Fordism & modernist forms: the transformation of work and style

William Jeffrey Casto
University at Albany, State University of New York, wcasto@albany.edu

The University at Albany community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/legacy-etd

Part of the American Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/legacy-etd/1095

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. Please see Terms of Use. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
FORDISM & MODERNIST FORMS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND STYLE

by

William J Casto

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

College of Arts & Sciences
Department of English

2014
FORDISM & MODERNIST FORMS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WORK AND STYLE

By

William J Casto

COPYRIGHT 2014
ABSTRACT

*Fordism and Modernist Forms* argues that Fordism is an American manifestation of a global tendency towards concentration and rationalization that we know as “monopoly capitalism.” Fordism, as part of the historical transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism, reshapes and reorganizes the structures of modern life – accentuating repetitive habits and efficient behavior, replacing craftsmanship with deskilled labor, and integrating consumer culture into identity formation. These socio-economic transformations obfuscate the actually existing structures that produce their uneven societies and the monotonies of modern, everyday “life” and, therefore, create an artistic crisis of representation as the individual increasingly relies on the prisms of ideology and reification to organize and narrate her own experience of empirical reality. “Modernism” is the name given to the aesthetic schools that attempt to represent, beyond mere empiricism, this chameleon modernity; and for American Modernism that means representing a specifically Fordist modernity.

*Fordism and Modernist Forms* examines the formal experiments that Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway, and F. Scott Fitzgerald employ in their literatures and there discovers symptoms of dramatically changing historical conditions. Subjectivity was threatened by the totalizing influences of monopoly capital and modernists responded by reprioritizing the individual and negating the primacy of the whole, mostly through formal adaptation. Stein, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald, while not always explicitly political or historical authors, record the symptoms of Fordism in their prose’s syntax and offer alternatives to its hegemonic status in their larger works.
## CONTENTS

Abstract iii  
Acknowledgements v  
Introduction: The Quandary of Realism 1  
1 American Efficiency and the Crisis of Representation 17  
2 "The Assembling of a Thing": Gertrude Stein’s *The Making of Americans* 45  
3 Ernest Hemingway and Administration 81  
4 F. Scott Fitzgerald and Unfinished Youth 122  
   Afterword - Fordism Today: *In Myth and Practice* 153  
   Works Cited 157  
   Notes 167
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is dedicated to…

…my committee members, whom I consider collaborators of this text’s better moments. Bret Benjamin, in whose front room I worked through the das Kapital volumes with a sympathetic cohort. He taught me to marry the universal arguments to the particular ones and calmly reassured us that late capitalism, like its preceding modes of production, is not eternal. Eric Keenaghan, who patiently bore my obdurate and scattered reading of Stein’s The Making of Americans in our independent study and whose critical eye helped to amputate this project’s initial vulgarisms. And Paul Stasi, il miglior fabbro, who read outlines and drafts of this book when it was mere paragraphs long and encouraged me to cross the country to develop it. His commitment to craft something legible out of the stubbornly sprawling drafts I offered him was indispensable.

…the litany of outstanding English professors at West Chester University, under whom I had the remarkable privilege of studying. They demanded rigorous thought and encouraged radical ideas. There were three professors that assumed extracurricular oversight of my education and shepherded me to SUNY. Carolyn Sorisio’s enthusiasm for teaching and her reassuring praise for my adventures into Marxism were unforgettable. During our final semester together, she rearranged her syllabus so that I could spend months, under her guidance, composing the paper that would become my entry essay for graduate school. Cortie Ervin, who directed my work in English education and supervised my student teaching experience, gave me coveted advice on living in New York’s capital and wise words on negotiating the politics of the SUNY English department. Her sincere benevolence and support during those years surpassed
fine pedagogy – she became a friend. And Seth Kahn, who sat with me in summer coffee houses reading Marx and Adorno, and took custody of my political education. His commitment to social activism and transforming radical theory into dynamic praxis, from the classroom outwards, inspires me.

…my childhood friend, Mike D’isa. Drinking cheap beers in our apartment thirteen years ago, we naively marveled at the excessive stipends graduate students earned to simply read books and feign the burden of exotic brilliance. We competed for perfect marks each semester and with his help I transformed my study habits and self-expectations. I cannot imagine having entered SUNY Albany without his initial motivation. I miss him every day.

…my parents, William and Carol Casto, who supported my decisions without questions, allowed me to become myself at every stage of my youth. They did not fully understand why I strayed into graduate school, but they dutifully encouraged it nonetheless.

…and my wife, Danielle Casto — the center of my world. Writing on the mythologies of idealism, Marx discovers in *The Holy Family* that “love first really teaches a man to believe in the objective world outside himself;” and Danielle has done just that for me, crystalizing the ecosystem of our shared social reality and our exquisite place within it. She taught me about the objective sacrifices and significant moments of bravery that constitute a modern romance. She displaced herself to New York, without family, friends, or job, to support my eccentric ambitions. Her fearlessness and trust
during that time are virtues of which I will forever be in awe. She has sacrificed too much for me to ever compensate her but through my steadfast love.
INTRODUCTION
THE QUANDARY OF REALISM

“Only the major realists are capable of forming a genuine avant-garde.”

-Georg Lukács, “Realism in the Balance”

“It is false to arrive at aesthetic realism from the premise of philosophical materialism.”

-Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory

The transformation of work in the early twentieth century is the subject of countless studies and innumerable depictions in literature. One of the most striking comes from Richard Wright’s autobiography in which he documents his first encounter with the regiments of Taylorism. Wright worked as a janitor in a Chicago research hospital in the 1930s. “We’re trying to make the institute more efficient,” a young doctor with a stopwatch explains to Wright. “Why don’t you work for a change?” Wright asks. “This is my work,” the doctor replies (Black Boy 307). The conflict is one that Taylor, in his treatise, The Principles of Scientific Management, anticipates. “The management must take over and perform much of the work which is now left to the men,” Taylor writes (9). It is not the physical labor that he transfers to management, but the planning, the determination of how each task is to be done and how long it should take. Wright’s accusation that the young doctor is not working and the young doctor’s retort embodies the larger transformations in labor that occur in the early twentieth century. A new class of middle management, entrusted to make efficient all aspects of the material labor that
produces value, emerges and creates a novel antagonism between those whose labor is physical and those whose labor is to manage the physical.

The obvious limitations of Taylor’s theory and, in Taylor’s defense, the problems that arise through its misapplication, confront a horrified Wright. As Wright finishes cleaning each hospital room he hears the button on the stop watch click. “It took you seventeen minutes to clean that last room,” the doctor tells the janitor, “that ought to be the time for each room.” “But that room was not very dirty,” Wright argues. “You have seventeen rooms to clean…seventeen times seventeen make four hours and forty-nine minutes,” the doctor explains, disregarding Wright’s protest. “Suppose I want relief?” Wright asks. To which he hears the unintended, ironic pun, “you’ll manage” (307). This alteration in his work devastates Wright. The subjective elements are erased and an objective criterion is superimposed. The young doctor’s method cannot account for differences in the condition of the rooms to be cleaned; they should all be cleaned at the rate of the cleanest room. “Never,” Wright recounts of the experience, “had I felt so much the slave…working against time” (307).

Fifty years earlier, Karl Marx describes this subordination to the clock as a disintegration of subjectivity. “We should not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s hour,” he writes in The Poverty of Philosophy, “but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour. Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the most the incarnation of time” (58-59). Elaborating on Marx, Georg Lukács describes this transformation as frozen, fixed, empty time that “becomes space” (History and Class Consciousness 90). Thus, seventeen minutes becomes one hospital
room for management, and any qualitative differences in the labor process or the laborer is effaced.

The problems of Taylorism that infect Wright’s work process as a janitor differ from those that confront the young protagonist in Theodore Dreiser’s *Sister Carrie*. In a factory that produces leather shoes she sits in a line of girls that each performs a simple task before a machine. Each girl’s work produces the work of that next to her so that any interruption by one laborer will disrupt all. On her first day at the job the physical toil undoes whatever joy she held for finally securing work:

> Her hands began to ache at the wrists and then in the fingers, and toward the last she seemed one mass of dull complaining muscles, fixed in an eternal position and performing a single mechanical movement which became more and more distasteful until at last it was absolutely nauseating (38-39).

The narrator tells us that “her idea of work had been…entirely different” (40). Taylor himself recognized that “scientific management” would take its toll on the laborer, but this, he felt, would change over time. Whatever physical pain emerges is actually a manifestation of the intellectual pain he feels for having his responsibilities arrested from him and turned over to management. Besides, the betterment of the man, or in Carrie’s case, the woman, is not the object of scientific management. Taylor, in traditional utopic terms, reminds his readers, “in the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first” (2).

It could be argued that Taylorism is the individualized and distilled philosophy of Fordism. Though Ford and Taylor never met or acknowledged influencing one another, the two developed radical methods for reorganizing labor, and by extension the larger social organizing principles of society, in the same decades. Whereas Taylor sought to
revolutionize the relationship of the worker to his material and his management, Ford sought to systematize the process across an unimaginable scale of factory and social spaces. For Taylor the key was science; for Ford it was efficiency. Though Taylor’s contributions are indispensable, it was Fordism that would come to be the hegemonic practice at the center of the American economy and would come to represent that new economy to the world. And in the literature of the era representations of the new laboring practices and articulated anxiety over its effects are commonplace.

In Claude McKay’s *Banjo*, for instance, which mostly takes place on the Marseilles waterfront, the expatriate Americans envision their homeland through its economic order. Ray, the writer and intellectual of the group, describes it in this way:

> In America…what I felt was an awful big efficiency sweeping all over me. You felt that business in its mad race didn’t have time to worry about honesty, and if you thought about honesty at all it was only as a technical thing, like advertising, to help efficiency forward. If you were to go to New York and shop in the popular districts, then do Delancey Street and the Bowery afterward, you’d get what I mean. Down in those tedious-bargain streets, you feel that you are in Europe on the shores of the Mediterranean again, and that their business has nothing to do with the great steam-rolling efficiency of America. (145)

Ray’s description of America is remarkably close to Gramsci’s, who, also from the vantage point of the Mediterranean, conceived of America not on its own ideological terms, as the home of freedom and democracy, but as the center of a new streamline capitalism that would conquer Europe as Europe had conquered others before. McKay reproduces this same reading through Ray, but also exposes the racial components of the concept of efficiency. It is not neutral or totalizing, but a specific strategy of a ruling class that forms a new structure of repression that often assumes racial forms. Wright feels this when he describes the young doctor with the stop watch as “Jewish.” The term
is not meant to speak to the doctor’s religious background as much as to signify the
doctor’s whiteness and unveil the racial relationship at work. A white man stands over a
black man with a stop watch in hand and Wright feels “so much the slave.” For Ray, the
new fad of efficiency and the administered world that came with it summons a new set of
racial questions. As he assimilates into the “rude anarchy” of the waterfront men, he
senses that he has discovered the “irrepressible exuberance and legendary vitality of the
black race” freed from the restraints of tradition found in America. He feels himself one
of them, a transformation that spans the novel, but worries “how that race would fare
under the ever tightening mechanical organization of modern life” (324). He imagines
his people robbed of their “loafing, singing, bumming, playing, dancing, loving,
working,” in other words, their freedom to exhibit and enjoy their own “spirits.” The
“magnified machine system” (325) was not the utopic means to increase productivity, but
another tool of a hegemonic, white society to expand its control over the black body and
soul. Europe, for Ray as for Gramsci, provides temporary sanctuary from that prospect.

Whereas its new mode of production was a means through which to conceptualize
America from afar for the characters of Banjo, it is used to foster American
exceptionalism for George F. Babbitt. Sinclair Lewis’ protagonist (initially) celebrates
the effects of Fordism as uniquely American and revels in the new ideology. “To a real
thinker,” he tells his son, “he sees that spiritual and, uh, dominating movements like
Efficiency…are what compose our deepest and truest wealth” (69). Babbitt loves his
Ford automobile and Gillette razor blades. Lewis’ satire makes of Babbitt a fiercely loyal
middle class American consumer whose own notions of society are determined for him
through ideological apparatuses – the newspapers, radio, film, and social clubs. His
conformity is presented not as his alone, but the community’s that produces it. It is the fundamental condition of American ideology, for Gramsci, who took an interest in the novel for that reason. For Gramsci, Babbitt’s conformity, the standardization of his thought and action, is national, whereas European conformity is regional and local. As a result, the European “Babbitts” “are a national weakness, whereas the American one is a national strength…their [European Babbitts] conformism is based on a rotten and debilitating superstition, whereas Babbitt’s is naïve and spontaneous and based on an energetic and progressive superstition” (Gramsci 297). In other words, the national character of Babbitt’s conformity, his participation in the larger Fordist systems of production and consumption, his ideological loyalty, and his energetic contribution to America’s hegemony were the model of the new economy and, for Gramsci, a fundamental reason that the new century would be American.

Along with the new systems of production, Taylorism and Fordism are also fundamentally tied to the rise of mass consumption. Efficient assembly lines produced masses of cheap goods and produced the classes that would consume them. Gertrude Stein’s Mrs. Reynolds, for instance, tells her European neighbors stories about mass production in America and how it had changed the consumer’s access to products once reserved for the very rich:

One story was about the romance of America about the cheapest things being made of the best material and how Europe was very worried when they first knew about it, it seemed to them to be indecent and immoral and shocking and at the same time romantic. It was hard for Europe to understand that if things were to be sold by the million and be cheap they must be made of the very best material, in Europe it was expensive things that were made of the best material (42).
What Mrs. Reynolds articulates here is affection for the Fordist productivist model that allowed for expensive items “made of the best material” to be produced cheaper and quicker and sold to the working classes. It is not the “materials” that make the American model “romantic” but the organization of labor, the Taylorized and flow production methods that produce “things” in the millions in accordance with the fundamental shift in the scale of relative surplus value produced and extracted by the American capitalist class. Mrs. Reynolds fetishizes the “cheapest things” because she recognizes her own fundamental belief in the power of habit in the commodified products that a newly concentrated labor of habit produces. Repetitive habit is modern and good and American commodities are evidence to this end. There is a historical contradiction within Mrs. Reynolds’ anecdote, however. The onset of the Depression and the war after it produced an ethic of scarcity. This ethic ideologically conflicts with the structures of mass production that were developed earlier in the century, the very ones Mrs. Reynolds fetishes. Mrs. Reynolds’ longing for American consumerism emerges as an ideological alternative to the war within which she is writing.

F. Scott Fitzgerald also thematizes the new patterns of consumption as a means to give psychological depth to Nicole Diver’s madness in *Tender is the Night*. Fitzgerald begins the scene with a momentous list of her day’s purchases before going on to contextualize her shopping within a complex world of factories, laborers, transportation mechanisms, and imperial projects:

Nicole bought from a great list that ran two pages, and bought the things in the windows besides. Everything she liked that she couldn’t possibly use herself, she bought as a present for a friend. She bought colored beads, folding beach cushions, artificial flowers, honey, a guest bed, bags,
scarfs, love birds, miniatures for a doll’s house and three yards of some new cloth the color of prawns. She bought a dozen bathing suits, a rubber alligator, a travelling chess set of gold and ivory, big linen handkerchiefs for Abe, two chamois leather jackets of kingfisher blue and burning bush from Hermes—bought all these things not a bit like a high-class courtesan buying underwear and jewels, which were after all professional equipment and insurance—but with an entirely different point of view. Nicole was the product of much ingenuity and toil. For her sake trains began their run at Chicago and traversed the round belly of the continent to California; chicle factories fumed and link belts grew link by link in factories; men mixed toothpaste in vats and drew mouthwash out of copper hogsheads; girls canned tomatoes quickly in August or worked rudely at the Five-and-Tens on Christmas Eve; half breed Indians toiled on Brazilian coffee plantations and dreamers were muscled out of patent rights in new tractors—these were some of the people who gave a tithe to Nicole, and as the whole system swayed and thundered onward it lent a feverish bloom to such processes of hers as wholesale buying, like the flush of a fireman’s face holding his post before a spreading blaze. She illustrated very simple principles, containing in herself her own doom, but illustrated them so accurately that there was grace in the procedure... (54-55)

The industries that produce Nicole’s goods are simultaneously caught in “the whole system” that also produces her family’s wealth. Nicole is the product of the success of monopoly capitalism. Her family’s businesses, which are not discussed beyond the images that Fitzgerald offers here, range across various industries like Henry Ford’s. Nicole, however, is not interested in the production side of things. Rather, her madness is revealed here as an insatiable desire to accumulate. She is the unregulated consumer – a new product of modernity.

In Wright’s depiction of Taylorism in \textit{Black Boy}, Dreiser’s description of repetitive labor in \textit{Sister Carrie}, McKay’s recasting of America in \textit{Banjo}, Stein’s affection for mass production in \textit{Mrs. Reynolds}, and Fitzgerald’s portrayal of unregulated consumption in \textit{Tender is the Night} we see the thematization of the movements of
monopoly capitalism. The new patterns of labor and consumption and the ways in which they transform the world’s view of America are concretely represented as historical artifacts, moments of the epoch captured on the page. In Wright and Dreiser, in particular, we see examples of realist and naturalist writing. They are attempts at depicting the Fordist world as it has come to exist. In McKay, Stein, and to an extent Fitzgerald, we find novels that are more experimental in structure, though less so in the instances quoted above. There is, I will be arguing, a limitation in these realist depictions of Fordism. They are useful as descriptions of the social and economic transformations at work. They recognize and depict the antagonisms at play and it is an important demonstration of Fordism’s hegemony that its practices are thematized in such disparate works by writers of different classes, races, and genders. But their capacities to capture the thorough historical experience of the hegemonic ascent of Fordism is limited by their inability to assimilate the tension between the art form and the historical object into their inner structure. These instances of thematized labor or consumption are, at their best, photographic representations, unmediated and constituted by a frozen conception of reflection. This does not render them irrelevant, indeed Wright’s novels present a complex rendering of racial relations in Jim Crow America, McCay’s Banjo contributes to the production of Afro-Caribbean and African-American voices during the Harlem Renaissance, and Sinclair Lewis’ Babbitt functions as a remarkable satire on the rising, white, American middle classes. To these ends (and others), these works are rich depictions of American life under Fordism, but the problems of nineteenth century realism do help to explain why many artists in the early twentieth century worked to develop new modes of aesthetic representation and why it is worthwhile turning to
modernist experiments to examine symptoms of Fordism on literary transformations. And, most importantly, since the target of this book is the relationship between literary transformations and changes in the socio-economic order, we must necessarily, if only temporarily, privilege the formalistic experiments of the modernists, at the expense of more content-driven literature of the same epoch.

The best way to expand upon this claim is to turn to the debate between Georg Lukács and Theodor Adorno, which exposes the stakes of what would become the distinction between Realism and Modernism. The debate is especially relevant because it concerns itself with not only the transformations in the aesthetic forms but also transformations in the social economy. For both thinkers, the economic and the aesthetic are inexorably linked, though in dramatically different fashions. For Lukács, realism was the preferred style for Marx and Engels and therefore worth preserving as a revolutionary weapon against the ideologies of immediacy and bourgeois empiricism. Realist writers are those who know “what thoughts and feelings grow out of the life of society and how experiences and emotions are parts of the total complex of reality.” They can then “assign these parts to their rightful place within the total life context” (“Realism in the Balance” 36). As the social order grows more complex, the task of realist writers to offer a coherent “perspective,” identify historical “types,” and contextualize them into an intelligible narrative is pressing. The onset of modernism is, therefore, particularly troubling because in it Lukács finds only individualism, aesthetic decadence, and formal disintegration. To his credit Lukács identifies these “modes of expression” as historical in nature; he sees in them the individual’s alienating and disintegrated experience of the immediate, reified, ideologized reality. But ultimately, the inability of modernist writers
to transcend those experiences and identify the social forces behind them condemn those authors to remaining pure formalists – content to merely parrot modernity by transforming their art’s mode of expression.

Adorno provides the most vehement and thorough critique of Lukács among his contemporaries. Adorno abandons Realism as an obsolete product of nineteenth century aesthetics. “Art becomes social knowledge,” he argues, “by grasping the essence [of reality], not by endlessly talking about it, illustrating it, or somehow imitating it. Through its own figuration, art brings the essence into appearance in opposition to its own semblance” (Aesthetic Theory 335). The stress on “semblance” in Adorno’s critique of realism is reframed as an emphasis on technique, style, and form in his brand of Critical Theory. The modernists, far from dehistoricizing or individualizing their representations of reality, are socially mediating their experiences of modernity through the forms of their art. Thus, “art does not provide knowledge of reality by reflecting it photographically or ‘from a particular perspective’; but by revealing whatever is veiled by the empirical form assumed by reality, and this is possible only by virtue of art’s own autonomous status” (“Reconciliation Under Duress” 162). For Adorno, the stylistic innovations of the modernists were essential strategies for uncovering the historical truth-content of the object. The object in art and the object in empirical reality, Adorno argues, “are entirely distinct.” He goes on, “in art the object is the work produced by art, as much containing elements of empirical reality as displacing, dissolving, and reconstructing them according to the work’s own law” (Aesthetic Theory 335). And the “laws” of the artworks’ forms are “socially rooted in their own social content” (“Reconciliation Under Duress” 166). Thus, in Adorno’s work, we see a turn away not
only from Realism proper, but from content-based reading as art’s historical content sediments in the formal structures and stylistic innovations of the modernists. The content is not abandoned here, but de-emphasized and put in dialogue with the form that produces it. The social content of the works, which always precedes the object of art and is fundamentally a component of it, comes to be framed, in properly Marxist terms, as a problem or antagonism: “the technique of a work is constituted by its problems, by the aporetic task that it objectively poses to itself” (Aesthetic Theory 279). The artwork, in other words, is produced through the social conflict in which it is created. And as such, it contains within it elements of those conflict’s structure and the social character of its content. Adorno best summarizes this position, “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form” (Aesthetic Theory 7).

Fredric Jameson further develops this line of thinking to flesh out the degree to which the formal elements of an artwork provide the most fertile source of its relationship to the historical Real. As against the work’s surface content, its literal referent, allegorical plot, or moral/psychological component, the distilled history captured in the work’s form is its “political unconscious.” Jameson argues for a reading in which “form is apprehended as content” (The Political Unconscious 99), as carrying ideological messages of its own and articulating various dynamic possibilities, so as to distinguish himself from a pure formalist perspective. Artistic form is thus subject to the “ideology of form” or “the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production” (76). The temptation to classify texts according to some superimposed corresponding mode of production, in other words to generate a homology between the artwork and a vulgar
compatible history, is therefore removed. Jameson insists that such positive relations are possible, but infrequent since the texts “emerge in a space in which we may expect them to be crisscrossed and intersected by a variety of impulses from contradictory modes of cultural production all at once” (95). Ultimately, the individual work is a *symbolic act* that attempts to produce imaginary or formal “solutions” to unresolvable social contradictions (79).

Adorno and Jameson’s articulation of a Marxist-formalist mode of reading provides the theoretical framework for *Fordism and Modernist Forms*. There is, it seems to me, much at stake in the question of modernism’s relationship to its coexisting, hegemonic model of economic production, Fordism. Beginning with Lukács, there is a historical line of thinking in which modernist literature, especially in its formal experiments, is ahistorical. In recent years a number of works have endeavored to firmly establish conjunctures between the structures of imperialism’s limitless expanse and modernism’s open and permeable forms and between modernism’s *avant-garde* forms and the industrial character of the cultural industry. In particular, *Fordism and Modernist Forms* will address the problem of Fordism as one of representation. As monopoly capitalism ascended, the forms that produce “reality” came to occlude themselves in the vast complexity of modernity and veil themselves through continuous transformation as Fordist modernity demanded a recurring revolutionary makeover to increase its extraction of surplus value. In response, the forms of modernist literature began to anticipate and articulate these changes as a means to cope with the crisis of representation that they generated.
Fordism and Modernist Forms begins with an account of the transformation of American industry at the turn of the twentieth century. It juxtaposes Taylorism and Fordism and articulates both within the encompassing framework of the transition from competitive to monopoly capital. Fordism, I argue, is the local, American manifestation of a larger trend of concentration and rationalization that, following Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran, I term “monopoly capitalism.” Fordism, through its desire to continually transform the means of production in the name of efficiency and its push to monopolize corresponding industries (what today would be called “vertical integration”) produces a crisis of representation. Modernism is the name given to the aesthetic schools that attempt to represent this chameleon modernity; and for American Modernism that means representing a specifically Fordist modernity. The “problem of Fordism” is a fundamental problem of representation within the crisis.

For Gertrude Stein, producing an “important” book, one that stands up to the pressures of vast historical change and withstands the impact that technology and new social patterns had on aesthetics, was essential. She proclaims, rightly or wrongly, that with The Making of Americans she had accomplished such a feat. In my second chapter I will trace the origins of Stein’s dominant stylistic device, repetition, and argue that its centrality to the book’s aesthetic and to the book’s importance stems from her dedication to a notion of historical determinism and a prophetic reading of her epoch as one whose political economy produced repetition as its hegemonic movement. For Stein, assimilating the structure of repetition into the structure of her book was her way of coping with the crisis of representation and the problem of Fordism.
One of Stein’s protégées and later contemporaries in Paris, Ernest Hemingway, scrutinizes the crisis from a strikingly different perspective. In my third chapter I argue that Hemingway adopts something of a managerial perspective, emphasizing efficiency and minimalism with his style. Industrialism and its transformations are the great unspoken element in Hemingway’s pastoral novels. From the style that mimics the general thrust of modernity’s fixation on efficiency to the stoic heroes who wrestle with changing notions of masculinity, the texts work to produce forms of subjectivity at odds with the Fordist ethic, yet entirely defined by its laws.

While reviewers noted Hemingway’s thoroughly modern style, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Hemingway’s friend and sometimes rival, was considered a somewhat old fashioned romantic. And yet it is Fitzgerald who would be given more credit for providing a literary framework for thinking about the 1920s. In my fourth chapter I will examine how Fitzgerald represents the narrative of fading tradition amongst the emerging Fordist economy by relying on the bildungsroman genre, which undergoes its own transformation, in which it cannot reach an honest conclusion, under the pressures of modernity. The bildungsroman, as a symbolic material sign of modernity and its capacity for transformations, becomes a genre in crisis when modernist writers, Fitzgerald among them, cannot depict or imagine a conclusion to youth. The reason for this closure, I argue, is Fordism’s open-ended, process structures, which promote a society where transformations are a permanent, and not temporary, condition.

The formal experiments Stein, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald employ are symptoms of dramatically changing historical conditions. Fordism, as a specifically American component of a more global trend towards monopoly capitalism, reshaped and
reorganized the structures of modern life – accentuating repetitive habits and efficient behavior, replacing craftsmanship with deskilled labor, and integrating consumer culture into identity formation. These socio-economic transformations created an artistic crisis of representation. Stein, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald, while not always explicitly political or historical authors, record these symptoms across their prose and attempt, with varying degrees of success, to produce representative fiction – what Hemingway calls “true writing.”
CHAPTER 1

AMERICAN EFFICIENCY
AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION

“Political boundaries and political opinions don’t really make much difference. It is the economic condition which really forces change and compels progress.”

-Henry Ford, My Philosophy of Industry (45)

“What saves us is efficiency—the devotion to efficiency.”

- Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness

PREMISES

By the time the political prisoner Antonio Gramsci was composing The Prison Notebooks in the 1920s and 30s, the mode of production he calls “Fordism” had distinguished itself from older forms of industrial production and emerged as the determinate model of modern monopoly capitalism. In chiding the European resistance to Fordist practices, Gramsci argues that those who reduce the production processes to “a manifestation of puritanism...deny themselves any possibility of understanding the importance, significance and objective import of the American phenomenon, which is also the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker and of man” (290). Yet Fordism was not merely an American phenomenon. To demonstrate the global hegemonic position of the Fordist model by the 20s and 30s one need look no further than the influence it had on the planned societies of the era. Lenin and the USSR adopted
American-style organization at the state level and carried out its execution during its five year plans. Stalin summed up this adoption: “American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles; which continues on a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is impossible...The combination of the Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism” (Hughes 251). For his part, Hitler kept a photo of Henry Ford in his office and later would grant the car maker the grand cross, the highest medal that Nazi Germany could award a foreigner (Dobbs). Even as Fordism was sweeping the world, however, it was always understood as American in its fundamental origins.

