A genealogy of gaze and voice in Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley

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A GENEALOGY OF GAZE AND VOICE

IN GODWIN, WOLLSTONECRAFT, AND MARY SHELLEY

by

Joon Yoon

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation, “A Genealogy of Voice and Gaze in Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley,” presents the unseen and unheard dimension of criminals, madwomen and monsters. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, modern man was born while imprisoning his neighbor. For the birth of modern man to take place, therefore, the criminals and the madwomen must be forgotten: the modern institutions of the prison and madhouse are instruments in this forgetting; the voices of these figures must be silenced by the modern discourses of criminology and psychiatry. In a similar way, beside modern man, the monster who is unseeable and unsayable was born and simultaneously banished into darkness and solitude as we see in Shelley’s fiction. Although their gaze and voice seemed to be totally repressed, they nonetheless always claim their existence and their right to speak as we see in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria, and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.

In this dissertation, I use Foucault’s genealogy and Lacan’s psychoanalysis which allow us rethink the way modernity and humanity were formed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In their formation, something unseen and unheard returns and haunts human history as we see in Foucault’s genealogy, and in the gaze and voice as the object a in Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Therefore, both Foucault’s genealogy and Lacan’s psychoanalysis allow us see a counter-memory of received history, a counter-memory which subverts the master narrative of modern
man. However, this history is nothing but a fiction, a narrative construction, which makes possible the birth of modern man, while excluding criminals, madwomen, and the monsters from humanity. But what if fiction – the novels of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Shelley – turns out to anticipate these thinkers? What if fiction turns out to be the force that reveals the fictional status of these master narratives? Therefore, even at the moment of the birth of modern man and even at the moment of forgetting and silence, criminals, madwomen, and the monsters never cease to claim their existence and their right to speak as we see in the novels, and they still haunt us, modern man.
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The abbreviations of Foucault’s and Lacan’s works

Michel Foucault


Jacques Lacan


**É**  *Écrits: The First Complete Translation in English*. Tr. Bruce Fink.


CHAPTER ONE

Introduction:

A Genealogy of Gaze and Voice in Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley

“A genealogy of gaze and voice” presents the way a criminal, a madwoman, and a monster were born beside modern man as his neighbor, and the way their existence and voice were forgotten and silenced for the sake of the birth of man. “Genealogy” entails the production of a counter-memory to the master narrative of modern man. For the birth of modern man to take place, the criminal and the madwoman must be forgotten. The modern institutions of the prison and madhouse are instruments in this forgetting; the voices of these figures must be silenced by the modern discourses of criminology and psychiatry. In a similar way, beside modern man, the monster who is unseeable and unsayable was born and simultaneously banished into darkness and solitude as we see in Shelley’s fiction. Although their gaze and voice seemed to be totally repressed, they nonetheless always claim their existence and their right to speak as we see in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria, and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. In seeking to provide the genealogy of the gaze and
voice, these novels produced counter-memories of the unheard and the unseen, subverting the master narrative of the birth of the modern man, narratives which were invented by Bentham, Beccaria, contemporary psychiatry, and finally Kant.

Here, the Foucauldian concept of “genealogy,” means a production of the counter-memory which challenges a received history of modern man and which allows us to see how modern man was born into true man by imprisoning the madman whose existence should be forgotten for the sake of the birth of modern man as true man. Thus, the genealogy of madness, instead of supporting the master narrative of the birth of man of reason, presents the way madmen were born at the modern madhouse and required to examine and punish their own potential madness. In his genealogy of modern madness, Michel Foucault elaborates the way the modern madhouse and psychiatry imprisoned and punished supposedly mad people and the way they were driven really mad in the madhouse. In this process, the mad became an observable object of the psychiatric gaze of doctors and their stories were brought into discourse by the doctors, not by themselves. In this way, the inmates were assumed to be mad by the doctors, and the fiction of madness turned into the truth of madness through the madmen’s confession of their supposed madness. This became a received history of reason which extols the progressive emergence of reason and truth, concealing its uncomfortable truth, the unreason of reason itself. However, even at the
moment when modern madness, which was born at the madhouse, seemed to become a perfect object of psychiatric observation and knowledge, there always remained something unseen and unheard. This silent and invisible dimension is brought to light by these three novelists, challenging the history of reason which unjustly imprisoned supposedly dangerous individuals as madmen, criminals or monsters. As such, their novels are the counterpart of the Foucauldian genealogy of madness which reveals that the supposedly true, factual history is nothing but a narrative construction or a fiction.

By the title, “a genealogy of gaze and voice,” I also intend to draw on Jacques Lacan’s concept of human subjectivity which shows the way the human subject fictionally constructs his supposedly true identity. As much as Foucault’s genealogy reveals that the truth of madness is a fiction invented by the modern apparatuses of knowledge, Lacan’s psychoanalysis reveals the way in which human identity is fictionally constituted in the specular and vocative fields of the Other. Lacan shows us how we are born into human beings as a semblance through which we identify ourselves as resembling the Other. Most of all, this specular, vocative identification of “I am like the Other” is a fiction in which we misrecognize ourselves as unitary and total, and in which something unseeable and unsayable (which is theorized as gaze and voice as object a) becomes excluded from the specular and vocative field. This is
the process of the birth of humanity which is possible only by excluding the ugly, monstrous being like the monster whose existence is unseeable and unsayable.

Shelley’s fiction *Frankenstein* tells the story of the way Victor Frankenstein’s creature who is born as a human being turns into a monster. Excluded from human community and forced into absolute solitude, the monster, as our semblance, returns to haunt humanity with his monstrous gaze and voice. Shelley’s fiction itself, a semblance which resembles reality and history, but which is truer than both, produces a counter-memory of the modern man and his semblance, the monster, problematizing the mythical birth of the modern man. Likewise, Lacanian psychoanalysis allows us to see humanity or human subjectivity as fictionally constructed by not seeing the unseeable and by not saying the unsayable.

In the birth of the modern man, something unseen and unheard returns and haunts human history as we see in Foucault’s genealogy, and in the gaze and voice as the object *a* in Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Moreover, the unseen and the unheard, as we see in Godwin’s, Wollstonecraft’s, and Shelley’s novels, have always already spoken of their stories to us, revealing the naked truth of humanity which made their contemporaries criminals, madmen, and monsters. Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s genealogical counter-narratives of modern man, present the way an unseeable, unsayable truth of the modern man comes to be revealed when the criminal and the
madwoman resist the truth, truth which makes those who are not guilty or mad into criminals and the mad. Likewise, in Shelley’s counter-memory of the modern man, the monster who is excluded from human community starts to haunt humanity with his monstrous gaze and voice. Thus these novels, which resemble reality and history, but which are truer than them, produce a counter-memory, problematizing the mythical birth of the modern man. In summary, the genealogy of the gaze and voice destabilizes the master narrative of the birth of the modern man and it shows how the novel functions as counter-memory, a genealogy of the criminal, the madwoman, and the monster whose stories had not been told until their fictions did so.

**Foucault and Lacan**

As I have shown above, both Foucault’s genealogy and Lacan’s psychoanalysis allow us to see a counter-memory of received history, a counter-memory which subverts the master narrative of the modern man in whose birth there remains something unseeable and unsayable. It is commonly said, however, that Foucault and Lacan are totally incompatible, even antagonistic, to each other in a similar way that “history” and “structure,” “historicism” and “structuralism” are: on the one hand, structuralism is inattentive to different social and historical conditions; on the other, historicism
appears to reveal a truth about the past in contingent historical events while overlooking the structural causality of the events, the malfunction of the structure and the possibility of its opening. This received opposition between structuralism and historicism has had damaging consequences for the reception of Foucault and Lacan: on the one hand, Lacan is purportedly a structuralist and therefore ahistorical; on the other, Foucault as a historicist demonstrates that the subject is merely a contingent discursive formation, that is, the product of social construction. Here, I will insist that Lacanian psychoanalysis “is not simply ‘ahistorical,’ but it is ‘anti-historicist,’ insofar as it entails a conception of time that differs from the historically linear, chronologically sequential time of ‘history’ as we usually understand it” (Shepherdson 2008, 7). Furthermore, I will show that Foucault is also antihistoricist in the sense that his genealogy stands against history as a grand narrative. I will then elaborate on the view that Foucault is not a social constructivist in the sense that he does not consider subjectivity as the product of discursive apparatuses, but as the surplus-product of it, which destabilizes such social construction.

First and foremost, Lacanian psychoanalysis is not ahistorical, but antihistoricist, insofar as it tracks a temporality different from a linear, chronological time of history. In terms of the relationship between psychoanalysis and history, psychoanalytic theorists often quote Lacan’s remarks that “the unconscious is the
chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be refound; most often it has already been written elsewhere” ([Écrits], 215). Here, psychoanalytic temporality as untimeliness comes on stage dislocating the linear, chronological time of history because the trauma or the censored chapter comes “too early or too late” ([SXI], 69). It comes too early in the sense that it takes place in a “traumatic” way, as an event that cannot be inscribed in the available symbolic network, and that is therefore “already … written elsewhere” ([Écrits], 215, my emphasis). As a result, this untimely event always waits for us to tell the truth of the censored chapter. And at the same time, it comes too late in the sense that it is only after an event (nachträglich), after the truth of the trauma passed, and after we have lost something, that we can refind the trace, as we begin to feel the anxiety of our missing something. And then, it repeatedly returns and haunts us as the monster who is the naked truth of humanity haunts Victor Frankenstein. Therefore, psychoanalysis has its own temporality as an untimeliness that is different from the linear, chronological time of history in that the unconscious and sexuality as its reality cannot be written down because the truth of it has been censored. Thus, in its exact sense of the genealogy of gaze and voice, Lacan’s psychoanalysis with its antihistoricist temporality produces an antihistoric memory of human society which allows us rethink the history of modern man, which has excluded the monster as
In a similar way to Lacanian psychoanalysis, in Foucault’s works there exists an archeological or genealogical temporality as untimeliness that differs from the linear, chronological temporality of history. It is often said that Foucault is a historical thinker and most of his works are about history, for instance, histories of madness, the hospital, knowledge, the prison and even sexuality. While attacking Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality*, Jacques-Alain Miller says in an interview with Foucault: “There isn’t a history of sexuality in the way that there is a history of bread” (*P/K*, 213). Miller is correct: sexuality is always in excess of any institutions and discourse that try to capture it; there has never existed a history of sexuality. But, Foucault replies, there is a history of sexuality “in the sense that there is a history of madness” (213). Madness has a history in a way that madness poses a question “in terms of truth, within a discourse in which human madness is held to signify something about the *truth* of what man, the subject, or reason is” (213, my emphasis). That is to say, while haunting the history of reason, madness poses a question of the truth to modern man and reason, the truth that the modern man was born into true man by imprisoning the madman, the truth which subverts the fabricated truthfulness of the modern man. As such, madness, like sexuality and the unconscious, does not stop haunting the history of reason. Here, Foucault as an antihistoricist challenges and
problematizes the prevailing, dominant history as the grand narrative through his
genealogy, as in the history of madness and sexuality.

It is often said that Foucault as a historicist demonstrates that the subject is
merely a contingent discursive formation, that is, the product of social, cultural
construction and that the subject was born imprisoned by prevailing discourses and
institutions, as with the Foucauldian self-surveilling Panopticon, with its vicious circle
of power and resistance, from which there is no escape. However, as I discuss later,
what Foucault insists on in *Discipline and Punish* is not only the total surveillance of
panoptic society, but also its *fictionality*, its *inherent inconsistency*. In terms of the
putatively perfect function of panoptic society, the modern subject seemed to become
a perfect object of the new form of surveillance which is invented by the Benthamite
Panopticon. According to Foucault, toward the end of the eighteenth century, a new
arrangement of the visible and the sayable, that is, a new way of seeing and saying
madness and criminality was formed. In his theorization of the formations of visibility
and discursivity, however, he does not fail to accentuate incompatibility “in the
relation of language to vision,” that is, the limits of visibility and discursivity in which
the unseen and the unheard as limit-experiences haunt the margins of truth (*OT*, 9).
The limits of visibility and discursivity are what Shepherdson calls “a gap or void”
between image and word “in which the encounter with alien image [as well as alien
voice] cancels out our self-knowledge and requires us to be transformed” (2000, 165).

In this limit of visibility and discursivity, in “this void that marks the relation between the image and the word, we can begin to approach what Lacan calls the question of the real,” in particular, the gaze and voice as the partial object \( a \) of the real (167).

Thus, Lacan’s concepts of the gaze and voice as the object \( a \) which are unsurveizable and unsymbolizable and which are a lack in the scopic and vocative fields of the Other can supplement Foucault’s concept of limit-experiences of the unseeable and the unsayable. Thus, both Foucault’s genealogy and Lacan’s psychoanalysis allow us to see the way the unseen and the unheard return in untimely fashion to haunt us, modern man, problematizing human history, humanity.

**Three Genealogists**

In their fictional writings, Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Shelley produced a counter-memory of the mythical birth of the modern man. They are genealogists in the sense that they tried to find a counter-memory of the way modern society oppressed their contemporaries and that the novelists resisted the master narrative of the birth of man. In late eighteenth-century England, there emerged the modern police state which aimed to secure society from supposedly dangerous individuals, such as vagrants,
criminals, madmen, and so on. During the period, the modern institutions of the prison and madhouse imprisoned and punished criminals and the mad and modern discourses of criminology and psychiatry normalized them. Imprisoned in the prison-world and the madhouse-world, they were required to supervise, examine, and punish their own potential dangerousness, that is, criminality and madness. Reading her parents’ novels, Shelley must have been horrified at society’s injustice which makes those who are not guilty or mad into criminals or madwomen and then she wrote a fictional narrative of the monster who is born as a human being, but who soon becomes a monster precisely because he is excluded from human community. In short, the three genealogists produced their own counter-narrative of modern man and modern society, problematizing how it oppressed their contemporaries.

Godwin, who is often considered the first modern anarchist, radically challenged the contemporary prison and criminal law which imprisoned and punished the modern subject only upon suspicion of his potential dangerousness. While witnessing the unjust practices of imprisonment and punishment which resulted from the police state and criminal law, Godwin wrote *Political Justice* and *Caleb Williams*, the first a philosophical treatise, the second a fictional work, which can be viewed as a genealogy against the prevailing narrative of supposedly humanitarian prison reform and criminal law, a narrative which was produced by Jeremy Bentham, an inventor of
the Panopticon, and Cesare de Beccaria, a founder of modern criminal law. Bentham designed a new form of the prison which was called the Panopticon and which metaphorized into panoptic society, the prison-world. In the prison-world, the modern subject was born both as an object of panoptic surveillance and as a subject who supervises his own potential criminality. Along with panoptic society, Beccaria invented a new criminal law which aimed to prevent future crime, while reforming and reeducating criminals. For that purpose, the criminal justice system starts to detect and punish future crime and the supposed potential dangerousness of criminality. With the advent of panoptic society and criminal law which functioned as the modern apparatuses of supervising and describing criminals, the police system imprisoned and punished the subject only upon suspicion of his dangerousness. Through the master narrative invented by Bentham and Beccaria, the modern subject seemed to be born as a docile subject, while becoming a perfect object of these discourses. Challenging this narrative, however, Godwin tells an alternative history of the way the subject resists the contemporary police state and criminal law, while revealing their unjust practices of imprisonment and their impotence in normalizing and subjugating the individual.

Wollstonecraft, who is regarded as the first modern feminist, wrote a fictional narrative, *Maria*, in which a supposedly mad woman starts her life story within a madhouse. In her fiction, Wollstonecraft produced a genealogy, a counter-memory of
the master narrative of women’s madness, the narrative through which a myth of women’s madness was invented. In the prevailing narrative, madwomen’s confessional stories were selected and written by male writers and doctors who forced them to silence their true stories as I shall show later. More specifically, during the late eighteenth century, there emerged a modern form of the madhouse and psychiatry both of which aimed to confine supposedly mad women and to curb their dangerous force, madness. Attacking the modern apparatuses, Wollstonecraft wrote a novel of the contemporary madhouse. In her fictional narrative Maria, she allows Maria to tell a confessional story which was unheard within the madhouse. Through this, Wollstonecraft shows the way Maria resists the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry, and tries to find a possibility to speak and think differently of women and madness. As a matter of fact, Wollstonecraft created a private madhouse for a spatial setting of Maria, after she visited the Bedlam asylum. Thus her fictional narrative opens in a madhouse as if women’s madness only could be told in the madhouse and as if the world itself is a madhouse. In the madhouse-world, women should reason on their potential madness, while normalizing it and eradicating it by imprisoning it within themselves. Through her fiction Maria, a genealogy, Wollstonecraft attacks the apparatuses which aimed to normalize women’s dangerous potentiality and to imprison women’s voices as madness and she presents the way contemporary women
like Maria resisted the two apparatuses, the madhouse and psychiatry, at the end of the eighteenth century.

Mary Shelley wrote *Frankenstein*, a fiction and at the same time a genealogy, a counter-memory of modern man and his semblance, Victor Frankenstein and the monster. In her fiction, she tells a story of the way Victor’s creature who is born as a human being becomes a monster, cut off from human community. In her genealogy, she criticizes human society which makes Victor’s human child a monster. While problematizing Kant’s anthropological question “What is man?”, she puts questions to us such as “What is man for man?” and “What is the neighbor?” Asking himself “What is man?”, Kant proposes that modern man seems to be born into true man even in his absolute solitude, as we see in Kant’s aesthetics which elevates solitude into the greatness of humanity. In *Critique of Judgment*, Kant excludes the ugly and the monstrous for the sake of humanity. Likewise, Victor abandons and runs away from his ugly, monstrous baby, deserting him into absolute solitude. Unlike Victor, who regards solitude as consolation, feeling within it the greatness of the human mind, the monster doesn’t thrive in his forced solitude and thus eagerly wishes to find his semblance, his neighbor. Excluded from human society, Victor’s creature whose existence is unseeable and unsayable turns into a monster. In his absolute solitude, the monster nevertheless returns to haunt humanity by raising the question “What is man
for man?”, problematizing the form of humanity which makes him a monster.

Through this fictional narrative, Shelley tells a genealogy, a counter-memory of the modern man and the monster who strangely resembles us, modern man.

The Unseen and the Unheard

To show a genealogy of gaze and voice in Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley, I explain the specular relations of seeing and being seen and the vocative relations of questioning and answering from a perspective that is both Foucauldian and Lacanian.

Through these scopic and vocative relations, the modern subject was born as a criminological and psychological man, while becoming an object of the criminological and psychiatric gaze and being called to answer the criminological imperative to “confess your crime” and the psychiatric imperative to “reason on your madness.” From a Lacanian viewpoint, the monster who is unseeable and unsayable becomes excluded from the specular reciprocity of seeing and being seen and from the vocative reciprocity of calling and responding, through both of which he was supposed to be born into a human being. In the birth of the modern man, there remains something unseen and unheard which disrupts the modern way of the arrangements of the seeable and the sayable as we see in Foucault and the specular
and vocative fields of the Other as we see in Lacan. In order to observe “a genealogy of gaze and voice,” I will focus especially on scenes of confrontation between Caleb and Falkland or the police in *Caleb Williams*, between Maria and Jemima in *Maria*, and between the monster and Victor in *Frankenstein*, confrontations which explicitly present the relation of seeing and being seen; and the relation of questioning and answering (in a Foucauldian reading) or of calling and responding (in a Lacanian one).

