Examining law enforcement analysis and intelligence capabilities: a case study of urban policing

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EXAMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS AND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES:

A CASE STUDY OF URBAN POLICING

by

Shelagh Ellis Dorn

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Examining Law Enforcement Analysis
and Intelligence Capabilities:
A Case Study of Urban Policing

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Shelagh E. Dorn

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Abstract

Extant research, concerning police use of intelligence analysis, hypothesizes that police culture and information-sharing partnerships may affect outputs of intelligence analysis. Previous efforts have provided overviews of criminal intelligence analysis, without examining organizational and structural factors which might affect the genesis and use of intelligence and crime analysis. Examining the role and impact of both analysis and information sharing in law enforcement has been largely absent, and based on current research, it is difficult to determine what accounts for law enforcement variation in the knowledge, use, and demand for crime and intelligence analysis. Ashton Police Department’s (APD) Information Coordination Unit (ICU) is responsible for case support, analysis, crime pattern identification, and development of intelligence leads for the department. This case study used a mixed-method approach to triangulate APD’s use and understanding of crime and intelligence analysis. Using semi-structured interviews with key personnel, key components, themes, and beliefs relating to the shared vision and practices of crime and intelligence analysis are identified. In addition to management-level and ICU interviews, review and analysis of intelligence products assisted with understanding APD’s use and implementation of crime and intelligence analysis. Secondary analysis of crime analysis documents offered an independent measure to evaluate the quality and type of intelligence and crime analysis produced by the department. A department-wide survey of stakeholders provided insight into the criminal intelligence unit’s effectiveness as well as formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms. In sum, this research affords a comprehensive look at the production, sharing, quality, and use of crime and intelligence analysis in a large urban police department.
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Introduction

Worldwide, as contemporary public policing undergoes reconstruction (e.g., increasing specialization in criminal intelligence work; Bayley & Shearing, 2001), intelligence-led policing (ILP) has emerged as one of the primary policing models of the 21st century. Adopted by law enforcement agencies both nationally and internationally post-9/11, leadership has incorporated ILP into the mission and goals of many progressive agencies. Yet, the implementation of ILP has had mixed results within law enforcement agencies, especially amongst proponents and researchers of ILP. Despite widespread acceptance during the past decade, ILP remains a relatively ambiguous policing model for most law enforcement agencies (Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 5). In addition, despite their agreement with ILP in theory, police have difficulty applying ILP practically due to a variety of technical, structural, and cultural obstacles.

Researchers have demonstrated that focused, specific policing strategies, tailored to discrete crime and disorder concerns, could allow police to more effectively address crime problems (National Research Council, 2004). This case study of an analytical unit in a large, urban police department provides qualitative data and in-depth insight into the workings of criminal intelligence analysis in law enforcement. Law enforcement, researchers, and policymakers will benefit from understanding the processes and procedures inherent in a unit charged with crime and intelligence analysis. This research varies from interviews and surveys competed by previous researchers, as the fieldwork focuses on U.S. law enforcement, incorporates a review of intelligence and crime analysis products, and examines the ways in which various agents in the intelligence process communicate about intelligence analysis.
The literature review identifies weaknesses and gaps in current literature that are addressed in this case study. For example, do current studies reveal whether intelligence analysis adds value to policing? What factors contribute to variation in the use and understanding of crime and intelligence analysis? Based on these options, this dissertation briefly examines the history and genesis of ILP. Following a review of current theoretical perspectives of ILP, and ILP in comparison with key policing models, a subsequent chapter examines the interplay between theory and application of ILP. Next, empirical findings of attempts to apply the framework of ILP in several countries is synthesized, and research about managing the intelligence function, intelligence leadership, intelligence personnel, and intelligence evaluation is presented.

Chapter 4 includes a review of the limitations of existing research and a discussion of the implications for further research, specific issues in need of resolution, and areas in which research remains necessary to expand and improve the knowledge and application of ILP within law enforcement. Empirical research about the criminal intelligence analysis function within law enforcement agencies has a limited scope, and mixed findings have resulted. Researchers studying police use of intelligence analysis have hypothesized that police culture and information-sharing partnerships might affect outputs of intelligence analysis. Current efforts have provided overviews of criminal intelligence analysis without examining organizational and structural factors, which might affect the genesis and use of intelligence and crime analysis. Examining the role and impact of analysis within local law enforcement has been largely absent. Based on current research, it is difficult to determine what accounts for law enforcement variation in the knowledge, use, and demand for crime and intelligence analysis.
As described in Chapters 4 and 5, fieldwork focuses on the Ashton Police Department (APD) and the work conducted by their Information Coordination Unit (ICU). ICU staff are responsible for case support, analysis, crime pattern identification, research, and development of intelligence for field officers and command staff. To produce a case study of this police agency’s criminal intelligence function and expertise, data collection involved interviews of staff and surveys of department members. Multiple methods of data collection were employed to facilitate a relationship that allows for a more personal, in-depth portrait of the study subjects and the police community. In addition to in-person interviews and surveys of intelligence unit personnel, management staff, and key stakeholders, secondary document analysis provides insight into the criminal intelligence unit’s effectiveness. Moreover, it provides an independent measure for evaluation of the quality and typology of intelligence and crime analysis produced.

This fieldwork and dissertation provides understanding and insight into law enforcement criminal intelligence analysis. Combining various methods to investigate the inputs and outputs of crime and intelligence analysis, along with identifying the structural and departmental factors that support or detract from the work performed by the ICU, provides a richer and deeper understanding of the factors affecting the initiation, production, and use of analysis within law enforcement. This qualitative research provides a springboard for generating additional hypotheses about the current state of law enforcement intelligence analysis, which may be used to refocus and guide future research efforts.
Chapter 1

Intelligence-Led Policing: Theory and Practice

Defining Intelligence-Led Policing

Although criminal intelligence units have existed in law enforcement agencies for several decades, the use of intelligence to direct police priorities and goals has represented a more recent innovation, dating back to the 1990s (Quarmby & Young, 2010). The Kent policing model (as cited in Anderson, 1997) resulted from serious increases in property crime within England’s Kent Constabulary region. Facing serious economic pressures, Kent redesigned their policing force around a centralized intelligence function, focusing on surveillance, informants, and generating intelligence to combat crime problems within their jurisdiction and beyond in a coordinated manner. These elements required retraining and realigning personnel, as well as relying on upgraded information technology (IT). The initial experiment proved so successful that leadership expanded it to all nine policing areas within the Kent Constabulary region. Anderson (1997) outlined the subsequent reduction in crimes:

The faith placed in the system by senior managers has been amply repaid by significant crime reductions throughout 1996 and 1997. Total crime in 1996 fell by 6.5% to 143,000 offences and in 1997 it fell by 16.3% to 119,000. Throughout that time, the model has evolved as the process matures. (p. 7)

While one cannot infer causality, crime rates in other parts of England, and throughout the United Kingdom, did not follow a similar pattern. In London, police noted a significant crime wave in the mid-1990s through early 2000s (The Greater London Authority, 2008). From the beginning, the Kent policing model established that civilian analysts were key specialists in ILP, necessary to produce “genuine intelligence” (Anderson, 1997, p. 7). Rather than the traditionally reactive, responsive method to crime complaints, analysis of crime patterns and intelligence identified specific locations and people believed to pose
potential threats (Maguire & John, 2006). Analysts were responsible for generating a portfolio of intelligence products used to understand criminal activities, i.e., target selection, activity disruption, recruitment of informants, and hypothesis generation for future policing activities (Anderson, 1997). Contrary to common belief, “early speculation that the [intelligence analysis] role required a police background has proved groundless” (Anderson, 1997, p. 7). Almost immediately, the Kent policing model was emulated and replicated by forces throughout the United Kingdom and beyond (Anderson, 1997). The United Kingdom developed the national intelligence model (NIM) based on the lessons learned in Kent; furthermore, soon Australia, New Zealand, and Canada also engaged in the ILP movement.

**The United Kingdom (UK)’s National Intelligence Model**

The impetus behind the NIM included incorporation of a standardized, national business plan to manage crime and disorder problems within the United Kingdom. This approach was designed to encourage partnerships, decrease expenditures, and assist managers with overseeing performance and planning (National Criminal Intelligence Services [NCIS], 2000). The NIM also prescribed a more rigorous practice of intelligence, and clarified participant roles (e.g., officer, analyst, and executive) during the creation and use of intelligence (NCIS, 2000). With the understanding that various police forces operate at different levels throughout the United Kingdom,¹ the NIM instituted a set of management, tasking, and coordination processes to standardize outputs and improve outcomes. To increase use and understanding of the role of intelligence analysis, the NIM also limited generation of intelligence to four main products: strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles, target profiles, target profiles, target profiles,

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¹ As part of the NIM, the UK stratified policing priorities into three tiers: Level 1- local crime problems; Level 2- cross-border issues; and Level 3- serious and organized crime (usually national/international in scope). (NCIS, p. 8)
and problem profiles. Ultimately, the NIM instituted a focused information/analysis/planning triumvirate for police forces to adopt, as a means to improve “intelligence structures, processes, and practices” (John & Maguire, 2004, p. 2). For many police forces, the NIM represented an opportunity to increase their effectiveness. Rather than developing new plans or initiatives, commanding officers simply had to reorganize their resources (e.g., personnel, units, and focus) and revise their procedures (NCIS, 2000).

![Diagram of the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model](image)

*Figure 1.* The United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NCIS, 2000:9).

Despite previous ILP success in Kent, national adoption of the NIM’s business aspects had more muted results. Rather than reorganization of current practices, along with collaboration and information sharing with non-police entities, police managers “interpreted the concepts of the model with reference to their existing processes, IT systems, and cultures” (Christopher & Cope, 2009, p. 237; see also John & Maguire, 2004). Culturally, police forces in the United Kingdom had a difficult time accepting intelligence analysis as a driving force for decision-making (Christopher & Cope, 2009). More explicitly, researchers judged police
agencies as needing additional insight into their communities’ crime and crime control problems (Ibid.).

Similarly, evaluation of NIM implementation in three constabularies between 2001 and 2003 revealed mixed results (John & Maguire, 2004; Maguire & John, 2004). In all three jurisdictions, management espoused a commitment to intelligence and the NIM; the number of analysts rose steadily; and evaluation of the structure of intelligence units indicated that they aligned with the NIM structural and business model. In addition, the quality of strategic assessments and tactical assessments improved significantly in a number of forces (John & Maguire, 2004).

Nevertheless, problematic areas, such as poor performance, still emerged in certain constabularies. Researchers indicated that leadership and management required additional commitment, including a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the NIM. For example, interviews with officers demonstrated resistance to the structure and the academic nature of the model; managers and street officers seemed confused by the technical terminology and felt that the model applied to intelligence specialists rather than field personnel (John & Maguire, 2004, pp. 18-19). In addition, commanders, managers, analysts, and officers had to assume ownership of crime and intelligence problems. They required training and better communication, and they needed to demonstrate their acceptance of the NIM. Performance measures required further scrutiny to determine how best to measure effectiveness of the NIM, especially as the model matured (John & Maguire, 2004; Maguire & John, 2004). As forces transitioned from reactive to proactive policing, the NIM remained at the forefront of ILP efforts despite these concerns.
Development in the United States

The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 expressly permitted the use of law enforcement grant money to create crime analysis units (Carter, 2005), providing both recognition and resources to previously underfunded, unappreciated police functions. Although crime analysis units have existed for over 40 years, the units primarily conducted tactical, investigations-based, support duties through the early 2000s (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). In addition, criminal intelligence had developed and functioned separately from crime analysis, a U.S.-based phenomenon not as pronounced in other countries (Ratcliffe & Police Foundation, 2007).

In the United States, importing the U.K.’s ILP movement met with some resistance. Historically, law enforcement intelligence lacked analysis; moreover, police viewed intelligence as reserved for large, primarily urban agencies (Carter & Carter, 2009). For many agencies, individual dossiers on potential criminals and subversives represented the hallmark of police intelligence in the 1950s through the 1970s (Carter & Carter, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008). This situation resulted in numerous federal civil rights charges against law enforcement agencies (Carter & Carter, 2009). As a result, law enforcement shied away from discussions about using intelligence largely due to the negative connotations associated with the civil rights litigation.

Researchers, however, have expressed consensus that the events on 9/11 prompted discussion about the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the U.S. system, spurring action to improve law enforcement intelligence analysis (Carter & Carter, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008; US Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2007). In March 2002, more than 120 criminal intelligence experts from across the United States gathered for an “Intelligence Summit” hosted by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP; 2002). Despite the fact that “ILP was never designed as a counterterrorism approach” (USDOJ, 2007, para. 1), law enforcement realized that problem-oriented policing (POP) and strategic problem solving possessed similarities; moreover, community policing remained both difficult to define and difficult to manage (USDOJ, 2007). At this summit, law enforcement professionals expressed frustration in the lack of guidance from the government as to how to define and practice ILP. As a result, one of the core recommendations from the summit became to “promote ILP through a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness” (IACP, 2002, p. v).

Because of 9/11\(^2\), ILP underwent changes in philosophy and in practical aspects (Carter, 2011). As Carter and Carter (2009) posited, blanket implementation of ILP in the United States, as exemplified by Great Britain’s NIM approach, is unreasonable because of significant differences in police force size and structure, differing police standards, and budget limitations that limit U.S. feasibility of wholesale adoption. Previously conceived as a business model for a much smaller, more discrete workforce in England,

Intelligence-led policing, as it is known post-9/11, has come to be defined and applied in somewhat of a piecemeal fashion… academics and professionals alike have been developing different components since 9/11 that are now interwoven with one another to create an overarching philosophy. Such components include crime and intelligence analysis, fusion centers, and public-private partnerships (to name a few). (Carter & Carter, 2009, pp. 71-72)

\(^2\) Brodeur (2007) differentiates between high and low policing, and the incorporation of homeland security, noting that post-9/11 state and local law enforcement agencies begin to focus upon “high policing” concerns, i.e. security intelligence, in contrast with “low policing,” e.g. actionable intelligence such as criminal intelligence/generating criminal intelligence for cases. In the US, it appears that conflation of the two has occurred as intelligence-led policing has been adopted.
Variations in Defining Intelligence-Led Policing: What do Police Know about ILP?

Uneven development within the United States increases difficulty in defining ILP. Frakes (2012) surveyed small, mostly rural law enforcement agencies and examined whether police officers understood and could articulate the basics of ILP. With a 24% response rate (94 respondents), most agencies did not have structural or formal acknowledgement of ILP; and only 4% referred to intelligence within their policing mission and goals. Forty-four percent of the respondents could not define ILP or even provide any ideas about what ILP involved. Of those who provided a definition, 46% mentioned that ILP involved information gathering; 20% included the concept of crime prevention in their definition. In addition, only 5% of those who were provided a definition included analysis as an essential theme within ILP (Frakes, 2012). Since rural law enforcement agencies might be less hospitable for ILP efforts compared to large, urban departments, this study cannot be viewed as representative of all police agencies across the United States. Nonetheless, it remains emblematic of police practitioners’ struggles with identifying core concepts of ILP.

One of the initial problems facing law enforcement is that a universally-accepted definition of ILP does not exist (Carter & Carter, 2009; McGarrell, Chermak, & Freilich, 2007). Similar to other professional policing models, there is some consensus on elements of the definition but disagreement concerning other requirements. McGarrell et al. (2007) averred that, similar to community policing, “there does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of ILP nor of the practical implications for police agencies’ mission, structure, and processes” (p. 142). Instead, agencies have pieced together their understanding

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3 How significant are the views of "rural" law enforcement? "90 percent of all law enforcement agencies in the United States have fewer than 50 sworn officers. Indeed, half of all law enforcement agencies have 10 or fewer officers. [emphasis added] Nationally, 90 percent of law enforcement agencies serve populations of 25,000 or less." (NIJ, 2004, p.1)
of ILP from a variety of academic (Carter & Carter, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008) and other sources, including guidance from federal agencies and professional groups (e.g., Global Intelligence Working Group, the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s [BJA; 2012] Violent Crime Initiative, and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts [IALEIA]). With several definitions available, one can surmise that practitioners who do embrace ILP are likely to adopt the simplest version of ILP that best suits their immediate needs.

Comparing Definitions

One can generally define ILP as a process, a product, and a business model guiding strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making. In the early 1990s, Great Britain conceived of ILP as the strategic use of criminal intelligence and crime analysis to target prolific offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008). Since then, the combination of essential variables and the meaning ascribed to those elements has varied. In addition, researchers have debated whether ILP represented a process (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008), a business model (NCIS, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2008), a philosophy (Ratcliffe, 2008; Carter & Carter, 2009), or some combination of the three.

The U.S. Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) incorporates mention of the intelligence process and focuses on the role of the executive in making strategic decisions in their definition of ILP: “Executive implementation of the Intelligence Cycle to support proactive decision making for resource allocation and crime prevention” (as cited in Carter & Carter, 2009, p. 300). Carter and Carter (2009) defined ILP to stress key elements of the intelligence cycle (e.g., collection, analysis and production, dissemination, planning and direction) along with the strategic and tactical use of the intelligence once it has been produced:
The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats. (Carter & Carter, 2009, p. 317)

Additionally, to support successful adoption of ILP, the authors called for the development of “organizational infrastructure to support the ILP initiative” along with an “information collection framework to manage threats within a jurisdiction” (Carter & Carter, 2009, p. 313). The Ratcliffe (2008) model of ILP, which focused on the use of tactical and strategic intelligence to combat crime problems, represents another option. This definition focuses on the law enforcement organization and the use of intelligence to drive specific crime and intelligence strategies:

Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 20)

Ratcliffe’s (2002) 3-i diagram simplifies the discussion about the various actors and actions present in ILP. Analysts must understand the criminal element, interpret current problems, and convey intelligence to influence decision makers. Analysts must deliver credible analysis and, more generally, build their reliability, while managers must be willing to accept analytic findings. Analysts outline various recommendations based on their analysis; managers must then select the preferred course of action.
In turn, decision makers, which may include command staff, managers, and officers, must use the intelligence provided to effect change or influence the criminal environment. A comparison of the three definitions reveals two visible similarities: (1) a focus on prevention of crime and (2) the role of strategic intelligence in law enforcement planning. Subsequent clarification of Carter and Carter’s (2009) definition highlights an additional commonality: (3) the role of the chief executive within the ILP process (Carter, 2011), an element already evident in the GIWG and Ratcliffe (2002) definitions.

An effective ILP model permits free flow of information and communication throughout the entire structure (Sheptycki, 2004). However, law enforcement information flow is primarily hierarchical in nature; in addition, depending upon the country studied, it could be complicated by many institutions, resulting in a plethora of pyramid-based intelligence entities. In addition to parallel “vertical” information flow, agencies must share information “horizontally” or from agency to agency. Such information and intelligence sharing efforts can be obstructed in various ways.4 Focusing on information and intelligence

Figure 2. The 3-i model of policing (Ratcliffe, 2002).

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4 Sheptycki (p. 313) notes that “less has been said about those aspects of formal systems of information exchange that bespeak of organizational pathology. I identify 11 such pathologies here. These are: digital divide; linkage
sharing between intelligence analysis unit personnel and other agents, analysts can garner data for analysis by *push* (i.e., analysts indicate specific priority information needs that officers or supervisors satisfy) or by *pull* (i.e., analysts seek and consolidate information from databases; Carter, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2008). Although Carter (2011) claimed that Ratcliffe’s (2008) model reflected only the pull of information to achieve its goals, Ratcliffe (2008) acknowledged that, ideally, analysts pursue and demand information (i.e., both push and pull), rather than simply analyzing information contained in databases and reports. This results in another point of similarity between the competing definitions.

At this juncture, differences between the Carter and Carter (2009) and Ratcliffe (2008) models of ILP appear. Historically, the Ratcliffe (2008) model reflected wholesale application of the British model of ILP adopted for use within the United States; however, Carter and Carter’s (2009) model reflected the application of best practices, excerpted from Britain’s experiences (Carter, 2011, p. 31). Ratcliffe’s (2008) definition was rooted in crime analysis and crime mapping, while Carter and Carter’s (2009) definition focused on intelligence analysis. Since 2002, the Ratcliffe definition has undergone a shift to more inclusive language (e.g., crime intelligence), rather than excluding intelligence analysis. Moreover, it has diminished its emphasis on prolific offenders (Ratcliffe, 2002, 2008). Ratcliffe (2008, p. 268) noted that more recently revised models of ILP in use in the United States seem to integrate principles of problem-oriented policing, resulting in information-sharing and strategic, collaborative partnerships to solve problems. However, Carter and Carter (2009) pointed to community-oriented policing as one of the foundational elements of ILP, as the impetus for

blindness; noise; intelligence overload; non-reporting; intelligence gaps; duplication; institutional friction; intelligence-hoarding and information silos; defensive data concentration; and the differences of occupational subculture.”
law enforcement’s interest in collaboration and information sharing. Despite some reviews indicating that community-oriented policing is not about crime reduction (Sherman, 2013; Weisburd & Eck, 2004), Carter (2011) noted that recent, unpublished iterations of the Ratcliffe (2002) model have shown indications of incorporating of the principles of community-oriented policing within discussions of ILP. However, the author claimed that there remained a philosophical divide between the two models (Carter, 2011, p. 31).

Finally, examining the definitions using an operational focus highlights another difference between the two definitions. Carter and Carter (2009) included threat terminology within their definition, as the more traditional crime/criminal discussion seemingly exempts homeland security from the discussion. However, Ratcliffe’s (2002) discussion focuses on crime and disorder (Carter, 2011). As a result, police and homeland security entities have elected to adopt a more inclusive philosophy of ILP. For example, the U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security noted that community-oriented policing “and problem solving” provide the basis for ILP:

Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) is a management and resource allocation approach to law enforcement using data collection and intelligence analysis to set specific priorities for all manner of crimes, including those associated with terrorism. ILP is a collaborative approach based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field of law enforcement has considered beneficial for many years. Today it is being adopted by a variety of law enforcement entities. (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 19)

While agreement on a common definition of ILP is a primary concern, applying these concepts to police and analyst activities reveals obstacles that emerge as definitions translate into action. Much of the inaction seems to derive from confusion about who initiates intelligence activities. For example, literature prompts supervisors to make strategic decisions regarding the extent of crime problems and threats within their jurisdictions to request and
deploy assets accordingly; executives utilize intelligence results to allocate resources, drive policy decisions, and inform politics (Dorn, Richardson, Filippone, & Burrall, 2009). However, ILP relies on collection of appropriate information from the field that an intelligence unit receives for collation and validation. Thus, the primary step in initial planning relies on supervisors communicating priority intelligence requirements to field personnel to generate valuable information for analysis. Ensuring that the information generated and forwarded by officers relates to relevant criminal enterprises diminishes the “noise” analysts face when dealing with copious amounts of data.

Ideally, ILP strengthens law enforcement’s response to criminals and terrorists, targeting the roots of criminal activities. Once combined with other information and analyzed, the resulting intelligence is provided in a variety of formats or products to officers, managing supervisors and executive level officers. Law enforcement is encouraged to look beyond the individual crime, identifying and contributing useful information used to understand criminal activity beyond traditional geographic boundaries, rather than solely engaging in reactive responses. Instead of focusing on criminal events as individual cases, ILP estimates the probability of future threats based on current knowledge of criminals, their routines, and their networks. What is new for police includes the use of information analysis and fusion of data to produce intelligence that is interpreted to strategically plan and direct law enforcement activities. Additional collection of useful information, relevant to the problem at hand, is then used to develop pattern and trend analyses of criminal organizations and their activities. ILP relies heavily on traditional police work: knowing one’s community, their routines, and activities; staying proactive; and working to solve problems and reduce crime (Dorn et al., 2009).
Forms of Intelligence and Analysis

In discussions about law enforcement intelligence analysis, differentiation between various forms of intelligence analysis becomes relevant. The commonly accepted forms of intelligence include tactical, strategic, and operational intelligence (Carter, 2011; Cope, 2004; Morehouse, Peterson, & Palmieri, 2011; Sheptycki, 2004). The three forms of intelligence analysis are complementary and may rely on the same data sources (Morehouse, Peterson, & Palmieri, 2011). Tactical intelligence provides knowledge about specific criminals, criminal enterprises, and criminal activities to investigate and prosecute immediate crimes. It can also provide the basis for strategic analysis (Morehouse et al., 2011). For example, this could include a background profile of criminal detailing addresses, relatives, associates, and recent crimes committed, generated to locate and arrest the criminal. Strategic analysis is knowledge; more importantly, foreknowledge about the world to inform policy makers matters as well (Kent, 1949). It follows that strategic intelligence provides a broader view of criminal enterprises, and it can provide an opportunity for informed conclusions and recommendations for longer-range law enforcement planning (Morehouse et al., 2011). Ultimately, strategic analysis is used to direct and focus crime prevention activities, such as an overview of drug trafficking operations in a defined geographic area.

Operational intelligence provides decision makers with detailed threat, mitigation, or response strategies used in organizational planning and resource allocation. Such plans include mission, goals, and objectives used to guide and direct collection and analysis (USDOJ, 2009). An example of operational intelligence might include hot spot and criminal intelligence analysis (i.e., both spatial and temporal information) provided to executive personnel to justify surveillance and staffing levels for targeted response efforts (USDOJ,
2009). However, the key entails the need for law enforcement to analyze both emerging threats (i.e., strategic intelligence) and to produce case-specific, tactical intelligence about crime-related activities and individuals (Sheptycki, 2004) with the understanding that intelligence remains uncertain in judgments (Morehouse et al., 2011).

Strategic, tactical, and operational intelligence can be communicated in various analytic product formats and tailored to the recipient’s needs (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, & International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts [GJISI & IALEIA], 2012). Intelligence analyses can include multiple sub-products deriving from traditional and nontraditional methods of research and analysis, including:

- Communication analysis
- Crime-pattern analysis
- Criminal business profiles
- Demographic/social trend analysis
- Financial analysis
- Flow analysis
- Geographic analysis
- Geospatial analysis
- Indicator analysis
- Market profiles
- Network analysis
- Problem and target profiles
- Results analysis
- Risk analysis
- Threat analysis
- Vulnerability analysis

A network analysis might include an association matrix, a link chart, a map, a geospatial chart, a summary, conclusions, and recommendations, all of which might be defined as individual “products.” A problem profile might include crime-pattern analysis, geographic analysis, demographic and/or social trend analysis, statistical analysis, indicators, conclusions, and recommendations. (GJISI & IALEIA, 2012, p. 23)

In contrast, Taylor, Boba, and Egge (2011) divided crime intelligence products into two categories: informational products (e.g., unfiltered lists that aid officers’ situational awareness) and analytical products, which tackle crime reduction strategies. Because of the enormous variability in intelligence analysis products, U.K. police forces develop “standard analytical products” that include analyses, such as network analysis charts and crime pattern analysis (Cope, 2004; NCIS, 2000). Under the NIM, analysts create strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles, and problem profiles (NCIS, 2000).

