Coercion, persuasion, and reflexivity in major counterinsurgency wars

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COERCION, PERSUASION, AND REFLEXIVITY
IN MAJOR COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS

By

Stephen Pampinella

A Dissertation
Submitted to the State University of New York at Albany
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy
Department of Political Science
2013
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the effectiveness of different counterinsurgency practices of states in 47 conflicts from 1945-2010. After discussing contemporary theories of counterinsurgency, it traces these theories to realist and liberal traditions of international relations to demonstrate how propose specific relationships with the civilian population as a means of ending social conflict. To evaluate these theories, I perform a Boolean analysis of counterinsurgency practices to determine which combinations of realist and liberal factors leads to counterinsurgent victory. Overall, I find that pure realist and mixed combinations are most likely to lead to victory, while pure liberal combinations fail to produce victory. I also evaluate the plausibility of a reflexive approach to counterinsurgency in a single case study of intrastate war between the United States and Iraqi insurgents in al-Anbar province.
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Chapter 1: Approaches to Counterinsurgency

Introduction

Defeating insurrection has always been the province of those wishing to preserve the status quo. Strong actors seeking to preserve their political power maintain their strength by denying all opponents an opportunity to violently contest their authority. If the foundation of the Weberian state is a legitimate monopoly on force, then incumbents must counter rebellious challenges to that monopoly and ensure the territorial and corporate integrity of the state. Actors practicing forms of governance outside the Weberian ideal still face the same problem, especially transnational empires. The 19th Century saw the United Kingdom, France, and other Western states repeatedly engage in colonial warfare in Africa and Asia to maintain favorable political and economic arrangements. Armed with superior technology and weapons of increasing firepower, the Great Powers successfully defeated many rebellions that challenged their supremacy and resisted the expansion of imperialism.¹

As new rebellions broke out after World War II and drove forward the process of decolonization, Western powers again returned to the problem of defeating insurrections. Yet the task had become more difficult given the new historical era and the development of Mao Zedong's theory of protracted warfare, in which guerrillas sought to win the political loyalty of civilian noncombatants and exhaust the political will of stronger

¹ The history of imperialism is replete with examples of failed rebellions and successful colonial conquest. For a grand history that places colonial conquest in the context of imperialism, see Hobsbawm (1989) and Wesseling (1997). For a focus on the British and French conquests, see Baumgart, et. al (1982). For a history of the 19th Century partition and conquest of Africa, see Wesseling and Pomerans (1996). For a history of the conquest of the American Indian, see Limerick (1986).
opponents (Mao 1964; Taber 1965). To combat these politicized forms of rebellion, or “insurgency”, Western forces developed a series of techniques known as “counterinsurgency” and employed these methods in Malaya, Kenya, Vietnam (twice), Algeria, and Cyprus, among others. Yet counterinsurgents achieved victory in far fewer rebellions compared to age of New Imperialism (if any at all), leading to intense soul searching about the effectiveness of different counterinsurgency techniques and even the efficacy of the Western theory of warfare.²

With the onset of the Global War on Terror in the early 21st Century, Western states have been once again confronted with the problem of counterinsurgency, particularly the United States. Insurgencies opposed to allied states have emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries in which the United States occupied following initial invasions in 2001 and 2003. In both cases, the United States has responded by transforming its understanding of warfare from a focus on defeating enemies on the battlefield through the conventional use of firepower the political objective of winning the “hearts and minds” of the indigenous population (Ucko 2009). As these wars near their conclusion, counterinsurgency has now become a mainstream paradigm within the United States military. Yet many scholars and practitioners echo earlier historical debates from the Vietnam era and question whether this “kinder, gentler” form of warfare is actually an effective means of defeating insurgencies (West 2012). Instead, they argue that counterinsurgency is not so different from other forms of warfare and that the

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² Van Creveld (1991, 2005) has been the most aggressive proponent of this thesis and uses the post-war defeat of major powers by insurgent rebellions as evidence for his claim. For the back-to-back defeat of France in Indochina and Algeria, see (Kelly 1965). For the American defeat in Vietnam, see Krepenevitch (1986).
application of brute force is the only way to repress rebellion (Luttwak 2007; Gentile 2009, 2013). These two approaches to counterinsurgency – 'hearts and minds' and 'out-terrorize the population' stand in opposition to each other in their different assumptions about how to relate to the people in conditions of asymmetric warfare (Arreguin-Toft 2012).

This dissertation seeks to evaluate these different arguments by empirically testing for the effectiveness of alternative combinations of counterinsurgency practices. In the following pages, I show how counterinsurgents have alternatively used coercion and persuasion to defeat rebellions since 1945 using practices grounded in = the realist and liberal traditions of international relations. The assumptions of these two traditions presuppose two different approaches toward counterinsurgency – one that emphasizes how all politics is a competition for survival and another that relies on human reason and bargaining to foster political cooperation. By evaluating different combinations of counterinsurgency practices and the results of counterinsurgency wars, I can demonstrate which assumptions about irregular conflict have historically been proven true or false.

In this introductory chapter, I first discuss the history of counterinsurgency theory and its roots in Western imperialism. I then briefly discuss each of the following chapters and the lay out of the dissertation.

**Alternative Approaches to Counterinsurgency**

*Persuasive Counterinsurgency as a Liberal Approach*

Our contemporary understanding of counterinsurgency is best articulated in the U.S. Army's *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, or *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Dept. of
the Army 2007). FM 3-24 was written in 2006 by a team of military and civilian scholars led by then Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus. Published in 2007, *FM 3-24* was the U.S. Army's first attempt to update its doctrine for low-intensity operations since *FM 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations* was published in 1980 (Dept. of the Army 1980). As the lead editor of the doctrine, Petraeus articulated a specific theory of persuasive counterinsurgency based on the historical experience of Western democracies involved in post-colonial counterinsurgency Nagl's comparison between British and American counterinsurgency provides the key foundation for Petraeus' theory of counterinsurgency. Nagl argues that the British succeeded because the Army could operate as a learning organization and adapt to the insurgency of the Malayan Communist Party. This interpretation of the Malaya conflict is further rooted in the work of Richard Stubbs (1989), who describes the British approach in Malaya as “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency that won over the population with the promise of democratic elections and the provision of economic resources. While Nagl's work involves social scientific comparison, other scholars clearly articulate the specific principles of British counterinsurgency. According to these scholars, British principles include the following: 1) recognize that insurgency is a political (not military) problem requiring that the grievances of the people driving insurgency must be met; 2) all counterinsurgency rests on sound intelligence gathered from the people; 3) military forces must closely cooperate with police forces, are governed by legal code, and operate “in aid to the civil power”; 4) counterinsurgency requires decentralization to empower local commanders to take the initiative in their area of operations; and 5) all counterinsurgency operations rely on
minimum force and must be conducted with restraint (Mockaitis 1993).

In addition to these British principles, *FM 3-24* is heavily influenced by the work of David Galula, a French Army captain who commanded a company in that country's counterinsurgency in Algeria from 1955-1956. Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964) is similar to Thompson's work, especially in its emphasis on the political nature of counterinsurgency, the need to maintain legitimacy, and the primary importance of winning the population's loyalty by providing protection from insurgent coercion. Petraeus has indicated that Galula's principles were the foundation for *FM 3-24* (Marlowe 2010). These principles have been incorporated directly into *FM 3-24*, which states that “[t]he key objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government” and that the key indicator of legitimacy is “[t]he ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).” (Dept. of the Army 2006, [1-21]).

On this basis, Petraeus emphasized has always emphasized non-military approaches to asymmetric war as opposed to a reliance on firepower applied on the physical terrain of the battlefield. Instead, counterinsurgents were to know 'the human terrain' and work to improve governance, economic development, and the rule of law with the objective of protecting the people and bolstering the legitimacy of the host-nation government (Petraeus 2005, 2013). To do so required that counterinsurgents gain a sociocultural understanding of civilian population that enabled the former to form relationships with the latter.  

Hence, contemporary counterinsurgency heavily emphasizes the need to learn

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3 The term 'sociocultural understanding' is drawn directly from the mission statement of a US Army
and know the culture of the population (Heuser 2007). By working with the people, counterinsurgents could gain intelligence for actual military operations targeting insurgents while creating space for institutional development and nation building (Ibid).

FM 3-24’s articulation of hearts and minds counterinsurgency is also supported by new conceptualizations of counterinsurgency that update the principles developed during the period of decolonization. David Kilcullen has sought to make counterinsurgency more applicable to the nature of today’s insurgent conflicts against self-organizing identity-based insurgencies rather than the top-down ideological insurgencies of the Cold War (Kilcullen 2006). He argues that today’s counterinsurgency must aim toward the restoration of political order and stable social structures that are consistent with the cultural worldview of the local population. To do so, counterinsurgents must not violence against civilians and limit the use of force within combat operations to undercut insurgent recruitment. This link between excessive force and insurgent mobilization is known as the Accidental Guerrilla syndrome. Counterinsurgents who employ more firepower in tactical actions tend to alienate civilians and motivate them to take up arms or support insurgents regardless of whether or not they share the same ideological grievances.  

program called Human Terrain System, which embeds social scientists in counterinsurgency units to perform sociological and anthropological field research to inform the commander about their operating environment. Thus, learning about the culture of the population is a core component of counterinsurgency operations conceptualized by Petraeus. See Department of the Army 2009.  

4 By “legitimacy,” liberal counterinsurgency texts refer to the support or the will of the people, generally accrued by protecting them from insecurity, assumed to be caused by the threat of insurgent coercion. While FM 3-24 and Kilcullen’s work generally suggests that coercion against the people will compromise counterinsurgent legitimacy (like when Kilcullen says that “counterinsurgents should do no harm” (2010, 4-6), there are passages in these texts that imply counterinsurgents gain legitimacy by manipulating the population's self-interest, which may include some degree of threatening coercion. In general, there is a significant degree of fuzziness regarding how the relationship between liberal counterinsurgent actions and the will of the people. In the rest of the text, I make the point that counterinsurgents may not always seek to respect the will and autonomy of the people (and thus seek
Kilcullen's work complements Petraeus' theory in FM 3-24 as well as its historical roots in the need to win the hearts and minds of the people. For military theorists, “population-centric counterinsurgency” marks a departure from traditional interpretations of Carl von Clausewitz (1976), which understands battlefield adversaries as the “center of gravity” of military operations to be annihilated through the technical delivery of firepower. Instead, the people are the center of gravity to be won over through non-military persuasion. Counterinsurgents must demonstrate to the people that cooperation is within their self-interest, which is considered by Kilcullen to be the driver of all human decision-making (Kilcullen 2010, 4, 37). Thus, while counterinsurgency is still a form of warfare (Ibid., 4) that involves the use of violence to defeat enemies, it does so only working with the people in pursuit of a common interest in social stability and the defeat of the insurgency. In this dissertation, I will argue that this approach is consistent with the liberal tradition of international relations. In its aim to promote cooperation and produce order amid asymmetric conflict, persuasive counterinsurgency relies on the enlightened self-interest of all involved parties. Because civilians and insurgents aim to use reason in their social interactions with others, including counterinsurgents, counterinsurgency practices take the form of bargaining or negotiations. By providing security from insurgents and meeting local needs, I argue that counterinsurgents aim to find shared preferences and provide side payments (Olson 1968) to insurgents and the people to rationalize the acceptance of social rules that restore order and create legitimate state institutions.

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genuine legitimacy) but instead focus on manipulating or shaping their understanding of legitimacy to achieve counterinsurgent self-interests. This is a point I more fully develop in the conclusion.
Coercive Counterinsurgency as a Realist Approach

Although the principles of counterinsurgency which guided the British experience as well as the lessons learned from Thompson and Galula accept limited violence and minimum force as crucial requirements, other scholars are less certain that such discrimination is even possible. Instead, they argue that counterinsurgency is no different from other forms of warfare, and that successful attempts to fight insurgencies will rely on brute force and not persuasion. Key amongst these critics is Edward Luttwak (2007), who argues that such a morally acceptable form of counterinsurgency is impossible. Instead, he argues that the only successful form of counterinsurgency involves the use of brute force against civilians to “out-terrorize” them into supporting counterinsurgents and turning against insurgents. Although he acknowledges that the U.S military and its contemporaries among Western democracies would reject such methods as abhorrent, he claims that the use of brute force is the “easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere” (Luttwak 2007, 36).

An additional critique is mounted by Gian Gentile, who argues that population-centric counterinsurgency has been adopted without consideration of its strategic objective, namely state- and nation-building (2013). Gentile (2010) argues that *FM 3-24* functions as a doctrinal straightjacket that limits commanders from considering operational and tactical practices other than those enshrined dogma by its proponents. Like Luttwak, Gentile claims that counterinsurgency can be victorious by means other than persuasion, and points to the successful use of brute force by the Sri Lanka in its defeat of the Tamil Tigers (Gentile 2009, 11). Gentile also strongly critiques the
historiography of counterinsurgency used to justify the need for winning hearts and minds as selective at best. He argues that coercion was essential for the U.S. Army's success in the later years of the war: “What pacified...the rural South Vietnamese countryside between 1969 and 1972...was not better COIN programs and methods, but rather the death and destruction of military operations using firepower and the resultant either willing forced depopulation of the countryside” (Gentile 2010, 122).

Gentile is not alone in challenging the historiography of British counterinsurgency and the assumption that British successes came without using coercion against the civilian population. According to Hack (2009, 2012), the success of the British Army in Malaya came prior to the use of a hearts and minds approach instituted by Gerald Templer in 1952. Instead, he argues that the Malayan insurgency was broken in 1950 under the leadership of Harold Briggs by the forced relocation of the Chinese squatter population and the separation of insurgents from any support which could be provided by the people. Other historians have argued that British practices in other conflicts were explicitly brutal. Bennett (2007a, 2007b) and Anderson (2012) show how exemplary force in form of torture and extrajudicial executions were common actions among British counterinsurgents in Kenya, in which the Mau Mau insurgency was ultimately defeated. Like the Malayan Emergency, such measures were used alongside forced population resettlement. Tuck (2007) Dixon (2009) illustrate the difficulty of applying the lessons of British counterinsurgency to the Northern Ireland case and how a “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency could be executed using persuasive and coercive interpretations.
Overall, these revisionist histories suggest that the principle of minimum force was more of an ideal rather than the reality of British counterinsurgency. French's (2012) historical overview broadly claims that minimum force was an ideal rather than the reality of British counterinsurgency. These pieces of evidence suggest that the precursors to population-centric counterinsurgency saw civilians as targets of coercion as well as persuasion. I will argue that this tradition of counterinsurgency is grounded in realist international relations theory. By emphasizing the use of brute force to create order, a coercive approach toward counterinsurgency relies on controlling the population through fear and the latent threat of force to compel cooperation with counterinsurgents. Such a method of counter-rebellion makes no claim to moral or legal appropriate but understands brutality as one tool among others to create order.

A Reflexive Critique of Counterinsurgency, However Aspirational

Coercive theorists grounded in realism do not offer the only critique of persuasive counterinsurgency. If a persuasive approach truly does seek to protect the people, then it should be consistent with the cosmopolitan norms of human security (United Nations 1994) and the responsibility to protect (Evans and Sahnoun 2001). These principles emerged not as vestiges of the era of decolonization but as part of the evolving security response by the United Nations and the international community to the outbreak of civil wars and ethnic conflicts which began after the end of the Cold War. Yet when the discourse of persuasive counterinsurgency is compared to that of human security, the former is found to be lacking in its commitment to protect the people and ensure that their best interests are served by counterinsurgency. Because FM 3-24 embeds population-
centric counterinsurgency within the Western theory of warfare, the same
counterinsurgents who must engage the population in cooperation are socialized into a
warrior ethos whose purpose is to defeat the enemies of the United States via high-impact
war fighting (Gilmore 2011). Thus, population-centric counterinsurgency functions as
merely a means to the end of defeating the enemies of the United States within the
context of the Global War on Terror and not the creation of a stable host-nation society.

These shortcomings of persuasive counterinsurgency suggest that persuasive
theorists have yet to fully appreciate the paradigm shift in conflict described by Smith
(2006), who argues that the post-1945 world is defined by a new paradigm of war
amongst the people that calls the very utility of force into question. Based on his own
military experience in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, Smith builds
on the relationship between legitimacy and restraint by arguing that the use of force
military force must be synchronized with the will of the people. If such ends were
adopted during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would require abandoning objectives
focused on the defeat of al Qaeda. Instead, the ends of such an approach to
counterinsurgency would be developing a intersubjective understanding of conflict shared
by counterinsurgents and civilians that constitutes them with the same perspective. Rather
than use cultural knowledge to achieve one's own instrumental objectives, culture could
inform a critical dialogue with the people about how best to provide human security and
develop impartial rules that govern the use of violence to maintain social order (Kaldor
2010). Such an approach would require that counterinsurgents engage in reflexive self-
restraint that prioritizes communicative action over instrumental action and abstaining
from the use of counterinsurgency as a means of overthrowing the will of one's enemies.

To be clear, an approach toward counterinsurgency that emphasizes human security over the defeat of one's enemies is more of an aspiration than a reality. While human security principles have been adopted by the United Nations as an objective of peace operations, proponents of counterinsurgency argue the complex humanitarian interventions of the 1990s resemble the counterinsurgency wars of the postcolonial era (Mockaitis 1999, 2007). If true, then the contradictions of liberal counterinsurgency are also shared by theories of liberal peacekeeping. Not even United Nations peacekeeping operations can be said to achieve human security objectives and instead can be understood as merely a way of managing countries that experience civil strife to protect the global order favorable to liberal capitalist states (Pugh 2004). From this perspective, the responsibility to protect may simply be the West's attempt to impose new norms of intervention as a matter of realpolitik that protect their own interests (Chandler 2010). Given the aspirational is nature of this approach, I do not evaluate it as rigorously as coercive and persuasive theories of counterinsurgency given its theoretical nature.

Theories of Counterinsurgent Practices and Victory

The key objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the success of counterinsurgency theories based on IR realism and liberalism. Arreguin-Toft accurately notes that both military theorists and academic scholars have tended to talk past each other in their work on counterinsurgency (Arreguin-Toft 2012, 636). By conducting a cross-national study of counterinsurgency practices and their relationship to war outcomes, I hope to bridge this gap and contribute to existing scholarly research that has
examined the relationship between coercive and persuasive forms of counterinsurgency. I review the major works in this field below and highlight how this dissertation will contribute to the existing literature.

The broadest recent study examining counterinsurgency practices and outcomes has emerged from the RAND Corporation, which has a long history of studying counterinsurgency going back to the Vietnam War. Paul, Clarke and Grill (2010) use factor analysis to show that counterinsurgency practices associated with FM 3-24 are perfectly correlated with counterinsurgency success over all cases over the past 30 years. However, this study is flawed due to the types of factors examined for their presence and absence within the case. By including factors such as “Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claimed to control”, ”COIN forces received substantial intelligence from population in area of conflict,” “Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced,” and “Insurgents' ability to replenish resources significantly diminished,” the RAND data confuses the causal relationship between counterinsurgency practices and war outcomes by including second-order outcomes of counterinsurgency as if they were practices themselves. This prevents us from definitively stating that the coercive or persuasive actions involved in different counterinsurgency wars led to victory or defeat. Instead, evidence of actual practices must be observed in such a way that is independent from the actual outcome of a counterinsurgency war. Social scientists have provided some insights which may resolve disputes over the effectiveness of alternative forms of counterinsurgency. The work of Stathis Kalyvas (2006) is especially important in this debate. Kalyvas argues that
combatants in civil wars will resort to indiscriminate violence against civilians if they lack information about the identities of insurgents. Such information can only be gathered from establishing relationships with civilians who denounce insurgents living among them. However, gaining the support of civilians requires that combatants control the civilian population through monitoring, surveillance, and the potential threat of coercion. Overall, Kalyvas suggests that some degree of coercion against civilians is necessary, the indiscriminate application of force will alienate noncombatants and perpetuate the absence of social control.

However, conflict-specific studies of indiscriminate violence yield alternative outcomes. Lyall's study (2009) of artillery strikes by the Russian military against Chechen villages shows that insurgent attacks near targeted villages decline relative to untargeted villages. These results suggest that the use of heavy firepower against civilians may be a successful counterinsurgency practice. Yet Kalyvas and Hocher's examination (2011) of aerial bombing by the US military in South Vietnam indicates that loyalty to the South Vietnamese government declined after US bombardment. This outcome – and the broader failure of the US Army's reliance on firepower highlighted by today's proponents of counterinsurgency (Nagl 2002)– validates Kalyvas's argument about the futility of indiscriminate violence against civilians, as least when delivered by heavy firepower.

Overall, these results indicate that further research is needed to identify patterns in the use of coercion or restraint by counterinsurgents in their use of force and their ability to defeat insurgencies. In this dissertation, I propose to meet this need by conducting a cross-national comparison of combinations of counterinsurgency practices in 47
asymmetrical conflicts with war outcomes. I identify six counterinsurgency variables that alternatively reflect realist or liberal assumptions about social behavior and the use of military and non-military power.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

Chapter 2 discusses IR theory and demonstrates how the theoretical assumptions of classic realism and liberalism as well as their neorealist and neoliberal counterparts are the foundation of persuasive and coercive forms of counterinsurgency. Modern American international relations has been defined by the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism, in which the classic IR theories have been adapted upon economic assumptions of human behavior to produce alternative theories of cooperation and cooperation in a context of anarchy and the absence of legitimate hierarchical authority. Although IR theorists have traditionally applied these theoretical maxims to interstate conflict at the international level, I will argue that many of these same assumptions can be applied in the domestic context of insurgency and counterinsurgency as a subset of intrastate war. In addition, I also explore how reflexive approach to counterinsurgency informed by critical theory and committed to human security can provide critical hypotheses about the effectiveness of coercive and persuasive approaches to social order.

Chapter 3 describes how I will evaluate the effectiveness of alternative counterinsurgency practices using qualitative comparative analysis and the method of Boolean analysis. A Boolean approach allows for greater causal complexity by identifying the unique combinations of causal factors that appear in each case. Such an approach is appropriate for the comparison of counterinsurgency practices because many
counterinsurgency theorists argue that the causal structure of a society experienced asymmetric conflict is so complex that it cannot be articulated by any one observer. If true, academic comparisons of different counterinsurgency practices to determine which theories are more or less accurate must account for such complexity.

Chapter 4 identifies which counterinsurgency practices and their combinations result in counterinsurgent victory by employing Boolean analysis and an inductive approach to comparing cases of counterinsurgency wars. In this chapter, I describe how the data is collected, how I measure for the presence and absence of logical combinations of six counterinsurgency practices, then analyzes the data to determine which practices are successful. Although nearly all combinations include both realist and liberal practices, I can infer how the relationships between different combinations produce more or less realist or liberal instances of counterinsurgency and different outcomes.

While Chapter 4 can compare outcomes against combinations of practices, it does not examine how practices shift over time within a single case. It also does not evaluate the plausibility of a reflexive approach to counterinsurgency in Chapter 2. To account for both of these aspects of counterinsurgency, I perform a brief case of US counterinsurgency in Iraq. This case takes the most combination of counterinsurgency practices and evaluates how those changes change during the conflict. This results in a fine-grained analysis in which I can assess the plausibility of an ideal reflexive counterinsurgency approach against the actual practices and the outcome produced by those practices. I can provide a fine-grained evaluation of hypothetical causal processes based on social constructivism that evaluates the effects of reflexive self-restraint in US
counterinsurgency.

Finally, Chapter 6 reflects on the empirical results of Chapters 4 and 5 and its implications for persuasive and coercive forms of counterinsurgency. While the results complicate both theories of counterinsurgency, the latter fare poorly and suggest that liberal counterinsurgency is fatally flawed. I then explore why the unique nature of asymmetric conflict makes liberal counterinsurgency so difficult, if not impossible. I then conclude by discussing avenues for future research.
Chapter 2: Hypotheses about Counterinsurgency

Introduction

Coercive and persuasive theories of counterinsurgency rely on different assumptions about human nature, social interaction, and the creation of social order. These assumptions are grounded in alternative traditions of realist and liberal political philosophy – how we conceptualize society and the effects of structures, individuals, and ideas on stability and disorder. In this chapter, I show how different political philosophies provide the foundation of modern-day international relations theory, particularly contemporary debates among neorealists, neoliberals, and social constructivists. Based upon these IR theories, I articulate several hypotheses about the strategic use of coercion and persuasion in counterinsurgency to evaluate the validity of predictions made by different political philosophies.

Modern international relations theory is defined by the First Great Debate between realism and liberalism. These two approaches toward world politics rest on opposing assumptions about human nature, the impact of anarchy on the likelihood of conflict, and the durability of institutions as well as their effect on the behavior of individual actors. They also prescribe different styles of political action, with a realpolitik on the one hand that views politics in terms of power and an idealpolitik on the other that aims to eradicate conflict and transcend power relationships. IR theorists in the late 20th
Century have sought to reinterpret both theories by using different levels of analysis, with neorealists emphasizing the structure of power relationships and neoliberals stressing the rational action of individual states. Overall, the evolution of realism and liberalism into neorealism and neoliberalism has produced a family of theories about war and peace that both conflict and overlap.

However, IR theorists have yet to apply realism and liberalism (and their neo variants) to the problem of asymmetric warfare within states. At first glance, prominent IR theorists might argue that their ideas are less applicable to such conflicts because of the different conditions which define domestic and international politics (Waltz 1959). While the former is defined by a hierarchical state authority that governs citizen subjects, the latter is defined by anarchy and understands states as the only important political actors. Yet both mainstream and critical IR theorists have argued that a strict demarcation between domestic and international politics is misguided. Milner (1994) argues that sovereignty and anarchy are not dichotomous concepts but instead lie on a continuum. Since many states that experiencing weakness or outright failure resemble the international system instead of the Weberian ideal, it is clear that anarchy can be present in domestic politics. Walker (1992) and Cynthia Weber (1994) expand this critique by arguing that sovereignty and anarchy are social constructs that emerge over time and can be interpreted by social actors differently based on their shared knowledge and

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5 Much ink was spilled in the 1990s and 2000s on the concept of state failure. Rotberg's (2004) edited volume is the most definitive text. See also Cliffe (1999), Milliken and Krause (2002) on conceptualizing state failure, Herbst (2004) that state failure is a complex process that cannot be solved, and states should be allowed to collapse, Fukuyama (2004) argues that the process of state building (restoring institutional structures in failed states) cannot be accomplished based on the expertise and experience of actors from outside the afflicted society.
experiences. If true, then theories of politics at one level of analysis may also be applicable to political behavior at lower levels of analysis. This is precisely the argument made by Kasfir (2004), who argues that the condition of state failure is defined by domestic anarchy. While anarchy does not have the same preexisting status in domestic politics as it does in international politics, domestic forms of anarchy still create the conditions of a security dilemma (Jervis 1978) that forces individuals to align with armed groups and build opposing military capacities (Kasfir 2004, 60-61; see also Posen 1993). On this basis, security dilemmas in domestic politics will cause zero-sum games of interaction in which continued conflict is preferable to peace and the emergence of divisive subnational group identities (Jervis and Snyder 1999). At the same time, domestic security dilemmas do not exist in closed systems. Instead, different groups in failed states have interactions with external actors, including states at the international level. A strict demarcation between levels of analysis would miss how conflict at the domestic level can be conceptualized with IR concepts and can be integrated with higher levels of analysis. In this chapter, I examine the specific assumptions of alternative social theories to show how they serve as the foundation for coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency. I also explore how constructivist approaches to social theory make counterintuitive predictions about the use of violence and restraint in causing different counterinsurgency outcomes. All together, these hypotheses will demonstrate the hypothesized logic of 'pure' of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency, the logic of mixed strategies that include both coercion and persuasion, and the strategic pitfalls and contradictions inherent in the execution of these strategies. In addition, I will also explore
the logic of reflexive counterinsurgency by developing a critique of liberalism and its inability to cope with the problem of asymmetric warfare.

I begin by tracing classical political theory's multiple interpretations of realism and liberalism and how these theories approach the problem of asymmetric conflict. I then chart their evolution into neorealism, neoliberalism, social constructivism. Then, I conclude by tracing the assumptions of coercive, persuasive, and reflexive approaches to counterinsurgency to specific hypotheses drawn from international relations and political philosophy. In doing so, I can demonstrate how different assumptions about society and politics have informed alternative theories of counterinsurgency discussed in the first chapter.

**Political Theory and IR's First Debate**

International relations revolves around competing assumptions about society articulated by classical political theorists. In the classic first debate, realists define international relations in terms of endemic conflict while idealists see a long progression towards world peace and global harmony. Although realism's ancestry can be traced back to Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, both theories are based on canonical texts written during the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. These serve as the basis for more scientific theories of IR articulated by 20th Century theorists under the guise of neorealism and neoliberalism.

**Classical Realism as a Foundation for Coercive Counterinsurgency**

Realism should be understood as a school of varying approaches towards politics. Doyle (1997) and Donnelly (2000) identify the main classical realist theorists as
Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. Each has a pessimistic understanding of politics but emphasize different structural factors or human characteristics that cause persistent strife and conflict. Although their assumptions suggest that coercive counterinsurgency is the only way to put down rebellion and create peace, the role of violence in maintaining order differs among their accounts.

Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1972) is the touchstone classical text for realist thought. His account of the decline of the Athenian Empire emphasizes both the structure of international relations and the conflictual essence of human nature. Because no authority exists above nation-states, Thucydides suggests that states must engage in power politics to ensure their own survival. Anarchy embeds states in a social environment of profound insecurity in which they must accumulate power to deter attacks by others.

One can read Thucydides and arrive at the conclusion that power is the true currency of politics. The Melian Dialogue, in which representatives of Athens instruct the inhabitants of Melos to surrender simply because they are no match for the former’s military capabilities, reflects this position. The Athenian argument indicates an approach to politics that privileges coercive power over appeals to morality and right. Actors that have a favorable distribution of power will compel others to bend to their will or suffer the consequences. Hence, the Athenians say to the Melians: “For you know as well as we

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Doyle (1997) argues that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a realist based on his assumption that the state is a unitary actor and that international anarchy can never be solved with international organization. However, he also argues that human beings can achieve real political equality that guarantees their rights, freedom, and security by entering into a social contract and forging a general social will represented by the state. Since I begin from the assumption that domestic and international spheres are not separate spheres of politics, and because I am more concerned with peace and conflict in the domestic sphere, I consider Rousseau a liberal and discuss his work later in this chapter.
do that right, as the world goes, is in question only between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides 1951, 331). In other words, conflicts defined by an imbalance of power (much like counterinsurgency) will leave the weaker side at the mercy of the power of the stronger and have no opportunity for resistance, compromise, or bargaining. Any attempt to do so will result in repression via brute force and swift defeat.7

However, many scholars would see this interpretation of Thucydides as a crude understanding of how power can be used freely without regard to moral or ethical constraints, a position. Donnelly (2000) describes as radical realism. , Reeve's (1999) analysis makes for a more nuanced interpretation. He argues that the most clear expression of his views on human nature can be found in his description of the civil war in Corcyra (Thucydides, Book I). While Thucydides does not assume that all human beings are always bent on the destruction of others, he argues that condition of civil war “assimilates most people's passions to their conditions, which are, since there is a war, violent conditions” (Reeve 1999, 440). Thus, our ability to retain discipline and practice sound judgment is confounded by our social conditions, and “[t]he result is that judgment or good sense is unbalanced by strong and undisciplined passion” (Ibid). This means that human nature does not automatically cause individuals to be prone to conflict, but that social context strongly influences how people think about the use of violence against others.

While power asymmetry does leave the weak subject to the whims of the strong,

7 For an example of how this reading of the Peloponnesian War approaches the effectiveness of violence, see Ginsburg 2013 and his forthcoming book.
The Peloponnesian War still maintains that prudent self-restraint is a prized trait of political actors. The speeches of Pericles during the initial decision to go to war as well as during the funeral oration clearly indicate a need for self-restraint. In both instances, Pericles tells the Athenians to avoid taking on new conflicts and making new adversaries, as doing so would fracture the Athenian coalition and drive allied or neutral states into the arms of their Spartan opponents. Certainly, the fall of Athens can be attributed to her hubris and overextension of her power. In this way, a more careful reading of Thucydides indicates that power is a finite quality and its overuse in pursuit of one's own objectives may result in its eventual destruction. On this basis, Doyle (1997) refers to Thucydides interpretation of politics as 'complex realism' to highlight the relationship between the use of power and prudent judgment.

Thucydides work is not the only touchstone for realism. Niccolo Machiavelli's understanding of politics is also considered a key source of realist philosophy. According to Doyle (Ibid.), Machiavelli articulates a “fundamentalist realism” which accepts that all human beings are inherently evil. Note that this is a more sociobiological understanding of the human condition in contrast to the Thucydides, who allows for human nature to conditional upon context and social relationships. For Machiavelli, human beings are inherently selfish and only perform morally good deeds when compelled to by the circumstances, and not because of ethical or religious convictions (Machiavelli 2003, Chapters 17, 23). Based on this assumption, Machiavelli argues that achieving political compliance is best achieved through the use of threatened coercion rather than persuasion. Hence, he argues that it is better to be feared rather than loved. Using
Hannibal as an example, he argues that his cruelties ensured compliance among his soldiers and strengthened the reputation gained through his other virtues, such as valor (Ibid., Chapter 15).

Donnelly also notes Machiavelli’s “love for the dramatic act of political violence” (2000, 25) by highlighting how Cesare Borgia killed his lieutenant Remiro de Orco, who had previously pacified the lawless region of Romagna yet was hated for his use of force. De Orco's body was then split in two and left at the piazza at Cesena along with a block of wood and a bloody knife: “the brutality of this spectacle kept the people of Romagna appeased and stupefied.” (Machiavelli 2003, Chapter 7). Donnelly argues that Machiavelli’s “praise of such exemplary violence” shows how violence is a useful tool to maintain one's power because it demonstrates the price of disobedience to all observers. “For Machiavelli, the evil and egoistic passions at the core of human nature often can be repressed only by force, and at times only by ferocious cruelty” (Donnelly 2000, 25).

Yet Machiavelli does not endorse the position that power should be freely without any concern for its second-order effects. He further argues that the Prince should be feared but not hated, as hatred will compel others to seek revenge and one's eventual downfall. In particular, the Prince should avoid taking the property of his subjects as this will produce feelings of vengeance: “men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.” (Machiavelli 2003, Chapter 15). Like Thucydides, Machiavelli sees some need for self-restraint on the part of those wielding power. Even as a fundamental realist, Machiavelli breaks with radical realist interpretations that suggest power must be wielded without any consideration other than the power of others.
The final major classical realist of IR theory is Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* has served as the point of departure for most 20th Century accounts of the effects of anarchy on international relations. Hobbes offers the most direct theory of realism surveyed here by arguing that man's natural social circumstances are defined by a state of war characterized by anarchy. Amidst such conditions, Hobbes argues that all human beings are driven by “competition, diffidence, and glory”, which ultimately makes human life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1994, Chapter 13) In this way, Hobbes combines both a strictly pessimistic understanding of human nature with the structural condition of anarchy to produce the most straightforward interpretation of realism.

Hobbes further argues that asymmetries of power will not provide any comfort to those with greater capabilities. He claims that all human beings are more or less equal: “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others” (Hobbes 1994, Chapter 13). Hence, a favorable balance of power alone will not guarantee security, and even weak actors will defeat strong opponents if such an opportunity arises. The only way to provide security in such a situation is for each person to relinquish their capacity for violence unto the state, or the Leviathan. By causing every subject to fear the sovereign's hierarchical political authority, its use of coercion will create social order. The sovereign thus has absolute authority to maintain society through the use of brute force. Only the universal threat of coercion can check the destructive core aspect of human nature and enable an escape from the state of war that defines anarchic social relationships.
Overall, realist political philosophy provides the theoretical foundations of coercive counterinsurgency. If cooperation is impossible and insurgency can only be defeated by 'out-terrorizing' the population (Luttwak 2007), then coercive counterinsurgency shares the same pessimistic understanding of social behavior as classical realists. However, classical realists would not agree about the degree to which coercive terror should be used by counterinsurgents to enforce civilian compliance. While a more radical realist like Hobbes would suggest counterinsurgents have no limit to their use of force, more nuanced realists like Thucydides and Machiavelli would be more cautious. Thucydides discussion of human nature in the Corcyra civil war and Machiavelli's instructions to avoid the people's hatred suggest that counterinsurgents can go too far in their use of coercion. While coercion against the people may be necessary, complex realism implies that it must be limited and not completely alienate the people.

