A nation in name, a 'state' in exile: the FRELIMO proto-state, youth, gender, and the liberation of Mozambique 1962-1975

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A NATION IN NAME, A ‘STATE’ IN EXILE:
THE FRELIMO PROTO-STATE, YOUTH,
GENDER, AND THE LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE,
1962-1975

by

Michael G. Panzer

A Dissertation
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A Nation in Name, a ‘State’ in Exile:
The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender,
and the Liberation of Mozambique, 1962-1975

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To my three “Janes”: Marie Jane, Zoë Jane, and Ayla Jane
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>African-American Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AASC</td>
<td>Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>American Committee on Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHM</td>
<td>O Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCP</td>
<td>Confêrencia das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas, Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Destacamento Feminino, Women’s Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EARP</td>
<td>East African Refugee Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique, Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLM</td>
<td>Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique, Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAE</td>
<td>Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio, Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIEC</td>
<td>Kurasini International Education Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANU</td>
<td>Mozambican African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Oberlin College Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECSA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDE</td>
<td>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, International Police for the Defense of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>South African Students’ Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West Africa National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika (Tanzania) African National Union</td>
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<td>TCRS</td>
<td>Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, National Democratic Union of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente, African National Union of Independent Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEMO</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Estudantes Moçambicanos, National Union of Mozambican Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC-PCR</td>
<td>World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUA</td>
<td>Yale University Archives</td>
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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the early political development of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) during the 1960s. The thesis offers several new theoretical perspectives on the evolution of FRELIMO as a liberation front. While operating from military bases, settlement camps, and urban settings in Tanzania, FRELIMO functioned as a proto-state with authority derived from a contingent sovereignty. At the beginning of the anti-colonial war against Portugal in September 1964, FRELIMO was able to help organize and oversee the lives of thousands of Mozambican refugees who fled into Tanzania to escape the escalating violence. Many of these refugees became FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents who contributed to the eventual success of the liberation front in gaining independence from Portugal. In order to construct and operate its institutions in Tanzania, FRELIMO’s leaders sought the help of this revolutionary constituency, as well as from the diplomatic connections and financial assistance it received from foreign organizations and governments. Many of the funds obtained by FRELIMO were utilized to underwrite the creation of liberation front’s most important institution in Tanzania: The Mozambique Institute and its secondary school. In overseeing this school and its other institutions in Tanzania during the war, FRELIMO’s legitimacy as a liberation front was constantly at stake. This dissertation also addresses how and why the Tanzanian government, the Ford Foundation, and World Council of Churches were instrumental in the political evolution and legitimation of FRELIMO. The governing strategies of FRELIMO as a proto-state were initially based on a revolutionary form of pragmatism, but eventually yielded to a burgeoning authoritarianism preferred by certain members of
the liberation front’s hierarchy. Jealousy, along with ethnic, regional, and age-related tensions all emerged at the Mozambique Institute secondary school by the late 1960s, signaling that the school had become a flashpoint for FRELIMO’s expanding authoritarianism prior to independence. The dissertation relies on an analysis of these theoretical aspects of power and governance, problematizes the notion of sovereignty and jurisdiction in liberation contexts, and explains how gender and generational factors at FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute secondary school deserve to be included in the narrative of Mozambican independence.
Introduction

For most of Africa, the years since independence have been challenging to say the least. The advent of African self-rule over nascent states often generated what James Ferguson has argued were “expectations of modernity” that fell short of hopes and optimism at the beginning of the era.\(^1\) From the mid-1970s until today, the prolific optimism of Africa’s early transition from European colonies to sovereign nations has precipitously declined. In reference to what Basil Davidson has termed “The Black Man’s Burden,” the contemporary African nation-state has been besieged with the seemingly ubiquitous realities of ethnic cronyism, child-soldiery, HIV-AIDS, poverty, and the failures of patrimonial states and clientelism to achieve political stability. Recent economic growth and infrastructural development in Mozambique, however, may potentially offer new opportunities for the citizens of the nation, but this remains to be seen. These and other topics have emerged in academic analyses about the continent, especially in the Western world.\(^2\) For example, writing in the early 1990s, Davidson’s frustration with the failures of African nationalist leaders and governments to prevent such disasters had resulted in the near universal fact of how:

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Harsh governments or dictatorships rule over peoples who distrust them to the point of hatred; and usually for good and sufficient reason; and all too often one dismal tyranny gives way to a worse one. Despair rots civil society, the state becomes an enemy, bandits flourish…And multitudes starved.  

Although it is important for scholars to seek the structural, political, and socio-economic origins of these all too common realities that plague postcolonial African states, this approach often exclusively analyzes the period after postcolonial governments took control of their respective nations. Most of the critiques of FRELIMO’s political struggles, for example, heavily favor analyses of post-1975 scenarios, and focus extensively on policy decisions and ideological directions derived from its Third Party Congress held in 1977.  

Writing in the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, scholars and writers such as John Saul, Joseph Hanlon, and Allen and Barbara Isaacman produced books that were often sympathetic to FRELIMO’s attempts to revolutionize Mozambican society along tenets of Marxism-Leninism. There is also significant (but not unfounded) blame placed on Rhodesia’s and, later, apartheid South Africa’s support of RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) for undermining Mozambican and thus FRELIMO’s sovereignty and socio-economic policies. References to FRELIMO’s politicization

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during the early anti-colonial war are scant and often extol the virtues of the era as one of honorable military struggle to achieve independence.

Also, during the 1960s, many Africans in the five Lusophone colonies (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, and the islands of São Tomé and Principe) pursued paths of liberation from Portuguese colonialism. Motivated (in part) by other independence movements in Africa and around the world, as well as by the exploitative agenda of Portuguese colonialism, many Africans took up arms to fight for their freedom. My dissertation will analyze the historical development of one of these nationalist movements: FRELIMO, *O Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, or Mozambique Liberation Front), and its goal of liberating Mozambique from Portugal during the 1960s and 1970s.\(^5\) During the early years of the anti-colonial war from 1962-1968, FRELIMO leaders made certain pragmatic and ideological decisions, in the context of burgeoning pan-Africanism and continental decolonization, that shaped the political maturation (July 1968- June 1975) of the liberation front and laid the foundation for an authoritarian single-party state shortly after independence on June 25, 1975.\(^6\)

As an amalgam of three regionally- and ethnically-based liberation movements, FRELIMO emerged as the primary liberation movement that fought for the independence of Mozambique during the zenith of African nationalism. As the main challenger to

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5 Although FRELIMO literally is translated as stated in its official documentation, it is often referred to more colloquially as simply a “Liberation Front.” I will remove the quotation marks and capital letters throughout the dissertation to make for an easier read.

6 Later in the dissertation, I apply a more theoretical term (proto-state) that addresses the complexity of FRELIMO as an organization and as something more than a liberation front comprised of guerrilla soldiers and leaders.
Portugal’s grip on Mozambique, FRELIMO was the product of that era in which many Africans of the educated, petty-bourgeois, and professional classes emerged to lead the Fanonian “wretched of the earth,” often in violent insurgency, against the colonial powers. FRELIMO was created, largely at the insistence of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, from three disparate liberation movements: UDENAMO (The National Democratic Union of Mozambique), MANU (Mozambican African National Union), and UNAMI (The National African Union of Independent Mozambique). Various leaders and members of these movements refused to recognize the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane who was Julius Nyerere’s choice to lead the new amalgamated movement for myriad reasons that included regional biases, ethnicity, personality conflicts, and jealousy. The divisions that emerged in the early years of FRELIMO’s ascendancy challenged the legitimacy and unity of the liberation front for the duration of the anti-colonial war. With this mind, one of the most critical aspects of this dissertation is that I argue there is a need for further research that examines FRELIMO’s earliest political development, particularly its activities and existence in Tanzania, during the transitional interstice period between colony and country. To be clear, Mozambique attained official independence on June 25, 1975, but this dissertation is an analysis of FRELIMO’s first eight years, 1962-1970. I attempt to elucidate aspects of the political context, relationships, and perspectives between FRELIMO and the government of Tanzania. FRELIMO’s existence and activities in Tanzania are an understudied topic within the narrative of the liberation front’s early political development. This dissertation will

7 The expression is borrowed from the title of Frantz Fanon’s famous book, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963).
explore the significance to this cross-border relationship to argue that the Tanganyika
(Tanzania) African National Union (TANU) and FRELIMO navigated new sovereign,
diplomatic, and ideological terrain that allowed both organizations to cultivate a nascent
hegemony over their respective citizens (Tanzanians) and, what I call, revolutionary
constituents (Mozambicans living in Tanzania who joined FRELIMO).

The independence movements that stood in diametric opposition to nearly all
colonial policies, racist ideologies, and economic exploitation of Africans in the recent
past were motivated to unshackle the continent from the European imperialist yoke. In
its structural organization FRELIMO, like many other African liberation movements
engaged in war, was pyramidal and hierarchical with power centralized among the
members of the Central Committee. FRELIMO’s efforts to liberate Mozambique were
similar to a professional labor union’s efforts to organize, seek strength in unity and
solidarity, and minimize internal divisions for a common purpose. Like a labor union
that seeks solidarity and the universal support of its workers, unity within FRELIMO was
a coveted goal, but personal disputes and differences among members of both the
leadership and rank-and-file prevented this from occurring. Although “unity” was a

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8 The ALUKA Project, Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa, Chilcote Collection, “Mozambique
Liberation Front” Constitution, 1962, 2.
http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.CHILCO046. All digital
sources obtained via the ALUKA Project were located within the “Struggles for Freedom in Southern
Africa” database. When citing references to the ALUKA Project throughout this dissertation, unless
specifically mentioned otherwise, the sources were accessed under the “Struggles for Freedom in Southern
Africa” database but with the specific reference to each particular “collection” such as, in this case, the
Chilcote Collection. I use the exact titles of subsections provided by the ALUKA Project for each
reference. Many of these resources have been digitized from sources at O Arquivo Histórico de
Moçambique (AHM) in Maputo, Mozambique.
common evocation from FRELIMO’s leaders, often the leaders themselves bickered and undermined the credibility of their revolutionary colleagues.\textsuperscript{9}

To stake its claims to both authority and legitimacy in the international arena during the Cold War, FRELIMO also needed to publicize and act upon its revolutionary positions.\textsuperscript{10} Unlike the conclusions drawn by Amílcar Cabral, a fellow African revolutionary fighting to liberate Guinea-Bissau, who argued that African nationalist movements generally suffered from a paucity of ideological thought pertaining to Africa’s historical conditions, I argue that following Cabral’s caveat on political development, Eduardo Mondlane and other members of FRELIMO’s Central Committee attempted to implement and practice an ideology, based on revolutionary pragmatism and African socialism, while in Tanzania and the “Liberated Zones” of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique.\textsuperscript{11} Many of those revolutionary practices were enough to convince the FRELIMO leadership that their ideological premises were effective and possible to implement on a greater scale after independence. While focusing on FRELIMO’s early years, I attempt to avoid both the idealization and criticism of FRELIMO’s ideological choices, opting instead to focus on the conditions and circumstances that informed its early statecraft and pursuit of legitimacy, particularly in

\textsuperscript{9} These internal challenges are briefly addressed later in the dissertation and have already been studied in detail by other scholars. They are not the primary focus of this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{10} Amílcar Cabral, \textit{Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (University of South Africa: Unisa Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{11} References to Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the two northern districts of Mozambique just south of the Ruvuma River border with Tanzania were referred to as “Liberated Zones” by FRELIMO. I will remove the quotations and capital letters (after this initial use) throughout the dissertation to make for an easier read.
Although official FRELIMO documentation was consulted for this dissertation, these sources have had a tendency to influence earlier scholarship on FRELIMO that often resulted in an idealization of the liberation front. I am careful to recognize that any discursive productions generated by elite members of liberation organizations also can efface the reality of events, obscure the actions and attitudes of elites themselves, and minimize the voices and any resistance from subalterns. With this in mind, this dissertation emphasizes both the opportunities and limitations for ideological development that informed the early politicization of the liberation front.

Although briefly addressed above, attempts to achieve universal solidarity among fellow Mozambicans in support of FRELIMO did not occur. The liberation front was plagued with internal rivalry and discord throughout its foundational years that originated from ethnic, regional, and personal differences among its leaders and rank-in-file. These early internal disputes reflected the conflicting ideological visions and personalities that made up the movement’s initial hierarchy. These maneuverings within the early hierarchy also resulted in the ostracism of certain notables such as, for example, UDENAMO founder Adelino Gwambe and created significant divides that threatened the existence of FRELIMO as a “unified” front. This was also evident during FRELIMO’s pre-independence Party Congresses in 1962 and 1968 that articulated an evolving set of political platforms. The writings and publications of the liberation front’s leaders during

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12 de Bragança and Depelchin, “From the Idealization.” Like any historical sources, FRELIMO’s documents need to be carefully examined to avoid the subjective biases of rhetoric and to discern where words did not match deeds in reality.

this early period of FRELIMO’s history often effaced many internal challenges in the hope of obtaining support from international aid groups and nations. Since the independence struggle for Mozambique necessitated a military solution, the liberation front developed a discourse of collective unity, self-reliance, and cooperation with the Mozambicans that was meant to demonstrate legitimacy.

This dissertation does not intend to necessarily underscore the problems of FRELIMO’s early years which have already been extensively examined by scholars, but given the prevalence of these early troubles within FRELIMO, I also do not ignore or minimize the negative impacts of these realities on the politicization of the movement and on the lives of individual Mozambicans. This is especially true in regard to my final chapter that addresses the complicated events surrounding the evening of March 5, 1968 at the FRELIMO Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam. With FRELIMO’s organizational and internal troubles in mind, what this dissertation specifically analyzes is how the liberation front endured and transformed into a political entity I call a “proto-state” based on the organization’s “revolutionary pragmatism” given the distinctive challenges of its early existence in the 1960s.

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Revolutionary Pragmatism and the Potential of Revolutionary Possibilities

The first contribution of this dissertation to existing studies of FRELIMO is my use of revolutionary pragmatism as a lens for the historical analysis of the liberation front’s politicization during the 1960s. In determining what is or is not pragmatic as a historical methodology is a challenging task, but I argue that in the context of a revolution and anti-colonial war, FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism was evident in its strategies of legitimation. Simply put, the dissertation addresses and objectively evaluates how the liberation front sought ways of establishing credibility and a validation of its existence in ways that can be deemed “pragmatic.” For example, FRELIMO’s pragmatism was evident in its engagement with third-party nations, diplomats, and international organizations (like the UN) or NGO’s (like the Ford Foundation); in the ways it obtained lethal and non-lethal aid from foreign and domestic sources; its development of a coherent ideology that generated support from ordinary Mozambicans; and, its focus on humanitarian institutions to help implement its revolutionary visions for a future, liberated country. I argue that to objectively assess the means of legitimation for revolutionary groups helps historians to determine if the methods and decisions of leaders and rank-and-file cadres achieved desired ends. This approach underscores the adaptability and strategies of FRELIMO in achieving a viable legitimacy from many sources. This study of FRELIMO’s history highlights evidence of the liberation front’s pragmatism and utilizes a methodological framework derived from the genre of
philosophical Pragmatism that emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century United States.¹⁵

Pragmatism focuses on the importance of experience as an active and shared human characteristic in the pursuit of inquiry, meaning-making, and certain truths in an attempt to reflect upon and understand the consequences of our decisions. Although highly theoretical, pragmatism is the study of the practical, how our decisions as humans have observable, real consequences and how we can analyze outcomes to work to improve our lives, gain knowledge, and minimize any resultant damage. Beyond individual refinement, FRELIMO acted pragmatically as an organization throughout the early-to-mid 1960s and adapted its means in pursuit of desired ends, namely political legitimacy and independence. FRELIMO’s leaders did not refer, cite, or claim a lineage from this philosophical tradition; rather, I use it as a methodological approach to objectively evaluate how, why, and when FRELIMO’s actions demonstrated their legitimacy. Thus, Pragmatism as a method of philosophical inquiry is useful for critiquing strategies of legitimacy, governance, and organizational decision-making over time.

John Dewey and other philosophers who wrote in the “classical” Pragmatist genre have argued that, as a practice of adjusting means toward achieving ends, pragmatism is a fundamental attribute specifically inherent to political processes in democratic societies.

¹⁵ Although Pragmatism’s “founding fathers” Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey could trace some of their philosophical foundations and criticisms on a lineage to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Immanuel Kant, each man developed his own philosophical arguments in the context of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century political and social realities in the United States. This epoch of Pragmatism is often referred to as “Classical” Pragmatism as opposed to more contemporary philosophical trends based upon “neo-Pragmatism.” For Pragmatism’s fundamental role in democratic societies, see Jack Knight and James Johnson, The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
I expand upon Dewey’s argument to claim that pragmatism also possesses a revolutionary variant and was evident in the way FRELIMO adapted to military contingencies, international pressures, and developed humanitarian infrastructure for Mozambicans in order to achieve a viable political legitimacy. FRELIMO’s leaders displayed pragmatic decision-making, especially in regard to procuring funds for the anti-colonial war and for humanitarian institutional projects in Tanzania. Several of FRELIMO’s leaders acted in pragmatic ways because the legitimacy of the liberation front was at stake, particularly during the escalation of war against the Portuguese in the late 1960s. Pragmatism in a revolutionary context was, then, about developing a genuine political legitimacy based on experiences and experimentation with nascent statecraft, a primary concern of FRELIMO’s leaders who aspired to one day rule Mozambique.

As a universal attribute of humanity, experience is the foundational catalyst for pragmatic thinking and adaptability. Pragmatism informs our notions (as individuals) of what is practical and toward what ends we must strive in order to better ourselves through an evaluation of consequences on the path toward certain ends.16 Although FRELIMO did not proclaim to adhere to this particular philosophical framework, in hindsight, as a “Front” its actions and adaptability to contextual circumstances were hallmarks of its existence and survival as an organization. As a political organization with the intention to liberate and one day rule Mozambique, FRELIMO’s early adaptability to contingencies signified its early maturation especially through its responsibilities toward and engagement with Mozambican refugees living in Tanzania. Therefore, FRELIMO’s

revolutionary pragmatism emerged in its pursuit of legitimacy, both in the eyes of Mozambicans and from organizations and nations in the international community.

For FRELIMO and the Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, revolutionary pragmatism was evident in the liberation front’s nationalist and participatory rhetoric in experiential terms and in its institutional development projects. Since the majority of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania interacted with and were exposed in some capacity to the revolutionary vision of FRELIMO, their participation in the military and institutional efforts of the organization signified an active effort to reverse their colonial victimization at the hands of the Portuguese through the direct involvement with and support for the liberation front. FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism, then, was evident in the way it implemented and continually negotiated its existence, moral purpose, and transformative visions with Mozambicans. Although Mozambicans provided less than universal support for FRELIMO during the crucible of violent anti-colonial war, FRELIMO’s leaders seized the opportunity to implement social services for Mozambicans such as education and health care to gain their loyalty while simultaneously developing and practicing its political ideology. It is also important to note the FRELIMO’s support base largely came from the Makonde of northern Mozambique who were willing to follow and fight alongside Shangana and other ethnic groups from Mozambique. The liberation front’s leaders predominantly originated from southern and central Mozambique.

Eventually, this regional disparity in regard to access to powerful positions in the

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17 By “negotiated” I mean that FRELIMO as a liberation front interacted with an inchoate, civil society of what I call in Chapter 2 “revolutionary constituents.” FRELIMO needed to demonstrate its capacity to lead and ordinary Mozambicans ultimately decided if they would follow. It was a nascent form of hegemonic bargaining.
hierarchy hampered the movement. FRELIMO’s quest for universal support from Mozambicans was also limited by historical divisions, numerous ethnicities, and the geographical size of Mozambique.

As a new approach to understanding events of the African past, I argue that revolutionary pragmatism’s philosophical contributions can direct scholars through the contemporary morass of postmodernism and its destabilization of meaning and truth.

Larry A. Hickman argues,

From the vantage point of classical Pragmatism, postmodernism continues to suffer from two great difficulties that the Pragmatists had already resolved: how to account for and use objectivity; and how to terminate processes of infinite self-referentiality, redescription, and reinterpretation in ways that can produce reliable platforms for action... Pragmatism claims to discover a strain of human commonality that trumps the postmodernist emphasis on difference and discontinuity.18

While acknowledging postmodernism’s influence over overt and perhaps overzealous truth claims in the discipline of history, pragmatism offers a framework upon which historians can move beyond circuitous debates surrounding the meaning of events, the reductive Foucauldian theory and Derridean tendency to relegate every discursive social, medical, and political act to the banal omnipresence of power, and gives us something tangible upon which to debate experiences, perceptions, and practical decisions that shaped particular events. In making a reference to John Dewey’s prescience in placing Pragmatism at the forefront of philosophy’s purposive mission, Richard J. Bernstein criticizes recent interest in the Derridean linguistic turn arguing that “deconstruction is

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not sufficient; it must be complemented with reconstruction.”¹⁹ To be clear, in regard to
the discipline of history, Pragmatism is not a forum for historians to offer revisionism in
Africa’s (or other) history. What I argue, is that revolutionary pragmatism goes beyond
its usefulness as a methodology and lens in historical analyses of societies that are
fundamentally democratic; it helps us to tease out evidence of how, why, and when
pragmatism was at work in the approaches of agents and organizations that sought
legitimacy in Africa’s revolutionary contexts. In short, pragmatism gives us an
alternative to postmodern influences in scholarship that constantly challenge meaning and
result in a permanent vacillation of historical substance.

It should also be stated that pragmatism is not a simple relativistic concept that
lends itself toward rendering the use of the word pragmatic solely as an adjective. In
advocating for a diverse approach to historical research and writing, Frederick Cooper
has also argued that “a more thorough and critical engagement with other fields, a more
rigorous and wider reading of social theory that both reconfigures and deepens
methodological understandings” is necessary in order to situate historical phenomena in a
more refined, analytical context.²⁰ This call for better incorporation of transdisciplinarity
within the social sciences and humanities helps to justify my use of philosophical
pragmatism as one method for analyzing FRELIMO’s development as a proto-state later
in this dissertation. FRELIMO’s revolutionary historical experience and practical
decision-making to achieve particular ends can be critiqued for its pragmatism. Deep
engagement with pragmatism as a methodology and tool for the historical analysis of

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¹⁹ Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn (Malden: Polity Press, 2010), 30. Italics are in the original.
²⁰ Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of
FRELIMO, and many of Africa’s other liberation movements, offers a fresh perspective on the dynamism, governing strategies, and challenges faced by liberation movements during the 1960s and 1970s.

As the core component of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism, the prioritization of experience in the war against Portugal meant that Mozambican refugees could engage as actors in a conscious awareness of the sacrifices necessary for the liberation of the colony. Mozambican refugees were encouraged to shape a new identity, develop a true consciousness by fighting the Portuguese, and to live the revolutionary potential of what was possible in their ostensible future. FRELIMO generated loyalty and legitimacy toward the movement via collective self-sacrifice and individual participation for the greater good in a way that satisfied the majority of FRELIMO’s leaders, TANU, and many ordinary Mozambicans.

FRELIMO’s strategies toward Mozambicans were also articulated and couched in the highly ideological, discursive language of nationalism and pan-Africanism. Joining FRELIMO ostensibly offered the possible reward of physical and social liberation from traditional practices and colonial rule. By contributing to the physical and mental construction of a revolutionary future, Mozambicans’ participation magnified the role of individuals in the moral crusade to unshackle the so-called “overseas province” from the Portuguese colonial yoke. 21 This was a continent-wide objective for many oppressed Africans still living under colonial or white settler rule. FRELIMO’s leaders utilized and

21 I quote the term “overseas province” here to address the legal designation of Mozambique after the semantic shift in terminology and amendments to the Portuguese constitution in 1951. In reality, Mozambique remained a colony. See Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (New York: Longman, 1997), 11.
articulated a revolutionary vision by linking their efforts to the greater pan-African cause, especially in creating its proto-state institutions that provided social services to impoverished Mozambicans which demonstrated its resolve as a genuine liberation front dedicated to the liberation of Mozambique.

For many Mozambican refugees and transitory laborers in Tanzania, their time spent in the friendly host-country was but a temporary, necessary sojourn - one that cultivated revolutionary possibilities, ideas, and sentiments about FRELIMO’s vision for the future. Getting Mozambican refugees in Tanzania to support and believe in FRELIMO required the discursive articulation of ideological vision, convincing propaganda, military victories, and, above all, demonstrating at all levels the effectiveness of FRELIMO’s emerging socialist vision through a pragmatic strategy of discourse, what I call the potential of revolutionary possibilities. This concept is an antecedent to the sociological phenomenon called “the revolution of rising expectations.”

What I call the potential of revolutionary possibilities is the allure inherent in the idea that certain material and mental transformations, for the better, are an option in the first place. Thus, FRELIMO offered the allure and promise of a better future modeled in microcosm in the sanctuary of Tanzania, as well as in the more limited, but no less significant, liberated zones of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. The consequences of this rationale of revolutionary possibility required practical military, discursive, and ideological strategies that were often generated in the moral messages of independence and unfettered unity. Therefore, what was potentially possible in the future

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For a further explanation about the existence of the liberated zones of Niassa and Cabo Delgado see below.
depended on the acceptance and legitimacy of FRELIMO through the active collaboration of Mozambicans. These strategies of legitimation fostered an emergent statecraft in the early years of FRELIMO. Starting in 1962, FRELIMO’s founding year, the liberation front outlined a revolutionary vision at its First Congress that necessitated a unified struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

By late 1964, the beginning of the anti-colonial war, the surge of Mozambican refugees who streamed across the Ruvuma River into Tanzania provided FRELIMO with the influx of human capital to expand on its promises of revolutionary possibilities. This situation also offered FRELIMO’s leaders the chance to expand its bureaucracy when it capitalized on the opportunity to inculcate Mozambican refugees with their vision. However, given the often chaotic nature of the refugees’ flight to Tanzania, acknowledging the infinite subjectivities inherent in that experience for each individual refugee is impossible. As has been suggested by other scholars like Joanna Tague and Edward Alpers, many Makonde simply tapped into existing local knowledge of paths and routes across the Ruvuma River.\(^{23}\) Centuries of trade and labor migration established such patterns. However, this knowledge was not universal, nor was it beneficial to all Mozambican refugees as many hastily sought refuge without locating or tapping into existing kin and economic connections.

Therefore, in recognizing that Mozambican refugees were motivated by myriad realities and circumstances to flee to Tanzania, we can then shed light in a more objective way on the commonalities of those experiences. Many of these refugee experiences were captured and represented in Tanzanian newspapers, most notably the *Nationalist* and the *Tanganyika Standard*. That is to say, the overall reality of the migration to Tanzania for Mozambican refugees was that a significant number of people fled across an international border and, in the process of securing their own survival, they often acted as revolutionary participants for FRELIMO when they provided intelligence on Portuguese movements and in their mustering as guerrilla soldiers. For the most part, Mozambican refugees enthusiastically joined FRELIMO while they simultaneously helped to develop areas of southern Tanzania. However, it was how FRELIMO as a liberation front articulated and practiced its vision of revolutionary possibilities in a way to develop its legitimacy while in Tanzania that is under study here.

A significant part of FRELIMO’s legitimation, then, was in both articulating and creating institutions that demonstrated the potential of revolutionary possibilities in the midst of war. The successful construction, utilization, and functionality of proto-state institutions such as the Mozambique Institute, were based on FRELIMO’s revolutionary ideals while in Tanzania and offered a glimpse of what was envisaged and possible in a liberated country. Ostensibly, FRELIMO’s financial limitations during the anti-colonial war precluded a full-scale humanitarian aid program in Tanzania that would completely satisfy the survival needs of all Mozambican refugees. These Mozambican refugees, but especially those unable to attend schools or obtain treatment in FRELIMO hospitals,
generally accepted these early limitations but also saw a modicum of success from the tangible evidence of FRELIMO’s institutional successes in Tanzania.

This strategy worked in FRELIMO’s favor during the formative years of the liberation movement from 1962 to 1968, although its capacity for universal access to its institutions was limited by space, money, and mobility to a small fraction of Mozambican exiles. FRELIMO simply did not have the financial or personnel capacities to meet the humanitarian demands of all refugees in Tanzania. Nevertheless, what emerged was a reciprocal bargain from an assumed *quid pro quo*: FRELIMO’s institutional developments (however limited) for refugees offered evidence of their resolve in exchange for loyalty. As this dissertation argues, by 1968, however, the combined effects of internal political and personal problems and the increasing escalation of the anti-colonial war paved the way for FRELIMO’s breakdown of pragmatic strategies of governance in favor of authoritarianism.

Prior to its burgeoning authoritarianism during the late 1960s, however, FRELIMO’s institutions such as schools, hospitals, military training camps in Tanzania were durable insofar as they served an immediate humanitarian if not also benevolent hegemonic purpose. Their existence, unlike the size and scope of peasant settlements in the later liberated zones, offered a tangible, strategic use of FRELIMO’s limited resources. Within the finite spaces offered by Tanzania for FRELIMO’s social services, the intention was to generate loyalty and a semblance of stability necessary for the

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24 This reality unintentionally generated divisions and a burgeoning elitism that affected the internal dynamics of FRELIMO. I address these issues, where and when necessary, throughout the dissertation.

cultivation of political legitimacy. Without these pragmatic approaches toward the institutionalization of FRELIMO’s vision for the Mozambican refugees, the liberation movement would simply have been another rebel group strictly focused on overthrowing a colonial state. This was not the case for FRELIMO whose position vis-à-vis the Tanzanian state was a model and, at times, a mimic of its revolutionary theories, institutional developments, and practices in a display of power and authority. It is for this reason that I spend considerable time addressing FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania.

Revolutionary Pragmatism and its Methodological Applicability to an African Context

As briefly stated earlier, as a field of philosophical inquiry, Pragmatism had its origins in the United States during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. For this reason, Africans, Africanists, and other scholars might argue that this is yet another foreign philosophical construct adopted and adapted to meet certain ends with no bearing on the African past or people. It could be argued that philosophical pragmatism is non-African in origin, so its relevance to understanding the African past is misguided and spurious.

I argue, however, that pragmatism’s humanistic approach to analyzing experiences and situational practicalities make it a useful paradigm for approaching and studying the African past, particularly within liberation movements concerned with their own legitimacy. As noted above, the American philosopher John Dewey has argued that Pragmatism is fundamental to the existence and organization of democratic societies. I argue that Pragmatism, as a theoretical concept, lends itself to revolutionary contexts as well particularly when revolutionary possibilities and burgeoning politicization requires
more than just the implementation of brute, violent force. Violence can be pragmatic and motivate people to fight, but it can also physically and mentally alienate them. For this reason, coercion was a strategy of FRELIMO but occasional heavy-handed approaches toward Mozambicans chipped away at its more humanitarian approaches to legitimacy. For example, Pragmatism necessitates an evaluation of circumstances and addresses the consequences of outcomes, even if the result (in FRELIMO’s case) was what Jürgen Habermas would deem an “administrative bureaucracy” in which a small number of loyal cadres limited “communicative action” and any viable path toward an alternative political model, most notably popular democracy.\textsuperscript{26} FRELIMO’s leaders and political organization never conceived of the liberation front as moving toward popular democratic input from the ordinary Mozambicans, which was impossible under the circumstances. When FRELIMO was formed in June 1962, a majority of Mozambicans remained in colonial Mozambique and were limited in their ability to interact with FRELIMO’s leaders. Moreover, Mozambican refugees who arrived later in Tanzania during late 1964 were in need of immediate assistance and organization which required prompt action with minimal deliberation. Thus, FRELIMO was expedient in its pragmatism and was initially based upon “democratic centralization” where power was reserved for a finite number of cadres. Therefore, in order to build loyalty to FRELIMO, violence as a motivating tool was effective to a point but was also limited in its pragmatic value toward legitimation.

\textsuperscript{26} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985) and \textit{Legitimation Crisis} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
To deny pragmatism’s place as a framework upon which to evaluate the experiences of nascent, revolutionary statecraft in Africa, is comparable to the original Eurocentric/anthropological view that sub-Saharan people did not have a “usable past,” therefore denying the humanity of Africans themselves. If nothing else, pragmatism further validates the Africanists’ position about a usable, viable, and discernible African past. As Joseph Margolis claims, “if pragmatism is to fulfill its own sanguine claims, it must go global.” The rationale for the international appeal of classical- and neo-Pragmatism requires an analysis of the ways in which pragmatism was also prevalent in revolutionary contexts during the nascent years of FRELIMO’s political evolution. In the example of FRELIMO, it can be assumed, then, that popular democracy was not the only means of political legitimation within a liberation struggle. In this way, using pragmatism’s revolutionary variant as a methodology and historical lens provides a necessary challenge to the fundamental premise that, as a theory, pragmatism is viably applicable in functioning democratic societies. This dissertation will offer an alternative vision for the applicability of pragmatism, in this case, an African revolutionary context.

In conjunction with FRELIMO’s militarization during its protracted anti-colonial war against Portugal, I argue that the liberation front’s leaders did not have the option, or the desire, to pursue a political orientation that favored popular democracy either during

28 For the distinction between “classical” and “neo” Pragmatism, see Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn; Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, c. 2009) and Consequences of Pragmatism, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
the war or upon independence. For example, the high illiteracy rates (by some estimates, above 90 percent) among Mozambicans were a significant obstacle to any efforts to expand opportunities throughout the country in a timely manner. Moreover, FRELIMO’s war effort necessitated unity and resulted in the stifling of political challengers to FRELIMO often through force. FRELIMO’s leaders needed to convince Mozambicans of the revolutionary merits of their political platform which, given the vast physical size and myriad cultural and linguistic differences in Mozambique, would have taken years even during a time of peace. It can be argued that democracy without patronage and cronyism still remains an elusive challenge to overcome for Mozambique. The circumstances that set the stage for FRELIMO’s politicization necessitated a hardline, militant and unified war effort against Portuguese colonialism and, as such, tolerance for political pluralism was literally impossible to achieve prior to independence in 1975. It should be noted as well that the exigencies of war necessitated ubiquitous calls for unity and contributed to a hard-line approach to FRELIMO’s organization and policies. While fighting the Portuguese as a liberation front, FRELIMO’s simultaneous existence as a proto-state was evidently manifest in its handling of quotidian realities like promoting literacy and providing basic health services to Mozambican refugees.

This argument is in no way meant to apologize for FRELIMO’s unwillingness to encourage such political pluralism or to efface the disastrous realities of the FRELIMO proto-state’s march toward a single-party, authoritarian state after 1975. The circumstances that warranted the militarization of FRELIMO limited the political

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29 Thomas H. Henriksen has argued that the militarization and, thus, the unwavering hierarchal composition of FRELIMO was the primary obstacle to the evolution of popular democracy. See his Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence, 1964-1974 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983).
possibilities for Mozambicans in the short term and laid the groundwork for a postcolonial society devoted to socialist, state-driven mandates putatively ‘for the people.’ However, this is an incomplete analysis because it relegates the authoritarian roots within FRELIMO as originating solely from its military organization and post-war consolidation of power. In the practice of early statecraft, there were two revolutionary contexts that shaped FRELIMO’s early ideological direction. First, as a proto-state, FRELIMO operated with more restraint in Tanzania than in Mozambique since its existence was precarious and tied to the sympathetic support of the TANU regime. It was in Tanzania’s revolutionary laboratory – the physical sovereign space afforded FRELIMO to conduct its operations - that FRELIMO first organized and adopted an “administrative bureaucracy” that fostered authoritarian roots based on African socialism. Second, FRELIMO had more flexibility to apply its revolutionary practices in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique since the purview of Tanzanian authorities did not extend into “bush schools” and other forums for interaction between cadres and ordinary Mozambicans. The Portuguese intermittently bombed and infiltrated these so-called liberated zones throughout the war and, as a consequence, this limited the educational and humanitarian operations carried out by loyal cadres and soldiers in these regions. Nevertheless, the close collaboration between ordinary Mozambicans and FRELIMO cadres did much to foster people’s power for the purposes of developing loyalty and legitimacy toward FRELIMO. This was especially true when local

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Mozambicans still living in the colony assisted FRELIMO soldiers as porters, with food, and intelligence regarding the movements of Portuguese troops.

The experiences of early statecraft emerged from revolutionary practices in different locales. FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism lay in the proto-state’s adaptability and its application of revolutionary possibilities in different spaces. Therefore, I argue that FRELIMO’s transition toward authoritarian rule upon independence had more saliency to its experiences with African socialism in the constraining milieu of Tanzania and less with its experiences with ordinary Mozambicans in liberated zones.

In sum, although not a stated objective or acknowledged strategy of the liberation front during the 1960s, revolutionary pragmatism was evidently manifest in the politicization of FRELIMO and represented the fundamental attribute of its nascent statecraft. As stated above, since FRELIMO faced various structural and logistical obstacles during the anti-colonial war that precluded alternative political orientations such as popular democracy, the liberation front opted instead to encourage a different form of political participation. This is similar to the situation in Tanzania during the 1960s under TANU and Julius Nyerere. Participatory rhetoric was common in both TANU’s and FRELIMO’s publications. See Gene Andrew Maguire, Toward ‘Uhuru’ in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, c. 2008). Given the scope of illiteracy, the lack of economic and transportation infrastructure, and the overall poverty of the Mozambican population, FRELIMO’s first priority was to fight and win the anti-colonial war against a well-armed and intransigent enemy. These circumstances necessitated that Mozambicans who participated in the war effort commit to the physical and psychological dismantling of
Portuguese colonialism. It also required the pursuit of a discursive and ostensible political unity that understated FRELIMO’s internal divisions and masked resistance toward FRELIMO from ordinary Mozambicans.\(^{32}\) “Unity” was a commonly stated, idealistic goal of various nationalist movements and was emphasized as a coveted goal for many African liberation struggles. Powerful forces worked to prevent this such as colonial policies and laws, disparate cultural practices and cosmologies, and personality differences. To counteract these challenges, FRELIMO demonstrated a revolutionary pragmatism in its establishment of schools, hospitals, refugee camps, and other social services that provided for the welfare of most Mozambican refugees in Tanzania and for those still living in the liberated zones of Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts in northern Mozambique. These spaces were intended to counter division and generate unity and legitimacy. Although insufficient to meet the needs of all Mozambicans in Tanzania and in the colony, the revolutionary commitment to such endeavors indicated a significant component of FRELIMO’s foundational statecraft. It was in the creation and maintenance of these institutions while simultaneously fighting the Portuguese that examples of FRELIMO’s practices of revolutionary pragmatism were most evident.

*Proto-State and Contingent Sovereignty*

A second major contribution of this dissertation is to assess the prevalence of two other important aspects that distinguish FRELIMO’s stature as a liberation front from

\(^{32}\) Most notably, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC until his assassination in 1973 often spoke of “Unity” as the essential motif for and within liberation movements. See Cabral’s collection of speeches in, Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*. For the challenges inherent to fostering unity within various Lusophone liberation movements, see also Philip J. Havik, “Virtual Nations and Failed States: Making Sense of the Labyrinth,” in *Sure Road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique*, ed. Eric Morier-Genoud (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 31-76.
other nationalist organizations elsewhere: what I argue were its possession of *contingent sovereignty* and its evolutionary existence as a *proto-state*.\(^{33}\) The term, “embryonic state,” sometimes deployed by scholars to explain early state development, is closely akin to my concept of a “proto-state.” However, I argue that the difference between “embryonic-” and “proto-” states lies in the former’s lexical connotation which implies the teleological inevitability of a liberation movement’s ascendancy exclusively within the territorial boundaries of a future nation. In FRELIMO’s case, it was limited in its capacity to develop physical institutions with the liberated zones because of the war. Although FRELIMO did have “bush schools” and worked to assist local agricultural production in liberated zones, it was more successful operating outside of Mozambique, specifically in Tanzania and was, thus, operating with relative safety in the developmental milieu of the host state. However, FRELIMO was also subjected to the limiting effects of contingent sovereignty while in Tanzania. Therefore, I argue that an essential difference in terminology exists between the two terms given the spatial, legal, and jurisdictional parameters that shaped the contours of FRELIMO’s early experiences with statecraft inside Tanzania. For the purposes of conserving space in the introduction, both concepts (briefly mentioned here) are further developed in my first chapter.

These two concepts are theoretically new in analyses of early FRELIMO and Africa in general and I argue that they can motivate historians and other scholars to

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\(^{33}\) I called my initial conception, based on evidence, of this liminal phase of FRELIMO’s political development “borrowed sovereignty.” However, after some considerable effort debating the exact terminology for these concepts, I felt this term in particular lacked the significance of a convincing analytical framework. I owe a “thank you” to my colleague and friend David Crawford Jones who, after some discussion and debate with me, suggested substituting the term “borrowed” with “contingent.” Thus, my use of “contingent” carries with it a deeper theoretical engagement and more appropriate description of the condition of early FRELIMO statecraft.
reconsider the authority, viability and, above all, the legitimacy of a liberation group operating in exile within a friendly host country such as, in this study, Tanzania. I first address the theoretical saliency of contingent sovereignty followed by its applicability to the existence of FRELIMO as a proto-state.

Contingent Sovereignty

Contingent sovereignty was manifest in the political relationship between TANU and FRELIMO. Tanzania’s political and ideological support, along with its sovereign physical space, enabled FRELIMO to act as a proto-state within certain contingent parameters (hence contingent sovereignty), namely that of sovereign decision-making and ideological formation. Since FRELIMO was operating, for the most part, from proximate exile across the border in Tanzania, it was inescapably limited in its political development by that nation’s formal sovereignty and its political philosophies. That is to say, FRELIMO’s ideological and organizational decisions needed to be acceptable to Tanzanian authorities and, given the international realities of the Cold War, it was a politically sensitive relationship to maintain. Thus, FRELIMO’s ability to act with contingent sovereignty was owed, in large part, to its recognition as the sole liberation movement by TANU.³⁴

Forged under Julius Nyerere’s purview from three regional nationalist groups, FRELIMO could only exist within an acceptable ideological and political framework that satisfied Tanzania’s leaders. Such was Nyerere’s liberation ethos for Africa that he was the catalyst that brought Mozambique’s three regional nationalist groups together under

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³⁴ TANU stands for the Tanganyika (Tanzanian) African National Union.
the banner of FRELIMO. \footnote{There remained, however, several individuals who were formally the leaders of the three other nationalist groups that refused to recognize FRELIMO as legitimate and Eduardo Mondlane as its President. I explore this tension in Chapter 3 entitled, “Borders and Brethren.” There were also factions within TANU that emerged over that organization’s support for FRELIMO.} Julius Nyerere’s power in Tanzania, as well as his international stature, meant that his recognition of FRELIMO as the only viable nationalist movement for Mozambique was critical for the FRELIMO leadership to preserve. This status enabled FRELIMO to display authority to thousands of Mozambican refugees living in Tanzania in the hope of maintaining legitimacy as a proto-state. It was, however, a delicate balance. On the one hand, FRELIMO needed to gain the support and loyalty of refugees and Mozambicans still living under Portuguese rule, but at the same time, it could only operate ideologically, militarily, institutionally, and internationally and within parameters acceptable to the Tanzanian government. This relationship between FRELIMO and TANU was based, then, on a contingent sovereignty which was absolutely essential for FRELIMO to respect so as to build legitimating institutions. The physical spaces afforded to FRELIMO and Mozambican refugees by Nyerere’s government enabled the liberation front to develop institutions - schools, hospitals, military training centers, and refugee “settlements” in Tanzania. \footnote{Joanna Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”} As Joanna Tague has argued, this situation also paid hegemonic dividends to the TANU regime which saw opportunity in Mozambican refugees to develop southern regions of Tanzania. \footnote{Ibid.} FRELIMO was able to establish these institutions both within Tanzania’s sovereign soil and, to a lesser extent, in the northern districts of colonial Mozambique.
(Cabo Delgado and Niassa) in a way that resembled viable, internationally recognized state institutions.

As an example of a liberation front that operated with contingent sovereignty, FRELIMO’s early politicization and institutional developments as a proto-state are comparatively important to other liberation movements during the era of independence struggles in Africa. African liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO), and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) for example acted to construct similar institutional capacities in ways akin to FRELIMO’s development. Tanzania often played host to other African liberation groups such as the ANC and SWAPO that were also amenable to TANU’s philosophies of liberation and socialism. In order to offer a more comprehensive analysis of the political evolution of FRELIMO, I argue that the liberation front doubled as a proto-state as a result of its experiences with refugees and from a need to establish loyalty, order, and legitimacy for the purpose of winning the anti-colonial war. Therefore, the dissertation will also examine how FRELIMO managed the organization, funding, and operation of its proto-state institutions and how they also maintained elements of authoritative and coercive power that shaped the lives of those Mozambicans associated with those institutions. Part of my argument regarding contingent sovereignty will draw upon aspects of Western nationalist and state theories


39 Zambia housed liberation movements and offices as well. This will be part of a future, larger project that focuses on contingent sovereignty and proto-state in other African contexts.
but, at the same time, I challenge their putative universal characteristics by highlighting the ambiguities that existed for the FRELIMO proto-state.⁴₀

**Proto-State**

I define a proto-state as a liminal phase of governance for any organization or liberation group operating to build legitimacy through a variety of revolutionary pragmatic strategies and evaluations within the political interstices opened during the transition between a colony and a liberated country. Moreover, a proto-state seeks to construct physical infrastructure and adhere to discursive political philosophies that attempt to galvanize loyalty from an ostensible future citizenry. The FRELIMO proto-state occupied a political status between a rebel movement and a nationally sovereign, territorially fixed, and internationally recognized and represented state polity. A proto-state also possesses elements of formal state power and characteristics such as a codified organizational pyramid structure, multiple and hierarchical bureaucratic positions for the oversight and implementation of political decisions, and an assumptive right to claim a monopoly over violence to achieve certain ends. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, FRELIMO’s proto-state authority was, however, ostensibly limited by the parameters of its contingent sovereignty. Proto-states, then, exist in the liminal phase in the transition from colonial power to independent nation and seek legitimation in its quest for unity through both coercive and humanitarian outreach to its revolutionary constituents in an

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⁴₀ Many Western concepts of “the state” originated during the European Enlightenment with scholars such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The nature of state power was also analyzed by post-Enlightenment philosophers and scholars such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Antonio Gramsci, Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas, Theda Skocpol, James C. Scott, and Michel Foucault. As a primary entity for contemporary, nation-state governance, “the state” has been highly theorized and remains part of academic discourse in multiple academic fields.
effort to generate loyalty. Moreover, FRELIMO’s proto-state had a modicum of adaptability to initially adjust policies and ideological platforms through acts and governing decisions that demonstrated its revolutionary pragmatism.

Although FRELIMO’s goal was to liberate and one day rule Mozambique as a political party in charge of the state, the FRELIMO proto-state which emerged in an African, revolutionary context initially deviated from a formal Western-conceived state in the following ways. First, it possessed no realistic way to impose or collect taxes from a population of impoverished peasants and refugees.41 The realities and circumstances that FRELIMO faced during the early 1960s meant that the proto-state could not realistically act as a formal state with the ability to tax as a form of revenue generation. Although there was some degree of agrarian production and exchange between Mozambican refugees and their host Tanzanians, most economic activity was limited by the contingencies of war. Agricultural production was often reserved for aiding the war effort within the liberated zones where Mozambican peasants and the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM) guerrillas often worked to help each other. That is to say, peasants provided food and intelligence about Portuguese movements in exchange for brief educational lessons in “bush schools.” This reciprocity of exchange encouraged enlistment in FRELIMO’s rank-and-file and served as a model for revolutionary possibilities in the future. For their part, Mozambican refugees in Tanzania were expected to engage in similar efforts, but also to contribute their labor toward their own survival, i.e. a similar policy to TANU’s notion - eventually codified in the Arusha

41 In her research, Joanna Tague has argued that TANU sought to incorporate Mozambican refugees into the local economies as agricultural producers that helped develop southern Tanzania. See Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
Declaration - of “self-reliance.” Thus, taxation and the infrastructure to collect revenues did not exist within the FRELIMO proto-state for myriad reasons, but other forms of hegemonic exchanges were at work.

Since Mozambicans, and especially the refugees in Tanzania, did not have taxable income or the means to obtain a taxable living, much agrarian production was for subsistence and consumed at the local level. In this sense, it is valid to argue that FRELIMO, as a proto-state, demanded and “collected” taxes in another way: in the form of human capital contributions to constructing infrastructure projects and through the mustering of soldiers for participation in the anti-colonial war. Joanna Tague has argued the interaction between Mozambican refugees and Tanzanian citizens did occur within and around the “settlements.”\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the existence of the “settlements” themselves demonstrates an attempt to physically isolate and better manage the respective populations of Mozambicans and Tanzanians over time.\textsuperscript{43} Although the Mozambican refugees contributed to the rural development of Tanzania in the short term, the goal for FRELIMO was to liberate Mozambique and subsequently repatriate the refugees to Mozambique.

Secondly, and perhaps more significant in the distinction between state and proto-state, is that since Mozambicans were colonial subjects of Portugal or refugees living in a host country, they lacked the legal designation and claims indicative of a national citizenry. That is, formal states and their respective civil societies interact in a process of hegemonic bargaining: an admixture of coercive state strategies and consenting

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
negotiation among members of civil society. Every formal state, regardless of its degree of authoritarianism, must contend with its civil society (citizens) which will make claims on the state for various services, even in liminal polities such as FRELIMO’s proto-state. Early in its organizational history, FRELIMO established a hierarchy that was defined as based upon “democratic centralization” which limited the semblance of democratic power to a small cadre of the movement’s elites - or in Leninist terms, vanguards. Universal suffrage did not exist within FRELIMO throughout the proto-state’s existence from 1962 to 1975 and, after independence, the expansion of full democratic rights was never fully implemented or considered a necessary goal given the party’s rapid radicalization under Samora Machel that ushered in a period of one-party, authoritarian rule.

What, then, of the refugees living in Tanzania in settlements under the limited authority of the FRELIMO proto-state? I argue that they were not citizens despite the rhetoric, but a “revolutionary constituency” in which FRELIMO’s authority and the interaction with this civil society was more reciprocal if undemocratic and heavily mediated by obvious financial limitations, legal and jurisdictional ambiguity, and international contingencies. FRELIMO attempted to build a viable citizenry, but lacked the territorial demarcation and financial ability to deliver goods and services to all of their people. Given FRELIMO’s limitations, these refugees also initially relied on aid from

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45 I concur with Tague’s conclusions that these sites in Tanzania where the majority of Mozambican refugees lived were not camps, but settlements. There may have been, as I explore in the dissertation, a difference in the way TANU and FRELIMO perceived of the purposes and long-term vision for the camps/settlements. See Tague, “A War to Build the Nation,” 17.
TANU, the Tanganyikan Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Thus, the term “revolutionary constituency” describes an ambiguity within the commonly held understanding of the hegemonic bargain, where both sides - proto-state and revolutionary constituents - have participatory obligations to the other that were necessary, in this case, for the liberation of Mozambique. Mozambican refugees and those living in liberated zones provided the basis for individuals that made up FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituency. This was a revolutionary affiliation in which both sides were limited in their capacities to truly develop, interact, or bargain with the other, thus the need for active assistance provided to these settlements by the TANU regime and other aid organizations.  

Finally, faced with the circumstances in which FRELIMO operated within Tanzania’s sovereign space, the proto-state did not possess the relative freedom to act fully in its own self-interest as formal states often do. FRELIMO’s war against Portugal might provoke that nation to attack its bases, institutions, and camps in southern Tanzania, an omnipresent fear among Tanzanian authorities who armed their own citizens in case of this exact scenario. Thus, the proto-state’s existence within Tanzania jeopardized that nation’s territory and subjected it to possible military incursions and clandestine infiltration. FRELIMO’s existence and operations launched from its rear

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46 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation,” 1-22, 84, 92.
47 For an outstanding analysis of how TANU seized this political opportunity to extend its own hegemonic and sovereign control over Tanzania’s remote southern provinces, see Tague’s dissertation, “A War to Build the Nation.” I am grateful to Joanna for sharing her dissertation with me shortly after filing, and for her insights into “defensive villages” in Tanzania. Our respective dissertations overlap and often compliment each other in several ways that mutually reinforce each other’s research and conclusions.
48 In extant documents in *O Arquivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo* and *O Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* regarding the Portuguese secret police/service, PIDE, there is overwhelming evidence of clandestine infiltration of FRELIMO and of Tanzania. See also Dalila Cabrita Mateus, *A PIDS/DGS: Na Guerra*
bases in Tanzania brought pressure upon the proto-state to minimize the extent of Portuguese infiltration, which often resulted in accusations and occasional purges of FRELIMO cadres believed to be in cahoots with Portugal. The purging of members of FRELIMO’s hierarchy included the first Secretary of Defense for FRELIMO, Filipe Magaia; FRELIMO’s first Vice-President, Uria Simango; former priest and teacher at the FRELIMO Mozambique Institute secondary school Mateus Gwenjere; and, Lázaro Nkavandame, FRELIMO’s provincial leader in Cabo Delgado. They were some of the most significant and controversial individuals in FRELIMO’s early history.  

Accusations of their egotistical individualism, collaboration with the Portuguese, or other egregious violations in the eyes of Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano, or Marcelino dos Santos led to factional disputes, vitriolic statements, and murders that hampered FRELIMO’s unity. Given the myriad explanations and scant evidence available to definitively corroborate an exact, objective claim for “who did what to whom,” suffice it to say that FRELIMO’s internal discord was endemic. Increasing authoritarianism, necessary to quell internal power-struggles emerged especially after the July 1968 Second Party Congress when FRELIMO, under Eduardo Mondlane, more clearly articulated a socialist, ‘no-nonsense’, approach to the movement’s ideology that did not tolerate deviation. Thus, in regard to these machinations, as well as to avoid undermining its good relations with the Tanzanian government, there was inevitably a


49 These men were not all killed before 1968, but their murders were the result of FRELIMO’s internal factionalism over time.
good deal of pressure upon FRELIMO to extend its fight and institutional operations into Mozambique.\textsuperscript{50} The proto-state did not, then, possess the putative “right” to defend itself as a “state” from foreign intrigues, rather it had an obligation to help defend the Tanzanian state and stifle internal challenges to its unity.

\textit{Underneath the Surface of Afro-Optimism}

When faced with tremendous external and internal obstacles on their respective paths to liberation, the hopes and goals of liberation fronts like FRELIMO hinged on developing revolutionary political agendas that aimed to create substantive changes in the lives of Africans. Frederick Cooper has argued for the need to reexamine the nationalist period of Africa and how postcolonial analyses often result in “subsuming all other struggles.”\textsuperscript{51} He goes on to say: “One of the problems in writing about decolonization is that we know the end of the story…the story lends itself to be read backwards and to privilege the process of ending colonial rule over anything else that happened in those years.”\textsuperscript{52} Analyzing Africa’s nationalist era allows us to critique the putative universals of the continent’s liberation movements, the essentialisms of their core beliefs and rhetoric, and lets us assess the veil of overarching optimism that often obscured emergent troubles that are, in hindsight, linked to many contemporary political issues in Africa. It offers scholars the opportunity to critically examine the short-lived period of hope which occurred nearly 50 years ago that so often ended in disaster for African states,
communities, and people. Critical engagement with Afro-optimism sheds light on a period otherwise heavily ensconced in overtly positive rhetoric and unprecedented hope. This is not to say that Afro-optimism was naïve or misguided. Its emotional connection to and its moral argument for independence were, indeed, motivational from the point of view of human agency. By analyzing discursive aspects the Afro-optimism that informed FRELIMO’s politicization during the 1960s and early 1970s, one can see that this period was also a period of volatility in which the realities of state and social development were fraught with challenges, rivalries, and tensions. Simply put, it presents the chance to better analyze and evaluate the transitional challenges and the early evolution of the African nation-state and body politic.

For liberation movements like FRELIMO, I argue that the negative effects of internal strife and the liberation front’s early ideological disputes, so often the sole point of analysis for scholars, were a necessary and normal part of the movement’s transition toward statehood. In dealing with and adjusting to the proverbial ‘bumps in the road’ or, as Jeanne Marie Penvenne has argued “a tapestry of conflict,” FRELIMO nevertheless endured to survive many of its early challenges. The process of adjusting to political realities was mitigated through what I argue was an evolving, revolutionary pragmatism of the FRELIMO proto-state. That is, this dissertation reexamines the early existence of FRELIMO to argue that it was more than just a liberation front of guerrilla soldiers and

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their leaders. FRELIMO was also an adaptable proto-state that sought opportunities for political legitimation and learned to better manage its organizational structure, propagandized rhetoric, and operational goals in pursuit of such ends. Simply stated, it was a process of political maturation through the actions and logic of revolutionary pragmatism that eventually gave way to a burgeoning authoritarianism that came to categorize the FRELIMO leadership by 1975. For the liberation front as a whole, this process of political transition from pragmatic proto-state to authoritarian formal state occurred in tandem with its escalating war effort against Portugal throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.

The volatility of overlapping military and political conditions informed FRELIMO’s experiences with early statecraft. When FRELIMO leaders interacted with foreign nations and philanthropic groups, they did so to garner legitimacy for their organization. These interactions, in turn, paved the way for FRELIMO to develop educational, health, and bureaucratic institutions within the revolutionary laboratory of Tanzania and in Mozambique’s liberated zones. Because of their early attempts at statecraft, FRELIMO was more than just what William Reno argues was a liberation front of “anti-colonial rebels.”\(^55\) Through its experiences and experiments with statecraft in Tanzania and later in Mozambique’s northern liberated zones FRELIMO, a self-proclaimed liberation front, displayed a remarkable likeness to a formal state but without the same sovereign status or jurisdictional authority.

During the 1960s, Mozambique’s liberation was not necessarily inevitable. Although the goal of liberation from Portuguese colonialism was clear, the path was not

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\(^{55}\) Reno, *Warfare*, 37-64.
despite post-1975 FRELIMO propaganda that often proclaimed such teleological inevitability.\footnote{See FRELIMO, Departmento de Trabalho Ideologico, Historia da FRELIMO, Coleçao Conhecer 4, 1981.} Unsurprisingly, this is especially evident in FRELIMO’s Central Committee Report to the Third Party Congress in 1977 and, later in 1981, in its official “History of FRELIMO” published by FRELIMO’s own ideological department. Evidence from both documents suggest that Mozambique’s independence and FRELIMO’s own ascendancy as a Marxist/Leninist organization were inevitable; both claims are problematic given that, once in power, FRELIMO had the power to discursively articulate whatever version of events it needed to suit its political ends. The unpredictable realities of the anti-colonial war and the sympathies or not of the international community often forced FRELIMO to adjust its policies, shake-up and occasionally purge members from its internal hierarchy and organization, and modify its military strategies. It was during the initial stages of FRELIMO’s political development and military engagement against the Portuguese from 1962 to 1968 that the movement’s leaders sought to create a unified front through pragmatic approaches to legitimation in order to receive financial and moral support from international sympathizers, as well as to gain the loyalty of the Mozambican people. However, as alluded to above, FRELIMO’s foundational years were fraught with internal disputes and ideological debates that resulted in competition and rivalries among the leadership which ultimately threatened the legitimacy of the liberation front in its war against Portugal.\footnote{These internal issues within FRELIMO have long been studied. For example, see Isaacman, \textit{A Luta Continua}; Minter, \textit{Apartheid’s Contras}; Opello, “Pluralism”; Geert Poppe, “The Origins of Mozambique’s Liberalization: A Reassessment of FRELIMO’s Early Years” (PhD diss., Faculty of the Graduate School, University of Southern California, August 2009).} The internal discord
within FRELIMO, in a way, demonstrated a polemic but normative politicization within the liberation front. FRELIMO’s success in the anti-colonial war, as well as its support from Mozambicans, depended on mediating this internal discord within the hierarchy. Although the goal of total unity within FRELIMO remained elusive for the duration of the anti-colonial war, it is important to note as well that the liberation front also demonstrated a penchant for adaptability and political survival. Therefore, in contradistinction to analyses that have focused on the internal fissures that plagued and bifurcated FRELIMO into “revolutionaries” versus “reactionaries,” or “Cosmopolitans” versus “Provincials,” I argue instead that the liberation front’s revolutionary political development and legitimation effectively navigated this discord during its foundational years because of the organization’s revolutionary pragmatism.  

Historiography

Scholarship on the dynamism of Africa’s recent past during the 1960s and early 1970s – the age of nationalism, pan-Africanism, and independence – has largely overlooked the early political development of Lusophone liberation movements such as FRELIMO. Eric Morier-Genoud has argued “there is…not just a quantitative lack of investigation on nationalisms and nations in Portuguese-speaking Africa, but also a qualitative issue” in regard to scholarship “during the last twenty-years – particularly in English.” Typically, this period of FRELIMO’s history receives a cursory glance in the

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59 Eric Morier-Genoud, “Introduction: Thinking about Nationalisms & Nations in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique,” in *Sure Road?*, ed. Eric Morier-Genoud, xv-xvi. Although sparse there are, however, various sources that do exist in Portuguese that have emerged recently which examine different aspects of
existing scholarship, as much of the focus is on the dimensions and fall-out from the liberation front’s early internal troubles. Overall, this period is often viewed, in hindsight, as a fleeting era of hope and optimism for much of Africa. New African countries often painfully endured volatile transitions to independence that resulted in profound structural and developmental challenges for nascent states to overcome. Tragically, these difficulties emerged shortly after many successful anti-colonial movements and liberation fronts obtained independence during the 1960s and 1970s.

There are many published works on the history of Mozambique that establish a contextual framework for my dissertation. In general, these historical analyses of the country and its people largely fall into three categories: socio-economic/colonial history (that often includes the years of anti-colonial war), Mozambique’s more recent political history and civil war (1975-1992), and analyses of the political and economic evolution of contemporary Mozambique. Various studies have focused on the colonial era in Mozambique and Portugal’s evolving but nefarious role in exploiting the colony and its people. Mozambique and Mozambicans had long served as a source of raw materials such as cotton, sugar, and cashew nuts, as well as a source of labor for white settlers on farms and in mines. In the colonial era, “Portuguese East Africa” (Mozambique) was


also a source of labor in neighboring colonies with large white settler communities, namely South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. More recent studies of Mozambique and FRELIMO focus on the ramifications and disastrous realities of the Mozambican Civil War, the debilitating economic effects of structural adjustment programs during the 1980s, and the recent political history of FRELIMO and its shift toward free-market policies tied to burgeoning globalization. There are also numerous works on the contributions of Mozambican women to both colonial and post-colonial Mozambique, and anthropological analyses that explore such themes as sorcery and metaphysical

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aspects of culture, politics, and belief.\textsuperscript{63} Most of these works figure prominently in the narrative text and bibliography. However, it is important to note that these texts do not necessarily provide evidence of FRELIMO’s early development as a proto-state empowered with a contingent sovereignty, nor do they specifically address the emergence of gender and generational tensions that also shaped the history of the liberation front.\textsuperscript{64} It is in these areas I hope this dissertation will make a significant contribution to Mozambican historiography.

Some recent research has begun to delve into the period of FRELIMO’s early development, most notably Geert Poppe’s dissertation entitled, “The Origins of Mozambique’s Liberalization: A Reassessment of FRELIMO’s Early Years” which analyzes critical aspects of FRELIMO’s politicization.\textsuperscript{65} Poppe challenges FRELIMO’s own official historiography produced shortly after independence in 1975. He argues that class tensions, critical to Marxist philosophy and adherents later during the Machel regime, were virtually non-existent in colonial Mozambique prior to independence since the proletarianization of the population was not widespread. Instead, Poppe contends that FRELIMO’s fundamentally undemocratic organization and character can be traced to the authoritarian policies of Party leader (and later President) Samora Machel and his faction

\begin{itemize}
\item For example, see Sheldon, \textit{Pounders of Grain}; and Harry G. West, \textit{Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).
\item More recently, the issue of gender and its contemporary relation to the politics of Mozambique appears in Signe Arnfred, \textit{Sexuality and Gender Politics in Mozambique: Rethinking Gender in Africa}. (London: James Currey, Ltd., 2011).
\item Poppe, “The Origins.”
\end{itemize}
of FRELIMO “progressives” who adopted a Marxist ideology at the Third Party Congress in 1977 to augment FRELIMO’s political control over Mozambique for a multitude of developmental and international reasons. Unlike Poppe who rightly challenges the teleology of the putative Marxist roots of FRELIMO, my analysis focuses extensively on how the seeds for FRELIMO’s later authoritarianism were progressively evident in its early hegemonic successes with its proto-state institutions in Tanzania. Poppe largely accepts the fact that FRELIMO’s liberated zones were places for political experience and interaction between the liberation front and ordinary Mozambicans, but he does not fully address the political evolution and impact of FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania upon the movement’s later authoritarianism. It was FRELIMO’s relatively successful proto-state institutions, bureaucratic organization and outreach, and its ability to operate with contingent sovereignty in Tanzania that emboldened the leadership - particularly after the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969 - to eventually espouse a hardline undemocratic centralized authoritarianism.