In the Godwin chapter, I explicate the way Caleb confronts the contemporary apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of criminality and the way he overcomes those apparatuses. While being pursued by his master Falkland, Caleb falls into a persecution delusion that he cannot escape as a result of his master’s supposedly total surveillance, and comes to believe that England is a vast prison in his paranoiac psychosis as we see in the unpublished manuscript ending. In the published ending, however, Caleb comes to realize that this supposedly panoptic surveillance is not as perfect as he imagined in his delusion. Critical discussions of Godwin’s *Caleb Williams*, especially Foucauldian readings of it, have argued for the perfect or total functioning of panoptic society. But, as I insist, what both Caleb and Godwin reveal through their counter-narrative of panoptic society is the *fictionality* and *inherent incompleteness* of panoptic society. In addition to the apparatus of surveillance, Caleb
is also captured by the apparatus of security which imprisoned supposedly dangerous individuals, beggars, vagrants, criminals, etc. Caleb, who disguised himself as an Irish beggar, is arrested by the police precisely because he is regarded as a supposedly dangerous person, such as a beggar and a criminal suspect. In order to evade the police, Caleb uses his disguise, a fiction or impersonation that resists the *eye of power* of the police system and then finally succeeds in deceiving it, revealing its incompleteness in which it fails to detect and prove his dangerousness. With the advent of the apparatus of security, there also emerged modern criminal law which aimed to prevent the future crime of supposedly dangerous individuals. In the scene of disguise and examination, therefore, Caleb who is supposed to be a beggar must explain that he is not a beggar in order not to be sent to a workhouse. In addition to this scene where he has to explain who he is, the first trial scene also presents how the truth-regime of criminality works by forcing him to defend himself against the suspicion of theft. In a court, he fails to defend himself and thus he is wrongly confined in a prison. Toward the end of the novel, however, Caleb comes to realize the way the contemporary truth-regime operates and he starts to tell a truth which challenges the fabricated truth of his crime. Resisting this truth-regime of criminality which provides an imperative to him, “Defend yourself,” he produces his own counter-narrative, his own truth-*telling*. In a word, through counter-narratives in
Caleb Williams and Political Justice, Caleb and Godwin reveal the internal deficiency of the contemporary criminal law and its truth-regime of criminality.

The Wollstonecraft chapter presents how the modern subject was born, thereby becoming a seeable, sayable object of the madhouse and psychiatry. In late eighteenth-century England, there emerged the modern form of the madhouse which aimed to confine, punish, and discipline supposedly mad people and in which there occurred various asylum practices, such as medical observation, separation of asylum inmates, isolation into individual cells, and deprivation of freedom. Imprisoned within the new madhouse, Maria comes to confront an asylum-keeper, Jemima, and is observed by the psychiatric gaze which is incorporated by Jemima. Under the supposedly panoptic gaze which looks at her as mad, Maria imagines that she is always under the total surveillance of Jemima. In addition to the psychiatric gaze, asylum authority presents a psychiatric imperative, “Reason on your potential madness,” through which she examines and punishes her own supposed madness.

Readers of Wollstonecraft’s Maria very often omit this historical emergence of the madhouse and psychiatry, only elaborating Maria’s imprisonment as a generalized form of oppression by patriarchal society and matrimonial despotism. The problem here is not only such social, familial, and marital oppression, but also the institutional one of the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry which imprisoned the melancholic
like Maria who is in fact not insane. Furthermore, critics overlook how Maria and Wollstonecraft resist the contemporary madhouse and psychiatric discourse, rather than simply describing it. In order to see how the modern subject was born with the emergence of the modern madhouse and psychiatric discourse, I concentrate on the scenes of confrontation between Maria and Jemima, which are structured like an encounter between patient and doctor, confrontations which hint at the emergence of the modern forms of psychiatric observation and knowledge. Most significantly, I emphasize how Maria resists the supposedly all-seeing, all-knowing gaze and knowledge, by showing the way she overcomes the fiction of her supposed madness which is fabricated by the psychiatric gaze and discourse. First and foremost, the psychiatric omnipotence and omniscience which aim to subjugate and tame the inmates are nothing but an invented fiction, as much as Maria’s supposed madness is just a fiction fabricated by her husband, by psychiatric authority which is represented by Jemima, and finally by a court in a trial scene. Imprisoned in the madhouse, however, she dares not admit this fiction as true; she dares not escape into madness as other inmates usually do and she overcomes the psychiatric gaze and discourse. Without being deceived by the fiction of her supposed madness, Maria starts to tell her own counter-narrative against her husband and psychiatric authority, a counter-narrative which has never been heard until her truth-telling. Then, she convinces
Jemima that she is not insane and she finally escapes from the madhouse with Jemima’s help.

In the Shelley chapter, I contend with the most popular reading of the monster who is considered as “human inside but monstrous outside,” with human speech but a monstrous face (Spivak 252). Victor’s creature is born as a human baby whose inside and outside are human features, but after he is abandoned by his (M)other Victor, he turns into a monster. Thus I interpret the monster as a human baby at his birth and explain the way he fails to be born into a human being. For that purpose, I privilege the scene of the birth of the monster, when he opens his eyes to see Victor and opens his mouth to speak to him. Confronting his baby, however, Victor fails to endure being seen by his gaze and being called for by his voice and then he runs away in horror from him. As such, from his birth, the monster is deprived of a chance to have his semblance with whom he could identify himself. From then on, the monster is condemned to wander in hope of encountering his semblance who can give him love and who can say to him, “You are a man like us,” but he fails. In the scene of seeing his image in a pool, he only sees his miserable deformity, a self-image which is reflected onto the mirror of the Other. Thus, the monster incorporates the gaze of the Other who sees him as a monster and then finally he sees his own self-image as ugly and monstrous. At the moment of his birth, the monster speaks inarticulate sounds,
which are nothing but a baby’s first cry, but Victor fails to respond to it. As such, from
the beginning, the monster is excluded from the vocative reciprocity of calling and
responding. However, he who was born as a human baby having human nature is later
able to speak articulate language by imitating what he hears from human beings.
Excluded from the specular and vocative reciprocity, thus, the monster returns to
haunt Victor and humanity.

The received histories of modern man tell us that the modern institutions of psychiatry
and the police, of the mental hospital and the prison, together with the development of
philosophical rationality, all coalesce to secure subjective integrity and civil society.
However, this history is nothing but a fiction, a narrative construction, which makes
possible the birth of modern man, while excluding criminals, madwomen, and the
monsters from humanity. Foucault’s genealogy and Lacanian psychoanalysis provide
a counter-discourse that disrupts these prevailing narratives. But what if fiction – the
novels of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Shelley – turns out to anticipate these thinkers?
What if fiction turns out to be the force that reveals the fictional status of these master
narratives? Thus their fictional narratives, which function as a genealogy, a semblance
which resembles reality and history, but which is truer than them, produce a counter-
memory to the master narrative of the modern man whose birth was possible only by
imprisoning criminals, madwomen, and the monsters, by silencing their voice, and by concealing its uncomfortable truth, the unreason of reason itself which Foucault’s genealogy and Lacanian psychoanalysis reveal. Even at the moment of the birth of modern man and even at the moment of forgetting and silence, criminals, madwomen, and the monsters never cease to claim their existence and their right to speak as we see in the novels, and they still haunt us, modern man.
CHAPTER TWO

A Genealogy of the Modern Prison and Criminal Law in Godwin’s Caleb

Williams and Political Justice

Godwin, a Genealogist

At the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged the modern apparatuses of supervising and describing criminals, that is the police state and criminal law, which aimed to imprison and punish supposedly dangerous individuals such as beggars, vagrants, and criminals in order to secure society from their potential dangerousness. While witnessing the unjust practices of imprisonment and punishment that resulted from these state apparatuses, William Godwin wrote An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793, hereafter Political Justice), a philosophical treatise which radically attacked the contemporary prison and criminal law; and Things as They are; or the Adventure of Caleb Williams (1794, hereafter Caleb Williams), a fictional narrative which embodies his political thinking as explained in Political Justice. In these works, Godwin emerges as a genealogist of the police state and criminal law, who recounts a different history of how those apparatuses were formed and of how they unjustly imprisoned and punished the supposedly dangerous individuals who resisted the
contemporary justice system. *Political Justice* and *Caleb Williams* can therefore be viewed as a genealogy, a counter-memory, that challenges the prevailing narrative of humanitarian prison reform and criminal law, a narrative which was produced by Jeremy Bentham, an inventor of the Panopticon, and Cesare de Beccaria, a founder of modern criminal law. As a result, we can see in Godwin’s work not only a form of genealogical thinking, but also a breakdown of the usual categories that would distinguish these two works – one a philosophical treatise, the other a piece of fiction.

It seems anachronistic, however, to give Godwin the title of a genealogist which is a Foucauldian concept since he predates Michel Foucault. In his genealogy, Foucault (a twentieth-century thinker) sets out “from a problem expressed in current terms today” and tries “to work out its genealogy,” for example, a genealogy of the prison and the criminal law as in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, quoted in Shepherdson 2000, 156). Thus, in order to explicate the way the contemporary prison is formed and operates, Foucault, who was an activist with the Prison Information Group in France during the 1970s, goes back to the past and identifies the late eighteenth century as the historical moment when the modern way of seeing and saying criminals was established. Foucault as a genealogist could be portrayed as a

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1 As for Foucault’s organization of the Prison Information Group, see Didier Eribon 224-34.
strategist who organized demonstrations and strategized how not to be captured by the police, in the political movement during the 1970s, a period that coincides with his pursuit of genealogical inquiry. At the end of his last archaeological work, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, in which he observes the *strategies of power/knowledge*, which is to say, the various arrangements of the seeable and the sayable, he promises to write three different genealogies, as *strategies of resistance against power/knowledge*: they are presented as the genealogies of aesthetics, the prison, and sexuality: *This is not a Pipe, Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*.\(^2\)

For example, Foucault’s *This is not a Pipe*, a genealogy of aesthetics, presents the

\(^2\) In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), Foucault in fact calls his three future projects “the ethical” (193), but they are closer to genealogy than ethics even though the three genealogies are connected to Foucault’s ethics of subjectivity. As a matter of fact, Foucault’s ethics of subjectivity is more clearly manifested in his second and third volumes of *The History of Sexuality* (*The Use of Pleasure* (1984) and *The Care of the Self* (199)) and his lecture courses, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981-2) in which he seeks the subject’s ethics of how to see oneself and of how to say oneself. Thus, the genealogical strategy of the different way of seeing and saying is connected to “how to see oneself” and “how to say oneself” in the third Foucault period dealing with the ethics or hermeneutics of subjectivity.
way René Magritte’s “This is not a Pipe,” which is a painting of a pipe, “disturb[s] all the traditional bonds of language and the image” (22).

One of the important aspects of Foucault’s genealogical works, which has received very little critical attention, but which is crucial for understanding the critical power of genealogy, is the way these works highlight the instability of the institutions and discourses they describe. As shown above, genealogical strategy aims to produce resistance against the apparatuses of visibility (institutions) and discursivity (discourses), in which modern man seems to become their perfect object. As a matter of fact, Foucault’s preoccupation with the relationship between visibility and discursivity, so to speak, his “constant preoccupation with the difference between seeing and saying, perception and verbalization, the level of visibility and the function of the name” prevails throughout his oeuvre (Shepherdson 2000, 165). In The Order of Things, for example, Foucault presents the way in which a change of the “arrangement of the visible and the expressible” makes possible a change from the classical epistémé to the modern one (137). In the theorization of the formations of visibility and discursivity, however, he does not fail to accentuate “incompatibility” “in the relation of language to vision,” that is, the limits of visibility and discursivity at which the unseen and the unheard of modern madness and criminality haunt and leave people speechless (9). Therefore, even in The Order of Things which is one of
the archaeological works and in which he elaborates the various forms of visibility and discursivity, what Foucault wanted to show is the breakdown of stable reciprocity between the visible and the sayable, while explaining Velasquez’s Las Meninas: “it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say” (9). This fundamental rift or schism between seeing and saying allows us to find a possibility for the subject’s resistance against seemingly perfect functioning of the self-surveilling panoptic society discussed in Discipline and Punish, as I will argue in this chapter.

While elaborating how the modern apparatuses of seeing and saying criminals were born during the late eighteenth century, Foucault finds “two great theoreticians” of the prison and criminal law, Bentham and Beccaria (Power, 186). Although Foucault notes that “anarchists posed the political problem of delinquency [and asserted] the most militant rejection of the law” during the mid-nineteenth century, he strangely does not mention Godwin who is the first modern exponent of anarchism and who radically opposed the Benthamite panoptic society and Beccarian criminal law (DP, 292). Godwin, as a genealogist in its Foucauldian sense, attacks the modern apparatuses of seeing and saying criminals: in terms of the new way of seeing or supervising them, he criticizes the Benthamite panoptic society by revealing the fictionality of total surveillance; concerning the new way of saying or judging
criminals, he objects to Beccarian criminal justice which inflicts eternal punishment
on dangerous individuals, such as Godwin and Caleb, his fictional double. It is at the
very birthdate and birthplace of the modern prison and criminal law, to which
Foucault returns from our contemporary moment, that Godwin himself testifies to the
advent of imprisonment, surveillance, and a police state, disclosing the cruelty and
injustice of the prison and the law, and revealing their limits, imperfections, and
failure to normalize supposedly dangerous individuals. Like Foucault’s genealogy of
the prison and the law, description that is “the story of the formation of the modern
police state, a network of normalization which is concealed by the conventional
history of law and justice.” Godwin’s genealogy tells a different history from
“conventional history of law and justice” as told by Bentham and Beccaria, disclosing
a fictionality of the conventional history in Political Justice and Caleb Williams
(Shepherdson 2000, 169). Therefore, one could say that Foucault is first and foremost
a Godwinian genealogist in the sense that Foucault problematizes the contemporary
prison, just as Godwin does.

While revealing the fictional status of the received history and problematizing
the grand narrative of the progressive emergence of reason and humanity that
characterizes Enlightenment discourse, Caleb Williams and Political Justice as a
genealogy repudiate the boundary between history and fiction. However, it is
commonly accepted that Godwin’s two works exhibit totally distinct generic configurations of *Things as They are* (the phrase which is the title of the novel and at the same time which “appears several times” in *Political Justice* (Collings 855)), that is to say, factual or fictional: thus, on the one hand, *Political Justice* is a philosophical, political treatise; on the other, *Caleb Williams* is a fictional narrative. As Evan Radcliffe observes, the two works show “the difference in form between a narrative and a philosophical argument” (528). However, the boundary between factual description and fictional narrative is occasionally destabilized in the two works which transgress each other’s domains, fact and fiction, history and fiction.

In his essay “Of History and Romance” which was written around 1797 following the two works and which consequently allows us to see relationship between history and fiction as the title, “Of History and Romance,” presents, Godwin thus says: “It must be admitted indeed that all history bears too near a resemblance to fable. Nothing is more uncertain, more contradictory, [and] more unsatisfactory than the evidence of facts. … That history which comes nearest to truth, is the mere chronicle of facts, places and dates. But this is in reality no history” (quoted in appendix iv of *Caleb Williams*, 367). He not only problematizes the supposedly true, factual history “which bears too near a resemblance to fable,” and insists that the received history is nothing but a narrative that a “historian construct[s] … for
himself”; he also suggests that a “historical romance,” such as *Caleb Williams*, can oppose the “mode of writing history … prevalent in modern times” (371). Even though both *Political Justice* and *Caleb Williams* as genealogies purport to destabilize the boundary between history and fiction, in order to tell an alternative history from the prevailing one, he knows that the two modes of writing are ultimately very distinct entities, and thus “the reality and the fiction, like two substances of disagreeing natures, will never adequately blend with each other” (370).

Nonetheless, fictional narrative sometimes intrudes into his philosophical writing, symptomizing his personal legal fear in *Political Justice*. Thus, according to Radcliffe, even in Godwin’s philosophical treatise *Political Justice* which “avoids narrative thinking,” especially “in his treatment of punishment, … his concern with [criminals’] character emerges most fully” (528, 535). At this point, Godwin seems to wish to tell “my life” and the “narratives … published by condemned criminals,” narratives which compete with their contemporary criminal biographies written by judges and police, and which anticipate his fictional narrative *Caleb Williams*, which was written in 1794, a year after *Political Justice* (*Political Justice*, 258, 257). The intrusion of such fictional narratives into philosophical thinking is clearly apparent, and “his own personal legal fears” are dramatized, when Godwin “upstage[s] the possibility of his legal trial” and “imagin[es] a forensic defense” of himself in a
chapter “Of Crimes and Punishments” in Political Justice (Grossman 50, 52).

In “Of Crimes and Punishments,” Godwin elaborates the way in which the justice system unjustly imprisons and punishes criminals. Defending the condemned criminals, Godwin seems to feel as if he is one of those who does not conform to the code of criminal justice and then he is led to advocate for “the abolition of all punishment [and] of all criminal law” (Political Justice, 255). At this moment of imaginative projection, it seems that he feels as if he, as an anarchist, is summoned to a court upon suspicion of high treason. Thus his tone and rhetoric change abruptly and he starts to use a great number of rhetorical questions as if he imagines that he defends himself against the death penalty. Most and foremost, his personal legal fears reach a climax and his persecution delusion is triggered especially when he writes that he might expect to be held accountable, with “a grave, perhaps a capital, penalty against me” (256, my emphasis). Thanks to a “magic … in the pronoun ‘my’” and “me,” a magic which summons Godwin who is outside the text to an imaginary court inside, Godwin falls into the persecution delusion and suffers from an imaginary trial as much as Caleb, his fictional double, suffers from the persecution delusion in which he imagines that the world is a prison-court (Political Justice, quoted in Radcliffe 532).

For the paranoid who imagines the world as a prison, there seems to be no
way out. Imprisoned within the prison-world, Caleb thus falls into the persecution delusion in which panoptic surveillance appears to function perfectly, as the Benthamite panoptic society purports to do; and in a similar way, it seems that Beccarian criminal law functions perfectly by detecting and punishing even “the future injury,” the dangerous potentiality of revolutionary or anarchistic individuals, as I discuss later (Political Justice, 255). By overcoming his persecution delusion of the perfect functioning of the apparatuses and producing his own counter-narrative to them, Caleb discloses the *internal incompleteness* of panoptic surveillance and criminal law. Likewise, Godwin produces his own genealogical works, *Caleb Williams* and *Political Justice*, which contest the Benthamite and Beccarian narrative of supposedly humanitarian prison reform. This chapter will examine that process in four parts: the first two parts survey the emergence of “Panoptic Society” and “The Apparatus of Security,” which are the new apparatuses of seeing and supervising the modern subject and in which Caleb suffers from the surveillance, imprisonment, and examination of the police state and fights back against them; the following two parts, “The Criminal Law” and “Truth-telling,” elaborate how criminal discourse, which is the new way of describing the modern subject, examines and punishes a dangerous individual like Caleb and how he resists and discloses its injustice.
Panoptic Society

*Caleb Williams* presents the advent of a panoptic society as well as its fictionality. Pursued by his master Falkland, Caleb Williams, the protagonist, imagines that he cannot escape from the all-seeing surveillance of Falkland. Thus he falls into a persecution delusion that the world is a prison from which there is no escape. In his delusion, Caleb imagines that he is always supervised by the panoptic surveillance of Falkland and, as a result, it seems that panoptic surveillance functions perfectly. As such, Caleb’s horror of surveillance heralds the advent of a panoptic society which aimed to supervise every individual during the late eighteenth century. However, as much as the Benthamite Panopticon is based upon the fictionality of the all-seeing gaze, the supposedly total surveillance of Falkland is not all-seeing and all-knowing. In fact, it is possible only through Falkland’s machinations and Caleb’s delusion. By revealing the inherent deficiency of supposedly panoptic surveillance, Caleb never ceases to challenge his infamous identity as a criminal Caleb, which is fabricated by his master’s publication of the biography of Caleb, and his employment of a spy Gines, in terms of what Godwin repulsively attacks the injustice of “public censure,” “inquisition” and “the employment of spies” in *Political Justice* (255). Toward the end of the novel, Caleb finally realizes that all-seeing surveillance is not as perfect as
he imagined and thus he overcomes his persecution delusion. Then he finally gets the
courage to confront his master, revealing the incompleteness and fictionality of
supposedly panoptic surveillance.

In the novel Caleb witnesses the advent of a panoptic society, while becoming
its paranoid victim. Caleb who is a confidante of his master Falkland comes to know
his crime of murder. Even though Caleb has sworn not to reveal his master’s crime, he
becomes a victim of his master who is anxious lest his crime be revealed. First, Caleb
is imprisoned because he fails to explain that he has committed no theft, but he soon
succeeds in escaping from a prison. From then on, his misery of flight and pursuit
begins. While Falkland pursues Caleb, he employs a spy Gines, who publishes some
biographical details which describe Caleb as a criminal. Caleb strives to elude his
master’s pursuit and surveillance, but his every attempt fails thanks to those
machinations and he feels that he cannot escape “the beam of the eye of
Omniscience” which “reach[es] through all space [and] penetrate[s] every
concealment” (352, 249). He comes to internalize the panoptic gaze of surveillance
and suffers from the persecution delusion that England is a huge prison and that there
is no escape from his master who is supposed to “know all and see all” (Collings
863).