**Classical Liberalism as a Foundation for Persuasive Counterinsurgency**

Unlike realism, classical liberalism's Enlightenment origins suggest that order can come from human reason rather than brute force. Persuasive counterinsurgency's understanding of “winning hearts and minds” is predicated on liberal foundations. John Locke is the first significant liberal philosopher to suggest that peace is the result of human reason. His work is often juxtaposed to Hobbesian realism because of his alternative interpretation of the concept of the state of nature. While Hobbes assumes that the anarchic state of nature is inherently a state of war due to humanity's violent impulses, Locke instead assumes that human beings are born free and endowed with natural rights to “life, liberty, and estate (property)” (Locke 1980, Chapter 7) and that all
persons are guided by their own reason to obey natural law. When individual property is threatened by other individuals who abandon reason by violating natural rights and law, individuals can voluntarily leave the state of nature and enter political society by consenting to a government that that enforces laws to protect property. Thus, the creation of government and formation of the social contract is merely an extension of the enlightened self-interest of which each person is naturally endowed; peace and social order are the collective result of a rational agreement that includes all property-owning citizens.

Locke's use of the concepts of freedom, individual reason, and the state of nature serve as the basis for a commercially-focused interpretation of liberalism in which peace results of each individual's reasonable actions. Adam Smith clearly articulates this position in his *Wealth of Nations*. Smith argues that mercantilist theories of political economy deny human freedom and thereby increase political strife and competition. By allowing individuals to trade freely as nature intended in an open market will allow them to live in peaceful cooperation. He repeatedly refers to the 'natural' propensity of individuals to “truck, barter, and exchange” goods (Smith 1982, Book I, Chapter 2). For Smith, society is a product of these interactions and takes the form of a free market which efficiently allocates resources based on the self-interest of each individual. 'The invisible hand' of the market is simply a natural outgrowth of each individual's use of reason. If individuals are permitted to freely interact on the basis of their natural freedom, peace will be the result. Thus, Smith's “commercial liberalism” (Doyle 1997) follows in Locke's footsteps by making considerations about economics the primary concern of individuals.
rather than concerns about security.

As the primary theorist of commercial liberalism, Locke paves the way for further refinements of his social theory made by Jeremy Bentham, who converts liberalism into a theory of utilitarianism. For Bentham, all human action is directed toward the maximum fulfillment of utility, or “that principle which approves or disapproves of every action...according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question” (Bentham 1789, Chapter 1), or “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham 1776, Preface). In the context of the liberal tradition, the pursuit of utility is analogous to Locke's argument about the pursuit of “life, liberty, and property” and Smith's claims regarding human beings natural propensity to trade. And like his contemporaries, Bentham's theory of the state is grounded in the concept of the will of the people. Government should serve to provide the greatest happiness for the majority of the population. Thus, Bentham's utilitarian liberalism provides the fullest articulation of a liberal theory of human behavior that serves as an alternative to realism. While realism assumes that individuals are always driven by insecurity to maximize power, liberalism assumes that individuals are always driven by reason to maximize utility.

Bentham refines and completes the reason-based theory of social order which originates in Locke and is later adopted by Smith. However, by making government subordinate to the consent of free individuals who exist prior to political society, Locke also allows for individuals to possess a right of rebellion. In the final chapter of the Second Treatise entitled “On the Dissolution of Government”, Locke argues that an
individual can withdraw their consent from the social contract it refrains from protecting the rights of the people (namely the right to property) and becomes instead a threat. In such circumstances, the individual has no recourse but to overthrow the government and form a new one. While this doctrine establishes the principle of periodic democratic elections, it also opens the door to armed rebellion against the state (a pragmatic choice for Locke, who lived in Dutch exile as an opponent of Stuart absolutism in England). Locke argues that the people themselves are the judge of when such circumstances warrant armed rebellion. But this invites new questions – what if the people are not united in their support of rebellion, and how can social order be maintained if the people always have a right to rebellion?

In other words, by allowing for the right of rebellion, Locke actually opens the door to social anarchy and civil war – the same conditions in which Hobbes developed his theory. Thus, if followed to its logical conclusion, Locke's individualist foundation creates problems of insecurity originally identified by Hobbes. For counterinsurgents, Locke's theory implies that counterinsurgent goals must overlap with those of the people or risk ongoing rebellion. However, individual liberalism doesn't allow explain what social factors may cause individual objectives to overlap or diverge.

While these theorists emphasize that order is a product of individual reason, other liberal theorists argue that peace and social order is a result of collective reason rather than merely individuals. Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides just such a theory and shares with Locke the distinction of being one of the two main theorists to originate the concept of a social contract. However, Rousseau articulates three steps in traversing from the state
of nature to a social contract. While man is free to follow reason in Rousseau's state of nature, he argues that economic inequalities produced by property ownership will promote political inequality. The result is a “corrupt state” that balances power with and against other states, thereby constituting international laws or agreements among sovereign actors (Doyle 1997, 143-145). However, Rousseau proposes that states can transform themselves through democratic revolution, with each individual affirming their commitment to democratic rule with their willful participation in the legislative process. Rousseau thus offers an alternative to Lockean individualism. Instead of proposing that political society is reducible only to individuals, Rousseau reverses this relationship and argues that an individual can only achieve individual freedom by fully accepting equality under a democratic state that transcends the power of any one actor. Because every individual has had an opportunity to contribute to the rational formulation of the laws in public debate, political society is governed by “the general will” of the people instead of merely the accumulation of private preferences (Rousseau 2003).

In this way, Rousseau is advocating not just a community of self-interested calculating individuals, but a moral community grounded a shared worldview and commitment toward equality (Froese 2001). The deliberative nature of his community-centric theory of liberal order dovetails with the work of Immanuel Kant, whose liberalism is also grounded in a communal and moral theory of social order rather than a utilitarian approach. Kant builds on Rousseau's collectivist social contract by arguing that all human action should be guided by the categorical imperative, or the principle that all human agents possessing rational will ought to choose the ends of one's action based on
what should be rationally universal law that would apply to all human actors (Kant 2001). Thus, Kantian reason is about the discovery of communal morality, not merely the pursuit of individual self-interest, and deliberation that produces law must reflect the collective reason of all members of society.

Kant's faith in the reason of the categorical imperative underlies his prescriptions for international cooperation stated in his *On Perpetual Peace*. Its definitive articles refer to the formation of a federative state among that has coercive powers and enacts a pacific union among liberal republican democracies governed by cosmopolitan law (Doyle 1997, 257-258). Kleingeld has gone so far as to argue that Kant is referring to a “state of states” or a world federal state in which develop shared “consensus on normative principles (2004, 311). The formation of such a consensus presupposes a willful dialogue among states and their citizens that produces universal moral and ethical principles for all humanity. Because a world federation would have coercive power, it would also function as collective security agreement with the capacity to use legitimate force to uphold cosmopolitan law. The implication for theories of social order and rebellion is actors (whether individuals or nation-states) must learn to transcend cultural divisions between each other and discover legitimate rules governing when and how coercion can be used to uphold order. In other words, by reading the Kantian theory of the world state back into civil society, we arrive a theory of social order that relies on 'legitimate' coercion constituted by the formation of transcendent political community through an intersubjective dialogue.

Although Rousseau and Kant's version of social liberalism arrives at peace and
social order through collective reason rather than individual rationality, it is not without pitfalls and inconsistencies. Rousseau's vision of an egalitarian social contract at the domestic level had no counterpart at the level of international relations. Rousseau envisions relationships between states as still inherently conflictual and determined by power politics. Although states can form international institutions to govern relations between them, the rights and rules of these institutions are constituted by the balance of power between states. Thus, whatever social contract is formed at the international level cannot transcend power (this is also why Doyle 1997 describes Rousseau as a constitutional realist). The differences between the processes resulting in either a transcendent social contract or power-based institutions lie in Rousseau's strict demarcation between the domestic and international spheres. Rousseau argues that no conflict could ever exist within the domestic sphere and that war is confined to the international relations. He cannot anticipate that the participatory deliberation of laws among a state's citizens could ever be interrupted by internal strife, and does offer any theoretical principles that can be used to derive a social theory of how to resolve conflict by maintaining the social contract.

While Kant is clear about his aim to resolve conflict, his tone in *Perpetual Peace* betrays a skepticism about the eventual formation of a world federated state. He opens the essay with the following: “Whether this satirical inscription on a Dutch innkeeper's sign upon which a burial ground was painted had for its object mankind in general, or the rulers of states in particular, who are insatiable of war, or merely the philosophers who dream this sweet dream, it is not for us to decide.” In other words, one way to the ‘dream'
perpetual peace is death (“a burial ground”). He then asks that statesmen do not view his articles on Perpetual Peace as a threat to their own power, and his role as a political theorist “as a pedant whose empty ideas in no way threaten the security of the state, inasmuch as the state must proceed on empirical principles.” Kant does not appear to conceive that statecraft could incorporate anything other than the “empirical principles” affecting questions of security such as a transcendent dialogue among states or citizens of different nations. By putting these caveats at the introduction of an essay describing the features of a world federation, Kant is offering us the form of a perpetual peace without any indication of how states traverse the “empirical principles” of power politics, which still exists in interactions between democratic and non-democratic states. This omission also leaves unclear how conflicts such as domestic civil wars could be resolved by counterinsurgent practices consistent with the categorical imperative.

The above brief survey of realism and liberalism offers us multiple theoretical approaches toward theorizing about the resolution of domestic conflict and the creation of social order. Our various interpretations of realism and liberalism produce four distinct theories of social order. The first is a radical or fundamental realism that assumes the worst of human beings and hypothesizes that brute force is the only way to maintain peace. The second is the complex realism best personified by Thucydides, who allows for human behavior to be conditional on social context but is still pessimistic about cooperation and peace. Third is the individual or utilitarian liberalism of Locke, Smith, and Bentham that understands peace as the cooperative satisfaction of individual self-interests. And fourth is the social liberalism of Rousseau and Kant, which conceives of
peace and individual security as the product of a collective process of deliberation and arrival about the rational principles of action universal to all members of society.

**Chart 1: Classical IR Theory and Assumptions about Maintaining Peace**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Expectation of Peace</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Society</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
<td>Hobbes</td>
<td>Thucydides, Machiavelli</td>
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<td>Optimistic</td>
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<td>Kant, Rousseau</td>
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We can discover the roots of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency in these theories of social peace. Coercive counterinsurgency is understood as a method of restoring social order that privileges the use of threats and violence against civilians. In its pure form, coercive counterinsurgency is consistent with radical realism. This idea of counterinsurgency accepts the need to 'out-terrorize' the people literally and without any sense of restraint (Luttwak 2007). From the perspective of political theory, pure coercive counterinsurgency is aligned with Hobbes' Leviathan and the notion that only the absolute power of the state can create a climate of fear that puts social rebellion in check. It follows that pure authoritarian regimes will use most inclined to use unlimited coercion since they recognize no check on power of the sovereign or obligation to. However, complex realism suggests that there are limits to the use of coercive power. This restrained form of coercive counterinsurgency accepts that the use of coercion can create new enemies and lead other actors unite together in the face of state terrorism. Instead, limited coercion must be complemented by adherence to some set of social conventions.
or principles that can maintain one's power despite other contextual factors that cause ongoing violence and disorder.

On the other hand, persuasive or 'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency is grounded in individual liberalism's emphasis on self-interest. Grounded in the political theory of Locke and Bentham, counterinsurgents aim to form a social contract that satisfies the individual utility of each person. Such an agreement (or set of agreements about how to use force to uphold the security of property) should promote freedom and allow civilians to pursue their self-interest without fear of armed threats from insurgents. Hence, counterinsurgents should aim to win the legitimacy of the people by providing protection from insurgent threats (Nagl 2002, Department of the Army 2006). Because human behavior is driven by interests and not ideas or emotions (Kilcullen 2007, 2010), it follows that counterinsurgents must appeal to the enlightened self-interest of civilians to promote the use of individual reason in restoring social order.

Persuasive counterinsurgency fits less neatly with social liberalism. Although doctrine like FM: 3-24 instructs counterinsurgents to learn about the culture of the civilian population, this facilitates an understanding of the people's self-interest, which is explained as the real driver of civilian behavior (Dept. of the Army 2006, [3-66]). Such assumptions are not necessarily inconsistent with the theories of society provided by Kant and Rousseau, but they require that counterinsurgents refrain from pursuing their own self-interest while engaging the people in reflective conversation that produces a shared understanding about moral principles and ethical uses of violence. A socially liberal approach toward asymmetric war would subvert the utility of force to the will of the people (Smith 2006),
Violence to restore order could only be employed after discovering the people's rules and conventions regarding the use of violence. Counterinsurgency would be performed on behalf of a new political community according to the principle of the Kantian categorical imperative, and counterinsurgents would subordinate their own will to that of the political society from jointly with the civilian population.

**Applying modern IR Theory to Counterinsurgency**

We can further explore the similarities between coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency by examining contemporary IR theory's reincarnation of the First Debate as well as its critiques. Modern IR theory is defined by the neo/neo debate and an attempt to theorize about the structural effects of the distribution of power within a system on the level of conflict between states. Each theory hypothesizes different causal variables as the cause of peace and war, but both rely on assumptions based on the structural constraints and opportunities for competition and cooperation among economically rational actors in an environment defined by anarchy. However, the material ontological foundation of the neo/neo debate was strongly challenged by IR constructivism, which starts with an idealist ontology that leads to critiques of all structuralist theories (including neorealism and neoliberalism) by emphasizing ideas instead of power or self-interest. Mainstream constructivists argue that states can transcend power politics and self-interest by engaging in reflexive self-restraint that constitutes a collective identity, joints interests, and an shared understanding about the meaning of power capabilities (Wendt 1992, 1999; Drulak 2005). Below, I examine how each of these three contemporary theories conceptualizes the causes of peace and war and
highlight which theories parallel or contradict persuasive and coercive counterinsurgency.

Neorealist and Neoliberal Approaches to the Problem of Domestic Social Order

Postwar IR theory begins with the work of Hans Morgenthau (1948), who combines both radical and complex theories of realism into a single text about the warlike nature of international relations. Because the international system is anarchic and because human beings tend toward conflict, Morgenthau argues that the behavior of all states can be understood by defining their self-interest in terms of power. Lacking any other means of security, a state's individual power is its only means of guaranteeing survival, so states rationally seek to increase their power and are acutely aware of the power of other states. Morgenthau still allows for states form agreements via international organizations, but suggests that such institutions will always be limited by the distribution of power among leading states. With these assumptions, Morgenthau essentially set the terms of postwar IR theory and the eventual debate between neorealism and neoliberalism.

These theories depart from Morgenthau's realism with the neorealist move toward theorizing about the structure of the international system. Whereas Morgenthau was comfortable with integrating the classical tenets of different schools of realism into a single traditionalist approach, neorealists starting with Waltz aim to develop an approach to politics that explained state behavior based on power relationships that was also grounded in empirical positivism. Based on the work of Thomas Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz (1979) builds a theory of neorealism or structural realism which argues that anarchy is the ordering principles of international relations, states are all alike in their need for survival, and the distribution of power capabilities is the main determinant of different relations
between states. Because states are always wary of other more powerful states, they tend
to balance power against other states by increasing their own power or forming short-
term alliances with other states to deter enemies from a future attack. On this basis, Waltz
argues that the most stable distribution of power is a bipolar system, in which both states'
rational preparations for war.

However, other scholars have demonstrated that long-term cooperation between
states is possible, even if relying on Waltz's assumptions about the anarchic international
system. Neoliberals like Robert Keohane and David Axelrod developed a theory of
cooperation based around rational choice theory rather than the structural logic of
anarchy. Using game theory, they argue that states can overcome their mutual distrust and
create agreements known as regimes that promote a “convergence of expectations”
(Krasner 1983) about economic exchange. Regimes provide information to states about
each other's intentions and enable them to realize their shared interests. Regimes work
by establishing reputational standards of behavior for future interactions (otherwise
known as lengthening the shadow of the future), increasing the benefits of cooperation as
well as the costs of non-cooperation (changing payoff structures), and increasing the
number of cooperative players by linking multiple issues together (Keohane 1983,
Keohane and Axelrod 1986). Once formed, neoliberals argue that regimes can take a life
of their own and constrain states from pursuing their own short-term gains at the expense
illustrate how self-restraining states can socialize others into cooperation and establish
regimes. Axelrod argues that a reciprocal strategy of tit-for-tat can create relational
incentives for other states to honor agreements and achieve optimal cooperative outcomes. In this way, states can pursue rational strategies that result in cooperative agreements which fulfill each state's self-interest.

Neoliberalism's explicitly rational assumptions about behavior have been adopted by neorealists to provide fine-grained explanations of why rational states still go to war. Just as the provision of information makes possible cooperation according to neoliberals, rational neorealists argue that its absence results in war. Both Van Evera (1989) and Fearon (1991) argue that war is often a result of private information which remains undisclosed to other states as well as incentives to misrepresent each state's intentions and capabilities. These information asymmetries exacerbate the security dilemma and promote the perception among each state that their offensive capabilities can overwhelm their opponents. Because such conditions breed mistrust, states will seek opportunities to use coercion and exploit their adversaries.

Other neorealists have critiqued neoliberalism by highlighting the conditions under which cooperation will fail. Grieco (1993) and Mearsheimer (1995) critique regime theory by arguing that it will only apply to issues of political economy and not security, which will always be governed by power politics and the logic of anarchy. Because state interests will always be in conflict, they will rationally pursue relative gains rather than merely absolute gains, and will cheat on agreements whenever possible.

We can take the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism and apply these theories to intrastate war and counterinsurgency. We can begin with neorealism. Since counterinsurgency is characterized by a situation of anarchic civil war, neorealist
assumptions imply that counterinsurgents will not share preferences with either insurgents or the people and will drive them to be concerned with relative gains in zero-sum interaction with other groups. Achieving civilian and insurgent compliance with counterinsurgents thereby requires that former must be deterred from engaging in rebellion. Following the logic of game theory, counterinsurgents must change civilian preferences and raise the costs of rebellion to a point that makes such activity irrational. This logic of deterrence, originally conceptualized by Schelling (1966) to explain thermonuclear strategy, was originally applied to counterinsurgency by Leites and Wolf (1970, see also Wolf 1965). They argue that insurgent systems are a series of input-output relationships which must be disrupted to end rebellion. Denying inputs involves controlling the behavior of the population by “raising the costs of support to the point that it becomes rationally unbeneﬁcial” (Shultz 1979). Coercive counterinsurgency of this type is further rooted in the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire, which assumes that insurgents themselves coerce the people into cooperation (Trinquier 1964). Counterinsurgents, then, are merely using the same successful coercive method of revolutionary warfare against insurgents. The ever present threat of counterinsurgent coercion balances against human tendencies toward zero-sum competition, and makes survival conditional on obedience. This understanding of counterinsurgency is also consistent with neorealist critiques of institutional theory. It suggests that any agreement made between counterinsurgents, insurgents, and the people will merely be short-term and represent counterinsurgents' favorable balance of power. Most importantly, making agreements will require that counterinsurgents threaten to use force against the people to
raise the costs of non-compliance. These assumptions about coercive counterinsurgency are most consistent with neorealism but also the radical realism Thomas Hobbes.

On the other hand, neoliberalism implies that agreements are possible where counterinsurgent, insurgent, and civilian interests overlap and that repeated social interaction can provide information to all parties to facilitate cooperation. The existence of conflict between counterinsurgents, the people, and insurgents can be assumed to be rooted in the inability of all actors to communicate their interests and intentions. Hence, FM 3-24 argues that counterinsurgents must learn about the culture, values, and interests of the civilian population in order to understand how local actors make decisions (Department of the Army 2006, Chapter 3). Thus, persuasive counterinsurgency can be successful if counterinsurgents can identify civilian interests and engage in bargaining that provides absolute gains to all parties. The formation cooperative agreements requires counterinsurgent self-restraint and an interactive strategy of reciprocity with civilians that creates expectations of joint action and socializes both sides into the pursuit of cooperation (Axelrod 1984). While self-restraint and reciprocity may be costly in the short-term, these interactive strategies will pay off in the long term by facilitating regular interaction between counterinsurgents, the people, and insurgents. These experiences enable exchanges of information about the interests of all parties that make possible cooperation and long-term agreements conducive to peace.

Further, side payments in the form of development assistance can act as selective incentives (Olson 1968) to encourage individual actors to cooperate with counterinsurgents. Advocates of persuasive counterinsurgency always predicated the
defeat of insurgency on the application of technocratic knowledge to spur socioeconomic modernization, which would increase the benefits of peaceful cooperation as well as the costs of rebellion (Latham 2006). Restoring social order thereby required creating administrative structures that could meet the needs of the people while gathering intelligence to find and fix insurgent targets (Thompson 1965).

In sum, coercive and persuasive theories of counterinsurgency propose two different approaches toward dealing with an insurgent threat whose identity is not immediately distinguishable from the people. Yet, both approaches rely on changing the economic calculus of civilian behavior. A coercive or 'enemy-centric' approach assumes that insurgents and counterinsurgents compete to coerce the population into supporting each respective side. Since combatants and civilians cannot be distinguished, the latter are treated as legitimate targets whose will can be mechanically adjusted via coercive deterrence and compellence. A persuasive or 'population-centric' approach is based on an appeal to self-interest which assumes that civilians and insurgents must be given positive incentives to cooperate and communicate with counterinsurgents while abstaining from rebellion. Such cooperation is based on the restoration of a social contract and governmental institutions that increase the payoff of participating in social order and costs of insurgency. Each of these approaches privileges a different causal factor in achieving counterinsurgent objectives – namely power and self-interest – that reflect economic interpretations of realism and liberalism and their implied uses of war and peace.

*Reflexive Counterinsurgency as an Aspirational Approach to Asymmetric Conflict*
By tracing coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency to neorealism and neoliberalism and identifying these strategies as Hobbesian or Lockean, I emphasize the shared rationalist assumptions of both theories. By relying on power and self-interest as alternative foundations for thinking about counterinsurgency, both theories of social order rely on assumptions about individual reason and contradictory or complementary preferences in explaining different counterinsurgency strategies. However, these contemporary IR theories have been strongly critiqued by social constructivists who argue that outcomes about peace and war are ultimately determined by the social structure of ideas and each actor's socially learned perception of identity and community rather than the distribution of power or individual self-interest. Constructivists argue that one's identity is socially learned through interactions with others. Social interaction provides actors with experiences and expectations about what actions are appropriate in future interactions. These experiences and expectations include assumptions about the roles, norms, and values that define how each other sees itself and others. This is shared knowledge jointly produced and reproduced through ongoing interaction. It also constitutes how each actor views the utility of different courses of action and conditions how they interpret observations of coercive capability. Thus, identity and ideas presuppose self-interests and understandings about power. While these latter causal factors are privileged neoliberals and neorealists, constructivists argue that they only matter to the extent that ideas determine how actors subjectively interpret them. (Wendt 1987, 1999; Ruggie 1998, Hopf 1998). By providing a framework for analyzing how identities learned through social interaction and shared knowledge constitute individual
interests, constructivism provides more depth to explanations of war and peace provided by neorealism and neoliberalism, and also highlights some paradoxical causal mechanisms that result from the second-order effects of counterinsurgency approaches based on each IR theory.

Constructivist critiques of neorealism explain how pure realpolitik strategies that rely on coercion can perpetuate conflict rather than produce peace and social order. Constructivist scholars have argued that identity is a self-fulfilling prophecy because each actor’s knowledge of Self (its identity) is learned based on how Others perceive Self and their expectations of Self’s behavior. Even if actors do not initially possess hostile expectations, actors that use force against each other because they perceive hostility will reinforce each other’s expectations of coercion and produce ongoing conflict. For counterinsurgents confronted with the identification problem (Kalyvas 2006), the cost of applying brute force is lower than separating insurgents from civilians and more easily resolves short-term uncertainty about physical security.

We can explain the effects of the identification problem using the concepts of structural realism, which turns the concept of the balance of power in on itself. Because counterinsurgents lack information about the identities of threatening insurgents in domestic society, they rationally use of violence against all civilians to increase the instrumental costs of rebellion (Kalyvas 2006, 146-172). However, the logic of the balance of power backfires against counterinsurgents seeking to play the role of Leviathan and establish a stable unipolar hierarchy. By attempting to enforce order through disproportionate violence against the people, counterinsurgents cause the people
to unite and balance against them. When insurgents use the identification problem to make counterinsurgents perceive that civilians are threatening enemies and compel a disproportionate response, they make any stable structure of unipolarity impossible. Counterinsurgents trapped in a realist logic will drive civilians to balance against them, an outcome that ultimately results in counterinsurgent defeat.\(^8\)

This same phenomenon is described by Kilcullen (2009) as the accidental guerrilla syndrome, or by rationalists as a sub-optimal outcome. However, the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Wendt 1999) highlights the importance of each actor's understanding of Self and Other rather than merely the costs and benefits of different actions. Self-fulfilling prophecies illustrate how the security dilemma is really about identity – whether or not one actor feels insecure about the potential for coercion by others depends upon their subjective understanding of each other as a friend or enemy, including the cognitive categories that define their similarity or difference. Counterinsurgents trapped in a self-fulfilling prophecy will perceive all civilians as enemies subject to lethal coercion, thereby convincing civilians that all counterinsurgents are threats that can only be dealt with via violence. Over time, stable expectations of enmity and violence become difficult to change and trap counterinsurgents in a self-fulfilling prophecy of enmity. The result is that counterinsurgents learn to dehumanize the civilian population and alienate civilians from cooperation with counterinsurgents. Thus, a pure strategy of coercive counterinsurgency based upon both radical realism and

\(^8\) Kalyvas (2006) explains this dynamic in pure rationalist terms – the use of indiscriminate coercion causes all civilians to feel insecure, and thus makes security a private good or a selective incentive that can be acquired by other actors, namely insurgents.
neorealism’s structural assumptions about power and human self-interest can backfire and result in counterinsurgent defeat.

While a constructivist approach illustrates how self-fulfilling prophecies can contradict coercive counterinsurgency strategies, it also allows for a critique of liberal counterinsurgency and its faith in individual reason. Existing doctrine like FM 3-24 relies on the model of rational individuals seeking to realize their self-interest in interaction with others through bargaining and cost-benefit analysis. But pure rationalism fails to account for how shared knowledge gives meaning to the costs and benefits of various actions taken by civilians (and insurgents). A focus on culture suggests an understanding of how people form shared identities with other individuals and relationships of enmity and war that mark group boundaries. Because culture constitutes rationality, counterinsurgents should act with the goal of creating a new worldview with the people and a shared identity that constitutes them with group-interests rather than merely satisfying utility. In terms of counterinsurgency among the people, a constructivist approach would seek to construct shared knowledge with the population through iterative social interaction, and not simply exchange information about each other’s individual preferences. The pursuit of self-interest would otherwise cause counterinsurgents to understand civilians as objects to be instrumentally manipulated to achieve security, rather than as an equal partner in joint action to solve security problems. This is a model of rationalism more consistent with Habermas’s communicative rationality (1984) rather than instrumental rationality that requires reflexive self-restraint in the pursuit of one’s own preferences (Wendt 1992, 420-422; Wendt 1999, 330-336). Rather than adhere to
individual reason, communicative rationality involves a process of generating collective reason that reintroduces morality back into politics. Hence, counterinsurgents “ought to do what is equally good for all persons” (Habermas 1998, 49), and not just themselves. Rather than resolving short-term uncertainty about the identity and intentions of civilians assuming enmity and rationally using coercion, reflexive counterinsurgents would treat all civilians as if they were friends regardless of existing knowledge. Coercive action in reflexive counterinsurgency would be guided only by an understanding of the population's interpretation of security – their laws, customs, and conventions – and not that of counterinsurgents. By shifting the purpose of military action and the referent of security to the people, this approach would be consistent with the concept of human security and the protection of civilians from threats associated with civil strife and the absence of basic necessities such as food and water (UNDP 1994, Kaldor 2007). By satisfying the people’s need for security based on their own understanding of the term, such actions would be consistent with what constructivists have described as critical strategic interaction (Wendt 1992, 421-422) or strategic social construction (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 909-915). Critical strategic interaction would synchronize the will of the people and the will of counterinsurgents together and direct military operations toward the achievement of common objectives (Smith 2006).

If applied to asymmetric war, critical strategic interaction points to a reflexive theory of counterinsurgency that emphasizes the formation of new constitutional norms about society. The aim of reflexive counterinsurgency is thus the restoration of social order based on a sense of a shared political community which fosters the acceptance of
subjectively legitimate rules and norms (Sitaraman 2013). It is also a position consistent with the pursuit of cosmopolitan law that transcends the bounded nature of legal rights wedded to the classical concept of state sovereignty. Instead, cosmopolitan law “directly establishes the legal status of the individual subjects by granting them unmediated membership in the association of free and equal world citizens” (Habermas 1998, 181). Out of the recognition of human security as a something to which all individuals are entitled, a reflexive form of counterinsurgency would function as a doctrine for the implementation of human security and a legal, rule-based order consistent with the values of the population. By establishing law as the objective, reflexive counterinsurgency can adopt the will of the people only by abandoning Clausewitzian assumptions about the need to defeat the enemy as a means of achieving one's own self-interest by eliminating threats to state security. Instead, the achievement of a legal objectives require that counterinsurgents protect the population on the people's own terms and without regard for short-term national or bureaucratic interests. Kaldor goes so far as to argue that this approach toward asymmetric warfare should no longer be labeled counterinsurgency because of its traditional preoccupation with the defeat of insurgency (Kaldor 2010, Beebe and Kaldor 2010).

A final note on the label 'constructivism' used above and the distinction between persuasive and reflexive counterinsurgency. Given the cultural emphasis of FM 3-24 and new military capabilities such Human Terrain Systems (Heuser 2007), some have argued that persuasive counterinsurgency itself has adopted the cultural assumptions of constructivism, yet fails to include a meaningful concept of politics that informs the
social construction of identities and civilian perspectives (Kalyvas 2008 351, 353), I agree with this assessment, but followed to its logical conclusion, it shows that persuasive counterinsurgency has subordinated sociological theory to the pursuit of counterinsurgent self-interests.

I established above that persuasive counterinsurgency is consistent with the classical theory of war, which sees military operations as a logical extension of policy. If true, then the people are seen as merely one other object in the external world that must be instrumentally manipulated to achieve but as consistent with the classical theory of war which sees instrumental theory of war. This theory of politics is clearly evident in FM: 3-24. In its section on power and authority, the manual states the following:

“Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her own will despite resistance. Understanding power is the key to manipulating the interests of groups within a society” (Department of the Army 2006, [3-55]).

Thus, if counterinsurgents want to achieve civilian cooperation, they should exercise power over civilians through the techniques of manipulation and management.

Knowledge about culture is very important in this effort, as it enables counterinsurgents to manage images and perceptions held by the people to better enable the achievement of self-interested objectives. This model of cultural engagement adopts the constructivist principle of 'putting oneself in other's shoes' without applying that new knowledge to critique one's own perspective and interests of the world (Schon and Rein 1994, 39). If FM 3-24 and persuasive counterinsurgency is constructivist, it is only in the limited sense.
in which culture is subordinated to one's unchanging self-interests. This is not in the transformative sense in which culture enables a reflexive critique of one's own self-interests as understood by Wendt and Habermas.

The scholars cited in the above description of reflexive counterinsurgency have proposed this approach toward asymmetric warfare only in the last 20 years as a reflection on the rise of civil wars and multinational peacekeeping operations of the post-Cold War era. Such an approach would also be consistent with the vision of cosmopolitan peace operations articulated by Kaldor. Peace operations differ from counterinsurgency because they aim toward the objective of human security rather than the rational will of national decision-makers implemented through warfare (Ibid.). Instead, peace operations are the military implementation of peacebuilding, which “reduce[s] the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (SG Policy Committee, 2007). Although empirical studies demonstrate that peace operations have been successful in ending conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Fortna 2008), critical IR scholars have argued that the liberal foundations of peace operations only serve the needs of powerful Western states without solving for the underlying problems that cause conflict (Pugh 2004, Chandler 2008). Such peacebuilding outcomes (including counterinsurgency conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan) are criticized as a form of neoimperialism for their imposition of Western objectives and values over the wishes of local actors (Martin and Knaus 2003, 2011). On this basis, a reflexive approach to counterinsurgency and peace operations can be theorized first as a critique of persuasive
counterinsurgency and its liberal foundations. Reflexive counterinsurgency is thus an aspirational theory of counterinsurgent action rather than one that we see empirically, meaning that we can't broadly test for reflexive counterinsurgency. We can, however, evaluate its plausibility, which I do in Chapter 5.

**Hypotheses and Propositions about Counterinsurgency**

Given the above survey of IR theories and their implications for counterinsurgency, we can state three clear hypotheses for why counterinsurgency will be successful:

- **H1**: If counterinsurgents credibly threaten to use force against the people, then rebellion should decrease.

  The causal logic of this hypothesis is that using coercion increases the costs of rebellion, thereby altering civilians' preferences to be in line with counterinsurgents. Its individualist assumptions about human nature are pessimistic about cooperation, and make it necessary to end rebellions by “out-terrorizing” the population. This hypothesis is consistent with the coercive counterinsurgency approach.

- **H2**: If counterinsurgents can identify the people's interests and find overlapping preferences, then they can make agreements about security and peacefully resolve disputes.

  The causal logic of this hypothesis is that peace is less costly than war, so counterinsurgents must bargain with civilians and insurgents to identify a mutually beneficial peace. Bargaining requires an interactive strategy of reciprocity in which other actors learn that the gains of cooperation will be higher than from competition. The
payoff structure of preferences can be further made to overlap with side payments and selective incentives for cooperation.

H3: If counterinsurgents can practice reflexive self-restraint and engage in communicative action with the people, then they will create a political community that legitimates and constrains their use of force based on the people’s understanding of legitimacy.9

The causal logic here is that reflexive self-restraint can allow counterinsurgents, insurgents, and civilians to learn about each other's identity and develop a shared perception of Self. Rather than exchanging information to learn about how preferences overlap, this hypothesis sees the exchange of information as a means to create a shared worldview that constitutes all actors with the same preferences.

Although I've produced three hypotheses with the above survey, existing theories of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency reflect only Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the shared assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism. 10 Chart 1 demonstrates the relationship between theories of political philosophy, IR theory, and counterinsurgency.

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9 As I explain in Chapter 3, I do not evaluate hypothesis 3 using qualitative comparative analysis. This is due to the methodological difficulties of measuring to what degree counterinsurgents engage in a reflective dialogue with the people and abstain from the pursuit of their own self-interest. However, I am able to evaluate the subjective nature of reflexivity using purely qualitative methods. I do this in the case of US counterinsurgency in Iraq, also in Chapter 4.

10 The term 'peace enforcement' refers to a concept of intervention originally proposed by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the 1992 'Agenda for Peace'. Peace enforcement would require that military forces be put under the discretion of the Secretary-General to end civil strife and conflict in interventions authorized by the UN Security Council. As Oliver (2002) notes, the term peace enforcement wasn't well defined by Boutros Ghali. Greater specificity was provided by US and UK military doctrine (Ibid., 102). Overall, the lack of clarity about the term indicates some confusion given its overlap with other terms, including peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping. All three terms are most clearly defined in the UN Peacekeeping Capstone Document (2008).
Each of these hypotheses distills the strategic logic of counterinsurgency depending on the different primary assumptions about social theory made by each school of political philosophy and international relations. However, some of the primary assumptions of one school can contradict the assumptions of another. Constructivism and realism is the key example, resulting in this hypothesis.