Joanna Tague’s dissertation entitled, “A War to Build the Nation: Mozambican Refugees, Rural Development, and State Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1964-1975” analyzes the impact of Mozambican refugees on state development in Tanzania and addresses the challenges of nascent statecraft for TANU in the remote southern regions of that country. Tague argues that the presence of Mozambican refugees and FRELIMO cadres in southern Tanzania was a catalyst for state development in that country. Her dissertation complements my own in that Mozambican (mostly Makonde) refugees were necessary actors that prefigured the development of statecraft and burgeoning hegemony

66 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
in two young East African political organizations: TANU and FRELIMO, respectively. While Tague focuses exclusively on the impact of Mozambican refugees on the political and economic development of southern Tanzania, she does not fully address the ambiguous nature of the sovereign political relationship between TANU and FRELIMO. Tague is correct to argue that the Mozambican refugees in their “settlements” did provide a working model for Nyerere’s Ujamaa villages, but she does not fully flesh out how their other roles as FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents contributed to the liberation front’s political maturation while in Tanzania. FRELIMO’s existence and use of rear bases in Tanzania meant that the liberation front also benefitted from its engagement with Mozambican refugees in such a way as to develop into a proto-state. In her conclusion, however, Tague briefly acknowledges the ambiguous existence of FRELIMO while it operated across the border in Tanzania. In regard to the Mozambican refugees in southern Tanzania, Tague states, “The image of Eduardo Mondlane or Samora Machel freely entering Rutamba Settlement, walking the streets, perhaps recruiting soldiers, perhaps simply taking a rest, attests to the fluidity of settlement borders in 1960s Tanzania.” It is precisely the nature, ambiguity, and contexts that informed this “fluidity” that I explore in this dissertation.

The new methodological paradigms of revolutionary pragmatism, revolutionary constituency, contingent sovereignty, and proto-state that I introduce in this dissertation should raise more questions in regard to the early development of FRELIMO and, perhaps, in other liberation movements. These innovative concepts will enhance existing studies that cover the nationalist era in Mozambique (and in Africa more broadly) and

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67 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation,” 268.
will ideally provoke more questions regarding the institutional operations and political legitimation of self-proclaimed liberation front’s. These concepts will problematize interpretations of anti-colonial movements, liberation fronts, or guerrilla “rebel” movements to suggest that they were often more complex and hegemonic in organization and vision. Although Africa’s liberation movements clearly operated with independence in mind, they were also organizations that used the morality of their respective causes to secure aid, sympathy, money, and legitimacy in ways that made them something more than simply “rebels” or guerrilla insurgents. William Reno suggests as much in his book, War in Independent Africa, when he alludes to the existence of something fundamentally distinct in FRELIMO’s political evolution in a section entitled “Pragmatism and Precarious Unity in Mozambique.” Speaking of Eduardo Mondlane and his ascendancy within FRELIMO in particular, Reno argues that he “exercised considerable pragmatism in becoming the head of this alliance of organizations.” However, Reno does not fully explore the plethora of contexts that informed this “pragmatism,” nor does he address the distinctive position of FRELIMO as a liberation front/proto-state vis-à-vis a formally sovereign state – in this case, Tanzania -that offered avenues for such “pragmatism” to evolve. In merely alluding to how “Nyerere’s patronage protected FRELIMO from challenges from other factions,” Reno briefly addresses how the internal challenges undermined FRELIMO’s “pragmatism” in its international affairs. Reno goes on to mention FRELIMO’s interaction with the U.S. government and aid it received from the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International

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68 Reno, Warfare, 51.  
69 Ibid., 52.  
70 Ibid., 54
Development Authority (SIDA), but he seems to casually accept FRELIMO’s “pragmatism” as simply a natural outcome of Eduardo Mondlane’s leadership.\textsuperscript{71} He does not fully explore the experiences, evolving circumstances, and contexts that informed the ambiguous relationship between TANU and FRELIMO that also shaped the liberation front’s “pragmatism” and strategies. As this dissertation will demonstrate, in the methods employed by FRELIMO to legitimize its existence during the liberation struggle, there emerged a nascent hegemony and need for bureaucratization that paved the way for a proto-state to evolve well before independence in 1975. It was how the FRELIMO proto-state operated with revolutionary pragmatism in particular contexts during the anti-colonial war that is the subject of this work.

As briefly stated above, recent historiographical contributions on Mozambique tend to focus on the period of post-liberation and independence which transformed the liberation front into a viable political party whose ideological and hegemonic development were largely the product of the movement’s immediate postcolonial consolidation of power and full transition toward a formal, socialist state. Focusing much of the analysis on the results of FRELIMO’s Party Conference of 1977, scholars have examined the impact of FRELIMO’s rapid shift to the Left and, in particular, Samora Machel’s goal of full implementation of Marxist/Leninist doctrine upon both party and the Mozambican people.\textsuperscript{72} Although the shortcomings of Machel’s ideological basis for a liberated Mozambique have been studied in detail, as has the negative and nefarious effects of the civil war with RENAMO during the 1980s, recent historiography addresses

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 54-56.
\textsuperscript{72} Poppe, “The Origins.”
how structural adjustment policies and political pluralism have affected Mozambican society. Some recent scholarship on Mozambique analyzes how neo-patrimonial relationships, for example, have replaced FRELIMO’s postcolonial Marxist policies to inform the contemporary political status quo and the country’s transition toward market capitalism in Mozambique.73

What many of these studies overlook is that FRELIMO’s evolution as a single-party, authoritarian state did not begin in 1977 at FRELIMO’s Third Party Congress, but had its origins across Mozambique’s northern borders in Tanzania (and to a lesser extent in Zambia and Malawi) starting in 1962. From its founding in Tanzania in June 1962, FRELIMO was fundamentally a liberation front whose simultaneous existence as a proto-state remains understudied. As a proto-state operating with revolutionary pragmatism and contingent sovereignty within Tanzania, this reality of FRELIMO’s early politicization remains an under-considered aspect of the organization’s adaptability toward and interaction with proto-statecraft. Moreover, it was these experiences in which FRELIMO developed its early inchoate socio-economic, ideological, and political positions that provided the basis for its burgeoning authoritarianism during the 1977 Third Party Congress. As a political party later in control of the Mozambican state, FRELIMO’s authoritarian policies did not originate upon independence or shortly thereafter in 1975. FRELIMO’s later authoritarianism was forged, rather, in the breakdown of its revolutionary pragmatism and in the violence of the anti-colonial war

during its proto-state phase of the 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, FRELIMO successfully operated with contingent sovereignty in the recruitment of and engagement with thousands of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania and in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique. It was this background and context that provided FRELIMO with the clout and experiences that both emboldened the liberation movement in its political transformation into a formal state and established the ideological basis for socialist statecraft in a liberated nation.

Sources and Materials

In this dissertation, I draw from a number of primary and secondary sources. After a short research trip to Mozambique in 2007, I planned to return to the country in 2010, only to learn in a fortuitous email from Dr. Joel das Neves Tembe – the Director of O Arquivo Historico de Moçambique (AHM) - that the archives I wished to consult were temporarily inaccessible. As a result of this unfortunate timing, I have obtained the vast majority of primary source materials via the digitized ALUKA Project and its extensive catalogue of material entitled “Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa.”74 This database includes more than 50,000 pages of documents from AHM and works to scan these documents to make them accessible to scholars around the world.75 Although the ALUKA project continues to expand its database, as a resource for scholars of Mozambique, in particular, the digitalized records from AHM are an invaluable and extensive resource. This digital collection contains a multitude of FRELIMO

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74 This was possible with the help of Jeanne Marie Penvenne who was instrumental in helping me to secure status as a “Visiting Scholar” at Tufts University.
publications, most of the ephemera from the Ronald H. Chilcote “Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa” collection, nearly all of editions of Mozambique’s *Tempo* magazine, and a plethora of other primary and secondary materials collected by scholars.

I have also conducted research for primary documentation at the Oberlin College Archives in Oberlin, Ohio, which houses a collection of ephemera collected by Herbert Shore in “Honor of Eduardo C. Mondlane” who obtained a B.A. from Oberlin. Herbert Shore met and was impressed with Eduardo Mondlane at Oberlin College but it is also very likely that Shore had maintained contact with Mondlane while he (Shore) was teaching at the University of Dar es Salaam during the 1960s. Yale University’s Sterling Library and Archives possesses a variety of primary source materials and a vast collection of microfilms relating to Mozambique. to explore his extensive private collection of primary sources from southern Africa. William Minter worked as a secondary school teacher at FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute school and collected a multitude of rare primary sources that include educational materials, FRELIMO publications, and personal letters. I consulted his extensive private collection of primary sources from southern Africa, many of which are not yet available via ALUKA.

After two extensive trips to Lisbon, I have collected other primary source material relating to the Portuguese involvement in Mozambique and their knowledge of FRELIMO from *O Arquivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo* (AN/TT) and *O Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* (AHU). These archives are particularly useful for exposing the extent of Portugal’s infiltration of FRELIMO, their concerns in regard to FRELIMO’s international support, and the role of the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*,
(PIDE) whose surveillance, infiltration, and use of torture were effective tools in undermining FRELIMO’s quest for unity.

In addition to written primary sources, I have obtained several oral testimonies of these events from both in-person interviews, email correspondence, and via Skype. In the course of my research, I have concluded that much of the oral testimony regarding early FRELIMO, its tactics, and its legacy remains highly polemic and extremely subjective. Although oral sources can account for perspective and contain nuggets of truth, I hesitate to rely exclusively on their collection and interpretation given the harsh opinions and grudges still held among many participants in the anti-colonial war and among dissidents living in exile. Nevertheless, these voices offer competing perspectives on events within FRELIMO and often challenge what Georgi Derluguian has called “the standard legend” that is the common metanarrative of FRELIMO’s evolution.

This reality speaks to the internal divisions within FRELIMO as much as it does the lingering effects of divisive interpretations and opinions regarding the proto-state’s politicization. As such, I wholeheartedly agree with Andrew Ivaska, who argues, instead, for the “…critical use of the rich but underutilized source base that is the press” because it “can…open up some important possibilities for writing postcolonial histories of Africa,” but I would add that the same is true for Africa’s transition from colonies to postcolonial states. As Ivaska argues, the prevalence and “authenticating status of oral history in the field” has

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overshadowed many other equally valid and no less biased sources.\textsuperscript{78} One fount of primary source materials is the newspapers published in Tanzania during the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, photographic images, headlines, and articles in both the \textit{Nationalist} and the \textit{Standard} reveal many of the challenges, gendered and generational realities, and achievements of FRELIMO. I have obtained these newspapers from Yale University’s microfilm collection in the Sterling Library. Many of these photos, in particular, possess captions that reveal a more precise description of the images themselves helping to diminish the subjectivities of interpretation(s). For example, cameramen usually opt to take a photo (or not) based on the person’s permission. However, in other cases, they take pictures of what images they think best inform the news story, lend themselves to their own personal bias, or to satisfy the whims of powerful elites such as those who own or manage the newspaper. As such, these Tanzanian newspapers often carried stories, images, and headlines that favored FRELIMO’s existence and reported on its actions. Therefore, they are an invaluable component of this dissertation.

Although several interviews were conducted for this dissertation, a few of my informants, given the political sensitivity of the topic, requested anonymity and refused to be directly quoted. This is often the case for all sensitive topics, particularly in regard to this project because certain individuals cannot return to Mozambique for fear of retribution. For this reason, I have considered the substance of the evidence they offered, but do not quote or cite them at any point. I have omitted their names and references in this dissertation. Suffice to say, however, I allude to the general substance of their evidence.

\textsuperscript{78} For a similar argument and line of reasoning about ongoing debates surrounding oral history, testimonies, and historical subjectivity, see Luise White, Stephan F. Miescher, and David William Cohen, \textit{African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
recollections, sentiments, and opinions as a means of expanding on the general historical knowledge of FRELIMO and Mozambique’s independence. I use their off-the-record responses for contextual enhancement only while also attempting to corroborate the substance of their responses with other sources. Where necessary, I minimize these contributions to avoid speculation and overt subjectivity.

Chapter Organization

Chapter 1: This chapter entitled, “‘Shaping the Political Line’: Contingent Sovereignty, Revolutionary Pragmatism, and the Legitimation of the FRELIMO Proto-State, 1962-1970,” addresses the theoretical framework and rationale used in this dissertation and their applicability in the political development of FRELIMO. I also explore the ramifications of FRELIMO’s ambiguous political stature as a proto-state and argue that loyalty or lack thereof to the liberation front was a direct consequence of FRELIMO’s possession of a contingent sovereignty, albeit with limited military and financial resources during the tumultuous and unpredictable occurrences of the anti-colonial war. Therefore, I provide comprehensive definitions for contingent sovereignty and proto-state that augment the brief explanations found above in the Introduction with the two-pronged intention to encourage scholars to consider interstitial statecraft in Africa and to advocate for their theoretical saliency to the specific context of FRELIMO and Mozambique’s liberation.

I follow these theoretical premises by analyzing links between revolutionary pragmatism and the use of violence to achieve certain ends. Related questions include how FRELIMO acquired the authority to discipline, punish, promote, or reward
individuals within the liberation front. There are, however, complex theoretical issues that arise in an argument for violence in the pursuit of justice, in this case, independence and freedom from Portuguese colonialism. Therefore, this means that a section of this chapter necessarily offers important insights into the challenges of proto-statecraft during the early years of Mozambique’s liberation. 

Relevant to the intersection between pragmatism and violence are the debates that surfaced in the early 1980s between Western philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. Michael Kelly, in his edited volume, *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, offers a comparative critique of both philosophers’ theories. According to Kelly, although “Formal debate between Foucault and Habermas never took place nor did an American conference proposed in the early 1980s to allow them to air their differences in public sphere,” Habermas’s ties to the genre of Pragmatism undergird his philosophical critique on the exaggerated role of power and violence in human nature toward achieving certain ends, a theory Foucault would have rejected. Unfortunately, “One major reason,” Kelly states for, “why neither event materialized was, of course, Foucault’s untimely death” in 1984. These competing theories shed light on the problem in relation to FRELIMO’s political evolution. Many commonly accepted notions and contemporary understandings

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81 Ibid., 2-3.

82 Ibid.
of violence and its use in the development and maintenance of state hegemony are based on the authority and viability of a recognized state itself – not on the ambiguity inherent in a liberation front acting without the legitimacy and recognition of a formal state with sovereignty over a fixed territorial space. Moreover, usually when scholars discuss the hegemonic bargain between state and civil society, they refer to governments utilizing institutional power within the sovereign borders of nations that are recognized by the international community, but what of liberation movements operating largely from foreign soil with no such luxuries?

These questions are central to this chapter. Moreover, they reflect multiple interpretations of FRELIMO’s ideological and political foundations and, in a way, also provided the liberation front with a semblance of a natural internal discord that contributed to the overall legitimacy of the movement. Although threatening to FRELIMO, the existence of polemic, political disagreement among its members also inspired various actors to influence the direction and, therefore, the legitimacy of the proto-state. Although independence from Portugal was the ultimate goal of those involved in the anti-colonial war, FRELIMO’s leaders, Mozambican refugees, Tanzanian authorities, foreign sympathizers, and traditional authorities all contributed to the early political discourse and development of the movement.

Chapter 2: This chapter entitled “Building a Revolutionary Constituency: Mozambican Refugees and the Development of the FRELIMO Proto-State, 1964-1968” will begin with how and why FRELIMO’s leadership needed to build loyalty among Mozambicans, predominantly the Makonde ethnic group from the north, who fled from
the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa to the relative safety of Tanzania. Since most of the early fighting between FRELIMO and Portugal took place in the northern provinces of the colony, the majority of these Mozambicans were already familiar with the border as they mainly fled *chibalo* (forced labor). Many Makonde utilized similar routes of escape when faced with Portuguese military reprisals. The Makonde live in adjacent communities on both sides of the Ruvuma River, thus as Edward Alpers, Joanna Tague, and Harry G. West have concluded, many Mozambicans had long accessed their extended kin and familial networks for safety and resources.83

The chapter examines how the international border between Mozambique and Tanzania was porous and offered opportunities for FRELIMO and the Tanzanian authorities to manipulate the notion of state sovereignty. The rapid displacement of Mozambicans across the Tanzanian border in late 1964 provided FRELIMO with a population of angry, impoverished, and vulnerable people from which to establish a military front against Portugal. The number of refugees was estimated in the tens-of-thousands and the challenge for FRELIMO and Tanzanian authorities was how to provide for their safety and well-being, determining who among them was willing and able to fight, and how best to build trust and loyalty to FRELIMO.

This chapter is also, therefore, about the conditions in which FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents acted to flee the fighting for the refuge of Tanzania. In the process of this migration, many refugees expressed individual initiative to survive and made use of kin networks on both sides of the Ruvuma River. The presence of thousands Mozambican refugees in Tanzania late in 1964 provided FRELIMO with the human

83 Alpers, “‘To Seek a Better Life’”; Tague, “A War to Build the Nation”; and West, *Kupilikula.*
capital to begin its proto-state activities under the constraints of its contingent sovereignty. It was not only vital for FRELIMO to assist the refugees living in Tanzania, but it was also important for the liberation front to conduct military and humanitarian operations within the northern provinces of Mozambique in an effort to garner logistical, military, and political support from Mozambicans still living in the colony. Simply put, the chapter argues that FRELIMO’s legitimacy as a liberation front was tenuous. Small but not insignificant victories during the anti-colonial war, as well as FRELIMO’s intention to transform the liberation front into a viable political organization in the future, rested on the leadership’s ability to define and juxtapose the purposes of the liberation struggle in terms of coherent ideological, economic, and humanitarian strategies. At stake was the immediate question of FRELIMO’s legitimacy as a nationalist organization, and its future as a political movement in a liberated Mozambique.

Chapter 3: This chapter, “Borders and Brethren: International Dynamics and the Legitimation of the FRELIMO Proto-State” explores the role of Tanzanian and other international support for FRELIMO’s proto-state institutions and political development. I analyze the various international influences upon FRELIMO, incorporate a brief discursive analysis of Nyerere’s Pan-Africanist rhetoric and influence, and introduce the major ideological and institutional strategies for the proto-state based on revolutionary pragmatism.

The chapter asserts, however, that decisions made at the military and humanitarian levels among the FRELIMO leadership were largely shaped by the influence of foreign benefactors and Cold War alliance systems. Although African
independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s found a logical attraction to socialist theory, FRELIMO’s “brand” of emergent revolutionary socialism and the parameters of its ideological evolution needed tacit approval from the Tanzanian government. Given the tenuous political relationship between FRELIMO’s leadership and the Nyerere government, the dissertation will explore the nature of this relationship and argue that FRELIMO could not significantly deviate from a socialist model inspired by Nyerere and ultimately implemented in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Moreover, FRELIMO could not ignore Cold War politics and Tanzania’s avowed non-alignment. Tanzania’s status as a sovereign nation, recognized by the international community, was an essential facet of FRELIMO’s anti-colonial war against Portugal. It was this sovereign and physical space afforded FRELIMO, and how it was allocated with the constraints of contingent sovereignty, that is under study in this first section.

This chapter also explores how the Portuguese threatened FRELIMO operations and institutions in Tanzania. An important question is how the Portuguese military learned of the scope and dynamism of FRELIMO’s proto-state institutions in Tanzania and why did they not extensively bomb or attack them. The threat of invasion was, however, taken very seriously in Tanzania and headlines in both the Nationalist and the Standard affirmed TANU’s fears of just such a possibility. The evidence suggests that the Portuguese were well-aware of FRELIMO’s operations in Tanzania and were active in trying to undermine them to some extent. However, unlike Portugal’s decision to invade Guinea in 1970 as a result of that nation’s support for the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and its guerrilla operations in Guinea-
Bissau, this chapter also asks the essential question: why did the Portuguese military not pursue a similar strategy of overtly bombing and invading Tanzania?

Chapter 4: FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism was also evident in its successful procurement of financial assistance from sympathetic foreign nations and organizations. This chapter, “Underwriting Legitimacy: The Moral Appeal of FRELIMO” analyzes the international connections established by FRELIMO cadres in order to obtain funds as well as build legitimacy for the organization. Through the interactions and travel itineraries of its leaders, FRELIMO gained an audience of ideological and financial supporters overseas. Although FRELIMO obtained financial support from other organizations such as the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) among others, this chapter is organized as a comparative analysis of two significant financial supporters of FRELIMO: the Ford Foundation (FF) and World Council of Churches (WCC). This comparative approach allows me to argue that the scope of FRELIMO’s appeal lay in its moral agenda for the liberation of Mozambique, a goal that resonated with both secular and religious organizations. I focus on and analyze the impact of these two external sources of funding (FF and WCC) and how this recognition from foreign entities played a significant role in FRELIMO’s legitimation.

In what appeared to be a benevolent humanitarian act, the Ford Foundation’s decision to initially underwrite the education of young Mozambican refugees at FRELIMO’s flagship school in Dar es Salaam resulted in significant international fallout. The government of Portugal successfully pressured the Ford Foundation to end the
funding. Similarly, FRELIMO’s liberation agenda also appealed later during the early-to-mid 1970s to the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Switzerland and their Committee (and “Programme”) to Combat Racism (WCC-PCR). The WCC supported FRELIMO long after the Ford Foundation withdrew its financial assistance for the Mozambique Institute in 1963. As a religious organization that continues to work with and establishes links between Christian churches around the world, the WCC made an overtly political decision when it sent money to an African liberation front for its institutional projects in Tanzania during the early 1970s. The chapter, then, extensively examines the interactions between the FF, the WCC, and FRELIMO to offer a comparative in-depth perspective on diverse sources of assistance to the liberation front that helped develop FRELIMO’s institutions as a basis for legitimacy. Analyzing the sources of FRELIMO’s income is also essential because it links the liberation front to the international political and economic community which helps to explain the political viability and financial solvency of a proto-state with the inability to tax. The same can be said for FRELIMO’s procurement of weapons and other military assistance (also explored briefly in the chapter), such as lethal aid and training provided by the Chinese. In sum, the chapter argues that in receiving humanitarian, military, and financial aid from a variety of foreign donors across the Cold War spectrum, these strategies helped generate a sense of legitimacy for FRELIMO in the eyes of the Mozambicans while simultaneously subjecting the proto-state to various foreign and contradictory pressures.

Chapter 5: This chapter entitled “…Where Courtesy and Dignity Can Walk Together…”: FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute and the Challenges of Creating a
Revolutionary Future” focuses on the organization and operation of FRELIMO’s institutions in Tanzania and Mozambique and addresses gender roles and expectations within these institutions. In particular, this chapter analyzes the existence, daily activities, educational endeavors, and social interactions of FRELIMO’s most visible proto-state institution: The Mozambique Institute and its secondary school in Dar es Salaam. I argue that the existence of this functioning school represents the most dynamic example of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism in that it was a forum for discussion, egalitarian order, education and indoctrination, and for social experimentation. Educational background, gender, and age were important determinants for enrollment at the secondary school. Thus, this chapter analyzes how gender roles and generational realities shaped the operation of the school.

Chapter 6: This chapter entitled “The Pedagogy of Revolution: Youth, Generational Conflict, and Education in the Development of Mozambican Nationalism and the State, 1962-1970” focuses on the challenge to adequately oversee and manage its own institutions and how actors of different generations interpreted the polemics that plagued FRELIMO. The troubles that emerged at the Mozambique Institute secondary school and, in particular, the events of March 5, 1968 forced FRELIMO to shut down the secondary school for nearly two years and resulted in a definitive shift away from the proto-state’s initial revolutionary pragmatism toward a more hard-line authoritarian ideology. Starting in the early 1970s, but clearly evident with the espousal of Marxist-Leninism during the Third Party Congress in 1977, FRELIMO loyalists and party ideologues violently purged dissenters and stringently imposed their will upon ordinary
Mozambicans shortly after independence. The omnipresent but downplayed troubles within FRELIMO since its inception in 1962 surfaced in dramatic fashion at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in 1968 and paved the way for Samora Machel’s postcolonial radical, authoritarian shift toward Marxist-Leninism.

This chapter sheds new light on how intergenerational tensions within FRELIMO shaped the operation and organization of the movement during the early years of the anticolonial war, which is something few scholars have specifically examined. Although mentioned but largely underappreciated in many of the works of other scholars, I will argue that both generation and gender played significant roles in the formation and conceptual organization of FRELIMO. These are significant analytical and historical categories in contemporary studies of the African past and, although various studies have focused on the impact of intergenerational tensions and gender roles during the colonial era, few scholars have fleshed out similar challenges within early FRELIMO. The altercation among students and staff on March 5, 1968 revealed how generational tensions within FRELIMO were significant factors that affected the operations and legitimacy of the proto-state.

**Conclusion:** My conclusion argues how the concepts of proto-state, contingent sovereignty, revolutionary constituency, and revolutionary pragmatism are critical to understanding the nuances of power, legitimacy, and politicization within Africa’s liberation movements. This dissertation focuses on the early political history of FRELIMO to argue that, by incorporating pragmatism into an African revolutionary context, existing assumptions of pragmatism’s methodical value for historians can be
expanded. I argue that FRELIMO’s early history and especially its activities in Tanzania are understudied areas of the liberation front’s political evolution. My methodological approaches offer a critical new perspective on the historiography of FRELIMO and provide a framework to reexamine the organization, strategies, and institutions of other liberation groups in Africa during the watershed years of pan-Africanism and independence in the 1960s and 1970s.
Chapter 1


In June 1972, FRELIMO published the 51st edition of its official organ, *Mozambique Revolution*. This periodical commemorated FRELIMO’s ten-year anniversary as a liberation front and provided a “special section” dedicated to an explanation of FRELIMO’s political evolution.¹ Written in English and “Aimed at an international audience,” the pictures and articles evoked a sense of FRELIMO’s legitimacy and purported egalitarianism.² The photos in this edition captured myriad activities that included Mozambican women carrying guns and children; a Western journalist, Gerard Klijn, eating and sitting with FRELIMO guerrillas; and Samora Machel, the President of FRELIMO, shaking hands with “1st Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the G.D.R., comrade Erich Honecker.”³ Articles and narrative inserts presented first-hand accounts of the sacrifices and struggles of FRELIMO militants from its earliest years until 1972. This edition of *Mozambique Revolution*, like many of FRELIMO’s official publications, provided nearly 28 pages of celebratory propaganda but carefully avoided drawing attention to the divisive internal struggles that had plagued FRELIMO from its inception. Although FRELIMO was careful to censor information about its early political troubles, it also demonstrated evidence of its revolutionary

² ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution Collection Summation Page.
³ ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution Collection, no. 51, (June 1972), 5-6.
pragmatism through the purposeful inclusion of stories and images that conveyed a political maturation of the liberation front primarily garnered through its experiences with both statecraft and war.

Perhaps the most significant section in this edition, entitled “Shaping the Political Line,” discussed FRELIMO’s military strategies and successes against Portugal, but it also laid out the evolution of its political development. FRELIMO’s Department of Information, which produced Mozambique Revolution, specifically conveyed evidence of the liberation front’s achievements in “the health services,” “education,” “foreign policy,” “Production and Trade,” and “Social Assistance for War Victims.” FRELIMO was eager to display its unwavering resolve to liberate Mozambique through both visual images and carefully selected first-hand accounts from Mozambicans. In managing its various social institutions for Mozambicans, as well as in its interactions with foreign heads of state to enhance its international stature, FRELIMO was making a case for its political legitimacy ten years after its creation in the midst of an ongoing anti-colonial war.

This chapter explores essential aspects of FRELIMO’s early political development and introduces two new theoretical concepts to existing historical analyses of Africa’s nationalist era during the 1960s. Although briefly addressed in the Introduction, these concepts – proto-state and contingent sovereignty - will be further explored for their historical utility. As concepts related to FRELIMO’s early

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4 Ibid., 13-28. This version of events was also produced after the purging of some significant, high-level cadres who contested Eduardo Mondlane’s and Samora Machel’s more “revolutionary” ideology. Thus, by 1972, FRELIMO took the opportunity to both celebrate its 10th anniversary but also inform the world of its affirmed political orientation that indicated an increasing authoritarianism.

5 Ibid.
politicization, the ideas of contingent sovereignty and proto-state will enhance existing scholarship regarding African nationalism, notions of “state” and the origins of its legitimation in early post-colonial Africa, and demonstrate the distinct circumstances that led to FRELIMO’s establishment of institutions on foreign and domestic soil.

Through a comprehensive analysis of these theoretical concepts, this chapter argues that one of the most important aspects of FRELIMO’s ascendancy as the sole political party of Mozambique in 1975 was its early ideological and organizational capacities as a proto-state. The circumstances in which FRELIMO operated as a proto-state were based on the movement’s geo-political strategies, ideological evolution, and its management of institutions for implementing social services to its revolutionary constituents during its operations in Tanzania. The chapter also demonstrates how FRELIMO’s early methods of governance and relative organizational successes, specifically in Tanzania, provided a framework for its future shift toward formal authoritarian state policies in early postcolonial Mozambique. Although I am in agreement with Geert Poppe that FRELIMO’s shift toward Marxism was not necessarily inevitable, I differ with some of his conclusions regarding the “Reassessment of FRELIMO’s Early Years.” Poppe does address the internal divisions within FRELIMO and its inchoate economic and agrarian policies, but focuses his argument mainly on FRELIMO’s activities in the liberated zones. FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania are

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6 I explain the concept of “revolutionary constituents” in greater detail in the next chapter.
7 In his dissertation, Geert Poppe does not flesh out this aspect of FRELIMO early politicization within Tanzania and the opportunities generated from the ambiguities in the relationship between TANU and FRELIMO.
8 This is borrowed from the subtitle of Poppe’s dissertation entitled, “The Origins of Mozambique’s Liberalization: A Reassessment of FRELIMO’s Early Years.”
under-analyzed. I argue, instead, that Tanzania was a revolutionary laboratory where FRELIMO’s early political development was significantly influenced by TANU and Julius Nyerere.9 Tanzania’s shift toward statist Ujamaa also likely influenced FRELIMO’s later and more radical shift toward Afro-Marxism. Although TANU’s Ujamaa was not a Marxist incarnation, the program’s initiative for collectivization and “top-down” state directives signaled how the Tanzanian government under Julius Nyerere was clearly influential in the political evolution of FRELIMO.10

While in Tanzania, FRELIMO’s leaders did not possess the sovereign, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional authority of a formal state. This chapter explores the consequences of this interstitial and liminal phase of FRELIMO’s political transition. Despite the frequent challenges, questions about how and why the early leaders of FRELIMO were able to operate with legitimacy are addressed. Scholars, then, might reconsider how “liberation fronts” and movements elsewhere in Africa sought legitimation from both foreign and domestic supporters and what this meant when these freedom fighters acted with a Foucauldian “governmentality.”11 That is, FRELIMO’s leaders developed viable strategies of governance over an ostensible civil society of Mozambicans in the unpredictable milieu of an anti-colonial war and revolution.

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9 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.” Tague makes a similar argument about this political relationship as well.
10 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Scott devotes an entire chapter to the structural shortcomings of Nyerere’s (and TANU’s) Ujamaa program. By the 1970s, after failing to meet certain economic and development targets, TANU resorted to coercion to forcibly move Tanzanian people onto collectivized, state-run farms. By the 1970s, burgeoning authoritarianism within FRELIMO mirrored in some respects similar realities for the TANU regime.
Several recent studies have focused on topics regarding liberation movements in Africa and the world. Zachariah Cherian Mampilly’s book, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War offers a comparative analysis of three rebel groups and their respective strategies in regard to nascent statecraft in war zones.12 Mampilly’s focus is on “the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD) in D.R. Congo, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan.”13 What Mampilly’s case studies all have in common, other than possessing similar strategies and obstacles in establishing governing systems in areas under rebel control, is that each of these liberation movements predominantly operated “in” the country in which they were fighting. Although Mampilly does not focus on FRELIMO, his analysis is important because it complements Adolfo Y. Casal’s study of FRELIMO’s legitimation within Mozambique, particularly in areas the liberation front deemed to be the “zonas libertadas” (liberated zones) of Cabo Delgado and Niassa in the extreme north of Mozambique. Casal argues that FRELIMO’s interactions with rural Mozambicans “was a very effective strategic imperative” for the movement and one that was “eminently political” in purpose.14 However, each of these studies specifically focuses on the governing strategies of particular rebel movements that were active within the territory they were seeking to liberate.

13 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 5. The emphasis in italics is mine.
This chapter finds common ground with Mampilly’s and Casal’s respective contributions but adds an analysis of FRELIMO’s revolutionary policies and “insurgent governance” within the formally sovereign, territorial jurisdiction of Tanzania. I introduce new theoretical concepts that relate to the historical narrative of FRELIMO’s existence in the early 1960s so as to address the significance of this revolutionary situation. This is important because, although liberation movements generally operate within the territory they seek to liberate and often act in ways akin to formal states especially in rural areas, FRELIMO existed and simultaneously operated within two sovereign milieus: Tanzania and colonial Mozambique. As a recently liberated nation (1961) and territorial “safe haven” for FRELIMO, Tanzania was a foreign country that allowed the liberation front the sovereign and territorial space for its “insurgent governance” to manifest. In essence, TANU shared the physical space of Tanzania with FRELIMO in such a way to allow the liberation front the opportunity to develop revolutionary practices in state-like institutions where jurisdicational, legal, and sovereign ambiguities were hallmarks of this relationship. The politicization of FRELIMO was most evident in the 1960s when other liberation movements in Africa were similarly emboldened with Afro-optimism and possessed a moral argument for dismantling European and white settler colonialism elsewhere in the continent. In order to delve into FRELIMO’s early statecraft in Tanzania, definitions and contexts for both proto-state and contingent sovereignty, briefly outlined in the Introduction, are necessary at this point.
A proto-state is a distinctively rare example of a state, whose existence as a political phenomenon problematizes common notions and definitions of the state itself. First, the FRELIMO proto-state was infused with genuine but limited hegemonic power over an inchoate civil society of what I call revolutionary constituents (Mozambican refugees) living in Tanzania and over individuals who still lived in Mozambique’s so-called liberated zones. Part of what separates FRELIMO as a proto-state apart from other “rebel movements” and traditional definitions of a state is that it possessed official recognition from foreign, formally sovereign states, as well as the tacit and overt support from a plethora of other international organizations. Nations such as Tanzania, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, and East Germany and sympathetic international organizations like the Ford Foundation, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), and other groups affiliated with United Nations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), actively aided FRELIMO in various capacities and for different reasons.\(^{15}\)

FRELIMO also received dignitaries from several foreign countries to tour their operations in Tanzania. For example, North Vietnamese officials visited the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam in 1967 and delivered remarks.

\(^{15}\)For further explanation on the interaction and roles of foreign aid groups and nations in the early years of FRELIMO, see my later chapters “Borders and Brethren” and “Underwriting Legitimacy.” For the extensive role of the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) in assisting in the settlement of Mozambican refugees, see Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
on the common anti-colonial struggles of FRELIMO and the North Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{16}

Individuals from other foreign nations such as Sweden and China, in both official and unofficial capacities, visited FRELIMO locations in Tanzania as well. Chinese military advisors, familiar with guerrilla warfare and well-versed in Maoist theories pertaining to the merits of guerrilla war, also assisted in training FRELIMO soldiers. Perhaps the most famous foreign official to visit FRELIMO was Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who met with Eduardo Mondlane and other FRELIMO leaders in Dar es Salaam in April 1965. It is interesting to note, however, that according to Piero Gleijeses, “Che’s encounter with the leaders of Frelimo was stormy…Mondlane’s irritation with Che’s insistence that FRELIMO send its guerrillas to train in Zaire was heightened by a personal clash with Che…The conversation became acrimonious, and they parted at odds.”\textsuperscript{17} Ideological preferences and points of view were, indeed, informed by Cold War strategy and did, at times, clash with strong personalities and different opinions regarding revolutionary vision.

The constellation of support networks reveals the influence of Cold War socialist nations upon FRELIMO’s development but, perhaps ironically, FRELIMO gained support and aid from among religious and Western aid groups as well. The diversity of support says much about FRELIMO’s moral arguments for the liberation of Mozambique, but also reveals how the charismatic appeal of the liberation front’s leaders was critical in establishing connections across different ideological lines to achieve their ends.

\textsuperscript{16} Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.
Secondly, FRELIMO established a viable but tenuous legitimacy through the creation of numerous bureaucratic institutions in Tanzania and articulated various revolutionary goals during its First Congress in September 1962. Held shortly after the liberation front’s official formation on June 25, 1962, this First Congress discursively established, through speeches and resolutions, the official political foundations of FRELIMO. Organizing a founding conference in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania signaled a political statement about the legitimacy of FRELIMO in the eyes of that host nation. It was the validating experience of the First Congress that enabled FRELIMO to articulate a gamut of strategies and proclamations that distinguished its vision from the Portuguese colonial state.

Finally, FRELIMO financed, supplied, and structured a military force, the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM), which was eventually directly linked to the political framework of the organization. The melding of the political and military wings of FRELIMO demonstrated a deepening political maturation of the proto-state because, in lieu of other avenues to power such as popular election, victory in the anti-colonial war would putatively usher the FRELIMO political leadership along with the muscle of its military wing into positions of party and state authority after independence. Poppe argues that this was a critical moment in the political trajectory of FRELIMO and one in which the factions within FRELIMO’s leadership began to bifurcate. This political evolution was not fully inclusive as the personal factionalism that emerged with the melding of the military with the political wings of FRELIMO nearly destroyed the

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18 The FPLM, or the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, was the acronym for FRELIMO’s military force that fought against the Portuguese. Today, the military of Mozambique is known as the FADM, or the Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique.
liberation front from within by 1968. In this way, Poppe and others have already argued that FRELIMO’s hierarchy was organized around tenets of “democratic centralism” and was not determined through popular democracy or by other forms of input from ordinary Mozambicans. This situation illustrates that pragmatism, so often associated with political practices in democracies, can also emerge as a basis for action and decision-making/evaluation in revolutionary contexts. In pursuit of legitimacy, FRELIMO sought ideological and militarily expedient courses of action to both end colonial rule and establish an administrative foundation for a future, just society. FRELIMO’s leaders attempted to match their revolutionary rhetoric with revolutionary practices, thus cultivating a “New Man” for a new society.

Once established as a hierarchal, pyramidal organization buttressed with international recognition and support, FRELIMO and its Central Executive Committee not only made moral arguments about the inevitability of independence for Mozambique, they also utilized periodic violence and other coercive strategies to demonstrate evidence of its authority over ordinary Mozambicans. Similar to any formal state which theoretically possesses the “monopoly on violence,” there was a parallel objective when FRELIMO’s use of coercion and violence served as a means to establish a modicum of control over ordinary Mozambicans. However, there were limitations to FRELIMO’s use of violence both as a basis to coercively motivate Mozambicans to join the liberation front and to generate loyalty for the organization in its war against Portugal.

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19 Poppe, “The Origins.”
Despite possessing commonly assumed attributes of formal state authority, however, FRELIMO did not possess other critical facets of a formally sovereign state. For example, FRELIMO was unable to procure loyalty and subservience through taxation from among destitute refugees and peasants. Moreover, FRELIMO did not organize its hierarchy and ideological direction based on extensive democratic input or the wishes of a viable civil society within a specific, legal, and internationally recognized political space. Modern states, however, do not need to be organized democratically or seek to engage with their own civil society. Given the circumstances of the anti-colonial war that necessitated expediency, FRELIMO did not solicit popular input into who constituted the liberation front’s hierarchy, their political decisions, and military strategies. Members of the FRELIMO hierarchy instead sought to insulate and isolate their power, positions, and responsibilities from any popular democratic impulse from ordinary Mozambicans. War required expedient decision making that meant an authoritarian element had the space to emerge within the hierarchy that would respond and adapt to contingencies as they arose. Finally, FRELIMO did not act without considering the omnipresence of the Tanzanian authorities and their willingness to host FRELIMO’s leaders, settlements, schools, hospitals, military training centers, and Mozambican refugees within its sovereign borders. Thus, the notion that “states” act as sovereign masters over particular territorial domains does not apply to the FRELIMO proto-state. FRELIMO’s authority was necessarily checked and overseen within the parameters of a contingent sovereignty, afforded the movement by the Tanzanian government, over the lives of Mozambicans.

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21 Why this failed in the long run has been analyzed by other scholars and will be briefly addressed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
living in Tanzania. Unable to tax or stray far from TANU’s constraining oversight or political philosophies, FRELIMO had to seek alternatives to finance their existence and liberation efforts, always keeping an eye on the concerns of the Tanzanian government and that nation’s citizens.

As a proto-state, FRELIMO was, at least initially, more theoretically complex than just its proclaimed existence as a liberation front or “nationalist movement” in Mozambican historiography. It is not entirely accurate to consider FRELIMO as merely a “nationalist movement” or, as mentioned earlier, a movement of “anti-colonial rebels.” Likewise, it is insufficient to relegate FRELIMO’s early political status to the vague, ambiguous category of a government-in-waiting. These terms lack a more nuanced analysis of the political situation and imply a connotation of teleological inevitability as if, in the case of a government-in-waiting, FRELIMO’s political development was already completely established before independence.

FRELIMO’s rear-base existence in Tanzania, its ideological foundations, its operational and institutional capacities, and its purported hegemonic power were subject to profound shifts, changes, and instability in the milieu of unpredictable situations. FRELIMO’s war against Portugal and its internal turmoil during its early existence as a liberation front rendered the movement susceptible to circumstances beyond the proto-state’s or its leadership’s control. Although all states face unpredictability in structural, economic, and other forms of quotidian governance, the FRELIMO proto-state was particularly vulnerable to instability since, despite the movement’s propaganda, its ostensible legitimacy was constantly in jeopardy. With this in mind, the fundamental

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22 Reno, Warfare, 37-64.
basis for FRELIMO’s purported legitimacy to act as a proto-state was based on contingent sovereignty.

Contingent Sovereignty

Although briefly addressed in the Introduction, critical to understanding FRELIMO’s position as a proto-state is the theoretical concept of contingent sovereignty. I argue that contingent sovereignty is the critical, symbiotic, and reciprocal relationship that exists between a host-state and a foreign, fundamentally political entity, in which the former is willing to sacrifice aspects of its own legal and territorial sovereignty to aid and assist the latter in its political development. Both stand to gain something from the moral conditions that undergird this relationship. In this instance, Tanzanian officials were cognizant of the existence and operations of a foreign entity (FRELIMO) which operated extensive social services and military camps within the sovereign, territorial and jurisdictional boundaries of Tanzania. The government of Tanzania, under Julius Nyerere’s leadership, utilized the nation’s sovereignty for what he and other members of TANU believed was a moral endeavor. This sympathetic governmental support allowed FRELIMO to operate in Tanzania’s territorial space. This situation, in turn, enabled FRELIMO to gain legitimacy via access to and the respect of many sympathetic international supporters and provided an opportunity to justify both its own internal hegemonic authority and its stature as an ascendant regional power broker in East Africa politics. This scenario was especially true from 1961 to 1964 when Tanzania, as a recently liberated country itself, looked to firmly establish an autonomous state akin to

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23 Joanna Tague makes this argument for TANU in her dissertation, “A War to Build the Nation.” I make a similar argument for FRELIMO’s political development.
every other independent nation in Africa and the world. As a primary philosophical epicenter for African decolonization in the 1960s, Tanzania’s permissive and amenable attitude toward FRELIMO and several other liberation groups like the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) was based on Julius Nyerere’s visible support for the liberation front and the morality associated with African independence during the benchmark years of African nationalism. It also enhanced Tanzania’s international significance in the age of volatile Cold War politics.

As a potential strain and burden upon the limited human and financial capacities of Tanzania, however, FRELIMO sought to develop its own social services for Mozambican refugees to relieve the authorities and citizens of that nation from shouldering the brunt of the massive refugee influx of thousands of people that started in September 1964. FRELIMO, then, needed a modicum of leverage and freedom to unburden its hosts and, as such, needed to act in ways that developed its own legitimacy as a liberation front, further demonstrating its revolutionary resolve to Tanzanian authorities. Therefore, contingent sovereignty was the conditional result of the mutual respect, the sense of common purpose, and a process of political legitimation for both the new TANU regime and for FRELIMO. What gave FRELIMO such a special place in the political discourse of Tanzania was that, unlike other more modern African “rebel” groups that operate in sovereign nations often without their permission, FRELIMO’s creation was acceptable to Julius Nyerere and his regime maintained close oversight over the liberation front’s activities in that country.
However, there is a difference between TANU’s (Nyerere’s) support for FRELIMO and many state-brokered rebel movements in contemporary Africa. Recently, significant news headlines from Africa point out that some modern African states finance and support rebel movements to achieve certain national ends, namely undermining unfriendly neighboring governments and/or seeking to gain access to precious resources across other territorial borders. At first glance it might appear that the notion of contingent sovereignty would also apply to these circumstances as well. However, I argue that there are several major distinctions in the nature of these contemporary, often exploitative relationships between African states and rebel movements that negate the existence of contingent sovereignty between them.

First, FRELIMO was responsible for financing both its own anti-colonial war and its social services in Tanzania. Although Tanzania played a significant role in the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Liberation Committee and often aided FRELIMO through this tertiary organization, the Tanzanian government did not simply tap into its own public tax dollars to underwrite FRELIMO’s existence. Also, Tanzanian authorities did allow FRELIMO’s leaders to use the international airport to seek out funds abroad, thus helping to facilitate easier access to money, military supplies, and other aid necessary to develop social services and fight the war. The same was true for Tanzania’s harbors which allowed ships from foreign nations carrying military advisors and supplies to dock and transfer cargo to FRELIMO. Many of the weapons obtained in Africa today originated from former Warsaw Pact nations. Thus, illegal weapons smuggling, drug running, and money laundering from resources have generally financed
Africa’s contemporary rebel movements for causes that do not necessarily stem from a moral vantage point such as decolonization.\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, rebel groups often do not have the intention, will, or capacity to fund and operate social services for refugees or local Africans with whom they come into contact. In fact, many contemporary African rebel groups prey upon local Africans often victimizing them in brutal ways.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, given the recent brutality of many African rebel groups upon civilians, sovereign African nations generally disavow any knowledge of their operations or aid for such endeavors. For example, recently Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, has proclaimed that his government does not support the M23 movement in the eastern regions of Democratic Republic of Congo when evidence strongly suggests this is, in fact, the case.\textsuperscript{26} It gives modern African regimes a case for plausible deniability and effaces the hidden agendas and roles of particular heads of state in perpetuating such violence.

For TANU and Julius Nyerere in particular, their transparency in aiding anti-colonial movements during the heyday of African decolonization provided a case for

\textsuperscript{24} Reno, \textit{Warfare}; Schmidt, \textit{Foreign Intervention}.
\textsuperscript{25} Events a little over a decade ago demonstrate the seemingly “senseless violence” that engulfed Sierra Leone. For evidence of violence and its socio-political causes in Sierra Leone, see Paul Richards, \textit{Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone} (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996). For a personal account of this modern African tragedy on the lives of children, see Ishmael Beah, \textit{A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier} (New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2007). Also, the causes of violence and the intersections between African youth and shadow state involvement in opportunistic violence have been recent topics for analysis in African studies, see Jon Abbink and Ineke van Kessel, eds. \textit{Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa} (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Edna G. Bay and Donald L. Donham, eds. \textit{States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006); Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, \textit{Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight} (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2004); Alcinda Honwana, \textit{Child Soldiers in Africa} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

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their own domestic legitimacy in aiding a liberation front like FRELIMO because the circumstances involved the morality of an extra-national, revolutionary fraternalism in ousting the colonial powers from the continent. Moreover, unlike many contemporary African leaders, Nyerere was not looking to pillage neighboring states and civilians for resources. As a statesman, Nyerere genuinely sought to unshackle neighboring Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism which, if there was anything to gain other than international clout for such a goal, was to provide Tanzania with security on its southern border.

This situation was especially relevant to the nascent TANU regime whose concerns about the security of the country following the Tanzanian military’s insurrection in January 1964 over issues of pay and political influence were legitimate. By late 1964, TANU was working to transform the nation’s military, a situation made more urgent by possible Portuguese border incursions once the war between FRELIMO and Portugal began the following September. Security from external threats, then, was a logical goal for the Tanzanian state to pursue. It was not like many contemporary African states, however, which often seek proxies for their illicit activities but it was, rather, a political exigency for the TANU regime to help establish a single liberation front which was eager to liberate and, in all likelihood, one day rule Mozambique. FRELIMO’s existence within Tanzania was a short-term necessity that ostensibly generated favorable long-term benefits for both political entities.

Therefore, although not specifically articulated at the time as a basis for the mutual political arrangement between FRELIMO and TANU, contingent sovereignty was
the essential condition that informed that political relationship during the 1960s. It was the willing and intentional use of certain aspects of Tanzania’s formal sovereignty that ceded certain territorial, legal, jurisdictional oversights to FRELIMO which allowed it the relative freedom to act as a proto-state.

This scenario presented FRELIMO with a moral platform from which to advocate for a revolutionary transformation in Mozambique based on a series of ideological positions codified at its First Party Congress held Dar es Salaam in September 1962.\(^\text{27}\) Couching much of its propaganda and rhetoric in highly moralistic terms \textit{vis-à-vis} Portuguese colonialism, FRELIMO’s institutional strategies and operations both inside Tanzania and in northern Mozambique offered an opportunity to intervene in the lives of Mozambican refugees with the goal of transforming these people into loyal supporters. 

\textit{The Establishment of FRELIMO and the Revolutionary Pragmatism of its First Congress}

To challenge Portugal’s claims of extra-territorial sovereignty and notions of racial superiority, many educated Africans formed “liberation fronts” in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Founded on June 25, 1962 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, FRELIMO was determined to challenge every aspect of Portuguese colonial domination. As a liberation front, FRELIMO sought to establish a set of ideological positions from its inception that would not only provide a framework for Mozambicans to challenge Portuguese colonialism, but would also establish a genuine revolutionary platform distinct from pre-existing colonial structures which were based on racial, gender, and class differences.

From 1962 to 1969, under the leadership of the Western-educated, Dr. Eduardo

Chivambo Mondlane, FRELIMO developed a set of ideological structures that, in contradistinction to Portuguese colonialism, incorporated non-racial, non-elitist, and non-traditional precepts based on ethnicity. Although these ideological positions underscored the basis of the struggle starting in 1962, they were also reaffirmed as “official” ideological philosophies during FRELIMO’s Second Party Congress in July 1968. Moreover, prior to his death on February 3, 1969, Eduardo Mondlane also wrote *The Struggle for Mozambique*, a political tome in which he justified FRELIMO’s legitimacy and further articulated his ideological positions and the political direction he envisioned for the liberation front.

From its inception on June 25, 1962, FRELIMO’s leaders began the process of devising strategies and declarations that were infused with revolutionary tenets, especially in many leaders’ repetitious calls for unity. Officially outlined later during FRELIMO’s First Congress, the liberation front acknowledged that the Congress “was a means of formalizing the new situation and of concretely defining the structure and programme of FRELIMO.”

The first example of FRELIMO’s early revolutionary pragmatism was the way in which the “prime aim…NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE” was tied to the initial international support and recognition received from Tanzanian officials and the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP): both of which had representatives at the meeting.

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29 Ibid., 1-2. CONCP was the acronym for the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies). The emphasis is in the original.
Lusophone countries, CONCP provided invaluable connections and access to resources to fight the Portuguese. The “adherence of FRELIMO to the CONCP” was important because it established political connections for FRELIMO beyond the borders of Mozambique and Tanzania to an international, pan-African organization.  

This provided FRELIMO with access to some financial assistance, the discursive support articulated in CONCP documents which advocated for “whole-hearted fraternal solidarity” between both organizations, and a real example of early legitimacy for FRELIMO’s existence.

It is also important to note that FRELIMO had one of its own, Marcelino dos Santos, acting as the “General Secretary” for CONCP during the First Party Congress. After initially affiliating with UDENAMO, Marcelino dos Santos later became a significant player in the Central Committee of FRELIMO as its Secretary of External Affairs. This was also followed later by the recognition of FRELIMO from the OAU in 1963 and liberation front’s subsequent recognition by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (AASC) that linked FRELIMO to the Soviet Union and its interests in southern African liberation struggles.

The experience of organizing a foundational conference, having invited representatives from both CONCP and TANU, signified a political strategy that displayed FRELIMO’s early statecraft in practice. The formal acknowledgement “of their excellencies Prime Minister RASWIBI KAWAWA [sic] and Minister of the Interior OSCAR KAMBONA” was not just a matter of official courtesy. The inclusion of Tanzanian dignitaries to oversee the process of FRELIMO’s initial politicization and


31 Ibid., 2.
ideological foundations expressed TANU’s interest in the internal affairs of FRELIMO and also ‘reaffirmed the sympathy and complete solidarity of the people and government of Tanganyika with the Mozambican people.’\textsuperscript{32} The First Congress was an early attempt to be politically transparent, to display a legitimate moral purpose for the decolonization of Mozambique and to offer “conclusive proof that our cause is a just one.”\textsuperscript{33} FRELIMO also made sure to capitalize each of its declarative statements relating to its ideological positions in the First Congress’s “RESOLUTIONS.” Terms such as “PROCLAIMS,” “EXPRESSES,” “AFFIRMS,” “DECLARES,” and “CONFIRMS” not only tends to grab the readers’ attention, but also unequivocally aver its revolutionary legitimacy through the codification of discursive terminology.\textsuperscript{34} This early political discourse claimed to speak on behalf “of all Mozambicans regardless of ethnic origin, financial means, religious and philosophical beliefs, or sex” thereby assuming a legitimacy of purpose over the lives of those who could not speak for themselves in such official forums.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, FRELIMO’s assumed right to speak on behalf of “all Mozambicans” revealed an assumed discursive authority, akin to a state, that putatively speaks and acts on behalf of its citizens.\textsuperscript{36} Since “The Congress laid down the general line of policy of FRELIMO on internal and external questions and defined immediate objectives as well as a means of action to realize them,” these officials expressed a collective agency: a philosophy of liberation that called for decisive action and a coherent political foundation.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 1. It is interesting to note that for such a foundational document in the history of FRELIMO that the misspelling on the first page of such an important member of TANU – in this case, Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa – seems odd for such “an event of great significance in the history of the people of Mozambique.”\textsuperscript{33} ALUKA, Mozambique Liberation Documents Collection, “1\textsuperscript{st} Congress Dar es Salaam 23-28 September 1962” Documents, 12.\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 8.\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
Reading against the grain of this document, however, reveals a critical flaw in the procedural creation of FRELIMO. As the first significant meeting and expression of FRELIMO’s political agenda, the legitimacy gained from the experience in the “Development and consolidation of the organizational structure of FRELIMO” during the First Congress was reserved for a small number of elite members of FRELIMO’s inner circle.\(^{37}\) This also reveals what Jürgen Habermas has cautioned is the folly of developing an “administrative bureaucracy” from among and within a small group of self-appointed cadres who not only control the discourse and, thus, “communicative action” of the organization but who also possess the means of defining an ideology for the masses.\(^{38}\) On its face, FRELIMO’s discourse at its First Congress was expressed in the moral language of a virtuous common purpose, an ethical crusade against Portuguese colonialism whereby “The winning of National Independence” was “the essential condition for the realization of our legitimate aspirations towards freedom, justice and well-being.”\(^{39}\) The irony of this circumstance is that FRELIMO advocated a moral rationale for the liberation of Mozambique but also expressed its right to determine by what course of action this was necessary for the Mozambican people to accept. Although Habermas’s concern with a lack of “communicative action” is applicable in this context, FRELIMO’s leaders faced little alternative in September 1962 for the inclusion of


\(^{38}\) The philosophical insights of Jürgen Habermas are useful for understanding the complexities of Pragmatism and its support for actionable experience in democracies. His insights, however, also prove beneficial in critiques of FRELIMO’s revolutionary Pragmatism and the interests of its elites. See Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); *The Theory of Communicative Action, Vols. 1 and 2* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

\(^{39}\) The ALUKA Project, Mozambique Liberation Documents Collection, “1\(^{st}\) Congress Dar es Salaam 23-28 September 1962” Documents, 11.
ideological input from the Mozambican people. This situation reveals the early and fundamentally undemocratic nature of the liberation front. However, FRELIMO’s discursive proclamations and initial political platforms also reveal the existence of a revolutionary strategy in establishing a broad, egalitarian, and moral justification for its struggle to liberate Mozambique. The apparent juxtaposition between FRELIMO’s undemocratic organization in the populist sense and its moral impetus to help liberate the people of Mozambique represented an inherent contradiction for the liberation front. This situation helps to justify my argument about how pragmatism, as a practice of political will and adjustment to circumstances, is not just evident in the political cultures of democratic societies; it was also present in FRELIMO’s decision-making and existence as an undemocratic but revolutionary organization. That is to say, FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism was evident in its expediency and adaptability to evolving humanitarian needs and political circumstances in Tanzania and the liberated zones without instilling or developing a broad, democratic structure. FRELIMO did not need to practice popular democracy to become legitimate: it employed other pragmatic approaches that generated loyalty to and legitimacy for the organization.

Although generated solely by the discursive productions of FRELIMO elites and not based on input from the Mozambican people, such declarative statements effaced and belied the existence of class, racial, ethnic, gendered, and religious divisions that shaped the dynamics of Mozambique indigenous societies and their colonial histories. However, such grandiose statements from FRELIMO were necessary to convey an overt optimism for unity and common moral purpose for decolonization. This discursive strategy was
politically pragmatic: to speak in anything less than a definitive terminology as the universal mouthpiece and organization for Mozambique’s decolonization would have made FRELIMO look weak, lacking in organization and ideas, and might potentially alienate its supportive TANU hosts and international supporters. Given Mozambique’s colonial status, FRELIMO articulated a nationalist rhetoric that juxtaposed its revolutionary vision of liberation from the exploitative control of Portugal.

FRELIMO’s First Congress in 1962 addressed the need for democratic centralization for FRELIMO. Since the majority of Mozambicans still lived under Portuguese control and the refugees in Tanzania were largely illiterate, FRELIMO’s early politicization necessitated definitive statements made from the organization’s educated hierarchy regarding the structure and revolutionary vision of the liberation front. However, as FRELIMO evolved and expanded its military presence in Mozambique, a similar level of democratic centralization remained the basis for the political organization of the liberation front. Popular democracy was not considered feasible because the liberation front faced with the overlapping circumstances of war, widespread illiteracy, and limited communications infrastructure that could have offered consistent coordination of and communication between refugees and FRELIMO’s leaders.

In sum, the First Congress was a political and legitimating experience in that it established relationships with outside groups, established a set of revolutionary positions, and acknowledged the contributions of foreigners to the initial organization of FRELIMO. Moreover, the First Congress was politically strategic because it illustrated FRELIMO’s early desire to capitalize on and gain support from the moral agendas of
burgeoning anti-colonial forces in the international community. In turn, this established a precedent that encouraged FRELIMO to pursue its ends through other international forums, i.e. the United Nations, foreign aid groups, and other sympathetic nations.\textsuperscript{40} For example, as part of the First Congress’s written statements, FRELIMO recognized and fully concurred with “the declaration on the concession of Independence to the colonial peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1960” thus tying the legitimacy of FRELIMO’s actions to official resolutions that favored decolonization already deemed acceptable to the majority of nations in the international community.\textsuperscript{41} U.N. Resolution 1514, commonly titled the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” passed overwhelmingly with eighty-nine “yes” votes, zero “no” votes, and nine abstentions. It is interesting to note that Portugal abstained on the resolution probably given the morality of the statements for decolonization and in the wake of British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan’s famous “Winds of Change” speech in Cape Town, South Africa earlier that year. Also in 1960, 17 other African colonies obtained independence from their European colonizers. U.N. Resolution 1514 was, then, following the trend in moral and global discourse for decolonization that considered the end of colonialism a \textit{fait accompli}.

Furthermore, despite the euphoric overtones associated within the grandiloquent accolades paid to the cause of liberation in speeches, both in English, at the First Congress by both Eduardo Mondlane (President of FRELIMO) and Marcelino dos Santos

\textsuperscript{40} FRELIMO international activities, relationships, and connections to the U.N. are further analyzed in Chapter 3, “Borders and Brethren” and Chapter 4, “Underwriting Legitimacy” in this dissertation.

(General Secretary of CONCP and later FRELIMO’s Secretary for External Affairs), there were also references that hinted at the ethnic, ideological, and personal troubles that plagued FRELIMO from its inception. Eduardo Mondlane made it a point to caution that “some of you probably have doubts as to our capacity to unite,” a blunt statement in which he clearly alluded to the challenges of bringing all Mozambicans together under his leadership early in FRELIMO’s founding year. As a discursive strategy that acknowledged FRELIMO’s common purpose with other Africans fighting colonialism, Mondlane adroitly linked the concept of unity across a constellation of overlapping interests. Mondlane stated: “…unity has crystallized now into this powerful movement called the MOCAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT” and connected his claim of this putative internal unity to a broader moral purpose in which he spoke to Mozambicans about how their “participation in this movement is a link with millions of people now under the boot of Portuguese colonialism.” Marcelino dos Santos augmented this claim in more militant terms when he proclaimed: “United, the people of our countries can easily liquidate our common enemy, Portuguese colonialism. Unity is a fundamental weapon.”

The “unity” motif, then, was a powerful trope that reflected FRELIMO’s overt attempt to minimize the liberation front’s early experiences with internal divisions. Such overarching idealism in FRELIMO’s earliest discourse was also, perhaps, a method of specifically undermining challenges from former leaders and members of the regional

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43 Ibid., 3-4. Emphasis in the original.
44 Ibid., Speech by Marcelino dos Santos, 5.
liberation movements such as Adelino Gwambe to Mondlane’s authority. FRELIMO not only attempted to stop early challenges within the organization to the leadership of Mondlane through the formal articulation of policy and ideological positions at the First Party Congress, but it also demonstrated a revolutionary pragmatism by evoking a sense of moral purpose that was necessary to rise above petty, archaic, and discriminatory differences.\(^45\) It was also as a means of satisfying their Tanzanian hosts who are consistently acknowledged for their presence at FRELIMO’s First Congress in Dar es Salaam.

“Unity Lessons”: The Discourse and Hegemony of FRELIMO’s Proto-State

FRELIMO’s ideological platform offered an alternative, paradigmatic shift in the “relations” among Mozambicans: a conceptually new, “modern,” and revolutionary opportunity for Mozambicans and refugees in Tanzania who had broken from colonial and many local, traditional expectations. Similar to other African revolutionary groups that formed in the 1950s and early 1960s, FRELIMO embraced a vision of modernity and a “New Man” that eschewed both traditional and colonial paradigms.\(^46\) TANU officials such as Julius Nyerere, Oscar Kambona, and Rashidi Kawawa inspired an African modernity that challenged alternative claims on power so that “Chiefs and ethnicity were out; new elites and nation-states were in.”\(^47\) This hostility toward “traditionalism” and

\(^{45}\) Ibid., Resolutions, 8.


“traditional elders” resulted in FRELIMO’s later decision to ban chiefs from politics and chiefdoms from existence shortly after independence in 1975. The work of building the liberated African nation required a new political bond between the people and the state but, unlike TANU’s path to independence, liberation for Mozambique also necessitated a violent anti-colonial war. From the pool of refugees who successfully escaped to Tanzania, FRELIMO needed to locate, train, and empower soldiers to instill in them an ideological platform that generated resolute loyalty and thus legitimacy to the proto-state from Mozambicans. For this to happen, “unity” between FRELIMO’s new elites and ordinary Mozambicans was the ultimate objective.

The early interaction between FRELIMO cadres and Mozambican refugees who were not yet necessarily subjected to the movement’s nascent ideological indoctrination offered an opportunity for both groups to navigate the social and ideational interstices opened during the early violence of the anti-colonial war. FRELIMO advocated for self-sufficiency (self-reliance) among Mozambican refugees but especially for the young who were expected to “cultivate their own fields, make their own clothes and equipment, build the school buildings and its furnishings, etc.”

For the refugees, however, opportunities for individual opposition toward members or policies of the FRELIMO hierarchy were muted in the official publications of the movement. To discourage any opposition toward the nationalist movement among refugees, the FRELIMO print media never carried the voices of refugees opposed to FRELIMO and its emergent socialist ideology. Instead,

propaganda discursively portrayed the refugees as powerless victims of colonialism in need of FRELIMO’s direction and leadership.  

Speaking as if the refugees who escaped to Tanzania were their constituents, FRELIMO would manage “the material to prepare our cadres for the struggle… who can fight efficiently against the 40,000 Portuguese soldiers scattered throughout Mozambique.” Individual refugees living in Tanzania were expected to conform to these plans accordingly, as it was “…not possible to wait until Mozambique was entirely free to launch a development effort on behalf of the population already free…” FRELIMO envisioned the refugees as willing accomplices in the liberation of the country, individuals whose contributions were necessarily overseen and managed by FRELIMO to achieve such ends.

Between 1962 and 1968, FRELIMO was able to gain the support of many of these refugees-turned-collaborators for a variety of its institutional projects, as well as for its war against Portugal, a fact underlined by the extensive use of print propaganda and newspaper photos depicting evidence of such endeavors. Meant to efface any evidence of negativity or non-compliance, this official propaganda depicted the appearance of unity and loyalty toward FRELIMO. However, this official propaganda also ironically alludes to another reality – that of its obvious silences - in which Mozambicans resisted

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49 This form of discourse mediation further demonstrates salience with Gayatri Spivak’s question “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Postcolonial theory and its contributions to Indian historiography in particular has raised such questions in an effort to further de-center truth claims of historians and the ways in which their research “rescues” voices and actions of subalterns. Many of these ideas have informed the research for this dissertation.