An artificial divide between crime and intelligence analysis further complicates matters. Researchers view crime analysis as summarizing and reviewing information,
processing it into manageable packets to aid in interpreting, and understanding crime problems (Cope, 2004). Arrests are seen as the end goal of crime analysis (Cope, 2004). In defining analysis, United States police administrators are more likely to equate crime analysis with targeting “hot spots” than with targeting “career criminals” (Phillips, 2012, p. 20). Intelligence analysis seeks to “reduce uncertainty and improve decision quality for intelligence consumers” (Derbentseva, McLellan, & Mandel, 2010, p. 20) through researching, analyzing, and making judgments about the activities of criminals. Intelligence is largely viewed as an aid to investigations, relegating analysis to the tactical level. Many countries integrate crime analysis and criminal intelligence analysis. The United States is relatively unique in separating the two. In addition, U.S. law enforcement personnel appear more knowledgeable about crime analysis and less enthusiastic about potential benefits of intelligence analysis. As Figure 3 illustrates below, reframing current divergent crime and intelligence analysis models and integrating them into a single model of analysis may be as simple as reframing the mindsets of intelligence personnel.
Many in law enforcement viewed crime analysis as beneficial since it uses data and applied analytic techniques to reduce crime and increase managerial accountability (Taylor, Kowalyk, & Boba, 2007). Despite U.S. law enforcement agencies embracing crime analysis, evaluating “the prevalence, characteristics, and effectiveness of crime analysis and crime mapping practice have received scant attention” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 18).

**Policing Models**

Traditional policing is largely characterized as random patrol, 911-response, officer deployment, post-crime to investigate criminal activity, and citizens depending on the legal system and police to handle crime problems (Ratcliffe, 2008). However, this traditional and
reactive model of policing has presented a subject for reform efforts. In an attempt to improve and innovate policing while reducing crime, researchers have introduced several models of policing in the past few decades, including Problem Oriented Policing (Goldstein, 1990), Community Policing (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Rosenbaum, 1994), and CompStat (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Even though crime analysis may seem unfamiliar and less accepted within the law enforcement community (Maguire & John, 2006), these more recent strategies have begun to focus on analysis of the criminal environment to improve police efficiency (Phillips, 2012; Ratcliffe & Police Foundation, 2007). “The professional model of policing, with its emphasis on crime control and law enforcement tied to technological development, succeeded in large part because it resonated with street cops and their sense of public duty” (Crank, Kadleck, & Koski, 2010, p. 419). However, police currently reside in a holding pattern due to budget constraints and continued reliance on preventative patrol as a primary policing strategy.

For some researchers, Community Policing defies definition (Ratcliffe, 2008). It emerged in the 1980s as a philosophy and strategy in which citizens engage in proactive partnerships with police to address fear of crime, disorder, and quality of life concerns (National Research Council, 2004). It incorporates three distinct components: departmental changes, inter-agency cooperation, and the needs of the community. Community members are encouraged to identify neighborhood problems and to work with their department to ensure that specific issues are addressed. While police remain responsible for law enforcement, community policing serves as recognition that police work is largely order maintenance and social services (Rosenbaum, 1994). Ideally, community policing steps away from reactive policing, propagating proactive initiatives, and going “beyond crime control” to “deliver a
broad range of services that improve the community’s general quality of life. This encourages police departments to engage in complex problem analysis that moves beyond traditional crime analysis” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 8).

The National Research Council (2004) urged continued engagement with community policing, along with more systemic investigation. They view the solving of local problems by locally based stakeholders as a particular strength of community policing. However, in a survey of policing scholars, community policing is seen as on the decline in law enforcement agencies. Problem-oriented policing, community policing, and zero-tolerance strategies may have suffered from difficulties in implementation, problems with assessment, dissolution of grant programs, and community disinterest (Crank et al., 2010).

In comparison, problem-oriented policing uses in-depth analysis and multi-agency and multi-sector collaboration to examine problems and offer comprehensive solutions (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Problem-oriented policing values preventative responses (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002) rather than traditional reactive responses to crime. Problem-oriented policing stands in sharp contrast to the standard model of policing because of its focus on highly community-based, localized responses. Review of the literature indicates that such methods require additional research and investigation (National Research Council, 2004) to validate effectiveness. Currently, researchers have identified specific barriers to implementation of problem-oriented policing, including problems with analysis (too-narrow focus, accompanied by limited time and attention by patrol officers due to conflicting responsibilities [Cordner & Biebel, 2005]), concerns with properly identifying incident and repeat incident/patterns, and managerial and executive accountability within the police organization (Boba & Crank, 2008).
In contrast with other policing models, CompStat has gained specific notoriety as a mechanism for management accountability (Ratcliffe, 2008), while de-emphasizing the responsibility of line officers (Boba & Crank, 2008). Hallmarks of CompStat include (a) timely information, including reliance on crime data and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), (b) targeted tactics for crime suppression, (c) rapid deployment of resources, and (d) follow-up, accountability, and assessment to encourage immediate problem solving (Boba & Crank, 2008). Several challenges have emerged with deployment of CompStat, including concerns about reinforcement of the police hierarchy and the heavy emphasis on mapping and spatial analysis of crime, which extends beyond the scope of knowledge and training of most police commanders (Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008).

Table 1. Key Dimensions of Policing Models, Ratcliffe (2008, p. 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard model of policing</th>
<th>Community policing</th>
<th>Problem-oriented policing</th>
<th>Compstat</th>
<th>Intelligence-led policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easily defined?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Fairly easy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fairly easy, but still evolving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easily adopted?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Superficially</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>At the technical level, but managerially challenging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation?</td>
<td>Police administrative units</td>
<td>Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>Police administrative units</td>
<td>Criminal groups, prolific and serious offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical focus?</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>As appropriate for the problem</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Top down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who determines priorities?</td>
<td>Police management</td>
<td>Community concerns/demands</td>
<td>Sometimes crime analyst, but varies from problem to problem</td>
<td>Police management from crime analysts</td>
<td>Police management from crime intelligence analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target?</td>
<td>Offence detection</td>
<td>Unde rer</td>
<td>Crime and disorder problems and other areas of concern for police</td>
<td>Crime and disorder hotspots</td>
<td>Prolific offenders and crime problems, and other areas of concern for police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for success?</td>
<td>Increased detections and arrests</td>
<td>Satisfied community</td>
<td>Reduction of problem</td>
<td>Lower crime rates</td>
<td>Detection, reduction or disruption of criminal activity or problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected benefit?</td>
<td>Increased efficiency</td>
<td>Increased police legitimacy</td>
<td>Reduced crime and other problems</td>
<td>Reduced crime (sometimes other problems)</td>
<td>Reduced crime and other problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As demonstrated in Table 1, comparison of several major policing models highlights similarities and dissimilarities in priorities, orientation, and measures of success. Despite
similarities, community policing and ILP appear philosophically disparate. For example, “The relationship between the two philosophies is based on the use of community policing as a mechanism that enhances ILP via two-way information flow between police and the community” (Carter, 2011, p. 20). With an external focus, patrol officers direct community policing in conjunction with specified communities; however, in ILP, management determines priorities based on intelligence analyses provided by analysts. Several dimensions emphasize some of the difficulties faced by police organizations attempting to adopt ILP, specifically the implementation challenges faced by management, various disparate targets, and an expected benefit that seems intangible and largely ill-defined.

\[\text{Figure 4. Comparison of policing models, Ratcliffe, 2008.}\]

Visualizing community policing, POP, CompStat, and ILP along two continuums (operational focus and problem focus) provides comparison of the models (Ratcliffe, 2008) and their philosophical proximity. ILP #1 represents earlier iterations of ILP, while ILP #2 represents recent revisions to the ILP. Despite reliance on crime analysis and GIS, ILP appears more closely aligned with problem-oriented policing compared to CompStat. Rather
than remaining mutually exclusive, POP and ILP should learn from and apply the best practices of both models (Ratcliffe, 2008).

In conclusion, implementation of ILP may be affected by its adoption of one or more policing models. Adapting one or more models to incorporate recognized and understood aspects of each may seem appealing to police executives. Such hybrid policing models might be seen as better or worse compared to classic ILP. Attending to the philosophy, function, and structure of each model may provide insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the model adopted by specific police agencies.
Chapter 2

Applying Intelligence-Led Policing

Primarily a review of empirical findings of the interplay between theory and application of ILP, this chapter assesses attempts to evaluate the framework of ILP in several countries. Comparison of the theory and practice of various countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) reveal similarities, differences, and areas for future study. This chapter examines various organizational and structural factors that have appeared in the literature and their relevance and impact on ILP. The role and performance of various intelligence unit personnel, including management and leadership; the role of information system technology; and the culture and the structure of police forces affect the application of ILP in predictable and unpredictable ways.

As evidenced in research about community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing, police officers’ activities are subject to organizational and structural factors that might standardize their decision-making authority (National Research Council, 2004). However, police agencies differ substantially with policies and procedures, operational styles, performance measures, and standards for police leadership and performance, all of which affect planned organizational change, such as ILP (National Research Council, 2004).

Sheptycki (2004) asserted that the difficulties in adopting ILP and the struggle for credibility among analysts in law enforcement agencies has deep organizational roots rather than reflecting primarily personality-driven problems. Other researchers stated that the quality of crime analysis varies widely by department (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Further investigation into organizational dynamics reveals that the use of law enforcement criminal intelligence analysis has been consistently inconsistent during the past decade. Some agencies
have the benefit of technically skilled analysts, supported by advanced IT and data systems, highly specialized division of labor, and facilitated coordination of resources and personnel from other units. Other agencies rely on individuals using publicly available freeware to map, analyze, and communicate intelligence. However, generalities exist between many of the agencies employing ILP as their policing model, which may relate to technology, personnel, culture, and the application of ILP within each police force.

Police Agency Structure

Positioning within the organizational structure can influence the use and reputation of criminal intelligence analysis. Police agencies have a number of choices about where to locate the criminal intelligence analysis unit within their department. Management must decide whether the unit will stay centralized or decentralized, whether they will function as line staff or professional staff, and the ways in which communication between clients and analysis personnel will be most successful. These basic concerns about organizing and managing clients represent structural elements that may contribute to the success or failure of ILP within the target agency.

Differentiation and specialization of the intelligence analysis role within police agencies have consisted of a tangential part of several studies. Some researchers concurred that, to increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of the analysis function, dedicated personnel performing analysis are preferred, rather than requiring officers to assume that responsibility in addition to their regular activities (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). In a U.S.-based survey of police agencies, 75% of those contacted reported having crime analysts. Of those with crime analysts, 75% worked on a specialized unit distinct from the end users’ data (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). However, in the face of fiscal
constraints in the United States, O’Shea and Nicholls (2003) seemed reluctant to recommend whether crime analysis specialization or differentiation within the organization was best. Instead, the authors delegated responsibility back to the chief executive. For example, “Police administrators will have to decide which approach is more in keeping with their particular organizational philosophy and technological capacity,” ensuring that the analytic unit’s focus remains strategically coordinated with the organization (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, pp. 13-15).

In some instances, decentralization of a crime analysis unit provides a duplicate chain of command structure, separate from the rest of the agency’s hierarchical chain of command. A decentralized structure may embed analysts within precincts or stations, placing them under the authority of those field command officers. Such assignment of law enforcement analysts is predicated on providing field officer support (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002), aiding in crime control while functioning as tactical intelligence analysts. Frequently, those analysts must still answer to a centralized crime analyst manager, setting up a parallel command for analysts (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). This often “leads to situations in which the crime analysis unit mission is subordinated to a variety of questionable, and at times trivial, needs of the target superior” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 14). This presents a problem of authority and control of analysts, who cannot ignore either chain of command. Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008), O’Shea and Nicholls (2003), Quarmby and Young (2010), Carter (2011), and Taylor et al. (2011) recommended that analysis units, with various customers and a wide mission scope, should have a single chain of command whenever possible. This is especially true as centralization within a structured intelligence unit “ensure[s] consistency, standardization, and proper governance of the intelligence function,” as well as ensuring neutrality (Taylor et al., 2011, p. 20).
Other key considerations involve managing the needs of various clients, or decision makers, maintaining:

- balance between proximity to clients and other senior staff and proximity to frontline staff;
- integration with structures for decision-making, tasking, and actioning of intelligence;
- proximity to gatekeepers of data and information;
- means of articulation with other key organizational structures (for example, risk frameworks and planning bodies). (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 26)

Specialized analysis within departments can lead to difficulties in communication and the exchange of information in a timely, efficient fashion. Moreover, it may affect utilization of intelligence. Several researchers found loose coupling or absent relationships between the crime analysis or criminal intelligence unit and the rest of the police agency (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). For example:

Links with other units are informal; interactions between units are primarily ad hoc… nearly three quarters of large police departments have chosen to specialize the crime analysis function, [yet] the operations of the function seem to be, at best, loosely integrated into the fabric of the organization. (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 15)

Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) noted that agencies must guard against “the risks of institutional friction, intelligence-hoarding and information silos [that] still remain in any organization that has a hierarchical command structure” (p. 118). Preliminary results indicate that managers must make formal arrangements to ensure that the crime analysis unit connects with like-minded, tactical operations. Centralization of analysis remains a concern, but a single chain of command is recommended; moreover, formal agreements should link the criminal intelligence unit with relevant operational units (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).
Technology

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) began to earmark funding in the 1970s to support the creation of crime analysis units to “encourage and facilitate formal, comprehensive, rational planning in the criminal justice system” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 23). In a parallel development, IT improvements, during the past few decades, have increased law enforcement capabilities to store vast quantities of information. In many instances, law enforcement agencies have received grants and earmarked funds dedicated to upgrading their legacy information systems. As a result, agencies have experienced advancement in a variety of analytic tools, along with the improved capacity to store information digitally (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 25).

However, significant challenges remain. Data quality and IT problems dictate the type of analysis that can be done; however, analyst hours, spent on data entry, detracts from analysis time. While simply owning certain software and data analysis systems “is held up by crime analysts as evidence of a more sophisticated, professional, specialized function” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 22) within law enforcement agencies, the strategic planning and coordination necessary to fully utilize many of the piecemeal development of these systems is poor. This results in weaknesses that affect value and usability of law enforcement data (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2005). Problems are not limited to difficult police technology systems. Data quality in law enforcement analysis remains uneven and the validity of the information dubious. For instance, Ratcliffe (2005) reported a 50% error rate with

5 Legacy systems are outdated, proprietary computer systems, applications, or data contained in a customized schema that make retrieval or conversion of information difficult. In law enforcement, legacy information systems have made reporting and analysis of information extremely difficult. For elaboration, see Manning (2006) and O’Shea & Nicholls (2002).
police recording information in New Zealand, as well as electronically available data limited solely to burglary and crime offenses.

Manning’s recent review of police technology and reform in the United States makes him skeptical that much has changed due to limitations in the available technologies, their low capacity for inter-operations, and especially the strong occupational culture that resists abstract, general, and complex methods. This skepticism is buttressed from a variety of studies that suggest that the crime and problem analysis capacity of American police may be considerably overstated by those who argue that information technology has made substantial improvements to police crime control effectiveness. (Mastrofski, 2006, pp. 29-30).

Problems are not limited to data quality concerns, however. Access to criminal intelligence databases, which are limited to sworn personnel, may impede usefulness of the products of criminal intelligence; additionally, access to training for proprietary systems can also limit usefulness and effectiveness.

**Personnel**

In intelligence analysis, each person has a specific role in carrying out the intelligence process. As consumers of intelligence, law enforcement officers, supervisors, and executive officers depend on accurate, timely, and thorough intelligence products to make appropriate decisions. Ideally, each participant in the intelligence process has discrete, delineated responsibilities requiring collaboration and cooperation.

**Analysts**

Law enforcement intelligence analysis relies on analytic personnel to interpret the criminal environment and influence decision makers. The intelligence analyst, whether civilian or sworn, functions as the hub of the intelligence operations within the analysis unit. A handful of researchers have examined the responsibilities of crime and intelligence analysts in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States. Current researchers, studying
crime and intelligence analysts, have focused on work duties and responsibilities related to job function, skills, and training (Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council [CICC], 2012; Dorn et al., 2009; Evans & Kebbell, 2012; GJISI & IALEIA, 2012; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011). Most recently, national and international leadership has revised standards for law enforcement analysts, including reviewing job descriptions and professional development (e.g., certification, training, and educational standards), and outlining analytic attributes (GJISI & IALEIA, 2012; Moore, 2007). Additional researchers have described how to perform analytic processes and create analytic products (Eck, 2011; Morehouse et al., 2011).

The majority of extant field studies query analysts about their daily job tasks (Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2005) and their perceptions of organizational fit (Taylor et al., 2007; USDOJ, 2008) within the agency. To date, even job manuals are absent,6 reinforcing the ad hoc nature of crime analysis within police organizations and providing “further indication that the function has not been given the careful, deliberate consideration that it should” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 17). Analysts must respond to information provided by law enforcement officers and managers by using their subject matter expertise in research and data analysis (Dorn et al., 2009). However, job descriptions for analysts tend to omit the research skills necessary for more complex (i.e., strategic) analysis (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). For such specialized positions, O’Shea and Nicholls (2002) revealed the “long processing time” (p. 17) for civilian law enforcement hires, accompanied by uneven selection methods for sworn personnel. Many officers bid on open intelligence analysis unit positions and are selected due to seniority reasons, based on collective

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6 For two exceptions, see UNODC, n.d.; and Dorn et al, 2009.
bargaining unit constraints, rather than for skill specialization (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). This creates problems with unit productivity, cohesiveness, and the intelligence unit work environment (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002).

In reviewing the job tasks assigned to analysts, researchers mentioned that the extreme variability in data and technology affected both the quality of analysis and the time devoted to criminal analysis and intelligence work (Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2005; Sheptycki, 2004). Responsibilities for analysts can vary, largely because of assignment of non-analytic tasks (e.g., printing maps and finding photos) that diminish the time spent doing analysis (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Such assignments pull analysts away from performing intelligence work; however, analysts who challenge the status quo face poorly defined job descriptions and the reality that officers lack the technical skills to perform many of these routine, time-consuming demands (Cope, 2004).

Researchers noted that analyst competencies, skills, trainings, and conceptual understandings of roles might factor into successful criminal intelligence work. While information systems provide better access to information and data stored within an agency’s servers, several researchers viewed the analysis capabilities of personnel as suboptimal. Even when performing analysis, descriptive products and summaries tended to be the majority of analysis produced by analysts (Cope, 2004; Derbentseva et al., 2010; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Notwithstanding the markedly reduced timeline needed to generate these products, the tactical materials being produced (i.e., wanted notices, pin maps) remind researchers of the rudimentary analyses produced 20 years ago (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003).

There was sporadic evidence of more sophisticated analysis (e.g., geographic profiling, point-pattern analysis, standard deviation-based early warning systems, etc.) … However, the evidence demonstrated that these advanced methods were more often the exception than the rule. As we have noted above, counting crime dominates current
tactical analysis… crime analysis is, by all appearances, underutilizing the vastly improved data sets that are now available. (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 22)

Intelligence and crime analysis products include a lack of research, context, or theory; as a result, these analyses remain primarily “tactical, descriptive, and historical” in nature (Cope, 2004, p. 196). One researcher revealed analysts and managers’ “single-minded” focus on tactical analysis, which seemed troubling in a number of ways. Limiting specialization at a time when IT software and applications are developing similar capabilities is hypothesized to reduce the need for tactical analysis “experts” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, pp. 13-14). Narrowly defining the scope of a specialized unit regarding tactical analysis capabilities could render such analytic units obsolete, especially in the face of new software that claims capabilities in predictive policing. Strategic management, requiring specialized problem analysis skills, is necessary for police administrators to perform their duties, including “stakeholder assessments, forecasting, policy evaluation, performance measurement, organizational intelligence, citizen surveys, etc.” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, pp. 13-14).

In addition to reviewing and analyzing information from appropriate databases, analysts create tactical, strategic, and operational intelligence products for dissemination to field personnel and management staff. In a properly functioning ILP agency, they assist with creating and refining priority intelligence requirements and collection plans issued by law enforcement managers, and they provide the intelligence foundation for decision-makers (Dorn et al., 2009). A few studies have included law enforcement supervisors’ perceptions about analysis and analytic personnel (Cope, 2004; Hensgen, 2011; Phillips, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2005; USDOJ, 2008). As part of an audit by the Inspector General, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency reviewed the standards and work product of intelligence analysts. The results were mainly favorable. Most special agents felt that the “accuracy, effectiveness and
timeliness of intelligence analyst products used to support drug enforcement cases” or the tactical analysis products remained generally appropriate (USDOJ, 2008, para. 1). However, a significant number of special agents felt concerned about the quality of intelligence products created; for example, “some special agents informed us that the quality of intelligence analysts’ work was affected by poor supervision, not prioritizing their work, or not being sure of their role” (USDOJ, 2008, para. 1)

Along with the communication of information to and from the intelligence unit, evaluations of the work produced by intelligence analysts have been conspicuously absent from the literature. Anecdotally, analysts reported a divide between crime and intelligence unit personnel and intelligence consumers (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe & Police Foundation, 2007). With the exception of the OIG’s audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA; USDOJ, 2008) and Johnson’s (2010) recent case study of a special intelligence unit within the Office of the Washington Attorney General that touched tangentially on the products of intelligence analysis, a comprehensive review of other consumers’ perceptions about the intelligence produced by law enforcement analysts has received limited attention. In addition, sparse research exists about the information and intelligence flow between analysts and other actors within the intelligence process and the forces and pressures on analysts to produce products. One can discern that information flow may be hindered by motivations such as self-interest and a lack of trust within the law enforcement agency; however, studies thus far seem limited (Johnson, 2010).

Ekblom (2002) and Cope (2004) summed up the problems facing law enforcement intelligence: “Poor problem-orientated approaches, poor analytical thinking and a culture that does not support innovation, alongside fragmentation, occupational divides, media and public
expectations all contribute to the lack of integration of knowledge into practice” (Cope, 2004, p. 196). Nonetheless, with varying levels of autonomy and even more limited feedback from intelligence managers and consumers, analysts must use their discretion to ensure that intelligence occurs (Ratcliffe, 2005). Unfortunately, leadership redirects many analysts to focus on administrative statistics, performance appraisals, and annual reporting and staffing allocation, rather than crime reduction and prevention (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2005). As a result, members of the analysis unit view the analyst’s primary role as a number cruncher directed by management personnel. However, producing management statistics (undeniably, a valuable service) clearly diverges from their primary responsibilities.

Analysts are also challenged by lack of uniformity across jurisdictions. In New Zealand, rather than creating a well-developed, comprehensive picture of each region’s criminal intelligence concerns, policing focused on local priorities. Data synthesis efforts were hindered by poor databases, failure of internal units to communicate with field personnel, and poor communication throughout the police agency (Ratcliffe, 2005). Similarly, data collection limitations adversely affected results. Analysts faced difficulties when trying to standardize their analyses across jurisdictions. Consequently, intelligence consumers received intelligence products of varying qualities (Ratcliffe, 2005).

Law enforcement agencies tend to have limited experience with employing civilian professionals. Other than agency communications staff, criminal intelligence units represent one of the only areas where sworn officers must regularly rely on the expertise and skills of non-sworn personnel to carry out their responsibilities. While trained and knowledgeable analysts provide recommendations about crime control measures, “police officers felt uncomfortable accepting recommendations from non-police personnel, suggesting this
encroached on their role” (Cope, 2004, p. 20). While civilian analysts must rely on information provided by officers, some researchers pointed to differing perspectives of the two groups as causing friction. The officer may not supply the necessary information, from the viewpoint of an analyst; conversely, the police officer may believe that the analyst cannot produce meaningful, actionable intelligence (Cope, 2004; Frakes, 2012). This feeds a dysfunctional cycle that perpetuates street officers’ view of analytic products as unhelpful, since analysts then turn to producing products demanded by managers, whose requirements and demands differ (Cope, 2004). To bridge the sworn/civilian divide, departments may require periodic ride-alongs with patrol to view problem areas and to build rapport with officers.

Within the crime analysis unit, previous experience as a sworn police officer is beneficial even though their technical skills might not seem apparent (Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Specifically, field officer experience aids in the evaluation of the intelligence cycle, as civilian analysts may not have the expertise or background to evaluate source reliability or information validity (Cope, 2004; Dorn et al., 2009). In addition, sworn officer experience provides immediate legitimacy to officers from other units (Cope, 2004). As a result, collaborating sworn and civilian employees, tasked with designing operational plans, resolves lingering legitimacy and relevancy problems (Cope, 2004). Other difficulties with accepting criminal intelligence and crime analysis as an integral part of police operations appear to be U.S.-based. Ratcliffe and Police Foundation (2007) noted,

More so than in many other countries, in the U.S. it is common for intelligence operatives to be sworn police officers, while crime analysts are most often civilians. The tendency for intelligence officers to refrain from sharing information is therefore compounded when the colleague that needs the information is a civilian. Some of the traditional reticence and mistrust that affects some sworn officers in regard to civilians
can manifest itself within the crime intelligence arena to the detriment of good intelligence flow. (p. 6)

In analyzing the role and acceptance of crime and intelligence analysis within law enforcement, researchers attempted to discern whether analysts were able to “fit in” with the law enforcement community (Taylor et al., 2007). While the ability to generalize results are limited (due to the low response rate, between 7 and 11%), the results provide data for consideration and further research. Analysts rated their attitudes toward sworn personnel as between somewhat and strongly positive, on average; however, they identify officers’ perceptions of analysts as “middle of the road” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 20). Moreover, 97% of analysts reported making an effort to understand the work of patrol officers. They rate their organizational fit within the law enforcement agency as between middle of the road and somewhat positive. They report similar results for management perceptions of analysts. Less than half (45%) of the analysts agreed, “Analysts are accepted within the ‘police culture’, and only 44% of the analysts believed that “patrol officers make effective use of crime analysts to solve crime and/or identify crime-related problems” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 20).

The problem appears to surpass simple perception of the analyst. It extends to their work and their potential to assist the officer’s crime-fighting efforts. Most analysts (82%) did not agree: “Patrol officers believe it is important to understand the work of analysts” or that “patrol officers make an effort to understand the work of analysts” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 162). About two-thirds of the analysts felt that patrol officers do not have the time to work proactively and problem-solve. In addition to the concerns analysts have about working with patrol officers, only about one-third of the analysts agreed that “generally speaking, law enforcement agencies make effective use of crime analysts to solve crime and/or process criminal intelligence” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 162).
In light of other officers’ concerns about the legitimacy of crime analysis, it seems logical to ensure that sworn and civilian personnel are co-assigned to analysis units in departments where resources allow. However, occupational prestige is significantly lower for “crimes prevented” rather than “crimes detected,” which may encourage police officers to bid for action-oriented street positions in lieu of crime and intelligence analysis work (Sheptycki, 2004, p. 20). With sworn officers who accept the assignment to a crime analysis unit, however, little or no impact on future promotional opportunities or on level of compensation was experienced (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). This was in stark contrast with civilian analysts, with similar job duties and responsibilities, who received substantially less monetary compensation compared to sworn personnel (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Researchers noted that retention of good civilian staff remains difficult due to low pay, lack of a vertical or lateral progression career or promotion structure, and internal and external competition for good analysts (John & Maguire, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Expanding lateral and vertical promotional opportunities, as well as performance-based pay increases for civilians, may increase staff retention (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002).