H4: Counterinsurgents that use extreme levels of violence can turn all civilians against them, especially by falling into self-fulfilling prophecies and becoming incapable of providing security to civilians.
This hypothesis relies on both the rationalist logic of collective action and the constructivist logic of the self-fulfilling prophecy. It also echoes complex realism's argument about limits to the use of force. It recognizes that violence does not take place in a vacuum and can alter payoff structures in ways that are sub-optimal to counterinsurgents. It is also related to a fifth hypothesis about combining self-restraint and the use of violence against civilians.

H5: If counterinsurgents combine limited violence against civilians with bargaining and side payments, they will raise both the costs of non-cooperation and the benefits of cooperation, thereby fostering civilian and insurgent compliance.

This hypothesis combines complex realism's emphasis on how violence makes possible institutional agreements with liberalism's emphasis on rational self-interest. It also points to a form of counterinsurgency that blends both coercive and persuasive elements. Along with Hypothesis 4, this hypothesis is consistent with the key propositions of Kalyvas (2006). His purely rationalist approach to violence against civilians in civil war demonstrates the validity of these propositions, and suggests that rationalist counterinsurgency which blends both persuasive and coercive qualities should result in counterinsurgent victory.

Conclusion

This chapter has performed a survey of political philosophy and IR theory to

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11 It is also broadly consistent with Rousseau's “constitutional realism” as described Doyle (1997). This assumes that the distribution of power makes possible specific institutional arrangements governing the relations between states. Hence, a relatively equal distribution of power between states makes possible peaceful cooperation among them regarding common problems. This approach to power suggests that the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe was so successful because the conquest of France restored an equal distribution of power among previously warring states.
uncover the assumptions underlining different theories of counterinsurgency. I articulated five hypotheses about why different counterinsurgency approaches might or might not be successful: three which reflect the primary assumptions of political philosophy and IR theory, and two that overlap between schools. The next step is to evaluate the validity of these hypotheses across historical cases.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

This chapter aims to situate the study of counterinsurgency outcomes within the methodological debates that have dominated modern American political science, and especially comparative politics. Methodology concerns a scholar's procedure or approach to the study of politics and the comparison of different cases of interest. It is not monolithic by any means, and is generally divided between quantitative and qualitative methodologies derived from the alternative traditions of positivist empiricism and historical sociology. These two approaches differ in regards to the number of comparable cases, the relationship between theories and observable data, and even possess alternative definitions of science as well as purposes for scientific inquiry. They also ask different questions about political phenomena and provide different answers about their causes. Positivist methods seek to provide strictly analytical explanations of why things happen, while historical methods aim to discover the subjective understanding of political actors.
and focus on how political processes unfold.¹²

Which approach is best for the study of counterinsurgency? It may well be neither. Today's counterinsurgency scholars go to great lengths to say that each counterinsurgency is uniquely complex, thereby implying that comparisons among multiple counterinsurgency cases may not yield any new knowledge about these conflicts (Kilcullen 2010). If, however, our conclusions about counterinsurgency wars are entirely dependent on the contextual factors unique to each conflict, then this would seem to presuppose any evaluation of coercive and persuasive theories of counterinsurgency that could be provided by a generalization of many cases. Although both approaches follow different logics of inquiry in identifying patterns and building social scientific knowledge, there are inherent trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative theories that researchers must accept if choosing one method or the other.

Fortunately, a middle-ground between qualitative and quantitative methodologies exists that is appropriate to comparing many complex cases of a phenomenon like counterinsurgency. Below, I show how a method known as Boolean analysis can bridge the quantitative-qualitative divide and enable researchers to identify patterns across cases while preserving the causal complexity of counterinsurgency wars.¹³ By identifying combinations of causal factors rather than simplifying cases into discreet and independent variables, Boolean analysis demonstrate which patterns of combinations produce

¹² By distinguishing positivist and historical methods based on their search for either explanation or understanding, I draw upon Wendt's epistemological arguments (1998) to ground my discussion of methodological in terms of alternative discussion what can be known about politics.
¹³ I do recognize that some scholars regard the quantitative and qualitative methods as merely different ways to identify patterns. I recognize the validity of this position, but still believe that each approach contains trade-offs. On this basis, qualitative comparative analysis provides a way out of this dilemma and combine the best aspects of both methods.
different outcomes, with multiple combinations producing the same outcome (this is known as multiple conjunctional causation). Once combinations of counterinsurgency practices can be empirically identified and matched to different outcomes, we can determine which theories of counterinsurgency are more accurate.

This chapter proceeds in two sections. First, I describe the quantitative and qualitative methodological debates that often divide the field. Second, I discuss how qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a useful alternative to both approaches that combines their strengths into a unique approach for evaluating causal paths. In this section, I also discuss QCA's strengths and weaknesses as a preview to the methodological choices made in Chapter 4.

**Trade-Offs Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods**

For most of the 20th Century, the study of politics has been defined as an effort to conduct rigorous scientific analysis. Hence, the dominant approach for actually doing 'political science' has been scientific empiricism, which aims to explain the occurrence of a specified political phenomena by making lawlike generalizations about the relationship between cause and effect. This 'variable-based' method of positivist empiricism is grounded in Enlightenment philosophy and in the capacity of human reason to explain the objective nature of the world around us.\(^\text{14}\) Scientific positivism was first developed for studying the natural world by empirically testing hypothesized causal relationships between independent and dependent variables (if X is present, then Y occurs) against the universe of all cases of the phenomenon of interest. A variable-based

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\(^{14}\) The philosophy of Rene Decartes “I think, therefore I am” is the touchstone philosophical statement for the ability of human reason to objectively learn about reality.
approach assumes independent and dependent variables exist as separate things in the world, independent variables exist temporally prior to the dependent variable, and that the presence of a dependent variable is not possible without the presence of a dependent variable (Wendt 1998, 105). The positivist offers insights about politics as scientific explanations as to why political events happen.

Ideally, social scientific inquiry could be performed using purely experimental methods, as in the natural sciences. This would enable researchers to demonstrate how outcomes of interest change depending on the presence of specific variables included in an experimental group of cases compared to a control group. However, social scientists do not have this luxury. We cannot go back in time to add or remove a particular variable and rerun history to determine how outcomes change. Neither can we perform an experiment in real-time with human beings, as this would violate basic ethical principles. However, this doesn't mean that some form of scientific inquiry is impossible. While we cannot perform experiments on history, we can document and observe historical outcomes of interest with defined variables. A variable-based approach relies on quantifying historical outcomes, making empirical observations about different variables, and then comparing values to find correlative or probabilistic relationships. This methodological approach can be traced by to Emile Durkheim, adapts the natural scientific method to the social sciences. Durkheim understands each society as a 'species' that can be compared to others to determine how their internal combination of parts are different. Actual units of observation are treated as if they are experimental cases which can be pulled apart to analyze the specific causal impact of each variable of interest. This
is indirect method of comparison that reduces differences among societies to numerical values common to the an category of relevant cases. This method aims to discover “parallelisms in series of values of two or more variables” by employing the logic of Mill's Method of Concomitant Variation (Ragin and Zaret, 1983; 736). In this way, Durkheim advocates for a variable-based model of social science that aims to identify abstract generalizations which explains the causal relationship between individual factors regardless of the social context that constitutes them. Doing so requiring simplifying the researcher’s understanding of each particular case and making assumptions about the independent nature of causal forces prior to an actual comparison of observed relations. It does, however enable a social scientist to include

Quantitative methods were popularized in the United States in the mid-20th Century under the label “behavioralism.” Scholars such as Charles Merriam, American Political Science Association President of 1925, is seen as an early voice for a scientific study of political behavior. Scholars of the Social Science Research Council were equally as important. They sought to formulate and test hypotheses “concerning uniformities of behavior in different institutional settings” (SSRC 1944, in Dahl 1960, 764). Research about politics became the study of “how social actors performed certain functions or how conflicts about economic interests were resolved politically.” (Munck 2007, 44) Quantitative methods made the process of building scientific knowledge reliant on testing hypotheses against empirical data to make nomothetic explanations that were always

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15 This is an indirect method because the social scientist cannot directly manipulate objects of interest and test for variation in variables of interest against a control group.
testable and falsifiable. By abstracting each case into an objectively measured set of variables, nomothetic explanations can make law-like general statements that “cover” different aspects of a political phenomenon. Thus, when formulating comparative theories, scholars should develop explanations of variance among political phenomena that only make reference to variables within each system. This requires including as many cases as possible and reducing the value of observations to a generalizable variable measurable across all cases. If the causal relationship between variables is similar across cases, then the variable can be used to cause the presence of the latter.

Quantitative methods have been dominant in the study of civil war and insurgency. The post-war Cold War resurgence in civil wars led by statistical studies which identified ethnicity, the presence of lootable resources, and state weakness as independent variables which increased the likelihood of intrastate conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Sambanis 2002). More recently, Lyall and Wilson (2009) have applied quantitative statistical methods to demonstrate a relationship between mechanization and counterinsurgent victory. These studies have provided great insight into abstract relationships between different causal forces at work within the phenomena of asymmetric warfare.

Yet the same researchers have often conducted qualitative research alongside or following the above variable-based studies. These comparisons have generally been

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16 A nomothetic explanation is one that is grounded in specific causal factors “regardless of time and space. This kind of an interpretation constitutes a direct transference of the dominant natural science model to the study of social reality” (Ibid., 7).
17 Lyall and Wilson include a short case study at the end of their article explaining how the mechanism of information deprivation inversely links army mechanization to war outcomes.
driven by the need to develop qualitative methodologies that may be appropriate where quantitative methods are not. Lijphart's (1970) argues that qualitative comparisons are useful when data is limited, but must limit the number of variables to less than the number of cases to avoid the degrees of freedom problem, a methodological requirement of rigorous quantitative research, By starting from the logic of quantitative analysis, Lipjhart vision of qualitative social science maximizes parsimony and simplicity to maintain the use of broadly comparable variables. King, Keohane and Verbal’s landmark Designing Social Inquiry (1994, KKV hereafter) extends the qualitative logic of variable-based approaches. They argue that case studies must demonstrate causal inference if they are to be used scientifically. This is much different from descriptive inference that emphasizes contextual understanding of the phenomena of interest. KKV argue that contextual descriptions may uncover the worldview of actors who are actually creating political outcomes with their own actions, but those insights cannot be applied to other cases as a foundation for truly scientific generalizable explanations (KKV 1994, 36-46).

Variable-based covering law methods (whether quantitative or distilled for qualitative research) are certainly dominant in American political science, but alternatives have always existed. The context-specific methods deemed inferior by KKV are still widely employed by researchers, especially with the rise of constructivism in international relations and comparative politics. Case-based qualitative methods are most strongly advocated by historically-oriented researchers who investigate social life grounded in the subjective interpretation of the world held by political actors. As an
interpretivist form of social science, this method seeks an understanding (*verstehen*) of the subjective experience of social actors. Rather than test for abstract covering laws about the political world in the tradition of Durkheim, case-study methods resist the assumption that the real world is equally observable by all persons and that causes and effects can be shown to exist as universal law-like regularities. Instead, this subjective approach assumes that social constructed worldviews motivate behavior but do not react to political phenomena (variables) in the same way across all cases. By assuming that understanding instead of explanation is a goal of social science, case-based interpretivists follow more from the tradition of historical sociology advocated by Max Weber (Lichbach 2006).

Unlike pure quantitative methods, interpretivist approaches allow the researcher to explore the causal complexity within each case. Rather than focus on parsimonious causal explanations between variables that exist as different things, case-based methods permit the discovery of constitutive relationships in which the presence one variable may constitute, or make possible, the existence of another. This approach allows for the existence of variables to be interdependent (rather than independent) of each other as parts of same complex structure of causal forces. This approach sees whole cases as more than simply the sum of their parts and resists abstract theoretical assumptions that simplify objects of inquiry into discrete variables. Instead of reducing causal forces to assumptions that generate abstract hypotheses to be tested by numerical data, , This approach builds knowledge through inductive reasoning instead of deductive reasoning. Generalizable patterns of behavior are identified on the basis of observations and then
subject to evaluation on larger scales.

Overall, the Weberian approach allows for an understanding of much more causal complexity than purely quantitative approaches and can discover interdependent relationships. For example, the asymmetric conflicts of the colonial era and modern insurgencies are dramatically different. Deductive analyses of these conflicts that include all cases from these different world historical eras will be unable to account for their contextual uniqueness and the circumstances that produced them, not to mention their presence in completely different world-historical periods. While quantitative scholars can certainly deal with this problem by limiting the number of cases to specific historical periods or including quantitative variables that include world historical periods, these actions will still be unable to specify the causal logic that makes context so influential in producing political phenomena. However, a case-based historicist approach approaches that seek understanding can make more precise statements about political life and still produce social science by referring to the subjective meanings of actors within relevant cases (Tilly 2001). This approach acknowledges that human beings are reflexive actors who can consciously work to change structures along with their own understanding of reality.

While this position acknowledges postpositivist philosophies of science, it does not mean that social science is impossible. Although there are many different meanings that may be ascribed to political phenomena, they are not infinite and can be interpreted by researchers as a basis for explanation. By focusing on subjective meaning rather than objective generalization, this approach still remains grounded in a positivist commitment
to scientific inquiry while acknowledging that human interpretation makes natural scientific methods less appropriate for studying politics (George and Bennett 2005, 131).

So how might researchers conduct historicist research that makes explanations via an understanding of subjective worldviews? George and Bennett argue that process tracing is the most viable method, whereby by the goal of the case study is to trace the process by which causal mechanisms lead to an outcome. With each political process, researchers must trace the sequence of causal mechanisms that lead to a specific phenomenon of interest. Causal mechanisms refer to "ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities" (George and Bennett 2005, 137). Process tracing even allows for hypothesis testing by specifying the chain of mechanisms that lead produce outcomes under study and then find evidence that validates that causal chain (Ibid, 207). How those causal mechanisms are activated requires demonstrating how the perception of social actors interacts with relationships and leads to events and phenomena that recur across different cases.

Process tracing is important because it can provide researchers with knowledge that is more policy relevant than deductive covering laws. George and Bennett argue that political science should provide “statements that indicate the condition under which a strategy is likely to be effective or ineffective…Good generic knowledge enables a practitioner to increase the chances of making the right decision about whether and how to employ a particular strategy” (Ibid. 272).
This is especially true for problems of strategic interaction, in which political actors seek to anticipate the moves of adversaries before taking their own action. By focusing on subjective meanings while analyzing only those cases that are closely comparable, process tracing can demonstrate why political strategies are effective in one context but may fail in another. McAdam’s work on black insurgency in the United States shows how process tracing can be the basis for future comparison. McAdam (1982, Chapter 6) finds that police repression against non-violent yet politically active civilians only served to strengthen the civil rights movement and compel action by the federal government to enact policies that ended segregation. By highlighting the mechanisms that produce collective action, McAdam has provided future researchers with a model a political process that can be evaluated using other cases.

**QCA as a Middle Way Between Quantitative and Qualitative Methods**

While qualitative arguments for case-studies as opposed to quantitative variable-based methods are strong, they remain unable to make comparisons among a large number of cases that are of the same class of events. While it is certainly possible to trace processes and mechanisms across 30, 40, or even 50 cases, the research tasks involved are daunting and incredibly time consuming. At the same time, reducing cases merely to numerical variables in pursuit of parsimony will dilute the richness of causal explanations and fall right back into the pitfall of over generalization. So, how can we compare many cases while preserving the causal complexity of political behavior and outcomes?

One such approach is the study of cases as configurations, or qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA blends the Weberian emphasis on cases as unique
systems with the Durkheim Ian impulse to evaluate the causal effects of specific variables of interest. Cases are seen as a set of component relationships that cannot be deductively isolated to determine the causal impact of abstract variables. Instead, cases should be appraised as configurations of variables which are unique products of their confluence (Ragin 1986, 11-13; 2000, Chapter 3). By focusing on configurations of variables within each case, this approach assumes that the nature of a specific case can change dramatically with a change in only one variable because of its interaction with other variables within the case. Ragin 2000, 73-74) At the same time, a configurational approach that explores multiple causal paths also avoids the tradeoff between complexity and generality inherent in the debate between qualitative and quantitative methods. By focusing on the diversity of cases, researchers can avoid focusing too closely on context-dependent factors while still making appropriate generalizations about specific categories of political events (Ragin 2000, 37). Thus, QCA can reduce causal factors into parsimonious relationships that explain outcomes across cases using algebraic logic (a method pioneered by George Boole, hence the name 'Boolean Analysis') while preserving the unique causal complexity of each case (Riboux 2003, 353). QCA thereby combines the generalizable, testable, and falsifiable strengths of quantitative methods with the attentiveness to complexity afforded by qualitative methods.

To identify causal combinations, ‘Boolean analysis’ uses variables as elements in a logical equation that indicates their presence or absence in a combination that results in an outcome of interest. That is, if a variable is present, its logical meaning is ‘true’, while absence indicates ‘false’. All possible combinations of Boolean variables are mapped a
truth table to indicate which possible combinations produce different outcomes. Thus, it highly likely QCA researchers will identify multiple combinations of variables that produce the same outcome, or find that the same combination of variables produces different outcomes (Ragin 1986, 86-88). Thus, Boolean analysis enables researchers to specify the causal complexity within each case and develop more precise arguments about the preconditions for political outcomes.

However, the algebraic rules of Boolean analysis also enable researchers to simplify Boolean equations and identify which variables or combinations of variables are necessary or sufficient for a particular outcome to occur. The additive logic of Boolean algebra assumes that the presence of any one variable can cause an outcome. Further, the multiplicative logic of Boolean algebraic assumes that combinations of specific variables (including both presence and absence) may be necessary for an outcome to occur. This combinatorial logic (including both additive and multiplicative rules) enables researchers to identify complex combinations of variables (Boolean ‘expressions’) that cause the same outcome and then simplify them according to logical rules. If two expressions cause the same outcome but different on only one causal condition, that condition can be said to be irrelevant and eliminated from a complete Boolean equation (Ragin 1986, 89-95).

Further, some minimized expressions which are drawn from a single primitive expression can be eliminated if their primitive expressions are ‘covered’ by other minimized expressions. These simplification rules enable researchers to produce equations that clearly demonstrate what variables (either stand-alone or combinations) are necessary or sufficient. By factoring Boolean expressions, researchers can also demonstrate what
conditions (which combinations of variables with one variable of interest) are causally equivalent (Ibid., 96-101).

By embracing both complexity and simplicity, QCA enables researchers to make important scientific findings without sacrificing the uniqueness of individual cases to make generalizations about political phenomena. For example, John Foran uses Boolean analysis to show how successful social revolutions require a combination of dependent development, repressive/exclusionary rule, a political culture of opposition, economic downturn, and a world-systemic opening (Foran 2005, 87). Revolutions that exhibit some of these factors but not all tend to fail, such as revolutions that are reversed by old regime authorities. Steve Chan (2003) uses Boolean analysis to show that three combinations of variables will cause international wars to terminate over short period of time. Over all, these analyses allow researchers to show how outcomes of interest are caused by combinations of variables (or multiple combinations, as in Chan’s work) across many cases rather than one or two hypothesized causes.

For all its strengths, QCA does have its weaknesses. Most significant is its need to reduce all causal factors into binary variables to determine their presence or absence within a single case. This necessity leads QCA to reduce the variation which may exist across cases regarding a specific phenomenon. Some causal factors may resist such simple forms of dichotomous categorization, especially if they can be conceptualized as lying on spectrum of values rather than a binary. These seemingly coding requirements cause QCA research to discard some information about cases and variables despite its commitment to initial causal complexity (Rihoux 2003). Ragin has attempted to confront
this problem by developing a more rigorous QCA method that looks at 'fuzzy-sets' rather than easily coded 'crisp-sets' like those described above. Fuzzy-set comparison treats variables as 'fuzzy' in terms the degree to which they can be classified as observable phenomena within a defined set of variables (Ragin 2005, Rihoux 2006). As a matter of methodological technique, fuzzy-set comparison departs from Boolean analysis and involves methodological procedures that evaluates variables on a spectrum of qualities which define a particular variable rather than a simple present/absent binary. Researchers are compelled to pay close attention to how different definitions of variables influence causal analyses and can create alternative explanations of outcomes.

While fuzzy-set comparison can cope with the problem of binaries in crisp-set QCA, the latter method still must confront the problem of contradictory outcomes within a constructed dataset. Contradictory outcomes refer to those combinations of causal factors that produce both the presence and absence of an outcome of interest. There are two ways to deal with this problem. First, researchers can return to the cases and determine what variables might be missing from those already identified (Rihoux 2003). Second, researchers can ignore those causal combinations that have a high ratio of contradictory cases. Along the same lines, researchers can adjust the ratio of contradictory outcomes upwards to exclude cases which especially glaring contradictions while keeping only those cases with minimal to no contradictions.19

**Methodological Choices in the Study of Counterinsurgency**

Given the above methodological approaches (variable-based, case-based, or

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19 Ragin's fsQCA software directly allows for this second technique, which I employ in the crisp-set QCA in Chapter 4.
QCA), which is most appropriate for evaluating the counterinsurgency theories discussed in Chapter 2? Ideally, counterinsurgency research examining the relationship between practices and outcomes would be performed using ethnographic methods to observe how counterinsurgents interact with the civilian population (whether violently or not). But this method would be so time-consuming that no researcher could collect data on all possible cases to make broad generalizations about which practices are successful. Yet collecting purely quantitative data would overly simplify cases and eliminate the complexity of counterinsurgency discussed by many contemporary theorists. However, QCA does enable researchers to collect data about each case without simplification. Thus, I argue that QCA is the best approach to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative counterinsurgency practices. It further enables the researcher to evaluate how combinations of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency are successful in quelling rebellions. Such an analysis will provide us with broadly comparable data about counterinsurgency that enables useful generalizations about counterinsurgency.

Yet using QCA to study counterinsurgency does have its own limitations as well, especially when using this method to account for the constructivist hypothesis H3 discussed in Chapter 2. Since theorizing about reflexive counterinsurgency has only been performed in last three years as a critical response to the reemergence of persuasive counterinsurgency, I do not expect to find empirical cases where reflexive practices have even occurred.20 Further, because reflexivity is fundamentally about shifts in subjective

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20 Since both coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency are still practiced as forms of Western warfare, they conceptually still adhere to the instrumental logic of military action in pursuit of self-interested political objectives. As Kaldor notes (2010), counterinsurgency theory has not broken out of the
worldviews, rare instances where reflexive counterinsurgency might be performed should be studied using qualitative process-tracing.

As the next chapter will show, counterinsurgents use practices derived from both strategies yet in different combinations. Thus, QCA can enable us to examine which counterinsurgency practices (and their combinations) are most effective while allowing for the complexity inherent in counterinsurgency wars. Given these methodological considerations, I use a mixed-method approach in the next chapter to make generalizations about coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency and trace shifts in subjectivity that may be caused by reflexive self-restraint. While I will not perform a quantitative analysis, I still recognize the value of such analyses. These provide insight into broad patterns between counterinsurgency forces and political outcomes. The analysis of the next chapter combining both QCA and qualitative methods will serve to evaluate other conclusions derived from quantitative work on counterinsurgency.

Western logic of war, and thus we should not expect to see any cases of reflexive counterinsurgency characterized by self-restraint in the pursuit of the restoration of a legal, rule-based order.
Chapter 4: Boolean Analysis of Counterinsurgency Practices in Forty-Seven Conflicts

Introduction

Academic scholarship has made important inroads regarding the different causal forces that cause civil war outcomes, namely counterinsurgent victory or defeat. Such factors include strategic interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents (Arreguin-Toft 2001), the level of counterinsurgent mechanization (Lyall and Wilson 2009), counterinsurgent regime type (Merom 2003), and insurgent access to an external safe haven (Record 2006). However, less research has focused on the relationship between counterinsurgency practices and military success. Lyall (2008) and Hocher, Pepinsky, and
Kalyvas (2011) provide opposing conclusions about the effectiveness of brute force, with the former showing a reduction in insurgent attacks following the use of artillery and the latter demonstrating a loss of state control following indiscriminate aerial bombing. Paul, Clarke, and Grill (2010) have conducted a cross-national comparison of counterinsurgent practices and outcomes, and find that non-coercive practices consistent with recent US Army doctrine are more likely to produce victory than defeat. These findings are best understood when put in the context of the ongoing debate among counterinsurgency theorists about the efficacy of brute force or cooperation as alternative types of counterinsurgency strategy (Arreguin-Toft 2012). This debate is closely linked to the seminal work of Kalyvas (2006), who demonstrates that combatants are more likely to use coercion against civilians when they lack control over a particular piece of territory due to the information problem. This conclusion implies that counterinsurgency will always involve violence against civilians due to the technology of asymmetric warfare (Ibid., 66-69; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and the ability of insurgents to blend in with the population.21

Clearly, more research is needed to determine which counterinsurgency approaches are more likely to cause specific outcomes. To address this gap, I conduct a cross-case comparison of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency practices along with war outcomes. I identify six coercive and persuasive practices that reflect the assumptions of either realist or liberal counterinsurgency theory and then identify how

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21 This aspect of insurgent strategy and its effect on war outcomes illustrates the lasting impact of Mao (1961) on the theory of insurgent warfare. The notion that insurgents are fish who swim amongst the people is often cited to explain the strategy.
these were used by counterinsurgents in 47 cases of asymmetric war. To make this comparison, I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), or Boolean analysis, to avoid oversimplifying each conflict. Boolean analysis has been previously employed to specify combinations of variables that result in interstate war termination (Chan 2003) and social revolution (Foran 2005), but has yet to be employed to study counterinsurgency. Boolean analysis enables the researcher to demonstrate how counterinsurgency victory is the result of different combinations of practices and the ideal, or 'pure', types of realist and liberal counterinsurgency are often blended by counterinsurgent forces. Analysis of the data will show that victory is most likely for counterinsurgents when using purely coercive practices or a combination of coercive and persuasive practices. However, persuasive counterinsurgency will be shown to be more of a myth than a reality, as every single case of counterinsurgency features some form of violence against civilians.

**A Boolean Analysis of Counterinsurgency Practices since 1945**

In Chapter 2, I made several hypotheses about counterinsurgency which are evaluated in this Chapter 4. These are:

**H1:** If counterinsurgents raise the costs of rebellion by either using force or threatening to use force against the people, then rebellion should decrease.

**H2:** If counterinsurgents can identify the people's interests and find overlapping preferences that lead to cooperative agreements, then rebellion should decrease.

**H4:** If counterinsurgents use extreme levels of violence, then rebellion will decrease.  

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22 H3 (“if counterinsurgents engage in reflexive self-restraint with the people, then rebellion will decrease”) cannot be evaluated using QCA due to its emphasis on subjective interpretation and evolving social relationships. I do, however, conduct a plausibility probe of this hypothesis in Chapter 3.
increase due to greater enmity from the people.

H5: If counterinsurgents combine coercion to raise the costs of rebellion while simultaneously bargaining to identify overlapping preferences, then rebellion will decrease.

These alternative hypotheses about counterinsurgency strategies can be evaluated using a Boolean analysis of counterinsurgency practices that reflect realist and liberal assumptions. Boolean analysis is a comparative method that enables a researcher to test hypotheses testing while allowing for maximum causal complexity. Although some social scientists argue that all research should strive for parsimony in articulating lawlike generations about the cause of a phenomenon across cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), cases of asymmetric warfare defy such simplistic explanations because the causes of both rebellion and quiescence are unique to each case (Kilcullen 2010). Ragin refers to such causal complexity as “multiple causal conjunction” indicating that the relationship between cause and effect may be the result of alternative combinations of causal conditions (Ragin 1987, Rihoux 2006). If all counterinsurgencies are uniquely complex, then the relationship between counterinsurgency practices and war outcomes is also defined by multiple causal conjunction, and should be studied as such.

The war outcome of interest is counterinsurgent victory, defined by the military defeat of the insurgency and the achievement of one's war aims. Cases have been

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23 I provide a full discussion of the methodological benefits of using Boolean analysis rather than traditional quantitative and qualitative methods in Chapter 3. Ragin (1987, 2005) provides the original methodological statement demonstrating how Boolean analysis can enable generalizations across cases without reducing them to abstract variables that erode their causal complexity. Further insight into the uses of Boolean analysis (and QCA more generally) has been more recently provided by Rihoux (2003, 2006).
selected based on two criteria:

1. There must be a clear imbalance in power capabilities of military forces and guerrilla opponents at the outset of the conflict.
2. The counterinsurgency must begin after 1945.

To evaluate alternative theories of counterinsurgency while preserving the complexity of counterinsurgency cases, I have identified three coercive practices and three persuasive practices that may or may not be present in each case. These are discussed below in the context of each approach to counterinsurgency.\(^{24}\)

**Coercive Counterinsurgency:** This approach to counterinsurgency is a method of restoring social order that privileges the use of threats and violence against civilians. In its pure form, coercive counterinsurgency is consistent with radical realism in international relations theory (Donnelly 2000) and accepts the need to 'out-terrorize' the people literally and without any sense of restraint (Luttwak 2007). Coercive practices are derived from the assumption that counterinsurgency is no different from any other form of warfare. Achieving the political objectives of the decision-maker requires using force to overthrow the will of the enemy, which may include ordinary civilians (Gentile 2009, 2010, 2013). From the perspective of political theory, pure coercive counterinsurgency is aligned with Hobbes' Leviathan and the notion that only the absolute power of the state can create a climate of fear that puts social rebellion in check. In the context of contemporary international relations theory, coercive counterinsurgency is most

\(^{24}\) While I discuss the theoretical links between IR theory and counterinsurgency approaches in Chapter 2, I provide a brief account here to provide the reader with the theoretical context needed to link counterinsurgency practices to assumptions about politics.
consistent with the assumptions of offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer (2001),
states maintain their own security by amassing as much power as possible to guarantee
their hegemonic domination over other states. By amassing power and demonstrating a
willingness to use it, a hegemonic state can impose punishing costs of weaker states that
may contest its hegemony or challenge its authority. Coercive counterinsurgency simply
takes this same logic and applies it to domestic sphere.

The following counterinsurgency practices are consistent with the assumptions of
coercive counterinsurgency:

(A) Large-Scale Massacres: this practice refers to the indiscriminate application of lethal
force on a large group of civilians, either through direct face-to-face violence or through
indirect bombardment using artillery or airstrikes. Counterinsurgents may resort to tactics
of annihilation to deal with insurgents because of their inability to identify insurgents and
separate them from the people. Faced with such uncertainty, counterinsurgents may treat
the entire civilian population as the enemy and seek their annihilation. When doing so,
they apply the Clausewitzian conception of warfare (in which victory is achieved by
annihilating the enemy on the battlefield) to asymmetric conflict. Massacres are a cost-
effective way of dealing with the identification problem because they create little risk to
counterinsurgent forces and do not require the development of any intelligence about
insurgents. Examples of massacres include genocidal massacres in Rwanda (Gourevitch
1999), bombing Afghan cities by the Soviet Army (Urban 1990, 30), and massacres of
black Angolans by Portuguese settlers and the Portuguese Army (Rivers 1974).

Employing annihilation does not attempt to alter the cost-benefit analysis of
targeted civilians. Rather, it presupposes that counterinsurgents perceive no positive or negative incentives that can alter the primary target population’s behavior to meet counterinsurgent preferences. In Clausewitzian terms, it suggests that the population is part of the enemy whose will can only be overthrown by the use of brute force. This logic ultimately leads military forces to commit widespread massacres (if not outright genocide) as a means of defeating insurgencies as opposed to bargaining with the target group of civilians. Such counterinsurgency practices are “‘massive retaliation’ on a diminutive scale” (Schelling 1966, 14-15), in which punitive violence is applied without any military target. While classic interstate warfare made use of civil violence (or at least its threat) only after a conventional force had been defeated, massacres are used during the war itself and appear in colonial conflicts where no enemy force could be identified and targeted on the battlefield (Ibid.). Massacres are thus the logical end point of Clausewitz’s claim about the nature of warfare to tend toward extremes (Clausewitz 1989, 76-77). This massive use of force can also be used to signal the consequences of non-cooperation with counterinsurgents to other population groups. Thus, for non-target groups, massacres can be used to increase the potential negative incentives of non-cooperation.

I code for the presence of massacres if counterinsurgents intentionally commit large-scale atrocities throughout the conflict either indirectly via mass firepower or directly via face-to-face homicide. By referring to counterinsurgent intentions, I mean that counterinsurgent leadership either directly orders its military forces to commit massacres or tacitly permits massacres to occur. If counterinsurgent leadership actively
punishes its own forces for committing massacres out of rage, I do not count this practice as being present.

*Exemplary Force: (B):* This practice refers to the application of force against civilians to increase the costs of rebellion and insurgent participation. Exemplary force may involve selective torture or extrajudicial killings of individuals suspected of ties to insurgents.\(^{25}\)

This practice involves less absolute forms of coercion when compared to annihilation because it aims to change the behavior of civilian targets rather than simply destroy them. Examples of exemplary force include David Galula's use of ovens to intimidate Algerian detainees (Galula 1965, 118-119), humiliation of Sunnis by US counterinsurgents in Iraq (Ricks 2006, 230-238), and assassinations by death squads in Colombia (Kirk 2004, 256).

Unlike massacres, which do not account for the cost-benefit analysis of primary targets, exemplary force is intended to increase the negative incentives to counterinsurgent non-cooperation against targeted civilians. Exemplary force thus can be used as a form of coercive bargaining with primary civilian targets. According to Schelling, (1966, 26-30), this ‘diplomacy of violence’ validates coercive threats against civilians by deterring cooperation with insurgents and compelling cooperation with counterinsurgents, especially in individual cases of torture and murder. However, such practices are distinct from mass annihilation because military forces believe they have identified individual loyalties based on the behavior of a specific individual. By targeting one individual and raising their costs of non-cooperation, other individuals are faced with

\(^{25}\) The term ‘exemplary force’ is borrowed from Bennett (2007), who argues that the principle of ‘minimum force’ in British counterinsurgency permitted the use of violence against civilians to compel them into cooperating with the government.
potential increased costs as well and may be compelled to cooperate.

I code for the presence of exemplary force if counterinsurgents regularly harass, intimidate, torture, or murder civilians during the conflict, either following direct orders or if such practices are tacitly permitted. If counterinsurgent leadership punishes its own forces for engaging in exemplary force, I do not code the variable as present.

*Resettlement (C)*: this variable refers to mass displacement and resettlement of civilians in new locations. Because insurgents live amongst the people, resettlement enables population control measures that prevent insurgents from moving among different geographic population centers and allow counterinsurgents to better fix and identify insurgent targets. Absent potential supporters, insurgents should face increased difficulty in their attempts to acquire resources and information. Resettlement is different from more coercive practices like annihilation or exemplary force because it focuses on changing the geography of civilian life rather than engaging in all-out annihilation or using exemplary force to deter and compel civilian behavior. The logic of resettlement is derived directly from the problem of insurgency, particularly Mao’s aphorism of insurgent as fish swimming amongst a sea of civilians. Examples of resettlement include the use of *regroupement* camps by the French in Algeria (Bourdieu and Sayad 2004), strategic hamlets by the United States and South Vietnamese government (Thompson 1965), and the resettlement of settlement of civilians during the colonial insurgency that defeated the Rhodesian state (Cilliers 1985).

Resettlement increases the costs of insurgent movement and coordination across geographic spaces. Resettlement also better enables counterinsurgents to monitor and
surveil civilians and thereby increases the risk of providing assistance to insurgents. Further, imposing population displacement and resettlement measures suggest that the people’s preferences for freedom of movement and habitation in a specific location do not coincide with counterinsurgent preferences regarding limits to insurgent mobility. Because counterinsurgents cannot identify insurgents amidst a population of civilians, they cannot distinguish insurgent preferences for mobility from the people’s preferences for mobility. On this basis, counterinsurgents using population control measures force the population to alter its behavior to meet counterinsurgent preferences.