51 Oberlin College Archives, Herbert Shore Collection in Honor of Eduardo Mondlane 30/307, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute, Pamphlet, 10. Hereafter OCA.
in both overt and tacit ways the burgeoning hegemony of the emergent FRELIMO proto-state.\textsuperscript{52} As young Mozambicans who initially joined FRELIMO, Daniel Chatama and Lawe Laweki, for example, often criticized Eduardo Mondlane to fellow students at the Mozambique Institute secondary school. By 1968, many students openly challenged Mondlane’s authority as the leader of FRELIMO and for his decision-making on their behalf.\textsuperscript{53} Perhaps the fact that the propaganda only provides one omnipresent perspective conveyed as a series of images and stories of unity that depict cohesion, discipline, and loyalty that the obvious omission of both overt and tacit resistance from refugees - in words and deeds - toward FRELIMO is not proportionately evident or mentioned at all. Moreover, the photographs do not speak to the lengths or methods employed by FRELIMO photographers to generate such images. That is to say, many photos produced by FRELIMO are clearly staged and do not indicate whether or not the subjects of those images were coerced or volunteered for the picture. Thus, the silences reveal a strategic use of the proto-state’s discourse. The goal was to generate specific messages in the images that further conveyed FRELIMO’s revolutionary ideology.

This is not to say that individual refugees in the early years of the war did not possess an outward or inward resentment toward FRELIMO, but that their voices and actions were silenced in official documentation. Simply stated, FRELIMO had the power and media to silence opposition in its quest to propagandize evidence of its purported unity. FRELIMO generated various publications such as its official organ, \textit{Mozambique Revolution}, with editions in different languages and often produced them in multiple

\textsuperscript{52} Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2011; Lawe Laweki, email message to author, June 18, 2012.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
countries via its foreign offices.\textsuperscript{54} For example, \textit{Mozambique Revolution} was published in similar editions in New York, Cairo, and Dar es Salaam and copies were translated into English, Portuguese, French, and Kiswahili. Although FRELIMO was not organized or described as a “political party” until 1975, this political behavior demonstrates its early capacity as a proto-state to act in highly bureaucratic ways. In reaching out to both domestic and international audiences clearly shows a political maturation and party-like organizational capacity. This media and print infrastructure was critical to FRELIMO’s legitimacy and its real or hyperbolized portrayal of unity.

Regardless of enthusiasm, many refugees willingly accepted their new roles as the liberators of Mozambique since independence offered the possibility of new opportunities. Photos and captions in FRELIMO’s publications, such as \textit{Mozambique Revolution}, depicted men and women as refugees-turned-soldiers.\textsuperscript{55} Kathleen Sheldon has argued that this was also true for female refugees, some of whom served FRELIMO as porters and guerrilla soldiers as part of the \textit{Destacamento Feminino} (Women’s Detachment, DF). Sheldon observes, “Mozambican women became known as exemplars of revolutionary zeal, promoting equality, pictured carrying arms, and embodying ideas about the possibilities for women under socialism.”\textsuperscript{56} FRELIMO’s early discursive strategy involved propaganda that portrayed the liberation movement as a cohesive, unified front in which both women and men contributed to the war effort. One notable

\textsuperscript{54} ALUKA, \textit{Mozambique Revolution} File and the Chilcote Collection for ephemera published at various times and places.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Mozambique Revolution}, no. 51, April-June (1972), Cover page and 15. Various examples exist on the covers of FRELIMO’s \textit{Mozambique Revolution} throughout its years of publication. It is also evident in many other official publications – memorandums, letters, and speeches - generated by FRELIMO. I am grateful to Walter C. Opello, Jr. who sent me hardcopies of several materials he collected while conducting his own research, including this edition of \textit{Mozambique Revolution}.

\textsuperscript{56} Sheldon. \textit{Pounders of Grain}, 119.
woman in particular, Josina Machel, the wife of the future leader of FRELIMO, Samora Machel, was also an active participant in the guerrilla campaigns of the DF. It was necessary to include women as part of the liberation struggle to create a universal appearance of conformity and loyalty from Mozambicans of both sexes: a revolutionary strategy and practice that appealed to both Tanzanian authorities and international sympathizers.  

In articulating such a vision, FRELIMO and its leader, Eduardo Mondlane, not only relied on the production of their own propaganda, but also frequently contributed articles to widely circulated Tanzanian newspapers: the *Nationalist* and the *Standard*. These newspapers were accessible to international audiences, Tanzanians, and to the small number of Mozambicans living in Tanzania with literacy in English. Therefore, these Tanzanian newspapers and their sympathetic portrayal of FRELIMO, in particular, disseminated broad support for FRELIMO’s moral crusade against Portuguese colonialism. They also served as a validation of TANU’s support for FRELIMO. Allowing FRELIMO the print space and headlines to articulate its specific agenda(s) and message of unity was an essential forum for the establishment of legitimacy.

Tanzania’s contribution as the primary host-state and supporter of the evolution of FRELIMO cannot be understated. For example, on October 24, 1964, during the early weeks of the liberation front’s war against Portugal, a conversation between FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane and a reporter from the *Nationalist* revealed a glimpse into the evolving political situation for FRELIMO. Mondlane argued: “We are seriously considering setting our government on our soil – Mozambique – even before the war.

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57 I follow up on the role of women, gender roles, and generational issues later in the dissertation.
ends. And we mean just that. Only under special circumstances would we be forced to have a government in exile.”

Mondlane did not elaborate on what those “special circumstances” were, but it is evident that during the early weeks of the anti-colonial war, the presence of thousands of refugees in Tanzania afforded FRELIMO a unique opportunity to begin establishing a viable political foundation. The use of the term “government” was revealing but, perhaps, a bit misleading in this case, especially given that “liberation fronts” are primarily connoted as militaristic entities, not state-like organizations acting hegemonically. Since “government” is an umbrella term for the managers of state power over a sovereign territory, Mondlane’s use of the term here indicates something more revolutionary was in play: a deepening political vision that offered FRELIMO an opportune chance to demonstrate its emergent capacity as a proto-state while simultaneously acting as a militant liberation front. This point was clearly articulated several months later in June 1965 when a FRELIMO editorial in the *Mozambique Revolution* stated that as “Our struggle develops, not only the armed struggle, but also the political struggle…” The editorial went on to state: “In the regions where the armed struggle has not yet begun, the people are impatient. We explained to them the programme of FRELIMO.”

The use of the word “programme” implies both a defined political vision, first stipulated in September 1962 at FRELIMO’s First Party Congress, and as a justification for the further legitimation of FRELIMO.

To illustrate the power of the press in articulating FRELIMO’s revolutionary vision, the December 8, 1964 edition of the *Nationalist* published an article written by

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Mondlane entitled “Frelimo’s aim: AFRICAN RULE IN MOZAMBIQUE, ‘Not Govt. in Exile’” that consumed nearly all of page six. In it, Mondlane hinted at, but downplayed, the ongoing obstacles to unity, such as his calls for revolutionary social change that discursively articulated an egalitarianism that eliminated ethnic and class differences within FRELIMO. Mondlane further explained his earlier statements on October 24, 1964 in the same publication. He stated,

The Mozambican people, after many years of facing a common enemy have coalesced into one solid people, ready to free themselves. The people of Mozambique have come to consider themselves a nation in the same way that the peoples of India, China, and the Soviet Union and other multi-lingual and multi-religious societies now consider themselves one nation…The people of Mozambique are deeply aware of the reasons for their movement of liberation and revolt…we had no alternative but to unite into one solid people and to organize our counterforce for freedom, the Mozambique Liberation Front.\(^{60}\)

In generating such an article, which included a subheading entitled “Unity Lessons” only three months after the first migrations of refugees fled across the border to Tanzania, Mondlane argued for a particular vision of unity. Although the primary goal was to liberate Mozambique, the process envisaged the future nation as one putatively on par with other successful revolutionary societies.

In contextualizing FRELIMO’s war to rid Mozambique of Portuguese colonialism, Mondlane favored a revolutionary transformation for the nation and its people that was akin to that in other emerging socialist nations and global powers. In 1967, Tanzania’s espousal of the Arusha Declaration put that country on a leftist-, socialist-oriented path. Ever aware of the political situation in Tanzania and in solidarity with Nyerere’s vision, FRELIMO would follow this ideological path and articulate a

\(^{60}\) *Nationalist*, December 8, 1964, 6. Capitalization and abbreviations are in the original.
similar political orientation toward Afro-socialism later in July 1968 at its Second Party Congress. Having situated Mozambique within the global discourse of socialist-inspired liberation and the moral discourse of Pan-African nationalism, Mondlane consistently pushed for unity within the movement and saw FRELIMO’s purpose as linked to the quest for independence and self-rule in Mozambique. Prior to Tanzania’s socialist transformation, which was fully articulated and implemented with Nyerere’s famous 1967 Arusha Declaration, both TANU and FRELIMO discursively articulated and sympathized with leftist revolutionary ideologies in newspaper headlines, articles, and other propaganda. Although officially “non-aligned,” Tanzania received aid and dignitaries from several socialist-oriented or sympathizers that included China, Sweden, and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Nationalist and the Standard also frequently carried stories relating to the plight and struggles of North Vietnam against the United States, the possibility of subterfuge from NATO nations against the “United Republic of Tanzania,” the castigation of the British for their lukewarm treatment of Ian Smith and the “Rhodesian Question,” and, finally, the brutal practices of apartheid South Africa. All of this strongly suggests that Tanzania’s shift from socialist rhetoric to socialist practice with the Arusha Declaration also defined political possibilities for FRELIMO which was headquartered in Tanzania.

With a socialist milieu playing out around the Mozambican refugees and Julius Nyerere’s international clout growing, FRELIMO alluded to this ostensible, transformative model of revolutionary statecraft in its own propaganda. Although Mondlane’s argument on December 8, 1964 was indicative of FRELIMO’s early idealism
that, in hindsight perhaps possessed a naïve optimism, his message purposefully and perhaps strategically, ignored and downplayed deep seated historical divisions in Mozambique along ethnic, regional, class, and religious lines and opted instead to highlight his quest for unity.61

The role of these divisive issues that emerged to prevent unity within FRELIMO surfaced most dramatically during the late colonial era. Although Portuguese colonialism and settler control over sugar *prazos* (plantations) was slow to materialize during the early twentieth century given the dearth of a reliable workforce and Mozambican resistance to forced labor schemes, the European incursions into the Mozambican hinterland entered a world already informed by centuries of slave trading, wars, cattle-raiding, and environmental challenges. The entrance of Portuguese company officials, white settlers, and other government officials who sought to exploit ordinary Mozambicans for labor and tax revenues, dramatically influenced the volatile political climate within rural Mozambican societies. Furthermore, similar to other places throughout colonial Africa, the presence of European missionaries also shaped local political conflicts, generational tensions, and religious conflicts. In colonial Mozambique, Swiss Presbyterian and Catholic missionaries were active proselytizers and generally provided a means to access alternative paths to power, often through schooling, and expanded economic opportunities for some Mozambicans. As a major population center, the colonial capital city of Lourenço Marques (Maputo) in the extreme south of the colony presented Mozambicans from the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane, in particular, with access to jobs in South Africa’s mines via railroad and education in the

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61 Opello, “Pluralism and Elite Conflict.”
numerous seminary schools operated by missionaries. Although Portuguese colonialism and European missionary activities eventually reached the northern provinces of Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula) in the early-to-mid twentieth century, Mozambicans in these regions typically had less access to education. Compared to Mozambicans in the southern provinces of the colony, where patrilineality was primarily practiced, matrilineal kinship was prevalent in the northern regions. The disparate systems of inheritance, gendered expectations, and economic transactions presented different interpretations of familial relations and paths to power and respectability. Finally, the linguistic differences among Mozambicans further complicated the notion of unity during the anti-colonial war. Mozambicans, then, were not a homogenous mass that came to universally support FRELIMO as loyalists, but represented different ethnicities, languages, customs, religions, regions and historical experiences. Some Mozambicans also benefitted from Portuguese colonialism and acted as collaborators in various colonial projects. The divisions among Mozambicans were a constant source of consternation for FRELIMO’s leaders, many of whom differed in ideological perspective and their visions of what a liberated Mozambique would mean for those in power. These historical divisions among Mozambicans complicated Mondlane’s discourse and pursuit of unity.

The challenges also informed another reality of FRELIMO’s political status in December 1964. Only three months after the start of the fighting, the liberation front attempted to minimize its status at that time when Mondlane argued in the Nationalist on
December 8, 1964 that FRELIMO was “Not” a “Govt. in Exile.”\textsuperscript{62} That is to say, FRELIMO’s emergent proto-state in Tanzania was envisioned as a short-term expediency to aid refugees but the final goal was national unity and the end of colonialism in Mozambique. The objective alluded to in this article, then, was to build upon the ideological and institutional models that were shaping the lives of refugees in Tanzania and in the liberated zones and apply them to all people in a fully liberated Mozambique.\textsuperscript{63} FRELIMO later claimed that the liberated zones of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, in the far northern regions of Mozambique south of Tanzania were, according to myriad FRELIMO publications, freed from direct Portuguese rule sometime in late 1965 or early 1966. Shortly after the war began, however, Mondlane’s intention in late 1964 was to avoid a protracted anti-colonial war in which FRELIMO had no choice but to manage its affairs and the lives of Mozambican refugees for an indefinite period of time in a neighboring host country. However, what did occur for FRELIMO between 1962 and 1968 was not, in fact, the creation and formalization of a government in exile, which Mondlane himself hoped to avoid, but the emergence of an increasingly authoritative proto-state that doubled as a militant anti-colonial liberation front. FRELIMO’s management of myriad commitments, i.e. the anti-colonial war, thousands of refugees, two vast liberated zones, and its international relations was a critical component to its ascendant hegemony and political legitimation during the early years of anti-colonial war (1962-1968).

\textsuperscript{62} Nationalist, December 8, 1964, 6.
\textsuperscript{63} Reno, Warfare, 40. Reno also alludes to the importance of creating “Liberated Zones” as a strategy for anti-colonial rebels and, as he indicates, this idea was also theorized and articulated in Mao Tse-Tung’s \textit{On Guerrilla Warfare}, Trans. by Samuel Griffith II (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000).
Revolutionary Pragmatism and the Limited Potential of Proto-State Violence for Generating Legitimacy

Despite many rhetorical and propagandized strategies to win legitimacy through pragmatic strategies based on genuine humanitarian concern, FRELIMO employed another approach that was more hegemonic in practice: coercion and violence as a means of recruitment and establishing loyalty. The use of violence against fellow Mozambicans was effective to a point, but it was also counter-productive from the point of view of maintaining loyalty and an emotional bond from the refugees and the native population who still resided in the colony. Afraid of both infiltration and sabotage, both of which became significant facets of Portugal’s anti-guerrilla war against FRELIMO, the proto-state also deployed violence against Mozambicans as a political strategy. From the viewpoint of FRELIMO’s leadership, Mozambicans who failed to support the revolution against Portugal and who failed to work toward their own physical and mental liberation from Portuguese colonialism required coaxing and re-education.

Egregious violence against civilians is less persuasive as a coaxing mechanism for generating loyalty. As Kai M. Thaler has argued in regard to FRELIMO, a coherent ideological vision often minimized wanton violence against civilians. He states: “In some cases, ideology may lead a group to be more selective and restrained in its targeting of civilians.”64 Certainly, during FRELIMO’s early years in Tanzania where it helped to manage the lives of refugees, ideology mattered as much as praxis: without the loyalty of refugees in Tanzania generated from genuine humanitarian assistance and institutional developments, FRELIMO could not have built-up its military forces and garnered

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legitimacy from its revolutionary constituents. In regard to FRELIMO’s early perceptions of traditional African leaders, Thaler is concerned with how ideology was critical when, “Frelimo attempted to create alliances with traditional leaders and officials appointed by the Portuguese, believing their ‘ancestral influence’ could be used to draw more people to the movement.”65 Thaler continues: “From the beginning, the protection of civilians and the preservation of popular support were emphasized…Thus, FRELIMO stressed discipline, cohesion, and a sense of justice when training cadres.”66 The focus of Thaler’s article is, like in much of the historiography of the independence era of Mozambique, on FRELIMO’s activities in the liberated zones in the northern districts of the colony while any attention to the liberation front’s activities and coercive tactics in Tanzania is missing. Thaler also argues against the value of the Portuguese newspapers as a reliable source that might adequately cover FRELIMO’s use of violence against civilians but, curiously, he neglects to consult African newspapers such as the Nationalist which reported on violent interactions between FRELIMO cadres and leaders in Dar es Salaam in May 1968.67 Although Thaler admits, “There is a paucity of good data on violence against civilians by Frelimo…” he privileges evidence collected by the Portuguese PIDE which, given its purpose to undermine, torture, and kill members of FRELIMO, possessed its own biases in regard to the collection and publication of data about the liberation front’s activities.68 After all, Portugal was at war with FRELIMO.

The veracity of PIDE’s documents, then, are certainly no less problematic than

65 Ibid., 552.
66 Ibid., 548, 552.
newspaper sources in terms of their under- and over-reporting on violence and their biased subjectivities against FRELIMO. Conversely, creating political legitimacy based upon a measured use of FRELIMO’s will to power was evident in the movement’s apparent will to kill (if necessary) against those elders and individuals who sympathized or collaborated with Portugal or against those who snitched on FRELIMO’s activities.69

Put directly, FRELIMO’s cadres did indeed kill Mozambicans in the northern liberated zones, but violence directed at those refugees who fled to Tanzania was less conspicuous if not generally under-reported. Thaler’s argument, however, is important to consider because it demonstrates how the use of violence in targeted ways to coerce Mozambicans into accepting the movement’s legitimacy was indeed a proto-state strategy. Violence is a means of hegemonic validation bolstered by ideology. However, FRELIMO paid a consequential price for its use of violence while maintaining an authoritative control over refugees in Tanzania and its putative liberated zones in Mozambique, in the form of an inchoate, shallow loyalty that threatened the nationalist movement’s quest for legitimacy and unity. This deployment of targeted discriminate violence would also repeat itself later after FRELIMO transitioned into a political party in 1975 and consolidated its sovereign hegemony over the entire population of Mozambique, many of whom later came to reject FRELIMO’s legitimacy.70

Although many unwilling individuals

69 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012. Mabunda recalled that FRELIMO threatened to kill his brother believing that he was a traitor to the cause.
70 This was especially true during FRELIMO’s war with RENAMO and its imposition of “top-down” agricultural and industrial schemes. See Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique (London: James Currey, 1991); Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique; Bowen, The State Against the Peasantry; Sheldon, Pounders of Grain; Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique; Victor Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 781-799; Benedito Luís Machava, “State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of
eventually joined FRELIMO and became loyal supporters, some Mozambicans who did not respond positively to the coercion remain bitter about their lack of choice in supporting FRELIMO to this day.\(^{71}\)

Opting either by choice or social pressure to flee to Tanzania inexorably resulted in decisions for refugees of both sexes that offered perils and opportunities, especially when FRELIMO loyalists employed violence as a means of motivation. However, the failure to incorporate local, traditional sources of power undermined FRELIMO’s complete authority over refugees and post-independence Mozambicans alike.\(^{72}\)

Diametrically opposed to input from local, traditional sources of power, FRELIMO’s adoption of revolutionary modernity negatively affected the cohesion and adaptability of the proto-state and its legitimation.\(^{73}\) As a result of his extensive fieldwork among the Makonde of the Mueda plateau, Harry G. West glimpsed the fine line between FRELIMO’s sympathy for refugees in Tanzania and its use of violence to deter possible collusion with the Portuguese.\(^{74}\) Although West confirmed this reality in an informal conversation, FRELIMO publications naturally avoided evidence of violence directed toward Mozambicans in refugee settlements or toward those still residing in the colony.\(^{75}\)

However, the memories of those individuals who witnessed or were directly affected by

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\(^{71}\) Cabrita, *Mozambique*; Abel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.

\(^{72}\) Bowen, *State Against the Peasantry*.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.


\(^{75}\) By “violence” in this sense, I mean physical violence. There may have been psychological violence imposed upon refugees who were already in a vulnerable state. This topic emerged in an informal conversation I had with Harry West via Skype.
the violence, many of whom now live in exile, remain vivid and are addressed in a later chapter. Violence directed toward Mozambicans as a hegemonic imposition and political strategy of FRELIMO, however, worked against the liberation movement’s more exemplary revolutionary pragmatism in developing institutions aimed at aiding refugees such as the Mozambique Institute and Tunduru Children’s Camp.

A legacy of targeted violence also informed FRELIMO’s hegemonic strategy into the 1970s. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott have argued, based on evidence and oral testimonies of survivors, “FRELIMO had always conducted terrorism against the native population – at least 689 deliberate assassinations had taken place between 1964 and February 1973, together with over 2000 woundings [*sic*] and 6500 abductions. In Tete alone 55 chiefs had been murdered during 1971.” Similariy, Norma Kriger addresses the fact that popular support for the rebel movements in Zimbabwe was eroded as a result of coercive tactics against the peasants on the part of the rebel movement itself. FRELIMO’s methodical use of violence against certain African chiefs (*régulos*), and suspected Portuguese sympathizers resulted in two unintended consequences that undermined the revolutionary pragmatism of the movement. First, and perhaps most overtly, the potential emotional and physical alienation discouraged many in the rural population from joining the liberation movement out of fear for personal safety. This reality undermined FRELIMO’s stated claims and quest for “unity.” Secondly, FRELIMO’s use of violence toward civilian populations also underscores the argument about how the liberation front doubled as a proto-state. If the Weberian notion of the

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77 Kriger *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War*, Chapter 1.
state’s “monopoly on violence” applies to modern legitimate states, FRELIMO’s use of targeted violence as a political-military tactic against its internal and external enemies, both real and imagined, also played a role in articulating its legitimacy.  

FRELIMO’s use of violence toward Mozambicans was not the same form or approach to violence later employed by armed groups such as Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique during the 1980s or the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) during the late 1990s in Sierra Leone. In those cases, “the violence perpetuated in these revolts is, in the strategic-instrumental sense, not irrational but deliberate and reasoned if atrocious. Its random nature serves to make it unpredictable, which in turn makes it unmanageable and therefore increases people’s fear and propensity to submit, especially if the form of violence is incomprehensible and, hence, alienating.”  

In case of the RUF, for example, infamously named atrocities such as “Operation Pay Yourself” or “Operation No Living Thing” revealed the callous intention of harming indigenous populations with no clear hegemonic objective.  Although it has been confirmed that various targeted individuals of FRELIMO’s violence were assumed, purported enemies of the movement, it was FRELIMO’s discretionary use of violence that revealed its organized, targeted, and politically authoritative nature.  

FRELIMO eschewed random violence against rural Mozambicans, and instead sought their assistance and participation, especially as food producers and porters. There was, however, a fine line between a logical use of violence

78 Max Weber “Politics as a Vocation.”
for ideological-political ends and the random, seemingly senseless use of violence to achieve other, more personal vendettas. Since FRELIMO did target perceived potential enemies within the movement, when leaders moved to kill those on the periphery who opposed the basis for Mondlane’s ideological positions, his organizational framework and leadership, they ran the risk of alienating Mozambicans who might otherwise have assisted FRELIMO in its efforts to liberate Mozambique. For many ordinary Mozambicans caught between the violence of the Portuguese military and the colonial state and FRELIMO’s violence intended to end internal challenges, it was a catch-22. For FRELIMO, coercive encouragement of the peasantry could be explained as a method of control, an authoritative display of the real and ostensible power in usurping the violent tendencies of the Portuguese colonial regime.

Episodic violence within FRELIMO eventually led to political ostracism, discursive retribution in rival publications and documents, leadership purges, murder and assassination within the liberation front itself – not the least of which included the assassination on February 3, 1969 of Eduardo Mondlane, most likely by A Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) agents. Other high-profile deaths and purges from FRELIMO include, *inter alia*, Filipe Samuel Magaia, Uria Simango, Lázaro Nkavandame, Father Mateus Gwenjere, Paulo Gumane, and Adelino Gwambe. Although still controversial and hotly debated, many of the political rivals within FRELIMO and founders of alternative “liberation movements” were purged and allegedly murdered by FRELIMO. The exact dates, locations, and the methods of execution for Gumane and Simango, for example, are still difficult to verify. However, a picture of Simango and
Gumane making a confession, dated May 11, 1975 before their “extrajudicial killing” was circulated.\(^82\) Political machinations, polemical debate, and ideological divisions are natural attributes of normative, formal states and political communities. However, as a proto-state operating on foreign soil, these factors were destabilizing and resulted in FRELIMO’s targeted use of violence, especially when motivating apprehensive Mozambicans to support FRELIMO and to eliminate perceived threats.\(^83\) This reality rendered FRELIMO vulnerable to infiltration and subversion as it provided the Portuguese with opportunities to undermine and disrupt its propagandized cohesion and unity. FRELIMO’s fear of Portugal’s secret police, PIDE, and its use of African informants, as well as the undermining presence of an “ambitious figure” like “Leo Milas” or other suspected agents provocateurs was not unfounded. Leo Milas, a.k.a. Leo Clinton Aldridge, is believed to have been “an imposter” and later assisted in the creation of RENAMO.\(^84\) Anti-FRELIMO dissidents and Portuguese loyalists frequently used rumor, rival publications, and other “acção psicosocial” (psychosocial operation/action) to undermine FRELIMO.

Given the many PIDE documents now available in Portuguese archives, the extent to which subversive Portuguese tactics undermined FRELIMO is not in doubt.\(^85\) It is, however, nearly impossible to determine to what extent internal rivalries within

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\(^83\) Ibid.


\(^85\) See especially the archival holdings on PIDE in *O Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo* and *O Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* in Lisbon. Both contain extensive PIDE files. For PIDE’s role in undermining and infiltrating African liberation movements in Lusophone Africa, see Mateus, *A PIDE/DGS*. 110
FRELIMO were the direct result of Portuguese machinations or arose from ethnic disputes, personality conflicts, or ideological and other fractional debates among the hierarchy. What is clear is that, when FRELIMO assumed control over the lives of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, the strategy to combat such threats, manipulation, and personal conflict necessitated a repetitious use of famous slogans such as *Venceremos ou Morte* (We Will Win or Die) and *Vamos Luta* (Let us Struggle or We Will Fight) alongside a willingness to use violence against its own revolutionary constituency to maintain security. Violence directed at the refugees or those Mozambicans still residing in the colony, then, was a means of vetting possible recruits but also served to alienate people who were skeptical about FRELIMO’s hegemonic authority especially while it operated within Tanzania.

Through occasionally violent actions and perpetual discourses of unity, FRELIMO underscored its validity as a proto-state despite threats to its legitimacy. Advocating for unequivocal unity as a precondition for victory in the anti-colonial war may have overshadowed deep fissures and animosity within FRELIMO itself, but without such sentiments, the movement faced a loss of credibility. Therefore, despite internal tensions often generated from external threats and faced with few alternatives, many initially reluctant refugees submitted to FRELIMO’s ascendant authority and did so as part of a coping strategy for a burgeoning moral community intent on liberating Mozambique.

For the FRELIMO leadership, however, loyalty to the movement from ordinary Mozambicans was but one aspect of legitimacy, as their propagandized victories over the
Portuguese required steadfast solidarity with the liberation front and identification with its leadership. FRELIMO’s official documents often ended with powerful sloganeering, manifested in other statements such as “Venceremos” (We will win) and “Independencia ou Morte,” (Independence or Death), which alluded to the argument for a collective and unified liberation. In the minds of FRELIMO’s leaders both internal and external challenges needed to be eliminated and the gains from such a hegemonic strategy outweighed the potential for negative consequences.

FRELIMO’s leaders also realized the potential risks in losing its legitimacy among refugees if violence was the only method employed to recruit members and soldiers. It is, at this point, well-known that many innocent Mozambicans were killed, tortured, and brutalized by both sides during the anti-colonial war, although the horrors of napalm bombing, forced internment in aldeamentos (detention camps), and other Portuguese brutalities putatively outweighed the violence imposed upon Mozambicans by FRELIMO. However, this mutual violence unleashed on segments of the population did, in the Weberian sense, garner a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Mozambicans.

The competition between FRELIMO and Portugal meant, tragically, that many Mozambicans would die in the process. This is meant in no way to apologize for atrocities committed on both sides. It is, however, meant to articulate how loyalty to FRELIMO was, at best, tenuous and in this milieu of violence, machinations, and internal rivalries, the proto-state also needed to display a visible humanitarian side to offset the horrors of some of its coercive decisions. Given the evidence of occasional violence in

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86 Thaler, “Ideology,” 552-553.
87 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation.”
achieving these ends, however, FRELIMO also necessitated a tangible humanitarian commitment, hence the existence of social services via the Mozambique Institute.

Conclusion

Political scientists and philosophers have long debated the meanings of a “state,” particularly from conceptions forged through a Western lens. It is generally accepted that the “modern state” emerged in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries as part of a burgeoning nationalistic “governmentality” concerned with managing political authority over citizens and civil society.\textsuperscript{88} Political revolutions against the \textit{ancien regimes} in Europe during the late eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries ushered in a period of political liberalization in which democracies challenged monarchical power. As many European nations industrialized and witnessed burgeoning nationalistic sentiments, the roles of the state transformed. Civil societies in Europe and elsewhere in the Western world came to debate the effects and existence of the state in their lives and, as such, through increased modernization of society, citizens were subject to state power as much as they served to inform it.

Much of the recent scholarship on states in Africa, however, draws attention to the failures of statecraft, the “crisis of legitimacy,” and enduring struggles to adequately explain post-colonial meanings and inherited colonial practices and abuses.\textsuperscript{89} For this reason, contemporary historiography of African states tends to overemphasize the era of statecraft after liberation struggles when political or nationalist movements espoused power, sent ambassadors to the United Nations, and ensconced their authority into the

\textsuperscript{88} Foucault, \textit{Security}.
\textsuperscript{89} This is borrowed from Habermas’s title, \textit{Legitimation Crisis}. 
trappings of what Frederick Cooper has called “gatekeeping.” What these studies lack, however, are comprehensive analyses of the years of the immediate pre-independence period: a time of ideological formation, informed by theories and approaches to political legitimation couched in terminology that was discursively Afro-optimistic. The circumstances that necessitated Mozambique’s violent path to independence established the conditions for FRELIMO’s political metamorphosis into a proto-state imbued with contingent sovereignty and represented a distinct example of interstitial nascent statecraft in Africa.

This chapter provides the theoretical template that undergirds the forthcoming historical evidence to support the overall argument of the dissertation: namely, that as a liberation front, FRELIMO also doubled as a proto-state that initially embraced pragmatic approaches toward its legitimation, especially in Tanzania. Eventually, the internal rivalries and differences of opinion coupled with Portuguese intrigue resulted in a strand of authoritarianism that came to dominate the leadership of the movement and their management of the liberation front.

Under its first President, Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO sought international recognition for its struggle in the acquisition of military, financial, material, and moral support. The liberation front actively encouraged acts of physical and mental resistance and, with the advent of war in September 1964, possessed the moral impetus to encourage military volunteerism, psychological and social transformations, and political legitimation through both violence and humanitarian assistance to refugees. By 1972, FRELIMO’s efforts at “Shaping the Political Line” had grown increasingly authoritarian.

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90 Cooper, *Africa Since 1940.*
Through the formalization of institutional power, the creation and maintenance of social services such as health care and education for Mozambican refugees, and the procurement of international recognition and largess, FRELIMO acted pragmatically within the ambiguous contours of contingent sovereignty in Tanzania. Despite the perils of anti-colonial war, internal schisms, and its burgeoning authoritarian politicization by the early 1970s, FRELIMO navigated a successful path to the liberation of Mozambique from its inception in 1962 that culminated with its political ascendancy in 1975.

Although FRELIMO frequently advocated the inevitability of independence for Mozambique in its published documents, it also claimed the authority to rule over all Mozambicans. But its official, self-proclaimed status as a liberation front meant that its actions as a proto-state lacked the formal sovereignty of an independent nation to reign over an internationally recognized and legally determined territorial space. As an instrumental component of FRELIMO’s revolutionary development, it established an institutional infrastructure such as schools and hospitals that aided both the Mozambican refugees and those individuals still living in the liberated zones. It was the nature of this relationship between FRELIMO and Mozambican refugees in Tanzania that is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Building a Revolutionary Constituency:
Mozambican Refugees and the Development of the
FRELIMO Proto-State, 1964-1968

In September and early October 1964, many Mozambicans fled from the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa to the sanctuary and friendly border of Tanzania, crossing the Ruvuma River to escape Portuguese reprisals and the escalating violence of the anti-colonial war. With the ongoing organization and infiltration of FRELIMO into these northern Mozambican provinces, Makonde men, women and children faced the stark reality of catastrophic violence in their lives given the severity of immediate Portuguese retribution. Portuguese planes and soldiers specifically targeted and firebombed villages and small rural towns on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique with fighter jets and raids seeking to exterminate FRELIMO soldiers and Makonde sympathizers. Many Mozambicans living in these provinces were killed. Such indiscriminate killing was the result of Portugal’s determination to quickly end any challenge to its authority in Mozambique; an effort to avoid engaging in a full-scale war in another one of its so-called “overseas provinces.”¹ Portugal made a semantic alteration to its Constitution, Articles 134 and 135 in 1951, henceforth omitting the use of the word “colony” and replacing it with the term “province.” This linguistic maneuver was meant to deflect foreign criticism and signaled a deepening ambiguity of meaning in its control over territorial possessions around the world. The result was a significant regional

¹ MacQueen, *The Decolonization*, 11. This is not to be confused with specific regional districts, e.g. Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Gaza, etc. within the so-called former colonial “province” of Mozambique.
migration for many Makonde, who constituted the greatest number of refugees to escape across the river successfully into Tanzania’s Mtwará region.²

This chapter argues that the Mozambican refugees who fled to Tanzania during the initial violence of the anti-colonial war in late 1964 were an important quasi-constituency in the early hegemonic development of FRELIMO. These Mozambican refugees, regardless of gender or age, experienced a crisis of status (like many war refugees) and yet possessed heretofore unavailable opportunities for social and individual reinvention under the auspices of FRELIMO cadres during the formative years of Mozambique’s liberation in the 1960s. When Mozambicans decided to flee, their lives were disrupted and their personal safety and security were jeopardized. Their lives as individuals and family members were thrown into a temporary state of social flux, thereby suspending in the short term many of the normative institutions, practices, and expectations held in their respective communities. This amorphous and volatile shift of social conventions allowed for a temporary break from norms and customary duties.

This reality presented FRELIMO with the chance to intervene in the lives of desperate Mozambicans in order to impose a new paradigm of state-building and hegemony. In contradistinction to the nefarious realities of Portuguese colonialism such as chibalo (forced labor), the limited opportunities for education that resulted in high illiteracy rates among the population, and Portugal’s reliance on sipais (African police) and régulos (chiefs loyal to Portugal) to enforce quotas and its extractive colonial policies meant that FRELIMO’s ideological position offered an alternative path for the liberation of mind, body, and the envisaged nation.

In order to manage this emergent relationship with thousands of predominantly illiterate and impoverished refugees, FRELIMO demonstrated its early legitimacy through both pragmatic applications of its revolutionary ideology in institutional settings and its management of contingent sovereignty: the critically supportive but limited and informal agreement between TANU and FRELIMO that offered the latter a modicum of conditional flexibility to operate as a ‘state’ on Tanzanian soil. During its formative years (1962-1968) FRELIMO was more than simply its translated name: “The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique” fighting a guerrilla war. Considering the circumstances of the massive refugee influx into Tanzania, FRELIMO was both a liberation front of militant fighters and a revolutionary proto-state whose interactions with refugees allowed for the formation of an inchoate hegemony. FRELIMO was a liberation front with intersecting political and military interests. It mobilized a military force of guerrilla soldiers to fight the Portuguese and, as an emergent proto-state, simultaneously established institutions and social services to benefit the lives of refugees in Tanzania and in Mozambique’s northern liberated zones of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The exact moment and definitive declaration that Niassa and Cabo Delgado were officially liberated zones is debatable. However, in its November 1965 Mozambique Revolution, FRELIMO stated that these provinces were “semi-liberated zones,” implying that they were on the verge of proclaimed independence from Portuguese colonialism.³ It seems, then, that the more extensive use of liberated zones and not “semi-liberated zones” in FRELIMO publications during 1966 indicates that the liberation front felt strongly that these regions were relatively free. Nevertheless, the Portuguese still conducted raids and

³ ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution File, Mozambique Revolution, No. 22, November 1965, 12.
bombardments of areas within these so-called liberated zones throughout the war thus illustrating a discursive military and psychological strategy behind the meaning of liberated zones.

Although scholars have largely focused on the educational and political successes of FRELIMO in the liberated zones, they have paid less attention to FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania. This chapter rectifies this lacuna to argue that the institutional achievements in Tanzania contributed to the development of FRELIMO and played a significant role in mustering soldiers and generating loyalty from among the refugees. It was in the context of these overlapping realities and opportunities that, during the early 1960s, FRELIMO emerged to mobilize refugees into a revolutionary constituency. Therefore, the refugees’ vulnerability during the early weeks and months of the anti-colonial war - something captured on camera and (re)presented in both Tanzanian newspapers and FRELIMO publications - equated to a revolutionary, political opportunity for FRELIMO.

From among the tens-of-thousands of refugees migrating to Tanzania, FRELIMO needed to discern who among them possessed literacy, usually obtained in seminary schools, medical and medicinal knowledge, technical and vocational skills, and an education regardless of how rudimentary. FRELIMO made these determinations with

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5 The Mozambican refugees, largely Makonde from northern Mozambique, also benefitted the hegemonic expansion of TANU and the Tanzanian state. See Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
limited resources. However, convincing thousands of young men and women to rebel and fight the Portuguese was not necessarily hard for FRELIMO’s leadership given the decades of extractive colonial policies and abuses that afflicted Mozambicans. What was a challenge, however, was how best to maintain that loyalty to FRELIMO from among its revolutionary constituents.

*In Vivid Black-and-White: Anti-Colonial War and Mozambican War Refugees in Tanzanian Newspapers*

After the anti-colonial war in Mozambique began with FRELIMO’s cross-border infiltration and attack on a Portuguese outpost in Chai Chai in Cabo Delgado district on September 25, 1964, two Tanzanian newspapers the *Nationalist* and the *Tanganyika Standard* reported on the atrocities subsequently committed by the Portuguese against Mozambicans in the northern districts. Although FRELIMO cadres had actively recruited and trained Mozambicans from northern Mozambique for this attack, the Portuguese response was immediate. The brutality of Portuguese colonialism was made plain not just through its historical exploitation of the Mozambican people, but also several years before in the town of Mueda in the northern district of Cabo Delgado. On June 16, 1960, scores of Mozambican Makonde protested in the streets of Mueda as part of a public demonstration against Portuguese colonialism. The demonstration ended in bloodshed in front of the Portuguese district administrator’s headquarters in Mueda. Portuguese soldiers on the ground were ordered to fire on the crowd resulting in a massacre of Makonde. The Mueda massacre was a catalytic event in the history of colonial
Mozambique and many Makonde joined FRELIMO as a result. Thousands of Makonde became loyalists to FRELIMO and served as soldiers for the duration of the war against the Portuguese military.

Through candid photographic images that represented Mozambicans’ victimization and social marginalization, the plight of the Mozambican refugees in September 1964 was depicted in Tanzanian newspapers along with stories that articulated the unequivocal and steadfast support offered by TANU for their safety and security. The October 6, 1964 edition of TANU’s official newspaper, the Nationalist, observed “More than six hundred starved and horror stricken refugees have entered the United Republic from Mozambique last weekend,” having escaped profound atrocities inflicted upon their communities by the Portuguese. The next day, October 7, 1964, the Nationalist updated the official government tally of refugees with a new estimate bringing the total to 1,950.

The images, headlines, and stories that were published in the Nationalist and, to a less consistent extent, the Standard represented a particular aspect of the refugees’ plight: that suffering and misery were initially widespread among the first exodus of refugees. Abel Mabunda, a former refugee who later briefly joined FRELIMO and attended the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam, confirmed that the photo representations of these events were accurate. In regard to the initial influx of

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7 No author cited, Editorial, “Each & Every One,” Nationalist, October 6, 1964, 4. Also, with the national unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar made official in late 1964, the Tanganyika Standard became the Tanzania Standard (hereafter Standard). Colloquially, the paper was also commonly referred to as “The Standard.” Also, this is not to be confused with the East African Standard which was published in Kenya.
8 No author cited, “600 Refugees Enter Tanzan,” [sic] Nationalist, October 6, 1964, Cover page.
Mozambican refugees, Mabunda stated, “Most suffered because there was no organization, national or international, prepared to receive the avalanche of people that migrated. Some found help from relatives, others from FRELIMO and still others form the Tanganyikan authorities.”

Another former refugee, Lawe Laweki, explained that in response to the suffering, “FRELIMO in turn built primary schools and health centers in the settlement camps and from time to time sent political commissars to the areas to recruit youngsters and to raise the political consciousness of the rest of refugees (particularly women and old people).” Moreover, the other pro-TANU newspaper, the Standard, often carried stories describing the prolific violence that engulfed northern Mozambique resulting in the flight of thousands of refugees. The burgeoning number of refugees, tallied early in October by reporters from the Nationalist was followed-up in the Standard on October 13, indicating that a significant increase of nearly 7,000 refugees were in Tanzania. A month later on November 14, a report in the Standard claimed the number reached 9,000.

During these early weeks of the anti-colonial war, the Tanzanian government faced a mounting humanitarian crisis on its southern border and opted, in line with its ideological Pan-Africanist and OAU commitments, to offer succor and basic assistance to the Mozambicans. Images and articles in Tanzania’s newspapers often depicted refugees, in juxtaposition, as both victims and willing agents who contributed to the

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10 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.
11 Lawe Laweki, email message to author, May 6, 2012.
13 Dar es Salaam also played host to the OAU’s Liberation Committee, commonly referred to as “The Committee of Nine.”
construction of FRELIMO’s institutions in Tanzania for propaganda purposes. A similar
discursive representation of refugees was also generated in FRELIMO’s official letters
and photographs which specifically displayed young Mozambican refugees as
simultaneously victims of Portuguese retribution and agents of their own revolutionary
participation and social transformation.14

Clearly, these numbers indicate two important facets of the Mozambican refugee
crisis in Tanzania: first, significant numbers of refugees were streaming across the
Ruvuma River border in rapid succession and, second, that the exact number of people
who had fled to Tanzania represented only a best-guess estimate by Tanzanian authorities
and reporters. Despite visits in late 1964 from Tanzania’s Vice-President Rashidi
Kawawa, the Minister of State in the Vice President’s Office, Lawi Nangwanda Sijoana,
and the Minister of External Affairs Oscar Kambona to the region, no official census of
refugees was made since the numbers increased dramatically over the course of a short
period of time. The prolific Portuguese bombings of the northern districts in late
September and early October 1964 prompted many Makonde, who lived along the
southern edge of the riverine border, to flee to Tanzania. Since the southern provinces of
Tanzania, (Mtwara, Ruvuma, and Lindi) were remote and lacked sufficient road and
communication infrastructure, official reports in the Tanzanian press could not be
substantiated even though Tanzanian officials ventured to these regions to assist and
oversee the refugee influx. At best, then, the numbers were estimates probably compiled

14 ALUKA, Chilcote Collection, “The crisis among Mozambican student refugees in Dar es Salaam,”
January 1964.
http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.CHILCO206; and
ALUKA, Chilcote Collection, “Mozambique Institute: 1965,”
by the staff reporters from hearsay and empirical observation. Moreover, large numbers of Makonde and other Mozambicans were already living in Tanzania as undocumented migrant laborers. To clearly discern and delineate between a migrant laborer and a refugee would have been a daunting task in the impoverished and remote regions. The representations of Mozambicans in newspaper photographs and captions focused particular attention on the refugees’ suffering but, given the massive influx of Mozambicans into Tanzania, the initial images and descriptions tended to focus solely on the challenges of the refugees’ new lives as refugees.

For their part, the Portuguese also attempted to determine which Mozambicans were most likely to lend support, sympathize, or join FRELIMO. According to M. Anne Pitcher, a study of how colonial policies “fomented sharp social divisions” and alienated some ordinary Mozambicans from their “traditional authorities” meant “the Portuguese engaged in strenuous attempts to discern who was legitimate and who was not…” The attempt to delineate between a deeply divided colonial population late in 1969, however, demonstrates that the Portuguese also did not have an accurate account and clear understanding of who was or was not a supporter of FRELIMO even by this late stage of the war. Thus, pinpointing the number of Mozambicans who fled the country with exactitude was a challenge for Tanzanians, Portuguese colonial authorities, and for FRELIMO.

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15 Pitcher, Transforming, 34, footnote 19 respectively.
16 For results of the study of Cabo Delgado and Nampula districts, see AHM, Secção Especial, Portugal, Província de Moçambique, Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações (SCCI), “Prospecção das Forças Tradicionais–Distrito de Moçambique,” by J. Branquinho. I am grateful to M. Anne Pitcher for pointing out the existence of this study.
In regard to these specific Mozambican refugees who fled earlier in the war, the United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Home Affairs website states… “By 1965, there were about… 10,000 from Mozambique,” therefore indicating an approximation.\textsuperscript{17} The website goes on to claim that with independence in “1975 about 20,000 refugees who lived in the five settlements in southern Tanzania were repatriated” demonstrating that by the war’s end, the estimated number of Mozambicans living in Tanzania had nearly doubled.\textsuperscript{18} Although these numbers represent the magnitude of the migration to Tanzania, they do little to address the agency of refugees or their interaction with TANU or FRELIMO officials. Since FRELIMO needed soldiers to fight its war against Portugal, the liberation front also sought means to generate loyalty from the refugees through humanitarian institutional projects.

\textit{Social Change, Violence, and a National Vision}

Tanzanian newspaper sources captured the struggles of the Mozambican refugees at the beginning of the anti-colonial war on September 25, 1964, as a refugee’s choice to escape was inevitably fraught with personal, familial, and communal pressures that might hasten or encumber an individual’s decision to flee. However, when an individual’s choice resulted in the opportunity or decision to escape to Tanzania even if one were, as some evidence suggests, just following the crowds during this exodus without direct contact with Portuguese violence, the previous existence of the now nascent refugee was

\textsuperscript{17} http://moha.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=127 [accessed February 23, 2012]. The emphasis is mine.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. According to the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs website, the “five settlements” were at Rutamba, Mputa, Muhukuru, Matekwe, and Lundo. See also Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.” The emphasis is mine.
susceptible to social and political transformation.\textsuperscript{19} The social organization of FRELIMO and its camps in Tanzania depended on a return to the social and gender roles of the Makonde so as to provide a degree of familiarity and security. For example, more photographic evidence from the \textit{Standard} shows that women still ventured away from the camps to collect firewood to prepare meals.

In the days and weeks that followed, many refugees simply could not rebuild their relationships with family members and sought, instead, to adjust their lives to new conditions and circumstances. For those who lost parents, entire families or kin, or their friends, the new reality of refugee status was especially mediated by Tanzanian authorities, rural Tanzanian citizens, and the emerging presence of FRELIMO in their lives. Mozambican refugees embarked, whether willingly or not, on a new constellation of relationships in which they acted as the \textit{dramatis personae} who embodied FRELIMO’s emergent revolutionary philosophy as guerrilla soldiers and supporters of the proto-state during the anti-colonial war.

The initial intensity and onslaught of the anti-colonial war in the broadly inaccessible area of the Mueda plateau of Cabo Delgado meant that many Makonde, as the majority of the refugees, faced little prospect of being reached or rescued. While disrupting the Portuguese war efforts in Cabo Delgado, refugees often escaped on foot carrying children and some meager possessions and were ferried by canoe across the crocodile and hippopotamus infested Ruvuma River.\textsuperscript{20} Images in the \textit{Standard} captured “a covey of canoes battling the current to reach safety in the Republic. One is

\textsuperscript{20} Pictures in the \textit{Nationalist} and the \textit{Standard} commonly depict these realities throughout late 1964. There are also references to a capsized canoe and the death of its occupants due to a hippopotamus attack.
camouflaged with branches” as it traversed the riverine border hoping to avoid detection by “Portuguese pursuers.”21 Given the lack of both accessible roads and motorized transportation, Mozambicans fled into the bush on foot along trails that were well-traversed because of centuries of economic exchange and labor migration across the Ruvuma River. Despite this local topographical knowledge and kin networks among Makonde on both sides of the border, Mozambican refugees nevertheless navigated a challenging terrain of forests and hills during Portuguese bombardments along routes that were also home to terrestrial predatory animals. Moreover, given the speed of the Portuguese retaliation in late 1964, the international community was initially slow to react and condemn the violence.22 This is also true of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which, although founded in 1951, was slow to help Mozambican refugees in this particular crisis for reasons that are unclear. The delay in UN aid to the situation, however, perhaps owes to the fact of the difficulties in distinguishing between a Makonde refugee who fled the war and people (usually young males) who migrated into Tanzania for periodic work as laborers. The UNHCR did, however, offer some assistance to Tanzanian authorities in helping to organize the refugees after the magnitude of the crisis became clear by 1965. Oxfam and various missionary groups such as the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, which were also active on the ground in Tanzania, provided basic essentials such as food and blankets.23

21 Picture Caption, Standard, October 12, 1964, 1.
23 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
Despite their elite local status in Mozambique, even Makonde male elders, who might otherwise be well-respected and powerful members of their communities, faced little opportunity to utilize kinship or social networks that could have potentially ushered them to safety much more quickly. As was the case in other regions and for other ethnic groups throughout colonial Mozambique, many Makonde chiefs aided the Portuguese as their status, power, and access to material privileges necessitated a collaborative relationship with Portuguese colonial and military authorities. This colonial strategy was ubiquitous and when a chief arrived in Tanzania as a refugee, his stature was subsumed under a cloud of suspicion. TANU and FRELIMO both embraced a revolutionary modernity that rejected traditional authority figures and, given the possibility of collusion between Makonde chiefs and Portuguese colonial officials, their presence in Tanzania was viewed with distrust. FRELIMO’s leaders did, however, also initially seek to work with elders who were sympathetic to the cause of liberation and, therefore, pragmatically sought to utilize important local leaders to augment the legitimacy of the liberation front.

Regardless of this early chaos, however, an elder male refugee’s quest for a modicum of order was captured in a description of a photograph alluding to his lingering traditional authority. It stated: “Mozambique villagers squat on the ground as one of their chiefs gives them instructions.” Although in this instance a village chief offered the

24 No author cited, “Mozambique Refugees Among Friends,” Standard, October 9, 1964, 3. Moreover, many Makonde “chiefs” and elders aided the Portuguese as their status, power, and access to material privileges necessitated collaboration with Portuguese colonial and military authorities. See West, “‘This Neighbor Is Not My Uncle!’”
semblance of leadership, he was also attempting to navigate his precarious new existence as a refugee in a host nation that was increasingly hostile toward “native authorities.” As Harry West has noted, the use of the word “chief” here is also problematic as the politically decentralized Makonde rarely made use of a single “chief,” but commonly used *nang’olo* or “elder” for someone holding a leadership position in Makonde villages. This was evident in newly liberated African nations such as Ghana whose leadership and bureaucracy espoused a revolutionary ideological platform that generally alienated traditional leaders and forms of power. In Tanzania after the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Julius Nyerere and TANU embraced African socialism enacted macro-structural reforms on a national level. This doctrinal shift toward African socialism increasingly alienated and rejected traditional leadership which also informed the ideological development of FRELIMO at the same time because peasant loyalties to traditional authorities were perceived as anathema to the liberation front’s vision of a “modern” future for Mozambique. Therefore, in line with their ideological beliefs and friendship with TANU, FRELIMO distrusted traditional male authority figures and sought to usurp their provincial power and replace it with a revolutionary perspective under its burgeoning authority in Tanzania. Instead of focusing on stories of male traditional elders in positions of lingering authority, the majority of the photographs and captions in newspapers such as the *Standard* focused on the overt suffering of refugees as a homogenous mass, as well as their attempt to maintain some degree of social order.

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27 For a great summary of Shimakonde terminology, see West, *Kupilikula*, 277. 
amid their initial insecurity across the border in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{28} The presence of a local village elder was, then, a rarity in these pictures and for these Mozambican refugees “most of whom have crossed the Ruvuma river into the Newala area...without possessions of any kind” revealing the haste in which many fled the fighting.\textsuperscript{29} 

With FRELIMO’s relationship with TANU always a priority, FRELIMO’s leadership gradually usurped the power of elder male authority figures with provincial power and replaced it with a revolutionary nationalist perspective under its burgeoning hegemonic authority in Tanzania that left little room for “native authorities.”\textsuperscript{30} The rapid displacement of people in late 1964 invariably meant a temporary breakdown of traditional gendered roles among the Makonde. Older men usually held positions of authority in rural Mozambican communities, while younger men and women typically contributed to agricultural production and childcare. However, as Yussuf Adam has pointed out, FRELIMO exploited opportunities within existing generational tensions that emerged within Makonde communities when young men earned wages that offered access to material goods, especially in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{31} These were social conditions that were dramatically interrupted with the advent of Portuguese bombing and the subsequent migration of individuals and entire communities. The results were twofold: first, the shifting social roles and “relationships” for many Makonde refugees in the short term and, second, the ascendant indoctrination of FRELIMO’s emergent socialist tenets that

\textsuperscript{28} Numerous editions of the \textit{Standard} in early October 1964 capture these images. For example, see images dated October 9, 10, and 12 that display sullen refugees of both sexes.


\textsuperscript{31} Adam, “Mueda, 1917-1990.”
would, in theory, trump and replace traditional practices, elder male authority figures, and the “occult power” of sorcery among the Makonde. In this way, FRELIMO exploited the vulnerability of traditional authorities, presented opportunities for socially marginalized people to seek alternative paths to power and respectability, and demonstrated a penchant for coercive motivation to achieve these ends.

Refugees in the Context of Gendered and Educational Discourse

As part of FRELIMO’s strategies of institutional development in the early 1960s, Mozambican refugees were often depicted as objectified victims in Tanzanian newspapers and FRELIMO publications: people whose terrible conditions and individual lives were narrated and photographed in the dramatic headlines and articles of revolutionary print media. This example further validates the claims of scholars from the “Subaltern School” such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who questioned how subalterns “can speak” - or not - when elites often use their power over media and academia to shape discourse. Spivak’s insight remains a relevant one and is applicable to FRELIMO’s discursive productions as well.

Unable and effectively powerless to generate their own newspapers along with other forms of media, Mozambican refugees during the early weeks of the war were objectified fodder for the liberation camera lens and the TANU journalist eager to depict their suffering endured at the hands of the Portuguese military. In keeping with Julius

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Nyerere’s Pan-Africanist beliefs, FRELIMO also capitalized on the influx of refugees and generated its own print and visual propaganda.\(^{34}\) Officially recognized by TANU as the sole legitimate liberation front for Mozambique, FRELIMO seized the opportunity in September 1964 and began assisting with the influx of Mozambican refugees. This fact was an essential component for FRELIMO’s legitimation as first the sole liberation front for Mozambique and, later, as a proto-state whose institutional development was tacitly monitored by Tanzanian authorities. Seeking funds to initiate their fledgling institutional operations, like the Mozambique Institute, required a propaganda blitz on the part of FRELIMO officials.\(^{35}\) Encouraging Mozambican refugees to join the liberation front as soldiers began in earnest, as did the development of educational programs, hospitals, and ideological indoctrination.

For example, in a much celebrated achievement in 1967, Mozambican refugees still in Tanzania participated in the construction of a “75-bed hospital…a solid structure well laid-out, and, we are proud to say, built by the labour of Mozambican refugees” to assist Mozambicans with inoculations and serious diseases.\(^{36}\) This FRELIMO report on their institutional progress does not clarify, however, whether or not the labor was voluntary, optional, or mandated through coercion. Nevertheless, Mozambican refugees were expected to contribute to the health and well-being of fellow Mozambicans living in Tanzania as well as to FRELIMO’s liberated zones, and the construction of the hospital

\(^{34}\) ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution Collection. See also ALUKA, A Voz da Revolução File.
\(^{35}\) See Chapter 4 in this dissertation, “Underwriting Legitimacy.”

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was indicative of a revolutionary achievement. This represents an important aspect of FRELIMO’s organization and revolutionary pragmatism: its approach to the management of the refugees was to establish an acceptance of its legitimate authority. The contribution of Mozambicans in the construction of the hospital, however procured, demonstrated FRELIMO’s burgeoning capacity to direct the lives of refugees.

To these ends, managing the discourse of liberation was a significant concern for FRELIMO officials as they strove to display a specific, gendered language in their official print media for both public and international consumption. Although not uncommon in the socialist, revolutionary discourse of the era, in the December 1963 edition of the Mozambique Revolution, FRELIMO’s official organ revealed the early use of familial language expressed in nationalistic terms to convey how the organization sent “Brother Uria SIMANGO [sic]” and “Brother Sarfukhan M. KHAN [sic]” to Cairo on September 18, 1963. The purpose of the trip was to open a Permanent Mission in that city for FRELIMO, an event so important that even “Brother Mondlane, President of FRELIMO was present for the opening of the office and held a press conference.” In the next paragraph, “Sister Celina SIMANGO [sic] represented the League of Mozambican Women at the International Women’s Congress in Moscow on June 24 to 29, 1963” and gave a speech that depicted how Mozambique’s population served “European capitalist exploitation” in that “they have been taking away the best of our men to feed their economic enterprises with cheap labor, while leaving the women and children behind to
fend for existence in the poorest of conditions.”37 The fraternalism and sisterhood, displayed in the early rhetoric of the liberation front’s leaders connotes a linguistic and discursive strategy essential to the conveyance of a united nationalist movement that equally shared important roles along gendered lines. Susan Geiger has argued, however, that during Africa’s nationalist era, “the larger narrative remains one in which nationalism itself – whether perceived as evil, failed, triumphal or flawed – is frequently essentialized as a masculine political project based on men’s activities and ideas.”38 It was FRELIMO’s revolutionary, nationalistic language that spoke only of the hopes and wishes of elite members of FRELIMO who were largely men. However, the appearance of revolutionary, discursive practice in the use of “brother” and “sister” was intentional and revealed another approach to developing an ideologically motivated gendered discourse in the nomenclature of liberation that was putatively meant to include refugees of both sexes as well. It was a language that flattened class and gender differences and spoke of a social and revolutionary equality, but as Geiger has cautioned, nationalism is often gendered male as a phenomenon and one is apt to remember that FRELIMO’s initial hierarchy largely consisted of elite, educated men.

It was also quite common to use this particular discursive strategy of egalitarianism in international contexts where many oppressed descendants of Africans

struggled during the same decade for full civil and legal rights in many countries. The influence of international movements and discourse regarding Black Power and African liberation helped to shape individual consciousness and motivated individuals to participate in revolutionary acts. The African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), South African Students’ Organization (SASO), and the Black Panther Party in the United States were influential examples of organizations that shaped and inspired the direction and ideas of other liberation movements in Africa such as FRELIMO. This linguistic and discursive phenomenon was by no means universal and, depending on circumstances, motivated by different historical circumstances.

FRELIMO’s use of gendered language was based on the biological distinctions between men and women, but it also implied sexual neutrality especially in its use of “comrade.” That is, it created an outward appearance of sexual egalitarianism within FRELIMO and demonstrated a decisive shift in its own ideological platforms. Gendered neutrality in discourse connoted a mutual responsibility toward liberation, implied a shared sacrifice, and advocated for extensive contributions from both sexes. Although far from universal, by articulating discursive neutrality toward gender roles, refugees were presented with opportunities unavailable in their previous lives which created avenues for

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41 See, for example, Yale University Archives (YUA), Mozambique Collection, Group Number 605, Box 35, Folder 645 Mozambique, “7th April 1972, 1st Anniversary of the Death of Comrade Josina Machel (Mozambican Woman Fighter).
limited social reinvention as both sexes needed to contribute in profound, active ways to the liberation effort.

*At the Border? Local Knowledge and Networks for Mozambican Men and Women*

The international border between Tanzania and Mozambique along the Ruvuma River was well-known to the inhabitants of northern Mozambique as centuries of slave trading and other local economic activities along the east African coast resulted in a multitude of local, regional, and foreign exchanges.\(^{42}\) Thus, many of the Mozambicans who escaped the fighting fled northward with knowledge of the terrain and physical environment. In early 1964, prior to the start of the anti-colonial war, but after the formation of FRELIMO, a survey of economic refugees prepared for the Mozambique Institute indicated that thousands of northern Mozambican males worked and lived in Tanzania and Zanzibar, toiling on sisal and clove plantations.\(^{43}\) This survey was compiled “to obtain a better understanding the \([sic]\) 500,000 Mozambiquans \([sic]\) who live outside their homeland” but only contained data from 220 interviews from those living and working in Tanganyika’s Tanga/Korogwe region. Although young men also fled northward into Tanzania, the visible evidence offered in the *Nationalist* and the *Standard* suggests that the vast majority of Mozambican refugees after the start of the war were women and children. The border was porous and remote as many Makonde

\(^{42}\) Alpers, “‘To Seek a Better Life’.”

lived and worked on both sides in adjacent communities, which also helped alleviate linguistic and cultural barriers during the resettlement of refugees into camps.

The economic, social, and political crises that afflicted Mozambique were a result of draconian Portuguese colonial policies throughout the twentieth century that transformed aspects of traditional life for northern Mozambicans. In their respective books on the topic, Allen Isaacman and M. Anne Pitcher have argued that the despised “cotton schemes” of the Portuguese authorities were routinely challenged by peasants, but also that the colonial influence in the region indubitably altered aspects of the traditional culture among rural Mozambicans as well as mechanisms for colonial control that emanated from the metropole in Portugal. Resistance to Portuguese colonial impositions was commonplace for many Mozambicans. As Isaacman states, “the partial subordination of the peasants as well as their awareness of their limited power helps to explain why cotton producers were prone to engage in hidden forms of protest rather than in broader social movements” which occurred later at the beginning of the anti-colonial war in September 1964 when many rural peasants opted by choice or force to join FRELIMO. Nevertheless, tumultuous years of resistance and negotiation over impositions like the “cotton schemes” resulted in a late colonial malaise in the daily lives of Mozambicans prior to the anti-colonial war. However, when the Portuguese started to drop firebombs on villages in late 1964, any semblance of social and cultural normality, no matter how mediated by colonialism, effectively ended.

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44 Isaacman, Cotton. Also see Pitcher, Politics in the Portuguese Empire.
45 Isaacman, Cotton, 9. There was also evidence of a coercive strategy deployed by FRELIMO in the recruitment of Mozambicans. See West, Kupilikula and “‘This Neighbor Is Not My Uncle!’.”
The demographics of this Mozambican migration to Tanzania also offers an opportunity to assess how gender roles and generational tensions were present in the lives of Makonde during the early anti-colonial war. As a matrilineal society straddling the border of a country in need of male migrant labor, the Makonde maintained established networks of extended familial contact in both rural and urban settings. Mozambique had long served as a source of migratory male labor and, although this reality largely affected southern Mozambique and its proximity to South Africa, Tanzania far to the north was no exception.\(^{46}\) Despite the existence of the artificially imposed colonial boundary of the Ruvuma River, many Makonde males crossed the border into colonial Tanganyika seeking work and means to escape their elders and Portuguese colonial and corporate mandates. However, German colonialism in Tanganyika was also brutal and extractive.\(^{47}\) With decolonization, access to the cosmopolitan opportunities of Dar es Salaam in the newly liberated country of Tanganyika offered Makonde men working there unique opportunities that were otherwise unavailable to their female kin who still resided in Mozambique. This included a political education these men were able to witness at work in a liberated Tanganyika and opportunities to ignore their elders back home.\(^{48}\) This was especially true in the short period between Tanganyika’s independence in 1961 and the advent of FRELIMO’s war with Portugal in late 1964. Exposed to the philosophy of Nyerere and TANU, as well as to the allure of a rapidly emerging socialist modernity in

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\(^{46}\) Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity*; Alpers, “‘To Seek a Better Life’.”

\(^{47}\) Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002). British control of Tanganyika as a League of Nations Mandate also, to a certain extent, allowed for more mobility and flexibility at the border.

Dar es Salaam, many Mozambican men were conscious of the political awakening happening around and to them.\(^\text{49}\) Considering the lack of communicative options between northern Mozambicans and their young men in Tanzania, unless young Makonde males frequently returned to northern Mozambique, elders, women and children were more limited in their access to life beyond their rural villages. Thousands of young Mozambican men, motivated to escape colonial labor schemes and traditional impositions migrated and worked in Tanzania right up until the beginning of the anti-colonial war. Although new opportunities existed for many Mozambican men in Tanzania, laboring on sisal and coconut plantations was labor intensive and many Makonde men still opted to maintain close ties with their kin and communities for financial, social, and cultural reasons.

