwick, leaving his army to the unhappy fate of a broken force in a hostile country.” (Warner and Marten, 1923, vol.1, p. 148)

Unable to annex Scotland, the English signed the Treaty of Northampton (1328) acknowledging Scottish independence from England. “It was the last gift of the great Bruce to the Scottish nation.” (Mowat, 1926, p. 116). After the death of Robert Bruce, his young son David became the King of Scotland. But his weak government opened the opportunity for his political rival, Edward Balliol, to take the throne. Balliol defeated David and was crowned King of Scotland. However, he was hated by his own people as the traitor because he gained recognition by Edward III of England as king of Scots, “through promising to hold Scotland of him, and to cede him Berwick” (Tout, 1909, p. 209). David soon came back and defeated Balliol, and was then defeated by the English force. Edward III put Balliol to the throne with a high price, and this effort shows “Edward’s greediness” that completely destroyed any “faint chance that Balliol had of success” (p. 209). “The Scots hated him as the betrayer of his country”, and supported David, who fled to France, as their leader to resist the rule of the enemy. Balliol and Edward III’s rule in Scotland was never justified, and “their effort to establish themselves involved the north in many years of bloodshed and misery” (pp. 209-210). David returned and took the throne after Edward III was busy fighting the French (the Hundred Years’ War, 1338-1453). Scottish independence was restored.
For a long time, the Scots and the English were not only foreigners to each other but also rivals fighting against each other occasionally. Therefore, it is not surprising that Scotland sided with France instead of England in the Hundred Years’ War. Tout (1909) attributed this to “the growth of an independent English-speaking state in Scotland” in the fifteenth century. “So constant was the hostility of the northern and southern kingdoms that it was to France rather than to its neighbour that the little Scottish kingdom looked for support and guidance.” (p. 306) The hostility continued into the Tudor time, though Henry VII (1457-1509) married his daughter Margaret to James IV of Scots, hoping to pull Scotland out of its old alliance with France. The authors mentioned that this marriage set the foundation for the union of England and Scotland, but the trouble of Scotland did not stop at this point. James IV chose to continue to side with France, and the Scots fought in the French side in the French War (1511-1514). The Scots were beaten and James IV died in the Battle of Flodden, and “this terrible defeat left its mark on almost every family, at least in the south of Scotland” (Mowat, 1926, p. 215). The Scots was defeated again at Solway Moss (1542), James V of Scotland died after the war, and Mary Queen of Scots was newly-born, which was regarded by Henry VIII as a golden opportunity to achieve the union. He proposed a treaty of friendship and the betrothal of the baby Mary to his son Edward. But he died very soon, and Young King Edward VI was under the guardianship of Duke of Somerset. Somerset was “a man of large ideas” (Mowat, 1926, p. 232) with the ambition to unite the monarchs and governments of the two countries into one for Briton. This could have been a good idea, but that he attempted to realized it by force was criticized by the authors. He decided to invade Scotland (1547), and the English army defeated the Scots at Pinkie Cleugh. “It was the worst possible way to set about persuading the Scots to a union” (Mowat, 1926, p. 232). His policy “drove the Scots once more into the arms of France” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 124). Though “he had broken the army of the Scots he had not broken their
will” (Thompson, vol. 4, p. 119). His “hasty violence had ruined his own plans” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 267). Somerset was responsible not only for the continuation of hostility between England and Scotland, but also for the postponing of Scottish Reformation (Tout, 1909, p. 354).

Although the authors admitted that the completion of Scottish Reformation abate the hostile between Scotland and England to some extent, Protestantism was not described as a reliable force to unity them, which is explained in the next section. In the textbooks, the descriptions on discontent, hostility and conflict between the Scots and the English did not stop after the unification of the Crowns in 1606 and Act of Union in 1707. In the seventeenth century, the unfriendliness between the two was exemplified by the establishment of Covenant in Scotland mainly for resistance against the imposition of the Scottish Prayer book by Charles I. The religious discontent reinforce the national spirit, which was not abated by the fact that the English hated Charles I as well. In the eighteenth century, two Jacobite Rebellions (1715, 1745) were crushed harshly by the government. Except Mowat (1926, explained later), the authors did not end the stories of Scotland with a happy ending.

The division between Ireland and England was also emphasized in the texts. The first English king who had dominance over Ireland was Henry II, who visited Ireland to make sure the loyalty of local barons and kings. But although he gained the title of “Lord of Ireland”, he did not have any real grasp of Ireland. This was “only a half-conquest” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 69). After he left, “the Irish ruled and quarrelled as before” (Warner and Marten, 1923). Everywhere in Ireland “Henry’s influence was very superficial” (Tout, 1909, p. 126). Ireland was kept under the throne indirectly and peacefully until the time of Queen Elizabeth, when religious problem started to emerge. By that time, Reformation in was completed in England. However, with the support of the Spanish and the Pope, Ireland was made “a centre of the Counter-Reformation” (Tout, 1909,
Rebellion broke out in Ireland, and in 1598 the rebellion, led by Hugh O’Neil, Earl of Tyrone, for the first time became the “combined national and Catholic movement against English supremacy” (p. 404). The rebellion was eventually put down by the English, with great ferocity emphasized by the authors except Fletcher and Kipling. The suppression was committed by lord Mountjoy, who “put a garrison in all the chief towns”. Mountjoy’s method result in brutality, in that “Everywhere else the rebels were either defeated or starved out, for Mountjoy's garrisons swept the country around. In some districts desperate people are said to have resorted to cannibalism” (Mowat, 1926, p. 286). The most vivid illustration of English brutality was in Warner and Marten (1923):

“At Elizabeth’s death the conquest of Ireland was for the first time complete. Yet it had been carried out with excessive brutality, and Elizabeth was told, at the end of her life, that she reigned but over ‘ashes and dead carcases’. We read of an English deputy attempting to send to Shane O’Neill a present of poisoned wine; of children in Desmond's rebellion being hoisted by the English soldiers on the point of their spears and whirled about in their agony; of Irish women so reduced by starvation during Mountjoy's campaign that they lit fires to attract children, whom they then seized and devoured. No doubt the brutalities were by no means confined to the English side. Moreover, the Irish were regarded, in Spenser's words, as "a savage nation", and they were in league with the two mortal foes of the English — the Pope and the King of Spain; and their chiefs were often very unreliable and treacherous in their dealings with the English lord deputy.” (Warner and Marten, 1923, vol. 2, p. 425)

Interestingly, Thompson (1902) only mentioned the suppression conducted by Mountjoy with one sentence: “He took prompt and severe measures, and in 1603 Tyrone at last submitted” (vol. 4, p. 237). In contrast, she emphasized the ferocity in Irish side:

“They [Irish Rebels] turned savagely on the few English who lived among them, murdering them and sacking and burning their houses; among others the castle of Kilcolman, the home of the poet Spenser, went up in flames; and though he and the rest of his family escaped, a little child was burned to death. Spenser took refuge in England, where soon after wards he died.” (Thompson, 1902, p. 235)

But in either way, the hospitality was emphasized, sharpening the impression that Irish problem was severe. The suppression of the rebellion in Elizabeth’s time caused more problems, as “the cruelty
of the process, largely the result of the queen's over-thriftiness, left the bitterest memories behind it. The Irish loathed the foreign yoke, and were only kept down by sheer force” (Tout, 1909, p. 404). “Elizabeth's policy in Ireland settled nothing; it only led up to all the disastrous events in the seventeenth century” (Warner and Marten, 1923, vol. 1, p. 321)

The severity of Irish Rebellion (1641) was also included as an important part of English history. The suppression during Elizabeth was followed by English plantation of Ulster, a Protestant district of Ireland. The plantation, however, made the Irish problem more complicated, “since side by side with the old Catholic and Celtic Ireland a new Protestant and Saxon Ireland was created. Bitterly hating the aliens who persecuted their religion and robbed them of their lands, Celtic Ireland sullenly waited for the hour of vengeance” (Tout, 1909, p. 423). Consequently, after the rule of Strafford in Ireland ended in 1640, the rebellion broke out.

“The Rebellion began with a rising of the native Irish against the in-comers who had settled upon their lands in Ulster. Numberless people were murdered, and the most fearful atrocities were committed. The English and Scottish settlers retaliated, and the war in Ireland became a savage struggle, partly racial, partly religious.” (Mowat, 1926, p. 331)

The situation was escalated and complicated by the outbreak of the Civil War in England which brought Oliver Cromwell to Ireland to crush the rebellion. The atrocity of Cromwell was depicted in the textbooks. “His first victories were the captures of Drogheda and Wexford, where he massacred the whole of the defeated garrisons, thinking that this cruel example would frighten the rest of the land into obedience” (Tout, 1909, p. 463). Warner and Marten (1923) depicted the condition of Ireland after the war:

“The condition of Ireland at the end of this long period of warfare was pitiable. Over one-third of the population, it is estimated, died during these ten years of bloodshed and misery. Much of the land was out of cultivation, and a great deal of country depopulated. The inhabitants were further reduced, as thousands of Irishmen went to serve in foreign armies, and some hundreds of
boys and girls were shipped to Barbados and sold to the planters.” (Warner and Marten, 1923, vol. 2, p. 430)

The ferocity of suppression of Irish Rebellion by English force, with large amount of Irish land being taken from Irish Catholics to Protestants, the struggle of this period “contributed not a little to the long hostility between Ireland and England” (Thompson, 1902, vol. 5, p. 139). In fact, the religious problem in Ireland was aggravated by the discriminative land policy against Irish Catholics, which caused great agrarian question of later Irish history (Tout, 1909, p. 477). Without proper measure to solve the land problem, the Irish problem continued into the nineteenth century, which was exposed by the Great Famine (1845-1851) devastated Ireland. The textbooks attributed the famine to the bad policy from London i.e. Corn Laws that was enacted to keep corns produced by foreign countries from being imported into Britain without heavy duties, with the purpose of protecting the domestic corn market. “Peel decided that these duties must be suspended and ultimately abolished. But he was unable to persuade the majority of his colleagues to agree with him, and accordingly resigned office.” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 622) In 1846 Peel came back to the office and repeal the Corn Law, but he “was too late to save Ireland from famine” (Fletcher and Kipling, 1911, p. 234). Tout (1909) discussed this with harsh words:

“England was deeply moved by the tale of Irish suffering, but the government was ignorant and timid, and was afraid of the cry of the Radicals that state interference with the food supply was an intrusion upon the work of the traders and against the doctrines of political economy. They therefore started relief works and paid the workers, but they left the food supply to the ordinary traders, who made disgraceful fortunes by speculating in Indian meal and flour. It was not until 1847 that the ministers were taught by experience that the only way to keep the Irish alive was to distribute food to them.” (Tout, 1909, p. 665)

And this is not only an economic problem, but also a national problem. Finding them unable to survive the famine, a lot of Irish emigrated to America and the large towns of Britain, and they “could not but hand down to their children the fiercest hatred of the English name” (Tout, 1909, p.
Mowat (1926) introduced *Gulliver's Travels* in that it discussed “How deeply he felt the misery to which they had been reduced by the selfish commercial policy of England” (p. 603).

In conclusion, the narratives on the relationship between England and its neighbors in the British Isles were represented by depiction of their struggles throughout history with high level of continuity. In most cases, the authors expressed their sympathies to the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish, for their rebellion and resistance against the English rule were often attributed to the misconduct of the English power. This implicated their sympathy to the advocacy of Scottish and Irish autonomy and suggested the separated identities at expense of the integrity of the British identity.

3. Oversea Empire

The sympathy toward autonomy was also paid to the overseas colonies but with a mixed attitude, thus a less clear tendency. But it is safe to say that the authors found reasons, whether or not they like them, to admit the existence of the loose tie between England and its colonies. Take America as an example. In the cause of imperial ascendency, the independence of America from British rule was a special event. Although it was generally considered not as an element of imperial decline, the textbooks authors paid considerable attention to it. None of them described this event with a celebrating tone. In fact, they expressed their disappointment and considered it as a significant loss of the Empire. However, their narratives had little lament on this issue, but was full of reasoning, albeit with different opinions. All of them mentioned the roots of the American revolution, and except Fletcher and Kipling (1911), they attributed the discontent among the American colonizers to the misgovernment from England. Tout (1909) described how the hatred was escalating step by step:

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“Things grew worse after George III's accession, for the new king abandoned the easy policy of the Whigs, who had left the colonies to themselves, and, guided by George Grenville, insisted upon the strict execution of the commercial laws which gave Britain a monopoly of American trade. Resistance to this policy first excited general discontent among the Americans. Things became worse when, in 1765, Grenville passed his Stamp Act. This was a measure which required that all legal documents and formal acts in America should be written on stamped paper, the proceeds of the duty going to the imperial exchequer, and the tax being imposed by authority of the English parliament. Grenville had no thought of lessening the liberties of America when he brought in the measure. He wished to keep up a permanent army in America, and thought that the Americans ought to bear a part of its cost. As each colony had a separate government of its own, there was no way of passing a law binding upon the whole thirteen, save by bringing it through the parliament at Westminster. This had often been done previously without the colonies raising any objection. But circumstances had now changed, and the weak point in Grenville's policy was that he thought of nothing but the legal aspect of the question. Common sense would have shown him that it was unwise to rouse the suspicion of America at a moment when it was already irritated about other matters.” (Tout, 1909, pp. 576-577)

And the situation got worse when the English statesmen “was foolish enough” to impose new duties in other commodities. For Tout (1909), it was the wishfully thinking on the English part to control its colony with commercial monopoly that stirred the discontent of the Americans. Controlling without granting privilege to the imperial subjects would be certainly unfavorable, and Tout (1909) had little sympathy to London. Although Warner and Marten (1923) seemed to try their best to defend the English statesmen by saying that some of their measures were “not unreasonable” and to split the responsibility to both parties, they admitted that the situation became worse because “the politicians were not statesmen enough to deal with a difficult situation” (p. 502), and they “made the cost in these twenty years [1763-1783] unnecessarily high” (p. 499). Having analyzed the bad policies that led to discontent and other elements eventually to war, Mowat (1926) took the analysis into a different level by saying that

“indeed there are two things equally remark able about them (the thirteen British Colonies): one is that the thirteen Colonies should take up arms against the Mother Country; the other is that they should form one strong federal union. The circumstances of the rebellion are memorable, for they produced, on the one hand, the United States of America, with its ideals of freedom; on the other hand, through the experience gained by the British, a new type of empire was developed, the modern self-governing British Empire.” (Mowat, 1926, p. 517)
The preference of the self-government, growing from the experience of America, served as the general background on their acceptance of the self-government in other colonies, such as Canada. “The lesson of the falling away of America had taught the mother-country the necessity and policy of allowing them to work out their political and economic destinies as they themselves thought best” (Tout, 1909, p. 721). Even Fletcher and Kipling (1911), who seemed to attribute American independent not to the measure from London but to the “foolish notion that all government is oppressive” (p. 167) held by the colonizers, admitted that the outcry of self-government from Canada must be taken into consideration, to prevent secession. They acknowledge the patriotic feelings among the Canadians to the Empire, but they stressed that “there was a danger of such feeling wearing out, and there were… threats that the Canadians would join the United States” (p. 237). The only way to prevent this was to satisfy the Canadians by granting them autonomy to rule. Warner and Marten (1923) stated that the Canadian mode was the solution to the contradictory between the need of self-governing and the need to preserve imperial connection. Tout (1909) asserted that the without direct ruling, loyalty can be maintained through the shared sense of Englishness between the mother land and the colonies. Besides the nominal reign of the Crown and “the continued jurisdiction of the English privy council as the supreme court of appeal from the colonies”, “nothing but common citizenship, common traditions, and common love of English ways bound the colonies with the mother-country and with each other” (p. 722).

The consideration of locality was also given to India by the authors, though India was a different type of imperial subject. The British rule of India was taken as a glorious deed, some affairs of misgoverning without the respect to the indigenous condition in India was mentioned (Tout, 1909; Warner and Marten, 1923). The authors also explained the Indian Mutiny (1857), at least partly, to the “carelessness and mismanagement” of the English administration. Although India was put
under the direct rule from the British government after the Mutiny, the Mutiny “affected the policy of the British” by generating the need for the reforms “in future undertaken with a due regard to native susceptibilities” (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 565). Warner and Marten (1923) even discussed the possible future of India, based on their knowledge on other colonies:

“It is natural that the educated natives in India, who still of course form but a tiny fraction of the population, should, as a result of the education on Western lines provided for them by their British governors, wish to have more self-government. Consequently there has been of recent years a certain unrest in India, as well as some seditious movements. This desire for a greater share in the government has been realized by the British nation”. (Warner and Marten, 1923, p. 698)

In conclusion, the national division between England/Britain and its imperial subjects was also emphasized in the textbooks, whose authors acknowledged the need for local self-government and non-coercive, indirect reign from the mother country. But this does not keep them from celebrating the glory of the Empire, and it was for the sake of the Empire that they suggested a self-government structure. In light of this, their opinion resembled the contemporary British politicians who believed that the implement of Home Rule was the best way to secure the imperial connection. On the other hand, with the emphasis of Englishness, the textbooks were much nationalist than imperialist.

4. The Absence of Imperial Culture and Institution

Another factor that pushes the textbooks away from imperial identity was the absence of a relatively unitary cultural or institutional elements that was depicted as the representation of the superiority of the Empire. The discussion on Christianity was almost confined within the British Isles. The idea of liberty was not decorated as an English gift for the rest of the Empire and the world, but was reduced to a privilege that had to be granted to the imperial subjects for fear of imperial dissolution. The development of Constitution and parliament was discussed continuously in most of the chapters, not as imperial institution, but English institution. Free trade mainly made
England strong. Although the authors discussed the English contribution to the development of India in its economic, administrative and social development, they did not spend a lot of ink on it, neither they took the superiority of the Western civilization for granted. As noted before, they acknowledged the particularity of indigenous culture and suggested that culture and institution from the west were not necessarily suitable for local governing.

What about the internal empire? Linda Colley (1992) stressed Protestantism as a key element of the construction of British nation, and Kumar (2007) suggested that Protestantism functioned as the glue of the Empire. Is the declination of imperial identity accompanied by the declination of Protestantism, as Colley and Kumar argued? The answer gave by this analysis is positive. Protestantism was not used as an element to stress the brotherhood of the three nations in the British Isles. It is not only perceived by the mentioning of “English Reformation” or “English Protestantism”. More importantly, the establishment of English Church as a national church independent from the control of the Pope preceded the Reformation. The shared Catholic belief in England and Scotland in England did not lead to shared practice. For example, when discussing the division between Scotland and England in the fifteenth century, Tout (1909) argued that the Scots followed French practice instead of English style. “A comparison of the Flamboyant churches of Melrose or St. Giles, Edinburgh, with the English churches of the same date, will show how deeply divided against itself English-speaking Britain had become.” (p. 306). The national division continued when the wave of Reformation came to Britain, which was not only indicated by the fact that the Reformation in England was earlier than that in Scotland, but also maintained by the difference between English Reformation and Scottish Reformation. Although Reformation made “Rome the common danger to both countries”, the two movements “strongly contrasted” (Tout, 1909, p. 376) to each other. As Mowat (1926) introduced:
“The Scottish Reformation differed markedly from the English in this: in England the Reform (in its initial stages at least) was imposed by the Crown upon the people; in Scotland, it was imposed by the people upon the Crown. It was, therefore, a more violent movement in Scotland, and resulted in the destruction of nearly all the great cathedrals and abbeys.” (Mowat, 1926, p. 248)

The religious contradiction between England and Scotland was so severe that it fueled the national division between the two, which was easily ignited and exploded into drastic conflict. Even after the union of Crown in 1606, attempts by James I to push religious unity excided deep antagonism and led to “strong suspicions” (Tout, 1909, p. 421), which delayed the full unity between England and Scotland. Furthermore, Protestantism was weak in Scottish Highland where Catholicism was dominant, and Britain was still plagued by religious problem even after the Union of 1707. The authors did not refrain from describing the rebellions in Scotland in eighteenth century.