I code for the presence of resettlement if counterinsurgents purposively displace civilians to new, permanent locations controlled by counterinsurgents. Thus, instances where counterinsurgent operations create refugees are not an indication of resettlement. *Persuasive Counterinsurgency:* not all counterinsurgency approaches emphasize coercion. Persuasive or 'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency is grounded in individual liberalism's emphasis on self-interest and human reason as the basis of social and political progress. This approach to counterinsurgency builds upon the political theory of Locke and Bentham, and suggests that counterinsurgents should form a social contract that satisfies the individual utility of each person. Such an agreement (or set of agreements about how to use force to uphold the security of property) should promote freedom and allow civilians to pursue their self-interest without fear of armed threats from insurgents while fulfilling the military objectives of counterinsurgents. On this basis, persuasive counterinsurgency doctrine argues that military forces should aim to win the legitimacy of the people by providing protection from insurgent threats (Nagl 2002, Department of
The economic assumptions of individual liberalism are also evident in persuasive counterinsurgency. Both Kilcullen (2010, 37) clearly states that “calculated self-interest, not emotion” governs civilian decision-making while US Army doctrine states that interests are the core motivation that drive individual behavior (Department of Defense 2007, 97). It follows that counterinsurgents can make cooperative agreements with the population that foster cooperation by appealing to the enlightened self-interest of civilians to promote the use of individual reason in restoring social order. Such an approach is consistent with neoliberal international relations theory that emphasizes the presence of overlapping preferences among actors in anarchy who lack information about each other’s intentions (Keohane 1984) and seek selective incentives to make cooperation rational (Olson 1968). To signal shared preferences and socialize others into collective action, actors should reciprocate cooperative actions and generate a reputation for working with others, thereby reducing fears of defection. To achieve cooperation, then, counterinsurgents must engage in bargaining and offer side-payments that rationalize cooperation.

The following counterinsurgency practices are consistent with the assumptions of persuasive counterinsurgency:

*Amnesty and Negotiations (D)*: this practice refers to offering amnesty programs that enable insurgents to reintegrate into society or negotiating with insurgents. Both are forms of bargaining that aim to find some shared preferences with either rank-and-file insurgents or insurgent leadership. Amnesty is intended to reduce any perceived threat by
insurgents from the government and demonstrate that counterinsurgents share with insurgents a preference for an end of conflict. Amnesty requires that counterinsurgents and insurgents exercise self-restraint in the pursuit of their own preferences about the nature of social order and the extent to which they will use power to pursue short-term gains. These include counterinsurgent preferences for excluding insurgents and their affiliated ideologies from society and insurgent preferences for asymmetric violence against state institutions. Negotiations function as an attempt at joint decision-making (Zartman 1975) and also suggest that some set of shared preferences may exist between insurgents and counterinsurgents including peace. Examples of amnesty include offers from the Guatemalan military to leftist insurgents to return from Mexico with no punishment (Streeter 2006) as well as offers from the Philippine government to Huk rebels to defect and join counterinsurgents (Johnson and Dimech 1993). Examples of negotiations include those between the Spanish government and ETA throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Clark 1990) as well as those between the Israeli government and the PLO in which ended the First Intifada (Catignani 2005, 2008).

I code for the presence of amnesty if counterinsurgents offer insurgents an opportunity to defect from the insurgency without any punishment. I code for the presence of negotiations if counterinsurgents engage in actual negotiations with insurgent leadership, regardless of whether these negotiations fail. This does not include what I refer to as abortive negotiations, when counterinsurgents fail to initiate in actual negotiations because of a disagreement among counterinsurgent leadership, including civilian or military leaders.
Development Assistance (E): this practice refers to the provision of development assistance to create new social and economic opportunities for the population. Development assistance can take the form of construction of infrastructure for use by civilians (schools, bridges, roads, etc.) as well as the creation of job opportunities that provide income to individual civilians. Development assistance can lead to cooperation between counterinsurgents and civilians by functioning as a selective incentive or side payment that solves the collective action problem and increases the benefits of counterinsurgent compliance (Olson 1968). Assistance can also function as a public good and increase the benefits of counterinsurgent cooperation for civilians who may be neutral. Although development assistance does not directly indicate that counterinsurgents and the people share preferences, it does indicate that counterinsurgents aim to improve incentives for cooperation based on the possibility of shared preferences. Examples of development assistance includes the provision of public health services to Algerian civilians by the French Army (Horne 1977, 340-341), major reconstruction projects initiated by the United States in Iraq (Ricks 2006, 2009), and the construction of local schools and health clinics by the government of Colombia (Walker 2009, 28-29).

I code for the presence of development assistance if counterinsurgents initiate major development projects in tandem with the initiation of counterinsurgency operations. Instances where counterinsurgents may already be providing foreign assistance unrelated to the conflict are not coded as relevant instances.

Elite Relationships (F): this practice refers to a deliberate effort by counterinsurgents to
form or maintain long-term relationships with elite members of the civilian population. Rather than focusing on the entire population, creating elite relationships makes possible bargaining with individuals whose capabilities are known and intentions are iteratively learned over time. Such relationships can provide counterinsurgents with a broader network of contacts in civil society including irregular armed forces drawn from the local population who are loyal to allied elites. Elite relationships do not refer to relationships with central government figures residing in capitals and leading bureaucratic organizations. Rather, elite relationships refer to counterinsurgent ties to those actors within civil society among populations experiencing insurgent mobilization. Examples of elite relationships include alliances between the British and landowning Kikuyus in Kenya (Branch 2007), the Burmese state and the United Wa State Army, which had previously engaged in rebellion (Cline 2009), and the cooption of the Kadyrov family in Chechnya by Russia during the Second Chechen War (Renaud 2010). I code for the presence of elite relationships if counterinsurgents successfully form cooperative alliances with local power brokers during the conflict.

The varying presence or absence of these six practices in each case will lead to any one of 64 combinations that may or may not lead to counterinsurgent victory. According to Boolean multiplication, each causal combination is unique in the presence and absence of causal variables and is represented by the conjunction AND. For example, take the following Boolean expression:

\[ W = ABC\text{def} \]

If the pure realist combination ABCdef resulted in counterinsurgent victory, then
annihilation AND exemplary force AND resettlement must be present while
negotiations/amnesty AND development assistance AND elite relationships must be
absent. Of course, multiple combinations can result victory for counterinsurgents, and
these are represented in Boolean algebra by the conjunction OR. For example, take the
following Boolean expression:

\[ W = ABC\text{def} + abc\text{DEF} \]

This means that either the pure realist ABC\text{def} OR the pure liberal abc\text{DEF}
combinations can result in victory. Not only do causal factors combine in unique and
complex ways, but the possibility of multiple causal conjuncture means that multiple
combinations may produce counterinsurgent victory. In the below analysis, I code each
case of counterinsurgency for the above six practices and war outcomes and then reduce
Boolean equations to their logically
simplified equations. The presence or absence of each factor in each case and its outcome can be seen below in Table 1.

**Boolean Analysis of Imperial Counterinsurgencies from 1945-present**

I begin by analyzing 18 cases of imperial counterinsurgency. By imperial counterinsurgency, I refer to those conflict in which an external military force invades
and occupies another state or territory either to extend its own political control or to support and defend the existing regime from an insurgent challenge. These should be more difficult cases for counterinsurgents to achieve victory compared to domestic cases of counterinsurgency due to cultural differences between foreign military forces and domestic populations as well as the nominal violation of state sovereignty and national self-determination. Such differences should make bargaining and the discovery of common preferences more difficult for imperial counterinsurgents. While a clean relationship between realist practices and imperial counterinsurgency on one hand and liberal practices and domestic counterinsurgency on the other is unlikely, it is useful to keep these distinctions in mind when examining different combinations of counterinsurgency practices.

After compiling a truth table for all 64 potential combinations of a six-factor Boolean equation (see Table 1, Appendix A) and coding all 18 cases, the data shows that counterinsurgents are victorious in only five out of 18 cases, or just over 26 percent. This indicates that imperial counterinsurgency success is rather rare after World War II. In addition, two of the five victories (KEN and MAL, or Kenya and Malaysia) were counterinsurgencies performed by Britain. The same combination of practices leads to victory in both British cases, namely aBCdEF (absence of annihilation, presence of exemplary force, presence of resettlement, absence of negotiations/amnesty, presence of development assistance, presence of elite relationships), and indicates a combination of both realist and liberal practices. Since British counterinsurgency is considered to be the historical basis for winning hearts and minds, it’s even mix of practices calls into question the effectiveness of persuasive counterinsurgency. Even in Cyrus, which is a
British defeat, British forces still use exemplary force as a means of compelling cooperation with counterinsurgents. Given the consistency of some kind of violence against civilians, we can say with a fair degree of confidence that the British never actually used pure persuasion. This indicates that the historical lessons drawn from their counterinsurgency experiences actually ignore the unsavory parts of their attempts to counter rebellion.

The other cases of victory were won by the Soviet Union (HUN or Hungary), France (MAD or Madagascar), and China (TIB or Tibet). These relied on pure realist strategies involving annihilation (A) and exemplary force (B). China's counterinsurgency in Tibet combines these practices with amnesty/negotiations (D) to achieve victory, but realist strategies remain dominant. Any one of these three combinations can produce victory, and demonstrate a preponderance of successful coercive practices over persuasive practices. Thus, the primitive equation for all combinations producing victory is

1) \[ W = AB\text{cDef} + aBCdEF + AB\text{cdef} \]

This equation can then be simplified using the basic minimization rule: if two expressions differ on only factor, then that factor can be eliminated and the two expressions can be combined. Applying the simplification rule produces the following equation:

2) \[ W = AB\text{cef} + aBCdEF \]

This cannot be simplified further because no prime implicants can cover all the primitive expressions.

Given equation (2), we can begin to make some generalizations about which counterinsurgency practices are necessary, but not sufficient, for victory. Exemplary
force (B) is the only factor that is present in both simplified expressions, making it the only necessary COIN practice for all 19 cases. But because no single factor can cause victory by itself, no single counterinsurgency practice is sufficient. To illustrate, I factor out (B) from all three expressions. This produces equation (3).

\[ W = B(acDef) + B(Acdef) + B(CdEF) \]

Equation 3) shows which others factors must be present with (B) to produce victory while all others are absent. These include BD, AB, and BCEF. Thus, victory is an outcome if exemplary force (B) is combined with amnesty/negotiations (D); annihilation (A); or resettlement (C), development assistance (E), and elite relationships (F).

I examine AB first. This is the most strongly realist combination of factors producing sufficiency because it relies solely on direct coercion, either by destroying the civilian population through massacres or using non-absolute forms of coercion to increase the costs of non-compliance with counterinsurgents while still threatening further violence. This combination demonstrates that pure coercion can be used to raise the costs of rebellion beyond what can be tolerated by civilians. ‘Out-terrorizing’ civilians may be a successful practice, thereby providing support to the realist hypothesis H1.

Next, BD combines both realist and liberal COIN practices. BD suggests that both positive and negative incentives are sufficient for victory, as exemplary force increases the costs of non-compliance while amnesty and negotiations provide cooperative avenues for bargaining about preferences that reduce the costs for compliance.

The combination BCEF also combines both realist and liberal practices, but suggests that liberal practices combine with exemplary force to increase incentives for cooperation rather than reduce costs for non-compliance. Factor (E), development
assistance, provides additional economic goods that make cooperation more attractive, while factor (F), elite relationships, establishes local allies among civilians whose prestige and status is bolstered by the provision of new positive incentives.

However, realist practices are also needed in this equation, and not merely to increase the costs of non-compliance. The presence of (C), resettlement, indicates that the combination of other factors (BEF) is effective only when civilians have fewer opportunities for cooperation with insurgents due to spatial control. Victory, then, results from the reduction of cooperative opportunities with insurgents and the increasing costs of non-compliance (as predicted by realists) as well as an increase in incentives for cooperation coupled strengthening the status and prestige of local allies among civilians (as predicted by liberals). This successful combination of factors supports H3, the mixed hypothesis.

Although this combination combines both coercive and bargaining practices, I claim that it still reflects more a more realist counterinsurgency strategy. Imperial counterinsurgents can strengthen local leaders through selective incentives because these elites have better knowledge about the intentions and activities of local civilians and enable targeted repression rather than mass annihilation. In this way, liberal COIN practices thereby enable imperial counterinsurgents to refine their coercive practices rather than pursue true bargaining that respects the autonomy of civilian choices. The simplified expression ABcef is a clear example of this. Negotiations/amnesty is shown to be irrelevant in this combination, it can be either present or absent while counterinsurgents are employing annihilation and exemplary force. This is consistent with Mearsheimer's realist claims about bargaining – if negotiations/amnesty is employed
by counterinsurgents (as is true in the Tibetan case of Chinese counterinsurgency), such bargaining merely reflects the short-term calculations of both sides and is merely a prelude to the defeat of insurgency.

This analysis of realist counterinsurgency strategies suggests that realism must always inform the mix of practices employed by militaries to achieve victory. In every combination, exemplary force (B) is a necessary factor for victory. Therefore, victorious counterinsurgencies must increase the costs of non-compliance to defeat an insurgency. However, B is combined with only annihilation (A), or with a mix of realist and liberal practices (C, D, E, or F). Thus, both pure realist strategies and mixed strategies can lead to success. However, this analysis of imperial counterinsurgency makes clear that pure liberal strategies do not produce success. No combination of pure liberal strategies - amnesty/negotiations (D), development assistance (E), or elite relationships (F) - produce victory. This conclusion produces no support for H2, and also challenges the model of counterinsurgency articulated in FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency and supported by Paul, Clarke, and Grill (2010). Although victory has many sources, they all involve a fair amount of coercion, and none of them rely on pure persuasion.

Boolean Analysis of Domestic Counterinsurgencies, 1945-present

My second analysis consists of 29 cases of domestic counterinsurgency. By 'domestic counterinsurgency', I refer to those cases in which in counterinsurgency is waged a by a sovereign state against an insurgency within its own territory and involves no violation of sovereignty. Victory occurs in 11 out of 29 cases, or about 38 percent. While defeat is more likely than success, victory in domestic counterinsurgency is still more likely compared to imperial counterinsurgency. In addition, two of the 11 victories
were achieved in the Philippines, which is seen as a country that has practiced successful counterinsurgency with American support and training. Although the combinations leading to Philippine victory are slightly different (varying only in the presence/absence of elite relationships), they nonetheless employ exemplary force combined with at least two liberal practices. In fact, all the above cases (win or non-win) employ exemplary force, suggesting that no state has waged COIN without using coercion against innocent civilians. There is, however, high variation among the use of annihilation (3 out of 11 cases) and resettlement (6 out of 11 cases).

Not including those combinations which repeat, the primitive Boolean equation for domestic COIN success is:

1) \( W = a\text{Bcdef} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} + a\text{BcDEF} \)

This initial result reinforces claims made by counterinsurgency theorists like Kilcullen (2010) that the conditions for counterinsurgency victory will vary greatly across cases and suggests that the causal complexity between counterinsurgency practices and war outcomes is especially high.

If simplified using the basic minimization rule, equation 1) can be reduced to the following:

2) \( W = a\text{BcDE} + a\text{BcDE} + a\text{BcDE} + a\text{BcDE} + a\text{BcDE} + a\text{BcDE} \)

This reduced equation demonstrates that the overall combinations of realist and liberal practices remain highly varied. The most realist combination is \( a\text{BcDE} \), which
covers counterinsurgencies in Sri Lanka and Sudan (Darfur). While negotiations were used in these conflicts, their insurgencies were generally suppressed through the full range of realist practices. This result suggests that Mearsheimer’s claim (1995) about the short-term nature of bargaining and agreements amid a struggle for power remains correct, and that counterinsurgents maximize such attempts at bargaining to improve their military and political standing. No successful case employs the full range of liberal practices, but instead feature combinations of two of the three practices alongside others.

Because of the great variation in combinations, the high number of cases, and the presence of successful combinations that lead to defeat in other cases, we can eliminate some outliers from equation 1) by increasing the ‘consistency cutoff’ for inclusion in the Boolean Analysis. Consistency refers to combinations that vary in their outcomes and create contradictions. A consistency of 1 means all cases in which a particular combination appears leads to victory, while a consistency of 0.5 means that only half of the cases in which a particular combination appears leads to victory. Combinations with lower consistencies indicate that other causal factors may produce variation in outcomes other than a particular set of COIN practices.

I do this in multiple ways, first by removing all those successful combinations that are failures in the majority of the rest of the cases in which that combination is present. Since combination ABCDef succeeds only in Sri Lanka but fails in seven other cases, its consistency of 0.125 makes it an outlier for removal. Once analyzed by removing this outlier, equation 3) is produced and simplified as follows:

3) \( W = ABDeF + BCDeF + aBCdef + aBcdef + aBcDEf \)

This simplified equation again demonstrate the need for mixed combinations, with all
expressions except aBcDEf equally mixing realist and liberal practices. Because no single practice can produce counterinsurgency victory, there are no individual factors that are casually sufficient. However, the presence of exemplary force in all cases demonstrates its necessary. Recall from the above analysis of imperial counterinsurgencies that exemplary force was also found to be a necessary variable. Below, I factor out exemplary force to create expression 4) and infer how different combinations of factors with exemplary force can produce victory.

4) \[ W = B(ADeF) + B(CDeF) + B(aCef) + B(acdeF) + B(acDEf) \]

Combination B(aCef) is the most strongly realist expression since it does not require the presence of any liberal practices but instead requires the absence of development assistance and elite relationships. Victory in this combination is produced by intimidating and resettling ordinary people, consistent with the inverse of Mao's metaphor of the people as the sea in which insurgents swim. Since annihilation is absent in this combination, it suggests that counterinsurgents still rely on obtaining information about insurgents from civilians to identify insurgents and cannot afford to simply destroy civilians. The presence of this combination provides further support for H1.

Combinations B(ADeF) and B(CDeF) are mixed combinations but still use direct coercion without offering any positive incentives to ordinary people. Although these combinations include liberal practices such as negotiations/amnesty and the formation of local elite relationships, these cooperative factors enable counterinsurgents to meet local preferences but only in tandem in coercion that moves those preferences closer to those of counterinsurgents. These combinations also feature the absence of development assistance and produce victory without providing material benefits to ordinary civilians.
and instead engage in bargaining with insurgents themselves and local elites.

Combination B(acdeF) is a politically conservative strategy that applies exemplary force to civilians while forging relationships with local elites. Thus, while counterinsurgents use coercion to force the local population to comply with their preferences, the formation of elite relationships and alliances suggests that the forced shift in preferences is still consistent with the preferences of local elites.

Lastly, combination B(acDEf) is the most liberal combination. Although it does employ exemplary force against civilians to alter their preferences, its use of development assistance indicates the provision of positive incentives to non-combatants that increase the benefits of counterinsurgent cooperation. Combined with insurgent negotiations and amnesty, this combination attempts to find common preferences with insurgents by weakening it through non-coercive means and positive civilian collaboration.

All together, the last four combinations discussed provide strong support for H3, the mixed hypothesis. Like in imperial counterinsurgencies, defeating insurgents requires increasing the costs of rebellion as well as the benefits of counterinsurgent cooperation. They indicate that domestic counterinsurgents can mix and match coercive and persuasive practices to achieve victory, and that no one mix of practices will always be successful in achieving counterinsurgent compliance. This suggests that counterinsurgents will always have to tailor the specific mix of coercion and persuasion to match the conditions producing a particular insurgency, as is consistent with claims about the complexity of counterinsurgency warfare.

**Boolean Analysis of All Counterinsurgencies, 1945 - present**
The third and final analysis compiles 47 cases of counterinsurgency, imperial and domestic, into a single Boolean Analysis. Counterinsurgency victory occurs in 16 out of 47 cases, or 33 percent of cases. Four of the 16 expressions repeat more than once, resulting in 12 unique expressions producing counterinsurgent victory. Once again, this demonstrates the high degree of causal complexity among counterinsurgency practices and outcomes. The equation encompassing all possible victorious counterinsurgency expressions is shown below:

1) \( W = aBcdeF + aBcDef + aBcDEF + aBCdef + aBCdEF + aBCDeF + aBCDEF + ABcdef + ABcDef + ABcDEf + aBCDef + ABCDeF \)

This equation produces all the relevant combinations leading to COIN victory in either an imperial or domestic counterinsurgency. Once simplified, it results in the following equation:

2. \( W = ABDe + ABcdf + aBcDE + aBCDF + aBCdef + aBcdeF + BCDef \)

Note that the above equation does include two combinations relying on pure realist strategies: \( ABcdf \) and \( aBCdef \). The former expression covers victorious counterinsurgencies including the Soviet Union in Hungary and France in Madagascar. The latter expression, \( aBCdef \), only includes Indonesia's post-independence counterinsurgency. As expected, there are no pure liberal counterinsurgency expressions, only mixed ones that combine releases and liberal practices.
Equation 2) can be further modified by removing outliers which have either a low frequency or have a high rate of inconsistency (these are victorious expressions that are also present in cases of counterinsurgent non-victory). Equation 3) indicates the result of simplifying the 'All Wars' equation by removing those cases with an consistency below 0.5 (cases featuring the same combination, yet less than half result in victory). Raising the consistency threshold eliminates expression ABCDef, which succeeds only in Sri Lanka but fails to produce victory in its seven other appearances. After simplification, the following equation is produced:

3) \[ W = BCDeF + ABDeF + aBCEF + ABcdef + aBCdef + aBcdeF + aBcDEf \]

BCDeF, ABDeF, and aBCEF are the only reduced expressions in the equation, and with the inclusion of four primitive expressions, equation 3) indicates that the combinations leading to counterinsurgency victory are still highly case dependent even after the removal of one outlier. Like the other equations, no pure liberal strategies lead to counterinsurgent victory, only mixed strategies.

Despite the unique relationship between combinations and cases of victory, we can still refine this equation to identify which combinations are most generalizable across by removing those combinations with a frequency less than two (these are combinations featuring only one case) while maintaining a consistency threshold of 0.5. Applying such thresholds removes most combinations, leaving only the following reduced expression:

4) \[ W = aBCEF + ABcdef + aBcDEf \]

This equation includes the following cases: Soviet Union in Hungary and France in Madagascar (ABcdef), both counterinsurgencies in the Philippines (aBcDEf), Colombia, Uganda, Kenya and Malaya (Colombia and Uganda feature aBCDEF, while
Kenya and Malaya feature aBCdEF. These reduce to aBCEF).

Overall, this indicates that two of the most generalizable combinations are those which feature mixed combinations. Both rely on economic development but alternate in their emphasis on negotiations and elite relationships. The former, aBcDEf, is more consistent with liberalism compared to aBCEF because it relies on bargaining with insurgents and civilians. The latter, more conservative strategy, relies on additional coercion of civilians via resettlement and additional bargaining and support for local elites.

Discussion

After performing these three Boolean analyses, we can make some claims about the relationship between realist and liberal theories of counterinsurgency and the use of force against civilians in counterinsurgency wars. All equations leading to victory for each of the three analyses are shown below in Table 2.

First, the presence of exemplary force in every case indicates that all counterinsurgency involves coercion against civilians. This historical evidence would seem to invalidate any theoretical claim that pure liberal counterinsurgency is possible and suggests that counterinsurgents can never engage in true bargaining with civilians. This resort to 'coercive bargaining' can be explained by putting the identification problem in the context of
### Chart 4: Boolean Equations Leading to Counterinsurgency Victory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperial COIN: Practices for Victory</th>
<th>Present Practices</th>
<th>Absent Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 (Most Coercive)</strong></td>
<td>Annihilation, Exemplary Force</td>
<td>Resettlement, Development Assistance, Elite Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 (Most Persuasive)</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Resettlement, Development Assistance, Elite Relationships</td>
<td>Annihilation, Amnesty/Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary for Victory</td>
<td>Exemplary Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies for Victory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Overwhelming violence or violence with elite alliances and incentives for resettlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 (Most Coercive)</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Resettlement</td>
<td>Annihilation, Amnesty/Negotiations, Development Assistance, Elite Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>Annihilation, Exemplary Force, Amnesty/Negotiations, Elite Relationships</td>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Resettlement, Amnesty/Negotiations, Elite Relationships</td>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Elite Relationships</td>
<td>Annihilation, Resettlement, Amnesty/Negotiations, Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 (Most Persuasive)</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Amnesty/Negotiations, Development Assistance</td>
<td>Annihilation, Resettlement, Elite Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary for Victory</td>
<td>Exemplary Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies for Victory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Overwhelming violence with negotiation and local allies or violence with combination of resettlement, incentives, and local allies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All COIN: Practices for Victory</th>
<th>Present Practices</th>
<th>Absent Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 (Most Coercive)</strong></td>
<td>Annihilation, Exemplary Force</td>
<td>Annihilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Resettlement, Development, Elite Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 (Most Persuasive)</strong></td>
<td>Exemplary Force, Amnesty/Negotiations, Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Necessary for Victory</td>
<td>Exemplary Force</td>
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<td><strong>Overwhelming violence or violence with combination of resettlement, negotiations, incentives and local allies</strong></td>
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arguments about the relationship between uncertainty about preferences. Recall that the identification problem refers to the inability of counterinsurgents to identify insurgents among the noncombatant civilian population (Kalyvas 2006). Because counterinsurgents cannot be sure about the identities of civilians, liberal constructivist arguments suggest that they will be unable to discern the preferences of civilians. For example, Fearon and Wendt (2002) claim that rationalist theories emphasizing self-interest and constructivist theories emphasizing identity form complementary explanations of social behavior. By claiming that the rationalist/constructivist debate is false, they argue that one's rational self-interests are constituted, or made possible, by one's socially learned identity.

However, if counterinsurgents are unable to identify civilians as non-combatants, they will be unable to specify the interests of civilians and determine whether or not they have shared preferences.

The lack of counterinsurgent information caused by the identification problem ultimately prevents any kind of bargaining between counterinsurgents and civilians that would lead to long-term cooperation. This argument validates rational neorealist arguments about the causes of war and their emphasis on private or incomplete information and the inability to make commitments (Van Evera 1989, Fearon 1994). Because counterinsurgents cannot separate the identity and interests of civilians from insurgents, any kind of negotiation between civilians and counterinsurgents will always fail to specify a ‘bargaining space’ that satisfies both the self-interests of counterinsurgents and the self-interests of civilians. If no such common interests can be identified by counterinsurgents, then it becomes rational to simply pursue their own interests regardless of civilians. This is how incomplete information about identity and
preferences leads to a breakdown of bargaining and collapse of peaceful negotiation. Further, the potential threat from a civilian population that includes unidentifiable insurgents creates a commitment problem on the part of counterinsurgents. If counterinsurgents seek to fulfill their own self-interest through bargaining with civilians, merely engaging in some kind of negotiation is inherently risky given the potential for hidden insurgents to use violence against counterinsurgents. Hence, counterinsurgents will find it difficult to commit to any process of bargaining with civilians because the potential for defection is always high.

Since the identification problem always causes incomplete information and commitment problems for counterinsurgents, there is no way they can engage in pure liberal counterinsurgency practices and achieve their own self-interests. The gains of negotiation between counterinsurgents and civilians are always zero-sum because the latter could be insurgents who can use violence against counterinsurgents. Thus, means that counterinsurgents will always approach such engagements seeking relative gains over civilians. This is consistent with Mearsheimer (1994) and Powell’s (1991) arguments about the conditions under which states in international relations will pursue relative gains. They argue that relative gains will always be pursued in issues of ‘high politics’, or security, in which the costs of defection within a specific interaction are very high due to the nature of security conflicts. Interaction in asymmetric warfare is characterized by the same conditions – if a counterinsurgent misidentify a civilian as an insurgent and assume cooperative preferences where none exist, the cost could be death. Since dead counterinsurgents do not have the luxury of iterated interactions, they should be extremely reluctant to engage in pure cooperation. At the same time, using more
selective forms of violence such as exemplary force when combined with persuasive practices can provide civilians with a range of benefits (both security and economic) that can lead to cooperation. Thus, manipulating both the positive and negative ends of civilian preferences appears to be the best way for counterinsurgents to achieve their own objectives.

In terms of the above hypotheses, the presence of pure realist combinations provides some support for Hypothesis 1, but the absence of pure liberal combinations provides no support for Hypothesis 2. However, neither hypothesis is strongly validated or refuted. Since every single case employs exemplary force, this analysis does not support a claim that coercion against civilians will always work. In some cases, a pure realist strategy will fail although it has succeeded in others. The same is true for mixed strategies that combine both coercion and bargaining. Thus, other causal factors may result in counterinsurgent victory which may be separate from realist or liberal counterinsurgency practices.

Lastly, these results suggest that violence against civilians may be a successful counterinsurgency strategy. According to Kalyvas (2006, Chapter 6), indiscriminate violence against a group of civilians makes protection a selective incentive and rationalizes collective insurgent action against the incumbent state. However, pure realist strategies of indiscriminate violence (featuring both annihilation and exemplary force) are successful in two cases. In four more cases (China in Tibet, Russia in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and Sudan in Darfur), annihilation and exemplary force are combined with other practices to achieve victory. Either way, there are six cases in which indiscriminate violence results in victory. Although a detailed case study would be necessary to identify
the specific causal chain between indiscriminate violence and victory in each case, we can infer that some other causal factors must be necessary to prevent insurgent mobilization despite the provision of protection as a selective incentive. Although these practices should make it impossible for counterinsurgents to provide any kind of selective protection, insurgents were unable to rally to population. Thus, whether or not counterinsurgents have to offer selective protection may vary on the case. Specifically, we can hypothesize that providing no protection to civilians will not be costly for counterinsurgents if insurgents are so unorganized that they cannot provide civilians with protection as their own selective incentive. In such cases, insurgent weakness may prevent them from holding territory and denying counterinsurgents the ability to threaten all civilians, thereby enabling counterinsurgents to freely use indiscriminate massacres and making the cost of rebellion absolute.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has used empirical data to demonstrate that purely coercive or mixed combinations of counterinsurgency practices are likely to result in counterinsurgent victory, while purely persuasive combinations of practices not only fail to result in victory but are found to not be present among any of the included cases. These findings cast serious doubt on the applicability of liberal counterinsurgency theory, particularly its assumption that insurgencies can be defeated and counterinsurgent preferences can be realized by forging cooperative agreements with the people. Because of the nature of asymmetric warfare, counterinsurgents cannot separate insurgents from civilians or learn about the latter’s preferences as a basis of finding a cooperative agreement that satisfies the interests of both sides. Faced with such uncertainty and the risk of insurgent violence,
counterinsurgents resort to coercion against civilians as the only way of achieving their own preferences. On this basis, liberal counterinsurgency theory (which privileges the protection of the people as a strategy to defeat insurgencies and achieve selfinterested objectives without using coercion against civilians) appears to be beset with insurmountable contradictions. Rather than form genuine relationships of cooperation, the application of liberalism to conditions of asymmetric war results in the manipulation of the people through coercion and persuasion rather than the structural transformation of social conditions that would provide real security to civilians.

One weakness of the above Boolean analysis is that it lumps the practices of an entire asymmetric conflict together into one single case without acknowledging that counterinsurgents may change the practices employed. Proponents of persuasive counterinsurgency would certainly make this critique based on their argument that successful counterinsurgents always learn and adapt to the nature of a particular conflict (Nagl 2002). This is a valid critique that limits the explanatory potential of Boolean analysis as well as the above findings. While the above analysis indicates what overall combinations lead to the defeat of insurgencies, it does not account for how shifts in practices during a conflict can change its trajectory. To evaluate these shifts, I perform a qualitative case study in the next chapter that also evaluates the plausibility of a reflexive approach to counterinsurgency.
Chapter 5: US Counterinsurgency in Iraq’s al-Anbar Province

Introduction

While the Boolean analysis of Chapter 4 casts doubt on the plausibility of liberal counterinsurgency, its explanatory power is limited by treating each case as a single observation. While the evidence demonstrates that no conflict has been fought using a pure liberal counterinsurgency strategy, it does not account for instances where counterinsurgents make a dramatic and pronounced shift in their counterinsurgency practices during an asymmetric war. Proponents of persuasive counterinsurgency have argued that such shifts between phases of a conflict demonstrate that counterinsurgents and the people can work together despite earlier instances of coercion. Nagl has famously argued that the difference between British and US counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam has been the former's ability to adopt hearts and minds counterinsurgency following the initial failure of more realist practices (Nagl 2002). The shift to new tactics is driven by learning and adaption to the nature of the conflict on the part of counterinsurgents. Contemporary theorists of persuasive counterinsurgents have expanded on this theme to highlight the importance of learning about the culture of the people (Heuser 2007). Logically, knowledge about the culture of the population should help counterinsurgents specify the people’s preferences and provide contextual information that enables them to engage in bargaining to find common interests that can serve as the basis of cooperation. If so, then the negative conclusions about persuasive counterinsurgency that are drawn from Chapter 4 must be evaluated using a more fine-

26 Of course, Karl Hack (2009) argues that Nagl's narrative about the benevolent nature of British counterinsurgency is exaggerated and suggests that coercive techniques including resettlement and population control effectively broke the back of the insurgency.
grained analysis, one that allows for shifts in practices within cases while accounting for the impact of those shifts on the perception of the population. While pure persuasive counterinsurgency may not be possible if the unit of analysis is an entire conflict, but it may be possible for counterinsurgents to dramatically switch from either pure realist or mixed strategies to pure persuasive practices. This chapter seeks to provide just such an analysis by examining US counterinsurgency in Iraq’s al Anbar province. This case is important for the evaluation of persuasive counterinsurgency because it contains all three persuasive counterinsurgency practices yet results in a stalemate. In the below section, I use the purely qualitative method of process tracing to illustrate how counterinsurgency practices activate causal mechanisms that lead civilians to alternatively oppose and support US counterinsurgents. This case study is informed by social constructivist approaches that explain security competition and cooperation by virtue of the intersubjective understandings of political actors. By using a constructivist approach, I can demonstrate how counterinsurgent practices are informed by perceptions of shared or opposing interests with the people while also exploring how the learned experiences of counterinsurgents constitutes their understanding of their self-interest. I can also evaluate the degree to which counterinsurgent learning can consistent with reflexive self-restraint, which defines the aspirational theory of reflexive counterinsurgency discussed in Chapter 2 and informed by theories of communicative action and human security.

While the Boolean analysis in Chapter 4 enabled me to evaluate Hypotheses 1 through 3, this case will enable me to evaluate the constructivist Hypotheses 4 and 5, which refer to the use of reflexive self-restraint without regard for the short-term interests of counterinsurgents and the activation of self-fulfilling prophecies that cause
counterinsurgents and the people to learn hostility from previous experiences. At the same time, I acknowledge that evaluating reflexive counterinsurgency in only one case cannot allow for broad generalizations about its empirical effectiveness. In fact, we should expect to evaluate reflexive counterinsurgency only in cases like Iraq that are the ‘most liberal’ because they include all three persuasive practices. Yet, as the Boolean analysis shows, we lack any other cases that are this close to pure persuasive counterinsurgency. Given this very limited number of cases, this chapter can only function as a plausibility probe since it examines the most liberal possible case of counterinsurgency for reflexive forms of interaction.

This chapter proceeds in two parts. First, it outlines a constructivist mechanism-based explanation of counterinsurgency outcomes. It argues that knowledge produced by social interaction informs the practices of actors in asymmetric warfare and drives changes in social relationships between the people, insurgents, and counterinsurgents that promote cooperation and competition. I show how the activation of specific social mechanisms (self-fulfilling prophecies, diffusion, brokerage, and reflexive self-restraint) leads the people to cooperate or compete with either insurgents or cooperation. The second half of the chapter explains the outcomes of different phases in al Anbar province by referring to the presence of those same causal mechanisms. Although the case ends with US-Sunni cooperation and the short-term defeat of al Qaeda insurgents, it will demonstrate that a shift from coercive counterinsurgency to persuasive and even reflexive practices failed to produce long-term security for the population following the departure of US forces. Ultimately, the hostile relationship between the predominately Shi’a Iraqi state and the Sunnis of Anbar could not be transformed by reflexive counterinsurgency.
In even this most favorable case for liberal counterinsurgency theory, true victory remained elusive.