The following book is premised on 1) the primacy of the Fordist model in the American capitalist market in determining processes of production, modes of labor, and the patterns of consumption by the close of the first World War and 2) that the transformation of labor and production brought about through the Fordist revolutions also, necessarily, produced a transformation in the ideological, or, broadly speaking, superstructural elements of social life that, among other spaces, registered in the aesthetic products of the epoch. I intend to read Fordism not as an achievement, as much literature on the matter has tended towards, but rather as a specific problem of the early twentieth century – an objective problem that inaugurated subjective solutions from sociological, political, psychological, and aesthetic spheres. Before engaging those solutions, it seems best to begin by unpacking the problem of Fordism by looking first at its distilled principles in the work of Frederick Taylor.
FORDISM AND MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

TAYLORISM:

The rationalization of the American economy that Gramsci, Lenin, and Hitler marvel at finds its most articulate logic in the writings of Frederick Taylor and its most prolific expression in the Fordist production model. Taylor wrote his treatise *The Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911. The manuscript did not transform the nature of work in the industrialized world; rather, it narrated a specific ideal of production efficiency that was already becoming the dominant logic of its epoch. Through the standardization of each task and by shifting the burden of responsibility from the workers to their managers, Taylor argued that the collective productivity of a factory could be increased through the application of his “scientific management.” Taylorism pushed the division of labor logic to its extreme, fragmenting labor procedures and the human subjects who enacted those procedures. Georg Lukács recorded these changes in his 1923 essay, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.” There, he argues that a rationalized work process required a process of fragmentation that necessarily viewed the “human qualities and idiosyncrasies of the worker...as mere sources of error” when contrasted to the abstract scientific laws that governed the worker’s movements (89). The fragmentation of the subject is fully realized when the worker recognizes that he has become “a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system” that does not and cannot lend credence to aspects of his humanity but that resonate with the system only as sources of error (89).

Anticipating Fordism’s tendency towards totality, Taylor defended his program as
a means to alleviate the class conflict between workers and management. As Evelyn Cobley, in her *Modernism and the Culture of Efficiency*, suggests Taylor’s *Principles of Scientific Management* is “motivated by a utopian desire to replace exploitation with cooperation” (46). For Taylor it was submission to the system that would produce this harmony: “In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first” (2). And the nature of the system he posits was to allow the individual, whether worker or manager, to “reach his highest state of efficiency” (5). To achieve this “state” Taylor argues for the transference of work authority from the skilled worker, whose experience in the trade gave them a degree of control over their own labor, to the managerial force who would oversee a set of unskilled workers. This transfer constitutes the “scientific” nature of the process – the accrual of oversight over the bodies and minds of the workers. “To work according to scientific laws,” Taylor writes, “the management must take over and perform much of the work which is now left to the men; almost every act of the workman should be preceded by one or more preparatory acts of the management which enable him to do his work better and quicker than he otherwise could” (12). From this we can read Taylorism, especially as it comes to be expressed within Fordism, as the dialectical increase in the complexity of the whole through the reduction of complexity on the level of particularity.

**FORDISM:**

The Ford Motor Company was incorporated in 1903 and quickly began to turn a profit with the early vehicles it produced and the primitive policies of standardizations
Ford implemented (Watts 83-84). The panic of 1907 was softened for the Ford Motor Company by the introduction of its newest product the following year, the Model-T. The price tag was only $850, hundreds less than the nearest competitor (Brinkley 110). The result of the car’s success was a needed expansion and in 1910 Ford opened the Highland Park plant, the first space specifically designed to accommodate the “production flow” method that Ford envisioned. In 1914 an overwhelmed visitor to the Highland Park factory and its assembly line production wrote of the experience, “of course there was order in that place, of course there was system— relentless system—terrible ‘efficiency’” (quoted in Brinkley 155).

By 1913 the United States had been the most productive nation on the planet for decades and produced a full third of the world’s manufactured goods (Brinkley 181). American monopoly on the capitalist world stage expanded as automobile production became the centerpiece of its economy and the Fordist method was generalized across all industries. By 1922, modernism’s miracle year, more than half of the vehicles driven on the planet were Fords, the price of a new Model-T had dropped to below one eighth of the average income of an American worker ($260), Ford was one of the richest men in the country, and the Ford Motor Company had long established factories in every major American city and on every continent (Brinkley 271). When a student, protesting Ford’s perception of education, protested to him, “these are different times: this is the modern-age” Ford retorted, “young man, I invented the modern age” (quoted in Brinkley 181). And so, when Gramsci was arrested in 1926 and began writing The Prison Notebooks to document how cultural hegemony contributes to the maintenance of the capitalist state, it is hardly surprising that he identifies the influential industrial and social models emerging
from America as “Fordism” and asserts its relevance in understanding the structures of modern culture.

Indeed the guiding philosophies that Taylor promoted in the 1911 publication of *Principles of Scientific Management* seemed to have been anticipated by Henry Ford, who was already successfully established by the time Taylor wrote his book. The feature that most distinguishes Fordism from Taylorism, however, is scale. Ford’s vision was to simultaneously boost mass production and mass consumption in an attempt to manufacture a marketplace that did not yet exist, and further, to place it at the center of the nation’s economic politics and policies. Taylor did not imagine his systems at such grand levels. More specifically, then, we might define Fordism as (1) the standardization of the commodity form along with the standardization of the processes of (2) production and (3) consumption. Through this mass uniformity, and in coordination with its processes, a capitalism of efficiency was inaugurated that made the Ford name emblematic of American enterprise.

Ford’s revolutionary methods, however, were already written into the historical narrative of American commerce by the time of his ascendency. From his theory of “interchangeable parts,” Eli Whitney is credited with first creating the standardization of the complex commodity form. Beyond standardizing one of the most complex commodities of its day with the Model T, Ford did something further. In an innovation whose anticipation was already inherent to capital, Ford and Taylor transferred the standardization of the commodity object to the most contentious commodity market – the labor force.¹ Crucially, Ford discovered that in assembly-line production the labor power extended by the workers becomes as interchangeable as the replaceable gears of the
Model-T. And while this was something of an old discovery, discussed at length by Marx and others decades before, it had never yet been applied to the production of so complex a commodity as an automobile – a machine composed of thousands of individual working parts.

In this way, Fordism is also the standardization of processes. The workers themselves are interchangeable because their actions (i.e. their errors) are replaced by mechanized acts. Fordism is thus the formalization of the processes of labor and the reproduction of the laborer. The worker, in order to provide his own sustenance, must perform the choreographed motions of the assembly-line. This newly produced workplace witnessed reification, or the objectification of an isolated process mistakenly believed to produce value, entering the realm of Fordist production – a process reframed by Taylor and the Ford marketing division as “efficiency.”

A final component of Fordism is the standardization of the laboring body’s complement, the consuming body. Ford re-imagined the worker/consumer and found the opportunity for completing valorization’s complex circuits under the roof of his own factories. He organized the productive forces in such a way so that it produced not only the commodity, but its consumer as well. He was able to extract surplus value from the worker in the factory and expropriate the worker’s wages outside the factory. The Fordist circle expanded the space of capitalist exploitation and became a defining characteristic of a consumer-based modernity. It discovered consumers in the “free-time” of its producers and was thus able to control the valorization of the production process to an unprecedented extent. It was Ford’s understanding of the production/consumption dialectic as a unified whole whose process he successfully managed that set him apart
because contemporary industrialists.

Because Detroit was already an industrial center before the Ford factories opened, the workers who populated the assembly lines in the early days of the factories had plenty of opportunity to resist the Taylorized processes used by Ford by migrating to the other local industries that were still mired in craft-based production. With the assembly line process firmly in place, the turnover rate was 380 percent in 1913 in Ford’s factory (Braverman 102). To combat this Ford Motors implemented the “wage motive” policy in 1914. Ford raised the salary of his employees from $2 a day to $5 a day - the highest paid industrial workers in the country (Ford 9). The result of this move was twofold: first, to save the company money by halting the turnover rate and establishing a stable, committed, and well-trained workforce that was, temporarily at least, immune from union organizing. And second, by raising his wages Ford forced the other industries in Detroit and the Midwest to do the same to protect their own workforces and thereby created a working class capable of consuming the automobiles and other products of industry that they produced. Summarizing this position in 1926, Ford writes, “The owner, the employees, and the buying public are all one and the same...One’s own employees ought to be one’s own best customers” (8).

The pervasiveness and prominence of the Fordist model is demonstrated by the extent to which the Ford company expanded in the 1920s. And while the assembly line model began as an advantage for the company, it was quickly generalized industry-wide and across the spectrum of all industries. For Ford, efficiency meant privatizing and monopolizing multiple areas of industry associated with his end product. He had a totalizing vision for the Ford factory as a self-sufficient industry that would not and did
not rely on exterior industries. Accordingly, the Ford Company purchased or established mines, forests, ship-building facilities, railroads, rubber farms, electrical plants, steel plants and banks. And for the benefit of his employees he built or purchased schools, churches, hospitals, community centers, grocery stores, and banks (Ford, *Today and Tomorrow*). The public business of his factory and the private business of his employees would go through his company. It was the new model of monopoly at work, originating in the concentration and centralization of finance and industrial capital that took place during the transition from competitive to monopoly modes of capital. Indeed, key aspects of monopoly capital, characterized by practices of concentration and centralization, lent themselves directly to the totalizing tendencies of Fordism. And the process of concentration practiced by the Ford Motor Company during the teens and twenties makes it a site in which the transition from competitive to monopoly capital is relatively visible since it is housed within a single industry and company. This historical trajectory is fundamental to understanding the hegemony of Fordism and roughly corresponds to the expansion of Marx’s theory of the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation developed by Baran and Sweezy in their important book *Monopoly Capital*.

The passage from competitive to monopoly capital is not, however, a linear process. We cannot pretend that the mid-nineteenth century was a capitalist utopia in which the pure laws of competition determined all and that these laws were felled by the early years of the Twentieth Century. Forms of monopoly capital predate the age of monopoly capital and forms of competitive capital have prevailed beyond the highest stage of competitive capitalism. Roughly speaking, the onset of the Twentieth Century saw the entrenchment of various expressions of monopoly capitalism in the hegemonic
economies across the industrialized world. This entrenchment was shaped by historical, cultural, economic, and political pressures, and as such varied in form, but its hegemonic presence is experienced in the early Twentieth Century, or what I term the moment of modernity, in a way previously unknown. For Britain, the transition from competitive to monopoly capital assumed the form of that country’s waning imperial project, in Germany it meant unification and a disciplined industrialization, in Japan it meant Westernization under the guise of “development,” and in America the Fordist model represented and solidified the new monopoly economy. Of course these are general dominant trends experienced by these countries: Germany, Japan, and America each had their own small imperial projects just as Britain also felt the shock of Fordist development in small increments. And while each of these local expressions is uniquely different from the others, they are all interrelated and point to a larger shift in global capital that Baran and Sweezy characterize as “monopoly capitalism.” They each produce and are produced by an intensified entanglement of private capital and government power, they all involve a deskilling of labor traditions and de-emphasis on cultural traditions in the name of valorizing new labor and social patterns, and they all radically accelerate the transformation of the geography of social existence, the texture of experience in a technological world, and the burden of social existence through its rigid administration and rationalization. They are, in a word, modern. And this relationship between modernity emerging from and informing the cultural constitution of the transition to monopoly capital is fundamental to the overarching argument of *Fordism and Modernist Forms*.

As closely related as they are, monopoly capital and Fordism are not to be taken
as synonymous terms. Rather, *Fordism is the American expression of the global passage to monopoly capital*. In the chapters that follow I will alternate between “Fordism” and “Monopoly Capital” when discussing their structures and their relationship to the structures of certain forms of modernist aesthetics. I do not do so haphazardly, however. When I use the term “Fordism” I specifically mean the American efficiency movement characterized by mechanized and rationalized labor and social practices. When I use the term “Monopoly Capital,” however, I intend to invoke something quite larger that includes imperialism, militarism, the hegemonic rise of finance capital, and so on (as well as American Fordism). It is not productive, in my estimation, to isolate these two terms from one another when they must be thought of as entangled products of the same epoch and two specific expressions of the same problem.

**FORDISM AND AESTHETICS**

One of the defining characteristics of American Fordism is the determining concept of *efficiency* – an efficiency that identified America to the world. In the introduction of his book, Taylor suggests that “the need for greater efficiency is widely felt” and envisions his work as answering the call of President Roosevelt who had recently lamented the lack of “national-efficiency” (1). *Ford Factory Facts*, a pamphlet given to visitors of the factories at highland park in 1915, begins with a celebration and lamentation of the effects of efficiency:

> THE continual march of efficiency throughout the entire Ford factory makes the recital of "factory facts" most difficult. Change is the order of the day because of the unceasing efforts to increase and improve
production and reduce the cost. To make Ford cars in larger volume, maintaining the high standards of quality and efficiency. This means that the "factory facts" of today will be different from those of a few months hence. But in this small book are the fundamentals which have brought success and made the Ford factory, in high efficiency and large production, the greatest institution in the automobile world (Ford Motor Company).

The author(s) of the pamphlet marvel at the continuing process of making the then seven year old factory more efficient but are quick to identify inherent problems of representing such a space. The changes have made the old pamphlet (produced in 1913) obsolete and the new one seems primed for obsolescence before its publication. The changes at the factory caused by an expanding market (the pamphlet notes that the number of cars sold by Ford doubled in the two years since its predecessor) served to stabilize and standardize the processes of production but has proved rather difficult to represent in discourse – a problem that would similarly affect the modernists. The notion of efficiency that the pamphlet’s preface focuses on, however, is full of contradictions and a multiplicity of meanings that renders it problematic to use in a static sense.

There is technical efficiency measured on an output model – the most graphic illustration of which is Ford’s assembly line. This model of efficiency undergoes a metamorphosis under monopoly capital to include processes of socialization and elements of morality that were previously regarded as private matters. Jennifer Korns Alexander’s book, The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control, documents how the concept of efficiency penetrates the social consciousness of industrial society in the early twentieth century to become a culture of efficiency encountered in all arenas of existence. Her book is able to trace the etymology of the word through its early
philosophical, mathematical, and scientific uses to arrive at the stage of monopoly capitalism in which the multiplicity of meanings around the concept point beyond “one local historical context to the larger phenomena of industrial modernity itself” (14). The larger phenomenon is perhaps best summarized by Copley in her dynamic understanding of efficiency as “marked by the lure of a perfectibility remaining always out of reach” (8). The “lure” that Cobley identifies is the desire for totality that characterizes Fordism and also identifies the notion of efficiency as a transferable system for understanding and commanding disparate fields of study. Alexander acknowledges this dynamism in the word, as it had come to be understood under monopoly capital, when she writes, “efficiency allowed comparisons between machines or systems of widely different design and function and had come to describe the general goal of machine design: to approach as nearly as possible to a perfect correspondence between output and input” (80). The ability to extend beyond the machinery of society and modify “efficiency” into an active metaphor in the social or superstructural spheres of existence speaks to the degree of entanglement the Fordist logic and the culture at large had experienced by the 1920s. Efficiency was, for Ford, the end-product itself. As a Ford engineer described it, “They weren’t interested in anything except efficiency of production. They wouldn’t talk dollars and cents at all. They talked in terms of the minutes that the thing cost” (Watts 154). Efficiency was no longer just a means to an end but had become an end in itself—a sentiment anticipated by Nietzsche in The Gay Science when he offered that “One thinks with a watch in one’s hand....Virtue has come to consist of doing something in less time than someone else” (259).

As with all ideologically-loaded words, efficiency embodies what Volosinov
describes as an “inner dialectic quality” (23). That is, the concept functions as a contentious site of class antagonisms. The assembly-line is only “efficient” within an output model; it is only “efficient” from the capitalist’s perspective, whose solitary aim is the extraction of surplus value. The worker, in contrast, experiences efficiency as the monotony of mere repetition within the Fordist system. For him, the redundancy of simple movements does not define the labor he sells; it is defined for him by the adjectives of Taylorist scientists. An increase in efficiency confronts him as an increase of his repetitive motions. Ford himself acknowledges this contradiction in Today and Tomorrow, “Of necessity, the work of an individual workman must be repetitive – not otherwise can he gain the effortless speed which makes low prices and earns high wages” (160-161). Therefore, the efficiency that defines the process as a whole remains beyond the worker. And, importantly, the concept of efficiency remains inseparable from that of repetition.

The inner dialectic quality of the concept of efficiency points to a larger problem that emerged from the hegemony of Fordism. The problem of representation that aggrieved the author(s) of Ford Factory Facts in 1915 was a byproduct of the Fordist process itself and by no means limited to its writers. Rather, this dramatic shift in the organization and exercise of the means of production contributed to a larger shift in both perspective and the dynamics of aesthetically reproducing social reality. Fetishism, a defining feature of the psychology of developed capitalism, extended from the marketplace to the workplace. Where it was once veiled from the consumer, the history of the commodity was now just as “mysterious” for the worker who labored upon it. The entirety of the assembly line, or any variation in a modern industrial factory, was visible,
but incomprehensible at the same time. The finished automobile that rolled off the assembly line confronted the worker as alien next to the individualized, repetitive, and unconscious tasks he contributed. His particular labor and that of his neighbors seemed to disappear into the totality of the end-product. This is the fundamental experience of modernity – a discord between the individual experience and the irresistible totality. And it would be repeated again and again. From imperialism’s grip on the undeveloped world to Fordism’s massive industrial scale, from the world wars to the great depression, the throes of a reorganizing and reconstituting monopoly capitalism confronted the individual as an incomprehensible force that did not adhere to the harmony and tradition of aristocratic society found in a Balzac or Tolstoy novel.

Adorno articulates this problem of perspective as a specific historical condition affecting Fordist-modernity and those who labor at its representation. “The coming extinction of art,” he writes, “is prefigured in the increasing impossibility of representing historical events” (Minima Moralia 143). As totality coalesces it simultaneously obstructs the panorama of itself as a representable object. Lukács disagreed with Adorno’s assessment, insisting that modernism “assumed the unity of the world it described and seen it as a living whole inseparable from man himself” (“The Ideology of Modernism” 204). Modernism, he concludes, “disintegrates” and “subjectivizes” man’s experience with his world as a means to “escape” the reality of capitalism (202). Adorno’s profound answer to this charge is not much different from the authors of the Ford Factory Facts. Whereas, they expressed anxiety in 1915 over representing a space that, having assimilated a culture of efficiency into its makeup, existed in a state of perpetual change and was therefore unrepresentable, Adorno posits in Minima Moralia
that the expansion of concentrated forms of capital entangled with centralized states had rendered entire “historical events” impossible to reproduce by art. “Total unfreedom can be recognized,” he concludes, “but not represented” (145). Whereas Lukács situates the demise of realism on the shoulders of the artists, Adorno identifies the issue as one of a historicity that could no longer be accurately depicted except at the level of subjectivity. “Whoever complains about modernism means the modern,” he summarizes (Aesthetic Theory 33). Thus, the organized complexity of the Fordist division of labor (along with the First World War and other factors that engorged the experience of modern existence beyond the scope of the individual) emerges in aesthetics as a problem of representability.

Theodore Dreiser thematizes this perspective in *Sister Carrie* when the title character arrives in Chicago and is astounded by the industrial sprawl. Searching for a job, Carrie is overcome with hopelessness “amid so much evidence of power and force which she did not understand” (17). Dreiser frames Carrie’s experience by suggesting that “she could have understood the meaning of a little stone-cutter’s yard at Columbia City, carving little pieces of marble for individual use,” but she could ascribe no meaning to the vast industrial fields of Chicago. Unlike the craftsmanship of the Columbia City stone cutter, the factories in Chicago “filled with spur tracks and flat cars, transpierced by docks from the river and traversed overhead by immense trundling cranes of wood and steel” represented “huge interests” that were “all far removed” (17). The industries are at once fragmented and wholly connected to one another in Carrie’s view. The activities of the laborers that she watches are disconnected from one another, divided and rationalized in the name of monopoly capitalism, and yet united in one great single task. Dreiser is
here able to adequately depict the subject who is unable to witness total production, but not process it. Carrie, in Adorno’s words, is able to “recognize” the “unfreedom” of the totality, but not fully “represent” or comprehend it, not even to herself.

The mystification that such scale inspires among the individuals who witness and participate in it would come to be intentionally harnessed during the construction of the atomic bomb decades later. In her history *The Girls of Atomic City*, Denise Kiernan describes assembly line processes at Oak Ridge in which the uranium for the Manhattan Project was weaponized. “Tens of thousands of individuals” were recruited to perform often simple tasks such as pushing a button repeatedly for hours at a time (x). However, in the name of secrecy, each worker was barred from knowing exactly what they were participating in and were barred from knowing what their co-workers’ tasks were. Amidst such an enormous undertaking, the military was able to produce ignorance among the 120,000 workers who, like Dreiser’s Carrie, felt “helplessness” before the “huge interests” that were “all far removed.” In the Manhattan Project, the military had brought to fruition a prophecy from a 1918 Buick advertisement that “motor cars will win the war.”² In the end, it was not the cars themselves, but the industrial methodology of Fordism, the mechanisms of the cars’ production, that decisively would contribute to the later war effort.

Modernism’s solution to the crisis of representation, perhaps the thing that most unites the disparate modernist camps into a converging unity, is a series of technical reforms. From Picasso’s cubism to Joyce’s stream of consciousness, modernist artists reconfigured the experience of art in response to the crisis of modernity. One such “solution” that will be interrogated at length in chapter four involves the role of the
narrator, which, in essence, temporarily faults the flawed narrator for the unrepresentability of reality. Joseph Conrad, Ford Maddox Ford, Marcel Proust, Henry James and F. Scott Fitzgerald all relied on displacing the actions of the story apart from the narrator who would write them. Then there are those who sought to put emphasis on the immediate and concrete aspects of the modern experience (John Steinbeck, Richard Wright, Ernest Hemingway, Zora Neal Hurston, Sinclair Lewis, and Sherwood Anderson), borrowing aspects from realism, without framing the works in a grand narrative that situates the characters and action in historical time and space. And some writers sought to put emphasis on the immediate and concrete while coupling it with a grand metaphoric or mythological narrative in order to amplify it (James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Franz Kafka, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and William Carlos Williams). All of these methods and authors were, in a way, responding to the degradation of realism as a viable and critical mode of representation. Realism’s faltering is a result of a common social abstraction taking place across modernity in which the production of life (the labor that goes into its reproduction, the materials that are assembled to assist in its production, and the social institutions and mechanisms that arrange these things) became a “far removed” and wholly abstract phenomenon. Simultaneously, however, there was a great shift towards concentration and centralization that defined monopoly capital on the large scale. But it is this centripetal movement within monopoly capital that strips the local, the immediate, and the concrete of its seeming purpose. Where realism sought to define and demark the relationships that governed social groups and their environments, Modernism was left to wrestle with the incomprehensible totality of monopoly capitalism that could not be contained in a single work. The social was refigured as the experience of the
individual, as in Proust. The environment was recast as the concrete topological playground of the individual’s movements, as in Joyce. The production of class and social hierarchies was misunderstood and misinterpreted, as in Fitzgerald. And the wholly-formed and integrated subjects that populated the great realist novels were recast as alienated and fragmented individuals, as in Kafka. In short, the production of social existence was dislocated and wholly occluded from the empirical view. And so empiricism gave way to the abstractions that constitute Modernism and its often contradictory perspectives, all in the name of representation.

This position is similar to Jameson’s argument in “Modernism and Imperialism,” in its reading of modernist form as an effect of an unrepresentable historical moment of European authors; however we might also distinguish an alternate historical geography to be represented by the American modernists. I agree with Jameson’s reading of imperialism’s spatial effects on modernism’s style, but want to emphasize a distinct feature of “American” modernism which is a problem of immensity or scale. It is a dilemma of alienation from within (for what else is the laboring subject who cannot represent his own totality to himself but alienated?). It is a modernism for whom the “essential abstractness of what really happens....rebuts the aesthetic” \(\textit{Minima Moralia}\ 144). Jameson’s claim does not allow for the recognition of historical totality, with one exception: Ireland – where the colonizer and colonized concur. American modernism, however, is not so defined by the effects of imperialism as by the complexities inherent in a frayed and fraying division of labor that is not tempered by the “passive sedimentations” of “tradition” and “civilization” that Gramsci finds restraining Europe’s capacity to keep pace with American capitalism (277). The processes that produce
existence (even for the producers themselves) are occluded by the drive to magnify the extraction of surplus value – in other words, by monopoly capitalism. As such, the individual is alienated from the objects that populate modern existence, the processes that produce them, and the social character of the relationships that constitute those processes.

Lenin, however, provides something of a bridge between Jameson’s reading and my own. In his seminal “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” he convincingly demonstrates the degree to which imperialism and monopoly capitalism are the same system assuming different forms. Imperialism, he argues, is the natural extension of finance and monopoly capital which seek to “protect” their monopolist status through the state. Colonial possession “guarantees” the flow of resources, the expansion of marketplace, and the elimination of competition necessary to produce a monopoly stage of capitalism (239).

Following the Spanish-American war, America undeniably established itself as an imperial power, albeit an emergent one. But, in actuality, the structure of American imperialism assumes a different form from that of Europe. In doing so, however, it successfully anticipates the structure that the world capitalist colonial system would be forced to take following World War Two. Henry Ford, in particular, was central in developing the process whereby American corporations established an empire of industry that stretched through the Americas and into Europe, Asia, and even into the Soviet Union, where so few American businesses could gain access. Through financial, rather than military power, the Ford Motor Company, and the companies that followed its lead, scoured the planet in pursuit of the vast resources necessary to build the unimaginable quantities of vehicles it produced and the markets necessary to ensure that the
valorization of its products would be realized. While the examples of this process are numerous, perhaps the most prolific is Fordlândia, a prefabricated “American” town transplanted into the Amazon rainforest in the 1920s. Ford established the town, which stands as the epitome of a corporate colony, as a rubber farm and included American style cottages, fire-hydrants, and community centers to ensure its Americaness (Grandin). The exploits of the Ford Motor Company on the international level demonstrate Lenin’s thesis and bring me back to Jameson’s contention and the fundamental problematic that I see as informing the individual and identifiable stylistic traits of the authors I engage below. Jameson, building off Adorno, correctly suggests that “style now becomes the marker and the substitute (the ‘tenant-lieu,’ or place-holding, in Lacanian language) of the unrepresentable totality” (58) As suggested above, I would add to Jameson’s thesis that the “dilemmas of the new imperial world system” that coincides with the emergence of “modernist style” (59) also, and not incidentally, coincides with the dilemmas of monopoly capital, or put another way, coincides, particularly in the American context that is my focus, with, as I phrased the issue above, the problem of Fordism.

**Fordist Aesthetics:**

There are two book-length studies that trace relations between literary modernism and Fordism and its culture of efficiency, but use very different objects and methods to register these instances. They are James F. Knapp’s *Literary Modernism and the Transformation of Work* and Evelyn Cobley’s *Modernism and the Culture of Efficiency*. Focusing on Taylor, Knapp interrogates the “discourse of scientific management” as it
arises in the fiction of Ford, Lawrence, and Joyce as well as the poetry of Pound and Williams. He traces how the logic that informs scientific management, including a desire to control, order, and give shape to what appears as a chaotic enterprise and the history of how men and women “came to be the objects rather than the subjects of history,” also came to inform modernist form and content (13). Accordingly, Knapp spends much of the book’s space reviewing representations of labor in his primary authors.

Cobley’s more recent book, Modernism and the Culture of Efficiency, maps out the origins of the culture of efficiency highlighted in the book’s title from the great exhibition of 1851 through Fordism, Taylorism, and into the genocidal practices at Auschwitz. The second half of the book considers how this “culture” manifested itself in quite disparate modes in the novels of Conrad, Ford, Lawrence, Orwell, Wells, Forester, and Huxley. Both Knapp and Cobley focus on American ideas and practices as put forth by Ford and Taylor and almost entirely British Literature. Why the disjuncture? Certainly British industrial capacity ranked with Germany and the United States as the big three centers in world production between 1900 and 1939, but there is a documented history of how resistant British industries, labor unions, and government were to the new ideas of efficiency promoted by Ford and Taylor. It is partly from this that American industrial output surpassed Britain’s at the onset of the century. Still, the emphasis on British literature and its connection to Taylorism, Fordism, and the culture of efficiency is rather incomplete without an investigation of how American literature, and specifically American fiction, engaged the anxieties surrounding the changing economic order as well. Cobley defends her exclusive use of British literature on the grounds that “although Fordism and Taylorism were specifically American manifestations, their impact was
perhaps felt to be more traumatic in a society deeply rooted in specifically English traditions” (16) – a very reasonable argument. However, as I shall argue in the following chapters, the transformation of labor under Taylorism and Fordism and the administrated culture that emerged as a result were just as foreign and therefore traumatically felt in American fiction.