Conclusion: Imperial Alternative and Nationalist Alternative

The Prime Ministers in the first half of twentieth century expressed more imperial identity than national identity, as the term “English” or “England” rarely appeared in their speeches. The reference to the British nation only increased in the war speeches, probably because the danger of the empire was only felt by political elites through imminent threats. Considering this, the writers of history textbooks were probably more sensitive on the decline of the empire, in that the English nation had already been highlighted as the main protagonists with the highest level of continuity, while the glory of the Empire was mentioned but not unbiasedly celebrated.

What is so special of the structure of historical narratives that makes the textbook express English nationalism? Hypothetically, historical narratives that express imperial nationalism would have these features. First, the conflicts between English and its neighbors could be deemphasized with less mentions, and be reframed into, rather than underlined by religious division. Secondly, the Unions between England, Scotland and Ireland could be described as a happy union after which
the national conflicted was significantly abated. Thirdly, the “civilizing project” of the Empire could be described in more pages, to the extent that it was depicted as an intrinsic feature of the expansion of England. The analysis shows that the narratives from Mowat (1926) indicated the second feature and part of the third. For Union of Scotland in 1707 he emphasized the benefit the Union gave to the Scots without stressing that the union was unpopular in both countries. He even argued that the Union gave the support from Scotland to deal with the Jacobite rising in 1715. Additionally, he used more spaces in discussing the social and economic improvement in India, while did not provide a specific civilizing project through which the English spread their superior culture to the world.

There could be another alternative which is equally nationalist but in a different type. In this type of narrative, the feature of Englishness would be symbolically emphasized and expanded at the expense of Scottishness and Irishness, and therefore Scottish and Irish identities would be downgraded from national level to ethnic level. There would be a strong English culture that assimilated the Scots and the Irish throughout history, based on which the union is legitimized. Additionally, historical events of national conflict would be described in the standpoint of England. Of course, the English history was not described in this way – otherwise it would resemble to the Chinese model analyzed in the last chapter. The next chapter will discuss how the differences between English and Han nationalism are related to the divergence of national building in the second half of the twentieth century.
Chapter 5

British Nationalism and Chinese Nationalism

Both China and Britain in the post-war period were building their nations symbolically out of the empires. The last two chapters show how Han nationalism and English nationalism, as the products of the retreat of imperial identities, were presented in political speeches and history textbooks. A key difference between Han nationalism and English nationalism was their symbolic extension. While Han culture are allegedly expansive and assimilative, the symbolic range of English identity is largely limited and English culture is exclusively belonged to English people. This divergence leads to different understanding on post-war China and post-war Britain, both of which are symbolically constructed in relation to how Han and English people perceive themselves. This chapter compares the speeches made by Chinese and British leaders in terms of their understandings respectively on Britishness and Chinese nationality. It also demonstrates how British and Chinese identity are constructed in the post-war history textbooks.

Speeches of British Leaders after 1945

The post-war period witnessed not only the gradual dissolution of the British Empire but also the beginning of the post-imperial British nation. The shape of the Empire was tangible for several decades after the great war in the name of “Commonwealth” that firstly came into use in late nineteenth century to refer to the connection between Britain and self-ruling white colonies such as Australia. If the threat to the dominance of the Empire before and during the second World War was not tangible enough to produce political English nationalism, the danger of imperial dissolution in the post-war period was so imminent and unstoppable that nationalism came into the political sphere. Did the politicians in this period still hold on to their loyalty to imperial
connection? Or if the “empire” became an inappropriate term, was “Commonwealth” the reincarnation of imperial identity? If not empire, what was the nation that people identify themselves to? By the discourse analysis on the Prime Ministers speeches from 1945 onward, this section demonstrates how imperial identity and national identity were defined and to what extent they were emphasized in political sphere.

Reading through the drafts of the party leaders’ speeches in the annual party conference, one can easily notice that the term “empire” had ceased to exist as an identity indicator. The only exception was those speeches made by Winston Churchill in which one of the “supreme causes” of Conservative Party was “the maintenance of…the unity of the British Empire…and of which our island is still the heart” (Churchill, 1952). Looking at his speeches among those made by others, one may gain the impression that Churchill was still living in the past while everybody else had moved on. In their speeches, whether for the Conservatives or the Labours, “empire” was not only absent but was also avoided. This marked a significant change from the speeches before and during the World War Two where the loyalty to the Empire from Britain and the Dominions was mentioned, if not stressed on, reflecting a British imperial identity recognized by political elites. And this change may have had something to do with the trend in post-war period of decolonization in which the terms “empire” “imperialism” “colonialism” started to carry bad name in political discourse so that they were often used to negatively label aggressive political actions.

A good example was Anthony Eden’s defense of British’s stance during the Suez Crisis (1956) in his speech in the same year. Suez canal was under British control since 1882 as an important business route for major trading countries including Britain. After Britain agreed to remove its troops from this area (1954), Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made several attempts to reduce British influence in this region, which later culminate in nationalizing the Suez Canal. This
action was considered in Britain as a threat of national interest and a challenge to Britain’s economic and military dominance in the region. Eden, though sharing the grievance with his Conservative fellows, showed his hesitation about immediate military aggression. Amidst the escalating situation, twenty-four canal users (except Egypt who did not respond to the invitation) of the Canal were invited to Britain to discuss the issue, and eighteen of them put forward a proposal for negotiation. In his speech, Eden gave credits to himself for being precautious, saying “if you are determined to defend national interests nothing is more foolish than to do so with inadequate forces” (Eden, 1956). He highly valued his diplomatic efforts as an opposite of imperialism and colonialism. Five nations, including Australia, the United States, Persia, Ethiopia and Sweden were chosen as the representatives of the main users of the Suez Canal to deliver the proposal. “Is anybody going to call those colonial powers? I would not. They were in fact representatives of the 18 users of the Canal, whose total traffic forms more than 90 per cent of the total” (Eden, 1956). In response to the suspicion of Britain’s aggressive posture, Eden (1956) said:

“I have seen it suggested that this dispute about the Canal has something to do with colonialism. No comment could be more misleading. Colonialism has nothing to do with the matter one way or the other. We have never disputed Egyptian sovereignty. What is at stake in this dispute is whether the sanctity of contracts has to be respected or not.” (Eden 1956)

Eden continued to suggested that Communist countries were examples of colonist powers, and Britain was by no means one of them. But in the end Britain responded this crisis by invading Egypt along with Israel and France to regain the Western control of the Canal. Under the pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain then called for a ceasefire and the operation failed. This was a major humiliating incident for Britain in post-war era, and marked by some people as the end of the British Empire and Britain’s global political hegemony. Interestingly, twenty-two years later, Harold Wilson, then the leader of Liberal Party and Prime Minister, in his speech made Conservatives aggressive stance (for commentators Eden’s hesitation was either the
disguise or symbol of inability) a target against which he promoted Liberal’s defense policy. “Our whole defence policy has been based on the rejection of unilateral, go-it-alone, do-it-yourself, military adventures, the rejection equally of Suez imperialism” (Wilson, 1968). This argument was made in the context in which Wilson defined the era as post-imperialist. He stressed that the government was responsible in dealing with the problems of “moving forward from imperialism to a modern industrial society”. For “post-imperial Britain”, neither financial imperialism nor political imperialism was option for decision making. “Monetary chauvinism is as out of date for Britain as military chauvinism.” (Wilson, 1968).

The avoidance of imperial label on identity corresponded to the appeal of self-government not only from the imperial subjects but also from London. If the political leaders before and during the second world war tended to use their acceptance of Home Rule as a source of legitimacy of imperial connection, those in the post-war period seemed to be saving the dignity of the lost empire by promoting the principle of self-government. In as early as 1946, Clement Attlee, then Labour leader and Prime Minister, stressed in the annual Labour conference that “a few voices…mumbling the old shibboleths about imperialism” was nothing but “second-hand voices” because “self-government marches on” in the Colonial Empire and the British government was willing to “follow the path of democracy and freedom” (Attlee, 1946). The insistence of self-government was best shown in Britain’s posture in dealing with the decolonization of Rhodesia (later became Zimbabwe) in southern Africa. While Britain planned to deal with decolonization of Rhodesia following the policy of “no independence before majority rule”, the white government in Rhodesia delayed the transition to black majority rule and insisted the legitimacy of white minority rule. In stalemate, the white government issued the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 signifying a break away from the mother country. Racial tension
escalated since 1960s between black nationalist and white colonists. The UDI faced challenges from multiple directions, including the pressure from Britain. James Callaghan, then Liberal leader and Prime Minister, concluded the government’s goal regarding Rhodesia problem by saying that British policy and operation were “based on and motivated by only one British interest - the interest in seeing an orderly and peaceful transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia, with a secure future for both black and white people” (Callaghan, 1977). He then argued that those people who interpreted British policy and action as plot of British imperialism “are chasing shadows”, and “if there are imperialists on the continent of Africa, they are certainly not British. We are seeking honourably to discharge our final obligation, not to recapture the long-lost glories of Empire” (Callaghan, 1977). It appeared that he was insinuating that the white government in Rhodesia were imperialists with nostalgic memories of past glories. To grant majority rule was to pay the “debt of honour” (Callaghan, 1976). In the post-war era, the promotion of self-government was one of the basic principles of the Liberal Party in disposing the relics of British Empire, which was first clearly defined in 1947 annual conference by Clement Attlee: “What is Labour’s policy overseas? We have sought to help all our fellow men towards self-government and towards higher economic standards” (Attlee, 1947). He then developed the framework into “a two-fold policy, the policy of ever giving more and more self-government to the peoples of the Colonial Empire and of developing the resources not only in the interests of the natives themselves, but in the interests of the whole world” (Attlee, 1949). This approach was shared by the Conservatives such as Harold Macmillan, who recognized that “with education and development there has grown a new ambition and a new political consciousness among the African people” (Macmillan, 1960), and these should be taken into consideration in the process of self-government. Not surprisingly, during the Suez Crisis, Anthony Eden used the supportive policies of self-government exculpated Britain from the
charge of colonialism: “If we are to discuss colonialism, is there any country in the world that has ever done so much to bring the people of its great Empire stage by stage to full nationhood?” (Eden, 1956). Self-government was advocated at the expense of imperial identity.

But it would be unreasonable to assumed that the politicians would immediately throw the memory of the Empire away. In the speech to the Conservative fellows, Macmillan (1960) retrospect the glory of Empire:

“Of course a lot of people do not like this change. The Pax Britannica had certainly great advantages. Guaranteed by the British Navy, there was maintained for a hundred years a broad peace between the great powers, in the course of which the world made the greatest jump forward in its history in technical and material progress. Nor should we forget what was done on the moral and spiritual side. If the trader developed the Empire initially, the doctor, the missionary and the administrator were close behind.” (Macmillan, 1960)

But Macmillan (1960) also admitted that the good old time for the British had gone and it was time to move forward and to seize the opportunity of the new era. However, the spirit of liberty was worth to be inherited. In his 1958 speech, Macmillan mentioned “the principles of liberty and respect for the law” as “our common tradition” (Macmillan, 1958) and this spirit was not exclusive to Britain but to other countries. Harold Wilson (1966) also stressed that Britain had “long and not inglorious history of granting freedom to previously dependent territories” and suggested that this tradition should be kept to secure the loose unity between Britain and its former colonies. In this case, the semiotic position self-government was again in the same side of unity and solidarity, just as it was in the speeches made before and during the great war.

However, the unity of which the legitimacy was said to be self-government and liberty was no longer imperial. Wilson made that description to support Britain’s insistence on the “no independence before majority rule” principle with regards to the Rhodesian problem which was an organic part of the process of the transition from Empire to Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth, in the ideal form, would inherit the composition between Britain and its former imperial subjects with only the principle of liberty, which means the former colonies had the freedom to decide whether they wanted to stay under the nominal reign of Crown. If self-government and liberty almost stood in opposition to the loyalty to the Empire, they were the essence of the solidarity among the Commonwealth countries. As Attlee (1948) said, in dealing with former colonies like India, Ceylon, and Burma,

“we have carried out the long-standing policy of our Party in respect to the extension of self-government to our fellow citizens of the British Commonwealth. We have given proof - I think a unique proof - of the fact that a true democracy seeks to build up on terms of equality and the fellowship of free nations linked together by common consent.” (Attlee, 1948)

Macmillan (1957) also acknowledged the growing and unstoppable trend of decolonization and stressed that “the free Commonwealth is our answer to the claims and problems of growing nationalism” (Macmillan, 1957). In the atmosphere of Cold War, he then contrasted the British approach to Communism’s answer to growing nationalism which “can be summed up in a single word-Hungary” (Macmillan, 1957) suggesting the superiority of the liberal connection within the Commonwealth. In his 1958 speech, Macmillan elaborated the ideological basis of the Commonwealth, arguing that instead of loyal feelings to Britain and to the Crown, the sense of partnership between the new Commonwealth countries was the product of

“the traditions of individual rights, the equality of man with man, the independence of the Judiciary from the Government, the right of free speech, and of free Press, to think, to say, and within limits to do what you like - all the things which in the long course of experience spread over hundreds of years we have learned in our own country. And it is because of this link in the Commonwealth that, although some of the new countries in it have different points of view on questions of defence, or the organisation of military strength, they have a complete unity of view about the things that are really worthwhile in life. It is perhaps worth noticing that it is these new, emerging countries which have come from and are still members of the Commonwealth where these traditions are being maintained and respected. They will have difficulties of course. But they will cling, I believe, to the principles of liberty and respect for the law which are our common tradition” (Macmillan, 1958)
In other words, although ideally Commonwealth would cover the territory of former British Empire, essentially its ideological basis did not include the coercive and repressive elements indispensable to imperial relations. Commonwealth was a voluntary coalition of nations. Therefore, although the speakers occasionally mentioned the fraternity among Commonwealth nations, the Commonwealth received little special treatment and it was little more than an international coalition of which Britain was a member. The symbolic status of the Commonwealth was on par with that of European alliance and the Anglo-American alliance. These three coalitions of nations were equally important for protecting Britain’s national interests. Although Eden (1956) said that “for us in Britain the Commonwealth must always come first”, he also stressed the importance of European alliance for Britain. Macmillan (1957) introduced “a triple shield” behind which British national interests were protected: “First, there is the community of purpose and moral influence of our own Commonwealth of Nations. Second, there is the growing solidarity of Western Europe. Third, there is our alliance with the United States.” Without considering the obscure morality that allegedly connected the Commonwealth nations, the Commonwealth resembled to a normal coalition of independent nations, and exemplified a miniature world made up of nation-states, at least those in the “free world”. Hence the Commonwealth was regarded as less a continuation of the Empire than an environment in which Britain played its part as a modern nation-state.

Symbolically, the disappearance of Empire happened simultaneously with the beginning of national building of Britain. This was reflected in frequent mentioning of the term “Britain” as the identity indicators in the Prime Ministers’ speeches in post-war era. Labour and Conservative governments were “British” governments working for the “British” national interest and for the well-being of “British” people. Britain is the “nation”. Attlee (1949) concluded the post-war industrial recovery as “great achievements…brought about by the nation”. Macmillan (1958)
claimed that when dealing with the troubles in the Far East, he “made clear the position of the British Government and people”. In the first annual conference speech after the Labour victory in election, Wilson said the Labour won “because of millions of our fellow countrymen who look to us to provide a strong Britain, a healthy Britain, and to create and maintain a new and just order of society” (Wilson, 1964). Two years before the economic stagnation in the 1970s, Heath in the Conservative annual conference stressed the importance for Britain to prevent protectionist trade war which could only be achieved with the “British interest” as the priority (Heath, 1971). Perhaps the most straightforward indication of the nationalization of British identity was made by Heath (1973): “We are an island race. That is an accident of geography. But it is a fact that has shaped our history.”

What does the national history of Britain look like? In his 1962 speech, Macmillan outlined a history of Britain, not as an imperial power but as an island nation:

“Successive British Monarchs and Governments have been concerned to preserve in changing conditions the liberty and independence of our country. This has involved using all our efforts to prevent the domination of Europe, then coterminous with the civilised world, by a single power. This was our story in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sometimes war was our instrument, sometimes diplomacy. What we could never rely on was our sheer size. In point of numbers we are and always have been a relatively weak country, not to be matched with the giants of Europe in the old days or with the giants of the world now. How presumptuous it must have seemed to the great conquerors and rulers in Europe Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon yes, and even Hitler. This tiny island defying their embattled might. And in a sense they were right. Alone we should have had but little chance and that is why all through history we have sought allies and sought them well. Our great leader, who cheered us on when we had to stand alone, devoted his energies to getting us allies bringing in the Americans, helping to revive France, encouraging the Italians when they freed themselves from the dictator’s grip, welcoming the Soviet alliance when Russia was attacked. This was Sir Winston’s method and well he justified it. We were perhaps never so proud as when we stood alone in 1940. But in the end it was the enemy who stood alone and that is how we won.” (Macmillan, 1962)

The historical Britain in Macmillan’s description was not an Empire with global dominance, but a nation with limited ability and a player in international politics. This was a nationalist
interpretation of history, which implied a shrinkage from imperial identity to national identity. But this does not mean that the politicians humbled Britain in front of their audiences. In fact, as other cases of nationalism, British nationalism includes both the action of boundary drawing, as has been described, and the expression of national pride. The speakers used a variety of elements to distinguish Britain from others. When talking about the external affairs after the great war and Britain’s contribution in the reconstruction of international geopolitical orders, Attlee (1949) that the coalitions of the nations in free world showed that “Britain stands out as the rallying point for all the democracies that are real democracies”. Regarding domestic issues, he stressed that the government was willing to cooperated with other institutions such as Parliament, Trade Unions and national and local voluntary agencies because this “is a market of the British way of life” (Atlee, 1946). Every post-war Prime Minister in his speeches promised that his government would bring Britain vigor and prosperity, and simultaneously praised that British people had made spectacular progress. “The people of Britain under the leadership of the Labour Government did a great work in reconstructing our viable economy and dealing with that difficult problem of the balance of payments” (Attlee, 1951). In Britain’s status in the Commonwealth, Macmillan (1962) said that it “depends not just on sentiment or on goodwill, important as the y are; it depends on the economic strength and prosperity of Britain”. When emphasizing the necessity of developing high-tech industry, Wilson (1964) said it was “humiliating” that overseas industrialists applied great discoveries and inventions which stemmed from Britain while Britain was “paying royalties on a British invention”. Amidst the economic stagnation, Heath (1972) attempted to encourage the British people by a review of the contribution made by Britain to the world:

“This contemporary world of ours is, after all, the world which Britain in the last four hundred years has profoundly influenced. When the cockleshell boats set off with a Drake or a Cabot their new commerce united the whole world. Their settlements sprang up in every continent. The new markets stimulated our science and technology to launch a whole new industrial way of life. The
institutions we adopted - of enterprise and personal freedom and social responsibility - broke open the ancient world of absolute government.