*Constructivism in Social Movement Theory and International Relations*

A constructivist approach toward intrastate war builds upon the use of process tracing in both social movement theory and international relations. The body of work produced by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly has synthesized previously competing structuralist and culturalist theories into a constructivist framework known as Contentious Politics that explains how social movement mobilization and the emergence of political identities that rationalize individual behavior (McAdam 1982; McAdam, et. al. 2001) Contentious Politics begins from Weber's assumption that political agents subjectively interpret how structures affect them based on their own understanding (*verstehen*) of their identity and their changing relationships to others in society. To explain how relationships and identities lead social movements to change over time, McAdam et. al. instruct scholars to examine social mechanisms and political processes. Two processes are central to the construction of social movements, namely mobilization and identity formation (Ibid., 43-51, 143-158). While several mechanisms interact to produce these processes,27 the relational mechanism brokerage is the most important for the social construction of new identities and movements. Brokerage is defined as “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites (Ibid., 23).” A second mechanism,

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27 McAdam et. al. argue that movement mobilization is driven by the following mechanisms: subjective attribution of opportunities and threats, the appropriation of bureaucratic or social sites by movement agents, innovative collective action, and shifts in perceptual uncertainty in response to the actions of other movements or the state. The process of identity formation is driven by brokerage, the subjective formation of new social categories, shifts in the objects of movement claims, and certification or decertification of movement actions by external authorities.
diffusion, explains how new understandings of the world and spread through existing social relationships and cause widespread transformations of social behavior (Ibid., 68). While diffusion can be partial and limited to a small subset of an entire population, Axelrod has used game-theoretic models to show how a critical mass of individuals can cause a social system to reach a tipping point at which new understandings about the possibility of cooperation become adopted by the entire population (Axelrod 1984, Chapter 3). In their examination of diffusion at the international level, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that new norms cascade throughout states and non-state actors through socialization. Coupling brokerage and diffusion highlights the structural relevance of networks of relationships that permit the spread of new ideas. For example, military theorists have incorporated culture and structure into explanations of the formation of insurgent networks as 'netwar' or 'open-source warfare' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, Robb 2007). Brokerage and diffusion thus are important mechanisms because they explain how new relationships permit the emergence of novel worldviews activated through new and existing social ties.

Two other mechanisms which explain movement mobilization and the formation of worldviews and movement mobilization come from IR constructivists. The first is the self-fulfilling prophecy. Vasquez and Wendt argue that beliefs about the hostility of other agents, like those that characterize realpolitik approaches toward international relations, often produce conflict. Since agents’ expectations drive their perceptions of themselves and others, they tend to settle into reinforcing patterns. For example, if one agent expects hostility from another and acts that way to prevent harm to herself, her counterpart will learn hostility and react accordingly. This is true even if the initial expectation of hostility
is mistaken. Thus, as agents learn to expect hostility from each other, they become locked in a competitive relationship (Vasquez 1993, Wendt 1999).

However, self-fulfilling prophecies can be broken as agents critically assess their own actions and realize how they reproduce mutual hostility. This characterizes a second key mechanism, reflexive self-restraint. A reflexive agent that recognizes how new actions can falsify expectations of hostility will purposely signal the possibility of cooperation by performing altruistic and empathic actions (Finnemore and Sikkink 898-899). By restraining oneself and demonstrating concern for the well-being of counterparts, a reflexive agent can communicate that it recognizes the subjective existence of other agents, thereby making possible the negotiation of new rules to govern interaction between them and the emergence of an inclusive political community (Drulak 2005). Wendt describes such purposeful attempts to transform subjective structures of hostility as a form of critical strategic interaction (Wendt 2003, 511-512). As conceptualized through Schelling’s work on the nature of commitments and bargaining, projecting friendship alters expectations because it binds the reflexive agent to a cooperative identity and signals to other agents that friendship is normatively appropriate (Schelling 1960, 9-11; 89-92). In this way, reflexive self-restraint creates stable expectations of cooperation that, in turn, constrain competitive practices within a group of agents by making possible a new inclusive collective identity. By refraining from pursuing one's own immediate interests and questioning one's own perception of the world, the reflexive agent can find novel ways of understanding social reality and articulate such an inclusive worldview in tandem with others.

The liberal counterinsurgency practices identified in the above Boolean analysis
can trigger these causal mechanisms and drive mobilization and identity formation. For example, negotiations and amnesty can break self-fulfilling prophecies and signal reflexive self-restraint by creating opportunities for peaceful communication between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Economic development can have a similar function by demonstrating concern for the well-being of the civilian population. And, forming elite relationships triggers brokerage by developing a social network through which new ideas can diffuse into existing networks.

These practices (which identify and create shared preferences according to neoliberal economic theory) can work to construct a shared identity that forms the basis for joint action with counterinsurgents. By tracing the presence of these causal mechanisms in a single case and linking them to outcomes, I can evaluate the effectiveness of the reflexive approach to counterinsurgency discussed in Chapter 2, albeit within the confines of a single case.

**Linking Causal Mechanisms to Explain Civilian Mobilization and Identities**

If we apply the above constructivist insights about identity and social interaction to intrastate war, we can explain how insurgents and counterinsurgents compete to mobilize civilians and build shared identities by activating the above four mechanisms. When combatant agents reflexively recognize the people as political subjects and not as threatening objects to be dealt with instrumentally (thereby constituting community membership), they form interactive relationships and broker new ideological worldviews that specify how violence ought to be used against threats to their community. Once articulated through brokerage, these new ideas are diffused through existing relationships.

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28 Of course, realist counterinsurgency practices can trigger self-fulfilling prophecies and create oppositional identities between counterinsurgents and civilians.
and can lead to tipping points that socialize an entire population to adopt the new worldview. However, socially constructing an adversary as an enemy of the community requires that the opponent willingly adopt hostile identities and practices. Combatants thus seek to create interactive situations in which adversaries learn to perceive the people as a threat by preventing those adversaries from discriminating between their opponents and the people, thereby realizing a self-fulfilling prophecy. For the reflexive combatant, the result is a hegemonic claim to violence in defense of the community. The positive feedback loop generated by a self-fulfilling prophecy can only be broken if the adversary reflexively realizes its own part in the reproduction of hostile relations and falsifies expectations of enmity by practicing self-restraint.

This proposed model is consistent with previous research associated with violence and identity. In the absence of reflexive self-restraint, intrastate war will result in high levels of violence against civilians. As Kalyvas notes, violence against civilians is highly logical if combatants cannot determine the political affiliations of civilians and suspect that they support opponents (Kalyvas 2006). Even if civilians may not actually support opponents, non-reflexive combatants confronted with uncertainty about the identities of civilians will act as if they are enemies and activate self-fulfilling prophecies. To trace these causal mechanisms, I use a range of sources including scholarly descriptions of the Sunni insurgency and journalistic accounts of insurgent and counterinsurgent behavior in post-invasion Iraq. These sources provide substantial evidence regarding the interactive strategies of insurgents and counterinsurgents, their perceptions of their own actions and the actions of others, and the presence of hostility or friendship between combatant groups and the indigenous population. They also allow me to compare this constructivist
theory of mobilization and identity formation against strictly primordial theories that rely
on static theories of culture and enmity between different groups. Kaufmann argues that
contemporary civil wars are defined by primordial ethnic tensions that end only with
successful campaigns of ethnic cleansing or forced partition (Kaufmann 1996). Similarly,
Pape argues that suicide bombing and other risky forms of insurgent action are rational
strategies of resistance that convey an ethnic group's determination to expel a stronger
adversary that does not share its own ethnicity. Pape also relies on Schelling’s theory of
strategic interaction, but does so on the assumption that the identities of different ethnic
groups are fixed and cannot be affected through interactive performances (Pape 2003).
These static theories of identity suggest that reflexive counterinsurgency practices will
have no effect on perceptions of threat and expectations of hostility and that conflict will
end only when each group no longer has opportunities to interact with its opponent, either
due to ethnic cleansing, separation by a third party, or by military withdrawal from
occupied territory.

**Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in al Anbar Province**

To evaluate the above hypothesized mechanisms, this paper performs a qualitative
case study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq’s al Anbar province. Using
descriptive accounts of journalists and academics, it locates the presence or absence of
causal mechanisms to trace causal patterns that produce hegemonic social relations,
shared identities, and violent mobilization. Before beginning, it should be noted that this
case study cannot sufficiently capture the perceptions of the people in Anbar to produce a
definitive and comprehensive account of subjective understandings during the war. This
would require ethnographic interviews with US military personnel, Iraqi military and
police personnel, civilians in Anbar, and insurgents. Given the difficulties in obtaining such data, this case study is limited in its ability to make especially rigorous assertions and only seeks to evaluate the plausibility of a constructivist model of reflexive counterinsurgency. To do so, I examine the conflict in terms of three major shifts in relations between combatants and the people.

*Invasion and Outbreak: April 2003-April 2004*

The onset of insurgency in Anbar Province followed weeks after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. For Sunni Iraqis, who had controlled governance in Iraq since the interwar British Mandate, the prospect of a democratic regime gave the long repressed Shi’a majority an opportunity to exclude them from control of the state. American and Iranian support to previously exiled political parties exacerbated the threat posed by the destruction of the Ba’athist regime (Allawi 2007, 137; Hashim 2006, 75). Because Sunnis’ ‘Iraqi’ identity was closely bound with their control of the state apparatus (especially among former regime elements, Iraqi security personnel, and Ba’ath Party members), Ahmed Hashim argues that their disempowerment precipitated an identity crisis requiring a redefinition of their place in Iraq relative to other groups (Allawi 2006, 68). This immediate shift in political context radicalized some Sunnis to perceive themselves in opposition to the emerging new political order and mobilize as insurgents. Consistent with Iraq’s decline in secular Arab nationalism throughout the 1990s and a regional turn toward Islam, Sunnis mobilized around mosques whose clerics regularly preached anti-American discourses and mobilize sympathizers into the insurgency (Baram 2005, 10). The historical trend toward Islamist ideologies in Iraq led to greater state support and social prestige for Sunni clerics and placed them in a
favorable social position to organize the insurgency following the invasion. With the elimination of Sunni bulwarks through the dissolution of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, the decentralization of state authority, Shi’a occupations of formerly Sunni mosques and arrests of Sunni extreme clerics by American forces (Hashim 2006, 114-115), the clerisy wholeheartedly turned toward the insurgency. Since no other political or social actor could legitimately claim to represent all Sunnis in the post-invasion period, the clerisy served to broker ideological and operational links to insurgents and made Islam the primary ideological driver of the insurgency. Sunni clerics formed the Association of Muslim Scholars in April 2003 to forge a collective identity emphasizing fiqh al-muqawama, or the jurisprudence of resistance, in which jihad against invaders was a moral obligation as a Muslim (Ibid., 182-183) By framing resistance as a program of action required by 'good' Muslims, they established initial values and understandings of the insurgent community that constituted an interest in violent mobilization against American occupiers, especially in response to threatening security practices interpreted as violations of their values. Sunni clerics thereby acted as popular intellectuals by brokering relationships among potential insurgents and created a shared understanding about the need for resistance in post-invasion Iraq.

Given this perception of the war, decentralized insurgent cells mobilized a wide range of participants including ex-Ba’athists, officers from the dissolved Iraqi army, homegrown Islamists, tribal leaders and followers, and foreign jihadis who traveled to Iraq to fight the occupation. Organizationally, connections between these groups were brokered by clerics who offered tactical advice, participated in and discursively justified the insurgent campaign (Ibid., 48-49). While the total number of insurgent groups
numbered over 100, the most active were the Islamic Army of Iraq, the Army of Muhammad, and Unity and Jihad, which would later become al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers. These groups were composed of specialized cells of bomb-makers, logistic experts, actual combatants, and were often mentored by former regime elements drawn from the old officer corps (Ibid., 96-97, 173-176). Actually mobilizing materiel and information regarding the production of IEDs was not difficult since the old regime facilitated IED production leading up to the invasion (McFate 2005, 37-40). Sheer ideological motivation was not the sole factor in mobilizing Sunnis, as insurgents paid relatively large sums of money to individuals (including criminals) to attack American forces (Hoffman 2004, 12). In this way, a common worldview provided by the clerisy and supported by material compensation rationalized resistance to the American occupation and constituted the insurgency as a self-organizing network.

Clerics were not the only significant actors involved in insurgent mobilization. Hostile interactions between American forces and the people reinforced the necessity for resistance and created new grievances that justified extensive social mobilization. Although Sunnis were not happy about the occupation, they initially were ambivalent about violent action and did not mobilize en masse. This neutrality was undermined by the dismantling of the Iraqi security apparatus and strict de-Baathification. Sunnis interpreted these measures not as the opening moves in Iraq’s transition to democracy, but as the de-Sunnification of the state in favor of the long-repressed Shi’a majority (Allawi 2007, 158). At the local level, expectations of hostility were reinforced by violent incidents in the city of Fallujah, whose residents had extensive ties to the state apparatus that emerged out of the Iran-Iraq war (Baram 2004, 7). Faced with the fall of the regime,
many Fallujans rejected the arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division on April 23. Fallujans assumed the worst and believed that American soldiers equipped with night vision goggles watched Iraqi women as they slept in backyards and on rooftops to escape warm evenings indoors. Their presence was considered an affront to Fallujans' cultural values of pride and honor (Chandrasekaran 2003). This hostile social environment was used by insurgents to provoke American forces into using indiscriminate violence and further radicalize the population. On April 28, American soldiers at the al-Qaid school responded to fire coming from a crowd of protesters and killed somewhere between six and seventeen protesters. No consensus between American or Iraqi accounts exists on the number of civilians killed or who fired first (Hashim 2006, 23; Ricks 2006, 139-140). On April 30 outside of Fallujah, protesting Iraqis blocking a military convoy were fired upon by American soldiers after they believed hostile shots were fired originating from the crowd (Ricks 2006, 141).

These incidents illustrate how American and Sunni actions came to reinforce their initial perceptions of each other’s hostility. American forces lacked information needed to discriminate between insurgents and civilians and began to assume hostility from the latter. Violent actions based on this perception confirmed expectations of hostility held by civilians and instigated new grievances that gave insurgents a “cause celebre” which aided their mobilization efforts (Ricks 2006, 147). Another successful insurgent tactic involved the use of roadside bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against American forces, who encountered such devices without any face-to-face social encounter with their adversary. Cognitively, such tactics compelled American forces to focus on force protection and reduce the risks of exposure to insurgent attacks (Smith
This tactic functioned as a “psychological wedge” that prevented American forces from engaging in interactive situations which would have provided counterinsurgents and civilians experience in practicing and communicating self-restraint (Fiasco 2006, 221).

Following the first American casualties in May and June 2003, American forces conducted cordon-and-sweep operations in towns and villages to locate insurgents, yet these operations served to further alienate the civilian population. (Hoffmann 2004, 6) As part of an overall strategy of “coercion and enforcement”, these missions entailed American forces forcibly entering homes of suspected insurgents and harshly forcing suspects to the ground in front of female family members and children to be detained and interrogated (Hashim 2006, 322; Ricks 2006, 230-238). Other examples include verbally berating newly-hired Iraqi Police and tribal sheikhs, beating prisoners, and the lethal use of stress positions during interrogation Ricks 2006, 276-277; Rosen 2006, 96).

Thomas Ricks argues that units performing these actions in Anbar were not committing the worst atrocities among all American forces, but instead represent what was generally common about American counterinsurgency by the end of 2003 (Ricks 2006, 278).

We can locate the origins of this indiscriminately repressive counterinsurgency strategy in cognitive frame of the U.S. military, rendering it “pathologically resistant” to learning from past counterinsurgency campaigns (Hoffmann 2004, 6). In focusing exclusively on capturing or killing insurgent forces, relations with civilians deteriorated because American forces could not identify precisely who amongst the population was an insurgent. Once Americans learned to expect enmity from all Sunnis, they rationalized harsh counterinsurgency tactics against the people as a defensive response to increase the costs of insurgent mobilization. Statements such as “all they [Sunnis] understand is
force” (Hashim 2006, 323) and “[w]e had to demonstrate our firepower to these people” (Ricks 2006, 252) indicate that American forces discursively justified a more coercive response based on cultural stereotypes learned through combat experiences. These statements indicate how American forces failed to consider how indiscriminate repression violated tribal norms and created antagonistic relationships with Iraqis that could only be redressed by taking vengeful action against the American military to recover social prestige and status (Ricks 2006, 251; Rosen 2006, 93-95).

In terms of the counterinsurgency practices discussed in Chapter 2, American practices involved the regular use of exemplary force (one of the coercive practices identified in Chapter 2) and created the perception of domination and collective Sunni humiliation (Hashim 2006, 102). At the same time, American counterinsurgents failed to engage in negotiations with insurgents while offering no amnesty (and instead cracked down on ex-Baathists via de-Baathification). Further, no evidence was found to indicate that the US initiated reconstruction and development assistance projects for Anbar’s Sunnis. Instead, the increasing spiral of violence suggests that US actors were unable to initiate reconstruction and development projects. These conditions also explain the absence of cooperative relationships between US counterinsurgents and local Sunni elites. Overall, US practices - especially its use of coercion - made broad-based participation in the insurgency collectively rational for Sunnis in Anbar. Insurgent actions capitalized on existing societal conditions and socially constructed Sunni and American perceptions of identity to create hegemonic relations with the people reinforced by a self-fulfilling prophecy of enmity between American forces and Iraqis. Beginning in 2004, this reinforcing feedback loop led the insurgency to almost entirely exclude the
American military and nascent Iraqi security institutions from civil society in Anbar. In February, the Fallujan police force collapsed entirely after insurgents sacked the Police Headquarters and the newly formed Iraqi Civil Defense Corps pulled out of the city (West 2008, 28). American forces attempted to regain access into Fallujah in late March following the departure of Army divisions and the arrival of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). I MEF sought to methodically identify insurgents and offer friendly gestures to the population. However, following the murder of four Blackwater contracts who ventured into the insurgent-held portion of the city and the subsequent appearance of a loss of American control, the Bush administration ordered the Marines to retake the city by force in Operation Vigilant Resolve. The First Battle of Fallujah began on April 5, 2004, and continued until the Marines unilaterally suspended the operation four days later at the behest of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which came under pressure from all Iraqi groups united in opposition to the American assault.

Insurgent Mistakes and Counterinsurgent Reflexivity: April 2004 - September 2005

After the suspension of Vigilant Resolve and the withdrawal from Fallujah, insurgents had won their first safe haven. The commander of I MEF’s First Marine Division, Major General James N. Mattis, opposed a forceful reoccupation of the city given his plan to tread more lightly compared to his predecessors. Mattis began his campaign by ordering Marines to demonstrate their respect of Iraqi culture by removing their sunglasses in personal interaction, having men open doors and furniture during searches, and maintaining personal honor by allowing suspects to explain to family members that they were about to be detained (Ricks 2006, 314-315). To force his organization to learn self-restraining strategies and tactics, Mattis distributed over seventy
articles about counterinsurgency doctrine to his subordinates (Ibid., 317-318) In his letter
to the people of Anbar and Babil provinces, Mattis thanked them for “warmly welcoming
us into your lives” and stressed a desire to work cooperatively with the people to identify
terrorists and criminals. He closed his letter with his “his sincere wish...for peace and
prosperity” for the families and children of Iraq (Mattis 2004). Despite handing over
security inside Fallujah to the Fallujah Brigade, composed of former regime elements
including ex-members of the Republican Guard and the same insurgents fought by the
Marines, Mattis also reached out to Sheik Abdullah al-Janabi, a central cleric within the
insurgency and met with him to discuss the grievances of insurgents on June 14, 2004
(Ibid.). Although these negotiations failed, they indicate the capability of the Marines to
think reflexively about their own actions with regard to the causes of the insurgency and
represent initial attempts to break the self-fulfilling prophecy of hostility that guaranteed
insurgent hegemony.

Acknowledgement of and communication with Fallujan insurgents exacerbated
the latent tensions within the insurgent network. During Summer 2004, insurgent-
controlled Fallujah was ruled by the mujahideen shura, an insurgent council including
nationalists resisting American occupation as well as fundamentalist jihadis adhering to
reactionary and literal interpretations of Sunni Islam. Most prominent among the clerics
was al-Janabi, the spiritual leader of Abu Musab al-Qarqawi’s al Qaeda in the Land of the
Two Rivers (Burns and Eckholm 2004; West 2008, 28-29). The Association of Muslim
Scholars (AMS) publicly represented nationalist insurgent groups including the Iraqi
Islamic Army and the Army of Muhammad (Rosen 2006, 154-155) Janabi’s position
within the insurgency declined as he came to share leadership with Omar Hadid, an
extremist native of Fallujah who grew in stature and disagreed with Janabi regarding negotiations with General Mattis (Malkasian 2008, 448). Further differences among insurgents grew as AMS-affiliated rebels and extremists linked to al Qaeda learned of their alternative definitions of hegemonic authority. Nationalist insurgents looked disapprovingly upon al Qaeda’s tendency to dispense with its own version of law and order. Al Qaeda’s repressive security practices prompted the Army of Muhammad to call for violence against Zarqawi in July 2004 and for fighters of the Islamic Army of Iraq to seek revenge against al Qaeda for the murder of Iraqis (Filkins 2008, 273-278). In addition, al Qaeda’s encroachment on traditional smuggling routes and attempts to ‘embed’ in tribal structures through forced marriages further antagonized the insurgency’s local elements (Kilcullen 2007). During the same month, Zarqawi condemned the AMS for being too moderate and accepting their humiliation by foreign forces (Rosen 2006, 168-185). These internal disputes indicate that the ideological foundations of the insurgency’s loose network structure were not strong enough to establish a lasting hegemonic consensus about how it would use violence and govern safe areas. This fissure itself constituted a political opportunity for cooperation between more moderate insurgents and American forces as the people could not develop stable expectations of change and social rules regulating the use of coercive force with extremist insurgents.

However, this opportunity would not be subjectively realized immediately as American forces had yet to settle on a counterinsurgency strategy. The formation of the Fallujah Brigade following the withdrawal from that city was emblematic of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency that assumed that an American presence among Sunnis instigated violent mobilization and created the perception of occupation. This suggested
that order could be created by rapidly recruiting local forces and pulling American units back to forward operating bases while reducing interaction between American forces and the indigenous people (Malkasian 2008, 81-82) Although this approach was perceived to be reasonable based on the hostile experience of occupying Fallujah, it stood in stark contrast to the labor-intensive strategy common to modern counterinsurgency theory that sought to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population (Galula 1964/2006; Dept. of Defense 2006) It also gave counterinsurgents fewer opportunities to falsify perceptions of hostility held by the people.

The strategic debate between these two counterinsurgency strategies played out among the 11 battalions comprising MEF I and seven locally recruited Iraqi National Guard (ING) battalions. Given the large size of Anbar province and the focus on Fallujah, American forces lacked enough battalions to directly secure every major population center in the province Malkasian 2008, 83). In cities such as al Qaim and Hit along the Euphrates River, Marine battalions began with direct counterinsurgency but transitioned to the indirect approach due to significant casualties. In these towns, the main task of providing security was left to ING battalions and local Iraqi Police (IP). The absence of American forces within al Qaim and Hit left these Iraqi units (and their families) vulnerable to intimidation by insurgents, ultimately leading to their dissolution through desertion (Ibid., 84-88) The fissures between the nationalist-tribal resistance and religious extremists produced increasing violence in the vacuum created by adherence to the indirect approach. The Albu Mahal tribe in al Qaim and the Albu Nimr tribe in Hit were both targeted by al Qaeda for challenging their indiscriminate intimidation and encroachment on tribal smuggling routes (Ibid.). Fallujah epitomized the successes of the
murder and intimidation campaign, where approximately one dozen insurgent cells regularly infiltrated the city to harass the population and deter any cooperation with American forces (West 2008, 93). Although local Sunnis began to perceive al Qaeda-linked insurgents as a threat, adherence to an indirect counterinsurgency strategy based on earlier experiences prevented American forces from capitalizing on resistance to insurgent hegemony.

Paradoxically, adherence to the indirect approach increased hostility in the city of Haditha, in which American forces swept three times yet left after each operation to attend to more insecure popular centers, like Fallujah. Leaving the city each time gave al Qaeda subsequent opportunities to violently intimidate city residents and force local police mobilized by the Marines to disband (Gordon 2006, 37). Over time, residents became unwilling to cooperate with the Marines as they learned to expect their departure (West 2008, 150). This hostile environment confronted the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, which rotated into Haditha from Fallujah. Some elements of this battalion perceived Iraqis as enemies following their difficult tour: “I don't like to say it, but after a while, when you have the rifle, and you see how the Iraqis look at you and how they live...then some of our guys feel superior – like the people in Haditha or Fallujah aren't quite like us. You don't think of them the same way. That's not right, but it does happen” (Ibid., 150). Deprived of interactive opportunities for mutual recognition by the indirect approach, some American forces learned to see all Iraqis as an existential threat, preventing them from exercising self-restraint in uncertain situations. These precipitating conditions led to what is widely known as the Haditha massacre, in which 24 civilians (including women and children) were killed by Marines responding to an IED attack on a
mounted patrol that killed Corporal Miguel Terrazas (Ricks 2008, 4-5). Military officers investigating the incident found that American forces still saw greater social value in the lives of their own men compared to civilians (Ibid., 6-7). Nonetheless, maintaining self-restraint and the discipline to provide Iraqi Sunnis with opportunities for cooperation despite the risk of defection was recognized by General Mattis as fundamental to establishing a shared understanding with the people: “No matter how provoked, a marine has to suck it up, stay friendly one minute longer and not turn into a racist. The goal is to diminish the enemy, not to recruit for him” (West 2008, 155).

In terms of coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency practices, Mattis certainly sought to limit the use of coercive practices against the people and to negotiate with Sunni insurgents. However, by adopting an indirect approach to counterinsurgency, counterinsurgents were never able to form cooperative relationships with local elites. Because al Qaeda-linked insurgents could still intimidate and harass the people, neither they nor their local leaders could build relationships with American forces and expect to survive, thereby precluding any form of cooperation. In addition, while the official policy of US counterinsurgents was to shift from the coercive practices of 2003-2004, the Haditha massacre indicates that some rank-and-file US counterinsurgents still saw the population as an enemy with a preference for cooperating with insurgents and threatening American military forces. Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that US counterinsurgents actively practiced restraint in their interactions with civilians. Direct Counterinsurgency and the Emergence of the Awakening: October 2005 – April 2007

Towards the end of 2005, Marine battalions in Anbar began to implement a direct approach involving intensive interaction with the people and constant partnering with
Iraqi Army battalions. In October 2005, Marine 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment (3/6) cleared al Qaim by setting up twelve combat outposts across the city and partnered every Marine platoon with an Iraqi counterpart, ensuring that Iraqi forces gained experience in practicing counterinsurgency operations and constraining opportunities for engaging in hostile interactions with the population (Malkasian 2008, 91). This sustained American presence finally provided the Albu Mahal tribe with a reliable security partner in opposing al Qaeda, enabling tribal sheiks to provide 850 tribesmen for police recruitment by Summer 2006 and ensure local security for the town in conjunction with American forces and the Iraqi Army (Ibid., 91-92; West 2008, 101-102). Similar successes were experienced in Hit, where one Marine and one Iraqi Army battalion patrolled regularly beginning in mid-2005. “Patient interaction with tribal leaders and the promise of consistent pay…generated recruits for the police in Hit,” most of which came from the Albu Nimr (Malkasian 2008, 92). These first instances of cooperation were made possible by performing counterinsurgency operations that provided substantial interactive opportunities for Sunnis and Americans to recognize each other’s subjectivity and broker cooperative social relationships.

Despite these initial successes, 2005 ended with Anbar accounting for 20% of all American forces in Iraq and 40% of all fatalities (West 2008, 106). The insurgency was by no means under control. In March 2006, the 1st Brigade of the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division commanded by Colonel Sean MacFarland was sent to reinforce the Marines in Ramadi, the largest insurgent stronghold and capital of al Anbar province. With the Marines holding only the Government Center and checkpoints running through the city on Highway 10, Ramadi was still considered to be under siege. Insurgents had
complete freedom of movement and actively intimidated the population to deter cooperation with counterinsurgents (Filkins 2006, West 2008, 132). Local police recruitment was slow and inconsistent, with zero recruits in March and 20 to 30 each month through July (Kagan 2009, 67).

Nonetheless, American forces aimed to rally indigenous support by empowering local leaders who had influence, or *wasta*, among fellow tribesmen (MacFarland and Smith 2008, 43). Colonel MacFarland improved hospital services, ‘deputized’ tribesmen as auxiliary police, created civil-military operations centers, and funneled humanitarian aid through tribal leaders (ibid., 44). Along with funds from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, these initiatives provided tribal sheikhs with access to material resources that could be dispersed to followers as patronage and gave lower level sheikhs increased *wasta* among fellow tribesmen. Captain Travis Patriquin, a First Armored staff officer who was fluent in Arabic and understood the dynamics of tribal society, was the lynchpin of this effort. By establishing personal relationships between tribal sheikhs and brigade commanders, Patriquin acted as a key broker in fostering security cooperation by appropriating tribal social sites alienated by al Qaeda and the extremist elements within the insurgency (West 2008, 291-292; Kilcullen 2007). After al Qaeda murdered Sheik Abu Jassim for encouraging tribesmen to join the police in August 2006, tribal sheiks led by Abdul Sattar Abu Risha (whose father and two brothers were killed by al Qaeda) held a meeting on September 9 with Colonel MacFarland and Captain Patriquin to organize resistance based on tribal revenge and the establishment of local government. The result of the meeting was the formation of the Awakening Council, or *sahwa* (MacFarland and Smith 2008, 47-48; 173-174). Thus, brokerage between Sattar
abu Risha, MacFarland, and Patriquin empowered local Sunnis to mobilize as a tribal social movement and created shared expectations about how they would collectively respond to the insurgent threat.

Support for the Awakening amongst Sunnis was reinforced by the spatial tactics employed by the 1st Brigade, which created a single ‘Combined Action Battalion’ of Iraqi Army, police, and American forces who were directly partnered and embedded in combat outposts throughout the city, creating interactive opportunities for Americans to learn about Iraqi culture and for Iraqis to learn about security operations and organizational leadership (Ibid.). To the northwest, housing was created for the families of police officers where they could be more easily protected from insurgent intimidation (MacFarland and Smith 2008, 45; West 2008, 175). American counterinsurgents thereby took the initial risk of providing security in lawless Ramadi and simultaneously sought to reduce the risks experienced by cooperating Iraqis. Not only did he actively protect cooperative tribal sheikhs, Colonel MacFarland consulted them regarding the placement of new police stations, reinforcing expectations of cooperation between the tribes and American forces (Ricks 2008, 64). The provincial governor guaranteeing 120 men from his own Alwani tribe to join the police force once American and Iraqi forces set up combat outposts near the city’s racetrack and relived pressure on the Government Center (West 2008, 209). When al Qaeda attacked the Albu Soda tribe near the town of Sufia on November 25, counterinsurgent forces immediately defended the tribe and attracted its support (MacFarland and Smith 2008, 49-50; Ricks 2008, 65). In the rural Habbaniyah corridor between Ramadi and Fallujah, tribesmen affiliated with sheikh Abu Abbas provided local informers partnered with American and Iraqi Army forces who identified
insurgents for arrest and detention (West 2008, 214-215). During January, the mayor of Ramadi, Iraqi police chiefs, and American forces began regular meetings to coordinate operations among the 14 police stations established throughout the city (Kagan 2009, 71). Recruitment of Iraqi Police also accelerated into February with a cumulative total of 4,500 recruits (Ibid., 73). By April 2007, al Qaeda’s once dominant control of the province had ceded to the emerging political order created by the Awakening, with Sattar abu Risha galvanizing the tribes and beginning the reconstruction of Ramadi (Ibid., 76; MacFarland and Smith 2008, 51). These successes would continue into 2007 as General David Petreaus’s ‘surge’ would flood the streets of Baghdad with American and Iraqi forces employing the same strategy as in Anbar, thereby convincing former insurgents to cooperate against al Qaeda in security partnerships with American and Iraqi forces.

This final phase of the Anbar campaign also indicates that all three persuasive counterinsurgency practices were successfully used. US counterinsurgents successfully incorporated former insurgents into the Awakening (a de facto form of amnesty), used the increased stability to engage in reconstruction and development projects (including the construction of security and housing infrastructure), and created strong elite relationships with Sunni tribal leaders. These practices activated all four social mechanisms and led to robust cooperation between counterinsurgents and the people. Today, the insurgency has been subdued and control of al Anbar has tentatively reverted to the Iraqi military and local police (Filkins 2008), but that control has been tenuous. Sporadic insurgent resistance to the Awakening has continued with deadly results. Although Sattar Abu Risha was murdered by a roadside bomb on Sept. 13, 2007, the Awakening’s prominent sheikhs still wield power in Anbar and have formed their own political parties which competed in
the January 2009 provincial elections (Raghavan 2008). However, the absence of a common threat has diluted the unity of the Awakening, resulting in the formation of rival political parties and at least one violent confrontation among the Iraqi Police in Ramadi (Rubin and Cave 2007; Dagher 2009). The great unease caused by the handover of control and payment of Awakening forces from the U.S. military to the government of Iraq has been exacerbated by the Awakening’s failure to win seats in the recent parliamentary elections (Arango 2010). Combined with arrests by Iraqi security forces on accusations of terrorism and renewed threats by al Qaeda, some Awakening members have actually begun to rejoin the insurgency (Williams and Adnan 2010).

Discussion: The Limits of Constructivism and Liberal Counterinsurgency

The war in Anbar province demonstrates the plausibility of a constructivist mechanism-based explanation of the trajectories of intrastate conflict. The widespread mobilization of insurgents at the outbreak of the conflict can be explained by brokerage and diffusion among Iraqis as well as the use of exemplary force by American counterinsurgents. This demonstrates the inability of American counterinsurgents to exercise reflexive self-restraint and instead caused them to fall into self-fulfilling prophecies of hostility. In contrast, the rejection of extremists and tribal mobilization with American counterinsurgents can be explained by self-restraining interactive strategies and brokerage with tribal leaders, as well as the inability of insurgents to practice reflexive self-restraint. The activation of these mechanisms occurred alongside the use of persuasive counterinsurgency practices, thereby suggesting that the theory of liberal counterinsurgency highlighted earlier in this chapter can be used successfully to win the legitimacy of the population. Amnesty and negotiations, development assistance, and
elite relationships were all used by US counterinsurgents to build cooperative relationships with Sunnis in Anbar. As McCary (2009) notes, these practices served to create enough positive incentives for Sunnis to cooperate with US forces. The above constructivist account of the Awakening is thus consistent with a pure rationalist (and liberal) explanation focusing purely on bargaining and overlapping preferences.

However, the fragmentation of the Awakening – much like the fragmentation of the insurgent network that emerged following the invasion – indicates that the identities and interests that led to its development were not sustainable, and that the reflexive self-restraint employed by US counterinsurgents failed to transform the deeply embedded structure of identities and shared knowledge that was entrenched from the start of the war. On this basis, we can claim that the alliance between US counterinsurgents and Sunnis was purely transactional and did not fundamentally transform existing relationships. When a US soldier asked a former insurgent-turned-Awakening member if he wanted to kill him, he replied “Yes...but not today” (Ricks 2009, 2007). By adopting persuasive counterinsurgency practices, US forces restored stability by convincing Sunnis that they were only the least-worst enemy rather than a true partner. Once US forces disengaged from the conflict (which was inevitable), recurring uncertainty and enmity between Anbar's Sunnis and the Shiite-led central government reemerged and increased tensions between those groups. These tensions were exacerbated by the increasing strength of the central government, which asserted its own authority as American military forces withdrew from the country. Given this changing dynamic, Anbar’s Sunnis were left with few options to pursue their own interests – they could not resist because they were already a known quantity through their previous relationships with
counterinsurgents, yet they faced an Iraqi state that had no interest in bargaining or sharing power. Thus, we can tentatively that Sunnis in Iraq lacked any meaningful to pursue their own interests following the decline of the Awakening, and merely had to endure the discomforting enmity of both the Iraqi state and a lurking al Qaeda.