Armed with trans-border knowledge and multifarious kinship connections, many Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, then, went in FRELIMO and TANU publications from a narrated status of an oppressed, victimized mass of illiterate peasants, to the re-narrated vanguard of Mozambican “freedom fighters.” Festooned in soldiers’ clothing and armed with sophisticated imported weapons, educated in FRELIMO’s ideological propaganda, and acting in the lead roles of the dramaturgy of Mozambique’s liberation, this radical and rapid transformation was, for many, a clear example of their willing participation in the anti-colonial war as FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents. Since FRELIMO offered a tangible alternative to Portuguese colonialism, many Mozambicans

\(^{49}\) Alpers, “‘To Seek a Better Life’:“ Tanzanian women were also very active in the liberation of their country and helped to inspire many men through their “performative nationalism,” including Julius Nyerere. For example, see Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997).
initially rallied to the cause of liberation. This support was, in reality, far from universal but was essentially maintained with practical incentives such as promises of personal and national freedom, access to education and health care, and the psychologically transformative benefits of espousing moral revolutionary values expressed via collective and self-sacrifice. FRELIMO encouraged Mozambicans to think beyond narrow and selfish economic and social interests and join the burgeoning moral drama playing out across Africa and the world in the 1960s: the liberation from archaic traditional practices, selfish individualism, colonialism and economic exploitation. Such a clarion call required strategies of indoctrination, propaganda, and real experiential examples of a liberated society in microcosm; hence, the development and fostering of FRELIMO’s institutional capacity was of paramount concern to its legitimation as a proto-state.

*The Bio-Social Experience: Survival, Coping, and Flourishing for Mozambican Refugees*

For these war refugees, in particular, the individual agency displayed during the migratory displacement of communities presents an opportunity to analyze interstitial moments of resiliency and transitions in experience. Once a refugee decided to flee, she or he became someone who, for better or worse, was driven by a natural, biological imperative for self-preservation since survival, even in areas of geographical familiarity and existing kinship networks, was initially paramount when their lives were upended in September 1964. Similar to Harri Englund’s criticism of studies that oversimplify the “refugee experience,” the path toward a livable existence for every Mozambican refugee was never simplistic, capricious, or universal. Rather it presented individuals with an inimitable bio-social experience that started each of them along what I argue is a

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survival-coping-flourishing continuum. This experience affected many impoverished Africans pursuing stability in the escalating violence of anti-colonial war and the transition from colony to country. The concept of bio-social experience is a modified version of American philosopher John Dewey’s philosophical argument about the biological impetus of the human species as a whole. Dewey’s theory of a biological continuum was based on three evolving aspects of human experience: first, instinct; second, habits; and third, intelligence. Read in the case of the Mozambican war refugee, Dewey’s concept can be reinterpreted as “survival, coping, flourishing.”

Existing awareness of kinship connections across the border in Tanzania might have alleviated the initial suffering of Mozambican refugees, but many who fled did not find or locate kin. Rather, the majority of Mozambicans, as Tague has argued, were subsequently sequestered in “settlements” within Tanzania. The ideology that informed this continuum was reinforced in the refugee settlement camps, bush schools, and by word of mouth as part of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism and hegemonic ascendency. Ensconced in the refuge of hastily constructed camps scattered throughout southern Tanzania, Mozambicans were commonly referred to in FRELIMO documentation as “Our People” and were exposed to the bold nationalistic vision and propagandistic blitz of liberation discourses from both FRELIMO and TANU.

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51 I also argue that the same scenario can be true in other refugee contexts then and now.
52 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct. This model also applies to refugees elsewhere and in the contemporary world. For similar theoretical argument, see Michel Foucault’s analysis of bio-power in Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979 (New York: Picador, 2010).
53 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
Mozambican refugees were envisaged, perhaps myopically and monolithically, given claims of their universal suffering and the putative sacrifices required of the FRELIMO leadership on their behalf, as a captive and captured audience of atomized individuals. For example, many images produced in various FRELIMO publications depict refugees crouching in large groups or circles listening contently to FRELIMO’s leaders, soldiers, or instructors; photos taken, perhaps, to propagandize the discourse of refugee suffering that minimized how Mozambicans also initially made use of local support networks of Tanzanian Makonde. Many young, male refugees upon their entry into Tanzania were directly pressured to join FRELIMO as soldiers for the liberation of Mozambique and several, like Raimundo Pachinuapa, were also trained in methods of guerrilla warfare in Algeria. Former FRELIMO cadre, Daniel Chatama, was sent to study in the Soviet Union while Samora Machel, FRELIMO’s Secretary of Defense also received military training in Algeria, whose anti-colonial war and subsequent ouster of the French offered a viable model for successful guerrilla resistance. Many others in the FRELIMO rank-and-file were trained in FRELIMO’s military camp in Nachingwea and were subjected to FRELIMO indoctrination at various settlements such as the one in Bagamoyo and in Kongwa - all of which were in Tanzania.

55 See, for example, the interview by Sol do Carvalho of Raimundo Pachinuapa in ALUKA, Samora Machel Documentation Center. http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.MACHELP1B2002. See also “African Rule in Mozambique,” Nationalist, December 8, 1964, 6. Many young, male refugees upon their entry into Tanzania were directly pressured to join FRELIMO as soldiers for the liberation of Mozambique and several, like Pachinuapa, were trained in Algeria. Many others were trained in FRELIMO’s military camp in Nachingwea, Bagamoyo, or Kongwa, Tanzania.
56 Ibid.
Once the immediate threat of death or injury abated, the refugees’ bio-social experiences which were initially based on an instinctual need for survival ultimately yielded to opportunities for the establishment of either previously held or new habits. These habits, however formulated, were necessary in an effort to create a new or at least similar set of social and political conditions that would result in a stable, potentially new social existence. The intelligence gained during the formation of habits (coping), offers opportunities for the individual to flourish and return to a viable stasis in daily routine, a process that was expedited by local kin networks that some refugees tapped into for assistance. The ideological conditioning of refugees to support FRELIMO, sometimes employed through coercive means, was most active during the coping phase of the transition in their roles as “freedom fighters.”

During this process, many but not all Mozambican refugees in transit to Tanzania, then, were people who initially experienced a form of “social death” resulting in the instinctual need to survive but who emerged as adapted revolutionary constituents and “freedom fighters” under the purview of FRELIMO. Similar to Orlando Patterson’s contention that slavery was a form of “social death,” for the Mozambican refugee who fled to Tanzania in late 1964 there was, during the transit, an experience of something uniquely comparable: a temporary suspension of established roles and social expectations, subsumed under the quest for

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58 Ibid. See also conference papers from the “Camps, Liberation Movements, Politics” Conference hosted at the University of the Western Cape in August 2011. I owe Christian Williams a “thank you” for inviting me to attend this conference but, unfortunately, I could not make that trip given my fieldwork in Lisbon, Portugal at that time.

59 Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Patterson’s argument has been criticized for depriving slaves of their individual and group agency. For an example, see the ALUKA Project, Samora Machel, Documentation Center, Interview with Joaquim Chipande, http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.machel0004
survival, that also resulted in opportunities otherwise unavailable in their lives under traditional practices and colonialism. Mozambican war refugees were people who had initially lost the quotidian predictability and the routinization of social practices in their daily lives. However, such an essentialized analysis of refugees as those who experienced a complete objectified “social death” risks stripping individuals who either migrated alone or in groups of (self or collective) agency and the limited use of local networks and kinship as a means of survival, coping, and flourishing during their hasty transit to Tanzania.60

Informed by FRELIMO’s revolutionary rhetoric and faced with a lack of viable alternatives, other than to remain as vulnerable refugees indefinitely in a host country, FRELIMO’s leaders defined and shaped the opportunities for the individual transformation of refugees. The evanescent moments for agency and social breakdown opened during the transit to Tanzania were quickly reconstituted and redirected toward FRELIMO’s and, as Joanna Tague argued, Tanzania’s envisaged future. Upon their arrival across the border into Tanzania’s southeastern province of Mtwara, TANU’s “administrative secretary…Mr. C.A. Njunde, said that at first most of the refugees were given shelter by local families, but attempts were being made to organise them” whereby many people were eventually placed in “three temporary camps in Mkunya, Mchichira and Mahuia.”61

Although established cross-border networks among rural Tanzanians

60 The same is true for slaves in the situations that Patterson describes. Slaves, although considered transferable property, maintained a modicum of their own humanity and actively sought, whenever possible, opportunities to alleviate their marginalized position vis-à-vis a master or owner. Patterson’s argument about “social death” is applicable to refugees in a sense, but its definitive linguistic connotation obfuscates acts of slave (or refugee) agency.

living in the southern regions of Tanzania’s Mtwara Province offered some assistance to
the refugees, many of these rural Tanzanians were quickly overwhelmed by the
escalating number of thousands of Mozambicans who were, days later, transported in
Tanzanian “lorries… taking them to Milola, 35 miles from Lindi, where National
Servicemen…began clearing bush to build a camp for them.”62 The TANU authorities
and local missionary and aid groups responded quickly to the burgeoning crisis and
assisted Mozambicans who fled the violence.63 However the presence of National
Servicemen also reveals that, in addition to FRELIMO cadres who assisted with the
influx, the mobility of refugees was also quickly curtailed and overseen by Tanzanian
state officials.64 The Tanzanian government also initiated a rudimentary health program
in which “all refugees” were “being vaccinated when they arrive” against various
diseases.65

The organization and transportation of people to camps was also a moment in
which Mozambican refugees took part in reestablishing their communities as the
evidence suggests, many had “appointed leaders of the various groups and teams of
people to look after the children.”66 Before FRELIMO officials could adequately manage
and establish their own control of these refugees, TANU, ordinary Tanzanian citizens,
and the refugees themselves made every attempt to limit the tumultuous effects of the
refugee influx. The agency and self-reliance displayed in the early days and weeks of the

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23, 2012].
64 This reality also confirms the conclusions drawn by Joanna Tague about the opportunity to expand
TANU’s authority into Tanzania’s rugged and rural southern regions in her dissertation, “A War to Build
the Nation.”
66 Ibid.
refugee migration to Tanzania were hallmarks of the individual refugees’ will to survive. Once in Tanzania, the organization and willing compliance of refugees to submit to TANU’s authority and to live in their settlements demonstrated a moment of transition along the continuum toward the coping aspect of the bio-social experience. It was in this coping phase that FRELIMO stepped in to manage, recruit, educate, and extend control over the refugees to provide an opportunity for flourishing.

The reestablishment of Makonde in settlement camps under the Tanzanian government’s purview and FRELIMO’s infiltration necessitated by the quest for survival early in the war, challenges any notion that Mozambican refugees were universally reducible to hapless victims of historical circumstance. The pursuit of a viable social stability presents refugees with a multitude of choices hitherto unknown, inaccessible, or taboo in particular communities. Mozambican refugees were also socially opportunistic and their social rebirth as “freedom fighters” and members of a hierarchical, organized, and viable nationalist movement in FRELIMO signaled an important transformative experience for individuals who transitioned from a marginalized status to FRELIMO’s front line militants. It also signaled a pragmatic and astute means of legitimation, as FRELIMO’s success in demonstrating a propensity for leadership through its social services, military recruitment, and proto-state institutions helped to (re)direct the lives of Mozambicans in new, revolutionary contexts in Tanzania.

*Humanitarianism meets nascent statecraft*

As the refugee influx into Tanzania increased during late 1964, FRELIMO embraced the opportunity to demonstrate its early legitimacy. The liberation front sought
opportunities to develop legitimacy through an admixture of humanitarian projects and authoritarian decision-making to impose its revolutionary vision upon Mozambican refugees. Under the volatile circumstances that affected their lives, many Mozambican refugees in Tanzania willingly joined or were coerced into FRELIMO to fight the Portuguese and helped establish the humanitarian infrastructure of settlements, schools, and hospitals to help sustain their lives. The thousands of Mozambicans who escaped to Tanzania were, then, a critical mass of possible supporters and revolutionary constituents whose acceptance of FRELIMO hinged on the liberation front’s ability to mobilize, organize, and oversee aspects of the refugees’ new lives.

In early 1965, FRELIMO formally expanded its military activities into the northwestern Mozambican province of Niassa and the refugee population continued to grow in Tanzania. During this early phase of the anti-colonial war, a document describing the brief history of FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute alludes to how in the province of Niassa there were:

no forests and few bushes in which the population can hide from the enemy coming from the skies…Quickly learning the ferocity of the bombing, when planes were sighted the first impulse was to flee. The unhappy result of this terror was that many children were abandoned…One of the Liberation Front fighters, disturbed by the plight of these children, began ‘collecting’ them.67

These children later formed the basis for FRELIMO’s Tunduru Children’s Camp, in the Rovuma Province of Tanzania, which offered primary level education to many orphans

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67 FRELIMO, “Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute [Brief History], Reports, November 1969, Section 10, 4. See also, American Committee on Africa, Children of Tunduru, 1969? (the question mark is in the original). Both accessed from ALUKA, respectively:
who were ushered across the Tanzanian border.\footnote{Tunduru was not one of the official “five settlements” where refugees lived in Tanzania: its location was designated specifically for orphans and young children who lived under the care of FRELIMO, TANU, and other refugee agencies’ aid.} Subjected to the volatile and hasty conditions of transit, these Mozambican children often failed to locate their parents and had to resort, regardless of gender or age, to finding, preparing, and cooking their own food. Some Mozambicans in Tanzania, however, did manage to keep the family unit together despite the tumult, a challenging task under the circumstances, as a different family was depicted in another caption of the Standard sharing a meal together.\footnote{David Martin, “‘Operation Refugee’ in Smooth Flow,” \textit{Standard}, October 20, 1964, 2.} Thus, the circumstances for individual refugees varied and, as such, so did the photographic images and captions that generally bemoan familial separation as the predominant reality.

As the population of children living at the Tunduru camp increased from 50 to 450 by 1967, so did FRELIMO’s expectation that they contribute to the expansion of the schools and lodgings that housed them.\footnote{OCA, Herbert Shore Collection in Honor of Eduardo C. Mondlane 30/307, Series SG II, Historical Files Collected, Pamphlets, Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute, Date Unknown (likely published in 1968 or shortly thereafter), 6.} Despite their young age, and regardless of their sex, these orphaned children were expected to enhance their own educational opportunities and well-being through direct involvement in the construction of FRELIMO’s physical infrastructure in Tanzania, a reality that established a clear policy for FRELIMO’s other institutional projects elsewhere in that country. It is also important to note that, in addition to five official “settlements” for refugees, FRELIMO’s activities at Tunduru and likewise at Nachingwea were outside of the officially allocated spaces for Mozambican refugees established under the Tanzanian government’s purview. This reality demonstrated that FRELIMO was able to engage in other educational and military
activities within Tanzanian soil but with that government’s knowledge and support. Therefore, the existence of these unofficial but recognized spaces for Mozambicans to live, train and attend classes suggests that a fluidity of physical and jurisdictional boundaries existed in which FRELIMO was able to operate within Tanzania.

Many Mozambican refugees participated in the construction of FRELIMO’s infrastructural projects, but it was a fine line between choice and coercion. Michel Cahen has argued, FRELIMO’s “authoritarian modernisation” was later disastrously enacted and enforced during the early years of postcolonial Mozambique (1975-1983), but an important question in the political narrative and development of FRELIMO remains: were the seeds established for this politically “authoritarian” rationale established earlier during the successful implementation of humanitarian institutional projects or were the coercive aspects of FRELIMO’s oversight merely the result of adapting to the needs of desperate people faced with difficult circumstances without political motivation?71 The foundations for FRELIMO’s postcolonial “authoritarian modernisation” were always political and manifestly evident in the liberation front’s earlier attempts to control the lives of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania. Evidence for FRELIMO’s expanding authoritarianism by the late 1960s, however, was revealed when a former refugee, Abel Mabunda, recalled that FRELIMO cadres acted with firm hands when he and his older brother attempted to join the movement. Mabunda fled to Malawi with his brother, but

was upset to learn that to join FRELIMO they were required “to surrender all [their] documents to the FRELIMO representatives, in this particular case, to late General Gruveta Massamba.” 72 As he recalled, “I never saw my documents again. The purpose, you control better people when you hold their identity.” 73 As the war against Portugal intensified into late 1967 (when Mabunda fled) and extended into Tete the following year, Mabunda’s initial experiences with FRELIMO cadres suggests that the liberation front was increasingly concerned with who was attempting to join the liberation struggle. According to Mabunda, “a certain Mr. Pedro Simango… took us in two buses from Limbe (Malawi) to Tunduma (border of Malawi/Tanganyica [sic]). The guy was mean… and we ate only once during the trip of over 12 hours… We stayed in an abandoned, decayed wharehouse [sic] in Tunduma for almost a week, living on outdated tinned food…you will understand … that some of us are more equal than others.” 74 FRELIMO’s fears of PIDE infiltration likely contributed to the delays and transfer of refugees into Tanzania. As Mabunda reiterated, “The whole journey was uncomfortable, tiresome, and with hardly any meals” until eventually they arrived at destinations such as Nachingwea, Tanzania for processing by either TANU officials or FRELIMO cadres. 75 The memories of both Mabunda and Laweki (recounted below) suggest that two distinct realities existed for Mozambican refugees several years into the war. First, that the journey into Tanzania was challenging given the realities of the ongoing war; and second, that the process of transferring and vetting refugees who

72 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
arrived after the initial influx in late 1964 led to further scrutiny and “authoritarian”
controls over new recruits, such as the gruff handling of recruits and the confiscation of
any identifying paperwork in their possession.

However, FRELIMO’s leadership also saw the potential to build legitimacy in a
way that openly displayed a genuine concern for the well-being of Mozambicans. When
FRELIMO cadres and leaders assisted refugees in the oversight and development of
humanitarian projects, these efforts required the active participation of Mozambicans
who assisted and collaborated with the liberation front. This relationship between
FRELIMO and refugees was a strategy of revolutionary pragmatism that provided a
moral basis for the liberation front’s quest for a unified anti-colonial struggle and
legitimacy in pursuit of independence. To solely pin FRELIMO’s later authoritarianism
on its earlier coercive agenda which established legitimacy through acts of pragmatic
governance is dubious. This scenario is an example of the caveat offered by Frederick
Cooper about a problematic historical methodology he calls the “leapfrogging legacy.”
Cooper argues “that something at time A caused something in time C without considering
time B, which lies in between,” therefore, many transformative events shaped FRELIMO
during the 1960s and early 1970s. In FRELIMO’s case, events in its “time A” (1962-
1968) were not universally authoritarian or politically imprudent from the point of view
of establishing a credible legitimacy in the eyes of Mozambicans and the international
community. FRELIMO’s political evolution, internal discord, and political schisms
during the amorphous and volatile anti-colonial war, particularly during “time B” (1968-
1974), dramatically influenced the politically authoritarian climate of Mozambique
during “time C” (1975-1983). The politics of revolution is a process as, throughout the 1960s, various internal tensions, external influences, and the events of the anti-colonial war all contributed to FRELIMO’s politicization and eventual control of Mozambique.

As modern states often enact social welfare programs, provide bureaucratic safeguards, and create agencies to assist in the well-being of citizenries, a revolutionary proto-state such as FRELIMO also possessed the traits of genuine responsibility and concern toward the survival of Mozambican refugees. This was, of course, a necessary component of FRELIMO’s political legitimation, as well as a means in which to recruit soldiers and loyal supporters, i.e. revolutionary constituents from among refugees. After all, FRELIMO had to fight a war for independence but the liberation front also valued the contributions of Mozambicans who sought, because of their own personal convictions, to unshackle Mozambique from the evils of Portuguese colonialism. It was the participation of refugees in myriad institution-building activities, such as schools and field hospitals, and in joining the war effort that helped FRELIMO to claim legitimacy through its orchestration of these endeavors. Although these circumstances occasionally required discipline, coercion, and the direct oversight of the refugees, these pragmatic decisions also ensured that FRELIMO was able to generate propaganda that offered both discursive and visible proof of the liberation front’s benevolent concern for its revolutionary constituents and helped to further legitimize the hegemony of its proto-state. Therefore, FRELIMO’s relative success, in microcosm, while in the revolutionary laboratory of Tanzania, provided a viable model upon which to evolve into a sovereign authoritarian state and single political party after independence.

76 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 17-18.
It is also important to recognize that FRELIMO’s leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos, and Uria Simango actively encouraged Mozambican refugees to contribute their labor to insure their personal survival, especially given the scope of the refugee influx early in the war. This reality also demonstrated to Tanzanian authorities, whose commitment to help various African refugees had already stretched state resources, that Mozambicans and FRELIMO took the initiative to unburden their hosts.\footnote{Nationalist Correspondent, “KAMBONA GREETS REFUGEES: All calm at Kigoma,” Nationalist, August 29, 1964, Cover page.}\footnote{Ibid.} Tanzania was already hosting various other African refugees from east and central Africa because of various political crises during the volatile 1960s. In this instance, nearly “1,000 refugees from Congo-Leopoldville” were in Tanzania before the massive influx of Mozambicans. Many economic and war refugees from Burundi and Rwanda were also in Tanzania.\footnote{Ibid.} FRELIMO was, therefore, in the position to tap into this pool of thousands of potential supporters to seek soldiers and other cadres. FRELIMO played an active role in the lives of refugee Mozambicans for the purposes of building a revolutionary constituency of loyal supporters dedicated to fighting the Portuguese. Through word-of-mouth and print sources, FRELIMO motivated the refugees to participate in both the anti-colonial war and in its infrastructural projects.\footnote{FRELIMO produced various forms of propaganda that included photographic images, film, newspapers, pamphlets, letters, and articles for the press. For example, see the multitude of examples in ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution File.} FRELIMO’s early authoritarian foundation over Mozambican refugees was only possible with support from TANU, whose emotional and ideological commitment to help liberate
Mozambique was the most critical factor in FRELIMO’s ultimate success as a proto-state.\footnote{This theme is further explored in the Chapter “Borders and Brethren.”}

FRELIMO highlighted the support it received from ordinary Mozambicans with photographic evidence of young refugees of both sexes who actively attended classes and helped in the construction of the Tunduru Children’s Camp.\footnote{OCA, Herbert Shore Collection in Honor of Eduardo C. Mondlane 30/307, Series SG II, Historical Files Collected, Pamphlets, Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute, Date Unknown (likely published in 1968 or shortly thereafter. The images are displayed over seven unnumbered pages of the pamphlet between 6-9.}

Juxtaposed in official FRELIMO photographs as both victims and agents for propaganda purposes, refugee children helped with the establishment of the Tunduru Children’s Camp which demonstrated how young Mozambicans helped their own chances of survival through ostensible contributions to their living and educational conditions. According to Jamie Maurício Khamba, a former FRELIMO recruiter, the liberation front established a policy of generational prioritization that targeted the young.\footnote{Jaime Maurício Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012.} As someone who had access to seminary schooling in Mozambique, Khamba was himself a young Mozambican refugee who joined FRELIMO out of a conviction to help liberate his country. Given his educational background and interpersonal skills, FRELIMO sought to utilize him and other refugees such as Abel Gabriel Mabunda and Lawe Laweki as agents of the revolutionary change envisioned by the front’s leaders. Most of these men were former students at seminary schools in Mozambique and already possessed a modicum of education. This educational background, no matter how rudimentary, was critical to gaining access to certain posts within FRELIMO. It also offered the possibility to attend
the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam. Many of these former seminary students were targeted to attend the school in Dar es Salaam and were subsequently deployed as teachers and visible models of FRELIMO’s vision for the “Homem Novo” (New Man) in both refugee settlements and in the liberated zones. However, these opportunities were limited for many others.\(^83\) For example, revealing how age and gender roles continued to intersect despite the early chaos of refugee migration, a photo caption in the Standard states that “A young refugee manages a wan smile for the cameraman as she attends to the preparation of a meal. It is not a family meal – the girl has lost her parents.”\(^84\) The conditions of transit for most Mozambican refugees, especially for the women and children, were horrendous and tragically often resulted in familial separation. FRELIMO’s early support of these refugees empowered individuals to work collectively, a political strategy espoused as well by its TANU hosts.\(^85\) It can also be argued, however, that during FRELIMO’s foundational years the liberation front possessed few resources, trained personnel, and materials to manage the construction of its own institutional infrastructure so as to sufficiently meet the needs of Mozambican refugees. The development of FRELIMO’s institutions required an active collaboration among individual refugees, but especially those with some modicum of education usually obtained in seminary schools in Mozambique, whose participation in such projects helped to demonstrate their commitment to their own survival as well as to FRELIMO. Although the line between a refugee and FRELIMO cadre is difficult to

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) No author cited, “Mozambique Refugees Among Friends,” Standard, October 9, 1964, 3.

pinpoint, as is the discernible effect of coercion in generating loyalists to the liberation front, the contributions of Mozambicans in constructing infrastructure and joining FRELIMO’s military forces, signified how the opportunities to participate in the revolution were abundant for many refugees.

The participatory actions of refugees in infrastructural and military efforts during FRELIMO’s early years in Tanzania signified that the liberation front possessed a moral agency and politically legitimizing support from the majority of its burgeoning cadre of revolutionary constituents. The political situation for FRELIMO in the early 1960s was conducive to a symbiotic relationship between the movement’s hierarchy and ordinary Mozambicans.

_Gendered Opportunism: Agency and Female Refugees_

The transition of status for the Mozambican refugees in the early 1960s also offers an opportunity to evaluate the earliest ideological foundations of FRELIMO and the liberation front’s attempts to win the proverbial “hearts and minds” of northern Mozambicans during the anti-colonial war. Since the photographic evidence suggests that the majority of Mozambican refugees were women and children, the social and cultural transformations for these actors are critical to understanding this process.

In the chaos of this particular exodus gender roles were largely, but also temporarily, suspended as many young women necessarily took leadership roles guiding their communities to the Tanzanian border. In escaping Portuguese bombardments at the beginning of the war, “One young girl who had crossed the river with her young sister, leaving their parents behind, said she just joined up with people heading for the border
and crossed into Tanganyika. Another girl of seven was unable to tell anyone who her parents were or where she had come from.”

Despite threats to their lives and bodies, many also assisted their families during the escape to Tanzania, and for those without families, many managed to survive their own transit regardless of their age. Young women not only took the initiative to flee to Tanzania, their contributions to the war effort made them some of FRELIMO’s most important revolutionary constituents.

Scores of Mozambican women shaped the direction of their new lives and participated in self-initiated guerrilla operations in support of FRELIMO. In 1967, some Mozambican women were also heralded as “freedom fighters” when they participated as guerrilla soldiers in FRELIMO’s Destacamento Feminino (Women’s Detachment, DF). The incorporation of both sexes into the guerrilla rank-and-file also signaled a revolutionary pragmatism and astute means of legitimation, as FRELIMO’s success in demonstrating a propensity for leadership through its social services, military recruitment, and proto-state institutions helped to redirect the lives of Mozambicans of both sexes in a new, revolutionary context. Many young Mozambican women including Josina Machel, the wife of future leader and President of FRELIMO and Mozambique, Samora Machel, were armed as soldiers and also served in essential capacities as porters and rural educators as part of FRELIMO’s DF. However, under the auspices of FRELIMO and the Tanzanian authorities, they often found that their opportunities were limited as their

86 Ibid.
87 West, “Girls with Guns,” 183. YUA, Mozambique Collection, The Mozambican Women in the Revolution, Pamphlets, Group Number 605, Box 35, Folder 645 Mozambique “7th April, 1st Anniversary of the Death of Comrade Josina Machel (Mozambican Woman Fighter). See also Sheldon, Pounders of Grain, 125.
gender roles and vulnerability were shaped for the purposes of winning the anti-colonial war.  

Gender and age were especially important factors and played a determinant role in the refugee experience as young men and women, often in their older teens and those in their twenties were conscripted into the military wing of FRELIMO. FRELIMO propagandized men and women as soldiers, portrayed them as willing supporters to the war effort, and displayed photographs in its publications which elucidated the contributions from both sexes to the liberation struggle. Like their male counterparts, Mozambican women were encouraged by FRELIMO to embody a militant agency and, therefore, they possessed an equally important moral imperative to liberate their country.

The contributions of former female refugees-turned-soldiers are also underscored in a pamphlet, later produced in 1972 by FRELIMO entitled “The Mozambican Woman in the Revolution.” The document described the roles of Mozambican women during the early years of revolution and strongly suggests the need for liberation of both mind and body through revolutionary actions. FRELIMO argued for the necessity of the physical liberation of the body from colonialism through participatory acts of militant agency. Therefore, FRELIMO articulated a revolutionary, gender-neutral position in  

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90 For example, various images displaying the military activities of men and women were reproduced in numerous editions of Mozambique Revolution.  
91 YUA, Mozambique Collection, Pamphlets, “The Mozambican Woman in the Revolution.”
regard to women in which officials claimed, “One of the prime functions of a women’s army is, quite naturally, just like the men’s army, participation in combat.”92 FRELIMO also recognized the brave contributions of its female soldiers, as “many of the women prefer the more active combats in the advance zones and choose to fight alongside the men in ambushes, and mining operations, where they have proved themselves as capable and courageous as any of their male comrades.”93 The level of personal involvement in the anti-colonial war emanated from a biological calculus, inculcated via FRELIMO indoctrination to individual Mozambicans that the body was paradoxically worth endangering in combat in order to save the body, and the bodies and lives of others, from colonialism and traditionalism. Meant to exemplify FRELIMO’s role in helping women to realize the socio-political possibilities of liberation from colonialism and traditionalism, the document was produced to “help us develop a fuller understanding of women in the revolutionary process” and referred to the traditional and colonial bias toward Mozambican women, stating their “feeling of inferiority towards men, which prevents their full participation in the struggle: they wish to know how to get rid of this complex.”94 The prevalence of gendered concerns in FRELIMO discourse, especially for Mozambican women, was common both during and after the anti-colonial war.95

Historically, women’s mobility in Mozambique as a whole was also curtailed in part both by Portuguese colonial impositions such as chibalo and their traditional

92 Ibid, 5.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid, Preface pages.
95 See Urdang, *And Still They Dance*; Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*; Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*. 159
responsibilities within Makonde society.\textsuperscript{96} Recognizing the challenges for female students among the Mozambican refugees in particular, FRELIMO argued that, “because of the war…some of them,” but “especially the girls, also face opposition from their parents,” and are “still afflicted with old prejudices about the role of women.”\textsuperscript{97} Similar to the vast majority of traditional communities elsewhere in Africa and the world, women were typically cast in the roles of agricultural producers and mothers. Although many Mozambican women faced a lack of educational opportunities due to colonial, patriarchal, and traditional strictures, FRELIMO did manage to offer both ideological and real support for the education of refugee women. However, as Kathleen Sheldon has argued regarding the expectations of Mozambican women after the anti-colonial war, “Women’s involvement in the struggle brought more attention to women and gender within Frelimo and shifted the debate slightly to include their interests, though they rarely gained everything they hoped they would” especially in terms of true gender egalitarianism, political opportunities, and socio-economic changes.\textsuperscript{98}

After several years of successful clandestine work in Cabo Delgado, FRELIMO inspired many of these initial female refugees to join in the liberation of their country. As events during the early anti-colonial war unfolded and women often led refugees to Tanzania, an anonymous woman recalled memories in which individuals “went to the bush” from where “the people were given the task of blocking the roads with big trees

\textsuperscript{96} Sheldon, \textit{Pounders of Grain}. In particular, see Ch. 2: “‘My Heart is Weeping’: Work under Portuguese Colonialism”; and Ch. 4: “‘Today in FRELIMO the Mozambican Woman Has a Voice’: The Struggle for Independence and Socialism.” \textit{Chibalo} is sometimes spelled Xibalo or Shibalo..


\textsuperscript{98} Sheldon, \textit{Pounders of Grain}, 115-116. This was especially true after independence in 1975.
and holes. We also cut telephone wires and cut down the poles.”

For women to play such a significant role in disruptive activities in the early days of the war demonstrates how female refugees, despite violence and threats to their survival and bodies, deployed guerrilla tactics en route to Tanzania. Such a dramatic example of the direct participation of female refugees was acknowledged among members of the nearly all-male FRELIMO hierarchy and helped to validate the legitimacy of FRELIMO as a liberation front in its revolutionary challenges to traditional patriarchal limitations on women among the Makonde. The guerrilla activities of women soldiers and bio-social experiences of female refugees seeking to survive meant that some individuals bypassed traditional constraints and expectations in order to “cope” with their new realities as “freedom fighters.”

Consciousness Imposed: Defining Intellectual Space and Future Possibilities within FRELIMO

The initial despair of Mozambican refugees, in particular, could be captured in FRELIMO’s nationalistic rhetoric and was discursively remade into hope in the discursive productions of the liberation front’s leaders. FRELIMO’s strategies during the anti-colonial war in regard to whom Mozambicans could become was fashioned around putatively reconstructed identities. However, this vision of top-down identity shaping met with occasional resistance and, therefore, the idea of a universal new revolutionary person was something too problematic to realistically expect, despite FRELIMO’s rhetoric and propaganda. Frederick Cooper’s argument about the instability and ambiguity of identity, given its overuse as an analytical term among scholars in

99 Ibid., 10. This quote was anonymously provided “by a militant from the Women’s Detachment.”
particular, is evident in FRELIMO’s attempt to remake the Mozambican refugee into someone who wholeheartedly espoused a revolutionary ethos. The exposure to the revolutionary dynamism of Tanzanian society resulted in the germination of a self-aware, critical self-transformation akin to Paulo Freire’s notion of “conscientization” among male migrant laborers and Mozambican war refugees. Similar to the way that “conscientization” shaped the Black Consciousness activists in South Africa during the 1970s, where “the goal was to impart not revolutionary consciousness, but consciousness itself and to trust that the people’s ‘awakened’ consciousness would make political change inevitable,” Mozambicans living in Tanzania were ensconced in the deeper pan-Africanist/liberation ethos sweeping the continent which offered necessary moral conditions and multiple opportunities for a critical self-conscientization.

Mozambicans living in Tanzania were exposed to revolutionary rhetoric and often rallied to FRELIMO’s nationalistic liberation paradigms. However, this conscious awakening, contra Freire, was unidirectional as FRELIMO was determined to define, manage, and control the revolutionary mindset of refugees. Simply put, the refugees were not equal partners in shaping the ideological direction of the FRELIMO proto-state or the movement’s vision of the future. Refugees were expected to be obedient, open “vacuums” for FRELIMO to lead and imbue with a revolutionary consciousness. In this way, FRELIMO missed an opportunity to establish a dialogue with the refugees that

100 Cooper (and Rogers Brubaker), *Colonialism in Question*, 59-90.
102 Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets*, 129.
103 As stated earlier in this chapter, a similar strategy was disastrously applied throughout Mozambique by FRELIMO after 1975.
104 Freire, *Cultural Action for Freedom*. 

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might have resulted in a developmental democratization and an authentic egalitarianism within the liberation movement.\textsuperscript{105} However, in the contingent milieu of a violent anti-colonial war, the FRELIMO proto-state gradually eschewed pragmatic approaches toward legitimation and, rather, imposed a unilateral consciousness-raising paradigm that did not tolerate deviance or challenge from its hierarchal mandates. Deviation or resistance to such measures resulted in several high-profile purges and condemnation in FRELIMO media.\textsuperscript{106} The result was an emergent internal threat from regional leaders, many of the “middle peasant” class, whose ethnicity, ages, and local provincialism undermined the goal of unfettered unity within FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{107} As Merle Bowen has stated in reference to similar realities in post-independence Mozambique, FRELIMO was “overconfident of its support from the masses” and developed a myopic set of authoritarian principles that eschewed peasant and refugee intellectual contributions.\textsuperscript{108} The same assumptions of top-down controls were imposed early in FRELIMO’s pyramidal formation as the leadership enforced and ultimately embraced a socialist model of modernity and governance over its refugees in “settlements” and schools, and among its soldiers. Many of these decisions alienated lower-ranking officials in the FRELIMO hierarchy as well as the refugees whose input into the organizational make-up

\textsuperscript{106} Most notably, the murder of Filipe Samuel Magaia, the public purge of Lázaro Nkavandame, and, later, the show trial of Uria Simango and Paulo Gumane. See Barnabé Lucas Ncomo, \textit{Uria Simango: Um Homem, Uma Causa}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed., (Edições Novafrica, Central Impressora e Editora de Maputo, SARL, Maputo, 2003). For photographic evidence of Simango and Gumane on trial, see also, ALUKA, \textit{Tempo} 728. September 23, 1984, 18. For less-high profile names, Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2011.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 8. For a similar issue involving the under appreciation of local knowledge, its production and discursive impact in putatively modernizing societies, see Steven Feierman, \textit{Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania} (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
and military strategies were downplayed. Thus, after establishing a viable hegemony between the proto-state and its revolutionary constituents through pragmatic strategies of legitimation via the construction of institutions and overseas diplomacy, FRELIMO leaders undermined their own credibility and stature with coercive acts and top-down impositions that were increasingly authoritarian. This was particularly true after FRELIMO Second Congress in July 1968 when the anti-colonial war intensified and internal subterfuge generated fear and violence that permeated all strata of the liberation front. For example, the tension that emerged between the FRELIMO cadre from Cabo Delgado, Lázaro Nkavandame, and the FRELIMO leader Samora Machel, was vitriolic given their ideological and personal feud over the direction of the liberation front.109

Nevertheless, for many of FRELIMO’s leaders like Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano, and Marcelino dos Santos, the lack of formal educational opportunities for many northern Mozambicans was a major impediment to progress and true unity.110 Therefore, an unnamed pro-FRELIMO author argued that for “those Mozambicans living in the liberated areas of Mozambique…” FRELIMO was “striving to eliminate individualism, egoism, and superstition, and to replace the concepts of tribe, region and race with the concept of the nation. Not an easy task!” FRELIMO’s perception of Mozambicans’ ignorance could only be remedied through “Revolutionary education”: a diametric opposite of “Traditional education” which “arose out of the weak development of the economy” that “created isolated communities” where the occult and

other forms of “Superstition took the place of science and its ultimate purpose was to integrate the youth into the old ideas of generations past. The result was the destruction of intellectual initiative, and the paralysis of society.” These strong words clearly articulate FRELIMO’s animosity towards and distrust of traditionalism, rural authority, and informal education: all factors that were perceived as impediments to “modernity” and refugee loyalty to the revolutionary proto-state. FRELIMO’s institutional apparatuses and cadres served to inculcate a political and revolutionary consciousness among refugees and left little room for divergent opinions or theories, although the liberation front did seek the support of traditional authorities who were willing to work with the liberation front.

Conclusion

This chapter does not suggest that the period of African liberation and independence was naively constructed or myopically optimistic in discourse or praxis. In fact, and quite to the contrary, the momentum and discursive productions of the era commonly and appropriately displayed an authentic pride in struggles for national liberation. However, the zealotry and ascendant moral justifications throughout the 1960s for African liberation did much to obfuscate the complexities, intrigue, and divisions at work in the interstices opened during the breakdown of colonial rule. As intransigent Portuguese, white Southern Rhodesians, and the Apartheid regime in South Africa dug in their heels, hopes for a peaceful, continent-wide transition to liberation faded for Mozambicans into the mid-1960s. Although Tanzania’s transition to independence was

111 OCA, Mozambique Institute, August 1971, Series SG II, Historical Files Collected, Series 6 – Mondlane/Mozambique Archive (microfilm), Reel #3, Document #4713, The Mozambique Institute (Instituto Moçambicano), No author, 3.
atypically peaceful compared to many other nascent African states, its southern neighbors, like Mozambique, were not so fortunate. Violence was also associated with anti-colonial struggle in African colonies with high white settler populations like Kenya, Algeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

It was in this volatile period of political and ideological transition that Mozambicans who were targets and victims of Portuguese reprisals were also, in fact, victimized in another way: their plight and visible suffering offered opportunities for FRELIMO as a proto-state to enhance its political legitimacy through a contingent sovereignty as its leaders sought to create a revolutionary constituency from among the refugees who escaped to Tanzania in late 1964. Fleeing a repressive colonial Mozambique meant that refugees were subjected to and ensconced within a new revolutionary vision actively being established by FRELIMO in Tanzania. This situation gave FRELIMO’s leaders an opportune chance to capture and channel the frustration and anger of Mozambican refugees to create a discourse of revolutionary liberation. FRELIMO’s legitimacy as a liberation front was the paramount concern of its leaders; a necessary precondition to foster a unified front of eager participants to win the anti-colonial war.

The challenge for FRELIMO, in particular, was how to maintain that inchoate loyalty throughout the anti-colonial war in such a way as to develop an envisaged political legitimacy later in a future nation. Moreover, the ostensible and ubiquitous brutalities of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and the metropolitan government’s intransigent attitude toward colonial liberation served as a convenient reminder for why
the anti-colonial war was unavoidable. These issues lie at the heart of FRELIMO’s early pragmatism, its attempts to construct a viable proto-state in Tanzania. This reality also revealed the agency of individual Mozambicans whose choices as refugees were necessarily limited by more powerful hegemonic forces looking to capture their “hearts and minds” as well as their bodies.

This is not to say that the agency at work during their transit to Tanzania should be minimized as irrelevant but it is to suggest that those acts played out in the brief social breakdown of social status and stasis were, at best, ephemeral. However, despite the official rhetoric and inter-nationalistic propaganda, the precarious and capricious existence of the Mozambican refugee determined how and in what ways individual refugees sought a return to a cognizable and relatively secure social existence regardless of gender or age. The fact that so many young men and women served as soldiers under FRELIMO’s military wing is evidence of refugee participation in liberating Mozambique. These ends were achieved, in part, as individuals responded to the allure of an appealing, revolutionary ideology and from the instability of unpredictable events during what I argued was a continuum of their individualized bio-social experiences. As guests of an economically impoverished but supportive host nation, Mozambican refugees also quickly found that their lives and envisaged future were shaped both by pan-African liberation sentiments and factors that linked independent Tanzania and FRELIMO to international forces during the Cold War. Tanzania was also a member of the Organization of African Unity’s anti-colonial “Committee of Nine” which provided a basis for international collaboration with other nations. Given the stark realities of white
racist political entrenchment in southern Africa, TANU’s discourse regarding decolonization transformed from hopes for a peaceful, but hasty movement toward majority rule in all existing African colonies to one of rhetorical and actual militancy, expressed domestically and abroad.

The early years of FRELIMO’s anti-colonial war represented a unique constellation of overlapping interests and strategies resulting in the creation of a proto-state. It also resulted in a new “relationship” between a liberation front/proto-state and a vulnerable civil society of refugees/revolutionary constituents. All of this explains how and why a multifaceted and theoretical approach to analyzing the layers and complexities of the nationalist period in Africa reveals how historical events and actors, otherwise obscured in the prevailing and often sanctimonious meta-narratives of African liberation movements, transformed Mozambique. These realities also require an evaluation of the impact of refugees upon Tanzanian society and how the “relationships” that developed in this friendly host-nation also paid hegemonic dividends for FRELIMO and TANU.
Chapter 3

Borders and Brethren:
The Relationship between Tanzania and FRELIMO

In January 1964, FRELIMO commemorated the “second anniversary of the independence of Tanganyika” with a special message sent to the TANU government.¹ FRELIMO specifically acknowledged the critical role of TANU in providing moral support for its effort to liberate Mozambique. Messages were also sent to TANU and Julius Nyerere that expressed FRELIMO’s intention to remain in good standing with the people of Tanzania. The message to the government stated:

We fully realise and appreciate [sic] the actions of the Tanganyika government in aiding the total liberation of African countries still under colonial domination. We admire and encourage your attitude that Tanganyika can only be really free when the rest of Africa is free and we are aware that rapid development of Tanganyika will not only benefit the people of your country, but also benefit the people in the rest of Africa. We would like to express our gratitude to the people of Tanganyika and the President, Mwalimu Julius K. NYERERE for the sacrifices they are making to aid African freedom and unity. The Mozambique Liberation Front will always be indebted to the people of Tanganyika for the help and assistance they are giving us in our struggle for freedom.²

FRELIMO recognized the significance of lauding Tanzania’s *Uhuru* (freedom and independence) while comparing it to its own quest to liberate Mozambique. This was a pragmatic exercise of diplomacy that revealed the liberation front’s early maturation as a nascent proto-state. The message was more than just a congratulatory note of thanks and commemoration: it was also a political statement from the leaders of a young proto-state

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¹ The original name of the country, Tanganyika, will be used only in the context of quotes especially in evidence cited prior to the establishment of Tanzania in April 1964. The island of Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika to form Tanzania.

whose goal, the liberation of Mozambique, was directly tied to “the sacrifices” of Tanzanians and their government.

Despite the international and ideological risks that Tanzania faced in its support for FRELIMO, this chapter argues that Nyerere and other high-ranking members of TANU gambled on the moral sentiments in support of African independence during the 1960s and relinquished aspects of their own legal and territorial sovereignty to assist in the liberation of Mozambique. FRELIMO owed its existence and survival as a liberation front to the moral and ideological support of TANU and the relative territorial safety of Tanzania. Calls for pan-African solidarity often encouraged a willingness on the part of some African nations like Tanzania to transcend national borders to find a common sense of unity and purpose. It also meant that independent African states like Tanzania, which already possessed formal state sovereignty, should endeavor to assist their African brethren who struggled for similar ends. By “brethren,” I do not specifically mean that this was a political relationship solely determined by males for men. I argue, instead, that “brethren” reflects a multitude of associational and affective relationships regardless of sex. Independence movements in Africa were disproportionately led by men but, as Susan Geiger illustrated in the years before Tanzania was liberated, expressions of nationalism and nation were not exclusively the domain of men.³ Nevertheless, male elites in positions of power are important to consider in the context of TANU’s support for FRELIMO. TANU’s assistance to FRELIMO was benevolent in nature because it was both influenced by pan-Africanism and based on regional, cultural, and in this case, ideological similarities between the political organizations. The majority of Africans

³ Geiger, TANU Women.
who joined FRELIMO were Makonde, people who lived on adjacent sides of the international boundary at the Ruvuma River in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. As my earlier chapter on revolutionary constituency suggested, identifying with kin, regardless of gender, who were also affected by the liberation struggle, meant that cultural and linguistic bonds were also a powerful force in motivating refugee Makonde to support FRELIMO. Downplayed in the modernist rhetoric of TANU and FRELIMO, ethnic affiliations were then an important font of revolutionary support. In a way, independence from European colonialism was an extended family affair.

The morality of African independence and the early evolution of the FRELIMO proto-state were linked directly to the flexibility and fluidity of the meaning of state sovereignty itself. After independence, many postcolonial African regimes, including FRELIMO, produced narratives that depicted their independence from colonialism as a fait accompli. These linear discourses evoked a sense of inevitability that obscured the complexities inherent in nascent statecraft, the challenges of meeting responsibilities to inchoate civil societies akin to a sovereign state, and the stressful and at times volatile relationships among individuals who led Africa’s liberation movements. As Eric Morier-Genoud has concluded, there is a “need to reject linear, evolutionist and teleological narratives and restore diversity, complexity and uncertainty” regarding the era of nationalism in Africa or, as Michel Cahen has semantically argued, the era of

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5 FRELIMO, Departmento de Trabalho Ideologicao, Historia de FRELIMO, Colecao, Conhecer 4, 1981.
“nationism.”⁷ My analysis of the relationship between TANU and FRELIMO expands upon Cahen’s argument to reveal how practices and interpretations of sovereignty informed the development of distinct but parallel “nationist” projects. That is to say, Cahen’s terminological distinction is important to consider but I differ with him on one point of the semantics. TANU was a new regime in charge of a nascent state in the early 1960s and was, therefore, in the process of “creating a nation” from a bricolage of colonial and traditional inheritances. TANU leaders invoked nationalist rhetoric as a strategy of nation-building linked to moral and emotional justifications, but the Tanzanian state did not fully articulate and apply its ideological vision for the nation until the Arusha Declaration in 1967. “Nationism” in Tanzania during the 1960s was located in the process of nation-creation and the consolidation of state authority over this agenda. In short, the evidence below strongly suggests that TANU and Julius Nyerere, in particular, utilized the language and sentiments of “nationalism” to engage in the process of “nationism.”

Similarly FRELIMO was, in essence, Nyerere’s philosophical and archetypal model for extra-national revolutionary experimentation. This was particularly relevant to the early evolution of FRELIMO because it concerned the role of formal states such as Tanzania when they assisted foreign liberation movements and struggles. As such, aware of its conditional and dependent relationship with TANU, FRELIMO made continual

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⁷ Eric Morier-Genoud, Sure Road? “Introduction”: xxi-xxii. Cahen’s use of “nationism” as opposed to “nationalism” reflects a nuanced interpretation of the purpose and paths of liberation as practiced by liberation movements. Indeed, Cahen argues that concepts such as “State, Nation,” and “Nation-State” are “sometimes used interchangeably” in historical analyses of liberation movements. Seeking better analytical precision regarding the era of African liberation in particular, Cahen introduced an important distinction between “nationalism” which would build on or reflect an existing nation, and “nationism” which does not build on or reflect an existing nation but aims at creating a nation (by force if necessary).” The parenthesis are in the original.
calls for unity, downplayed the negative impact of internal discord, and attempted to showcase its revolutionary pragmatism in both its management of social services for Mozambican refugees and in their international affairs.

Even in that brief note of “gratitude” sent to Tanzania’s government, FRELIMO pragmatically sought an experience with statecraft that displayed its legitimacy and maturity. Typically, formal states recognize symbolic events and significant days in friendly countries as a matter of official courtesy but, in this instance, FRELIMO’s message signified a practice of political tact. It was also an act of legitimation since FRELIMO possessed a formal means of a diplomatic, communicative exchange with TANU officials while ensconced in the revolutionary laboratory of Tanzania.

Given this relationship, this chapter further explores significant components in the legitimation of FRELIMO and its interactions with TANU and Tanzanians as a proto-state. First, the chapter presents an analysis of the nature of the early relationship between TANU and FRELIMO, since the latter operated numerous institutions within Tanzania. I argue that the circumstances of the anti-colonial war generated opportunities for state development but also put significant burdens on both TANU and FRELIMO. Their relationship in the 1960s and early 1970s problematizes assumptions regarding the principle of formal state sovereignty, especially in regard to the early evolution of African states. As Douglas Howland and Luise White have suggested, recent scholarly interest in sovereignty as a theoretical concept should not focus on “the fragility of sovereignty but its enduring importance.”

Paul Bjerk has also pointed out the ongoing “passionate debate about Tanzania’s socialism,” in regard to the nature of Tanzanian

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8 Howland and White, eds. The State of Sovereignty, 16.
sovereignty which he claims, “highlights not successful policy, but rather successful politics.”

Second, I contend that any study of the early TANU regime and its development must consider the impact of FRELIMO’s presence in Tanzania during the 1960s. My rationale is that, as a young government in charge of a newly independent African state, TANU simultaneously devised strategies to increase its single-party sovereign authority while, at the same time, compromised its early political ascendancy with the allocation of contingent sovereignty for FRELIMO to operate on Tanzanian soil. As such, the existence of both formal and contingent sovereignty, for TANU and FRELIMO respectively, meant that the responsibilities that informed this relationship outwardly displayed a vision of unity while, at the same time, effaced tensions within and between Tanzanian hosts and Mozambican guests. In particular, the Tanzanian newspapers, the Nationalist and the Standard, played a significant role in making the case for FRELIMO’s legitimacy and for Tanzania’s role in assisting the liberation front, which is revealed in context throughout this chapter. However, these newspapers, managed by Africans for an African audience, not only offered a critical perspective of these events but also revealed the unease of TANU officials and ordinary Tanzanians about the presence of FRELIMO within their country and the possible retribution of the Portuguese military. Nevertheless, Tanzania was the epicenter for Mozambique’s liberation and remained FRELIMO’s critical milieu for political experimentation and practices until independence in 1975.

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Morality Trumps Sovereignty: Julius Nyerere and pan-Africanist practice in Tanzania

In the inaugural edition of the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Julius Nyerere contributed the journal’s first article entitled, “A United States of Africa.” In this pithy clarion call for continental unity, Nyerere argued: “Nationalist leaders all over Africa feel themselves to be part of a greater movement,” and that they should “feel personally involved in the triumphs and set-backs of all other African countries.”

Published in March 1963, two years after Tanganyika’s independence and before that country’s unification in 1964 with Zanzibar, Nyerere placed special emphasis on his desire to see “Indissoluble African unity.” The pursuit of this goal, he claimed, necessitated raising the consciousness of all African people through revolutionary actions.

He also acknowledged that colonialism was thoroughly exploitative, particularly to the economic and social development of the continent. In his opinion, the abuses of colonialism must end while, at the same time, Africans needed to suppress political divisions within nationalist movements to achieve the objective of liberation. Nyerere argued:

> When the nationalist movements in the different countries started campaigning for independence, they did not stop to argue about the ideal type of government for their country; they decided only that it was necessary to wrest sovereignty from the alien power – its use and its form were decided according to circumstances at the time of victory. So it should be with our new campaign for African unity.

It is interesting to note both the sincerity of Nyerere’s emotional appeal for pan-Africanism and his fervent contention that political disputes had no place in the midst of

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11 Ibid., 1.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 3.
anti-colonial transformation. For Nyerere, unity was critical to the success of any liberation movement. It is important to note that, when Nyerere’s article was published in 1963, the divisions within FRELIMO were already apparent. Perhaps it is ironic, then, that shortly after Nyerere and TANU played a substantial role in the liberation front’s creation, FRELIMO was so adversely affected by politics. Moreover, the article’s publication predated the army mutiny in Tanzania in January 1964, which threatened the stability of the TANU regime itself, the same month in which FRELIMO commemorated the second anniversary of Tanzania’s independence. This example of Nyerere’s pan-Africanism demonstrates its optimistic overtones, which were evidently manifest in his published article. It also confirms that publicized pan-Africanist discourses obscured and downplayed the realities of politics within and between African “liberation fronts” and formal states. For FRELIMO, its factional bifurcation into what Geert Poppe states were “progressives” and “conservatives” and the bitter personal and ethnic divisions that prompted internal purges and violence, make Nyerere’s claim that “nationalist movements…do not stop to argue about the ideal type of government” seem ludicrous in hindsight. The polemical disputes that surfaced within FRELIMO were largely tied to differences in ideological position, regional backgrounds, and personality conflicts.

Nyerere’s point about how African “nationalist movements” would “wrest sovereignty from the alien power” is also important to consider because of its implied militancy since Tanzania obtained independence without a violent anti-colonial war. As

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Susan Geiger has demonstrated, Tanzanian women affiliated with TANU “performed popular nationalism” and, at times, clashed with colonial authorities, but Tanzania’s path to independence from colonial rule was relatively peaceful compared to Mozambique and the east African country’s other neighbors such Zimbabwe and Kenya where violence was prolific.\footnote{Geiger, \textit{TANU Women}, 162.} Nyerere’s philosophical belief in the existence of Africa’s trans-continental fraternalism, particularly as it informed regional relationships between African states, was a primary motivation for him to advocate for African self-rule. Although advocating for unity, the concept of pan-Africanism was itself divisive. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, pushed for an interpretation that continent-wide unity was possible; for Nyerere, pan-Africanism was first necessary at the local, regional level. Hence Nyerere’s role in helping to establish the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA, originally called PAFMECSA to include Southern Africa) and his later support for Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). The OAU, first organized in Addis Ababa in 1963, eventually trumped the notion of provincial regionally based calls for unity. Tanzania did join and played a significant role in the OAU, particularly in its Liberation Committee, but Nyerere and Nkrumah remained at philosophical odds in regard to the vision of pan-Africanism.

Ousting the colonial powers from the continent would mean that Africans could then claim the former colonial territories for themselves, establish a national sovereignty over these spaces, and work to develop new and legitimate African states. It is also important to note that Nyerere’s support for FRELIMO was both personal and
ideological, especially since the liberation front had not yet started its anti-colonial war against Portugal. Therefore, FRELIMO was in a position to wield considerable sovereign power over Mozambicans in Tanzania with the goal of uniting them prior to the independence of Mozambique.

To borrow from Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, Julius Nyerere’s “United States of Africa” was ultimately envisaged as a continental “imagined community.” Moreover, Nyerere’s extra-nationalistic imagined community also complements Partha Chaterjee’s expansion of Anderson’s perspective. Chatterjee argued that non-European actors also attempted to articulate and imagine new identities and nations from specific historical and cultural contexts. In Nyerere’s extra-national/pan-Africanist vision, it was possible to transcend the “boundaries which divide African states” but that it was also prudent to acknowledge “…that each country has special problems which are its own concern, as well as problems which have inter-African repercussions.” The existence of formal sovereignty within Africa during the early 1960s was reserved specifically and, perhaps legally in the eyes of the international arena, for those countries that had recently obtained independence. How each newly sovereign African nation opted to interpret its use of sovereignty was of crucial importance, since freedom from colonialism literally meant that African states emerged on the world stage with the power to act in their own

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17 This early support was evident, for example, in allowing FRELIMO to organize its offices and First Congress on Tanzanian soil starting in June 1962.
18 Ibid.
21 Nyerere, “A United States of Africa,” 5. See also Anderson, Imagined Communities.
self-interest.\textsuperscript{22} Nyerere argued, in essence, that assisting other independence movements in Africa was of great moral and pragmatic concern for new African states, but it also conveniently demonstrated a practice of formal sovereignty and mature governance over his own state’s affairs. Tanzania also played host to the OAU’s Liberation Committee, commonly called the “Committee of Nine” which consisted of officials from nine liberated African countries who sought ways of aiding Africa’s liberation movements against colonialism. When the struggle against apartheid in South Africa came to the attention of the international community, many of the same African nations later formed the “Frontline States” movement to challenge exclusive white-rule in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Thus, continental pan-Africanism often rallied behind liberation movements using messages of solidarity and the morality of common purposes.

In Nyerere’s opinion, it was the responsibility of existing African states to rise above myopic and artificial territorialism to expedite Africa’s liberation from colonialism. Finally, he argued it was essential to recognize and do away with historical “boundaries” which were “so nonsensical” in the effort to demonstrate a rapid political maturation of independent states that would reflect “The new pride in national independence, the new consciousness of national sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{23} By “boundaries,” Nyerere was not only suggesting that colonial territorial boundaries were artificially imposed, but also that economic, ethnic, and linguistic boundaries needed to be overcome.

\textsuperscript{22} Bjerk, “Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania,” 276.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 2.
Despite Nyerere’s belief how sovereignty as the necessary component in a new nation’s transition to political maturity and a coveted goal for Africa’s liberation movements in general, the term sovereignty is highly theoretical and subjective. As Stephen D. Krasner has argued, it is a concept that lends itself to “organized hypocrisy.”²⁴ That is to say, formally recognized states often manipulate sovereignty’s putative universal meanings, in the Western conception, on a regular basis for myriad reasons.²⁵ The malleability of sovereignty as the legal principle for the justification of state’s policies and actions, both internal and external, “is the normal state of affairs” and provides a good explanation for the rationale that informed Nyerere’s decision to support FRELIMO.²⁶ TANU’s relationship vis-à-vis FRELIMO seems to resonate with one of Krasner’s main arguments, namely that “Because international legal sovereignty is a widely accepted and recognized script, it makes it easier to organize support from internal as well as external sources. Especially in politics with weak domestic sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and international recognition can provide a signal to constituents that a state and its rulers are more likely to survive and thereby make it more likely that these constituents would support the regime.”²⁷ Without Nyerere’s political and moral will to mediate Tanzania’s sovereignty to aid FRELIMO, “The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique” might not have come into existence, especially given Nyerere’s role in this endeavor. Moreover, FRELIMO would have been unable to muster

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²⁴ Krasner, Sovereignty. The term, “organized hypocrisy” is borrowed from the sub-title of Krasner’s book.
²⁵ Krasner, Sovereignty, 6-7.
²⁶ Ibid., 7.
²⁷ Ibid., 41.
a significant degree of international recognition or aid to claim legitimacy and develop as a proto-state with the support of its revolutionary constituents.\textsuperscript{28}

With tens-of-thousands of Mozambicans living in Tanzania, FRELIMO’s friendly but contingent relationship with Julius Nyerere and other TANU leaders put FRELIMO in a unique position compared to other liberation movements from elsewhere in southern Africa that were also active in Tanzania. ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), SWAPO, (South West Africa People’s Organization) and even the ANC (African National Congress) also operated within Tanzania but not with the same level of proto-state institutional capacity as FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{29} The reasons for this difference were partially due to lower populations of their political exiles and refugees living in Tanzania during the 1960s, the greater distance to these colonies and countries, and international pressures on the new TANU regime.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, TANU also controlled a sovereign territory and, as the sole political party of Tanzania, could forcibly dictate who or what organizations could operate on sovereign soil because of its control over state power.\textsuperscript{31} FRELIMO leaders acted to manage the large Mozambican population living in Tanzania and developed an ideology that was overtly and purposefully similar to TANU’s emerging

\textsuperscript{28} The role of international aid and funding is addressed in the next chapter. Suffice to say here that it was a critical component of the proto-state’s legitimation.

\textsuperscript{29} Jaime Mauricio Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012. Khamba was a former recruiter and member of FRELIMO.

\textsuperscript{30} For ZANU, Southern Rhodesia’s break from the British Empire in 1965 necessitated a struggle against white minority rule in that country. For the ANC and SWAPO, both organizations combated the white apartheid regime in South Africa. Both South Africa and Namibia were significantly distant from Tanzania. Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was closer to Tanzania, but necessitated travel through Zambia or Malawi and Tete Province of Mozambique—still considerable distances from Tanzania’s southern border.

\textsuperscript{31} Jaime Mauricio Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012; No author cited, “SWANU Banned in Tanzania,” Nationalist, August 30, 1967. SWANU (South West Africa National Union) was a rival group to SWAPO which was supported by TANU. In the article, TANU claimed that “SWANU was of no use in the task of liberating South West Africa.” No specific reason was given.
model of socialist modernity. The liberation front’s leaders, then, understood that their war with Portugal potentially endangered Tanzania and, therefore, their continued support from TANU.

FRELIMO operated in a particular political, social, and economic milieu in which Tanzania willingly sacrificed aspects of its own sovereignty to aid the liberation front. For Nyerere it was a cause that was both moral and strategic. Tanzania and its people needed to help liberate Mozambique since the Tanzanian government was decidedly anti-colonial and pan-Africanist. This purposeful aid to FRELIMO helped TANU to earn clout from sympathetic international observers. This moral quest also included assisting the Mozambicans living in their country, which offered the Tanzanian government an opportunity to further advance its control and oversight over remote rural regions in its own nation. This, then, was indicative of the process of Tanzania’s “nationism.” It is also prudent to acknowledge that TANU both established and, at times, ignored or modified aspects of their own sovereign authority when it was politically or morally expedient. Nevertheless, TANU was opportunistic in its manipulation of sovereignty for its own ends, as well as in its decision to help FRELIMO.

FRELIMO’s early rhetoric was also shaped by and articulated within the Tanzanian crucible of revolutionary discourse that came to eschew both colonial policies and traditional values. By March 1964, FRELIMO’s socialist inclinations were emerging in its official discourse when an unspecified cadre explained that “all exploitation of man by man will be eliminated” after FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique.32 TANU’s and FRELIMO’s early socialist discourse often alluded to the potential of revolutionary

32 ALUKA, Chilcote Collection, “Boletim de Informação, no. 6,” March 1964, 8.
possibilities, visions for profound social, political, and economic changes initiated by these regimes. TANU’s African socialist model was ultimately implemented in February 1967 when Nyerere officially outlined his plans for African socialism in the Arusha Declaration.³³ Afro-socialism emerged as a political and social trajectory in practice or discourse shortly after Tanzania’s independence in 1961.

Influenced by its relationship and proximity to the political climate in Tanzania, FRELIMO espoused an early penchant for socialist rhetoric when its leaders articulated their visions for a liberated Mozambique. As Gavin Williams has argued, with specific regard to Lusophone liberation movements in Africa in general, “In some ways, socialism in Africa was another word for nationalism.”³⁴ The political climate and national culture of Tanzania under Nyerere in the 1960s did much, then, to inform similar socialist visions for both the leaders of FRELIMO and their revolutionary constituents. By the 1970s, however, under the leadership of Samora Machel, FRELIMO dramatically reoriented to the Marxist left but the basis for this radical shift in vision did not occur after independence. If anything, it coincided with radicalized thinking and practices that also informed the militant enforcement of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* program in Tanzania during the same decade.³⁵ FRELIMO’s quest for unity and its involvement in shaping aspects of many Mozambican refugees’ lives during the 1960s, e.g. military recruitment and pedagogical strategies that inculcated its revolutionary ideology in classrooms and “bush

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³⁵ This topic, briefly addressed here, will also be part of my next research project.
schools,” meant that top-down disciplinary strategies for control presaged the authoritarian shift to Marxist-Leninism in 1977.

In a way, TANU’s evolving political philosophy and eventual introduction of mandatory state-sanctioned programs like *Ujamaa* emerged from a process of political trial-and-error and signified a burgeoning confidence drawn from government’s and Nyerere’s sense of TANU’s legitimacy. However, FRELIMO did not have the flexibility, in the contexts of both violent war and with its legal ambiguity as a proto-state, to allow evaluations of its evolving political maturation and statecraft based on practice. Rather, FRELIMO’s initial revolutionary pragmatism yielded to a need for internal order and unity that occurred at the expense of stability or input “from below.” For FRELIMO, the result was the onset of “authoritarian modernization.” Samora Machel, who later succeeded Eduardo Mondlane as the President of FRELIMO, pursued a more radical, hardline governing style that trumped the liberation front’s initial pragmatism. Moreover, given the contexts of the escalating war and internal conflicts that perpetually challenged the unity within FRELIMO, the radical shift toward Marxism after independence surfaced much earlier when partisan ideologues seized an opportunity to solidify their own status in the hierarchy of the movement in 1968 during FRELIMO’s infamous “schism.”