While analysts believed that leadership generally supported them, limited research has revealed that they perceived less acceptance and understanding from patrol personnel (Cope, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007). One way to remedy the incongruity includes ensuring that officers, analysts, and management personnel receive regular, consistent training in crime analysis and intelligence. Both training and career development efforts for police officers and analysts (Cope, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007) may encourage collaboration, use, and understanding of crime and intelligence analysis within law enforcement.

In an agency striving for the integration of crime analysis, training of all sworn personnel is important, because they must understand the capabilities of crime analysis
as well as the purpose of the crime analysis products…. Training of sworn personnel would not discuss how the products are created, but would focus on what they mean, how they can be used, and examples of successful use of the products. Training should be tailored to the responsibilities of the individuals attending the training and should seek to improve data collection at the call-for-service and crime-report level (i.e., poor data collection results in poor crime analysis). Crime analysis training can also be integrated into the normal police training (e.g., academy training, field officer training, and in-service training) of the agency. (Taylor et al., 2011, pp. 42-43)

Current crime and intelligence analysis training within the United States remains limited and is not seen as a high priority for many law enforcement agencies (Johnson, 2010). Many agencies expect to hire analysts with already-existing crime analysis skill sets, despite analysts’ varying educational backgrounds and experience. Analysts must teach themselves (Ratcliffe, 2005); furthermore, in-service training stays limited and sporadic, largely dependent on time constraints and the availability of resources. Training tends to be prevalent for entry-level personnel, and it focuses on basic, routine tasks: counting rather than analyzing crime (O'Shea & Nicholls, 2002). As a result, basic crime analysis (data manipulation and presentation) flourishes, while strategic analysis, critical thinking, and higher-level data analysis activities languish.

Leaders

Intelligence managers actively direct and utilize strategic intelligence. In addition to the responsibilities held by supervisors, law enforcement executive staff dedicate the resources necessary for ILP to succeed (Dorn et al., 2009), while a lack of commitment from leadership can hinder the progress of ILP initiatives (John & Maguire, 2004). Law enforcement managers oversee the flow of information to and from the intelligence unit. They ensure subordinates’ participation in ILP, and they encourage and supervise traditional and nontraditional information source development (e.g., confidential informants, community liaisons). Senior leaders require timely, accurate intelligence to develop priorities, promote an
intelligence collection and sharing environment, and inform appropriate decisions (Dorn et al., 2009).

One of the hallmarks of ILP is that executives and supervisors have direct responsibility for properly managing intelligence, generating intelligence products, and directing the use of ILP. Managers must influence performance within the agency, balancing internal resources against external pressure while ensuring productivity within the organization (Cho and Ringquist, 2010). O’Shea and Nicholls (2002, 2003) posited that the energy and the vision of the crime analysis unit’s leader appear linked to the success of the unit. While front-line officers have autonomy in many of their daily activities, police supervisors must understand and encourage intelligence-led activities, allocating and directing proper resources to address the agency’s priority intelligence requirements. Managers and police executives play an integral role in ILP, from managing the intelligence unit’s personnel and products, to structuring the unit, to identifying and cultivating clients and achieving action (Quarmby & Young, 2010).

Mastrofski (2006) noted the gap between “willingness and capacity” (p. 20) of police managers to use new technology, including analytic tools and mapping. He ascribed this to inadequate training with the technological tools, accompanied by habit (i.e., a business as usual approach to dealing with analysis). Coupled with law enforcement officers’ notorious antipathy for recording and reporting, analysts are left with “junk in – junk out” (Mastrofski, 2006, p. 29) to analyze. Unlike some researchers, however, he is optimistic, noting, “Occupational culture does not change overnight” (p. 29). Police officers may become more appreciative of criminal intelligence analysis since newly hired officers are more adept with computers and technology. He also anticipated that police agencies would draw on civilian
hires for this specialty area. A remaining challenge, however, included “creating a sufficiently large class of adept internal ‘consumers’ for this information – consumers who will use the information to guide their work. This will take time” (Mastrofski, 2006, pp. 29-30). He suggested that further research is necessary to determine whether police agencies could develop an “information and analysis culture” (Mastrofski, 2006, pp. 29-30).

In comparing the ILP movement with law enforcement’s struggle to adopt community policing, management must influence and guide their subordinates’ behavior and activities (Engel & Worden, 2003) if criminal intelligence analysis is to have any longevity or success. Community policing research demonstrates that officers’ priorities seem to play a minimal part in their daily work activities; however, their perceptions of their managers’ priorities (which, by the way, are often mistaken) play a greater role in influencing their daily activities (Engel & Worden, 2003). Since managers tend to agree that law enforcement and administration could use analysis, but officers might view it as slightly less useful (Phillips, 2012), supervisors must clearly communicate their goals and directives to subordinate personnel to influence their policing activities (Engel & Worden, 2003).

By 2002, as part of their strategic planning activities, many New Zealand police forces adopted ILP, providing an opportunity to examine effectiveness within those organizations (Ratcliffe, 2005). The author interviewed 50 leaders and intelligence personnel from three agencies. However, adoption of intelligence-led policing terminology is significantly easier than adopting the management and administration tenets implied in the ILP model (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). While police practitioners in New Zealand expressed excitement about the potential benefits of ILP (Carter, 2011), managerial disengagement occurred in adopting and communicating the specifics of ILP. Police departments may state a mission or a vision that
incorporates crime and intelligence analysis, but they fail to properly develop a strategic plan within their agency that emphasizes fully utilizes of analysis in operations.

Management personnel should consist of intelligence analysts’ primary clients, regularly engaged in prioritizing police activities. However, in many cases, New Zealand analysts could not identify their agency’s target priorities (Ratcliffe, 2005). Ratcliffe (2005) also noted decision-makers’ absence of formal requests for intelligence analysis as evidence of the detachment between strategy and communication. Leadership did not clearly understand ILP, causing frustration. Researchers cited the disjuncture between New Zealand’s management staff and their analysts as confirmation that the agencies must reexamine and reengage the ILP model within their organizations (Ratcliffe, 2005; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). This reinforced their need for education and training throughout the various levels of command and responsibility within the agencies.

Phillips (2012) observed a similar pattern in a survey examining the attitudes of police managers about the use of analysis in policing. Phillips asked more than four hundred supervisors to provide their impressions of crime analysis. These managers from around the country attended professional development courses at the FBI National Academy in Quantico and represented a convenience sample of attendees (Phillips, 2012). The results seemed uniform. Managers within agencies employing crime analysts believed that police culture accepted analysts. Most managers agreed with the statements that they encouraged officers to use the results of analysis in their daily work and that administration understood the need for analysis. They agreed, somewhat less strongly, that their officers saw and understood the need for analysis (Phillips, 2012). These results indicate that while law enforcement agencies and
management have begun to adapt to crime analysis and ILP, it is probable that complete, agency-wide implementation has not resulted (Phillips, 2012).

Researchers noted additional similarities, transcending agency affiliation and country boundaries, in the engagement and performance of managers and executives. Quarmby and Young (2010) referred to Australian intelligence managers as the “meat in the sandwich” (p. 229), responsible for maintaining clear and open communication between clients and analysts. To facilitate the collection of information, managers build relationships between analysts, clients, and stakeholders. In his study of ILP in New Zealand, Ratcliffe (2005) concluded, “Intelligence staff who worked in environments with definite leadership, clear areas of responsibility and accountability, and a structured command and control environment expressed confidence as to who they thought could impact on crime reduction strategies” (p. 444).

However, this role does not come easily to law enforcement managers, who feel accustomed to functioning in a hierarchical, paramilitary organization. Several observers noted the difference between rhetoric and reality, as leadership dealt with new personnel and differing organizational goals. In a study of ILP within the New Jersey State Police, Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) noted that conflict persists within the ranks as managers try to understand and accept a new, enhanced role for civilian analysts in the criminal intelligence world. Phillips (2012) suggested that gradual acceptance amongst supervisors might occur as agencies formalized the role of crime analyst within their organization.

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7 Clients are requestors and recipients of intelligence products; intelligence might have relevance to stakeholders but they are less likely to participate in "setting the parameters of the intelligence work" (Ratcliffe & Police Foundation, 2007; Quarmby and Young, 2010: xv).
Ratcliffe (2005) identified additional reasons for the failure of crime analysis and intelligence products within law enforcement environment.

The inexperience of senior managers in handling intelligence material, the apparent irrelevance of this strategic domain to street-level officers, and that training and strategic intelligence practice is rare, resulting in uncertainty about the tasking of practitioners and interpretation of intelligence products. (Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 4).

Other researchers mentioned their concern about senior staff, who often lack specific intelligence practitioner background, resulting in little insight into the analytic process and poor direction for analysts (Derbentseva et al., 2010; Quarmby & Young, 2010). These disadvantages result in managers who cannot understand or communicate the role, responsibilities, and necessity of criminal intelligence analysis. Interviews with New Zealand’s law enforcement executives revealed the basic assumption amongst them includes that decision makers and police understand what ILP entails, resulting in “business as usual but under a new name” (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 436).

Even the United Kingdom’s NIM cannot solve the internal management problems inherent in police agencies, since it “does not examine if operational commanders are able to understand and apply the intelligence products or if they use them to create effective and evidentially sound crime reduction strategies” (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 438). In addition, “assigning dedicated resources to this assignment can divert those resources from other traditional or accepted police tasks. Police administrators must be willing to dedicate resources, such as funding, personnel, or space, to the analysis of information” (Phillips, 2012, p. 18). Unfortunately, in most of the research to date, leadership has not incorporated law enforcement intelligence into planning or resource prioritization and allocation (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005). With approximately 18,000 police agencies in the United States, smaller
agencies may believe that they do not have the capability for analysis or the resources to employ analysts.

Larger agencies that may have more assets to dedicate to law enforcement intelligence analysis may not prioritize training management or other personnel in either criminal intelligence analysis or the utilization of intelligence. Current intelligence analysis training within the United States is limited (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). Schools only offer a few intelligence managerial courses, and these courses remain subject to grant money availability and instructor time constraints. However, recent researchers in the United States have demonstrated a positive correlation between receiving crime analysis training and acceptance of crime analysis (Carter, 2011; Phillips, 2012). Administrators who had experienced analysis training seemed less likely to agree that leadership should reallocate resources, dedicated to analysis, to patrol or investigations. Administrators whose agencies employed analysts seemed more likely to believe that their personnel (i.e., both administrative and street officers) recognized the need for crime analysis, as well as supported crime analysis training within the police academy curricula (Phillips, 2012). Ultimately, educated leaders demanded better analytic results. O’Shea and Nicholls (2002, 2003) recommended that law enforcement agencies should collaborate with professional groups, research organizations, and/or academics for assistance in meeting training, resource, and educational gaps.

While researchers heralded managerial accountability as a cornerstone of ILP (Ratcliffe, 2005), what were supervisors and managers doing to direct, constrain, and guide ILP discretion? Analysis of police practice failed to support incorporation of analysis more than superficially (Cope, 2004). Unfortunately, the detachment between managers’ understanding and employing ILP as an agency-wide strategy demonstrates that rhetoric about
the importance of crime analysis in policing remains acceptable, in lieu of demonstrable results. One also must study whether the interaction between civilian intelligence analysts and law enforcement managers is similar to the relationship between law enforcement officers and their supervisors. For example, one may question whether civilian professionals are accorded a level of responsibility matching their roles within the department. Law enforcement management must balance competing priorities and an array of information when making decisions, and executives must ensure that their participation in the process is evidence-based influence, rather than interference-based (Ratcliffe, 2005).

Culture

During the past several decades, researchers have extensively written about the existence of law enforcement culture (i.e., attitudes and values shared amongst an occupational group; Paoline, 2001). Crank (1998) defined culture as, “Dense in values and beliefs, rituals, habits, full of historical prescriptions and common sense that guide action. Culture processes information, but in value-laden ways and in moral predispositions that are self-affirming” (p. 5). Over time, the understanding of police organizations has evolved from identifying police culture as a monolithic set of shared beliefs and attitudes to the realization that a number of typologies of police behavior exist. Rather than a unifying set of values, beliefs, and practices that exist despite agency affiliation, one may view culture as varying from agency to agency (Paoline, 2001). Contributing factors may depend on various aspects, including the bifurcation between management personnel and street officer (Reuss-Ianni, 1983), the tension inherent between the occupational environment and the organizational environment (Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 2003), group solidarity, themes of loose coupling (Crank, 1998; Manning, 1995), and officers’ belief systems (Worden, 1995).
While researchers continued to examine the determinants of and contributing factors to variation in police typologies, application of current knowledge to the study of ILP leads to a number of intriguing questions. Police culture traditionally has a reputation for cynicism, suspicion, and solidarity (Cope, 2004; Reiner, 1992). Based on this supposition, how does police culture guide officer strategies for dealing with the unknown? Do certain belief systems affect the understanding and use of criminal intelligence?

Current research seemed largely silent about the interaction between officers and intelligence analysis, although one frequently saw references to ILP relying on open, two-way communication between street officers and intelligence personnel. Street-level officers, as one of the most important sources for intelligence, collect information that people have provided to intelligence personnel; nevertheless, one significant problem includes that the police “must know culture” places a premium on controlling that information (Cope, 2004, p. 193). Police may “know” a great deal, but reticence to share or communicate that information makes them the sole point of contact (Cope, 2004, p. 193).

While researchers noted that executives, management, and street officers did not understand how criminal intelligence and analysis “fit” in police work (Ratcliffe, 2005), it might derive from “the ambiguity around their role, the pervasive lack of knowledge about analysis, and their position within police organizational hierarchy” (Cope, 2004, p. 194). These factors limit the role of criminal intelligence analysts. Cope (2004) posited that the overall mistrust stemmed from police, who did not understand analysis and its potential to aid in decreasing crime. In return, analysts do not understand policing (Cope, 2004). Coupled with the perception that civilians remain on unequal footing with sworn personnel, police viewed analysts as silent partners in the law enforcement community. Some researchers
mentioned that the paramilitary hierarchy of law enforcement results in analysts who are intimidated by police personnel and the police organization (Cope, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007). Manning (1995) described officers’ predilection to maintain “an edge” (p. 20) of authority, which might broaden the divide between police and non-sworn personnel. Further investigation of these factors may determine whether the problems arise from “organizational placement, job description, work duties, and priority of function rather than any intrinsic reluctance to use crime analysis by operational patrol officers” (Taylor et al., 2007, p. 165).

Using surveys, researchers have focused on the presence or absence of crime and intelligence analysis within law enforcement agencies (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, 2003; Taylor et al., 2007, 2011), but have not captured details about cultural and environmental factors that enhance or preclude the success of analysis within police agencies. Specifically in reviewing ILP efforts, researchers have accepted police culture as a barrier/obstacle to integrated analysis. Police culture is characterized as specifically inhibiting the adoption of ILP in the U.K., New Jersey, and New Zealand (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Nevertheless, solid evidence to support this is sparse. In the U.K., one may witness police officers reticent to respond to proactive taskings and assignments based on analysis; understandably, this becomes discouraging to analytic unit personnel (Cope, 2004). It is unknown whether officers’ reluctance to take action represents “reactive demands on the police or was a rejection of the tasking” (Cope, 2004, p. 198).

In police activities, researchers noted that officers “appear to substitute their own priorities for those of their supervisors,” absent specific directives and goals (Engel & Worden, 2003, p. 20). Enabled by vague organizational definitions of ILP, police culture, generally resistant to change (Cope 2004, Ratcliffe 2005), can passively or actively reject
initiatives adopted by their agency. This thwarting of reform can become problematic, especially as executive and command staff work to implement change within their organization. Agencies address reluctance to change using a variety of methods, including the “move them around” and “wait-them-out” approaches described in Ottawa’s (as cited in Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p. 20) community policing strategy, as managers demonstrated that they had a buy-in problem… [and] intractability in deferring operational control to the empowered frontline. As downward command conflicted with upward flow of information, Ottawa needed a way, which removed middle barriers. Regionalization and early retirement offered the promise of at least partially ‘flattening’ the organization. (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p. 20)

In contrast with community policing, successful ILP needs somewhat less than universal participation from street officers; however, it also requires complete buy-in by management. Despite the fact that police executives claim to accept crime analysis (Phillips, 2012), “the ‘cultural baggage’ carried by personnel… is often difficult to break down” (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 273). This situation limits the success of intelligence-based initiatives.

Investigative units, within the police, primarily provide tactical crime support, which is sometimes referred to as case-based policing (Cope, 2004; Quarmby & Young, 2010). The case-based approach, which normally provides instant action, guides officers’ thinking and prioritization, while tips and leads provide immediate results. Such a strategy often precludes police from considering more proactive, “intelligence-led” (Cope, 2004, p. 198) policing, because it does not provide concrete results or immediate action. As crime intelligence analysis meets sworn law enforcement personnel, experiential knowledge or the “way things really work” (Cope, 2004, p. 198) on the street intersects with the rigorous theoretical and technical nature of the analytic process performed by professional analysts. This mindset
encourages police officers to act as the *experts*, in control of their own domain within a legitimate, hierarchical rank-and-file structure (Cope, 2004). Acceptance of non-sworn personnel, “recognizing individuals for their role, rather than rank … would require a fundamental cultural shift in how police and civilian roles are conceptualized” (Cope, 2004, p. 199).

As previously mentioned, civilian analysts often struggle for acceptance and recognition within law enforcement agencies as the “new arrivals” (Cope, 2004, p. 198) into the occupational subculture of law enforcement intelligence analysis (Sheptycki, 2004). Anecdotal accounts noted that police culture can be alienating to civilians, especially since criminal intelligence information is sensitive, and officers believe that intelligence should stay guarded and maintained against non-police influence (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Therefore, intelligence becomes a “precious commodity” (Ratcliffe & Police Foundation, 2007, p. 29) controlled by sworn personnel. As a result, civilian analysts often function with limited information within the web of information communication (Sheptycki, 2004). This simultaneously diminishes the effectiveness of crime and intelligence products and adversely affects their reputation within the department. Posner (2005) found similar problems with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (p. 21). Internal recruitment efforts for intelligence analysts have drawn primarily from clerical personnel, who received limited training and had to perform non-analytical duties, adversely affecting perceptions of intelligence analysis throughout their agency (Posner, 2005).

Other researchers noted identical struggles as civilian law enforcement intelligence analysts tried to engage in analysis. For instance, “It was not uncommon for young female staff trained as analysts to report being given ‘inappropriate’ tasks” (Sheptycki, 2004, p. 20),
such as typing memos or performing data entry duties. Crime analysts, normally reticent to assert themselves within an unfamiliar environment, report having to “sell” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 20) themselves to officers within the department in hopes of gaining credibility and reputation. They often accomplish this action by performing tasks outside their job description, in hopes of earning trust and a reciprocal relationship with street personnel. This then creates a cyclical deterioration in the role of law enforcement intelligence analysts, who must perform tactical intelligence-related work based on the officers’ expectations. Without proper managerial accountability, the potential impact of intelligence analysis will be greatly diminished.

In the absence of empirical evidence, one may propose possible hypotheses for further investigation. Cultural factors present a concern when implementing reform (e.g., ILP and other analysis-driven reform efforts). One must consider the importance of culture and organizational factors when dissecting the successes and failures of law enforcement intelligence efforts. For example, in what specific ways does police culture function as a barrier or obstacle to analysis efforts? Does a “civilian culture” (Cope, 2004, p. 197) exist within police forces, or do analysts attempt to embed themselves into the existing police culture? If they must influence sworn decision-makers, it is necessary for civilians to transcend those cultural barriers. Therefore, how can crime intelligence analysts win the trust and respect of officers without subverting their roles and responsibilities within ILP?
Chapter 3
Measuring What Matters

Performance Measures

Performance measurement represents an often neglected but key aspect of policing. Up to this point, systemic measurement and strategic planning (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002; Roberts, 2006) have been difficult for law enforcement to implement. Traditionally, police executives amalgamate various outputs and outcomes⁸ to approximate policing results, such as decreases in violent crime rates, response times to emergencies, and comparison of citywide crime categories to other, similar-sized jurisdictions (Roberts, 2006). However, these measures fail to account for the processes and systems within police agencies. As a result, “Police practices are well understood within the police world, and the reporting, designed for external audiences, is a shadowy figure” (Manning, 2009, p. 20). In addition, performance measures, which fail to gauge and select appropriate indicators, result in an inadequate picture of the organization: “In an organizational philosophy that is fixated with performance indicators, what can be measured ends up being what is considered important” (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 446).

Nevertheless, proper performance measurement demonstrates effective management of police resources (Roberts, 2006). A robust system incorporates clear, measurable objectives (e.g., measures processes, resources, and project/activity impact), encourages personnel to respond in innovative ways, and measures the impact of such responses to determine their level of success (Roberts, 2006, p. 18). This management paradigm reflects not only the

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⁸ For further discussion of outputs - actions taken by police, and outcomes - societal results that occur as a result of police action affecting perceptions of police organizational legitimacy, see Moore and Braga (2003, pp. 2-6).
effectiveness of operations, but it also demonstrates the managerial climate of the law enforcement agency and contributes to the legitimacy of police practice (Bayley, 1996; Roberts 2006). In addition, consistent performance outcomes measure for criminal intelligence and may minimize the impact of occupational subculture. For example, “When the organizations that make up the police sector are commonly evaluated against commonly held measures of agency success, it may be less easy to maintain substantially different subcultures within and across the sector” (Sheptycki, 2004, p. 327).

In ILP, the performance measurement dilemma is magnified. In addition to balancing demands of various consumers of intelligence, internal considerations (e.g., proper and timely communication of intelligence throughout chain of command and to various units) complicates attempts to measure and quantify appropriate standards. Therefore, determining the efficacy of ILP is no easy task. Despite the importance of measuring the quality of analysis and intelligence to manage scarce resources most effectively, performance measures remain elusive. In most of the crime analysis units visited by O’Shea and Nicholls (2002), unit-specific performance measures seemed absent and lacked “rational methods to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of their output” (p. 73). Minimal evidence of formal performance metrics highlights the transitory relationship between the crime intelligence unit and their customers, while emphasizing a substantial deficiency in organizational effectiveness, a “deficiency [that] appears to be linked to the overall ad hoc nature of the relationship between crime analysis and the targets to whom they provide support” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 15). In addition, thus far, no impact or logic models for intelligence analysis have assisted with clarifying the discrepancies.
However, one must observe caution when designing and incorporating standardized criminal intelligence performance measures. John and Maguire (2006) noted that local-level officers complained that national intelligence performance measures unduly influenced the strategy of their management personnel, adversely affecting local concerns, resources, and strategies. Rather than a two-way process, where local priorities informed strategy and operations and vice versa, management took their cues from the national-level strategy. While this type of conflict is expected, it does raise concerns about law enforcement personnel maintaining autonomy and responsibility while balancing competing national and local priorities.

**Evaluating Analysis**

While tactical crime intelligence analysis flourishes in the law enforcement environment, it appears that ILP and strategic intelligence analysis have yet to become an integral part of police agencies or their evaluation mechanisms. In many organizations, analysts are viewed as “silent partners” (Cope, 2004, p. 198) in the intelligence process (theoretically important, but collectively, their products are overlooked and ignored by management), especially during strategic, tactical, and operational planning. Instead, analytic products are used post-intervention to justify operations or are requested at the conclusion of operations to summarize events for court proceedings or management purposes (Cope, 2004).

Assessment of the quality of intelligence analysis is largely subjective (Derbentseva et al., 2010). Without structured evaluation or feedback, analysts rely on anecdotal evidence to “draw conclusions about the value of their work. Neither the analysts, nor the analysts’ managers are clear about how [n]or how well targets use their product” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 16). In interviews with Canadian federal intelligence supervisors about the quality of
work done by subordinate analytic personnel, Derbentseva et al. (2010) highlighted the implications of assessing analytic conclusions (i.e., both product and process). While ensuring analytic integrity involves critical evaluation of both the analytic rigor and the intelligence outcomes, intelligence supervisors largely cannot evaluate and validate presented factors due to largely absent measures for intelligence products (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). Most units have not conducted a systematic assessment of the outputs of crime analysis, which would require “formal mechanisms” to determine the value of products to end users (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003, p. 20). In the resulting vacuum, some agencies rely on interviews and surveys to determine the effectiveness of intelligence analysis products, such as strategic reports, intelligence bulletins, and intelligence cables. The results entailed mixed data; for example, a recent audit revealed that recipients of DEA information believed that the information is both useful and reliable. However, some respondents chafed at the prolonged vetting period for information, noting that significant delays existed in receiving operationally useful information (US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division [USDOJ OIG], 2008).

Part of the disjuncture may result from communication gaps between the target audience and the intelligence unit. Ideally, law enforcement officers balance society’s demands for reactive police response with the importance of consistent, proactive information gathering. In ILP, officers must understand and respond to standing and ad-hoc priority intelligence requirements, collecting appropriate information in response to intelligence requirements and tasks issued by the agency. Officers enter information into information systems to communicate information to the intelligence unit, and they review, utilize, and provide feedback regarding intelligence products (Dorn et al., 2009). Typical complaints from
police about intelligence products usually include the message that “analysis [doesn’t] tell us anything we don’t know already” (Cope, 2004, p. 180).

Other researchers have demonstrated that while law enforcement officers might seem aware of analysis, they are unaware of the intelligence services available to them. For example, in an examination of a specialty unit in Washington State’s Attorney General’s Office, 96% of criminal investigators agreed that timelines were important in their investigations; however, only 37% seemed aware that the specialty unit could provide that service to them (Johnson, 2010, p. 20). The problem extends beyond field personnel, since supervisors, asked the same question, resulted in similar percentages (Johnson, 2010). Additional questions about the availability of gang affiliation information demonstrated that only 40% of investigators expressed awareness that this intelligence was available for their cases (Johnson, 2010).