In this political context, the use of reflexive self-restraint by US counterinsurgents has only served to promote its own interest in defeating al Qaeda and allowing the Iraqi state to enjoy some modicum of security. However, this has left Sunnis with no viable means of pursuing their own interests. Although US counterinsurgents used persuasive practices in the last phase of this case and employed reflexive self-restraint, the failure to transform politics between the Sunnis of Anbar and the Shi’a dominant Iraqi state demonstrates the gap between liberal counterinsurgency and the transformative ideal of reflexive counterinsurgency. The former enabled counterinsurgents to achieve their own objectives without enabling a realization of the will of the people through the transformation of social structure.

**Conclusion**

The chapter employed a single case study of US counterinsurgency in Iraq's al Anbar province to evaluate how counterinsurgency practices can change within a conflict and drive security competition and cooperation with the people. While the case does show that a transition from realist to liberal counterinsurgency practices (including reflexive self-restraint) did change the trajectory of the conflict in favor of counterinsurgents, gains were only temporary owing to the political dynamics of post-Saddam Iraq. It also demonstrates that mixed combinations of counterinsurgency practices can occur out of learning and adaptation on the part of counterinsurgents.
So, is it possible for counterinsurgents to win a conflict by employing liberal practices alongside reflexive self-restraint? I cannot answer this conclusively because this is only a single case study, and thus merely a plausibility probe. Nonetheless, it does suggest what may be possible. While counterinsurgents can shift from realist to liberal practices, the fact that realist practices were used at the outset may limit the ability of counterinsurgents to forge long-term agreements with the people that enable them to restructure social relationships and promote long-term peace. This becomes more of a problem with counterinsurgency practices are put in the context of state building. While counterinsurgents can adapt and learn (as liberal counterinsurgency theorists remind us) to shift from coercive to persuasive practices, this does not mean that the initial structural effects of flawed state building projects will be reversed. If true, then a shift to persuasive practices can only have a limited impact because of the path dependence of initial counterinsurgent choices and the increasing returns to different parties in the conflict (Pierson 2000). In the Iraqi case, the American adoption of persuasive counterinsurgency could not alter the incentives for the Iraqi state to continue to exclude Sunnis. That structure of interests and ideas which originated with the creation of Shi’a dominant state could not simply be altered by switching counterinsurgency practices. Thus, while the adoption of persuasive practices served the interest of the US counterinsurgents (degrading al Qaeda and enabling the Iraqi state to assume more greater control over the country), it didn’t enable Sunni Iraqis to achieve their long-term interests. It seems, then, that adopting persuasive practices (and even reflexivity) in the middle of a conflict only serves as a means of managing an insurgency and will fail to truly realize the will of the people.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

Introduction

This dissertation evaluated coercive and persuasive theories of counterinsurgency using two methods to compare all cases of asymmetric warfare since 1945 and a within case comparison of a recent US counterinsurgency campaign. It demonstrates that 1) purely coercive and mixed combinations of counterinsurgency practices are most likely to produce victory in each case, and 2) no counterinsurgency war has ever been fought without using violent coercion against civilian populations. This conclusion goes beyond merely disproving the hypothetical effectiveness of pure counterinsurgency strategies. In fact, it shows that no counterinsurgency has ever been fought along purely liberal principles. These findings should cast serious doubt on the logical consistency of any theory of persuasive counterinsurgency. If counterinsurgent victory always requires some degree of coercion, then it is impossible to fight a counterinsurgency war based solely on liberal principles of enlightened self-interest and bargaining to achieve cooperation.

These findings should not be used to indicate that coercive or mixed counterinsurgency practices should be employed to restore stability to societies that experience asymmetric warfare. Not only is it possible that the use of such practices will turn the population against counterinsurgents (as indicated in the case study of US counterinsurgency in Iraq), but they require that military forces consistently violate human rights and commit war crimes. At the same time, this finding is consistent with contemporary counterinsurgency theory's emphasis on learning and adaptation – counterinsurgents can transition from coercive to more persuasive counterinsurgency and
restore some semblance of order. However, the US experience discussed in the case study presented in Chapter 5 shows that such gains are only short-term and create purely transactional relationships the people. The same can be said about other cases of counterinsurgency that inspire its current renaissance. The Communist insurgency in Malaya reemerged in 1967, while French counterinsurgency failed to end the war on terms favorable to France. Instead, the reactionary French Army leadership which served in Algeria turned on France itself when it was clear that Algeria would be granted independence. Long-term security and stability do not follow from the historical examples used to promote persuasive counterinsurgency.

So how to account for these conclusions, and what is the future of counterinsurgency theory? Below, I show how this historical trend is driven by the inherent contradictions between the instrumental theory of action that forms the basis of Western military theory and the 'protect the people' imperative of persuasive counterinsurgency. Ultimately, the identification and information problems presented by asymmetric technologies of warfare prevent military forces from engaging in the kind of instrumental bargaining advocated by liberal counterinsurgency theorists. These problems create uncertainty about civilian identities and interests, thereby rationalizing preemptive violence and coercion against civilians as a means of realizing counterinsurgents preferences and objectives. Thus, incomplete information problems and the absence of trust make bargaining impossible, and even 'liberal' counterinsurgents employ force and persuasion in a form of coercive bargaining. Rather than engage in bargaining that seeks to find shared preferences, liberal counterinsurgents are forced to manipulate the people’s preferences and compromise their own autonomy and reason.
These insights drawn from political theory suggest that the liberal foundations of persuasive counterinsurgency theory must be completely reformulated if it still aims to protect the people and restore legitimate government. Reforming counterinsurgency requires making a radical break from the Clausewitzian theory of instrumental military action as originally suggested by Van Creveld (1991). Such a position would reject the use of counterinsurgency as a means of achieving the purely self-interested ends of policy makers. Instead, counterinsurgency would become a non-instrumental, or communicative, form of action directed toward the formation of a shared understanding of politics and society with the local population. Such operations would still retain a purpose, namely the reconstruction of social order and law based upon an shared understanding with the people about rules and norms that govern the legitimate use of violence. In this way, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations would be aligned with the objective of building new state institutions. Ultimately, this move from instrumental to communicative military operations would require abandoning the conceptualization of counterinsurgency as war, whereby military force must be used to overthrow the will of the enemy. Instead, the concept of the enemy itself must be abandoned, as indicated by the critique of counterinsurgency offered by Kaldor and Beebe (2010). On this basis, I argue that persuasive counterinsurgency must be reformulated as reflexive counterinsurgency and practice the concept of cosmopolitan peace enforcement.29 By treating state building as the objective of counterinsurgency (rather than as one means by which to deny enemies territorial access and achieve counterinsurgent self-interests), counterinsurgents can align the purpose of military operations with the needs and wants...

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29 At the same time, I acknowledge that the same critiques about military action made about counterinsurgency could also be applied to existing UN peace operations. This is discussed below.
of the people and thereby provide human security.

**Asymmetric War and the Contradictions of Liberal Counterinsurgency**

Liberal counterinsurgency assumes that the defeat of insurgencies can be accomplished by persuading the population to cooperate with military forces. As discussed in Chapter 2, the political theory of Smith and Mill privileges the reason of each individual. Economic liberalism relies on the assumption of enlightened self-interest. Two actors pursuing their own objectives can find ways to cooperate that benefit everyone. Neoliberal IR theorists have shown that such cooperation takes the form of bargaining, in which actors exchange information about preferences, intentions, and capabilities that enable them to find overlapping preferences that serve as the foundation for contractual agreements. Thus, bargaining enables peaceful cooperation in which each actor realize absolute gains of their own free will.

However, the nature of asymmetric warfare makes achieving this military goal impossible. The use of exemplary violence in every Boolean case (as shown in Chapter 4) demonstrates that pure liberal counterinsurgency have never been practiced and is likely impossible. The logic of persuasion in counterinsurgency, while consistent with liberal assumptions about human nature and Western military theory, cannot be reconciled with the technology of asymmetrical warfare and the creation of uncertainty by insurgents who blend in with the population and prevent military forces from identifying the enemy. As Kalyvas notes, insurgents are always at an advantage because of the technology of insurgency, which relies on blending in with the population to deny strong state militaries the ability to identify enemies as easily fixable targets (Kalyvas 2006, 67). The identification problem makes it impossible for persuasive counterinsurgency, grounded in
liberal assumptions of human nature, to square the circle of asymmetric warfare and enable the restoration of social order on liberalism's own foundations.

For counterinsurgents, the identification problem is also an information problem, and incomplete information about the identities and interests of the people makes the pursuit of cooperation through bargaining highly risky for their own security. We know that such failures of bargaining are at the heart of the failures of cooperation interstate war. As mentioned in Chapter 2, IR theorists investigating the micro-causes of war have identified incomplete information and an inability to honor commitments due to fears about cheating (Fearon 1994, Van Evera 1998). Under such conditions, bargaining over the terms of cooperation in counterinsurgency will fail because of a lack of information, on about preferences as well as a lack of trust between counterinsurgents and the people. Liberal counterinsurgency is thus fatally flawed by the related problems of identification and incomplete information. Combined with the resultant fear and uncertainty about threats from the people, counterinsurgents always fall into a security dilemma that rationalizes coercion against civilians and prevents them from making agreements that benefit all parties.

How does liberal counterinsurgency cope with this problem? By seeking forms of cooperation that are both transactional and one-sided while avoiding coercive actions that trigger a popular backlash. Hence, Kilcullen (2009) argues that counterinsurgents must avoid the 'accidental guerrilla syndrome', in which civilians resist counterinsurgents over affronts to custom and convention rather than ideological conviction, thereby triggering a self-fulfilling prophecy. To avoid such failures of cooperation, liberal counterinsurgency theorists advocate for learning about the human dimensions of conflict, namely the
sociological aspects of life among the population. This is where liberal counterinsurgents adopt constructivist assumptions about culture and complexity and even advocate transforming social structure to restore peace and order (Kilcullen 2009). Doctrine for operational design and planning is based upon these same assumptions. Field commanders are instructed to engage in an open and reflective dialogue with design partners that reframes their perspective and enables a new understanding of operational environments (in the sociological sense). Such reframing creates a new understanding of the problem to be solved by counterinsurgency operations (Department of the Army, 2008), thereby reconnecting the objective, or end state, of counterinsurgency with the actual operational and tactical actions that achieve it.

However, liberal counterinsurgent theorists also make assumptions about human behavior geared more toward the instrumental decision making of economic liberals like Smith and Locke. Kilcullen says that interests drive decision making, not emotion (Kilcullen 2010, 37). FM 3-24 says that “understanding power is key to manipulating the interests of groups in society.” (Department of the Army 2007, 94) As something that counterinsurgents use to gain power and influence social groups, these statements indicate that culture in the liberal counterinsurgency is a doctrinal attempt for a more coercive kind of bargaining that can enable policy makers to realize national security interests while minimizing popular discontent.

In the context of war (understand as the instrumental extension of policy) counterinsurgency is way to manage social instability in the short-term to maintain the counterinsurgent policy preferences. Although these doctrines rely on the concept of learning and even reflexive dialogue, this dialogue and new understanding is not intended
for the people but instead for military superiors and civilian policy makers to better realize their objectives in the presence of the people. This is a managerial rather than transformative approach to learning and cultural knowledge that enables “reframing without frame reflection” (Schön and Rein 1994, 39), a skill prioritized by managers who are most concerned with achieving bureaucratic or national interests.

The Imperial Legacies of Liberal Counterinsurgency in Today's Conflicts

Although liberal counterinsurgency is fatally compromised by its own theoretical contradictions, that doesn't negate its own historical legacies. As discussed in Chapter 1, the concepts that provide the foundation for today's liberal counterinsurgency are not new ideas but are really built upon the classical counterinsurgency theory of the postcolonial era. While today's liberal counterinsurgency theorists have sought to update these ideas for a globalized context (Kilcullen 2006), they still retain the same manipulative relationship with the people characterized by coercive bargaining. The actions of David Galula in Algeria demonstrate this clearly (see Chapters 1 and 2), yet his classical theory serves as the foundation of the persuasive counterinsurgency of John Nagl and David Petraeus. At the same time, Galula's theory was informed by the practices of 19th Century Western empires, which shift from coercive approaches like Bugeaud's use of the razzia against Algerian rebels to persuasive approaches like Galleini's tache d'huile and the creation of a bureaux arabes that could build relationships and provide civil administration services to Algerians (Rid 2009, Rid 2010; Porch 2013). These shifts demonstrate similar forms of learning and adaptation that Nagl (2002) argues occurred in British counterinsurgency in Malaya, but not the kind of reflexive learning promoted by IR constructivists and critical theorists like Habermas that would actually lead to new
foreign policy objectives. Although there is some evidence that the military engaged in reflexive counterinsurgency in Iraq's al-Anbar province, the transactional nature of its alliances with the Awakening cannot be discounted. Some have even argued that the Awakening was nothing more than elite bribery and co-option as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy commonly used by Western empires to end colonial revolts (González 2009). Given this practical legacy, it would seem that persuasive counterinsurgency has always combined with coercive bargaining and manipulation. Because classical counterinsurgency theory was developed by waning colonial empires aiming to end rebellions while protecting national interests, it should contain the same emphasis on coercive bargaining and manipulation.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is true. The writings of David Galula, a classical counterinsurgency theorist who served as a French Army captain in the Algerian Revolution, reveal assumptions about the local population that lead him to undermine their own free will out of mistrust and permit human rights abuses that amount to forms of exemplary force. For example, Galula describes his job as a counterinsurgent as one where he must force the population into reacting against his will as an agent of France. On this basis, he holds rallies and events that promote French loyalty and convenes mandatory village meetings where he selects a village president who will be responsible for local affairs. While this is a form of self-government, it is mediated and controlled by Galula without regard to the collective demands or preferences of the people. Galula's practices for holding and interrogating detainees also reveal a degree of coercion. When his troops capture detainees, they are placed in shallow coffin-shaped holes in the ground (or 'tombs', in his parlance) that are covered by barbed wire. He also permits his
subordinates to use unlit bakery ovens as an interrogation tactic to scare suspected insurgents or supporters into providing information. All of these tactics are successful, and eventually local civilians provide information to Galula that enable him to capture or drive out Algerian insurgents and restore order.

But they also demonstrate that Galula (as a forefather of liberal counterinsurgency theory) sees the people as something to be instrumentally manipulated as a means of defeating the insurgency, not as a willing cooperative partner which shares the same interests and preferences. Because of his inability to identify Algerian insurgents or their sympathizers among ordinary villagers, Galula asserts that he does not trust the people: “outwardly you must treat every civilian as a friend; inwardly you must consider him as a rebel ally until you have positive proof to the contrary.” (Galula 1965, 72) In purely economic terms, the identification problem forces Galula to make an assumption of potential enmity and prevents him from specifying the real preferences of civilians without engaging the risky practice of communal interaction. He does not seek the participation of the people in his attempt to restore order and governance, but compels participation. This is an interactive strategy that relies on the manipulation of the people's will to fight the insurgency – Galula's actions are intended to force the people to respond to his will (Ibid., 90-95). Manipulating the people is appropriate for Galula because he aims to fulfill French national interests in the war, namely the maintenance of French imperial rule. In this case, protecting the people is simply a means of imperial policing, not the creation of systems of government that are seen as internally legitimate by the people.

This brief examination of Galula's own thoughts on counterinsurgency is meant to
demonstrate that the political purpose of counterinsurgency (as a means of state policy) is has always been oriented toward the development of colonial government rather than liberal democracy. On this account, his work cannot be severed from the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century origins of counterinsurgency developed by Western empires in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century (Rid 2010; Porch 2013) On this account, different forms of counterinsurgency reflect different operational extensions of imperial policy. France alone sees shifts from coercive approaches like Bugeaud's use of the razzia against Algerian rebels to persuasive approaches like Galleini's \textit{tache d'huile} and the creation of a \textit{bureaux arabes} that could build relationships and provide civil administration services to Algerians (Rid 2009). These shifts demonstrate similar forms of learning and adaptation that Nagl (2002) argues occurred in British counterinsurgency in Malaya, but not the kind of reflexive learning promoted by liberal constructivists that would actually lead to new foreign policy objectives. Instead, 19\textsuperscript{th} Century counterinsurgents were more preoccupied with defending and expanding modern ways of life grounded in Western progress. These forms of counterinsurgency were successful up until the postcolonial period, but only because they left local societies fragmented, divided, and ultimately unstable (Porch 2011).

Overall, the historical context of imperialism makes counterinsurgency a practice that always prioritizes the interests of policy makers over the people. The renewed development of liberal counterinsurgency approaches retains this same instrumental purpose and thus is beset by the same contradictions. Consider the strategic goals of US counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, the United States has adopted war objectives whose implementation generates opposition by local populations.
In Iraq, the simultaneous destruction of the Ba'athist state and the creation of a Shi'a dominated liberal democracy inspired intense opposition by formerly powerful Sunnis. US counterinsurgency simply shifted from coercive practices that intimidated Sunnis to more persuasive ones that enabled cooperation against a common enemy that was effectively created by the US invasion. Al Qaeda in Iraq had no presence in the country prior to the fall of Baghdad. Thus, US counterinsurgency was successful only in the sense that it defeated an enemy of its own creation while simultaneously creating deep conflict among Sunnis as well as a low-grade civil war between Sunnis and Shi'a. In post-9/11 Afghanistan, the United States hired warlords to pursue al Qaeda and the Taliban through the CIA (Rashid 2008, 125-144). These relationships have endured throughout the state building process that produced the democratically elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. By relying on these parallel structures, the weak central government in Kabul has always been forced to co-opt these same warlords empowered by the United States. More directly, US military forces use extralegal violence in pursuit of insurgent subjects during the entirety of the Afghan surge. Tactics such as night raids and airstrikes are strongly rejected by Afghan civilians and inspire mass protests as well as official condemnation from the Afghan government. Even during liberal counterinsurgency campaigns in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, the pursuit of al Qaeda and the Taliban has always been the primary US and NATO objective, not the creation of stable social structures that would constitute a legitimate Afghan state (Woodward 2009, 385-390).

Liberal counterinsurgency tends toward coercive bargaining and manipulation due to the pursuit of self-interested objectives despite the identification problem. In such
circumstances, counterinsurgents must manage and contain popular revolts in the short-term to achieve their own objectives. Because civilians are potential enemies whose preferences cannot be understood, counterinsurgents can never trust the people to negotiate freely about how to end the ongoing conflict and create truly legitimate institutions of government. The people are seen only as a means through which counterinsurgents can defeat insurgencies and achieve their objectives. These contradictions are endemic to all liberal counterinsurgency because of its origins as an approach for imperial warfare right alongside more realist approaches. Counterinsurgents may adapt liberal practices through a process of learning from past experiences and interaction with the people, but new ideas learned by counterinsurgents do not change the underlying worldview that constitutes their self-interests.

Although I have argued that persuasive counterinsurgency must be substantially reformed based on the principles of cosmopolitan peace enforcement, scholars of peacebuilding indicate that its existing practices suffer from similar problems. They argue that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations rarely fulfill the objective of restoring a stable social dynamic in societies following intervention. Instead, peace operations have the effect of merely managing conflicts by establishing unaccountable transnational authorities or fatally flawed state institutions which lack legitimacy (Pugh 2004). Rather than rely on local knowledge, these operations tend to impose Western values and expectations that characterize modern liberalism on local actors in a similar to that of 19th Century European empires (Knaus and Martin 2003). They also reflect a new realpolitik whereby strong Western states which embody liberal values can impose their own will on actors who are trapped in contexts defined by state weakness and failure.
(Chandler 2004). Like counterinsurgency, this mode of intervention is more about protecting and expanding Western interests and their values without concern for the will of the people.

Avenues for Future Research

These conclusions offer opportunities for future research that can further specify the factors that lead to counterinsurgency outcomes. By exploring the role of practices in counterinsurgency wars, I have not identified the societal-level factors that may lead a particular combination to be successful in one case but not in others. In fact, the existence of contradictory combinations of counterinsurgency practices (logical expressions that lead to both the presence and absence of victory), suggests that are causal factors unrelated to the actual practices of counterinsurgents that may determine outcomes. These factors may include counterinsurgent regime type (Merom 2004), the presence of a geographically contiguous insurgent safe haven (Record 2006), participation in international institutions, and the ideological position of the counterinsurgent government. All of these society-level factors should be included in further analyses to explore their interaction effects with counterinsurgency practices.

Another avenue for future research might focus specifically on the interaction between counterinsurgent practices and insurgent practices. Although preferences are hard to determine in asymmetric war, that does not mean that there are instances where short-term objectives may overlap with civilians, particularly in situations where insurgents are very strong and create insecurity for the people. In such conditions (which define the al Qaeda insurgency in Iraq's al Anbar Province), insurgent practices may turn the people against themselves and make civilians more willing to cooperate with
counterinsurgents despite lopsided gains. They might also make civilians more likely to denounce insurgents and help counterinsurgents solve for the information problem. According to Kalyvas (2006, 173-208), such conditions create opportunities for counterinsurgents to use violence more selectively and enable to gain local control, thereby leading to popular support. While Arreguin-Toft's work on strategic interaction (2001) has already taken an important first step in this direction, it can be further integrated with the insights provided by Kalyvas. In addition, strategic interaction can also be combined with the causal factors listed above for a more complex analysis of their impact on war outcomes.

Methodologically, gathering data for the above research would require multiple methods applied in different ways. Not only could insurgent practices be evaluated as logical expressions as well combinations of insurgent and counterinsurgent practices, but each case of asymmetric warfare could be broken up into individual phases. This would enable researchers to evaluate how both insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt new practices based on the outcomes of previous interactions within the same conflict. Boolean analysis would also be a useful method to evaluate different combinations of international and state-level characteristics of cases of asymmetric warfare.

Statistical analysis would be appropriate for unit-level comparisons as across cases and their outcomes. Statistical analysis would also be useful for a spatial evaluation of how the use of different counterinsurgency practices impacts the loyalties of affected civilians. Such methods have been used to evaluate the impact of artillery (Lyall 2009), airstrikes (Hocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011), and resettlement programs (Kalyvas and
Hocher 2009) in past wars. Such methods would also be useful to evaluating liberal counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to these empirical research projects, further theoretical work should also be done to illustrate the conditions under which counterinsurgency (and liberal peace enforcement) can escape the contradictions of asymmetrical warfare and liberalism. Such a project would use non-mainstream approaches to security including critical IR theory to develop a new theory of action for restoring order in societies racked by conflict and instability (for example, see Booth 2007). Non-American IR theorists who focus on problems of security and international organization have already done much of this preliminary theoretical work. For example, Knaus and Stewart (2011) make strong critiques of liberal humanitarian intervention including the near-completed counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. They argue for a conservative approach toward intervention that resists the imposition of liberal technocratic solutions to problems and allowing solutions to emerge on the basis of local worldviews that are not intuitively grasped by Westerners. However, the most direct critique of counterinsurgency is made by Beebe and Kaldor (2011), who argue that it fails to promote human security as a primary objective. They argue that liberal interventions should not aim toward winning over the people to defeat an enemy, but should abandon the concept of an enemy all together. Counterinsurgents would focus more on providing security as a local service needed by the population rather than pursuing enemies as a means of realizing one’s own interest. This would be the most radical shift away from the existing theoretical basis for counterinsurgency because it envisions counterinsurgency not as Clausewitzian war but more as peace enforcement in support of durable institutions. It would also necessitate
that peace operations are motivated with new organizational and bureaucratic interests that are harmonized with the objective of state building and human security.

These avenues of research are available to many theorists and they are offered as a way forward to continue research on asymmetric war. They also demonstrate that persuasive counterinsurgency guided by liberal principles exist in a state of crisis. It should either be discarded completely or be entirely reformulated to correct for the paradoxes of liberalism and asymmetric warfare.
Appendix A

This appendix includes the coding for 47 cases of counterinsurgency since 1945.

These cases were selected based on the following criteria:

Cases are chosen based on the following criteria:

3) There must be a clear imbalance in power capabilities of military forces and guerrilla opponents at the outset of the conflict.

2. The counterinsurgency must begin after 1945.

3a. Imperial counterinsurgencies include those waged by a state military in territory outside of its own sovereign borders.

3b. Domestic counterinsurgencies include those waged by a state military in territory within its own sovereign borders.

This appendix is divided into two sections: cases included as imperial counterinsurgency and cases included as domestic counterinsurgency. Each section begins with a list of cases included, followed by a description of the evidence gathered for each case indicating the presence or absence of the six relevant counterinsurgency practices.

Imperial Counterinsurgency: 18 Cases

1. Soviet COIN in Afghanistan
2. Soviet COIN in Hungary
3. French COIN in Algeria
4. French COIN in Indochina
5. French COIN in Madagascar
6. British COIN in Kenya
7. British COIN in Cyprus
8. British COIN in Malaya
9. British COIN in Aden
10. Portuguese COIN in Mozambique
11. Portuguese COIN in Angola
12. Portuguese COIN in Guinea-Bissau
13. Dutch COIN in Indonesia
1. Soviet Counterinsurgency in Hungary
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Massacres

23 October 1956, Hungarian state security fires into unarmed crowds of protesters.

Greater protests follow (Kramer 1998, 282) Soviet forces crush the rebellion in early November, with 22,000 Hungarians dying in the repression (Kramer 1998, 210).

Exemplary Force

100,000 were arrested following the rebellion, 35,000 tried for 'counter-revolutionary acts' 26,000 sent to prison, and 600 executed. (Kramer 1998, 211).

Resettlement

No evidence.

Amnesty/Negotiations

No evidence.

Development Assistance

No evidence.

Elite Relationships

No evidence.

References


2. Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
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Massacres


Exemplary Force

Regular use of intimidation, torture, and murder of ordinary Afghans (Feifer 2010, 104).

Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Soviet Union did negotiate with specific commanders (such as Massoud) to declare cease-fires in specific areas. While conducted in good faith initially, hostilities resumed over time and these negotiations did not ever lead to counterinsurgent victory. Soviets and DRA engaged in a reconciliation initiative after January 1987 that sought negotiations with the mujahideen during the Soviet withdrawal. These negotiations led to the Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which the US and Soviet Union signed as interested parties (Grau 2002, 304-305).

Development Assistance

The Soviets provided significant economic assistance to the DRA in support of the
military effort to suppress the mujahideen. These efforts at forced modernization were consistent with the socialist ideology of the Soviet Union and military. Soviet development personnel conducted mass projects aimed at improving infrastructure (Kalinovsky, 2010).

**Elite Relationships**

No evidence found.

**References**


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**3. French Counterinsurgency in Indochina**

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155
Annihilation
Outbreak of conflict features French bombardment and occupation of the city of Haiphong in November 1946, causing six thousand civilian casualties (O'Ballance 1964, 77).

Exemplary Force: French use punitive measures against the population including food seizures, cordon-and-search of villages (O'Ballance 1964, 87-88).

Resettlement
Resettlement does occur in Cambodia, but this is in 1951-1952, when war goes conventional (0).

Amnesty/Negotiations
Negotiations were sought between the French and Ho Chi Minh, but these were not pursued forcefully because the Army saw such action as a sign of weakness and undermined any chance of military victory (Porch 2008, 91). Army rejects negotiations in 1947 (O'Ballance 1964, 85-86).

Development Assistance
No evidence of development assistance found.

Elite Relationships
French leadership sought to co-opt Emperor Bao Dai of Annam to lead Vietnam in the French Union, However, Bao never fully agrees to French demands and a lack of full sovereignty, so he leaves Vietnam and never takes control of political events. No local elites were thus co-opted who could rival the Viet Minh. French do form alliances with Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, they form militias to defend against Viet Minh. But no local elites in North Vietnam. (O'Ballance 1964, 83-84)
4. French Counterinsurgency in Algeria

Massacres

According to Horne, mass murder and the elimination of entire villagers did happen, although it wasn’t official government policy. When Soustelle comes to power, he says “To send in tank units, to destroy villages, to bomb certain zones, that is no longer the fine comb; it is using a sledgehammer to kill fleas.” (Quoted in Horne 1977, 107) The Sakiet massacre (February 1958) appears to be the worst case, where French bombers wiped out the village after a nearby ambush and then shots fired at overhead aircraft (Horne 1977, 249-250). However, De Gaulle was adamantly opposed to all forms of such brutal oppression and reiterated in 1958 that no such atrocities were to take place.

Retaliatory, not official policy.

Exemplary Force

Servan-Schreiber (1957) discusses the killing of Algerians driving a truck suspected of supporting the FLN, and then covering up the murder by claiming self-defense from their attack. French paratroopers commanded by Massu during the Battle of Algiers regularly used torture against suspected insurgents and employed summary execution against prisoners. Galula once approved of forcing a prisoner to stand in an oven to scare him...
into talking. Although Galula demonstrated some wariness with this type of ‘police work’, he felt it was nonetheless effective. This method effectively combatted the FLN’s indiscriminate terrorism with terrorism by the French army and was consistent with *guerre revolutionaire*.

**Population Control**

The French Army did employ civilian resettlement to separate the people from insurgents during the Algerian war. This program was actively administered by SAS and monitored by the Inspection Générale des Regroupements de la Population (IGRP). Resettlement began under a program of recasement, in which isolated rural villages were consolidated into more defendable positions. Sutton’s description suggests this became widespread in the conflict’s second phase. A larger program of regroupement was first mentioned in late 1957 which sought to purposely deny the people interaction with insurgents. By late 1959, regroupement had been articulated as a four-step model of resettlement that supported the maneuver operations of Plan Challe. Regroupement was employed into Phase Four when the largest number of civilians resettled peaked in late 1960. Total control (resettlement).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

While the possibility of reconciliation and negotiation was broached by the civilian government in France, this was out of the question for the French Army and the *colons*. Negotiations are opened by De Gaulle in 1958 when he discusses a *paix de braves*, he opens the possibility of self-determination in late 1959, and the *colons* and Army resist bitterly, compromising the policy and leading to Barricades Week in January 1960 (Horne 1977). Incomplete Amnesty.
**Development Assistance**

Development assistance was common throughout the period. Soustelle developed the SAS to reconnect with the population after his appointment in 1955, also aimed to improve lives of Algerians by doubling school-building budget, initiating land ag reform, and starting public works projects (Horne 1977, 108) The French Army supplanted the state as a provider of services to the population. Galula himself opens schools and health clinics throughout his command, staffs them with soldiers from his own company who act at teachers and doctors for the people. (Galula 1963) The Constantine Plan is implemented starting in 1959, aims to improve lives of Algerians by starting industrial enterprises, giving land to Algerian farmers, increasing school attendance, build more housing to ease the struggles of regroupment. (Horne 1977, 340-341)

**Elite Relationships**

French colonial administration was overstretched in Algeria at the start of the rebellion with “areas half as big as France were left in charge of one French administrator and a handful of genarmes (Horne 1977, 107-108) Galula describes observing Kabyles paying the French tax collector out of custom, as he was the only enduring presence of the French state in Algerian villages. (Galula 1963) However, military presence does create more cooperative relationships. Galula also describes creating self-government by holding elections for mayors and councilmen within villages. SAS was also intended to create more relationships with local populace and connect French state to Algerians. However, FLN attacks were intended to erode trust between French and loyalist Algerians – SAS officers were always a target of FLN (Horne 1977, 109) Combined with escalation of *colons*/Army alliance, Algerians lose faith in the French over time. While
the protests calling for the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958 include loyalist Algerians, the riots at Barricades Week includes no Algierans (Horne 1977. I take this as against that the Algerians no longer support the French presence as the pied noirs an Army become radicalized.

References


**5. French Counterinsurgency in Madagascar**

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Massacres

Nearly 90,000 were killed in the rebellion, up to 2 percent of the total population. This indicates mass use of indiscriminate violence (Little 1990).

Exemplary Force

Of 90,000, many died in prison, suggesting mass incarceration and levels of coercion below mass annihilation (Little 1990).

Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement.
Amnesty/Negotiations

No evidence of amnesty/negotiations.

Development Assistance

No evidence of development assistance.

Elite Relationships

No evidence of elite relationships.


6. British Counterinsurgency in Kenya

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Massacres

Mass killings were never part of the tactical repertoire of British counterinsurgency. Their strategy involved coercion to change Kikuyu behavior, not outright annihilation.

However, incidents of mass murder atrocities did take place following Mau Mau mass killings. After the Lari massacre and the killing of 200 loyalist villagers, the local Home Guard retaliated by killing over 100 villagers also in Lari, March 1953 (Anderson 2005, 125-139). Although other smaller group killings took place, these tended not to be against civilians but against suspected or captured insurgents. Either way, there were no large-scale attempts at simply killing all the civilian population. Chappell shows how British airpower was never used to bomb civilian targets. (Chappell 2011)
Exemplary Force

Bennett (2007a) argues that brutality was regularly used indiscriminately against the civilian population. These included beatings, torture, and murder. He argues that these practices were mostly committed by the Kenya Police Reserve (civilian settlers), King’s African Rifles, Home Guard. Former modeled on Army battalions, latter used in joint ops with the Army. (Ibid., 155) British strategy used punitive force, fear and intimidation. Less hearts and minds. (Ibid., 157) Even though common law still reigned, the result was ‘sham legalism’. (Ibid., 158) “Minimum force didn not prevail as often as is claimed; intimidation of the population, summary executions, torture and unrestrained violence were prevalent for at least eight months.” (Ibid., 158) This would be from 10/52 to 6/53. (Ibid., 153) The Mau Mau Lari massacre of Home Guard families at Lari and subsequent mass intimidation occurs in 3/53. Anderson confirms sham legalism and shows how sham legalism worked through the court system, with mass arrests of Kikuyu and confessions under duress resulted in mass executions. Intimidation was even used against suspected insurgent lawyers who were African or Asian. (Ibid., 156-157) Intimidation continued through Operational Anvil, starting Phase 3 on April 24 1954. “Anvil epitomized an attitude of mind that pervaded the security forces” (Anderson 2005., 205), led to screening of Kikuyu in Nairobi (Ibid., 201). Screening commonly involved beatings and torture (Bennett 2007b, 648). Home Guard also regularly looted and pillaged Kikuyu (210-211). Anvil becomes the turning point of the British campaign and disrupts Mau Mau bands (213-214).

Population Control

The British regularly used resettlement throughout the conflict. Villigization between
10/52 and 4/53 led to as much as 100,000 Kikuyu displaced from the Rift Valley and Central Provinces. Lancaster Rifles ‘evacuated’ Kikuyu throughout this phase (Bennett 652, 2007b; Bennett 153, 2007a). Policy reversed in mid-1953 with overcrowding and realization of use of murder, torture, and beatings. (Bennett 2007a, 153) However, population is put through mass screening in Op Anvil in 4/54, and this results in detention and relocation of 70,000 Kikuyu. The camps were atrocious, and all Nairobi churches made outspoken criticism of gov’t policy (Anderson 207-208). Resettlements of loyalist Kikuyu around European farms also took place through 1955-1956 (Branch 2007, 306), presumably for their security and for economic opportunities. They sought self-mastery, and criticized Mau Mau for their lack of it and use of violence against them. (Branch 2007, 307)

Amnesty/Negotiation

Two offers of negotiation are made to Mau Mau, first happening in 4/54 after capture of General China. This was not honored and rebels who aimed to surrender were instead ambushed, and those who went to trial were hanged. (Anderson 2005, 276-277). The settlers always rejected negotiations as well (Ibid., 278), making British commitments difficult to uphold and caused preferences to diverge. Belief of Mau Mau as ‘sub-human’ blocked British from ever taking rebel preferences seriously or seeing them as legitimate, and instead they were just seen as crazed and bloodthirsty, a rejection of modernity (Ibid. 280-281).

Development Assistance

Development assistance appeared to be used selectively, and not all Kikuyu received the same benefits from new schools, infrastructure, and other new services. Again, patronage
was used to build networks of clients, and British assistance was funneled through their loyalists.

**Long-Term Relationships**

British ties to Kenyan loyalists were deep, local chiefs had been incorporated into self-rule throughout the colonial period, they favored their clients. In fact, these relationships to local elites are what drove the rebellion, as many Africans were excluded and became tenants who lost their land and suffered under low wages. Mau Mau led the cause of the dispossessed (Anderson 2003, 55) These loyalists were recruited into the Home Guard as well, they were the targets of Mau Mau. However, British respond by protecting and providing Kikuyu loyalists with resources to build their own patronage through new local institutions: “Although not usurped entirely, chiefs and headmen were demoted and replaced in the upper echelons of patron-client networks by African legislators and administrators appointed as Kenya began to prepare for decolonization.” (Branch 2007, 314) Thus, there is the erosion of the old network through Mau Mau attacks and the construction of a new one in the emerging edifice of the Kenyan state.