FRELIMO’s burgeoning authoritarianism was symptomatic of its quest for internal stability and homogenization of ideology which was fully codified during its Second Congress in July 1968.

Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that FRELIMO would have otherwise chosen an alternate political path dissimilar to Nyerere’s growing preference for African

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socialism. The leverage to achieve a viable political legitimacy, afforded to FRELIMO within the sovereign space of Tanzania, originated from the nationalist movement’s relative success in gaining the early loyalty of northern Mozambicans and refugees at the beginning of the anti-colonial war. Therefore, as long as FRELIMO acted within the constraints of contingent sovereignty in its relationship with TANU and did not stray too far from Julius Nyerere’s emergent socialist visions, attract hostile international condemnation, or abuse Nyerere’s overt patronage, the liberation front appeared to be relatively free to act as a proto-state with responsibilities toward Mozambican refugees.

This responsibility toward refugees was most evident in FRELIMO’s institutions in Dar es Salaam such as the Mozambique Institute, its Children’s Camp and School in Tunduru, its educational and training camps in Bagamoyo, its hospital in Mtwara which opened in 1970, its military training camp in Nachingwea, and in the five major “settlements” for Mozambican refugees in southern Tanzania. However, not all of these Mozambicans were under FRELIMO’s direct control as TANU managed the Rutamba “settlement” camp, one of the first sites to house refugees after the start of the war. FRELIMO’s institutions existed as a constellation of military and humanitarian operations that spread their activities and the physical presence of their cadres throughout southern and eastern Tanzania. Despite the logical location of its headquarters in Tanzania’s capital city, Dar es Salaam, the dissemination and locations for FRELIMO’s other epicenters for proto-statecraft were predominantly determined by TANU.

Tanzanian officials were aware of FRELIMO’s need for space, but FRELIMO officials

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37 For an analysis of these five “settlements” for refugees in Tanzania, see Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
38 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
did not choose any location they wanted in Tanzania to establish their institutions. Even the location of FRELIMO’s premier proto-state institution, the Mozambique Institute in Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, was ultimately decided by TANU.\textsuperscript{39} The locations for the five official refugee “settlements” were also decided by TANU officials and, for practical and logistical reasons, were located near small towns in southern Tanzania. When Tanzanian National Guardsmen showed up to assist the initial influx of Mozambique refugees in September and October 1964, they moved them to sites that were predetermined and already under hasty construction.\textsuperscript{40} By the start of the anti-colonial war in Mozambique, FRELIMO had already existed and operated within Tanzania for nearly two-and-a-half years. Thus, the Tanzanian government under Nyerere’s leadership played an active role in the oversight of FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania but, at the same time, offered a modicum of sovereign space to practice its statecraft. FRELIMO was able to experiment with and act upon the application of its revolutionary policies in different locales.

This fraternal and revolutionary relationship was also based, however, on the power dynamics between TANU and FRELIMO, especially when the anti-colonial war began in September 1964. Without Tanzania’s active assistance in guarding its own territorial integrity from the Portuguese military or other incursions, Tanzanians might have lost what FRELIMO hoped to gain: a nation.

\textit{The Validation of FRELIMO’s Legitimacy in Headlines: the Nationalist}

As the official mouthpiece for TANU, the \textit{Nationalist} daily newspaper was a significant conveyor of Nyerere’s and Tanzania’s liberation ethos. Clearly slanted to the

\textsuperscript{39} Janet Mondlane, interview by the author, June 1, 2012.
\textsuperscript{40} “Lorry Lift to Refugees Camp”, [sic], Picture Caption, \textit{Standard}, October, 12, 1964, 3.
left, the *Nationalist* offered a forum for Tanzanian bureaucrats and citizens to voice their opinions and perspectives on the role of Tanzania in African liberation.\(^{41}\) The newspaper’s headlines and columns advocated for the decolonization of mind and body in order to forge a revolutionary new society in Tanzania. It was also a powerful discursive tool used to shape the revolutionary mindset and culture in Tanzania during the 1960s and early 1970s and further illustrates Benedict Anderson’s argument that “print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness…”\(^{42}\) The revolutionary rhetoric and practice of the nation were on full display in both words and images and demonstrated the overt commitment to continental liberation maintained by a majority of officials in the TANU regime.\(^{43}\)

Early in the history of the publication, on May 25, 1964, a *Nationalist* headline exclaimed in bold, capitalized letters: “LIBERATION OF ALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES IS THE GOAL.” Written by Oscar Kambona, the Minister of External Affairs and the Chairman of the OAU’s Liberation “Committee of Nine,” the article articulated Tanzania’s position on the issue of liberation and the revolutionary role of newly independent African states. Kambona proclaimed: “We in this country are fully committed to the promotion and consolidation of African Unity.”\(^{44}\) This position and use of solidarity discourse spoke not only to the international community, but also played a role in establishing the viability and garnering the ideological support of the Tanzanian people for TANU’s causes. Framing his argument in the rhetoric of what was practically

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\(^{41}\) *Nationalist* was published in Dar es Salaam from April 1964 until April 1972.

\(^{42}\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 44; For the Tanzanian context see Ivaska, *Cultured States*, 15-23.

\(^{43}\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 37-46.

\(^{44}\) “Liberation of all African countries is the goal,” *Nationalist*, May 25, 1964, Cover page and 5.
a mandate, Kambona went on to stipulate, “We in the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar will continue to work for the liberation of Africa with all the vigour and determination at our command. It is our duty, as well as the duty of all independent African states, to support dependent peoples in Africa in their struggles for freedom and the restoration of their human rights.” Kambona’s use of the word “we” reveals the overarching and foundational tenet of Tanzania’s continued support for FRELIMO and other African liberation movements: “we” has an inclusionary and mutually supportive connotation and was a powerful grammatical indicator of Tanzania’s discursive commitment to pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism.

The term “we” also reflected TANU’s burgeoning hegemonic control over Tanzania. The government of Tanzania, then, recognized that as a new nation, calls for egalitarian sacrifice and action were not only expected but were also part of a nationwide ideological strategy for the emergent one-party nation. As such, the massive influx of refugees into Tanzania offered the TANU regime the opportunity to rally the populace with a discourse of national unity and humanitarian responsibility to the cause of aiding the Mozambicans in a government plan dubbed “Operation Refugee.” It was an opportunity for the nascent Tanzanian government to display both authority over its sovereign territory, turning many areas of their nation into a refuge for Mozambicans fleeing from Portuguese attacks, and the chance to develop a highly nationalistic and discursive framework upon which to narrate the lives of refugee Mozambicans into a

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45 Ibid.
greater call for regional Pan-African solidarity.\textsuperscript{47} Joanna Tague, for example, has argued that this situation also offered TANU officials the administrative opportunity to both consolidate their nascent state authority over remote southern villages and people who were far removed from the epicenter of TANU’s power in urban Dar es Salaam and attract resources to support them from the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{48}

As the refugee situation unfolded and TANU actively sought to aid the Mozambicans escaping across their border, the call to all Tanzanians to help their fellow Africans resonated in the pages of both the \textit{Nationalist} and the \textit{Standard}. Arguing that the lives of Tanzanians are worth risking in order to assist the Mozambican refugees, an editorial in the \textit{Nationalist} entitled “Each & Every One” stipulated, “It is not something which can be limited to those dedicated young men and women who regard citizenship in this young United Republic as such a privilege that they not only fully accept the political responsibility this entails by their membership of TANU, but also voluntarily equip themselves for any ultimate sacrifice” conceding, therefore, the possibility of their deaths for the nation.\textsuperscript{49}

Many of the articles in the \textit{Nationalist} imply a tone of mandates and directives, often cast in gendered and generational terms, about how the Tanzanian youth, regardless of sex, should both physically aid their nation and cognitively conceive of their roles as the harbingers for African and Mozambique’s liberation.\textsuperscript{50} As an instrument of TANU’s

\textsuperscript{47} Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
power and putative collective vision, the *Nationalist* was a daily call-to-arms for the nation’s youth to play a revolutionary role in their own society as well as in their capacity to assist in the liberation of Mozambique. For such a young nation to strongly advocate for a unified revolutionary fraternalism with FRELIMO was a remarkable gamble. To risk Tanzania’s tenuous global status and newly-acquired sovereignty for what TANU officials believed was a just cause both beyond and within the nation’s borders, indicated a strong moral connection that sympathized with FRELIMO’s struggle.

The *Nationalist* also generated headlines that produced an alternative, legitimating discourse for FRELIMO beyond the production of its own propaganda. It often reported on the liberation front’s victories in both the anti-colonial war and on the international front, but was more careful to describe FRELIMO’s exact activities within Tanzania. It is likely that the editors and journalists for the *Nationalist* did not want to provide the Portuguese with intelligence on FRELIMO’s activities on a routine basis. The newspaper often generated articles about FRELIMO’s successes well after they occurred and avoided revealing when and where FRELIMO officials were going to travel. The newspaper also limited its coverage on the exact nature of FRELIMO’s activities in the refugee “settlements,” at its primary school in Tunduru, and especially, in the military training camp in Nachingwea. Nevertheless, the connotative power of pithy headlines in the *Nationalist* such as “Aid Promised to FRELIMO by Czechs, East Germans,” “Frelimo to set up government,” “Frelimo claims successes in Liberation War,” and “Frelimo Fighters Bag Two Aircraft” matched similar evidence of FRELIMO’s successful institutional developments as a proto-state found in headlines such as
“Refugees Centre: Dar institute to open” in the *Standard* newspaper. Reporting on FRELIMO’s activities vindicated the proto-state’s efforts to garner legitimacy and to fight the Portuguese.

The news stories also reported on FRELIMO’s efforts to obtain funding from foreign sources and alluded to the creation of the proto-state’s premier educational institution, the Mozambique Institute. These newspapers demonstrated visible, reportable evidence of FRELIMO’s attempts to act with a modicum of sovereign authority. In this way, the Tanzanian newspapers often served as a corroborative tool that seemed to verify information and propaganda provided in FRELIMO’s numerous publications. Besides FRELIMO’s own propaganda, the *Nationalist* augmented FRELIMO’s claims of the liberation front’s successes in war, often reporting the numerical deaths of Portuguese soldiers on the cover pages of various editions. Although the *Nationalist* relied on FRELIMO’s accounts and could not be independently verified, the numbers reflected a modicum of success early in the war. The *Nationalist* did not report on the number of casualties or deaths of FRELIMO’s military, the FPLM. Therefore, the reports clearly obscured the negative realities of the anti-colonial war for FRELIMO soldiers. Simply put, the revolutionary discourses and provocative headlines of the *Nationalist* offered FRELIMO a printed medium that augmented its legitimacy. After all, since Nyerere played an active role in the creation of FRELIMO, it stands to reason that TANU’s official mouthpiece would endeavor to preserve it.

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51 *Nationalist*, October 17; October 24; November 5; December 28, 1964 (respectively); *Standard*, October 20, 1964. All capitalization is in the original.  
The *Nationalist* also provided a forum for the articulation of TANU’s policies and offered FRELIMO’s leadership the print space to defend its policies. The newspaper was a public forum that ensured that the cooperative relationship between FRELIMO and TANU was publicly underscored. FRELIMO and TANU generated a dialogic exchange of liberation discourse that demonstrated evidence of fundamental revolutionary pragmatism in the power of words to provoke action and to articulate experiences. As the basis for revolutionary language, the *Nationalist*’s editors and journalists structured headlines and sentences, often in boldface type, in ways that were mentally empowering thereby generating a *modus operandi* for collective action.

As the official organ of political propaganda, *Nationalist* columnists and editors used the newspaper to motivate and manipulate Tanzanians and international readers to support attainable goals. The newspaper offered evidence of what was possible, necessary, and morally just in the political and international milieu of 1960s East African leftist politics. Not only was FRELIMO’s existence and legitimacy as a proto-state at stake, so was the political ascendancy and status of Tanzania as a new nation. In this way, the *Nationalist* broadcasted the message of Tanzania as a significant trailblazer for and of African liberation, as a nation that represented the moral archetype for African independence and statecraft in the volatile decades of the 1960s and 1970s.

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53 Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1*; Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn*, 172. This reality reflects Habermas’s theory of “communicative action” as Julius Nyerere, Oscar Kambona, and other Tanzanian leaders used words in speeches and headlines that revealed “a claim to normative rightness” in their quest to aid FRELIMO and liberate Mozambique. The morality that informed TANU’s support of FRELIMO was important as a basis for this “rightness.”
Contingent Sovereignty and FRELIMO's Dependence on Tanzania

The relationship between TANU and FRELIMO was based not only on pan-Africanist philosophy, cross-border ethnic affiliations, or socialist solidarity - it was also characterized by dependency and contingent sovereignty. FRELIMO’s leaders acknowledged their subordinate position, despite the fraternal rhetoric, as a liberation front in relation to the government of Tanzania. For example, during FRELIMO’s discursive and logistical build-up to the impending military struggle against Portugal in mid-1964, Eduardo Mondlane beseeched Tanzania for assistance when he stated: “There is only one thing to do – that is to fight. We of Frelimo are ready to fight. But we request three important things from our brothers – weapons, training facilities and money to support our freedom fighters.” In this case, the word “request” connotes the asymmetrical power relationship between TANU and FRELIMO. Would the Tanzanian government match its supportive words with deeds and provide FRELIMO with what Mondlane was requesting?

Before the anti-colonial war started, Mondlane recognized FRELIMO’s vulnerability against Portugal and politely but firmly requested help from Tanzania. Although Mondlane was speaking directly to an anonymous reporter from the Nationalist he was, in essence, speaking directly to all Tanzanians and especially to his TANU “brothers.” In asking for “training facilities” for military activities that were later housed at Nachingwea for example, Mondlane argued about the need for space within Tanzania to prepare for the armed struggle. FRELIMO’s territorial needs in Tanzania increased significantly later when the war started in September 1964 and resulted in the influx of

54 No author cited, “Mozambique is Ready to Fight,” Nationalist, July 22, 1964, Cover page.
Mozambican refugees into Tanzania. Thus, when TANU chose the locations for FRELIMO’s activities in Tanzania and opted to help them with some logistics for their war effort, they were making an intra-national sacrifice of national territory and sovereignty for a moral, extra-national cause.

Shortly after Mondlane’s “request,” a July 20, 1964 editorial in the Nationalist argued “that the independent African countries have a greater role to play than express support for freedom fighters. In fact, each and every one of the independent African states must make it a duty to give military training to the freedom fighters and actively aid them with modern weapons to fight the colonialists who all along have been equipped with up-to-date weapons by their allies.”55 This evidence suggests that some people in Tanzania sided with a military solution to liberate colonial Mozambique. This was a bold statement produced in Tanzania’s revolutionary print media in advance of FRELIMO’s war with Portugal which got underway several months later in September 1964. Moreover, it was this type of militant rhetoric that bolstered FRELIMO’s legitimacy in the eyes of both Tanzanians and Mozambicans since widely circulated newspaper editorials often made the case for the liberation front’s morally justifiable existence. The newspaper often carried pieces that argued that existing liberated nations in Africa, i.e. Tanzania, had a more significant, hands-on role to play in assisting their oppressed brethren. However, despite the rhetorical sympathy and encouraging words for FRELIMO evident in newspaper editorials and articles, support for FRELIMO among Tanzanians did have its limits.

As FRELIMO’s own war rhetoric against Portugal increased in its publications such as *Mozambique Revolution*, concerns also mounted in Tanzania that violations of their national territory would increase from both the Portuguese military and their African spies. These fears were not unfounded as evidence of PIDE infiltration and its networks of informants actively gathered information on FRELIMO in Tanzania. Even Julius Nyerere acknowledged the possibility of significant burdens shouldered by the citizens of Tanzania because of FRELIMO’s impending war with Portugal. He warned Tanzania’s citizens to be vigilant in a speech on August 17, 1964 in Tenende. The next day excerpts of his speech were published in the *Nationalist* under the headline “Beware Border Spies.” Although Tenende borders Zambia, the issue of cross-border incursions was increasingly real for Nyerere and Tanzania in mid-1964 as FRELIMO was preparing for war. Nyerere warned Tanzanians “who were living on the borders of the country” that they “should be on their guard” since “…Africa had many conspirators.” Tanzanians were expected to play an active role in assisting FRELIMO as it organized its war effort to liberate Mozambique while, at the same time, Tanzanians being prepared to defend their own nation.

Tanzania’s territorial integrity and internal security remained a concern throughout the war, but were particularly evident in the formal expansion of police forces throughout the country that started in February 1965. The Tanzanian government actively sought to reinforce its rural districts with newly trained police officers who

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56 Mateus, *PIDE/DGS.*
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
would “help curb crime, particularly along the borders where outside people encroached on Tanzania territory.” The goal stated by Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa was “that every region would have its own field force,” as an effective monitoring and enforcement safeguard for the nation. These statements reflected a burgeoning concern related to FRELIMO’s presence in the country and the potential for Portuguese intrigue in Tanzania’s peripheral regions. It also signaled TANU’s expanded hegemonic involvement in rural Tanzanian society. Fear of a Portuguese invasion of Tanzania ran high, particularly among members of the TANU government and people living in southern regions who understood that proximity to Mozambique endangered their communities.

In the same February 2, 1965 edition of the Nationalist that reported on the growing police presence in rural Tanzania, Eduardo Mondlane responded to fears that FRELIMO’s camp in Bagamoyo, located just north of Dar es Salaam, was being used for military purposes, specifically training FRELIMO’s soldiers, therefore making it a potential target for attack. Mondlane was cited as having said, “Bagamoyo Camp is not a military camp and it has never been one. The camp has been set up to receive male refugees from Mozambique who were otherwise crowding in the capital…the refugees in the camp are not soldiers and they are not armed. They only receive basic education and physical training…there are over 300 male refugees at the moment in the Bagamoyo

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61 Ibid.
These statements were intended to answer “allegations” from an unspecified source about FRELIMO’s activities within the camp. Printed perhaps purposefully on the same day Tanzania announced new security measures, the exact nature of what purpose FRELIMO’s camp in Bagamoyo served rose to the fore. Anxieties relating to the proximity of FRELIMO’s Bagamoyo camp to Dar es Salaam required Mondlane to be publically transparent and address concerns relating to any activities there that might have “threatened Tanzania’s security.” The news story also reflected Tanzania’s deepening gendered concern about vagrants and undisciplined male youth in Dar es Salaam, particularly the large population of undocumented Mozambican men in its capital city during the mid- to late-1960s.

Saber Rattling: Portuguese Threats against Tanzania

Despite Mondlane’s attempt to quell Tanzanian nerves, headlines in the Nationalist served to remind Tanzanians of the serious possibility of a Portuguese invasion. On May 11, 1965, the Nationalist reported on a press conference in London given by Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira under a headline that read: “Portugal Threatens Tanzania: Retaliation Against Bases of Freedom Fighters.” Speaking to an anti-Communist international crowd during a Cold War NATO meeting,

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
“Dr. Nogueira had bitterly attacked Tanzania, describing it as ‘a large and dangerous communist base for the whole of Eastern and Central Africa’” and argued that “‘legitimate retaliation’” might be necessary “against African countries like Tanzania who have allowed ‘terrorist bases’ to be set up along their frontiers with Mozambique.”

Two days later, on May 13, 1965, an article appeared in the Nationalist to challenge Nogueira’s accusations and mocked his insinuation of an impending Portuguese invasion. Stating on FRELIMO’s and Tanzania’s behalf “that Portugal with her poor record of military history is inexperienced in jungle-war, and the freedom fighters who were born and brought up in these surroundings are taking full advantage of the situation and are making steady progress in the Mozambican war,” the article rebuffed Nogueira’s threatening comments. Moreover, in a statement of pure bravado that acknowledged and played to Tanzania’s sovereign integrity and power, FRELIMO’s Vice President at the time, Uria Simango, was quoted as having “said that Portugal was scared stiff of Tanzania and that was why it would not dare to fly planes in Tanzania [sic] airspace.”

Later in April 1967, reports surfaced in the Standard that Portuguese planes were, in fact, violating Tanzanian airspace. The omnipresent threat of a Portuguese invasion was, then, more than just a TANU strategy of hegemony, it was reinforced with Portugal’s visible display of air superiority.

It is clear from the evidence that a Portuguese attack was possible, but never materialized on a grand scale, as happened when Portuguese forces invaded Guinea as punishment for aiding the PAIGC in 1970. As John Cann has argued, for logistical and

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67 Ibid.
financial reasons a Portuguese invasion of Tanzania was not feasible, and the military preferred instead to pursue a low-level counterinsurgency campaign within Mozambique that also included subversive infiltrations of loyalist Africans into the country.\footnote{Cann, \textit{Counterinsurgency in Africa}.} William Minter, a former teacher at FRELIMO’s secondary school in Dar es Salaam offered a similar explanation during an interview in August 2010.\footnote{William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010.} However, there may be another explanation that convinced the Portuguese military not to invade Tanzania.

As mentioned above, late in Portugal’s colonial wars (1970), their military invaded Guinea to retaliate for its support of the PAIGC. In Mozambique, under General Kaúlza de Arriaga, the Portuguese military engaged in the massive but unsuccessful Nó Górdio (Gordian Knot) military operation in northern Mozambique to end FRELIMO’s advances during the same year.\footnote{Carlos de Matos Gomes, \textit{Moçambique 1970: Operação Nó Górdio} (Lisbon: Prefácio, 2002).} The military operation did destroy many FRELIMO bush camps and did disperse many FRELIMO militants, but the successful proto-state activities of the movement had long established relations with local Mozambicans, but especially Makonde who were, by 1970, generally committed to the liberation of Mozambique. The failure of Operation Gordian Knot and other Portuguese military failures prolonged what was becoming an “unwinnable” war and likely played a direct role in the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 that deposed the Prime Minister Marcello Caetano in Lisbon.

Therefore, if Portugal was willing to invade Guinea in 1970 and simultaneously launch a costly and massive offensive in Mozambique well into the war, why did the Portuguese military not pursue an invasion of Tanzania earlier in the war when its
military capacity and morale were higher? The answer may lie in Portugal’s fear of condemnation from other members of NATO, and especially the United Kingdom which maintained friendly ties to Tanzania, until the debacle of the Rhodesian Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.\textsuperscript{73} International pressure on Portugal to avoid an invasion of Tanzania also seems likely given that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were warm to Tanzania and Eduardo Mondlane, and England’s earlier intervention in assisting TANU against mutinous army officers demonstrated an amenable attitude toward the Nyerere regime.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, articles in the \textit{Nationalist} on August 11, 1964 “Britain to lend Tanzan \textit{sic} £7.5 Million” and October 19, 1964 “Britain and Us” reflect close ties between the two nations.

Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira’s threats of invasion were addressed at the United Nations, while Tanzania’s concerns were also directed to other NATO countries. By mid-1965, the international community was well-aware of Portuguese intentions against Tanzania at least in a public forum. On June 5, 1965, the \textit{Nationalist} reported on Tanzania’s vocal pressure on NATO to condemn Portugal under the headline “Expel Portugal: NATO Urged.” The article stated: “The Tanzanian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. John Malecela…called upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) \textit{sic} to expel Portugal from the organization…after a delegate from Denmark had said that Nato \textit{sic} did not support the

\textsuperscript{73} Universal Declaration of Independence – when Southern Rhodesia formally broke away from the British Empire. Although I have been unable to corroborate this question with official and definitive evidence, the circumstantial evidence from Tanzanian newspapers for these suggestions offers some possibility.

\textsuperscript{74} This topic is further explored in this dissertation Chapter 4, “Underwriting Legitimacy.”

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subversive activities of the Portuguese in Africa.” 

Several days later, on June 8, 1965 the Chairman of the United Nations Decolonization Committee, Sori Coulibaly of Mali, condemned NATO’s continued support of Portugal, arguing that the intransigent Salazar regime remained “a very grave threat to world peace and security...particularly so in Africa.”

The year before these international pressures came to bear on Portugal, Franco Nogueira published a book entitled, *The United Nations and Portugal: A Study of Anti-Colonialism* in which he argued that Portugal was entitled to defend and manage its overseas possessions free from international interference. In the book’s “Forward,” Oliver Lyttleton, the Rt. Honorable Viscount Chandos, made a special appeal to “the British who have been in treaty relations with Portugal for more than 600 years,” that they “should read and understand the Portuguese case.” Clearly then, international pressure existed and may have plausibly affected Portugal’s decision to invade Tanzania. In a similar way, Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott argue that, in regard to Tanzania and Zambia:

The existence of such international frontiers, providing readily-accessible guerrilla sanctuaries, represented a considerable difficulty for the Portuguese, who were largely constrained by political considerations from striking across them or indulging in ‘hot pursuit’...Tanzania shot down a Portuguese Harvard T6 converted trainer in April 1972. The relatively small number of such claims, however, is an indication of Portuguese reluctance to incur additional international criticism... There was...little Portugal could do to prevent the training undertaken by guerrillas in their hosts’ territory...
Other than scant references such as Beckett and Pimlott’s to international realities affecting Portuguese military strategy, however, definitive evidence for this claim exists circumstantially. Nevertheless, Tanzania’s concerns about a military incursion in its remote southern regions remained visible in the creation of “defense villages” along the Ruvuma border until FRELIMO established more of a solid foothold over the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa after Operation Gordian Knot in 1970. Joanna Tague has analyzed TANU’s creation of “defense villages” that required arming Tanzanian civilians and argued that they were also part of a broader, long-term hegemonic project for the Tanzanian government. Therefore, Portugal may have considered the possibility of a full invasion of Tanzania, but for myriad reasons that included international pressures, opted not to follow-up on this course of action.

Either way, although a full-scale Portuguese invasion of Tanzania never occurred, low-level cross-border operations were frequent and likely resulted in the death of several Tanzanian citizens. On December 1, 1966 the Nationalist reported that, “The Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa announced last night that four people were killed and five others injured…by bombs placed by Portuguese soldiers on a road in Mtwara District.” The next day, a graphic visual was displayed on the cover of the paper’s December 2, 1966 edition. The photos depicted the gruesome remains of dead bodies

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80 It also begs the question about why Portugal invaded Guinea without fear of international condemnation. Again, evidence is lacking, but perhaps France’s attitude remained bitter to the only country that rejected the French Community in the wake of Guinea’s “No” national vote on September 28, 1958.
81 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
82 Ibid.
near “the village of Mahurunga” in Mtwara province in southeastern Tanzania.\textsuperscript{84} The December 2, 1966 cover story also stated that John Malecela, Tanzania’s Ambassador to the United Nations, had castigated Portugal for the cross-border incursion that resulted in the death and maiming of Tanzanian citizens. The article began with the statement that, as a result of Portugal’s violation of Tanzania’s sovereign territory:

An Afro-Asian resolution has proposed that Portugal be condemned for its policies in African territories which are described as crimes against humanity. It has also proposed that the Security Council make it obligatory for all states to break off all diplomatic and trade relations with Portugal. The resolution was introduced in the General Assembly’s Trusteeship Committee here.\textsuperscript{85}

Although the Nationalist later reported on the “Portuguese denial” of the bombings, the evidence of Tanzanian deaths confirmed that, although the Portuguese military was “Playing with fire,” it remained a potent threat to the security and sovereignty of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{86} Later that month, reports also surfaced in Zambia that the Portuguese had conducted military raids into that country from Angola that resulted in the death of two of its citizens.\textsuperscript{87} This incursion followed earlier evidence of Portuguese infiltration and bombing of Zambian territory in July and October 1966, followed by a low-level invasion of Malawi in November 1966.\textsuperscript{88} These actions, nearly two years into the war, signaled FRELIMO’s increased successes in military advances and victories in

\textsuperscript{84} The quote is from the December 1, 1966 article, for the pictures, see No author cited, “Tanzania Will Not Sit Idle: Malecela Warns Portugal About Mtwara Killing,” Nationalist, December 2, 1966, Cover page.


\textsuperscript{87} No author cited, “Troops Rushed to Frontier: We will brook no more nonsense, Kaunda warns,” Nationalist, December 29, 1966, Cover page.

\textsuperscript{88} No author cited, “Portugal Bombs Zambia’s Territory,” Nationalist, July 22, 1966, Cover page; No author cited, “Portuguese bombs hit Zambia again,” Nationalist, October 10, 1966; No author cited, “Portuguese Invade Malawi,” November 26, 1966. As mentioned above, in April 1967, Portuguese war planes were spotted over Tanzanian airspace in the southern provinces. Similar Portuguese aggression was also reported in Zambia in 1968.
Mozambique since borders that sheltered FRELIMO’s rear-bases were subjected to military infiltration. They also served to remind TANU and FRELIMO officials of Portugal’s omnipresent hostility and threat to Tanzania.

*Defining Sovereign Parameters or Generating Legal Ambiguity?: The Refugee’s Control Act of 1965*

Returning to FRELIMO’s early years (1962-1965) when fear of a Portuguese invasion seemed imminent, Tanzania opted to extend its control over non-citizens living in its country in a way that established a new legal framework for the relationship between TANU and FRELIMO. In an effort to contain the influx of refugees and economic migrants into Dar es Salaam and across Tanzania’s borders, the government enacted the Refugees Control Act in late 1965.\(^89\) Passed by Tanzania’s National Assembly on December 23, 1965, the “Refugees Act” (later known as the Refugees Control Act) represented a detailed legal description of who constituted a refugee, under whose official jurisdiction refugees’ were organized in settlements and surveilled, and further listed punishments for violators.\(^90\) The law also stipulated a method of imposed jurisdictional oversight for TANU officials that defined the contours of FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty over its revolutionary constituents. Although the law clearly reflected TANU’s burgeoning authority over its own sovereign territory, it is remarkable that the law did not specifically mention or directly allude to FRELIMO or the presence of its “freedom fighters” actively working in and on its institutions in Tanzania. The five refugee “settlements,” for example, were well-established before this law was enacted, but the law stipulated that only the Tanzanian “Minister may declare any part of

\(^{89}\) [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5294.html](http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5294.html) [accessed February 13, 2012.]

\(^{90}\) Ibid.
Tanganyika [sic] to be an area for the reception or residence of any refugees or category thereof.”

The creation of fixed points of entry and departure revealed a need to better monitor the movements of non-citizens within Tanzania during Mozambique’s anti-colonial war. These decisions were also likely informed by evolving United Nations and UNHCR initiatives regarding humanitarian and human rights issues that emerged after World War II.

The refugee law necessarily contained a section in regard to the “Surrender of weapons.” The law stated: “Every refugee who brings any arms or ammunition into Tanganyika shall immediately surrender such arms or ammunition to an authorized officer” but made no mention of whether or not this applied to FRELIMO’s soldiers, who were effectively all refugees. Such a provision challenges the notion that refugees were merely powerless victims in need of protection, often carrying few if any possessions at all. The specific reference to refugees who possessed weapons during their migration in Tanzania connotes the existence of a different kind of “refugee.” After the war began, the Mozambican refugees who served as soldiers and porters for FRELIMO were part of the proto-state’s burgeoning revolutionary constituency. As agents of revolutionary practice and experience, these refugees in Tanzania’s legal definition were active participants in initiating revolutionary changes in liberated zones and in refugee “settlements” in Tanzania. In Tanzania’s new legal definition of non-citizens they may

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91 Ibid., Section 4, “Reception areas and refugee settlements,” Article 1. I use the “[sic]” to acknowledge the use of “Tanganyika” instead of Tanzania for a clarification reflected in the law, especially since the nation officially changed its name in 1964. The law was also enacted to deal with the influx of refugees from Rwanda and Congo during the same period.


have been legally designated as refugees but, as FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents who often carried weapons to fight the Portuguese, their status was ambiguously extra-legal. Given the law’s ambiguity and limited enforcement, the Refugees Control Act reflected an interesting dynamic in the legal nature of FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty. Although Tanzania’s borders could not be completely policed or protected, the creation of the law illustrated an attempt to surveil and impose TANU’s rule-of-law upon non-citizens who crossed into their country.

However, a specific provision of the law was directed to any “authorized officer” monitoring refugees who likely originated from Mozambique. Without specifically mentioning “Mozambique,” the new law clearly alluded to Mozambican political refugees still seeking asylum from Portuguese military attacks. It stated:

An authorized officer appointed…shall not refuse a refugee a permit under his section if the officer has reason to believe that the refusal of a permit will necessitate the return of the refugee to the territory from which he entered Tanganyika and that the refugee will be tried or punished for an offence of a political character after arrival in that territory or is likely to be the subject of physical attack in that territory…

The law theoretically applied to FRELIMO soldiers and ordinary Mozambicans who exited and entered Tanzanian territory with regularity, but given the government’s avowed support for FRELIMO’s efforts to liberate Mozambique, it is evident that no such “surrender of weapons” occurred. In fact, although he was a significant member of the FRELIMO hierarchy, visual evidence of Samora Machel in various FRELIMO publications throughout the 1960s illustrates that, while wearing his military fatigues, he

94 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5294.html, Section 11, “Permits to remain in Tanganyika,” Article 2.
carried a pistol on his side at all times.\textsuperscript{95} Given Machel’s evolving status as FRELIMO’s Secretary of Defense and eventually, after Mondlane’s assassination in February 1969, to the Presidency of FRELIMO his possession of a sidearm for self-defense seemed logical. However, by carrying a pistol, Machel also appeared to overtly defy the 1965 Tanzanian law in regard to refugees and guns but, perhaps because of his stature, it is presumable that Tanzanian authorities made exceptions. Interestingly, William Minter, a teacher at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam, observed that Samora Machel “always” carried a pistol when wearing fatigues.\textsuperscript{96} Thus, despite attempts to monitor refugee flows and activities in Tanzania, certain members of the FRELIMO hierarchy were able to act extra-legally. Since the law was written after FRELIMO’s war against Portugal began, some leaders of the liberation front like Machel seemed to maintain a grandfathered exception. Although never clearly stipulated, it is also plausible that the law would serve as legal mechanism for TANU to intervene if and when it ever became necessary to address issues regarding FRELIMO’s existence on Tanzanian soil. The Tanzanian government’s interpretation and use of sovereignty also extended to other nations beyond Africa. It is to Tanzania’s expanding interaction with the outside world and its tolerance of certain foreign influences meant to support FRELIMO that this chapter now turns.

\textsuperscript{95} For example, see ALUKA, Mozambique Revolution Collection, \textit{Mozambique Revolution}, no. 52, Cover image. Various images produced by FRELIMO are too numerous to list, but also often depict Samora Machel with a sidearm.

\textsuperscript{96} William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010.
Chinese Influence and the Malleable Nature of Tanzania's Internal Sovereignty

Although future Mozambican refugees would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Refugees Control Act, FRELIMO’s early military strategy reflected Maoist influences. This was especially true in FRELIMO’s successful creation of liberated zones in Mozambique where FRELIMO’s soldiers collaborated with peasants in revolutionary agricultural and social projects during the guerrilla war.\(^\text{97}\) John Saul, Joseph Hanlon, Geert Poppe, and Sonia Kruks have all argued that China’s influence over the early ideological and practical application of FRELIMO’s socialist theories was evident well before its turn toward Marxist-Leninism in 1977.\(^\text{98}\)

As an example of TANU’s permissive attitude to violations of its own sovereignty on behalf of FRELIMO, Chinese military advisors played an active, early role in training and modeling Maoist ideology for FRELIMO’s guerrilla soldiers in Nachingwea starting in late 1964 and early 1965. The presence of Chinese military trainers in Tanzania increased after Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos among other FRELIMO central committee members made trips to Beijing late in 1964 to meet with high-ranking members of China’s Communist party that included Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and Foreign Minister Chen Yi.\(^\text{99}\) This trip to China also provided early evidence of FRELIMO’s diplomacy since “Both brothers Dos Santos and Mondlane had been invited to China by the Peking Institute of Foreign Affairs.”\(^\text{100}\) Such a high level invitation from

\(^{97}\) Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*.
\(^{99}\) ALUKA, Chilcote Collection, Boletim de informação, no. 4, 6.
the leaders of communist China to a liberation front reflected the early propensity of FRELIMO to portray itself as or even “the” legitimate heir to Mozambique. Thus, the experiences of foreign diplomacy with formal, socialist-oriented states obtained results for the FRELIMO proto-state in ways that were both legitimizing and militarily strategic.  

FRELIMO worked directly with Chinese military trainers in Nachingwea and elsewhere with the direct knowledge of the Tanzanian government. This fact reflected two important aspects of the proto-state’s contingent sovereignty. First, an element of constraint informed FRELIMO’s approach to relations with communist China. Since FRELIMO interacted and trained with friendly and ideologically sympathetic third-party foreign nationals, in this case the Chinese, upon Tanzanian soil with TANU’s knowledge, it stands to reason that FRELIMO necessarily obtained permission from Tanzanian authorities first. Chinese officials maintained close relations with the Tanzanian government which received high-level dignitaries such as Premier Chou En-Lai who visited Tanzania on a goodwill tour in June 1965. Second, if the reverse scenario was true, that Chinese and Tanzanian relations were strained or hostile, no such military training with Chinese trainers would have occurred in Tanzania. As Poppe has argued, “Nyerere’s Tanzania, FRELIMO’s host, enjoyed a close relationship with China built


upon their ideological similarities and may have served as an important relais.”¹⁰⁴ This diplomatic relationship was a powerful reflection of Tanzania’s and FRELIMO’s burgeoning friendship with socialist and Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War and reflected an ideological stance that favored socialism before 1967. TANU’s knowledge of Chinese trainers at the FRELIMO military camp in Nachingwea demonstrated Tanzania’s cognizance of the sacrifice and malleability of its formal sovereignty for a moral end that the government supported. Conversely, it could also be argued that Tanzania’s support for these activities on their soil represented a powerful example of TANU’s use of sovereignty and burgeoning internationalism. That is to say, the Tanzanian government’s interpretation of its own formal sovereignty included its willingness to effectively utilize the power inherent in the concept for a moral purpose with which it agreed. This reality reflected TANU’s use of sovereignty, in which the Tanzanian government granted permission to FRELIMO to engage in military training in a joint, extra-national operation with the Chinese in Tanzania’s territory.

However, this situation might have also reflected the tacit reality of Tanzania’s own military weakness. If Tanzania’s military had played a direct role in training or fighting alongside FRELIMO, this might have provoked an invasion from Portugal and embroiled the young TANU regime in a war it could not handle.¹⁰⁵ This situation was especially true during 1964 as the TANU reorganized Tanzania’s military after a coup that required the intervention (by invitation) of the British military. By 1965,

FRELIMO’s war against Portugal provided a convenient forum for TANU’s justification to reorganize the Tanzanian military. The military was, by 1965, still undergoing structural and hierarchical transformation. Since the threat of Portuguese invasion was very real, the Tanzanian government had a logical excuse for bolstering of the military – the nation needed to be defended. Thus, with TANU’s toleration for Chinese nationals’ training of FRELIMO’s soldiers, the government adroitly linked the struggle for Mozambique to a powerful Cold War ally that might dissuade Portugal from invading Tanzania.

China’s willingness to aid FRELIMO originated from diplomatic visitations and negotiations between leaders of a sovereign country and the liberation front. When Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos convinced the Chinese government to send trainers and war materiel to Tanzania, this request reflected a diplomatic and political acumen of mature statecraft. Behind the scenes, however, FRELIMO would have likely cleared such interaction and activities with TANU officials first. However, the outward appearance in FRELIMO’s publications suggests that Tanzania played a secondary role in garnering China’s assistance for FRELIMO. As Henriksen, Jackson, and Poppe have argued, however, Soviet, East German, and Czech weapons as well as Chinese trainers were funneled through the OAU’s African Liberation Committee into Tanzania. The depth of FRELIMO’s international appeal and procurement of arms and trainers via Tanzania provided a veneer of legitimacy while it also clearly demonstrated Tanzanian

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oversight and approval of such activities. Although the communist regime of the People’s Republic of China was not recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate government of China, it was an important relationship to maintain since Mao Tse-Tung was willing to assist other leftist movements in their guerrilla efforts against colonial powers. FRELIMO’s leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane, Uria Simango, and Marcelino dos Santos may have traveled abroad to seek such aid, but it was Tanzania’s friendly relations with such countries that allowed the shipment of weapons and trainers at all.

Conclusion

By 1966, when FRELIMO’s soldiers began to win decisive battles against the Portuguese in northern Mozambique, FRELIMO’s soldiers did not need to travel back-and-forth over the Ruvuma River. As part of the proto-state’s practice of revolutionary pragmatism, FRELIMO soldiers engaged in state-building and legitimating activities with ordinary Mozambicans in the liberated zones of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and later in Tete, Sofala, and Manica Provinces. Mimicking Maoist strategy, FRELIMO wanted its soldiers to be visible to and supportive of local populations of Mozambicans who remained in the colony. Thus, as the war progressed into the late 1960s, FRELIMO endeavored to move its proto-state operations and activities into Mozambique, thereby alleviating the constraints upon its contingent sovereignty with Tanzania in exchange for a more flexible application of its strategies within Mozambique’s liberated zones. This is not to say that FRELIMO differed substantially in its revolutionary practices in Mozambique’s liberated zones as compared to their operations in Tanzania: but its

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107 Ibid.
activities and interactions with Mozambicans still in the colony technically fell outside the legal and administrative purview of TANU officials.

If FRELIMO was to be successful in its war against Portugal, Tanzania and Tanzanians needed to play an active role in what was colloquially known as the “Uhuru War.”\(^ {108}\) The Refugee’s Control Act appears to have been only tacitly enforced in regard to FRELIMO militants and cadres who carried out training, education, agricultural production, and life-sustaining activities for their revolutionary constituents in both Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Thus, Nyerere’s call for vigilance and the militarization of borders also signified the limited capacity of FRELIMO to defend Tanzania. The liberation effort for Mozambique, then, required the combined effort of FRELIMO cadres and Tanzanians with outside help from nations such as China, especially when stories from refugees and newspaper journalists commented on the “Portuguese Military Build Up” in northern Mozambique.\(^ {109}\) One aspect of the nature of contingent sovereignty, then, was in recognition and acknowledgment of the necessary role of Tanzania and Tanzanians in assisting FRELIMO in its war efforts.

However, as Abel Mabunda, a former FRELIMO soldier explained, TANU was made up of many individuals and did not act “as if it was of one mind” in regard to attitudes about FRELIMO.\(^ {110}\) This reality perhaps reflects anxieties among some TANU officials and ordinary Tanzanians over FRELIMO’s activities in Bagamoyo and elsewhere in their country and suggests that skepticism about FRELIMO existed in

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\(^ {109}\) No author cited, “Troops, Fighters and Bombers Based along Mozambique Border: Portuguese Military Build-Up,” *Standard*, October 10, 1964, Cover page. Airstrips were widened and thousands of Portuguese troops were being off-loaded in northern Mozambique.
\(^ {110}\) Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
unpublicized ways. It also necessitated that Tanzania better articulate, through the
enactment of a national law in this case, the Refugee Control Act, an official policy in
regard to refugees. The codified definitions and policies toward refugees demonstrated a
formal sovereign management over territory and who did or did not constitute a refugee.
After all, the law provided the national government with a framework to impose
limitations upon FRELIMO and Mozambican refugees. However, in regard to
FRELIMO’s presence and activities in Tanzania, the Refugee Control Act was
ambiguous in both language and enforcement. Thus, the overall sentiment and morality
of FRELIMO’s quest to liberate Mozambique trumped, at least temporarily, Tanzania’s
legal and territorial sovereignty. This reality also speaks to “the sacrifices,” mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter, in FRELIMO’s message which acknowledged Tanzania’s
Uhuru and revolutionary fraternalism.

During FRELIMO’s Second Congress in July 1968, a letter was sent to Julius
Nyerere that, by that point, redundantly expressed how much “FRELIMO highly
appreciates the support that the people and the government of Tanzania have always
given to the struggle of the Mozambican people.” The letter unequivocally stated that:

The acceptance of the establishment of FRELIMO’s external headquarters
since 1962, the accommodation given to Mozambican refugees at special
camps in Tanzania, the material aid, as well as the political support accorded
to us by the Tanzanian people, in particular through the African Liberation
Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, are the concrete expression
of a highly revolutionary spirit of African solidarity that the Mozambican
people will never forget.111

111 ALUKA, Chilcote Collection, Letter from Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) to His Excellency
Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania.
http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.CHILCO014
When the letter was sent to Nyerere, FRELIMO also made sure to include a special point of gratitude to the Tanzanian citizens, who “Because of their solidarity with the Mozambican people…have often been victims of aggressions from the Portuguese colonialists. Several Tanzanian brothers have been killed, and some wounded as a result of those aggressions.”

Written six years after the creation of FRELIMO, the letter reflected the ongoing relationship between TANU and FRELIMO and how Mozambique’s anti-colonial war had affected Tanzania’s populace and sovereignty. Although the letter made no reference to the burgeoning internal discord within FRELIMO, it also signified an engagement with the proto-state’s mature revolutionary pragmatism. FRELIMO’s decision to specifically thank Julius Nyerere and Tanzania for his continued support for the war against Portugal was an act of political tact reminiscent of FRELIMO’s earlier letter in January 1964. Although by 1968 FRELIMO had achieved a modicum of success in the anti-colonial war, as evidenced by the establishment of liberated zones and an expanded military engagement in Tete Province, this letter demonstrated FRELIMO’s continuing dependence on the TANU regime and its willingness to mediate Tanzania’s own sovereignty to aid in the liberation of Mozambique. The financial costs of maintaining FRELIMO’s institutions in Tanzania, however, fell largely on the shoulders of the proto-state’s leaders and their ability to locate and procure funds from diverse sources.

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112 Ibid.
Chapter 4

Underwriting Legitimacy:
The Moral Appeal of FRELIMO’s Liberation Struggle

Well after FRELIMO had procured financial assistance for an educational project in Tanzania in 1963, the President of the Ford Foundation in New York City, Mr. Henry T. Heald, received a letter labeled “Personal and Confidential” dated November 12, 1964 from Joseph R. Roda, the Chairman of the Board for Ford Lusitania S.A.R.L. Speaking on behalf of the Board for the Ford Motor Company’s interests and operations in Portugal, Mr. Roda felt inclined “to acquaint” Mr. Heald “with certain facts” specifically in regard to “a grant by the Ford Foundation to the African-American Institute in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, for the Mozambique Institute.” In blunt terms, Mr. Roda stated:

We feel it necessary to communicate directly with you because of the recent criticism being leveled against us as a company by the Portuguese government because of the actions taken by your organization… We believe you should know, too, that the consequences of your grant have caused great embarrassment to Ford Lusitania and have caused Portuguese government officials to question the wisdom of our company being allowed to continue in business here in this country. Already handbills and advertisements are appearing in this country and in Portuguese-controlled parts of Africa urging people not to purchase Ford products since our profits contribute to the cause of anarchy, bloodshed and revolutions in Africa.¹

Although Mr. Roda also acknowledged that the Ford Motor Company and the Ford Foundation were, in fact, separate organizations, “it is difficult if not well nigh impossible to convince others not familiar with American laws about these facts.”

Roda’s letter went on to make “an earnest request”: that the Ford Foundation “re-

Roda’s admonishment of the Ford Foundation for its grant to the African-American Institute (AAI, that helped establish FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute) was written nearly two years after Eduardo Mondlane, already the President of FRELIMO, had approached the Foundation. Mondlane took the time to visit the Foundation in New York City in late 1962 while he was teaching at Syracuse University in upstate New York. As a former member of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, Eduardo Mondlane approached various organizations and institutions in pursuit of funds to construct facilities for Mozambican refugee students in Tanzania. In an interview, a former FRELIMO cadre, Jaime Maurício Khamba, recalled that it was through Mondlane’s position at the United Nations – a position he held prior to becoming the President of FRELIMO - that he (Mondlane) came to initially meet Julius Nyerere. Khamba strongly suggests that this meeting might have first convinced Nyerere that Mondlane would make a good leader for FRELIMO given his presence, intellect, and demeanor. The other organizations that Mondlane visited in New York City to seek funding for Mozambican refugees included the Phelps-Stokes Fund and AAI. Through these connections, Mondlane garnered both an international audience and a substantial amount of financial support that later drew the special ire of the Portuguese government and other Portuguese banking institutions with personal knowledge of people affiliated,

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2 Ibid.
3 Jaime Maurício Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012.
in particular, with the Ford Foundation. The threat of an economic boycott and the potential ouster of the Ford Motor Company from Portugal demonstrated how FRELIMO’s foreign interactions were able to create significant tensions in international affairs in the early 1960s. This situation also indicated the expanding role and activities of FRELIMO in international affairs during the 1960s.

Establishing relationships and connections abroad meant that FRELIMO was successful in its navigation of Cold War scenarios and, as Georgi Derluguian argued, this “was clearly related to the inordinate ability of its intelligentezia [sic] leaders to benefit from global alliances.” Derluguian argues that FRELIMO was strategically adaptable and ambitious. He states: “It was once an organization seriously engaged in conflict which it was determined to win. The organizational adaptations found in the course of conflicts served to strengthen the organization.” This is an especially important statement since FRELIMO’s pursuit of international aid during the 1960s complicated the relationship between Portugal and the United States, both of whom were allies and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It also placed FRELIMO within the constellation of Cold War discourse, rivalries, and politics. The successful procurement of funds from various foreign organizations and governments, as well as military and non-military aid from diverse sources demonstrates how FRELIMO’s

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successful diplomatic endeavors abroad became a significant component of its legitimation.

This chapter explores how FRELIMO obtained funds, lethal and non-lethal aid, and interacted with foreign organizations and states as part of its pragmatic approaches to legitimacy. These legitimating strategies not only secured financial assistance that helped provide services for FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents and institutions in Tanzania, it was also a necessary but time-consuming task that proved the dedication of FRELIMO proto-state and military forces to the liberation of Mozambique. The scope of the quotidian problems involving the needs of thousands of Mozambican refugees and the fact that it was also simultaneously engaged in a violent anti-colonial war meant that FRELIMO’s legitimacy was constantly in jeopardy. Through a comparative analysis of two of the international organizations that aided FRELIMO, the Ford Foundation and the World Council of Churches, this chapter focuses on the financial and human interactions between FRELIMO and these donors. Through the moral discourses of genuine humanitarian concern, FRELIMO leaders like Eduardo Mondlane successfully articulated the movement’s need for financial assistance to support its institutional projects in Tanzania and in the liberated zones. FRELIMO’s strategies for obtaining funds needed to appeal to a spectrum of humanitarian and philanthropic secular and religious institutions, as well as to established governments. Letters requesting aid and personal visitations to these organizations revealed a multifaceted strategy on the part of the FRELIMO leadership to secure funding that was meant to help the Mozambican people and advance the cause of liberation. FRELIMO was aware of how its cause, the
liberation of Mozambique, garnered sympathy and financial support from diverse international groups that were motivated by various ideological, religious, and humanitarian concerns. As global decolonization became a fait accompli for the majority of former European colonies around the world by the late 1950s and early 1960s, Portugal’s continued intransigence was juxtaposed against the morality of FRELIMO’s humanitarian efforts. This situation provided ostensible opportunities for sympathetic philanthropic groups to assist FRELIMO in its moral quest to help educate and provide health care for Mozambicans.

In order to demonstrate the appeal of FRELIMO and how its quest to liberate Mozambique was tied to a multitude of foreign agendas, the chapter also briefly addresses how the United States government during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy actively engaged with FRELIMO. Thus, despite ideological differences and global military alliances, its leaders articulated a moral agenda in a way that appealed to a spectrum of interests. This comparative approach to the chapter also illustrates the relative flexibility of the leaders in exercising contingent sovereignty, as well as the power of charisma in achieving their ends. This chapter will also demonstrate that FRELIMO’s international appeal extended to various religious and secular organizations, as well as to the governments of rival Cold War powers.

FRELIMO’s operations and institutions and, to a lesser extent, its activities in Mozambique’s northern liberated zones were largely underwritten by sympathetic foreign aid groups. Foreign funds and humanitarian assistance served as the necessary precursors for the creation of the Mozambique Institute and other administrative epicenters that
encapsulated, embodied, and demonstrated FRELIMO’s legitimacy. Simply put, FRELIMO’s international efforts with both secular and religious organizations paid dividends for its legitimation as a proto-state.

*Networking to Create a Revolutionary Laboratory: The Ford Foundation and Early Institutional Outreach*

Portugal’s anger at the Ford Foundation for its initial support of FRELIMO surfaced dramatically after Mozambique’s anti-colonial war started in September 1964. On November 4, 1964, an internal hand-written letter between two staff members of the Ford Foundation confirmed, with concern, that “Salazar has really been raising the roof because of our grant to this Dar school, including a strong threat to throw the motor company out of Portugal and extremely strong regulations [sic] to the Ambassador & State. I suspect it will be a long time, if ever, before we undertake another program involving the education of refugees.”

Stories in the *New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor* also reported on the actions of the Ford Foundation’s financial assistance to FRELIMO. The situation quickly became an international crisis for the Ford Foundation and prompted its Vice President, Verne Atwater, to send a letter directly to the Chairman of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford II, regarding the “Salazar incident.” Atwater tried to assuage the company’s fears of a Portuguese boycott when he stated, “Frank Sutton, our resident representative for East Africa, has advised us that there is no sign that anything but educational criteria have been employed by the Institute

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7 FFA, Grant File PA 63-425, Microfilm, Memorandum, “From J. Donald Kingsley to Ted Harris” November 4, 1964.
in selecting students for the school or in determining the subjects and skills to be taught.”

Portuguese fears and anger clearly originated from the existence of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, a FRELIMO educational center that Portugal claimed undermined its colonial authority in Mozambique. Atwater’s decision to specifically mention that the Mozambique Institute met “educational criteria” was an effort to inform the Ford Motor Company that funds were not being used for military purposes, an accusation leveled by Portuguese officials.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, was aghast at the Ford Foundation’s assistance to FRELIMO and took the opportunity to write to its President. In a letter labeled “personal and confidential” sent to the President of the Ford Foundation, Henry T. Heald, Nogueira castigated the Ford Foundation’s involvement and decision to send money “regarding educational projects…for African students.” In the letter, Nogueira denied the existence of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania and stated that only “Political agitators go inside the country; they bribe and corrupt people; they bring them to neighbouring territories; and then they call them refugees.” He continued to lambast the Ford Foundation when he stated, with sarcasm, “Really Mr. President, let us face the facts as they are, and let us not be guided by slogans. Would you care to come to Mozambique and see for yourself? We would be delighted to have you.”

Taking particular aim at Janet Mondlane, Eduardo’s American wife and Director of the Mozambique Institute, Nogueira went on to dismiss the humanitarian nature of the

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10 FFA, Grant File PA 63-425, Microfilm, Letter, From Portuguese Minister Franco Nogueira to Henry Heald, Undated Letter (but likely written after October 23, 1964 given a reference to that date in the letter).
Mozambique Institute and argued instead that “Mrs. Mondlane certainly directs the project on ideological lines, and for purely political purposes... It is at least a very amazing coincidence that, of all American ladies, the one selected to direct such a program should be the wife of a Mozambican political adventurer, who acts on behalf of foreign interests.”

To clarify the point from the Portuguese perspective, Nogueira attempted to demonstrate the faulty logic of the Ford Foundation’s humanitarian grant for FRELIMO’s educational project when he stated: “You will agree that there is a way of doing political work under the guise of educational assistance.”

Nogueira concluded the letter with a way for the Ford Foundation to “save face” when he said, “I have no difficulty in admitting [sic], however, that up to now the Foundation could claim to be unaware of the foregoing.”

By December 1964, the Ford Foundation was under enormous pressure to end its interaction with FRELIMO and assuage Portugal. Seeking a way to quell the international fall-out, newspaper sources reported that the Ford Foundation announced it was ending its financial support of the Mozambique Institute and would seek, in the future, “to placate Lisbon.” The entire affair came to light after Janet Mondlane, while on a good-will, fund-raising tour in the United States, had spoken to newspapers such as the Syracuse Herald-Journal and alluded to FRELIMO’s ultimate goal: the liberation of Mozambique.

Looking to extricate the name of the Ford Foundation from FRELIMO’s emergent politicization and escalating war with Portugal, members of the Foundation’s

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Board wrote letters detailing their mistakes and clarified their new position in regard to the Mozambique Institute project. In a brief letter to Mr. John Cowles, the President of the *Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, Ford Foundation President Henry Heald attempted to explain his feelings and revealed his exasperation with these events. Heald unequivocally stated, “We have had quite a time in connection with the Portugal – Mozambique – African situation.” The letter demonstrates the significant concerns at the Ford Foundation regarding the organization’s involvement with the project, but also offers a viable example of FRELIMO’s proto-state status and use of contingent sovereignty in regard to Tanzania. It is worth quoting two sections of Heald’s letter at length. Mr. Heald told Mr. Cowles, with his own dose of exasperated sarcasm:

> The Foreign Minister’s press conference gave me an excuse to write him directly, which I did, explaining in detail the purpose of our grant, explaining that the Motor Company had no connection with it, etc. He replied in beautiful diplomatic language, but saying in effect that we really didn’t know what was going on. Seeking to bring the exchange to a terminal point, since he seemed somewhat mollified, I wrote again and explained that the grant in question had expired in July 1964 and had not been renewed, although I was careful not to say that it would not be renewed. I also thanked him for the information he had given us and indicated that should we have occasion in the future to consider Foundation activity relating to the Portuguese areas of Africa we might… explore it with him. (Of course, this is standard practice. We never make grants in foreign areas without consultation with the duly constituted government, nor do we go where we are not invited.)

> This letter concluded with a specific ‘tongue-in-cheek’ insight into the relationship between Tanzania and the Ford Foundation. Heald stated,

> This is a brief account of our adventures with Salazar & Co. I should add that while the subject was in the newspapers, Kambona, the foreign minister of Tanzania, visited us but he seemed fully to understand our position and said

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16 FFA, Grant Number PA 63-425, Microfilm, Letter, From Henry Heald President of the Ford Foundation to Mr. John Cowles, President of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, December 30, 1964.

17 Ibid.
he hoped that we would continue to do things in East Africa that we could and were in position to. As a by-product, we heard that at least one Ford dealer from East Africa was delighted with the situation. He had a lurid poster from Mozambique which showed how the whites were “killing your brothers” while supported by the Ford Motor Company so don’t buy Fords. The dealer said he took pleasure in showing this around and his sales had never been better.\textsuperscript{18}

The fact that Oscar Kambona was aware of the situation revealed how a triangulation of sovereign and philanthropic concerns informed the Foundation’s decision to assist FRELIMO. According to the letter, Heald indicated that the Ford Foundation would have required the organization to inform the Tanzanian authorities of their intentions to provide funding for an institution operating on their soil by a liberation front. It also revealed that FRELIMO’s outreach and successful procurement of Ford Foundation funding generated international intrigue and tension. As a proto-state, then, FRELIMO acted within the rules of the Ford Foundation’s policy that necessitated the “consultation with the duly constituted government,” in this case, Tanzania.\textsuperscript{19} However, the Tanzanian government did not make the direct appeal for aid to the Ford Foundation - Eduardo Mondlane and, later, Janet Mondlane of FRELIMO did. It stands to reason, then, that the grant was approved for an avowed liberation front that possessed the stature and organizational capacity of a proto-state with quasi-sovereign responsibilities toward a

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. The Tanzanian government did have a relationship with the Ford Foundation, which sent a significant sum of US $520,000 to the “University of East Africa” for both “the development of the university” and “…to train in diplomacy…civil servants from East and Central Africa.” See Nationalist, October 15, 1964. The Ford Foundation had already been active in Tanzania and continued its development funding for educational projects throughout Africa to the sum of £430,000. See, No author cited, “Ford Foundation Grants Help African Studies,” Nationalist, May 14, 1965; and, perhaps most interestingly, in regard to pre-Arusha villagization schemes in Tanzania, the Ford Foundation gave a total of “£12,495…to assist the completion of research of problems of a large-scale village resettlement in Tanzania.” See No author cited, “Ford Foundation Helps Tanzania,” Nationalist, January 27, 1966. 225
vulnerable civil society. The Ford Foundation did not just obtain permission from Tanzania, it negotiated directly with Eduardo and Janet Mondlane—individuals who were not in charge of a “duly constituted government.” How and why, then, did the Ford Foundation violate its own protocol and regulations in regard to interacting solely with governments of sovereign nations in its decision to help establish the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania?

The answer lies in a blend of the Ford Foundation’s humanitarian vision, FRELIMO’s adaptability that appealed to its moral endeavors, and the diplomatic prowess of Eduardo and Janet Mondlane who both had powerful, charismatic personalities. Moreover, the actions of FRELIMO’s other high-ranking cadres such as Marcelino dos Santos, Uria Simango and, later, Samora Machel reflected a multifaceted “Front” of personalities, despite emergent differences of ideological opinion, who sought aid and international connections in order to create an aura of legitimacy for FRELIMO. The Ford Foundation grant was also allocated to FRELIMO based on reports from other organizations such as the AAI, with which the Foundation had a working relationship that documented the genuine need for humanitarian assistance for uneducated Mozambican refugees in Tanzania. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, morality may have the ability to trump sovereignty and, in the case of a putatively non-partisan philanthropic organization like the Ford Foundation, the morality of educating refugees may have also

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20 Janet Mondlane, interview by author, June 1, 2012. As the head of the “Eduardo Mondlane Foundation” in Mozambique, Janet is still intimately involved in Mozambican affairs and politics—particularly the legacy of her late husband. See also Nadja Manghezi, O Meu Coração está nas Mãos de um Negro: Uma História da vida de Janet Mondlane (Maputo: Centro de Estudos Africanos/Livraria Universitária, 1999); and, de Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane. Preface written by Janet Mondlane.

21 Ncomo, Uria Simango, 96-108. These men often traveled abroad to interact with foreign leaders and sought aid for the military and humanitarian operations.
trumped the organization’s policies and procedural protocols. However, the grant to FRELIMO also reflected, what Edward H. Berman has argued, was the burgeoning presence of Western philanthropic organizations after World War II whose “programs were designed to further the foreign policy interests of the United States.”

Nevertheless, Eduardo Mondlane and other charismatic leaders of FRELIMO sought aid for their agendas in an international climate that was both willing to provide it and generally in favor of decolonization.

Before the fallout from the grant in late 1964, on December 3, 1962, Eduardo Mondlane “came in to talk” with Frank Sutton, a member of the Ford Foundation board at the organization’s headquarters in New York City. In an enthusiastic memorandum to members of the Ford Foundation, Sutton said that Eduardo Mondlane was “about the most intelligent man from Mozambique I’ve met” and that he was “head of a Mozambique political movement with headquarters in Dar es Salaam.” It is interesting to note that Sutton specifically referred to Eduardo Mondlane as the leader of a “political movement” because, as an avowed apolitical organization dedicated to humanitarian and educational projects in impoverished countries, the Ford Foundation was clearly well-aware of FRELIMO’s political existence and intentions well-before Roda’s 1964 letter of concern. There was no question of Eduardo Mondlane’s stature since, as the liberation

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22 Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 3. It could have been the moral inclination to aid refugees that provoked the Ford Foundation to action, the charisma of Eduardo Mondlane, or the pressure of the Kennedy regime to motivate the Foundation to act. It could also have been a blend of all three reasons.

23 FFA, Grant File PA 63-425, Microfilm, Memorandum, From Frank Sutton to FCM, December 3, 1962. 227
front’s President, he led an overtly political organization whose titular name signified the clear purpose of its existence.

Shortly after returning to Africa early in 1963, Eduardo Mondlane provided a list of the estimated costs and budgetary allocations for the nascent Mozambique Institute to the Ford Foundation. The list of needs for his educational project was approved by the Ford Foundation Board and sent via the AAI a total sum of “$99,700…for an educational project for African refugee students in Tanganyika over a one-year period.” The funds were channeled through the AAI, an organization that was already stationed in Dar es Salaam and involved in educating and procuring scholarships for East African students who attended their school at the Kurasini International Educational Center (KIEC). The AAI was “Founded in 1953 as the premier Africa-focused U.S.-based non-profit…to strengthen human capacity in Africa.” The AAI’s operations in Dar es Salaam at the KIEC began in 1962 as part of the “East African Refugee Program” (EARP) where African refugee “students participated in an academic program that included basic college preparatory curricula and commercial education, focusing on accounting, bookkeeping, typing, English language as well as agricultural training courses.”