Ratcliffe (2009) characterized the broader issue, however, as a lack of understanding cultural and organizational factors. He suggested that redesign of the organization’s reward structure – basing promotions or transfers on participation in intelligence-led activities – might prompt positive change within law enforcement agencies (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

The apparent lack of connectivity between strategic decision-making and tactical issues means that few street-level officers appreciate the value of strategic intelligence; to them, a broader, longer-term view of the criminal environment can often seem irrelevant. A common complaint heard around police stations is that the intelligence section is a “black hole,” where information goes in but nothing comes out. This can even be heard from some crime analysts in regard to the strategic process. Yet this apparent gulf between the tactical and strategic levels is rarely real. It is more a reflection of a lack of communication to explain policy positions in the law enforcement world. It is also possible that some in strategic intelligence fail to accept that they must continue to “sell” the strategic product at all levels of an organization. (Ratcliffe, 2009, pp. 4-5)
Evaluating Products

Despite efforts to standardize law enforcement intelligence analysis during the past dozen years, analysis products have been largely absent from intelligence evaluation efforts. Past efforts to evaluate intelligence have focused on quantitative, tangential measures (i.e., number of bulletins disseminated, number of customers served; Moore, 2007). Federal, state, local, and tribal units widely disseminate products, such as crime analysis and intelligence bulletins; however, products rarely receive comprehensive evaluation and feedback. To ascertain levels of satisfaction with the analysis products produced, many law enforcement agencies have incorporated customer feedback surveys and appended them to their crime and intelligence products, usually resulting in poor response rates. These surveys vary in length and depth, as well as the quality and type of feedback requested from the customer. Such variability, accompanied by lack of sampling rigor, leads to suspect results. In addition, if consumers have not received training in the use or application of intelligence products, their responses to surveys result in little value, as they cannot properly assess the quality of that intelligence.

One of the frequently cited primary problems concerns data quality. Criminal intelligence products result from information available to analysts, rather than the information available to the police (Cope, 2004). As previously mentioned, analysts frequently have significant knowledge gaps. Officers may not collect key details, valuable to ascertaining crime patterns (e.g., victimization details, or criminal associates). This limits the ability of analysts to perform quality analysis; instead, they become reliant upon information contained within computer systems (Cope, 2004, p. 193), again fueling the street officers’ perceptions of the intelligence unit as a “black hole” for information (Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 25). In ILP
evaluations, researchers characterized the variety of intelligence products as attributable to analytic skills accompanied by a lack of standardization. For example:

The main problems around intelligence products were the variety in quality (and availability) of strategic assessments, and the lack of standardization (and again variation in quality) of tactical assessments. Clear training needs were apparent here. However, there were also strong signs that quality improved rapidly with ‘practice’, providing that analysts received encouragement and constructive feedback from TCG [Tasking and Coordination Group] members. Without this, there could be dangers of a ‘vicious circle’ developing, whereby TCGs lose respect for products and those providing them lose the incentive to put energy into improving their quality. (Maguire & John, 2004, p. 5)

Further investigation into the quality of analytic reporting reveals a confusing array of possibilities to management and analysts, as various stakeholders might perceive differing product value. Articulating criteria that assesses the quality of intelligence products may highlight much of the confusion surrounding expectations about the quality of criminal intelligence analysis.

The end goal includes providing actionable intelligence deriving from previously unknown information. Current criteria for evaluating intelligence analysis products and establishing valid work process includes readiness, timeliness, usability, relevance, accuracy, and objectivity (all represent qualitative measures; Brei, 1996; Moore, Krizan, & Moore, 2005). One may use readiness (i.e., the availability of intelligence systems to respond to requests) and timeliness (i.e., delivery of intelligence while still actionable) to evaluate the organization’s ability to provide intelligence to customers/clients. The other four principles include accuracy (of sources and data), objectivity (of judgments), usability (of resulting intelligence communications), and relevance (of information to consumer’s specific requirements; Moore et al., 2005). Law enforcement agencies can employed these factors to judge the strengths and weaknesses of their intelligence products.
Moore et al. (2005) presented a competency-based model to evaluate analysts and intelligence analysis, although they do not further define or delineate measures (p. 210).

Figure 5. Competency model for evaluating intelligence (Moore et al., 2005).

In the figure above, the authors outlined a concept model that balances the analytic process with the analytic product, encouraging analysts to attend to quality content while ensuring timely, efficient results. It is instructive to focus on the “Evaluating Analysis” portion of the model, as most researchers have prescribed analyst competencies or have described the various species of intelligence analysis. Law enforcement intelligence process and products, however, appear more difficult to conceptualize and routinize. Therefore, in-depth
examination of both process and products would be instructive for new, emerging, and established criminal intelligence units.
Chapter 4

The Current Study

Current researchers studying ILP have provided an assortment of perspectives about the personnel involved: analysts (Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2005; Taylor et al., 2007), analyst managers (Cope, 2004; Derbentseva et al., 2010; Ratcliffe, 2005), police executives (Phillips, 2012), and field intelligence and informant handlers (Cope, 2004). Additionally, police officers who were end users of analytic unit products have had limited feedback as part of Cope’s (2004) research and as part of an internal evaluation of the DEA (USDOJ, 2008). Despite these studies, however, what researchers know about the practice and application of crime and intelligence analysis within federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies remains extremely limited.

Researchers have demonstrated that serious problems exist with the implementation of intelligence-led policing. Sheptycki (2004) noted, “At the strategic intelligence level, problems include technical, organizational, and cultural factors that are inhibiting a rapid adoption of the central tenets of intelligence-led policing” (p. 237). A strategic “intelligence lacuna” (Koper, 2004, p. 20) remains. Nationally and internationally, it becomes evident that police organizations which have adopted ILP have been unable to transition their analysts to performing strategic intelligence (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Evolving from well-entrenched “policing-led intelligence” (Cope, 2004) and “investigation-led intelligence” (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008, p. 20) is a struggle for law enforcement agencies worldwide. Analysts strive to gain acceptance with their sworn counterparts within police organizations by providing tactical, case-based intelligence. However, researchers noted an undercurrent of passive resistance against wholehearted acceptance of ILP that permeates every rank of police
organizations (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Instead of embracing ILP as a professional policing model to emulate, law enforcement officers perceive ILP as the next fad in policing models, which will soon result in replacement by another popular concept (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Confronting and overcoming these and other barriers to intelligence analysis in policing may encourage expansion of the organization-wide use of intelligence, rather than relegating it to a compartmentalized, underutilized function within the department.

The Study

Based on hypotheses generated by previous studies of law enforcement and criminal intelligence (Carter, 2011; Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, 2003; Phillips, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2005), this case study of crime and intelligence analysis in the APD examines the structure and function of APD’s ICU, as well as the creation, use, and usefulness of analysis. This case study takes a multifaceted approach to understand the genesis of the information unit and the current role of intelligence and analysis within the organization. To gain relevant detail and perspective about the APD, its practices, and the perceptions of its sworn and unsworn members, I utilized several methods: (a) interviews with personnel, (b) surveys of department members, and (c) an independent review of analytic documents.

The current fledgling field of ILP in the United States reveals that the knowledge base about criminal intelligence and law enforcement intelligence units is limited. Thus, a case study of a police department’s use of crime and intelligence analysis provides previously unavailable details about the inner workings of a large urban police agency. One may use this case study as a departure point for additional research to understand similarities and differences amongst the theory of crime and intelligence analysis; and actual police practice.
Grounded in previous literature examining implementation of ILP by police agencies, I developed several hypotheses as departure points for inquiry and discussion. Specifically, evidence gathered support or disprove the following themes:

H1: Ashton Police Department management identifies with the rhetoric and terminology of intelligence-led policing but will also adhere to elements of other policing models, such as CompStat and community policing.

H2: A police department views crime and intelligence analysis as a distinct function that is differentiated, and separated, from policing activities. Rather than intelligence-led policing in which analysis is the driver of policing activity, and fully integrated into department management’s decision-making process, analysis is instead used as evidence to support pre-determined actions.

H3: Intelligence-led policing and crime analysis are delegated as specific responsibilities to the ICU. As a result, it is unlikely that personnel in other divisions of the Ashton Police Department will identify and articulate that they hold specific roles in the department’s criminal intelligence analysis activities.

H4: The majority of intelligence generated by the ICU is tactical in nature, and descriptive rather than prescriptive.

H5: Who authors intelligence reports (sworn officers versus civilian personnel) will be as important as the quality of crime/intelligence analysis produced.

In addition, I address the following questions:

- How does this urban police agency understand, and use, crime analysis?
- Does the ICU serve all units, or primarily one unit?
- What are the roles, responsibilities, and training of personnel assigned to the ICU?
- Do police command personnel utilize criminal intelligence analysis when prioritizing and decision-making?
- Does the police agency employ an intelligence-led policing strategy, or some other model or combination of policing strategies?
- Can we identify specific organizational or individual factors that affect the use of crime and intelligence analysis?
- Do police officers seek out intelligence products?
- How do officers evaluate the analysis products they receive?
- What do officers do with analysis: how do they share information?

Methodology

The University at Albany Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved this research study in December 2015. The case study derived from three separate but
complementary components: (a) interviews of the ICU and command staff, (b) a department-wide survey, (c) and crime and intelligence analysis product review. I analyzed quantitative data (surveys) using Excel and qualitative (interview) data using NVivo.

Table 2  Population Studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Command Staff</td>
<td>7/22</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Information Coordination Unit</td>
<td>4/7</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product review</td>
<td>100 products</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>APD</td>
<td>120/450</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Semi-structured interviews of APD management and ICU members. For interviews, I contacted APD personnel via email and phone, and arranged for an interview time at their convenience during the months of January and February 2016. The original contact email included the basis of the study as well as an attachment (i.e., a letter from the police chief that gave permission for the research to occur). I provided each of the individuals who agreed to an interview with a copy of the IRB informed consent paperwork prior to initiating a discussion. Moreover, I obtained permission to record the interview for later transcription and reference from each participant.

- **Command staff.** During this stage of research (January 2016) there were 24 members of command staff, with two vacancies due to retirement. This category consisted of 17 lieutenants, which included three shift lieutenants and four detective lieutenants, five commanders, one deputy chief, and one chief. Responses were aggregated as a group; seven individuals completed an interview. There were no direct refusals. The remainder did not respond to the email, followed by a voice mail message, requesting an interview.

- **Information Coordination Unit (ICU).** Four interviews were completed of the seven members of the unit. Again, there were no direct refusals.
I recorded, transcribed, and initially analyzed 530 minutes of interviews using NVivo for overarching themes and commonalities. Since sample size was small, I anonymized responses to protect the identity of each respondent. I asked specific questions in all interviews (see Appendices A and B) to determine whether participants could reach consensus on certain key points. Furthermore, I encouraged participants to provide any additional information that they felt was relevant to this study. Specific information, obtained from interviews, was not shared with other participants, and the interview data were safeguarded.

In addition, results do not identify specific individuals. Although the population size of some potential survey groups (Chief of Police = 1, ICU supervisors = 2) remained too small to promise complete anonymity, I aggregated responses for the purposes of this case study, and did not identify individuals. Table 3 displays a summary of participant demographic information. I grouped participants into ICU and command personnel categories during analysis. This grouping allowed me to focus on the similarities and differences between ICU and command divisions.

I used thematic analysis to analyze and interpret data collected from the 11 participants in the study. NVivo 11 coding software was used to store and code data. While I used NVivo to analyze results, comparison of the themes generated through the computerized analysis version versus the results coded by hand revealed that the hand coding provided richer detail. Material from both is included herein where they apply to the study.

Table 3  Summary of Participant Demographic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A, B, C, D</td>
<td>ICU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, F, G, H, I, J, K</td>
<td>Command Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Police department survey.** In addition to individual interviews, I examined specific understandings and uses of crime and intelligence analysis by officers and civilians. The results derived from anonymous, online surveying, via SurveyMonkey, to gauge the perspectives of individuals and groups (e.g., management, analysts, street officers, and stakeholders who are recipients of APD crime analysis). Based on previous exploratory research of police officers’ use of analysis conducted by McLean and Worden (2009), I provided personnel with examples of analysis products and asked them to gauge the effectiveness, usefulness, and readability.

I invited all APD personnel to participate. No one was mandated or compelled to participate; furthermore, I provided all potential subjects with the informed consent script, explaining participants could opt out of the survey or skip any questions. I emailed potential participants as an introduction to the study, and I referred them to an external link on SurveyMonkey. Rather than email department members from an external email address, the APD IT group set up a temporary address to use for purposes of notification about the survey. After only receiving 55 responses, a reminder was sent to the department after 6 days, notifying the department that the survey would close in another day. The follow-up email encouraged respondents to complete the brief survey, and I mentioned that if an additional 100 people completed the survey, I would donate to the John Finn Scholarship Fund. Sixty-five additional people responded to the survey, for 120 respondents in total. The survey data were collected and downloaded to a personal password-protected computer. I analyzed survey data using Excel to provide a basis for interpreting perceptions of analytic products as well as department-wide information-sharing efforts.
Analytical products review. Working with the ICU produced the third and final phase to incorporate an objective review of the analytic products. Expert evaluation of crime and intelligence analysis products provided an independent perspective that one could then compare to the reviews provided by other stakeholders. Examining approximately 100 analysis products for utility and efficacy, I could understand the different types of analysis produced by the ICU, including the similarities and differences. Obtaining the analytic products was efficient; the ICU set up access to a computer and provided their intranet address, allowing me to download the relevant products to review. These products were quite useful in evaluating the characteristics of the products disseminated by the unit; therefore, I used redacted examples to construct the survey instrument for the department-wide survey.

Weaknesses

As I conducted the qualitative research, such as interviews and surveys, I had to acknowledge that subjects might alter their behavior or attempt to influence the interviewer. Reviewing the IRB survey and interview instruments and outlining the safeguards taken to ensure confidentiality represented methods to reassure participants that specific responses would not attribute to any individual. However, the possibility remained that the reported results include approximations and indications of practices and procedures, rather than certainty. This situation represents one challenge of conducting person-centric analysis rather than quantitative analyses.

In addition, several of the questions dealt with the historical evolution of crime and intelligence analysis within the department. Despite management-level rank in the department, it became evident that most of the participants had substantively different assignments and responsibilities across the years. As a result, in many cases, answers to the
historical questions represented best guesses. Rather than reporting conjecture, I omitted those responses. In the future, reaching out to retirees from the department (i.e., those present for the discussions and negotiations) might provide a better perspective about the genesis of crime and intelligence analysis within the ICU.

Advertising the online survey presented a challenge; furthermore, a recently retired department member advised me that many officers were unlikely to open the e-mails. While he suggested that the subject line “Free Beer and Wings!” would likely get my email the attention it needed, I elected to retain a more neutral subject header with the survey link, “APD: Help Needed.” In addition, the department-wide survey was conducted during a time when department members had recently been surveyed by other research interests. The department participated in roll call training and research-driven initiatives, and they might have been suffering from “survey fatigue” because of the attention focused on their activities and their actions. This likely affected the response rate, driving down the number of respondents to this survey. While less than an ideal situation, this situation represents a reality faced by many criminal justice researchers; and it includes a reminder that timing of survey opportunities may be subject to narrowly focused windows of opportunity.

**Trustworthiness of Research**

I took several steps to address issues of trustworthiness within the qualitative research paradigm. I made adjustments to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the present study (Shenton, 2004). Credibility was maintained by adopting well-established research methods and by incorporating researcher reflexivity during data collection and analysis procedures. I maintained transferability by providing information about the demographic information relevant to the study and disclosing the data collection
I ensured dependability by providing a detailed account of the research design, implementing data collection and analysis procedures, and addressing the detailed nuances of data collection throughout the study. Lastly, I ensured confirmability by reporting research limitations and potential researcher bias. This involves the use of detailed methodological procedures and explanations for methodology choices made within the study.

**Summary of Methodology**

This case study supplied an in-depth, qualitative look at a police department, including its criminal intelligence and data analysis outputs and the sharing of intelligence and information throughout the agency. I used collected and collated data to construct a narrative about the creation, communication, and use of crime and intelligence analysis within the department. I realistically depicted criminal analysis in law enforcement today; moreover, the results can be used as a starting point to dispel misconceptions about unrealistic capabilities while generating new dialogue and hypotheses for future research and replication. This qualitative research generated ideas that I used to formulate one snapshot of the current state of law enforcement crime and intelligence analysis, which future researchers might use to refocus and guide future study efforts.

The end goal of this case study was to provide an in-depth look at criminal intelligence production and use; guide future research efforts; and provide APD with measured, informed feedback regarding its analysis processes. I questioned whether best practices were reflected in production, dissemination, and use of criminal intelligence analysis. Therefore, this fieldwork provides understanding and insight into the current “black box” of law enforcement criminal intelligence analysis. Using various methods to investigate the inputs and outputs of the analysis unit, along with identifying the structural and departmental factors that support or
detract from the work performed by the criminal intelligence unit, provides a richer and
deeper understanding of the factors affecting the initiation, production, and use of analysis
within law enforcement. The remainder of this study synthesizes the results of these three
paths of inquiry, and it concludes with implications and further research suggestions.
Chapter 5

Information Coordination Unit

I examined the historical aspect of crime analysis and intelligence use within the APD. What were the precursors to the ICU, and how did the process of developing the ICU occur during the last fifteen years? Interviews of ICU members and command staff set the foundation for this case study. In addition to the basic details about the ICU (i.e., number of people, their roles, and how they engage with the department), understanding historical origination can provide valuable insight into the thought processes of the people who foresaw the department’s future and designed their crime and intelligence analysis capabilities. One benefit to studying APD’s ICU includes that the unit has had a chance to mature, in both process and function, during the past decade, making this case study more relevant as an example to other departments looking to emulate a familiar model. Instead of studying crime and intelligence analysis as a recent initiative or program, I examined criminal intelligence as a long-standing practice and process within the police agency.

Historical Origins

As a research setting, Ashton’s police department, established in the mid-1800’s, is representative of police agencies along the eastern seaboard. As a large urban police force, Ashton employs approximately 330 officers for traditional law enforcement duties ranging from traffic enforcement to criminal investigations to specialty details, such as K9, Scuba, and a Mounted (horse) division. The department also employs approximately 140 civilian employees, mostly for booking, clerk, and dispatch duties. Since Ashton serves as a work hub for the region, officers provide services for a population of approximately 200,000 citizens during the day, which diminishes to about 98,000 people at night.
As is typical practice in many states, police officer hiring primarily derives from a civil service commission and standardized testing, followed by interviews, in-depth background checks, and polygraphs. Selected candidates are hired as probationary employees, and those without statewide police certification attend the state-run regional Police Academy for 6 months before they are assigned to on-the-job training under the supervision of a field-training officer. In addition, educational standards vary by department throughout the country. In Ashton, applicants must be 19 years old and have at least a General Equivalency Diploma (GED). As is typical in the region, 2013 base pay for an officer ($52,856) reflects strong lobbying power in a highly unionized state (Gaffney, 2015). In comparison with other jurisdictions in the region, Ashton’s entry-level salary remains competitive. State Police starting salary equals $66,905; furthermore, neighboring local departments have slightly lower base pay, with three jurisdictions bordering Ashton paying officers $51,235, $41,608, and $43,006 (Gaffney, 2015).

With moderately high turnover in police command staff during the past fifteen years, Ashton chiefs and commanders have applied different skills, strengths, and interests within their positions. As in many other police departments (O’Shea & Nichols, 2002), the role of information analysis emerged later in Ashton than in comparable departments on the East Coast. One of the first crime analysts started with APD, primarily collating Part I and Part II crimes for FBI reporting in 1999. The desire to field a more robust, intelligence-driven initiative was discussed at the command level; however, a lack of funding minimized their efforts. Two participants pointed to the designation of statewide grant funding in the early 2000s, specifically around 2004 to 2006, as providing the impetus for expansion of crime and intelligence analysis in Ashton. Although patrol officer familiarity was initially confined to
increased manpower via patrolling with the state police as ride-along partners through “Blue-Grey patrols,” command personnel recognized that the state grant funding “started to morph…. into equipment, data collection systems, the ICU unit itself, coordinating information gathering throughout units in the state.” (Participant G).

Department Policing Philosophy

Each model of policing (i.e., standard, intelligence-led, community, problem-oriented, and CompStat) includes strengths and weaknesses in orientation, implementation, and targeting. Discussion with participants revealed an evolution in orientation throughout the last two decades, as the APD has carried out various missions and ordered and rearranged priorities. For example, participants mentioned that the department officially engages in community policing; however, aspects of other models have been implemented as well, representing a combination of community, intelligence-led, and problem-oriented policing. Participants voiced their perceptions of the ways in which the police department performed community outreach, developed partnerships and relationships with the outside community, and consulted outside organizations. Policing strategies have shifted over time to incorporate community-based policing models. The participants noted the positive impacts of community engagement while incorporating policing strategies. However, they also noted that mutually respectful communication influenced the effectiveness of community engagement when forging positive relationships with the community.

APD’s policing philosophy has changed since the 1990s, but most participants stated that the department’s current primary focus included working with the community to build trusting relationships, solve ongoing problems, and ensure public safety. Participant J stated,

We’ve come to the realization that, without the help of the community, we can’t fix these crimes that are on the street. We can put Band-Aids here and there, but, really to
actually fix something, you can’t just come to the police department. You need the community’s help.

Community engagement focuses on strengthening trust and communication in neighborhoods. Participants revealed that their policing strategies involve collaborating with other government authorities, engaging with the community, and maintaining an active network of liaisons and sources of information. Participant F emphasized the role of community-based policing, coupled with crime and intelligence analysis:

Everybody’s a community police officer, so we take the concerns of the community, identify problems with them and then we’ll look for patterns of crime whether it’s car larcenies or an uptick in shootings. We’ll concentrate resources to address issues based on crimes reported through crime reports. The analysts will develop patterns and then we can direct resources to deal with that.

Participant H discussed community policing as the beat officer and Neighborhood Engagement Unit (NEU) officer’s “one-stop shopping” strategy. Rather than being purely call responsive, officers were responsible for handling previously ignored or lost complaints, such as working with codes enforcement to resolve concerns. They included APD’s front line representatives at meetings, listening and responding to community concerns. Participant K highlighted Ashton’s gun violence strategy, which involved prevention and focused deterrence, as a strategy requiring community participation, interaction, and engagement to accomplish their goals.

Several participants mentioned the cyclical nature of the department’s policing strategies. Participant H noted,
far as the social work. Years ago, families, community, found less of a need to reach out to police.

The current community policing, intelligence-led, problem-solving mashup has evolved after 20 years of trial and error. Across the years, noticeable barriers to their success have emerged in the form of buy-in from the department and the community and disconnect between neighborhoods and police. The department’s focus on CompStat/statistically driven policing, in the last decade, faced similar challenges. Participant K noted,

When I came on in the 90s there was an effort to go to community policing. It was a good effort. I think their department tried to go in the right direction. It was just ... There wasn’t the same amount of buy-in from either, at the department level, or even the community-level.

Then it went to very, very statistically driven. At a certain point in time, in the mid 90’s with the issues surrounding crack cocaine and violence surrounding drugs, I think there was a big disconnect between the community and the department. I think we really went heavy on the war against drugs, and then I think we went heavy against the statistical driven policing of driving down Part 1 crimes.

However, while state and national statistics measure the safety of the community in terms of violent and property crimes, community members are less likely to feel concerned with Part 1 crimes.

We’d go to community meetings and we’d have big maps, big PowerPoint presentations to be like, well no, look, all these crimes are down. You have no reason to feel unsafe. It was clear that there was a disconnect. They didn’t know who the officers were and they felt like they were being held prisoner in their houses. There were all kinds of cops in the area that they didn’t know who they were. The community made it clear to us that it wasn’t really acceptable what was going on.

Officers were involved in what I affectionately call chasing dots on a map and deploying people strategically. The community was clearly feeling like we were just an occupying force and... They made it known that they weren’t happy with what was going on. (Participant K)
As a consensus among the different models, Participant E discussed the current impacts of community-based policing, describing community-based policing strategies as a process that integrates intelligence-based policing:

I would imagine that we went back to the community policing model back in 2009 – 2010. Before that, we were using mostly intelligence-based policing as a deployment strategy; and now they’re kind of merged together.

We currently employ a neighborhood policing model, which still relies on intelligence-based policing, our approach to actually dealing with the community…. It’s more of a concept than program… a way of doing things, it’s a way of including a community voice in most of the things that we do. However, we do still use crime analysis and intelligence-based policing to deploy resources and to hopefully identify crime patterns before they get too large.

Participant A concurred with this timeline, noting that the intelligence-driven policing movement in the department occurred around 2009, but was quickly overtaken by data-driven policing. Another observer noted that elements of ILP are present, including a bit of CompStat, where the crime data were analyzed, and strategies based on data analysis.

Participant K mentioned,

No, we borrow ... we certainly use parts of that within community policing, and we use intelligence…. We don’t let ourselves get caught up so much in what the numbers are that we forget to have those communications with the community and don’t involve them. In the past we didn’t involve them, it was one of those “we know what’s best for you, so this is what we’re doing.”

Instead of selecting one specific model, APD uses complementary elements from several policing models to deal with victims, offenders, and locations. Community policing includes the department’s overarching philosophy. However, Ashton incorporates both ILP and a problem-oriented approach to neighborhood problems, and the department analyzes data to ensure that their efforts are beneficial to crime rates and community needs.
The Information Coordination Unit (ICU)

Researchers observe the first public recognition of the new ICU’s formalization within the department’s structure as a means of generating, synthesizing, and analyzing data in 2004.

The Information Coordination Unit (ICU) is one of the newest additions to the APD yet, it’s dramatically altered the way the Department does business. Some of the most salient benefits of employing cutting-edge technology are evidenced by the intelligent policing and rapid information sharing which has become standard practice in the APD. Along with these advancements comes a better ability to understand, analyze, and ultimately prevent crime. (Jennings & Krokoff, 2013, p. 18)

Interactive crime mapping and rapid access to crime information from state, regional, and local databases by mobile data terminals provided accurate and timely access to data. These factors are cited as hallmarks of this new method of crime control (Jennings & Krokoff, 2013).

By 2009, the unit’s chain of command had officially shifted, moving from administrative services bureau to investigations, with the ICU sergeant reporting to the commander of investigations. Previously located in administration, at APD Headquarters, the ICU was moved downtown to South Station, where the detectives resided. Participant K explained the reasoning behind the move:

We made a decision early with the crime analysis center to attach it down at the detective office. That way, the detective office was also utilizing the resources … Historically, at least in our department, I don’t think our department was alone in this, detective units tend to keep things within themselves and not push things out to the patrol units.
We wanted to make sure that we had things pushed out, so we wanted the analysis center attached to the detective office. That way, things were actually getting pushed out to the patrol officers.
….It was a lot of debate internally about how to do that. There were some folks that wanted to keep it separate and apart from everywhere else. There was a concern that it was going to get consumed with the detective office and not utilized by the other parts of the department. Thankfully, everybody played nice together and it worked out really well.
One of APD’s primary goals included ensuring the information created in the ICU, based on information gained from investigations, was received by the patrol officers on the street. It is noteworthy that participants mentioned that the audience for crime and intelligence analysis products was larger than only the investigations division, which ultimately translated into a move from administration to investigations.

Figure 6. Ashton PD ICU organizational chart.