**References**


7. Britain in Cyprus

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Massacres

British do not resort to massacres of civilian populations.

Exemplary Force

British faced with civilian uprising among children throwing rocks at outset of insurgency. British shoot at some. Led to first deaths. Routinely rough up suspected insurgents, use mass arrests following the death of police officers as well as curfews to impose hardships on the civilian population. (Holland 1999, 46, 72) “On the heels of emergency measures such as detentions, curfews, and searches that were alienating average Cypriots, British appeals to law and order, essentially the administration's only legitimation strategy, lack conviction and appeal.” (Demetriou 2007, 183).

Once the Emergency started, the Army used police methods, baton charges, “non-lethal methods of dispersing crowds and maintaining order.” (Anderson 1993, 186-187).

Population Resettlement

No use of population resettlement in conflict.

Negotiations/Amnesty

No evidence of negotiations with insurgent leadership.
Development Assistance

No evidence of development assistance.

Elite Relationships

Britain fail to develop relationships with Greek Cypriots. The Orthodox Church was the main institution of Greek Cypriots, always sympathetic to enosis. Under Archbishop Makarios, they supported the insurgency. Makarios was never allied with British and treated with hostility after negotiations to put off self-determination fail. Insurgents delegitimize British regime by assassinating any Greek Cypriots working for administration and targeting police. Make British unable to build local leaders of coercive state institutions (Anderson 1993).

References


8. British in Aden
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Massacres
In 1964, British instruct forces to destroy livestock, “inhabitants were ordered to evacuate and any villages where people remained were attacked either by artillery or by rockets from RAF planes. (345)

**Exemplary Force**

Arbitrary deportation, taking people in the night and taking them across border to Yemen. (345) Several allegations of abuse by British intelligence officers in mid-1960s, pre-Crater campaign (Walker 2008, 161) Operations inside Crater district after July 1967 lead to mass arrests, harassment of population, shooting anyone who ran from British forces (Walker 2008, 164).

**Population Control**

No evidence of resettlement.

**Negotiations/Amnesty**

No evidence of negotiations or amnesty.

**Development Assistance**

No evidence of development assistance.

**Elite Relationships**

No evidence of elite relationships.

**References**


Massacres

Reinforcements arriving in summer then bomb and strafe areas indiscriminately, even those unaffected by rebellion, destroy Portuguese credibility, create refugees that flee to Congo. 20k die (Cann 1997, 28).

Exemplary Force

Gov’t forces respond indiscriminately after initial MPLA attacks in Feb 1961 in Luanda, killed several hundred Africans, bodies left in streets. (Cann 1997, 27) Sought to keep insurgents in rural areas through many means, including torture, curfews, dragnets, all to gain intelligence from detainees. (Pahlavi and Ali 2012, 48)

Resettlement

In 1967, Portugal regroups civilians in the east into strategic hamlets to prevent contact with insurgents. (Bender 1972, 334). Three types, aldeamentos (run by military in fighting zones), reordenamento rural (run by civilian gov’t in rural areas and promote socioeconomic development), and colonatos de soldados (settlements of ex-soldiers in strategic areas). Rural resettlements began in 1962 but little done between 62 and 67, motivated by those with altruistic intentions who are very clear in distinguishing them from strategic resettlement. (Bender 1972, 335) But, in terms of ‘appearance and results’, rural and strategic settlements are not distinguishable. (Bender 1972, 336)

Within settlements, some civilians are coerced into being informers by intelligence police. (Bender 1972, 336) Settlements affect 20 percent of entire African
population by 1972 (Bender 1972, 337). However, socioeconomic structures or locations never considered by program organizers. (Bender 1972, 337)

Settlements of the north unsuccessful, too disruptive of social/residential patterns, and not enough education/healthcare to “produce any marked change in the quality of life.” Africans are really cheap labor for coffee plantations. (Bender 1972, 338) In East, none of the services promised by the gov’t were provided, at least by 1970. (Bender 1972, 339)

**Negotiations/Amnesty**

No evidence of negotiations. However, Portuguese sought to turn captured insurgents and recruit them into their military forces. This is offered as an alternative to punishment, not as a form of forgiveness, so I do not code this as amnesty.

**Development Assistance**

Portuguese seek to modernize Angola through resettlements and provide health and educational services. Army employed as teachers in many cases, supported building schools, health clinics. According to Cann (1997, XX), Portugal adopts WHO standards for doctor/population and meets them. However, according to Bender (1972; 1978, 167), economic development programs fail b/c of social disruptions to ordinary life. Africans living in settlements faced declining standards of living, not improving. So, efforts at development were incomplete at best.

**Elite Relationships**

Although Portuguese incorporate Africans into military forces, there is no evidence that they ally or support local indigenous leadership among tribes contested by insurgents. Heavy-handed tactics involving mass use of airpower as well as resettlements
appear to prevent any move toward elite cooption.

References


10. Portugal in Mozambique

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Massacres

Portuguese adopt a 'scorched-earth' party along Tanzanian border in Cabo Delgado with simultaneous regrouping in 1965. (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 100). References are made in historical sources to the use of defoliants and napalm Mozambique, but these are often mentioned without reference to specific incidents. Another example is the “systematic application of officially sanctioned violence against noncombatants consisted
of the strafing of trails and water holes and the napalming of guerrilla forest bases.” (Henriksen 1983, 131). Missionaries leave Inhaminga Plateau to protest mass killings, 200 dead from August 1973 to March 1974 (Henriksen 1983, 131). “From the beginning of the conflict there existed a marked indifference toward Mozambican life.” (131) Torture, intimidation, and mass killings used to compel population into aldeamentos. (Ibid., 131). Although no specific incidents are mentioned, I assume these were commonplace among Portuguese COIN.

One noted massacre occurs in the village of Wiriyamu, south of Tete, where Portuguese forces killed 400 (Henriksen 1983, 120). Portuguese forces also attacked civilians out of frustration following insurgent attacks, with murders of suspected mine layers and supporters in Mocumbura in May 1971 (Henriksen 1983, 129). Also threw grenades into crowded huts as retaliation for allowing insurgents to set up attacks (Henriksen 1983, 129).

Exemplary Force

Torture, intimidation, and mass killings used to compel population into aldeamentos (Henriksen 1983, 131). Portuguese used civilians as human mine detectors, forcing them down suspect roads to clear them (Henriksen 1983, 132). Civilian huts and crops destroyed when they did not willingly move into resettlements (Henriksen 1983, 132). Portuguese police torture and use extrajudicial murder against detainees (Henriksen 1983, 136). Police also use wide dragnets and mass detention regularly, largest was in 1972 where 1800 were detained (Henriksen 1983, 137). Estimated 10,000 regime opponents were arrested between 1967-1973, with PIDE using torture on prisoners (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 103). Flechas (native African special forces including turned insurgents)
known to “treat with a savage ruthlessness the villagers among whom they operated...to prove their new commitment” (Henriksen 1983, 107).

**Resettlement**

Resettlement schemes were modeled after British in Malaya (Henriksen 1983, 154). As Bender (1972) points out in Angola, Portuguese use three types of resettlements, including military-run *aldeamentos, reordenamento rural* for socioeconomic development, and *colonatos de soldados*. But, *reordenamento* are used less in Mozambique, and more *colonatos* used in areas with guerrilla activity. (Jordanian 1974,520)

*Aldeamentos* first proposed in 1965, implemented south of Tanzanian border in Cabo Delgado, using scorched earth policy (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 100; Jundanian 1974, 523). 1 million resettled by 1970. Officials admit that population not so involved in resettlement construction, and “the amenities of the villages are minimal.” Infrastructure and services to follow after rapid regrouping (526). (Jundanian 1974, 540) General Arriaga does too much too quickly, built all settlements fast, viewed negatively by the people. (Cann 1997, 157) Resettlements often done forcefully, had hardships on the people and didn’t account for African desire to remain in their own lands. (Cann 1997, 161; Henriksen 1983, 161)

**Negotiations/Amnesty**

Portuguese did support efforts to get FRELIMO personnel to defect, as military published offers of amnesty before, during, and after large campaigns, offering money for weapons. (Henriksen 1983, 103). When Arriagas comes to power, he orders that wounded FRELIMO troops get flown out for medical care first to encourage defection. (Henriksen

**Development Assistance**

Only sporadic development projects in the absence of major *reordenamento rural* projects (520). These programs “haven’t been well financed nor have they helped a significant number of Africans.” (521) Major development initiatives centered around construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam (Henriksen 1983, 165). But, the dam wasn’t intended so much for Mozambican development, but to attract more settlers, foster mineral extraction in Tete, and provide electricity to South Africa (Issacon and Issacson 183, 104; Munslow 1983, 114).

Also, Portuguese settlers want to use Africans as a labor source, less emphasis on actually providing development for them as opposed to the Europeans. African crop purchases fell, indicating a declining standard of living, while statistics show higher economic gains for Europeans (Jundanian 536-537 1974) Bishops also complain not enough schools, qualified teachers (Jundanian 1974, 538).

Social programs: Cann provides data suggesting increases in admitted students and teachers in Angola (5x), Guinea (2x), and Mozambique (1.8x). (Cann 1997, 147) Army played key role, building schools, became teachers if necessary. (Cann 1997, 148) On health, Portuguese adopted WHO standards for proper health care regarding numbers of professionals / population, military became prime implementer. (Ibid., 149) Military worked to ensure doctors/nurses/hospitals were available to meet standards. (Ibid., 150).
But military had to fill in a massive gap since not enough teachers were available. All these suggest a mixed approach toward development.

**Elite Relationships**

Portugal always sought to pit tribes against each other, suggested FRELIMO was dominated by the Makonde tribe and an enemy of the Makua tribe, all in Cabo Delgado (Munslow 1983, 121). In Niassa, Portuguese pit the Pao and Nyanja, the latter was FRELIMO (Issacson and Issacson 1983, 102). In aldeamentos, local chiefs are mobilized to raise a 10-12 man militia, supervised by the army but paid by administration (Munslow 1983, 122). But over long-term, the Portuguese fail to develop a “moderate Mozambican constituency” (Hendriksen 1983, 47), limited efforts to include Africans in the colonial state but are never serious (Hendriksen 1983, 108). No programs to train local leaders and youth to lead local government (Hendriksen 1983, 109). In the last phase, Portuguese do support the emergence of the *Grupo Unido de Mozambique*, which advocated for continued ties to metropole, but this is too little and too late to affect war. (Hendriksen 1983, 110).

**References**


Massacres
Portuguese use heavy airpower in areas controlled by PAIGC, bombing villagers and using napalm against rebel-held villages (Dhada 1998, 582). Military under Spinola innovates hellebore attacks in free-fire zones, attacking villagers and villages, destroying livestock (Chabal 1980, 83).

Exemplary Force
Regular use of violence against civilians in raids and operations.

Population Control
Like Portuguese COIN in other countries, Portugal uses aldeamentos to resettle population and distribute economic assistance and development. These were increased after Spinola came to power, but were used in the first phase as well (Dhada 1998, 584).

Amnesty/Negotiations
Military and PAIGC negotiate independence following the 1974 coup to end the conflict.

Development Assistance
When Spinola becomes Governor-General/military commander in 1969, he enacts a development program called 'A Better Guinea' by increasing food production, building infrastructures (hospitals, schools), etc. (Chabal 1981, 83).

Elite Relationships
Although Africans are incorporated into Portuguese military forces, no evidence exists that the Portuguese form allies among local elites. This is consistent with direct rule throughout the colonial period.

References


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12. United States in Vietnam

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Massacres

US Army concept of achieving victory through firepower is dominant, saw the conflict as a Korea-style conventional war. This creates many opportunities for the destruction of population centers, civilians. Firepower was used 'as a crutch' for a counterinsurgency strategy and alienated the people from the army (Krepenevitch 1986, 198). Army destroys hamlets to remove VC from population (Krepenevitch 1986, 199). B-52 bombers made available in Operation Arc Light in 1965, flew 1320 sorties in that year, (ibid., 200). Desire to run up body counts to show quantitative evidence of the destruction of the enemy (meet quotas), led to looser ROEs. (Ibid., 201-202). “On occasion, the gunships mistook civilians for the enemy.” (Ibid, 204).
Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas (2011) show that US military did use airpower against civilian targets, often resulting in mass civilian casualties. ROE for air bombing permitted attack of civilian targets if deemed necessary: “even direct bombardment of populated areas was not prohibited, although restricted” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5) They quote Race (1972, 233), who states “despite these rules, however, heavy casualties still occurred.” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5). Further, their highly specific data show that areas which were targeted of air bombing later turned to insurgent control.

**Exemplary Force**

US Army repeatedly used indiscriminate force against the population. Emphasis on heavy firepower in fight insurgents and body counts leads to widespread attacks on civilians. These were part of standard operating procedures (Turse 2013).

**Resettlement**

Based upon Thompson's advice and British example in Malaya, 'strategic hamlet' program of resettlement began in January 1962 by Diem, but influenced by MAAG, and its desire to fight the enemy. But military was used inside hamlets, not to surround them (Hunt 191, 21) Diem and MACV choose Ben Cat and resettle many civilians and alienated them. Diem's brother tries to exploit the peasants through the resettlement program, Operation Sunrise (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). 8,000 hamlets created in two years, but “no attention was paid to their purpose; their creation became the purpose in itself.” (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). According to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded too quickly by Diem's brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly located, and failed to adequately develop them over time and spread successfully.
Amnesty/Negotiations

Alongside Strategic Hamlets was an amnesty program called 'Open Arms', or *Chieu Hoi*, but it had a small budget, and money wasn't actively spent, but organized under ARVN. 11,000 communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership never expressed any interest, only “draining enemy manpower,” didn't see the political potential of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power, including former enemies into political system.

Development Assistance

US policy-makers conceived of development as a tool to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966, Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb. William Porter, unites all civilian agencies under one chain of command but still doesn't include military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a single manager, and CORDS is created in May 1967 with Westmoreland as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al. 2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations occurs with AB 143, combined campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't integrate with new Ministry of Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD never has any capacity to implement to address development priorities or implement US-provided aid programs (Hunt 1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building initiatives by SVN. But, US creates more destruction than development: “The alleviation of social and political dislocations which were the inevitable result of military operations in populated areas was impossible” (Cable 1991, 130).

Elite Relationships
From 1961 to 1962, Special Forces and CIA do close pop-centric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 70-71). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and Yarborough reform Special Forces program. New Army-led Special Forces execute Operation Switchback in 1962 for offensive operations against VC, no longer building local militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)

Elite relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the political instability following it. Each time a new ruler came into power, administrative turnover was the result as they promoted their own loyalists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could develop among SVN pacification cadres.

References

13. United States in Iraq
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Massacres

Although atrocities like the Haditha massacre did happen, these incidents were not official policy, and were not informally accepted by COIN leadership. Generally, no policy of massacres.

Exemplary Force

Exemplary force was common in the first phase following the fall of Baghdad. US forces had little guidance or training on how to interact with the population or react to insurgency. Many US forces showed little respect for Iraqi cultural traditions. Use of live fire against civilian protesters in Fallujah in April 2003 starts spiral of violence and empowers insurgents (Ricks 2006, 141). US forces berated, harassed, and humiliated Iraqis, leading to civilian radicalization. After Fallujah is retaken, US Marines led by General James Mattis initiate population-centric COIN, aim to treat people with respect (Dept. of Defense 2004). Norm slowly takes hold in military forces, although instances like Haditha suggest it took time to spread as operating concept. By third phase most exemplary force had ended in favor of 'hearts and minds' tactics.

Resettlement

No major resettlement program found.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Most US forces settled into patterns of coercive deterrence, weren't seeking some kind of negotiated settlement. Outreach to insurgents and civilians starts in Anbar 2006 (Ricks 2009). As tribal leaders form the Awakening, their fighters and allies separate from the insurgents, and many fight alongside US forces in Anbar and Baghdad, which is a de
facto form of amnesty.

Development Assistance

US forces and US government provide massive amounts of development assistance to Iraq, but these often are hampered by corruption and mismanagement, leading to very limited effectiveness. Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP) does provide commanders with their own resources to provide to civilian populations, and permits increased bargaining between US forces and Iraqi populations. US forces attempt to rebuild many areas destroyed in fighting (Ricks 2006, 2009).

Elite Relationships

With the exception of Peter Mansour as Baghdad commander in first phase, US commanders did not establish relationships with tribal or religious leaders in the first phase of the war. In the second phase, these relationships occur spontaneously in Anbar province, but become commonplace in the third phase when the rise of the Anbar Awakening. Col. Sean McFarland and staff forged a close alliance with Abdul Sattar abu Risha, who rallied Sunni tribes and militias across Anbar and drove out al Qaeda in tandem with US forces (MacFarland and Smith 2008).

References


Massacres

IDF doesn't employ massacres. Generally, civilians are given opportunities to leave areas of combat. There is a legal emphasis on restraint employed by the IDF, although these rules are often bent to allow violence against Palestinians (Ron 2000). Further, in 2nd Intifada, Israeli troops emphasize force protection at the expense of civilians and often cause significant collateral damage. However, there are no purposeful attempts at killing entire groups of civilian populations.

Exemplary Force

Exemplary force is common throughout all phases of the conflict. During the outbreak of the 1st Intifada, IDF responds with 'diplomacy of violence' (Inbar 1991) and seeks to use violence as a deterrent to rebellion. (Catignani 2008). Initial response is with single shots from long-range, but then evolves with Rabin's provision of truncheons to IDF in March.
1988 (second phase). Throughout this second phase, IDF becomes demoralized, often breaks rules intended to limit force in a policy of 'savage restraint' (Ron 2000). IDF forces realize not enough force is being used to put down the rebellion (Catignani 2008, 84). IDF forces routinely use force against Palestinian detainees as outlet for frustration (Catignani 2008 85-94; Ron 2000).

In 2nd Intifada, Israelis use different policy of using Palestinian civilians as human shields. Attacks urban targets with conventional weapons up until 2002, including civilian targets. (Catignani 2008 105-109). Bulldozers used against homes of families of suicide bombers as punishment. New phase with Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, in which IDF employs swarming tactics to clear refugee camps and cities such as Nablus and Jenin. IDF destroy homes to move through camps, destroying civilian property as a counterinsurgency tactics and forcing civilians to leave the city and go to new camps.

**Population Control**

While no population resettlements were used during the Intifadas, Palestinian movement was heavily restricted throughout the Territories during both rebellions. These were stepped up during the 2nd Intifada during major military operations. Civilians were alternatively forced to leave cities where IDF assaults would take place or forced to remain in their homes without access to basic necessities. In addition, the construction of a separation fence is used to end the 2nd Intifada, which prevents any Palestinian movement into Israel proper.

**Negotiations/Amnesty**

No negotiations in 1st Intifada until late 1992, when the negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords signed in Sept 1993 begin. These negotiations end the 1st Intifada and lead to
Israeli acceptance of an eventual two-state solution. Negotiations are used at the end of the 2nd at the Sharm el-Sheik Summit, in which Abbas agrees to end violence while Israel agrees to release Palestinian prisoners. However, real cause of drop of violence is the Israeli-built a separation fence preventing Palestinian suicide bombers from infiltrating Israel.

**Development Assistance**

Development assistance was generally little-used during the Intifadas, as Israel's focus on deterrence sought to increase costs without increasing benefits. Israeli operations were solely military-focused and had little political, or bargaining dimension. (Catignani 2008).

**Elite Relationships**

Israel never develops elite relationships among Palestinians civilians. Only relationships involve developing informants to gather HUMINT for assassinations of major leaders.

**References**


Massacres

Generally, there is no evidence that the British sought to destroy the Chinese population of Malaya. They appear to not have employed any heavy firepower or airpower against civilians. This is consistent with Nagl's discussion as the British as an imperial, non-conventional army (Nagl 2002, 35-57). One massacre of note did occur at Batang Kali, but this was not official policy nor informally tolerated. Komer (1972, 51-52) claims no bombings of population centers, very limited use of artillery at all.

Exemplary Force

Bennett (2009) shows that the British regularly coerced Chinese civilians. Violence included shooting those civilians who fled counterinsurgents and destroyed their property. This was not halted by Far East Land Forces because it interpreted the intel it gathered as showing that these forms of coercion were successful. British used collective punishments against entire communities. Didn't codify this in directives, but “created a permissive environment by encouraging a hostile attitude towards an entire population, without initially setting out specific guidelines on the use of force.” (Bennett 2009, 431).

Forms of repression used describes suspects as 'shot whilst attempting to escape', like at the Batang Kali massacre in December 1948. Also mass arrests in cordon-and-sweep ops. (Bennett 2009, 436). Nonetheless, these actions alienated the population from counterinsurgents (Hack 2007).
**Population Control**

18,500 resettled by March 1950. Done in an adhoc basis. Major resettlement programs begin after that (Bennett 2009, 438-9). Generally occurred following insurgent attacks pre-1950, followed by burning of homes, property destruction (Bennett 2009, 439). Briggs Plan of April 1950 resettles over 500,000 squatters, regroups 600,000 laborers. Starts in June, done by 1951. Resettlements involve food controls, denying resources to population. By the end of the Emergency, almost one-tenth of entire population were resettled in New Villages (Kom 1972, 56-61).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

A reward for defection program exists after 1948, offers payment to MNLA-MCP members for defection, information about others. Nets over 2,000 defections during entire emergency. However, unclear if this should be considered a general form of amnesty (-1).

**Development Assistance**

From late 1952 onward, New Villages (resettlements) receive more basic schools, town halls, medical facilities, and better infrastructure (Hack 2009). New Villages were “Malaya's greatest socioeconomic development project during 1948-1960.” (Kom 1972, 62)

**Elite Relationships**

Templer tries to win over Chinese after coming to power, improving infrastructure in New Villages, permits enhanced administrative powers by elected village councils in May 1952, citizenship conferred on Chinese. (Smith 2001, 66). Templer also shepherds
through a new Public Service Commission in Nov 1953, which permits non-Malays (Chinese) to join administrative service, and encourages Chinese recruitment (Smith 2001, 67-68).

Alliance between United Malays National Organization (UNMO) and Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, previously formed in 1949 with support from Gurney and MacDonald (Smith 2001, 65; Komer 1972, 65), while the alliance itself was formed in 1952 (Smith 2001, 71) wins elections in 1955. Demonstrates elite relationships formed amongst leaders of Chinese minority Hack (2009). Elections became an incentives for these groups, like MCA, to challenge MCP for popular support. (Smith 2001, 71).

References


16. Dutch COIN in Indonesia

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Massacres

Dutch military committed massacres by using heavy firepower against Indonesian civilians suspected of supporting insurgents. (Zaalberg 2008).

Exemplary Force

Extralegal coercion, intimidation of civilians was normal practice (Zaalberg 2008).

Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement.

Development Assistance

No evidence of development assistance.

Elite Relationships

No evidence of elite relationships.

References


17. Chinese COIN in Tibet

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Massacres

Chinese bombed villages and monasteries to suppress rebellions from 1956-1959 (Thapa 1982, 89). Repeated mentions of atrocities leading up to and during the mass uprising in
1959. Chinese then shell and assault Lhasa on March 20, 1959 to put down uprising, fire on demonstrators (Ibid., 100-101).

Exemplary Force

Chinese used coercion and intimidation of civilians regularly to deter cooperation with insurgents (Thapa 1982).

Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement found.

Negotiations/Amnesty

Chinese are in constant discussions with Dalai Lama about Chinese rule in first phase, counts as negotiations (although forceful) (Thapa 1982).

Development Assistance

No evidence of development assistance.

Elite Relationships

No evidence of elite relationships.

References


18. South African COIN in Namibia

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Massacres

Violence used against civilians, but no evidence of mass killings or massacres.
Exemplary Force


Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement.

Amnesty/Negotiations

No evidence of amnesty/negotiations.

Development Assistance

SADF does employ civic action programs supplying public goods, indicating provision of development assistance, social services (Ibid., 14).

Elite Relationships

No evidence of elite relationships.

References


Domestic Counterinsurgency: 31 Cases

1. Burmese COIN against Separatist Insurgencies
2. Russian COIN in First Chechen War
3. Russian COIN in Second Chechen War
4. Chinese (Kuomintang) COIN against Communist Revolution
5. Colombian COIN against Leftist Insurgencies
6. Cuban (Batista regime) COIN against Population Revolution
7. El Salvadoran COIN against Leftist Insurgency
8. Ethiopian COIN against Eritrean Insurgency
9. Guatemalan COIN against Leftist Insurgency
10. Indian COIN against Naxalite Insurgency
11. Indonesian COIN against Post-Independence Insurgency
12. Indonesian COIN against Timorese Insurgency
13. Indonesian COIN against Acehean Insurgency
14. Serbian COIN against Kosovar Insurgency
15. Nicaraguan COIN against Leftist Insurgency
16. Nicaraguan COIN against Rightist Insurgency
17. Peruvian COIN against Leftist Insurgency
18. Philippine COIN against Leftist Insurgency
19. Philippine COIN against Moro Insurgency
20. Rwandan COIN against Tutsi Insurgency
21. Spanish COIN against Basque Insurgency
22. Sri Lankan COIN against Tamil Insurgency
23. Sudanese COIN against Separatist Insurgency (First Civil War)
24. Sudanese COIN against Separatist Insurgency (Second Civil War)
25. Sudanese COIN against Separatist Insurgency (Darfur)
26. Turkish COIN against Leftist Insurgency
27. Ugandan COIN against Religious/Separatist Insurgency
28. Yugoslavian COIN against Separatist Insurgencies
29. Rhodesian COIN against Anticolonial Insurgency

1. Burma – Popular Uprising
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Massacres

Burmese military attacked villages and carried out large-scale massacres early in the conflict, and this has continued into 1990s and 2000s.

Exemplary Force

Burmese forces have regularly pressed the population into service as porters. Beatings and intimidation of civilians are common, as well as rapes and sexual crimes against ethnic minorities.

Resettlement
Burmese military begins to forcibly resettle ethnic minorities in 1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive Party, continues for several years with thousands resettled.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Burmese military is constantly negotiating with different rebel groups, leading to many cease-fires. Yet, many of these fail (like the cease-fire prior to the 1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences.

**Development Assistance**

No evidence of development assistance or civic action to win over ethnic minorities.

**Elite Relationships**

The Burmese military has co-opted some rebel groups to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State Army.

**References**


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**2. Russian COIN in Chechnya – 1st insurgency**

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**Massacres**

Russian used of heavy airpower (artillery) against Chechen communities, attacking civilian targets. Led to widespread civilian casualties, eventually alienated the civilian population as well (Kramer 2005, Renaud 2010).
Exemplary Force

Russian forces treated Chechen civilians harshly. MVD used cordon-and-sweep ops to harass Chechen civilians, even kidnapping some for ransom (Kramer 2005).

Resettlement

No active policy of resettlement of entire regions, although refugees were created by the fighting.

Negotiations/Amnesty

Khasav-Yurt Accord signed between Russian and Chechen rebels in August 1996, providing for a cease-fire and the end of the war, but also allowed for de facto independence until new deliberations in 2001 (Renaud 2010).

Development Assistance

No major policy of development assistance or civic action.

Elite Relationships

1994 Russian invasion of Chechnya alienates existing Chechen allies and leads all Chechens to turn against the government (Renaud 2010).

References


3. Russian COIN in Chechnya – 2nd insurgency
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Massacres

Russian military attacks Grozny in Oct 1999 and nearly levels the entire city with air and artillery bombardments, takes full control in February 2000. Russian military regains control over most of Chechnya by mid-2000, but causing immense destruction with indiscriminate violence (Renaud 2010).

Exemplary Force

Pro-Russian Chechen government established after Russian invasion ruled mainly through violent coercion, regularly brutalized the population (Renaud 2010).

Resettlement

While refugees were created during the war, no evidence of a focused resettlement policy.

Negotiations/Amnesty

No record or indication of negotiations with insurgents or an amnesty policy.

Development Assistance

Reconstruction occurred during the initial second invasion in 2000, but slowed after this. Areas in southern Chechnya that were destroyed in the fighting were necessarily rebuilt. So, this is incomplete reconstruction (Renaud 2010, Kramer 2005).

Elite Relationships

Russia identifies new pro-Russian allies who successfully build local support, particularly the Kadyrov family. Despite the assassination of the father, the son took over as the region's pro-Russian leader and guided the end of the counterinsurgency (Renaud 2010).

References


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4. China (Kuomintang) – Communist insurgency

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**Massacres**

No evidence of massacres by Chinese nationalists.

**Exemplary Force**

Nationalist forces tended to be undisciplined and harassed and intimidated civilians, including stealing and plundering their property, leading to alienation.

**Resettlement**

No resettlement by Chinese nationalists.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

No amnesty or negotiations by nationalists, instead they aim to conquer and hold the entire country.

**Development Assistance**

Nationalists never provide any aid to civilian population, relying more on plundering local wealth.

**Elite Relationships**
Nationalists fail to renew ties to local leaders after World War II and the withdrawal of the Japanese.

References


5. Colombia – Leftist Insurgencies

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Massacres

Military does not purposely use mass firepower to wipe out villagers or population centers. However, airpower is used alongside military operations, and there are incidents where airpower is used on individual homes.

Exemplary Force

Exemplary force is common throughout the war. US military advisors instruct Colombian military to develop paramilitary organizations in late 1950s to intimidate suspected insurgents, including members of legal political parties, unions, other civil society organizations (Stokes 2005). Military or paramilitary forces regularly intimidate, torture, and murder civilians suspected of insurgent support. Again, growth of massacres due to paramilitaries. 12 deaths at La Rochela massacre by MAS in 1989 (Kirk 2003, 127). Multiple deaths at La Cristalinamassacre, including judges investigating paras by MAS in 1987 (Kirk 2003, 121; HRW 1996, 23). Para networks conduct targeted killings and massacres throughout Chucuri region in 1992, “detaining and killing suspects and

**Population Control**

While individuals are always threatened with intent to force migration throughout the war, this becomes systematic with the creation of the MAS/AUC paramilitaries and the formation of the United Front, a leftist political party supporting FARC but including unionists, regime dissidents (Steele 2011). Strategic displacement used following elections push out civilians in neighborhoods registering strong UP support since they can be identified as insurgent loyalists (Steele 2011). Occurs throughout city of Apartado, while neighborhoods that do not support UP are mostly left alone. Thus, displacement occurs with elections and leads to growth of internally displaced people throughout Colombia.

**Amnesty and Negotiations**

Multiple negotiations take place throughout the conflict with either the Colombian state or paramilitaries and different insurgent groups. FARC and the government opened negotiations in 1984, however violence from both sides continued throughout these talks and they eventually broke down. This period also saw the formation of the first
paramilitaries tied to narco-traffickers in response to insurgent kidnappings. Negotiations are opened again between the FARC and the Pastrana administration in 1999, leading to the granting of the demilitarized zone as a pre-condition for talks. However, it appears the FARC used these negotiations merely to buy time and growth its strength in the zona, and they were never conducted in good faith. While President Pastrana attended the opening of the peace talks, Marin sent a subordinate. These talks break down when Pastrana realizes he is making no headway in 2002 (Kirk 2003)

Development Assistance

Development assistance was common during the counterinsurgency efforts spearheaded by Plan Lazo. Assistance and aid was provided to peasants to tie them to the Colombian government and provide incentives for their loyalty. This assistance was administered in tandem with military operations. These initiatives were derided by Marin as a bribe to trick peasants into forgetting the army’s past abuses (Kirk 2003). Development assistance is intended as a key part of Uribe’s Democratic Security plan, and I have found evidence suggesting that such assistance is provided to civilians in areas of counterinsurgency operations (Walker 2009, 28-29). The National Consolidation Plan was one aspect of the Democratic Security policy that sought to provide social services to areas recently retaken from insurgent control and integrated into the Colombian state. With support for US military civil affairs officers, quick-impact projects and longer-term service delivery projects were implemented. (Spencer et al., 2010, 87-88, 90).

Elite Relationships

Relationships between provincial elites and counterinsurgency forces have been common throughout the conflict, but have intensified in the last 30 years to produce new
counterinsurgent organizations. Elites (including nacrotraffickers) formed their own paramilitaries with assistance from the Army in the 1980s. These ties and relationships continued throughout the following years among liberal party elites led to stronger paramilitaries that provided security for landowners (some of whom were para leaders). As Richani (2005) notes, the nexus between regional elites, the military, and the paras contributes to the fragmented sovereignty of the Colombian state.

References


6. Cuba – Communist insurgency

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Massacres
No evidence of massacres, mass atrocities, destruction of population centers.

**Exemplary Force**

Batistia's relatively unprofessional army regularly harassed and brutalized civilians, ultimately alienating them (Joes 2010, 141-164).

**Resettlement**

No evidence of resettlement, the insurgency was initially organized in the already depopulated Sierra Maestra mountain range.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Batista does offer an amnesty early on in his rule to rebels including Castro in 1955. He himself is pardoned, but then becomes an insurgent yet again (Joes 2010, 141-164).

**Development Assistance**

No evidence that Batista government ever offers civic action or development aid to win over rural Cuban peasants.

**Elite Relationships**

Batista never wins the loyalty of peasant leadership in Cuba, leaving them to be co-opted or controlled by Castro and the insurgency.

**References**


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**7. El Salvador - Leftist insurgency**

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Massacres

FAES killed tens of thousands of peasants in massive repression, destruction of villages, massacres, etc (Peceny and Stanley 2010)

Exemplary Force

FAES resorted to assassination and intimidation of opposition figures, including priests. These were common throughout the war. (Peceny and Stanley 2010)

Resettlement

While refugees were created by violence, no program of ethnic cleansing or population resettlement appears to have existed.

Amnesty/Negotiations

The war ends as a negotiated settlement between the government/military and the FMLN. (Peceny and Stanley 2010)

Development Assistance

Programs of development and economic assistance were adopted, but these were always incomplete and never effective or distributed much aid.

Elite Relationships

Government never wins over local indigenous elites, all were alienated by massive use of repression and violence.

References


8. Ethiopia – Eritrean National Liberation Movement

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**Massacres**

Town of Keren was bombed after local bridges were bombed by insurgents in 1970. Army committed many massacres, burned villages. Worst atrocities happened during 1967 and 1970-1 (Tareke 2002).

**Exemplary Force**

Random arrests and arbitrary violence decreases after 1981, but exists in Ethiopian COIN prior (DeWaal 1991).

**Resettlement**

Civilians were cleared from a six-mile area running alongside the Keren-Asmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, other areas as well (Tareke 2002).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Ethiopian military government held talks with the EPLF in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead launched a new military offensive. Negotiations between mid-level officers guided by Jimmy Carter also begin in 1989 (Pateman 1990)

**Development Assistance**

No real assistance, only tied to resettlements.

**Elite Relationships**

No evidence of local elite allies.

**References**
9. Guatemala – Leftist Insurgency

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**Massacres**


**Exemplary Force**

Intimidation, harassment, torture, and murder of individual suspects was common practice by military.

**Resettlement**

More than 1 million Guatemalans forcibly displaced during the period from 1981-1983 in a deliberate policy of removal and displacement, then reorganized in 'model villages' controlled by gov't (Streeter 2006).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Amnesty offered in 1982 for those returning from Mexico, or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty (Streeter 2006).

**Development Assistance**

Much assistance available via USAID and the Alliance for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm policy of development to implement programs. Oligarchy
always shirked from supporting socioeconomic reform. Military does implement its own
civil affairs program known as the “National Plan for Security and Development”,
offering both “guns and beans.”

**Elite Relationships**

Military doesn't build new alliances among local elites, 'model villages' enable complete
surveillance and monitoring of the population. No move to use local elites for control.
More direct form of intervention in civil society (Streeter 2006).

**References**

Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency:
Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress.” *Third World Quarterly*
27(1): 57-68.

### 10. India – Naxalite Insurgency

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**Massacres**

No evidence of massacres.