I also depart from the content-focused readings that inform Knapp and Cobley’s books. While they are not insensitive of the ways in which history conditions the form and style of literary texts, they are first and foremost concerned with manifestations of history as it is thematically represented by the texts. While I find both of their methodologies and findings convincing, I am primarily interested in the determination of style and its relationship to the Fordist epoch. This work intends to analyze the formal experiments typical of modernist novelists for signs of a cultural preoccupation with efficiency, repetition, nostalgia, and other concepts that the age of Fordism inaugurated or amplified. It does not suggest that the authors took their cues from industry or the economy around them, but rather that the simultaneity with which their individual emphases on process and the economy of language in their works entered the culture along with the Taylorist and Fordist logic is not incidental. Rather, this project focuses on the salient features of the culture of efficiency as felt in a sample of the literature of the time. This culture did not appear in the writing practices or production of the literature itself; indeed, the production of each novel was unique to the author producing it and often proved quite inefficient. Rather, the historical logic emerges in the attention to form that identifies “style” as a site of ideological contestation.

Suzanne Raitt performs a similar reading in her “The Rhetoric of Efficiency in
Early Modernism.” There, she details the passage of “efficiency,” as an industrial method, from the factory space to the domestic space and eventually into the manifestos and early debates surrounding modernist literature. It is most evident for her in the discourse surrounding Pound’s Imagism movement which “aspired to an accuracy and an efficiency that were implicitly associated with the modern world” (847-848). And further, she develops how the ideals surrounding Imagism informed the early stream of consciousness techniques in Dorothy Richardson’s *Pilgrimage*. While Raitt’s essay is useful for mapping the early discourse surrounding “efficiency” within the modernist movement(s) and for convincingly demonstrating how that discourse applies to fiction that, on its surface, appears anything but efficient, she narrowly reads the efficiency movement as emerging from moral standards and personal ideas without documenting the larger economic and social origins of the concept that were producing, more importantly, new patterns of labor and social engineering techniques. She does not, in other words, read the shift in the aesthetic sphere as a dynamic or contentious site that was a product of “unsolved antagonisms of reality,” but rather a convenient process of assimilation and identification with “the modern.” In the following chapters I will fill out this line of thinking to include that indispensable history.

The texts critiqued below are, therefore, not purely aesthetic acts but are acts of cultural exchange that participate in the naturalizing of the hegemonic tendencies that they produce and reproduce. This process constitutes their “cultural intelligibility.” And, the novels of the three authors are particularly productive sites because they have unique, even contradictory, relationships to the modes of cultural intelligibility of their historical epoch(s). As such, the accentuations in their writings and the reception that each piece of
writing attained serve as registers of fundamental changes in the cultural landscape. What is at stake is not the production of the texts themselves, but the form in which the texts produce their knowledges – or, the cultural space of their consumption. This is a space conditioned by the policies of efficiency, repetition, and managerial control developed in the large industries. In other words, the texts contribute to the history of the ascent of Fordism as much as they are affected by it. They are entangled in the cultural moment at which these transformations occur and are some of the spaces in which those transformations take hold.

*Fordism and Modernist Forms*’ thesis rests on the assumption that various experimental literary styles adopted by modernist writers were specific strategies developed by the individual authors to engage the social dilemmas of an unrepresentable Fordist landscape. As such, the site of their identifiable styles, and the general modernist attention to the formal processes of literature, proves to be the most sensitive register of the problem of Fordism. Additionally, the components that constitute their styles (efficiency, totality, repetition, and nostalgia) are historically appropriate strategies that emerge as entangled indicators of the problem they are meant to manage. For Adorno, this entanglement is likewise determined through historical interrelationships: “The substantive element of artistic modernism draws its power from the fact that the most advanced procedures of material production and organization are not limited to the sphere in which they originate…Art is modern when, by its mode of experience and as the expression of the crisis of experience, it absorbs what industrialization has developed under the given relations of production” (*Aesthetic Theory* 43). The crisis that Adorno identifies stands as a paradox that informs this project – the attempt by literary
modernism to aesthetically represent modernity using the very techniques that render it experientially unrepresentable, a name for which is “style.”

“Style,” as I use it, is a neutral term. And, while it is a fundamental category for understanding works that are “modernist,” Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate how it functions negatively within the culture industry, which they read as “stylized barbarity” (128). Lukács might not object to using the same phrase to describe high modernism, which he identifies as a movement in which “style ceases to be a formalistic category...it is the specific form of a specific content” (“The Ideology of Modernism” 189). The function of the category of style serves as one example in which the structures of modernism and the culture industry converge. As such, it becomes a combative site for critics. Those who have attempted to marry modernism and the culture industry have a correct instinct but go about their project in problematic ways. They are correct to suggest that the textual evidence simply does not support the “frontier between high culture and so-called mass or consumer culture” (2) that Jameson identifies in his brief history of modernism at the opening of Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Rather, the relationship is eminently dialectical. The two movements constitute one another and overlap in their most antagonist instances. That is, their convergences are instances of enmity rather than commonality. This position is different from Lawrence Rainey in Institutions of Modernism or Michael North in Reading 1922, for whom the separation of the two traditional spheres is the product of an originary hermeneutic mistake. In their slightly different arguments, the difference between modernism and the culture industry is formal in nature and a history of misguided criticism has long asserted the dual-existence of the same thing. Thus, they collapse the
two into one category and erase the cultural and economic foundations and consequences of each in the process. The culture industry and forms of high modernism are as distinct as the object and subject in a materialist ontology. They are united in opposition; though their entanglement does not efface their differences or antagonisms. As Adorno notes in *Negative Dialectics*, “in truth, the subject is never quite the subject and the object never quite the object; and yet the two are not pieced out of any third that transcends them” (175). It is in this uncertainty that Rainey and North go astray. They mistake instances of commonality and historical or cultural concurrence for evidence of hybridity.

The dual categories of modernism and the culture industry are relevant to my project because 1) of the highly relevant relationship between the *rise* of Fordist industrialization and the *fissure* that transpired between high and low culture and 2) because of the precarious position of Fitzgerald and Hemingway as writers who exist on the borders of the categories in various and often conflicting narrations of their place in the artistic landscape of the early Twentieth Century. Gertrude Stein, on the other hand, seems always within the modernist camp; however, the composition of her most popular book, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Tolkas*, and the subsequent fame she received speaks to a transition of her negotiation with that obscurity.

It is in this spirit that I will argue that the novels of Stein, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald provide productive sites in which the effects of Fordism on a particular conjunctive of American modernism, can be deciphered and mapped. The chronological expanse of their novels from a pre-Fordist epoch (early Stein) to the hegemony of high-Fordism (all three authors) will prove particularly sensitive of the transformations at stake. Furthermore, the unique position of my authors in their dynamic and
representative positions across the modernism/culture industry dialectic provides ample room to interrogate the Fordist influence across a generous and suitable aesthetic sample. Finally, the particular intimacies of the authors, their social and literary relationships with one another along with the proximity in which they spent large portions of their professional lives, will provide an opportunity to re-interrogate the social nature of their influences on one another.
CHAPTER 2

“THE ASSEMBLING OF A THING”:

GERTRUDE STEIN’S THE MAKING OF AMERICANS

“Think of anything, of cowboys, of movies, of detective stories, of anybody who goes anywhere or stays at home and is an American and you will realize that it is something strictly American to conceive a space that is filled with moving, a space of time that is filled always filled with moving”


INTRODUCTION

Gertrude Stein counted The Making of Americans, along with Remembrance of Things Past and Ulysses, as one of the three “important” books written during the modernist era. She writes “A thing you all know is that in the three novels written in this generation that are the important things written in this generation, there is, in none of them a story. There is none in Proust in The Making of Americans or in Ulysses” (Writings 299). The claim is a curious one since the acclaim that accompanied Proust and Joyce’s novels did not follow hers. What then were her criteria for “important” books and why is The Making of Americans important? And further, what does the absence of a “story,” as Stein understands the concept, have to do with her generation and its great literature?

In this chapter I will (1) summarize the central scholarship surrounding The Making of Americans and the origins of its stylistic devices, (2) demonstrate through a
close reading of her lectures and essays Stein’s investment in a form of historical
determinism and use this investment to problematize the critical narratives of *The Making
of Americans*, and (3) use the framework of Stein’s hermeneutic to read *The Making of
Americans* and its stylistic innovations against the emerging structures of Fordist
America. It is my contention that Stein’s dominant formal technique – repetition –
emerges from the structures of the new social practices originating in the economies of
the early twentieth century factory space and normalizing across society during the
production of Stein’s novel. Stein assimilates these formal transformations in industrial
production into the formal structures of her prose in an effort to produce an “important”
book that speaks to the structures of its historical moment.

**STEIN’S IMMEDIATE INFLUENCES AND ITS SCHOLARSHIP**

Gertrude Stein famously studied under William James and the exact nature of his
influence over her is an area of contention. In particular, Stein scholarship has paid close
attention to both Stein and James’ investment in the concepts of repetition and habit. In
his *Principles of Psychology*, James writes in detail on the physical and psychological
process of repetition, which he terms *habitude*. Habit’s function in his evolutionary
account is to “economize the expense of nervous and muscular energy;” it “simplifies the
movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes
fatigue” (113). For James, just as for Taylor and Ford after him, efficiency and repetition
are interrelated, simultaneous actions through which productive ends are achieved. He
develops an industrial metaphor to demonstrate habitue’s importance to society: “habit
is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (121). In valorizing society’s enormous fly-wheel, James summarizes its impact by entering the realm of class and politics: “habit...saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor...It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein...It keeps different social strata from mixing” (121). Thus, individual and even social change comes from two places: disrupting the repressive habits and developing the positive ones (122).

Habit is phenomenological for James. It functions both at the unconscious and conscious levels, constituting self-consciousness itself. The self in this account has both subjective and objective aspects. It is an object of knowledge or the “self as known,” generated by its totality of habits, and it is the subject who knows or “self as knower” (Psychology: Briefer Course 191). It is here that a fundamental break between James’ science and Stein’s methodology occurs. While the inner dynamic of the self’s objective and subjective aspects are emphasized in James, the social dynamic of the observer who records the habit’s role in the formation of self is left unexamined. Stein acknowledges the limitations of James’ science in her lecture on The Making of Americans:

When I was working with William James I completely learned one thing, that science is continuously busy with the complete description of something, with ultimately the complete description of anything with ultimately the complete description of everything...When I began The Making of Americans I knew I really did know that a complete description was a possible thing, and certainly a complete description is a possible thing. But as it is a possible thing one can stop continuing to describe this everything. That is where philosophy comes in, it begins when one stops continuing describing everything. (283-284)

Stein’s emphasis on description as the process of science and the describer as the one who begins or ends that process is quite distinct from James whose whole attention is
focused on the object being described. Stein goes on to distinguish herself further by insisting that description is insufficient; at its end the scientist becomes a philosopher in order to fill in the gaps created by the inner dynamic of the self being described and the social dynamic of the self who describes.

This division between Stein and James problematizes the identity that many critics have formed between the psychologist’s observations and the author’s style. At issue is the relationship between the distinct terms “habit” and “repetition.” James aligns himself with the object of his study and uses the term “habit” to blur the lines between the observer and the observed. “Habit” is the internal vocabulary that the “self as knower” would use to describe its own processes. Stein takes this concept and re-frames it as “repetition.” In so doing, she creates space between herself as observer and the object of her observation. Her characters have repetition that is “coming out” of them, and her narrator, rather than identifying with those characters or trying to inhabit them, records those repetitions and meditates or “philosophizes” on the differences that she observes. Jennifer Ashton helps us see these distinctions:

While in James the way experience becomes a habit remains an implicit analogy for the way a subject knows an object, the terms of that analogy exist in a deeper functional relation in Stein's *The Making of Americans*. There habit is a matter of recognition. Synonymous with character, it emerges through resemblances in a person's successive repeating, and repeating really only counts as such when someone listens to it and recognizes it as repeating. In this respect, the habits that are said to begin with Mr. Hersland's settled repeating, for example, signify the degree to which his character has become knowledge to a subject who listened, the subject in this case being the novel's narrator. Backed by James's phenomenology of habit, the novel portrays repetition as constitutive of character, and in doing so establishes repetition as the experiential basis of knowledge. (309)
Repetition, in this account, replaces older literary models (bildungsroman, heroic adventure, romance, etc.) of constituting character. In other words, what Stein borrows from James is a trope or device for fleshing out character while doing away with “story.” Ashton’s reading is particularly strong at integrating James’ psychology into the novel’s technique and especially into the narrator’s two tasks of “description” and “philosophy.” This is quite different from another dominate mode of reading Stein’s relationship to James that interrogates Stein’s writing methods and experiments James conducted while Stein was a student.

Barbara Will’s reading of Stein typifies the emphasis on James’ experiments into automatic writing and the function of rote in consciousness. Through a reading of two journal papers Stein wrote as a student under William James, Will suggests that Stein’s research into “motor automatism” heavily influenced her technique as author. Will attributes the idea to a famous B.F. Skinner article from 1934 in which he uses Stein’s scientific work to suggest that Stein’s writing was a “lifelong exercise in automatic writing” (26). While Stein herself brushes off Skinner’s article, Will emphasizes that Stein does not deny the thrust of his argument. There is even some evidence for Will’s line of thinking within Stein’s own writings. For Stein, automatism is the process of doing two things as though they were one, “like the motor going inside and the car moving, they are part of the same thing” (“Lectures in America” 290). It is a process of “consciousness without memory” (Will 56). Stein herself ties automatism and repetition to industrial modernity: “a motor goes inside of an automobile and the car goes. In short this generation has conceived an intensity of movement so great….that is what makes this
generation what it is and that is why it is American, and this is very important in connection with portraits of anything” (“Lectures in America” 287-288).

Tim Armstrong connects Stein to James and automatic writing, but in his study of modernism, he also marries the technique to the modernist performance of stream of consciousness. “Automatic writing,” Armstrong writes, “works at the borders of consciousness, raising questions about the source of its materials…” (96). He goes on to describe the style of *The Making of Americans* as “a lateral flow…in which language dissolves into the axis of association” (97). Armstrong’s reading places Stein (as she would herself insist) square in the center of modernist technique and names her alongside Eliot and Joyce as investigating the “distribution of language” across new forms.

Armstrong, Will, and Ashton’s readings of Stein’s style are quite typical in the critical canon. They situate Stein’s writing within a genealogy that stretches back to James and then interrogate the evolution of the repetition device as it emerges from “habitude” and comes to function in *The Making of Americans*. There is, indeed, much in Stein’s own lectures and essays to validate this mode of scholarship. But there is something more within those lectures and essays that a purely discursive or even psychological reading cannot access. There is a streak of what might be called historical determinism painting Stein’s own recollection of the novel’s composition and its place in an emerging hegemony of American literature. The task of this chapter, then, is to reorient the discussion of repetition in the novel’s form to the historical structures in American life that Stein attempts to name in her lectures and concretely tie to the novel. I do not intend to replace the scholarly narrative that links James’ psychology to Stein’s methodology, merely to contextualize and historicize it. Stein undoubtedly draws from
her work with William James, but her own recollections make it clear that larger external pressures inform both her appreciation for James’s theories and her appropriation of them for her style. In the following section, I will turn to examine these external, and I believe thoroughly historical, pressures.

**STEIN THE DETERMINIST**

In “Composition as Explanation,” an essay the author claims was written entirely within a Ford Model-T in a repair garage (*The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* 233), Stein argues that “the only thing that is different from one time to another is what is seen and what is seen depends upon how everybody is doing everything” (*Writings and Lectures 1909-1945* 21). This quote provides the essential structure of Stein’s form of historical determinism. It informs her histories of literary styles and the way that she reads her contemporaries. This structure, however, takes many forms. In “How Writing is Written” it is national: “Think of your reading…,” she writes, “you will see that what you might call the ‘internal history’ of a country always affects its use of writing” (265). In “Portraits and Repetition” it is generational: “A motor goes inside of an automobile and the car goes. In short this generation has conceived an intensity of movement so great that it has not to be seen against something else to be known, and therefore, this generation does not connect itself with anything, that is what makes this generation what it is and that is why it is American” (*Writings 1932-1946* 288). But the overall thrust of the argument remains constant: aesthetic production is unavoidably entangled with the society from which it emerges and the moment in time when it is produced. It is not an
isolated psychological or romantic act, for Stein, but a historical one. And nowhere does Stein flesh out the extent of her investment in history’s effect on art and establish the criteria by which she reads importance into *The Making of Americans* than her lecture “What is English Literature?”

“What is English Literature?” begins with a fundamental question for Stein: why is the rate of great English writers decreasing and the rate of great American writers increasing? She begins by examining Chaucer and early British literature, which, she argues, is defined by the quality of its description of “daily island life” (*Writings 1932-1946* 197). This is England’s “glory” as she calls it and it stretches until the time of Jane Austen. There are, of course, problems for England during these centuries. The Norman Conquest interrupted the daily island life, but it was “absorbed” into that life and the “confusion” that it generated was momentary. The English Civil War, likewise, disrupted the flow of the daily island life, but things settled down in time and normalcy resumed. The literature of these centuries is marked by “completion” or the concrete understanding of the limits of daily life within the boundaries of the island space. This, of course, changes in the nineteenth century:

If you live a daily island life and live it every day and own everything or enough to call it everything outside the island you are naturally not interested in completion, but you are naturally interested in telling about how you own everything. But naturally more completely are you interested in describing the daily island life, because more completely as you are describing the daily island life the more steadily and firmly are you owning everything you own which being practically everything could be called everything…And what has it to do with writing. It has a great deal to do with writing. (209-210)

The “owning” of everything outside itself, in this account, problematizes the literature of “completion.” The boundaries that once defined the island are ambiguous and the idea of
completion (of either building an empire or describing one) becomes quite complicated. This creates a transition in the literature from that which describes to that which explains, as the daily life on the island no longer took precedent over the explanation for that island owning everything beyond itself. The nineteenth century “discovered explanation,” just as it discovers “sentimental literature” and both, in chorus, are tasked with justifying imperial expansion while retaining ideological coherence in the island space (212). This, for Stein, creates an incomplete and somewhat incoherent literature: “all this leads you to that what you think is not what you say but you say what you think and you are thinking about what you think” (214). And this ideological confusion manifests itself in grammar, as the nineteenth century turned away from the hard nouns and adjectives that had made up its descriptive phase and instead became composed of “phrases” (215-216). This is because “the emotional sentiment that any one living their daily living and owning everything outside needs to express is again something that can only be expressed by phrases” (216). With Queen Victoria’s death and the Boer Wars, however, Stein marks a distinct change within the relationship between inside and outside, description and explanation. There is “less owning” and the dominant device of imperial logic, the phrase, begins to lose its potency (217-218). And this is when American industry, its literature, and Stein’s self-proclaimed masterpiece The Making of Americans, step in to assume a new hegemonic role.

The transition from British and American power, from British to American literature, is registered, for Stein, in the transition of prominence from the phrase to the paragraph. The grammar here provides a metaphoric structure to map the history of the two countries. The disconnectedness and incompleteness of the expanding and
contracting British Empire found its expression in the disparate phrases of its literature and their tenuous connections to each other. American literature, on the other hand, is not concerned with describing its daily island life, since from its inception its borders have always been permeable from immigration and expanding under the call for ‘manifest destiny.’ Nor is America tasked with explaining its owning of everything outside itself, since it has no empire worth mentioning, in Stein’s opinion. Rather, America needed the wholeness that comes through the paragraph form. The twentieth century was America’s century, its literature was America’s, and the wholeness of the paragraph was its device and motif – a kind of literary manifest destiny. The artist who exemplifies this transition best, for Stein, is Henry James. His literature “had a future feeling,” while his English contemporaries had “an ending” (221). James’ paragraph was “detached” – “what it said from what it did, what it was from what it held” (222). This is the way of “American” society and literature for Stein; “the disembodied way of disconnecting something from anything and anything from something was the American one” (222). But here Stein stops her lecture, having spent a dozen pages on British literature and its history and only one or two on its American counterpart. Her line of thinking, however, picks up again, nearly uninterrupted, in a later lecture, “The Gradual Making of The Making of Americans.”

In this later lecture we can see that Stein believes herself to have inherited James’ legacy (Henry, not William!) and that The Making of Americans is an “important” novel precisely because it captures and expresses a determinate dynamic in American society that Stein struggles to name in her lectures. This dynamic can be reduced to a word not available to Stein at the time: Fordism. Indeed, across her lectures and essays she
consistently turns back to the assembly-line and automobile metaphors to identify a fundamental shift in American society that makes the twentieth century its century and which begins to be felt in art and literature around the time Stein completed writing *The Making of Americans* in 1911, just seven years after Henry Ford established the Ford Motor Company in Detroit. Stein describes this transition to American power and prominence in literature, relying on the series production and assembly metaphors, in her lecture on the making of *The Making of Americans*:

Paragraphs were inevitable because as the nineteenth century came to its ending, phrases were no longer full of any meaning and the time had come when a whole thing was all there was of anything. *Series immediately before and after made everybody clearly understand this thing.* And so it was natural that in writing *The Making of Americans* I had proceeded to enlarge my paragraphs so as to include everything. What else could I do. In fact inevitably I made my sentences and my paragraphs do the same thing, made them be one and the same thing…and now in the beginning of the twentieth century a whole thing, being what was assembled from its parts was a whole thing and so it was a paragraph…Then at the same time is the question of time. *The assembling of a thing to make a whole thing and each of these whole things is one of a series,* but besides this there is the important thing and the very American thing that everybody knows who is an American just how many seconds minutes or hours it is going to take to do a whole thing. It is singularly a sense for combination within a conception of the existence of a given space of time that makes the American thing the American thing, and the sense of this space of time must be within the whole thing as well as in the completed whole thing. *(Writings 1932-1946 285-286, italics mine)*

These words constitute the determinate dynamic in American social life that was missing from her earlier account in “What is English Literature?” The British had their “daily island life” and their empire of “owning everything outside” that structured their literature and created discursive tensions still discernible centuries later for Stein. The Americans, on the other hand, have a sense of wholeness stemming from its manifest destiny expansion and its monopolistic practice of “including everything” and liquidating
the difference between the parts and whole, as Stein confesses having to do with her sentences and paragraphs. Along with this came a productive dynamic that redefined American society in the late nineteenth century and earned it hegemonic status in the twentieth – its unique Fordist capacity to assemble whole things out of parts and understand whole things within a specifically Taylorized “sense for combination” and “sense of time.” This is the starting point of twentieth century, American literature, for Stein, along with her criteria for identifying “important” literature or that literature which shares a concrete and identifiable structure with its national space and generational time.

Stein has cause to argue that “important” American literature of the twentieth century would find its reflection in American industry. America was emerging as a hegemonic nation in the sphere of industrial production due to its revolutionary production methods: the scientific management of labor and the mechanization of labor on the assembly line. Frederick Taylor gives a voice to this revolution when he calls for “time study for all work done by hand” and for “all operations done by the various machines” (Shop Management). The stop watch was to be the tool of choice for the new managerial class – the class that, in Stein’s words, would measure that “very American thing…just how many seconds minutes or hours it is going to take to do a whole thing.” And Henry Ford’s factories led the way for new industrialists building their businesses around the philosophy of assembly or “the assembling of a thing to make a whole thing and each of these whole things is one of a series” (Writings 1932-1946 285-286).

But in her determination that these new industrial methods were the determinate characteristics of American society and thus the foundation of its new literature, Stein never pauses to wonder what effect the Taylorization of time and the Fordist factory as
the kernel for modern America might have on that society. It is, for her, self-evident that these sources provide the model of the new century, but the consequences are left unexamined even as she returns to the industrial origins of American power and the automobile’s assembly as the symbol for that power across her writings:

They created the Twentieth Century. The United States, instead of having the feeling of beginning at one end and ending at another, had the conception of assembling the whole thing out of its parts, the whole thing which made the Twentieth Century productive. The Twentieth Century conceived an automobile as a whole, so to speak, and then created it, built it up out of its parts. It was an entirely different point of view from the Nineteenth Century’s. The Nineteenth Century would have seen the parts, and worked towards the automobile through them. (“How Writing is Written” 264-265)

A problem thus persists in Stein’s turn towards the industrial base of American power: she accepts its productivity and status without question. The perspective that the Fordist model is inherently superior to other options and ultimately results in the betterment of the country and its people is entirely uncontested in Stein’s accounts. By not interrogating the internal dynamics and contradictions of what in a Marxist language is termed the “base” (a process Stein appears to have done through her critique of British imperialism and the inherent problems of representation that emerge thereof), Stein is unable to anticipate the recurrence of those contradictions and problems in her literature. Thus, as we shall see, the dehumanizing and destructive forces that fuel Fordism’s productivity recur in the structure of The Making of Americans, where the characters are re-made as spectacles of repetition and the story of the “making” is paralyzed by an accumulation of redundancy. Before moving on to the novel, however, it is worth taking some time to reconsider the models of efficiency that the new Fordist century is built
upon and especially its effects on the category of subjectivity both in the social sphere and its troubling representation in the aesthetic space.

The writings of both Marx and Lukács on the topics of time and space describe the fragmenting subjectivity of modernity, or, more accurately, recognition of the instability of the bourgeois conception of a unified, whole subject in the first place – a process that Stein will reproduce in *The Making of Americans*. Lukács argues that the “fragmentation of the object of production” through reification, in which the object as commodity loses its connection to use-value, “necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject” (89). In other words, the worker as subject of history, but also as the object of commodification himself, experiences the same disintegration as the object whose production he partakes in. As the division of labor is magnified and the individual’s active contribution to the production process is quantifiably narrowed, the phenomenon of fragmentation or reification also expands.

In Marx’s early writings, the concrete relationship between time and space under industrialization is similarly articulated in terms of the subject’s experience of it:

Through the subordination of man to the machine the situation arises in which men are effaced by their labour; in which the pendulum of the clock has become as accurate a measure of the relative activity of two workers as it is of the speed of two locomotives. Therefore, we should not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour. Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the most the incarnation of time. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything: hour for hour, day for day. (quoted in *History and Class Consciousness* 89-90)

Commodified time becomes space under industrialized capitalism. It is categorized, measured, and filled – *time is money*, the bourgeois proverb insists. Time also becomes the antagonistic space of class conflict: how much of it does the worker occupy and how
much is it worth in wages? That the antagonism over time explodes in the labor fervor of
the early twentieth century should not surprise us when we consider that Fordist
production models fundamentally altered the nature of its experience from even the
industrial practices of the mid-nineteenth century.

The congealing of time and space under capitalism is a process that accelerates
alongside the development of capital’s hegemony. While the disciplinary structures of
the “tyranny of the clock” felt oppressive for early industrial workers, its amplification
under Fordist production proved a new problem. Fordism is, in a word, and for its epoch,
the perfection of the division of labor. Its processes and logic is in many ways not much
different from those found in the Manchester and London factories that Marx and Engels
document in the mid-nineteenth century. They are merely amplified. Indeed, the central
discovery by made by Ford and his managers was the “flow production” process that
systematically harmonizes the fragmentation that results from the division of labor.
Thus, the “assembling” that Stein recognizes going on inside of Ford’s factories is not so
much the automobiles themselves, but rather the disparate “parts” of labor that are unified
into a systemic “whole” – the assembly line.

Lukács identifies these transformations in the division of labor and its
reconfiguration of how time and space contribute to the production of surplus value.
Elaborating on Marx, he notes that

the contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically
conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of man’s
consciousness and impervious to human intervention, i.e. a perfectly
closed system, must likewise transform the basic categories of man’s
immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common
denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space. (*History and Class Consciousness* 89)

The subject is objectified by the system which occupies the productive space (where once would have been a human subject or “craftsman”) and which determines the flow of time according to the spatial dimensions in which it functions. He continues, “thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ (the reified, mechanically objectified ‘performance of the worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes space” (90). Time is reified in Lukács’ telling; what was “natural” about its passage for the farmer and craftsman in a previous age becomes mechanized and utilized as a tool of capital under late industry.

The Fordist moment is a “break” in how time and space were apprehended and thus represented. Industrialism, as Marx lays it out, certainly reconfigures these categories and posits them in a new relationship with one another that is conducive to the production of surplus value, but Fordism marks something different. Its insistence on flow processes generates unprecedented homogeneity between divisions in time and thereby spatializes its experience. This perception of time as simultaneity is a symptomatic passage to what Benjamin will term “empty, homogenous time” in the late 1930s (“Theses on the Philosophy of History” 261) and what Stein represents in her novel. This “empty, homogenous time” is essentially what Lukács means when he says that “time….becomes space.” This all marks a break with older industrialism and even a historical break with Marx whose notions of revolutions could and would explode the continuum of history as the passing of time. Thus, we must consider that time’s homogeneity under monopoly capital is not just a product of the organization of the
means of production or its disciplinary apparatuses, but of its hegemonic status and the improbability of its explosion.