The ICU resides at Ashton PD’s South Station, and it has been co-located with the Ashton Crime Analysis Center (ACAC) since 2009. The unit is staffed with sworn and non-sworn personnel who are responsible for generating and sharing crime and intelligence data to assist the region’s police operations. ICU staff represent a part of the command group for the ACAC, led by a Director employed though a state criminal justice agency, and assisted by an Ashton Police Department Sergeant and a Crime Analyst Supervisor. Civilian crime analysts, funded by the state and staffed through a not-for-profit institute, work in conjunction with sworn personnel from key partnering agencies, including the Ashton County Sheriff’s Office and the state police. Analysts are staffed in cooperation with Corrections and
Community supervision and through contractual arrangement with the not-for-profit institute. Competitive yearly state grants support the ACAC’s key initiatives, including, data connectivity between multiple agencies in the region, analytical tools, software, mapping programs and other resources. These tools assist in making connections: between crimes, suspects, victims, MO; and quickly provide the APD and other local police departments with vital information to solve crimes. As one participant noted, constructing a close relationship has been a vital part of the crime and intelligence analysis center’s success:

I think it’s been excellent, actually. I think one of the big assets with us here in Ashton is not only having the crime analysis center right in our building, which is very helpful, is the fact that Sgt. F. came from Ashton PD. It gives us instant access. The fact that he’s one of those people that remembers everybody he’s ever come across and every crime that’s ever happened since 1992. He’s his own computer... a wealth of information. (Participant J)

This type of collaborative effort appears to have achieved success due to several factors: the vision and active involvement of key players within command staff; strong partnership and resources from partnering agencies, including the state criminal justice authority; and contribution of key individuals from APD who were actively involved in the decision-making process within the ACAC. Vision and plan had to coincide, as many changes occurred simultaneously. As one participant stated, realization that data from in-house systems could help drive investigative and intelligence efforts helped spur intelligence and analysis changes within the department; furthermore, it led to important decisions that ultimately affected ICU location and positioning within the department.

Current changes, underway in the past year (i.e., June 2015 to June 2016) with the ACAC that affects the ICU, includes the conversion of the crime analysis center to a “Real Time Crime Center.” The RTCC focus includes providing immediate support to officers, responding to current happenings that can be supported by a quick mining of information
from data (CAD, RMS, and DIG searches) and cameras. Intelligence and analysis take time to collect, process, and analyze prior to disseminating results. The RTCC focuses on the police radio, providing immediate access to video and camera feeds, license plate readers, and data responsiveness to patrol officers handling calls.

The Role and Responsibilities of the ICU

**Key personnel.** The ICU staffs seven APD employees: a sergeant, three detectives, a crime analysis supervisor (civilian), and two civilian crime analysts. The sergeant, crime analyst supervisor, and two of the detectives have worked in the ICU between 4 to 12 years. Sworn personnel in the unit have been on the job for a significant length of time before moving into the ICU. The third detective position is dedicated to video retrieval and analysis, and was a recent addition to the ICU. Frequent turnover has occurred in the two civilian analyst positions in the past 3 years, largely due to analysts departing for other jobs. Pay disparity between APD analysts and other agencies is believed to fuel some of that transition. Command staff verbalized their commitment to stemming the exodus of civilian personnel; however, changing pay structure takes significant time and effort within the city’s civil service system.

A recent position posting for civilian analyst illustrates expected duties within the ICU. Most of these responsibilities involve data mining from law enforcement databases about specific criminal groups and their criminal activities, coupled with detection of trends and patterns of criminal activities. This includes the analyst’s responsibility to

- Collect, organize and analyze statistical and intelligence data in reference to
  - Criminal activity and criminal offenders;
  - Public safety including criminal activity, terrorism, national security, emergency management and any other information required;
Investigative initiatives and arrests;

Collect and convert raw data into valid criminal intelligence information and convey information to personnel in various formats;

Attend appropriate meetings, training and conferences related to criminal analysis and intelligence gathering;

Develop a target profile analysis for career criminals by analyzing the linkages and similarities between crimes, offenders, suspects and victims;

Make recommendations to Command Staff on the current trends based on the analysis of crime data and various research or statistical findings;

Study changes and emerging trends in drug trafficking and drug related crimes;

Prepare basic crime-related and other maps utilizing geographic information systems (GIS);

Perform association link analysis and other techniques by drawing data from departmental, private and other sources to form information on groups and their inter and intra-relationships;

Enter and retrieve information in an automated information system.

As evident in this most recent posting for crime and intelligence analyst, Ashton has moved forward with ILP efforts in the past decade. This June 2016 posting reflects significant differences between responsibilities for the position today versus ten years ago, when one participant reports that analysts were largely assigned to administrative and statistical analyses and federal data reporting, separated from patrol and detectives both in location and in responsibility.

The crime and intelligence analysis process. The work of the ICU is initiated in several different ways, including:

- Ad hoc requests for information from officers and command staff. These requests may also reflect community-identified concerns that have been brought to the attention of the police department;

- Routine or scheduled products, such as weekly or monthly reports;
• Priority crime (e.g. guns and shootings) and offender categories (e.g. top offenders / VOID) that are developed to strategically and operationally organize and coordinate the department’s work with regional and statewide initiatives; and
• Products that are analyst-driven or unit-driven, such as detection of patterns or trends of criminal activity.

Each member of the ICU is assigned a focus area, such as burglaries, assaults, or robberies; in addition to being the point of contact for those crimes, they are expected to detect patterns of serial activity and proactively initiate a response. As a result, they gather information, develop intelligence with the assistance of the detective unit, and notify the department by creating and disseminating bulletins. In this way, the ICU has a specific role in developing crime pattern analysis which is used by patrol, detectives, and mid-level management to direct officer activities to combat specific trends. Analysts are called on to assist with developing problem-solving strategies based upon their assigned specialty areas. And, in addition to attending daily and weekly meetings to discuss crime and criminals of interest, the ICU plays a key role in strategy-based monthly crime and intelligence meetings across the region.

**Defining crime and intelligence analysis.** I asked respondents to define crime analysis and intelligence to explain what they perceived as similarities and differences between the two. Each of the respondents was thoughtful and reflective, and they provided measured responses based on their years of experience in policing and their understanding of the ICU and its responsibilities. Analysis of their responses was instructive. Based on years of working with various police agencies, it reflected what police across the country also understand about analysis. Rather than critique individual perceptions, the next section
includes an aggregate of their definitions to provide a synopsis of key elements present across the group.

**Crime Analysis**

- Officer awareness through the collection of crime data.
- Specific to crime patterns and crime trends in series, “That way officers are aware that the next stolen vehicle that they’re going to or copper burglary isn’t necessarily a standalone incident. It’s a part of a larger pattern.”
- Bulletins and be on the lookout for individuals (BOLOs).
- Quantitative in nature (e.g. counting number of crimes).
- Plots out where to deploy resources.

**Intelligence Analysis**

- Assisting [specific] investigations, running individuals’ names and associates, running the cars they’ve been known to drive in against license plate readers (LPRs). Owners and occupants; the people involved.
- Who people associate with, their affiliations, and gang memberships.
- Informants and information from the street.
- Community policing – our allies providing intelligence.
- Qualitative in nature.
- Analyzing officer intuition – providing a reasoned understanding of hunches.

In comparison to Frakes’ (2012) study, where forty-four percent of the respondents could not define ILP or even provide any ideas about what ILP involved, Ashton Police Department interviewees easily surpassed that statistic. All but one of the command staff articulated an understanding of intelligence-led policing, and all participants were able to provide examples of ILP and crime analysis. Similar to Frakes’ 2012 study, however, many of the definitions they provided focused on information gathering activities. This theme was followed closely by officer awareness of patterns and trends, a different perspective than the items identified in Frakes’ research. Another difference was that most of the interviewees
discussed their understanding of *analysis*, which diverged markedly from the results of Frakes’ study.

In many of the interviews, personnel defined the process of crime analysis and intelligence analysis by department and unit structure. During the interviews, personnel frequently mentioned that detectives and CRU (Community Response Unit – largely vice and narcotics) worked on intelligence and had informants, while ICU worked on crime analysis and provided operational support and direction. Patrol supervisors spoke of crime analysis as a tool from the ICU, used to direct their deployment of street resources systemically and department-wide. Command staff seemed grateful to have some of the guesswork taken out of policing:

> I would say crime analysis is a group that gathers all the information we have, plots it out, and lets us know where patterns are. It gives us an idea of where we should concentrate our resources. I think in the past, it was done in an informal way with people that are like V.F., people that have these computer minds. The majority of us, myself included, can’t do that in our head. It’s very nice to have somebody put together something and say, “Hey, you’ve got a crime pattern starting here.” (Participant J)

> I think we police a lot more efficiently and intelligently than we ever have. Going back in time, a lot of things were just intuition and stab-in-the-dark kind of things. You have a hunch, you think because of things that have happened before, and that’s your own intelligence in your head, your own historical analysis of what’s going on, but with their products, now we can really focus very quickly, intelligently, and efficiently on how we go about our day.” (Participant G)

Other than viewing intelligence as a role for detectives and crime analysis as a role for ICU, most participants did not observe significant differences between crime analysis and intelligence analysis, perhaps due to the overlap in information-sharing and analysis methods within this field. Four of the 11 individuals did not articulate differences between crime analysis and intelligence analysis. While their views indicated the relationship between crime analysis and intelligence analysis, these perceptions also provide a comparative perspective on
the various facets of crime and intelligence analysis models. As mentioned in the literature review, the separation between crime and intelligence analysis represents a unique dilemma faced regularly by police across North America. This separation of crime and intelligence does not occur in other countries where crime and intelligence analysis remain complementary, unified, and unseparated by rhetoric.

**ICU Theme: Role and Responsibility**

I discovered a theme of recurring sense of duty and responsibility, manifested in task ownership, in the participants’ answers. Responsibility refers to perceptions of codes of conduct and required role and task orientations. For the ICU, police deem responsibility as a significant component in determining appropriate courses of action based on present situational contexts. Individual perceptions of responsibility are varied; however, participants shared common perceptions on the balance amongst work tasks, internal motivations, and personal codes that influence behavior.

All of the participants mentioned that they maintained specific roles within their departments, and they recognized the importance of top-down prioritization, proper training, and coordination between multiple divisions to improve efficiency and functioning. Articulating specific responsibility is prevalent among both command personnel and ICU analysts. Despite differing roles, I found that both command personnel and ICU depend on regular, reliable information sharing between analysts and other units in the department. I found that responsibility reflected the most significant factor during discussions with command personnel. Participant D elaborated on perceptions of responsibility and role congruence developed to promote efficient departmental functioning:

> My current set of responsibilities is mainly putting out the bulletins, so officer safety, officer awareness, wanted persons… that have warrants, attempt to locates, that’s the
biggest thing. First thing in the morning I would go through all of our nightly arrests, see if there’s any known offenders, known offenders of burglary, robbery, weapons possessions, and sex crimes. We take care of those and forward them out to various [contacts], whether it would be ADA, whether it would be probation, federal probation, letting them know that these folks have been arrested. They are currently going to be arraigned sometime, and parole, parole might shoot over a warrant. That’s the first thing we do.

Participant B provided a descriptive account of job duties relevant to specific situational contexts in Ashton:

All the robberies that occur in Ashton - I handle …There’s an incident - I’ll review the cases and the calls. There was a robbery or just a claim of someone stealing something from someone, there’s some type of force. I investigate it and then send out a bulletin if there’s any type of stills or pictures to help identify the person. And I will also communicate with crime analysts and ask them, “Hey, do you recognize this person?”… I’m also a NEU liaison, which is Neighborhood Engagement Unit. Last month I attended one of their neighborhood meetings, which was pretty good. Officers communicate with people in the community, and I also send them our weekly e-mails about what’s going on in their specific beats. Like arrest warrants, crimes, FIs - which is field interviews and people who’ve been arrested. I’m also a liaison for [a local] PD.

Civilian analysts and sworn officers noted differentiation between the job duties in their responses. The divide became evident, especially as the officers complimented their civilian counterparts on their technical and analytic capabilities. Officers mentioned meeting attendance, outreach, and case support responsibilities to specialized units as their primary role; rather than analysis, they fulfill a distinct role as communicators and translators of the information sources they searched. They specifically mentioned officer safety notices and bulletins as within their purview. Officers specifically mentioned that they respect the training and education needed for civilian analysts to thrive in this busy environment; in addition, it became clear during interviews that the sworn and civilian staff within the unit worked in close collaboration without competition or animosity. One research question posited that officers might express a preference for intelligence produced by sworn personnel versus civilians, as anecdotal reports indicated that officers might believe that products created by
sworn officers were more relevant and attentive to the concerns of other officers. This belief was not supported during the interviews. Delegation of assignments appeared largely due to experience level, technological skills, and subject matter expertise, rather than biases or a cultural divide between sworn and civilian staff.

During interviews, I asked command staff to identify up to four key crime and intelligence leaders within the APD, to determine whether linchpins existed for crime and intelligence analysis within the department. Answers varied; Figure 7 presents the results below. The ICU Sergeant, a Lieutenant who ran investigations before recent promotion to Commander of Detectives, and the Crime Analyst Supervisor were the three most-frequently mentioned leaders – the vital go-to people who were most depended on by others. Four of the seven ICU members are represented, including both detectives. The detective who handles video was mentioned, as that has become an integral focus of ACAC activities as they transition to a Real-Time Crime Center. Three Lieutenants who held recent assignments in investigations round out the top eleven. The two civilian analysts who were not mentioned each had less than a year with the department, which might have resulted in command staff’s lack of familiarity with their capabilities.
Figure 7. Key information sharing personnel.

ICU Influence

The ICU had a significant influence on the APD during the last decade. Participant I remembers being in one of the inaugural groups brought in and provided with a log-in and password to one of the data systems. He was assigned to the SDU (Strategic Deployment Unit), which developed a great deal of street level intelligence; therefore, his unit was one of the first to orient to the new ICU. Part of the orientation included an explanation of roles and responsibilities, what kind of information the ICU was collecting, and where officers could find it. In-person orientation occurred because patrol officers rarely used department email. He remarked that gangs represented one of the hot topics they dealt with; at the time, it felt
revolutionary to have access to a gang database and to locate and retrieve information pertaining to the gang they investigated.

Increased communication has established the credibility of the ICU’s efforts. In addition, interviewees pointed to better communication between units and throughout the department because of their work. One participant mentioned, “We can always improve, but one of the biggest things is that people are now definitely aware of everything…or they can be if they want to be.” The tremendous amount of information at everybody’s fingertips, whether via webpage or bulletins through email, represents a significant change from when many officers started fifteen or twenty years ago. According to Participant G, in those days, rarely did the other officers become aware of patterns of criminal activity unless crimes occurred within the same beat and reports were taken by the same officer.

From the viewpoint of police management, the ICU produces information for command staff to use to plan their tactical and operational activities. Managers, such as Respondent K, pointed to a number of tangible, discrete items and activities that highlight the work of the ICU:

- First and foremost is the morning briefing, at 0930, on the last 24 hours’ worth of crime. “For this meeting, it’s everybody on the command staff, all of the detective bosses, the day operations lieutenants.” (Part. K) In addition to reviewing individual crime events of note, ICU identifies any emerging patterns. That regularly updates command staff on UCR Part 1 crime. This daily briefing does not supplant a previous iteration, the weekly briefing, which now targets a wider audience.

- The ICU also produces a weekly report that describes all of the Part 1 crimes, not simply the overall numbers of crimes within the City, but breaking down by categories, analyzing newly released parolees, and federal probationers, and identifying any new patterns of any specific crimes.

- A tri-city shooting report goes out that captures Ashton’s and two large neighboring jurisdictions’ shootings. This report covers any time there is a shots fired call, any time there is a person shot, any time there is a recovered weapon or
casings. Because Ashton PD doesn’t always see the other cities’ overall numbers, it allows command staff to compare volume of shots fired and case clearance rates for gun violence with the other cities in the region; it also helps ACAC, ICU, and command staff identify whether there is something going on in the three cities, like a spike in gun violence due to gang violence.

- Assistance with gang information and workups on individuals provide valuable leads when officers are looking into suspects and their activities.
- Anytime there is any special event or issue going on in the area; if there is a major protest coming in, ICU reviews social media to provide the department with a detailed brief of threats and concerns.
- Ad hoc requests for specific crimes requiring detailed analysis.
- In addition, the ICU is participating in staffing and producing real-time crime results as part of the real-time crime center.

I asked participants what type of influence the ICU had on the way the department polices. Respondents indicated increased efficiency, information sharing, a concentration of technical resources, more immediate realization of serial crimes, and a more coordinated approach to dealing with criminal behavior. Officers appreciated seeing results based on incident and arrest reports deriving from the information collected and warehoused in disparate databases for years, and they felt that “we probably have one of the best intel units” in the region (Participant G).

I think we police a lot more efficiently and intelligently than we ever have. Going back in time, a lot of things were just intuition and stab in the dark kind of things. You have a hunch, you think because of things that have happened before, and that’s your own intelligence in your head, your own historical analysis of what’s going on, but with their products, now we can really focus very quickly, intelligently, and efficiently on how we go about our day. (Participant G)

I think it lets us know earlier that there’s a crime pattern, whereas before, it would take longer. I think one of the good examples of that would be the burglaries. In fact, burglaries are way down and I think part of the reason is we’re finding out that there’s a pattern going on sooner than we would have before there was a crime analysis center. That way, resources get sent there, a guy gets caught maybe when he’s done the first three or four burglaries, as opposed to after he’s done 20. That brings the stats number way down because it may have taken us 15 or 20 to realize, “Hey, something’s
going on here.” It was not as plotted out earlier, we wouldn’t get that information. (Participant H)

Respondents pointed to differences between their past roles and the advantages that officers have today. One of the advantages to having the ICU included their access to information management tools, such as DIG (a data mining system that pulls data from disparate databases). Participant J mentioned that ten years ago, no crime analysis center existed; in fact, a huge difference in policing occurred. Participant J stated,

As a lieutenant in this unit, what I did not have as a sergeant in this unit, was going to the crime meetings every day. When you go to the crime meetings every day you get all the information. As the lieutenant that goes there, it’s your job to disseminate ... Figure out what’s important, what’s appropriate for your people so you don’t overwhelm them with stuff they don’t care about. You push that down toward them. In 2000, other than people like V.F. and T.R. … those guys, who could remember everything in the world, ready access to data, along with pattern recognition, were elusive to officers and management.

One participant remembered the state of information sharing clearly. Although the comments are lengthy, they indicate how far the department progressed in the last fifteen years.

My personal opinion? 15 years ago? There was no information sharing. I mean, there was. There was information sharing in a basic sense ... Say I’m assigned to 107. 107 is a car assigned to Zone 7 in Center Station or Division, whatever part of the police department you’re talking about in a particular era..... We used to have a clipboard in the roll call room. We had nine cars. So, we had nine clipboards. One through nine. Each one of them corresponded to a Zone and a car.

You would flip through your[s] and in it would be, this guy’s wanted, vacation check over there. This person’s on vacation. Then sometimes during roll call, the sergeants would get information from wherever they got it back from then. Maybe the detective sergeant is like, “Hey, we’re looking for this car for this,” or, “This person for that.” Or if you had a buddy in CRU (Community Response Unit), maybe you were on the SWAT Team with them, you guys are friends, he would call you personally and say, “Hey, if you see so and so,” because he knows you work a particular zone, “if you see so and so, we want him for a drug sale,” or maybe he’s got a gun or something along those lines. That’s how we did information sharing back then.

Not that that kind of stuff still doesn’t happen, but it’s different. Now, with the, I call it Crime TV, it’s the computer feed from ACAC. Now that stuff is broadcast so you can
get it on your phone. You can get it on the computer in the car, which we didn’t have 15 years ago. That stuff’s everywhere. You can get it almost everywhere. If you pay attention, you’re much more likely to know what’s going on, who we’re looking for, why we want them.

A lot of information back then was mouth-to-mouth. So you’re a day guy, and you got a buddy that works in the detective office. You’re friends with him. I’m friends with you. You say, “We’re looking for so and so.” You go home and then I run into him on the street at nine o’clock at night. So now I got him and I don’t know who’s looking for him. I may call a five to one detective, but it may be a nine to five [guy].

It’s just much more efficient now. For the most part, everybody knows what’s going on. It’s a much better flow of information down and up. It goes up the same way it always did but it comes down in torrents, where before it would trickle down. Some people would know more than others. It’s much better this way.

[ICU gives] us a product and knocks everything out, so we can start figuring out who all is doing these, and have an actual document that you can start working off of, and actually coming up with leads on them. It’s been an amazing leap. (Participant I)

Prioritizing Crime

Participants related specific examples of the role of criminal intelligence analysis assisting in operational and strategic assignments. For example, Participant I discussed community meeting responsibilities and the ways in which the ICU could assist with providing a package of materials to explain crime problems in a student neighborhood.

I needed it all bundled up so I could explain... and I called up there. I called M.Z. and was like, “I must know from here to there, between these dates, in this particular area,” a student area. I needed to know misdemeanors and felonies, assaults, robberies, murder. I had it all. I think the only thing I didn’t have was kidnapping. Introduced a nice little map. Lined up the crimes, the dates, times, potential suspect. It was fantastic.

This participant also discussed strategic application of crime and intelligence data, specifically related to deploying resources effectively while minimizing overtime. With money a finite resource, he has to balance his roster and competing crime trends, balancing resources across seasonal fluctuations that demand police presence:

I have to weigh what I have going on now against what I know is gonna be, students leaving in May is going to cost me some money. Then they come back, end of August, beginning of September. That’s also going to cost me some money.
Receiving and studying the ICU’s analytic products provides an opportunity to for command personnel to figure out how to best deploy and coordinate labor and financial concerns.

**Developing Priority Targets**

The old school methods of developing targets for arrest and interdiction were for each unit to set their own priorities based on their connections and informants. Officers targeted the violent criminals and gun and drug traffickers, but largely ended up with the “low-hanging fruit,” despite a great deal of work. Participant J elaborated about the process:

Basically, the way it works, and it still works this way but now we have a goal, of people that we’re pushing it towards. Detectives get criminal informants, and the informants would say, “Hey, I can buy into so-and-so.” The detective would bring that to a supervisor….Then they’d look at who so-and-so is and run his pedigree, figure some things out about him, run a criminal history on him. Are they worth spending our time going after, or should we tell them, “No, find us a better target.” We’re not wasting our resources if we go after this person. That’s kind of how it was before. Still works that way. We do the same thing, but we’re pushing towards certain people. People that we’re not coming up with. ACAC’s coming up with them.

Through extensive work by the ICU and the ACAC, a violent offender identification directive (VOID) was developed about three years ago to identify and deal with the worst of the worst. During their weekly meeting, the group discusses their top offender list. Current efforts focus on the most prolific gun offenders and gang members who have a high propensity for violence. A time element is factored in as well, considering whether individuals are actively involved in recent criminal activity. This work refines the data and produces a discrete picture of who commits the most gun violence and is likely to reoffend. Participant J is thrilled to have defined targets:

Now we have the VOID list coming; that gives us a clear set of 10 people for me to push out to the guys and say, “Look, I know we’re going after all these other targets but these are our main priority here.” I assign the guys out to somebody and everybody in the unit is involved in coordinating activities and developing leads about specific individuals.
Such intelligence-based efforts are designed to complement the department’s community policing efforts. Participant A notes that their LEAD program, Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion, began on April 1 after two years of planning and negotiation. This crime-reduction strategy focuses on providing people with the services that they needed, especially in lieu of arrest. Under this program, officers can exercise discretion to divert individuals charged with low-level offenses to a case manager, who facilitates entry into a network of targeted social services (Gaffney, 2015). This program focuses on systems of health, care, and wellness; moreover, it was designed to treat the underlying issues, such as mental health, poverty, and addiction, involving those individuals who represent a disproportionate demand on police resources.

**Current Resources**

Participants seemed equally split between a desire for additional staffing in the ICU and the reality of scarce resources. Part of the problem involved space constraints; for example, South Station is in dire need of renovation and expansion, and the ICU/ACAC are only a part of the clamor for additional space. Participant K noted,

> It could definitely get bigger. We expanded a couple of years ago to put somebody on the 4pm-midnight shift. That helped because he is able to help them out in the afternoon to get on some cameras, to get on some of the records management stuff when there’s something serious going on. But, it would definitely help if we could have somebody ... Especially in that real-time crime stuff, to sit there and go on cameras and look at different things as they’re happening ... It would help to be bigger.

Trying to stay ahead of the various technology problems that arise can be challenging. A few respondents (H, J, and K) mentioned IT support as an area they would like to see expanded as well. More strategically, however, participant K saw the current situation as a tension between transparency and intelligence efforts in today’s policing environment:
We’ve got great resources. We’ve expanded things like license plate readers. The analysis center is doing… facial recognition. There’s a few other things going on…. probably my biggest question is … Where are we going to be with our analysis and transparency? We’re certainly being asked to share, not only more information, but to tell more people exactly what we’re doing and why we’re doing it.

**ICU Customers**

In determining external customers’ expectations of the unit, responses varied. One participant reported that patrol and detectives are equally important customers when producing analytic products, but for different reasons: patrol for officer awareness and officer safety concerns, and detectives for patterns of investigative activities to solve cases.

Participant A stated,

> Although detectives are working case by case by case, we try to make sure that they get reports that are specific to a crime pattern to the same detective. Sometimes that doesn’t always happen (but) those bulletins can be important for detectives to be aware of…. [and] is probably more where intelligence analysis would be.

To determine whether ICU is primarily responsive for requests and direction from specific divisions, I asked participants to identify which units within the department represented the primary customers for the ICU’s work; they were permitted to identify up to four units. Responses varied. With five nominations, patrol was seen as a primary customer for crime and intelligence analysis. If combining the various investigative units (CIU, CRU, detectives) into investigations, however, they would lead the pack with eight nominations, with patrol a close second (see Figure 8).
As previously surmised in discussions about functional differentiation of analysis, agencies differ in their approach to crime and intelligence analysis. Some agencies prefer a centralized approach to crime and intelligence analysis, where core groups of individuals are doing the analysis and problem solving. Other departments prefer decentralization, allowing police officers in the field the ability to do crime mapping on demand and to have access to online analysis dashboards to make quick decisions about emerging criminal patterns. Ashton’s approach concentrates the analytic capacity of the organization into a core group of people completing the majority of analysis and contributing to problem-solving activities carried out by management.