As the number of Mozambican refugee students increased and enrollments grew throughout 1963, the KIEC school could not house or provide instruction for the increasing number of students. Thus, when Eduardo Mondlane appealed to the Ford

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24 FFA, Grant Number PA 63-425, Microfilm, Letter to Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York from Secretary, June 26, 1963.” Eduardo sent a list of needs and monetary justifications to the Ford Foundation in May 1963. After the Ford Foundation ended its affiliation with FRELIMO, they requested that the remaining sum of just over US $11,000 be returned immediately.
Foundation for a grant to construct a FRELIMO school, given the overflow at the KIEC, there was a clear need for just such an institution. The AAI willingly received the Ford Foundation grant on behalf of Mondlane for “the Special Refugee Educational Project” allocated specifically for the Mozambican student refugees.\(^\text{27}\) The organization also promised to audit the Ford Foundation grant to make sure that the funds were being spent on “a Research and Counseling Center, with specific reference to Mozambican refugees, at Dar es Salaam” and that to ensure the intended grant was spent properly, the AAI would “submit regular reports to the Ford Foundation.”\(^\text{28}\) The result was the creation of the Mozambique Institute secondary school, which initially started as a hostel for Mozambican refugee students who found their way to Dar es Salaam seeking to continue their education in a more formal setting. In her dissertation, Joanna Tague provides a synopsis of how student volunteers from the United States, from Harvard University, initially volunteered to educate some of these refugees. A grandson of former U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Haven Roosevelt, was one of these students.\(^\text{29}\) However, language difficulties, a lack of space, and financial barriers limited their effectiveness, especially as the number of students continued to grow.\(^\text{30}\) The Mondlanes saw an opportunity to help these refugees and actively sought to develop a veritable educational institution to do so.

Eduardo Mondlane successfully procured funds under the banner of education for refugees. By many accounts, “he was a nice man” and his charismatic personality

\(^\text{27}\) FFA, Grant Number PA 63-425, Microfilm, Letter to Mr. Frank Sutton at the Ford Foundation from Waldemar A. Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute, Dated May 28, 1963.
\(^\text{28}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{29}\) Haven Roosevelt, interview by author, December 7, 2012.
\(^\text{30}\) Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
conveyed an aura that convinced sympathetic philanthropic and religious groups to aid FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{31} Despite the fact that Jaime Khamba, a former FRELIMO cadre, stated that Mondlane was a “nice man,” he also promptly followed this statement by expressing his belief that he was not a good political leader and that Mondlane’s presence and leadership style often angered young Mozambican males such as Khamba himself who eventually quit FRELIMO. To some young Mozambicans like Khamba and Daniel Chatana, Eduardo Mondlane seemed elitist and detached from the suffering of ordinary Mozambicans.\textsuperscript{32}

Nevertheless, Mondlane also convinced young Americans, such as William and Ruth Minter, to assist in FRELIMO’s institutional projects.\textsuperscript{33} William Minter, a former math teacher at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam, said during an interview, “He [Eduardo] was an extremely impressive person. He had hundreds and hundreds of American friends.”\textsuperscript{34} During a separate interview, Ruth Brandon (formally Ruth Minter), a former science teacher at the Mozambique Institute secondary school explained how she and William Minter came to teach at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam. According to Ruth Brandon, she and William Minter first met Eduardo Mondlane and heard him speak at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City near the United Nations in March 1965. About that encounter, Ruth Brandon said:

Mondlane had been brought to the United States for education by the Presbyterian Churches who had identified him as an up-and-coming young Mozambican…so

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\textsuperscript{31} Ja\textsuperscript{i}me Maur\textsuperscript{c}io Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012.
\textsuperscript{32} Daniel Chatana, interview by author, December 30, 2011; Khamba, interview.
\textsuperscript{33} William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
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he had trust in their judgment and there was a program, Frontier Internship and Mission with Margaret Florey heading it; he knew Margaret Florey and they were eventually the source of the funding to send us to teach at the Mozambique Institute. But I think that because he knew her; because we had been in Civil Rights; and I had been at Oberlin, all of those were in our favor, so that we went endorsed by Mondlane. And that was pretty unusual because, of course, the United States was a partner with Portugal in NATO, and so all Americans by definition were suspect.35

Both Ruth Brandon and William Minter revealed how Eduardo Mondlane’s friendship with Margaret Florey, an activist member of the Presbyterian Church in New York City, was critical in helping him secure an audience and assistance from various religious and secular groups.36 Eduardo often spoke in various settings in New York City, such as at the Union Theological Seminary, to raise awareness of the plight of Mozambicans under Portuguese colonialism.37 William Minter explained that prior to meeting Eduardo Mondlane, he (Minter) had been involved in the National Christian Student Federation via the Union Theological Seminary, and joined its Southern Africa Committee to actively protest against South African apartheid and champion liberation efforts for Africans.38 This Southern Africa Committee also worked closely with the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) based in New York City and led by George M. Houser who, in the 1960’s, helped to raise funds for FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute after meeting Eduardo Mondlane.39 George M. Houser outlined the purpose of the

35 Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 17, 2012.
36 Ruth Brandon, interview with the author, April 6, 2012; William Minter, interview.
37 Ibid.
38 William Minter, interview.
39 For an extensive collection of ACOA’s activities on behalf of liberation efforts in Africa and its interaction with the Mozambique Institute, see The Amistad Research Center, Operation Crossroads Africa Files, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States. See also, ALUKA, American Committee on Africa File. For an extensive analysis of ACOA’s role in assisting the Mozambique Institute in the mid-to late-1960s, see Joanna Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”

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ACOA in regard to liberation fronts like FRELIMO and its charismatic leader Eduardo Mondlane. He wrote:

…the task for outside, non-governmental organizations, such as the ACOA…is the support of the liberation movements of southern Africa, in the form desired by these movements, in any way possible. Of primary importance in this connection is our own Africa Defense and Aid Fund…This aid should include, not only direct assistance to the organizations of the movements, helping to supply vehicles and office equipment, but should also include legal defense for those arrested, refugee assistance, etc…

These were important external connections for Eduardo Mondlane and FRELIMO to maintain. These foreign relationships (and friendships) were pragmatic in that they helped legitimize the existence of FRELIMO and linked the organization to a broader decolonization and anti-racist discourse that emerged in the international community during the 1960s. Moreover, in the case of ACOA, funding and other forms non-lethal, humanitarian aid were secured for FRELIMO’s operations and secondary school in Dar es Salaam.

During an interview with Ruth Brandon, she went on to describe how after meeting Eduardo Mondlane in New York City, she and William sought to teach at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam where “at least twenty others who applied to come to teach at the Mozambique Institute…were rejected.” Although she was unsure of the reasons, this selectiveness indicates that FRELIMO maintained some procedure for the vetting of teachers and that Eduardo Mondlane, based on the Minters’ background, by-passed this process and communicated directly with Janet Mondlane.

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41 Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 17, 2012.
regarding the Minters’ credentials. Brandon further recalled, in regard to those who were rejected, that “first they had to get past Janet Mondlane,” but she could not remember herself ever having a formal interview about the job. It seemed that Eduardo Mondlane’s approval was all that was necessary in certain circumstances but, in other situations, Janet Mondlane was intimately involved in the process of overseeing the proto-state’s operations at the Mozambique Institute.

In another compelling example of the early internal dynamics and organization of the FRELIMO, Nancy Freehafer, a former English teacher at the Mozambique Institute who started teaching there in 1966, stated that she and a colleague, Brigitta Kalström, “didn’t have any contacts or any arrangements” when they arrived in Dar es Salaam and applied for jobs at the secondary school. Before arriving in Tanzania, Nancy Freehafer and Brigitta Kalström met in Germany and became friends. Nancy went to Germany as a representative of the American Friends Service Committee to work in a settlement house. After meeting Kalström in Germany and returning to the United States, Freehafer got a job teaching English at a “mental hospital”/school outside of Boston, Massachusetts, while Kalström became “active in the anti-apartheid movement” in Sweden. Kalström suggested that the pair go to Tanzania “and look for a way to work with refugees.” During the interview, Freehafer whimsically stated, “It sounds pretty crazy, but we just decided that we were going to go” because she “wanted to be among people who were solving their problems in a different kind of way.” Freehafer did not clarify what this

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42 Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
“different kind of way” meant, but the substance of the interview suggests that she was impressed with the ways Mozambicans challenged colonial injustice and were working to improve their lives.

Without any previous contact with either Eduardo or Janet Mondlane, Freehafer also stated “they (FRELIMO) had been expecting an English woman who was supposed to be teaching English as a second language and she didn’t show up…the term was starting and they needed somebody to do this.” After they arrived at the secondary school looking for work, Janet Mondlane conducted a brief interview with both Freehafer and Kalström who were hired on the spot to fill the void. Freehafer and Kalström ended up splitting the position and the small salary teaching English at the school.

As the Director of the Mozambique Institute, Janet Mondlane was the gatekeeper of the staff and operations at the institution, but as this evidence suggests, the vetting of teachers and other formal procedures at the school could be by-passed (in the case of the Minters) or based on expediency (in the case of both Freehafer and Kalström) by either of the Mondlanes. The charismatic personality of Eduardo Mondlane and the morality of the cause for which he advocated, in particular, clearly appealed to secular philanthropic organizations, as well as to young foreigners affiliated with certain religious organizations who were eager to assist FRELIMO.

“A Terrifically Impressive Fellow”

FRELIMO’s leaders were also aware of the agendas and international activities of foreign governments and officials in powerful “First World,” as well as non-aligned, nations. In this constellation of competing and, at times, overlapping foreign interests, 46

46 Ibid.
FRELIMO was subject to the whims of international perceptions and influences from diverse ideological positions during the tumultuous decade of the 1960s. The government of the United States, for example, also took an interest in FRELIMO as part of its Cold War strategy to curtail the potential spread of global communism. This reality demonstrated how FRELIMO’s appeals for financial assistance extended beyond willing philanthropic organizations like the secular Ford Foundation to include the governments of sovereign nations that jockeyed for global influence. Since Eduardo Mondlane received advanced academic degrees in the United States and worked for the United Nations, his position as the leader of FRELIMO captured the attention of high ranking members of the U.S. government. Since FRELIMO’s early ideology, articulated at its First Congress in June 1962, stipulated a revolutionary approach toward transforming Mozambican society along socialist lines, it is important to briefly address why the U.S. government reached out to FRELIMO and sought to aid the movement.

Eduardo Mondlane had “some conversations” with U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy who advised his brother President John F. Kennedy, that Mondlane was “a terrifically impressive fellow.”\(^{47}\) Although no date is provided for the source, it is likely that the conversations between Mondlane and Robert Kennedy occurred in late 1962

\(^{47}\) Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Recordings, Dictabelts, Dictabelt 18B, Conversation #3: President Kennedy and RFK, Transcript, No Date, 3: http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/JFKPOF/TPH/JFKPOF-TPH-18B-3/JFKPOF-TPH-18B-3-TR.pdf. [accessed on August 26, 2012]. José Manuel Duarte de Jesus also refers to the significance of these conversations between Mondlane and the Kennedy Administration in his book *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem a Abatar*, 171-178. De Jesus succinctly summarizes these events as well in order to foreground his subsequent chapter entitled, “A Política Africana da Administração Kennedy” (The African Politics of the Kennedy Administration) where he goes into an in-depth analysis of these Cold War relationships. For my purposes, although our narratives reflect a similar analysis of the extant evidence, I argue that this data also provides evidence of how FRELIMO functioned as a proto-state in its formal dealings with the United States government. De Jesus uses the same primary sources to provide a more complete, comprehensive biographical sketch of Eduardo Mondlane.
while Mondlane was in the U.S. In the course of this high-level discussion, Robert Kennedy implored the President to provide funding for Mondlane in the amount of US “fifty thousand dollars for help with the refugees.” Cold War concerns were also on Robert Kennedy’s mind when he informed his brother that FRELIMO cadres “have gotten some aid and assistance from Czechoslovakia and Poland” and that Mondlane hoped to show his fellow Central Committee members “that there are people in the West at least sympathetic to his efforts and….to keep ‘em going.”48 In one of the most intriguing parts of the conversation, Robert Kennedy specifically mentioned that Eduardo Mondlane was working to get a grant from the Ford Foundation. Robert Kennedy suggests at the possible role of the Kennedy administration in helping Mondlane to obtain the grant when he (Robert Kennedy) stated, “It’s a possibility that they can get the second fifty thousand dollars from the Ford Foundation. At least they’re working on that. Carl Kaysen is…I think it would be damn helpful. Now, we’ve had discussions on these things for the last week and Carl Kaysen can fill you in on it.”49 Carl Kaysen was the Deputy Special Assistant for National Affairs and worked closely with the U.S. National Security Advisor to President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy. For such a high-profile staffer to be working on Mondlane’s bid to get a Ford Foundation grant suggests a level of interaction between Mondlane, the Ford Foundation, and the Kennedy Administration in regard to funding the movement. However, the full scope of the United States’ involvement in the Mozambique’s liberation is difficult to discern. Even the appearance of association between the Kennedy administration and Mondlane was enough for one

48 Ibid., 3-4.
49 Ibid.
former FRELIMO cadre, Daniel Chatama, to conclude that “with Mondlane in power...the USA and other Western powers” worked “to offset Soviet Union [sic] or turn Mozambique into ‘Strategic’ [sic] zone for its vast coastline.”

Chatama’s point suggests that, as a member of FRELIMO’s rank-and-file, he perceived Mondlane as an elitist with Western ties and, given the complexities of Cold War geo-politics, had a hard time trusting him.

It is also important to note, perhaps, that Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, had previously served as the President of the Ford Motor Company from 1960-1961. He later headed the World Bank. Interestingly, McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, later became a President of the Ford Foundation from 1966-1979. These close affiliations between Ford, its Foundation, and the Kennedy administration reveal that other forces may have been at work behind the scenes – namely that Eduardo Mondlane was someone whom the U.S. government could work with to keep communism at bay in East Africa. Certainly, Robert Kennedy’s words about Mondlane (above) strongly suggest this as a possibility. There was also mention of John McCon who was the Director of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in regard to his awareness of the situation as well. Finally, in his biography of Eduardo Mondlane, José Manuel Duarte de Jesus suggests that two high-profile Democrats, Jacob Wayne Fredericks, an engineer for Kellogg’s cereal and Gerhard Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs were prominent figures that influenced

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50 Daniel Chatama, email message to author, May 30, 2012. The typographical errors are in the original email.
51 Chatama was also a student at the Mozambique Institute secondary school and told me that other students did not trust Eduardo Mondlane as well.
Kennedy administration’s policies toward Africa and sympathized with FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{52} Later accusations against Mondlane often labeled him a cover for the CIA and its anti-communist interests in east Africa. This accusation is impossible to corroborate since CIA records are largely sealed or heavily redacted regarding its operational history but, as Haven Roosevelt asserted, officials at the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam were consistently asking him for information on FRELIMO’s leaders and their activities.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, President John F. Kennedy was concerned that the United States would appear to be overtly assisting a liberation front in Africa with a project that was clearly designed to undermine America’s NATO ally, Portugal. President Kennedy said to Robert Kennedy about Eduardo Mondlane, “‘Course, we wouldn’t want him to be saying that he got anything from us,” to which Robert Kennedy responded, “No, but you wouldn’t have that you see. You’d have it through some private foundation.”\textsuperscript{54}

These international dealings with the United States government demonstrated the distinct political climate in which the leaders of FRELIMO operated during the Cold War. The United States maintained a vested interest in both financial and geo-political terms in Africa during the Cold War. It was not that the United States government only worked with viable liberation groups like FRELIMO, it also sought alliances with individuals and formal nations that were favorable to its pro-Western, anti-communist

\textsuperscript{52} de Jesus, \textit{Eduardo Mondlane}, 171-178.
\textsuperscript{53} Haven Roosevelt, interview by author, December 7, 2012. See also de Jesus, \textit{Eduardo Mondlane}. De Jesus briefly addresses this lingering controversy of the CIA in east Africa. To date, FoIA requests have been limited and offer little evidence of the CIA’s role in Mozambique or its interactions with FRELIMO or Eduardo Mondlane.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 4.

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Despite the active role of the United States in Africa, it is worth mentioning again that, only two years after the start of FRELIMO’s war against Portugal, Chinese military advisers assisted FRELIMO with guerrilla training in Tanzania. In addition to China’s involvement with FRELIMO in the friendly revolutionary environment of Tanzania, FRELIMO officials had established warm relations with the governments of Egypt and Algeria. FRELIMO established a foreign office in Cairo, Egypt shortly after Eduardo Mondlane had visited Gamal Abdel Nasser, a diplomatic connection with a head-of-state in a geopolitically sensitive area of the world during the Cold War. Nasser was firmly anti-imperialist and his support of FRELIMO was important to maintain. Also, like other FRELIMO soldiers and loyal cadres, the future President of FRELIMO Samora Machel underwent military training in Algeria, a former French colony that had fought for its independence. FRELIMO’s guerrillas trained in these officially non-aligned nations, but some of their young men visited the Soviet Union for educational and military training. These nations were ardent supporters of anti-colonialism and offered the diplomatic space and physical locations to further internationalize and, thus, legitimize the FRELIMO proto-state. These foreign connections to non-aligned nations and FRELIMO’s operation of humanitarian projects and military training in Tanzania appealed to the juxtaposed interests of capitalist and communist global strategies. It also signified how FRELIMO deftly navigated these opposing Cold War influences to obtain

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55 For example, the United States maintained close ties with Kenyan labor leader, Tom Mboya as well as the controversial President of Zaire, Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) both of whom were favorable toward U.S. interests during the 1960s.
56 Jacinto Veloso, Memorias em Voo Rasante (Maputo: JVCI, Lda., 2006), 40-50. In his book Veloso, a white Mozambican defector to FRELIMO, comments on his time in Algeria as well.
57 Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2011.
what it needed to survive as a proto-state. Ironically, because FRELIMO received aid from and established diplomatic connections with these opposing forces, this pragmatic strategy of legitimation also sometimes complicated the relationship between FRELIMO’s leaders and the rank-and-file. This tension indicated a deepening divide and played a significant role in the internal bifurcation of FRELIMO in which some former cadres such as Daniel Chatama accused the leaders of the liberation front of selling out to either Western or Marxist sympathies.\footnote{Daniel Chatama, interview by author, May 26, 2012.}

The means by which FRELIMO obtained funding also requires an analysis of how its internationalism was informed by local conditions. That is to say, money and non-military materials from international sources needed to be utilized in overtly humanitarian ways, such as assisting refugees for the purposes of building a revolutionary constituency. This reality demonstrated FRELIMO’s organizational competency and pragmatism as a proto-state. At the same time, FRELIMO was a politically vulnerable entity in which its leaders sought to avoid intentionally offending foreign donors’ ideological positions or opinions. As evidenced by the Ford Foundation’s initial financial support of FRELIMO and the resultant international fallout, it was a delicate balance. Also, the possibility of financial mismanagement, corruption, and bureaucratic ineptitude was anathema to the successful procurement of funding. This reality was something that the leaders of FRELIMO, such as Janet Mondlane, strove to avoid. For example, as the Director of the Mozambique Institute, Janet Mondlane generated estimated budgets for the operations and needs at the Institute and produced

\footnote{Daniel Chatama, interview by author, May 26, 2012.}
tangible evidence of internal audits.\textsuperscript{59} Any accusations of malfeasance or overt use of humanitarian money to purchase weapons would have jeopardized the proto-state’s financial solvency and its semblance of legitimacy. FRELIMO’s leaders such as Janet and Eduardo Mondlane, then, argued that the Mozambique Institute and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique were two separate entities and, on a yearly basis, endeavored to publicize their self-audits of fiscal expenditures and allocations.\textsuperscript{60} Janet Mondlane was consistent, for example, with her projections of the Mozambique Institute’s budgetary needs and expenditures and generated publications for the purpose of transparency.

FRELIMO leaders realized that funding from humanitarian groups would likely run dry if they were used to directly support their military agenda and, as such, delineated between the two. An irony exists here in that the Ford Foundation and Ford Motor Company also existed as two separate organizations but their namesake affiliation, regardless of U.S. tax code law, connoted a conjoined existence. FRELIMO’s leaders publically averred that the liberation front’s military efforts were supposedly divorced from the funding of its other institutions which were strictly humanitarian. Although as a liberation front FRELIMO was not bound by the same international legal structures of formal states or philanthropic organizations like the Ford Foundation, FRELIMO sought to act transparently and “play by the rules” of good governance. FRELIMO went out of its way to unequivocally state that financial aid for those social services institutions was not rerouted for military procurement. Nevertheless, FRELIMO rarely provided receipts for


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
all of the organizations’ expenditures. Janet Mondlane denied any overlap of funds between FRELIMO’s military procurements and the operations at the Mozambique Institute, stating that they were, indeed, “separate institutions.” This scenario suggests a conscious attempt on the part of FRELIMO’s leaders to legitimize the liberation front’s activities via organizational and fiduciary management.

During the First Congress in September 1962, when FRELIMO initially revealed the tenets of its ideological positions and outlined the original structure for its Central Committee, the leadership also needed to consider how its appeals for aid affected Tanzania. Since Tanzania was officially non-aligned during the Cold War, FRELIMO’s dual commitments to anti-colonial war against Portugal and to institutional projects in Tanzania and Mozambique’s northern liberated zones required a careful assessment of which foreign powers were favorable to Tanzania and vice-versa. Since financial assistance from the major powers was of paramount necessity for the survival and operation of FRELIMO’s institutions, the leaders needed knowledge of and approval from Tanzanian authorities in regard to which countries were amenable to Tanzania’s foreign interests. As a sovereign state, Tanzania’s foreign affairs also imposed a constraint upon FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty. Thus, Tanzania’s formal sovereignty checked FRELIMO’s international dealings but the Tanzanian government still allowed the liberation front to operate within acceptable foreign parameters.

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61 Janet Mondlane, interview by author, June 1, 2012.
62 Relations between Tanzanian and U.S governments cooled under the Johnson administration due to his escalation of the Vietnam War and his unwillingness to cut NATO support for Portugal. The Ford Foundation, however, still allocated money for projects in Tanzania during Johnson’s administration.
Since FRELIMO was simultaneously a fighting force of guerrilla soldiers and a proto-state, the financial and human costs to liberate Mozambique were enormous.

Therefore, in weighing the international contexts and contests with local needs, both military and non-military, FRELIMO’s leaders sought to strike the right ideological balance for multiple audiences. For example, FRELIMO’s avowed ideological positions needed to appeal to both the U.S. government and the Chinese communist regime. FRELIMO’s publications portrayed a viable bureaucratic professionalism that needed to resonate across a constellation of foreign and domestic interests. Because FRELIMO lacked official sovereignty over a national territory and citizenry, FRELIMO adapted its ideological positions and alliances to suit its financial needs and to propagandize an image of solidarity in order to remain the only official liberation movement for Mozambique. FRELIMO was adept in its diplomatic international appeals and statecraft.

According to George M. Houser, the director of the ACOA, another secular group that provided financial aid to FRELIMO:

Virtually all military aid, including not only weapons and armaments but also clothing, medicine, and food, came from socialist countries. Western European countries and North American humanitarian and religious organizations contributed educational and medical supplies. Both the People’s Republic of China and the USSR gave material support. About 20 percent of FRELIMO’s needs were met through the OAU and Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria, and Zambia. FRELIMO had offices in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Algiers, and Cairo and overseas in Moscow, Stockholm, and New York.63

Houser’s quote reveals the scope and diversity of the FRELIMO’s international connections. It also reveals that FRELIMO made conscious and tactical decisions to direct funding from different sources into different uses and to keep them separate.

The FRELIMO institutions in Tanzania provided visible and tangible evidence upon which to secure humanitarian financial assistance from among myriad foreign sympathizers. FRELIMO’s active development of “bush schools” within Mozambique, propaganda campaigns that extolled the movement’s successes in the anti-colonial war, and the initial dissemination of membership cards were also strategically motivated to win the hearts and minds of Mozambicans. The use of membership cards was eventually discarded after Portuguese forces began to severely punish or kill those individuals who were found carrying them in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the membership cards were a powerful symbol of organizational capacity early in the existence of FRELIMO. The creation of membership cards allowed for a sense of belonging for individuals whose association with FRELIMO was an important example of a revolutionary constituents’ self-identification and the liberation front’s legitimacy.

FRELIMO actively played a role in helping to manage the amorphous mass of Mozambican refugees who fled into Tanzania. Since the massive influx of refugees placed significant demands on the government and on the people of southern Tanzania, religious organizations such as the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) also played a significant role in providing food, blankets, and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

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64 For an image of the initial FRELIMO membership cards, see http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/frelimo_62-63.html [accessed May 11, 2013].
assistance to Mozambican refugees in the Tanzanian “settlements” such as Rutamba.\textsuperscript{65}

The logistical operations involved in getting assistance to the refugees were enormous and other on-the-ground humanitarian groups such as the TCRS and UNHCR were instrumental in their aid to the refugees.\textsuperscript{66} As ambitious as it was internationally, FRELIMO could not function in a formal state-like manner in regard to the management of its refugees. Therefore, in its international appeals for aid, FRELIMO attempted to alleviate the worst suffering endured by the refugees in an effort to create a loyal revolutionary constituency.

“Racism is a Sin”: The World Council of Churches and its Committee to Combat Racism

In addition to financial support from the Ford Foundation and Kennedy administration, religious organizations also actively supported FRELIMO. It was evident that Eduardo Mondlane’s personal religious convictions, often muted in official FRELIMO publications, played a role in his networking and appeals for financial and human capital assistance for Mozambican refugees.\textsuperscript{67} For example, on February 9, 1967, he sent an informative but solicitous “Memorandum” to Monsignor Alberto Giovannetti, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations. In the letter, Mondlane informed Monsignor Giovannetti of Portugal’s expanding war in Mozambique and recent allocation of “30 million dollars for Mozambique alone… meant to boost the Portuguese military…”\textsuperscript{68} Mondlane appealed to the Catholic Monsignor and stated, in regard to the

\textsuperscript{65} Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} This fact emerged in my respective interviews with William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010 and Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012.
\textsuperscript{68} World Council of Churches, (hereafter WCC) Geneva, Switzerland, File General Secretary, 42.3.005/5, Memorandum, “To Monsignor Alberto Giovannetti from Eduardo Mondlane” Dated February 9, 1967. I am grateful to Eric Morier-Genoud for his help in accessing these WCC files. For an analysis of the
Mozambique Institute’s role in assisting refugees in Tanzania, “…we need support in funds, medical equipment, and drugs and medicines. For the schools we need mostly books and school equipment to help the teachers in their work.” Mondlane continued: “These Mozambicans have many problems typical of refugees everywhere,” because they lacked “legal, educational, and health services.” By early 1967, it was evident that FRELIMO still sought foreign aid and appealed to the morality of their endeavors. Mondlane stated, “It is FRELIMO’s duty to try and provide these services.”

In a direct appeal to the Catholic Church and playing the religious angle, Eduardo Mondlane took the liberty to remind the Monsignor, despite Mondlane’s own Protestant faith, that he had been busy with the religious concerns of Mozambicans. Mondlane stated how, for the past three years, he had been suggesting to some of the local Catholic Priests in Tanzania to consider assigning some of the former Catholic Missionaries to work among Mozambicans in Tanzania, thus enabling us to get advice on the spiritual problems of these displaced persons who remain within Mozambique. But so far my efforts have not met with success. There seems to be a fear amongst some of the leadership of the Catholic Church that if they realign former Catholic missionaries to Tanzania the Portuguese Government will consider it an unfriendly act by the Vatican and react in a manner that might compromise the position of the Church…

Eduardo Mondlane’s appeal to the Monsignor was another example of FRELIMO’s efforts to procure funding and engage with the burgeoning international order that generally favored decolonization. No mention was made, however, about how

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
active Mondlane was in “suggesting” that Catholic missionaries directly assist
FRELIMO. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that Mondlane’s stature as the leader of
FRELIMO was the reason that the Monsignor had specifically asked him “to prepare this
memorandum.”73 Correspondence between religious officials and FRELIMO leaders
offered a sense of moral rationale and institutional legitimacy for the liberation front.

However, espousing a religious rationale for independence was not part of the
FRELIMO leadership’s agenda during its war against Portugal. That is to say, despite the
religious differences among FRELIMO’s traditional, Protestant and Catholic cadres, the
liberation front did not plan to implement or adopt a specific dogma of any official
religion to obtain aid. FRELIMO’s leaders argued for the morality of liberation which
appealed to many religious leaders and institutions. In seeking funds for FRELIMO’s
revolution from the Monsignor, Mondlane pragmatically exploited an obvious hypocrisy
and endeavored to drive a wedge into the long-standing relationship between the Catholic
Church and Portugal. This pragmatic approach ostensibly put the Catholic Church into a
position of choice: assist in the moral welfare of impoverished refugees or continue to
support the antiquated policies of a desperate and notoriously brutal colonial regime.

Although appeals for support from the Catholic Church fell short, the World
Council of Churches (WCC) from Geneva, Switzerland, expanded its role of financing
FRELIMO during the early 1970s. As an ecumenical movement of churches around the
world, the WCC was not only active in supporting FRELIMO’s humanitarian endeavors
in Tanzania, it was also an instrumental force in the burgeoning global anti-apartheid
movement. According to a recent official WCC document, generated after the

73 Ibid.
organization’s Central Committee meeting from August 26 to September 3, 2002, the continuing role of the WCC’s assault on racism remained a clear objective. This speech reminded the WCC’s affiliated churches that “racism is a sin” and, as such, the organization had long advocated fighting racism. Reminding those in attendance that “A special programmatic on the issue of racism dates from 1968…when the IVth assembly of the WCC set its face decidedly against the scourge of racism and thus gave impetus to the creation of a Programme to Combat Racism (WCC-PCR),” the organization argued that racism was still a bane to Christ’s work on earth.74 After the closure of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam in 1968, FRELIMO modified many of its admittance procedures and later reopened its secondary school in Bagamoyo, Tanzania in 1970. During this tumultuous year of FRELIMO’s history, in which Samora Machel emerged as President of the liberation front after the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969, Janet Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos saw an opportunity to utilize the anti-racist activism within the WCC to FRELIMO’s advantage and established contact with its Committee to Combat Racism.

At a brief meeting in Dar es Salaam in February 1970 between FRELIMO members Samora Machel, Jorge Rebelo, Janet Mondlane and the director of the WCC-PCR, Baldwin Sjollema, discussed a “Special Fund to be distributed among organisations of oppressed racial groups and organizations assisting the victims.”75 Sjollema later

stated that Samora Machel “indicated that Frelimo and the Mozambique Institute would discuss whether to make an application for the Special Fund.” 76

After a time lag in correspondence regarding these funds, Sjollema lamented: “So far, I have not heard from you nor Mrs. Mondlane, and I therefore wonder whether this means that you are not interested… Looking forward to hearing from you.” 77 Delays in correspondence seemed to plague the FRELIMO proto-state from its inception. 78 In this case, interruptions and lags in correspondence between Baldwin Sjollema, Janet Mondlane and other members of FRELIMO’s Central Committee were the result of the contingencies related to FRELIMO’s daily affairs and the expansion of Portuguese military operations in northern Mozambique during Operation “Gordian Knot.” 79

By July 1970, however, Janet Mondlane had submitted a formal proposal to the WCC’s Committee to Combat Racism for funding that required, according to Sjollema, some clarification. 80 Sjollema was curious to know “whether there is much difference between the project for support of the Mozambique Institute which has been included in the World Council of Churches Inter-Church Aid project list for the amount of $143,750, – and the project which you are submitting to the Special Fund to Combat Racism. Is the amount of $25,000 to $50,000 you are asking from the Special Fund in addition and for the same project…?” 81 This was an important sum of money for FRELIMO which needed the funds to support its

76 Ibid. The emphasis is in the original.
77 Ibid.
78 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.” As Tague also discovered, long lags between letter exchanges with George M. Houser of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and Janet Mondlane were common in the 1960s as well.
79 1970 was the year of Portugal’s military campaign in Mozambique known as Operation “Gordian Knot.”
81 Ibid.
educational and health initiatives, but it was unclear from the extant documentation if the full amount of $143,750 was sent to FRELIMO from the WCC-PCR. However, Sjollema later wrote to Janet Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos to tell them:

…on September 2, 1970, the World Council of Churches’ Executive Committee, on the recommendations of the International Advisory Committee for the Programme to Combat Racism, decided to allocate to your organization the amount of US.$15,000. [sic] The Committee further agreed that this grant be made without control over the matter in which it is spent. It noted with appreciation that your organization has given the assurance that it will not use this amount for military but humanitarian purposes.82

Although far shy of the $143,750 requested, the WCC-PCR still approved a beneficial amount of money for FRELIMO and took Janet Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos at their word that the funding would not be used to support military efforts.

Several weeks later, the initial financial relationship between FRELIMO and the WCC-PCR blossomed after an exchange of letters. A distinct example of FRELIMO’s international appeal and outreach occurred on August 28, 1970, when the WCC-PCR “received the amount of $925.00 designated for FRELIMO ‘for whatever purpose they choose’ from David W. Robinson, Jr., History Dept., Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 06520.”83 Private groups and individuals, then, could also send FRELIMO money via the WCC-PCR to aid FRELIMO, as Sjollemia inquired in the letter how best to transfer the money to FRELIMO. This pattern continued into early 1971 when “a gift of DM1,136.70 for the Mozambique Institute for FRELIMO” was sent to the WCC-PCR


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“from the German church youth work group in Hamburg.”84 This letter also did not specify how the funds were to be spent. Shortly thereafter, another private grant for “DM150.94” from the “Protestant Community of Siegelbach…in Germany” was sent to FRELIMO via the WCC-PCR.85

These monetary contributions and several future donations were funneled through the WCC-PCR and were deposited a local Tanzanian bank. According to the WCC and a letter from Janet Mondlane to Sjollema, FRELIMO maintained an account at the National Bank of Commerce in Dar es Salaam in which these funds could be deposited. These donated amounts, regardless of their size, were not insignificant because they provided the hard currency for FRELIMO to sustain its institutions and further validated the moral agenda at work. When FRELIMO accessed these funds to pay for humanitarian needs, they managed its solvency in ways that were also beneficial to Tanzania. Although not a major boon for Tanzania, FRELIMO helped to augment the overall economy of Tanzania when it maintained accounts, paid rents for properties, and paid its staff in Tanzanian shillings. Moreover, this money also helped to offset the costs of providing succor for Mozambican refugees living in Tanzania.

As the exchange of letters between FRELIMO and the WCC-PCR increased during the early 1970s, so did the diversity of forms of aid sent to FRELIMO. On May 31, 1972, Baldwin Sjollema asked Janet Mondlane to confirm that “medicaments” sent


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from the “Third World Group in Switzerland…safely arrived at its destination” in Dar es Salaam. Not only was the WCC-PCR itself a important donor to FRELIMO, by the early 1970s, it was also serving as a conduit for other forms of aid from private, tertiary organizations around the world with sympathy for FRELIMO’s cause. The extant documentation suggests that the WCC maintained relations with FRELIMO throughout the 1970s and 1980s, even though FRELIMO moved to single-party authoritarianism with a clear anti-religious agenda after the Third Party Congress in 1977. Curiously, the year before in November 1976, the Ecumenical Press Service announced that a discussion between the WCC, various church organizations, and “the Mozambican government” was to ensue regarding “A multi-faceted aid program for Mozambique, valued at at [sic] least $600,000 over a three-year period in health, education and agriculture.” Thus, the role of the WCC in underwriting and supporting FRELIMO cannot be understated.

Finally, in an appeal to inform the World Council of Churches of FRELIMO’s challenges and accomplishments before independence in 1974, Bill and Ruth Minter (Brandon) generated a “circular letter” that came into the possession of the WCC. In it, the Minters offered a sober assessment of how FRELIMO needed to balance its transitional authority with the lingering effects of Portuguese colonialism. Written in


87 ALUKA, World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism, Three-year aid programme for Mozambique discussed, http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.ydlwcc2323. November 25, 1976. The sources I obtained via the ALUKA Project on this topic are scant between 1977 and 1984 suggesting that the Mozambican civil war and FRELIMO’s authoritarian state may have curtailed its interaction with the WCC.
November 1974, nearly a year after they returned to Tanzania to teach, this time at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Bagamoyo, the Minters’ insights offered evidence of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism. They referred to the political maturation of the liberation front gained from its anti-colonial war and humanitarian projects. In regard to the struggles that loomed and did, indeed, eventually surface for FRELIMO later in postcolonial Mozambique, they enthusiastically stated:

So, there are difficulties…But they are difficulties that will be confronted by a revolutionary party that has experience in dealing with difficulties, during ten years of armed struggle. These years have tempered the party, and it has learned how to organize, that its strength stems from unity, from organization, from being based in and responsive to the people.  

The tone of the letter is understandably upbeat given the pervasive pre-independence euphoria that gripped many FRELIMO sympathizers and Mozambicans alike. FRELIMO was certainly in a position to inherit political power in Mozambique, but its experiences and revolutionary pragmatism as a proto-state during the 1960s in Tanzania and in Mozambique’s liberated zones helped to legitimize its status as a “transitional government” by 1974. Perhaps ironically, then, after FRELIMO’s Third Party Congress in 1977 when the Party/State attacked formal church activities, particularly the Catholic Church’s presence in Mozambique, FRELIMO had reached a point of secularization, as a formal state, that overlooked and discursively minimized the

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89 Ibid.
contributions of religious groups and individuals from Protestant institutions that helped to initially underwrite its proto-state.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Conclusion}

This chapter has addressed how funding from both secular and religious organizations was essential to the legitimation and existence of FRELIMO. In the global context of the 1960s and early 1970s, FRELIMO’s leaders secured financial and military support from philanthropic groups as well as from the formal governments of diametrically opposed Cold War “enemies.” This reality reveals the ways in which international connections, regardless of ideology, were also important factors in the legitimation of FRELIMO. Both the West’s and the East’s support for FRELIMO reveals another important aspect of Cold War politics: that the supposed bipolarity of Cold War alliances was more ambiguous in regions where liberation fronts fought against colonialism. As part of the overall strategy of legitimation, FRELIMO’s leaders sought myriad sources of financial and military support from a diverse range of supporters. FRELIMO obtained support from sympathetic Nordic countries and religiously affiliated organizations, as well as from private donors; received military assistance from China; trained in guerrilla tactics in both Tanzania and Algeria; secured funding from American philanthropic organizations and the United States government; sought opportunities to send students abroad for study; and, perhaps most importantly maintained a home-base of relative sanctuary within Tanzania. FRELIMO intellectuals and leaders tapped into a

global networks that generally favored decolonization and interacted with the United Nations. These activities underscored FRELIMO’s successful appeals for aid via secular and religious international connections.

However, the international support and the movement’s ideological development were limited to frameworks tolerated by the Tanzanian government during the early years of Nyerere’s regime. Weighing their options, this scenario forced the FRELIMO leadership to make some tough decisions about whether to accept the money and potentially undermine their standing with Nyerere. Although faced with a lack of alternatives, Mozambicans living in northern Mozambique and Tanzania were, by and large, initially supportive and even loyal to FRELIMO given the movement’s recognition by Nyerere and international aid groups. As this chapter has demonstrated, these were critical relationships for the proto-state to maintain because they established the conditions for FRELIMO to claim a viable legitimacy while operating institutions and managing its affairs in a host country. Critical to understanding the significance of funding the proto-state’s institutions is to analyze the most significant example of FRELIMO’s efforts to build a revolutionary new society: the Mozambique Institute and its secondary school.
After the founding of the liberation front in 1962, the education of Mozambicans became one of FRELIMO’s top priorities. Writing in the midst of the Mozambican refugee crisis in October 1964, Janet Mondlane was concerned with the prevalence of uneducated Mozambicans entering Tanzania. In a letter describing how the majority of Mozambicans were exploited as a source of cheap labor during decades of Portuguese colonialism, Mondlane lamented, “since the early 1900’s” people sought ways “to escape the oppressive labour system.”¹ Migratory labor was one of the primary means of revenue generation for the colonial regime and Mondlane recognized that many Mozambican refugees never possessed an opportunity to go to school.² By the early 1960s, the vast majority of Mozambicans remained illiterate and uneducated, realities that FRELIMO was determined to rectify if Mozambique was to flourish as a nation after independence.

In order to transform these colonized subjects into informed citizens, providing Mozambicans with access to an education was essential. Janet Mondlane routinely appealed to groups and organizations in the international community for funds to develop and maintain the Mozambique Institute secondary school for refugee students in

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Tanzania. FRELIMO’s leaders not only envisaged this secondary school as the proto-
state’s consummate educational institution, but also as the institutional model for future
schools in Mozambique.

In the same letter that described the lack of education for Mozambicans under
Portuguese colonialism, Janet Mondlane estimated that there were roughly 150,000
Mozambicans living in Tanzania who needed help and that educating them was critical to
FRELIMO’s revolutionary agenda. The Mozambique Institute and its students, she
argued, would assume this important responsibility. She stated: “What can be done to
help eager young Mozambican refugees face a future in which they will be leaders of an
independent state?” Although a plethora of religious and secular aid groups offered help
for “the refugee problem in Tanganyika,” the plight of the war refugees in late 1964
ultimately rested on the shoulders of the Mozambique Institute, which was “looking for
an answer.”

Established in 1963 with the help of foreign aid from the Ford Foundation, the
Mozambique Institute was not only the flagship secondary school for young Mozambican
student refugees, it was also meant to provide medical services, clothing, and literacy
classes to refugees in Tanzania. The school was the primary venue for the education of a
select group of young student refugees, who were intended to act on behalf of
FRELIMO’s leaders and work directly with the Mozambican refugees in Tanzania. The
school was a site for the Mozambican revolution in practice, a place that enabled
FRELIMO to implement a modern educational paradigm for students under the proto-

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
state’s purview. Put another way, the school and its mission was designed to serve as
tangible proof of FRELIMO’s ideals and commitment to improving the lives of its
revolutionary constituents, especially in Tanzania. Given the significance of the
secondary school to FRELIMO’s legitimacy, this chapter analyzes several important
issues that emerged at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam
arguing that, for several reasons, the implementation of the proto-state’s revolutionary
objectives in the school proved to be a challenge for FRELIMO’s leaders.

First, in addition to its status as the most important institution to represent the
proto-state’s legitimacy, the secondary school was also meant to demonstrate
FRELIMO’s commitment to include women as equal partners in the revolution. As the
Director of the Mozambique Institute, Janet Mondlane wanted to offer male and female
students the same educational opportunities at the school.6 In colonial Mozambique,
young men typically had more access to education than young women for a variety of
social, economic, and cultural reasons. This meant, of course, that fewer women initially
attended the FRELIMO secondary school. As outlined at FRELIMO’s First Congress in
1962, the proto-state articulated goals that clearly included Mozambican women as
essential partners in the revolution.7 Since education was important to building a new
nation, FRELIMO’s leaders sought to increase the number of female students at the
secondary school over time.

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6 Janet Mondlane, interview by author, June 1, 2012.
7 ALUKA, Mozambique Liberation Documents Collection, “1st Congress – Dar Es Salaam 23-28 September
In order to solicit funds for the school from the international community, FRELIMO generated photographs for two pamphlets, produced in 1965 and 1967, of the secondary school. Made for an English-speaking audience, the photographs demonstrate that an education was equally important to students of both sexes. They depict interactions between staff and students in classrooms, young men and women laboring in the maintenance of the school, and students enjoying their educational experience at this co-educational institution. The images purposely captured FRELIMO’s efforts at educating and building the revolutionary consciousness of young students.

As important as the photos are to displaying FRELIMO’s revolution in action, their captions reveal interesting contradictions between the stated goals of educational equality and the actual operation of the school’s programs. Providing access to education for young women was important for building a new nation. Before the construction of the secondary school in 1963, FRELIMO’s leaders expressed their intention to revolutionize Mozambican society in “measures to be put into immediate execution” after the liberation front’s First Congress in September 1962. Essential to “the struggle of the Mozambican people for National Liberation,” Mozambican women were depicted as equal participants in the revolution since the “development of the Mozambican woman” was a stated goal. Moreover, although FRELIMO sought, “To encourage and support the formation and consolidation of trade union, student, youth and women’s organizations” as part of its revolutionary objectives after the First Congress, this was a discursive strategy of universal inclusion; a broad statement meant to subsume as many Mozambicans as

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
possible, regardless of sex, class, ethnicity, or region, under FRELIMO’s revolutionary umbrella.\textsuperscript{10} Although young women were pictured alongside young men in both classrooms and in school activities, many of the captions that accompany the photos describe different gendered realities and expectations in regard to the respective sex of the students. In reality, throughout the school’s existence in Dar es Salaam (1963-1968) the majority of the students were males who were being groomed to serve FRELIMO as loyal technocratic cadres. Young Mozambican men were, therefore, expected to emerge from the school as leaders within FRELIMO, but female students were to be educated in ways that augmented their respectability, “courtesy,” and “dignity.” As a proto-state largely comprised of male leaders, FRELIMO’s initiatives during the early 1960s did not include a revolutionary transformation in gender roles within the liberation front. Simply put, FRELIMO’s leaders discursively advocated for a revolutionary new status for women but, in practice, gender roles and expectations remained unchanged.

Secondly, as FRELIMO’s most important proto-state institution, the school was also meant to embody the revolutionary goals of transforming class and other social relations based on race and ethnicity. However, the school’s leaders also struggled to make these social and class transformations a reality. After all, since its creation in 1962, racial and ethnic tensions, as well as class divisions informed many of FRELIMO’s internal challenges, especially among the leadership. These issues also surfaced at the Mozambique Institute secondary school during the late 1960s when FRELIMO, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, became increasingly authoritarian. Therefore, as

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid. This was true for many other statements expressed in official statements, speeches, and letters written by FRELIMO’s leaders in the 1960s.

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FRELIMO’s premier proto-state institution, the secondary school represented more than a place for an education and refugee assistance: it was a primary focal point of disparate revolutionary values, paradigms, and positions within FRELIMO to converge.\textsuperscript{11} By the late 1960s, these divisive issues were most keenly felt at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam which became a flashpoint for internal strife and personal differences within FRELIMO. Therefore, the propaganda that depicted FRELIMO’s efforts at revolutionary pragmatism in regard to educating both young men and women and creating national unity ironically belied the degree to which conventional gender roles, racial tensions, and class strife were also realities at the secondary school.

\textit{Revolutionary Pragmatism in Practice: FRELIMO as a Performative State}

Allowing select Mozambican men and women access to education while in Tanzania was pragmatic because the very existence of the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam presented tangible evidence of FRELIMO’s legitimacy to Mozambican refugees and supportive Tanzanians. Critical to evaluating the pedagogical strategies at the school, FRELIMO’s use of revolutionary pragmatism in its institutional operations at the Mozambique Institute is similar to Bruce Gilley’s “Pluralist Model of Legitimation.” Gilley argues that formal states “must rely on their performance to win the right to rule,” as the complexities inherent in the circumstances that informed FRELIMO’s early actions were linked to its international appeal.\textsuperscript{12} The “performance” that generated legitimacy was expressed in two pragmatic ways: first, the proto-state provided a modicum of social services to the Mozambican people living in Tanzania;

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
and, secondly, in its international outreach in which high-ranking FRELIMO officials interacted in various ways with foreign supporters and dignitaries. Borrowing from Susan Geiger’s analysis of women’s “performative nationalism” in Tanzania’s nationalist movement, FRELIMO acted with revolutionary pragmatism as a performative state, but within the parameters of its contingent sovereignty. Thus, Gilley’s analysis of the theories that create the “particularism” of legitimacy are based on the notion “that sources of legitimacy are non-universal and vary across both time and space” since “legitimacy is a historically bound concept.” For FRELIMO, interactions with international interests both shaped the ideological direction of the movement and provided the moral rationale to direct the lives of its revolutionary constituents.

Against this backdrop, FRELIMO emerged to challenge the historical abuses perpetuated by the Portuguese colonial regime to control Mozambicans and stultify their education. As part of FRELIMO’s strategy, its cadres would infiltrate Mozambique and interact with ordinary Mozambicans for the purposes of military recruitment, intelligence gathering, and securing food for its guerrillas. In exchange, FRELIMO’s soldiers informed the Mozambican people in the liberated zones of FRELIMO’s alternative, revolutionary vision for their futures, established rudimentary “bush schools,” and sought to demonstrate their resolve to oust the Portuguese from their lives. The vagaries of the war and the fluidity with which FRELIMO soldiers transited in and out of the lives of rural Mozambicans, however, meant that most institutional and organizational activities occurred in Tanzania. FRELIMO acknowledged its dependent position vis-à-vis the

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13 Geiger, *TANU Women*.
TANU regime in its official “Constitution” written after the First Congress in late 1962. The leaders of the liberation front articulated their official political policies and organizational framework “based on Democratic Centralization,” and included several “Temporary Arrangements” in Article “XXI,” one of which stated, “The Provisional Headquarters of FRELIMO will be in Dar es Salaam – Tanganyika while operating in exile.”15 The specific mention of “democratic centralization” implies a foundation for a single, party state to emerge and that only an educated vanguard could effectively lead a movement primarily comprised of illiterate peasants. Thus, as early as 1962, the organizational structure of FRELIMO’s Central Committee was based on the existence of an educated elite whose status and privileged backgrounds, in essence, would replace traditional and colonial models of authority and power. Along these same lines, the Mozambique Institute secondary school students were to attain an education that would prepare them to inherit, manage, and govern a liberated Mozambique in the future.

Education, Gender, and Society in Colonial Mozambique: A Brief Synopsis

After World War II, the Salazar regime in Portugal resisted pressure to decolonize from international and domestic critics. As Harold MacMillan’s proverbial “winds of change” began to affect the European colonies of Africa, Portugal remained a stalwart supporter of colonial rule and a vehement opponent of any challenge to its imperial authority. The authoritarian tenets of Salazar’s Estado Novo (New State) and the intentional linguistic alterations of Portugal’s constitution, which changed the definition

of the African colonies to “overseas provinces,” reflected the regime’s decision to remain in Africa.

Between 1926 and 1941, education in Mozambique increasingly came under the jurisdiction of both Catholic and Protestant missionary schools. Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, sought to increase Portugal’s colonial control and economic exploitation of African colonies with the *Estado Novo*, while simultaneously turning the responsibility and financial burden of education over to religious institutions.\(^{16}\) The colonial relationship between Portugal and its colonies shifted dramatically with the adoption of Salazar’s *Estado Novo* in 1933. As an authoritarian state project based on a corporatist model of state, the *Estado Novo* envisaged the colonies as a panacea to the economic woes of the metropole during the 1930s and 1940s. Prior to Salazar’s tightening grip over colonial policies and people, chartered companies like the Mozambique Company established extractive practices based on forced labor in colonial Mozambique.\(^ {17}\) With the ascendancy of the Salazar regime, many of these companies were already defunct and several, like the Mozambique Company, saw their charters expire without renewal.\(^ {18}\) As Zachary Kagan-Guthrie has argued, regardless of this transition to centralized state rule over the colonial economy, many of the coercive tactics utilized during company rule in Mozambique, which included forced labor and threats of punishment and exile, continued under Salazar’s *Estado Novo*.\(^ {19}\) During the *Estado Novo*, Mozambique and its people

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\(^{17}\) Vail and White, *Capitalism and Colonialism*; Allina, *Slavery*.

\(^{18}\) Allina, *Slavery*, 4.

came under the direct purview of Portuguese colonial officials, their loyalist Africans, and the burgeoning number of white migrants who settled in Mozambique to find their fortune.\textsuperscript{20} In order to augment the domestic economy of Portugal, the Salazar regime sought to play a more active role in the preservation of its empire through the use of white settlement but also employed a racially-motivated, paternalistic attitude that provided a façade meant to further exploit the colonized people.

The education of Mozambicans was not a priority of the Salazar regime.\textsuperscript{21} However, in an effort to minimally monitor education in Portugal’s African colonies, Salazar enacted the Missionary Statute of 1940 which officially granted Catholic missionaries more control over the education of Mozambicans, but also imposed state controls over the curriculum.\textsuperscript{22} Although the role of the Catholic Church in these educational endeavors was paramount to Salazar’s strategy of Lisbon’s distant state surveillance of the Mozambican population in remote regions, it was a fine line between church and state as, Michael Cross argued, “Catholic missionaries in Mozambique were almost totally ‘domesticated’ and controlled by the colonial state.”\textsuperscript{23} In exploring the nuances in the relationship between the Portuguese state in Lisbon and the Catholic missionaries in Mozambique, Cross argues “The Catholic Church remained almost a government agency for many years and an important transmitter of colonial ideology.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Judith Marshall, \textit{Literacy, Power, and Democracy in Mozambique: The Governance of Learning from Colonization to the Present} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Cross, \textit{An Unfulfilled Promise}.
\textsuperscript{22} Morier-Genoud, “Religious Orders”; Johnston, \textit{Study}, 51.
\textsuperscript{23} Cross, \textit{An Unfulfilled Promise}, 31.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
Thus, Protestant missionary schools scattered throughout Mozambique faced mounting opposition to their existence after Portugal’s Concordat with the Vatican in 1940, but were significant sites for the incubation of colonial resistance.\textsuperscript{25} Portugal’s concern for the quality of education for Mozambicans was minimal and driven primarily by “a mechanism of reproduction of labour.”\textsuperscript{26} The colonial state itself was unwilling to shoulder the financial and institutional obligations to educate and empower their colonial subjects, thus revealing the other purposes for intransigent Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique: first, the metropolitan zeal of the Salazar regime for affirming Portugal’s role in world history, second the rapidly shifting geopolitical scene that emerged in the post-World War II era in which the economies of Western European nations began to rebound, and the ongoing extraction of resources through the exploitation of Mozambican labor.\textsuperscript{27}

Although the \textit{Estado Novo} was officially implemented in 1933 by the Salazar regime, other strategies for colonial manipulation were also considered around this time, namely Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s philosophy of “Lusotropicalism.” This concept was initially touted by Salazar’s Colonial Minister and later successor, Marcello Caetano, as a possible basis and justification for preserving Portugal’s colonial empire.\textsuperscript{28} Freyre argued that the Portuguese, because of “Lusotropicalism,” were distinctly adept


\textsuperscript{26} Cross, \textit{An Unfulfilled Promise}, 31.

\textsuperscript{27} For an outstanding analysis of the political pressures and decisions that hurt the Salazar regime in Portugal during this time, see Pitcher, \textit{Politics in the Portuguese Empire}. For colonial exploitation of Mozambicans, see Vail and White, \textit{Capitalism and Colonialism}; Allina, \textit{Slavery}.

\textsuperscript{28} Penvenne, “Settling against the Tide,” 80.
colonizers since they were putatively amenable to miscegenation with traditional peoples.\textsuperscript{29} Unlike other European colonizers with empires in the tropical regions of the planet, Freyre contended that Portuguese colonial and cultural philosophy was not especially domineering or brutal toward their colonized people: a philosophy that could not have been further from the reality.\textsuperscript{30} According to Jeanne Marie Penvenne, “Lusotropicalism” offered little more than “a useful ideological veneer” for Portugal’s exploitative colonial policies and was, therefore, initially rejected.\textsuperscript{31} The Salazar regime saw the concept as too liberal and based on the notion that Portuguese culture was adaptable and its people were susceptible to miscegenation with colonized people. Therefore, the ultra-right ideologues of the \textit{Estado Novo}, instead, promoted the idea of white Portuguese exclusivity and superiority over colonized people: a racist platform that informed ongoing colonial policies in Mozambique and Portugal’s other colonies for nearly 35 years.

Missionaries who taught in Mozambique were required to use Portuguese while instructing students and were expected to extol the history and achievements of Portugal. This policy curtailed enrollment in these schools principally because the majority of Mozambicans could not read or write Portuguese. Mozambicans interested in attending school needed a rudimentary understanding of Portuguese as a prerequisite for enrollment. Also, the students were required to develop their literacy in Portuguese throughout their primary schooling in order to pass examinations and continue their

\textsuperscript{29} For his introduction of Lusotropicalism, originally published in 1933, see Gilberto Freyre, \textit{The Masters and the Slaves} [\textit{Casa-Grande and Senzala}]: \textit{A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization}, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

\textsuperscript{30} Penvenne, “Settling against the Tide,” 80.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 81.
education at the secondary level. This also became important for those Mozambicans who wished to pursue assimilado status in the colony which putatively offered perks and access to positions working for the colonial regime, a social classification which few people could realistically obtain given the structural, logistical, and familial obstacles. The missionary curriculum intentionally ignored the history, people, languages, or cultures of Mozambique.\(^{32}\) This was a tactical decision on the part of the Portuguese authorities to thwart revolutionary fervor and nationalistic sentiment in Mozambique.\(^{33}\) All of these factors contributed to a general lack of educational opportunities for most Mozambicans and allowed officials of Salazar’s Estado Novo regime in Portugal to further argue for a continued colonial presence in Mozambique and the other Lusophone colonies.

Adding to the challenges for Mozambicans who pursued education, most missionary schools remained underfunded and understaffed throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Generally, most mission and private schools were located in cities and towns of southern Mozambique, a regional and geographic reality that limited the number of potential Mozambican students with access to education.\(^{34}\) In many locations, especially in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete, mission schools were especially rare because of their distance from the epicenter of Portugal’s colonial capital: the southern urban capital – Lourenço Marques. Thus, the vast majority of Mozambicans in these remote northern regions areas remained uneducated and illiterate. Citing a Portuguese source, Allen Isaacman stated “Until the 1960s Lisbon flagrantly denied

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\(^{34}\) Johnston, *Study*, 57.
educational opportunities to Africans. By its own admission, almost 98 percent of the population was illiterate in 1958…On the eve of independence this situation remained unchanged and more than 90 percent of the African population were still illiterate.”  

Eric Morier-Genoud has contended that Mozambicans with limited access to education beyond the primary level varied from city to city, region to region, and village to village. Despite the challenges of obtaining an education in Mozambique on the eve of anti-colonial war, access to mission education in the colony was contingent on the circumstances of proximity, means, and availability. Since the majority of Mozambicans never attended school, FRELIMO faced a significant challenge in its quest to offer educational opportunities.

The educational system in Mozambique during the colonial era amounted to little more than a contrivance to control the colonized people. At the same time, it offered the opportunity to indoctrinate a limited number of black Mozambican students who were able to attend schools. Although educational opportunities did exist, they were primarily limited to the white population and to *assimilados* (assimilated black or mixed Mozambicans) as the Portuguese did not make education a priority of their colonial, “civilizing” mission in Mozambique. The majority of *assimilados* were young Mozambican men who earned a basic education, learned Portuguese, generally lived in urban areas, and worked in wage-earning positions. In addition to tremendous legal,
racial, and social obstacles, for a Mozambicans to obtain the status of an *assimilado*, they needed to prove that they could financially support themselves, converse and understand Portuguese, and eschew their customs, languages, and values. Education was a means to pursue *assimilado* status but, given the obstacles within the colonial system, few Mozambicans aspired for this social distinction.\(^{39}\) They were considered “Portuguese” but by the very nature of their skin color would never be treated as equals to whites. According to Allen Isaacman, by 1961, only 1 percent of the Mozambican population had attained *assimilado* status.\(^{40}\) This number is indicative of the lack of educational and social opportunities afforded to black Mozambicans and many those same *assimilados* would later fight in the revolution against Portugal.

Gender was also a factor in access to education as Mozambican girls did not have the same educational opportunities or access to schools as Mozambican boys. Isaacman argues “many parents preferred to keep their children at home where they provided an important source of domestic labor. This was especially true for young girls who rarely attended school.”\(^{41}\) According to Stephanie Urdang, given the long absences of male laborers in Mozambique, the women were “heavily engaged in production – agricultural production; it is the women who are, to the vast degree, the family farmers.”\(^{42}\) The majority of Mozambican students who did attend mission schools or state-run private schools were boys, since many parents in the southern and central provinces of Mozambique (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, and Zambézia) restricted their

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\(^{40}\) Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, 10.  
\(^{41}\) Ibid., 12.  
\(^{42}\) Urdang, *And Still They Dance*, 25.
daughters’ access to education since, as Kathleen Sheldon has argued, “Women’s work in food production was at the center of family and village life…”⁴³ Economic, social, and familial expectations relegated most Mozambican girls to domestic roles in the rural African societies. Women served as the primary agricultural laborers throughout Mozambique, a fact that was especially true in the southern provinces, where Mozambican men often migrated to South Africa as mine laborers or Southern Rhodesia as farm workers in the 1940s and 1950s.⁴⁴ This reality, coupled with traditional practices of bridewealth (lobolo), female initiation rites, and ubiquitous patriarchal attitudes, limited educational access for women and girls.⁴⁵ Lobolo was an essential component of marriage and exchange in Mozambique, especially since women would become part of the husband’s community and contribute to his lineage.

Forced cultivation of cotton in northern and central provinces, however, predominately affected individuals of both sexes who were required to meet cotton production quotas during the colonial era.⁴⁶ Men who could not pay their taxes or who were perceived as being “idle,” were subjected to the chibalo (forced labor) system. Women living in the north, however, who were also subject to the chibalo system, now had to find the time to provide for the family, grow subsistence crops, and meet the cotton quotas. Even in the matrilineal communities of northern Mozambique, women

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⁴³ Sheldon, Pounders of Grain, 22. For the intersection between gendered expectations for women and educational opportunities, see also Sheldon’s Chapter 3 “‘I Studied with the Nuns in the Mission, Learning to Make Blouses’: Girls Domesticity, and Colonial Education,” 79-105 in the same volume; Johnson, Study, 60; Isaacman, A Luta Continua, 12.
⁴⁴ Isaacman, A Luta Continua, 12; For the role of girls as domestic producers in rural and traditional settings, see Urdang, And Still They Dance, 25; Sheldon, Pounders of Grain.
⁴⁵ Johnston, Study, 58.
⁴⁶ Isaacman, Cotton is the Mother of Poverty; Pitcher, Politics in the Portuguese Empire; Vail and White, Capitalism and Colonialism.
still arguably endured greater social and familial hardships as many men fled to neighboring Tanzania to work on sisal and other agricultural plantations. As addressed earlier, these economic realities also provided the Makonde in particular with networks of exchange as well as escape routes into Tanzania at the beginning of the war in 1964. Colonial authorities had long opted not to modernize the agricultural infrastructure of Mozambique as a means of coercing Mozambicans to work harder using “traditional” methods to meet production quotas, a key component in the Portuguese justification for “civilizing” the Africans. Although there were later efforts to introduce more modern technological approaches to cultivation in Mozambique, the colonial economy still required significant labor from Mozambicans.

FRELIMO sought to establish a set of ideological positions from its inception that would not only provide a framework for Mozambicans to unite against Portuguese colonialism, but would also establish a clear revolutionary distinction from pre-existing colonial structures which were based on racial, sex, and class differences. Under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO gradually developed a set of anti-colonial ideological structures that incorporated non-racial, non-elitist, and non-“traditional”/ethnic precepts. FRELIMO sought the help of Mozambicans who were willing to unite against the Portuguese and establish a new society in the future liberated Mozambique. The limitations of educational infrastructure coupled with colonial and

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47 Allina, Slavery; Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 34-37. This was especially true in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, where the Portuguese implemented chibalo, or forced labor for meeting production quotas for cotton.

traditional expectations of women, influenced revolutionaries like Eduardo and Janet Mondlane who pragmatically linked their personal struggle to improved access to education for Mozambicans and, in doing so, demonstrated FRELIMO’s engagement with the revolutionary discourse that was beginning to argue for gender-equality. Although international discourse regarding gender-equality blossomed in the 1970s, FRELIMO espoused a more inclusionary ideology for women that solicited their participation in the liberation struggle as early as its First Congress in June 1962.\(^{49}\) Mozambican men and women who joined FRELIMO were expected to break with the significant burdens of traditional gender roles for the common cause of unity and struggle during the anti-colonial war. This did not mean that women and men radically shifted their traditional attitudes and practices in regard to gender, but from 1962 to 1974, FRELIMO systematically developed an ideology that challenged customary practices and every aspect of Portuguese colonialism.

*The Significance of Education as a Prerequisite for Liberation*

As a young man from southern Mozambique, Eduardo Mondlane earned a primary education in a mission school and continued his education in South Africa, Portugal, and ultimately in the United States.\(^{50}\) At the beginning of the liberation struggle in 1962, he was Mozambique’s only Ph.D., which was significant because it had provided him with international connections and teaching experience; he was, in


\(^{50}\) de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane*, 78-88. Eduardo Mondlane helped form NESAM in South Africa– a Mozambican Student Movement opposed to Portuguese colonialism. He attended classes in Portugal but was harassed by Portugal’s secret police- PIDE- for subversive activities, and ultimately attended Oberlin College and Northwestern University where he earned a Ph.D. in Anthropology/Sociology.
Nyerere’s opinion, the most qualified candidate to lead FRELIMO. Due to his educational background, Eduardo Mondlane clearly understood the importance of education in helping a liberation struggle. The two men - Mondlane and Nyerere - formed an initial friendship and political bond based on their mutual objectives and a revolutionary fraternalism. The overt support from Nyerere in hosting Mozambican refugees within the sovereign domain of Tanzania helped to foster FRELIMO. This amicable relationship between Mondlane and Nyerere was also instrumental in the FRELIMO’s development of a socialist ideology and served to create the conditions necessary for the legitimate formation of the liberation front’s proto-state based on contingent sovereignty.