The process Lukács identifies concerns the factory space of industrialization as its immediate object, but also extends beyond that into the realm of private existence. “The internal organization of a factory could not possibly have such an effect [upon all of society] – even within the factory itself – were it not for the fact that it contained in concentrated form the whole structure of capitalist society,” Lukács argues (90). And later,

the atomization of the individual is, then, only the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the ‘natural laws’ of capitalist production have been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society; that – for the first time in history – the whole of society is subjected, or tends to be subjected, to a unified economic process, and that the fate of every member of society is determined by unified laws. (91-92)

In other words, changes to the industrial character of the factory space are emblematic, in many instances, of larger transitions across the whole of the industrial society. That the totalizing character of reification could itself be ideological is not lost on Lukács: “if this atomization is only an illusion it is a necessary one” he suggests (92). Whether the effects of changes in the factory space on the experience of time and space as they protrude into “civil” and “private” life are as quantifiable and structural as in the factory or remain illusory afterimages of the production process is immaterial. As with all shifts in the mode of production, its reconfiguration must occur at multiple levels of social existence in order that they may be reproduced.

The narrator of The Making of Americans feels the symptoms of subjectivity’s degradation and acknowledges it as an early impediment to her progress. She is
compelled to present a sort of dialectic between the reified components of modern life and the “singularities” which preserve the individual. She writes:

> Yes real singularity we have not made enough of yet so that any other one can really know it. I say vital singularity is as yet an unknown product with us, we who in our habits, dress suit cases, clothes and hats, and ways of thinking, walking, making money, talking, having simple lines in decorating, in ways of reforming, all with a metallic clicking like the typewriting which is our only way of thinking, our way of educating, our way of learning, all always the same way of doing, all the way down as far as there is any way down inside to us. We all are the same all through us, we never have it to be free inside us. No brother singulars, it is sad here for us, there is no place in an adolescent world for anything eccentric like us, machine making does not turn out queer things like us, they can never make a world to let us be free each one inside us. (47)

Here, Stein presents a litany of reified structures that produce the individual as a category; commodities such as “clothes and hats” are put into parallel structure and equated to more personal functions such as “ways of thinking” and “habits” and also to social roles such as “making money.” This cacophony of structures coexists in the modern world with the regularity of a “metallic clicking,” like that of a typewriter, whose rhythms seem to mimic the reified structure of other social functions such as educating and learning. Yet “vital singularity” remains an undiscovered “product” within the individual. Stein laments that “we are all the same all through us” and thus “freedom” remains unrealized in a world so determined by metallic clicking rhythms. And just when the individual seems vanquished, the narrator is compelled to remind the reader that “machine making does not turn out queer things like us.” The narrator recognizes that the production of personality types will bring to mind the Fordist assembly line and has to intervene to prevent that association. Through her efforts, however, she unwittingly places the connection into the mind of her reader. She struggles here, as elsewhere, to distinguish and establish subjectivity as a viable category in a modern world which has
discovered the value-producing mechanisms of liquifying the very individuals that would populate that category.

Stein is, in many ways, struggling against a type of reification here that Jameson identifies in *Marxism and Form*. There, Jameson argues that the separation between the “natural” world and the specifically human-created world of the modern urbanity with its high industry, centralized economies, and standardized practices – a separation that rigidly exists in the Romantic imagination – was disappearing. Subjects of the reified modernity began to experience and represent high industry and its effects as the “natural” state of things (105-106). Stein’s narrator fills her prose with a perspective that anticipates Jameson’s through a resistance to it. And while “machine making does not turn out queer things like us,” the narrator does sadly admit that machine making does produce the world in which these “queer things” exist, but does not produce it in such a way to cultivate “singularity.” She concludes, “they can never make a world to let us be free each one inside us” (47). The narrator goes mute about whether the “they,” to whom she refers, are the handlers of the machines or the machines themselves. The difference between the two might well be irrelevant from her perspective.

The looming question that haunts the text, “how is an individual supposed to achieve their ‘singularity’ in a machine made and metallic clicking modernity?” transfigures into “how is the representation of the individual, a character confined by an author’s prose, supposed to achieve this singularity in a system of pure repetition?” Stein’s style at once arrests and confines her characters, but in so doing mimics the parameters of a totalizing modernity, abstracting the task of preserving individuality. Adorno, nearly forty years after Stein, presents a similar problem. “In the midst of
standardized, organized human units,” he writes, “the individual persists. He is even protected and gaining monopoly value. But he is in reality no more than the mere function of his own uniqueness…” (*Minima Moralia* 135).

The novel’s structural relationship to the internal dynamics of Fordist industry thus becomes the criterion by which Stein insists *The Making of Americans* ought to be considered. These internal dynamics include the Taylorization of time into space, the assembly of parts into a whole (always from the perspective of the whole), and the reification of the subject within the social conditions that these transformations in industrial procedures auger. The novel is “important,” she declares, and its importance is grounded in the determinate historical circumstances of the society in which it was composed. I will now turn to a closer reading of the novel to demonstrate how the dynamics of Fordism find expression there and examine what the consequences of employing those dynamics are for the aesthetic object.

**The Making of Americans**

*The Making of Americans* is a novel about reification and the new realities of Fordist modernity. Its defining features, according to Stein’s own lectures, are the paragraph as “whole,” the novel’s “space of time” that is filled with “moving,” the predominance of the repetition/insistence device, and the absence of a “story.” Through an analysis of these features, I will demonstrate the degree to which they are an attempt to represent the reified structures of American modernity through the novel’s experimental formal elements. The text reproduces the patterns and contradictions of

64
Fordism, as it is experienced by the subject, and in so doing reproduces the violence done to the category of the subject by monopoly capital’s onset. As such, the novel is particularly sensitive to the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism and this is the source of its “importance.”

THE PARAGRAPH AS WHOLE:

As I have already covered above, Stein argues that the twentieth century was the American century, that its literature is to be the dominant literature, and that the paragraph is the “part of speech” that would define this literature. The paragraph is essential for Stein, because it has the capacity to represent the social realities of the twentieth century: the primacy of the whole over the parts that constitute it, the space of time that it takes for the parts to constitute the whole, and the sense for combination within that space of time. Paragraphs were “inevitable” because, as the author explains, “the time had come when a whole thing was all there was of anything” (Writings 1932-1946 285). But Stein also confesses that the paragraph is vital for her own work because it can govern its “parts” as no other “part of speech” can. It creates homogeneity in the text that a reliance on sentences or phrases could not. “I made my sentences and my paragraphs do the same thing, made them be one and the same thing,” she writes. This task of the paragraphs, to eliminate differences between its parts, silence the conflict between the parts and the whole, and marginalize those parts as merely elements of the whole is, for Adorno, a structural element of the reified society. He was particularly critical of Hegel whose logic sought “the unity of the particular and the universal, a unity
which strikes him as identity” (*Negative Dialectics* 326) and laments that “nowhere in his work is the primacy of the whole doubted” (*Minima Moralia* 17). Rather than a strict identity, Adorno insists on a dialectical approach, something “Hegel knew well but liked to forget on occasion” (*Negative Dialectics* 328). This un-dialectical approach would serve as a “model of...culture” in the twentieth century: “the false identity of the general and the particular” (Horkheimer and Adorno 120-121). The economical name of this tendency towards a strict identity is rationalization, in which the structure and logic of the whole is harmonized across its various parts, which are, potentially, from the perspective of the whole “mere sources of error” (Lukács 89). And for Adorno, the uncritical primacy of the whole, found especially in Lukács’ reading of Hegelian philosophy, was the product of ideology within monopolistic states in both the east and west. Stein’s insistence on the need for the paragraph form to capture and express the “whole” of her own period is then not out of step from Adorno’s perception that the logic of the whole was the defining quality of life in the early twentieth century, whether it was within the thoroughly reified United States, the totalitarian horror of Fascism, or the fantasy of the Soviet Union’s “miscarriage” of history (*Negative Dialectics* 3).

For Stein, the representation of aligning the sentence with the paragraph was a function of the repetition device. The paragraph’s internal repetition generates the unity between sentence and paragraph, whose combined message is singular. The paragraph thus appeals to Stein because in its totality, it has the ability to corral the other parts of speech into a collective unit that gestures towards something larger than the individual parts themselves are able. In other words, it enacts monopoly capital by gathering together its various components and providing for them a systemic function. We should
remember that in Stein’s narrative of literary history, the American paragraph replaces
the British phrase at the crucial moment between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The failure of the phrase “created the need of paragraphing” as an historical imperative.
This is because the paragraph could “register or limit an emotion,” which had thrived
early in British literature when it concerned itself with the description of “daily island
life,” but which suffered during the imperialist years of “explanation” (Writings 1932-
1946 218). What, though, is the “emotion” attained within a paragraph composed of
redundancies? Stein is unusually vague in defining what she means by “emotion” here.
Later, however, in the essay “Portraits and Repetition,” the same essay in which she first
declares The Making of Americans “important,” she provides a clue. There she writes, “I
cannot repeat this too often any one is of one’s period and this our period was
undoubtedly the period of…series production. And each of us in our own way are bound
to express what the world in which we are living is doing” (Writings 1932-1946 294).
Here, the modern reality of “series production” (a term that I interpret as a metonymy of
Fordism), which is elemental in calling forth the paragraph form as a necessary
component of modern American literature, is tied to expression. The author “expresses”
what the world around him or her is doing. Emotion, then, is the authenticity of
experience between that reality (in this case series production) and its expression.
Paragraphs, she writes, “register an emotion” and, as such, “were the natural expression
of the end of the nineteenth century” (219).

But part of the paragraph’s “emotion” is also tied to its capacity to represent the
“whole.” Repetition unifies the disparate and dispersed parts of speech into a singular
entity in the paragraph form. It stamps the appearance of sameness onto all of its parts,
while generating an internal difference that is only experienced at the level of the whole. And there is an emotional and historical element to the force of the whole, as Stein understands it. In other words, something within the reality of her “period” demands the component of the whole within its “expression” or representation. It is here, more than anywhere else, that the traces of monopoly capitalism, which is defined by its rationalizing and centralizing tendencies, are felt in the novel.

THE NOVEL’S “SPACE OF TIME” THAT IS FILLED WITH “MOVING”:

“It is something strictly American,” Stein writes, “to conceive a space that is filled with moving, a space of time that is filled always filled with moving and my first real effort to express this thing which is an American thing began in writing The Making of Americans” (Writings 1932-1946 286). To stylize this “movement” within the paragraph space, Stein plays with verb tenses and reprioritizes her parts of speech. “I had gotten rid of nouns and adjectives as much as possible by the method of living in adverbs in verbs in pronouns, in adverbial clauses written or implied and in conjunctions” she explains (Writings 1932-1946 325). The purpose of this adjustment is to create the effect of “American” moving within the space of time of the paragraph form. Stein calls this effect the novel’s “continuous present” or “beginning again and again and again” (Writings and Lectures 1909-1945 26). The result is the noticeable presence of “ing” words, gerunds, present participles, and on rare occasions, adjectives. An example of this tendency is found in the follow passage:

There was a time when I was questioning, always asking, when I was talking, wondering, there was a time when I was feeling, thinking and all
the time then I did not know repeating, I did not see or hear or feel repeating. There was a long time then when there was nothing in me using the bottom loving repeating being that now leads me to knowing. Then I was attacking, questioning, wondering, thinking, always at the bottom was loving repeating being, that was not then there to my conscious being. Sometime there will be written a long history of such a beginning. (302)

The present participles in the passage (questioning, asking, talking, wondering, feeling, thinking, using, loving, attacking, thinking) emphasize the movement of the narrator, both as a thinking and writing being. She is always in the process of creating and the present participle, as a part of speech that always indicates incompleteness, highlights the procedural nature of the narrator’s actions.

The gerunds (repeating, nothing, being, knowing, and beginning) are special because they could easily have been written in their simple present-tense noun forms (i.e. “Repeating” in the phrase “I did not know repeating” could have been “repetition”). By employing the gerund form as often as possible, the narrator maintains the rhythm created by the present participles in the first place and also continues to highlight the process-nature in the creation of these things. That is, repetition is a static thing that already exists, if not always-already existed. It has no history; it just is. Repeating, however, as the subject of the verb “to know,” is a specific process populated with an active history. It has been, it is, and, as a gerund, it will continue to be. However, that existence is not a stable and static one; rather, the existence of “repeating” is evolving. It may change through its particular history, and with it, so too must the perspective of the one “knowing” it change in order to keep pace. In short, the activity that the gerund form injects in the noun brings it into Stein’s notion of “continuous present.”

This notion is further found in a phrase like “bottom loving repeating being”
which collapses the present participle and the gerund into something that more closely resembles a string of adjectives, but always remains too unstable to purely qualify as such. “Loving repeating” could be interpreted as “to love repetition” and a permanent modification of the speaker’s “being.” But the sense of time in the paragraph calls this permanence into question. The speaker is comparing the past (there was a time) and the present (...that now leads me...) and the “bottom loving repeating” phrase appears in the same sentence in which this transition occurs. The phrase could also designate “loving,” “repeating,” and “being” not as proximate and related words that modify one another, but as separate, equally important, present participles. They could be simultaneous actions that in harmony constitute the “knowing” the narrator is led to at the sentence’s end. In another text this option might seem less likely considering the absence of commas separating and equating the participles, but in Stein’s texts these absences are not uncommon. “Commas,” she writes, “are servile” (Writings 1932-1946 320). It seems essential for our understanding of the narrator that these multiple possibilities coexist. Her ambiguities becomes fundamental to the novel’s problematic, its “space of time.”

A central problem in American modernism, as noted in chapter one, is the malleability of its objects. The technologies and social patterns that constituted the modern world, in short, were changing too quickly to be represented as a static totality in the vein of realist literature. Stein’s “ing” tense speaks to and attempts to solve this problem. Rather than ossifying its object, it presents it in motion, as a process. And by filling her “space of time” with “moving,” Stein is producing a stark commentary on modernity itself and its obsession with the spatialization or reification of time and the acceleration of productive movement within that time. “Art is modern when, by its mode
of experience and as the expression of the crisis of experience, it absorbs what industrialization has developed under the given relations of production,” Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory (43). Stein, through her emphasis on movement within the novel’s syntax and her comparison of its form to “series production” and the complex simultaneity of the Fordist production lines, holds a similar perspective. And nowhere is the “experience” of modernity more felt in the novel than through its dominant feature: the repetition device.

THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE REPETITION/INSISTENCE DEVICE

The repetition device creates a dialectic in the syntax. On the one hand the style insists on movement through the “ing” words. Nothing is stationary or solid; it is always in the process of becoming. The repetition device, however, paralyzes this movement. The effect on the story-arch is stagnation as the narrator recurrently turns on herself. For Stein, however, the majority of the movement within the text is found within the repetition itself. “I am inclined to believe there is no such thing as repetition,” she writes (Writings 1932-1946 288). She argues in her lectures that this is due to a “difference of insistence” created by the repetition. Each utterance has a different emphasis and therefore each is unique unto itself. Within the novel, the narrator carries on this line of thought. “There is always repeating in every one but such repeating always has in it a little changing” (191), she writes. Later, this repetition produces an “accent” (206) or “subtle variations” (284). Thus, repetition for Stein is always the production of difference or the “difference of insistence” (Writings 1932-1946 289). Beyond invoking
the assembly line production of automobiles (287), Stein compares this process of differentiation to the repetition of images within a cinema projection: “by a continuously moving picture of any one there is no memory of any thing and there is that thing existing…in The Making of Americans I was doing what the cinema was doing, I was making a continuous succession of the statement of what that person was until I had not many thing but one thing” (293-294). Once again Stein returns to the “whole” and how a multitude of moving internal repetitions produce a singularity that Stein defines as “American” and of the twentieth century. This is where the structures of Stein’s ontology and Henry Ford’s business model converge. They each isolate repetition as expression (of personality or of labor) at the individual level and blend it with a multitude of other expressions to produce the totalizing entity that systematizes the parts into a whole. For Stein, that her philosophy and Ford’s should converge is not accidental, but determinate: “any one is of one’s period and this our period was undoubtedly the period of the cinema and series production. And each of us in our own way are bound to express what the world in which we are living is doing” (294).

In Henry Ford’s writings, repetition is merely the effect of efficiency, but for Stein repetition, not efficiency, is the preeminent model of modernity. As I have stated in chapter 1, Volosinov’s theory of language’s “inner dialectic quality” provides the proper class perspective necessary to read the referents of efficiency and repetition as one and the same thing. What was “efficient” for the capitalist class and its ideologues was understood as “repetition” or the increased rationalization of the worker’s movements by the majority of the society. One employee of the Ford factory explained the assembly line, “It’s so monotonous, tedious, boring…It’s the most boring job in the world. It’s the
same thing over and over again. There’s no change in it, it wears you out” (Beynon 118). Factory workers fought this monotony by changing their pace, playing practical jokes on one another, or merely bearing the flow of work. But it is through the flow that the monotony turns into the pressure of incessant movement, or what we might term, following Stein’s lead, the subject’s confrontation with the “continuous present.” Robert Linhart, who worked on an assembly line and wrote a novel about the experience, describes this:

If one car’s done, the next one isn’t, and it’s already there, unsoldered at the precise spot that’s just been done, rough at the precise spot that’s just been polished. Has the soldering been done? No, it’s waiting. Has it been done once and for all this time? No, it’s got to be done again, it’s always waiting to be done, it’s never done – as though there were no more movement, no result from the movements, no change. (17)

Stein’s use of repetition and its connection to modernity and modernism in the writings of her critics demonstrate the degree to which the dominant productivist patterns in the American economy, as one of the dominant archetypes of modernity, came to be connected, whether consciously or unconsciously, to the production of aesthetic artifacts. Her idea of The Making of Americans, “to conceive a space that is filled with moving, a space of time that is filled always filled with moving” homologously corresponds to the increasingly common experience of labor under monopoly capital. Thus, it was for her, inherently “an American thing” that she wished to express. For Stein, as for the Detroit factory worker, the “space of time that is filled always filled with moving” was tempered with recurrence and repetition.

The entanglement of efficiency and repetition, of Ford’s and Stein’s styles, is increasingly important as the reality of what “the world in which we are living is doing”
assumes formations in other areas of the novel. It turns out that the world is “doing” capitalism. “I am writing for myself and for strangers,” the novel’s narrator writes, “that is the only way that I can do it” (289). Jameson reads Stein’s words as “revealing testimony” of the transformation of the relationship between the author and her audience under the marketplace conditions. Rather than the pre-capitalist aesthetic “contract” between the cultural producer and the relatively homogenous class of cultural consumers, Stein is faced with an artistic sphere that has become “one more branch of commodity production” and an audience composed of faceless consumers (Jameson “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture” 132). Thus, not only will the anonymous consumers replicate, but the book will be published and distributed within the systems of repetition that characterize mass cultural production.

THE ABSENCE OF A “STORY”:

Story is reframed as repetition in The Making of Americans. Rather than a rising action, climax, and falling action, Stein notes that “the important things written in this generation” are storyless (Writings 1932-1946 299). As I argued above, “important” should be read as a combination of “modern” and structurally corresponding to the social characteristics that define modernity. Stein’s claim, then, brings us to the question: why is the absence of story a feature of important and modern novels?

To begin to answer this question we should return to Stein’s analysis of American industrial processes and their relationship to American power in the twentieth century. She writes:
The United States, instead of having the feeling of beginning at one end and ending at another, had the conception of assembling the whole thing out of its parts, the whole thing which made the Twentieth Century productive. The Twentieth Century conceived an automobile as a whole, so to speak, and then created it, built it up out of its parts. It was an entirely different point of view from the Nineteenth Century's. The Nineteenth Century would have seen the parts, and worked towards the automobile through them. (“How Writing is Written” 264-265 of Ida, 2012)

Here Stein does away with the nineteenth century notion of “beginning at one end and ending at another.” The whole, once again, assumes prominence and America’s reconfiguration of its assembly, from the perspective of the end-product, defines the twentieth century and will define the nature of twentieth century art for the author.

Stein’s prose registers a key social transformation that accounts for the decline of realist literature: the decline of skilled labor under the guidance of monopoly capital. What Stein calls “The Nineteenth Century” roughly corresponds to the demise of craftsmanship production within manufacturing factories wherein an object is the sum of its parts and the craftsman builds it from the ground up. Through this process, craftsmanship tells something of a “story” of production, which the craftsman usually learns through apprenticeship and is able to reproduce under the right conditions. The twentieth century, however, utterly purges the craftsman from the industrial space. The craft of assembly, its story, is replaced with the redundant actions of the assembly line. The knowledge of the craft is not removed entirely. It is merely displaced by the immediacy of repetition and reformed as the province of the managerial class. This abstraction of the labor process reduced the experience of production, and thereafter the experience of consumption, as a systematized, preconditioned, and repetitious set of
movements. In other words, the experience of modernity was not one of storylines (beginnings, middles, and ends), but of paralyzed repetition.

Reframing story as repetition presents Stein (and her narrator) with a new set of problems. For one, the framework of passing time that structures a traditional “story” needs to be replaced. In its stead, Stein puts forth the family unit and its structure. The progress in the novel, then, is not time’s, but the family’s, per the novel’s subtitle. And this progress is stifled through the narrator’s desire to use the individuals in the family as “types” for what becomes the novel’s true cause: to “describe every individual human being that could possibly exist” (Writings 1932-1946 275). The narrator’s obsession with types stifles the story of the family’s progress. And that potential “story” is replaced with the task of charting the “bottom natures” of everyone, everywhere – of distilling the qualities of character to a few elemental categories. But even these categories and the repetitions that generate them begin to break down for the narrator.

The narrator begins the novel arrogantly believing that her characters are “whole” beings conforming to bourgeois ideologies of unified, free subjects. “The whole of them comes to be repeating in them” (299) she argues. And shortly after she again clarifies the perspective she adopts towards her characters early on: “each one is a whole being to me” (308). The “wholeness” that the narrator believes is to be found within her characters is actually an ideological fantasy about herself. “Each one” is or comes to be “whole” to her or for her. The degree to which the narrator’s characterization of others is actually a reading of her own ideological coherence further emerges when her notion of wholeness breaks down later in the book. She becomes confused as to the nature of some of her characters and struggles to understand their contradictions which leads her to write,
“some of them are a whole one in me and then they go to pieces again inside me, repeating comes out of them as pieces to me, pieces of a whole one that only sometimes is a whole one in me” (311). And what she depicts as a process quickly becomes a memory, “every one was a whole one in me and now a little every one is in fragments inside me” (519). Her characters disintegrate on the page; they are unrepresentable and are left unrepresented. Treating her characters like component objects that could be broken down to their interchangeable parts leads Stein and her narrator back to Lukács’ belief that the “fragmentation of the object…necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject” (89). Put another way, the narrator’s attempt to develop a coherent system, regulated by scientific laws that would categorize “everyone,” only succeeds in accentuating her own writerly actions as the system’s laborer, its “mere sources of error.”

Perhaps the most evident effect of replacing story with repetition occurs in the book through the narrator’s strategy of deferment. Faced with the impossible task of categorizing the entirety of humanity into a workable subset, the narrator resigns to put off her project indefinitely, even as she continues its work. “Sometime then there will be a history of every one,” (176) the narrator concedes and repeats often (190, 279, 283, 293, 294, 297, 300, 574, & 665). The task that the book sets for itself becomes the thing it must defer. Deferment is, for the narrator, the most productive possible means of representation. The narrator is able to transmit the concept of the object to her audience, without its defining qualities or even an abstract notion of its structure coming into existence within the space of the text. Rather than represent the object itself (a history of every one), the narrator posits the potential of its representation through deferment. This deferment is in stark contrast to the expressed desire to produce “complete lists of every
body ever living and to be realizing each one and to be making diagrams of them and lists of them and explaining the being in each one” (594). She metaphorically captures the experience that one would have consuming such diagrams in the discussion of a map and its representation of space: “knowing a map and then seeing the place and knowing then that the roads actually existing are like the map, to some is always astonishing and always then very gratifying” (389). The narrator can never establish her key. The categories that she introduces (independent dependent, dependent independent, etc.) are casually abandoned. She gives little explanation for the shift but does lament “categories that once to some one had real meaning can later to that same one be all empty” (440). The narrator’s words are self-reflexive and leave the audience with the sense that it is herself that changes, like the Ford factory, too quickly and thoroughly to be concretely represented. She reaches a point when she confesses as much:

I am writing everything as I am learning anything. I am writing everything as I am learning anything, as I am feeling anything in any one as being, as I am full up then with a thing, with anything of any one….I have not been very interesting in explaining being in men and women in my feeling as I am just now having it a good deal in me. That is quite certain, sometime later I will do it again. (540-541)

Even with regards to her own processes of “learning” and “feeling” the narrator relies on deferment. Sometime later, ad infinitum, she will write a different, more totalizing and stabilizing, book

The result of these problems is the novel’s colossal size. The story’s progression is replaced with shear accumulation, as information is gathered and charted and repeated. And through this accumulation, Stein’s own theory of theory of what makes her book “American” breaks down. British literature from the nineteenth century on, she argues in
“What is English Literature,” is defined by “explaining” the empire. And the difficulty with explanation, Stein argues, is that it assumes the form of phrases. Theses phrases go on indefinitely as the explanation for empire is never complete. Thus accumulation of phrases becomes the definitive problem of English literature. American literature, however, is meant to be different. It is composed of wholes containing moving parts. The accumulation of wholes, however, overwhelms the novel. The characters are (sometimes) whole, made up of repetitions and characteristics. They continue to multiply until Stein defers the diagramming of many peripheral characters. Then there is the whole of the project at hand: to chart the bottom natures of everyone. Once again, the accretion of types overwhelms the project and the narrator must defer the project’s conclusion.

But even through the problem of accumulation, Stein’s novel continues to establish connections between itself and the Fordist structures of its time. Centralization and rationalization were in no way perfect mechanisms of production. They were fraught with crises tendencies, especially in the realm of overproduction. That is, while the systems of production are made efficient and accelerated, the corporation as a whole falters when the systems of distribution and consumption fail to keep pace. David Harvey describes the problems of the Fordist model as “the rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production systems that…presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets” (The Condition of Postmodernity 142). The inflexible nature of the accumulation can find no outlet. The corporation then overproduces and accumulates its own excesses until an equilibrium is reestablished. These specific flaws of the Fordist model are articulated through the successes of the
Toyotist model of flexible accumulation introduced in the 60s and 70s. Under flexible accumulation, overproduction is eliminated through the pressure to reduce or abolish the space of time between the production of the commodity and its realization in sale. It is “marked by a direct confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism” (147). The system reaches its precise apex when the moment of production coincides with the realization of value. The accumulation of types, categories, and repetitions reflects the potential pitfall of Fordist overproduction. For Stein, as for the manager of a Fordist factory, the problem is best resolved through indefinite deferment.

This problem of accumulation returns us to the problem of subjectivity as it is felt in the novel. Accumulation is one of the mechanisms through which the text produces its subjects, but it is also one of the mechanisms through which the potential freedom of those subjects is limited. This process is reminiscent of the narrator’s declaration that “machine making does not turn out queer things like us,” but by “producing” her characters through repetition, she mimics a machine aesthetic (47). And what is “queer” is reduced to the systemic confines of the narrator’s diagrams and charts (225), unstable though they may be. As such, the text does not preserve or liquidate subjectivity; rather, it is confined and submitted to the process of the industrial assembly. In other words, it is formed in the fashion of a commodity – pieced together through repetition and packaged as an abstract totality that engages in a social dynamic with other “types.” That the text represents subjectivity as a wholly reified object, externally produced, helps to legitimate Stein’s appreciation for the novel as “important.” For in reproducing the conditions of Fordist modernity, the text works through its effects and potentially, though only temporarily, neutralizes them.
CHAPTER 3

ERNEST HEMINGWAY AND ADMINISTRATION

“The contradiction between the abstractness of the language that wants to do away with bourgeois subjectivism, and its emphatically concrete objects, does not reside in the incapacity of writers but in a historical antinomy”

-Adorno, *Minima Moralia*

**INTRODUCTION**

The great unspoken element in Ernest Hemingway’s writing, the silenced space of the text’s ideology, is industrialism and its transformations. In their form and content, Hemingway’s writings are symptomatic of an aggressively changing economic sphere and its effects on style, labor, aesthetic representation, and the historical category of masculinity. Drawing on Fredric Jameson’s suggestion that Hemingway’s novels are an “attempt to come to terms with the great industrial transformation of America after World War 1” (*Marxism and Form* 412), this chapter will examine the structural devices at play in Hemingway’s style and argue that those devices exist to cope with the unstable transformations in the social realm and its effects on a form of masculine subjectivity.4 Ultimately, Hemingway’s identifying markers – the stoic hero, the sparse text, the dispassionate, balanced voice – are strategies for preserving, if not producing, a form of subjectivity at odds with the ethic of a Fordist economy.