For an offshore island of a few million people, it was and remains a staggering achievement. We did not secure it by staying at home. In fact, there is hardly a great movement of post-renaissance man, be it national statehood, scientific endeavour, economic expansion or worldwide discovery that has not been profoundly marked at every stage by British energy and endeavour and backed by the hard slogging dedication of the British people.” (Heath, 1972)

Heath (1973) also stressed that as “an island race”, Britain had great achievement in the past and would continue to make great achievement in the future, and this “is the fruit of British character, of British determination, of British tolerance, above all it will be the victory of the British nation acting as one”. And this “island race” includes not just the English, but also the Scots and the Welsh, as the speakers included their development as examples of the post-war achievements in the nation. For example, Attlee (1951) said:

“Only a few years ago Wales was in danger of losing an enormous proportion of its population, of becoming derelict. Today Wales is a land of hope and a land of achievement. We have the same thing in Scotland, not only in the industrial belt but in the highlands and islands. You have the same thing in the countryside of Britain.” (Attlee, 1951)

Similarly, when taking about the revival of British tourism, Wilson (1969) cheerily said:

“Last year, nearly five million tourists came to Britain, almost half as many again as the numbers who came to look at Britain in 1964. Still more this year. It is not just the Tower of London, not just the Beefeaters they want to see either, nor even the Kings Road. Nor only London, or even Edinburgh, or Caernarvon. It is Britain.” (Wilson, 1969)

Heath (1973) also mentioned Scotland and Wales regarding the improvement of job market, suggesting an inclusive British identity. But at that time the rivalry between local nationalism and British nationalism had not entered the political agenda in London. It was John Major, the Conservative Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, who expressed his opinion on the union within the island, facing growing appeal of devolution. It will be discussed later.
The era of Margaret Thatcher marked a number of transitions in politics and policy, one of which was the growing of British nationalism. Her speeches continued the dominance of British identity and expressed a stronger sense of national pride. In her speeches at St Lawrence Jewry in 1981, Thatcher (1981) called for buying home-made products to alleviate high unemployment. Perhaps British nationalism reaches its pinnacle in 1982 because of British victory of Falklands War. “The spirit of the South Atlantic was the spirit of Britain at her best. It has been said that we surprised the world, that British patriotism was rediscovered in those spring days.” (Thatcher, 1982) As her predecessors, Thatcher repetitively argued that only her Party (Conservative) could bring about a prosperous and strong Britain whereas the Opposition could not. For example, regarding the role Britain played in the IMF, she said: “unlike the last Government we went not as a nation seeking help but as a country giving help to others - a much more fitting role for Britain” (Thatcher, 1982). Similarly, she suggested that the Trade Union movement backed by the Labour government was unpatriotic because it had little contribution for the development of Britain. The Labour Britain of 1979 “was a Britain in which union leaders held their members and our country to ransom; a Britain that still went to international conferences but was no longer taken seriously; a Britain that was known as the sick man of Europe” (Thatcher, 1985). Only the Conservative Party could bring people “a new Britain, confident, optimistic, sure of its economic strength - a Britain to which foreigners come to admire, to invest, yes and to imitate” (Thatcher, 1987).

A more distinctive feature of British nationalism expressed in Thatcher’s speeches was her emphasis on the traditional morality as the core element of Britishness. In her 1990 speech, she said that the Conservative principles were “freedom, independence, responsibility, choice” and democracy upon which “Britain’s legacy to the world” was built. Britain set the example of Parliamentary politics (Thatcher, 1990). But the emphasis on the British core value was made
mostly in response to the growing advocacy of multiculturalism that came with the increasing plurality of Britain since the 1970s. In her speech at St Lawrence Jewry, she said that what held the British nation together was Christianity:

“Today we live in what is called a ‘plural society’, one in which many different traditions of belief exist alongside each other and also alongside other more recent fashions—those of total disbelief or even nihilism. No doubt we have absorbed much from other systems of belief and contributed much to them. The change, however, has also brought its dilemmas, not least for the legislator.

We now have to concern ourselves not only with how Christians should behave towards each other within the framework of the nation, but with how they should seek to organise the nation's life in a way that is fair and tolerant towards those who do not accept the Christian message. What I am suggesting to you today, however, is that even though there are considerable religious minorities in Britain, most people would accept that we have a national way of life and that it is founded on Biblical principles.” (Thatcher, 1981)

In other speeches, however, Thatcher stressed that Conservative value of “Law and Order” was “the foundation of the British tradition” (1982). This argument was made to support the implementation of National Curriculum for education which was designed to reduce the autonomy of schools and teachers in classroom. She complained that “children who need to be taught to respect traditional moral values are being taught that they have an inalienable right to be gay” (1987). She expected that in the reformed education system would not only enhance pupils’ competitive edge but also teach discipline and moral values (Thatcher, 1982).

However, she rarely mentioned the relationship between the four nations in the United Kingdom in her speeches. It was either because at Thatcher’s time the liberal value had not really threatened the integrity of British identity, or because Thatcher believed that criticizing the violence in Northern Ireland was a sufficient response to the surging Irish trouble. “They are not fighting for freedom. They are fighting for chaos.” (Thatcher, 1979). It was her Conservative successor, John Major, who found it necessary to reinstate the Unionist opinion in response to the plans of the
devolutions of Scotland and Norther Ireland which became more promising when the Conservative Party was weakened and the voice of independence was louder in political sphere. But instead of moral value, he backed the Union with more pragmatic concerns: Constitutional integrity and political stability. More than once he argued or suggested that devolution would bring about Constitutional chaos. Also, he accused Labour’s support for devolution of causing serious conflicts between parliaments and was an “immediate threat to Scotland” (Major, 1994). With his reiteration of the Conservatives’ Unionist stance, it appeared that there was no room for negotiation. On the other hand, Major clarified the Conservative stance by saying that “at the heart of our philosophy is an abiding belief in the right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future” (Major, 1993) and that “we recognise that Scotland and Wales are Nations in their own right. Of course, if they insist, they could ultimately go their own way. We could not properly stop them” (Major, 1994). This type of concessive statements, without exaggeration, is the epitome of British national identity if we put the British case in comparison with the Chinese case.

I will come back to this point later. But a key feature of the British sense of national identity is notable here. While “Britain” is the major identity indicator in the speeches and none of the speakers support the break-up of the United Kingdom, the Prime Ministers never ruled out the option of the independence of Scotland, Northern Ireland and even Wales. Under this background, devolution became a battleground between the two parties, and the Labour defeated the Conservative Party in 1997 general election with a promise of giving Scotland and Wales the devolution referendums. Both referendums came with “yes” answer (in Wales the margin was narrow). The Labour, led by Tony Blair, had move from the left to the central path. Other than its economic policy, the central path could also be shown by the Labour’s approach on the relationship between the union of United Kingdom and local nationalism. On one hand, Blair did not show any
preference to the break-up of the United Kingdom; on the other hand, he argued that only the
devolution with constitutional reform could strengthen the union and stop separatist movement.
“The enemies of the Union are the advocates of the status quo and the separatists alike. We have
defeated the one and we will defeat the other” (Blair, 1998). He suggested that Northern Ireland
deserved a referendum for dissolution and no one other than the Ulsterman should determine the
Northern Ireland’s future. And only with this promise could the violence in Northern Ireland be
stopped (Blair, 1999). Blair and Labour’s approach of transformation of national identity could be
concluded by “the unionists must accept justice and equality for nationalists” (Blair, 2001). Blair
was so confident in this path that he claimed that devolution did not break-up Britain as
Conservatives worried as “the nationalists are running from their separatism” (Blair, 2002) and
nationalism was “in disarray” (Blair, 2003). Blair may agree that the nations in Britain could be
held together by liberal approach and the spirit of reform. And following liberalism Blair
advocated the tolerance to cultural and ethnic diversity in Britain and the celebration of
multiculturalism (Blair, 1999). He believed that strict controls were needed regarding immigration,
but he also expressed a welcoming attitude to immigrants in general. He clarified that immigrants
should have full citizenship, but “citizenship comes with a duty: to give loyalty to our nation, its
values and our way of life” (Blair, 2005). Other than the value of diversity, Blair did not specify
other values that could make up the solidarity among people from different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds.

If Blair’s expectation was met, then Britain would be an example in which multiculturalism and
nationalism was complementary to each other, with the thin liberal values were sufficient to forge
the national identity. Blair’s confidence was shared by Gordon Brown, who before he became the
Labour leader attended a seminar on Britishness and said that two-thirds of British citizens
“identify Britishness as important” and “British people feel more patriotic about their country than almost other European country” (Brown, 2007). He then put forward his theory on British national identity to explain what he observed:

“Indeed a multinational state, with England, Scotland, Wales and now Northern Ireland we are a country united not so much by race or ethnicity but by shared values that have shaped shared institutions. Indeed, when people are asked what they think is important about being British many say our institutions: from the monarchy and the national anthem to the Church of England, the BBC and our sports teams.

But when people are also asked what they admire about Britain, more usually says it is our values: British tolerance, the British belief in liberty and the British sense of fair play. Even before America said in its constitution it was the land of liberty and erected the Statue of Liberty, I think Britain can lay claim to the idea of liberty.” (Brown, 2007)

However, Blair and Brown’s version of Britishness was probably not convincing enough to contain Scottish nationalists. And it seemed that as the Scottish nationalism became more intensive, his confidence began to wane very soon after he took the office as the last Labour Prime Minister. In his three speeches in the Labour annual conferences from 2007 to 2009, he repetitively appealed to keep Britain intact, arguing that only the union can strengthen the nations. “Sharing this same small island, we will meet our environmental, economic and security challenges not by splitting apart but when we as Great Britain stand united together. (Brown, 2007) “Stronger together as England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland we can make our United Kingdom even better” (Brown, 2008). And in 2009 he said the Labour “will never allow separatists or narrow nationalists in Scotland or in Wales to sever the common bonds that bring our country together as one” (2009).

But probably the “common bonds” composed of the thin liberal principles and shared institutions were not attractive to many Scots. Otherwise David Cameron would not be begging Scotland to stay in the United Kingdom before the 2014 referendum for Scottish independence, with tears in his eyes. Good for him, the Scots voted for “stay” and Cameron could say with a relief that “now…England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland…we are one people in one union and
everyone here can be proud of that” (Cameron, 2014). However, the danger of disintegration is still lurking behind, and the unionist central government have few effective and repressive measures to rule out the possibility because they would be a violation to liberal values.

However, liberalism was not the only reason behind the instability of British identity. Among the nations with liberal value and multiculturalism, Britain is quite unique in the level of dispute on national identity. There have been appeals for independence within Canada and America, but not as extended and intensive as those in Britain. In this analysis, I choose another perspective in which the national building of Britain is interpreted as a product of the transition from empire state to nation state. From the post-war era to present days, although fighting verbally against each other, the leaders of Labour Party and Conservative Party have one thing in common in their speeches: their tolerance of the development of non-English nationalism. After the War, more overseas colonies were granted self-government, which facilitate the disintegration of the oversea Empire. And the emphasis on British identity was accompanied by the respect for self-governing of non-English Britons, the latter of which was realized by devolution. The Conservatives tried to apply the brake to stop devolution and then independence referendum, but failed. The danger of the disintegration of inner British Empire still exist. Taking the speeches analyzed in Chapter 4 into consideration, from the twentieth century, the continuity of the tolerant attitude toward the self-rule of non-English people is spectacular. In comparison, the unionist idea, albeit influential, is less continuously presented in the political discourse.

From the political speeches after the second World War two contradictory trends are found: the emergence and emphasis of “Britain” out of the Empire as the major identity indicator, and the continuous generosity of the independent non-English nationality. They could be respectively interpreted as two different possible scenarios in the course of empire’s declination. First, the loss
of most overseas colonies provoked a strong sense of unity among the nations of the inner Empire, which reproduced the British nation; second, the shaky and crumbling overseas Empire not only gave room for nationalism in colonies, but also for local nationalism within the British Isles. In the political speeches discussed above the second scenario was more consistently suggested than the first one. How about the history textbooks? Did they show the coexisting of the two scenarios, or the British identity triumphing over the national division within the isles, or the shrinkage of imperial identity continued into the inner Empire? Chapter 4 shows the third possibility. Is this “tradition” being brought into the post-war era?

**English History Textbooks from 1950 Onward**

From after World War Two to mid-1960s the government continued to have limited and indirect influence on the writing and adoption of history textbooks in secondary schools. But the Ministry of Education published an important pamphlet entitled *Teaching History* containing suggestions and recommendations for the history education in primary and secondary schools. Although there is an impression that English history textbooks are less nationalist and propagandists (Cannadine et al, 2011) compared to those in other countries, the pamphlet stressed the importance of history as a subject in imposing moral values and sense of national heritage to pupils. On the other hand, the author of the pamphlet was not immune to the trend of “new history” placing more emphasis on social and non-political history of England. So presumably if the pamphlet reflected the general condition of history education in post-war England, then the textbooks adopted in this period should reflect the insistence on traditional chronological presentation of English monarchs, wars and constitutional evolution, accompanied by more coverage of social, economic and cultural history. Immediately after the war, many schools were still using pre-war publications, and in secondary school the one from Mowat (1922), having been analyzed in the last chapter, remained
in widely use. It is discussed again in this chapter with the three books written by Sidney Reed Brett, The Tudor Century, 1485-1603 (1962), The Stuart Century, 1603-1714 (1961) and A History of the British Empire and Commonwealth (1959). The materials published by Brett were especially used for O Level history examination taken by an increasing number of secondary modern school students.

From the mid-1960s to 1970s, there was a growing feeling of a nation “in decline” in public, and this social mentality had widespread effect in many realm, and history education was not an exception. For example, Cannadine et al (2011) cited The Times editorial that raised question about history teaching in English schools. “How did the national narrative, which had previously culminated in the nineteenth century era of global greatness, now look when those supremacies seemed to have vanished? What version of English history, if any, might plausibly be put in its place?” (p. 142) With Whitehall still did not have direct influence, there was no definite answers to these questions. But even if they did, it would be unlikely that they would adopt the traditional perspective of history teaching and textbook writing. In “an era of national anxiety and introversion, it no longer seemed either possible or appropriate event to suggest the sort of national history that should be taught” (p. 148). The decision regarding the design of history education was in the hands of the School Council and local educational authorities. The Schools Council History Project (SCHP) became the driving force of the revolution of history education which aimed to swing the teaching from traditional style to ability-centered. Pupils were encouraged to investigate historical questions by analyzing historical sources, rather than reading narratives. Under this circumstances, the narratives in the history books were of less density than they used to be, and continued playing down those about politics and introducing more on social, economic and cultural evolution. The
subjects of this part of analysis were History Alive series written by Peter Moss (1968) and History Through Maps and Diagrams (1965).

Since the inauguration of Margret Thatcher, there was a growing complain about insufficient quality of education in England in and outside the government. Sir Keith Joseph, well-known as the godfather of Thatcherism, was appointed Secretary of State for Education and Science. “He abolished the progressively-inclined and teacher-dominated School Council, urged local authorities to sack incompetent teachers, and made it plain he regarded many teachers as below standard” (Cannadine et al, 2011, p. 184). But his action cost him the confidence from teachers, and he soon regret it. So in the annual conference of Historical Association in 1984, his speech was swinging back and forth between traditionalist and “progressive” teaching, emphasizing both knowledge/skill-centered approach and the approach for the nation’s “island story” being told continuously and chronologically. He stressed the importance of history teaching in cultivating a sense of honor among pupils with “the development of the shared values which are a distinctive feature of British society and culture”, while he also recognized that history education should take the variety of “social, cultural and ethnic backgrounds” (Cannadine et al, 2011, p. 192) among pupils into consideration. The influence of teachers and progressive revolution was also indicated by the process of the design of national curriculum, for which History Working Group was formed by Kenneth Baker, the successor of Joseph. The History Working Group consisted of teachers, teacher trainers and academics. Although they were willing to comply to Baker’s demand that half the curriculum should be designed for British history, they were “not generally in favour of a traditional national narrative” (Cannadine et al, 2011, p. 194). Some members thought it necessary to tell the stories of minorities such as women and black people. There was also a view “that British history should be taught from the perspective of Ireland, Wales and Scotland as well as England”
in an era of growing devolution. “Appalled” by the progressiveness of the proposal, Thatcher insisted on additional public consultation which she hoped would reflect her preference of traditional history. A series of debates were held, and two camps of historical academics were arguing with regards to the choices between skills and content, traditional or progress modes of teaching, and common heritage of British nation or cultural diversity brought about by New Commonwealth immigration, devolution and Irish troubles. This helped the production of the final report of the History Working Group which was then converted to the National Curriculum published in 1991. It was not surprising that, with the strong tendency of progressive teaching and consideration of minority, the history textbooks adopted after the 1990s, while presenting British history chronologically (at least partially), often gave students the opportunity to analyze historical sources on their own, which is expected to produce multiple perspectives to understand national history. For this study, I select James Mason’s A Sense of History published from 1991 to 1995, John D. Clare’s Options in History from 1996 to 1997, Martin Collier’s Thinking History! from 2003 to 2005 and History in Progress from 2009 to 2010.

1. Which Nation, “English” or “British”? 

The assertion of the centrality of England as the protagonist of history was still evident in Brett’s books. He followed the general rule of the usage of “British/Britain” and “English/England” as the major identity indicators. In the narratives, the threshold laid in 1707: in the stories before this time the major player was English/England, while after this time English/England and British/Britain were often used in same texts as if they were interchangeable. For the latter part, the division between English/England and British/Britain is only clear in two circumstances: for domestic issues, the author made clear that the government and parliament before 1707 was “English” while the one after 1707 was “British”; for imperial affairs, the overseas Empire was
called “British Empire” instead of “English Empire”, and after the independence of American
colonies the players overseas ceased to be English but British. Except for these two circumstances,
in the narratives English/England and British/Britain conflated to each other. The colonies could
be both “English” or “British”. For example, in a chapter entitled “Canada Becomes British, 1756-
63”, the author mentioned that “at the beginning of 1757 the condition of English colonies was its
lowest ebb” because the French-Indian alliance was giving the “English” a hard time. But under
the wise strategy of William Pitt, British force gained the edge over French troops, who were also
fighting “English troops” (Brett, 1959, p. 125). Similarly, when English traders settled at Port
Natal in South Africa, they faced dangers because they were isolated by Zulus, and the “little
English colony existed only on the suffrance of Dingaan the Zulu chief”. Therefore, the settlers
petitioned the home government in 1834 and 1835 “to recognize their settlement as constituting a
British colony, and to give to them adequate military protection” (Brett, 1959, p. 289).

English/England conflated with British/Britain even more for domestic affairs.

This pattern of identity indicators could also be found in the textbook written by Mowat (1922).
However, Mowat (1922) differed from Brett (1959, 1962, 1964) in two noteworthy aspects. First,
unlike Brett using “English government” and “British government” respectively before and after
1707, Mowat (1922) used English government throughout the book, so “English” and “British”
conflated to each other in a higher level. For example, when describing the relationship between
Britain and Portugal during Portuguese civil war fought for monarchical succession in the first half
of nineteenth century, Mowat (1922) described the stance of Britain by saying that “the English
Government looked upon itself as in some degree the protector of the young Queen Maria”, and
Canning, then Prime Minister, “maintained a British force in the country”. Inversely, the Duke of
Wellington wanted to withdrawing British troops from Portugal because “the British Government
was nominally neutral” (p. 724). The constant use of “English” regardless of the union between England and Scotland increased the continuity of English/England as the major identity indicator. Secondly, Mowat (1922) connected the identity indicators to readers by terms such as “we” “us” “our” in the texts, which suggested that he was telling the history of students’ nation. The government was “ours”: “In 1812 Great Britain became involved in war with the United States, chiefly owing to the right of search which our Government claimed during the Napoleonic Wars with regard to American ships on the high seas” (p. 965). English literature was “ours”: “The work of Chaucer, however, is not merely among the earliest poetry, written in the English that we can understand, but it is among the most beautiful and charming of all our literature” (p. 144). The English expansive might was “ours”: “Englishmen, too, took more than ever to the sea, to plant a great empire in the West, and from this time our maritime power has steadily increased” (p. 281). Similarly, when George III attempt to strengthen his personal authority, he was “breaking up that system of constitutional government which…is the only safeguard of our liberty” (p. 509). Eventually, “our history of England stops with 1914” (p. 991). This type of wording that obviously assigned Englishness to readers’ personality was absent in Brett’s books where “we” “us” “ours” were only used in cited texts or referred to readers as the researchers of history. This was a significant change, as it implied that history was becoming less nationalist but more academic than before.

The popularity of the series by Peter Moss (1968) shows the continuation of this trend. Similarly, “we” “our” referred to readers mostly as academics. In the rare cases where they implied a relationship of belonging, they did not refer to what happened in the history. For example, sentences like “the Greeks and Romans, Saxons and people of the Middle Ages all played an important part in shaping our lives–our language, our customs, our attitudes and government for
example” (Moss, 1968, p. 5) expressed a much weaker connection between present and the past than the sentence saying the traditions in the past were “ours”. By the same token, when discussing music in Tudor time, the text said “the instruments of the sixteenth century were ancestors of our modern ones” (Moss, 1968, vol. 1, p. 60), which could have been more nationalist if it said “our instrument of the sixteenth century” or “our ancestors” just like Mowat (1922) and other textbooks analyzed in chapter 4. Another feature that weakened the nationalist connotation was the scope of narration that transcended the British Isles. This was corresponding to the idea that British history should be told as a part of European history. Though this idea was not fully realized in this series, Moss (1968) paid more attention to non-British contribution when he described “the voyages of discovery” that opened the new world for Europeans. He gave credits to both English and non-English explorers as previous textbooks did, but he did not give special treatment to English sailors while gave most spaces to Christopher Columbus, Vasco Da Gama and Ferdinand Magellan. The English adventurer, Sir Francis Drake, was presented like one of them. Furthermore, the much less frequency of identity indicators such as “English/England” and “British/Britain” also made the textbooks less nationalist. And this may have something to do with pedagogical change from the focus on political history to social, economic and culture history. For instance, in volume one, there were three chapters where “English/England” or “British/Britain” as identity indicators did not exist, and one of them was about the daily life in Tudor time, one entitled “Clothing and Fashion”, and the other one was about Tudor architecture. This did not mean that the students would not know that these chapters were introducing some parts of English history, but without saying that the students would focus exclusively on the content rather than the identity.