Ashton’s respondents saw the value of both approaches. One respondent mentioned that officers must have some user-friendly tools for searching for answers, accompanied by the skills to make basic analytic decisions on their own. The reality of the patrol environment, however, is that officers on their regular shifts are simply too busy with other responsibilities to discern patterns of criminal activity on their own, especially considering their geographic and time constraints. Currently, officers walk beats, bike patrol, and engage in neighborhood engagement activities, making advanced problem solving unwieldy. Officers on patrol have difficulty balancing largely competing tasks, including understanding and synthesizing the
data they receive and reconciling it with their call-based responsibilities. One interviewee explained,

I mean literally, there’s so many things happening that if you’re one cop, there’s no way, because if you did it, you’d have to spend probably two or three hours a day on your shift, just going over all that [analysis]. You don’t have that luxury. You know, you have to be out in a car answering calls and doing other stuff. It’s going to be very rare where you can just sit down for 4 hours at a rip and look over all this crime stuff. Then, trying to retain it all. (Participant H)

Participants also mentioned that the desire to complete this type of analytical work was complicated by advanced technology, the specialized skill sets needed, and the sheer quantity of data to sift through. A smaller group, more specialized and with the required training, can do the stuff in half the amount of time ... Some of the officers, it would wind up taking them 20 hours’ worth of work to do something that might take one of the analysts to do in two hours. (Participant J)

Other participants referred to a lack of desire by officers to complete crime analysis work on their own, noting that it takes a unique personality to remain at a desk, analyzing data or watching videos all day. Because of the value of these positions, it becomes important to fill them with the right individuals who can complete those duties and stay dedicated day in and day out. As a result, a clear delineation exists of responsibility and duties between the officer on the street and the personnel assigned to analysis functions. Participants noted that police officers tend to include action-oriented individuals. While they have access to crime mapping on the mobile data terminals in the police cars and in computers throughout the department, they prefer to reach out to the ICU for more in-depth user assistance with technical specialty. The key, however, is coordination of effort by officers and the expert group of data analysts:

Data collection, data analysis unit, they’re working within the different detectives, the patrol, even specialized units, to help coordinate and identify. You’ll often hear that so-and-so identified this ... they’ll put something out that this unknown individual on a
flyer, and people from all over the department will come up and say, “Oh yeah,” and so-and-so identifies this, because he knows him from XYZ, or whatever. Everybody has a little piece of it, but it’s coordinated through a centralized point.” (Participant G).

Recognizing the value of the ICU, I asked respondents what would happen if funding from the state ended. All of the participants felt committed to keeping ICU and the ACAC/Real Time Crime Center running, despite resource constraints. Respondents E and G pointed to the fact that they already tried to help in neighboring jurisdictions through crime analysis support and extending invitations to meetings on topics of cross-jurisdictional interest. Since crime and intelligence analysis have become such an integral part of the department’s daily work, relied on by different aspects of the agency and the community, interviewees felt that that they would be handicapped without their current staff and the crime analysis center.
Chapter 6

Analysis of Products

An important part of understanding crime and intelligence analysis within the police department involves not only how information is produced, but also the quality of the analysis conducted. In Chapter 3, discussion about the “quality” of analytic reporting reveals a perplexing array of possibilities for management and analysts. Articulating criteria that assess the quality of intelligence products may clear up much of the confusion surrounding expectations about the quality of criminal intelligence analysis. The end goal of analysis is to provide direction, also known as actionable intelligence. Brei (1996) and Moore et al. (2005) outlined criteria for evaluating intelligence analysis products, including readiness, timeliness, usability, relevance, accuracy, and objectivity. Law enforcement agencies may employ these measures in order to judge the strengths and weaknesses of their analytic products.

Independent review of analytic products created by the Ashton ICU provides an objective indicator of the material being disseminated to patrol, detectives, and special units. As part of this research, APD provided access to a variety of analytic products, which had been produced in 2015. These products were archived but still viewable as reference material on the police department intranet. Previous discussion of intelligence analysis delineated three classification categories of analysis as a means of understanding products: tactical, strategic, and operational (administrative) analyses. In reviewing the APD materials, most of the materials available department-wide were tactical in nature. Operational intelligence analyses, and strategic products derived from ad hoc requests from management, were less likely to be posted for the entire department’s review. After initial review of the materials, I realized that operational products were largely underrepresented in the sample; and only a handful of
strategic products were available. This refocused my intended review; instead, I analyzed the material that was generally available to the entire department.

The following items represent the types of analytic products produced by the ICU:

- Officer Safety
- Be On the Lookout (BOLO)
- Patterns and Trends
- Burglary
- Robbery
- Active Crime Series, such as commercial burglaries, catalytic converter thefts, countywide burglary pattern
- Gangs
  - Incidents of Significance; Arrests; Warrants/Wants; Newly Associated Vehicles; Social Media Activity; Arrest Maps; Contact Maps
- Stolen
  - Pawns (100+ pages), available by county, or year-to-date
  - Stolen Property reference list (100 + pages)
  - Stolen bikes
- Wants and Warrants
  - Department of Corrections / Community Supervision wanted / warrants
  - Ashton County Probation – wanted
  - Family Court Warrants
- Parole
  - Newly Released Parolees
  - Federal Supervision
- Population lists – Ashton and regional county Jails
- Ashton County and regional county Parole lists
- Weekly Part 1 Crime Synopsis and Investigative Agenda
  - Contains Part 1 crimes, notable incidents; density/hot spot maps for previous 28 days, and traffic stats.
- ACAC interactive crime map
- Sex Offenders
- Public Housing list (assists with trespassing, identifying point of contact for violations and warnings)
- City camera locations list
- Patrol Zone teams/map
- Department Daily Briefing, which includes stolen vehicles; missing persons; Warrants; Recent Parolee registrants; and special event city details
• Citywide crime statistics – both state and local comparisons
• Domestic Violence Problem Addresses
• GIVE crime (firearms-related offenses)
• Theft from Motor Vehicle hotspots
• Needs to be ID’d bulletins
• VOID list (violent offender identification directive)
• Weekly larceny reports
• Weekly shots fired report
• Year to date – Statistical Part 1 report

Normal practice is to disseminate each of these products to the department via email; in addition, notifications about new products on the intranet are made regularly, as material is posted. With such a large quantity of information made available to police, one must wonder if officers can effectively understand and use the different types of information. Results of the department-wide personnel survey reveals that the ICU has managed to curtail the flood of information. They analyze the material at hand, provide a constant flow of relevant products, and produce documents useful to a majority of the department.

Classification

During review of the available material, I referred back to the performance measure discussion outlining different perspectives of analytic products. Taylor, Boba, and Egge’s (2012) classification of crime and intelligence analysis into informational products (e.g., unfiltered lists that aid officers’ situational awareness) and analytical products, which tackle crime reduction strategies, seem applicable to understanding the types of materials that are available to the Ashton Police Department personnel. Of the thirty-three product items mentioned above, eleven, or one-third, were lists of information designed to assist officers with performing their duties. Three other products that fell into the informational category were maps providing general information that might be useful to solving to officers, such as
camera locations and on-demand crime maps. The majority of the products provide tactical crime analysis or situational (intelligence) awareness. Within this category, for example, were individuals being sought for arrest, and hotspot analyses. From the intelligence perspective, this included products describing unfolding patterns of criminal activity, or publications highlighting individuals or groups requiring either apprehension or situational awareness by officers. Finally, there is a category comprising administrative or operational analyses. Most of these items included summary statistics used to monitor or detect increases or decreases in crime rates, such as the city’s shots fired summary and Part 1 crimes overview.

As previously discussed, one of the goals of intelligence products is to provide officers with actionable intelligence derived from previously unknown information. Criteria for evaluating intelligence analysis products and establishing valid work process includes evaluating readiness, timeliness, usability, relevance, accuracy, and objectivity (Brei, 1996; Moore, Krizan, & Moore, 2005). One may use readiness (i.e., the availability of intelligence systems to respond to requests) and timeliness (i.e., delivery of intelligence while still actionable) to evaluate the organization’s ability to provide intelligence to customers/clients. The other four principles include accuracy (of sources and data), objectivity (of judgments), usability (of resulting intelligence communications), and relevance (of information to consumer’s specific requirements; Moore et al., 2005). These factors are aspects of the actual products that can be used to judge the strengths and weaknesses of crime and intelligence analysis.

The ICU’s readiness and timeliness - both related to the unit’s relevance – are indirectly measured through the department-wide survey. One question (see Table 9) asks respondents how often crime and intelligence analysis products contribute to arrests; 35%
state that ICU products contribute to arrests “regularly” or “frequently,” and 49% state that analyses assist in arrests “occasionally.” A system lacking in timeliness and readiness would likely engender frustration and lack of confidence from officers, which does not appear to exist in Ashton.

Finally, excluding the information lists, and using the approximately sixty crime and intelligence products from the sample set produced by the ICU, I created a list of the elements that were consistently evident in the analyses. The results are presented in Table 4.

**Analysis Products Schema**

Based on intensive review of the analytic products provided by APD, along with experience in teaching intelligence-writing seminars, a template to evaluate, or rate, analytic products was developed to provide objective measures for evaluation. This schema can be used by new analysts to self-evaluate their analytic products; it could be used by analyst supervisors to assist coworkers with understanding strengths and weaknesses in crime and intelligence products. At the very least, it should open a dialogue about what each agency believes to be “good” analysis versus “bad” analysis. The goal is to score a ten or higher on this rubric with tactical and strategic intelligence analysis products being disseminated.

Items that did not include a substantial number of the measures below might not actually represent crime and intelligence analysis products. In fact, they might represent lists of information, statistics used for administrative oversight or operational purposes, or case updates. Each of these items has a role in policing, but they do not constitute crime or intelligence analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Rating: Yes = 1, No = 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>All supporting facts and statistics are reported accurately as of the time of the publication.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actionable</td>
<td>The recipient has a clear course of action to take on receiving the product: what information to gather, what to do, and who to contact when additional information is obtained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytic conclusion</td>
<td>A summary of the details informs a clear, factually-based conclusion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of audience</td>
<td>Demonstrates an understanding of the potential reader and uses appropriate vocabulary and material. Anticipates reader’s questions and provides thorough answers appropriate for that audience.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brevity</td>
<td>The product is brief enough to suit the needs of the target audience without sacrificing relevant details.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence / examples</td>
<td>All of the evidence and examples are relevant and specific; explanations are given that show how each piece of evidence supports the product.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Formatting, colors, and background do not distract from the message.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>Easy-to-read charts, graphs, and pictures support the reader’s understanding of the analytic product, and are appropriately labeled.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>Information is presented without prejudice or editorializing: “just the facts.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Analysis and intelligence details provided clearly relate to the main topic. Supporting details and/or examples are included.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The current topic or pattern is immediately pertinent to police (audience) activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequencing</td>
<td>Arguments and support are provided in a logical order that makes it easy to follow the author’s train of thought.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>All sources used for quotes, statistics and facts are credible and cited correctly. Multiple sources are used to triangulate and validate the information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency / updates</td>
<td>Time-sensitive material is communicated immediately; and any updates are provided – and labeled - to continue to assist law enforcement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total score** /14
Revisiting Ashton ICU’s products, I applied the intelligence products rubric to the original set of one hundred items. I divided the products into four categories: tactical products, strategic products, informational products, and operational products. Sampling ten products from the tactical and informational categories diminished the impact of biweekly, or scheduled, criminal intelligence items within each of the categories, while providing a variety of different products to test the effectiveness of the rubric.

- **Tactical products** included: robbery series; commercial and residential burglaries; area bank robberies; a series of scrap thefts; catalytic converter larcenies; criminal intelligence/ suspicious activity; criminal activity in the West End; and a pattern of pocketbook thefts.

- **Strategic products** included: gang intelligence updates and analyses, and the department’s analysis of the city’s VOID list which highlighted the month’s top shooters.

- **Informational products** included: crime maps; sex offenders lists; public housing list; citywide cameras map; family court wants; County jail population list; County Parole list; 2016 APD pawns; and stolen property lists.

- **Operational products** included: Part 1 weekly crime synopses; daily briefings; statewide gun-involved violence statistics; and year to date statewide, regional, and city comparison of crime rate statistics.

Rating the sample of items using the Analytic Products Rubric (Table 4) reveals several distinct differences between the four categories (Table 5). First, Ashton’s tactical products perform well within this rating rubric. Scores for each individual tactical analysis product range from 12-14, with an average of 13.2.
Despite the small sample of strategic crime and intelligence analysis products, scores for the strategic products were similarly high (average of 12.7; range of 12-13). Admittedly, however, the three products utilized may not be a representative sample of the types of strategic analyses produced by the Ashton ICU. Drawing conclusions about the strengths or weaknesses of Ashton’s strategic analyses based solely upon these three products may be misleading.

The informational products exhibit a different pattern when evaluated using the Analytic Product rubric. The average score is 6.7, with scores for individual products ranging from 4 to 10. Items in this category scored consistently low in analytic conclusion (0), quality (0), and sequencing (0); followed by three categories: actionable, evidence/examples, and graphics (.2).

Finally, the operational products, which mainly consisted of statistical analyses, crime counts, and temporal and spatial comparisons, showed scores similar to the informational products. The average score was 7, with a range between 5 and 8. Average scores of 0 occurred in the categories urgency/updates; sources; sequencing; evidence/examples; and analytic conclusion.

In reviewing all fourteen measures, Ashton’s products scored lowest in the “Analytic Conclusion” and “Actionable” categories. The analytic conclusion category seeks a summary of the details of the analysis to inform a clear, factually-based conclusion. In reviewing the products, conclusions are implied in many cases, but are left unstated. In the actionable category, “The recipient has a clear course of action to take on receiving the product: what information to gather, what to do, and who to contact when additional information is obtained.” Many of the products reviewed do not specify a course of action for the recipient,
or what information should be collected and provided to relevant units. Specifying information collection priorities might increase the feedback to the ICU, improving both the quantity and quality of information available to the department.

Table 5  Evaluation of Ashton’s Analytic Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>tactical products n=10</th>
<th>strategic products n=3</th>
<th>informational products n=10</th>
<th>operational products n=8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actionable</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytic conclusion</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of audience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brevity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence / examples</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequencing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency / updates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

average: 13.2  12.7  6.7  7  
range: 12-14  12-13  4-10  5-8

The Survey

Building on a survey by McLean and Worden (2009) that reviewed the efficacy of intelligence analysis products for officers, I designed a survey of the APD, asking personnel to rate their familiarity with and understanding of three different types of products. I also
asked respondents their impressions of the number of products they received monthly and how often those products led to an arrest.

During the eight days of the survey, 120 department members responded out of 450 email addresses, a 27% response rate. From the patterns of responses, 37 were completed on the first day of the email notification, and 55 were completed on the day of the follow-up email reminder. The average time to complete the survey equated to 5 minutes and 55 seconds (range of completed surveys: 1:59 to 1:14:26).

Ninety-one percent of the respondents included sworn officers; in addition, 66% of the respondents reported that they had been in law enforcement for more than 10 years. Eighty-six percent of respondents reported a length of service greater than 5 years; additionally, only .01% had less than 1 year on the job. Thirty-seven of the respondents stated that they had some training in critical thinking, analysis, problem solving, data, or intelligence, identifying the following courses, listed in order of frequency:

- Community policing and problem-solving utilizing the SARA or POP methods (x 5)
- In-service (x 3)
- Military (x 2)
- CPTED – Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
- Homeland security courses
- Cell phone training and analysis
- Financial crimes
- Gang information class
- Trainings related to Operation Ceasefire (Gun/Group Violence Interruption) strategies.
## Survey Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sworn Employee</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Sworn Employee</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 year</td>
<td>.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 years</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 years</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training in analysis</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (33%)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (67%)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line supervisor</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Engagement</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST (Emergency Services Team)</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Staff</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Enforcement</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatch</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K9/Mounted</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Coordination Unit</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO (School Resource Officer)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the design phase of the survey, I hypothesized that assignment to different units, throughout an officer’s career, might affect their responses. Table 5 presents demographic information, and it lists the assignments selected by the officers, who could choose more than one response based on career trajectory. The “other” category reflected specific assignments, such as court officer, training unit, counterterrorism team, field trainer, computer and technology unit, and scuba. The number and type of assignments throughout the
department did not correlate with more positive or more negative survey responses to each of 
the questions.

I asked each survey respondent to review three example bulletins and respond to a 
series of questions about their familiarity with the product, including whether a supervisor 
referred to the product, how often this type of product was received, and how useful the 
respondent found this type of product. Open-ended options after each bulletin allowed 
respondents to add suggestions about other products they would like to see, along with ideas 
for improvement.

The first product (see Appendix C for the survey instrument) included a standard 
crime analysis bulletin that profiled a series of commercial burglaries; it included a map of the 
recent burglaries, commonalities between the cases, a photo of a suspect from a video image, 
and a list of the relevant cases. Ninety-five percent of survey respondents had seen this type of 
a bulletin previously. Sixty-two percent had a supervisor refer to this type of a product during 
their roll call or unit meeting, and 8% stated that their supervisor had not referred to this type 
of product during their roll call or unit meeting. Eighty-eight percent of respondents reported 
that they received this type of product daily or weekly; in addition, 99% of respondents found 
this product useful.
Table 7  *Crime Analysis Bulletin*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you seen this product? – Yes</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor has referred to this product?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A – I am Supervisor</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A - I do not attend roll call</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of receipt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As they come out</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you find the product useful?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When compared to the results of a similar survey conducted by McLean and Worden (2009), admittedly, the sample sizes differed as well as the method of surveying (roll call versus the current online survey). However, the frequency of receipt and the ways in which respondents rated the usefulness of the product remained remarkably similar. In 2009, 70 respondents rated a crime analysis bulletin about theft of GPS devices. Ninety-four percent recognized the type of bulletin; moreover, 84% noticed that similar bulletins came out daily or weekly. In addition, 98.4% found this type of bulletin “very useful” or “somewhat useful.” These numbers are almost identical to 2016 results.
The online survey respondents had several suggestions for improvement. Those included frequency concerns:

- Too many e-mails- amount of information far too much to retain.
- Sometimes ACAC postings are an overload of information, washing out what is important with what is not.

Feedback to improve audience understanding and communication:

- Better educate the patrol force at large. These postings are often going over people’s heads.
- Information is shared to a better extent than ever before, however (as one of the persons who recover surveillance and photographic evidence), the information is still lacking. A person may be ID’d by several members of the department quietly without anyone ever learning about it. (Where that person lives now is something every member of the department should know - in case calls for service to that address arise, etc). Bureaucratic nature of structure is the major hurdle- the product is useful.
- A legend, scale, and cardinal direction on the map.

Also mentioned equipment considerations:

- Cameras must be updated and take better photos at better angles.
- Better cameras for businesses.

One respondent suggested that increased pressure from the public might solve some of the cases: “I think this information should be put out to the public with limited info because they actually know where these people are.”
Table 8  
*Warrants/Known Offender Bulletin*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you seen this product? – Yes</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor has referred to this product?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a – I am a Supervisor</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a - I do not attend roll call</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of receipt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As they come out</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you find the product useful?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second product included an example of a warrants/known offender bulletin. In the one-page example, four known offenders were profiled, each with a picture, date of birth, last known address, and list of current warrants charges along with the date of the warrants. This usually entailed a multi-page bulletin disseminated regularly by the ICU. Ninety-three percent of survey respondents had seen this type of product; in addition, 85 percent saw it at least on a weekly basis. Fifty-four percent of respondents had their supervisor refer to this product during roll call or unit meetings. In addition, 93% found this type of product “very” or “somewhat” useful.
When compared to the McLean and Worden (2009) survey, results remained consistent, with one exception. Eighty-nine percent of McLean and Worden’s respondents had seen this type of a product before. Ninety-two percent had their supervisor refer to it during roll call; in addition, 80% saw it daily or weekly with 90% finding it very useful or somewhat useful. The one noticeable difference emerged when querying respondents about whether a supervisor referred to the product; this might have occurred due to an additional answer choice in the 2016 survey, which was not necessary in the 2009 survey: “n/a – I do not attend roll call or unit meetings.”

When respondents were asked whether they had suggestions to improve this type of product; several ideas were mentioned:

- Use updated/most recent picture and mugshot.
- Most recent addresses (and sources of information for the addresses).
- Last known addresses/ places they frequent.
- Include location subject was most recently contacted or frequently contacted in the recent past.
- Slim list down to a few people. Perhaps include text lists of every single warrant within city.
- Clear the active warrants faster. At times, someone has already been captured; yet, the known offender with warrant display still shows they have a warrant for weeks.
- Sometimes these bulletins become outdated and show people who no longer have active warrants. This could lead to an unnecessary stop of a person and should they be searched based on the officer’s belief they have a warrant, any discovered contraband could be suppressed.
Table 9  *Theft from Motor Vehicle: Hotspot*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you seen this product? - Yes</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor has referred to this product?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a – I am a Supervisor</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a - I do not attend roll call</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of receipt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you find the product useful?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final, two-page bulletin previewed a crime series that profiled recent thefts from motor vehicles and bicycle thefts, mapped and color-coded by week. It included commonalities and several suspects with their pictures and addresses. Eighty-nine percent of respondents had previously seen this type of product; in addition, 73% received it at least weekly. Ninety-two percent felt that it was either “very” or “somewhat” useful. Similar to the previous two examples, 58% remembered having a supervisor refer to this product during roll call or unit meetings. A comparison could not occur between these results and the 2009
survey results, as this product was substantively different from the bulletin provided in 2009.

Suggestions for product improvement included the following items:

- Same as earlier. (Better educate the patrol force at large. These postings are often going over guys’ heads.)
- Patrol force isn’t educated about these folks and who they’re involved with. They are also most likely to contact them.
- Has anyone been arrested in reference to these reports?
- Tougher sentences on juveniles! *[Likely, a reference to the juvenile suspects profiled in this crime series bulletin.]*
- Different point colors by week = not effective, too busy.
- Perhaps do a heat map with the incidents over the top of that? Might give an idea of the epicenter.
- With this many crime points, we should probably connect the dots with a corresponding colored line to make the document more readable.
- Visible scale on the map?
- Briefer, more to the point. (Participant quotes)

Finally, to measure the effectiveness of the analysis products distributed by the ICU, one of the survey questions included having respondents indicate how frequently products contributed to an arrest. Eighty-four respondents agreed that analysis products “occasionally, regularly, or frequently” assisted with an arrest. However, only 12% of survey respondents claimed that analytic products “never” contributed to an arrest. In addition, 5% “Don’t know” or could not judge whether products assisted in making arrests. This represented a positive finding that reaffirmed the role and importance of data analysis for the APD.

Table 10  *Arrest Frequency*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How frequently do products contribute to arrest?</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7

Information Sharing

The sharing and dissemination of relevant analysis influences the entire department; in addition, it increases department-wide communication that complements the work of ICU during the past eight years. Participant I noted that the ICU is embedded to ensure information sharing for the good of the department, rather than rewarding individuals who hope for promotion. The ICU is “doing a bang-up job. It is such a huge difference between before and now as far as information flow. It’s downward. More downward. It always went up because everybody wants to get upstairs. But getting them to come back the other way is eight billion times better than it used to be.” Another participant matter-of-factly noted, “We can always improve, but one of the biggest things is that people are now definitely aware of everything…or they can be if they want to be.” With the quantity and quality of crime and intelligence analysis available and “pushed” to the department via email and intranet, how do officers receive and respond to the material they receive? Are they receptive to the information? How do they use what is provided?

Department-wide, survey respondents were asked to rate whether “timely, effective information-sharing” was a priority for the APD. Only 10% disagreed with that statement; furthermore, 90% agreed or strongly agreed.

Table 11  Information Sharing is a Priority?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information sharing is a priority for APD</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is a positive sign for department management, and a clear signal that personnel throughout the agency are aware of the current emphasis on the correct people receiving the correct information in order to make appropriate decisions.

Table 12  *Number of Monthly Products*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How many analytic products do you see each month?</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I asked survey respondents to indicate how many analytic products they received or saw each month. One hundred fourteen people responded to this question. Seventy-two percent of respondents received more than ten analytic products each month; in addition, 53% saw more than 20 products each month. The sheer quantity of documents, provided and accessed by police personnel, likely sets this agency apart from most other agencies in the region.
Table 13  *Information Access Methods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you access information?</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll Call</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text Messages</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website/Intranet</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Meetings</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memos</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Forces</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulletin Boards</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apps</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Teleconference</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t access or share information</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To measure whether interviewees’ perceptions about the wide availability of analysis products were indicative of department perceptions overall, I surveyed the department about how they accessed or shared analytic products and how often they obtained bulletins and updates. Methods of accessing/sharing analytic products varied; respondents could select multiple categories. Email (89%) represented the most frequent way that personnel received analytic products, followed by roll call/unit meetings (67%), and then by personal contact (64%). Text message and the intranet/website rounded out the top five most frequent methods of accessing analyses. Three percent of respondents admitted that they did not access or share any analysis.
Figure 9. Recipient actions.

It is important to understand the actions officers take once they become recipients of analysis, as analytic products are limited in value if officers do not follow up with action based on the outputs of the ICU. Therefore, I surveyed police personnel about the actions they took when they received analysis products from the ICU; they could select multiple responses, as well as volunteer comments about any actions that the survey responses did not reflect. Most of the respondents selected multiple answers for this question. During analysis, I reviewed the answers carefully, and I qualified the category *ignore and delete*. Respondents who selected this option in addition to other actions were disaggregated from those who selected *ignore and delete* only. I concluded that while 18% of respondents read and took note of some ICU products (perhaps taking action based on job duties or forwarding some items to relevant personnel), only 7% of the respondents admitted they simply “ignore and delete” these products on receipt.
Seventy-nine percent of the survey respondents read the publications and took note of the details in the analytic products, and 26% shared the information (i.e., forwarded the material to personnel interested in the material). Only about one in ten recipients responded back to the ICU with information. Depending on the details in the analytic product, 42% of respondents take action based on their job duties or save to read or refer back to later (18%). For the most part, these findings were positive. Analysis personnel are aware that officers might not open or read the produced material; however, this measure quantified that the actual unresponsive group was likely to represent less than 10% of the population within the APD.

Interview Results

Participants discussed information sharing and the ways in which the landscape changed in the last decade. I discovered obstacles that the APD has faced and transcended along the way by devising lessons learned from the various narratives. Based on participant interviews, the following thoughts might assist agencies seeking ways to improve information sharing in their jurisdictions.

Agency representatives must have direct contact with each other. Participant K noted, “It’s great to have data going in and out, but if people don’t talk to each other and don’t meet each other, it’s not going to work. Because that’s where and when things really happen.” Policing is inherently connections built between individuals, encouraging cooperation. Data are important; however, relationships built between people represents where APD has seen a real benefit. Participant K continued,

If folks aren’t willing to send a resource, even if it’s a part-time, to the center, it’s just not going to work. People can say, “Okay, I’ll sign the agreement and send the data, but I’m not sending anybody out.” That agency might as well be written right off the map because their data ... Yes, they’ve got their data but ... They’re not going to “get it.”
Run meetings that are focused, multi-agency, and have a discrete purpose.

Management mentioned that attending meetings and making contacts develops a network of individuals more likely to pick up the phone when one must call and make a request. Again, policing is still largely a culture that eschews technology.