According to James Thompson, Caleb’s “horror of surveillance runs
throughout *Caleb Williams*” and “adumbrate[s] the coming state of surveillance and discipline” (181, 183). Furthermore, Thompson insists that Godwin also “cannot reject altogether this new system of surveillance and investigation. And so, despite his objection to all systems of punishment, discipline and surveillance nevertheless reenter his plan by the back door” (191). While introducing Foucault’s explanation of the Benthamite Panopticon, Thompson insists that both Caleb and Godwin couldn’t completely escape the surveillance of the panoptic society, which produces a paranoid subject who imagines that he is always supervised by the all-knowing gaze. Indirectly quoting E. P. Thompson, a historian, James Thompson writes, “in the 1790s the feeling of being spied upon was not necessarily a paranoid fantasy” (176). However, in the novel Caleb’s “feeling of being spied upon” *necessarily* results in “a paranoid fantasy” even to the point of his psychotic certainty in which he *believes* that this world is a prison and that he cannot escape from his omnipotent master in the unpublished manuscript ending. By overcoming his persecution delusion, however, Caleb reveals the inherent incompleteness of panoptic surveillance instead of its perfect functioning.

Remarkably, the invention of society as a panoptic prison is possible only by producing the modern subject as the paranoid who imagines that he is always penetrated by the panoptic gaze, such as in the case of Caleb, who imagines an all-
seeing, all-knowing Falkland, who in fact is not all-seeing or all-knowing. The modern police state indeed attempted to construct society as a vast prison as we see in the Benthamite Panopticon. Total surveillance is what is invented by the Panopticon and what is imagined by the modern paranoid subject. As a matter of fact, total surveillance is possible only in Caleb’s delusion in which an all-seeing, all-knowing being can be assumed to exist and, as a result, it is Caleb’s paranoia that ironically testifies to the fictionality of total surveillance, not its perfect function. Although Thompson discusses “Gothic paranoia,” he doesn’t fully develop the structure of the paranoia or psychosis to the point of explicating the fictionality of the Panopticon and panoptic society (176). Furthermore, he seems to assert perfect surveillance by ending his discussion with a so-called Foucauldian panoptic argument, the perfect functioning of total surveillance, “the penetration of state apparatus into the everyday lives of individuals” (192). In addition to the perfect functioning, however, the fictionality of total surveillance is clearly presented in Foucault’s explanation of the

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3 Although Thompson insists that Foucault maintains the perfect functioning of the Panopticon, Thompson seems to be more or less ambivalent to the completeness of the panoptic society. Thus, he hints at the way Caleb Williams disrupts it; for example, “a paranoid fantasy” during the 1790s and Godwin’s “counter or dystopian vision of the present state of corruption” (176, 173).
Panopticon as well as in Godwin’s counter-narrative of panoptic society. Let me explain how Foucault reveals the advent of panoptic surveillance and its fictionality and then how Godwin does so.

In the late eighteenth century, the modern panoptic society emerged in which a new way of the distribution of spaces was “designed to make things seeable” and in which the modern subject became an observable object of knowledge, in terms of criminal discourse and psychiatric discourse (Rajchman 103). With the new spatial distribution, according to Foucault, there took place a historical change of prison practice, a change from pre-modern “confinement” to modern “imprisonment” (HM, 420). In the change, madmen and criminals were liberated from a darkened dungeon, but once again imprisoned in modern panoptic institutions. Thus, beggars, vagrants, madmen, and criminals, who had been confined all together during the previous age, were imprisoned separately in a workhouse, a madhouse, or a prison. And then, they came to be supervised and punished in each panoptic institution.

Such new surveillance and discipline culminated in Bentham’s invention of the Panopticon. “Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition: … at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this [inspection] tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells” (DP, 200). “These cells have two windows, one
opening on to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell,” while “daylight and the overseer’s gaze capture the inmate more effectively than darkness” \((P/K, 147)\). Given such conditions, Foucault writes, “the observer’s gaze can traverse the whole cell; there is no dimly lit space, so everything the individual does is exposed to the gaze of an observer who watches through shuttered windows or spy holes in such a way as to see everything \textit{without anyone being able to see him}” \((\textit{Power}, 58, \text{my emphasis})\). The point here is that this apparatus makes the prisoner believe that the observer always supervises him even when he is not in the inspection tower. As a result, it produces “a \textit{fictitious relation}” in which the gaze of the observer only can be imagined because it is unseen and in which the prisoner subjects himself to the imagined all-seeing gaze as Caleb imagines that he is always supervised by the supposedly panoptic gaze of his master \((\textit{DP}, 202, \text{my emphasis})\). Now, the prisoner who is the observable object of panoptic surveillance turns into the subject who supervises himself, assuming and internalizing the imagined panoptic gaze. In effect, panoptic surveillance becomes possible through the architectural construction as well as through the submission of the modern paranoid subject to the imagined gaze.

On the contrary to the so-called Foucauldian “panoptic argument” \((\text{Copjec} \ldots)\)
from which it is usually said that Foucault himself cannot escape and in which for the modern subject there is no possible resistance to panoptic society, Foucault’s work, as shown above, clearly manifests the fictional functioning of the Panopticon and the inherent incompleteness of total surveillance. Supporting Thompson’s reading of Foucault, some critics provide a sort of Foucauldian reading of *Caleb Williams*, and assert that Foucault maintains the total surveillance of the Panopticon. Moreover, other critics, who suggest a psychoanalytic reading of *Caleb Williams*, thus attack this

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4 In terms of Foucault’s panoptic argument, see Joan Copjec’s remarks: “the panoptic argument is ultimately … unable to conceive of a discourse that would refuse rather than refuel power” (18).

5 David S. Hogsette says: “James Thompson discusses surveillance in *Caleb Williams* in terms of Michel Foucault’s analysis of the Benthamite Panopticon in which the authoritative gaze isolates and alienates its subject, inducing feelings of terror and paranoia” (paragraph 4). And Andrew McCann also observes: “As James Thompson points out, *Caleb Williams* is a political novel primarily because it excavates the formation of the new bourgeois state in terms of the panoptic disciplinary mechanisms that Foucault describes in *Discipline and Punish*” (73). Also see Quentin Bailey 530, 538-9.
version of Foucault. However, what Foucault argues in *Discipline and Punish* is not only the supposedly total surveillance of the Panopticon, but also its *fictional function* which is possible thanks to its architectural construction and the prisoner’s submission to the imagined gaze. Most of all, in “The Eye of Power,” an interview from 1977, Foucault clearly demonstrates that the penetrative power of the gaze is an “illusion” in which eighteenth-century reformers like Bentham believed that “people would

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As for psychoanalytic criticism of Foucauldian panoptic argument, see Dale Townshend and Daniela Garofalo. Agreeing with “Copjec’s Lacanian critique of Foucauldian historicism,” Townshend criticizes “Foucault’s all too seamless account in his later genealogy *Discipline and Punish*” (425, 396). Garofalo also says, “[m]uch of the critical work on Godwin’s novel … engages a Foucauldian vision of a modern disciplinary society organized around the panopticon” (239). According to her, the “Foucauldian reading is too similar to Caleb’s own and tends to replicate the failure of his vision,” that is, the failure to disclose “the incoherence of the law” (240, 242).
become virtuous by the simple fact of being observed” (*P/K*, 161).  

The inherent fictionality of the Panopticon is seen clearly through a Lacanian explanation. According to Jacques-Alain Miller, Bentham’s Panopticon is based upon his “theory of fictions” which “is not the question of eliminating fictions, but of controlling them, for fictions can also act,” like a new criminal law as a fiction acts (1987, 26). Now, thanks to the constructed fictionality of panoptic surveillance, “a faceless gaze” starts to imprison and punish the modern paranoid subject (*DP*, 184, my emphasis). Such a faceless gaze – which also recalls Lacan’s remarks in “Kant with Sade” that the Kantian superego is faceless – denotes “a de-individualization and disembodiment of power” whose facelessness, with its pervasiveness or ubiquitousness, ironically allows panoptic surveillance to function fictitiously (*PP*, 7).

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7 In terms of one of the most crucial attacks on Bentham’s Panopticon among his contemporaries, see William Hazlitt’s satirical remarks: people put men into the Panopticon, “like a glass hive, to carry on all sorts of handicrafts (‘—so work the honey-bees’ —) under the omnipresent eye of the inventor, and want and idleness are banished from the world” (249).

8 For the “theory of fictions,” in addition to Miller, also see Miran Božovič who makes an excellent Lacanian explanation in “An Utterly Dark Spot,” the preface to *Jeremy Bentham: The Panoptic Writing* (1-24).
In a similar way to Foucault’s genealogy of the fictitious Panopticon, Godwin also reveals the fictionality of panoptic surveillance in his fiction *Caleb Williams*, a genealogy which problematizes the prevailing fiction of the Benthamite panoptic society. In short, the total surveillance of the modern police state is a *pure fiction*, a *Benthamite utopia* – which is nothing but Godwinian dystopia – and thus once its fictionality might be unveiled and the subject might “resist the system of surveillance” as Caleb does, it might be destabilized (*P/K*, 162).

*Caleb Williams* presents the formation of panoptic society as well as its fictionality. Suffering from seemingly endless flight and pursuit, Caleb is enthralled with “raging delirium” and “ideas of horror” in which he imagines that he cannot elude the surveillance of his master’s omnipotent gaze (*Caleb Williams*, 305). As a result, Caleb falls into the persecution delusion in which he imagines that England itself is a prison and there is no escape from his master. In fact, the persecution delusion is triggered merely by “the machinations of Mr. Falkland,” for example, Gines, who is a “visible agency” of Falkland, and the criminal biography of Caleb (307, 295). Caleb’s paranoid self-surveillance is nothing but a symptom of the modern police state. And thus, this persecution delusion could end in madness, a paranoid psychosis, as we see in the unpublished manuscript ending which explains that Caleb ends up imprisoned within a madhouse, or rather within his own madness. In the final
trial scene of the manuscript ending, Caleb, with “undoubting certainty,” believes he is telling a truth about his master’s secret crime (340). But, the truth “is only known to” Caleb himself and thus an audience considers him insane and he comes to be imprisoned in the madhouse (Collings 862). In his madness, Caleb’s delusion or “fantasy that there could ever be a secret order of the world that Falkland could control or that Caleb could know” turns into a psychotic certainty in which Caleb really believes, rather than doubts with uncertainty, that all-seeing, all-knowing Falkland always exerts its power (861). Accordingly, he doesn’t even believe the fact that his master has died, a fact that he hears from an asylum-keeper. Then, his almighty master might live eternally in his madness. This is a structure of the psychosis in which a pure metaphor of the prison-world becomes real and the imagined fiction of total surveillance of the paranoid turns into the real truth in a delusional belief.⁹

⁹ A psychotic is a subject who is foreclosed from a symbolic order, and so he cannot understand witticism and metaphor. For the metaphor of the prison-world, thus, the psychotic believes that the world is really, not symbolically or metaphorically, a prison. Since he is foreclosed from the symbolic, occasionally he himself becomes a creator of language. He believes that there exists the Other of the Other and he occupies the place of the Other of the Other. And he creates metalanguage which
Toward the end of the novel in the published ending, Caleb finishes his persecution delusion and discloses the impotence of his master. At the very moment when he is enthralled with “a delusion of the imagination,” he suddenly realizes that Falkland is not an all-seeing, all-knowing being and so says:

Mr. Falkland … acts by human not by supernatural means. … He cannot produce a great and notorious effect without some visible agency [for example, Gines], however difficult it may be to trace that agency to its absolute author. He cannot, like those invisible personages who are supposed from time to time to interfere in human affairs, ride in whirlwind, shroud himself in clouds and impenetrable Could modify language, the Other, the symbolic order. In this sense, Bentham is a psychotic who invented a language of criminal law and a symbolic order of the Panopticon.

On the two versions of ending, see Clifford Siskin 212-3; Maggie Kilgour 69-72; Cheryl Walsh 33-36; and Vijay Mishra 154-6. Siskin and Kilgour interpret Caleb’s madness in the manuscript ending as “descent into madness” and “the fragmentation of his own identity” (213, 70); on the contrary, Mishra extols madness which “still slips past the ‘censor’ of the published ending through what we might call a process of semiosis, and effectively controls the text” (155).
While he experiences success and failure repeatedly in evading Falkland’s apparently all-knowing gaze through disguise and transformation, he suddenly realizes that Falkland is not a supernatural being “in clouds and impenetrable darkness” and that the supposedly omnipotent pursuit and surveillance of his master were possible only through his machinations. As he says, “however difficult it may be to trace that agency to its absolute author,” namely one of Falkland’s machinations which are the very cause of his persecution delusion; and however difficult to resist the judiciary and penal system which Falkland manipulates and uses, it may be not impossible for him to trace and resist them.

As such, at the very last moment when Caleb realizes the impotence of Falkland’s panoptic surveillance, he overcomes his persecution delusion. As shown above, *Caleb Williams* evidences the advent of modern panoptic society in which the modern subject is put under supposedly panoptic surveillance. In his horror of surveillance, Caleb falls into the persecution delusion in which he imagines that he is always supervised by his master’s all-seeing surveillance. Imagining there is no way out and without knowing the way the contemporary panoptic society works fictitiously, Caleb always strives to escape his master, but he fails. For the paranoid Caleb, indeed there is no way out. As such, Caleb, who symptomizes the birth of
modern man as a paranoid, seems to be put under the total surveillance of the panoptic society. However, after Caleb realizes that Falkland is not as omnipotent as he imagined and that the imagined fiction of his master’s panoptic surveillance is just a fiction, his mere fantasy, he resolves to confront him and to persuade him to publicize his secret crime as we see in the published ending, unlike the manuscript ending in which he is telling the truth of Falkland’s crime, but nobody believes him. Through his counter-narrative, Caleb tells his life story; how he suffers from the supposedly all-seeing surveillance of Falkland and of the way he overcomes his own persecution delusion, disclosing the impotence of supposedly omnipotent surveillance.

The Apparatus of Security

While passing through panoptic society, Caleb confronts another state apparatus, the apparatus of security. In late eighteenth-century England, there emerged the apparatus of security which aimed to secure society from supposedly dangerous individuals such as beggars, vagrants, madmen, and criminals. In order to escape to Ireland, Caleb disguises himself as an Irish beggar. His disguise is so perfect that he ironically comes to be arrested by the police because he is mistaken for an Irish robber. Although he explains that he is not the robber, he is still taken into custody because he is once
again mistaken for a beggar or a vagrant, who was imprisoned in modern institutions, such as a prison or a workhouse, in late eighteenth-century England. In order to secure society from the supposedly dangerous individuals, the contemporary criminal law orders the police to imprison them. Thus, the police arrest and examine Caleb who is disguised as a beggar. Witnessing how the contemporary police system operates as a state apparatus of security, Caleb tries to evade the apparatus by concealing his supposedly true identity, a criminal Caleb, which is fabricated by his master and his criminal biography. Thus Caleb uses his disguise to resist the eye of power of the police system which aims to detect the dangerousness of the beggars and the vagabonds. His disguise and transformation eventually succeeds in deceiving the apparatus which fails to identify his true identity and, as a result, he reveals its incompleteness.

In order to evade Falkland’s pursuit and surveillance, Caleb disguises himself as an Irish beggar and attempts to cross the sea to escape to Ireland. His disguise and transformation into the beggar are so perfect that he easily conceals his own identity and deceives the eyes of the world and the supposedly all-seeing surveillance of Falkland and then he almost succeeds in escaping. Ironically enough, however, his disguise and Irish brogue are so perfect that he comes to be arrested because he was mistaken for an Irish robber. “[O]fficers of justice” do the “examination” of Caleb on
a ship and order him to state his name and address, but Caleb who abandoned his identity and disguised himself as the beggar couldn’t answer the questions and consequently he comes to be arrested (*Caleb Williams*, 248). In this scene of disguise and examination, Caleb once again falls into the persecution delusion that his master has detected his disguise and chased him even to the countryside. Here, however, *what inspects, arrests, and imprisons Caleb is not the system of panoptic surveillance, but the apparatus of security of the police state*. As such, the apparatus of security whose duty is to identify and examine supposedly dangerous individuals comes to arrest and imprison Caleb who fails to identify himself and thus who is suspected of being a dangerous person, such as a crime suspect, a vagabond, a beggar, an offender, and so on. Therefore, even though Caleb succeeds in deceiving the eyes of the officers concealing his true identity, his disguise as the Irish beggar seems to fail to deceive the contemporary apparatus of security which aimed to detect dangerousness of beggars and which imprisoned them.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the apparatus of security examined, imprisoned, and punished the supposedly dangerous individuals like beggars and vagabonds. During the period, the apparatus of security, says Foucault, started to imprison “the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers, and so on” (*STP*, 18). Along with the apparatus of surveillance and
discipline whose “panoptic mechanism … basically involves putting someone in the center – an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance” – there emerges the apparatus of security whose mechanism “involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits” (66, 45). Therefore, the apparatus of security is “a matter of organizing circulation [of goods, money and population], eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (18). Therefore, it organizes and controls the “daily comings and goings” of population and imprisons supposedly dangerous individuals in order to prevent “the insecurity of the towns [which] was increased by the influx of the floating population” (18). As Quentin Bailey notes, “the most important duty of the new police constables would be ‘to certify the name, place of abode, and profession or trade of every stranger’” in England during the 1790s (536). With the control of the population taking place all over the country during the late eighteenth century when “vagrants only become a problem in the countryside,” Caleb who is arrested in a sea-port far from London is taken into custody because he is a supposedly dangerous individual, such as a vagabond, a crime suspect, or a criminal (STP, 335).11

11 On “a nationwide network of ‘police clerks’” during the late eighteenth century, says Bailey, “a new police force … could increase the level of surveillance through
Through the apparatus of security, the police state seems to function perfectly by supervising and detecting every dangerous individual all over the country.

Furthermore, the apparatus seems to be a more efficient form of governmentality than the panoptic prison in the sense that the police officers are literally, not figuratively, ubiquitous unlike an imagined inspector in the Panopticon. Thus, the apparatus of security arrests Caleb who doesn’t obey the order of identification and is thus considered a suspicious person. However, the apparatus always fails to detect and identify Caleb’s true identity and the police officers mistakenly arrest Caleb as the Irish robber because of his appearance, such as his “habiliments of a beggar” and Irish brogue (Caleb Williams, 253). After Caleb realizes that he was caught as the Irish robber, not as Caleb Williams, he tries to explain that he is not the robber “differing from me both in country and stature,” yet still masking his own identity, hiding his own name (256). His explanation seems to reveal that he is not the robber, but he is told that he ought to be sent to Warwick to cross-examine the already caught Irish robber; or sent to a workhouse because “it was clear that I [Caleb] was a vagabond and a suspicious person” (253). It is clear that he is a vagabond and a suspicious person according to his appearance, his fictional disguise. Once again, the police fail the city and across the country” (536). Foucault calls this “the urbanization of the territory,” in which “to police and to urbanize is the same thing” (STP, 337).
to detect Caleb’s true identity by judging him as a robber or a vagabond and he is still in crisis, threatened with being sent to Warwick or to a workhouse.

Strangely enough, however, on the way to Warwick, Caleb is released from custody by paying “eleven guineas as the price of my freedom,” without being given any explanation (Caleb Williams, 256). Thus, Caleb supposes that once it turns out that he is not the robber, the sum is compensation for the officers who had expected 100 guineas for catching the Irish robber. What Caleb witnesses in this scene is not only the corruption of the police and the miscarriage of justice, but also the incompleteness of the apparatus in detecting his true identity concealed behind a disguise. Most of all, in order for the apparatus to imprison and punish a suspicious person as a vagabond or an offender, it has to identify him as such or it requires his confession. Thus, the apparatus orders him to explain who he is and whether he is dangerous or not, while saying that if he fails to defend himself, he will be sent to a prison or a workhouse. The apparatus orders: “You are an Irish robber because of your Irish brogue. Defend yourself”; then, “If you are not the robber, you are a suspicious person and a vagabond. Explain yourself.” Thus, it is Caleb who ought to prove that he is neither the robber nor a vagabond in order not to be hanged on a gallows or sent to a workhouse.