It was doubtless that Moss (1968) wrote a less nationalist series, but it would be erroneous to assume that he did not make any attempts to draw the national boundary in the narratives. The first
volume covered from 1485 to 1714, most of which were pre-union years. It was quite clear that the major protagonists were English people and England. For example, the growing wood trade contributed by English merchants signified that “England had taken the first step on the road that three hundred years later was to make her the greatest and richest trading country in the world” (vol. 1, p. 62). Similarly, “Anne's reign marks the beginning of a new century, and one of the most exciting periods in English history” (vol. 1, p. 118), and “England” was unlike other countries because the monarch’s absolute power was subdued in favor of parliamentary power. The second volume of the series, covering from 1688 to 1789, marked an evident shift in terms of identity indicator from English/England to British/Britain. Interchangeability of these two terms still exists. For example, the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739) broke out because of “a quarrel between England and Spain about the right of Spanish warships to search British ships suspected of illegal trading” (vol. 2, p. 12); “For Britain, the Seven Years War was fought out in North America, in India and at sea, and when it was concluded with the Peace of Paris in 1763, England had gained one of the largest empires in history” (vol. 2, p. 14). However, the level of the conflation between English/England and British/Britain was lower than that in Mowat (1922) and Brett (1959, 1961, 1962), as the history in politics, economy and society was discussed on behalf of Britain. By the nineteenth century Britain had been “the world’s richest and most powerful nation” (Moss, vol. 2, p. 7). The younger William Pitt was considered by many people as “the greatest Prime Minister in the whole of British history” (vol. 2, p. 43); In the discussion of the demographic and economic features, the author presented figures of British population: “the population of Britain which had taken from 1500 to 1700 to rise from two million to about five million, rose to ten million by 1800” (vol. 2, p. 6); the Agricultural Revolution was probably “the most important events which took place in
Britain in the eighteenth century” (vol. 2, p. 46). Furthermore, there was no “English government” but only “British government” in this volume.

In other words, the less frequency in which English/England “invaded” the narratives on the history after the 1707 union suggested a clearer transition from English identity to British identity, a breaking of the continuity of Englishness, and the uprising of Britishness. Perhaps the most significant evidence of the last feature was that the contribution made by the Scots was also mentioned in the history of technology. In the chapter entitled “Transport, Communication and Post”, the author mentioned that Thomas Telford, one of the most famous turnpike engineers in the eighteenth century, was “the son of a Scottish shepherd” (Moss, 1968, vol. 2, p. 76). An improved model of steamer was made by William Symington in Scotland (vol. 2, p. 85). The story of a Scottish merchant was told as an example of the development of banking system (vol. 2, p. 96). In volume three it was more obvious that Britain became the major identity indicator, as there was only one example of interchangeability. This volume placed emphasis on Industrial Revolution, which was demonstrated as the major achievement in modern Britain, not just England. “The story of Britain in the years 1789-1900 is largely the story of the Industrial Revolution—that is, how Britain changed from being an agricultural country to an industrial one.” (Moss, vol. 3, p. 5); it was because of the Industrial Revolution that “Britain became industrialised almost 50 years before any other country” (vol. 3, p. 6); among all the inventions, “it was the steam engine that had made Britain the richest and most powerful country in the world. British trains and British ships carried goods made in British factories all over the world” (vol. 3, p. 10). Specifically, achievements in transportation were made by Britain. “Between 1760 and 1840 almost 6,500km of canal were dug in Britain” (vol. 3, p. 44), and British railways “were by far the busiest in the world” (vol. 3, p. 49). Regarding urbanization, the growth of industrial cities in England, Wales,
and Scotland were mentioned. “The towns were really the creation of the nineteenth century. In 1801 only eight towns in England. Wales and Scotland had more than 50,000 inhabitants (Birmingham, Bristol. Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester). In 1899 there were over 60.” (vol. 3, p. 78).

The uprising of Britishness in the textbooks corresponded to the demand of nation-building after World War Two, as shown by the speeches made by post-war national leaders. However, it would be erroneous to presume that British nationalism was promoted in history textbooks the same way in which English nationalism was promoted in the first half of the twentieth century. Firstly, the degree of empathy expressed by the texts was lowered by the absence of “we” “us” “our” as identity indicators in the narratives. Secondly, the content was still organized in traditional, English-centered way, though substantial part of non-political history was added. Hence the concern of national declination and the demand of multiple-perspective narratives of history were not fully reflected in series by Moss (1968). Thirdly, stories of Ireland (including Northern Ireland) were almost missing after the 1800 union, which made the narratives of Britain unable to reflect the reality of national composition of the United Kingdom in the present day. In other words, even the author was trying to expand the territory of identity from England to Britain, this expansion is largely limited.

Furthermore, though Moss’s series was said to be very popular, it would be biased to assert that it could represent the style of history textbooks in this period. In fact, some contemporary textbooks adopted progressive pedagogy on one hand while reflected traditional interpretation of history on the other. History Through Maps and Diagrams written by L. A. Davey (1965, 1965, 1974) was a good example. With numbers of map and diagrams, less intensive texts and topical contents arranged chronologically, this series reflected progressive pedagogy. However, in terms of the
identity indicators, it resembled to Moss (1922). “English/England” dominated in pre-union periods, and was used interchangeably with British/Britain after the union. Also, the series used “we” “us” “our” to connect the past events to present readers, which made it as nationalist as Mowat (1922) and its contemporary discussed in chapter 4. English nationalism was expressed in a degree close to the traditional educational historiography. For instance, when discussing the emergence of patriotism in Europe, Davey (1965) gave Henry VII credits for “he put an end to lawlessness and disorder and made England a strong, rich and united country”. And at this period in England “men were beginning to be proud of their own country and anxious to make it the greatest in the world”. The author called this feeling Patriotism which was a feeling making “us happy to be Britons and thankful for the freedom that our ancestors won for us” (Davey, 1965, vol. 2, p. 6). With this type of narratives, it was even harder to determine that the history textbooks were moving away uniformly from traditional to progressive and from English-centered to British-defined simultaneously.

It was by the narratives in A Sense of History series written by James Mason (1991. 1992. 1994) following the National Curriculum that a more complete British identity was expressed, though the textbooks still pay more attention to England. England was still mentioned throughout the book series, but so as Scotland, Wales and Ireland albeit in less amount of coverage. The author already described what happened independently in Scotland, Wales and Ireland before Wales fell into the English control, before England and Scotland united, and before Britain and Ireland united. This was largely achieved by several maps of “the British Isles” in volume two. In the chapter about the Norman Conquest, a map entitled “the British Isles in 1066” preceded the main body of texts, though the subject of Norman conquest was only England. In this map, the histories of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland were briefly and respectively described. In other words, Scotland,
Wales and Ireland in were treated more like independent entities and their relationships to England were no longer the prerequisite for them to be included into the historiography. Manson (1991) did this again before he started to described the relationship between England and other three nations, by a map entitled “the British Isles in the twelfth century”, in which brief histories of the four nations by this time were respectively summarized. This strategy of presentation continued being used in volume two. In the chapter entitled “Crown and Government”, Mason (1992) described the political division in the British Isles by saying that “in 1509 Henry VIII became King of England and Wales, and Lord of Ireland. The other kingdom in the British Isles was Scotland which James IV had ruled since 1488” (p. 11). This text was followed by a map of “the British Isles in 1500” in the format like that of the last two. Although in the narratives about the history before the establishment of the United Kingdom, “British/Britain” was less an identity indicator than a geographical name, the inclusion of non-English nations in the texts implied that an identity wider than English was more consistently presented in the historiography than it was in previously discussed textbooks.

So it was not surprising that the discussion on the social change after the eighteenth century would be not only about England, but also Wales, Scotland and Ireland. Also, there was no evident conflation between British/Britain and English/England in the texts. The only ambiguity was the identity of the Irish. It was quite clear that Britain and Ireland were two countries within the United Kingdom, but the Irish was British. For instance, the author attributed the emigration of British people to the overseas colonies to the lack of jobs due to “the huge rise in the population of Britain and Ireland” (Mason, 1994, p. 61). And when the Empire was mentioned, it was also “British Empire” and the author did not clarify if Irish people made contribution to the Empire. Other than this, there was no conflation between identity indicators.
Although Clare (1997, 1997, 1996) did not mention Scotland, Wales and Ireland as frequently as Mason (1991, 1992, 1994) did, his narratives also implied a multi-national identity. In the first volume entitled “the Middle Ages, 1066-1500”, he followed the general rule in which England/English was the major identity indicator and historical events of England were the majority. However, he was not shy of “British/Britain” in the texts. In the chapter about parliament, Clare (1997) was talking about the history of British Parliament. After the enactment of the Bill of Rights (1689), “Britain became a ‘constitutional monarchy’” (p. 51), which was an important part of the growth of “Britain’s democracy” for “over hundreds of years” (p. 50). Also, the victim of Black Death was “Britain” and “British Isles” (p. 73). Also, in the chapter entitled “Everyday Life” in the second volume, Clare (1997) started his discussion with a map in a similar format to those maps in Mason’s series. This part was entitled “the British Isles in 1500”, and the demographic features such as the sizes of the population and the political situation in the four nations were specified respectively. And not surprisingly, the stories of Scots, Welshmen and Irishmen were told in the domestic history after the union and the history of imperial expansion.

But it appeared that the existence of National Curriculum could not guarantee that the textbook writing in the twenty first century would continue moving away from the English-centric tradition to the construction of British identity. The Think History! series contributed by Martin Collier (2003, 2005, 2004) was a case in which the textbooks moved back to the other side of the continuum in terms of identity construction. English/England was the dominant identity indicator in the first volume covering the Middle Ages. Although British/Britain existed as identity indicators as well, the volume was still largely English history as Scotland, Ireland and Wales were only talked about in relations to England, especially English kings who went to war with them. This feature was shared by the second volume covering the period from 1500 to 1750. More
significantly, this volume made a clear division between “internal politics” and “external relations” by putting them into two separate chapters, and the former was about English monarchs and politics while the latter covered the England’s relations with Scotland, Ireland and overseas colonies. This was a major break away from the integration of British identity. Also, in the chapter about social life, only the social life in England was discussed. Furthermore, in volume three which covered the modern and contemporary history, Britain/British became the major identity indicator, but stories of Scotland, Wales and Ireland were missing whereas England were mentioned several times.

But Collier (2009, 2010, 2009) paid more attention to Scotland, Wales and Ireland in his History in Progress published for the 2007 version of Key Stage 3 curriculum. More contents on histories outside the British Isles were included, and British history was demonstrated with world history side by side. But in the first volume, the stories in the British Isles regarding politics and social life were centered in England. Wales and Scotland were only mentioned in a chapter about their relations to England. In the second volume covering the period from 1603 to 1901, some historical issues in Wales, Scotland and Ireland were discussed. This may make this series more “British” than Think History!. However, with more chapters and texts focusing on world history, the level of British nationalism may be lower than other textbooks.

In conclusion, in the educational historiography for the post-imperial Britain, the attempts to construct an integrated British national identity was disrupted by the recurrence of narrow English nationalism. The part of the analysis show that Britishness in the textbooks were further weakened by the narratives on the relations of England to other nations in the British Isles.

2. International Relationship in the British Isles
Chapter 4 demonstrated how the intensive narratives in the textbooks adopted in the first half of the twentieth century focused on the conflictual relationships between English and other nations in the British Isles, which may harden the boundary of English identity against Wales, Scotland and Ireland. Out of intuition, one may compare the amounts of mentioning on struggles and wars in these textbooks and those adopted in post-war era. However, the pedagogical revolution in post-war era led to a drastic simplification of narratives and less coverage on politics, which made the whole bodies of texts incomparable to each other. In other words, comparing the amounts would fall into over-comparison, because the changes in pedagogy and format of history textbooks account for most of the decrease in the narratives, not just in conflictual relationship between English and other nations but also in many other aspects. To avoid this risk, this part of analysis focuses on the historical events that no textbook could omit, not even for the progressive approach of history education. These includes the Union of 1707 between England and Scotland, the Union of Britain and Ireland in 1800, and the rebellions and troubles in Ireland in modern history (from eighteenth century onward). They are too important to be overlook because they were the close history of present national problems in Great Britain.

Mowat (1922) in his narratives on Irish problem implied his sympathy to the division of Ireland and England, though he was not opposed to the Union. He concluded that in the eighteenth century the history of Ireland “was marked by rebellions and bloodshed” (p. 598) and the Irish received discrimination from the English. More importantly, although the discrimination was more economic than political as “the Irish were not treated with direct hostility or severe oppression” (p. 598), the bad government and policies causing and aggravating the Irish problem received substantial critiques from the author. As noted in Chapter 4, the misery out of Irish Famine was emphasized as the result of the economic discrimination against Ireland. Also, after the
confiscation following the oppression of the rebellion, most of the land of the Ireland were passed to Irish Protestants or English adventurers, which led to widespread infertility of the land. Mowat (1922) commented that

“The best of the peasants left the country and went abroad; the rest learned to look upon the law as some horrible engine, made to ruin their souls by the Penal Code and their bodies by Land Acts. They lost the sense of justice, and all respect for law. The English system was ruining public morality, and bringing a state of affairs to pass which would make government impossible. It rendered absolutely impossible in Ireland the formation of that habit of instinctive and unreasoning reverence for law which is one of the most essential conditions of English civilization.” (Mowat, 1922, p. 604)

This comment suggested that the English way of work was not applicable to Irish situation, which implied the social and cultural difference between them, other than the religious difference. Corresponding to this was his acknowledgment of Irish patriotism and the Irish people’s will to manage their own affairs in the discussion about the realization of the first self-government (1782-1800) of Ireland. He also stressed that “Ireland greatly improved financially and industrially during the period of self-government” (Mowat, 1922, p. 609). And that this period of self-government was too short was “unfortunate”. The rebellion of Irish Catholics was responsible, but the author blamed the French Revolution (1789) for bringing “the evil spirit of secret societies and rebellion” (p. 609) to Ireland. He also noticed patriotism expressed in the rebellion. “In 1796 a number of flaming patriots-it must be admitted that they loved their country-planned a great rebellion.” (p. 609). Both sides of ferocity were emphasized in the texts. In the conflicts in 1798, “both sides assailed each other with ferocity, and seldom gave quarter. People surrendered and then were massacred; promises were made and broken. The Irish rebels were no better than the regulars and the Protestant yeomanry; the whole country was demoralized” (Mowat, 1922, p. 610).

With the sympathy to Irish nationalism, the author suggested that the advocacy of Union in 1800 was “a noble summons to partnership and kindly association” because it was not achieved by
method of coercion but by free-will of the Irish people expressed by voting. The “Irish Parliament had to vote for its own abolition, if the union was to take place” (Mowat, 1922, p. 612). Also, an expected advantage brought about by the Union was the stoppage of political and religious repression against the Irish Catholics. Pitt, then Prime Minister, wanted to bring this about. But George III refused such reform, which was responsible for the bleak future of Ireland, let alone that the Union was unpopular among the Irish public. Against this background, the failure of the Home Rule bill of Gladstone in 1886 brought more unrest in Ireland.

“The introduction and rejection of the Home Rule Bill was undoubtedly one of the great crises of British history, one of the 'Imperial occasions' of which Mr. Gladstone often spoke. In the first place the Bill raised hopes of self-government in Ireland; and, whether it was right or wrong originally to encourage these hopes, they were now raised to an intensity which nothing seemed likely ever to quench but their fulfilment.” (Mowat, 1922, p. 915)

The relationship between England and Scotland shows a very different picture to Mowat (1922), although he described their conflicts before the union in many pages of the textbook. Contrast to Irish Union, Scottish Union in 1707 “suited the needs of each country, and has been a lasting success, prospering in mutual comfort and support” (p. 615). The author attributed this success to three factors: the treaty of union did not suggest “inferiority on either side” (p. 616) so that England and Scotland were two equal entities; there was less religious difference between Scotland and England; the social status of Scots was equivalent to that of English people, and they together contributed to domestic social development and imperial projects overseas (p. 616). There were some discontents over the Union in the eighteenth century and there were two major Jacobite rising (1715, 1745). The 1715 rebellion was supported by both Highlanders and Lowlanders, but in 1745 the situation got better because the Lowlanders ceased to support the rebellion because they
had found that England was a splendid market for their cloth; and they had experienced the just and mild rule of the Hanoverian Government. Therefore, while the Highlands, even then almost a foreign country which had learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the days of Montrose and Dundee, rose to the call of Prince Charlie, the Lowlands did not move. The port of Glasgow was growing great on the profits of the American trade, and was typical of the new Scotland, eager, commercial, staunch in the cause of law and order.” (Mowat, 1922, pp. 617-8)

Mowat (1922) also discussed in detail about other aspects of the development in Scotland after the Union. Therefore, Mowat’s perspective in constructing British identity was ramified: he supported the integration between England and Scotland, but he was empathy to Irish nationalism. In other words, if there was a British identity implied in the narrative, it did not include Ireland.

Brett (1962, 1964, 1959) had a similar view. He was positive to the result of the Scottish Union in 1707 by saying that the United Kingdom after the union was stronger in foreign affairs and in economy, “which neither country could have achieved alone” (Brett, 1964, p. 350). And the rebellions in 1715 and 1745 failed because of the lack of Scottish support, which implied that Scots and English had more solidarity after the union. However, Brett was very parsimonious with the benefit of the union. Most of his description about the English-Scottish relationship from the late seventeenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century was about how these two countries either disliked each other or were negotiating for total separation or total union based on rational calculation on the interest they would get. The negotiation was long and dreadful, and eventually “both parties to the union made sacrifices” (p. 350). No religious or racial similarity between these them were mentioned as they were in Mowat (1922) to support the sense of solidarity. But Brett (1962, 1964, 1959) was as negative to English-Irish relations. Though the book about domestic issue stopped at 1714, he mentioned that religious oppression in Ireland against Catholic majority was “the foundation of the hostility which continued between Ireland and England throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on into the twentieth” (Brett, 1964, p. 319), which shows that he was pessimistic on the resolution of Irish troubles.
This omission of Ireland was shared by Moss (1968) after the 1800 union, as noted above. The only historical event in which Irish played a significantly role was when they rebelled against the Commonwealth (1649-1660) and were brutally oppressed by Cromwell. Moss (1968) concluded the conflict and made a pessimistic future on English-Irish relationship:

“As a result of those killed in the wars, those sold as slaves and those who fled abroad, the population of Ireland was reduced to half, and there were sown the seeds of a hatred towards the English that has lasted in some places until the present day.” (Moss, 1968, p. 108)

Moss (1968) also discussed very little about the Scottish Union. He mentioned his union as a part of political reformation unique in British history. By the time of Queen Anne, “England had broken the power of her kings and was ruled largely by a chosen parliament. This itself was made stronger in 1707 when England and Scotland at last became one country, with one king, one parliament and one flag” (vol. 1, p. 118). Without other discussion on cultural or religious connection, it appeared that the union was solely based on political institution. The rebellions in 1715 and 1745 were discussed, but was framed as the wars for the English throne and did not yield any meaning on identity.