Adorno argues that a common theme of modernist literature and art is “fracturedness.” Fracturedness had always existed as a component of artworks, as an element of their “enigma” or “the duality of being determinate and indeterminate,” but
during the modernist period social forces drove the fractured element of artworks to the surface. Adorno notes that Kafka’s work typifies this quality of modern art (*Aesthetic Theory* 165-167). It is within Adorno’s argument that we should situate Hemingway’s style; though we must invert the metaphor. Hemingway’s is not a fractured form; *it is administered style* – single-minded, rationalized, controlled, and concentrated. But it is through this negation of fracturedness that Hemingway’s style demonstrates the historical validity of Adorno’s theory. The texts themselves reveal a writerly voice obsessed with negating fracturedness through formal precision. One does not experience the strict, almost militaristic, simplicity of the language as “natural,” but rather as an artificial and agonistic system of representation. The texts are displays of arrangement and technique, exercises of rational processes intended to smooth and polish the historical pressures that Adorno connects to the negation of administered modernity. The style brushes against the grain of fracturedness and reveals its function in the process. Fracturedness exists, therefore, only in the antecedent traces of Hemingway’s works. The fractured predates and informs the text, but these preconditions are what motivate the text’s desire for structure and coherence and so are indispensable.

In a separate section of *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno describes Beckett’s work as a “shabby, damaged world of images” and interprets the author’s style as the “negative imprint of the administered world” (39-40). Once again, Hemingway’s work negates Adorno’s conception of the modern by assimilating it. We might say that Hemingway’s *texts are the positive imprint of the administered world*. As this chapter will demonstrate, Hemingway’s style enacts the tasks of administration, as the term is used by Weber,
Adorno, and Marcuse, and, in doing so, attempts to reconcile the central contradictions producing the problem of Fordism and affecting aesthetic narration in the modernist age.

Alongside administration, the other key concept I will consider is stoicism. Stoicism, as I will argue, is both a masculine trait in Hemingway’s texts and an informing quality of their form. It is a worldview of the author and his main characters that is determinate in the production of their genders. In my discussion of stoicism and masculinity, both dominant themes in Hemingway studies, I will argue that these conceptions became contentious sites for Hemingway because of pressures created by monopoly capitalism and how they transformed the function of the masculine subject in the modern world. For Hemingway, reconstituting masculinity within a stoic framework was a way of preserving masculine autonomy in the epoch of Taylorized administration and its devastating effects on subjectivity.

This historical grounding of stoicism will bring us back to form, as the stoical perspective of the novels’ characters thoroughly contributes to the texts’ ascetic styles. The primary devices that the narrators rely on – iceberg method and parataxis – simultaneously administer the process of representation into a practicable system and buttress the stoical perspective by providing outlets for unrepresentable elements of the plots. The result of this marriage of stoicism and administration is a set of texts that are particularly sensitive to the problems of representation in an era of dramatic political, economic, and social change. As such, Hemingway’s famous style works to negate the very administration that it adopts as its method. It accomplishes this by administering the crisis of representation and preserving the unrepresentable in the subtext. For in Hemingway, that which cannot be said is not passed over in Wittgensteinian silence, but
is submerged and inscribed in the text through the narrator’s use of gesticulated allusion. By capturing so many of the social contradictions within the submerged “iceberg,” Hemingway demonstrates how, through administration, his writerly voice is able to produce a particularly masculine subjectivity in the face of its historical liquidation.

**ADMINISTRATION AND STYLE**

Advances in processes of rationalization and administration marked the structures of monopoly capitalism that came to define the American economy in the early twentieth century. The Taylorist and Fordist systems produced a new managerial class designated to oversee the processes and producers that they rationalized in the name of efficiency. Just as with other elements of monopoly capital, the administrative logic that was formed out of its productive and distributive centers saturated the general culture. For Adorno, administration is the desire to “assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize” ("Culture and Administration” 107). It is the rational incorporation of the particular and the individual to the will of the general and the totality. In a sense, it is the process of constructing order, of restraining spontaneity, and eliminating excess. And Ernest Hemingway is the author who best captures that administrative logic within his style.

As an author primarily concerned with technique, he administers his style within a framework of efficiency and concreteness. Ultimately, Hemingway’s stories are as much about the style in which he tells them as they are about the sedimented content. For the sensation of reading Hemingway is framed through the consistency in which the material is presented and represented. “The deepest subject,” Jameson argues of Hemingway’s texts, “is simply the writing of a certain type of sentence, the practice of a determinate
style. This is the most ‘concrete’ experience in Hemingway” (Marxism and Form 409). The author’s style so thoroughly mediates the text’s content that the all-encompassing, efficient, equilibratory inner-structures that produce the administrative quality of his style constitute the center of the novels’ content. Style produces a dissonant distance in the texts between itself and that which it administers and in so doing asserts itself as the fundamental ‘thing’ that Hemingway’s writings are about.

Understanding the transition in monopoly capital’s structures allows us to return Hemingway’s innovative style to its social grounding. Hemingway began crafting his style in the moment of what I have termed “the problem of Fordism.” Fordism, as a metonymy for monopoly capital in its American form, centralized and concentrated the very procedures and resources necessary for reproducing existence while simultaneously expanding the horizons at which those processes took place. The result was an objective matrix of structures that constituted an unrepresentable set of historical conditions. The endpoints of production and consumption were no longer accessible through empirical models; the elements of existence that determined the quality and texture of that existence were shrouded in a machinery of exchanges that was incoherent for the subject in its center. For Jameson, globalization produces the unrepresentable totality of modernism (“Modernism and Imperialism”), but I would add that the more local structures of that global movement – the centralization of monopoly capital and the reorganization of labor and social relations of Fordism – contribute to the alienating perspective of the atomized subject. For thinkers like Lenin, Lukács, Adorno, and Gramsci, abstract dialectical interpretive models were fundamental to critiquing what had become an abstract social existence. This was one way of coping with modernity.
Another included the revolutions in aesthetics that are grouped in the modernist camp. Hemingway’s unique style is one of the (often forgotten) revolutions in aesthetics that transforms the representation of reality to correspond to the increasing abstraction of real social conditions. His techniques, which developed at the heart of this expansion of monopoly capital and were popularized during its hegemonic ascent, document and provide possible resolutions to the problems of representation at the heart of modernist aesthetics and monopoly capital.

I began this chapter by declaring that Hemingway is the author of administered culture. To further clarify this, I mean to suggest that his style more aptly typifies the logic of monopoly capitalism than any other. This argument could also be cast within Jameson’s theory of the “ideology of form” in which “symbolic messages” are “transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production” (*The Political Unconscious* 76). There are many such sign systems and stylistic categories in Hemingway that I will cover, but collectively they contribute to a literary form that typifies the problems of Fordism. The ultimate function and effect of these stylistic strategies is to produce imaginary solutions to irresolvable social contradictions, the central of which is the preservation of, what I shall term, “masculine subjectivity” against the forces of administration and standardization. Ironically, Hemingway’s particular style appropriates rather than negates the aspects of the historical forces his texts symbolically resolve. The effect proves to be enduring as the model of the masculine Hemingway hero long outlives its author.
This feature of the prose to typify elements of the culture in which it was created was not lost on Hemingway’s original reviewers who, with remarkable consistency, rhetorically codify the entanglement between aspects of Fordism and the author’s style. This is especially true for the early reviewers, who spend equal time reflecting on the style and content in Hemingway’s books. I am not here proposing an undiscovered connection between the Fordist economy and Hemingway’s syntactic structures so much as recovering an idea that was self-evident to his original readers. A brief survey of those reviewers demonstrates the extent of the connection. Edmund Wilson describes Hemingway’s contribution as “a distinctly American development in prose” (Stephens 2); a development that is often classified within two not unrelated metaphors: the language of mechanical sterility and the language of economic efficiency. Reviewers note that the prose is: “hard and clean” (7), carried out with a “mechanical neatness” (14), and “built after the pattern of a machine” and “as a result it has certain striking advantages in reflecting our modern, stereotyped machine civilization” (16). “His style,” another reviewer writes, “is made up of clean-cut, metallic elements. One is reminded of modern buildings – steel beams and cement” (49). The New Republic finds in the author’s prose “the use of the direct, crude, rudimentary forms of the simple and primitive classes and their situations, of the stuffs, textures and rhythms of the mechanical and industrial worlds….Hemingway’s vocabulary is largely monosyllabic, and mechanical and concrete” (9). And this leads to a novel and modern aesthetic that is a product of the metonyms of industry: “Hemingway’s style none the less in its very experimental stage shows the outline of a new, tough, severe and satisfying beauty related…to the world of machinery....” (9). The paper for which he worked, The Kansas City Star, writes that
Hemingway had “discovered a rich vein of linguistic ore that lies just below the surface of every trafficway and freight dock…drawn from the complex mechanical civilization of today” (11). Four years later, the same reviewer turned away from the metaphor of ore extraction to the cleaner and more penetrating metaphor of a well-shot bullet in the air, writing that in *A Farewell to Arms*, “there is almost no lost motion in his sentences; his phrases carry to their mark with a very flat trajectory” (40). And finally, in descriptions that just as aptly describe the cooperative elements of labor within the Fordist factory space, the *Saturday Review of Literature* notes that Hemingway’s style “implies infinitely more than is to be found in its individual parts” (42) and, in the review that would occupy the back cover of Hemingway’s paperback novels for decades to come, the *New York Herald Tribune* argues that Hemingway’s “lean, hard, athletic narrative…. knows how to arrange a collection of words, which shall betray a great deal more than is to be found in the individual parts” (32). These reviews all participate in a narrative of industrial cleanliness, the sterility of the machine metaphor, and the surface simplicity of the complex mechanisms of Fordist political economy, despite the fact that none of the stories or novels the reviewers covered actually thematize industry in general or industrial workers.

Other reviewers engaged in the rhetoric of the frugal “economic” to describe the author’s technique. For them Hemingway’s prose is marked by an “economy of language” (8), an “economical method” (14), an “economy of language” (21) again, “a maximum of economy” (33), and a “sparseness and economy” (41). For Virginia Woolf the syntax was simply “efficient” (53). This all contributes to the sensation that Hemingway’s is a singularly “modern technique” (39). And, at least one reviewer, in a
comparison between the author and Joyce as a representative of other modernists, celebrates the author: “He is modern art....For he has found the secret of how to be modern and coherent” (63).

The early reviews are evidence of the entanglement of transformations in the economy with transformations in literary style in the original readers’ imaginations. For those reviewers, descriptions of the new American economy, its streamlined productivity under Ford’s guidance and its expansion in the monopoly era, were specifically transferrable to Hemingway’s style, which seemed to capture something of that modernity in its structures and movements. The prose, for them, typified elements of the texture of life in a Fordist political economy and for that reason it acquired relevance. Chip Rhodes echoes this idea in his book Structures of the Jazz Age. In it, Rhodes writes, “For Hemingway...literature doesn’t offer a window onto historical reality; it imitates a social process by which a subject comes to feel a certain relation to his/her historical circumstances” (47-48). Rhodes, however, leaves unexamined the “social process” that Hemingway intended to invoke through his style, but that is exactly the gap filled by the Fordist language of the early reviewers. For them, the style imitates and alludes to the social processes that had become the symbols of modernity itself: machines, assembly lines, efficiency, and so on. Hemingway, despite the often foreign and pastoral content of his work, seems fundamentally American and fundamentally modern. And this connection to modernity is a tacit connection to Ford and the industrial techniques that defined the rise of American power. Hemingway, perhaps unwittingly, assumes the role of ambassador of American literature precisely at this moment in history because his literature registers what is distinct to America in the interwar period. Thus, we can argue,
when Gramsci employs the adjective “American” in his *Prison Notebooks* he means to invoke more than the mere geographical space of the country, but also the industrial, rationalized, efficient, and Fordist characteristics that he defines and, to some extent admires. The concept of “American” contains these elements; they are part of its distinction from Europe. These same characteristics populate the literary reviewers’ use of the adjective “American” to define Hemingway’s style. His literature to them was not “American” because he was himself from that country, but because it seemed to aesthetically reflect preconceived notions about hegemonic structures in American society that were commonplace in the 1920s.

That Hemingway’s writings were celebrated as particularly “modern,” “American,” and “industrial” is ironic given their pastoral content. Indeed, there is a concerted absence of industry in his work; his characters avoid centers of industry and most of them avoid occupations. Within this consistent fetishization of pre-capitalist spaces and idealization of the economic periphery, we find the industrial within the “modern” style and the historical subtext. The industrial timbre that his reviewers could not escape is Althusser’s “absent cause,” Macherey’s “unspoken,” or Jameson’s “political unconscious.” It is the relationship that the text shares with history that must be “(re)constructed after the fact” (*The Political Unconscious* 81). And this process of (re)construction in Hemingway begins with the conspicuous distance Hemingway places between his settings and the centers of global capital as well as how these distances shrink in the face of a transforming modernity that demands standardization and administration.
Within these enclaves of seeming premmodernity Hemingway situates a collection of chameleon heroes whose hybridity is drawn from the eclectic histories that constitute the American singularity they all claim. Jake Barnes, for example, while in Pamplona, is the only American to “have aficion” (137) and when he and his friends read a banner that proclaims “hurray for the Foreigners!” they question where the foreigners are before realizing that they themselves are the objects of the banner’s message (158). Similarly, Robert Jordan in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* has to recognize himself as a foreigner and defend himself to Pablo, the leader of the militia group he joins. “What right have you, a foreigner, to come to me and tell me what I must do?” Pablo asks. “That I am a foreigner is not my fault. I would rather have been born here,” Jordan answers (15). Robert Jordan’s desire for inclusion within the economic other typifies the Hemingway hero, who is at once a vanguard figure of imperialism *and* its negation. He desires to exploit the cultural and natural resources of the lands he enters, but at the same time he will die to defend them against those that might follow his lead.

The Hemingway hero adopts a frontiersmen-like appreciation for pastoral spaces. And the author groups these pre-capitalist spaces together in his imagination. “There’s no bloody difference” between Spain and the hunting grounds of Tanzania for the Hemingway of *Green Hills of Africa* (151). A connection to the primitive and an absence of the modern determines the connection. They are the same because (1) they are not modern and (2) they are threatened by the modern. Both Africa and, later in the 1930s, the integrity of Spain are vulnerable to outsiders, who are described in specifically imperialist-capitalistic terms, for Hemingway:

A continent ages quickly once we come. The natives live in harmony with it. But the foreigner destroys, cuts down the trees, drains the water, so that
The water supply is altered, and in a short time the soil, once the sod is turned under, is cropped out and, next, it starts to blow away as it has blown away in every old country and as I had seen it start to blow in Canada. The earth gets tired of being exploited. A country wears out quickly unless man puts back in it all his residue and that of all his beasts. When he quits using beasts and uses machine, the earth defeats him quickly. The machine can’t reproduce, nor does it fertilize the soil, and it eats what he cannot raise. A country was made to be as we found it. We are the intruders and after we are dead we may have ruined it but it will still be there and we don’t know what the next changes are. (Green Hills of Africa 285)

The frontiersman, presumably, does not participate in the exploitation of the land and the transformation of the “country.” He “lives in harmony with it” like the natives. And to demonstrate this, if not ensure it, Hemingway wrote an article of ethics that, among other things, decries shooting at animals “from the protection of a motorcar” (“Shootism versus Sport” 164). The ethical code demands bravery and ensures maximum danger for the hunter who cannot become the extension of a mechanical death without participating in the imperial order of exploitation so derided in many of the novels.

The tension between the natural and harmonious world of these underdeveloped spaces and the forces of monopoly capital are laid bare across Hemingway’s texts. In For Whom the Bell Tolls we find Robert Jordan defending Loyalist areas of Spain against the expansion of imperial capital. The contrast between Jordan’s small band of cave-dwellers and the Fascists is starkly established. The Fascists occupy houses, drive automobiles, and are well supplied by distribution lines from Italy and Germany. Jordan, along with Pablo, Pilar, and the small band of republicans in the mountains, sleep outside, hunt and fish for food, and ride horses (most famously in the final scene). Jordan’s sole job in the novel, the destruction of a strategic bridge, is to insulate Segovia from the
hostile, outside world that wishes to militarily and politically, if not economically, colonize it.

The mobility and modernity of the Fascist forces is best embodied in the airplanes that they pilot nearby:

They stood in the mouth of the cave and watched them. The bombers were high now in fast, ugly arrow-heads beating the sky apart with the noise of their motors. They are shaped like sharks, Robert Jordan thought, the wide-finned, sharp-nosed sharks of the Gulf Stream. But these, wide-finned in silver, roaring, the light mist of their propellers in the sun, these do not move like sharks. They move like no thing there has ever been. They move like mechanized doom.

You ought to write, he told himself. Maybe you will again some time.” (87)

Hemingway’s narrator compares nature to the machinery of modernity. But the machinery is sublimely horrific next to the harmony of nature. While they resemble sharks (just as the artillery in the mountains elsewhere resemble “summer lightening”), the bombers are explicitly unnatural; they “move like no thing there has ever been.” Rather, Jordan ties them back to industry; their movements only make sense as “mechanized.” Curiously, the urge to write is juxtaposed with this mechanization – the sleek, silver lines of the airplanes and what they harbinger for civilization (“doom”) functions as muse for Robert Jordan who desires throughout to write a book on Spain and his experiences there. Jordan’s urges to write and the sociology behind it mirrors Hemingway’s own aesthetic. Jordan wants to represent the pure, underdeveloped spaces of Spain, specifically in the face of an expanding capital that will inevitably “exploit” and “destroy” it. Yet the aesthetic of the conquering machines is itself influential. It replicates objects in the natural space that it “destroys,” but retains the distinguishing
elements of human creativity and the social forces of modernity. The enormous social forces that produce these machines are, epistemologically, absorbed back into them. “We are nothing against such machines,” Pilar tells Jordan of the bombers (89). The machines have an autonomy to her that is impossible to resist. But it is not the bombers themselves that causes Pilar to feel her own insignificance, but the industrial factories in Germany that produce them, the forces of administration that train, regulate, and deploy the soldiers that fly them, and the hegemonic political-economy that has determined Spain’s destiny despite the will of its own population. The realization that “we are nothing” becomes a common theme for the Hemingway heroes as they navigate the modern moment in its remotest spaces.

While the content often laments the onslaught of capital, the prose borrows elements from the structure of monopoly capital in order that it might administer what it considers to be the “natural.” Through this process of administration, or the distillation of the “natural” to the systems and structures that determine Hemingway’s style, nature is made unnatural. It is objectified and reified within the governing logic of late capitalism, which must occupy, evaluate, and exchange in order to establish hegemony. And this is the action that Hemingway, his narrators, and his central characters perform. Thus, Hemingway’s early reviewers emphasize Hemingway’s “economic” and “efficient” form over his pastoral content. Horkheimer and Adorno provide a possible explanation for this curiosity during a reading of Chaplin in Dialectic of Enlightenment:

The ears of corn blowing in the wind at the end of Chaplin’s The Great Dictator give the lie to the anti-Fascist plea for freedom. They are like the blond hair of the German girl whose camp life is photographed by the Nazi film company in the summer breeze. Nature is viewed by the mechanism of social domination as a healthy contrast to society, and is
therefore denatured. Pictures showing green trees, a blue sky, and moving clouds make these aspects of nature into so many cryptograms for factory chimneys and service stations. On the other hand, wheels and machine components must seem expressive, having been degraded to the status of agents of the spirit of trees and clouds. (149)

Hemingway’s style, overdetermined by the structures, syntax, and innovations of modern industry, does not assimilate itself to nature or represent it organically. The gazes of his American, middle class narrators do not disappear into the environment of pre-capitalism that they occupy. Rather, the style subjects the natural (Africa) and the culturally autonomous (Spain and Italy) to a logic of domination, to the movements of a highly systemic mode of representation that is almost exclusively alien. And the contradictions of the process here emerge within the style itself. For, rather than protect the natural or the pre-capitalism, as Robert Jordan believes himself to be doing, the style colonizes and alters it. Ultimately, the text fetishizes and attempts to commodify nature and the pre-capitalist as it is found rather than allowing for what it could become under more severe forms of industrial domination. The style’s code demarks modernity and invokes the timbre of urbanity and high industry while inhabiting the spaces barely touched by those transformations in capital. It transfigures the forms of the natural into cryptograms for the artificial. This is perhaps what Gertrude Stein meant when she wrote that Hemingway “looks like a modern and…smells of the museums” (Autobiography 216).

From its original reviewers to the way that Hemingway’s texts ideologically filter and process its un-industrialized objects, we must conclude that there is always-already a mediated relationship between Hemingway’s style and the industrial forms of Fordism that define his epoch. These industrial forms demark the passage to monopoly capital
and serve as the “condition which makes the work possible, which precedes the work so absolutely that it cannot be found in the work” (Macherey 150). There is, in this mediated relationship, what Eagleton terms a “text-distortion” (90) wherein the concealments or unspoken of the text are never as important as its “determinate disorder” (Macherey 155) – the ideological necessity of concealments in the first place – that we shall unpack first by clarifying the specific devices at play in Hemingway’s style and then later by examining their ideological function. The two central devices that constitute Hemingway’s unique prose are (1) the iceberg method and (2) parataxis. It is through the use of these two central devices that Hemingway constructs the style that his early reviewers found so “economical” and “efficient” on the one hand and yet so full of “craftsmanship” on the other. Furthermore, through an analysis of these devices, I will attach each of them back to another prominent feature of Hemingway’s style – stoicism – which will prove to be the common element connecting Hemingway’s formal processes to his thematic content and the pressing historical question of masculinity that establishes the “text-distortion” of Hemingway’s writings.

**ICEBERG METHOD:**

The iceberg is one of the most celebrated metaphors in the body of criticism covering Hemingway’s style. It was an analogy that Hemingway himself introduced, in reflecting on his own writings. Beyond the interesting moments of self-reflection, these writings on the iceberg method demonstrate the degree to which Hemingway sought to administer the formal presentation of his texts into a standardized and reproducible
system. It is this will to administer that needs to be grounded in the historical framework of Fordism that defined the era of its creation and helped Hemingway and his original critics think and write about the texts’ characters.

The critical narrative surrounding Hemingway’s iceberg method is often about his style of omission, about what is missing, silent, or absent in the text. I, however, do not want to use the language of “omission” or “silences.” Rather, I read Hemingway’s style as one of “concreteness” and “efficiency.” The absent is parenthetically omitted; it is always present elsewhere. And, in the tension between this visible surface of the text and the ever-present under-text, we find the scars of historical sublimation. For the tension between the present and un-present structures the works and puts syntactical stress on the surface prose. Just as with Stein, the meaning of words or phrases that recur is never stable. Hemingway’s rather narrow grammar implies emphases that fill out a vocabulary capable of indicating, if not representing, what is explicitly absent. This dynamic of representation is a unique strategy of Hemingway’s to manage the problem of Fordism. And this strategy begins with the administering voice of the iceberg method.

This method presupposes a writer or narrator wholly in control of the material at hand and who can administer it to its greatest degree of efficiency – what Hemingway customarily refers to as “true writing.” “The dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth of it being above water. A writer who omits things because he does not know them only makes hollow places in his writing,” he writes in Death in the Afternoon (192). Here we find the reason why Hemingway’s critics always talk about “absence,” despite the iceberg, even in the author’s metaphor, never being absent. Rather, the object is reduced or distilled to its elemental signifier. For even through the
process of omission “the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them” (Death in the Afternoon 192). The effects must be felt, and this is accomplished through the writer’s capacity to command the processes of signification in the totality of both the presence and absence of his text. For Hemingway the important thing about the world for the writer is “to see it clear and as a whole.” That way any part the author made would “represent the whole if it’s made truly” (Death in the Afternoon 278) It is for this reason that Hemingway’s iceberg theory, which informs his style but does not define it in total, is one that sublimes the logic of Taylorized administration, or the process of breaking down a complex phenomenon to its elemental components, into its expressive style.

Hemingway most aptly internalizes the ideology of efficiency with regards to the purifying labor he performed on his texts. A famous illustration of this is Jake Barnes’ description of Romero, the bullfighter in The Sun Also Rises. Jake’s words serve as a transferrable commentary on literary style. It is there that Hemingway posits the idea of purity:

Romero never made any contortions, always it was straight and pure and natural in line. The others twisted themselves like cork-screws, their elbows raised, and leaned against the flanks of the bull after his horns had passed, to give a faked look of danger. Afterward, all that was faked turned bad and gave an unpleasant feeling. Romero’s bull-fighting gave real emotion, because he kept the absolute purity of line in his movements and always quietly and calmly let the horns pass close each time...Romero had the old thing, the holding of his purity of line through the maximum of exposure. (171-172)

Jake describes Romero’s technique as “beautiful” because of its “purity” and the authentic “emotional feeling” it incites from the audience (171-172). One can see how easy it would be to read Romero’s bullfighting as a surrogate for a literary manifesto.
Always write “straight,” “pure” and “natural” with the aim of giving “real emotion.” And within the space of the iceberg principle we find Hemingway adhering to his advice on maximum exposure. A story about abortion like “Hills Like White Elephants” or the bloody suicide in “Indian Camp” show Hemingway confronting impolite and otherwise unspeakable topics in the pursuit of “real emotion.” And this “real emotion” is indelibly tied to “purity” as its precondition and determinate.

To help achieve purity in his writing, Hemingway was famous for revision processes that transformed early drafts into entirely different novels and was known to reduce whole pages or even chapters to single paragraphs. He also counted words with mathematical precision, a procedure that, with some possible exaggeration, he explained to his editor:

Don’t worry about the words. I’ve been doing that since 1921. I always count them when I knock off and am drinking the first whisky and soda. Guess I got in the habit writing dispatches. Used to send them from some places where they cost a dollar and a quarter a word and you had to make them awful interesting at that price or get fired. (quoted in Phillips 57)

Often the word count came from more concrete historical circumstances such as censorship. In *The Sun Also Rises* Jake and Brett engage in a sexual act that is designated only by the time-lapse in the syntax: “then later…” (62), as in, after the sex act. In *A Farewell to Arms* the verb “fucking” is replaced by a telling dash (196). And in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* surrogate words such as “unprintable” or “obscenity” stand in to represent not just the words they replace, but all censored words and their functions in the language. Hemingway was able to turn these instances of censorship into productive gaps in the text. In “The Hills like White Elephants” the absence of the word “abortion”
seems to fulfill both criteria – it both appeases the censors while maintaining an aesthetic integrity central to the iceberg ethos.

A more critical reading of Hemingway’s novels shows that more than mere historically idiosyncratic vices were repressed in the inner structure of the iceberg metaphor. The iceberg theory can be useful, for instance, in evaluating the “determinate disorder” that Macherey’s method seeks to uncover in the relationship between what precedes the text and the production of the text. It serves the function of mapping the historical or ideological conflict at play in the text. Thus, the sexual politics of the 1920s prevented the word “abortion” from being printed, yet its absence in the text alludes to a larger and richer history of the gender, sexual, and class issues at work in the debate then could have been produced by its mere presence. Consequently, the story’s indeterminate conclusion alludes to the “girl’s” ability or inability to control her body and the constellation of political conditions of oppression that preceded (and anteceded) the story’s simple actions. This is why Bickford Sylvester has suggested that “the best kept secret” of Hemingway’s iceberg theory is its “calculated ambiguity,” its “tour de force of narrative ambiguity, allowing a work to speak with some validity to two or more readerships and to different levels of experience within individual readers” (260).

Similar to the ambiguity found in “Hills Like White Elephants,” Robert Jordan’s wound in The Sun Also Rises transforms a novel about the debauchery of the middle and upper class’ leisure time into a concrete and definitive World War One novel. Though the war is sparsely mentioned, its effects condition the characters and their capacities to determine the novel’s events. Like the wound, the war is repressed in the novel’s subtext, but once again, the iceberg method functions to expose and critique the novel’s historical
precondition and the silences it induces. This is because the metaphor \textit{insists} on connectivity, ambiguous though it might be, between the spoken surface text and the unspoken or the historical precondition.

**Parataxis and Reification:**

The second major device almost always at work in Hemingway’s style is parataxis. That Hemingway should put such an emphasis on equivalences during this moment in the transformation of capital is a thorough historical gesture. For parataxis functions as a metaphor for the increasing role of equivalences in the economic and social order that Marx identified as central to capitalism’s functioning.