But Caleb disobeys the imperative in his own way by concealing his real
identity, instead of revealing it. Caleb dares not identify who he is, only saying who
he is not. Thus, he explains that he is not the Irish robber, not a beggar, not a
vagabond, *ad infinitum*. Caleb arrested as a suspicious person possibly could be
somebody dangerous, such as an Irish robber, a beggar, a vagabond, “a poacher” or
even “a murderer,” but he finally ends up as nobody, concealing his name Caleb
Williams (*Caleb Williams*, 253). Thus, his use of disguise and impersonation allows
him to elude and deceive the eye of power which appears to penetrate every
individual’s appearance forcing him to reveal the real identity behind it. If the
supposedly true identity turns out to be a disguised one, the eye of power would
attempt to take off the mask. Thus the police order Caleb to explain who he is and
whether he is dangerous or not. Here, for Caleb the problem is how to defend himself
without revealing his name Caleb Williams which is defamed by his criminal
biographies. Thus this scene of *disguise* and *examination*, Caleb’s disguise and the
examination of the police, is nothing but Caleb’s battle against the eye of power
which attempts to unmask his disguise and to detect his dangerousness.

Disguising himself, however, Caleb seems to feel guilty at not revealing his
name, not explaining his true identity. But the reason why he feels guilty is because
there is no way to explain that he is not a vagabond except by saying he is Caleb
Williams, even after he seemed to prove he is not the robber. If Caleb confesses that
he is Caleb Williams, as he guesses, he might be taken to Falkland for “the sum [100 guineas] that had originally excited their pursuit, upon a different score” (Caleb Williams, 259). As a matter of fact, his identity as a criminal Caleb that he unwillingly conceals is a construction of Caleb’s biographies which are fabricated by his master and Gines and which describe him as a thief, a betrayer of his master, and so on. Here, the binary opposition between fictional disguise and true identity starts to be destabilized in the sense that his supposedly true identity is already a manipulated one. If Caleb admitted this fabricated identity as his true identity and if he ceased to resist it, a criminal Caleb might be his real identity, not the other way around. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as a presupposed true identity before being related to the other. For Caleb the problem is to change the relationship which frames his own manipulated identity and to change his master-servant relationship in which he sometimes falls into the persecution delusion regarding his supposedly omnipotent master. As a result, the supposed true identity can be changed through his challenge to his master.

As we see in the scene of disguise and examination, the criminal justice system purports to detect the dangerousness of beggars, vagabonds, and suspicious persons and to imprison and punish them. Caleb thus seems to be trapped within the perfect function of the police system which is supposed to detect his potential
dangerousness and to reveal his true identity. In this scene, however, the apparatus mistakenly arrests and imprisons only according to Caleb’s appearance and the apparatus completely fails to detect and identify his true identity. Thus Caleb witnesses how the apparatus of security emerged, while showing how the police system unjustly imprisoned and punished the supposedly dangerous individuals in late eighteenth-century England. Through his use of a fictional disguise, however, Caleb tries to evade the apparatus and to elude the penetrating gaze of power which aims to unmask his fictional disguise and to detect his true identity. Eventually the apparatus fails to penetrate his fictional disguise and thus he reveals its inconsistency, arbitrariness, and imperfection. Through this counter-narrative of the modern subject like Caleb, Godwin presents how the subject can resist the apparatus of security of the emerging police state.

While passing through the apparatus of surveillance and that of security, Caleb problematizes the modern power which supervises, examines, and imprisons him. Thus, he says: “the nature of this power, from which I was to apprehend so much, yet which seemed to leave me at perfect liberty” (Caleb Williams, 295). As he detects, the power of the police state operates in two distinguishable ways: the apparatus of discipline and surveillance from which he was to apprehend so much is regulative;
and the apparatus of security which seemed to leave him at perfect liberty is 
libertarian. Regardless of whether it is regulative or libertarian, the modern police 
state exerts its power on such a dangerous individual like Caleb who always tries to 
elude those apparatuses. Thus, because Caleb suffers from the fear of “the vengeance 
of the law” and power, he accuses it of cruelty, injustice, and inhumanity which 
persecute an innocent man like him, since, he says, “the law has neither eyes, nor ears, 
nor bowels of humanity” (335, 288). Impeaching the law’s cruelty, he personifies its 
eyeless, earless power as if it has always had eyes or ears. But modern power is by 
nature faceless and impersonal, that is to say, it is de-individualized and disembodied 
and so it is distinguished from the personified pre-modern power which is inscribed in 
the body of sovereign king as in Hobbes’ Leviathan. In the modern period, “an 
anonymous, nameless and faceless power … takes over … the empty place left by the 
king’s dethronement” (PP, 21). As a matter of fact, the law and power of the modern 
police state do not know what vengeance is, unlike Caleb’s persecution delusion 
because they only purport to reform and reeducate supposedly dangerous individuals. 
Therefore, the impersonal modern power had liberated vagrants, beggars, criminals, 
and mad people from a darkened dungeon by the rationale of the supposedly 
humanitarian prison reform whose purpose is to eradicate the useless severity of 
punishment, but it once again imprisoned, examined, reeducated and punished them
within the new state apparatuses in order to reform them and to prevent their future crime.

**Criminal Law**

Along with the apparatus of security which imprisoned beggars and vagabonds, the criminal law of the police state provided the justification for why they should be imprisoned, punished, and reeducated during the late eighteenth century. Beggars and vagabonds were imprisoned and punished not only because they were supposed to be dangerous, harmful, and useless to society, but because their potential dangerousness is punishable in reference to contemporary criminal law and penal law. At the end of the eighteenth century, idleness, vagrancy, and delinquency which had not been the object of punishment during the previous age became its new object. The new criminal law which stems from Beccaria purports to eradicate potential dangerousness of the modern subject as penological and criminological man. In *Political Justice*, Godwin criticizes the Beccarian criminal law which imprisons and punishes suspicious individuals in order to prevent their future crime. In *Caleb Williams*, he also attacks the injustice of the contemporary criminal law by showing the way in which Caleb is arrested only upon suspicion of his supposed dangerousness as we see
in the scene of disguise and examination. During the late eighteenth century, the modern subject was born as a perfect object of the contemporary penology and criminology which punished even future crime. By contrast, Godwin produces a counter-narrative of the contemporary criminal law by revealing its inherent incompleteness in detecting future crime, not its perfect function. Before examining Beccaria and Godwin, let me explain Foucault’s elaboration of the modern criminal law as the apparatus of security.

During the late eighteenth century, there occurred a historical change of criminal discourse, a change from “inquiry” to “examination” (Power, 5). Whereas in the former a crime is “something related to sin and transgression” at the level of “what one does,” in the latter “it is something that harms society” at the level of “what one might do” (53, 70). Along with the new prison practice, i.e., imprisonment of beggars and vagabonds, a new form of criminal discourse emerges in which “the task of this new knowledge is to define [delinquency] ‘scientifically’ qua offence and above all the individual qua delinquent,” who was confined just as a beggar or a vagrant, but who is now imprisoned as an offender because of his delinquency (DP, 254). The criminal law which “must simply represent what is useful for society” and which defines a crime as what does harm to society, starts to imprison and punish the beggars and the vagrants as delinquents (Power, 53). As a matter of fact, the reason
why the beggars and the vagrants, “people moving around,” are considered useless and harmful to society is because they don’t wish to labor, “resist the regulation of the population [and] try to elude the apparatus” (STP, 335, 44). Thus during the late eighteenth century, the contemporary criminal law as an apparatus of security started to imprison and punish such dangerous individuals in terms of what they might do, in order to secure society. Therefore, the modern subject who should not be harmful to society must eliminate his own potential dangerousness in order not to be imprisoned and punished.

The modern form of criminal justice, the new grid of intelligibility of criminality, is suggested in Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments published in 1764 and translated into English in 1767. Beccaria, who asserts “the greatest happiness shared by the greatest number” to be the primary goal before British Utilitarians would do so and whom Bentham calls “my master,” is acknowledged as a founder of modern criminal law (Beccaria 8, x). While criticizing the “useless cruelty” of punishment, Beccaria suggests a new criminal law whose aims are to “prevent the criminal from inflicting new injuries on its citizens and to deter others from similar acts” (42). He thus repudiates the useless “torture and torments” which don’t help “attain the end for which laws are instituted,” i.e., the prevention of crimes (10). For that purpose, the criminal justice system starts to detect and punish “the manifest
intention of committing a crime” or “a criminal attempt” (14, 40). As such, its purpose, the prevention of future crime seems to be accomplished through the punishment of a criminal attempt, through the punishment of potential dangerousness.

In *Political Justice*, Godwin radically attacks “the supposed utility of punishment” which is suggested by Beccarian criminal law (259). In the chapter titled “Of Crimes and Punishments,” which exactly corresponds to the title of Beccaria’s *On Crimes and Punishments*, Godwin in fact calls him “humane and benevolent” while supporting Beccarian criminal justice and prison reform. Like other prison reformers of the day, there was no reason for Godwin to object to the humanitarian prison reform and to the seemingly more benevolent criminal law whose aim is “to save future offenders from the gallows by reforming them before they had the chance to commit crimes” as English legislators during 1790s contended (Bailey 537).

However, as Godwin detects, this benevolently intended criminal law operates tyrannically and unjustly and so he criticizes “the three principal ends that punishment proposes to itself, restraint, reformation and example” which were proposed by Beccaria’s criminal law.

Among the three purposes, in terms of restraint from committing future crime – the punishment of a criminal attempt and the prevention of “inflicting new injuries” in Beccaria’s words – Godwin asserts that “all punishment for the sake of restraint, is
punishment upon suspicion, a species of punishment, the most abhorrent to reason, and arbitrary in its application, that can be devised” (*Political Justice*, 249, my emphasis).\(^{12}\) Even though Beccaria suggests that the new criminal law must be prudent in detecting criminal intention, it in fact punishes upon suspicion of inflicting new injuries. Thus, punishment “is employed against a person not now in the commission of offence, and of whom we can only suspect that he ever will offend” (252). As a matter of fact, under the 1792 Middlesex Justices Act, “no specific action needed to be alleged before a man could be arrested and committed to a jail” (Bailey 537). As such, the contemporary criminal justice system imprisons subjects only upon suspicion of future crime, as Caleb is arrested as a suspicious person without any evident criminal act and might be sent to a workhouse because he is considered a vagabond.

Godwin sheds light on the fictionality of the criminal law which presupposes

\(^{12}\) In terms of Foucauldian/Godwinian criticism of the punishment of potential dangerousness, future crime, Sue Chaplin elaborates a Derridian criticism of “juridical temporality,” “oppressive fictions of constant juridical ‘time,’” through which the law “constitute[s] a fiction of legitimate juridical origin,” depends upon “some pre-existing precedent,” “re-presents and re-authorizes itself in the present,” and “might guarantee justice in the future” while detecting and punishing future crime (130).
that idleness and delinquency are dangerous to society and thus imprisons and
punishes beggars, vagrants, and delinquents. He thus asserts that “no standard of
delinquency ever has been, or ever can be, discovered,” that is to say, there is no
preexisting criterion which adjudges what delinquency is (Political Justice, 253).
Thus, as soon as the law is confronted with delinquency and potential dangerousness,
it issues “edict … upon edict,” “volume upon volume” not only because there is no
preexisting truth of delinquency, but also because “as new cases occur, the law is
perpetually found deficient” (273, my emphasis). As such, the modern criminal law
which punishes future crime and potential dangerousness is nothing but a fiction
invented by Beccaria. Through this fiction, modern man was born both as homo
penalis and as homo criminalis during the late eighteenth century: penological man is
a punishable object of penology as well as a subject who should punish his own
potential dangerousness; and criminological man is an object of criminology as well
as a subject who is required to examine his own potential criminality. Moreover,
modern man was also born as homo economicus (economic man) who should
eliminate his laziness and delinquency.

Through this presupposition of potential dangerousness, modern criminal law
orders the police to imprison and punish supposedly dangerous individuals. Here, we
can find a peculiar mutual reliance between power and knowledge, the police system
and the criminal discourse, mutual reliance upon each other’s fictions. At one level, the new criminal law is a fiction through which the police imprisons and punishes potentially dangerous individuals like beggars and vagrants, or like Caleb who is mistaken as a vagabond and nearly sent to a workhouse. At another level, the authority of the police system is a fiction in which dangerous individuals seem to be tamed and reformed and through which the criminal law justifies its punishment whose purpose is to reform them. But, what if what the apparatuses confront is not the reformation of idleness and delinquency, but their flourishing, just because of their unjust enforcement in which every individual could be imprisoned only upon suspicion of future crime? As a matter of fact, modern delinquency and future crime are something which is penologically and criminologically invented in order to punish somebody who disobeys the law and at the same time something which is an unexpected surplus-product which “comes to haunt the untroubled courts and the majesty of the laws” (DP, 255). The criminal law comes to find its deficiency and inherent incompleteness especially when it encounters an unknown case of delinquency which is unclassifiable with respect to preexisting criteria. Thus modern delinquency which is a historically and fictionally invented crime starts to emerge as a limit of modern criminal discourse at the very moment when it becomes its object.

Godwin’s fictional narrative *Caleb Williams* challenges this fiction of the new
and supposedly more humanitarian criminal law which imprisons and punishes beggars and vagrants only upon suspicion of future crime and it reveals its impotence in detecting such supposed dangerousness. In the scene of disguise and examination, the police officers do the examination of passengers on a ship and they ask “a few frivolous questions of such of my [Caleb’s] fellow passengers …; and then turning to me enquire my name, who I was, whence I came, and what had brought me there?” (Caleb Williams, 249). In contrast to Caleb’s supposition, those questions are not “frivolous” because examination is the very first step to identifying crime suspects. In addition to identification, officers ask Caleb to explain who he is, just as the new justice system asks the individual, “Who are you?” and then orders him, who is supposed to be dangerous: “Explain yourself” (Power 178, 177). As such, he who is arrested without an evident criminal act ought to explain whether he is dangerous or not as the contemporary criminal law which aims to detect his potential dangerousness commands him to explain himself.

As a matter of fact, what the officers want from Caleb is to “hear what account the gentleman gives of himself,” that is to say, his account of whether he is an Irish robber or not and then of whether he is “a vagabond and a suspicious person” (Caleb Williams, 251, 253). However, due to “the contradictions in my story,” Caleb fails to prove that he is not suspicious and dangerous and he is nearly sentenced to be
“sent to hard labour as a vagrant upon the strength of my appearance” (253). Caleb’s failure of explanation comes from the fictional supposition of the criminal law that if somebody fails to defend himself who is supposed to be dangerous, it proves that he is dangerous and should be imprisoned. That is to say, if Caleb who is considered a beggar, fails to prove that he is not, it proves that he is a dangerous beggar and then he might be imprisoned. Given this scenario, how could Caleb who should conceal his fabricated identity as criminal Caleb, contend that he is not dangerous? Therefore, in order to elude the police system and to resist the fiction of the law, he uses his fictionalized story of himself, which is contradictory, but which makes the officers confused about who he is.

As a matter of fact, the criminal law which aimed to detect the dangerousness of the modern subject couldn’t work if the subject dares not identify himself, if he dares not confess his supposedly potential dangerousness. Through his resistance, therefore, Caleb comes to reveal not only the injustice of the contemporary criminal discourse which allows the police to arrest a person only upon suspicion, but also its impotence and incompleteness in detecting dangerousness. Instead of confessing to his supposed dangerousness, Caleb produces his own counter-narrative of who he is not, disguising his supposedly true identity, revealing the law’s impotence in detecting dangerousness, and revealing its supposition of dangerousness as a fictional
construction. In *Political Justice* as a counter-discourse to Beccarian criminal justice, Godwin also reveals all the deficiencies of modern, humanitarian criminal law, which invented supposed dangerousness as a crime and which unjustly imprisoned and punished a person only upon suspicion in order to prevent future crime and to secure society.

**Truth-Telling**

As shown above, the modern criminal justice system commands the subject to tell the truth of who he is, of whether he is dangerous or not. Foucault calls this regime of truth-telling on the part of the suspected criminal the regime of veridiction (*vérité + diction*, truth + telling) which raises “the question of truth addressed to the criminal: Who are you?” (*BB*, 34) and which orders him “Explain yourself” (*Power*, 176). Thus, what Caleb confronts in the scene of disguise and examination is this regime of veridiction in which he must reveal who he is and explain that he is not dangerous. In the first trial scene, he also confronts the truth regime which demands of him to “make the best story” of the suspicion of theft (*Caleb Williams*, 169). He fails, however, to defend his innocence of having committed theft, given that Falkland has provided critical circumstantial evidence of Caleb’s crime. As a matter of fact, the
reason why Caleb fails to defend himself is precisely because he has already sworn to
his master not to reveal his crime of murder which is the most important
circumstantial evidence to defend his innocence. But toward the end of the novel
Caleb decides to persuade his master to reveal his secret crime in court. Thus,
realizing how the truth regime operates, he starts to produce his own counter-narrative
to his master’s criminal biography of him and he starts to tell a truth; the truth of his
own dangerous potentiality which challenges the contemporary truth-regime itself.

Significantly, modern criminal law which defines the supposedly potential
dangerousness as a punishable crime could not work without the regime of veridiction
which orders the modern subject to explain who he is. In other words, future crime
and potential dangerousness could not be detected and punished if he might not
confess who he is, dangerous or not. Thus, in order to secure society from the
supposedly dangerous individuals, such as beggars and vagrants, and to detect and
punish their future crime, the modern regime of veridiction forces them to confess
their dangerousness. Before the law, the modern subject seems to be born docile and
normalized, while confessing his own potential dangerousness and swearing not to be
dangerous. If he disobeys the imperative of the modern law, “Explain yourself”; and if
he fails to prove that he is not dangerous, he will be imprisoned as Caleb is arrested
not only because of his disobedience of the order of identification, but also because of
his failure of self-defense. As a result, through the veridictional practices of the subject, such as “confession, self-examination, explanation of oneself, [and] revelation of what one is,” the supposed dangerousness seems to be a generally accepted truth, a truth of criminality (*Power*, 177).

However, at the moment of its birth, what the truth-regime confronts is a resistant subject like Caleb who dares not explain who he is and dares to speak a different truth against the truth regime. In “About the Concept of the ‘Dangerous Individual’ in Nineteenth-Century Legal Psychiatry,” Foucault starts with a description of a trial in 1975, observing how the criminal justice system collapses at the moment when it confronts the offender of the trial who remains silent despite the veridictional imperative of “Who are you?” and “explain yourself.” Thus, Foucault says, the “accused evades a question that is essential in the eyes of a modern tribunal but would have had a strange ring to it 150 years ago: ‘Who are you?’” (*Power*, 177).

In a precisely similar way, what the truth-regime confronts at the very moment of its birth is such a resistant individual like Caleb who dares not identify who he is. As a matter of fact, it is Caleb’s anonymity and disguise that threaten the faceless, anonymous power of the police state which fears the anonymous multitude and which thus attempts to identify individuals who disobey, in order to imprison and punish them. It is at this moment of confrontation with a non-docile individual, who doesn’t
confess who he is or whether he is dangerous, that the modern regime of veridiction
starts to break down by exhibiting the absence of proof of supposed dangerousness.

In addition to the scene of disguise and examination which is nothing but an
arena of masking and unmasking the truth of who Caleb is, the scene of the first trial
also presents how the modern regime of veridiction turns into a war of truth-telling. In
the trial, Caleb is asked to explain that he has committed no theft – a claim that was
set up by his master. Advising Caleb how to prepare for the trial, Forester, a judge,
says to him: “Make the best story you can for yourself – true, if truth, as I hope, will
serve your purpose; but if not, the most plausible and ingenious you can invent. That
is what self-defense requires from every man, where, as it always happens to a man
upon his trial” (Caleb Williams, 169, my emphases). The imperative to “make the best
story,” according to Jonathan Grossman, “describes modern justice; not trial by jury
but trial by narrative” or truth-telling, and here “rhetoric, or to be more specific
forensics, matters” (54). Thus, Caleb’s veridictional “self-defense” that he is not
guilty is a matter of rhetoric or forensics, of how to explain and defend himself, and of
how to tell the truth of his innocence in a “plausible and ingenious” way, not a matter
of the preexisting truth in and of itself. However, Caleb, who sticks with the truth of

13 On the first trial scene and the imperative to “make the best story,” also see Cheryl
Walsh 29-31; and Emily R. Anderson 108-110.
his innocence and who “trust[s] the whole truth would eventually appear,” fails to persuade Forester (Caleb Williams, 179). This is because the truth that he has committed no theft is meaningless if he couldn’t explain his alibi given the circumstantial evidence against him, which is artificially manipulated by Falkland. The reason why Caleb fails to defend himself is because he doesn’t understand how a fiction of his theft could become a truth fabricated and how the truth-regime works by telling a truth. And eventually, Caleb seems to realize that the regime of truth-telling is not a problem of the preexisting truth, but of telling a truth, truth which is a production of the criminal’s truth-telling and of other truths that surround him.