Davey (1965) shared similar view of Mowat (1922). After listing out the main content of the Act of Union (1707), he argued that after the union “Scotland prospered rapidly and she has since played a great part in the building up of Great Britain and the British Empire overseas” (Davey, 1965, vol. 2, p. 62), and the union “has proved to be an enormous benefit to both countries” (p. 64). The Jacobite rebellions in 1715 and 1745 were not depicted as an interethnic conflict but struggles over the English throne. And after the fire was put out by English army, “within a few years Scotland began to enjoy a wave of prosperity previously unknown” (Davey, 1974, p. 12). In contrast, the story of Ireland did not have such happy ending. The historical relationship between England and Ireland was filled with struggles on religious dispute, wars, and economic exploitation.
And the 1800 union did not stop but continued the hatred between them. The union was extremely unpopular among Irish people. “Many of the southern counties never favoured the Union for they differed in outlook and religion from the people of Great Britain” (David, 1974, p. 61). The opinion on Home Rule was divided between Ulster and other parts of Ireland. And the author did not lean to either side of opinion.

Mason (1992) started his discussion on the Scottish union with a retrospect of the centuries of disputes and conflicts between Scotland and England. Although after Scottish Reformation the religious division was not as deep as before, the two people disliked each other. “The English still thought of Scots as foreigners, living in a poor and uncivilised land” (p. 117) and they “did not want Scottish merchants to be able to share in their wealth and trade” (p. 118). They started to consider the possibility of union only because they want important things to each other. The English needed the Scottish to support their selection of the next monarch after Queen Anne to prevent the Catholic Stuart to return to the throne, and the Scottish wanted a share of the global market to get rich. The negotiation, however, did not run smooth and they were once “on the brink of a war” (p. 120). But eventually they worked the union out. The union received “immediate unpopularity” in Scotland, and it got better after Scottish found themselves benefiting from trade. Basically, the relationship of England and Scotland was depicted not as a fraternity but as a contract signed after rational calculation.

The Irish Union was not discussed as a separated event, probably because it had little effect in alleviating the Irish trouble. Although Mason (1992) mentioned that Irish also participated in overseas colonization and joined the British Army, he emphasized that for a long time most of Irish population “had lost their rights as citizens and religious freedom” (p. 124). The Irish problem from the eighteenth to twentieth century was discussed in the chapter entitled “Parliament and
Protest”, which signified its conflictual feature. The political and economic inequality against Catholic Irish were demonstrated in detail, which was accompanied by an “Activity” box asking students to read the material and think about “why do you think some Irish people decided that violence rather than the use of Parliament was the way to solve Ireland’s problems with Britain” (Mason, 1994, p. 94). This may show some degree of sympathy to Ireland.

But Mason (1992) at least discussed the advantage brought about by the Scottish Union. Compared to him, Clare (1997) mentioned the union in as if it was insignificant at all aspects. In the chapter entitled “The Jacobites and the ’45 Rebellion”, he said “until the eighteenth century, Scotland was an independent country with its own Parliament. By the Act of Union (1707), however, England and Scotland become a United Kingdom. Many Scots hated the Union” (p. 75), which opened the discussion on the Scottish rebellions in the eighteenth century. The leader of 1745 rebellion, Bonnie Prince Charlie who wanted his father to be king, had invaded England and successfully marched to Derby, a town only 100 miles from London, but stopped going forward and turned his army back. And eventually the rebels were hunted down by English troops. Clare (1997) presented several reasons behind Charlie’s decision, and interestingly, for one of them, he cited the argument from the textbook written by Mason (1992). The cited part goes “The increased prosperity of the Scots helps to explain the failure of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. There was little support and although Charles's army reached Derby in England, it found no support and retreated” (Mason, 1992, cited in Clare, 1997). However, Clare (1997) did not cited the preceding paragraph in Mason (1992) where he mentioned that Scotland became wealthier in the mid-eighteenth century with the help of the union, though he acknowledged that “the Union was not the only cause of this prosperity” (Mason, 1992, p. 122). In other words, though both Mason and Clare attributed the
failure of the 1745 rebellion to economic growth in Scotland, Clare did not trace it back to the benefit brought about by the Union.

Compared to Mason (1994) who at least mentioned Ireland and Irish people occasionally on their participation in the economic growth and the colonial empire, Clare (1997, 1996) discussed them exclusively regarding the political, economic and religious suppression suffered by the Irish people. The Irish Union did not exist in the texts; only the misery of Irish people before and after the union did. In the seventeenth century, Irish Catholics lost their land, they were not allowed to vote or to be MPs, and they “were forbidden to export their cattle, milk and butter to England” (Clare, 1997, p. 74). For the eighteenth century, Irish story was told as part of the dark side of economy development in the title of “the village of the living dead”:

“In Ireland, the population grew as quickly as it did in England, but in Ireland there were no agricultural changes to produce more food for its growing population. By the middle of the nineteenth century, many Irish people were living on nothing but potatoes and milk – and in 1845, the potato crop failed. A potato blight turned the potatoes into a black, foul-smelling mush…with tragic consequence.

The Irish potato crop foiled again in 1846, 1847 and 1848. The British government did little to help. People starved to death. Disease followed famine. A third of the population of Ireland died. Thousands more emigrated to America.” (Clare, 1996, pp. 50-51)

Collier (2005) discussed the Irish and Scottish issues in a chapter with a very suggestive title: The Celtic Fringe: Why were the Scots and Irish Discontented in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century, which defined the mainstream of Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Irish relationship as being conflictual. For Irish part, religious conflicts between England and Ireland in the seventeenth century were discussed. Focusing mostly on England, Collier (2005) did not mention Irish and Ireland in the history of the eighteenth century onward. The Scottish Union was presented in a way similar to Mason (1992) as a product of negotiation, which was added with a discussion on religious factor. But unlike Mowat (1922) who assert that religion was a pushing factor of the
Union, Collier (2005) understood the problem more comprehensively. Although he acknowledged that “the Protestant Lowlanders in Scotland wanted the Union because they hated the Catholic Highlanders more than they hated the English”, he also stressed that “the Catholic Highlanders did not want to be ruled by the Protestant English. A lot of Scots were Presbyterian Protestants and many English people did not support this religion” (p. 189). Also, the Jacobite rebellion in 1745 was described as more influential than it was in other textbooks. Collier (2005):

“Charles and his Highlanders decided to head back to Scotland. What they did not know was that King George II was so worried by the presence of the Jacobite army in Derby that he had packed his bags and was ready to leave London!” (Collier, 2005, p. 194)

Collier (2010) in another history textbook, following the new trend of progressive education, often presented multiple source of materials that yield different opinions on historical issues, from which students could have their own interpretation of history. The Scottish Union was one of the controversial events, therefore Collier (2010) started his presentation under a title with a question mark: Scotland and England: a popular union? And under this title he presented the statements about the pros and cons of the union, and let students identify the reasons for and against the union. But he made clear that the Act of Union in 1707 was disliked by some Scots which was the reason behind the revolts in the eighteenth century. The rebellion of 1745 was “the most serious” one. He did not elaborate the real benefits brought about by the Union, and ended the section with a box briefly describing the devolution of Scotland in 1999. He then ask “what are the benefits (if any) of Scotland having a separate parliament again?”. Also, compared to other textbooks, Collier (2010) spent more ink on the so-called “Highland Clearance”, which could be understood as the enclosure movement in the Scottish Highland following the Scottish defeat in the battle of Culloden (1746). Scottish clan chieftains and English landlords, instead of paying the Scottish clans for the land, attempted to take the land for free. With a chart Collier (2010, p. 159) listed six factors that promote
Highland Clearances, five of which were unfair tactics used by English landlords and clan chieftains to exploit the Highlanders. Beside this chart there was a “Did you Know” box, saying that “after the Battle of Culloden the Scottish they were treated badly by the English. Scottish men were banned from wearing kilts and playing the bagpipes” (p. 159). Following the Highland Clearance was Highland potato famine from 1846 to 1857, which was

“similar to the Irish potato famine of 1846. As in Ireland, many families suffered. Clan chiefs and English landlords did not try to help; instead they continued with the clearances. Many elderly people and children died from starvation. Scottish families were forced to leave the Highlands to look for work in larger towns such as Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Some Scottish families were so desperate they fled to England. As a result of the clearances, large areas of the Scottish Highlands remain uninhabited today.” (Collier, 2010, p. 159)

Collier (2010) then stressed that “the Highland Clearances were one of the worst tragedies in Scottish history” (Collier, 2010, p. 160). As for the Irish problem, he did not mention the Union of 1800, but presented some factors behind Irish emigration to the United State in the eighteenth century, two of which were related to poor economic condition in Ireland: potato famine and unequal distribution of land. On the other hand, he also mentioned that the British government’s measure to alleviate the famine. This was a part of the general style of the textbook writing that was expected to give students the opportunity to learn how to discern different sides of arguments for certain issues, especially for those controversial and subject to debate. Devolution was one of them. In volume three, students were asked to debate on Scottish and Welsh devolution around three choices: devolution, full union, and full independence. Irish trouble in twentieth century was discussed in a chapter about terrorism because of violence involved.

In conclusion, the Scottish Union of 1707 did not gain full support from the history textbooks. Its benefits were discussed in the textbooks to different extents, but the union was described more like a product of bargain between two businessmen than a fruit of the brotherhood. Also, except Mowat
(1922), all the authors discussed above had a more balanced opinion on the union, and with the discussions on the Jacobite Rebellions in 1715 and 1745, they showed certain degree of sympathy of Scottish autonomy. The description on the Scottish Union had a long way to go to construct the Britishness as an “invented tradition”, let alone the Irish Union. Except for those who omitted it, the Irish story, before and after the union, was full of blood and misery. They were depicted as the victims of religious, political, and economic suppression, which implied the authors’ sympathy to Irish autonomy. Furthermore, the historical continuity of British identity was challenged by the sustaining dominance of English identity in the texts.

The analysis above shows important consistency between the leaders’ speeches and the history textbooks with regards to the opinions and definitions of national identity. Both Prime Ministers and textbooks editors made attempts to increase the presence of Britain in semiotic spheres in which they were working. In the speeches, “English” or “England” was almost nonexistence, and the major identity indicators were Britain and British. Correspondingly, the continuity of the discussion on English and England decreased in the history textbooks published after the Second World War, while in some textbooks Britain was presented as a historical entity which the audience should identify themselves with, and the stories in non-English nations in the British Isles were increasingly told. However, neither the speeches nor the textbooks successfully constructed an integrated Britishness. Although Prime Ministers were speaking on behalf of the British nation, they never ruled out the possibility of its disintegration that could be interpreted as the continuance of dissolution of the Empire, and they expressed substantial respects to the will of independence from local nationalist in the name of liberalism. Similarly, although the history textbook editors may think it necessary to move away from the English-centered narratives, a symbolically and historically integrated British nation was not their destination. Probably under the influence of the
advocacy of “four nation history” or other less nationalist frameworks, the writers never considered Britain as a historically given entity because of the emphasis on the ethnic conflicts within Britain, and thus were very critical to the Unions between England and others. Consistent with this was the lack of cultural elements that could have been interpreted as the solidarity force among the nations in the British Isles.

**Speeches of Chinese Leaders from 1949**

The founding of People’s Republic of China is not only a regime change, but also a new phrase of national building of China. Compared to the speeches made by Sun and Chiang in the time of Republic of China that involved the feature of Han nationalism, the communist leaders defined a much clear obligation of national building: to build the China for the people of a variety of ethnic backgrounds. It was the Chinese people whom the communists claimed that they were serving, from, and it was the development of Chinese nation from whom the national pride is raised. Therefore, “China” in the Chinese speeches could be considered as the counterpart of “Britain” that in the British speeches, as both are the name of multi-ethnic nation. In terms of national characteristics, for example, Mao Zedong referred to the whole Chinese nation and suggested why and how Chinese people should/could be proud of the nation. For example, in the epic speech, The Chinese People Have Stood Up, for the first national conference of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), he celebrated the foundation of the new political regime by saying that

“The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments. For over a century our forefathers never stopped waging unyielding struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our great forerunner in the Chinese revolution. Our forefathers enjoined us to carry out their unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly. We have

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closed our ranks and defeated both domestic and foreign oppressors through the People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution, and now we are proclaiming the founding of the People's Republic of China. From now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. Our revolution has won the sympathy and acclaim of the people of all countries. We have friends all over the world.” (Mao, 1951)

And people who were making contributions were making efforts for the whole Chinese nation. In the message of greetings delivered to the “model workers” in industry, agriculture and the army in 1950, Mao (1950) praised them by saying that “You are models for the whole Chinese nation, activists propelling the people's cause forward to triumph in all spheres of endeavor, a firm pillar of support to the People's Government and a bridge linking the People's Government with the masses”. The title of “model workers” at that time was so honorable because of the social atmosphere that encouraged the devotion to the construction of new China. Mao (1956) expressed his eagerness to drag China out of backwardness and poverty. While he stressed the greatness of China and its people, he admitted that “In the past there were reasons for others to look down upon us. For we had little to contribute, steel output registered only several hundred thousand tons a year, and even that was in the hands of the Japanese”. Only by hard working could China become a great country and “radically transform the situation in which for over a century it was backward, despised and wretched”. He also compared China with the richest and one of the most powerful countries in the world, United States of America, by saying that only through hard working can China.

“be able to catch up with the most powerful capitalist country in the world, the United States. The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are favored with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to catch up with the United States. Oughtn't we catch up? Definitely yes. What are your 600 million people doing? Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why can't you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons of steel when
they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 million tons? If you fail to catch up, you
cannot justify yourselves and you will not be so glorious or great. The United States has a history
of only one hundred and eighty years, and sixty years ago it too produced four million tons of steel,
so we are sixty years behind. Given fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake the United
States. This is an obligation. You have such a big population, such a vast territory and such rich
resources, and what is more, you are said to be building socialism, which is supposed to be superior;
if after working at it for fifty or sixty years you are still unable to overtake the United States, what
a sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the
United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, the Chinese
nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a
contribution to mankind.” (Mao, 1956)

It was not difficult to see that Mao usually called the construction of new China “socialist”. There
is an impression that socialism and nationalism should be understood as two different and separate
ideologies, but in the Chinese case the socialist construction also severed the need to strengthen
the Chinese nation, which was an expression of Chinese nationalism. In Maoist era, socialism
became the dominant symbol representing the Chinese nation. The ideology of socialism at that
time was implemented by the so-called “Three Movements of socialist reform” that included
radical transformation of the relationship of production in agriculture, handicraft industry, and
capitalist commerce and industry, after which “socialist construction” could be done by
hardworking Chinese people. The socialist transformation was expected to be completed in the
whole of China. For Mao, only the national success of socialist transformation could legitimize
and secure the unity of new China. However, this radical reform inevitably caused controversy
because of ethnic and cultural diversity of China. “The Three Movements” were successfully and
fully realized in most places, but met obstacle especially in ethnic minority regions. While Sun
and Chiang at their times were struggling to give an ethnic definition of modern China, Mao had
a clear goal, which was nation building, expected to be achieved by a clear method homogenization
through socialist reform. It was not surprising that this ambition on social hegemony would raise
some eyebrows, especially among western scholars. Was this project continuation of Han
nationalism in which ethnic minority were made to learn Han culture (at this case socialism)? It is safe to say that in some places where the minority cultures were strong and independent, socialization caused disagreement or even conflicts between Han communist cadre and ethnic minorities, because Mao himself admitted the existence of Han chauvinism in the process of socialization in minorities regions. But he strongly criticized this phenomenon in some of his speeches by saying that Han chauvinism was not an element of socialism and communism, but reactionary ideology in old society. In 1953 he said:

“In some places the relations between nationalities are far from normal. For Communists this is an intolerable situation. We must go to the root and criticize the Han chauvinist ideas which exist to a serious degree among many Party members and cadres, namely, the reactionary ideas of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, or the ideas characteristic of the Kuomintang, which are manifested in the relations between nationalities. Mistakes in this respect must be corrected at once.” (Mao, 1953)

Han chauvinism was manifested by the idea of Han cultural superiority over minority culture. Mao (1955) listed some examples: “monopolizing the affairs of the minority nationalities, showing no respect for their customs and folk-ways, being self-righteous, looking down on them and saying how backward they are”. This type of idea and attitude must be subdued among local cadres, otherwise the unity of the nation would be compromised. Mao (1955) admitted the existence of local nationalism in some non-Han ethnic groups, but he believed that only the elimination of Han chauvinism could help overcome the threat to national solidarity brought by local nationalism:

“Naturally, narrow nationalism may arise among the minority nationalities, that also is to be opposed. But of the two the chief one, the one to be opposed first, is Han chauvinism. So long as the comrades of Han nationality take the correct attitude and treat the minority nationalities with real fairness, so long as the nationality policy they follow and the stand they take on the question of nationality relations are entirely Marxist and do not reflect bourgeois viewpoints, that is to say, so long as they are free from Han chauvinism, it is comparatively easy to overcome narrow nationalist views among the minority nationalities.” (Mao, 1953)
In the policy level, Mao believed that the socialization projection should be conditioned in ethnic minority areas. Local cadres were expected to take local situation into consideration when they were pushing the socialist reforms. In the speech entitled “Don’t Hit Out in all Directions”, Mao (1950) showed his side of prudence on the social reforms in ethnic minority regions as he said that they “must be handled cautiously. On no account must we be impetuous, for impatience will lead to trouble”. The local cadres should understand the local conditions and avoid premature actions. “No reform is to be instituted unless the conditions are ripe. Neither should any major reform be introduced where only one of the conditions is ripe while the others are not.” (Mao, 1950) This idea was also expressed in a speech in 1955 with regards to the national promotion of agricultural co-operation as a socialist type of relationship of production. Mao (1955) admitted that “In some places, such as Tibet and the Taliang and Hsiaoliang Mountains, where conditions are not yet ripe, co-operatives should not be set up”. This flexibility was also demonstrated in the Constitution. On one hand, the Constitution of China stipulated that China has four forms of ownership of the means of production. On the other hand, it was necessary to recognized that “there are other forms of ownership in our minority nationality areas”, such as primitive communal ownership, slave ownership and feudal ownership. The Constitution acknowledged their existence, and stipulated that the ethnic minority areas “may, in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the ethnic group or ethnic groups in a given area, make regulations on the exercise of autonomy as well as specific regulations” (Mao, 1954). This combination of principle and flexibility was important to make sure that Chinese people of all ethnicities would embrace and support the Constitution of new China.