I don’t know if you’ve ever tried to call a police department where you don’t know anybody.....You get bounced around and bounced around. People are like, “Yeah, I’m sure I’ll get somebody to call you back…” ‘Click’.” If you call somebody who you have a personal relationship with, their cell phone, they try and help you, and vice versa. I think that’s been a big help. (Participant J)

In policing, cultivating personal contacts still trumps technology. Several respondents alluded to the fact that police still valued relationships built person-to-person, rather than through email, computers, and text messages. While technology was seen as an enabler of relationships, most management and ICU personnel relied on face-to-face conversations and occasional phone calls to establish and maintain good connections. When emergencies occurred, police relied on those connections to receive instantaneous results. Several participants noted that, often, new officers seemed over-reliant on technology, and in emergencies they were less likely to successfully complete tasks without an established network of people connections to rely on.

Regularly attend to the push and pull of crime and intelligence analysis. Well-publicized successes may engender additional users, and it may encourage people to contribute information and assistance. Nevertheless, analysis must occur regularly at all levels: peer, analyst, and manager. Both the ICU and the ACAC are accommodating, but “they can’t beg people to use their products. They definitely spend a lot of time and energy getting their message out” (Participant E). With a number of retirements and a significant number of new employees coming on board, APD is aware that they must consistently push
details about the success of data analysis, crime, and intelligence to the masses, and they must continuously encourage officers to contribute relevant information to the ICU.

**Balance data-driven initiatives with community concerns.** Participant K mentioned that he experienced information sharing at its best, its worst, and various times in between. He cautioned that an over-reliance on data that could occur, which would divert the department too far from the original goal. Ashton experienced periods when Part 1 crime rates were low; however, the department was characterized as unresponsive to community needs. He attended meetings where the agency highlighted dropping crime rates; nevertheless, the neighborhoods expressed outrage about nuisance and disorder in the community. Therefore, balancing community interests with crime and disorder statistics represented the best course of action.

I asked interviewees about the main obstacles that prevented information sharing, and their messages were instructive.

**Egos are the primary obstacle to information sharing.** Several respondents mentioned that individuals seeking glory represented a philosophy of the past. Participant J mentioned,

> A lot of times groups or agencies want the glory, and they want to be the one that gets the handcuffs on somebody. I’m hoping those old dinosaurs are aging out and people are more interested in getting the job done – getting criminals off the street.

Another respondent mentioned,

> I think every unit in the department has individuals who are more than easily approachable, willing to share what they have and hear from others. I think those same units also have individuals who work it for themselves. It’s more of a personality thing. (Participant A)

Combating egos might be as simple as emphasizing a team ethos. Participant J noted that past regimes involved
a lot of head smashing, and a lot of egos, and people didn’t talk to each other. That’s not the case anymore… Part of that is probably those morning meetings. If a place is getting shot up, it’s a pain in the butt for all of us, not for one of us.

**Avoid disparate data systems for each agency.** Police must collaborate with adjacent jurisdictions to identify solutions, eliminate inefficiencies, and solve crime.

Participant K emphasized that oftentimes agencies viewed cooperating with the same data platform and sharing servers as the end goal, when communication and collaboration with other agencies represents the true goal. Sharing CAD/RMS systems might seem ideal; however, for local jurisdictions, it usually is a cost-prohibitive solution that deters people from negotiations. Yet Participant G noted that tools exist that can overlay systems, such as DIG, to data mine and achieve the same results.

**Community policing is not somebody else’s responsibility.** Similar to Participant H, most officers admitted that their job was more complicated than rescuing victims and arresting criminals. Police roles include referee, social worker, providing referrals for unmanageable children, and handling complaints about neighbors.

Now it’s a whole bunch of other responsibilities. Some of it is good, but some of it, we’re trying to wear too many hats, trying to do too much. Sometimes it creates unreasonable expectations that, “The police are going to be able to solve my problems that I’ve had for 20 years, out of the blue. I’m just going to call them.”… [While] it’s good that you try to get away from this attitude in the community of, “Here’s the police. There’s the community. Us against them.” I do think that’s good, to make more inroads there, but I’m realistic, too.”

However, each contact is important, providing the opportunity to observe details that could be relevant down the line. As police engage in intelligence-led initiatives, such as VOID, such non-adversarial, problem-solving encounters with the public could provide information that could assist in intervention and prevention of future criminal activity.
**Fiefdoms.** With 18,000 police agencies across the United States, jurisdictional conflicts occur. As participants noted, some people simply do not want to share their information “in the sandbox,” and they resist cooperation.

We have multiple jurisdictions within a small area, so sometimes you run into some problems for patrol, little things like warrants. You stop a guy with a warrant from [a bordering city] and they tell you to go beat it because they’re not coming to get it and they don’t want you to drop him off. It’s the same with us. We do the same thing. So those are some of the roadblocks and I would imagine, resources. (Participant H)

It takes time, outreach, informal connections, and sometimes retirement to correct the course and start looking at criminals and all of their crimes comprehensively.

**External Information Sharing**

With whom do police share information? In addition, what resources do they seek out if they have questions about intelligence? In this section, I review how the ICU performs outreach to other entities as a normal course of business. During interviews, I asked ICU personnel a number of questions about the databases they used, agencies they worked with, and what agencies and organizations they would reach out to for assistance or with questions. From the results below, one may see that regional counterparts in other organizations (e.g., the regional crime analysis centers, state, county, and local law enforcement, and including staff from within the agency) were very likely or likely to be consulted.
The ICU focuses on topics that are of concern to a large urban police department; but they do provide clarification as to which agencies are of primary importance when conducting routine business. Many of their responsibilities also affect agencies within the region, which explains why they would regularly reach out to other state, county, and local law enforcement.

On the other hand, federal and out-of-state agencies, such as the FBI, DEA, and fusion centers from other states, were unlikely to be contacted as a source of assistance. ATF, U.S. Marshals (which was not on the list but was volunteered by two respondents), and Customs/Border Patrol were the federal agencies that engendered the most agreement with the concept of information sharing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the likelihood that you will consult representatives from the following agencies if you have questions/concerns about intelligence issues?</th>
<th>Very likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Not likely</th>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs/Border Patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY City PD</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Crime Analysis Centers</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fusion Center</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States’ Fusion Centers</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Federal Law Enforcement</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Law Enforcement</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Law Enforcement</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Local Law Enforcement</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Within Your Agency</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/State Government Officials</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorneys</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts in the Field</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This represented an important discussion point as Ashton sought to improve homeland security and intelligence sharing. As Participant K observed,

And then to the intelligence analysis... I guess this would be a little bit of a criticism on our federal partners. I think our federal partners still get a little too caught up with what is super-secret and needs to be limited to those with clearances.

I think what New York City does on the Sentry program, and what they release though the Sentry program compared to what the FBI will release ... I think people learn a lot from what the Sentry program will release, and understand that sometimes we have to take risks and let our partners get that information.

I think what we, at the intelligence level, especially when it comes to counter-terrorism ... I think we’re still caught up in what we were caught up in 15 years ago with our detectives where ... “I don’t want to let the patrolmen know I’m looking for this guy for a burglary” ... That they might screw the case up on me. I think we’re still worried about that with intelligence.... If we start breaking some of our intelligence stuff down more... Have a little more faith in people in sharing it, I think we’d be better off.
Chapter 8

Discussion

Participants related, in a number of instances, that operational functioning relies on the use of effective intelligence processes and resources. Using results of semi-structured interviews, I identified key components, themes, and beliefs relating to the shared vision and practices of crime and intelligence analysis. In addition to management-level and ICU interviews, review and analysis of intelligence products assisted with understanding APD’s use and implementation of crime and intelligence analysis. Secondary analysis of crime analysis documents offers an independent measure to evaluate the quality and type of intelligence and crime analysis produced by the department. Managerial decision-making strategies frequently employ a combination of empirical evidence and crime and intelligence information. Therefore, it is crucial that analytic products stay rigorous and validated. Finally, a department-wide survey of stakeholders provided insight into the criminal intelligence unit’s effectiveness as well as formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms.

Changing situational contexts, responsibilities, and technology advancements are part of the department’s intelligence evolution. Participants indicated that changes within the police force could be made to minimize liability and demonstrate commitment to intelligence-sharing efforts. Furthermore, participants noted that changes in criminal behavior, within the community, also affected organizational functioning. This theme seemed most prevalent in discussions with ICU personnel. Participant A discussed situational awareness and changing crime patterns:

It’s tough because it’s both negative and positive. The negative is that we’re not chasing crime trends constantly. On that same side, we’re also not seeing crime trends as much as we had been seeing in the past… I really mean series, patterns, and that kind of thing. For whatever reason our burglaries have dropped off a significant
amount over the past several years. Over the past five years, it fell like 30 or 40 percent. It seems like it’s those high productive individuals that aren’t out there as much pulling in 40-50 burglaries per pattern. It seems to be a much smaller volume. You just get your one offs.

This insight revealed that well-executed intelligence analysis might have resulting effects on crime. For Participant A, this evolution was perceived as both beneficial (for crime rates and the community) and adverse (for analysts trying to detect emerging patterns).

**Crime Intelligence and Analysis - Themes**

Observed themes include communication, technology advances, awareness, and feedback.

**Systemic information sharing coupled with technology advances.** Perceptions of communication and knowledge resources represented key points throughout interviews, and were validated by the department survey. Participants perceived information sharing as both a department-wide goal and a crucial component of analysis. Participants also indicated that the use of innovative and emerging technology tools has assisted them in utilizing new forms of communication. This theme seemed the most apparent in ICU interviews. For instance, Participant C commented on embracing technological and social media resources to enhance the analysis process, stating,

> Routinely? All of them. I mean I use everything, Facebook, social media, local RMS….LPR readers, whatever I can, simple Google searches, whatever I can use to collect data. Talking to people, talking to officers and victims right away.

Participants mentioned that popular social media and video have become crucial mechanisms for analysis in the ICU, as personnel tracked down criminals. Video footage is particularly useful for capturing crucial information. During interviews, Participant J elaborated on the role technology plays in ILP:
When there’s a shooting... It’s not necessarily the crime analysis center that does it, but the videos, [x] does the video canvass and gets all that information to the ACAC. The ACAC puts it out for all of us to see, which, before the ACAC, that information might go to the case detective but everybody else wouldn’t see it. Now it goes out department-wide. Your likelihood of somebody recognizing who this person is that left the scene of a shots fired, or where they went, is much higher.

Obtaining accurate information was discussed as a significant component of effective collection and analysis. Participants’ concerns related to technology and resource availability.

Participant J discussed systemic improvements that were needed in cameras, despite the multi-million dollar cost:

I think the department needs a camera system that works. They’ve got a piecemeal camera system around the entire department. They need one camera system ... In this modern day and age where everything’s high-definition, our camera system is terrible. Half the time it doesn’t work, half the time somebody’s down on a bucket truck going up trying to download a video instead of just sitting at the desktop and looking at all these cameras. I know it would be expensive, but it seems like it should be something that started from scratch, an entire camera system. It could be expensive, but I think in the long run it would pay off.

Participant C felt that technological improvements would improve organizational functioning:

I’d upgrade our computer systems, if money were no object, I would start there, and then not only make it so that we had everything we need, but all the officers knew how to use it and it was easy for them to use. I think if it was easy and everything worked, the officers, they would probably use it more often.

Awareness. This theme centered on participant perceptions of effective and ineffective policing strategies. Participants noted that educational awareness, improved communication, and adequate training were needed to maintain the vision of the APD.

Command staff and ICU were equally aware of areas for strategic development. When asked about areas of potential improvement, Participant E described the need for better communication amongst department members. However, the identified problems appear to be due to individual traits rather than organizational deficiencies:
I think more social communication; we have a pretty good line of communication open but it’s not perfect. I would definitely make sure everyone within the department ... it’s difficult, we have a bigger department, it’s utilizing it to the best of its ability and not everyone does. I think the first thing I would do is to get everyone to be at the same high level, which is obviously a pie in the sky, but that would be my goal to get everyone to be sharing information.

There are a lot of reasons why people don’t realize some of the information is important, some people are lazy, some people don’t know where it should go, but there’s other people who do a great job. That would be the biggest thing, I think. If the infrastructure’s in place for this to be successful - it is successful now - I think the best way to enhance it would be to make sure everyone is getting the most out of it and putting the most into it.

**Feedback emerges as a theme throughout the interviews.** Performance evaluation in crime and intelligence analysis normally takes the form of satisfaction surveys for products and yearly performance reviews for people. In between, however, both products and people need regular review. One set of interview questions centers on feedback to measure the success of the ICU: (a) the utility of the products produced by the unit and (b) indications of success through achievements made by personnel. The compiled data are presented in Figure 8. Comparing areas of agreement between ICU and management allows one to derive measurable items that may be used as indicators of success. Despite variation between command personnel and ICU interviewees, reaching a consensus that meets the expectations of both the department and the unit would be useful in evaluating the health of the system.

Finally, in revisiting the original hypotheses that formed the basis for this research, I concluded the following:

*H1* was confirmed. Ashton Police Department management and ICU personnel identify with the rhetoric and terminology of both community policing and intelligence-led policing, but also identify valid elements of other policing models, such as problem-oriented policing, during in-depth discussions about policing strategy.
H2 was refuted. This police department views crime and intelligence analysis as a distinct function that drives identification of patterns, provides the basis for resource allocation, and appears to be fully integrated into department management’s decision-making process.

H3 was refuted. While intelligence-led policing and crime analysis are delegated as specific responsibilities to the ICU, both management and patrol identify with specific roles in the department’s criminal intelligence analysis activities, and participate in information sharing activities to ensure that crime and intelligence analyses are successful.

H4 was partially confirmed. Much of the intelligence generated by the ICU is tactical in nature; but management alludes to strategic and operational intelligence products that the ICU creates as needed.

H5 was refuted. The quality of crime/intelligence analysis produced takes precedence over who authors the analytic reports (sworn officers versus civilian personnel).
In measuring performance, certain items can be used as indicators of success.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Command Staff</th>
<th>Information Coordination Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>Somewhat Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A line of signature items that are recognized by officers and command staff.</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quantity of deliverables circulated throughout the department.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of agencies that share information with the department.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What officers do - the action taken - when they receive items from the ICU’s “actionable intel”.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime reduction within APD’s jurisdiction.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer feedback process that assesses whether the products of analysis are useful.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The [average] turnaround time to provide an answer to requests.</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The availability of multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of products and their delivery to field personnel.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of repeat customers.</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests made to the ICU.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The trend of requests overtime — increasing, decreasing, or staying the same across the years.</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers’ use and understanding of crime and intelligence analysis.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses from outside APD - external stakeholder feedback.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative referrals/initiation of new cases as a result of intelligence.</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw criminal information that is reported from APD to the state or national level.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The in-house capacity to perform crime analysis.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing intelligence.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders who are requested to speak at national conferences.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysts who have certification.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysts who participate in national/international forums.</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products that result in feedback and additional information from field personnel.</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"OTHER" responses:
- Whether bulletins are successful in producing arrests (2)
- How often the intelligence is accurate or inaccurate (1)
Discussion – Relating Key Points from the Literature

One of the keys to sustainable law enforcement includes adaptation to economics, politics, and social changes (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). In the past decade, the greatest changes have occurred in the areas of information management and crime/intelligence analysis (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). Previously, researchers viewed professional policing as a closed system, believing that law enforcement relied on internal culture and direct experiences to deal with crime. However, community policing demonstrated a shift in that philosophy, opening up the world of policing to previously underutilized domains – both the use of help from people from the “outside” along with employing data analysis to solve community problems and reduce crime (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). This involves stakeholders, external information, and, most importantly, trained staff to analyze, understand the disparate data, and communicate results methodically to command staff and police officers (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003).

A publication examining the effect of ILP on violent crime provided an overview of current BJA (2012) targeting violent crimes (TVC) initiatives. Ten agencies were selected for in-depth study to determine program viability, collaboration, transferability, and sustainability of ILP results. Although departments were significantly different both organizationally and operationally, BJA (2012) extracted commonalities that contributed to their success, including:

- Command commitment
- Problem clarity
- Active collaboration
- Effective intelligence
- Information sharing
- Clearly defined goals
- Results-oriented tactics and strategies
- Holistic investigations
- Officer accountability
- Continuous assessment (p. 20)
These factors are useful in evaluating the department's systemic adoption and implementation of community-oriented and intelligence-led policing.

Ashton restructured the ICU as an integral partner with investigations, rather than keeping the analysis unit in the administrative services bureau. This move made the ICU relevant and accessible to officers. This decision improved information-sharing, communication between divisions, and resulted in acceptance of the roles and responsibilities of the ICU personnel. This finding suggests that constructs (e.g., formalization and functional differentiation) represent strong indicators of the successful adoption of ILP. In addition, “These formalities also allow for a strategic division of labor for specialized persons to perform specialized tasks – thus improving effectiveness and efficiency (the positive attributes of the scientific management approach)” (Carter, 2011, p. 262). However, these findings are accompanied by a codicil: “When compared, agencies’ self-reported perception of adopting intelligence-led policing differs from an index measurement of intelligence-led policing adoption” (Carter, 2011, p. 262). In other words, perceptions are sometimes unsupported by reality, which is factor to consider in evaluations relying solely upon self-reported data.

Understanding law enforcement’s traditions provides insight into the strengths and weaknesses of planned change efforts. To date, researchers have generally identified “police culture” as theoretically problematic for intelligence activities. In addition, surveys and interviews have hinted at the limitations of current crime analysis units. A department’s internal reticence to embrace the role and function of criminal intelligence can be crippling: “if the units are not perceived to be symbiotically associated with the drive for crime reduction, then requests for improved personnel or resources in the intelligence cell will not be perceived to be a high priority” (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 20). Such limitations were not found in this case study of APD;
crime and intelligence analysis appear to be widely embraced as a necessary part of a well-functioning agency.

On a strategic level, it may be that part of the problem in the United States derives from a fragmented and politicized police industry. In comparison to police in the United Kingdom, agencies cannot set their own strategic agendas and priorities based on analysis of intelligence; they must respond to politically motivated influencers. Law enforcement is not unique in the challenges they face with understanding and incorporating crime and intelligence analysis. Federal intelligence communities face similar difficulties and have identified substantial, relevant problems. These problems include systematic evaluation of analytic tools and techniques, methods for evaluating training effectiveness, surveying current knowledge management practices and needs, investigating new methods for product and performance evaluation, and organizational analysis (i.e., staffing, time constraints, and personnel turnover). In addition, “lack of feedback on final intelligence products, and barriers in inter-agency and inter-departmental information sharing” can affect analyst productivity and “contribute to the disruption of organizational processes, loss of expertise, and organizational memory” (Derbentseva et al., 2010, p. iv).

One of the glaring anomalies about the ILP movement includes the lack of education for participants who must participate, and contribute to, successful resolution to intelligence problems. As seen in other countries, problematic areas for intelligence and crime-fighting efforts include “issues with training, and data quality and availability” (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 20). In the United States, training presents a specific challenge. For patrol and field officers from smaller, rural agencies, few agencies surveyed had trained their personnel in
collection, analysis, and information sharing (Frakes, 2012). Yet comprehensive client education is key to a successful ILP initiative (Quarmby & Young, 2010). Although the reasons varied, Lack of funding was considered the largest obstacle (66%) followed by manpower shortage (44.7%). Lack of relationships with other agencies and the ineffectiveness of training were the least likely obstacles to training (5.3%) followed closely by low individual motivation (5.6%). (Frakes, 2012, p. 13)

While ICU personnel have been afforded advanced training as part of their relationship with the state’s Crime Analysis Center network, basic training, and regular refresher sessions, within the police department at the patrol and management level, might assist the end user in understanding crime and intelligence analysis.

Some researchers argued that the nature of police work conflicts with basic tenets of intelligence: that officers are acculturated to collect case-based information that supports tactical operations rather than focusing on long-term, strategic agency initiatives. “In certain circumstances, the long-entrenched subcultural expectations of detective work may reduce the intelligence process to evidence gathering and evaluation” (Sheptycki, 2004, p. 323). In contrast with law enforcement personnel, defense/federal intelligence officials are often schooled, early in their careers, to understand and use intelligence as a valuable tool in their daily work. Understanding and interpreting criminal intelligence is a skill that needs development and experience. Law enforcement senior management rarely have this education, leaving deficits in their policymaking (Ratcliffe, 2009). These points, left unaddressed, inhibit both practice and study of ILP within the law enforcement community. Because of the continuing conflict between theory and practice, ILP remains at a crossroads:

As one of the more recent innovations within law enforcement, [intelligence-led policing] is still finding its feet. Many analysts are convinced of the craft’s relevance: the issue is one of convincing policymakers. This situation is aggravated by decision-makers in policing who are unable to see beyond the evidential focus of policing and cannot see the value of intelligence for prioritization and resource allocation. Crime prevention is still the ugly stepchild to the more glamorous prosecution. (Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 3)
Chapter 9

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to provide an in-depth review of the core of criminal intelligence practices and behaviors in APD’S ICU. Specifically, I examined influencing factors associated with criminal intelligence analysis as a significant component of police department activities involve production, dissemination, and use of investigative crime analysis. This case study of APD’s crime and intelligence analysis and information-sharing efforts identified the strengths within the system as well as the value of the analysis to various department members. This case study is important to understanding the genesis and the flow of information throughout the police department, as the department seeks to enhance and evaluate strategic initiatives.

Analytic personnel within a police force are responsible for examining characteristics of crimes that occur and developing solutions to address these issues. Intelligence analysis practices were analyzed using a qualitative design, to determine the underlying unit member, command staff, and department perceptions of law enforcement capabilities. Participants frequently elaborated on the structure and process of policing in the APD to provide a comprehensive background of contextual information relevant to the sample. Participants also emphasized the importance of technical and skill-based knowledge and training in the ICU.

While intelligence analysis and crime analysis are often viewed as disparate fields, they are complementary and more effective when integrated. Interviews with command personnel reveal that this is the case with Ashton Police. The system functions well without differentiation between crime and intelligence; and analysis is well-received by command whether it serves a tactical, strategic, or operational purpose.
In reviewing the various analytical outputs of the department (i.e., the crime analysis and intelligence analysis products that are distributed to the field), a uniformity and simplicity exists in the products. Assessment of utility and value to the consumer can be completed through a rating schema. Customer assessments of the products of the ICU are overwhelmingly positive; and few substantive comments for improvement were generated by the recipients. Additionally, the flow of information and the ways in which officers use the analytic products demonstrate that the current system and the outcomes of crime and intelligence are important to the end users (i.e., from patrol officers on the street, to detectives working cases, to police management). As the ICU and ACAC evolve to become an immediate-response, real time crime center, staffing should be at the forefront of their attention, along with maintaining quality crime and intelligence analysis products and practices and performance evaluation efforts.

**Recommendations for Additional Research**

There remains significant work to be done in research areas about police organizations, police work, organizational change, and innovation. Current research about policing and structure has been fragmented; in addition, the field lacks systematic, cross-agency research on the effectiveness behind organizational change strategies when applied to police agencies (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; National Research Council, 2004). This critique extends to the study of ILP, which necessitates evidence-based empirical research to understand whether police agencies are adapting their current practices to embrace ILP fully (Carter, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2002). This model requires research into the various organizational models for ILP within state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies, as best practices seem nonexistent (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Understanding the characteristics of agencies that are successful with ILP may also aid in
setting benchmarks, policy development, and understanding how to successfully adapt ILP to other agencies (Carter, 2011), such as this exploratory case study based on APD.

Partnerships between the academic community and field practitioners are key in defining criminal intelligence analysis and its positioning within the law enforcement agency (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). However, one must remember that “functionally differentiated crime analysis” (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002, p. 20) might not be a foundational concept, but should be a testable hypothesis. Using this research as a basis for inquiry, further research about the structure, the responsibilities, and the outputs and outcomes of emerging units as compared to more established units, such as Ashton’s ICU, would yield valuable information about law enforcement activities.

The perspectives of various stakeholders in the ILP process also require further research. While current researchers demonstrated that strategic intelligence is lacking in law enforcement agencies, additional empirical information is needed about the current use and value of intelligence analysis by patrol officers (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Taylor et al., 2007), criminal investigations (Taylor et al., 2007), and management personnel (Derbentseva et al., 2010; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002). This research provides additional perspectives as to whether patrol officers effectively use intelligence products (Taylor et al., 2007) and the ways in which management personnel objectively evaluate intelligence products (Derbentseva et al., 2010). Can the success of analysis units be quantified via performance measures similar to those presented in Chapter 8? As the research initiated in Ashton indicates, police are attentive to analysis, and they seem receptive to the information provided.

Organizational analyses are useful when evaluating productivity, training, information-sharing barriers, and intelligence products (Derbentseva et al., 2010). Evaluation of outputs, such
as intelligence products, can be largely subjective, based on the individual judgment of each intelligence manager. Investigating current practices and adopting objective measures, such as the product template presented in Chapter 7, may standardize intelligence production as well as provide valuable feedback about analyst competency and performance. Similarly, evaluating management, analyst, and officer training programs (Derbentseva et al., 2010; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008) and assessing outputs versus outcomes will lend validity to the current piecemeal system of training law enforcement personnel to understand and carry out crime and intelligence analysis.
References


Dorn, S., Richardson, T., Filippone, T., & Anna Burrall. (2009). *New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) fusion center training strategy development: Guidelines and recommendations for fusion center intelligence analysts and personnel*. Washington, DC: University at Albany.


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Appendix A

Management Interview Questions

MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS / INTERVIEW

INTRO: This interview is to understand your perspective about policing theories and the development and use of crime and intelligence analysis. We’ll discuss (a) What is intelligence-led policing? (b) How does intelligence-led policing fit into the agency? (c) Does intelligence-led policing replace or work in conjunction with community policing? (d) What are the demands on the agency, and how has APD adapted to handle those demands? and (e) How does intelligence policing benefit this agency?

QUESTIONS

How long have you been a police officer? How long have you worked for APD?

Describe your career progression through the Department: which units you’ve served in or managed.

Mission, Goals and Priorities

What main policing philosophy does the department follow? Has this always been APD’s policing strategy? Are there other philosophies that are similar, or that work in conjunction with the one(s) you’ve named? What might some other police departments’ philosophies be? Why did the department choose this as their overarching approach? Were you part of the process?

In your own words, what is crime analysis? How is it similar to, or different from, intelligence analysis? How have crime and intelligence analysis progressed over the last 10-15 years within APD? How would you make crime analysis better? How would you improve intelligence analysis?

Information Coordination Unit (ICU)

Tell me about the department’s Information Coordination Unit. What are their responsibilities? What do they produce? Can you give me an idea of some of the different products that the ICU puts out? Is the unit the right size for APD, or should it be larger/smaller? What changes have been made to this unit throughout the years? Who are the different audiences for the ICU’s crime and intelligence analysis?
What influences has the ICU had on policing and the department throughout the last fifteen years?