During the late eighteenth century, the emerging truth-regime of criminality operated in two distinct ways: firstly, a criminal’s truth-telling of criminality in a court or before the police authority; secondly, the production of literature on criminality, for example, criminal biographies, crime novels, detective novels, and fait divers, which “produced … an enormous mass of ‘crime stories’ in which delinquency appears both as very close and quite alien, a perpetual threat to everyday life” (DP, 286). In the “political culture of danger,” says Foucault, there appeared “detective fiction and journalistic interest in crime around the middle of the nineteenth century” (BB, 66). Whereas such effulgence of crime literature, according to Foucault, happened in the mid-nineteenth century all over Europe, in England, criminal biography emerged from
the mid-eighteenth century as critics of *Caleb Williams* observe. In the novel, thus, Caleb’s veridictional practices are presented in two different ways: his truth-telling in the court in the first trial scene or before the police at the scene of disguise and examination; and his production of his own criminal biography, his own counter-narrative against “the Wonderful and Surprising History of Caleb Williams” which was published by Gines (*Caleb Williams*, 311). In order to resist “triumphant falsehood” which is fabricated by Falkland and Gines and to reveal Falkland’s tyranny, Caleb produces his own counter-narrative, his production of his own story of resistance against tyranny (312): he says, “[w]ith this engine, this little pen, I defeat all his machinations. … This pen lingers in my trembling fingers! Is there anything I have left unsaid?” (325-6). As such, Caleb produces a counter-narrative to the criminal biography which is manufactured by his master and Gines.

As *Caleb Williams* proceeds toward its ending, Caleb witnesses the fictional production of the prevailing truth, the truth of potential dangerousness, while telling a truth of dangerous potentiality, potentiality which disrupts the modern regime of veridiction. Godwin’s fictional narrative *Caleb Williams*, a counter-memory of the law, allows us to see how the truth-regime can be destabilized through Caleb’s veridictional practices, such as silence, the refusal to identify who he is, the disguise

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14 On this point, see Grossman 37-61; Bailey 542-545; and McCann 75.
of his identity, and telling a different truth instead of confessing to the fabricated truth of his own crime. At the moment when for Caleb there is no way to prove his innocence in the first trial scene, he says to the judge that “there are certain parts of my story that I have not told,” that is, his master’s secret crime, but this testimony gives no help in proving his innocence (177). Like a Kantian imperative, “Argue, but obey,” this veridictory imperative to “Make the best story” or “Explain yourself” is in fact self-contradictory and so Forester warns Caleb: “Defend yourself as well as you can, but do not attack your master” (179). Under this regime of veridiction, Caleb, who cannot reveal his master’s crime of murder, seems to have no hope of fighting “against the stubbornness of truth,” truth that is fabricated by “Falkland’s contrivance” (179, 177). However, toward the end of his story of resistance, he finally resolves to persuade Falkland to reveal his secret crime in court and to “treason against the sovereignty of truth” whose scandalous injustice cannot be challenged (334). Therefore, after he decides to fight back against the stubbornness of truth, after he ceases to stick with the preexisting truth of his innocence and “after he learns that the telling of the truth, not the truth itself, ‘establishes its credibility and power’ can he become convincing” at the end of his story (Collings 857).

In *Caleb Williams*, Caleb indeed poses himself as a first-person omnipotent narrator of his own story and supposes that he knows the truth of *Things as They are,*
the truth of his master’s secret murder, the truth of the cruelty of tyranny. As a matter of fact, although the novel begins with “[m]y life,” it ends with “thy [Falkland’s] story,” “a half-told and mangled tale” (5, 337). At the very end of his story, Caleb comes to realize belatedly that he who is politically positioned, historically conditioned, and naturalistically determined within society cannot occupy the empty place of transcendence or omnipotence, insomuch as all characters (for example, Falkland and Forester) and the state apparatuses are not omnipotent and transcendent. Therefore, he replaces the truth of “things as they are,” the truth of reality which is produced by the contemporary police state and law, with the truth of things as they are told in a war of veridiction, a war of how the truth or “reality” is told and produced. Toward the end of the novel, he resolves to tell another story, his genealogy of tyranny and resistance and of the emerging police state, a story which “shall one day be published” (Caleb Williams, 325) by a genealogist like Godwin who wishes to excavate “the narratives … published by condemned criminals,” counter-narratives which are “different … from the construction that was put upon them by their judges” (Political Justice, 257). As such, Caleb’s story, this novel, a fiction as a counter-memory, tells how the truth-regime produces the truth that the modern subject must not be dangerous to society and of how we, modern man, can resist the truth-regime, by telling an alternative history against the prevailing narrative of the progressive
emergence of the humanitarian prison and law.

In his story of pursuit and flight, tyranny and resistance, Caleb tells how he resists and evade the apparatus of surveillance and that of security. While seemingly entrapped by their perfect function, he nonetheless soon overcomes his persecution delusion through his incessant resistance against their injustice. Furthermore, he witnesses how the contemporary criminal law and its justice system demand of him to confess a truth of his supposedly potential dangerousness. Against this regime of truth-telling, he speaks his own truth, the truth of dangerous potentiality which should be imprisoned as criminality, while producing his own practice of truth-telling. Even at the moment when he becomes an observable, punishable, sayable object of the contemporary institutions of surveillance and security and of the discourses of criminal law and the truth-regime, he never ceases to resist those apparatuses of visibility and discursivity and thereby in the end produces his own counter-narrative against them. Contesting the master narrative of Bentham and Beccaria under which modern man seemed to be born as a docile subject, Godwin’s counter-narrative tells an alternative history of the way the subject resists the contemporary apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of criminality. If genealogy is the production of a counter-memory that disrupts the prevailing truth, and if we can see Political Justice as a genealogy in this sense, then
we can also see that Godwin’s novel, a fiction, functions in precisely the same way, as
a counter-memory, another story, a fiction that disrupts the prevailing truth, and as a
result tells the truth, in the sense that it reveals the fictionality of the truth-regime that
it describes.
CHAPTER THREE

A Genealogy of the Modern Madhouse and Psychiatry in Wollstonecraft’s *Maria*

History of Madness

In *The Wrongs of Woman; or Maria* (1798, hereafter *Maria*), Mary Wollstonecraft tells the story of a woman who is imprisoned in a private madhouse even though she is not insane. In this fictional narrative, Wollstonecraft produces a counter-memory of women’s madness, an alternative history of how women were imprisoned in the madhouse, of how psychiatric discourse normalized them, and of how they resisted the apparatuses of the madhouse and psychiatry at the end of the eighteenth century. To show such social, institutional oppression of women, Wollstonecraft wrote a fictional narrative of a woman who tells her life story at the madhouse, the story of the way she is imprisoned and of the way she breaks out. “In the invention of the story,” Wollstonecraft writes in the preface to the novel, “this view restrained my fancy; and the history ought rather to be considered [to be that] of woman, [rather] than of an individual,” namely, the history of women and madness (*Maria*, 73). It is, therefore, through the fictional story of a woman that Wollstonecraft suggests the possibility of rethinking the history of the way different apparatuses oppressed
women’s voices as madness, imprisoning them within the madhouse and silencing their true stories.

Until Maria, madwomen’s stories were not told by themselves. In Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771), for example, a madwoman in the Bedlam asylum is the object of spectacle and her story is narrated by a tourist, Harley, not by herself. As such, the madwoman who looks like a mere melancholic in the novel becomes an object of literary representation of women’s madness, not a subject who tells her story on her own behalf as we see in eighteenth-century literature of women and madness. As a matter of fact, Wollstonecraft visited the Bedlam asylum with her husband William Godwin in 1797 and after the visit she created a madhouse as the spatial setting for her novel, Maria. Through the story of a woman who speaks of and for herself at the very place of madness, the madhouse, Wollstonecraft suggested an alternative history of the way women’s existence was forgotten behind the wall of the madhouse, of the way their true voices were forced into silence, and, most significantly, of the way they nevertheless resisted the emerging apparatuses at the end of the eighteenth century.

In Maria, a supposedly madwoman in a madhouse tells her story which was unheard in the contemporary narratives of women and madness. In the prevailing narratives, women who were supposedly insane were imprisoned in the madhouse and
then their stories of how they were imprisoned and of how they became insane were
only narrated by male writers, asylum-keepers, and doctors. This became a received
history of women and madness. However, such received history is nothing but a
narrative construction in which the madwomen’s confessional stories were selected
and written by male writers and doctors for the sake of the history of reason.
Accordingly, women’s true voices were silenced and their true stories were unheard in
the received history of women and madness. By allowing a woman to tell her own life
story within the madhouse, however, Wollstonecraft shows the way contemporary
women could fight back against the dominant narratives of women’s madness which
were formed at the very place of madness, the madhouse. Through this fiction Maria,
a counter-narrative to the received history of women and madness, Wollstonecraft
problematises the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry which unjustly imprisoned
and silenced women’s voices as madness, revealing their limits and failures in
normalizing them.

Wollstonecraft created the madhouse as a spatial setting where a supposedly
mad woman starts her story that has been silenced within the madhouse. As much as
Caleb tells the story of the social and institutional oppression of the prison and
criminal law, Maria speaks her own story of unjust imprisonment. However, unlike

*Caleb Williams* in whose unpublished manuscript ending Caleb ends up imprisoned in
the madhouse, *Maria* opens in a madhouse where Maria starts her narrative. In his own madness and psychotic certainty, Caleb believes that he is telling the truth of Falkland’s secret crime, but nobody believes his story and Caleb ends up imprisoned in a madhouse because he is considered mad. This is the reason why Godwin abandoned the manuscript ending where Caleb’s story would probably be regarded as madness, and thus Godwin seems to eliminate any possibility of madness in the published ending. For Godwin, madness is a dead end where there is no possibility to speak the truth of social, institutional oppression. Unlike her husband, however, Wollstonecraft directly confronts the problem of madness in her fictional writing and lets a woman who is imprisoned in the madhouse speak her story which was silenced as madness throughout the eighteenth century.

At the very confines of madness, the madhouse, where madwomen’s voices were forced into silence, Maria, with her own voice, starts her narrative of the way she is imprisoned without being insane. As Maria’s confessional story proceeds, it is revealed that she was imprisoned by her husband Mr. Venable who had alleged that she was insane. When Maria recovers her senses, she comes to find herself in the “abodes of horror” (which is assumed to be a prison in her imagination and which turns out to be a private madhouse as her narrative unfolds) and soon she confronts an asylum keeper, Jemima, who assumes that Maria is mad (*Maria*, 75). Thus, to prove
that she is not mad, she tells her own life story to the keeper. As such, Maria opens in 
medias res, after her imprisonment in the asylum where Maria starts to tell her story
of her romantic love with her husband, his despotism, her flight and pursuit, her
husband’s abduction of her baby, and her imprisonment. Through this narrative
technique, Wollstonecraft lets Maria narrate her story at “the very confines of
madness” and produce a counter-narrative to her husband’s claim that she is mad and,
furthermore, to matrimonial despotism and patriarchal society (Maria, 88).

Significantly, Wollstonecraft’s use of the madhouse as an opening scene
reflects her own experience of how the contemporary madhouse unjustly imprisoned
women and how society drove women mad. Most of all, the reason why
Wollstonecraft opens her novel at the madhouse is to tell the way the world at large
oppressed women, especially when Maria asks “Was not the world a vast prison, and
women born slaves?” (Maria, 79). Wollstonecraft who is interested in such social,
institutional oppression asked “Godwin for the second volume of Caleb Williams,
where Caleb is unjustly imprisoned” (Gordon 342) and in Maria she criticizes how “a
house of correction” and a “work-house” unjustly imprison Jemima, another heroine
(Maria, 118). Thus, the opening scene of Maria could be the prison, not the
madhouse, if Wollstonecraft had not visited the Bedlam asylum. As I have said above,
er her use of the madhouse as the opening scene directly derives from her own
experience of her visit to the Bedlam asylum with Godwin on February 6th, 1797 when she was writing *Maria*.\(^{15}\) According to Lyndall Gordon, “it was not until February 1797 that Wollstonecraft explored a setting for her drama: a madhouse” (341). The visit allowed Wollstonecraft to think more concretely about madness, which she “personally feared throughout her life” and which was silenced throughout her philosophical and fictional writings (Sapiro 60).\(^{16}\) Thus, she invented the fictional narrative of Maria who is imprisoned without being mad, and let her start her story at the madhouse. As such, *Maria* is a fiction about the contemporary madhouse, not the prison. If Maria had realized that she was imprisoned in a madhouse, not a prison, she might have asked: “Was not the world a madhouse?” Thus *Maria* opens at the madhouse as if the world *is* a madhouse where Maria is required to supervise and examine herself to conclude if she is mad or not.

\(^{15}\) On her visit to the Bedlam asylum, also see Janet Todd 2000, 427.

\(^{16}\) As for Wollstonecraft’s lifelong fear of madness, see Sydny Conger, who remarks that “Wollstonecraft seems to feel and fear, at various junctures in her life, something she calls ‘madness’” (xxiv); and Steven Blakemore, who comments that “During various crises in her life, Wollstonecraft felt that she was going insane. … In a letter to Henry Dyson Gabell (16 April 1787), Wollstonecraft fears her ‘reason has been too far stretched, and tottered almost on the brink of madness’” (72).
Maria presents the way in which the modern subject is formed in the madhouse-world in much the same way it is in the prison-world in Caleb Williams. In terms of the metaphor of the prison-world, as I have discussed in the second chapter, the modern subject was imprisoned in the Panopticon, imagining that he is always supervised by supposedly panoptic surveillance and feeling guilty for his crime. And then, this panoptic prison metaphorized into the panoptic society in which modern man was required to supervise and punish his own potential criminality within the prison-world as we see in Bentham’s theory of fictions and Caleb’s paranoia. In this prison-world, Maria asks “Was not the world a vast prison?” and imagines herself “bastilled [and] fettered by the partial laws of society” (Maria, 79, 155). In a similar way, the modern subject was imprisoned in the madhouse and his/her madness came to be supervised and examined by asylum authority. Then, the madhouse metaphorized into the madhouse-world in which it was incumbent upon him to supervise, examine, and normalize his/her own potential madness. As such, the subject is imprisoned and punished within the madhouse-world which forces him/her to “reason on the nature of madness” (85). As shown above, these two subject formations are isomorphic, but their contents are distinguished from each other: on the one hand, the prison is an apparatus which aims to imprison criminals who have to examine and punish their own criminality; on the other, the madhouse is to imprison
madmen who ought to reason on their own madness. Thus, if the criminals, the vagrants, or political prisoners had been imprisoned in the madhouse, they might have examined, confessed, and punished their potential madness, not their potential criminality.

As such, the metaphors of the prison-world and the madhouse-world present how modern subjectivity was formed under the apparatuses of visibility of the prison and the madhouse and the discursivity of criminology and psychiatry. In the prison-world, as shown in the previous chapter, modern man was born as homo penalis (penological man) and homo criminalis (criminological man) by becoming an object of the modern penology and criminology as well as a subject who punishes his own potential criminality. In the prison-world in Caleb Williams, Caleb is put under the eye of power which is supposed to always supervise and detect his potential criminality; and he is forced to answer the imperative of criminology, “Confess your potential criminality!” In a similar way, within the modern madhouse, modern man was born as “homo mente captus (insane man)” by becoming both an object of the modern madhouse and psychiatry and a subject who was required to examine his own madness (HM, 529). Outside the madhouse, that is, in the madhouse-world, modern man was also born as homo psychologicus (psychological man) who is “a possessor of internal truth, fleshless, ironical, and positive of all self-consciousness and all possible
knowledge” (MIP, 87). Most of all, the modern man who is a possessor of all possible knowledge was able to know even his own potential madness which had been divine, sacred, and unknowable truth during the classical age. In order not to be imprisoned in the madhouse, therefore, the psychological man should eradicate potential madness by imprisoning it within himself and not by exhibiting it in reality. In short, the modern man who is “enslaved sovereign, observed spectator” was born both as the seeable, sayable object of institutions and discourses and as the subject who supervises and examines his own supposedly potential dangerousness, such as criminality and madness (OT, 338).

As much as Wollstonecraft’s metaphorical use of the madhouse allows us think of the subject formation within the madhouse-world, it also displays a material, historical condition of her own experience of the madhouse which was emerging in her time. According to Janet Todd, “the madhouse in which [Maria] is trapped is not metaphorical but a specific and legal institution,” which historically framed the experience of contemporary women, including Wollstonecraft (1988, 106). It is Wollstonecraft’s use of the madhouse that presents the way the contemporary madhouse imprisoned women in late eighteenth-century England. Todd thus criticizes readers who accentuate only Wollstonecraft’s metaphorical use of the madhouse and who marginalize “her and her writing to take her out of the history” (106).
Remarkably, some critics deal with Maria’s imprisonment in the madhouse as a metaphor: I take two examples, “Maria’s imprisonment serves as a perfect metaphor for the vulnerability of women” to men (Markley 61-2); and “Maria’s imprisonment is a metaphor for women’s situation in a world” (Spencer 135). As such, critics very often generalize her imprisonment as a metaphor for a social and marital oppression by patriarchal society, while overlooking women’s imprisonment in the modern madhouse as a historically new event during the late eighteenth century when melancholy was an imprisonable malady. As a matter of fact, Maria who is a melancholic and considered mad by her husband, becomes imprisoned by contemporary psychiatric authority. The problem here is not only social, familial and marital oppression, but also the institutional one of the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry which were emerging in late eighteenth-century England.

Strangely enough, some critics speak of the prison when it seems that they mean the madhouse: for example, Wollstonecraft’s “choice of a prison setting symbolized the degree to which women’s liberty was limited by patriarchal society” (Gunther-Canada 136); “the prison is to be seen as a symbolical representation of the confinement and oppression that is part of all women’s lives” (Berglund 112). However, the institution where Maria is imprisoned is not a prison, but “a private receptacle for madness,” a madhouse (Maria, 119). Most important of all,
Wollstonecraft’s description of the contemporary madhouse reflects the historical emergence of the modern form of the madhouse, as I will argue in this chapter. In late eighteenth-century England, there emerged the modern madhouse in which women were imprisoned and driven mad as Maria is imprisoned and driven almost insane. Most importantly, it is Wollstonecraft’s visit to the Bedlam asylum that prompted her to think of the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry. After this visit, she metaphorized her own experience in order to invent the story of Maria who is imprisoned in the madhouse without being insane and to criticize the madhouse-world which forced women to normalize their potential madness and to silence their voices as dangerous potentiality and, as a result, which drove some contemporary women mad.

Wollstonecraft’s fictional narrative as a genealogy, a counter-memory, tells an alternative history of women’s madness which radically challenges the prevailing master narratives in English eighteenth-century literature. During the period, as Philip Martin elaborates, “a myth of women’s madness” was fabricated with madwomen being the object of literary representation, not the subject who tells her own story of madness (1). Unlike preceding authors, however, Wollstonecraft allows Maria to tell her own story from within the very confines of madness. Through this, as Helen Small notes, Wollstonecraft “wrote about women and madness and her writing reveals what
it was possible to say and think at a time … when criticism of medical attitudes to women was barely making itself heard as yet” (28). As such, Wollstonecraft’s fictional narrative problematizes the contemporary medical attitudes to women, which thereby make possible “a ‘rearrangement of the hierarchy of knowledge,’” that is, a new grid of discursivity of women’s madness (20). To Small’s discussion of the formation of medical knowledge of women’s madness, I want to add the rearrangement of the hierarchy of power, in particular, asylum power to which asylum inmates were forced to subject themselves. This chapter will explain the way the modern madhouse and psychiatry were formed from the viewpoint of Michel Foucault’s genealogy of modern madness, especially focusing on the scene of the first confrontation between Maria and Jemima, an asylum-keeper, which is structured like a confrontation between patient and doctor and which prefigures a great founding scene of modern psychiatry described in Philippe Pinel’s *A Treatise on Insanity* (1801).

The confrontation between Maria and Jemima indicates a historical change of asylum practice during the late eighteenth century, a change from “spectacle” in which asylum inmates were the object of sightseeing as we see in *The Man of Feeling* to a “confrontation between doctor and patient” (*HM*, 442, 207). In *Maria*, “the lady at the end of the gallery” can be seen only by “the physician appointed by her family”
and asylum-keepers, and Maria sees only the asylum-keeper Jemima (Maria, 78).