Similar to the British Unionists who believed that only by giving autonomy to non-English others could the union of Britain be maintained, Mao’s consideration on ethnic diversity and the system
of “ethnical regional autonomy” in China was made as more safer alternatives to the homogenizing model of national building. Only with the respect of ethnic particularity could the relationship between Han and non-Han people hold together as a strong unity, which was “the basic guarantee of the success of our [socialist] career” (Mao, 1957). Also, like the British Unionists’ idea that the unity brings about economic benefits, Mao (1956) emphasized that the unity of the nation could secure the state’s ownership to the natural resources in the minority regions:

“The population of the ethnic minorities in our country is small, but the area they inhabit is large. The Han people comprise 94 per cent of the total population, an overwhelming majority. If they practiced Han chauvinism and discriminated against the minority peoples, that would be very bad. And who has more land? The ethnic minorities, who occupy 50 to 60 per cent of the territory. We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han whose population is large and the ethnic minorities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich, or at least in all probability their resources under the soil are rich.” (Mao, 1956)

However, Mao was much more steadfast in the territorial integrity than the British leaders, as he would not take his sympathy for the autonomy to the level of the acceptance of the possibility of independence like British leaders did. The symbolic and political statuses of unity are always above those of autonomy. And it is autonomy that is conditioned: no matter in what level the ethnic groups enjoys self-rule, the integrity of Chinese territory shall not be challenged in any ways. Nor the sovereignty of territory could be a bargaining chip in any geopolitical negotiation. Moreover, this invincible insistence of national unity was legitimized by the claim and the reality of institutional hegemony. Instead of reducing the solidarity between Han and non-Han to the prediction of more economic benefits, he argued that the socialist transformation, though in some regions may be postponed with the consideration of particular situations, had to continue until completely realized. For example, when talking about Tibet and socialist transformation in 1957, he said:
“As a result of the efforts of the people of all ethnicities over the last few year democratic reforms and socialist transformation have in the main been completed in most of the ethnic minority areas. Democrat reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet because conditions are not ripe. According to the seventeen-article agreement reached between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet the reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided when the great majority of the people of Tibet and the local leading public figures consider it opportune, and one should not be impatient. It has now been decided not to proceed with democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. Whether to proceed with them in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan can only be decided in the light of the situation at the time.” (Mao, 1957)

From this excerpt, we can see that regardless of the consideration of ethnic diversity, socialist homogenization must be carried out in non-Han ethnic regions. Although Mao admit that socialist reform in Tibet would meet obstacles and did not clarify actual date of its realization, he did not renounce the final goal of setting up social democracy and socialism in Tibet. In order to justify the unconditional insistence on institutional homogenization and national unity, Mao made a sharp distinction between socialist reform and Han chauvinism. While Han chauvinism denoted a wholesale prejudice and discrimination against minority culture, institution and custom, socialist reform would only target those that were considered as “backward or bad”. In the case of Tibet, Mao claimed that the social reform in Tibet would only eliminate slavery, which would no doubt supported by the majority of Tibetan people though it would be rejected by the Tibetan ruling classes. With the same logic, the oppression of the revolt in Tibet in 1959 was legitimate as the struggle between the people, let by Communist Party, and the minority in Tibet who supported the old institution. It was the demand of historical progression and the will of the great majority of the people that the backward slave ownership be replaced by the socialist relationship of production and socialist democracy. Those who started the revolt and those who support the independence of Tibet only supported the minority, not the mass of people. The Communist Party, on the contrary, fought for better social institution and welfare for the majority of Tibetans (Mao, 1959).
In light of this, as an ideological symbol, socialism served the building of Chinese nation in two aspects. First, as the core of Han culture in new China, it was expected to as expansive as Confucianism in old time, thus was expected to follow the step of Confucius culture in affecting non-Han minorities, which was the cultural basis of the unity of multi-ethnic China. Second, focusing on economic and political life, Chinese socialism allegedly kept religion and custom mostly intact especially in ethnic minority regions, as long as they would not undermine the socialist construction of China. The duality of socialism can be exemplified by Mao’s comments on Lamaism (the branch of Buddhism in Tibet):

“The old system is not good, [especially] not good for the Tibetan people with less population and wealth. Tibet is a huge place with so few people, now we want it to develop. I’ve spoken to Dalai Lama about this issue. I said that you need to increase your population. I also said that I don’t believed in your Buddhism i.e. Lamaism, but I permitted you to believe. However, could some of your rules be changed a little bit? Out of your 1.2 million people, there are 80000 Lamas and they are unproductive. They neither produce people nor produce goods…Lamas should participate into production, working on agriculture and industry, only by which you can be self-sufficient. Don’t you want to believe in Buddhism? I don’t agree with believing in Buddhism forever, but if you want to, what can we do! We can do nothing. Believe or not to believe in religion depends on personal decision.” (Mao, 1959)

Therefore, what makes Chinese national identity different from British national identity is the existence of a dominant culture that is allegedly accepted by all the ethnic groups. It is the dominant culture and the project to promote this culture that legitimize the unity between Han and non-Han people. On the contrary, the unity between England and Scotland was a deal based on rational calculation of economic benefits. The English leaders did not have the ambition to strengthen the unity by the production of British national culture, neither they had an unyielding insistence of the union. So the devolution in Britain opened more demand of power, especially in Scotland where the advocacy for independence is strongest. If you yielded, you will yield more. The redline of national unity is never drawn. China also have some form of devolution in that the Party gave official positions to non-Han people in minority regions. But the practices of self-government shall
not cross the redline of national unity, because the insistence of national unity is legitimate because ethnic minority also accept the dominant socialist culture and institution.

And the unifying power is not exclusively owned by socialism. After the Maoist era, the cultural authority of socialism declined gradually and significantly, but there constantly are forged cultural elements taking its place. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor as the national leader, was conscious of the dwindling of the impact of socialism as the deepening of reform and opening. In some speeches and writings, he expressed his concern about the danger that because of the liberalization of economy more and more people abandoned their belief in socialism and turn to capitalism. For him, this was dangerous for socialist national pride:

“it is necessary to stress repeatedly that our cadres must keep to the socialist road. It is particularly important to reaffirm this point today. When we study the technology and management experience of capitalist society, we must never allow ourselves to worship capitalist countries, to succumb to corrosive capitalist influences or to lose the national pride and self-confidence of socialist China” (Deng, 1980)

On the other hand, Deng was very confident on switching the cause of the ruling party and the development of China from class struggle to grand modernization project or so-called “Four Modernization” that included modernization of agriculture, modernization of industry, modernization of national defense, and modernization of science and technology. Deng sometimes called them socialist modernization, while the modernization process was by no means exclusively achieved in socialist economy. But socialism was still strong in political discourse until today. In a speech in 1979, Deng suggested that modernization was not contradict to socialism, but would strengthen socialist economy on which national unity was based. “In the course of bringing about the four modernizations, the ethnic groups will achieve an even greater degree of socialist unanimity and their unity will become stronger and stronger.” (Deng, 1979) Modernization and
economic growth, however, took the place of socialism in semantically unifying the nation. “The destiny of our country and people hinges on” (Deng, 1979) the success of Four Modernization.

It is important to distinguish the unity founded on the modernization ideals in China and the unity founded on the mutual benefits in Britain. Both seem to be based on economy growth. However, in the British case there was no clear sign of who is the giver and who is the receiver of the benefit, as the unity may only bring about the uplifting of trade barrier between British nations and let capitalist economy go in its own way, and the growth of economy is not usually expected to be utilized to strengthen the unity symbolically, at least less so than the Chinese case. In China, the modernization project and economy growth is what everybody pursue, including Han and non-Han people. There is no doubt in China that ethnic minorities also want to have a better life. Therefore, Han people with higher level of economic status and resource are expected to help ethnic minorities living in poor regions for raise their standard of living through modernization projects. For example, on the Party’s policy on Tibet, Deng (1987) suggested that Han people migrating to Tibet would not hurt Tibetan’s benefits because they went there to help the economy.

“The population of Tibet is thinly scattered over a vast area. The two million local Tibetans alone are not enough to carry out development, and there is no harm in having some Han people go there to help. If the problems in Tibet and China’s policy towards ethnic minorities are judged on the basis of the number of Han people in Tibet, the conclusion is bound to be wrong. The important things to consider are how the Tibetan people will benefit from their presence and what it will take to stimulate rapid development in the region and bring it into the forefront of the drive for modernization. Marked changes have already taken place in Tibet, and the living standards of the Tibetan people have risen a great deal, but in general the region is still backward and a great deal remains to be done.” (Deng, 1987)

In Deng’s era, modernization and economy growth became the uniting force of the nation. However, it cannot be used to solve the problems of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Hong Kong and Taiwan at that time were much more modernized than Chinese mainland, and socialism was simply unacceptable in these two places. However, Deng was very confident on the prospection of
unification, probably because Han people were the majority in both places. In other words, the blood was enough to connect Hong Kong, Taiwan to the mainland. Deng was so confident that he proposed a “one China, two system” framework to solve Hong Kong and Taiwan problem, in which Hong Kong and Taiwan could keep their capitalism intact and could enjoy high level of self-governing, as long as they insist on the “one China” principle and reject any trend of full independence.

The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 significantly undermined the leader’s confidence on the strength of mainstream culture based on socialism and economy growth. Jiang Zemin, the national leader of third generation, attempted to bring the popularity of national culture into another level by including patriotism, socialism, and collectivism as the main subjects of civil education. He also placed great emphasis on the traditional culture of China as one of the ideological basis of national solidarity. There were many elements in Chinese traditional culture, and Jiang (1999) argued that it was necessary to select those valuable to inherit and to include into historical education. In response to the danger to national solidarity brought about by local nationalism, Jiang (1999) argued that it was important to cultivate the understanding “the long history of the ethnic merging within the Chinese nation and the glorious tradition of bravely maintaining the national independence”. Furthermore, for Jiang, patriotic education was especially important in ethnic minority regions to tackle local independence force. He claimed that only with education of patriotism could secure the unity between ethnic minorities and Han people. Jiang (2000) also for the first time put forth the concept of “national spirit”, saying that the national spirit was the product of the development of Chinese nation over five thousand years. Patriotism is the core, accompanied by the sprits of unity and solidarity, peace loving, industrious and brave, and fortitude and perseverance.
Hu Jintao inherited Jiang’s idea that patriotism is the core of the national spirit of China. “Loving our motherland is the glorious tradition of Chinese nation…we must actively promote patriotism and maintain and strengthen the grand unity of all ethnicities in the country” (Hu, 2011). Because of the role played by traditional culture, the mainstream ideology that are expected to have nationwide influence is a combination of traditional values (or some symbols that are said to be traditional) and the Party’s innovation based on present need of the nation. Furthermore, in the political discourse on national solidarity, Han culture did not exist, leaving the impression that there is no Han culture but only “Chinese culture”. However, the expansiveness of Han culture is handed down and assigned to Chinese culture.

**Chinese History Textbooks from 1950 Onward**

Textbook writing and publishing in China was much more controlled by the state in China. The Ministry of Education is directly responsible for the design of curriculum and the framework of taught history. The curriculums were usually published in great details, containing the purposes of history education, the time arrangement of history class, the bullet points teacher were required to cover in the classroom, and an abstract of the educational content. The last part is equivalent to a summarize of main part of the textbooks, and undoubtedly served as the guideline of history writing. Also, for most time in the second half of the twentieth century, there was only one version of history textbooks on the market-the one written according to the guideline, published by the People’s Educational Press (PEP). Even in recent years there are other textbooks on the market because of educational reforms in different localities and more autonomy of textbook authors, they were still much less popular than the ones published by the PEP, and they also followed the general guideline. Therefore, the analysis on the history textbooks could directly reveal the shape of the identity on which the Chinese state wanted to impose students.
This study compares six history textbooks of imperial (pre-modern) China adopted after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As stipulated by Provisional Middle School Education Plan (Ministry of Education, 1951), the pre-modern history of China was taught in the first grade of junior middle school and the first grade of senior middle school. Chinese History for Junior Middle School (Ye, 1951) was used for junior middle school curriculum and is analyzed in this study.

China started its systematic educational historiography writing under the guideline of The Outline of Middle School History Education (Ministry of Education, 1956). Junior Middle School Textbooks: Chinese History (Wang, Qiu and Chen, 1957[1955]a, 1957[1955]b) were edited and are studied for this period. There was another outline of history education published in 1963, but it was never fully implement due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, the history education was largely paralyzed, and the qualities of the history textbooks were questionable. However, several history textbooks, mostly trial and temporary version, were published in later years of the revolution and adopted in some regions. Trial Textbooks for Middle School in Beijing: Chinese History, Volume One (BEB, 1973) is selected for this research.

After the Cultural Revolution, the state started to regroup and reform the history education. The first post-revolution curriculum for history education was published in 1978, based on which the textbooks in the 1980s was written. This study selects the one published in the late 1980s, titled Junior Middle School Textbooks: Chinese History (Zang & Wang, 1988[1986], 1990[1987]).

In 1992, a new guidance for middle school history education was published (National Education Committee 1992), probably under Jiang Zemin’s promotion of patriotism education to resist the “peaceful evolution” conspired by the West which had been successful in Eastern Europe. According to this outline, four volumes of Chinese History for junior middle School were
published by People’s Education Press (PEP) and adopted nationwide. This study selects the first two volumes and lesson one to four of volume three covering Chinese ancient history (PEP, 1993[1992], 1993, 1994[1993]).

As the educational reform continued into the twenty-first century, the new history curriculum (Ministry of Education 2001) came out, and a new series of history textbooks for junior middle school class was edited and adopted. The first two volumes of Chinese History (PEP, 2006a, 2006b) covered the ancient part, and are analyzed in this study as the last subject.

1. Han, Zhongguo, and Zhonghua

As a textbook used for the interim, the 1951 textbook showed a mixture of old and new terminology in its narratives with regards to the definition of China. Composed out of the old textbooks in different regions in pre-1949 China, it was as Han-centric as those discussed in chapter 3. Within most part of the texts, there was a pattern in which “Han nation” was conflated with Zhongguo. There was also a clear tendency to refer non-Han ethnicities, wherever they resided in the past, as foreigners or aliens. For example, in the description on the strength of Tang Dynasty [618-907], the textbook argued that the Tang Dynasty in its early years was “an acme of Han people’s ruling” so that “today in some foreign places Chinese people were called ‘Tang people’”. And all the wars engaged by the early rulers of Tang Dynasty were against foreign countries such as Turkic, the Tuyuhun tribe, Gaochang, Qiuci, India, Korea and Japan; the loss of territory of the late period of Tang to non-Han ethnicities was the result of the “invasion by aliens”. These aliens were Uyghur, Tibetan and Nanzhao (Ye, 1951, p. 69). Throughout the main body of the narratives, the Chinese nationhood was consistently granted to Han, and all non-Han ethnicities that played their roles in Chinese history were consistently considered as non-Chinese.
On the other hand, there was a subtle change in connotation of *Zhongguo* and *Zhonghua* in the introductory section. As chapter 3 shows, the meaning of *Zhongguo* experienced a shift from the imperial-cultural center to Han nation; *Zhonghua* was firstly used to represent multi-ethnic nationality, but fell into Han-centric meaning in most cases. Both terms in pre-1950 textbooks had Han-centric connotation, though some author made efforts to broaden their definitional range. But in the introductory section of the 1951 textbook, the *Zhongguo* and *Zhonghua* were not only used interchangeably as if they meant the same thing, they also simultaneously refer to the multi-ethnic definition of China. Although in the introduction the author suggested that the development of *Zhonghua* was mainly the development of Han, he defined that “*Zhongguo* is a country consisting of multiple ethnicities” (Ye, 1951, p. 11). The author also argued that the other than Han, “the ethnic minorities”, such as Chinese Muslim, Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, Miao, Yi, and Di etc., also had long history. Han and ethnic minorities were called together as *Zhonghua* nation. Furthermore, the history described in this book was the history of *Zhonghua* nation which reflects the its national characteristics. “*Zhonghua* nation was not only renowned for its diligence, but was also a nation that loves liberty with the tradition of revolution” (Ye, 1951, p. 12). And these characteristics were shared by all the ethnicities including Han and non-Han.

But in 1951 the transformation from Han-centric identity to multiethnic Chinese identity had yet been completed. In the main body of the texts, the narratives not only treat the relationship between Han and non-Han ethnic groups as foreign relations, but also emphasized more on conflictual events, which hardened by line separating “us” and “others”. Following the above-mentioned example, the ethnic relations during Tang Dynasty were featured by the overwhelming military conflicts. The early Tang Dynasty ‘conquered’ (Ye, 1951, p. 69) Turkic, Western Regions, Tibet, Uyghur and Nanzhao. The last three ethnic groups then “invaded” (Ye, 1951, p. 74) China in late
Tang. Also, the textbook had the highest percentage (40.8%) of descriptions leaning to Han against non-Han out of all the mentioning on ethnic conflicts. Terms like “brutal” “invasion” “atrocity” “plundering” were used to describe the aggressive action of non-Han ethnicities, or whether the terms with positive meanings such as “courageous” “heroic” “unyielding” were used to describe the action of Han people.

The multiethnic definition of Zhongguo was crystalized in the first official history curriculum published in 1956. “Student should know that Zhongguo history is the history of all ethnic groups” (Li, 1999, p. 135). However, from the outline of history attached to this curriculum it was noticeable that the Jurchen and Mongolians were still described as foreign invaders. Heroes who resisted bravely against their invasion were “national” heroes, and their sacrifices “fully demonstrated that the spirit of unyieldingness and integrity of national pride among Zhongguo (Chinese) people” (p. 141). On the contrary, regarding Tang Dynasty, the online stated that “teacher should concretely explain that the ethnic groups within the Chinese border had a long history of intimate relationship by addressing the history of Tubo (a Tibetan regime), Huihu (ancestor of Uyghur) and Nanzhao” (p. 139). Corresponding to this controversy was the ambiguity in the 1956 textbook in terms of the ethnic basis of China. Most descriptions did not explicitly grant nationality to non-Han people. Han people undoubtedly were Chinese, but it was not clear whether non-Han population were. Rather than ‘aliens’, the textbook often used ‘ethnicities in frontier land’ or certain geographical directions to label non-Han ethnicities. This type of label did not imply their inclusion to or exclusion from China. It was applied to the narratives on the ethnic relations during Tang Dynasty. The textbook put the wars fought by Tang against Turkic, the countries in the western region (i.e. the Tuyuhun tribe, Gaochang, Qiuci in the 1951 textbook), Korea and Japan in the same section, but this section was named ‘The Wars Fought by Tang
Empire’ (Wang, Qiu & Chen, 1957[1955]b, p. 13) without any national annotation. Similarly, Tang lost part of its sovereignty to Tibet and Nanzhao in its later years, but this was a ‘frontier situation’ rather than encroachment by foreigners. On the other hand, in the narratives on Tang’s communication with other non-Han ethnicities, a subtle division was drawn. The peaceful relationships between Tang and Persia, Arabs, Indian, Japan and Korea was narrated under one section titled ‘Tang Empire Was the Center of Economic and Cultural Communication among Asian Ethnicities’ (Wang, Qiu & Chen, 1957[1955]b, p. 15), and these Asian ethnicities were said to be communicating with China, which suggested that they were not Chinese. The relationship between Tang and Tibet, Uyghur and Nanzhao were put into a different section. However, the narratives in this section did not contain a clear national annotation to their protagonists. As a consequence, this subtle division was less suggestive on the ethnic basis of China. The 1956 textbook seemed to be stuck between the Han-centric history and multi-ethnic history.

But there was a clear change in 1956 textbook compared to the 1951 one. Though both textbooks had a lot of pages talking about wars and struggle between ethnic groups, in 1956 textbook there was a substantial proportion (27.2%) of conflictual events that were transformed into class conflicts. The class conflict symbols diluted the ethnic enmity, as the ethnic struggles between Han and non-Han ethnicities was recast as class struggles between “the ruling class of all ethnicities” and “the people of all ethnicities”. Probably for fear of that this simplistic explanation would distort historical reality, in 1963 there was a new curriculum published, stating that “although ethnic contradiction was generally and essentially class contradiction, [we] cannot simply see all the ethnic contradiction as class contradiction” (Li, 1999, p. 257). But as the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the class-struggle theory became too hard to contain. The 1973 textbook published in the later period of the Cultural Revolution used the class-struggle theory to explain 62 out of 99
interethnic conflict, which means that the ethnic enmity was diluted in the narratives to a greater extent.

The 1973 textbook also shifted the gear completely to the ethnic plurality. Firstly, China was no longer confined by singular Han ethnicity but instead was defined as a ‘unified multi-ethnic country’ (BEB 1973: 156). Secondly, non-Han ethnic groups were no longer ‘aliens’, but ethnic minorities that were members of ‘our country’. Mongolians and Jurchen were no longer exceptions. The textbook also divided domestic affairs to foreign affairs, and put the content on non-Han ethnic groups that were assigned Chinese nationality to the chapters whose titles usually had terms like “ethnic” or “ethnic minority”. On Tang Dynasty, the peaceful and conflictual relationships of Tang and Turkic, Western Region, Tibet, Uyghur and Nanzhao were discussed together under the third section titled ‘The Development of Ethnic Minority Areas’ (BEB, 1973, p. 93), while those of Tang and Korea, India and Japan were elaborated in the fourth section titled ‘The Relationship between Tang and Other Countries in Asia’ (BEB, 1973, p. 97). Also, the texts made explicitly that those ethnicities in the third section were communicating not with China but with Han people and Tang Dynasty, while those in the fourth section were communicating not only with Tang but with Zhongguo. The organization of the contents about non-Han ethnicities was carried forward to the latter textbooks. In these textbooks, the line separating ‘us’ from ‘others’ was no longer drawn along the ethnic boundary of Han/non-Han, but approximately along the current territorial boundary of the PRC (Zang & Wang, 1988[1986], 1990[1987]; PEP, 1993[1992], 1993, 1994[1993], 2006a, 2006b).