Marx begins his analysis of capital through a reading of the commodity form and the mechanisms whereby disparate objects (commodities) and actions (abstract labor) are reduced to equivalences so that they may be socially exchanged. He briefly historicizes the origins and ramifications of this process:

> The secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. This however becomes possible only in a society where the commodity-form is the universal form of the product of labour, hence the dominant social relation is the relation between men as possessors of commodities. (Capital 152)

And later he confirms that “a commodity only acquires a general expression of its value if, at the same time, all other commodities express their values in the same equivalent” (159). This forms the basis for the formula for “the metamorphosis of commodities” C-M-C (198-209) and the general formula for capital M-C-M’ (247-257) in which the most immediate character of the processes of exchange are captured. The influence of
exchange and its reduction of qualities to equivalences is widely felt across capitalist society. The division of labor, specifically under Fordism wherein the worker’s skills are devalued so as to create a production line “flow” of interchangeable laborers, across the history of capitalism is “rationalized” – a term which itself designates either the submission of social antinomies to the laws of equivalence and exchange or their elimination from the general circulation of social intercourse. The development of these tendencies contributes to Lukács’ theory of reification, which “requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange” (*History and Class Consciousness* 91), and informs Adorno’s reading of the “administered world” in which “the extension of the conditions of exchange throughout the entirety of life” contributes to the evolution of the ideology of “freedom” as pretense for its absence (“Culture and Administration” 110). Additionally, and most importantly for our purposes here, the tendency towards equivalence assumes aesthetic forms in some modernist works, including Stein’s use of repetition. But nowhere is this expression of a reified equivalence more apparent in literature than in Hemingway’s paratactic style.

Harold Bloom argues that Hemingway’s paratactic style structures his perspective and form. He begins his reading of *The Sun Also Rises* by first suggesting that Hemingway’s style “set the style of an age” and further: “A great style is itself necessarily a trope, a metaphor for a particular attitude towards reality. Hemingway’s is an art of evocation, hardly a singular or original mode, except that Hemingway evokes by parataxis…” (331-332). Bloom goes on to quote from a study of parataxis in conjunction with Hemingway: “This term implies a structuring of sentences such that they do not convey any distinctions of higher or lower order. ‘Order’ here means intensity of
interest, since what is more important usually gets the greater share of attention” (quoted in Bloom 332). Parataxis calls into the question the necessity of hierarchy in the first place, but, as Bloom suggests, leaves the reader desiring it nonetheless since its qualitative tasks are so commonplace in everyday language. In Hemingway’s style, however, parataxis, as a system wherein “order” is “evoked” though never established and where a disconnected reality of objects constitutes or is substituted as a synthetic sublimation of values, morals, and mediated emotions, directs us towards Bloom’s original reading of a style as a “trope, a metaphor for a particular attitude towards reality.” To Bloom’s formula I would add that style is not merely about a particular “attitude towards reality” but about an attitude towards the representation of reality, which, as I have documented above, had become historically problematic at the time Hemingway set about developing his style. Style is the process of mediating the relationship between the object rendered and the form through which it is rendered. And this mediation, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, should produce a recognizable tension, the residual trace of which is the style (Dialectic of Enlightenment 130-131). And while this mediation reveals the author’s attitude towards “reality,” it also produces traces of the author’s attitude towards its representation. And further, because of its mediating qualities, style is acutely sensitive to historical transformations within what Bloom terms “reality.”

A typical example of Hemingway’s paratactic style and its effect on the representation of its objects is found in The Sun Also Rises:

I lit the lamp beside the bed, turned off the gas, and opened the wide window. The bed was far back from the windows, and I sat with the windows open and undressed by the bed. Outside a night train, running on the street-car tracks, went by carrying vegetables to the markets. They
were noisy at night when you could not sleep. Undressing, I looked at myself in the mirror of the big armoire beside the bed. That was a typically French way to furnish a room. Practical, too, I suppose. Of all the ways to be wounded. I suppose it was funny. I put on my pajamas and got into bed. I had the two bull-fight papers, and I took their wrappers off. One was orange. The other yellow. They would both have the same news, so whichever I read first would spoil the other. *Le Toril* was the better paper, so I started to read it. I read it all the way through, including the Petite Correspondance and the Cornigrams. I blew out the lamp. Perhaps I would be able to sleep. (38)

The paragraph weaves between objective and subjective descriptions: the big armoire was beside the bed which Jake supposes was “practical.” And while it documents the furniture of the apartment, Jake’s body, and the contents of two bullfighting papers, it also tracks the passage of time through Jake’s relationships to those objects. First lighting the lamp and opening the window, then hearing the streetcars and looking at his body in the mirror, then reading the papers. Most importantly, the syntax distills all observations to equivalent objects without hierarchizing them. The open windows, large armoire, noisy street-car, orange and yellow papers, and Jake’s mutilated body are all covered in an even tone and across an even space. And further, to avoid Jake’s body dominating the paragraph as a sort of apex, Hemingway neutralizes it through a reflection on French furnishing. Thus, Jake does not take off his clothes, look in the mirror, and call his wound “funny” in order. Rather, he disrobes, looks at his body, describes French furnishing as “practical,” and then terms his wound “funny.” The effect is to diminish the importance of his mutilation. The “noisy” streetcars that keep him up at night and the redundancy in the two bullfighting papers, syntactically at least, annoy him more than his damaged sex organ. Much seems vested in these descriptions and particularly in the topography of their layout within the paragraph. Throughout his entire canon, Hemingway’s narrators do not reflect or evaluate so much as record and objectify. The
wound is not an abstract, psychological, or emotional presence in Jake’s life. Rather, the
text’s style suggests that it is evaluated to the same degree and within the same structure
as the “wide” window, the “large” armoire, the “noisy” streetcar, the “yellow” and the
“orange” paper, and the “practical” French style of arranging bedrooms. It is his “funny”
wound, his “funny” body – given an adjective, in a typical Hemingway manner, that is
evaluative without being very descriptive.

Through the text’s treatment of Jake, we can see how parataxis also affects the
production of masculine subjectivity within the texts. It is here the problems of style and
content most overlap in Hemingway. Masculine subjectivity is a concept threatened by
the rationalizing forces of modernity and Hemingway’s use of these techniques in his
style raises questions about the concept’s arrangement in his prose. His style removes
causal relationships and replaces them with exchangeable, coordinating clauses,
neutralizing sequential affect and emphasizing the experiential torrents of an alienated
modernity. Explanation and reflection are insufficient mediums of representation for the
damaged world of Hemingway’s characters and narrators. The characters and narrators
can document and, through paratactic style, establish a relationship between immediate
objects, but the style occludes the exact nature of that relationship. That Jake’s wound
and the overwhelming effect of the great war are so skillfully blended into the co-
existence of commodity-objects in the novel’s syntax demonstrates the important
ideological role that parataxis plays for Hemingway. The device helps to neutralize those
inconvenient histories that may otherwise threaten the text’s task of producing an
autonomous masculine subjectivity.
Furthermore, parataxis functions to reduce the texts’ characters, even those with specific idioms or motifs, to the administered system of the author’s style. The abstract differences that separate the characters from one another (gender, religion, politics, etc) are captured through the content, but that content is incapable of producing representations of the characters as wholly-formed free subjects. Rather, the style itself objectifies and reifies them as equivalents even when the language attempts to distinguish. Thus we find descriptions that follow simple patterns such as Jake Barnes’ “Mike was a bad drunk. Brett was a good drunk. Bill was a good drunk. Cohn was never drunk” (The Sun 152). What this reveals is the subservience of particularity to totality and the texts’ steady but anxious production of modernity as a space in which the articulation of subjectivity is limited by abstract social systems that are more invested in producing equivalencies.

Taken together, insistence on parataxis and the iceberg principle represents an attempt to stylistically corral and capture totality in the age of monopoly through (what by then had become) the totalizing image of “things.” Things become a modern trope of representation itself as the effects of the commodity culture come into focus. Hemingway particularizes and compartmentalizes his content in an effort to produce meaning from a collection of things and a style that emphasizes thing-ness. The iceberg theory itself relates the represented (the tip) to that to which it is connected (the submerged). It creates the hierarchy in the system between relevant and irrelevant. It is a theory of representing the whole through its measured parts, which are almost exclusively things, for Hemingway. And these “things,” these concrete objects, take on exchangeable relationships – a condition demonstrated through the absence of descriptive
hierarchy or parataxis. The iceberg creates hierarchy in the text’s system while parataxis dismantles it. This exchangeability, or put another way, the filtering of the world through the mechanisms and language of exchange value, has an alienating effect on the characters and narrators. This is best captured in the story “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” in which the central nouns of The Lord’s Prayer are rewritten as nothingness: “Our nada who art in nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be nada in nada as it is in nada. Give us this nada our daily nada and nada us our nada as we nada our nasas and nada us not into nada but deliver us from nada” (The Short Stories 383). The nouns are reduced to interchangeable parts for the old waiter who constructs the prayer. He evacuates whatever other values the nouns once had and replaces them with the higher value of exchangeability, ironically represented by “nada,” thereby evacuating value itself. This constitutes what might be called Hemingway’s reified style in which the antinomies of a world in which objects, persons, and even abstractions have been reduced to exchangeable equivalents is felt deeply enough by the intelligent gaze of the narrator to inform the patterns of his writing. The syntax is governed by the noun and, as Harry Levin has noted, “Hemingway puts his emphasis on nouns because, among parts of speech, they come closest to things” (108).

Reification, Stoicism, and the Production of Masculinity

As the mythology of the bourgeois subject, or at least its potential to be realized, is liquefied by Fordist models of administration, Hemingway rewrites the ideological narrative of individual autonomy, situating the hero firmly within the totalizing grasp of a
standardizing system (style) in order that a negotiated autonomy might emerge. The tension between the high industrial style and the pastoral content reasserts itself here as the space of that negotiation as the hero, conditioned and produced by various determinants of modernity, seeks self-actualization in the spaces of the un-developed other. It is a thoroughly colonial gesture, as the capacity to fulfill desire is realized through the expansion of modernity to its margins. Thus, on the plains of Africa, Hemingway’s modern technique does not conflict with the pastoral setting, but rather serves to reinforce the degree to which the hero commands his surroundings. The cultural and economic Other, its seeming chaos and its primitive barbarity is rationalized and standardized by the style of modernity and the gaze of the Hemingway hero. It is, in a word, administered. And the hero, whose desires serve as a pretext for this process, illustrates the structural positions of subjectivity preserved within the Fordist logic: the creative and the managerial classes. He is not reified as a mere object within that process (though he is never free of being an object), but is shown to be dynamic in his ability to create and expand it to satisfy his own desires.

The object-centered style that marks Hemingway’s writings is a product of his personal experiences and the effects of a reifying, monopoly capitalism that placed value in such modes of categorization. Of all of the critical narratives that attempt to give a genesis to Hemingway’s style the most dominant and recurrent is certainly his career as a journalist and its impact on his form. Such critical narratives successfully document the transfer of craft from journalism to fiction, as either smooth or turbulent, without touching on perhaps the most direct connection between Hemingway’s two fields of narration – the “objective” gaze of the journalist and the “stoicism” and ironic distance of
his narrators and protagonists. For both Lukács and Adorno, however, the pursuit of journalistic objectivity and the bourgeois ethos of stoicism are fundamental to industrial conceptions of identity, and, I will argue, gender-identity, in modernity.

In his discussion of reification and consciousness, Lukács presents the journalist as a primary example of how the structural conditions of reification enter into the structures of subjectivity:

The specialized ‘virtuoso’, the vendor of his objectified and reified faculties does not just become the [passive] observer of society; he also lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-à-vis the workings of his own objectified and reified faculties. (It is not possible here even to outline the way in which modern administration and law assume the characteristics of the factory as we noted above rather than those of the handicrafts.) This phenomenon can be seen at its most grotesque in journalism. Here it is precisely subjectivity itself, knowledge, temperament and powers of expression that are reduced to an abstract mechanism functioning autonomously and divorced both from the personality of their ‘owner’ and from the material and concrete nature of the subject matter in hand. The journalist’s ‘lack of convictions’, the prostitution of his experiences and beliefs is comprehensible only as the apogee of capitalist reification.

Lukács calls attention to the problematics of exactly what is held in the highest regard by the ideologies of journalism: objectivity. The journalist is an example of cynical reification – he or she desires a closer identity with the “mechanism” that distances observer and observed. Experience, memory, and personality are all compartmentalized as aspects of the labor process and the journalist’s writing assumes the same reified forms as the subject who produces it. Hemingway expressed a similar complaint about the effects of journalism: “on a newspaper…you have to sponge your memory clean like a slate every day…you have to learn to forget every day what happened the day before…Newspaper work is valuable up until the point that it forcibly begins to destroy
your memory” (quoted in Fishkin 146). Adorno takes Lukács’ reading of subjectivity a step further – bridging a connection between journalism and stoicism. After quoting at length from *History and Class Consciousness*, Adorno suggests that within “late industrialism” the ego is fragmented through “the consummation of the division of labour within the individual” and from this process: “All that is left are the light, rigid, empty husks of emotions, matter transportable at will, devoid of anything personal. They are no longer the subject; rather, the subject responds to them as to his internal object” (*Minima Moralia* 230-231). In a word, the transformations of late capitalism produce “the bourgeois philosophy:” stoicism (Horkheimer and Adorno 96). And while Adorno does not apply that particular word to his expansion of Lukács’ theory, he does describe at length how the fully integrated, assimilated subject or “the character of irreplaceable existence under late capitalism” (*Minima Moralia* 230) rationalizes those spontaneous and unpredictable aspects of personality into a set of things or “equipment.” Reflexes are rendered “mechanical” and, in Adorno’s hyperbolic calculation, “the subject is entirely extinguished” (*Minima Moralia* 231). Adorno is very effective when tracing the sources of what I am terming stoicism back to the internalization of the structures of capital. He is less convincing, however, in his grasping of its social and psychological functions. He argues that stoicism reduces the individual to an automaton on the individual level and leaves him or her susceptible to authoritarian movements on the social level. To an extent he is correct, though incomplete. He does not, for example, explain why adopting a “business manager…re-organization” (230) of the ego should appeal to the individual in the first place. It is here that I believe Hemingway’s texts can shed some light on the allure of the stoic identity.
For Hemingway, stoicism is an attempt to produce a certain type of autonomy, particularly geared to function within a Taylorized modernity. It involves the choice to refrain from ungovernable emotion. It is the freedom to not emote. And through this will to prioritize a particular version of rational and collected thought, the production of masculine subjectivity begins to take shape. Nick’s father, in the story “Indian Camp,” perhaps best embodies the stoic philosophy in action, often summarized in the Hemingway canon as “grace under pressure.” In the story Nick’s father performs a caesarian on a woman without any anesthetic. Her screams disturb Nick who begs his father to make them stop. His father retorts, “her screams are not important. I don’t hear them because they are not important” (In Our Time 16). His father’s single-mindedness seems to quell Nick’s disturbance as the woman’s screams are not highlighted again in the story. His father’s words also reflect the overall perspective of the writer adhering to the iceberg method, disregarding the cacophony of things that “are not important.” However, the misogyny at work does begin to show some of the problematic aspects of masculine subjectivity. The woman’s screams, her pain, her utterances “are not important.” They are cast as irrational against the stoical self, in a recurring process that will mark Hemingway’s novels.

The subjectivity that Hemingway develops is, indeed, fundamentally masculine. It involves a productive, promethean, dynamic figure, motivated by sexual desire, an ambiguous notion of honor, and a flexible code of ethics. The author mostly applies these traits to the novels’ male heroes: Robert Jordan, Jake Barnes, Fredric Henry, and Nick Adams. The development of their autonomies is often at the expense of the development of the female characters that share the page. Maria in For Whom The Bell
Tolls and even Catherine Barkley in A Farewell to Arms serve as sexual props for their male counterparts. They are overly feminized as passive, subservient, and victimized. And the female characters that are more well rounded on the page achieve their coherence through the trope of masculinity. Brett Ashley dons a man’s name and a man’s sexual prowess. She is repeatedly described as being one of guys, a drinking buddy to whom Jake happens to be attracted. Pilar, on the other hand, earns Robert Jordan’s respect by assuming a matriarchal leadership position. She is the sole figure that all of the cave dwellers respect and so he too must respect and defer to her as the commander on the ground. They share manly pursuits and, especially, the manly, stoical perspective. Thus, Brett Ashley can detach her fiancé from her sexual conquests and Pilar can relieve her husband of his command without allowing any emotional complexity to motivate their faculties. This capacity is valued above all others for the Hemingway hero.

Stoicism is not merely a means for Hemingway to develop his characters. It affects multiple areas of the text. For example, the submerging done by the formal iceberg method and that done by the stoical characters are homologous. This connection, in turn, contributes to the production of masculine subjectivity. The stoic voice that tells the stories treats instances of life, death, and suffering as commonplace and expected outcomes. In turn, the stoic characters whose stories are told are likewise seemingly immune to the turbulent chaos of their lives. The death of Fredric Henry’s son serves as a typical example in which the two merge through Fredric’s narrating voice:

He had never been alive. Except in Catherine. I’d felt him kick there often enough. But I hadn’t for a week. Maybe he was choked all the time. Poor little kid. I wished the hell I’d been choked like that. No I didn’t. Still there would not be all this dying to go through. Now Catherine
would die. That was what you did. You died. You did not know what it was about. You never had time to learn. They threw you in and told you the rules and the first time they caught you off base they killed you. Or they killed you gratuitously like Aymo. Or gave you the syphilis like Rinaldi. But they killed you in the end. You could count on that. Stay around and they would kill you. (327)

For Fredric, his son’s death is posited as an inevitability. Just like a litany of other friends who have died or will die in the war, his son’s death is a natural extension of the new social norm. Interestingly, however, while Fredric’s pessimism remains constant, his explanation of death’s origins changes throughout the passage. Death is a passive inevitability at first: “That was what you did. You died.” But he goes on to personalize the act in the figures of Aymo and Rinaldi, and specifically historicize it as a function of the war waging across the world; death is transformed into the active pursuit of “they.” Four times Fredric suggests that “they killed you” which reconstitutes the act not as a natural phenomena, but as an effect of some incomprehensible social machinery. It remains inevitable, but is denaturalized through Fredric’s historicizing its context within the deaths that have followed him through The Great War. Stoicism here takes on the attributes of a different worldview: cynicism.

Fredric’s reaction to Catherine’s death only a few pages later has perplexed critics even more. “I do not want to talk about it,” Fredric tells the doctor when he attempts to explain the causes of her death. He expels the doctor and nurses from the room and laments that saying goodbye to Catherine “was like saying good-bye to a statue.” He then leaves the hospital and returns to his hotel, presumably to eat dinner and drink (332). James Phelan has argued that there is indeed emotion at play in Fredric’s reactions to both his son’s and Catherine’s deaths. He writes,
There is emotion in the reporting here, but it is emotion under control, the emotion of one who knows the painful truth, who is suffering from the knowledge and experience of that truth, but who is also moving beyond that knowledge and experience – not in the sense of forgetting it or discounting it but of integrating it into an even larger view. It is a view that insists on the possibility of going on with some measure of control and dignity despite the world’s malevolence…(62)

Phelan is correct to assert that Fredric has developed this “view” over the course of the novel and that Hemingway is essentially advocating Fredric’s “emotion under control” as the only rational response to be had in a world where “they killed you in the end.” But Fredric’s stoicism, because it is also Hemingway’s, is not merely a philosophy for living; it is a stylistic coping device as well. The stoic element in Hemingway’s style follows Adorno’s recognition that the barbaric elements of modernity “can be recognized, but not represented” (Minima Moralia 144). Hemingway’s prose represents not the horror but its recognition and the strategies through which it might be managed in a reified world – in other words, to objectify and to standardize it through parataxis, and submerge the problematic, the “unspoken,” the unrepresentable through the iceberg method and the façade of stoicism. And within this complex formula lies Hemingway’s unique blueprint for masculinity – one fundamentally conditioned by the hegemony of exchange value.

The crisis of subjectivity itself is historically rooted in the ascent of exchange value as a structural feature of social life. Adorno addresses this crisis in a critique of the Kantian transcendental subject: “The universal domination of mankind by the exchange value – a domination which a priori keeps the subjects from being subjects and degrades subjectivity itself to a mere object – makes an untruth of the general principle that claims to establish the subject’s predominance” (Negative Dialectics 178). The features of subjectivity that seem to constitute it as such – in the case of Hemingway’s protagonists
this feature is almost exclusively a form of stoicism as a defining characteristic and form of consciousness – actually provide the evidence of the ego’s object structure. Stoicism functions as a feature of Hemingway’s style; it is an extension of each of his narrators. It thus performs a dual role in each text: character trait and stylistic trope. And in both of these roles the object structure of the writing subject is expressed. But the stoic quality that weaves between the character’s actions and the narrator’s gaze also seems to negate the fragmentation of the subject so thematically common in modernist literature. It artificially quarantines those irrational aspects of personality liable to expose the subject as anything other than the ideological example of the wholly-integrated bourgeois so idealized in nineteenth century literature. Hemingway is negating the “fracturedness” that Adorno identifies as a feature of modernist literature and a byproduct of the hegemony of exchange value under Fordist logic. The victory over fragmentation in Hemingway is false, however, as the implicit necessity for such a strategy in the first place reproduces the fracturedness as a precondition for the text. This negation is what Macherey terms “the resistance in the object” (150). Hemingway’s administered form and administering characters resist the historical tendency towards fracturedness, but cannot erase its original pressures.

Jameson’s brief writings on Hemingway further elucidate the connection between Hemingway’s literary devices, the ascent of monopoly capitalism, and the production of masculinity. The “life experience” of Hemingway’s work, the stories and their overtly masculine characters, are “in reality merely a projection of the style itself. Hemingway’s great discovery was that there was possible a kind of return to the very sources of verbal productivity if you forgot about words entirely and merely concentrated on prearranging
the objects that the words were supposed to describe” (Marxism and Form 410). We must, I feel, understand Jameson’s use of the word “objects” here to describe not merely the inanimate things that populate the setting, but also the characters themselves, as objects of reification, and their component parts which, Hemingway recognized, had become functions of their personalities. Thus, while Hemingway’s “discovery” concerns the “prearranging” of those objects, it is also a meditation on the conditions whereby those objects are atomized so as to be objectified and made exchangeable to the extent their “prearrangement” is necessary and not naturally obvious. Jameson continues his reading of “the process of writing” as the “dominant category of experience” in Hemingway by suggesting that in a work like the Green Hills of Africa “the shooting of the animal in the content is but the pretext for the description of the shooting in the form” (411). And consequently, the world of equivalences emerges again in Hemingway as “writing, now conceived as a skill, is then assimilated to the other skills of hunting and bullfighting, of fishing and warfare, which project a total image of man’s active and all-absorbing technical participation in the outside world” (412). Hence, when Fredric Henry suggests that “abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates,” (Farewell to Arms 185) he participates in a common event in Hemingway’s prose in which the narrator halts the movement of the narration in order to digress on a theory of the technique at work. The time and space of the narration are exploded as the voice speaking is no longer the narrator in the action of the war so much as the narrator in the action of writing about the action of the war. This type of event is a trope within the Hemingway catalog where the bullfighter’s “purity of
line” in *The Sun Also Rises* or the mathematical precision of Robert Jordan’s explosives in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* are actually self-reflective instances of defining and defending the technique of the narrator through comparison to its masculine equivalent in the text’s content. It is thus that we return to Jameson’s suggestion that “the Hemingway cult of *machismo* is just this attempt to come to terms with the great industrial transformation of America after World War I: it satisfies the Protestant work ethic at the same time that it glorifies leisure” (*Marxism and Form* 412). The Hemingway hero, draped in his masculine and stoic traits, is an attempt at subjectivity that retains what autonomy is lost through the great industrial transformations that Jameson mentions and that I document above. But it is a subjectivity necessarily composed of “pre-arranged” fragments, as the reified ego is unable to reconcile itself to the ‘objects’ that constitute it. Form and content entangle once again as Hemingway’s style is called forth to provide “imaginary or formal ‘solutions’ to unresolvable social contradictions” (*The Political Unconscious* 79). It does this in three ways: (1) by submerging the truly unresolvable using the iceberg method, (2) by artificially and formally generating the appearance of equality through parataxis, and (3) by creating distance between the action (history) and the narrator (the subject) through the stoic voice. The central unresolvable social contradictions that Hemingway’s prose confronts and attempts to resolve is the Fordist remaking of masculinity in late capitalism. As the structures of Fordism liquify subjectivity to its own external logics, Hemingway chooses the production of masculinity as an ideological site in which his prose can resist the hegemony of monopoly capitalism.

Using Macherey’s theory of ideology, and his emphasis on the “elsewhere,” we can reevaluate the “subconscious” silences in Hemingway’s texts in relation to Jameson’s
argument that the Hemingway hero’s “cult of machismo” is an “attempt to come to terms with the great industrial transformation of America after World War 1” (412). Because he is writing ad hoc on Hemingway, Jameson does not flesh out what to “come to terms with” might entail and why the industrial transformations would necessitate such a reevaluation. But it is here that Macherey’s theories can fill out Jameson’s critique.

To reiterate the sentiment with which I opened this chapter, the great unspoken element in Hemingway’s writing, the silenced space of the text’s ideology, is industrialism and its transformations. There is a crisis of what the young Marx terms “man’s species being” as the division of labor is internalized and rationalized within the worker, producing the fragmented and fractured experience of modernity that many modernist artists reproduce. Fordism amplifies the crisis of subjectivity produced by capitalism’s determinate features. This is the condition that “precedes the work so absolutely that it cannot be found in the work” (Macherey 150).

Hemingway’s characters altogether avoid the fate of the alienated assembly line worker and his plots posit an alternative, if not problematic, path towards modern subjectivity. Indeed, the labor sphere is an impoverished space for the development of the Hemingway hero’s personality and the exploration of his subjectivity. Even when a character does work it is with great embarrassment. Jake Barnes, the journalist, describes how in the newspaper business “you should never seem to be working” (19). Leisure time is privileged in labor-time’s stead. But the leisure time is not defined by a passive hedonism. It is always productive and sacrificial. The soldiers in Hemingway’s fiction, for instance, are volunteers who, while they might be “working,” imagine themselves apart from work while at war. For example Robert Jordan thinks back to his teaching job
in Montana. The transformation of work in the early twentieth century, however, excludes it from being a determinant factor in Hemingway’s conception of masculinity. As the production of social life transformed under Fordism, so too did the social conception of masculinity. The gender confusion that emerges as a central theme in Hemingway’s work is evidence of this crisis, though it is not fully explained by it.\textsuperscript{10} Rather, it is the Fordist economy, itself responsible for destabilizing the categories of gender, of agency and subjectivity, that is the absent cause that initiates the need for silences or unspoken ideological gestures in Hemingway’s fiction. Under Taylor and Ford’s guidance, the masculinity of the creative and productive craftsman transitioned into the more passive and femininized assembly-line laborer. It is in this way that industrialism always persists as silence in the prose; it occupies the negative spaces produced by its positive others: the African wilderness, medieval Italian towns, Midwestern woodlands, and the Spanish countryside. The arena for exploring masculinity is not in Detroit, but in Detroit’s frontier, the spaces that monopoly capital has yet to conquer.

Hemingway’s production of masculinity across his texts thus functions to symbolically resolve the contradictions of identity formation \textit{within a Fordist framework}. The text, from this angle, is an ideological act – one that reproduces the administrative and efficient workings of the modern political economy within the structures of its style while also providing an imaginary resolution to the problems of those structures in its content. Hemingway’s characters produce new conceptions of an active masculinity within the stylistic framework of capital. They are, in essence, examining and experiencing the boundaries of that framework. If grace under pressure is a typical
element of the Hemingway code for masculinity, then surely the desperate search for pressure within which to be graceful is also essential. These characters are soldiers, fishermen, bullfighters, journalists, hunters, etc., and they demonstrate the range of possibilities for experiencing masculinity within the new world market and with nearly unfettered freedom of movement. This narrative of a dynamic masculinity is not entirely new. It makes up novels of soldiery, westerns, and can be traced back to the stories of chivalry that incite Cervantes’ Don Quixote to go in search of villains to make of himself a hero. But Hemingway’s heroes are cast in a new modernity of monopoly capital and imperialism. Modernity’s outside is quickly closing and they symbolically go forth to experience the ideological spectrum of a free and dynamic man on behalf of the armies of industrial laborers to whom that experience is denied.

This production of a dynamic, mobile, graceful, yet stoic male is in concert with the production of its perspective in the author’s style. In attempting to quarantine industrialism from his narrative spaces, Hemingway borrows some of its features to distinguish and underscore his style. In this way, the logic of monopoly capital appears in the systemic approach to ordering the disorder of the ideology in the first place. The dismantling of masculinity by modern industry necessitates the representation of its reconstitution within an identifiably industrial voice. Just as Eagleton describes Freud’s uppermost dream layer as existing “to systematize the dream, fill in its gaps and smooth over its contradictions, produce from it a relatively coherent text” (90), so too does Hemingway’s form attempt to rationalize and administer the incoherence of social relations, identity formation, labor, consumption, and other areas of modern existence turned opaque by monopoly capitalism. The author’s style functions to negate the
disorder of singularity within the sublime order of Fordism; it is a tool to combat the problem of unrepresentability and fracturedness. And the problematic of Fordism, the social consequences of its newly minted hegemonic status, provide for us a contrasting structure that, while not thematized in the texts, nevertheless precedes and determines the elemental conditions of those texts’ production and consumption.