Confronting the doctor within the new modern asylum, the inmates become the object of psychiatric gaze which looks at them as mad and their madness is recognized first by the doctor and then by the inmates themselves. Now, the mad who are imprisoned under the gaze of reason are “condemned … to reason on the nature of madness” (85). The psychiatric imperative to “reason on madness” indicates the emergence of new psychiatric discourse during the end of the eighteenth century. In order not to be imprisoned in the madhouse, the modern subject should thus eliminate his own potential madness, while internalizing the punitive gaze of reason and the psychiatric imperative. In a word, Wollstonecraft’s fiction as a genealogy presents how the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry were formed and how Maria resists the asylum practices and psychiatric discourse by revealing their limits and failures in normalizing her as much as Foucault’s genealogy of madness shows the limits of those apparatuses.

At the very moment when madness became a seeable and sayable object of psychiatric power (institutions) and knowledge (discourse), modern madness ironically discloses the limits of the modern asylum and psychiatry, two distinct apparatuses of the visibility and discursivity of madness. However, even at the moment when it was imprisoned, observed, and examined; and thus even at the
moment when it came to confess its whole story, something remained unseen and unheard. Such an unseen, unheard part of madness could be discussed in terms of “madness itself” that is defined as “inaccessible primitive purity” in Foucault’s 1961 preface of the French edition of History of Madness (180, xxxiii). In order to dig out such hidden, unknowable madness itself, Foucault continues; “we must try to return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself” (HM, xxvii). The undifferentiated experience, madness itself, is “a sort of living, voluble, and anxious madness that the mechanisms of power and psychiatry were supposed to have come to repress and reduce to silence” (Power, 120). Then, how can we know such repressed, silenced madness existed, which was never, could never be, written in the history of madness? According to Shepherdson, “it may well be … that madness (‘madness itself’) will ‘always already’ be excluded as soon as any science or philosophy, or indeed any history of medical knowledge, begins to speak ‘about’ it” (2009, 43). As a result, it is impossible for Foucault or any other historians to write the history of “madness itself” because it is “always already” repressed and reduced to silence.

Instead of postulating such inaccessible, unknowable madness itself, Foucault suggests a genealogical method (which is always already in History of Madness) in
which he explains how “modern madness” was born in its “first homeland,” the madhouse, in terms of the apparatuses of visibility and discursivity (HS, 82). It is within the modern madhouse that modern madness was born as a surplus product of the apparatuses during the modern era and thus “modern” madness is distinguished from “madness itself” as a supposedly unknowable, undifferentiated entity. Most explicitly, in an interview in 1976, Foucault criticizes his own “implicit use of this notion of repression,” the repressive hypothesis, in History of Madness (Power, 119-20). In the same year he published The History of Sexuality in which he discussed and rejected such a repressive hypothesis in which some presupposed entity must be repressed by the apparatuses. Contrary to the repressive hypothesis, modern madness is something invented, not a presupposed reality. Thus, the modern apparatuses name supposedly potential dangerousness as madness or criminality, even without knowing what they are and whether they are dangerous or not. Most of all, as I discuss in this dissertation, the modern apparatus of security imprisoned and punished supposedly dangerous individuals as criminals, madmen, and vagrants in order to secure society from them. In this process, they were assumed to be possessors of criminality, madness, or delinquency and were required to confess their criminality and madness and swear not to be dangerous to society. As a result, their supposed dangerousness turned into madness or criminality and modern delinquency and modern madness
were born as a surplus product of the modern apparatuses of visibility and
discursivity, which made their contemporaries who were not guilty or mad into
criminals and the mad as we see in Caleb Williams and Maria.

As such, modern madness was born in the madhouse-world as a surplus
product of the apparatuses which repressed supposedly dangerous potentiality as
madness. In order to explain modern madness and to criticize his own use of the
concept of “madness itself,” Foucault suggests concepts such as “unlivable”
experience, “limit-experience,” and “transactional reality”: modern madness is
“unlivable” unlike “lived” everyday experience as described in phenomenology
(Power, 241); it is an experience, but experienced as a “limit” which disrupts our
knowledge of madness (241); and finally it transacts as a reality “although [it has] not
always existed” (BB, 297). The limit-experiences or unlivable experiences such as
death, criminality, madness, and sexuality became the objects of modern human
sciences, but nevertheless, at the same time, they broke down the apparatuses of
power/knowledge revealing their limits and failures. If one could say that Foucault is
not an obsessional neurotic who toiled over his own impossible project of the history
of madness itself as some Lacanians may describe him (as we see in Jacques-Alain
Miller’s criticism of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality), he could be called a “happy
positivist” who paradoxically wrote histories of madness, illness, criminality, and
sexuality which are unlivable experiences, limit-experiences, which disrupt the modern apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of them (AK, 125).

As such, modern madness as the limit-experience which was produced during the modern age ironically subverted the modern power-knowledge nexus which was formed along with the birth of modern human sciences. In Mental Illness and Psychology, his master’s thesis published in 1954, Foucault observes the “anthropological constellation of man” in which “a certain relation, historically situated, of man to the madman and to the true man” was established (61, 2). In History of Madness, Foucault paraphrases this: “the path from man to true man passed through the madman,” that is to say, modern man was born into true man by imprisoning the madman within the madhouse (526). While elaborating on the anthropological constellation of man throughout his whole works, Foucault observes how the mad, the sick, and the criminal were born beside man as his neighbor (Nebenmensch, neben + Mensch, beside + man). Thus the mythical birth of modern man was possible along with the birth of the madman as his neighbor whose existence should be forgotten in the madhouse. In The Order of Things, a work of the birth of modern man as laboring, living, and speaking being, what he really wanted to write is the death of man at the very moment of his birth: Foucault says, “when the world, its order, and human beings existed, but man did not” (322). Thus the modern man who
functioned as a transactional reality would have made possible the birth of modern human sciences even if he had not existed. At the very moment when it seems that modern man was born as a perfect object and subject of modern human sciences (criminology, penology, political economics, psychiatry, and so on), modern man himself always disrupted them, becoming something unseen and unsayable.

As I discuss in this dissertation, the modern formations of visibility and discursivity, through which modern man became a seeable, sayable object of human sciences of madness and criminality, emerged while also displaying their own limits and remaining something unseen and unheard. Therefore, the history of modern madness aims to show the formation of the madhouse and psychiatry at the end of the eighteenth century and at the same time to show their limits, namely, modern madness itself as a limit-experience and a surplus product, modern madness whose existence is forgotten and whose voice is silenced, but which, nonetheless, always claims itself as a dangerous potentiality which implodes the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry as we see in Wollstonecraft’s fiction. Her fiction Maria as a genealogy tells an alternative history of the way in which “modern madness” was born at the modern madhouse, its “homeland,” while witnessing the unreason of reason which imprisons Maria who is not mad (HM, 82). In the following sections, I will discuss how Maria is imprisoned in the new modern madhouse by becoming an observable object of the
psychiatric gaze in “The Modern Madhouse” and “Psychiatric gaze”; and how she is forced to reason on her supposed madness by the psychiatric discourse, but how, nonetheless she overcomes it by telling her own counter-narrative in “Psychiatric Discourse” and “Truth-telling.”

The Modern Madhouse

*Maria* presents the way a modern form of the madhouse came into being during the late eighteenth century. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the surveillance of panoptic society took place in a way that a new form of visibility, a new way of spatial division, was designed to supervise and observe supposedly dangerous individuals during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Beside the panoptic prison, there appeared a new form of the madhouse which aimed to imprison, observe, and discipline the insane. Along with the advent of the new apparatuses of surveillance, the criminal, vagrants, and the mad were liberated from an unenlightened dungeon, but once again imprisoned into distinct forms of institutions such as prisons, workhouses, and madhouses. With the historical events of liberation and imprisonment, madmen became an *object* of psychiatric observation and knowledge as well as a *subject* who was required to supervise and examine his own madness.
Maria is thus imprisoned in this new madhouse which was established to curb madmen’s dangerous force of madness and there she becomes an object of medical observation, examining and punishing of her own potential madness. More specifically, Maria presents the emergence of the private madhouses which were built in late eighteenth century England.

Maria starts her story in a private asylum without knowing where she is. Thus, she imagines that the place is the “abode of horror … and castles, filled with specters and chimeras, conjured up by the magic spell of genius to harrow the soul, and absorb the wondering mind” (Maria, 75). But she soon realizes that the place is not such an imaginary Gothicized space as in her fantasy, but a prison. While seeing “her manacled arms” “in her dreary cell,” she supposes that she is confined in prison (76). And then, she imagines that she will “put the risk of life into the balance with the chance of freedom,” that is to say, escape from “the master of this most horrid of prisons” (77). As Wollstonecraft’s description of the prison-like setting presents, this spatial setting appears like a darkened pre-modern dungeon which purported to confine criminals, the mad, and political prisoners altogether, rather than a modernized panoptic prison which aims to reform them. As a matter of fact, the novel’s spatial setting denotes a fully modernized institution, in particular, the madhouse which aimed to imprison mad people. Furthermore, the novel explicitly
presents the emergence of new asylum practices, such as medical observation, the separation of asylum inmates, their isolation into each cell, and deprivation of freedom, which aimed to tame and discipline the inmates during the late eighteenth century. In short, the private madhouse where Maria is imprisoned is not the pre-modern dungeon, but the modern madhouse which is set up only for mad people, such as the melancholic, the frantic, and the maniac as Maria describes: “Melancholy and imbecility marked the features of the wretches allowed to breathe at large; for the frantic, those who in a strong imagination had lost a sense of woe, were closely confined” (84).

During the latter part of the eighteenth century, there emerged a new modern madhouse which imprisoned supposedly mad people. In History of Madness, Foucault points out that the mad were freed from the darkened dungeon, but once again they became imprisoned in the new institution and consequently they became an established object of the psychiatric gaze and discourse. With the historical events of liberation and the imprisonment of the mad and with the historical change of asylum practice from “confinement” to “imprisonment,” they are liberated from their confinement, separated from the criminal and vagrants, but once again imprisoned in the new panoptic institution, the modern madhouse (HM, 420). However, as Roy Porter observes in his criticism of Foucault’s History of Madness, during the long
eighteenth century in England, there was no “great confinement” which, according to Foucault, prevailed all over Europe during the classical age (Porter 6). And consequently there was no liberation from it, at least, in England. It is no doubt that Porter’s comment on historical facts is correct. But, Foucault’s point is that there appeared a historical change of asylum practices from “confinement” which aimed to expel madmen into the darkened dungeon to “imprisonment” in the modern institution where they became an object of psychiatric observation, a historical change which indicates the emergence of a new form of seeing and observing madmen.

Together with the historical change from confinement to imprisonment, there emerged a new set of spatial divisions or spatialization, which made possible the asylum practices such as isolation, supervision, and discipline of asylum inmates. During the late eighteenth century, there occurred three distinct spatial divisions in terms of the formation of the modern madhouse: firstly, a division between the insane and the sane, which separated them from each other and which imprisoned them into distinct institutions; secondly, a division inside the madhouse, which separated an asylum inmate from the other inmates and which isolated them in each cell in order to prevent madness’ contagion and to make it easy for asylum authority to control, observe, and discipline them; and lastly, a division between patient and doctor, in which the patient became an object of psychiatric power and the knowledge of the
doctor. Through those divisions which made possible those asylum practices, the mad
confronted the doctor who was supposed to know what madness was and who forced
them to submit their own madness to his asylum power.

In the modern madhouse, Maria encounters an asylum-keeper, Jemima, who
was “instruct[ed] how to treat the disturbed minds” of the inmates and who embodies
the asylum power (Maria, 119). In the first confrontation, Jemima enters “with a firm,
deliberate step, strongly marked features, and large black eyes, which she fixed
steadily on Maria’s, as if she designed to intimidate her” (77). As a matter of fact, to
intimidate the inmates is what Jemima was instructed to do by a proprietor of the
private asylum. Thus, Jemima exerts her asylum power to tame and subjugate Maria.
Saying that the other inmates “gave up their intent, as they recovered their senses,”
Jemima orders Maria to eat food when Maria refuses; “You had better sit down and
eat your dinner, than look at the clouds” (77). To Jemima who thinks that “disgust for
food” is caused by “madness,” Maria rejoins that her disgust is caused by her “grief”
over her stolen baby, but nonetheless she at last submits to Jemima’s asylum power
(77-8). Maria thus “calmly endeavoured to eat enough to prove her docility” (78, my
emphasis). As a matter of fact, what Jemima commands Maria to do is to prove her
docility as much as contemporary psychiatric authority purported to tame and
subjugate the asylum inmates.
In the scene of the first confrontation, there appears a conflict between two forces in which Jemima attempts to curb Maria’s dangerous force of madness which is supposed to cause her disgust for food. In addition to the scene, throughout the novel, various asylum practices, such as isolation and separation, the deprivation of bodily freedom, and medical observation, allow the psychiatric authority to subjugate the madhouse inmates. For example, “Maria was not permitted to walk in the garden” because she didn’t fully prove her docility as well as sanity (Maria, 83). Moreover, in order for Jemima to “soften the rigour of confinement” and “to alleviate all in her power,” Maria is required to prove her docility and sanity (83, 80). As such, the principle of punishment and reward purports to make it easy to control, supervise, and discipline the inmates unlike pre-modern confinement which aimed to separate and expel them from society. Effectively, Maria shows the way the modern madhouse was formed and the way asylum authority executed its practices which purported to curb dangerous madness, by depriving the inmates of bodily freedom, isolating them in each cell, and requiring them to prove their docility.

The scene of the first confrontation between Maria and Jemima suggests the great founding scene of modern psychiatry. The founding scene, according to Foucault, is well described in Pinel’s A Treatise on Insanity, which was published in French in 1801 and translated into English in 1806:
Faced with a raving lunatic, the supervisor ‘advances towards the lunatic with an intrepid air, but slowly and gradually. … As he advances he speaks to him in the firmest, most threatening tone and, with calm warnings, continues to fix the lunatic’s attention on himself so as to hide what is going on around him.

He gives precise and imperious orders to obey and to surrender. (PP, 9)

It is as if Pinel had read Wollstonecraft’s novel, Pinel’s description of the confrontation scene is very close to that in Wollstonecraft’s fictional narrative. In the confrontations in both Wollstonecraft’s fiction and Pinel’s treatise, the asylum power purports to tame and subjugate patients’ dangerous madness. Thus, “the therapeutics of madness is ‘the art of, as it were, subjugating and taming the lunatic by making him strictly dependent on a man [for example, a keeper, a supervisor, or a doctor] who is able to exercise an irresistible influence on him’” (8). Subjected to asylum authority, the inmates must “agree to be obedient” to it and to stop exhibiting madness and then “the cure will become involuntarily the second payment” (165, 29). In short, the modern madhouse – regardless of whether it is public as in Pinel’s treatise or private as in Wollstonecraft’s fiction – was formed in the process of imprisoning, punishing, disciplining, and subjugating the inmates, and promising the cure for madness.

Maria shows the emergence of the private madhouses in late eighteenth century England. At the end of her confessional story, Jemima explains how she
arrived at “a private receptacle for madness” (*Maria*, 54). This private madhouse might be “an asylum outside London” (Gunter-Canada 136), which would be one among “sixteen metropolitan licensed houses” according to 1774 documents (Parry-Jones 30). For the geographical setting of *Maria*, Wollstonecraft might choose one of the sixteen metropolitan licensed houses which were private ones. Jemima says that she was employed by a person who “had been a keeper at a house of the same description, and conceived that he could make money much more readily in his old occupation” (*Maria*, 119). As Gordon notes, “in the course of the eighteenth century private ‘madhouses’ became profitable. They were unregulated by law until 1774 [*the Madhouses Act*], and, even after, were as unsupervised as Wollstonecraft reveals” (342). The private madhouse in the novel seems to be at best a licensed one in that Jemima speaks of madhouse doctors. But the doctor who can test whether Maria is really mad never appears. As a matter of fact, she is imprisoned only because of her husband’s claim that she is mad. “People,” according to Todd, “could be admitted without a certificate of lunacy; although this had to be obtained within three days, it could be signed by a doctor, surgeon or apothecary without his having a sight of the patient, while the term ‘apothecary’ was so loose that almost any asylum-keeper could claim it” (2000, 427). Thus Jemima plays the role of apothecary on the condition that the doctor doesn’t appear. But she refuses to incorporate asylum authority and helps
Maria to escape the madhouse after she is convinced that Maria is not mad.

For the spatial setting of her novel, Wollstonecraft created a private madhouse which might have been selected from among the metropolitan madhouses which were founded in her time. Most of all, the reason why she chose a private madhouse, not the public Bedlam which she had visited, may be to suggest a possible escape from the madhouse. In the private madhouse, Maria succeeds in convincing Jemima that she is not insane, which would probably be impossible in the public institution of Bedlam. Through the invention of a fictional narrative about Maria who is imprisoned in a private madhouse and who breaks out of it, Wollstonecraft presents the way Maria escapes and overcomes the oppressive institution of the madhouse. Allowing Maria who is supposed to be mad, to speak of her life story in a madhouse, Wollstonecraft provides a possibility to speak and think differently about the domineering narrative of women and madness. Through this fiction Maria in which Maria tells her own counter-narrative, Wollstonecraft produces a genealogy, a counter-memory of the received history of women’s madness, showing the way the modern madhouse and psychiatry were formed and the way contemporary women resisted them.
Psychiatric Gaze

Imprisoned within the modern madhouse, Maria becomes an observable object of the psychiatric gaze which is supposed to penetrate something which is called madness. Thus Maria is put under surveillance by the gaze which sees her as mad and which forces her not to exhibit her dangerous madness. As the panoptic prison functions fictionally through architectural construction and through prisoners’ submission to the supposedly all-seeing gaze of surveillance, the panoptic functioning of the psychiatric gaze also becomes possible through the spatial distribution of power in which the inmates become observable objects of the gaze and in which they subjugate themselves to the gaze of power. Maria thus imagines that she is always supervised by the supposedly panoptic gaze of Jemima throughout the asylum scenes. Being seen as mad, Maria comes to supervise herself whether she is insane or not. As a result, she finally seems to incorporate the psychiatric gaze and to see herself as mad, while seeing how other inmates are punished because of their madness. She is, however, far from being driven mad in the madhouse as other inmates usually are; instead, she endures the furious psychiatric gaze of Jemima and comes to convince her that she is not insane.

In the madhouse, Maria becomes the object of the psychiatric gaze which sees
her as mad. In the scene of the first confrontation between Maria and Jemima, patient and doctor, Maria encounters the psychiatric gaze which is incorporated by the asylum-keeper Jemima. When Jemima fixes “her black eyes … on Maria’s,” her black eyes already work as the psychiatric gaze (Maria, 77). Jemima assumes that Maria’s disgust for food derives from madness, not from her grief about her stolen baby, and thus she orders her to eat. This gaze is psychiatric in the sense that it looks at Maria as mad, not as guilty as a criminological gaze would do. In the confrontation, Maria asks Jemima: “Do you really think me mad?” (77). Jemima replies, “Not just now. But what does that prove? – Only that you must be the more carefully watched, for appearing at times so reasonable” (77). Although Maria does not appear insane, she is told that she must be more carefully watched to determine whether she is mad or not, instead of being told that she would be freed. Most of all, the reason why she must be observed is because she was imprisoned in the madhouse. Thus Maria who is looked at as mad by Jemima is forced to examine if she is mad or not, in order to prove her docility and sanity.

Throughout the asylum scenes, therefore, Maria imagines that she is always supervised by psychiatric observation. In the second confrontation, “when by chance [Maria] met the eye of rage glaring on her [Jemima] …, she shrunk back with more horror and affright” (Maria, 84). Encountering Jemima’s gaze of rage, Maria seems to
feel as if her intention “to pass the threshold of her prison” was detected by Jemima (84). Under the penetrative gaze, thus, Maria seems to internalize the psychiatric gaze which sees her as mad and to examine herself to see whether her conduct is insane or not. Most of all, for psychiatric authority, the most insane behavior might be the inmates’ attempt to break out of the madhouse in the sense that the attempt itself proves their madness by not admitting that they are mad. Therefore, Maria always suffers from Jemima’s all-seeing gaze which is assumed to detect even her intention to break out. It is this psychiatric gaze which is embodied by Jemima that she must endure in order not to really become mad. Or to put it differently, if she fails to endure the gaze of the asylum power which punishes her supposed madness; if she fails to temper the furious gaze of psychiatric reason, she might be led to incorporate the punitive gaze which looks at her as mad. As a result, she would end up seeing herself as mad, believing that she is imprisoned because she is mad. Maria thus laments; “What a task, to watch the light of reason quivering in the eye” of Jemima (84).