Corresponding to the clear multi-ethnic definition of China, from the 1973 textbook onward only a minority of conflictual events that were described in Han standpoint. Take the wars between the Southern Song Dynasty [1127-1179] and Jin Dynasty [1115-1234]. The 1951 textbook elaborated
the conflicts from the standpoint of Han, depicting Jurchen (the ethnicity that founded Jin Dynasty) as the ‘looting’ invaders of China, while the resisting power from Song, such as the armies led by Yue Fei and Han Shizhong were “patriotic” and supported by the people. It also labelled the officials and emperors of Song who shirked military confrontation against Jurchen as the “capitulators” (Ye, 1951, p. 89-90). The 1955 textbook started to describe the conflicts between Jurchen and Han partly as class struggles. It was the ruling class among Jurchen, instead of all Jurchen, who committed war crime in the northern China, and were the enemy of the people. But the textbook still contains a large proportion of Han-centric description. “Yue Fei’s persistence in fighting against Jin was in line with the interest of the majority of the people. He was respected by the people forever” (Wang, Qiu & Chen, 1957[1955]b, p. 23). This was written in accordance to the 1956 curriculum and outline discussed above.

Significant change happened in the 1973 textbook. With the dominant class-struggle theory, the description with Han standpoint substantially decreased. Who destroyed the agricultural production in northern China were Jin rulers, rather than regular Jurchen people. And “the people in all ethnicities…actively resisted the brutal exploitation by Jin ruler, and attacked the ruling by Jin nobles” (BEB, 1973, p. 122). Yue Fei was fighting against the Jin ruler, and the interethnic wars during the Song Dynasty were concluded as the wars between the rulers of different ethnic groups. Interestingly, the gradual relinquishment of class-struggle theory from the 1980s textbook onward did not lead to the revival of Han-centric descriptions. The mentioning of interethnic conflicts with Han standpoint continued decreasing since then. Furthermore, the amount of mentioning of interethnic conflicts had significantly reduced from 1980s, which corresponded to the enlargement of the proportion of peaceful communication.

2. What Unifies of China?
The understatement of ethnic conflicts removed the symbolic obstacles in the way to the symbolic construction of the integrated Chinese identity. More importantly, there was a continuous attempt since the 1950s to reconstruct conflictual elements into the unifying force of solidarity among different ethnic groups. These elements included class oppression, ethnic oppression, and foreign invasion. The 1956 curriculum did not mention “ethnic oppression” probably because of the increasing dominance of class-struggle theory which was used to reinterpret ethnic conflict into class conflict. As noted above, as early as 1963, educators had argued that not all the events of ethnic conflict could be explained by class-struggle theory. The waning dominance of class struggle theory after the Cultural Revolution allowed the designers of curriculum to realize this idea. However, that did not mean that they would allow the description on ethnic conflicts to compromise interethnic unity. Ethnic oppression was as a driving force of national solidarity as the other two, because “people in all ethnic groups are opposed to mutual oppression” (Li, 1999, p. 329; p. 387; p. 449; p. 541) as stressed in the curriculums of 1978, 1980, 1986 and 1990. From 1978 to 1990, all the three elements were defined by the curriculums as part of the reasons why the people in all ethnic groups were (and should be) unified together as a nation. The typical statement was that “people of all ethnic groups helped each other, developed together, resisted class oppression and ethnic oppression together, and defended foreign invasion side by side”. Interestingly, though educational historians knew that some interethnic conflicts should be analyzed independently to class-struggle theory, defining ethnic oppression as a unifying force was itself an application of class-struggle theory: the people of all ethnic groups reject the wars and conflicts waged by their leaders. Probably because of this logical contradiction, in 1988 and 1992 curriculums the statement of “the people in all ethnic groups are opposed to mutual oppression” was replaced by “all ethnic groups…maintained national solidarity” (Li, 1999, p. 511;
p. 657). And the 1992 curriculum further reduce the logical contradiction by removing “ethnic oppression” as one of the unifying force. However, neither “ethnic oppression” was said to influential enough to undermine the integrity of Chinese nation according to this curriculum. But how to reduce the symbolic influence of the events on ethnic conflicts, without reinterpreting them as class struggle? There was only one solution left: significant reduction of the description of ethnic conflicts. This explained why, in the pedagogical reform in 1990s in the history education which reflected in the textbook by the reduction of thickness of narratives, the intensity of the description of wars and conflicts between ethnicities was significantly decreased, which was accompanied by the continuing decrease, albeit not as significant, of the number of events mentioned in the texts.

Correspondingly, the proportion of the mentioning on the peaceful communication between Han and non-Han ethnic groups increased in newer textbooks, so much so that economic, technological and cultural communication was said to be the mainstream of the history of interethnic relationships. However, this was less the case in the 1951 and 1956 textbooks. Among all the post-1950 textbooks, the 1951 one had the lowest percentage (21.2%) of the mentioning on peaceful communication out of all the mentioning on ethnic relationship. For example, in the chapter on Tang Dynasty, there was no mentioning on economic or cultural communication between Han and non-Han ethnicities. The narratives on the same topic in the 1955 textbook contained more peaceful economic and cultural communications between Han and Tibet, Uyghur and Nanzhao. ‘Srongtsen Gampo [the leader of Tibet] loved the advanced culture of Tang…He sent children of nobility to study in Tang, and employed Tang’s intellectuals to manage paperwork’. As Tang’s craftsmen brought the techniques of making wine, paper and ink, the Tang Dynasty ‘was an important period of cultural communication between Han and Tibet’. Also, ‘Uyghur used horses and furs to exchange for Tang’s silk and tea’, and ‘thousands of Nanzhao people were studying in
Chengdu [a city of Sichuan, China]’ (Wang, Qiu & Chen 1957[1955]: 18-20). However, the textbook did not ignore that they had conflict with Tang afterwards, and the relationship between Tang and Turkic remained conflictual, and the textbook had even more elaborative description on Tang-Turkic wars than the 1951 textbook did. Those narratives on other dynastic periods were also dominated by conflicts.

The major shift happened in the 1973 textbook as the conflicts between Tang and Turkic were significantly downplayed and replaced by economic and technological communication. ‘Tang and Turkic had lots of wars against each other, but they had more economic contacts to each other…Turkic people acquired seeds of grain, farm implements and iron, which had promotive function for them to develop agricultural production’ (BEB 1973: 94). The historical significance of the conflicts between Tang and Tibet, Nanzhao was also downplayed. ‘Tibet and Tang had conflicts many times at the frontier, but both sides had need of peace, and they formed alliance many times’ (BEB 1973: 95). The textbook also acknowledged that there were both warring time and peaceful time between Tang and Nanzhao, but it only elaborated the friendly side of the relations. The pacification of ethnic relations between Tang and other ethnic groups continued after 1980s. In the 1980s textbooks, the description on Tang-Turkic conflicts was significantly reduced. The conflictual events between Tang and Tibet, Nanzhao were totally not mentioned. The relations between them appeared exclusively peaceful so much so that Tang and Tibet were ‘a harmonies unified family’ (Zang & Wang 1990[1987]: 130). The 1990s and 2006 textbooks confined conflictual narratives to the events happened between Tang and Turkic, and emphasized economic and cultural communication between Han and non-Han ethnicities. The emphasis on peaceful relationships in 1973, 1980s, 1990s and 2006 textbooks supports the inclusive ethnic basis of China and the political-territorial delimitation of the nation.
But what was the feature of the peaceful communication among the ethnic groups in history? Who were the major contributors of cultural, economic, and technological dissemination in historical China? Chapter 3 has shown that the pre-1950 textbooks, with clear trace of Han nationalism, attributed cultural diffusion to Han people, to the extent that aside from wars and conflicts, non-Han people being assimilated into Han was another trend in Chinese history. This theory was evidently rejected by the Chinese officials who were very sensitive to any suspicion of “Han chauvinism”. Therefore, the 1956 curriculum emphasized that in the history education “students should know that Chinese history is the history of the people of all the ethnic groups. All the ethnicities had long histories, and they made great contribution to the development of the motherland’s economy and culture” (Li, 1999, p. 135). The curriculums published in and after 1978 unanimously defined the approach of the history education in terms of ethnic relationships: “our nation was a unified, multiethnic nation with a Han majority. All ethnic groups make contribution to the motherland. Apart from the history of Han, Chinese History should also describe the histories of ethnic minorities, which can reflect that motherland’s history is created by all ethnic groups”. However, this does not mean that the histories of non-Han ethnicities should be described separately, otherwise it would resemble to the advocated “four nations’ history” in British case which would be at odds with the mainstream understanding of China as a unified nation in most periods of history and in present (and the contemporary unity is legitimized symbolically by the unity in the past). In other words, the textbooks were expected to achieve a balance between the emphasis on the unity of Chinese nation thus Chinese culture and the consideration of cultural diversity of various ethnic groups.

Respect of ethnic cultural diversity was shown by the increased description on cultural particularity of non-Han ethnicities. This type of narratives rarely existed in the 1951 textbook. Starting with
the 1955 version, however, the textbooks started to present the characteristics of non-Han ethnic groups so long as they were protagonists in certain historical periods. When discussing the Tang period, for example, the 1951 textbook merely mentioned Tibet as a powerful enemy threatening the Tang Dynasty, while the 1955 textbook elaborated on many characteristics of Tibetan people. ‘Some of them had farming lifestyles, cultivating highland barley, wheat and buckwheat; some of them had nomadic lifestyles…Tibetans believed in Buddhism and [they] created their own written language’ (Wang, Qiu & Chen 1957[1955]: 18). The later textbooks followed the opinion that non-Han protagonists should be treated as historical entities with their own stories, which significantly raised their cultural statuses in the narratives.

However, in Chinese case, the consideration of ethnic diversity is not allowed to jeopardize the integrity of Chinese nation, which means the diversity should be contained in a unified Chinese nationality. How is this could be done? The key point here is to make sense of the unity, or unification of Han and non-Han ethnicities that produced a Chinese nation. Apart from the common enemies they faced, the textbooks also attempted to use ethnocultural symbols to support the interethnic brotherhood. Supposedly, when the authors are looking for certain items in the tool kit of ethnocultural symbols, they would inevitably choose those that were believed to be superior, and more importantly, expansive or influential, because only with these features could these cultural elements represent the shared ethnocultural characteristics of different ethnic groups in China. For the sake of unity, Han culture was picked.

The analysis on the description of the events around the topic of ethnic merging shows that Han people were constantly regarded as the main contributors of the culture in communication. Non-Han ethnic groups learned much more from Han people than Han people learned from non-Han ethnicities. The textbooks published after the 1978 curriculum had more mentioning on the events
that Han people diffused their culture to non-Han ethnic groups than the 1973 textbook. The cultural dominance of the Han was exemplified by the textbooks’ emphasis on the reforms of Emperor Xiaowen of Northern Wei Dynasty [368-534, founded by the Xianbei ethnic group]. These reforms were equivalent to Xianbei people learning Han culture, which was evaluated as a milestone of ethnic merging. All the textbooks recognized that the Xianbei were an active students of Han culture. But a closer look at the description of this event indicates subtle differences in different textbooks.

The 1951 textbook attributed the reforms only to a personal trait of the emperor. ‘Emperor Xiaowen was infatuated with Han culture, [so] he decided to move his capital city from Pingcheng (in Datong, Shanxi Province) to Luoyang in Henan and used his political power to promote the Hanification’ (Ye 1951: 55). Additionally, the narrative in the 1951 textbook only included a plain description of the reforms, and did not make any arguments about their historical significance or whether Han culture was studied because it was more advanced. The description of the reforms in the 1955 textbook were more Han-centric than in the 1951 book. First, besides the changes included in the 1951 version, the 1955 textbook discussed the adoption of the Han style of government. Second, it claimed that moving the capital to Luoyang had practical and rational reasoning because ‘[T]he new location of the capital made it ‘easier to accept Han people’s culture’ (Wang, Qiu & Chen 1957[1955]: 76). The teleological narrative suggested that Han culture was more suitable for efficient governing. The 1973 textbook explicitly indicated non-Han inferiority and Han superiority. Moving the capital to Luoyang was described as being for the purpose of ‘further strengthening the government and accepting the advanced culture of the Han’. These measures of Hanification in customs and politics could ‘change the backward status of the Xianbei’ (BEB 1973: 77). In these textbooks, only the ruling class of the Xianbei learned Han culture.
However, the textbooks after the 1980s depicted the reforms as the Hanification of the whole Xianbei population. In fact, all the stories of ethnic merging in these textbooks transcended class divisions. It was said that the people of various ethnicities in northern China changed from a nomadic lifestyle to an agrarian one. The 1980s textbook argued that the reforms were implemented as a part of ethnic merging. The acceptance of ‘the advanced Han culture’ and the political system of the Han ‘accelerated the feudalization of each ethnic minority and promoted the grand merging of the ethnic groups in the north’ (Zang & Wang 1988[1986]: 102-3). The 1990s textbook made the prevalence of Han culture among the Xianbei population more evident. It told a story about Emperor Xiaowen being upset about some women in Luoyang still wearing clothes in the Xianbei style. He blamed his minister for not doing his duty, but his minister defended himself by saying ‘there were no longer many people wearing Xianbei clothes’ (PEP 1993[1992]: 156). This story demonstrated that after the reform the normal Xianbei people’s lifestyle was Hanified. The 2006 textbook further argued that the reforms changed the social atmosphere with a ‘greater development of Han culture’ (PEP 2006: 116).

The sense of Han superiority in the post-1950 textbooks was certainly not a new thing. As shown in chapter 3, the pre-1950 textbooks expressed Han nationalism with the emphasis on the expansiveness of Han culture, and the authors were not shy of the seemingly aggressive term “assimilation”. However, this term was unacceptable for the authors after 1950s because it suggested that the cultural status of non-Han people was lost in the communication among the ethnic groups. Therefore, the authors found another term, “ethnic merging” as the less aggressive alternative. This term firstly appeared in the 1932 history curriculum, but it was not until in the 1956 textbook that it was constantly and frequently used to indicate the interethnic communication, and it was not until in the 1978 curriculum that it was consider as an important feature of most of
the historical periods of Chinese history. “ethnic merging” in the textbooks became the major pattern of ethnic relationship in Chinese history. Apart from the mildness, what makes “ethnic merging” different from “assimilation”?

Firstly, the narratives of ethnic merging gave room for cultural particularity of non-Han ethnicities, which implied that non-Han people in some cases were teachers rather than students of culture. ‘Merging’ implied mutual communication in which both Han and non-Han ethnicities participated in the building of Chinese national culture. Therefore, there comes the Chinese culture transcending both Han and non-Han ethnic cultures, and Chinese national identity encompassing ethnic identities of Han and non-Han.

Secondly and more importantly, while Han people’s contribution was still emphasized over others, the meta-theory of “ethnic merging” could significant reduce the impression of cultural aggressiveness of Han. Terms like “assimilation” or “Hannification” would fail to do so. This allows Han culture to function as the representative of Chinese culture and a unifying force bringing cultural solidarity among different ethnic groups, without raising the alert of Han chauvinism. Through this process, “Han nationalism” with the belief of expansive Han culture is forged into Chinese nationalism which is based on but transcends Han culture.

With regards to the construction of Chinese nationhood, the history textbooks are highly correspondent with the speeches gave by the national leaders. In both symbolic spheres, the multiethnic definition of the Chinese nation crystalized, and the concept of China is the only “nation” that legitimately exists and Han and non-Han groups are ethnicities that belong to the nation. The integrity of China is not only expressed politically in the leaders’ speeches, but is also justified and legitimized in the form of written collective memory. The multiethnicity of China at present finds its root in the official history in which Han and non-Han players are described as
heading to the same direction of the final formation of multiethnic China. The insistence on the multiethnic depiction of historical China is in line with the leaders’ steadfast belief in territorial integrity as the core interest of China.

The second aspect of the correspondence lies in the description on interethnic relationships. In terms of the obstacles lying in the way of socialization project in ethnic minority regions, such as Tibet, Mao likes to describe the local unrest as the manifestation of class struggle. Correspondingly, during the Maoist era, the paradigm of class struggle dominated the textbooks’ explanation of interethnic conflicts in Chinese history. Another interesting point of correspondence is the underplay of interethnic struggle in both symbolic spheres. In the speeches made by Deng, Jiang, Hu and Xi, this is one of the least popular topics, though interethnic conflicts are happening in post-Mao era. The amount of the description of interethnic conflict in history also substantially decreased in the history textbooks published in the same period. It appears that the discontents from ethnic minorities and the unpleasantness between Han and non-Han peoples are unfavorable issues in both symbolic spheres. As for the peaceful relationship between the ethnic groups, there is an evident correlation between the history constructed by textbook editors and the present ideas expressed the national leaders. In both contexts, there are cultural elements that serve as the glues that connect multiple ethnic groups together. In Maoist era, the paradigm of class struggle theory is said to help Han and non-Han people find their common class enemies both in history and in the present age. In the post-Mao era, the belief in historical progression, especially in production capability, legitimize the solidarity of the nation in both symbolic spheres. In the historiography, it is represented by the grand theory of ethnic merging in which non-Han people are said to continuously learnt advanced culture from Han. In the speeches, it is represented by the discourses about modernization and economic growth as the major goals of China. Han is the major
contributor of cultural transmission both in the past and in the present. Interestingly, the mentioning of Han people is minimalized in both contexts, which is probably a gesture to avoid arousing the suspicion of Han nationalism that would be symbolically detrimental to the transcendence of China.

**Conclusion**

The data analysis in this chapter can be used to explain why Britishness is much weaker than Chinese nationality. The British leaders, regardless of their positions on the Union, were largely sympathetic to the will of self-government in previous English colonies and other nations in the British Isles. The analysis on the history textbooks adopted in England suggest a switch from English-centered view to a broadened horizon to look at history. But this expansion of the perspective does not lead to the expansion of identity from English to British. A unifying cultural body is absent to justify the Britishness, and most of the writers had limited faith to the Union. The understanding on the history of interethnic conflicts justifies this lack of confidence. Furthermore, the symbolic segregation of England and others, drawn directly by the emphasis of interethnic discontent and indirectly by the lack of unifying dominant culture, is logically consistent to multicultural understanding of British identity.

Chinese case shows the opposite. The understanding of Han culture as an assimilative power showed in pre-1949 textbooks is carried through the regime change. In Maoist era, the Han culture, or more precisely, the culture of Han people, was defined as socialist transformation justified by Socialist belief. During Deng Xiaoping’s rule, the influence of Socialism is waning and the dominant culture became the pursuit of modernization and economy growth. Jiang Zemin, for fear of the lack of persuasive power of economy growth as the dominant culture, added Patriotism and Chinese traditional culture into the list. Hu Jintao generally follows Jiang’s path, and Xi Jinping
continued the innovation of dominant culture with the combination between selected elements in traditional culture and some new items for present needs. The history textbooks after 1951 had moved away from the radical Han assimilationism, but simultaneously inherit the understanding that the dominant culture is expansive and influential across the ethnic boundary. This is justified in the textbooks with the grand theory of “ethnic merging”, in which the culturally assimilative power of Han is recognized, but the particularity of Han culture is less emphasized. This strategy makes it easy to replace “Han culture” by “Chinese culture” as the dominant force to strengthen the solidarity of Han and non-Han people, hence a stronger Chinese nationality. As a result, although in most circumstances the dominant culture is possessed and disseminated by Han, without being labeled as “Han culture” its content is fluid and dynamic. However, no matter how the content of culture is changing, Han people constantly occupied the cultural status higher than others, and they always have the responsibility to transmit the dominant culture to the others.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

There is a custom in nationalism study in which homogeneous elements in modern nation is emphasized in theoretical thinking and empirical research. It is based on the understanding that nation building must be accompanied by a sense of community, whether it exists before nationhood emerges or it is “imagined” or deliberately constructed in different aspects of modernization of a nation. Consequently, the diversity within a nation is marginalized in the studies of nationalism, or even considered as an abnormality in modern nations. In reality, however, most nations in the world do not have absolute ethnocultural homogeneity. The post-war immigration increases demographical diversity in many nations, and waves of globalization opens a surging interest on the softening instead of hardening of national boundary and a tendency to study “global” issues supposedly transcending any nation. Therefore, in the realm of identity study, two camps stand against each other. One insists on the investigation of dominant identity constructed by singular set of ethnocultural symbols for the building of solidarity within a nation; the other one focuses on either local identities within a nation or global identities across the national border. The divergence of these two approaches is related to a big epistemological question of social science: should nation be the unit of analysis?