The surface-structure of Hemingway’s style, the emphasis on nouns and strong, evaluative adjectives highlights itself as the metonymy of what is buried. The tip of the iceberg serves to direct the reader’s attention to the unrepresentable mass below the surface. At times, throughout his writing, Hemingway offers a glimpse of the shape and mass of the history of circumstances and determinate forces at play producing the “tip.” But within that will to craft, that adherence to the culture of rationalization that exploded within his epoch, Hemingway’s style contains an implicit warning of the dangers of an expanding and rationalized social-economy that renders itself incomprehensible and unrepresentable. For, as one reviewer puts it, under his administration the determinate forces in social existence are reduced to a skillful subterranean existence: “between the lines of the hard-boiled narrative quivers an awareness of the unworded, half-grasped incomprehensibles of life” (Stephens 45). Hemingway’s relevance as a writer, then, emerges from his ability, if only in the negative spaces of the text, to retain and even underscore some of the facets of modernity that had become unrepresentable for his peers.
CHAPTER 4
F. SCOTT FITZGERALD AND UNFINISHED YOUTH

“Worry about efficiency”
- Fitzgerald’s advice to daughter, August 8, 1933

“That terrible sinister figures of Edison, of Ford and Firestone—in the rotogravures.”
-F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack Up

The classical bildungsroman traces the physical, psychological, and moral growth of its hero. Growth is accomplished through symbolic acts of socialization as the hero recognizes the structures of his society, resists them, and then comes to embrace them at the moment of maturity – a moment defined by a “harmony” between the hero and his society. The modernist bildungsroman, however, develops an alternative narrative, problematizing the very notion of a harmonious coexistence between the individual and the social order, and re-imagines the coming of age process within the context of monopoly capitalism and its defining structures: finance capital, imperialism, rationalized institutions, and consumerism.

This chapter will argue that the problems of the modernist bildungsroman are symptomatic of monopoly capitalism and the larger “crisis of artistic reproduction” (Benjamin “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” 338) affecting the production of aesthetics. The novels of F. Scott Fitzgerald, a writer preoccupied with the bildungsroman form, serve as an occasion to examine the historical origins of the fundamental problems of the form and the characteristics of a dynamic American economy that shape the genre’s
modernist trajectory. Specifically I will argue that Fitzgerald’s bildungsromans, as barometers of monopoly capitalism’s emphasis on relative surplus value and the economies of transformations without ends, reconceive development as a process of consumption, accumulation, and assembling. These surrogate conduits, however, are incapable of producing the harmonious maturity that defines the traditional bildungsroman. In its stead is the figure of permanent youth – a recurring trope in modernist coming of age stories.

The undeveloped youth of the modernist bildungsroman is something of a historical archetype. Stephen Dedalus does not so much grow up as simply flee Ireland and its obligations, a refugee of his own youth; Lord Jim similarly absconds his obligations, literally jumping off the ship and exiling himself from European society; and Gregor Samsa finds himself turned into a giant insect and returned to the dependence of youth before he can complete his transition to maturity. In Fitzgerald’s novels the problem exists as an unsolvable quandary facing the young heroes at the ambiguous conclusions. *This Side of Paradise* records the stable youth of Amory Blaine and tracks his progress through *The Great War* and after. The restlessness that the war creates, however, finds him incapable of assimilating back into his social class and the novel’s close finds him arguing for a socialist revolution and hitchhiking back to Princeton University in search of his more innocent and stable youth.

*The Beautiful and the Damned* features a tumultuous relationship between Anthony Patch and Gloria Patch. They marry young and seem to achieve many of the symbolic demarcations of maturity, but the text defers the completion of their youth to the moment of Anthony’s inheritance, which will arrive upon the death of some elderly
relatives. The inheritance, and thus full autonomy, is incessantly delayed. Ironically, when the money does come on the novel’s final pages, it is too late for Anthony. The psychological damage to Anthony is immense as Gloria finds him, fresh from the court decision that gave them the inheritance, playing with a childhood stamp collection on the floor and speaking like a toddler, trapped inside a memory of youth.

*The Great Gatsby* offers a counter-narrative to the traditional bildungsroman. The construction of Gatsby shows how the production of identity and the socialization process can be manipulated. The reification of identity allows for its management. While Nick, Tom, Daisy, and Jordan assume their roles within their social class, Gatsby upsets the social order and the text, symbolically, punishes him for his transgression.

*Tender is the Night* documents the bildung process of two female characters at different moments in time and juxtaposes each against the stable and overly masculine figure of Dick Diver. Nicole Diver, Dick’s young wife, attaches herself to Dick as a surrogate father figure. After her own father sexually assaulted her as a child, Nicole falls under the care of Dick at his psychiatric institute and the two form an egregiously inappropriate romance that is problematized by “episodes” in which Nicole experiences the trauma of her youth as though it had just occurred. Nicole’s growth comes when she is able to shed herself of Dick and his patriarchal medical care over her body and mind. Rosemary Hoyt, Nicole’s romantic rival for Dick’s attention at the end of their marriage, is seventeen when she meets Dick. Without a father of her own, Rosemary does not project her desire for patriarchy (if she has any) onto Dick. Rather, he is the first of many sexual conquests that will prove indispensable in her blossoming film career. Coached by her risqué mother, Rosemary seduces and Dick, using him to fulfill her own sexual
and romantic curiosity, and then disposes him. In a reversal of the classical gender roles of the bildungsroman in which the male lead uses females to measure his own progress, Rosemary is tutored by her mother to experiment without sacrificing her financial or emotional autonomy.

The archetype of endless youth is a much written about phenomena in recent modernist studies. The origins of the archetype that these studies provide is illuminating and will help provide a framework to think about Fitzgerald’s heroes and the conclusions to his novels. I’ll begin with perhaps the most seminal work on the bildungsroman form, Franco Moretti’s *The Way of the World*. Moretti spends his text examining the conventions of the form in early bourgeois literature and convincingly argues that “youth is ‘chosen’ as the new epoch’s ‘specific material sign’…because of its ability to accentuate modernity’s dynamism and instability” (5). In the appendix of the book’s new edition, Moretti meditates on the “crisis” of the “late bildungsroman” created by The Great War. The war traumatically redefined how existence should be contextualized as the most modern of experiences “didn’t decree the renewal of individual existence, but its insignificance” (229). In the literature of the time, what Moretti describes as “kernels,” or a “burst of sudden change” (232), “are no longer produced by the hero as turning points of his free growth – but against him, by a world that is thoroughly indifferent to his personal development” (233). While the protagonists certainly feel this trauma, it also contributes to the modernist experiments in style: “the clearest sign that a trauma has occurred is the fact that language no longer works well” (238). The modernist bildungsroman is the end of the form for Moretti, as it became an impossible and impractical means for representing the complexities of modernity.
Jed Esty performs a similar reading of the modernist bildungsroman, turning his emphasis to imperialism and the task of identity formation within the empire. He seeks to establish a “significant symbolic relationship between uneven development in colonial modernity and antidevelopmental plots in canonical fiction of the same period” (72). Esty argues that the “dissonance between hypermodernization in the metropolitan core and underdevelopment in the colonial periphery” affected the fabric of novelistic time and the “realist proportions of biographical time” that had defined the classical bildungsroman. Thus, the modernist bildungsroman lost the ability to “synthesize the inner and outer world” and “project the true shape of history” (87). He summarizes, extrapolating Moretti’s thesis into the interwar period: “If, as Adorno put it, modernity is the state of permanent transition, then its most trenchant literary incarnation is the figure of endless youth” (87).

Gregory Castle argues that the modernists appropriated the bildungsroman form as a means to “redeploy it in a progressive fight against ‘rationalized’ forms of socialization and in the search for satisfying modes of self-cultivation” (30). For him, the hero of the classical bildungsroman undergoes a progression of self-discovery and enlightenment that is tied to a “pragmatic discourse of social recruitment and social mobility” (30). As monopoly capitalism coalesces, however, around rationalized institutions (what Althusser would term ISAs), this process of enlightenment is outsourced to the structures of the state-church, school and university systems, health care systems, military, the Fordist workplace, and the nationalist nation-state and resultantly takes on the function of social control. This conversion of enlightenment from liberation to control reiterates the central claims in Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of*
Enlightenment. The unfinished youth that defines the modernist bildungsroman, then, is a rejection of the “unified, harmonious” bourgeois subject (66). The “unfinished” bildungsroman is reframed as a “critique” of old “modes of closure” that offer “alternatives that are open and fluid” (72).

Moretti’s, Esty’s, and Castle’s readings provide valuable insight into potential modes of reading Fitzgerald’s bildungsromans. The trauma of World War One that Moretti emphasizes is expressed in Amory’s “restlessness” and the contradictory silent space that the war occupies in This Side of Paradise, while the modernity of “permanent transition” that Esty puts forth requires the “endless youth” of an Amory Blaine, Jay Gatsby, or Nick Carraway to have symbolic currency in the marketplace. And as the rationalized institutions of the Fordist state capitalism take shape, the resistance found in the figures, like Amory and Gatsby, who refuse to “grow up” and assimilate take on social significance as viable alternatives to the discourse of socialization. Importantly, within Moretti, Esty, and Castle’s readings we find that the moment of monopoly capitalism and its various expressions (imperialism, World War, “rationalized” social institutions) leaving its traces on the literary form itself, which is forced to adapt to symbolically retain a meaningful connection to its own history. The modernists rewrite the bildungsroman genre as a strategy to address the crisis of representation monopoly capitalism presented and Fitzgerald, the sometime modernist, is never more so than in his reformulations of the classical coming of age story.

In the chapter that follows I will flesh out the symptoms of monopoly capitalism’s effect on the bildungsroman form as it appears in Fitzgerald’s two most important coming of age novels: This Side of Paradise and The Great Gatsby. I will then argue,
following Castle, that the ambiguity of the “open” endings of each novel provides a critical commentary on the nature of permanent change that defined monopoly capitalism and the capacity to retain autonomy over one’s identity within its hegemony. The texts themselves demonstrate that the potential of self-cultivation outside the structures of monopoly capitalism’s institutions and socio-economic expressions is presented as thoroughly problematic, but still preferable to the hegemonic standard in the end.

THE BACKGROUNDING OF HISTORY

In the classical bildungsroman the individual shares a dynamic relationship with the historical social order in which he or she develops. This social order, the shape of history around the hero, contributes to defining the character and the character in turn defines herself in relationship to it. Thus, Elizabeth Bennett’s precarious class position as a “gentleman’s daughter” equal to and deserving of Mr. Darcy’s affection is complicated by the surfacing bourgeoisie, whose emergent wealth is chronicled in the novel’s periphery. Elizabeth’s uncle, a businessman, lives scandalously “within view” of the warehouses he runs and is much wealthier than her father, despite not being a gentleman himself (Pride and Prejudice 120). For Mr. Darcy, these connections are “objectionable” (167) and for Lady Catherine, the rising bourgeoisie and their foreign revolutions are a clear threat to her aristocratic status and “presumptuous” and “ambitious” Elizabeth is symbolic of their dangerous hybridity. Thus, the union between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth Bennett at the novel’s close narrates a British alternative to the French revolution. This concrete relationship between the dynamic individual and the dynamic social order is an
essential element of the classical bildungsroman, but the modernists struggled to positively articulate that relationship.

For Moretti, the mutation of the social totality into an entity that no longer contributed to the individual’s development but rather confronted the individual as an impenetrable obstacle helps to explain the breakdown of the dialectic. The Great War consumed a generation of nameless individuals and demonstrated how insignificant the category of “individual” would become in the new modernity. The Fordist assembly line, with its perspective of individuals as interchangeable parts, would perform the same essential function. Benjamin suggests that the individual experiences modernity as a series of depersonalized traumas that shock him or her into an epiphany of secular insignificance. *This Side of Paradise* and *The Great Gatsby* each absorb the trauma of The Great War and repackage it as a rather prosaic occurrence in the lives of their heroes, but neither can articulate a coherent and harmonious relationship between the historical imperative in the background and the individual’s foregrounded development. The Great War, the single most important historical event of their early lives, is as muted by the text as the details of the heroes’ diets. It is an implied necessity that does little to advance the development of the young men who partake in its horrors.

The timespan of *This Side of Paradise* is historically rich: America’s emergence as a world power, the rise of the automobile, the rise of finance capitalism, World War One, Prohibition, and the early expressions of the mass consumerism and the culture industry that would come to define America in the twentieth century. The novel, however, struggles to couch Amory Blaine within these transformations, choosing instead to treat each as near-unrelated events, when the historical is acknowledged at all. The
text achieves this compartmentalization of history through the multiplicity of forms and montage structure it employs. The protagonist and the history of his epoch are thus separated. This is perhaps less of a modernist technique than an inexperienced author’s makeshift attempt at structure. Fitzgerald wrote many of the chapters as short plays and short stories before hastily marrying them together in single text. Fitzgerald’s friends begged him to “pay a little more attention to form” (Turnbull 103). For Edmund Wilson and John Peale Bishop, for instance, the novel was more a product of sloppy writing than avant garde aesthetics. The result, however, is curious. The assembled text reconceives the bildungsroman, a genre dependent upon unity and development to create meaning, as montage. The juxtaposition of various forms is layered with the juxtaposition of disconnected episodes and interludes. The text employs narrative, lists, vignettes, dramatic dialogue, poems, letters, didactic debate, and segments of stream of consciousness. Jumping between these forms, it centers entirely on its protagonist, Amory Blaine, and the emblematic moments in his social, romantic, and intellectual life. A typical example of this montage of forms and contents comes in Chapter II. After a short epiphany sequence in which Amory lies on a lawn at Princeton below “gothic peaks” and “all they symbolized as warehouses of dead ages,” he realizes that he must work harder to become important on the campus, and wakes from his epiphany to realize that it has been raining (a scene clearly modeled on Joyce’s own bildungsroman, a book that is mentioned by name as a favorite of Amory’s). The text then pauses to announce the onset of The Great War:

…”Oh, God!” he cried suddenly, and started at the sound of his voice in the stillness. The rain dripped on. A minute longer he lay without moving, his hands clenched. Then he sprang to his feet and gave his clothes a tentative pat.
“I’m very damn wet!” he said aloud to the sundial.

HISTORICAL

The war began in the summer following his freshman year. Beyond a sporting interest in the German dash for Paris the whole affair failed either to thrill or interest him. With the attitude he might have held toward an amusing melodrama he hoped it would be long and bloody. If it had not continued he would have felt like an irate ticket holder at a prizefight where the principals refused to mix it up.

That was his total reaction. (58)

Following the “Historical” interlude is a section entitled “Ha-Ha Hortense,” which covers an elaborate joke that Princeton students play on members of Yale’s Skull and Bones society. The war, in which Amory will go on to fight and lose friends, is introduced as insignificant alongside the Skull and Bones prank, which garners three pages. Not only does this scene demonstrate the eruptive, montage nature of the text, it also exhibits the Flaubertian quality of backgrounding the social and the historical and foregrounding the individual. The tension between the individual and the social is produced by the tenuous disjuncture with which the text treats their connection – each existing in isolation from the other, yet still unified by their placement together on the page.

As the historical becomes more forceful and pressing in reality, the text insists on muting it and refocusing on the development of the individual in isolation. Amory’s epiphany regarding his place in Princeton’s social structure is very specific and the severity of the war is undercut by the Ha-Ha Hortense anecdote. In this tension, the text displays an ardent concern for the place that the individual plays in the globalized, intertwined, rapidly changing world, but a harmony between the two, as in Pride and
Prejudice or any number of classical bildungsromans, is not presented as a viable possibility. By the novel’s final page, the individual is privileged and his connection to the social order is mutilated. Pearl James reads the war’s place in the novel: “‘Historical’ ironically demonstrates his [Amory’s] failures to imagine himself as an agent of, or participant in, history” (7). History, emblemized by the war effort, had become the irrepressible force of totality and the individual could no longer recognize himself as anything but a replaceable entity in its production. But this severed relationship between the individual and history works both ways. In This Side of Paradise, just as Amory cannot imagine himself an agent in the production of history, history is likewise not a constitutive force in the characters’ lives. Rather, it is disconnected scenery.

The starkest example of how history is actively silenced in the text is the role that World War One will play in Amory’s development. World War One is the absent center of the novel; it is the thing around which the major movements of the novel occur. Despite this, the war does not exist as a positive moment in the text. It is negatively represented through the gaping hole its time-span blows into the text. The war’s absence is conspicuous to a fault; everywhere it is mentioned and its effects are felt as a rising action, climax, and falling action, but still the deeds of the novel’s characters in its presence is wholly muted. As a spectator at Princeton, for instance, Amory is annoyed with “his lack of enthusiasm” about the fighting and determines “to put the blame for the whole war on “all the materialists rampant, all the idolizers of German science and efficiency” (142). As a soldier, the war is even more foreign then when he is at Princeton. Its action is reduced to a short letter that Amory writes in a six page chapter entitled “Interlude May 1917-February 1919.” Amory does not mention the war in the
letter, but does cover the fact that “Kerry’s death was a blow; so was Jesse’s to a certain extent,” acknowledging that friends from Princeton have died in the fighting (153). That the novel should treat the war, the central historical event in its pages, with such silence is especially curious when we consider what the novel does dedicate much time and effort to in its stead: perceptions of ivy league universities, types of ice cream sundaes, and the evolution of Amory’s narcissism.

Stylistically, the war functions as a wound on the text, tearing apart its logic into fragmented vignettes of moments before and after the war. We know that the war literally had an effect on the text’s structure and substance as Fitzgerald hastened its completion under the compulsion that he was going to die in battle before he could produce a finished product (Turnball 101). This haste appears in the awkward transitions between “chapters” and the inconsistencies that plague the story. Symbolically, however, the war dismantles the characters and transforms their stories into schizophrenic bursts of climaxes. Before the war Amory’s character develops unevenly and, in some instances, unbelievably, but he does develop. His dialogue and actions mature and the style through which the text depicts him takes an increasingly serious tone as he ages from a child of three to a student at Princeton. After the war, however, his development is replaced with a desperate search for a pre-war solace that carries him through the chaos of early 1920s America. He works in advertising and falls in love with a socialite, is passed over for a man who makes more money, goes on a binge in the last days of prohibition, falls in love with an atheist only to incite her to nearly kill herself, and finally turns socialist and argues economics with the father of a friend killed in the war before walking through the forests of New Jersey in search of Princeton. Thus we know that the war affects Amory,
but since his experience there is a two year, six page interlude, we cannot concretely tie it to any of Amory’s post-war failures. Rather, we can say, following Moretti’s general suggestion, that the war is a traumatic event for Amory and read his interpretation of himself and his generation as “restless” (256) as an aftereffect of the war’s dehumanization.

Strangely, the war’s effect on the characters in *The Great Gatsby* is more strongly established by that text. Nick spends much of Gatsby’s parties speaking of “wet, grey little villages in France” with other former soldiers (52) and is later astonished at the “authentic look” of the war medal from Montenegro that Gatsby produces to support his manufactured history (70-71). But the most important impact of the war on the characters of *The Great Gatsby* is the restlessness it engenders in the characters. Just as Amory’s wanderings are a product of restlessness, so too does Nick declare that he “came back [from the war] restless” (7) and departs his beloved mid-west for New York to appease that part of himself. While the restlessness and mobility incited by the war are not unfamiliar themes in the classical bildungsroman, the incapacity of the characters’ to identify a destination and reach it is unique. Amory and Nick are both aimless at the close of their novels, moving backwards across the country to Princeton and Minnesota respectively. The war, in both cases, alienates them from creating a meaningful connection to their chosen homes, as the “relevant symbolic process” in both novels “is no longer growth but regression” (Moretti 231). Their restlessness seems to have no end.

Arguably, *The Great Gatsby’s* deepest engagement with history is through Nick’s position as a bondsman. It is significant that Fitzgerald places him at the heart of the new financialized economy, anticipating the important role that Wall Street would have on the
decade. It is problematic, however, that the text is unable to couch Nick’s position within a more productive historical narrative. We are not privy to his education about the bond business; we never see him in the office, only studying great books at night in the Yale Club’s library. For the text, it is merely a job, one of many that Nick could have chosen. Nick himself seems indifferent to it: “everybody I knew was in the bond business so I supposed it could support one more single man” (7). And while the text doesn’t explore the influence of the bonds business on Nick, it does fruitfully juxtapose his education into speculative capitalism to Gatsby’s criminal enterprises. Neither are the fully realized capitalist envisioned by bourgeois romances, but we witness Gatsby as a more fulfilled subject of capital, despite being outside of its legal apparatuses.

This backgrounding or muting of history is important to consider with Fitzgerald because he is considered one of the defining constitutive voices of his generation. He was specifically concerned with the historical qualities of his generation and its place in future memory. He named the “jazz age,” politicizing it by arguing that it began “about the time of the May Day riots in 1918” when “the police rode down the demobilized country boys” and his generation realized that “maybe we had gone to war for J.P. Morgan’s loans after all” (The Crack Up 13). The “jazz age” is bookended on the backside by the 1929 crash when “somebody had blundered and the most expensive orgy in history was over” (The Crack Up 21). While his depictions of the 1920s – the decade in which Fordism is codified as the defining industrial model of the new economy, the efficiency craze sweeps all industries and governments, finance capital becomes the centerpiece of a new ideological relationship between Americans and the American economy, and the culture industry and its new vehicles for advertising ascends to peak of
a culture committed to a model of monopoly capital – are often individualized and romanticized, he was acutely aware of the symbolic power of his literature to represent historical and generational movements and moments. Thus, those defining elements of the socio-economic makeup of the 1920s are always present in the background of his novels – the automobile is vilified as an agent of death again and again, Amory Blaine’s family losses its fortune in mass transportation when the model-t begins replacing the nation’s trolley systems, Nick Carraway moves to New York to work on Wall Street and learn finance capital, advertising seems to replace all other art forms as Amory Blaine can only make money writing copy for an ad firm but not writing stories, and George Wilson prophetically misinterprets the eyes of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg, an old advertising billboard, as the gaze of “God.” This persistent engagement with the larger questions of his historical period, even amidst the melodramatic plot lines, demonstrates a sensitivity to the movements of historical change that were so pertinent to that moment of time.

History is not removed from the novels completely, but it is disentangled from the production of the individual. The maturation process is isolated in the late bildungsroman as the ethos of individualism is problematically left alone to produce plot. In place of a dynamic dialectic with the social realities of history, the individual confronts an alienated world of ideas, an industrialized culture, and a world of commodities. And these tenuous relationships with things, under monopoly capitalism, rewrite traditional notions of development with the modern ideology of accumulation.
THE ACCUMULATION OF IDENTITY

The classical bildungsroman is rooted in the concept of development - development as a process of socialization and development as a process of education, two processes that are obviously not mutually exclusive. For Moretti the bildungsroman is about resolving the “conflict between the ideal of self-determination and the equally imperious demands of socialization” (15). In other words, the individual is produced through the process of submitting to the larger historical order and the ideal of maturity is posited as the end of that process. The bourgeois narrative of development, with its emphasis on the uncertainties of youth and the transformations that define its progress, was historically compatible to early modes of competitive capitalism. Bourgeois culture departed from the aristocratic narrative of tradition and chose youth as its “specific material sign” precisely because it could encompass and endure capitalism’s dynamism. The passage to monopoly capitalism, however, problematizes the narrative of development for the modernist bildungsroman. The concept of identity, so intimately tied to the dominant ideologies of individualism, seemingly detached from the socio-historical narrative of development and was replaced by the effects of consumerism.

Fordism’s mass production produced mass consumption and an explosion in marketing and the culture industry as mechanisms for transmitting new ideological codes about identity and its relationship to the modern corporation, the commodity, and lifestyle. Chip Rhodes describes this transformation during the 1920s as one that comes to affect and define the subject:

a new regime of accumulation came into being in and around the twenties that was facilitated by certain crucial ideological coordinates and felt by
subjects in particular coded ways…the subject was experiencing the consequences of profound historical transformation, a change that was both the partial product of ideologies like mass culture and was often expressed by means of these same ideologies. (112)

The goal of the modern corporation under monopoly capital was “to gear consumer needs to the needs of production instead of the other way around” (Braverman 266). Monopoly capital attempts, in other words, to bring the uncertainty of individuals’ desires and preferences under the same type of rigorous control as the production process. In this way desire becomes a historical category and is subject to the process of reification. Rosemary Hennessy writes that during the transition to monopoly capitalism there is an “emergence of new ‘desiring subjects’ of consumer culture” whose desires come to structure their identities. Identity is thus reified – a process that Hennessy defines as “a process whereby the history of social relationships underlying identities becomes occluded or made invisible, and identities come to be seen as natural ‘things in themselves’” (217). Both desire and identity are thus “things in themselves” within the marketing arm of capital, which works to condition the public’s consuming habits. Naturally, this conditioning process takes on ideological overtones. Building on Althusser’s definition of ideology and his theory of interpellation, Rhodes argues that “in the marketplace, people’s choices are determined both by real needs and imaginary needs; the two are inseparable. Consumption is thus an effect of ideological interpellation; it is a semi-autonomous activity that is determined in the last instance by the buyer’s real position within the structures of economic life” (92). From these new modes of producing desire and identity, the Fordist culture began to produce new representations of relationships between individuals and their “real conditions of
existence.” Fitzgerald’s modernist bildungsromans situate the individual within the Fordist marketplace and problematize the new forms of identity construction by accentuating their ideological contradictions.

*The Great Gatsby*, for example, narrates an alternative to the bourgeois model of social development – a story in which social mobility is not the target of the young hero, but a tool; a story in which the socially acceptable modes of development were cast as impoverished forms of class stratification; and a story in which history is not a social phenomenon, but a personal experience that is, for Gatsby at least, subject to modification. The novel’s plot, the interior devices upon which it achieves its momentum, is inextricably tied to Fordist modernity: mobility, advertising, consumer culture, and flexible identities.

The two characters whose identities are most reified and therefore problematic for the bildungsroman genre are Gatsby and Daisy. Gatsby is reified because his personhood is a direct extension of the objects he owns and Daisy because the novel treats her as an object herself. Daisy is as fetishized as any object in the novel and she is acutely aware of it. Her voice is “full of money” (127) and her character is, for Gatsby and to an extent Nick, frozen in time at the moment Gatsby met her in Louisville, defined by the “youth and mystery that wealth imprisons and preserves…safe and proud above the hot struggles of the poor” (157). Nick produces her object-nature when he describes how Gatsby was “excited” by how many men were in love with Daisy in Louisville and how it “increased her value in his eyes” (156). Ross Posnock reads this representation as follows: “Made explicitly here is the mediated nature of his desire for Daisy; Gatsby’s interest in her is not simply spontaneous or self-generated but stimulated by others’ desires” (206). Daisy
becomes the repository of other men’s desires and the determination of her fate she leaves to external forces. Nick describes the moment when she abandons Gatsby, who is at Oxford, for Tom and the external forces of determination:

And all the time something within her was crying for a decision. She wanted her life shaped now, immediately—and the decision must be made by some force—of love, of money, of unquestionable practicality—that was close at hand. That force took shape in the middle of spring with the arrival of Tom Buchanan. (159)

Here we see Daisy, in contrast to Gatsby, explicitly desiring to have her life shaped by outside sources. She submits to Tom, but knows fully the gender politics of her action. When their daughter is born, she tells Nick that she sobbed over her sex and said, “I hope she’ll be a fool—that’s the best thing a girl can be in this world, a beautiful little fool” (21). It is clear that she is referencing herself as much as her daughter and that her notion of subjectivity is severely limited by the object-nature of her relationships to the men in her life.

If Daisy is an object, a commodified possession, then it is not surprising that Gatsby should posit himself as the ultimate consumer. Everything about him is articulated through his accumulated possessions. And foremost among these is his house: the fullest expression of his manufactured self. He measures its value in time: “it took me just three years to earn the money that bought it” (95) and posits it as the most important attribute in his attempt to win back Daisy. But unlike Tom’s house and the mansions on East Egg, Gatsby’s does not have the feel of natural harmony; it is on the wrong peninsula and has a sordid history. It is, like Gatsby himself, a fabrication, an imitation “of some Hotel de Ville in Normandy” (9), purchased with fabricated wealth. The house’s construction is likewise marked by a counterfeited attempt to recapture a
nostalgic past. Nick notes that the brewer who built it did so during a “period craze” to resemble the Norman mansion and offered his neighbors (presumably one of them the then-resident of Nick’s cottage) five years’ taxes if they would thatch their roofs with straw to resemble a village and manor house in mediaeval Europe. Nick interprets the unsuccessful attempt: “Americans, while occasionally willing to be serfs, have always been obstinate about being peasantry” (93).