Being seen as mad, incorporating the psychiatric gaze, and consequently seeing herself as mad, Maria is forced to see the madness of the other inmates who are imprisoned together, but separated in each cell. In her isolated cell, Maria sees only “the prison of vexed spirits” and hears the terrific “groans and shrieks” of the inmates (Maria, 86, 75). Furthermore, Jemima gives Maria a “subject for contemplation, by
describing the person of a lovely maniac, just brought into an adjoining chamber”

(88). Jemima tells a story of a lovely maniac who exhibits a perfect example of madness, in order for Maria to reason on the madness of the maniac. Seeing the other inmates’ madness and projecting her own madness onto it, Maria is expected to see her own madness. As Foucault points out, “if the doctor shows each patient how all the others around him are really ill and mad, as a result of this, perceiving the madness of the others in a triangular faction [two patients and a doctor], the patient in question will end up understanding what it is to be mad, suffer delirium, be maniacal or melancholic, and suffer monomania” (PP, 103-4). Therefore, “the madman recognized himself in the mirror of the madness,” which the doctor showed to him and with which he should identify himself (HM, 499, my emphases). That is to say, “he found himself the unpitied object of his own gaze, and faced with the silence of [doctors] who presented reason and did nothing other than hold out a dangerous mirror, [so that] he recognized himself as objectively mad” (499). As such, after Maria watches other inmates’ madness, she is expected to recognize her own madness reflected in the mirror of madness and to submit her supposed madness to the asylum power.

Ironically enough, however, while hearing Jemima’s story of the madwoman, what Maria contemplates is not the madness of the maniac, but the unreason of
matrimonial despotism which had driven the woman mad. As Maria guesses, “this poor wretch was obviously not confined without a cause,” that is to say, she is confined because of her insanity which is caused by matrimonial despotism (Maria, 88). Jemima says; “she had been married, against her inclination, to a rich old man, extremely jealous; … and that, in consequence of his treatment, or something which hung on her mind, she had, during her first lying-in, lost her senses” (88). Thus, Maria exclaims: “What a subject of meditation – even to the very confines of madness” where Maria realizes how the madhouse-world makes women mad (88). As such, what Maria sees in the mirror of madness is not her own madness, but the unreason of matrimonial despotism which drove the woman mad and which unjustly imprisoned Maria herself based only on her husband’s fabrication of her madness.

As I have discussed above, the power of the psychiatric gaze aims to subjugate the dangerous force of madmen. In Maria, however, the psychiatric gaze fails to tame and subjugate Maria who tries to endure the light of reason of the psychiatric gaze. First, Maria tries to temper the furious gaze of asylum authority which Jemima embodies, while displaying her docility. In order not to be punished, Maria must tame her own gaze whose subjection may well prove her docility and sanity. As a matter of fact, a male inmate, who is not “so unruly” and appears sane, “has an untamed look, a vehemence of eye … that excites apprehension” of madness on the part of Jemima
(Maria, 87). Paradoxically enough, what is insane is the punitive gaze which is always furious and intimidating. The punitive gaze of psychiatric reason doesn’t know that what makes the modern subject mad is the psychiatric gaze itself, and not the other way around. The punitive gaze sees the inmates as mad and they who are seen as such come to see themselves as mad, while seeing the madness of other inmates, finding their internal truth of madness, and being driven genuinely mad.

The psychiatric gaze of reason is supposed to know all and see all and with its psychiatric power and knowledge, the asylum authority justifies its imprisonment and punishment of supposedly mad people, promising a cure for madness. However, this supposedly panoptic gaze is something which is invented through hierarchical distribution of power and through inmates’ subjection to the psychiatric gaze. The mental “hospital,” says Foucault, “is a panoptic machine, and it is as a panoptic apparatus that the hospital cures. The hospital is in fact a machine for exercising power, for inducing, distributing, and applying power according to Bentham’s schema” (PP, 102). Imprisoned within the modern panoptic asylum, the modern subject becomes the object of “permanent visibility” of psychiatric power (102). “Under the potential power of a permanent gaze” which is imagined as all-seeing thanks to the spatial distribution of power, “it is precisely when one knows one is being looked at, and looked at as mad, that one will not display one’s madness” (102).
By not exhibiting their supposed madness and by proving docility and sanity, the inmates might believe that they are cured and that they are not insane any more. Thus, Maria who is looked at as mad tries not to display her melancholic grief which is considered madness by Jemima, even proving her docility and subjugating herself to the gaze of psychiatric power.

As such, this psychiatric gaze which is supposed to be all-seeing and all-knowing regarding madness comes to be invented not only through the hierarchical distribution of power, but also through the submission of the subject to the gaze. To accomplish its panoptic functioning, therefore, the gaze should be embodied by keepers, nurses, or doctors and then by the inmates themselves. But what if the doctors fail to incorporate the supposedly panoptic gaze? What if the inmates manage to endure the punitive gaze, without being driven insane? And thus, what if the supposed omnipotence is revealed to be fictional as much as Maria’s supposed madness is just a fiction? As a matter of fact, the omnipotence and omniscience of psychiatric power and knowledge are invented to tame and subjugate supposedly mad people to asylum authority. Then, what if at the very moment of the birth of modern psychiatry, the supposedly omnipotent, omniscient doctors had never existed? In Maria the doctors never appear and their presence is only suggested by the asylum-keeper Jemima. No matter how they come and test Maria, they might diagnose her
disgust for food and her melancholic grief as madness as Jemima does in the first confrontation scene. The problem here is that as much as Maria’s madness is fictionally assumed, psychiatric omniscience is fictitiously postulated and must be incorporated by Jemima. Paradoxically enough, psychiatric omniscience is assumed to even know what does not exist, i.e., Maria’s madness. Incorporated by Jemima, psychiatric power/knowledge considers Maria mad and then her supposed madness might turn into a truth which is indeed a fabricated one if she admits her fabricated madness as true. However, Jemima who is a doctor-surrogate refuses to incorporate the punitive psychiatric gaze which looks at Maria as mad approaching to the end of the novel and then finally Jemima helps Maria to escape the private madhouse.

Imprisoned within the modern panoptic asylum, the modern subject like Maria seems to become a perfect object of the psychiatric gaze of power. Being seen as mad and seeing oneself as mad, the modern subject comes to subjugate him/herself to asylum power, while taming his/her dangerous force, madness. Most of all, such an all-seeing, all-knowing gaze of psychiatry could only be assumed by the distribution of the powers of seeing and being seen in which the inmates imagine that they are always supervised by the all-seeing gaze. However, the supposed omnipotence of the psychiatric gaze is nothing but a fiction through which asylum authority aims to imprison and punish women’s resistant voices as madness. Maria resists this fiction
without being deceived by the fiction of the psychiatric gaze which sees her as mad and which is incorporated by Jemima. Wollstonecraft’s fictional narrative as a genealogy, a counter-memory, presents how the modern subject, both as insane man and as psychological man, was born in the madhouse-world and how he/she resisted the asylum power of the psychiatric gaze.

**Psychiatric Discourse**

Imprisoned in the madhouse, the modern subject was born as insane man, being seen as mad by the psychiatric gaze, seeing the other inmates’ madness, and finally seeing him/herself as such. Incorporating the psychiatric gaze, he/she also hears the psychiatric imperative, “Reason on your potential madness!” And thus the subject is forced to examine whether he/she is insane or not, while internalizing the normalizing imperative. As a matter of fact, the modern madhouse functioned to normalize the modern subject who is supposed to have the dangerous force of madness. Thus the subject was forced to examine, supervise and punish his/her supposed madness. Then, the subject came to be born as psychological man who is a possessor of all possible knowledge and who comes to know even his/her own madness which was divine, unknowable truth during the previous age. Imprisoned within the madhouse, however,
Maria as the modern subject manages to endure the psychiatric imperative in order not to be really driven mad, while telling her own life story. Through the inmates’ confession which aims to normalize them, it seems that their supposed madness turns into a verified truth of madness. Ironically enough, however, Maria’s confessional story comes to convince Jemima, who here represents psychiatric power and knowledge, that she is not insane.

While narrating the story of Maria’s imprisonment, describing the madhouse scenery full of madness, and portraying the confrontations between Maria and Jemima, patient and doctor, Wollstonecraft shows how the contemporary psychiatric discourse operates. During the late eighteenth century, the contemporary psychiatric authority imprisoned the melancholic, the frantic, and the maniac who were supposed to be mentally ill and abnormal, and consequently they became mad in the madhouse. Here, madness means a psychosis which is defined as “loss of reality” in which the subject comes to fall into hallucinations and delusions while believing his delusions as real with a psychotic certainty (Écrits, 454).\footnote{M. Dominic Beer suggests that the concept, psychosis, was invented around the mid-nineteenth century. Beer observes that “in Feuchtersleben’s (1847) psychiatric textbook 	extit{Principle of Medical Psychology} we find the first mention of the word psychosis” (177). It seems anachronistic or ahistorical for me to define “madness” as} Maria is almost driven mad, imprisoned
in “the madhouse, where the imagination, cut off from reality, constructs fantasies that can have no reference to or place in the world outside, and which, if indulged too long, would lead to real madness” (Kilgour 87). Thus, losing any contact with outside reality, seeing the madness of other inmates, falling into delusions, and punishing her supposed madness, Maria might end up believing that she is imprisoned because of her own madness. In her melancholy, she punishes herself for having had her baby stolen by her husband. However, this is not her wrongdoing, but her husband’s or that of matrimonial despotism. Imprisoned in the madhouse which was built to imprison melancholic women, Maria might become much more melancholic, much more self-punishing to the point of madness, being deprived of any chance to get her baby back. She thus might be really driven mad, being deceived by the fiction of her madness which is fabricated by her husband and contemporary psychiatry. However, she manages to endure the cruel reality of imprisonment and her missing baby and succeeds in escaping from the madhouse to take back her baby.

As Maria records, the contemporary madhouse imprisoned the melancholics like Maria during the late eighteenth century. As I have discussed above, critics argue psychosis. However, even if the concept of psychosis didn’t exist during the late eighteenth century, there existed psychotic symptoms, such as total separation from reality, delusions, and psychotic certainty, as I discuss in this dissertation.
that Maria’s imprisonment results from her disobedience to her husband and
disrespect toward patriarchal society: for example, Brigitta Berglund insists that
“since the act of defying male authority is in itself seen as a proof of insanity, the very
fact that [Maria] has left [her husband], i.e. tried to escape from oppression, justifies
his confinement of her” (114); and Wendy Gunther-Canada argues that
“Wollstonecraft emphasizes that Maria has been imprisoned because her actions as a
reasonable woman have been interpreted as irrational by the questionable standards of
the ‘rational’ world” (137). However, first and foremost, the reason why Maria is
imprisoned is because she is recognized as mentally ill. Mr. Venables, her husband,
alleges that Maria is insane: “after the birth of her child, her conduct was so strange,
and a melancholy malady having afflicted one of the family … was necessary to
confine her” (Maria, 194). The malady might be post-partum depression which is
partly congenital. Because of her strange conduct and the melancholy malady, Maria
comes to be imprisoned with only her husband’s claim of her madness and “without a
certificate of lunacy [which] had to be obtained within three days” (Todd 2000, 427).
Maria remains imprisoned for a long while without seeing a doctor who can test
whether she is insane and seeing only the asylum-keeper Jemima. Furthermore, at the
end of the novel, a trial court rules that her imprisonment is not unjust because “[t]he
proofs of an insanity in the family, might render [her imprisonment] a prudent
measure” (Maria, 196). Her insanity denotes the melancholy, post-partum depression, as an *imprisonable* malady. Contrary to the critics’ argument, the problem here is not so much oppressive society which imprisoned women in the normalizing madhouse-world, as contemporary psychiatry itself which imprisoned melancholy as madness within the madhouse during the late eighteenth century.

As *Maria* describes, the contemporary madhouse imprisoned the melancholic, the maniac, the frantic, and so on. The reason why they are imprisoned is because they are regarded as *dangerous* to society, not because they are really mad, psychotic. As I have discussed in “Psychiatric Gaze,” the contemporary psychiatry which Jemima incorporates, punishes Maria’s melancholic grief as madness because such excessive grief, which is not controlled by reason, causes disgust for food, disgust which is dangerous to Maria herself and which dares to violate the rules of the asylum. According to Foucault, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a new psychiatry (more accurately, proto-psychiatry according to his explanation in *Psychiatric Power*) “is no longer a question of recognizing the madman’s error, but of situating very precisely the point where the wild force of this madness unleashes its insurrection” (*PP*, 8). As I have shown in the previous chapter, during the late eighteenth century, there occurred a historical change to criminal discourse from the inquiry of what one does to the examination of what one might do,
and the justice system as the apparatus of security imprisoned and punished supposedly dangerous individuals in order to secure society from them. In a similar way, the new modern psychiatry emerged to detect the dangerous force of madness, to imprison it in the modern asylum, and to subjugate it to asylum authority. The force of madness is dangerous to society because the madman “could commit arson, murder, rape, etcetera” (220). As such, contemporary psychiatry functioned as an apparatus of security which started to imprison and punish supposedly mad people in order to secure society from them.

While subjugating her supposed madness to asylum authority, Maria should examine herself to determine whether she is mad or not. First Maria asks Jemima, “Do you really think me mad?” (Maria, 77) and the question might turn into another question “Am I really mad?” after the first question is reflected in Jemima’s answer, “You have to be more carefully observed, for appearing at times so reasonable” (77). And then, those questions also lead to another question, “Was he mad?”, while seeing a male inmate (86). Here, the point is that Maria as the melancholic internalizes such psychiatric questionings and thus she, like the other inmates in the asylum, comes to be “condemned … to reason on the nature of madness” in order for her to prove her sanity (85). Incorporating the imperative, Maria examines herself, to see whether her conduct is insane or not, obedient to the psychiatric power/knowledge or not.
Therefore, even though she is almost driven mad because of her lost daughter and her imprisonment, her internalization of psychiatric discourse forces her to normalize and not to exhibit passion, fancy, and sentimentality which are supposed to be madness if they are not shackled by reason and which are presupposed to belong to woman who, "weak in reason, impotent in will, is required to moralize, sentimentalize herself to stone" (83). As a matter of fact, the modern subject, including Maria, seems to be "imprisoned in a moral world," in the madhouse-world, through the internalization of the normalizing, moralizing discourse which commands her to shackle supposedly dangerous affects like melancholic grief (HM, 503).

Although Maria is almost driven mad because of her imprisonment and her stolen baby, she manages to endure the psychiatric imperative of the madhouse-world which inhibits mothers’ mourning and melancholy. For Jemima, Maria’s disgust for food comes from her madness, not from her grief over her missing baby. First and foremost, however, Maria’s grief is not madness, but an affect which is provoked by her reality, her stolen baby. In its Spinozian sense, the affect (affectus) which is often wrongly considered feeling or emotion is rather defined as “an ability to affect or be affected” (Deleuze and Guattari xvii). “[T]he affectus,” says Deleuze, “refers to the passage from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variations of the affecting bodies” (49). Thus, Maria’s grief which is caused by her stolen baby could
be affected into madness confronting the cruel reality of imprisonment, falling into delusions, and escaping into madness. However, “[t]o keep herself from going mad,” says Kilgour, “Maria occupies herself with reading and writing to her daughter” (82). As such, her writing which functions as mourning for her missing baby, helps her not to fall into madness, but this mourning as acting-out cannot resolve the cause of her anxiety, that is, her stolen (probably murdered) baby. Maria’s anxiety is caused by the fact that she is not sure whether her stolen baby is alive. Maria realizes that if she remains imprisoned in the madhouse, she might forever lose any chance to get back her stolen baby. The cause of her anxiety, that is her baby, allows Maria to live and to escape the madhouse. As I have discussed above, her reality of imprisonment might push Maria into madness, while seeing other insane inmates and punishing herself, but she endures the disastrous reality and she even tries to change Jemima who “harden[s] my heart” in order not to be affected by and into madness in this private madhouse and in this madhouse-world (Maria, 119).

As Maria witnesses, what is insane is not her, but the madhouse-world, or more specifically, matrimonial despotism and patriarchal society, which make contemporary women mad. While exerting its normalizing power upon every individual all over society, psychiatric discourse gives the modern subject an order: “You must find for us the mad, feeble minded, difficult, and perverse, and you must
find them yourself, through the exercise of disciplinary kinds of control” (PP, 115). In other words, in order not to do harm to society, every individual must find and reason on the dangerous potentiality that normalizing psychiatric discourse defines as madness and abnormality. Paradoxically enough, this normalization of individuals, which considers every individual potentially containing madness, results in “the abnormalization of individuals,” which is its surplus-effect (114, my emphasis).

Accordingly, normalizing psychiatric discourse produces what it purports to eradicate, that is, dangerous, abnormal individuals, instead of normalized, disciplined, tamed individuals. Modern psychiatry presupposes modern man to be a potentially dangerous individual who is forced to observe and examine his own supposed madness in order not to be imprisoned and punished. Thus the modern subject is born as the psychological man who is a possessor of all possible knowledge and thus who is able to know even his own potential madness, normalizing it and imprisoning it within himself. As much as modern man becomes imprisoned in a prison only upon suspicion of potential criminality, he also becomes imprisoned in a madhouse only according to potential madness. Perhaps then, ironically enough, modern psychiatry becomes appalled at homo mente captus (insane man) who is born as its surplus product at the very place of madness, the madhouse. A horrifying society, which is another name for the normalizing society, arises from its own great fear of the
dangerous individuals and from “a foreboding of the dreadful dangers inherent in authorizing the law to intervene against individuals because of what they are” as having potential dangerousness, madness (Power, 200).

*Modern* madness as such is born under the psychiatric gaze of power which sees the modern subject as mad and through which he sees himself as mad and under the psychiatric discourse which orders him to reason on supposedly potential madness, while forcing him to confess it. Confessing the truth of madness, or rather the fiction of madness, which is imposed upon him/her by modern psychiatry, the modern subject should find his/her potential madness and eradicate it by imprisoning it within him/herself. Through the subject’s confession, the supposed potential madness comes to be verified into a truth which is nothing but a fiction fabricated by modern psychiatry. Within the madhouse, Maria confronts the psychiatric knowledge which considers her mad and which requires her to examine whether she is mad or not, whether her behavior is obedient to asylum authority or not. However, her supposed madness is nothing but a fiction which is fabricated by her husband, by asylum authority, and by a court. Maria thus starts to tell her life story in order to convince Jemima that she is not mad. As a matter of fact, her confession of her story is a veridictional practice of the truth-regime, which purports to normalize her. Ironically enough, however, Maria’s confessional story eventually comes to convince
Jemima that she is not insane. Through her confessional story, her counter-narrative, Maria overcomes the contemporary psychiatric discourse which describes her as insane.

**Truth-Telling**

During the late eighteenth century, modern madness was born at the modern madhouse, through the invention of the fiction of madness. While providing the psychiatric imperative to “reason on your madness,” modern psychiatry gives the asylum inmates medical reality in which they recognize themselves as mad. Given the medical reality, thus, they see how other inmates’ madness is punished, hear the psychiatric imperative, and examine and confess their potentially dangerous madness and finally they may well believe that they are imprisoned because they really are mad. As a matter of fact, the madhouse and psychiatry function as a truth-regime of modern madness, in which a fiction of the supposed madness of inmates turns into an accepted truth. The truth-producing regime of madness orders the modern subject to examine and confess his own potential madness. Through his/her veridirectional practices, such as self-examination, explanation of him/herself, and the confession of his/her biography of madness, the supposed madness might be an accepted truth of
madness. As such, the modern institution and discourse which are an apparatus of security presupposes the potential madness, giving the psychiatric reality to the modern subject. Thus, in order not to be imprisoned and punished in a real madhouse, the modern subject should examine potential madness and its dangerous force, while punishing it, imprisoning it within him/herself, and not exhibiting it in reality. Then, what if the subject dares not admit this supposed madness as a truth which is fabricated by the institution and discourse of madness?