Crime and Intel Analysis - Data Systems
Some agencies prefer a centralized approach to crime and intelligence analysis, where a small group of individuals do all analysis and problem-solving. Other departments prefer to decentralize, allowing police officers in the field access to crime mapping on demand, and online analysis dashboards.

Which approach does Ashton take? Do officers currently have a way to generate maps on their own, or look at patterns of crime throughout Ashton, without having to contact someone specific to create the maps or patterns?

As part of a statewide competitive grant program, crime analysis data systems were funded through the State. What expectations did you have about creating a comprehensive crime and intelligence analysis data system?

- Have your expectations/goals been met?
- Would you continue using this system if state funding ended? Why/why not?

Does your department have Field Intelligence Officers?
- How many?
- What are their job responsibilities?
- Where are they assigned?
- Are they successful? (If not, what changes do you think should be made to improve effectiveness?)

Analysis Products
What intelligence and crime analysis products do you see regularly?
Are there other products you would like to see that your CA/FIO units don’t currently produce? If not being produced currently, why not? (e.g. staff doesn’t have specific skills, etc)
What specific forms of analysis do you prefer?
Do your CAs/FIOs attend training regularly? If so, what types of training?

Training
How do law enforcement officers make the transition to commander of an analysis unit? Is there a mentoring process, formal trainings, or certification for management/commanders?
Does APD have specific training to assist command staff in understanding analysis or working with crime or intelligence analysis?
Have you attended any training in analysis, problem-solving, data, or intelligence? Which courses?

Evaluating information-sharing within the department
How do officers share information within the department? [Prompt: For example, some agencies rely on a webpage where tips and information is shared; others depend on emails]
back and forth; some have chat options about different topics; and some prefer to have their ICU/analysis unit generate information.]

In measuring performance, certain items can be used as indicators of success. [Provide handout with scale - very important through not important at all.] Tell me if you think these potential measures are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not important at all.

- A line of signature items that are recognized by officers and command staff.
- The quantity of deliverables circulated throughout the department.
- The number of agencies that share information with the department.
- What officers do - the action taken - when they receive items from the ICU (“actionable intel”).
- Crime reduction within APD’s jurisdiction.
- Customer feedback process that assesses whether the products of analysis are useful.
- The [average] turnaround time to provide an answer to requests.
- The availability of multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.
- Using multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.
- Timeliness of products and their delivery to field personnel.
- Number of repeat customers.
- Number of requests made to the ICU.
- The trend of requests over time -- increasing, decreasing, or staying the same across the years.
- Officers’ use and understanding of crime and intelligence analysis.
- Responses from outside APD - external stakeholder feedback.
- Investigative referrals/initiation of new cases as a result of intelligence.
- Raw criminal information that is reported from APD to the state or national level.
- The in-house capacity to perform crime analysis.
- Producing intelligence.
- Leaders who are requested to speak at national conferences.
- Analysts who have certification.
- Analysts who participate in national/international forums.
- Products that result in feedback and additional information from field personnel.
- Any other ideas? __________________________

**Interagency Coordination**

If agencies are working together through APD’s ICU, whose idea was it to bring them together? What was the rationale behind collaboration?

What are the steps that have been taken to promote the exchange of information and skills? (e.g. co-locating).

What obstacles prevent effective interagency coordination?

What steps have been taken/are being taken to promote information sharing and coordination?

- Were there other models considered?
Tell me about the history of APD’s relationship with the regional crime analysis center. How did it develop, and who were the main players in moving it forward? How are the different stakeholders engaged with APD? Some answers might include:

- Meetings
- Task Forces
- Sharing data
- Joint investigations
- Receiving products
- Community meetings
- Generating joint products
- Other______________________

Tell me about your engagement with other areas of the state. What other partnerships exist outside this region? Has the state fusion center been a long-term partner, a short-term partner / how has the relationship changed over the past 12 years? What do you attribute successes or failures to across the years in terms of statewide crime and intelligence analysis?

**Strategic Plan**
What is your vision for crime and intelligence analysis during the next five years? What resources do you must carry out your vision?

- Do you expect to maintain your current staffing levels (CA, FIOs)? Do you have any plans to expand?
- Do you have the latitude to select the proper people to staff intelligence and crime analysis efforts?
  - What are your criteria?
- What else do you must grow your crime and intelligence analysis capabilities? (e.g. other technologies, equipment, more staff, etc)
Appendix B

Analyst and ICU Questions

Crime and Intelligence Analysis Evaluation
Information Coordination Unit – Analysts, Officers

INTRODUCTION:  This interview is to understand your perspective about policing and the development and use of crime and intelligence analysis. I’m interested in hearing your views on (a) What is intelligence-led policing? (b) Does intelligence-led policing fit into this agency? (c) Does intelligence-led policing replace or work in conjunction with community policing? (d) What are the demands on the agency, and how has APD adapted to handle those demands? and (e) How do intelligence and crime analysis benefit this agency? There are a number of open-ended questions as well as some multiple choice questions. Feel free to elaborate wherever needed. We can skip and return to any questions as well.

Personal background
- How long have you been with APD?
  - What is your title and what are your responsibilities there?
- When did you become a [FIO or Crime Analyst]?
  - Is this your full-time responsibility or do you retain other responsibilities?
- What prompted you to become a [FIO or Crime Analyst]?
- What sort of training or education do you have in intelligence gathering and analysis (e.g. debriefing training)?
- What sort of training or education do you have in crime analysis?
- When you became a [FIO or Crime Analyst], were the expectations for your work explained to you clearly/or at all? Explained by whom? (As needed: What was your initial understanding of what your roles and duties would be?) And is that actually the case?

Intelligence and Policing
What main policing philosophy does the department follow?
Has this always been APD’s policing strategy?
Are there other philosophies that are similar, or that work in conjunction with the one(s) you’ve named?
What might some other police departments’ philosophies be?
Why did the department chose this as their overarching approach? Were you part of the process?

In your own words, what is crime analysis? How is it similar to, or different from, intelligence analysis?
How have crime and intelligence analysis progressed over the last 10-15 years within APD? [or How has crime and intelligence analysis changed since you’ve worked here?]
  - How would you make crime analysis better?
  - How would you improve intelligence analysis?

How familiar are you with the Intelligence Led Policing concept?
Scale: Very Familiar; Somewhat Familiar; Have Heard of It; Have Not Heard of It

Has your agency adopted Intelligence Led Policing?
Scale: Yes; It is in development; No; Unknown
If yes, how effective is Intelligence Led Policing in your agency?
Scale: Very effective; Somewhat effective; Slightly effective; Not Effective

   The chief executive of your agency supports ILP
   Scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree

How often is intelligence formally integrated into your agency’s decision-making process?
All the time, sometimes, occasionally, never

In your opinion, how far along is your agency in developing and maintaining a criminal intelligence capacity? Scale: 1 (Not Very Far at All)---7 (Very Far)

Training
Does APD have specific training to assist COMMAND STAFF in understanding analysis or working with crime or intelligence analysis?
Does APD have specific training to assist OFFICERS in understanding analysis or working with crime or intelligence analysis?
Are there training courses available that you’re aware of that educate officers about crime and intelligence analysis? What are they, and do you recommend them?

**Perspective on the ANALYTICAL PROCESS (INPUTS)**
- From what sources (whom /where/how) do you routinely get information?
- Prompt-for each source – how often do you tap into that?
- How do you assess whether raw information that made available to you is reliable and worth passing on– (decide what to pass on to others or disregard)?
- Who are the key consumers of your work?
- Do you have any suggestions about information sources you would like to see made available to you (e.g. jail docs)?
- Ideally, data analysis and blending intelligence should be a cyclical process that provides for feedback and expanded analysis – do you see a feedback loop in the work you do as a [FIO or Crime Analyst]? How could it be improved?
- The intelligence cycle should also provide for analysis which would reveal gaps in information – does your work help to direct intelligence collection? How?

**Perspective on PRODUCTS (output)**
- Do you personally produce or give input into any products on a regular basis?
- For each, prompt for whom you produce it, for what purpose, how is it distributed, and how often
- Who typically asks you for information or analytical products? For what purpose are they using it (e.g. strategic, case support)?
- How do requests for information get prioritized?
• When it comes to disseminating pieces of information or products, do you have any suggestions on how this process might be improved?

How frequently does your agency create the following intelligence products?
Scale: Never, Once or Twice a Year, Monthly, Weekly, Daily, On Request

• Bulletins
• Risk Assessments Advisories
• Alerts
• Warnings
• Executive Reports
• Briefings
• Other _______

In a typical month, how many analytic products will your agency produce?
Scale: 0; 1-3; 4-6; 7-10; 11-20; 20-50; More than 50

How frequently does intelligence from your agency contribute to arrests?
Scale: Rarely, Occasionally, Frequently, Always

How frequently does intelligence from your agency contribute to assets seized?
Scale: Rarely, Occasionally, Frequently, Always

Information sharing is explicated rewarded in our organization (e.g., formal evaluation).
Scale: Strongly agree, agree, disagree, Strongly disagree

Information sharing is one of the priorities of our agency.
Scale: Strongly agree, agree, disagree, Strongly disagree

What factors are critical for assessing an analyst’s (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function) performance in your agency? (Check all that apply, or answer “We don’t assess an analyst’s performance”)

• Number of Strategic Products Produced
• Number of Tactical Products Produced
• Number of Risk Assessments Completed
• Quality of Strategic Products Produced
• Quality of Tactical Products Produced
• Quality of Risk Assessments Completed
• Number of Actions that Led to Investigation Being Opened
• Number of Actions that Led to an Arrest
• Number of Actions that Led to Conviction
• Number of Contacts From Personnel Within the Agency
• Number of Contacts From Outside Agencies
• Other __________________
What would you say are the most important measures for assessing an analyst’s performance? Is it: [Scale - Yes/No]

- Number of Strategic Products Produced
- Number of Tactical Products Produced
- Number of Risk Assessments Completed
- Quality of Strategic Products Produced
- Quality of Tactical Products Produced
- Quality of Risk Assessments Completed
- Number of Actions that Led to Investigation Being Opened
- Number of Actions that Led to an Arrest
- Number of Actions that Led to Conviction
- Number of Contacts From Personnel Within the Agency
- Number of Contacts From Outside Agencies
- Other _________________________

You identified [________] as the most important measures. Which are the top three?

How frequently do the person/persons responsible for conducting analysis in your agency perform/are involved in the following tasks:

Scale: Daily, Weekly, Bi-Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly, Bi-Annually, Less than Annually, Never

- Crime Pattern Analysis
- Crime Mapping
- Geographic Profiling
- Hot Spots Analysis
- Traffic Analysis
- Produce Analytic Products
- Analyze Suspicious Activity Reports
- Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment
- Criminal Commodity
- Vulnerability Assessment
- Statewide and/or Regional Risk Assessment
- Share Intelligence Related Information within the Agency
- Share Intelligence Related Information with other agencies
- Identify Criminal Enterprises
- Identify Threats to the Jurisdiction
- Criminal Investigation Support
- Proactive Strategic Analysis
- Visual Investigative Analysis
- Alerts and Notifications
- Deconfliction
- Public Health Trend Analysis
- Criminal Background Information
- Case Correlation
- Link Analysis
● Social Network Analysis
● Telephone Toll Analysis
● Flowcharting
● Scenario-based Tabletop exercises
● Live training exercises

How are your products distributed? (check all that apply)

● We don’t distribute analysis products
● Formal reports
● Periodic memorandums/briefings
● Formal meetings
● Secure portal
● National Recognized Intelligence and Information Systems (RISS/HSIN/LEO)
● Fax
● Email
● Telephone
● Personal Contact
● Website
● Intranet
● Video teleconferencing
● Roll Call
● Not Distributed
● Other

Information Sharing

How do officers share information within the department? [Prompt: For example, some agencies rely on a webpage where tips and information is shared; others depend on emails back and forth; some have chat options about different topics; and some prefer to have their ICU/analysis unit generate information.]

What do you see as measures of success for information-sharing?

In measuring performance, certain items can be used as indicators of success. [Provide handout with scale - very important through not important at all.] Tell me if you think these potential measures are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not important at all.

● A line of signature items that are recognized by officers and command staff.
● The quantity of deliverables circulated throughout the department.
● The number of agencies that share information with the department.
● What officers do - the action taken - when they receive items from the ICU (“actionable intel”).
● Crime reduction within APD’s jurisdiction.
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● The availability of multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.
● Using multiple data sources to create crime or intelligence analysis products.
● Timeliness of products and their delivery to field personnel.
● Number of repeat customers.
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● Raw criminal information that is reported from APD to the state or national level.
● The in-house capacity to perform crime analysis.
● Producing intelligence.
● Leaders who are requested to speak at national conferences.
● Analysts who have certification.
● Analysts who participate in national/international forums.
● Products that result in feedback and additional information from field personnel.

Does your agency have defined goals and objectives for collecting, analyzing, producing and sharing information? Yes  No

The following are sources of intelligence that your agency might consult. Please indicate how useful these sources have been to your agency.

Scale: Not Used, Not Useful, Somewhat Useful, Very Useful

● FBI
● JTTF
● Department of Homeland Security
● Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
● State Fusion Center
● State Homeland Security
● State’s Attorney General
● Regional Crime Analysis Centers
● Other Local/Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies
● Other State Law Enforcement Agencies
● Other Regional/State Fusion Centers
● Anti-Terrorism Task Force Incident reports from law enforcement agencies
● Classified sources
● Department of Defense products
● Terrorism Early Warning group reports
● Books, articles and other scholarly materials
● Commercial database systems (such as AutoTrack, Intersect or Lexis-Nexis)
● Professional Law Enforcement Publications
● Other Open Sources (Internet, News Media)
How frequently do analysts in your agency (or personnel responsible for analysis) receive the following information from outside agencies? Scale: Daily, Weekly, Bi-Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly, Bi-Annually, Less than Annually, Never

- Suspicious Activity Reports
- Crime Reports
- Crime Maps
- Witness/Suspect Interrogations
- Threat Assessments
- News Reports
- Other Open Source Information
- Human Intelligence
- Intelligence Reports that can be acted on by your agency
- TIPS-line information
- 9-1-1 calls

How close is the working relationship between your organization and the following agencies? Scale: Very Close, Somewhat Close, Distant, We have No Relationship

- FBI
- DEA
- ATF
- US Marshals
- Other Fed. Law Enforcement
- State Law Enforcement Agencies
- Local Law Enforcement Agencies
- Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies
- State Fusion Center
- State Homeland Security Agency
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Other Fusion Centers
- State Government Officials
- Critical Infrastructure Security Representatives
- Department of Corrections
- Emergency Management
- Fire Marshal
- Coast Guard
- ICE
- DHS
- IRS
- Border Patrol
- Social Security
- Hospitals
- Private Sector Agencies
- Public Health Agencies
- Public Works
- Transportation
- National Guard
- Other

How often do you provide actionable intelligence to the following agencies? Scale: Very frequently, Frequently, Infrequently, Very Infrequently
How often do you receive actionable intelligence from the following agencies:

- State Health Department
- State Attorney General
- National Guard
- Local/Tribal Police
- Sheriff
- Fire Service
- Private Businesses
- Critical Infrastructure Security Manager
- Other Agencies and Organizations

What agency, if any, do you contact most frequently when you are seeking information about intelligence issues? Agency Name:

Analysts (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function) access which of the following sources of information (check all that apply):

- Motor vehicle records
- Driver’s License Information
- Correctional databases
- Commercial (Paid) data sources - for ex: Accurint, LexisNexis, JusticeXchange
- NLets
- National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
- DIG
- InteLink
- Customs databases
- Infraguard
- Sex offender registries
- Health related information
- LEIN
- HSIN
• HIDTA
• RISS
• Open Source Intel Center
• LEO
• R-DEx
• N-DEx
• FBI.NET

• HSDN

Professional organization contacts and list-servs (eg IALEIA, IACA, LEIU, ECGIA)
• LIST OTHER

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with FBI?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with other federal law enforcement agencies?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with your state fusion center?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with state law enforcement in your state?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with local law enforcement in your state?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with tribal law enforcement in your state?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with the private sector in your state?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with public health officials in your state?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

How satisfied are you in the relationship you have with emergency management personnel?
Scale: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Not Satisfied, Not at All Satisfied, We have no relationship

What is the likelihood that you will consult representatives from the following agencies if you have questions/concerns about intelligence issues: Scale: Very likely, Likely, Not Likely, Not at all Likely

• FBI
• DEA
• ATF
• Customs/Border Patrol
• NY City PD
• Regional Crime Analysis Centers
• Your State Fusion Center

• Other State Fusion Centers
• Other Federal Law Enforcement
• State Law Enforcement
• County Law Enforcement
• Other Local Law Enforcement
• Staff Within Your Agency
• Local/State Government Officials
Perspective on SYSTEM FUNCTIONING

- With implementation of Crime Analysis Centers, has the information sharing system changed in the last decade?
- How does Ashton coordinate with other FIOs and Crime Analysts in the county/region?
- With the introduction of crime analysts and FIOs have you seen a change in information sharing in APD?
  - If yes, would you characterize the sharing of intelligence as primarily based on informal relationships, or is it standardized throughout the agency?
- What could Ashton do, if anything, to better support your efforts in crime and intelligence analysis?
- Are there times when your responsibilities/caseload as/from another job title/responsibility conflict with your role as an FIO or analyst? If so, how do you reconcile accountability to multiple agencies?
- In your opinion, does Ashton have enough resources to meet the demands placed on it (in terms of people, equipment, information)?

Finally, are there any items that we didn’t talk about that you would like to discuss?
Appendix C

Online Department Survey Instrument

Informed Consent

This study asks about your knowledge and experience with crime and intelligence analysis. Your responses to this survey will provide an overview of the use of crime analysis within the department, and will help assess information sharing and intelligence efforts.

Your participation is voluntary, and you may choose not to participate. Your responses will be confidential. All results will be summarized in statistical form so that no individuals can be identified.

The survey will take about ten minutes to complete. Please make an effort to answer each question; but if you prefer not to answer a question, you may skip it.

If you have questions or concerns about this study, you may contact Shelagh Dorn at 518-542-2704, or by email at shelagh.dorn@gmail.com.

This dissertation research has been reviewed and approved by the University at Albany’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research subject or if you wish to report any concerns about the study, you may contact University at Albany Office of Regulatory & Research Compliance at 1-888-857-5459 or hsconcerns@albany.edu.
Crime Analysis Bulletin

Arbor Hill West Commercial Burglaries Update 1
Created July 28, 2015 Bulletin Number: 15-764-A

There have been 4 commercial burglaries within the past month. These burglaries are occurring in the Arbor Hill area between 1:00am and 3:00am. The first pattern involved two burglaries where holes were cut in the walls of the store. The second pattern involved two burglaries where the suspect threw a brick through the glass windows of the stores. Be advised that suspects may be armed during their next strike. See updated photo of suspect related to incident 15-3144947.

COMMONALITIES

TOD: Early morning hours
MOE: Hole in wall & Brick through window
PROPERTY: Tobacco and currency from cash registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigating Agency/ detective</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Suspect Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APD 15-291-86 (Detective Bruce)</td>
<td>135 Clinton Ave:</td>
<td>6/21 3:35-5:00</td>
<td>Cut hole through wall</td>
<td>Currency &amp; Cigarettes</td>
<td>1 HM small build. One armed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD 15-291-86 (Detective Yamin)</td>
<td>82 Ontario St:</td>
<td>7/3 2:00-2:10</td>
<td>Cut hole in north side wall</td>
<td>Currency &amp; Cigarettes</td>
<td>1 HM Involved. See picture below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD 15-306-86 (Detective Bruce)</td>
<td>Henry Johnson</td>
<td>7/16 1:14</td>
<td>Throw brick through window</td>
<td>Currency &amp; Cigarettes</td>
<td>6'7&quot; 170 lbs, white baseball hat, light colored wind pants with a dark stripe down the middle of each pant leg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD 15-314-84 (Detective Bruce)</td>
<td>206 Livingston Av:</td>
<td>7/29 3:42</td>
<td>Throw brick through window</td>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>Suspect wearing a Black Bucket Cap, Black T Shirt &amp; Black Shorts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Double Click to open Bulletin (15-291-86)

Incident 15-3144947

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE - (NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. LIMIT DISSEMINATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND DESIGNATED STATE, LOCAL, TERROR AND MILITARY OFFICIALS WITH A NEED TO KNOW)
1. Have you ever seen a crime analysis product similar to the example shown above?
   - Yes
   - No
   - Don't know/unsure

2. How often do you receive or access this type of product?
   - Daily
   - Weekly
   - Monthly
   - A few times per year
   - Never
   - Other (please specify)

3. Is this type of product:
   - Very Useful
   - Somewhat Useful
   - Not at all Useful

4. Does your supervisor refer to this type of product at roll call or at unit meetings? This could include discussing updates, making personnel aware the bulletin, or providing directions for operations.
   - Yes
   - No
   - N/A (I am a supervisor)
   - N/A (I don't attend roll call/unit meetings)

5. Do you have any suggestions about how this product could be improved?
   - No
   - Yes: (please explain)
6. Have you ever seen a warrant product similar to the example above?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/unsure

7. How often do you receive or access this type of product?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Monthly
- A few times per year
- Never

Other (please specify)
8. Is this type of product:
   - [ ] Very Useful
   - [ ] Somewhat Useful
   - [ ] Not at all Useful

9. Does your supervisor refer to this type of product at roll call or at unit meetings? This could include discussing updates, making personnel aware of the bulletin, or providing directions for operations.
   - [ ] Yes
   - [ ] No
   - [ ] N/A (I am a supervisor)
   - [ ] N/A (I don't attend roll call/unit meetings)

10. Do you have any suggestions about how this product could be improved?
    - [ ] No
    - [ ] Yes (please explain)

Theft From Motor Vehicle Hotspot

Created August 3, 2015 Bulletin Number- 15-821-A Update on 08/21/2015

During the months of July and August a hotspot for incidents of thefts from motor vehicles has been identified. The area spanning from Central Ave to New Scotland Ave has seen a large number of these incidents along with bicycle thefts. The target area as well as the progression of the incidents can be seen below. Please note the updated map and suspect information.

Selected Thefts From Motor Vehicles and Bicycle Thefts

07/20/15 - 08/21/15

Law Enforcement Sensitive: (Not for Public Release. This document is for official use only. Limit dissemination to Law Enforcement Personnel and Designated Local State, Federal, Tribal and Military Officials with a Need to Know.)
Commonalities:
- **Area:** All incidents have occurred within the Central Ave to New Scotland Ave area with the majority taking place in the vicinity of Washington Ave and New Scotland Ave
- **Time of Week:** Most incidents of TFMV and bicycle thefts took place during the weekend
- **Time of Day:** The majority of TFMV and bicycle thefts occurred during the overnight hours
- **MOE:** Most TFMV involved unlocked vehicles

The following suspects have been identified in incidents of TFMV or bicycle theft:

- **Name:** R--- X------
  - **DOB:** xx/xx/2001
  - **LKA:** xx Broad St # xx

- **Name:** A--- X------
  - **DOB:** xx/xx/1998
  - **LKA:** xx Washington Av

- **Name:** D--- X------
  - **DOB:** xx/xx/2003
  - **LKA:** xx N Pearl St

Also stopped in relation to incidents of TFMV or bicycle thefts (pictures unavailable):
- **Z--- X---, xx/xx/1997, of xx Morris St**
- **Q--- M---, xx/xx/2001, of xx B N Manning Bl**
- **E--- U---, xx/xx/2000, of xx Myrtle Av**
- **L--- X---, xx/xx/1998, of xx Avenue A**
- **J--- H---, xx/xx/2000, of xx N Manning Bl**
- **S--- J---, xx/xx/2001, of xx Livingston Av**
11. Have you ever seen a crime pattern bulletin similar to the example shown above?
   - Yes
   - No
   - Don't know/unsure

12. How often do you receive or access this type of product?
   - Daily
   - Weekly
   - Monthly
   - A few times per year
   - Never
   - Other (please specify)

13. Is this type of product:
   - Very Useful
   - Somewhat Useful
   - Not at all Useful

14. Does your supervisor refer to this type of product at roll call or at unit meetings? This could include discussing updates, making personnel aware of the bulletin, or providing directions for operations.
   - Yes
   - No
   - N/A (I am a supervisor)
   - N/A (I don't attend roll call/unit meetings)

15. Do you have any suggestions about how this product could be improved?
   - No
   - Yes (please explain)
### Use of Crime and Intelligence Analysis

16. In a typical month, how many analytic products do you see? This includes crime analysis, intelligence analysis, and bulletins.

- 0
- 1-5
- 6-10
- 11-20
- more than 20
- unknown

17. What do you normally do with the analysis products you receive? *(select all that apply)*

- [ ] Read and take note
- [ ] Forward to relevant personnel
- [ ] Respond back to the sender with information
- [ ] Take action based on job duties
- [ ] Save to read later
- [ ] Ignore / Delete

Other (please specify)
18. How frequently do crime and intelligence analysis products contribute to arrests made by you and your unit?

○ Never
○ Occasionally
○ Regularly
○ Frequently
○ Don't know

Other (please specify)

19. Do you have ideas about other types of analytic products that would be helpful to you?

○ No

YES (please specify)

### Internal Information and Intelligence Sharing

20. Law enforcement shares information in different ways. How do you access or share information? (check all that apply)

- [ ] Formal meetings
- [ ] Task Forces or special briefings
- [ ] Email
- [ ] Tablets/smartphone apps
- [ ] Telephone
- [ ] Text messages
- [ ] Personal Contact
- [ ] Website or Intranet
- [ ] Department memos
- [ ] Video teleconferencing
- [ ] Training
- [ ] Roll Call or unit meetings
- [ ] Bulletin Boards
- [ ] I don't access or share any analysis products
- [ ] Other (please specify)  

![Input Field](image)

21. Do you agree with the following statement?

Timely, effective information sharing is one of our agency's priorities.

- [ ] Strongly agree
- [ ] Agree
- [ ] Disagree
- [ ] Strongly disagree
- [ ] Don't know
Assignments

22. Are you a sworn or non-sworn employee?
   - Sworn
   - Non-Sworn

23. How long have you worked at APD?
   - less than one year
   - 1-4 years
   - 5-9 years
   - 10 or more years

24. What assignment(s) have you had at the Police Department? (choose all that apply)
   - Patrol
   - Information Coordination Unit (ICU)
   - Line supervisor
   - Command Staff (Lt. and above)
   - Traffic enforcement
   - EST
   - K9, Mounted
   - Administrative Services Bureau
   - Dispatch
   - Neighborhood Engagement Unit
   - SROs
   - ACAC
   - Detectives
   - Multi-jurisdictional Task Force
   - Other (please specify)
25. Have you attended any training in analysis, problem-solving, data, critical thinking, or intelligence?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don't know

If Yes, which classes or training?