But it is not just the house that we must count among Gatsby’s possessions. Indeed, the contents of the house, from the gaudy automobile that runs down Myrtle Wilson to the elaborate library form one enormous spectacle of consumption. And, we are told, it is all for Daisy, as Nick is initially dragged into the action because he accidently lives next door to Gatsby who, Jordan tells us, “wants her to see his house” (84). When she does finally visit he reevaluates each possession according to her reaction. “He hadn’t once ceased looking at Daisy,” Nick writes, “and I think he revalued everything in his house according to the measure of response it drew from her well-loved eyes. Sometimes, too, he stared around at his possessions in a dazed way as though in her actual presence none of it was any longer real” (96-97). Gatsby once again mediates the meaning of the object through a social reaction to it. This is especially true in the orgy of commodity celebration that occurs when Gatsby showers his collection of colorful London shirts on an overcome and weeping Daisy.

This façade of an identity, constructed from a mass of possessions, is dangerously permeable. Each character, at some point, recognizes Gatsby’s identity as a mask, even if they cannot discern what lies beneath it. Nick has to “restrain” his “incredulous laughter” at Gatsby’s “threadbare” autobiography, but then is astonished at the “authentic look” of
the war medal Gatsby produces to support his history (70-71). Earlier, Nick tells us that Gatsby is rumored to have killed a man, is related to the Kaiser, or was a German spy. The narrator marvels that he inspires “whispers…from those who had found little that it was necessary to whisper about in this world” (48). His guests are able to recognize Gatsby’s artificiality, but not pinpoint or define it. Most suspicious among the guests is “Owl Eyes,” a drunk man Nick and Jordan find in Gatsby’s imposing library during the first party. Nick recounts the scene:

“What do you think?” he demanded impetuously.

“What about?”

He waved his hand toward the book-shelves.

“What about that. As a matter of face you needn’t bother to ascertain. I ascertained. They’re real.”

“The books?”

He nodded.

“Absolutely real – have pages and everything. I thought they’d be a nice durable cardboard. Matter of fact they’re absolutely real. Pages and – Here! Lemme show you.”

Taking our skepticism for granted he rushed to the bookcases and returned with Volume One of the “Stoddard Lectures.”

“See! He cried triumphantly. It’s a bona fide piece of printed matter. It fooled me. This fella’s a regular Belasco. It’s a triumph. What thoroughness! What realism! Knew when to stop too – didn’t cut the pages. But what do you want? What do you expect?”

He snatched the book from me and replaced it hastily on its shelf muttering that if one brick was removed the whole library was liable to collapse. (49-50)

Owl Eyes knows that Gatsby is a fraud, but he is astonished at the “realism” and “thoroughness” of the scam. Gatsby’s possessions function as camouflage and their authenticity is carefully established. No metaphor in the novel so clearly represents
Gatsby’s persona: gaudy, but carefully arranged, and subject to collapse once one piece is removed. The effect on Owl Eyes is not temporary. He remains so moved by the experience that he is the only of Gatsby’s guests to attend his funeral.

We know that the possessions that represent Gatsby are strictly to develop his identity and to make himself Daisy’s equal. He does not cut the pages on the books in the library, he does no use his swimming pool all summer, his bedroom is the “simplest” in the house (97). He does not desire or gain pleasure from the possessions except through Daisy, whom they are designed to attract. This leaves Nick, and us, with a surface conception of Gatsby. For unlike the protagonists of the classical bildungsroman, Gatsby is not a figure that has developed, but is rather an individual composed of accumulated possessions: commodities (house, car, shirts, etc.), stories (Oxford, Montenegro, Collecting Jewels in Europe, etc.), and rumors (he’s a spy, a bootlegger, a murderer, etc.). He is, in other words, only surface. The object-nature of his being troubles Nick, who struggles to represent him without contradiction. At times Nick thoroughly “disapproves” of him “from beginning to end” (162) and describes him as representing everything for which he has “unaffected scorn” (6) and elsewhere Gatsby is “gorgeous” and exonerated as the victim in a story of “careless” and destructive people (187). Nick even depicts Gatsby as an event at one point, for on the Manhattan side of the Queensboro bridge “anything can happen…even Gatsby could happen” (73). He is the reified individual, the consumer of identities and the instability of his identity is threatening to Tom and Daisy and even to Nick himself, who is not so removed from Tom’s social class as he likes to portray himself. In one sense, Gatsby is easy to quantify; Nick can list Gatsby’s histories and eccentricities without problem. But
penetrating the truth-content of Gatsby’s façade is more difficult. Gatsby is produced from too many sources and of too many materials to distill into a simple, motivated ego, like Tom. Gatsby, then, is Fordist modernity incarnate – a new money chameleon figure whose mysterious production is threatening to the old guard. He is the product of mass production and consumer culture – assembled from the advertised components of the class he infiltrated. This class, however, is structured in traditions and defined by stability. Daisy, Tom, Jordan, and Nick all have familial legacies and connections in the upper bourgeois circles of American society. But because of the temporal nature of the consumer culture, dependent as it is on technological revolutions, shifts in fashion and taste, and transformations within the advertising narrative, Gatsby’s identity can never be stable. He attaches his personhood to the ebb and flow of an unfixed cultural ideal and this is what betrays him in the end.

Whereas Gatsby is the ultimate consumer, Amory Blaine finds himself working in marketing, attempting to produce manipulation. As a writer he is dismayed at having to submit to capital and alienate himself from his work. During his socialist debate at the novel’s close he makes the case that by building the culture industry and advertising industry, the ruling classes have pacified a generation of thinkers who might otherwise cause them problems. “Even art gets enough to eat these days,” Amory explains, “artists draw your magazine covers, write your advertisements, hash out rag-time for your theatres. By the great commercializing of printing you’ve found a harmless, polite occupation for every genius who might have carved his own niche” (249). Unlike Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, Amory finds that he must submit himself to the process of producing surplus value as an artist. In order to survive he joins the working class
vocation of laboring to produce wealth for the ruling class. “I object to doing their mental work for them,” Amory declares, “it seemed to me that the root of all the business I saw around me consisted in overworking and underpaying…” (249). The institutions that Amory objects to, what Althusser calls ISAs, were not so prolific and powerful under early bourgeois culture. The printing industry, the marketing departments of corporations, the culture industry as a whole were all in their infancy and they did not condition the production of ideas and the production of identities as they do in Fordist modernity. As a consequence, Amory’s aspiration that his art might lead to self-fulfillment and a path to some sort of stable maturity is stifled. It is not for himself that he will labor but for a corporation. When he quits his job as a copy writer he confesses “It didn’t matter a damn to me whether Harebell’s flour was any better than anyone else’s. In fact I never ate any of it. So I got tired of telling people about it…” (191). Amory’s disillusionments with paid artistry within the institutions of Fordist capitalism contribute to his inability to fulfill the classical bildungsroman. The normative modes of socialization and social mobility are entrenched, under monopoly capitalism, within rigid institutions that standardize and rationalize human activities to maximize profit. These transformations in the social economy force modernist writers to posit alternatives to the classical processes of socialization. For Amory, becoming a writer means becoming a copywriter and so Fitzgerald has him abandon this avenue to preserve some notion of self-development and subjectivity.

Problems of subjectivity and marketing are not isolated to the alienated writer. *The Great Gatsby* demonstrates the ways in which the new forms of mass advertising, powered by the culture industry, structures the ways that individuals thought about each
other and themselves. Tim Armstrong suggests that in modernist works “personhood appears as an effect of advertising” (51). Identity and the capacity to articulate identity was intimately tied to the normalizing effects of the advertising industry. Daisy uses the metaphor of advertising to tell Gatsby that she loves him in front of her husband and cousin. “You always look so cool,” she tells him just before their mid-summer journey into the city, “you resemble the advertisement of the man…you know the advertisement of the man—” (125). Nick interprets the scene, “she had told him that she loved him, and Tom Buchanan saw” (125). For Daisy, there is possibly no greater compliment than a comparison to an advertisement. And for Gatsby, who carefully constructs his appearance and identity around commodities, it is a validation. He is not Jay Gatz, the poor Midwestern boy, but rather the idealized “advertisement of the man,” effortless, stylish, and cool in the summer heat. He is performing his identity according to the normative standards established by capital and Daisy recognizes herself as the performance’s object.

Advertising’s role in the plot arises many times through the novel. Myrtle Wilson’s story of how she met Tom Buchanan reveals the degree to which the commodity logic has infiltrated her perspective. “He had on a dress suit and patent leather shoes,” she describes her first sight of him on a train to New York. “I had to pretend to be looking at the advertisement over his head,” she goes on to say (40). That Myrtle would juxtapose Tom and his fine clothes with an anonymous advertisement is important. It puts into context her consumption of him as a man of money and style, unlike her husband. She pretends to look at the advertisement for a product so as to not be seen looking at the advertisement for her escape from her wretched life. Myrtle’s
husband, George Wilson, also has a fascinating relationship with an advertisement in the novel. His auto repair shop sits below the ominous eyes of Dr. T.J. Eckleburg and after his wife’s death he explains that he had been berating Myrtle for her infidelity just before the accident. Specifically he points to the billboard with its “blue and gigantic” (27) eyes and explains, “God knows what you’ve been doing, everything you’ve been doing. You may fool me but you can’t fool God” (167). Wilson’s neighbor, Michaelis is “shocked” to realize that Wilson is looking at the eyes on the billboard during his recreation of the incident. “That’s an advertisement,” Michaelis assures him. Wilson’s misrecognition of God within the billboard’s eyes reveals the ways in which ideology is jointly created by both the subject and the object. The advertisement interpellates him, but he misreads the interpellation as a moral imperative rather than an invitation to consume. Under monopoly capitalism, however, consumption does become part of the moral project of the society and Wilson’s mistake is a symbolic harbinger, in many ways, of the consequences awaiting a people that begin articulating their desires and identities through the language of the commodity logic.

CONCLUSION

It is curious that the heroes of both This Side of Paradise and The Great Gatsby share a common, motivating principle: one’s personal history can be recaptured and reproduced. Each believes that they can recover something from their past and, essentially, redo it better. “You can’t repeat the past,” Nick casually reminds Gatsby. “Why of course you can!” Gatsby returns (116). “His life had been confused and
disordered” since Daisy married Tom, Nick explains, “but if he could once return to a certain starting place and go over it all slowly, he could find out what that thing was…” (117). Gatsby’s development, the production of his personality, hinges on a circular idea that he can recreate the circumstances under which things went off track. As such, Gatsby has no desire to mature or reach a fulfilling conclusion unless everything is perfectly ordered. The reproduction of time, in this equation, is something that mimics the Fordist conception of time’s passing as a process full of errors that can be remedied by modifying an earlier element. In a word, it can be rationalized. This process-based passing of time that Gatsby ascribes to also affects Amory Blaine.

At the close of This Side of Paradise Amory, impoverished on the streets of New York, begins a trek back to Princeton University, where he had enjoyed most of his early success. The text gives no clear reason for why he returns to Princeton. His extreme poverty and alienation, however, suggest that he, like Gatsby, believes that he may re-begin the process of his development at the point of his last accomplishment. His development is, in other words, negotiable – a thoroughly modern concept. It confirms that for both Amory and Gatsby identity is something that is assembled and can thus be deconstructed and reconstructed should the process go astray. The first attempt is merely a rehearsal. And while the texts certainly suggest that identity is constructed within the modern world, however, neither text show their heroes successfully accomplishing this feat. Gatsby is murdered, symbolically punished for transcending his class and not accepting the role that society provided for him and Amory seems destitute at the close of his story, with no indication that redemption is on the horizon. His development is left incomplete, which in itself is a statement about the aversion to completion.
The theme of the unfinished or incomplete is common across Fitzgerald’s work and finds its way into the structure of his syntax. After Gatsby utters one of his most famous lines, “her voice is full of money,” Nick attempts to expand the metaphor and gets lost: “It was full of money – that was the inexhaustible charm that rose and fell in it, the jingle of it, the cymbals’ song of it….High in a white palace the king’s daughter, the golden girl….” (127, ellipses in original). Here we see Fitzgerald resisting closure in crucial sentences through dashes or ellipses, a strategy that he often employs. The ellipses assume the place of concrete representation and demarcate the moments that the narrator loses faith in language. Gatsby’s metaphor that Daisy’s voice is full of money compels Nick. He hears the money in her voice and wants to connect it to some fairy tale of a princess wholly disconnected from her subjects. But the difficulty in juxtaposing the modern symbol of the money form and the medieval princess breaks down and Nick abandons the line of thought before it wholly takes shape. The irony is that as a bonds salesman and student of economics, Nick should be the first to be able to develop the money metaphor. It is his livelihood to manipulate, but his ideological position prevents him from seeing the metaphoric qualities of money to begin with. It is “the absolutely alienable commodity, because it is all other commodities divested of their shape, the product of their universal alienation” (Marx Capital 205). In the process of circulation that defines capitalism, money “constantly removes commodities…by constantly stepping into their place in circulation, and in this way continually moving away from its own starting-point” (Marx Capital 211). Thus, within Daisy’s voice is the “necessary form of appearance” of “objectified human labour” (Marx Capital 188). In other words, Daisy’s voice has within it the complicated and most likely racialized history of labor
relations of her Louisville upper-class family intertwined with the Buchanan’s industrial empire of machines and laborers in Chicago. For Gatsby and Nick, Daisy’s voice contains the “universal alienation” of her families’ relations to capital, but contains it in its most abstract and simplified expression – money. She is, in Nick’s words, “the King’s daughter,” blissfully oblivious to the crimes of the crown. It is in unpacking the historical nature of Gatsby’s metaphor that Nick succumbs to the “crisis of representation” and abandons his own discourse in the hopes that the reader will perform the process of representation on his behalf.

The impact of these incomplete sentences takes on more significance when we turn to the close of both This Side of Paradise and The Great Gatsby, both of which end with open punctuation. Upon seeing the Princeton skyline on the final page of This Side of Paradise, Amory reflects on the new generation there, the post-war generation “dedicated more than the last to the fear of poverty and the worship of success; grown up to find all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken…” (260 ellipsis in original). Amory moves from thinking of “them” to himself and declares “‘I know myself,’ he cried, ‘but that is all—’” (260 dash in original). His final words are full of irony, made stronger by the open-ended dash, which seems to suggest flexibility in the words that precede it. Only pages before he was lecturing on historical transformations and the malleable nature of the world within the conditions of modern capital. “Modern life,” he lectures, “changes no longer century by century but year by year, ten times faster than it ever has before – populations doubling, civilizations unified more closely with other civilizations, economic interdependence, racial questions, and – we’re dawdling along. My idea is that we’ve got to go very much faster” (251-252). It is arguably the
only moment in the text in which he recognizes his individuality, what he often terms his “personality,” as undeniably bound up with the large social organism in back of him. He is a product, a refugee, of “modern life” and its “changes.” But while this realization is essential to his own evolution, his final action of retreating to Princeton still shows that he is unwilling to submit to the “imperious demands of socialization” that Moretti claims marks the conclusion of development for the young protagonist (15). Therefore, when Amory declares that he knows himself “but that is all–” the text is leaving open the possibility, indeed the probability, that he is wrong and his knowledge is subject to the violent changes that marks his modern existence. The dash doubts its speaker’s words and we see that Amory is not close to reaching a degree of fulfillment that in any way resembles the classical bildungsroman model. The closest he can come to closure is acknowledgment, through the open punctuation, that transformations or “changes” are the essential condition of modernity and to that extent he knows himself to be subject to those historical forces.

*The Great Gatsby*, likewise, closes with an open punctuation. There, Nick Carraway, the novel’s inconsistent and problematic narrator, summarizes his experiences with Gatsby: “Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter – tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther….And one fine morning–” (189). Nick idealizes Gatsby’s desires and the symbolic representation of those desires. The dash that concludes Nick’s expectation of “one fine morning” suggests that that day, that completion to the running and arm stretching, might not come. And further, if it were to come, its shape is left unspecified. For the text, the idea of completion and a harmonious ending, the “one fine
“morning” is ineffable except through the open punctuation. The open punctuation then is something of a demarcation of modernity itself, indicating that “modern life” does change “ten times faster than it ever has before,” as Amory puts it. The punctuation indicates the moment at which the modern bildungsroman is no longer useful.

The transformation of the bildungsroman genre reveals the degree to which youth is a historical category fostered by modernity’s emphasis on dynamism and the transformative. Within the culture industry, youth was further repackaged as a marketing device accompanying the rise of mass consumerism, and the myth of its perpetual status was protected as a valuable marketing tool. Both The Great Gatsby and This Side of Paradise end with open punctuation, accentuating a rejection of the closed systems of aristocratic and early bourgeois bildungsromans. Under Fordist modernity, as evidenced by the assembly line model, open ended-ness is privileged over conclusion or completion. It is not the production of one thing, founded in tradition, such as artifacts produced by craftsman, but rather the opening of numerable possibilities through a shift in the form of production. The modernist bildungsroman, similarly, rejects the closed systems of the precapitalist modes of development in favor of the flexibility offered by the unfinished conclusion. Youth, which found so much cultural currency in early capitalism, becomes too valuable to consumer culture to shed at a prescribed age. Instead, its dynamism and vibrancy is preserved and endless youth is normalized in the literature and other modernist arts.
“Every work of art is an uncommitted crime.”

-Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*

“There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”

- Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”

*Fordism and Modernist Forms* was conceived during the recession of 2008. The subprime mortgage crisis toppled Lehman Brothers and threatened all of the Wall Street investment banks. In response, a few Treasury officials and the nation’s top bankers drafted a three page document demanding a $700 billion bail-out of the banking system to stave off economic armageddon. “It seemed” David Harvey writes, “like Wall Street had launched a financial coup against the government and the people of the United States” (*The Enigma of Capital* 5). The small-government President and the campaigning candidates all backed the bill and, after an initial hiccup, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 on October 3rd. The effects of the financial industry’s fall were much like they were in 1929; despite the problems originating from Wall Street, they were not isolated to that sordid alleyway. As Andrew Mellon once revealed, during financial crises, “assets return to their rightful owners,” and so the fixed pastime that is our postmodern economy defaulted to its preset blueprint and
the wealth of millions of Americans, my own retirement account included, seemed
enigmatically to “vanish.” As industries across the globe faltered or failed altogether a
curious narrative began to circulate on the nightly news: will the government do for
“Main Street” what it did for Wall Street? The ambiguous concept of “Main Street”
began to take a more definitive form when it was clear that the already floundering
American auto industry, the “Big Three,” would become a casualty of the crisis if the
government did not intervene. The debate on whether the government should have saved
the speculative branches of capitalism was juxtaposed with endless images of angry and
anxious UAW workers sitting, like a synchronized working-class objective correlative,
behind Ron Gettelfinger or Michael Moore during televised interviews. On the surface it
seemed that the schism between financial capital and industrial capital had divided the
nation and the very nature of the American economy’s future was at stake. Would
America make “things” ever again?

In truth, however, the dichotomy between the industrial branches of capitalism
and the financial branches was simply false. The UAW was a convenient prop for the
corporations for whom they labored. The “Big Three” did not have the access to Henry
Paulson’s office that Goldman Sachs enjoyed, and so they leaned on their sympathetic
workers to market the idea to the American people while the heads of the companies,
infamously, flew on their private jets to meet with Congress in November of 2008. The
union proved itself to be just another arm of the integrated corporation, mobilized on its
behalf. Furthermore, the very notion that the “Big Three” were exclusively companies
that “made” cars was plainly false. They were sophisticated, diversified companies,
willing to make money anywhere they could:
From the 1980s onwards reports have periodically surfaced suggesting that many large non-financial corporations were making more money out of their financial operations than they were out of making things. This was particularly true in the auto industry. These corporations were now run by accountants rather than by engineers and their financial divisions dealing in loans to consumers were highly profitable. General Motors Acceptance Corporation soon became one of the largest private holders of property mortgages, as well as a lucrative business financing car purchases. (Harvey The Enigma of Capital 23)

In the end, the American taxpayer would infuse billions into Chrysler and GM and extend a line of credit to Ford to ensure their solvency. The government would go on to spurn demand for new cars by offering large tax breaks and initiating the “Cash for Clunkers” program. The American people, it turned out, were willing to save a part of their industrial heritage and preserve a fantasy about capitalism’s vulnerable supremacy.

The 2008 financial crisis and the narratives surrounding the automobile industry demonstrated the degree to which the myth of Fordist America was entangled in the American psyche to notions of economic health and power. That the taxpayer was forced to save the institution that was once at the center of the American idea of production and prosperity is a remarkable commentary on Fordism’s place in history and its slow decline. The romanticization of the Fordist productivist model and the Fordist laborer brought to the surface of the public dialogue ideological strains about the nature of our economy, our connection to the traditions of the twentieth century, and the shapes we want twenty-first century capitalism to take. It also brought to the surface a contradiction, however, as the Fordist model was idealized as more pure and authentic than other models of capitalist production; after all, those workers produced “things” and America should be a country that makes “things” again.
Not to be lost in all of this is the current debate around the minimum wage and the transformations that Fordist models have undergone in the latter half of the twentieth century. Within the spheres of certain industries Fordism has been replaced by flexible accumulation, but it has found a home in more deskillled forms of commonplace labor. The McDonald’s cook who makes cheeseburgers nine hours a day participates in a complex system of food production that in many ways resembles Fordist values: anticipate the customer’s needs, rapid production, assembly–line flow production, and so on. These workers, increasingly a large segment of the nation’s economy, continue to fight for the livable wage and balanced work schedule that Henry Ford, through a devotion to his own profit motive, provided through his five-dollar work day. The specter of monopoly capitalism and its, in Adorno’s words, “liquefying” effect on the individual remains an insurmountable problem. Ultimately, the onset of monopoly capitalism is about an antagonism between the individual and the totality, between the subject of history and its object. Modernist forms, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, sought to carve out a place for subjectivity in the face of an overwhelming force of rationalization and standardization. As the abstractions of a monopoly state-economy continue to occlude the individual’s capacity to coherently and productively articulate their situation and act on their own behalf, and the crisis nature of capitalism continues to threaten the stability of the individual to discover any semblance of fulfillment, the lessons of modernism’s avant garde movements – to anticipate and assimilate the very forms of our shared history into an aesthetic experience that, free from the relations of exchange value and in contradiction to its ethic, negates the barbarity and unfreedom of the empirical world – will continue to be indispensable.
WORKS CITED


- - -. “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” Jennings, Michael W., ed. *Walter Benjamin:


www.mtfca.com/books/15_factory.htm.


Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York:


Knapp, James. Literary Modernism and the Transformation of Work. Evanston:


Lenin, Vladimir. “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.” The Lenin Anthology.


Posnock, Ross. “‘A New World, Material without Being Real’: Fitzgerald’s Critique of

164


Internet Achieve.

www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/taylor/principles/.
20 August 2010.


Notes

1. One of the central contradictions inherent in bourgeois theories of labor, according to Marx, is the commodity form that labor power assumes in capitalist relations. Though it is not produced like other commodities, labor power appears as a marketplace commodity. That Taylor and Ford should extend Whitney’s revolutionizing of the commodity object to the form of labor power is a logical extension of Whitney’s invention within the contradictions of capital.

2. Buick used the motto “Motor Cars will win the war” during a 1918 ad campaign that declares competition with America’s industrial capacity as “impossible.” It was a moment of prescient hubris.

3. Braverman documents how the engineering histories of “scientific management” came out of a German tradition and were only reluctantly assimilated into British industries.

4. Jameson’s claim is quite the opposite from Horkheimer and Adorno’s brief mention of the author in *Dialect of Enlightenment*. There, the theorists group Hemingway with members of the culture industry. Unlike Jameson, who reads Hemingway’s novels as something of a critique of high industry, Horkheimer and Adorno indict him as its accomplice. Specifically, they accuse the author of being a victim of “schematic reason” and at once accuse him of collaboration with the industry while lamenting his position as one of its intellectuals. They write:

   On all levels, from Hemingway to Emil Ludwig, from Mrs. Miniver to the Lone Ranger, from Toscanini to Guy Lombardo, there is untruth in the intellectual content taken ready-made from art and science…the refugees of a mindless artistry which represents what is human as opposed to the social mechanism are being relentlessly hunted down by a schematic reason which compels everything to prove its significance and effect. The consequence is that the nonsensical at the bottom disappears as utterly as the sense in the works at the top (143).

Hemingway, along with Jan Struther’s fictional Mrs. Miniver and Toscanini’s music, is accounted as one of the “refugees” attempting to represent something more human within the framework of the culture industry. Ultimately, however, they are all subject to the forces of schematic reason that reduce their works to the level of all products assembled and distributed by the culture industry. And furthermore, their degradation functions to balance the intellectual content of the industry’s products. In other words, Hemingway’s texts legitimate other products as art-like by helping to eliminate the “nonsensical at the bottom.”

Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading of Hemingway’s position is curious. There is no evidence from letters or other texts that would indicate either actually read anything the author wrote. However, their perceptions of Hemingway were undoubtedly shaped by the author’s fame during the *Dialect of Enlightenment*’s composition early in World
For Whom the Bell Tolls was published a few years earlier, solidifying Hemingway’s status in American letters, and Hemingway’s position as a war correspondent in Europe regularly brought his name into the American public sphere. The author’s popularity, then, probably accounts for much of their thought. And while it is problematic for this reason, Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of Hemingway (and especially the production of “Hemingway” as a celebrity figure) as entangled in a web of “schematic reason” connects them to the majority of the author’s contemporary reviewers who recognized facets of high industry within the texts. But, as I will argue, this connection to high industry and especially to elements of “schematic reason” is not arbitrary. Hemingway is the quintessential author of high administration.

4 Most notably Gertrude Stein, who, in her essay “Composition as Explanation” declared that The Great War had shifted the general appreciation for experimental writing forward “by almost thirty years.”

5 For examples of scholarship on Hemingway and masculinity see Suzanne Del Gizzo’s “Ernest Hemingway: Machismo and Masochism,” Thomas Strychacz’s Hemingway’s Theaters of Masculinity, Debra Moddelmog’s Reading Desire: In Pursuit of Ernest Hemingway, and Stephen P. Clifford’s Beyond the Heroic “I”: Reading Lawrence, Hemingway, and “Masculinity.”


7 Another famous example is found in The Sun Also Rises in which Jake wants to distinguish between his friends: “Mike was a bad drunk. Brett was a good drunk. Bill was a good drunk. Cohn was never drunk” (152).

8 Richard Gooden has developed an alternative, though theoretically similar, reading of Hemingway’s style. In his account the author’s style is determined by transformations not on the production side of the economy, though issues of standardization and its effects are commonplace, but on the consumption side. The organizational methods and surface-attuned descriptions of the style is the mark of the new class of sophisticated consumers that inhabit Fordist America. From this context, the mode through which Nick Adams watches trout fighting the river current in the “Big Two-hearted River” stories is informed by his historical environment of mass consumption. Gooden reinforces his reading by noting the recurring role that window shopping and the mathematical precision of finance play in the construction of character throughout the stories and novels. Nick Adams examines fishing gear in the social marketplace with a youthful wonder and then transfers that joy to watching the trout fight the current in an isolated riverbed. This leads Gooden to describe Hemingway, stylistically, as a
“capitalist realist” – an author whose writerly gaze, no matter where in the world it is mobilized, is conditioned by the desire for consumer satisfaction (50).

9 Charles Fenton places much emphasis on the editor’s rules of style at The Kansas City Star where Hemingway worked as a young man, especially Rule 21: “Avoid the use of adjectives, especially such extravagant ones as splendid, gorgeous, grand, magnificent, etc.” (33). Shelley Fisher Fishkin documents Hemingway’s movement away from journalism, under pressure from Gertrude Stein who thought it would ruin him as a writer, and his eventual “disillusionment” with the discipline’s limitations (146-147). These limitations are also explored by Elizabeth Dewberry who argues that Hemingway’s style demonstrates a “persistent skepticism” that “reality can be accurately represented” by either journalism or literary realism (16). For her, Hemingway’s style unveils a critical dilemma in modernity concerning the truth-content of “realism” and “journalism,” and ultimately the author plays with his style to bring these constructs concerning “fact, fiction, language, and reality” to the surface (34).

10 For examples of the complex gender roles and identities in Hemingway’s works see Nancy Comley and Robert Scholes’ Hemingway’s Genders, Carl Eby’s Hemingway’s Fetishism: Psychoanalysis and the Mirror of Manhood, Richard Fantina’s Ernest Hemingway: Machismo and Masochism, and Lawrence Broer and Gloria Holland’s collection Hemingway and Women. The novel at the center of most of the scholarship of oscillating gender identities in Hemingway’s work is his last: The Garden of Eden.