Choosing China and Britain as two comparative cases, this study follows the epistemological and methodological approach that puts nations as units of analysis. However, this study did not presume that ethnocultural diversity is an obstacle that should be eliminated to produce an objective and subjective nation. Otherwise, it would follow the false assumption of national homogeneity. Instead, I assumed that the ideological approach to ethnocultural diversity is ingrained in national identity, which could be demonstrated in the symbolic processes of nation
building. And as the demographic composition changes from time to time, nation building is a continuing, fluid process. This is more so in the nation building processes in China and Britain, because both have long imperial history. The great diversities of their populations are mostly the result of imperial expansions. In other words, for both China and Britain, treatment of ethnocultural diversity is essential to the symbolic framework of nationhood. Therefore, while taking nations as units of analysis, this study does not take the existence of nation for granted but aims at deconstructing the concept of nation into multiple symbols. It focuses on two core aspects of the concept of the nation: its definition as the major identity indicator, and the interethnic relationship that is demonstrated to legitimate the definition. Taking the histories of the empires into consideration with a historical perspective, the symbolic processes of nation building are interpreted in relation to the recognition of imperial identity.

The goal of this study is to find out the similarity and difference between China and Britain in terms of the symbolic treatment of ethnic diversity in relation to the presumed need of national solidarity. In practical level, I analyze the contents relevant to national identity in the political speeches and the history textbooks. To cover the process of the symbolic construction of national identity as complete as possible, the data analyzed in this study ranges from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present, which is based on the consideration that the symbolic construction of nationhood in China and Britain have been systematically manifested in history textbooks since 1900s.

**Findings**

The analysis shows that the definition of identity indicators in national level is correlated with the dominant ideas about the ethnic relations in the past and the present. The Chinese history textbooks discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrate how imperial identity was replaced by national identity in the
first half of the twentieth century as the main identity in state level. The textbooks adopted in the interim had traces of imperial nationalism. The superiority of imperial culture i.e. Confucianism and Examination System was taken for granted. The imperial cultural elements were represented as nationless entities. In this way, although Han was recognized as the disseminator for non-Han ethnicities in history, the narratives did not nationalize the superior culture, which was in line with the absence of the effort made by empires at cultural or ethnic homogenization for the purpose of not provoking resentment from ruled ethnic groups which would be dangerous to imperial unity. Semantically, the cultural hierarchy was implied by the term “Zhongguo” which was used as the name of the political and cultural center. The allegedly boundless of the cultural influence of Chinese civilization was contained in the frequent use of Tianxia to indicate the community of which the stories were told. Furthermore, wars between regimes in history were described more as struggles between political powers than conflicts between ethnic groups.

In the newer textbooks, however, imperial identity lost its popularity and was replaced by national identity in the narratives. The universal superiority and boundless influence of Confucius culture and government insititution of dynastic China were questioned, which reflected the loss of confidence of Chinese civilization following the decline of the Empire. Regarding the definition of the community, Tianxia was rarely mentioned as an identity indicator, and Zhongguo started to carry the Han-centric meaning. The tendency to equalize Han to China was also tangible in the Sun and Chiang’s speeches. However, as Sun and Chiang, albeit expressing Han nationalism as their main doctrine of nation building, went back and forth between the Han-centric definition and the multiethnic definition of China, the textbooks cannot circumvent the history constructed by more than Han power.
In Chiang’s speeches, we found two contrasting logics that could be interpreted as his responses to the gap between Han nationalism and multiethnicity. On one hand, Chiang acknowledge that the will of self-government or even independence of non-Han people should be respected, but this logic was undermined by his discriminative attitude towards “strong” ethnicities and “weak” ethnicities. On the other hand, he advocated that the assimilative power of Han culture should be realized to solidify the multiethnic nation. These two logics were mirrored in the history textbooks. On one end, Han nationalism was strengthened with the nationalized emphasis on interethnic conflicts between Han and non-Han, in which non-Han enemies were often mentioned as foreigners. On the other end, the assimilative power of Han was represented by the wide influence of Confucius culture. Besides receiving critical analysis, the superiority Confucianism received nationalist interpretation, in which its ethnic basis i.e. Han was emphasized. However, it was the expansiveness rather than exclusiveness that was considered as the feature of Han culture. Equalizing Han to China in the textbooks did not, as one may expect, lead to an exclusive and conservative understanding of ethnocultural basis of the nation. The textbooks provided the solution to this logical loophole by presenting the history of “Hannization” i.e. non-Han ethnic groups being assimilated into Han ethnicity with custom learning and intermarriage. It was ironic that Confucius culture, while lost its divinity and was even criticized in some textbooks, functioned as the ethnocultural tie between Han and non-Han people in the assimilation processes. Confucianism was nationalized as the central element of Han culture, but was believed to be assimilative as the carrier of absorption processes which was to cover most periods in the history. However, the Yuan Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty were two important exceptions, and the theory of Han’s assimilative power had not been full-fledged. In sum, the analysis of the materials in the first half of the twentieth century reveals the decline of imperial nationalism, the uprising of Han
nationalism with its logical inconsistency with the demographic and political multiethnicity of China, and the belief and advocacy of the assimilation by Han as the symbolic solution to this logical inconsistency.

The idea of the expansiveness of Han culture was passed down to the political and intellectual elites of the Communist China, which is reflected by the socialist reform in minority regions during Mao’s time, the promotion of economic growth in the whole society including non-Han regions since the late 1970s, and the “core value of socialism” and patriotism as the Chinese national characteristics. The evolution of the content of the dominant culture does not change the fact that this culture is expected to be carried by the culturally dominant group (Han) who then disseminated it to ethnic minorities. The fluidity of the dominant culture corresponds to the rhetoric de-nationalization of Han culture which is shown in the history textbooks with the grand theory of “ethnic merging” as the replacement of the idea of Hannization, but this does not change the cultural hierarchy between Han and non-Han people. Although Hannization is now not a popular term because it sounds racist, the idea that Han people are the producer of mainstream culture persists. In other words, the sense of “Han men’s burden” has been constant since the first half of the twentieth century, though the things carried on the Han men’s backs are different from time to time throughout the whole century until today. The grand narratives of “ethnic merging” strengthen the legitimacy of this unidirectional cultural transmission, and covered the production of the concept of “Chinese culture” which takes the place of “Han culture”. In this process, the identity of Han is hiding behind multiethnic Zhongguo as the main indicator of state-level identity.

The symbolic construction of British nationality also involved the transition from imperial identity to national identity. But the transition took place in the history textbooks earlier than in the speeches of Prime Ministers. As the Prime ministers in the first half of the twentieth century
identified themselves more with the Empire then with nation, the textbooks organized the contents in English-centered way. When the textbooks mentioned “our nation”, they meant England. Historical events were described in the English standpoint, and the attention to non-English others was only paid when they had a relationship with England. Also, though it would be biased to consider the textbooks as Whig historiography, the analysis finds in some textbooks Whiggish writing with the label of “liberty lover” attached to the English, which showed the ethnocultural characteristics of the English nation. The key difference between China and Britain lies in the treatments of the inconsistency between growing nationalism and ethnocultural diversity in the state. While in China the political and intellectual elites attempted to solve this logical controversy by the theory of Han assimilation, in Britain few attempts were made. In English textbooks, the narratives about wars, conflicts and other types of struggles between England and the others were emphasized just as similar contents were represented in contemporary Chinese history textbooks, but they were not accompanied by the narratives on ethnocultural communication between the English and the others like their Chinese counterparts. Besides the critical analysis of British colonial rule, the failures of central government in appeasing local discontents from Scotland and Ireland were also emphasized. The Scots and the Irishmen were depicted as historical enemies, rather than brothers and sisters of the English. In other words, while in China the demand of national homogenization was semantically fulfilled with the expansion of Han ethnicity, in Britain it was fulfilled with the shrinkage of the realm of identity. This explains why although the first half of the twentieth century was a good time for nationalism at the expense of imperial nationalism, Han nationalism was congruent with the concept of “big China” whereas English nationalism corresponded with “little Englandism”.

From the second half of the twentieth century until present day, Prime Ministers and textbook writers made some attempts to symbolically construct the British nation out of the gradual dissolution of the global Empire. The analysis of the leaders’ speeches found that the main identity indicator was Britain. Correspondingly, popular history textbooks substantially reduced the amount and the thickness of the narratives on wars and politics and saved the space for the discussions on social and economic development in British history in which England was not the only player. However, this effort had limited effect on the general framework of British identity, as it was challenged by the lack of ethnocultural symbols that legitimize the integrity of Britishness and the insistence on the historical segregations among the nations in the British Isles. It appeared that the “let it go” attitude expressed by the textbook authors and the national leaders on the dissolution and the rule of overseas colonies was brought to their discussion about the self-government within the British Isles. Most book authors analyzed the Scottish Union and the Irish Union critically and were pessimistic on them. Ethnocultural communication was still lacking, and the union was said to be formed with thin factors such as economy and geopolitics. Therefore, it was not surprising that the national leaders, when addressing issues like dissolution, self-government or even independent, always claimed that the non-English nations deserved the right to determine their fate. For them, independence is acceptable as an option. This idea is correlated to the weakness of Britishness about the symbolic segregation among England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The absence of cultural bond and the tolerance of local nationalism is in line with the fragmentation of British national identity and the durability of English nationalism or “little Englandism”, which is in sharp contrast to the integrity and crystallization of multiethnic Chinese nationality.
Additionally, it should be noted that the shapes of nationality expressed in the leaders’ speeches and those by the history textbooks were not necessarily congruent to each other, especially when the textbooks writers had more autonomy to state’s control. This was why we see more evident differences between the two collection of materials in the British case than in the Chinese cases. It appeared that Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom before the War lingered on the Empire, and those after the War insisted that it was the British nation that they were speaking to. The contemporary educational historians, on the other hand, identified themselves and the pupils as less imperial subject than English, as they either nationalize the imperial glory or questioned the righteousness of imperial rule. They were also skeptical on the historical integrity of British nation. The gap between the two cultural products can be explained by the difference of the context in which they were produced. While the textbooks were written by historians who held different levels of insistence on the Empire or the British nation, the Prime Ministers spoke on behalf of the state as well as the nation. Therefore, the leaders’ speeches must reflect the basic political reality. If the imperial state existed at the time of the speech, they were speaking to all imperial subjects. If the British Empire was gone and the state only covered England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, their audience must be the British people as a whole. In contrast, as the textbook writing were more strictly controlled by the state in China, the history textbooks and the leaders’ speeches could be regarded as being produced in the same political context, or at least in two spheres close to each other. Consequently, the gap of the two parts of the materials seen in the British case was less evidence in the Chinese case.

In sum, the fundamental difference between the British and Chinese cases lays in the alleged characteristics of the culture of the dominant group. While the English had been looking at themselves inwardly since the decline of the Empire, the confidence of the expansiveness of Han
culture expressed in official languages was not dampened by the collapse of the imperial state, neither it was at odds with the volatile shape of Han culture. The understanding of this distinction is helpful in making sense of the gap between British identity and Chinese identity regarding three important aspects.

First, the lack of cultural transmission leads to the understanding of cultural segregation, within which England and others are separated cultural entities that are relatively equal. Following this logic, people of various ethnocultural backgrounds set their identities on par with British identity as the latter is not ethnoculturally constituted. And they together formed a multiculturalist coalition, in which England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales are called “nations”, and new immigrants from former colonies use hyphenated terms to label themselves e.g. British Asian, British Muslim and so on. On the contrary, the discourse of unidirectional cultural transmission serves to legitimize the allegation that different ethnic groups in China are melted into one Chinese nation. Consequently, the Chinese nation occupies the highest cultural status, and the statuses of ethnic groups do not reach the level of “nation”. Although the ethnic groups possessed unique cultures, the Chinese nationality is the overriding identity. Chinese nationalism is closer to an example of conservative nationalism regarding the mainstream attitude toward diversity.

Second, with the firm belief in the ethnocultural solidarity, the Chinese have a much stronger commitment to maintaining the national unity than their British counterpart. History textbooks in China insist that the unity between different ethnic groups is the mainstream with evident historical continuity, and China is a unified multi-ethnic nation that is an important product of the long history of interethnic communication. National unity is the core interest of China, and the political leaders take a hard, uncompromising attitude toward territorial integrity. In contrast, most English textbooks tell more stories about the wars and struggles between the nations in the Isles than about
their peaceful communication, and are skeptical about or even pessimistic to the unity of Britain. The national leaders in post-war era until today usually bend over to local nationalism, not necessarily because they side with the separatists, but because of they, deliberately or loathly, expressed their sympathy to the option of national independence. It would be biased, however, to ignore that some Unionist expressed their concerns about the symbolic dissolution of Britishness. For instance, Gordon Brown in various occasions stressed that the traditional value of Britain should be revived to contain the uneasiness caused by separatism and strengthen British national identity. However, his attempt was extremely unpopular as people are very sensitive about his reference to “traditional value” of Britain in which Britain and England are unacceptably conflated to each other. Therefore, when Scottish Prime Minister Nicola Sturgeon proposed to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence, Theresa May responded only by saying that “now it’s not the time” and suggesting that Scottish independence would hurt the United Kingdom’s bargaining power in the long Brexit negotiation with EU. Can you imagine Xi Jinping tells Dalai Lama that “it’s not the time” for Tibetan independence?

Lastly, different strategies to deal with ethnocultural diversity correspond to distinctive narratives on the history of imperial expansions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, English textbooks had a celebrating tone in the description of the establishment of British global hegemony. Afterward, the decline of the Empire was more and more felt by the intellectuals and historians, and the shrinkage of national identity, along with the anti-colonialism in the post-war era that was also popular among English intellectuals, led to the acknowledgment of the negativity of British imperialism. Both sides of colonial stories are presented in English history textbooks today, which fits into the multiculturalist framework of national identity that requires the history teaching to take multiple standpoints, including that of Britain and that of new immigrants, into consideration.
Differently, the international expansion of China experiences a definitional change. In the apex of Han nationalism, Han was equivalent to China. Thus all the victories of Han power against others were regarded as international expansion. The celebrating tone was observed in the analysis of some textbooks before the 1950s and the one published in 1951. However, in the construction of the concept of the multiethnic unified nation with the emphasis on the peaceful relationship between Han and non-Han in history, the conflictual events between them are downplayed and discussed as domestic issues. In other words, the events of imperial expansion from Han nation against other nations are transformed into interethnic struggles that ever happened in the Chinese nation. Furthermore, to build the image of China as a peacekeeper in the modern nation-state world system, the conflicts that cannot be transformed into domestic affairs, such as wars against Japan and Vietnam, are largely downplayed or even entirely omitted in the textbooks.

Neither the Chinese model nor the British model is existing without real or potential problems. The idea of assimilation in China and a monolithic understanding of Chinese culture is helpful to maintain and reinforce national unity symbolically, but it constantly faces the risk that the cultural homogenization projects cost the cultural rights of ethnic minorities, which would be one of the sources of the grievance that fuels local unrests. Prevention of this result requires proper implementation of cultural expansion with sensitness to minority culture. If local nationalism in China may root in the discontent about the losses of cultural rights due to the radical cultural aggression with a tight grip of national unity, forces of local nationalism in Britain are given room to develop by the lack of strong commitment to national unity. As this study shows, Britain is an example in which the principle of liberalism not only fails to constitute a stable and integrated British national identity but also works against nation unity because independence is allowed to be a discussable option in the name of liberalism and multiculturalism. The comparison between
Britain and China shows that thin principles may not as useful as ethnocultural elements to keep a multiethnic nation united.

Theoretical Contribution

Predicated on the basic assumptions of modernism and social constructionism, this study is an attempt to remedy the unwitting consequences of the dominant modernist and social constructionist paradigm. Firstly, abandoning the assumption that there was only Western model of modern nationalism, this study applies Eisenstadt’s concept of “multiple modernity” and the analysis demonstrates how the construction of Chinese and British identities, as two cases of modernization, are implemented in the cultural products following different paths. Furthermore, the study stands outside the box of the dichotomy of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. It should be admitted that this dichotomy indeed has some explanatory power in that Chinese nationalism is closer to ethnic side while British nationalism is closer to the civic end. But this study demonstrates a different type of comparison. The key differences between China and Britain lays in the distinctive understanding of the culture of the majority, which respectively lead to fragmented Britishness and integrated Chineseness.

Secondly, the finding of this research indicates that if nationality is “invented” as Hobsbawm insisted, the level of its success and the tangibility of the “inventors” may vary from case to case. The construction of British identity is a failure compared to its Chinese counterpart. While the purpose behind Chinese construction is somehow tangible and imaginable, it is unknown why the integrity of Britishness loses its legitimacy in such way. One may argue that the political leaders in Downing Street expressed their sympathy of home rule and even independence probably to gain support from the non-English nations, but this cannot explain the continuity of the sympathy to self-government since the devolution of Ireland in the 1920s regardless of the change in political
atmosphere, neither it can explain why the national leaders had similar attitude to devolution and independence of overseas colonies. In other words, if nationhood is the result of deliberate invention by political elites, it should be varying from time to time. It is obviously that different textbooks used different historical evidence and expressed different opinions on national characteristics, but this study shows an important continuity in the feature of expansiveness of ethnocultural basis. In both cases, the ideas about levels of expansiveness of culture possessed by dominant ethnic groups experience a continuity since the decline of the empires began to be felt. The acceptance of the shrinkage from imperial identity to British national identity is shared by the reduction from British national identity to English identity afterwards. By the same token, the idea of expansion of Han culture is passed down as the confidence of the expansiveness of the dominant Chinese national culture. This study emphasizes more variation across the cases than the change within a case.

Thirdly, this study could reflect the importance of the historical roots of nationalism. I borrow Kumar’s theory that the fall of empire leads to dissolution of imperial identity, which leaves room for the emergence and development of modern nationalism. However, only discussing the British case, Kumar (2007) focused less on cross-case comparison in his study. Our analysis finds that the development of nationalism in Britain and China, though started to fill in the void left by imperial identity, took different paths in the twentieth century. As the product process of nationalist doctrine too intangible to explain the variation, it is useful to make sense of their differences with a historical perspective taking the empires into account not as a direct explanation but as conditions in which “little Englandism” and “big China”. The fragmented Britishness and the identification to little England may root in a feature of British Empire. Maier (2006) grouped England as one of those nations that “have empire”, which meant that England and Britain allowed semi-autonomy
for the imperial subjects. In contrast, China was an empire because of the state’s stronger power to rule the peripherals. But interpreting the current divergent opinions on local autonomy in China and Britain as rooted in old structures of imperial rule would be problematic, because for both cases the strength of imperial rule varied from time to time. There were times when Britain limited the local autonomy e.g. the nationalization of British East India Company after Indian Mutiny, and there were times when the Chinese imperial state lost its grip on peripherals e.g. Tibet during the Tang Dynasty. What could be considered as the “conditions” in which nationalist doctrines were produced is the ideas on imperial structure, or cultural understanding on imperial structure, rather than the structure itself. Regardless of the structural relationship between Britain and India or England and Scotland, the latter one is always treated as culturally others by the former one. On the contrary, the ethnicities that were subject to the Chinese imperial rule, or even those who were only under the undirect influence of hegemony from the state, were more likely to be treated as culturally Chinese. For Britain and China, the current framework of national identity may be the continuation of their cultural tradition.

With this understanding of the continuity of the model of national identity, this study could be an effort to bridge the cognitional and ideological gap between Britain and China. I am not suggesting that the British scholars had no right to criticize the Chinese Communist Party for the repression of the independence movements in Tibet, nor am I, as a Chinese student, questioning the lack of commitment to national solidarity among the British Prime Ministers. However, the CCP is not the only one responsible for the assimilative approach of cultural policy, and all major parties in Britain shared the sympathy toward devolution. Therefore, I am here to suggest that any normative judgment of British nationalism and Chinese nationalism should rest on the historical understanding of the whole process of nation building.

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References