The multitude of disparate sociological, demographic, and historical conditions brought together a diverse community of “patriots,” many of whom actively sought to eliminate Mozambicans’ local differences in favor of overthrowing Portuguese colonialism. In particular, Eduardo Mondlane shaped the national future through a discursive analysis of Mozambique’s past and wove a revolutionary “homespun history” in which FRELIMO constituted a “moral community worthy of political defense” and

51 Mondlane’s doctoral thesis is entitled “Role Conflict, Reference Group and Race” (Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1960). Several scholars and activists interested in Africa from the United States met Mondlane and were generally impressed with him as an academic and speaker. Such notables include Melville J. Herskovits, George Houser, William Minter, and Herbert Shore. William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010. Herbert Shore briefly instructed at the University of Dar es Salaam in the 1960s during the heyday of the university’s radical Leftist orientation. Shore also collected many of Mondlane’s papers, speeches, and ephemera which are currently housed in the Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio, U.S.A. Finally, Herbert Shore also wrote a biographical sketch of Mondlane, for a later edition of Eduardo Mondlane’s The Struggle for Mozambique (1983). For a summation of the Leftist environment at the University of Dar es Salaam during the 1960s see Ivaska, Cultured States, 147-162.

52 Educational status was nearly a prerequisite for many African nationalists and “rebel” leaders. See Reno, Warfare, 5-6.

articulated a point of view of the current historical implications involving the transition to independence.54 Written later to clarify FRELIMO’s ideological development and reify the moral justifications for anti-colonial war, Mondlane’s book, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, is also a revolutionary manifesto dedicated “To the People of Mozambique.”55 Published in 1969, the year of his untimely death and during a particularly volatile year in FRELIMO’s internal hierarchy, the book called attention to the divisions within FRELIMO. Mondlane argued against the petty partisanship that emanated from “problems of tribalism and regionalism,” and advocated, instead, for Mozambicans to recognize that their solidarity and “source of national unity is the common suffering during the last fifty years spent under effective Portuguese rule.”56 “When FRELIMO was first formed,” he wrote, “we gave top priority jointly to two programmes: the military and the educational” which clearly articulated support for the development of formal and makeshift educational settings along with other infrastructure projects in Tanzania.57 A liberated Mozambique was going to need educated leaders, bureaucrats, and technicians capable of serving the new state and civil society. However, given the role assigned to education as a socially and politically transformative experience, refugees and colonized Mozambicans were also subjected to an emergent socialist, top-down pedagogy that attempted to routinize and homogenize the educational model envisaged by FRELIMO. Since education was a significant facet of FRELIMO’s

57 Ibid, 175.
revolutionary paradigm, it served as a marker of difference between the leaders and ordinary Mozambicans.

Despite evidence of early internal challenges within FRELIMO, routinization in the lives of the refugees was another important source of legitimation, and schools provided that forum for physical and mental conditioning. In her analysis of cultural issues mainly in African schools, but particularly in contemporary Ghana, Cati Coe synthesizes the role of education in the legitimation of the state, arguing “Studies of the state have shown how its agents seek to render visible the people and areas under their domains in order to control them… Schools are one of the most sustained zones of contact most people have with the state, and they become a way for the state to attempt to reach and shape its populace.”

Schools were and remain organized theaters for building, modifying, and controlling individuals, cultural practices and national perspectives.

*The Mozambique Institute and the Development of the FRELIMO Proto-State*

Before the full operations of the secondary school were established in Dar es Salaam in 1963, many of the young student refugees who were selected to attend the school already possessed some rudimentary education previously attained in Mozambique. In addition to these older students, a limited number of refugee children were able to attend a FRELIMO primary school in Bagamoyo. The challenges were enormous and indicative of the financial and logistical limitations for FRELIMO as, “most…have come to Tanganyika with one or the other of their parents and they

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therefore live where their parents stay.” The logical question of creating a formal school outside the Bagamoyo settlement, therefore, meant that “an extra group of teachers,” something the Mozambique Institute did not immediately possess, “raises the question of a hostel for small children if their parents are not with them.” The massive influx of Mozambicans put significant pressure on the nascent Mozambique Institute, whose existence both displayed FRELIMO’s position as a humanitarian proto-state concerned with its revolutionary constituency and later offered a visible, tangible model of statecraft with constructed buildings and budgetary decision-making that generated legitimacy for the movement.

In September 1962, three months after the initial planning meetings, the First Congress of FRELIMO was held in Dar es Salaam. The liberation front attempted to outline its objectives and establish a list of resolutions that would guide the struggle against the Portuguese. In regard to FRELIMO’s position on education, resolution Number 7 stated that the movement’s goal was, “to promote at once the literacy of the Mozambican people, creating schools wherever possible.” This language, coupled with Janet Mondlane’s determination to establish an educational center for Mozambican refugees in Tanganyika, helped to justify the creation of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam in early 1963. As the secondary school initially lacked a campus, buildings, and a teaching staff, its initial educational operations took place in refugee settlements. The fact that the concept for the Mozambique Institute was established prior to the

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59 Ibid., 5.
60 Ibid.
61 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 122-123.
62 Ibid.
63 Tague, “A War to Build the Nation.”
beginning of colonial war in September 1964 demonstrated the Mondlanes’
determination to implement a viable educational archetype and empower FRELIMO with
responsibility over a vulnerable civil society of revolutionary constituents. Therefore, the
Mozambique Institute not only provided a setting for the formal education of student
refugees, but would also serve to attract and train future FRELIMO politicians and
administrative cadres.

Also critical to understanding the revolutionary context within which FRELIMO
educated student refugees was the location of the Mozambique Institute secondary
school. Situated in Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, a city that during the 1960s exposed
students to an urban setting that served as East Africa’s epicenter for revolutionary
discourse and practice, the secondary school was proximate to the allure of cosmopolitan
opportunities in a major city. Dar es Salaam provided access to the trappings of Western
modernity, but was also the primary milieu for TANU to accept or reject such foreign
cultural influence. Gender was also an important aspect of the culture wars in Dar es
Salaam and, more broadly, in Tanzanian society. For example, TANU Youth League
members contended with the influences of foreign music such as jazz, rock, and blues;
the prevalence of wigs, miniskirts, and make-up for women; and the extreme leftist
orientation of Tanzania’s premier academic institution, the University of Dar es Salaam,
which hired high profile international scholars.64 FRELIMO also recognized that its
activities and headquarters in Dar es Salaam were essential to maintaining access to

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64 Ivaska, Cultured States. See also Thomas Burgess, “Cinema, Bell Bottoms, and Miniskirts: Struggles
Over Youth and Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar,” International Journal of African Historical
Studies, 35, no. 2 (2002): 287-313; James R. Brennan, “Youth, the TANU Youth League, and Managed
Vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, 1925-73,” in Andrew Burton and Hélène Charton-Bigot, eds. Generations
international contacts and to members of the Tanzanian government. Naturally, then, Dar es Salaam was the *de facto*, albeit temporary, capital city for FRELIMO. However, the Ruvuma River that separated Tanzania from Mozambique was far to the south and much more rural. The urban setting in Dar es Salaam also created a physical separation between FRELIMO cadres and ordinary Mozambicans still residing in the colony or in rural settlements that resulted in the emergence of an elite, urban clique within FRELIMO.\(^{65}\) In this milieu, many opportunities existed for young Mozambicans to engage with their own revolution and its leaders in profound ways.

Although the location of the secondary school in Dar es Salaam was important for FRELIMO’s leaders to consider, the construction of Institute’s secondary school in the city was an expense that the proto-state needed to cover. In addition to payroll and classroom supplies, one of Janet Mondlane’s most important jobs as the Director of the Institute was to procure funding in order to build and maintain student hostels and classrooms. The initial funding for the Institute, addressed earlier in the dissertation, was obtained by the Ford Foundation via the AAI to establish the school in Dar es Salaam.\(^{66}\) This money, which was known as the Mozambique Emergency Education Fund (M.E.E.F) was, according to Janet Mondlane, specifically earmarked to pay for building the hostel in Dar es Salaam, which will house those students studying in Dar es Salaam; pay for the salaries of four executive officers of the Mozambique Institute; pay for the transportation of about 30 Mozambican students who may have received scholarships overseas but may not have financial means of defraying travel expenses; pay for the cost of transportation within Dar es Salaam for the boarders as they go back and forth to the various educational

\(^{65}\) Cahen, “The Mueda Case”; Panzer, “The Pedagogy of Revolution”; Tague,”A War to Build the Nation.”

\(^{66}\) See Chapter 4, “Underwriting Legitimacy,” in this dissertation.
institutions where they will be attending school.⁶⁷

As the founder and director of the Institute, Janet Mondlane envisaged a facility that could accommodate “dormitory space, toilets, showers and lockers for 35 boys and 15 girls.”⁶⁸ Written in 1963, this was the first official indication that girls would also be educated and housed at the Institute. The decision to include girls as residents of the hostel signified Janet Mondlane’s commitment to building a gender-inclusive institution. By emphasizing the need for equal opportunities and housing for male and female students in 1963, the Mondlanes began to formulate an educational philosophy that espoused a semblance of egalitarianism and articulated a burgeoning mandate over the lives of Mozambicans living in Tanzania.

The initial cohort of fifty students (35 males, 15 females) collectively personified an important component of FRELIMO’s revolutionary ideology at the Mozambique Institute. The fact that male and female student refugees would not only have the opportunity to attend the secondary school affiliated with the Institute, but would also learn similar academic material with the same level of expectation was an important aspect of the operation of the school. Many of these students, while waiting for the completed construction of the buildings at the Mozambique Institute, attended the Kurasini International Education Center (KIEC) for Tanganyikan students under the

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⁶⁷ Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute Letterhead, “The Mozambique Institute,” 3, 1963, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8. See also Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, 13. Students were also attending secondary school at the Kurasini International Educational Centre School, which was part of the African-American Institute in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. This school also offered limited opportunities for Mozambican students to continue their studies abroad.
⁶⁸ Ibid. Chilcote Collection, 2.
auspices of the AAI.\textsuperscript{69} The KIEC provided lessons in English, but its primary mission was to prepare Tanganyikan secondary students for university level instruction abroad. Given the tenuous financial realities during the first two years of its existence, the Mozambique Institute relied on the benevolence of the KIEC to prepare Mozambican secondary students for similar opportunities.\textsuperscript{70} Two years later in 1965, the Mozambique Institute was financially able to offer its Mozambican student refugees’ secondary instruction in both Portuguese and introductory English in preparation for university study abroad.

When the Mozambique Institute was established in 1963 and started to enroll more students by early 1964, initial attempts to seek a peaceful resolution to the end of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique had failed. FRELIMO thus began its transformation from a liberation front to a proto-state with a guerrilla wing. From bases inside Tanzania, FRELIMO soldiers first attacked a small Portuguese military outpost in the northeastern province of Cabo Delgado on September 25, 1964.\textsuperscript{71} The first outbreak of war in Lusophone Africa occurred in Angola in 1961. As a result, during the brief interim period before the war in Mozambique, Portugal’s armed forces prepared and mobilized for the possibility of similar wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

As argued earlier, the Portuguese, who were anticipating a colonial war in Mozambique at some point, responded with speed and brutality. On October 9, 1964,

\textsuperscript{69} Yale University Microfilm, Progress and Plans, 1963-1964, Mozambique Institute, 1, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
\textsuperscript{70} The Kurasini [KIEC] School assisted the fledgling Mozambique Institute, under construction in Dar es Salaam between 1963 and 1965, by providing opportunities for Mozambican students to continue their education.
Janet Mondlane estimated that in the first week alone, “5,000 men, women, and children have crossed into southern Tanganyika with tales of the horror of killing, burning villages and wholesale destruction by the Portuguese.”\textsuperscript{72} The influx of refugees added to Janet Mondlane’s overall estimate of 150,000 Mozambican refugees living in Tanganyika by 1964.\textsuperscript{73} Northern Mozambicans were not only the most victimized groups under the Portuguese cotton \textit{chibalo} system, but they also represented the largest rural and illiterate communities in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{74}

During the colonial era, northern Mozambicans were least exposed to educational opportunities. After many of them fled to Tanzania, the Mozambique Institute was not in a position to provide educational or humanitarian assistance for all refugee men, women, and children. Further exacerbating the problem was the fact that most refugees could not speak, read, or write in Portuguese. This realization enabled Janet Mondlane to estimate that, overall, 90 percent of the refugees in Tanganyika were illiterate.\textsuperscript{75} Faced with this woeful legacy of colonialism, the administrators at the Mozambique Institute understood the importance of establishing a viable educational system in order to help the multitude of refugees. Therefore, one of the main educational priorities of the Institute was not only to promote literacy at the secondary school but also among the refugees living in

\textsuperscript{72} Yale University Microfilm, Letter/Updates by Janet Mondlane, 1. No Title Given, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Refugee Survey, 4, 16-18. Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8. In February and March 1964, 200 refugees were interviewed, and 31 percent fled the coercive labor system in which men and women were forced to grow cotton. See also Isaacman. \textit{Cotton}; Pitcher, \textit{Politics in the Portuguese Empire}. These monographs provide comprehensive analyses of the \textit{chibalo} system and the plight of rural Mozambicans.
\textsuperscript{75} Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Refugee Survey, 16. Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8. Also see page 18 of the survey in which out of the 200 people surveyed, 26 percent claimed they could read and 20 percent claimed they could write in another language other than Portuguese. According to the survey, it was either Kiswahili or their respective ethnic language in which they possessed some literate ability.
settlements. This goal, however, would take money, personnel, and resources— all of which were in short supply at the start of the anti-colonial war. As a pragmatic alternative, the male students affiliated with the Mozambique Institute were required to go to refugee camps in Bagamoyo and Rutamba, Tanzania during their holiday breaks to help promote literacy and personal hygiene. These holiday breaks were not specifically for religious observance but were rather scheduled with the national holidays of Tanzania.76 Girls who were training to become nurses at the Institute also assisted refugees in the settlements.77 Although young women did, under guidance, also leave the secondary school grounds during holidays “to go on a camping trip…to take the girls on an adventure,” female students often stayed on the campus to tend to domestic chores and the general upkeep of the hostels.78

However, these trips during holidays were required of students and revealed another aspect of FRELIMO’s early authority. As one former student, Daniel Chatama, also recalled the trips to the settlements were a mechanism for FRELIMO’s leaders, but especially Eduardo Mondlane, to discipline and control some of the young men from the Institute’s secondary school by the late 1960s. Chatama said:

Mondlane made a big blunder by sending us there as a punitive Christmas holidays. For the purpose of punishing us, he ordered some tools such as machetes, hacksaws hoes and shovels for no other constructiveness but punishing us to the point that we returned to Dar es Salaam with blistered hands…Comrade Solomon, the old man in charge of Tunduru had been instructed to merclessly

76 Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.
77 OCA, Report, 5-7, Mozambique Institute, 1 September 1965, Herbert Shore Collection in Honor of Eduardo Mondlane 30/307, Series SG II Mondlane, Mozambique, Africa, Series 3. Subject Files, Folder Mozambique Institute (General), Box 1.
78 Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.
punish us…the old man gave us a long speech in which he showed us all the tools he bought for us with which to wantonly chop up trees.\textsuperscript{79}

The perceptions of other former students further demonstrate that tensions between FRELIMO’s leaders and students existed and originated in large part from disagreements about the operations at the school, the generational gap between staff and the students, the presence of white Portuguese at the school, and the strong likelihood of Portuguese agents engaging in subterfuge at the secondary school.\textsuperscript{80} Since these issues arose within FRELIMO’s flagship educational institution, the tensions provide evidence that the discourses of unity and legitimacy were, at best, tropes that did not reflect the reality of the situation within the liberation front.

Despite the humanitarian intentions behind creating the secondary school in Dar es Salaam, the limited capacities of the Mozambique Institute became increasingly obvious with the influx of refugees entering Tanganyika in late 1964 and 1965. Although Janet Mondlane argued for and attempted to expand the educational scope of the school to include these new groups of refugees, the finite number of tutors and limited financial resources could not keep pace with the most basic demands. Because of these circumstances it was impractical and nearly impossible to meet the needs of all uneducated Mozambicans. Thus, the Mozambique Institute’s educational priorities shifted primarily to those students who already possessed either primary or secondary levels of education. The unintentional result of this decision created a situation where many young and ambitious male students at the Mozambique Institute became a

\textsuperscript{79} Daniel Chatama, email message to author, May 30, 2012.
\textsuperscript{80} Jaime Maurício Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012; Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email messages to author June 22, 2012 and June 29, 2012.
“privileged elite” that had access to scholarship money and opportunities to study abroad. The formation of this group who possessed access to some formal education stands in stark contrast to the egalitarian, class-neutral rhetoric propagandized by FRELIMO. As the colonial war intensified, these students were called upon to serve in FRELIMO’s guerrilla army or in other capacities to aid the movement. At both the Institute’s secondary school and universities abroad, these elite students also became the catalyst for resistance toward the revolutionary leadership of FRELIMO. This may have been the reason for the punitive treatment of some students like Daniel Chatama during holidays. Before these tensions at the school dramatically surfaced in 1968, propaganda generated by FRELIMO attempted to show a different reality at the secondary school: images that demonstrated a revolutionary pragmatism in progress to build a new society.

*Revolutionary Images: Gender Roles and Propaganda at the Mozambique Institute Secondary School - 1965*

In November 1964, approximately one month after the start of the anti-colonial war, the Mozambique Institute hastily opened its doors to Mozambican students. At that point, however, the hostel on the Institute’s campus was equipped only to house male students.⁸¹ Four months later on March 10, 1965, Janet Mondlane expressed frustration with the opening of the Institute in a pamphlet/letter entitled, “Background Information and Progress.” She states,

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⁸¹ The hostel and secondary school for the Mozambique Institute were quickly constructed which led to a series of plumbing, electrical, and other structural problems. Furthermore, there were not enough funds by the March 10, 1965 Progress report on the Mozambique Institute to construct a separate “female only” hostel. The girls remained in off-campus housing but at some point prior to September 1965 came to live in a newly constructed girls-only hostel on the campus of the Mozambique Institute. Yale University Microfilm, Background Information and Progress, Mozambique Institute, March 10, 1965, 6-8, Chilcote Collection, Yale University, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
A serious problem facing the Mozambique Institute is that of housing for the girl students. At the moment they are living in scattered residence, some of them in undesirable conditions. Although the Mozambique Institute was originally designed to house girls as well as boys, the overwhelming preponderance of boys made it necessary to use all available space for them. Therefore, the alternative is to find a house in the Kurasini area for the girls. Mrs. Anna Raposo has already consented to act as house mother. What is needed is the promise of funds to support this house. A request has been made to a refugee organization in Europe, and we hope it will only be a short time before this request is approved.  

Janet Mondlane was expressing dissatisfaction with the Mozambique Institute’s initial inability to provide equal opportunities for male and female students. Furthermore, on March 10, 1965 the total number of fifty-two male students in residence at the Mozambique hostel was significantly higher than the six female students who lived close enough to the campus to attend classes. Between March and September 1965, however, improvements were made at the Institute for the expansion of girls’ housing and other educational infrastructure with the financial support of various international aid groups.  

As thousands of new refugees arrived after 1964, the number of students with some educational background expanded. In September 1965, the Institute was able to house and provide for a total number of 104 male and 18 female students at a maximum capacity. Although the Institute’s hostel was geared specifically for educating and housing males, the influx of female refugees escaping the brutality of Portuguese soldiers

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82 Ibid., 7-8
83 Ibid., 1.
84 OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Report, 1,5.
85 Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute 1965, (No page number provided but, if numbered, it would be page 7), Photograph 12, Chilcote Collection, Yale University, Microfilm 710, Reel #8. The male students would have slept in bunked beds.
and the colonial war in general, contributed to adding three more girls (with some limited exposure to education) to the overall student population. 86

The increased student population and skewed gender demographic created new challenges for Janet Mondlane and teachers at the Mozambique Institute since FRELIMO attempted to treat both sexes equally at the school. As early as the First Congress of FRELIMO in September 1962, FRELIMO stated that one of the movement’s objectives was to “promote by every method the social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman.” 87 The nature of this statement is articulated along with sixteen other goals that “could be summarized as consolidation and mobilization; preparation for war; education; diplomacy.” 88

In essence, gender roles were redefined in the imperatives of FRELIMO’s anticolonial struggle. It is reasonable to state, therefore, that provisions had to be made for educating and housing young women at the Institute in order to demonstrate that “every method” was in fact being implemented to include women as students at the school and as equal partners in the liberation struggle. One way in which this was achieved was that teachers at the Institute delivered instruction in Portuguese, Mozambican history and culture, and mathematics in a coeducational environment. Educational expectations and standards were similar for young men and women, and the living quarters for both sexes were similarly styled and physically separated on the campus. A former English teacher at the school, Nancy Freehafer, stated that she and other female members of the staff

86 Until funding could be secured, the female students stayed in a rented residence off-campus. Yale University Microfilm, The Mozambique Institute, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
87 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 122-123.
88 Ibid., 123.
briefly lived in the crowded confines of the girls’ dormitory and slept in bunk beds.\footnote{Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.} The presence of staff, in the girls’ dormitory in particular played a role in monitoring the students. Recalling her time in the dormitory, Freehafer said, “the girls had to go to bed at a certain time…the boys may have been freer, but the girls were definitely in bed at 9:30pm or something like that.” Although Freehafer was not directly asked by Janet Mondlane or the Dean of Students, Eduardo Coloma, to monitor the students because “there were other people doing that,” William Minter, a former math teacher at the secondary school recalled, some girls, indeed, got pregnant and had to leave the school.\footnote{William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010.}

Despite these occasional lapses in surveillance and order at the school, the administrators and teachers at the Mozambique Institute attempted to juxtapose and synchronize gender roles of the male and female students during their other responsibilities and daily activities. For example, in 1965 most likely after the completion of the girls hostel, photographs were taken for a FRELIMO pamphlet of the students, teachers, and daily activities at the Institute.\footnote{Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute 1965, (No page numbers provided but they would be, including the title page, 1-12), Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.} As representational tools to procure funding from international donors and to demonstrate FRELIMO’s revolutionary vision and purpose for the secondary school, each photograph is accompanied by a caption that describes the scene above and presents evidence about FRELIMO’s goal to implement its revolutionary gender policies in its premier educational institution.

The photographs demonstrate revolutionary transformations in social practices. In particular, photographs (#14-21) of the 1965 pamphlet confirm FRELIMO’s attempt to
blend gender roles and responsibilities for all students at the Mozambique Institute.

Taken prior to the Second Party Congress in July 1968, in which the FRELIMO hierarchy codified non-sexism as an ideological position, these photos convey the reality that the school’s maintenance was the responsibility of all students regardless of sex – a common practice at boarding schools throughout East Africa. The photographs serve as an important tool with which to analyze how all students were required to contribute actively to the daily domestic chores of the school. For example, photograph #14 shows three male students washing and drying dishes, with the caption, “the students take care of the hostel buildings themselves. Cleaning is their responsibility, and bed-making, sweeping and washing up are some of the daily chores…”\(^\text{92}\) This picture is followed by another (#15) that shows a young man sweeping up a classroom and/or cafeteria with the statement “…and on Saturday morning the whole building is scrubbed.”\(^\text{93}\) Domestic responsibilities which had been the primary domain of women in colonial and “traditional” Mozambican society were, at the Mozambique Institute, also the responsibility of young men.\(^\text{94}\) In a final example of how males contributed to the domestic duties and requirements at the school (photograph #16) shows young men (one of whom is smiling for the camera) washing and folding laundry.\(^\text{95}\) Nancy Freehafer corroborated this evidence, recalling that male students were generally responsible for their own domestic duties, i.e. laundry, cleaning, and general maintenance and did not

\(^{92}\) Ibid., Photograph #14.

\(^{93}\) Ibid., Photograph #15.

\(^{94}\) Similar domestic duties were also typical of Mozambican male laborers in living in labor compounds in South Africa and in seminary schools throughout Mozambique. See Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity*, 195-200; Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.

\(^{95}\) Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute 1965, Photograph #16, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
expect the female students to do it for them.\textsuperscript{96} Despite the practical necessities of maintaining the school, these images demonstrated egalitarian policies at work within the Mozambique Institute and may have been used to propagandize a broader revolutionary vision in which gender roles based upon colonial and traditional structures needed to be reconsidered if not totally dismantled.

By September 1, 1965, the Institute had procured enough international funding via the Swedish Agency for International Assistance for the construction of a “female only” hostel.\textsuperscript{97} The photographs (#17-21) depict female students engaging in similar domestic capacities as the male students. It is interesting to note the image and caption for photograph #17, which shows at least two female students (under the tutelage of Anna Raposo) learning how to cook with pots over a range oven.\textsuperscript{98} What is unique about this particular photograph is that girls, who often prepared meals for their families and male relatives in their respective “traditional” societies, were learning to use a “modern” appliance in preparation for their own dinner. The caption also alludes to the fact that “although the girls attend classes and eat lunch at the Institute with the boys, they prepare their own dinner at their hostel under the supervision of the housemother, Mrs. Raposo…”\textsuperscript{99} The Mozambique Institute did have its own cooks and dining facilities, but at night, male and female students occasionally cooked for themselves. This reality not only reinforced the efforts toward egalitarian operations at the school, it also serves as an example of how the “traditional” expectations of domesticity, also employed in seminary

\textsuperscript{96} Nancy Freehafer, interview message to author, June 30, 2012.
\textsuperscript{97} OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Report.
\textsuperscript{98} Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute 1965, Photograph #17, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., Photograph #17.
schools throughout Africa, were not always completely transformed despite the revolutionary ideology of FRELIMO.

Since the operation of the school depended on the cooperation of both male and female students, it was difficult at times to challenge the “traditional” domestic role of women. For example, photograph #20 shows two female students operating a hand-powered sewing machine, yet another example of “modernity” at the Mozambique Institute. The caption below the picture, however, reveals an interesting insight into the gendered expectations at the school. It states:

In addition to cooking lessons, the girls are taught to sew. They have made their own clothes, sheets and curtains, and during the holidays, while the boys were at a refugee camp teaching reading and writing to older refugees, the girls did all the repairing of the bedding and mosquito nets at both hostels.\(^{100}\)

Based on the content of this caption, while male students were expected to help educate refugees on their time off, girls contributed their time off to maintaining the Institute and continuing the “domestic” requirements for both sexes. In the September 1, 1965 “Report” compiled by Betty King, the Administrative Secretary to Janet Rae Mondlane, a specific reference to this gendered situation is stated in Point 14. It says:

…during June holiday this year, the 50 boys then enrolled at the Mozambique Institute went to the refugee camp at Bagamoyo, where they taught in courses of primary and literary education and followed a programme of physical training. During that same holiday, the girls helped with the reorganization of the library, repaired the linens at both hostels, took sewing and cooking classes and followed an informal programme of independent reading.\(^{101}\)

It is clear from these captions that, despite revolutionary attempts to blur gendered “domestic” responsibilities, the administrators at the Mozambique Institute still

\(^{100}\) Ibid., Photograph #20.  
\(^{101}\) OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Report, 5-6, Point 14.
maintained a modicum of traditional expectations. Male students interacted with
refugees and helped promote literacy in the camps on their holiday breaks; thus, they
were actively engaged with the people in a leadership role. On the other hand, female
students did not have the same opportunities because, according to the caption under
photograph #21,

the majority of the girls who come to the Institute…are frightened and unsure of
themselves, refusing to go into the city of Dar es Salaam for fear of being chased
away from the store windows. Therefore, in addition to teaching them their
lessons, it is necessary to show the girls that there is a larger world where there
is no need to fear, where courtesy and dignity can walk together…\(^\text{102}\)

The caption appears to present a contradiction in the egalitarian values of FRELIMO and
the Mozambique Institute. None of the other captions describing the activities of male
students make a similar argument about the timidity of the boys. Although the majority
of students originated from seminary schools in rural areas of Mozambique, the allure of
cosmopolitan Dar es Salaam in the 1960s provided an opportunity for young
Mozambicans of both sexes to engage with urban modernity.\(^\text{103}\) For male students in
particular, it seems that they were “naturally” expected to go to the refugee camps, teach
as many refugees as possible, and carry out their implied responsibilities as leaders.

Given the scope of the responsibilities for both sexes at the secondary school and the
challenges of truly revolutionizing gender roles, it is understandable that some traditional
facets of male and female perceptions endured at the school. Evidence of gendered
stereotypes in these captions, i.e. females as timid and males as leaders, is an example of
the difficulties in separating customary gender assumptions and practices from

\(^{102}\) Yale University Microfilm, The Mozambique Institute 1965, Photograph #21, Chilcote Collection,,
Microfilm 710, Reel #8.

\(^{103}\) Ivaska, *Cultured States*; Brennan, *Taifa*. 

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revolutionary goals. The photographs offer a glimpse into the gendered make-up, roles, and responsibilities of all students at the Mozambique Institute secondary school. Although they convey a set of revolutionary images of a fully functioning, well organized, and egalitarian educational environment, the captions and photographs belie, or at least complicate, our understanding of the overall realities at work within the school.

Another important facet of the operation of the Mozambique Institute was the number of students attending schools in foreign countries. In September, 1965, there were 122 Mozambican students attending schools overseas.\textsuperscript{104} The majority of these students abroad were males who had attended either the AAI’s school or Mozambique Institute’s secondary school, both in Kurasini, Dar es Salaam. Many of these students were at least 19 years old, had attended secondary classes at the Institute and were, therefore, encouraged to attain scholarships from external sources to pursue advanced degrees outside of Africa.\textsuperscript{105} The students abroad were exposed to new points of view and opportunities not afforded them in Africa or by FRELIMO. The sources on the Mozambique Institute in 1966 and 1967 are scant, but many secondary sources alluded to the fact that during the intensification of the war in Mozambique, many of these men (both at the Institute and studying abroad) were called upon to play a more active role in the guerrilla forces. Many of the male students, especially those seeking degrees abroad, refused to return to Mozambique, however, their defiance was not just a direct challenge to FRELIMO: it was the result of inherent problems affecting the entire nationalist movement. During the tumultuous years from 1966-1969, that the Mozambique Institute

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\textsuperscript{104} OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, “Report,” 8.
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secondary school came to reflect the collective ideological schisms at work within FRELIMO.

_Ideological Divisions and the Mozambique Institute_

Prior to the outbreak of war in September 1964, FRELIMO had begun to suffer from internal divisions over ideological issues that would later dramatically emerge at the Mozambique Institute secondary school. In addition to the challenge of maintaining a secondary school was that, throughout the entire liberation struggle, the liberation front was made up of people from disparate ethno-linguistic, religious, cultural, regional, and class backgrounds. These obstacles to unity made it difficult for the leaders of FRELIMO to forge a collective identity and a cohesive ideological position within the liberation movement and at the secondary school. These same issues also created a schism among members of the FRELIMO hierarchy. Moreover, individuals who disagreed with Eduardo Mondlane’s vision and his position and intentions as the President of FRELIMO asserted that he was not fully committed to Mozambique’s liberation. Opponents of Mondlane’s position envisaged a liberated Mozambique in which they would replace the colonial officials and become the new authorities, maintain the traditional patriarchal structures which perceived women to be inferior to men, and encourage an entrepreneurial individualism within the framework of a future postcolonial economy. However, there were also active members of FRELIMO who, at the time, did not trust Mondlane alluding to his educational background and Western connections.

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which they saw as antithetical to true socialist revolution.107 This minority opposition within FRELIMO did not espouse the collective, revolutionary objectives of Eduardo Mondlane, but instead they and their supporters envisioned themselves as the true architects for FRELIMO’s and Mozambique’s future. Challenges to Eduardo Mondlane’s authority, then, were motivated by various factors that included ideological, personal, ethnic, religious and regional differences. By 1968, the divisions within FRELIMO had become contentious enough to jeopardize the entire liberation movement.108 Burgeoning elitist and generational tensions between young male students and their senior male leaders resulted in increased verbal and physical confrontations in 1967 and 1968. These altercations not only forced the closure of the Mozambique Institute in May 1968, but also seriously undermined the entire liberation struggle and led directly to the breakdown of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism in favor of policies that were more authoritarian.

Several individuals affiliated with FRELIMO disagreed with Mondlane’s ideological direction. By the late 1960s, other FRELIMO party cadres like Lázaro Nkavandame and Uria Simango ultimately differed from Mondlane on a variety of issues. These men, as well as rank-and-file members of FRELIMO felt animosity toward Mondlane and challenged the utopian vision of a socialist, secular, and egalitarian Mozambique. Many believed this was neither feasible nor practical especially under

108 For an analysis of how Mozambican youth played a substantial role in these events, see my dissertation Chapter 6: “The Pedagogy of Revolution.”
Mondlane’s rule. A former Institute secondary school student, Daniel Chatama, stated that his personal “rage against Mondlane, his wife and fellow southern traitors” was motivated primarily by his belief that these people “represented colonial interests” and not the interests of ordinary Mozambicans. Another former FRELIMO student, Abel Mabunda recalled that class divisions were very obvious within the liberation front since FRELIMO elites like the Mondlanes “lived in Oysterbay, drank when and what they wished, afforded to have dogs at home (even bought property) and feed them well, had their children educated in good schools, travelled often abroad; so what can I say about their treatment of others who spent days without food, had their school closed for no purpose, ended up getting into a refugee camp and only saw the future in third countries? Just read George Orwel’s [sic] ‘Animal Farm’ and you will understand…” Thus, during the first six years of its existence, FRELIMO cadres not only fought the Portuguese military, but also argued among themselves as dissident factions of FRELIMO’s leadership clashed with Mondlane. The acrimony within the FRELIMO leadership not only resulted in well-publicized purges of elite men like Nkavandame and Simango, but also profoundly affected the rank-and-file FRELIMO youths who were fighting the Portuguese as either soldiers on the frontlines or as students attending the FRELIMO secondary school at the Mozambique Institute.

What also contributed to animosity among students at the Institute secondary school was the fact that the three nationalist movements that had united to form

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110 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
111 Isaacman, A Luta Continua, 23.
FRELIMO were based on regional affiliations whose respective ideologies were based upon specific geographic and ethnic identities. The vast majority of refugees in Tanzania were Makonde peasants from the northern provinces of Mozambique, but the leadership and Central Committee of FRELIMO were comprised of semi-westernized, *assimilados* from the southern provinces. With the start of the colonial war, the majority of FRELIMO’s guerrilla forces were predominantly made up of male migrant workers already in Tanzania and from the multitude the Makonde refugees who fled the early anti-colonial violence from Mozambique’s northern provinces across the Ruvuma River. As the number of Makonde causalities increased during the early years of the war, so too did the negative perceptions of their southern leaders (Mondlane, Machel, dos Santos, and Chissano) who operated and dictated missions from the relative comfort of bases inside Tanzania. Therefore, the same regionalism and ethnicity that undermined FRELIMO from its inception also affected student perceptions of power and opportunity within the Mozambique Institute.

The majority of the individuals who constituted the leadership within FRELIMO espoused a revolutionary, socialist ideology under the direction of Eduardo Mondlane. Mondlane encouraged Mozambicans to adopt a revolutionary line consistent with FRELIMO’s adaptations from the TANU’s emergent leftist philosophy. Although not completely identical to Nyerere’s model for Tanzania, Mondlane’s vision included

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113 Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, 18; West, *Kupilikula*.
114 Under Mondlane, FRELIMO was influenced by Tanzania’s version of socialism. Many of these positions were given further credence after Nyerere’s famous Arusha Declaration in 1967 that served as a harbinger for the implementation of *Ujamaa*. 
empowering the peasantry via collective educational and agricultural strategies, the cultural and social liberation of women, and usurpation of traditional power from rural chiefs. Mondlane’s philosophy of social egalitarianism was the antithesis of both traditional African practices and Portuguese colonial impositions. Many of FRELIMO’s leaders also eschewed traditional African values and practices, which they interpreted as socially and politically stultifying, to implement a revolutionary new social paradigm under Mondlane. Between FRELIMO’s First Party Conference in June 1962 and the Second Party Congress in July 1968, Mondlane and the FRELIMO leadership endeavored to implement ideological positions that attacked colonial and traditional African structures that they believed promoted racism, sexism, class warfare, and individualism. As a political and social ideology, Mondlane’s ideological leanings were based on a revolutionary pragmatism that was adaptable to contingencies. Mondlane’s belief in these particular tenets as a basis for a liberation Mozambique was instrumental in providing a later foundation upon which FRELIMO Party Congresses shaped and modified proto-state policies.

Despite the shared desire to remove the Portuguese, deep-seated mistrust and skepticism undermined cohesion within FRELIMO. Mondlane states in his book, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, that:

We came from all over Mozambique and from all walks of life: different language and ethnic groups were represented, different races, different religions, different social and political backgrounds. The occasions for possible

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conflict were unlimited, and we found that we had to make a conscious effort to preserve unity. The main form this took was education. From the very beginning we carried on political education to combat tribalism, racism, and religious intolerance.\textsuperscript{116}

It is interesting to note that Mondlane makes a specific reference to the importance of education in resolving differences within FRELIMO. To these ends, the Mozambique Institute was an organ for the indoctrination of FRELIMO’s ideology and a place where revolutionary goals could be fostered. Moreover, the students represented various ethnic backgrounds and this offered the opportunity for the instruction of refugees. The Mozambique Institute, therefore, was a vital component of the revolutionary image and goals of FRELIMO.

Another reality that hindered FRELIMO’s guerrilla war was the division among its leaders over the question of defining the “enemy.” Part of what drove the wedge between the factions was whether or not FRELIMO should wage a war against Portuguese colonialism or a racial war against whites, or both?\textsuperscript{117} Several former students recalled that race was not the sole factor that motivated them to quit FRELIMO. Instead the Mondlane’s decision to hire and interact with white Portuguese at the secondary school, such as the white Mozambican defector, Jacinto Veloso and FRELIMO’s Director of Health Services, Drs. Helder and Helena Martins who worked with Mozambican refugees students and taught nursing and hygiene, was what convinced many students to abandon their support for FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{118} There were also whites who

\textsuperscript{116} Mondlane, \textit{The Struggle for Mozambique}, 130-131.
\textsuperscript{117} Kathleen Sheldon, \textit{Pounders of Grain}, 118. See also, Isaacman, \textit{A Luta Continua}, 16; Munslow, \textit{Mozambique}, 85.
\textsuperscript{118} Jaime Mauricio Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012; Daniel Chatama, interview by author, May 26, 2012. However, white Portuguese at the school were the basis for student angst and the same
joined FRELIMO during the outbreak of the war mainly because of their own economic disenfranchisement and disillusionment with the Salazar regime.\textsuperscript{119} Therefore, although many revolutionaries saw the advantage of formulating an ideology that was not based on racism, other FRELIMO leaders like Lázaro Nkavandame and Uria Simango believed that colonialism and “whiteness” were intrinsically linked.\textsuperscript{120} This sentiment was particularly strong especially among many northern Mozambicans who viewed “whites” as the enemy.\textsuperscript{121}

Lázaro Nkavandame was an outspoken critic of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane and his revolutionary vision. Nkavandame was from Cabo Delgado and relied on the support of elders and male “chiefs” for his following. Furthermore, Nkavandame was putatively exploiting “his own people” by personally capitalizing on profits from the cotton exchange via Tanzania to global markets. Nkavandame refused to attend FRELIMO’s Second Party Congress in July 1968 – purposefully held in Niassa province and not Nkavandame’s province of Cabo Delgado.\textsuperscript{122} Nkanvandame ultimately defected to the Portuguese. Uria Simango, the Vice President of FRELIMO also differed from Eduardo Mondlane on various positions. Simango was later accused of sympathizing with the skepticism from students was not directed toward white Americans like the Minters who worked at the school. ALUKA, Mozambique Liberation Documents Collection, The Mozambique Institute Medical Program, 1966-1968, http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.pwmoz000008 See also, Veloso, \textit{Memórias}; Helder Martins, \textit{Porque SAKRANI? Memórias dum Médico duma Guerrilha Esquecida} (Maputo: Editorial Terceiro Milénio, 2001).

\textsuperscript{119} Munslow, \textit{Mozambique}, 68-69. Jacinto Veloso is a good example.
\textsuperscript{120} These accusations have been leveled, addressed, and refuted in numerous other articles, sources, and interviews. For example, see Isaacman, \textit{A Luta Continua}, 23; Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2011; West, “Girls with Guns.”
\textsuperscript{121} Jaime Maurício Khamba, interview by author, August 14, 2012.
\textsuperscript{122} Poppe, “The Origins.”
Nkavandame faction and was later ousted from FRELIMO for printing a damning pamphlet of FRELIMO’s internal problems entitled “Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO.”

Eduardo Mondlane, however, attempted to dissuade FRELIMO leaders and cadres of the notion that “whites” were the enemy, which was evident in the fact that his white American wife was committed to helping Mozambican refugees via the Institute. Rather, Mondlane and other revolutionaries viewed the institution of colonialism as the enemy. He argued in his book, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, the effect of colonialism on the people of Mozambique went beyond just economic exploitation: it also engendered a racist assumption that “whites” were superior.

One of the most divisive issues that threatened the existence of the secondary school was the fact that Janet Mondlane was a white woman and a non-Mozambican. While living and pursuing his doctorate in the United States, Eduardo Mondlane met and married Janet Rae Johnson, a white American woman who became the Director of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam in 1963. Despite her non-Mozambican background, Janet was a committed revolutionary and her loyalty to both Eduardo and FRELIMO made her a good choice to head the Institute. She spent a considerable amount of time procuring foreign financial aid to construct and maintain the secondary school. Janet Mondlane’s presence at the helm of the Mozambique Institute was also indicative of FRELIMO’s proclaimed goal of sexual and racial egalitarianism and, although her role as the Director also brought criticism, her self-sacrifice and steadfast dedication to the

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operations of the Mozambique Institute were essential to the new, revolutionary direction that FRELIMO wanted to pursue. The Mozambique Institute was a critical component of FRELIMO’s proto-statehood: its existence to oversee the school buildings, hospitals, and dormitories offered physical evidence of FRELIMO’s capacity to manage a bureaucratic institution in ways that garnered legitimacy from Mozambican refugees. The purpose of the Mozambique Institute, then, to educate, heal, and assist the Mozambican refugees, meshed well with its functionality and the revolutionary pragmatism of FRELIMO’s socialist ideology.

Nevertheless, Eduardo Mondlane’s political opponents attacked his credibility and viewed Janet Mondlane’s leadership post as the Director of the Mozambique Institute with disdain.\textsuperscript{125} Although there were other whites employed at the Institute, Janet Mondlane became a primary target among FRELIMO’s dissenters. For example, in Photograph #1 of the pamphlet \textit{Mozambique Institute, 1965}, Mondlane is seated at a desk engaged in a policy discussion with Bernando Ferraz who was the Dean of Students.\textsuperscript{126} Although the photograph appears innocuous, the connotation is that as a black male Mr. Ferraz is receiving a policy directive from a white woman, Janet Mondlane, who is seated behind a desk. The caption below reads, “Mrs. Mondlane, in consultation with other members of the staff, carries out policy, handles major problems and continuously seeks financial support to keep the Institute’s programmes functioning.”\textsuperscript{127} This photograph no doubt contributed to perceptions that FRELIMO was attempting to implement a

\textsuperscript{125} Munslow, \textit{Mozambique}, 105; Newitt, \textit{History of Mozambique}, 522.
\textsuperscript{126} Yale University Microfilm, The Mozambique Institute 1965, Photograph #1, Chilcote Collection, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
revolutionary image, reflected in its multiracial dynamic, but among Eduardo Mondlane’s opponents it may have also evoked further animosity and opposition. Other photographs (#5, #9, and #10) also show whites – Gretchen Hawley as a tutor for black students, and Dr. Helder Martins a medical doctor and nurses’ instructor – as active participants in the education of black students at the Mozambique Institute. These images were intended to demonstrate FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism at work, but may have also provided Mondlane’s enemies with fodder for disagreement about FRELIMO’s revolutionary direction. Sexism, elitism, and racism became inseparable realities at the Institute secondary school in 1968 and were the primary causes of strife and opposition to both Eduardo Mondlane and his wife Janet.

Conclusion

As FRELIMO attempted to consolidate its authority over the lives of Mozambicans in liberated zones and in Tanzania through a contingent sovereignty, internal divisions and youthful intransigence toward party elders undermined the stability and “unity” of the movement. It was at the Mozambique Institute’s secondary school in Dar es Salaam where many of these challenges emerged and threatened FRELIMO’s tenuous legitimacy, contingent sovereignty, and institutions. Despite these divisive issues, FRELIMO members and foreign volunteers who were loyal to the Mondlane’s educational vision at the school worked to help educate young Mozambican refugees. Gender roles were central to FRELIMO’s egalitarian message under the Mondlane’s leadership. However, the prevalent propaganda that depicted gender-neutral

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128 Martins. Porque SAKRANI?.
responsibilities such as school maintenance still disproportionately affected the lives of female students. For their part, male students also contributed to maintenance of the school facilities in Dar es Salaam, but they were also expected to actively assist FRELIMO in the settlements as teachers and advocates of the liberation struggle. The Mozambique Institute was, then, a place “…where courtesy and dignity…” did “walk together,” but gendered realities and perceptions at the school also defined the limitations of real change portended in FRELIMO’s ideological vision. Although gender was a factor in shaping the opportunities and expectations for young Mozambican students at the Mozambique Institute secondary school, the unraveling of FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism also surfaced around the issue of Mozambican youth at the school and their role in the pedagogy of revolution.
During the night of March 5, 1968 at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam, a fight occurred between two students, Daniel Baulene Chatama and Shadraque [sic] Paulino. In a 2012 interview, Chatama recalled, “I did not have any prior altercations with Xadreque or personal grudge against him…I slapped Xadreque as a political statement in my rage against Mondlane, his wife and fellow southern traitors who I believed represented colonial interests…Indirectly I slapped Mondlane, and aware of the consequences, I stood prepared for Frelimo leadership’s reaction.”

Still incensed by his altercation with Xadraque forty-four years later, Chatama continued, “You don’t have to believe anything I am writing to you. I write about the things as I lived them. Neither Janet, nor any living Frelimo leader would truthfully tell you what actually happened…I am not telling you to believe, but that is what I personally believe happened.”

Chatama’s acrimony and strong words reflect his lingering emotions regarding the magnitude of the events of that particular evening.

This recollection illuminates an important, but often overlooked aspect of the existing historiography of Mozambique’s liberation struggle: the impact of generational tensions between Mozambican youth and FRELIMO party elites that emerged at the
FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam. These intergenerational conflicts were significant realities within the liberation front during the late 1960s and early 1970s and were major factors in the breakdown of FRELIMO’s initial revolutionary pragmatism in governing its cadres.\(^4\) This analysis will enhance existing knowledge of the internal strife within FRELIMO and demonstrate the ways in which the events in March 1968 at the FRELIMO Mozambique Institute’s secondary school, its flagship educational institution, represented a critical moment in the political transformation of the proto-state. The problems at the school in early 1968 provoked a heavy-handed response from some of FRELIMO’s highest-ranking members, including Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano. The fight between Chatama and Paulino was the pinnacle of other forms of violence and discord that erupted at the school. Moreover, given the severity of the altercation between these two young men, the situation also required the intervention of Tanzanian authorities which indicates a blurred line of jurisdiction in the school’s oversight and operations.

The importance of creating an educated base made the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam FRELIMO’s paramount proto-state institution. However, maintaining harmony at the secondary school was a difficult challenge. The secondary school offered opportunities to expand FRELIMO’s political legitimacy but it

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also exposed the proto-state to risks of class elitism and privilege that undermined the stability, purported unity, and the legitimacy of the liberation front. The unintended consequences of elite formation at the secondary school made it difficult for the leaders of FRELIMO to forge a collective unity and a cohesive ideological bond. Personal and ideological disputes within FRELIMO originated from the movement’s inception in 1962, but with the advent of the anti-colonial war in 1964, the bipolar extremes within the FRELIMO hierarchy created tension, jealousy, and personal rivalries that nearly derailed the notion of a unified liberation front by March 1968.

The Mozambique Institute was intended not only to act as a secondary school that provided educational opportunities for young Mozambican student refugees, but also to provide oversight to the medical services, the distribution of clothing, and the promotion of literacy and food to refugees living in Tanzania. FRELIMO’s cadres, then, worked to develop the humanitarian agenda of the liberation front and acted not just as soldiers, but as members of a civil service who worked with the proto-state’s revolutionary constituents. The Institute’s civic obligations, ambitious goals and organizational outreach were to also serve as the educational standard for future schools in an independent Mozambique. When the façade of order at the school broke down in March 1968, it was a critical moment for FRELIMO as a proto-state. The liberation front transitioned from a movement led by revolutionary pragmatists to authoritarian ideologues. Simply put, the violence that erupted at the secondary school heralded the fulcrum moment in the political evolution of FRELIMO, the beginning of a profound transition to authoritarian solutions to real or perceived internal threats. Therefore, one of
the most critical elements that informed FRELIMO’s transition from pragmatic proto-state to authoritarian single-party state upon independence was the intergenerational and ideological disputes that emerged among the student body at the secondary school in Dar es Salaam in early 1968. With the intensification and expansion of the anti-colonial war in 1967 and 1968, generational tensions arose when the liberation front’s leaders increasingly sought authoritarian approaches to managing FRELIMO’s institutions and its revolutionary constituents well before independence in 1975 and the Third Party Congress in 1977.

_A Luta Interna: Violence at the FRELIMO Mozambique Institute Secondary School_

The cause of the altercation between Chatama and Paulino during the evening of March 5, 1968 was not immediately known to the teachers or administrative staff, or to Janet Mondlane who, as the Director of the Mozambique Institute, was informed by telephone at approximately 10:30pm that evening about a situation at the school. In her statement to the Tanzanian police on March 7, 1968, Janet Mondlane explained that this altercation at the secondary school required the direct intervention of Samora Machel, Marcelino dos Santos, and Joaquim Chissano who were, at that time, some of FRELIMO’s most important political cadres.\(^5\) They arrived with the intention of restoring order at the school and removing individual students who had been causing problems with the daily operation of the facility.

According to Janet Mondlane’s statements provided to the police, as a result of the fight, two members of the school’s staff – Aurélio Manave, a nurse and instructor, \(^5\) OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Documents, 1, Mozambique Institute, 7 March, 1968, Series SG II, Historical Files Collected, Series 6 – Mondlane/Mozambique Archive (microfilm), Reel #3, Document # 1585: “Statements Given to the Police, Kilwa Road Station.”
and Eduardo Coloma the Dean of Students – were taken into police custody, brought to Kilwa Road police station and beaten by Tanzanian police in the full view of students who were “shouting beat him, beat him” from outside the station window.⁶ Aurélio Manave was, in fact, manacled and, according to Janet Mondlane:

Indeed, the policeman did strike him across the head, and naturally Manave could not defend himself. Manave did not know how many times – once, twice, thrice – he was struck since after the initial blow, he was quite unaware of further blows. Finally, he was asked to remove his trousers and his shoes, all of this in front of the students...Soon after Coloma came in and the men were manacled together. He said that Coloma was molested by the students. After a while some FRELIMO men came and they were released to them.⁷

The Tanzanian police had apparently arrested these two men based on accusations made by one of the students involved in the fight, Daniel Chatama, who claimed that the staff at the secondary school was threatening him as well as other students.⁸ After determining that he was the instigator of the fight, Coloma and Manave sequestered Chatama to his room, but he managed to escape out the window and go to the police. Chatama had also learned of Machel and Chissano’s summons to the school “to remove” him “from the place and quiet the students.”⁹ In regard to this situation, another former student Abel Mabunda who “witnessed the arrest of Chissano and Samora,” also later confirmed that he “witnessed the spanking of Manave and Coloma at Kilwa Police Station.”¹⁰ Finally, in an interesting insight into FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty a former student Abel Mabunda recalled that, in regard to Tanzania’s oversight or

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⁶ OCA, Ibid., 4.
⁷ OCA, Ibid.
⁸ The tone, nature, frequency, and type of “threats” were based on the accusations of certain students like Daniel Chatama who perceived several classmates serving as “spies” for Eduardo and Janet Mondlane.
⁹ OCA, Ibid., 1.
¹⁰ Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
involvement in FRELIMO affairs at the Institute secondary school, Tanzanian authorities “appeared very rarely. Tanzanian officials or police only came to the Institute upon the request of Mozambicans. On the day the Institute was closed, they were invited by President Mondlane.”\footnote{Ibid.} It can be argued that FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty, then, functioned similarly to the colonial practice of indirect rule, especially in regard to its relative autonomy to act on its own behalf.\footnote{I am thankful to Iris Berger for pointing out this important insight into my evolving argument regarding contingent sovereignty. Also, Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.} Tanzanian authorities often left FRELIMO’s leaders and cadres to settle their own disputes unless, as the situation on the evening of March 5, 1968 necessitated the intervention of Tanzanian police.

In a 2003 interview, Aurélio Manave a nursing instructor at the secondary school revealed another interesting insight into this tumult at the FRELIMO secondary school. Referring to the situation as “this incident,” in which “confusion broke out at night,” Manave mentioned that Samora Machel

always carried his pistol and when he found out about the disturbances and conflicts, he and four other people who came with him from Tembeke went to my room. They didn’t fire any shots...Samora came to hide his pistol in my residence…once the Tanzanian police forces arrived, the students started shouting, ‘these two friends are the ones who are threatening us.’ So, the police arrested me and Koloma [sic]…the police went to investigate my room and they found Samora’s pistol and mine. But Samora was gone by then. He didn’t stay because he didn’t want to get involved in that conflict.\footnote{ALUKA, Samora Machel Documentation Center, Interviews, “Interview with Aurélio Manave,” http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.machel0005.}

Nowhere in this interview does Manave describe the beating he endured at the police station, nor does he mention the chortles and physical threats of the students at the station window.
An important disparity exists in the oral evidence provided by both Manave and Mabunda. Before his arrest that evening, Manave stated that Samora Machel had already left the school without incident or arrest but, as Mabunda observed, “As for Machel, I think it incorrect for him to have shown up at the Mozambique Institute, during the night, attack the students, and end up arrested by the Tanzanian police. He was, after all, the Secretary of Defense of FRELIMO!” Therefore, memories of individuals regarding this particular evening at the secondary school remain contentious and reflect a diverse interpretation of the events. In this case, one point of view exists from a former instructor and friend of Samora Machel (Manave) and the other from a former student who shortly thereafter quit FRELIMO to live in exile in Kenya (Mabunda). Both versions reveal different recollections about the presence and role (or not) of Samora Machel.

It is also interesting to note, however, that Manave made a specific point to state that, although there were guns at the school, there was no gunfire or gun-related violence that evening. João Cabrita, a FRELIMO critic describes the situation differently in his book Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy. Without a specific citation, Cabrita argues that when Machel and other FRELIMO cadres arrived at the secondary school, shots were indeed fired that evening, resulting in the flight of many students from the campus. Perhaps distinctly important to this debate about the use of a gun (or not) is Abel Mabunda’s recollection: “If I saw or heard a gun, no!” Although Mabunda does

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14 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
15 Cabrita. Mozambique, 54. Thus far, I have been unable to verify whether or not there were actually shots fired that evening. During my interview with William Minter, August 5, 2010, he stated that he did not hear or see evidence of shots being fired that evening. Moreover, another informant, Abel Gabriel Mabunda who was at the school that evening did never “saw or heard a gun.”
16 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 29, 2012.
not possess fond memories of his time as a FRELIMO cadre nor of his time at the secondary school, he could not recall any use of a gun that evening. However, Mabunda did allude to the outbreak of violence at the school and that Samora Machel was clearly involved in the situation. These conflicting reports and eyewitness recollections regarding the situation at the school on March 5, 1968 reveal the magnitude of this defining moment of tension within FRELIMO, a series of events that remains as emotional as it does disputed to those who were there that evening. The violence and arrests also signaled an important moment in the history of FRELIMO whose leaders shut down the school for two-and-a-half years to reevaluate their policies in regard to educating their cadres. William Minter recalled that when the Mozambique Institute secondary school reopened in Bagamoyo in 1970, its students were much more ideological and loyal to FRELIMO than the students who attended the school in Dar es Salaam before 1968.17

The intervention of Tanzanian authorities is also important to consider because it reveals a unique facet of FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty. The volatile situation that erupted necessitated the Tanzanian police to make arrests and proceed with an investigation into the violence. Moreover, it also indicates that FRELIMO still had some influence to “police” its own students and revolutionary constituents well after the enactment of the Refugees Control Act of 1965 and that Tanzanian authorities only acted when asked to by FRELIMO’s leaders.

The following day, March 6, 1968, when Manave and Coloma were still in police custody, there was another fight on the roof of the school between two other students:

17 William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010.
Alberto Njanja and Marcelina Rafael. Again, according to Janet Mondlane’s statement to the police, a security guard at the school, Mr. Sandy, saw both students “struggling” on the roof. She recalled:

He ran out of the dorm and up to the roof, separated the two students and took Marcelina to her room. Sandy did not know if she had been beaten seriously by Njanja, but she was crying. She had been hanging her laundry on the roof when Njanja encountered her…Njanja accused her of telling others and spying on him and giving information to his enemies…Marcela denied doing such a thing concerning anybody. Njanja then grabbed her and beat her in the face. Then the guard came to break it up.¹⁸

Janet Mondlane also mentioned in the police statement a student named Sarmento, who had brought a knife into his classroom. When the teacher went to tell Janet Mondlane about this incident, he (the teacher) revealed that, “Sarmento told him the knife was to be used to kill the white Portuguese who were in the school. The teacher replied, “‘And do you want to kill Shadraque (Paulino) and Marcelina, too?’ Yes, yes, was the reply. At this point the teacher walked out of the classroom.”¹⁹ Many former students still contend that Marcelina Rafael, who later married FRELIMO cadre and future President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, served as a spy for FRELIMO leaders Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel and worked to inform these men of any challenges to their authority from within the student body.²⁰ For example, Daniel Chatama unequivocally stated, “Marcelina was the female informant” who many students believed snitched to members of the FRELIMO hierarchy which perhaps explains why she was attacked.²¹

¹⁸ OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Documents, 1, Mozambique Institute, 7 March, 1968, Series SG II, Historical Files Collected, Series 6 – Mondlane/Mozambique Archive (microfilm), Reel #3, Document # 1585: “Statements Given to the Police, Kilwa Road Station,”: 4-5.
¹⁹ OCA, Ibid., 4. The teacher’s name is not mentioned, but it was a male teacher.
All of these incidents at the FRELIMO secondary school reveal important clues about the complex internal tensions within FRELIMO during the war against Portugal. As addressed earlier in this dissertation, these divisive issues included how to define the “enemy,” how to develop and implement a revolutionary ideology within FRELIMO, and what strategies were best to pursue in the course of armed conflict. The personal ambitions of individuals and the ethnic and regional backgrounds of FRELIMO officials had already affected the unity of the liberation movement. However, there is also ample evidence to argue that gender and generational conflicts significantly affected FRELIMO and the operation of the secondary school. In her work on Christianity and generational tensions in colonial Ovamboland, Meredith McKittrick argues, “…in practice, generation is always gendered, while gender always has a generational component.” Although her study analyzes a different African society in an alternative context and time frame, McKittrick’s statement is also applicable to FRELIMO’s struggle to liberate Mozambique as gender and generational issues permeated all social, political, educational, and cultural relationships. The generational tensions that emerged between male students at the secondary school and the leadership of FRELIMO during the late 1960s were indicative of how competing visions of Eduardo Mondlane’s stature as the President of the liberation front were increasingly contested by a clique of young students. The exact number of students at the secondary school who were opposed to Eduardo Mondlane’s leadership is difficult to discern. However, several former students

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22 These factors are well-known and have already been analyzed in detail. For example, Opello, “Pluralism and Elite Conflict,” 66-82; Isaacman and Isaacman. From Colonialism to Revolution, 83.
23 Meredith McKittrick, To Dwell Secure: Generation, Christianity, and Colonialism in Ovamboland (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2002), 6.
explained that, by 1968, a majority of the students either had mixed feelings about
Mondlane or were opposed to his leadership. This perhaps explains why a significant
number of students fled the secondary school campus after these outbreaks of violence on
the campus. An estimated 50 students, including Daniel Chatama and Abel Mabunda,
escaped Tanzania and fled to Kenya, afraid of retaliation by those still loyal to a
FRELIMO led by Mondlane. Many of these former students believed Mondlane was
merely a puppet of a Western agenda and was using his position and influence to thwart
any opposing ideological views (such as Marxism) from emerging among the students
that could have potentially challenged the existing status quo in FRELIMO.

Prior to these events, as a liberation front, FRELIMO was able to construct
institutional bodies (schools, hospitals, military camps) that garnered hegemonic
legitimacy in a way that allowed the organization to act as a proto-state. Other liberation
groups such as the African National Congress (ANC) from South Africa also operated
institutions within Tanzania, but functioned much more overtly in that country later in the
1970s and 1980s. Although other liberation movements were active within Tanzania,
they lacked the scale and breadth of FRELIMO’s institutional operations in that host
nation during the 1960s. In this way, FRELIMO was a trailblazer for other southern
African liberation groups that also operated with contingent sovereignty, on a smaller
scale, in Tanzania.

24 Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012; Daniel Chatama, interviews by author,
December 30, 2011 and May 26, 2012; Lawe Laweki, email message to author, June 18, 2012.
26 Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2012. In my first email exchanges with Daniel
Chatama, he informed me that his views about Eduardo Mondlane remain unwavering and, interestingly,
Chatama right from the very beginning insisted that he (Chatama) was still a Marxist which informed the
way he described his convictions then and now.
27 Morrow, et al., Education in Exile.
With the advent of the anti-colonial war on September 25, 1964, the number of refugees living in Tanzania increased significantly. Tens-of-thousands of Mozambican men, women, and children crossed the Ruvuma River and entered into refugee camps to escape the escalating military retaliation from the Portuguese. In the first few months of the war, so many refugees came into Tanzania that Janet Mondlane estimated their total number to be around 150,000. Given the burgeoning numbers of Mozambican refugees, FRELIMO and the Mozambique Institute were, therefore, faced with numerous humanitarian crises and a realization that education was the vital component to foster Mozambican nationalism within Tanzania.

Since the majority of the refugees in Tanzania were from the Makonde, Makua, and Yao ethnic groups of northern Mozambique, it is also important to recognize their difference from most of FRELIMO’s leaders who were from southern Mozambican provinces. Due to their initial proximity to Lourenço Marques (Maputo), many individuals in high-ranking positions within FRELIMO possessed more access to education via colonially sanctioned mission schools. FRELIMO’s leadership largely consisted of individuals who had attained some degree of education and social empowerment during colonialism, by contrast with the northern Mozambicans who had fewer opportunities to pursue an education during the colonial era. This explains why the

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28 Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Collection, Letter/Updates by Janet Mondlane, 1. No Title Given, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
29 Ibid.
30 Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, for example, were both from southern provinces in Mozambique were access to even a rudimentary education during the colonial era enabled them to pursue higher education and emerge as party leaders. Two of my informants, Lawe Laweki and Abel Gabriel Mabunda, received their initial education in Catholic seminary schools in Mozambique.
high numbers of illiterate Mozambican refugees originated from the provinces in the north.

Not surprisingly, therefore, uneducated northern refugees who fled to Tanzania posed a unique problem for FRELIMO. The leadership recognized that it needed to provide education to as many refugees as possible in order to promote their revolutionary ideology and build a cadre of educated, loyal technocrats. However, perceptions of southern Mozambican privilege and elitism within FRELIMO were, therefore, also understood in terms of ethnic differences. The regional background of FRELIMO leaders exacerbated ethnic strife within the movement, as the majority of party elites originated from Mozambique’s southern provinces.

By the late 1960s, the anti-colonial war against Portugal intensified and internal conflicts stemming from personal jealousy, ethnic and regional biases, and ideological differences rose to the fore resulting in assassinations, purges, and instability within FRELIMO. Although FRELIMO attempted to correct this regional and ethnic imbalance among the party leadership with expanded educational opportunities in Tanzania and the liberated zones, by 1968, the party elite was still disproportionately southern. A victorious FRELIMO would mean the political and social empowerment of individuals in the highest positions of authority within the movement. Therefore, not only was the independence of Mozambique at stake, but so were regional, ethnic, and individual claims to power in the future nation.

By the early 1970s, the proto-state’s leaders dispensed with approaches to statecraft based on revolutionary pragmatism and, instead, became increasingly

31 Opello, “Pluralism and Elite Conflict.”
authoritarian as Samora Machel and his supporters sought to increase their influence within FRELIMO. The expanding guerrilla war into Tete province in Mozambique in 1968, as well as the Portuguese counterinsurgency efforts throughout the colony during Operation “Gordian Knot” in 1970 presented an opportunity for leaders like Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos to consolidate their authority over FRELIMO and lead the organization toward a hardline Marxist-Leninist ideology. FRELIMO’s rapid shift to the left in 1977 at their Third Party Congress was a strategy that (a) appealed both to the Soviet bloc nations on ideological grounds, (b) challenged and antagonized the apartheid regime in South Africa and the white minority government of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, and, (c) centralized political authority in the hands of a vanguard of FRELIMO stalwarts who would orchestrate structural changes putatively meant to transform the economic maladies and social divisions created by Portuguese colonial system in Mozambique.