**Exemplary Force**

Military has used extra-judicial killings, promoted use of violence by civilians and
vigilante groups against Naxalites in retaliation for their violence.

**Resettlement**

No evidence of resettlement.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**
Multiple rounds of negotiations have occurred between the many Naxalite groups and India's federal and state level governments.

**Development Assistance**

The Indian government has implemented development plans at the state level. For example, Uttar Pradesh state provided electricity to rural villages as a means of meeting peasant grievances.

**Elite Relationships**

Local governments in India formed cooperative relationships with vigilante groups comprised of upper caste Indians to put down Naxalite rebellions in different regions.

**References**


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**Massacres**

No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military.

**Exemplary Force**

Indonesian military pressed civilians into militia service and participation in cordon-and-
sweep operations known as *pagar betis* while under threat.

**Resettlement**

Indonesian military does evacuate and resettle villagers who live in Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

No evidence of amnesty or negotiations, DI insurgency ends with decapitation.

**Development Assistance**

No evidence found.

**Elite Relationships**

Few elite relationships, Kilcullen (2000) argues that local military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de facto control over civil administration and civil society.

**References**


**12. Indonesia II – Ethnic insurgency (East Timor)**

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Massacres

Exemplary Force
Intimidation, kidnapping, extra-judicial murder was common in the 1990s among pro-gov't militias and paramilitaries against anti-Indonesian activists, pro-FRETLIN supporters.

Resettlement
Widespread resettlement of civilians by Indonesian military from 1983 - 1989. Major civilian displacement was common in period prior to 1983 as well. Large-scale displacements after 1999 referendum on independence.

Amnesty/Negotiations
Cease-fire and negotiations between FRETLIN and TNI in 1983, but talks fail and Indonesian military attacks.

Development Assistance
The military did enact a civil affairs program that improved sanitation, health, created infrastructure, enhanced local gov't control.

Elite Relationships
Local Indonesian military leaders take political control in areas of operation, but do establish local allies and support elites like Tomas Goncalves, conservative groups like KOTA, Apodeti and the UDT.
References


----. 2006. “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 44-64.


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Massacres

No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military.

Exemplary Force

Indonesian military used intimidation, rape, torture, murder against civilian population during 25 year conflict, about 20,000 civilian casualties.

Resettlement

Indonesian military establishes 'black' and 'gray' zones that are cleared of civilians who are forcibly resettled in 2003-2004. Civilians given no warning, forced to leave possessions, then become refugees.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Negotiated settlement concludes with peace agreement and disarmament provisions in 2000, some fluctuations in violence but lowered. Most fighting truly ends with 2005 tsunami.
Development Assistance

Indonesian govt builds roads, television relay stations, but no other indications of civic action, development assistance, improvements in livelihood.

Elite Relationships

No evidence of local alliances with Muslim elites, local leadership.

References


14. Kosovo – Ethnic Insurgency

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Massacres

Vojbska Jugoslavije did use artillery, tanks, APCs to provide indirect fire in support of “police forces”. Another massacre occurred at Kacak village, killing 45, including extra-judicial killings and mutilations. Serbian forces also wiped out an entire clan, the Jashari, whose leader was a key member of the UCK. Of 59 killed, 23 were women and children.

Exemplary Force
Serbian forces used brutality against Kosovar civilians, beating, raping, and harassing non-combatants.

**Resettlement**

VJ forcibly displaced thousands of Kosovar civilians from their homes and burned them, making them IDPs and refugees who resettled in mountainous regions as well as refugee camps in Albania. This was Milosevic's primary COIN strategy.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

No amnesty or negotiations.

**Development Assistance**

No evidence of development assistance offered to Albanian Kosovars.

**Elite Relationships**

No local alliances with Albanian Kosovars.

**References**


**15. Nicaragua I – Leftist insurgency**

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**Massacres**

Fewer massacres, more individual killings found.
Exemplary Force

Summary execution, rape, and torture were common tactics among Nicaraguan military forces used against civilians.

Resettlement

After outbreak of conflict in 1974, Somoza regime declares state of siege and resettles 80 percent of rural population in strategic hamlets.

Amnesty/Negotiations

US-sponsored mediation of the conflict takes place in late 1978 through 1979. These negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful as Somoza refuses to agree to a plebiscite to decide his rule.

Development Assistance

No evidence that Somoza's regime provides development assistance or civic action programs to increase the benefits of cooperation to the population. US aid to Nicaragua is also cut during this period by the Carter administration in protest of human rights violations, further limiting resources that could be provided to the regime, and then to civilians.

Elite Relationships

No evidence that Somoza wins over rural elites or political moderates. Rather, polarization driven by the war tends to pull away potential allies and drives them toward the Sandinistas and the broad-based opposition.

References


Weathers, Bynum, E. 1983. “Guerrilla Warfare in Nicaragua,” Air University
16. *Nicaragua II – Rightist insurgency*

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**Massacres**

No evidence of massacres.

**Exemplary Force**

Sandinistas did use intimidation and assassination against enemies of the regime, including those they thought were supporting the Contras.

**Resettlement**

FSLN government resettled 8,000 civilians in Miskitu during campaigns, but then allowed them to return to their homes after operations were over. Only temporary resettlement. FSLN eventually used resettlement on Indian population in the country's interior. Since peasants traditionally lived in isolation, resettlements violated their way of life and alienated them. Sandinistas also created 3,000 strategic hamlets that provided military protection to peasant farmers.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Amnesty was announced in 1983 for Contra insurgents who would lay down their arms.

**Development Assistance**

Government implements 'historic' land reform in 1985 that provides land to ordinary peasants.
Elite Relationships

Decentralization initiative in 1985 incorporates local Miskitu leadership into FSLN governance structures, creation of two new governmental departments on the coast.

References


17. Peru – Leftist insurgency (Sendero Luminoso)

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Massacres

More individual killings than large-scale indiscriminate massacres.

Exemplary Force

Intimidation, torture, and harassment of civilians by Peruvian military and police was common throughout the conflict.

Resettlement

While refugees were created by COIN and insurgent operations, no systematic policy of resettlement.

Amnesty/Negotiations

No evidence of negotiations between Sendero and the government.

Development Assistance

Although no detailed development plan was adopted, Peru successfully uses small-scale
projects throughout contested regions consistent with Thompson's emphasis on 'hearts and minds' in counterinsurgency theory.

**Elite Relationships**

In 1990s, Peru wins support of village leaders of Peruvian peasants to encourage formation of *campesinos*, local village militias. Occurs after brutal violence of Sendero and earlier indiscriminate violence by the Peruvian state.

**References**


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**18. Philippines – Leftist insurgency (Huk Rebellion)**

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**Massacres**

No evidence of mass atrocities, massacres by Philippine government.

**Exemplary Force**

Philippine forces, especially the Military Police Command, abused villagers, intimidation and harassment, beatings were common. Some political opponents were summarily executed individually.

**Resettlement**

No evidence of resettlement of civilians in new locations to enable separation from
insurgents.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Economic Development Corps used to encourage Huk rebels to defect under amnesty. Rebels were promised land in exchange for turning to the government. However, less than 1,000 rebels took up EDC offer.

Development Assistance

When Magsaysay becomes Defense head, he creates an Economic Development Corps within the military that performs civic action programs and provides aid to civilians to reduce dependence on Huks and increase ties with the government.

Elite Relationships

No evidence that local peasant leadership joins against Huk rebellion and with government.

References


19. Philippines II – Ethnic uprising (Moro)

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Massacres

One atrocity found, no widespread indication of massacres.
Exemplary Force

Incidents against civilians did occur, but generally went unpunished. No control over military intimidation, harassment, murder of civilians. Witnesses to UN human rights violations have been shot and killed in the 2000s as well.

Resettlement

No evidence of resettlement.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Negotiations occur throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the prospect of substantial autonomy for Muslim areas. Leads to agreement in 1996 between MNLF and gov't, but not MILF which continues armed opposition, although gov't doesn't bother them if they do not launch attacks.

Development Assistance

Army does initiate development programs, building roads, improving Mindinao's airport, building mosques for Muslims, construction of schools, health facilities, support for rural electric service.

Elite Relationships

Since MNLF become a press group following insurgency, their reintegration into civil society supports gov't claim for peace.


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20. Rwanda – Ethnic insurgency

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**Massacres**

Hutu-led government conducted a genocide in April 1994 against Tutsis and moderate Hutus suspected of supporting the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 800,000 Rwandans were killed.

**Exemplary Force**

Rwandan military forces regularly intimidated and harassed civilians, particularly the Interhamwe militia.

**Resettlement**

The genocide displaced massive numbers of civilians and forced them to become IDPs or refugees.

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Both the Rwandan government and the RPF negotiated an initial settlement known as the Arusha Accords which provided for a provisional coalition government, but it was not sustainable and never had legitimacy from all sides of the conflict.

**Development Assistance**

No indication that the Rwandan government offered any kind of aid or assistance to improve the livelihoods of Tutsis.

**Elite Relationships**

The absolute nature of the war ensured that no local Tutsi elites sided with the
government.

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21. Spain – ethnic/religious insurgency

Massacres

No evidence of massacres.

Exemplary Force

Use of torture and detentions by Spanish police alienated the population. After 1988, far fewer arrests and much less instances of the use of force by police in general.

Resettlement

No resettlement policy.

Amnesty/Negotiations

At least 20 attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement to end conflict by 1990.

Development Assistance

Development assistance provide through the European Union and the Spanish government.

Elite Relationships

Spain allowed Basque country to be an autonomous community in 1978, enabling for a
Basque parliament and regional president, all integrated into the Spanish state, although they are sympathetic to Basque nationalism.

References


22. Sri Lanka – ethnic insurgency

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Massacres

Government forces shelled densely populated areas in Northern Sri Lanka during the last months of the conflict in 2009. Targets included hospitals. Munitions included cluster bombs, white phosphorous. Civilians had burn marks from phosphorous and napalm. (Shahnewaz 2010, 6-7). Large civilian massacres have been common throughout the war, including 53 Tamil detainees at Welikade Prison and 60 civilians in Jaffna in July 1983, 70 at a church in April 1984 in Jaffna, 100 Tamil civilians at Iraperiyakulam army camp and 100 Tamil civilians at Mannar, both in Dec 1984. Attacks common except for 1986-1989, but large massacres again in 1989 and 1990 of Tamils (Ibid., 7-8). Fewer attacks in mid-90s, couple in late-90s, mid-200s, and then the final assault with massive numbers of civilians, in 10s thousands (Ibid., 8-9).

Exemplary Force
Intimidation, torture, and summary execution have been common throughout the conflict. Intimidation occurred through arbitrary arrest, and disappearances of insurgents or civilians suspected of supporting the insurgency. From 1988-1994, at least 20,000 disappeared. (Shahnewaz 2010, 9) “Extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, forced recruitment and other human rights violations are persistent and widespread.’ (Ibid., 10)

**Resettlement**

Over 100,000 Tamils were displaced from the country post-1983, starting with a mass displacement at the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. Areas around Trincomalee have been depopulated of Tamils. Same happened to Manal aru Tamils in 1985, and in Vanni in 2009. COIN strategy appears to keep Tamil civilians out of some areas to prevent LTTE infiltration. Sri Lankan military forces created internment camps called ‘welfare centers’ in March 2008 for civilians fleeing conflicted areas, these were still used in late 2009 after the final offensive crushing the LTTE had ended despite mass overcrowding (Shahnewaz 2010, 7-8).

**Development Assistance**

No evidence of the provision of development assistance to civilians. Instead, the origins of the conflict are due the denial of social services to Tamils. After the 2004-5 tsunami, aid was actually prevented from reaching civilians in LTTE areas.

**Amnesty and Negotiations**

Peace treaties and cease-fires were common throughout the conflict. The first led to the introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987, but this collapsed in renewed violence in 1990, 1995, and 2002. However, In 2004, Colonel Karuna, commander of 6,000 troops, defected with his forces to the Sinhalese military. This greatly diminished
LTTE forces and reduced recruitment in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Provinces, increasing its vulnerability. (Jalal 5-6, 2011). DeSilva says it was 3,000 troops that defected, and then 500-600 became gov’t troops (DeSilva 2010, 3).

**Elite Relationships**

None, this appears to be total war.

**References**


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**23. Sudan I – ethnic civil war (First)**

**ABCDef = S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>EXP</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>AMN/NEG</th>
<th>DEV</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Massacres**

Sudanese army committed multiple large-scale massacres in July 1965 in which thousands of civilians were killed and several villages were destroyed (Poggo 2009).

**Exemplary Force**

Mass arrests, beatings, torture, and rape were common abuses of forces perpetuated by
the Sudanese military against southern civilians throughout the entire conflict (Poggo 2009).

**Resettlement**

Sudanese military repeatedly displaced thousands of villagers and destroyed their villages. Also created resettlement program known as 'peace villages', coupled with an offer of agricultural/grain support, health and educational facilities (Poggo 2009).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

War ends with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, ending the conflict and allowing for reintegration of southern Sudan into the rest of the country (Poggo 2009).

**Development Assistance**

Some assistance is provided in tandem with peace villages, but few ordinary southern civilians experience or receive these benefits (Poggo 2009).

**Elite Relationships**

No evidence of local allies among southern Sudanese, all see northerners as culturally distinct (Arab/African, Muslim/Christian), and this cultural divide is only reinforced by other violent tactics.

**References**


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**24. Sudan – ethnic civil war (Second)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>EXP</th>
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</table>

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222
Massacres
Annihilation practices continue from first conflict. These include attacking villages, bombing civilian targets like schools with airpower, repeated massacres.

Exemplary Force
Brutality against civilians is common, including rape, forced conscription, mass arrests, assassination of Nuba intellectuals (Meyer 2005).

Resettlement
Population was relocated en masse using 'peace villages' which were nominally protected by the government (Meyer 2005).

Amnesty/Negotiations
Multiple rounds of negotiations occur, which end in a 2005 peace treaty that promises a future referendum on the status of South Sudan.

Development Assistance
Development assistance is made available and promoted by the United Nations, but it is not clear that these development efforts are tied to Sudan’s government or its counterinsurgency. Generally, development assistance provided by multilateral institutions would strive for neutrality. Also, development assistance provided to Nuba who moved to 'peace villages' was offered conditionally in exchange for converting to Islam (Meyer 2005).

Elite Relationships
No evidence of any relationships with local elite allies.

References
Massacre

Janjaweed militia repeatedly committed large-scale massacres, killing tens of civilians during each attack on multiple villages and population centers.

Exemplary Force

Janjaweed beat, tortured, intimidated Darfuri civilians on a regular basis.

Resettlement

Janjaweed destroyed villages of Darfuri civilians and displaced them, creating thousands of refugees.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Sudan engaged in negotiations with the major rebel groups in Darfur in 2006-2007, leading to an eventual cease-fire.

Development Assistance

No evidence of development assistance provided by government of Sudan.

Elite Relationships

Sudan co-coopts Arab nomadic tribes as janjaweed in Darfur to fight black African rebel movements.

References

26. Turkey – Leftist/ethnic insurgency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>ANN</th>
<th>EXP</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>AMN/NEG</th>
<th>DEV</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Massacres**

Small scale killings, no evidence of large-scale massacres.

**Exemplary Force**

Government forces would sweep through villages and beat and torture civilians to extract confessions about PKK collaboration. Military sought to intimidate the population to gain loyalty, thereby countering PKK intimidation and terror with that of the state (McDowall 2000, 425). In the early 1990s, targeted assassinations were conducted against leaders of newly-formed Kurdish political parties (HEP, DEP, HADEP), journalists, and human rights workers. These murders peaked in 1993 when 510 persons were killed that year. (van Bruinessen 1996, 20).

**Resettlement**

Military embarked on a campaign of forced evacuation and village destruction at the end of the 1980s through the mid-90s, leading to 1,779 villages/hamlets and 6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden 2001, 80). Systematic ‘cleansing and evacuation’ occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages emptied by July 1995 (McDowall 2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in village-towns, which were constructed along urban planning models but did not accommodate the
agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 80-84).

Development Assistance

Military controlled all large constructed projects and military enterprises by 1990 employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no consideration was given about how to connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56; McDowall 2000, 434). In the course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into village-towns, hospitals and clinics were constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few civilians returned to live in such village-towns and utilize the available social services.

Amnesty/Negotiations

Turkish military adopts purely military approaches toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political reforms of alleviate causes of the rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the rebellion, and negotiations were never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish initiative in 2009, which presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 251-252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish names of villages and cities, has amnesty for low-middle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish language in education, campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252).

Elite Relationships

Following the initial PKK offensives, the government passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These militias were organized
against tribal clans led by elders, these tended to identify with the rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also, aghas (local landowners) collected salaries for village guards and controlled distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall 2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security forces, these were used to obtain construction contracts to build things like police complexes and schools.

References


27. Uganda – ethnic/religious insurgency (northern Uganda)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>EXP</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>AMN/NEG</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>W</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Massacres

During resettlement pushes, Ugandan military forces fired artillery at villagers and
villages that did not leave their homes. But, no evidence that this was a purposive attempt to destroy all Acholi. (Branch 2005, Finnström 2008).

**Exemplary Force**

Acholi were regularly harassed intimidated by Ugandan forces, leading to human rights violations (Branch 2005, Finnström 2008).

**Resettlement**

Ugandan military forced the Acholi to leave their homes for refugee camps in 2002, eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming IDPs (Branch 2005).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

LRA and Ugandan government engage in negotiations from 2006 – 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for safe areas in the DRC, however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South Sudan (Finnström 2008).

**Development Assistance**

Ugandan government under Museveni initiates Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new livelihoods and opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and coordinated with bilateral and multilateral donors (Finnström 2008).

**Elite Relationships**

Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government, including as members of parliament. The lack of a political program by the LRA has driven many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive arrangements with the government.

**References**

Branch, Adam. 2005. “Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in


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### 28. Yugoslavia – multiple ethnic separatist movements

#### ABCDef = W

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>EXP</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>AMN/NEG</th>
<th>DEV</th>
<th>ELT</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Massacres**

Yugoslavian military (JNA) and militias committed massacres and ethnically cleansed villages throughout the conflict, culminating with genocidal attack on Srebrenica, killing 8,000 Muslim men and boys (Maass 1997).

**Exemplary Force**

JNA and militias regularly intimidated and attacked civilians from all three ethnic groups, including ethnic Serbs. Shelling cities like Sarajevo as a regular feature of the war (Maass 1997).

**Resettlement**

Serbian forces drove Muslim and Croatian civilians away from villages and towns in Serbian-held territory, forcing them to resettle as refugees in other places. No plan for resettlement, just forced evacuation (Maass 1997).

**Amnesty/Negotiations**

Serbs engaged in negotiations throughout the conflict with Bosnia, Croatia, and the United Nations on different cease-fires, attempts at limiting violence. All of these eventually failed however (Maass 1997).
Development Assistance

No development assistance offered to targeted populations.

Elite Relationships

Serbs ally with other Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina, but never form any local alliances with Muslim and Croatian elites. Engage in total war.

References


29. Zimbabwe – anti-colonial uprising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABCDef = L</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence/Absence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Massacre

Rhodesian military forces regularly committed atrocities, focused exclusively on an enemy-centric COIN strategy that prioritized 'high-body counts' at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).

Exemplary Force

Rhodesian military forces regularly beat and intimidated civilians, regularly executed prisoners (Cilliers 1985, De Boer 2011)).

Resettlement

In July 1973, Rhodesian government initiates Protected Village programme, resettling Africans in new locations, eventually becomes key part of Rhodesian COIN, leads to establishment of the Guard Force, local militias to police Protected Villages (De Boer 2011).
Amnesty/Negotiations

Amnesty was announced twice in 1979, about 6,500 insurgents accept, but not fully implemented by Rhodesian military. Rhodesian military was worried that the war effort would be undermined by amnesty for rebels and this drove executions of prisoners, which ultimately cancelled any amnesty policy at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).

Development Assistance

Proposals for farms, bakeries, even a national pension plan for Africans were floated but never funded. (Cilliers 1985).

Elite Relationships

No evidence of elite relationships.

References


Appendix B

The below Appendix includes all the data and Boolean analysis discussed in
Chapter 4. It includes an analysis of imperial, domestic, and all 48 cases of counterinsurgency practices.

Six tables are included below. The first three include the combinations of practices for each of the three analyses (imperial, domestic, and all). The second three are the truth tables for each analysis. Outcomes are coded for wins (=1), stalemates (=2), and losses (=3). While I am only creating Boolean equations for combinations of practices that produce victory, I retain this coding scheme to use this data in future analyses.

To demonstrate the reliability of my analyses, I have also included the outputs from the program FsQCA, originally developed by Charles Ragin. These outputs have been included to enable replication.

1) IMPERIAL COIN – BOOLEAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY

Below is a summary of the Boolean analysis for all 18 counterinsurgencies that meet my coding criteria.

After compiling a truth table for all 64 potential combinations of a six-factor Boolean equation (see Appendix A), I produce the following Imperial COIN combinations and their war outcomes. The combinations highlighted in blue form the equation indicating all combinations that produce victory below the table.
Victory ((W) in the column 'outcome') occurs in only five out of 18 cases, indicating that counterinsurgency success is rather rare. In addition, two of the five victories (KEN and MAL, or Kenya and Malaysia) were counterinsurgencies performed by Britain. British counterinsurgency is widely known as involving more liberal practices aimed at winning 'hearts and minds'. The same combination of practices leads to victory in both British cases, namely aBCdEF, and indicates a combination of both realist and liberal practices.

The other cases of victory were won by Soviet (HUN or Hungary), French (MAD or Madagascar), and Chinese (TIB or Tibet) counterinsurgencies, and relied more on pure realist strategies involving annihilation (A) and exemplary force (B). China's
counterinsurgency in Tibet combines these practices with amnesty/negotiations (D) to achieve victory, but realist strategies remain dominant.

Any one of these combinations can produce victory. Thus, the primitive equation for all combinations producing victory is:

2) \[ W = ABcDef + aBCdEF + ABcdef \]

This equation can then be simplified using the basic minimization rule: if two expressions differ on only factor, then that factor can be eliminated and the two expressions can be combine. Applying the simplification rule proceeds as follows:

aBCdEF does not combine with ABcdef
aBCdEF does not combine with ABcDef
ABcdef combines with ABcDef to produce ABcef

Because ABcef is a combination of ABcdef and ABcDef, these two expressions are eliminated. However, because aBCdEF cannot be simplified by with any other expression, it is carried down into equation (2), as per Chan 2003.

4) \[ W = ABcef + aBCdEF \]

I've verified this simplification using Ragin's Boolean analysis software 'fsQCA'.
Below is an output from the analysis of the data. The acronyms ANN, EXF, RES, AMN, Dev, ELT represent each of my six factors.

******************************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
******************************

File: C:/Users/user/Desktop/Wars -1 = a.csv
Model: OUT = f(ANN, EXF, RES, AMN, DEV, ELT)

Rows: 13
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.500000

<table>
<thead>
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<th>unique</th>
<th>coverage</th>
<th>coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN<em>EXF</em>~RES<em>~DEV</em>~ELT</td>
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<td>0.600000</td>
<td>0.600000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.400000</td>
<td>0.666667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 0.625000

\[ \text{ANN*EXF*~RES*~DEV*~ELT} = \text{ABcef} \]
\[ \sim\text{ANN*EXF*RES*~AMN*DEV*ELT} = \text{aBCdEF} \]

This confirms my initial simplification.

*Prime Implicants*

Below is a prime implicant chart used to determine if the reduced expression \( \text{ABcef} \) can cover all primitive expressions, as described in Ragin 1997, pp. 95-98.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>\text{ABcDef}</th>
<th>a\text{BCdEF}</th>
<th>\text{ABcdef}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\text{ABcef}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, \( \text{ABcef} \) cannot imply or 'cover' \( \text{aBCdEF} \).

No prime implicants can cover all the primitive expressions.

Given equation (2), we can begin to make some generalizations about which counterinsurgency practices are necessary, but not sufficient, for victory. Exemplary force (B, or EXF) is the only factor that is present in both expressions, making it the only necessary COIN practice for all 18 cases. Because no single factor can cause victory by
itself, no single counterinsurgency practice is sufficient. To illustrate, I factor out (B) from all three expressions. This produces equation (3).

$$3) \quad W = B(acDef) + B(Acdef) + B(CdEF)$$

Equation 3) shows which others factors must be present with (B) to produce victory while all others are absent. These include BD, AB, and BCEF. Thus, victory is an outcome if exemplary force (B) is combine with amnesty/negotiations (D); annihilation (A); or resettlement (C), development assistance (E), and elite relationships (F).

I examine AB first. This is the most strongly realist combination of factors producing sufficiency because it relies solely on direct coercion, either by destroying the civilian population or using non-absolute forms of coercion to increase the costs of non-compliance with counterinsurgents while still threatening further violence.

Next, BD combines both realist and liberal COIN practices. BD suggests that both positive and negative incentives are sufficient for victory, as exemplary force increases the costs of non-compliance while amnesty and negotiations provide cooperative avenues for bargaining about preferences that reduce the costs for compliance.

The combination BCEF also combines both realist and liberal practices, but suggests that liberal practices combine with exemplary force to increase incentives for cooperation rather than reduce costs for non-compliance. Factor (E), development assistance, provides additional economic goods that make cooperation more attractive, while factor (F), elite relationships, establishes local allies among civilians whose prestige and status is bolstered by the provision of new positive incentives.
However, realist practices are also needed in this equation, and not merely to increase the costs of non-compliance. The presence of (C), population control, indicates that the combination of other factors (BEF) is effective only when civilians have fewer opportunities for cooperation with insurgents due to spatial control. Victory, then, results from the reduction of cooperative opportunities with insurgents and the increasing costs of non-compliance (as predicted by realists) as well as an increase in incentives for cooperation coupled strengthening the status and prestige of local allies among civilians (as predicted by liberals). Although this combination combines both coercive and bargaining practices, I claim that it still reflects more a more realist counterinsurgency strategy. Counterinsurgents can strengthen local leaders through selective incentives because these elites have better knowledge about the intentions and activities of local civilians and enable targeted repression rather than mass annihilation. In this way, liberal COIN practices enable counterinsurgents to refine their coercive practices rather than pursue true bargaining that respects the autonomy of civilian choices.

Conclusion

This analysis of realist counterinsurgency strategies suggests that realism must always inform the mix of practices employed by militaries to achieve victory. In every combination, exemplary force (B) is a necessary factor for victory. Therefore, victorious counterinsurgencies must increase the costs of non-compliance to defeat an insurgency. However, B is combined with only annihilation (A), or with a mix of realist and liberal practices (C, D, E, or F). Thus, both pure realist strategies and mixed strategies can lead to success.

However, this analysis makes clear pure liberal strategies do not produce success.
No combination of pure liberal strategies (amnesty/negotiations (D), development assistance (E), or elite relationships (F) produce victory. This conclusion challenges the model of counterinsurgency articulated in FM 3-24: *Counterinsurgency* and supported by Paul, Clarke, and Grill (2010). Although victory has many sources, they all involve a fair amount of coercion, and none of them rely on pure persuasion.

**DOMESTIC COIN – BOOLEAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY**

After compiling a truth table for all 64 potential combinations of a six-factor Boolean equation (see Appendix B), I produce the following domestic COIN combinations and their war outcomes. The combinations highlighted in blue form the equation indicating all combinations that produce victory below the table.
Victory ((W) in the column 'outcome') occurs in 11 out of 29 cases, once again indicating that counterinsurgency success is rather rare. In addition, two of the 11 victories were achieved in the Philippines, which is seen as a country that has practiced successful counterinsurgency with American supporting and training. Although the combinations leading to Philippine victory are slightly different (varying only in the presence/absence of elite relationships), they nonetheless employ exemplary force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Total</th>
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<th>Outcome</th>
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<th>Value</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU1 Total</td>
<td>ABCDef</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU2 Total</td>
<td>ABCDef</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>GUA Total</td>
<td>ABCDef</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN Total</td>
<td>aBcdef</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>CUB Total</td>
<td>aBcDef</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1 Total</td>
<td>aBCDdef</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ABCDef</td>
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<td>N2 Total</td>
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</tr>
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<td>RWA Total</td>
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<td>ZIM Total</td>
<td>ABCDdef</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
combined with at least two liberal practices. In fact, all the above cases (win or non-win) employ exemplary force, suggesting that no state has waged COIN without using coercion against innocent civilians. This is, however, high variation among the use of annihilation (3 out of 11 cases) and resettlement (6 out of 11 cases).

Not including those combinations which repeat, the primitive Boolean equation for domestic coin success is:

\[ W = aBcdeF + aBcDEF + aBcDEF + aBCdef + aBCDeF + aBCDEF + ABcDeF + ABCDef + ABCDeF \]

The combinations for domestic counterinsurgencies demonstrate a high degree of variation. Out of the 11 victories, only two combinations lead to victory twice, namely aBcDEF and aBCDEF. This initial result reinforces claims made by counterinsurgency theorists like Kilcullen (2010) that the conditions for counterinsurgency victory will vary greatly across cases.

If simplified using the basic minimization rule, equation 1) can be reduced to the following (I haven't included the full simplification as above, but I have cross-checked this with fsQCA):

\[ W = aBcDE + ABCDe + ABDeF + aBCDF + aBCdef + aBcdef \]

Like the reduced expression for imperial counterinsurgencies, exemplar force is
common to all equation, yet the overall combinations of realist and liberal practices are highly varied. The most realist combination is ABCDe, which covers the Sri Lanka and Sudan's counterinsurgency in Darfur. While negotiations were used in these conflicts, their insurgencies were generally suppressed through the full range of realist practices. No successful case employs the full range of liberal practices, but instead features combinations of two of the three practices alongside others.

Because of the great variation in combinations, the high number of cases, and the presence of successful combinations that lead to defeat in other cases, we can eliminate some outliers from equation 1) by increasing the consistency cutoff for inclusion in the Boolean Analysis. I do this in multiple ways, first by removing all those successful combinations that are failures in the majority of the rest of the cases in which that combination is present. Since combination ABCDef succeeds only in Sri Lanka but fails in seven other cases, its consistency of 0.125 makes it an outlier for removal. Once analyzed by removing this outlier, equation 3) is produced and simplified as follows:

3) \[ W = ABDeF + BCDeF + aBCdef + aBcdeF + aBcDEf \]

These simplified expressions again demonstrate the need for mix combinations, with all expressions except aBcDEf equally mixing realist and liberal practices. Because no single practice can produce counterinsurgency victory, there are no individual factors that are casually sufficient. However, the presence of exemplary force in all cases demonstrates its necessary. Recall from the above analysis of imperial counterinsurgencies that exemplary force was also found to be a sufficient variable.
Below, I factor out exemplary force to create expression 4) and infer how different combinations of factors with exemplary force can produce victory.

\[ W = B(ADeF) + B(CDeF) + B(aCef) + B(acdeF) + B(acDEf) \]

Combination B(aCef) is the most strongly realist since it does not require the presence of any liberal practices but instead the absence of development assistance and elite relationships. Victory in this combination is produced by intimidating and resettling ordinary people, consistent with the inverse of Mao's metaphor of the people as the sea in which insurgents swim. Since annihilation is absent in this combination, it suggests that counterinsurgents still rely obtaining information about insurgents from civilians to identify insurgents for neutralization.

Combinations B(ADeF) and B(CDeF) are mixed combinations but still use direct coercion without offering any positive incentives to ordinary people. Although these combinations include liberal practices such as negotiations and the formation of local elite relationships, these cooperative factors enable counterinsurgents to meet local preferences but only in tandem in coercion that moves those preferences closer to those of counterinsurgents. These combinations also feature the absence of development assistance and produce victory without providing material benefits to ordinary civilians and instead engage in bargaining with insurgents themselves and local elites.

Combination B(acdeF) is a politically conservative strategy that applies exemplary force to civilians while forging relationships with local elites. Thus, while counterinsurgents use coercion to force the local population to comply with their
preferences, the formation of elite relationships and alliances suggests that the forced shift in preferences is still consistent with the preferences of local elites.

Lastly, combination B(acDEf) is the most liberal combination. Although it does employ exemplary force against civilians to alter their preferences, its use of development assistance indicates the provision of positive incentives to non-combatants to increase the benefits of counterinsurgent cooperation. Combined with insurgent negotiations and amnesty, this combination attempts to find common preferences with insurgents by weakening it through non-coercive means and positive civilian collaboration.

**ALL COIN – BOOLEAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY**

After compiling a truth table for all 64 potential combinations of a six-factor Boolean equation (see Appendix B), I produce the following domestic COIN combinations and their war outcomes. The combinations highlighted in blue form the equation indicating all combinations that produce victory below the table.
Chart 7: Combinations of all COIN practices for 48 conflicts, 1945-1990

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Counterinsurgency victory (‘W’ in the above table) occurs in 16 out of 48 cases. Four of the 16 expressions repeated more than once, resulting in 12 unique expressions producing counterinsurgent victory. The equation encompassing all possible victorious counterinsurgency expressions is shown below:

1.1. \( W = aBcdeF + aBcDEf + aBcDEF + aBCdef + aBCdEF + aBCDeF + aBCDEF + ABcdef + ABcDef + ABcDeF + ABCDef + ABCDeF + ABCDeF \)

This equation produces all the relevant combinations leading to COIN victory in either an imperial or domestic counterinsurgency. Once simplified, it results in the following equation:

1.2. \( W = ABDe + ABcdf + aBcDE + aBCDF + aBCdef + aBcdeF + BCDef \)

Note that the above equation does include two combinations relying on pure realist strategies: ABcdf and aBCdef. The former expression covers victorious counterinsurgencies including the Soviet Union in Hungary and France in Algeria. The latter expression, aBCdef, only includes Indonesia's post-independence counterinsurgency. As expected, there are no purely liberal counterinsurgency expressions, only mixed ones that combine releases and liberal practices.
Equation 2) can be further modified by removing outliers which have either a low frequency or have a high rate of inconsistency (these are victorious expressions that are also present in cases of counterinsurgent non-victory). Equation 3) indicates the result of simplifying the 'All Wars' equation by removing those cases with an consistency below 0.5 (these are cases featuring the same combination, yet less than half result in victory). Raising the consistency threshold eliminates expression ABCDef, which succeeds only in Sri Lanka but fails to produce victory in its seven other appearances. After simplification, the following equation is produced:

3. \[ W = BCDef + ABDef + aBCEF + ABcdef + aBCdef + aBcdef + aBcDEf \]

BCDef, ABDef, and aBCEF are only reduced expression in the equation, and with the inclusion of four primitive expressions, equation 3) indicates that the combinations leading to counterinsurgency victory are still highly case dependent even after the removal of one outlier. Like the other equations, no pure liberal strategies lead to counterinsurgent victory, only mixed strategies.

Despite the unique relationship between combinations and cases of victory, we can still refine this equation to identify which combinations are most generalizable across by removing those combinations with a frequency less than two (these are combinations featuring only one case) while maintaining a consistency threshold of 0.5. Applying such thresholds removes most combinations, leaving only the following reduced expression:

4) \[ W = aBCEF + ABcdef + aBcDef \]
This equation includes the following cases: Soviet Union in Hungary and France in Madagascar (ABcdef), both counterinsurgencies in the Philippines (aBcDEF), Colombia, Uganda, Kenya and Malaya (Colombia and Uganda feature aBCDEF, while Kenya and Malaya feature aBCdEF. These reduce to aBCEF).

Overall, this indicates that two of the most generalizable combinations are those which feature mixed combinations. Both rely on economic development but alternate in their emphasis on negotiations and elite relationships. The former, aBcDEF, is more consistent with liberalism compared to aBCEF because it relies on bargaining with insurgents and civilians. The latter, more conservative strategy, relies on additional coercion of civilians via resettlement and additional bargaining and support for local elites.
Chart 8: Truth Table for Analysis I (-1 = a), Imperial Counterinsurgencies

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Chart 9: Truth Table for Domestic Counterinsurgencies

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Total | 29 | 11 |

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**Total** | 47 | 16
References


Afghanistan, 207-230.


**References for Chapter 5 Case Study**


Defence Studies. 8(1): 78-104.