Internal stability, however, was a challenging task for FRELIMO to achieve considering the circumstances of state formation while in the midst of an anti-colonial war against Portugal. Rural Mozambicans in the northern and central provinces of the colony in particular coped with the horrors of the anti-colonial war as FRELIMO expanded its military presence within Mozambique by the early 1970s. The escalating violence negatively impacted Mozambican communities, as the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) infiltrated FRELIMO’s rank-and-file and used torture to extract intelligence from
the peasantry on FRELIMO’s movements. Moreover, the possibility of a Portuguese invasion of Tanzania and local Tanzanian anxieties about just such a possibility, especially after Portugal’s invasion of Guinea in 1970, required that FRELIMO actively expand its physical presence in Mozambique. This was especially challenging given the penury of funds to adequately extend its proto-state institutions into Mozambique as FRELIMO had in various locales throughout Tanzania. Finally, the omnipresent internal disputes motivated by personal jealousy, and ethnic and regional rivalries within FRELIMO emerged by the late 1960s to undermine the entire liberation front. The magnitude of these responsibilities coupled with the liberation front’s tightening hegemonic grip over refugee populations and rural Mozambicans in the liberated zones of Niassa and Cabo Delgado meant that FRELIMO’s initial revolutionary pragmatism – defined in this dissertation as an evaluative method of assessing the evolving means and strategies of FRELIMO to achieve the desired end of liberation - was curtailed in favor of authoritarian solutions favored by ideologues. This transition of philosophical perspective and strategy undermined FRELIMO’s internal unity and its ability to function as a proto-state by the late 1960s, as did the intensification of the anti-colonial war and efforts to counter Portuguese subterfuge against FRELIMO inside Tanzania. FRELIMO’s quest for political unity and nationalist homogeneity only obscured deep ethnic, class, generational, and social tensions within the liberation front itself.

32 The PIDE archives are now accessible in Lisbon, Portugal at O Arquivo Nacional de Torre do Tombo and similar sources relating to Portugal’s infiltration of FRELIMO and surveillance of its activities can be located in O Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino also in Lisbon, Portugal.  
33 Opello, “Pluralism and Elite Conflict.”
An Age of Revolution or a Revolutionary “Age”?  

While facing an increasingly hostile and brutal war against the Portuguese in 1968, FRELIMO needed to preserve a united front: an effort that faced multiple challenges from within the movement itself and especially from some young Mozambican students attending the Institute secondary school and several others studying at schools abroad. As the likely inheritors of a liberated Mozambique, youths’ compliance and loyalty to FRELIMO was of paramount concern to the movement’s leadership. When young students challenged the rules and hierarchy imposed by FRELIMO, its quest to maintain a united nationalist front faltered. Generational tensions, then, were significant factors that contributed to the internal divisions of FRELIMO during the nationalist period.

An analysis of intergenerational conflicts and the role and meaning of youth within FRELIMO sheds new light on how and why the incidents occurred at the secondary school in March 1968. Although youth and generational studies are relatively new discourses in African history, they are important frameworks through which historical phenomena are (re)analyzed. For example, recent works such as Paul Richards’s *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* have raised the issue of how the failures of patrimonial networks and political malfeasance can contribute to the ‘youthful’ desire to participate in acts of violence against corrupt

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“gatekeeper” states. Moreover, in her insightful analysis of youth in Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war, Norma Kriger addresses how youths – usually single, young males - shaped relationships between peasants and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) guerrillas in ways that often undermined the functionality and operation of nascent civilian organizations. For Kriger, youth often “defrauded” parents, attacked and killed those believed to be “sell-outs,” and persistently challenged their elders’ authority during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. For their part, young Mozambicans, whether as students or as soldiers, had a vested interest in the outcome of the anti-colonial war because their potential future - as colonial subjects of Salazar’s authoritarian Estado Novo - offered few opportunities and would merely continue to stultify their lives, through colonial structures such as chibalo, forced labor. Chibalo (also spelled Xibalo or Shibalo) meant forced labor, especially in the production of cotton in northern Mozambique. Similar work requirements and conditions existed in the port of Lourenço Marques for stevedores. To escape this rigorous labor demand, some young Mozambicans who had attained a rudimentary education, spoke fluent Portuguese, and often held occupations that assisted the colonial state could, but rarely did, attain the status of assimilado. Since many young Mozambicans never possessed the means or financial and familial support to pursue assimilado status, their anger at the Portuguese colonial regime was understandable in the light of the brutality of coerced labor. For FRELIMO, young Mozambicans, but

35 Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest. For an explanation of “gatekeeper states,” see Cooper, Africa Since 1940.
36 Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War, 179-180; Lan, Guns & Rain. David Lan addresses the role of youth in shaping the “legitimacy of resistance” and the relevance of metaphysical and symbolic heritage during anti-colonial wars.
37 See, for example, Isaacman, Cotton; Penvenne, African Workers and Colonial Racism.
especially those from urban centers or Protestant missionary schools were the primary font of revolutionary potential and military recruitment.

Therefore, FRELIMO leaders, like their counterparts later in Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, recognized that young people were “elements of the African population” who were “especially responsive to a revolutionary summons,” but only if youthful intransigence, defiance, and violence could be focused, controlled, and contained.38 Mike Kesby makes a similar argument regarding youth in Zimbabwe stating that “…military strategy intended to further national struggles had unintended consequences for local social relations. In guerrilla-held areas however, the guerrillas consciously empowered local young people whose energy they wished to harness for intelligence gathering and logistical support.”39 To further their struggle, FRELIMO leaders wanted to foster the revolutionary potential of disaffected Mozambican youths who had arrived in Tanzania as refugees in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Many Mozambican refugees who escaped to Tanzania sought retribution against the racist and exploitative policies of Portuguese colonialism. FRELIMO, with its promises of social and political egalitarianism, coupled with an emergent leftist ideology, offered an attractive alternative to many young Mozambican refugees in Tanzania as well as for people still living in colonial Mozambique.

Youth constitutes a complex, heterogeneous, and socially constructed category that encompasses individuals of both sexes and, although young people are part of all societies, defining youth requires an analysis of the shifting social, cultural, and gendered meanings that transcend age as the sole determinant of youth. For example, youth is also understood as a temporary phase of life in which individuals’ ability to engage in socially recognized rites of passage ultimately determines marriage eligibility, social status, concepts of manhood and womanhood, as well as access to political power and property. Youth, in this sense, were not necessarily children but were, at times, older men and women whom many Western societies would deem to be adults.40

In many African societies, youth was a social status that most individuals tried to escape as quickly as possible. Youth was often perceived as an undesirable social category imbued with assumptions of physical and mental immaturity, as African elders often expressed their power and control over youth in ways that curtailed individual agency. Elders in all societies create social mechanisms designed to control young people who embody potential threats to gerontologically and socially established positions of power and authority.41 According to Jon Abbink, “…there is a need to integrate the youth factor as a necessary element in any social analysis of African

40 Recent scholarship has also addressed the role and complex meanings of youth in colonial and post-colonial African history. See Burton and Charton-Bigot, eds. Generations Past. For a wonderful overview of the role of youth and generational studies in African history, see G. Thomas Burgess and Andrew Burton’s “Introduction” in that same volume. See also Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck, eds. Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005); Andrew Ivaska, Cultured States.

41 There are several recent studies, for example, that have analyzed how urbanization, gender, and migration have altered the ‘traditional’ elder/youth dichotomy in Africa. See Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity; McClendon, Genders and Generations Apart; McKittrick, To Dwell Secure; Ivaska, Cultured States; Lan, Guns and Rain; Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War; Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest.
societies, thus testing the relative autonomy of youths as actors (re)shaping social relations and power formations.\textsuperscript{42} Abbink’s assertion, then, is that youth serves as a discourse that defies reductive tendencies to homogenize “youths” as individuals who are relatively powerless because they are physically young or mentally immature.

Youth as a discourse and young people as individuals affected and defined Mozambican nationalism. For their part, FRELIMO also propagandized youth as a political strategy to demonstrate the vibrancy and dynamism of the liberation front, but also disciplined students in educational institutions and settings, and mandated their participation in the anti-colonial war. Some Mozambican youths like Daniel Chatama, who expressed individualism through physical and intellectual resistance toward FRELIMO, contributed to the evolving political philosophy of the liberation front in his opposition to the Mondlane’s leadership.\textsuperscript{43} Some Mozambican youths expressed agency through their participation in the anti-colonial war against the Portuguese, while others did so in their refusal to fight at all. Moreover, some young people engaged in activities that subverted FRELIMO’s ideological beliefs, which were often dictated by older officials who were entrenched within the hierarchy. In these ways, as revolutionary constituents, Mozambican youth took advantage of the interstices created in the unpredictable context of the war to shape FRELIMO’s political evolution.

As evidenced by the events at the FRELIMO secondary school in March 1968, education and educational settings – whether in FRELIMO’s “formal” schools or “bush schools” – were potential sites of generational, ethnic, class, racial, and gender discord.

\textsuperscript{42} Abbink and van Kessel, \textit{Vanguard or Vandals}, 3.
\textsuperscript{43} Daniel Chatama, interview by author, December 30, 2011.
The FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam putatively generated loyalty to the liberation movement through the appropriation of Western pedagogical methods and the empowerment of youth who were expected to play an active role in the anti-colonial war. The FRELIMO secondary school also represented an archetype: a model for future schools in a liberated Mozambique that were organized and built upon revolutionary precepts that purported to eliminate racial, sex, and class differences. Finally, the school, above all, generated obedience to FRELIMO through daily, task-oriented regimentation that established order, classroom decorum, and a dichotomous yet reciprocal power relationship between teacher and student. It was in the highly-structured educational milieu that generational tensions emerged to challenge the FRELIMO hierarchy.

The Mozambique Institute was a critical component of FRELIMO’s proto-statehood: its existence as a group of buildings, hospitals, and dormitories offered physical evidence that demonstrated FRELIMO’s capacity to manage a bureaucratic institution in ways that garnered legitimacy from Mozambican refugees. The purpose of the Mozambique Institute, then, to educate, heal, and assist the Mozambican refugees, meshed well with its hegemonic functionality and use of a contingent sovereignty. That is to say, the management of these multiple institutional apparatuses within Tanzania with minimal Tanzanian oversight gave FRELIMO’s leaders the ability to forge legitimacy as a proto-state.

44 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation, “…Where Courtesy and Dignity Can Walk Together…” for a critique of how customary gender roles and expectations in classroom settings belied the revolutionary egalitarian rhetoric of FRELIMO.
As addressed earlier in the dissertation, many of the “student refugees” who first attended the secondary school and FRELIMO’s primary school in Tunduru already possessed a rudimentary education, typically attained in Catholic missionary schools operating in Mozambique. Since the initial cohort of “approximately 50 student refugees” was predominantly male, in her international appeal for funding the Institute, Janet Mondlane revealed a gendered assumption about the students that also incorporated a generational component.⁴⁵ Despite her personal frustration with the initial lack of opportunities for female students, she stated:

These are young men who have a purpose in life. They are young men on whom the future of Mozambique depends...These young men need scholarships and a school to help them continue on the path that they have selected. Mozambique is a country which has a desperate need for doctors, economists, for people who are trained in agriculture, for all the professions that a modern society requires: teachers, engineers, mechanics. These are the roles that these young refugees must finally fill.⁴⁶

It is highly probable that these young men and women were teenagers around the ages of 15-18 as Janet Mondlane indicates that they would need scholarships to study abroad in a university setting.⁴⁷ Mondlane briefly describes the educational challenges facing a 17 year old young man named Zeca. She argues: “The story of Zeca’s search for education can be repeated in the experience of Antonio, and in the story of Lopes, in that of Eli, in the experiences of Isaac, and João. The same experiences apply to Felipe, Daniel, Pedro, Gabriel, José, Patrick, and any of the young men that we found in the refugee camps.

⁴⁵ See also in this dissertation Chapter 5: “…Where Courtesy and Dignity Can Walk Together...”
⁴⁶ Yale University Microfilm, The Mozambique Refugee Situation, 2, 11-12, Microfilm 710, Reel #8. The emphasis is mine.
⁴⁷ Ibid., 4-5.
outside Dar es Salaam. Based on this statement, it is very likely that these young men were around the same age as Zeca.

Janet Mondlane’s writing reveals another common facet of a burgeoning Mozambican national identity: that FRELIMO, as the sole revolutionary movement, “imagined” its own organization and boundless potential as a nation through their youth. Although international donations enabled the Mondlanes to establish the FRELIMO secondary school at the Mozambique Institute, insufficient funds limited the number of students with access to formal education. Young male refugees in their imagined roles as future leaders seemed to take precedence. FRELIMO was also limited in its capacity to educate older adult refugees at the school, regardless of sex or educational background. Age was a paramount factor in determining who could and could not attend the secondary school as well. Older Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, for example who might have possessed a limited education, did not possess the same opportunities to attend classes at the FRELIMO secondary school given the school’s size and limited financial capacity.

As refugees, the youth who were selected to attend the school possessed an assorted mix of talents, potential, and educational backgrounds. Another important consideration was the degree of fluency in Portuguese the student possessed, “since all classes are conducted in the Portuguese medium, the textbooks as well as the outside

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48 Ibid., 6.
49 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
50 This was especially true at the FRELIMO secondary school in Bagamoyo, Tanzania which began its operations in 1970. This school was the successor school to the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam which ended its operation after the March 1968 violence. William Minter, “Centros Difusores da Linha in the Mozambican Revolution, 1969-1975,” in David Wiley and Allen Isaacman, eds., Southern Africa: Society, Economy, and Liberation (African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1981): 137-138.
reading material must be in Portuguese, too.”51 This decision ostensibly limited the number of potential students who could, at least initially, attend the FRELIMO secondary school. Moreover, the use of Portuguese as the primary language of instruction created a homogenous linguistic medium for classroom lectures, thus eliminating the problem of deciding which African language might otherwise take precedence.52 The primacy of Portuguese language instruction also limited the number of students with access to English, which was the necessary language to pursue if they continued their education at the Kurasini International Education Centre (KIEC – also in Dar es Salaam), as well as at many universities abroad. Throughout the mid-1960s, the FRELIMO secondary school also prepared students to attend the KIEC.53 As stated earlier in the dissertation, the KIEC was another international secondary school in Dar es Salaam run by the African-American Institute and partially funded by the Ford Foundation. Students who attended the KIEC also had opportunities to attain international scholarships. Janet Mondlane stated that, although initially educated at the Mozambique Institute, there were “46 secondary and pre-secondary students enrolled at the English-speaking Kurasini International Educational Centre (KIEC)…” Both educational institutions worked together to create opportunities via education for African students. The students who attended the KIEC were advanced students of university age (on average, around the age

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51 OCA, Pamphlets, Mozambique Institute 1967, Janet Mondlane, Mozambique Institute, Reel #3 (microfilm), Document # 1080.
52 For more on the debate surrounding the use of Portuguese as the medium of instruction in FRELIMO’s classrooms, see Antoinette Errante, “The School, the Textbook and National Development: Colonial and post-Revolutionary Primary Schooling in Portugal and Mozambique, 1926-1992”(PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 1994).
of 18) who were proficient in English. The FRELIMO secondary school and KIEC also promoted university studies abroad, and those students fortunate enough to attain this distinction would likely pursue a college-level education at schools in the United States or Europe. Janet Mondlane explained on September 1, 1965:

As has been said many times before, the purpose which has motivated the development of the Mozambique Institute is that of providing educated young men and women to work within their homeland. Every young nation needs people with an understanding not only of the problems that must be faced within their country, but also of the complex role each nation plays in today’s world…At this time there are more young Mozambicans undertaking advanced studies than there have been altogether throughout the centuries of Portuguese colonisation. There are 122 Mozambican students enrolled in studies overseas at the university and technical schools.\(^5^5\)

The opportunity for some young Mozambican students to study abroad, however, also inadvertently resulted in the creation of educated elites among students within FRELIMO’s secondary school. When certain students gained access to education abroad, it is not hard to imagine that those young FRELIMO students who were able to continue their studies outside of Tanzania were envied by other less academically proficient students who were unable to pursue similar ends. The desire to study abroad was also a coveted goal, as the opportunity provided FRELIMO’s leadership with the reason to encourage students to adhere strictly to the movement’s revolutionary ideology and contribute to the independence of the nation. The possibility of studying abroad in the 1960s served as the proverbial “carrot” to discipline, motivate, and control youth in FRELIMO’s secondary school and other educational settings. The access to university education overseas was one factor in the events at the Mozambique Institute in March

\(^{54}\) Ibid.  
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
1968. However, due to the escalation of the anti-colonial war, FRELIMO’s leaders eventually began to place severe restrictions on the number of students studying abroad. The debate surrounding access to university education abroad was a factor in the violence at the Mozambique Institute’s secondary school in March 1968.

Young refugees who possessed some educational background were tested and placed in the appropriate classes with students of similar education levels. Many of the students arrived in Tanzania without birth records or other materials that would verify their age.56 Although the vetting process was not uniform, Janet Mondlane and other school leaders generally relied on physical appearance to estimate age and peer-group classifications, which would, in turn, serve as a determining factor for which classes a student could attend. These estimates proved impractical as individuals who were younger teenagers (14-16) might possess a similar level of education to older teenagers (17-19). Although the FRELIMO secondary school was co-educational, students of different ages and peer-groups often attended the same classes. The result was a heterogeneous classroom comprised of different ages and sexes possessing a similar educational level. The age differences between students did not necessarily affect the level of academic instruction in the classroom, but older students were distinct from their younger peers because they were expected to act as role-models and leaders for them.

Acquired in both FRELIMO’s schools and through direct participation in the revolution, FRELIMO’s educational strategy was intended to generate a sense of revolutionary nationalism and loyalty to the leadership among the future citizens of

56 Some young people, however, like Abel Gabriel Mabunda did cross the border with paperwork but had their documents confiscated by FRELIMO cadres upon entering Tanzania. Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.
Mozambique. Despite limiting the number of student refugees at the FRELIMO secondary school because of financial considerations, disparate educational backgrounds, and generational differences, both Eduardo and Janet Mondlane also understood that it was necessary to educate as many refugees as possible – regardless of sex or exact age - in order to inculcate the ideology of FRELIMO and foster loyalty to the movement, thus, generating a sense of political legitimacy and proto-state sovereignty. Simply put, education was of fundamental importance in building a new nation and building FRELIMO’s legitimacy.

In order to motivate people to fight for independence and demonstrate political legitimacy, FRELIMO’s leaders needed young students who attended the secondary school to educate as many refugees living in settlements as possible. These students, although refugees themselves, were expected to assist in the educational development of other Mozambicans who possessed little if any formal education at all before arriving in Tanzania. As the last chapter argued, this task largely fell on the shoulders of young men attending the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam. These young men, in particular, were a perceived panacea to cure the prolific illiteracy among the refugees living in Tanzanian settlements. The role of youth in facilitating education in the refugee settlements was a powerful symbol of the vitality of FRELIMO and also fostered the image of a youthful nationalist movement determined to achieve independence from Portugal. FRELIMO rhetoric proclaimed that education was paramount to the success of the revolution and that it was the responsibility of everyone – but especially young males – to deliver the nation from colonial and traditional burdens.
Male students at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam were expected to travel to the refugee settlements during their holiday breaks to teach reading to the roughly 90 percent of refugees who were illiterate and, in the process, also instruct refugees about FRELIMO’s ideological positions through reciting party rhetoric using public-speaking skills. Education and the promulgation of literacy within the refugee camps served as a disciplinary tool to get both youthful instructors and older illiterate refugees to conform to the policies and revolutionary values of FRELIMO. The presence of young educated men in the refugee camps also demonstrated FRELIMO’s commitment to expand education to all Mozambicans and use their youth as proactive and visible supporters of the liberation movement. By empowering these young men to actively assist in the education of other Mozambicans in Tanzania, as well as in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique, it was a means of channeling youthful agency into a productive forum that benefitted FRELIMO’s revolutionary constituents and demonstrated a pragmatic strategy toward bolstering the liberation front’s legitimacy via this humanitarian outreach.

It is also important to recognize that many refugees were considerably older than the younger students from the secondary school, so when these young men taught in the refugee settlements, they inverted the typical educational paradigm by which older, more experienced teachers taught younger, less experienced students. Thus, young FRELIMO men embodied a visible shift in societies that were traditionally ruled by elders. The new status of youth, promoted by FRELIMO, altered more commonly accepted power and

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57 Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Refugee Survey, 16, Microfilm 710, Reel #8.
58 Numerous scholars such as Michel Foucault, Max Weber, Paulo Freire, and Antonio Gramsci, for example, have already argued about the disciplinary power of education over subjects and citizens.
generational relationships in traditional Mozambican societies and families. By incorporating and proactively empowering young men as integral members of the liberation movement, FRELIMO was able to display a youthful image that not only promoted its legitimacy as a proto-state among refugees, but also proved that traditional African age-grades and generational power relationships were anomalous to the movement’s revolutionary values.

Although this reality of educational and generational inversion was prevalent in refugee camps and in “bush schools” within the liberated zones, this was not the case at the secondary school itself where older teachers maintained discipline and order with a regimen of class periods, eating and leisure time, mandatory study sessions, cleaning and building maintenance duties.\(^{59}\) Organization and routine were essential facets of the school’s daily operation. The challenges at the school were also linguistic since many of the foreign teachers, such as Ruth and William Minter and Nancy Freehafer, all admitted their lack of fluency in Portuguese, which was deemed by FRELIMO’s leaders, to be the language of classroom instruction.\(^{60}\) As Nancy Freehafer recalled, English was taught as a second language for those students who were older and already possessed a strong understanding of Portuguese.\(^{61}\) The FRELIMO secondary school borrowed heavily from Western models of pedagogical method, school discipline, and educational practices and

\(^{59}\) Some of the teachers and tutors were white, foreign nationals who supported and volunteered for FRELIMO. There were also black teachers, staff, and other personnel at the secondary school. Most teachers in the “bush schools” were black Mozambicans.

\(^{60}\) Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012; William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010; Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.

\(^{61}\) Nancy Freehafer, interview by author, June 30, 2012.
techniques derived as well from Catholic seminary schools that involved rote memorization.\textsuperscript{62}

Based on the rich visual evidence taken from pamphlets produced by the Mozambique Institute in 1965 and 1967, students were depicted in rows and sometimes two at one desk, facing a teacher who projected an image of a disciplinarian and controlled the “narrative” of instruction.\textsuperscript{63} The candid images produced for these pamphlets were used to procure funding from sympathetic international aid groups and, thus, were used as propaganda tools through which youth in an educational setting were put on display to convey the image of order and revolutionary progress.\textsuperscript{64} The photos portray the way FRELIMO envisioned and imagined its own operations at school and, likewise, also articulated the image of a revolutionary, pragmatic, and humanitarian organization to the outside world. That is, the organization of the photographs appears purposeful: on one side the depiction is of the violence inflicted upon young Mozambicans who suffered because of Portuguese brutality and, on the other, how FRELIMO helped to direct these revolutionary constituents into activities that expressed individual agency and productive contributions to the proto-state’s institutions. The photos represent and portray the value of individual initiative under the direction of FRELIMO that, despite the horrors of war, Mozambicans endeavored to persevere as

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. The British boarding school model was also utilized in Tanzania’s educational system but was undergoing a transformation by the late 1960s. See Lene Buchert, \textit{Education in the Development of Tanzania, 1919-1990} (London: James Currey, LTD., 1994).

\textsuperscript{63} Yale University Microfilm, Mozambique Institute 1965, Photographs 1-21, Microfilm 710, Reel #8, and Pamphlets, Mozambique Institute 1967. See also OCA, especially photographs 3, 5, 8, 9, 15, 23, 25, 26, Janet Mondlane, Mozambique Institute, Reel #3 (microfilm), Document # 1080. For a further explanation of power and the need for reciprocal dialogue in an educational environment, see Freire, \textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed}.

\textsuperscript{64} But not necessarily “dialogical,” revolutionary pedagogy as theorized by Paulo Freire in \textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed}.

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revolutionary constituents. For example, FRELIMO pamphlets such as “Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute, 1972” which depicts orphaned children on its cover, includes juxtaposed photographs of maimed children on crutches and healthy youths in productive and educational settings. These images conveyed the idea that FRELIMO was not only fighting the Portuguese to liberate Mozambique, but also struggling to provide a better future for all young Mozambicans. The daily existence at the FRELIMO secondary school and in the refugee settlements were published in the political and educational publications of FRELIMO, whose leaders unabashedly portrayed youth as the primary beneficiaries of a successful liberation movement.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the photographs in these pamphlets were used as propaganda to obtain funds for the secondary school and other FRELIMO projects, but gender roles were not necessarily reconfigured to demonstrate that a revolutionary egalitarianism was underway in FRELIMO’s institutions. They also show how school uniforms, a common facet of schools throughout colonial and contemporary Africa, were not always uniform. Although it was typical for African students who attended missionary or other schools in Africa to wear uniforms, young men at the FRELIMO secondary school wore a white shirt with dark pants and young women wore an assortment of blouses and skirts. It is, therefore, unlikely that funding for universal school uniforms took priority over classroom materials, room and board requirements, and teacher/staff salaries. Given the limited funds to maintain the operation of the school, the priority was to educate the maximum number of students. FRELIMO’s

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65 See this dissertation Chapter 5: “…‘Where Courtesy and Dignity Can Walk Together…”
photographers juxtaposed positive and negative images of youth, despite the obvious differences in apparel, to procure funding for its schools and to gain an international audience sympathetic to the liberation struggle.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, Mozambican youth were the likely inheritors of a liberated Mozambique, and those who attained an education would be the primary beneficiaries as jobs and future government positions might be made available to them.

*Speaking “Youth”-to-Power*

The origins of the incidents that occurred on the night of March 5, 1968 at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam can be traced to the relationship between certain teachers, staff, and students at the school itself and the ideological direction of FRELIMO in the context of the burgeoning anti-colonial war. They are also connected to the role of the fortunate Mozambican students who, with the help of funds from the Mozambique Institute, were studying abroad and who refused to return to Tanzania to serve in the military or rear-base operations against Portugal. Although FRELIMO struggled during the mid-1960s to fight against internal political machinations and external Portuguese threats, the movement managed to provide access to education, health care, and refugee assistance to a limited number of Mozambicans in its capacity as a proto-state. In the context and unpredictable course of the anti-colonial war, tensions and factions within FRELIMO surfaced that exposed the ideological differences and

personal rivalries that threatened to destroy the semblance of unity FRELIMO enjoyed in the early 1960s.

Two significant issues directly affected the operation of the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam: first, the oversight of Janet Mondlane as the Director of the Mozambique Institute coupled with the presence of Portuguese whites as teachers or staff at the school, and, second, the presence of Father Mateus Gwenjere, a Catholic priest who became a teacher at the secondary school, who putatively motivated students to pursue a course of action and study that countered FRELIMO’s revolutionary expectations. It is interesting to note, however, that race was not always a primary issue of contention at the school, as several informants told me that their attitudes and perceptions in regard to non-Portuguese whites such as William and Ruth Minter and Nancy Freehafer were not hostile or threatening.\(^{68}\) As the wife of the President of FRELIMO, Janet Mondlane was the exception to these attitudes. Nevertheless, these two issues intersected with long-standing differences based on race, class, gender, youth, and generation and surfaced to undermine the proto-state’s policies.

The origin of the trouble at the school coincided with the escalation of the anti-colonial war in 1966. The opening of new fronts in Mozambique forced FRELIMO to procure more military and administrative cadres to participate in the struggle. In a letter written on April 2, 1968 to a Mr. Mwingira (the Chairman of the Member Commission investigating the “Affairs of the Mozambique Institute”), Janet Mondlane provides some speculative hindsight into the situation as it developed at the school. She states:

\(^{68}\) Daniel Chatama, interview by author, May 26, 2012; Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.
In 1964, a decision was made in conjunction with the views of FRELIMO, that an age limit be established at which a student might enter the Institute. Those students who were 17 years of age or under, who had completed primary school in the Mozambican educational system (the first four years of school) or in the Tanzanian system, would be given entrance to the Institute and its facilities. Each student was interviewed individually by the Director of the Institute, and if there was doubt in the case of any student, he was interviewed by the President and the Education Secretary of FRELIMO. Since there were no documents to certify the age of any of the students, it was therefore necessary to rely on the good faith of the student and there is no doubt that a good number of people beyond the age of 17 remained as students in the Institute.\(^69\)

Janet Mondlane recognized that the arbitrary age limit of 17, which apparently could not be verified, provided a means for some older students to enter the secondary school despite FRELIMO’s attempts to prevent it. She continued to assess the situation at the school by referring to the time “in October of 1966” when “the Central Committee of FRELIMO met and among other things, outlined its educational goals and aspirations.” They observed:

> The Central Committee considers that the Mozambique Institute: 1- Ought to be basically an educational centre in which there will be militants with an intellectual qualification sufficiently adequate to enable them to be directly assisting in the realisation of the duties of the Revolution, or selected for special training, or for following middle or upper level studies abroad, within the general perspective defined by FRELIMO…following these resolutions, FRELIMO began a more intense programmes [sic] of explaining to the students their role in the Mozambique revolution. In addition to sending all students to special camps during their school holidays, political courses became a part of the school curriculum in order that the individual student could better understand the meaning of the liberation struggle.\(^70\)

These expectations of the students, regardless of their age, made it their duty to take part in revolutionary activities. Young students would, then, supposedly recognize

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\(^69\) OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Correspondence, April 2, 1968, Janet Mondlane, Mozambique Institute, Reel #3 (microfilm), Document #505.

\(^70\) Ibid.
the value of contributing to the revolution itself. In this sense, participation in the revolution provided an education that trumped the formulaic pedagogical milieu of the classroom. Knowledge acquisition and learning in the classroom were superseded by active participation in the various ideological and military fronts of the anti-colonial war. Whether as soldiers, administrative cadres, or as instructors in the refugee camps, young Mozambican students at the FRELIMO secondary school and university students studying abroad were expected to fulfill their revolutionary obligations, even if that meant forsaking a semester or graduation to return home to fight. Educated youth were “required to serve the liberation struggle in whatever capacity seemed necessary… no student could be absolutely assured that he would, upon leaving secondary school, automatically go ahead for university studies.”\(^{71}\) If students finished secondary school, they were expected to serve FRELIMO for one full year before even considering a study abroad option.

Mandatory service to FRELIMO, however, became an issue for those university students who were already studying abroad, several of whom refused to return to Mozambique. In December 1967, Eduardo Mondlane produced a document entitled, “A Brief Account of the Situation of the Mozambican Students Abroad and of Their Participation in the Struggle for National Liberation” that was directed toward young members of UNEMO (\textit{União Nacional dos Estudantes Moçambicanos} or National Union of Mozambican Students), who were affiliated with FRELIMO and attending universities outside of Mozambique. However, it was a letter especially directed toward those

\(^{71}\) Ibid.
Mozambican students in the United States. Mondlane’s tone is polemical and, at times, angry which is evident in the extensive use of capital letters in the text to emphasize certain points. Mondlane lamented:

Unfortunately, whether because of certain failures on the part of the Central Committee, or because of the corrupt and evil influence of imperialism, CERTAIN STUDENT COMRADES AS MUCH BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPREHEND THE TRUE MOZAMBICAN SITUATION AND THE DEMANDS OF THE STRUGGLE, AS BECAUSE OF EGOTISTICAL TENDENCIES, HAVE BECOME HESITANT, THUS RAISING OBSTACLES BEFORE THEIR DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION.

Although classroom studies were important, Mondlane argued that the knowledge and experience gained from participation in the revolution was a better form of pedagogy because individuals developed a sense of political and ideological solidarity. For Mondlane and other elder leaders of FRELIMO, “THE STRUGGLE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND BEST TRAINING SCHOOL THERE IS IN THE WORLD.” Therefore, when several UNEMO students in the United States refused to return not only did each express a sense of individualism in their defiance of elder FRELIMO leaders, but their perceived intransigence was a threat to the entire liberation movement in its war against Portugal. Although Mondlane recognized that “THE MAJORITY OF STUDENTS DO NOT ASPIRE TO HAVE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES… THE STUDENT WENT ABROAD PRECISELY BECAUSE FRELIMO HAD DECIDED IT WAS

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72 Wheeler, “A Document for the History of African Nationalism,” 319-333. UNEMO was an organization of students whose existence was sanctioned by FRELIMO.
73 Ibid., 321. Emphasis in the original.
74 Ibid., 326.
75 Ibid., 331. Emphasis in the original.
BEST, and the student was in this way continuing as a part of the national action.”76 The document also reveals the paternal nature of FRELIMO’s authority over young people, as Eduardo Mondlane used language that hinted at patriarchal power that was both conceptual and nationalistic.

The wording in the document provides clues about the generational tensions reflected in the recalcitrance of the young students and their refusal to submit to the disciplinary power reserved for the older FRELIMO leadership. Mondlane argued that FRELIMO’s authority was paramount to the protestations of students abroad by stating:

In the context of the struggle for the national liberation of Mozambique, WHICH IS OUR HISTORIC TASK IN THE PRESENT PHASE, because FRELIMO and only FRELIMO KNOWS [and] understands the real motivations of the People and clarifying their historic objectives; [only FRELIMO knows how] TO ORGANIZE, TO UNITE, TO EDUCATE THE PEOPLE POLITICALLY AND TO PREPARE THEM MILITARILY, BECAUSE FRELIMO AND ONLY FRELIMO WAS CAPABLE OF DEFENDING STRATEGY AND TACTICS ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO UNLEASH, TO DEVELOP, TO CONSOLIDATE, TO EXTEND AND TO CARRY TO SUCCESS THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION; FRELIMO [therefore] APPEARS AS THE INCARNATION OF THE WILL AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE MOZAMBICAN MASSES, THE DEPOSITORY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND LEADERSHIP FOR THE FATHERLAND. Thus, to obey FRELIMO is to obey the Fatherland, to pursue an objective which is the historic task of our People in the present phase of national liberation.77

Mondlane’s attempt to rein in unruly students abroad and force them to “obey” FRELIMO’s orders also prompted an angry response from those UNEMO students studying in the United States. Published in May 1968 (five months after Mondlane’s letter, and two months after the events at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam), the polemical and accusatory tone of the student response challenged “the unjustified

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76 Ibid., 327.
77 Ibid., 327-328. The emphasis in the original.
accusations made by Dr. Mondlane” and also included a pronouncement of defiance in which the students wanted to “publicly…denounce Dr. Mondlane’s failure as leader of a truly revolutionary Mozambican party.” The student reply, according to historian Douglas L. Wheeler suggests a “passionate and sometimes confused or cryptic” rhetorical style that verbally assailed Mondlane. These students also attacked Mondlane’s credibility, especially his order that they curtail their studies, especially in the “imperialist” United States, and return home to serve FRELIMO. Because Mondlane had earned his doctorate in the United States prior to the anti-colonial war, many students felt that his demands were both egotistical and hypocritical. In a direct expression of youthful defiance, the students pointed out this apparent hypocrisy by bluntly stating “take note, Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, that it is this same government that you consider to be the corrupter of the nationalism of our Mozambican youth that placed you there as the president of FRELIMO!” The students also resisted the FRELIMO directive to return to fight blaming Mondlane’s “superiority complex” and claiming:

To make decisions and impose them on others could be due to a superiority complex, or despotism, or mental insanity. We are curious to know which of the three would apply to the Doctor in view of all these decisions of his. We believe that the third choice, mental insanity, was not the mental state of the author when he wrote that very excellent pamphlet. But what about the superiority complex?

It is interesting to note the sarcastic and derogatory tone of the student response.

Either as an immature tirade or strong rebuke of Eduardo Mondlane, their reaction

79 Ibid., 173.
80 Ibid., 177.
demonstrates how some young men perceived the authority of the movement’s elder patriarch. Youth agency was expressed from abroad through this verbal defiance. Although these students attacked the very character of Mondlane and questioned his authority and the revolutionary direction of the liberation movement, to write their names at the end of the document and not remain anonymous reveals a maturity in their willingness to make such bold statements and potentially jeopardize their future association to or role(s) within FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{81}

The argument between these young men and Eduardo Mondlane reveals that intergenerational strife was a significant factor in FRELIMO’s quest for legitimacy. If the FRELIMO hierarchy was unable to convince many young students to return from abroad, the proto-state faced a loss of the credibility, authority, and sovereignty which it claimed to possess. Relative student autonomy abroad enabled them to both defy President Mondlane and expose FRELIMO’s façade of unity. Youthful defiance, then, undermined the anti-colonial war effort and threatened the modicum of legitimate hegemony maintained by FRELIMO.

The exchange of ideological and personal barbs between Mondlane and young Mozambicans studying abroad demonstrates how youth agency and generational tensions also affected the liberation movement. The apparent lack of student discipline evident in their refusal to defer to the demands of elder FRELIMO leaders demonstrates how some

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 180. The students were all male and are listed as follows: Marcos G. Namashulu, President; João H. Wafinda, Vice President; Mario J. de Azevedo, Secretary General; Gilberto Waya, Treasurer; Carlos Anselmo, Secretary of Publicity; and Alberto Jama, Auditor. Interestingly, some reconciliation occurred between the factions, for example, Marcos G. Namashulu became the Mozambican ambassador to the United States in the late 1990s.
youth conceptualized their own value and roles within and to the nationalist movement. For many young people, Mozambican nationalism was not, therefore, determined only by their participation in the anti-colonial war at the behest of elder leaders, but was also expressed in blatant acts of individualism that defied FRELIMO’s egalitarian ideology. Thus, intergenerational conflict intersected with class, ethnic, regional, and racial tensions already affecting FRELIMO.

This individualism on the part of the students demonstrated an alternative interpretation and expression of nationalism. The vitriolic exchange between FRELIMO’s President, Eduardo Mondlane and younger students studying abroad reveals how the meaning of Mozambican nationalism could be shaped and understood differently among various generational actors. In this way, FRELIMO party leaders were forced to reconcile the tension between their socialist-inspired interpretation of nationalism and overt individualism among certain members of the Mozambican youth. This is not to say that all young people who studied abroad challenged the FRELIMO hierarchy as many did return “home” to fight, but the students who did resist the movement’s demands displayed an alternative understanding of what it meant to be a FRELIMO cadre and future citizen of Mozambique.

Closer to “home,” the situation at the FRELIMO secondary school in Dar es Salaam also rapidly deteriorated as racial and generational conflicts arose that undermined the operation of the school. The best example of how ideological divisions among students began to affect the internal organization of FRELIMO was the controversy surrounding the role of Father Mateus Gwenjere as a teacher at the

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82 Ruth M. Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012.
Mozambique Institute. Father Gwenjere, a Catholic priest and teacher from Sofala, Mozambique who fled to Tanzania with several students in 1966, was hired by Eduardo Mondlane to teach Portuguese at the secondary school.\textsuperscript{83} According to secondary evidence, Gwenjere was hired sometime during early 1967 at the nurses’ training school near the Mozambique Institute at the insistence of Eduardo Mondlane, who would later regret the decision.\textsuperscript{84} While working for the Institute, Gwenjere putatively aligned himself with the burgeoning minority opposition within FRELIMO that disputed Eduardo Mondlane’s leadership.\textsuperscript{85}

This controversy still shapes the way individuals remember these events and the role (or not) of Gwenjere in fomenting “trouble” at the secondary school. Accusations that Gwenjere was a member of Portugal’s PIDE are unverifiable in extant and available documentation, although several former teachers feel strongly that this was the case.\textsuperscript{86} Gwenjere’s presence at the school was a source of agitation and ultimately resulted in his removal from the school and from FRELIMO. However, several former students like Daniel Chatama and Lawe Laweki continue to hold an opposite opinion of Gwenjere. Chatama praises Gwenjere for challenging Eduardo Mondlane’s elitism and his leadership of FRELIMO, especially Mondlane’s supposed decadent life of lavish comfort. According to Chatama, Gwenjere “confronted Mondlane over such…opulence when Mozambicans were starving in the camps and some wounded soldiers rotting right

\textsuperscript{83} Johnston, \textit{Study}, 76.
\textsuperscript{84} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, 52-53.
\textsuperscript{85} By late 1967 and early 1968, Eduardo Mondlane’s leadership was also opposed by several students who attended the secondary school at various times such as Daniel Chatama, Lawe Laweki, and Abel Gabriel Mabunda.
\textsuperscript{86} William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010; Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012. 345
in Dar-es-Salaam” were not being attending to “because Dr. Helder Martins and his wife refused to treat them.”87

Inevitably, Janet Mondlane’s position as the Director of the Mozambique Institute became the catalyst for Gwenjere’s and others’ opposition. According to William Finnegan,

…the Gwenjere faction began to make race an issue. Gwenjere tried to use the fact that a number of Frelimo’s leaders were white, Asian, or mestiço – Mondlane’s wife Janet, a white American, was the director of the Frelimo school – to discredit the leadership with their Tanzanian hosts and with black-nationalist students.”88

By accusing them of being “imperialist agents,” Gwenjere succeeded in fomenting animosity among black students toward their white teachers. Several students also led calls “for the removal from the Institute’s staff of four expatriate Portuguese teachers and the director, Janet Mondlane, all of whom were white.”89 The sources are mute on Janet Mondlane’s response to the situation, but in my interview with her, it was still a source of stressful recollection.90 There is also no indication of the responses from other whites of non-Portuguese origin at the Mozambique Institute to these accusations.91 The issue with white instructors was only an issue if they were of Portuguese.92 However, foreign

90 Janet Mondlane, interview by author, June 1, 2012. Out of respect for her wishes, I did not pursue further questions on this topic.
91 William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010. Minter briefly told me, however, that he never felt personally threatened by any students at the school. Moreover, it is interesting to note, that Daniel Chatama a former Mozambican student at the school praised William (and his then wife Ruth Minter, now Ruth Brandon) for being good teachers despite the fact that they were white. In particular, Chatama also alluded to the fact that the Minters were not white Portuguese, since several white Portuguese like the Martins’ worked for the Institute which was a major source of student frustration.
whites remained in their positions despite growing student opposition to the burgeoning white Portuguese presence at the secondary school.\textsuperscript{93}

The relationship between Gwenjere and Janet Mondlane quickly deteriorated as a result of Gwenjere’s opinion that students should learn English instead of Portuguese, although Mondlane recognized (like her husband) that the majority of the students at the school had more knowledge of Portuguese than English. Although there were many white, expatriate Portuguese working for FRELIMO in its effort to oust Portuguese colonialism, Gwenjere’s presence and support for student individualism affected the operation of the school.\textsuperscript{94} Gwenjere’s position was particularly effective among those who likely had little chance of being selected to study abroad. In a direct challenge to Eduardo Mondlane’s position that students studying abroad and attending the Mozambique Institute should contribute to the war effort, Gwenjere actively persuaded many students to eschew their military service to FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{95} Among others, students like Daniel Chatama, Nunes Antonio Nunes, and Alberto Njanja, the alleged instigators of the fights, stopped attending classes, caused disruptions on the campus and often refused to interact with white teachers and staff.\textsuperscript{96} As tensions at the school mounted between students and staff, Eduardo Mondlane was forced to remove Gwenjere from his teaching post in February 1968, but the damage to the operation of the FRELIMO secondary school was already in progress.\textsuperscript{97} Subsequently, the climax of these tensions at

\textsuperscript{93} Abel Gabriel Mabunda, email message to author, June 22, 2012.
\textsuperscript{94} Ruth M. Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012.
\textsuperscript{95} Finnegan., 108-109; See also Isaacman, \textit{A Luta Continua}, 21; Munslow, \textit{Mozambique}, 98.
\textsuperscript{96} OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Documents, June 17, 1968, Janet Mondlane, Mozambique Institute, Reel #3 (microfilm), Document # 97.
\textsuperscript{97} OCA, Herbert Shore Collection, Correspondence, May 6, 1968, Eduardo Mondlane, Eduardo Mondlane Materials, Reel #2 (microfilm), Document # 2610. If Gwenjere was working for the Portuguese, his
the school erupted in the fight between Daniel Chatama and Shadraque Paulino during the evening of March 5, 1968.

Conclusion

The escalation of the anti-colonial war in the late 1960s coupled with the problem of trying to control and discipline Mozambican students abroad exacerbated the situation at the secondary school. Gwenjere was a catalyst for young students to express their frustrations by rebelling against FRELIMO authority. Although not all of the students embraced Gwenjere’s positions on race and the “problem” of FRELIMO’s authority, rebellious students attacked other students who remained sympathetic to FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, and the presence of white teachers. This explains why accusations of “enemies” existed in the fights between Chatama and Paulino and Njanja and Rafael. Moreover, when Manave and Coloma were arrested and taken into police custody, rebellious students not only physically and verbally attacked their elder authority figures, they were privy to the humiliating emasculation of Manave who was stripped naked in front of them and beaten by police. When the Tanzanian police acted upon the students’ chants of “beat him, beat him,” the students inevitably realized that the normative power relationship between teacher and student had broken down. Many students fled the campus leaving teachers and staff to serve FRELIMO in other capacities. It is important to note, then, that Tanzania’s jurisdiction included the policing of the

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influence over the students in the FRELIMO secondary school did succeed in fomenting some anti-FRELIMO activities and sentiment.

Despite the closure of the school, some Mozambique Institute staff continued to help FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam and in the refugee settlements. Some individuals, for example, apparently helped by writing and translating books that would be used when the secondary school was later reopened in Bagamoyo. This was the case, for example, for William and Ruth Minter (Brandon). William Minter, interview by author, August 5, 2010; Ruth Brandon, interview by author, April 6, 2012.
Mozambique Institute and the Mozambicans living in their country – but only as a last resort. This provides clear evidence of FRELIMO’s contingent sovereignty as the situation at the school ultimately required TANU and local authorities to intervene at Mondlane’s request. Although FRELIMO cadres like Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano arrived to restore order and quell the problems at the school, their presence did little to mollify those students who took matters into their own hands and sought the assistance of the Tanzanian police. As a result of these events, the FRELIMO secondary school at the Mozambique Institute was forced to shut down for two and a half years in order to evaluate the causes of the violence between students and threats to the teachers and staff.

The tensions at the school largely reflected the internal political debates within FRELIMO itself. Scholars have argued that racial, class, ethnic and regional differences undermined ideological unity within FRELIMO, but as this chapter demonstrates, generational tensions – played out in educational settings – also negatively affected the revolutionary direction and stability of the liberation movement. The violence at the FRELIMO secondary school, coupled with student protests abroad and the presence of Father Mateus Gwenjere, demonstrated how some youths, in the context of the nationalist period of Mozambique’s history, attempted to assert power over their own lives as individuals. Moreover, the effect of these decisions also undermined the notion of a universal, homogenized Mozambican nationalism. That is not to say that the relationship between the FRELIMO leadership and Mozambican youth in the borrowed sovereign space of Tanzania was not, at times, affable and politically expedient. However, as the
anti-colonial war placed new demands on FRELIMO leaders, the inability to muster all able-bodied young men to the cause of liberation reveals the precarious relationship between generational actors. FRELIMO’s claim of being a united front against Portuguese colonialism was exposed as fallacious in terms of its ability to overcome the influences and practices of individualism, elitism, regionalism, sexism, and racism from its revolutionary positions.

In the realm of education, FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute secondary school was a pragmatic marker of proto-state development, but its inability to accommodate the vast majority of refugees unintentionally created the appearance and reality of educated elites, a small fraction of whom gained access to universities abroad. The initial benevolence of FRELIMO’s premier educational project, in turn, ironically undermined its own egalitarian and socialist ideology. Moreover, when some youths resisted the beckoning call of FRELIMO to return to fight the Portuguese, their actions exposed yet another facet of burgeoning Mozambican nationalism: the relevance of intergenerational tensions in the power relationships of FRELIMO cadres.

The myriad factors that led to the tumult during the evening of March 5, 1968 at the Mozambique Institute secondary school in Dar es Salaam were created in the crucible of the international- and pan-Africanist-inspired nationalism of the politically volatile decade of the 1960s. In this revolutionary, anti-establishment, and anti-colonial decade Mozambique’s liberation drama played out in rural, northern provinces, across friendly borders, at the United Nations, and within the nationalist movement itself. In this revolutionary age, African states and nationalist movements clashed with intransigent
colonial regimes such as Portugal, states under white minority rule such as South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and among themselves as the disparate visions, ideas, and ideologies of pan-Africanism jockeyed for continental influence and international recognition.
Conclusion

On June 25, 2012, FRELIMO politicians and party members celebrated the organization’s fiftieth anniversary with a variety of festivities throughout the country. The political party organized a multitude of public events, broadcast interviews of former and current party members on Mozambican television, and held celebratory rallies in which speeches from Mozambique’s President, Armando Guebuza, and other officials extolled FRELIMO’s achievements, historical legacy, and current national vision. The personal sacrifices of certain former FRELIMO cadres were also highlighted during the celebrations. Various foreign dignitaries visited Mozambique during these celebrations and attended many formal ceremonies that acknowledged the sacrifices of former leaders and ordinary Mozambicans who helped FRELIMO survive and evolve as an organization.

Despite the pomp and celebratory festivities held throughout the country, the tumultuous history of FRELIMO and the struggles of postcolonial Mozambique were significantly downplayed during these events. The fact that FRELIMO had survived as a political organization is, in itself, a significant testament to its political adaptability over time. After all, since 1964, Mozambique and Mozambicans have experienced a ten-year anti-colonial war against Portugal, a rapid shift to authoritarian Marxist-Leninism under Samora Machel following independence in 1975, and survived a violent civil war against RENAMO that resulted in atrocities against civilians and the destruction of economic infrastructure. The nation also endured debilitating neo-liberal structural adjustment programs during the 1980s and faced the challenges of ubiquitous poverty and HIV-
AIDS. Ordinary Mozambicans have lived with political cronyism and corruption at multiple levels. Therefore, amid the celebratory mood of FRELIMO’s current leaders in June 2012, one might wonder what exactly FRELIMO was commemorating. By minimizing the lingering effects of FRELIMO’s political and internal troubles, it appeared that current leaders and members of the party were focusing solely on the organization’s successful evolution from a former liberation front into Mozambique’s majority political party.

FRELIMO’s existence as a political organization in contemporary Mozambique is directly attributable to its time as a liberation front fighting the Portuguese. However, FRELIMO’s political longevity is not only due to its experiences as an anti-colonial liberation front. Although never as such by its leaders, FRELIMO was also a proto-state that based its governing strategies and practices on revolutionary pragmatism. For historians, the concept of revolutionary pragmatism provides a new lens for assessing how FRELIMO adapted to contingencies during the anti-colonial war and pursued a multitude of political strategies that augmented its legitimacy as a movement and successful proto-state. One of the central aspects of this dissertation, then, has been to reconceptualize theories of state, sovereignty, and constituency in regard to FRELIMO’s political evolution during Africa’s nationalist period. However, FRELIMO’s history offers one example of how an analysis of revolutionary pragmatism is relevant to liberation movements. Historians might seek alternative ways of interpreting the status of other African liberation/nationalist movements and the political interstices they exploited during anti-colonial struggles. For example, utilizing the lens of revolutionary
pragmatism may present important new ways of evaluating Guinea’s support of the PAIGC, the ANC’s activities in many African countries, as well as the Zambian government’s relationship with and support of various southern African liberation groups.

Critical to this understanding of the significance of the FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism in pursuit of legitimation is the concept of contingent sovereignty and the proto-state’s relationship with Tanzania. FRELIMO’s early experience interacting with thousands of refugees as revolutionary constituents not only occurred in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique, but in the ambiguous jurisdictional milieu of Tanzania. The Tanzanian government, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and the TANU regime, were essential elements in the political development of the proto-state. FRELIMO’s experiences with statecraft, governance, and strategies of legitimation, particularly in the revolutionary laboratory of Tanzania, gave the proto-state space to experiment with governance. The focus on Tanzania and FRELIMO’s activities in that country has also addressed a lacuna in many of the histories of the liberation front that tend to focus on its activities and interactions with Mozambicans still living in the liberated zones of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. FRELIMO’s military activities and humanitarian institutions throughout Tanzania, as well as Eduardo Mondlane’s friendship with Nyerere, were critically important factors in FRELIMO’s early political and ideological evolution. Despite the omnipresent threat of a Portuguese invasion of Tanzania, the Tanzanian government, which had just achieved independence as well, used the sovereignty of the nation in ways that allowed FRELIMO to operate as a proto-
state. The TANU regime gave the liberation front the physical and legal space to experiment with statecraft. The pan-Africanism of the era also provided the necessary moral framework for Nyerere and the Tanzanian government to advocate for the liberation of Mozambique: a nation on their southern border ruled by an intransigent and hostile colonial power. For FRELIMO and other liberation movements from southern Africa, Tanzania was also a laboratory for revolutionary experimentation with agricultural schemes based on self-reliance and social transformations that offered more options for women and young men to participate in the development of the nation.

In addition to the ways in which Tanzanian citizens and TANU officials influenced the early political development of FRELIMO, the contributions of ordinary Mozambicans to the success and survival of the proto-state are important to consider. FRELIMO’s leaders needed the assistance and support of the Mozambican refugees in order to pursue their revolutionary objectives and win the war. As such, this dissertation problematizes the legal and definitional status of the Mozambican refugees in Tanzania during the anti-colonial war. Although they were to be the future citizens of a liberated Mozambique, their liminal legal status in Tanzania makes it most accurate to describe them as revolutionary constituents – individuals who maintained different degrees of loyalty (or not) to FRELIMO. As survivors of their own migration to Tanzania, many Mozambican refugees tapped into existing familial and ethnic connections on both sides of the Ruvuma River for security. They also had a modicum of political consciousness and many refugees arrived in Tanzania with the desire to fight the Portuguese, assist FRELIMO in liberating the colony, till and harvest fields, and contribute their labor to
construct and maintain refugee settlements. Many refugees found new ways to cope with new challenges and eventually to flourish in Tanzania as part of a bio-social experience that occurred during migration. They constructed hospitals, schools, and assisted in the building and maintenance of the settlements that housed them.

Nevertheless, the ambiguous social and legal status of Mozambican refugees as revolutionary constituents meant that they were neither citizens of Tanzania nor bound to the nascent hegemony and revolutionary vision of FRELIMO. Although many Makonde from northern Mozambique joined FRELIMO as loyal soldiers and cadres, many other Mozambicans from different ethnicities, regions, and generations also fled to Tanzania, making FRELIMO’s quest for unity elusive. Moreover, not all Mozambican refugees wished to participate in the war effort or felt amicably toward FRELIMO, especially when the anti-colonial war escalated throughout the 1960s and FRELIMO’s cadres treated many refugees with suspicion and rough-handling – another sign of growing authoritarianism within the proto-state. This tension was, in part, a reflection of the impact of PIDE’s successful clandestine infiltration of FRELIMO and the Portuguese military’s psychological war, but it was also a symptom of lingering internal disputes and distrust within FRELIMO’s hierarchy that destabilized the organization. The myriad perceptions of FRELIMO’s leaders by Mozambicans in Tanzania, as well as the proto-state’s tenuous legitimacy in a host-country, were especially important factors that spread disillusionment among many young Mozambican refugees who were privy to the machinations (both real and imagined) of those in the movement’s hierarchy. Despite many of the internal troubles and external challenges that plagued FRELIMO from its
inception, FRELIMO generated a viable legitimacy from the overt support it received from many disenfranchised Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, as well as from people living in the northern liberated zones in the 1960s.

As a distinguishing characteristic of FRELIMO’s early existence, the construction of both humanitarian institutions and other practical aid projects for Mozambican refugees in Tanzania such as the Mozambique Institute, were hallmarks of the proto-state’s pragmatism. As the sole liberation front for Mozambique, FRELIMO articulated a revolutionary vision that sought to quash social, class, and gendered divisions among the people in order attract all Mozambicans to its cause. Although FRELIMO struggled to implement and get people to accept these ideological goals, the leaders of the proto-state were conscious of how their revolutionary strategies for dynamic social and political change also affected the hierarchy. In turn, FRELIMO’s early leaders possessed a desire to achieve legitimacy, but violence within FRELIMO adversely affected the organization and led to authoritarianism.

Given this distinctive facet of FRELIMO’s political existence in the 1960s, the organization also sought domestic legitimacy through the construction of humanitarian, institutional infrastructure that included the Tunduru Children’s Camp, the military training camp in Nachingwea, and the refugee education camp in Bagamoyo. However, FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute secondary school, a major focus of this dissertation, also became the flashpoint for internal tensions that dramatically shaped the political strategies and evolution of the proto-state. Although intergenerational tensions were a major factor in the closure of the secondary school, FRELIMO’s effort in creating a
school to provide an education to young Mozambican students was indicative of the genuine concern to improve the lives of its revolutionary constituents.

During the liberation front’s early years, its leaders also actively pursued and received military and financial support from many foreign nations and organizations as part of their pragmatic strategies of legitimation. This dissertation comparatively addressed how foreign assistance was procured from different secular and religious groups, such as the Ford Foundation and World Council of Churches, but how FRELIMO also received support from sympathetic governments that were, ironically, opposed to each other during the Cold War. FRELIMO’s initial pragmatism was, then, couched in an era of growing anti-colonialism and pan-Africanist discourse during the breakdown of imperialism, all factors that appealed to diverse foreign and domestic sources of support. This foreign recognition and support was critical for FRELIMO’s initial legitimation as a political movement.

Also germane to this analysis of FRELIMO’s politicization during the 1960s, is how the liberation front transitioned from a pragmatic proto-state into an authoritarian political organization well-before independence in 1975. The escalation in fighting during the anti-colonial war in the late 1960s was a major reason for FRELIMO’s shift toward authoritarianism, since decision-making in this volatile time necessitated expediency. The revolutionary pragmatism of the movement, exhibited earlier in the liberation front’s existence (1962-1968), was more deliberate and strategic in regard to concerns of FRELIMO’s legitimation. This was especially true in the ways the liberation front established a rapport with its revolutionary constituents and sympathetic
international organizations. In addition to the pressures of the war, burgeoning authoritarianism within FRELIMO also occurred as a result of the power struggles that emerged from longstanding ethnic, regional, personal, and ideological disputes within the liberation front. While other scholars have focused almost exclusively on these challenges, this dissertation raised the issue of how intergenerational tensions between students and the proto-state’s leadership were also catalytic factors in FRELIMO’s shift toward authoritarianism. In assessing how intergenerational conflicts affected FRELIMO, especially at its Mozambique Institute secondary school, this analysis offers a fresh perspective of the events that undermined the operations at the proto-state’s premier institution in Tanzania.

As William Reno has argued about “anti-colonial rebels” in general, FRELIMO operated within particular “fields of leverage.”\(^1\) In order to achieve its revolutionary goals of liberating Mozambique, FRELIMO needed both the assistance of revolutionary constituents and to create liberated zones to operate within Mozambique. The liberation front’s leaders put considerable effort into rallying local Mozambican support, a model the political party pursued after independence with the creation of “dynamizing groups” and local party cells throughout Mozambique. Under President Samora Machel, FRELIMO imposed a ‘top-down’ approach to overseeing these political entities starting in 1975, but this dissertation has demonstrated that FRELIMO already had established a relatively successful framework for these interactions with civilians during its experiences in Tanzania and in the liberated zones. Perhaps FRELIMO’s relative success working with revolutionary constituents in Tanzania and the liberated zones (who largely

\(^1\) Reno, *Warfare*, see Chapters 1 and 2 respectively.
sympathized with FRELIMO and the cause of liberation anyway) generated a degree of hubris among the proto-state’s leaders in regard to establishing future politics and practices. Although Machel’s embrace of Marxist-Leninist ideology meant a more authoritarian approach to governing Mozambique’s citizens after independence, more nuanced and reciprocal strategies of pragmatic governance typified FRELIMO’s earlier existence as a proto-state.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, then, there remained a constant juxtaposition and friction between FRELIMO’s strategies of legitimacy based on its revolutionary pragmatism and its transition toward a centralized authoritarianism that necessarily oversaw and managed the proto-state’s tenuous legitimacy. FRELIMO’s status as the sole liberation front for Mozambique enabled its leaders to wield considerable power over ordinary Mozambicans through the expanding power of its proto-state. To counter Portuguese subterfuge and the debilitating effects of its internal rivalries, FRELIMO’s leaders jockeyed for power to challenge and eliminate their rivals, utilized violence as a form of control over refugees and colonized people still living in Mozambique, and abandoned the symbiotic, pragmatic approach to proto-statecraft that solicited the support of ordinary Mozambicans. Instead, by 1968 and early 1969, FRELIMO’s factional infighting and intergenerational tensions revealed the deep fissures within the proto-state which, in turn, could only respond to these crises – in the midst of an escalating anti-colonial war with Portugal – with burgeoning authoritarianism, threats, and violence. It was the admixture of FRELIMO’s early revolutionary pragmatism and fledgling authoritarianism that defined the proto-state’s existence before independence.
From 1962-1968, FRELIMO’s leaders such as Eduardo and Janet Mondlane also exhibited bureaucratic acumen and a penchant for political pragmatism. Couched in a humanitarian and nationalistic discourse, FRELIMO needed to broadcast its successes in multiple forms of media, for example official organs, Tanzanian newspapers, and photographs with important world leaders in order to enhance its legitimacy. Convincing Mozambicans to risk their lives for independence required more than just revolutionary rhetoric. FRELIMO had to offer practical solutions to problematic quotidian realities, envisage and implement (however limited) a society radically different from people’s lives under the Portuguese colonial system. FRELIMO’s leaders argued that Mozambicans who joined their movement they were part of a larger, moral imperative that was sweeping the African continent.

For this reason, FRELIMO was simultaneously an insurgency and a revolutionary proto-state whose quest for legitimacy does not necessarily fit into the classic state-repression theories held, for example, by Max Weber and Charles Tilly. As a proto-state that operated with contingent sovereignty largely within the territorial boundaries of a foreign host nation, FRELIMO was a hegemonic entity that ruled in a distinctive way. As this dissertation argues, John Dewey’s and Jürgen Habermas’s theories about the political significance of Pragmatism and its relationship to morality, adaptability, and the articulation of experience are more appropriate as analytical frameworks to study early FRELIMO. Nevertheless, many of the refugees who fled Portuguese colonialism and repression were often cajoled into joining FRELIMO. As a proto-state, FRELIMO’s early leaders relied on an admixture of coercion and tangible rewards such as education,

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2 Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*, 66-68.
health care, and self-reliance for recruiting Mozambicans into its military wing. The liberation front tapped into refugee abhorrence of brutal Portuguese colonial tactics meant to extract resources and control the rural population. In theory, this alone should have enabled FRELIMO to channel Mozambican hatreds toward the Portuguese as the primary source for building loyalty to the proto-state. However, FRELIMO also offered a semblance of attractive alternatives to its loyal adherents in Tanzania such as schools, hospitals, and other forms of humanitarian assistance hitherto unavailable to most Mozambicans. Thus, the dissertation has also addressed the question of how the potential of revolutionary possibilities inherent within these humanitarian projects helped to ameliorate the more violent tactics employed by FRELIMO cadres to fill their ranks.

The influence of international organizations and governments along with the moral justifications for decolonization also shaped the ideological and political development of Africa’s diverse national liberation movements from the 1960s to the 1980s. Based on his analysis of the “Guinea model,” Patrick Chabal correctly concludes that FRELIMO was able to initiate “a successful campaign of political mobilisation before the beginning of armed action, allied with the ability to establish and protect liberated zones and conduct a systematic diplomatic offensive internationally.”

Thus, the period of Africa’s liberation from colonialism was politically dynamic and forged by certain geo-political forces and economic realities, most notably the Cold War. Therefore, decolonization in Africa, as a whole, necessitated the active engagement of Africans in both international and local contexts and often introduced radical ideological paradigms that were perceived as panaceas for Africa’s socio-economic woes. During

3 Chabal and et al., A History, 10.
the apex of Africa’s decolonization, evidence of the successful transition to independence through war or more peaceful colonial withdrawal, often overshadowed moments of quotidian banality, strife, and anything but a natural teleology toward inevitable independence.

In sum, FRELIMO’s revolutionary pragmatism, evident in its practices as a proto-state that acted with a contingent sovereignty, has shed new light on FRELIMO’s early years as a liberation front and its pursuit of legitimacy in a moral struggle. What has emerged from this dissertation is a better understanding of early nationalism for Mozambicans and a way for scholars to address the obstacles that other liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere faced when the decision to fight for independence was truly the only option. Historians of contemporary Africa might then consider how other African nationalist groups, operating within another nation’s sovereign space, also faced challenges in pursuit of political legitimacy. This analysis may also reshape our understanding of decolonization and contemporary “rebels” movements in Africa that garner support from friendly bordering states and other sovereign nations. It may also help to illuminate the current dilemmas surrounding child soldiery in Africa, and to contribute to the ongoing focus on how and why youth serves as a pivotal social stage for the symbolic, physical, and political development of new nations.

In celebrating the first fifty years of its existence on June 25, 2012, FRELIMO party members and supporters were, perhaps, commemorating something more than an anniversary. For fifty years, FRELIMO has survived as a political organization despite significant self-inflicted and externally imposed challenges. It is highly probable that
FRELIMO’s adaptability and survival can be traced to the successful strategies of revolutionary pragmatism that resulted in the liberation front’s initial legitimation. Either as supporters or detractors of FRELIMO, many Mozambicans have come to recognize that the longevity of the organization remains a testament to its early adaptability and its successful fight against Portuguese colonialism. FRELIMO’s survival and existing political stature as the majority party of Mozambique in 2013 has much to do, perhaps, with the pragmatic approaches of its leaders in establishing a revolutionary proto-state in Tanzania and the liberated zones that contributed to the organization’s initial legitimation during the early 1960s: a decade of anti-colonial struggle in Mozambique against lingering European imperialism.
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