Through her story of imprisonment and escape, Maria suggests a possibility of living in this madhouse-world, while enduring the psychiatric power/knowledge, without being deceived by the fiction of her fabricated madness and without becoming really mad. Most of all, Maria doesn’t agree with the fiction that she is mad, fiction which might be materialized, actualized, or realized into the truth of her madness while confronting medical reality which is fabricated and provided by psychiatric power and knowledge. First, what Jemima provides to Maria as medical reality is the psychiatric discipline of “You had better sit down and eat your dinner, than look at the clouds” (Maria, 77). This imperative to which Maria must submit substantiates Maria’s madness, that is to say, her disgust derives from her madness. If she fails to abide by the rule, it may well prove her insanity. And then, Jemima provides another reality, the asylum itself as the very confines of madness, the asylum
where Maria is imprisoned. Here, the reason why she is imprisoned in the madhouse is precisely because she is mad and consequently her imprisonment proves her madness. Furthermore, asylum authority provides several asylum practices (such as isolation, separation, and deprivation of bodily freedom) as invincible reality to which Maria must subjugate herself. As Foucault says, “the psychiatrist is someone who must give reality that constraining force by which it will be able to take over the madness, completely penetrate it, and make it disappear as madness” (PP, 132). By giving her a medical reality in which Maria finds herself mad, it seems that Jemima successfully subjugates her to the psychiatric power-knowledge which regards her as mad.

At the end of the eighteenth century, new psychiatric discourse functioned as a truth-regime in which a fiction of madness turns into a truth. Given psychiatric reality which verifies the supposed madness as the truth, asylum inmates were forced to examine and confess their own potential madness. Therefore, psychiatric discourse starts to produce some veridictional practices such as psychiatric questioning, self-examination, and confession which are “a particular way of fixing the individual to the norm of his own identity – Who are you? What is your name? … What about the different episodes of your madness?” (PP, 184, 234). Answering the questions, the inmates may well recognize their supposed madness as the truth in their own
autobiographical account of it. Through these psychiatric questionings and confessions, there blazes forth a truth, a psychiatric truth of madness in which the madman speaks of himself. The truth, however, “is not so much the truth that he could say about himself, at the level of his actual experience, but a truth imposed on him in a canonical form: cross-examination of identity, the recall of certain episodes already known to the doctor, acknowledgement … that he really was ill between certain dates, etcetera” (159). In other words, “this truth is not the truth of madness speaking in its own name but the truth of a madness agreeing to first person recognition of itself in a particular administrative and medical reality constituted by asylum power” (161). Thus, it seems that through inmates’ veridictional practices, such as self-examination, explanation of themselves, and the confession of their autobiographical accounts of madness, a fiction of supposed madness might become an accepted truth of madness.

As I have shown above, the reason why Maria is imprisoned is because she is considered mad. But, this is a fiction which is manipulated by her husband and then by psychiatric authority which is represented by Jemima and finally by a court in a trial scene. As such, the asylum practices and psychiatric questionings give medical reality to the fiction of Maria’s madness and asylum authority orders her to reason on her own madness while showing her the mirror of madness. While seeing a male inmate and sympathizing with him, Maria thinks he is “condemned, like me, to reason
on the nature of madness … and almost to wish himself – as I do – mad, to escape from the contemplation of” it (Maria, 85). Wishing herself mad, Maria’s question of “Am I really mad?” finally might lead to her certainty of “I am mad!” after confronting the psychiatric reality which verifies such supposed madness into the truth. Once she admits her supposed madness as true, while incorporating the psychiatric imperative and punishing her own fabricated madness, she might end up believing the fiction as true and being driven mad. Given the punitive psychiatric reality, she almost wishes herself mad like other inmates and consequently she is nearly driven mad, falling into delusions in her isolated cell.

Mitzi Myers argues that “Maria fears, yet almost desires, madness. …Maria’s cell confers a paradoxical freedom, that of indulging unreservedly her visionary energies” (112). As I have discussed in the above paragraph, Maria does desire madness, just because her escape into madness or delusions might be the easiest way of shunning her reality of imprisonment, of her stolen baby, of matrimonial despotism, of the madhouse scenery full of madness, and of the psychiatric imperative, “Reason on madness.” The madhouse, however, is far from being a space of freedom; but, it is indeed “the very confines of madness” as Maria witnesses (Maria, 88). As Massimo Recalcati observes in “Madness and Structure in Jacques Lacan,” “clinical experience on psychosis shows that the madman does not find
freedom but the chains of the Other” which is materialized in the apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of madness, the modern madhouse and psychiatry (103). If Maria is driven mad, psychotic, within the madhouse, there is no possibility of getting out of the madhouse because she is really mad, while believing her madness as true in her delusional certainty. If Maria is mad, she is mad. Here is no metaphor. However, while not escaping into the fiction of madness, she dares to confront the reality of her imprisonment, the fabricated reality of her madness, the reality of psychiatric power-knowledge which imprisons and punishes mothers’ melancholic grief as madness.

Like Maria’s text, according to Mary Jacobus, Wollstonecraft’s writing is prone to madness. Jacobus argues that Wollstonecraft’s “language of feeling can only ally itself with insanity – an insanity which, displaced into writing, produces a moment of imaginative and linguistic excess” (33). However, this applause of madness as “resolution and articulation of utopian desire,” as Todd insists, is “to confine her [Wollstonecraft] to the attic indeed” precisely because madness is not freedom, but chains (1988, 106, 107). Madness could be a freedom, but only within madness and within the madhouse. Wollstonecraft’s fiction is thus not the language of madness in the sense that madness cannot be displaced into language, but language on madness as a limit of language, which could not be written down if she becomes really mad. If the novel is the language of madness, it could not be understood.
because it is the language of madness. Thus Wollstonecraft’s novel as language on
madness which is feared throughout Wollstonecraft’s life as I have said above and
which is experienced as a limit in her fiction Maria disrupts the normalized language
of a dominant narrative of women’s madness. Madness is a limit-experience which
Maria might undergo at the very place of madness, being almost driven mad and
which Wollstonecraft might experience while writing of her fiction Maria, a counter-
memory to the contemporary narrative of women’s madness. It is this limit-experience
that Wollstonecraft couldn’t avoid any more and then she wrote Maria, a fictional
narrative of women and madness.

If Maria became really mad and remained imprisoned in the madhouse, her
story might be told by asylum-keepers, doctors, and male writers who might treat her
as a madwoman and her writing as madness. If Maria failed to escape the madhouse;
and if she failed to tell her story by herself outside the madhouse, her story might be
narrated and censored by a doctor-surrogate Jemima. Unlike contemporary women
who might end up becoming mad once they are imprisoned within the madhouse,
Maria manages to endure the madhouse and psychiatry and escapes from them. Thus
women’s madness and the madhouse are not a space of freedom, but of chains, as the
novel witnesses. As Small says, critics’ “celebration of hysteria … also ignores the
medical history of women’s relationship to madness – hysteria and depression have
been far from liberating for most of the women who, from the eighteenth century, have made up the majority of patients in mental asylums” (27). During the late eighteenth century when hysteria and depression were imprisonable, punishable maladies, women were historically imprisoned because of their melancholy even if they were not really mad and then they really became mad, escaping into madness within the madhouse. Escaping into madness which is outside male-dominated society and language, women come to be excluded from them without any possibility of disrupting such oppressive society from within – not to mention the fact that such an escape into madness might be given as the one and only choice for some women in the madhouse-world where mothers’ mourning and melancholy are inhibited.

However, enduring her anxiety about her own madness which Wollstonecraft feared throughout her life, she wrote a fictional narrative of Maria who resists such matrimonial despotism and patriarchal society which made contemporary women mad.

Maria tells a different truth which challenges the prevalent regime of truth-telling of madness which verifies the fiction of her madness into the truth. Thus she comes to reveal the limit and failure of modern psychiatric discourse in normalizing her, since she refuses to incorporate the imperative of psychiatry and overcomes the punitive gaze of reason. Maria’s dangerous potentiality should be imprisoned and
punished as madness because such potentiality never ceases to speak and show itself.

Even at the moment when she is imprisoned in the madhouse, she always tries to break out of it. Most of all, Maria dares not agree with the truth of madness, or rather its fiction, which is given to her by contemporary psychiatry. She dares not avoid the cruel truth of the madhouse-world. She dares not escape into madness. And then, she dares to escape the private madhouse with Jemima’s help. While not incorporating the psychiatric imperative and not being deceived by the fiction, she even tries to change Jemima, who incorporates psychiatric power/knowledge. Imprisoned within the madhouse, Maria speaks of herself, her own life story. *This is an unheard story of the supposedly mad women whose voices have been silenced for so long within the madhouse.* Then, she speaks out a truth; *a truth that what is mad is not her, but the madhouse-world which oppresses women like Maria and Jemima.* Through her own veridictional practices, through telling the truth of herself who resists the modern apparatuses, Maria even changes Jemima who had hardened her heart and moralized and sentimentalized herself into stone, but who finally decides to help Maria escape from the madhouse.

Through this fiction *Maria* in which Maria produces her own counter-narrative against her husband and psychiatric authority, Wollstonecraft tells an alternative
history of the way the modern madhouse and psychiatry were formed and of the way contemporary women resisted them. Wollstonecraft speaks her truth of madness as a limit-experience which she feared throughout her life, and produces a genealogy, a counter-memory which radically challenges the contemporary madhouse and psychiatry. With the advent of the apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of madness, madness as a limit-experience became the seeable, sayable object of those apparatuses. At the very moment, however, modern madness, which is a surplus-product of the modern apparatuses, was born by remaining something unseen and unheard, that is to say, something which should be forgotten and silenced in order to conceal the naked truth of the unreason of reason which imprisoned and punished women’s voice as madness, mothers’ grief as madness. Even at the very moment of forgetting and silence, nonetheless, Wollstonecraft’s fictional narrative Maria, a genealogy, a counter-memory, presents how women’s dangerous potentiality always speaks and shows itself problematizing the master narrative of the progressive emergence of reason and truth and still haunting us, modern man.
CHAPTER FOUR

A Genealogy of Modern Man and of the Monster’s Gaze and Voice in Mary

Shelley’s *Frankenstein*

Modern Man and his Semblance

Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein; or The Modern Prometheus* (1818, hereafter *Frankenstein*) tells the story of how Victor Frankenstein’s creature, who is born as a human being becomes a monster, cut off from human community. Forsaken by his creator, the creature wanders around to find an answer to the question “what am I?” but he fails to find the human beings who can give him an answer and the question is “answered only with groans” in his absolute solitude (*Frankenstein*, 121). He has never had his semblance or *Nebenmensch* (neighbor) who resembles him and thus who says to him “You are a man like us.” As a result, the creature’s question “what am I?” leads to an answer “I am not like man. I am a monster!” Becoming a monster who is still a human being, the monster radically problematizes a question “what is man?” which was put by Immanuel Kant at the end of the Enlightenment and through which modern man was supposed to be born into true man. “What is man?” is the question which was raised by modern man about himself. Through the question, thus,
modern man was born both as a subject and as an object of modern human sciences which tried to answer the question. At the moment of his birth, ironically enough, the monster was born as his Nebenmensch. Thus the monster as our semblance or Nebenmensch comes to be excluded from human community because of his ugliness and monstrosity, but nevertheless he returns and haunts humanity.

In this chapter, I argue that Victor’s creature who is born as a human being becomes a monster. In this reading, I critique “the simple suggestion that the monster is human inside but monstrous outside” (Spivak 252). This suggestion is simple, but one of the most dominant readings of the monster; for example, a “contradiction between the verbal and the visual” (Brooks 83). “As a verbal creation,” says Peter Brooks, the monster “is very opposite of the monstrous,” that is, the monstrous visual (82). As a matter of fact, whereas human beings abhor the monster because of his “miserable deformity,” his human speech sounds exceedingly eloquent and touching (Frankenstein, 114). As such, the binary opposition of “human inside but monstrous outside” seems to prevail in Frankenstein and in critical argument about it. With respect to this binary opposition, I will maintain that his inside and outside, his speech and face, are human features, but nevertheless they turn into monstrous ones after he is deserted by Victor. While suggesting a psychoanalytic reading of the monster, I deal with the monster as a human baby at his birth and explain how he fails to be born into
a human being, excluded from the specular reciprocity of seeing and being seen and from the vocative reciprocity of calling and responding. As a matter of fact, the monster who is our semblance has never had his semblance who dares to see and talk to him. Therefore, he finishes up identifying himself as unlike human beings and comes to be born as the monster beside modern man, as his semblance, while problematizing the mythical birth of modern man and disrupting the supposed unity of humanity.

As I have shown in the previous chapters, the modern man who is born as homo criminalis (criminological man) and homo psychologicus (psychological man) becomes an object of modern criminology and psychiatry, a subject who examines his own potential criminality and madness. Godwin’s Caleb Williams and Wollstonecraft’s Maria, as a genealogy, a counter-memory of modern man, tell stories of how he/she was imprisoned and observed under the criminological and medical gaze which is supposed to be all-seeing and all-powerful and which sees him/her as a criminal or a madwoman and tells stories of how he/she internalized the imperatives of the human sciences; for example, “Confess your potent criminality!” in criminology and “Reason on your potential madness!” in psychiatry. As such, the modern man who is “enslaved sovereign, observed spectator” was born both as the seeable, sayable object of power/knowledge and as the subject who supervises and
examines his/her own supposedly potential dangerousness (OT, 338). Moreover, their genealogy of contemporary society presents how the modern subject resisted the apparatuses of visibility and discursivity of criminality and madness by revealing their fictionality which makes those who are not guilty or insane into criminals or madwomen. In a way similar to this Foucauldian approach to the relationship between the subject and the modern institutions of a prison and a madhouse and criminological and psychiatric discourses, Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis also allows us to see the relationship between the subject and the Other who is supposed to see all and know all and who functions as an apparatus of power/knowledge of modern man.

Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory shows the way the modern subject is born in the field of the Other while revealing the fictionality of the supposedly all-seeing, all-knowing Other, as Foucault’s genealogy reveals that of the apparatuses of visibility and discursivity. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, the subject is constituted fictionally in the scopic and vocative field of the Other who is supposed to see all and know all and who, as a result, is supposed to guarantee the subject’s unity of being. The subject is born through specular and vocative identification with the Other, his identification of an “I am like the Other.” The subject, like a little child in the mirror stage, identifies himself with his own specular image which is reflected in the mirror of the Other. Seeing his own specular image in a mirror, the little child “turns back
toward the one who is carrying him, towards the adult, towards the one who here represents the big Other, as if … the child … seems to demand of him to ratify the value of this image” (SX, 42). Then, through the Other’s reply of “Thou art that,” that specular image in the mirror of the Other, the small child comes to identify himself as full and unitary as the Other, while incorporating his ratifying voice (Écrits, 81).

However, the specular, vocative identification is based on the fiction of likeness or resemblance, the fiction which makes it possible for the subject to construct his supposedly true identity. Here, the subject’s identification of the “I am like the Other” is doubly fictional: on one level, the Other who is the object of identification is not omniscient and omnipotent and his unity and totality can only be assumed; on another level, the subject cannot be identical to the Other because the subject has his own absolute alterity, his own unassimilable singularity, unassimilable by the Other. However, this fiction of identification is absolutely necessary for us to be born as human beings. Through the fiction, we who are born as a being of a lack or void fortunately come to be born into human beings by masking our lack of unity and by misrecognizing ourselves as being a semblance to the Other, to his supposed fullness of being.

Unlike any other human being, however, Victor’s creature unfortunately cannot find his semblable, his fellow-man, who says “You are like us” and thus he
comes to identify himself as the monster. He is just unfortunate because his creator is an extremely bad mother who is reluctant to pacify his baby without responding to his anxiety-provoking cry.\(^{18}\) No matter that his child is ugly and monstrous, Victor should be a good (M)other with whom his child might identify, but he abandons his child. Through identification, the creature would have constructed his identity as resembling Victor who here represents the (M)other. Although he is deserted by his bad (M)other,

\(^{18}\) As for an example of an extremely bad mother and a human baby who fails to be born as a human being, see the Leforts’ case study of the wolf child which is presented in Lacan’s *Seminar I*, 89-106. Robert, the wolf child, identified and represented his self-image as a wolf speaking only “Wolf” and “Miss” when he was three years and nine months old. The wolf child seemed to identify himself with the wolf who might represent a devouring wolf in a fairy tale and thus “devouring Mother” (101). In his delusion, he might be always horrified at being devoured by the Wolf-(M)other who already might have devoured his mother who was a paranoiac and thus who didn’t respond to his baby’s cry to the point of not feeding him. As a matter of fact, the paranoiac like Robert’s mother is someone who suffers from being devoured by the Other. Thus Robert might have identified himself with his mother who fears being devoured and thus he might suffer from being devoured by his mother, the Wolf-(M)other, in his psychosis.
the creature eagerly wishes to encounter a being who resembles him, but he fails. The monster says, “When I looked around, I saw and heard of none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all men fled?” (Frankenstein, 120). Far from being a human being, thus, he finishes up identifying himself as the monster as the other sees him and speaks of him.

As such, the monster, who considers that he is not like man even though he is still a human, turns into “a monster, a blot upon the earth” whose existence is unseeable and unsayable (Frankenstein, 120). Condemned to wander to look for his semblance, “I,” the monster says, “had never yet seen a being resembling me, or who claimed any intercourse with me. What was I? The question again recurred, to be answered only with groans” (121). He thus turns into the monster who is the being of the gaze and voice, who is an object unspecularizable and unsymbolizable, and who is a lack in the scopic and vocative field of the Other. Thus, in order for us to make sure that we human beings are the beings of unity and totality, the monster should be banished into darkness as if he is nothing and exists nowhere. A human being becomes a human being only on the condition that he is beside or among his fellow human beings. As the monster says of his prospective partner, “we shall be monsters, cut off from all the world; but on that account we shall be more attached to one another” (145-6). If we are cut off from human community; and if we are forced into
absolute solitude like Victor’s baby, “we” human beings shall be the monsters.

In his anthropomorphic desire to create a perfect man, Victor attempts “the creation of a being like myself” (*Frankenstein*, 53). However, Victor’s creature who was supposed to be as beautiful and perfect as Victor imagines himself to be turns out to be much too ugly and monstrous. Thus he abandons his child. From the moment of his birth, the monster has never had his semblance onto which he reflects himself and with which he identifies himself. Thus he fails to identify himself with the (M)other Victor and to identify himself as full and unitary as the (M)other. Through this identification, the monster might have masked his own lack with his own specular image, not seeing his own lack of unity and totality. However, Victor refuses to be the mirror of the (M)other onto which the monster might have projected his self-image and “his narcissism is thus thwarted from the outset” (Dolar 1991, 16). Thus, in the scene of seeing his monstrous image in a pool, which reminds us of the myth of Narcissus in which he falls in love with his own narcissistic image reflected in a pool, the monster only sees his miserable deformity, his self-image which is reflected onto the mirror of the Other. Thus, the monster incorporates the gaze of the Other who sees him as a monster and then he sees his own self-image as ugly and monstrous, not as beautiful. Then, finally, the monster fails to mask his ugly, monstrous face with his supposedly beautiful self-image.
Forsaken by his (M)other, the monster laments his motherless childhood when he had not been given (M)other’s “smiles” onto which he could project his own existence (*Frankenstein*, 121). If the monster learned how to smile by imitating his (M)other’s smile, he could masquerade with a human face which would help him to veil his ugly face and monstrous gaze. Therefore, his naked appearance and face which are unseeable and unspecularizable come to be exposed to us without a veil or mask. However, although he is deprived of the chance of being the semblance of human beings, he realizes by himself how to conceal his own existence, his ugly face, and terrible appearance, as I discuss later. Most of all, the reason why he hides himself under darkness is to avoid people’s eyes which see him as the monster.

Our specular image or our face is nothing but a mask to veil our own lack of the unity of being. It is usually said, as we see in Jungian psychology, that “the *persona* is a mask” and thus that “this notion has managed to assume the value of incarnating a unity that is supposedly affirmed in being” (*Écrits*, 562). The persona means “to act as if” or “to act like,” which aims to conceal one’s supposedly true self. Thus behind the persona or the mask, it is assumed that there exists the hidden unity of the self. To this assumption, however, Lacan puts questions: “what about being, if there is nothing behind it? And if there is only a face, what about the *persona*?” (562). In other words, the persona or the mask which is supposed to veil the unity of being
only veils a lack or nothingness of being. Behind the mask or the persona, there is
nothing. If there is something, there is a face which is once again supposed to veil the
unity of the hidden self. Therefore, one could say that the face is assumed to mask our
supposedly hidden fullness of self. Paradoxically enough, however, this assumption
implies that our face only functions as another mask which is supposed to veil
something of our self. However, as much as the persona hides nothing, the face does
so. Because there is nothing behind the face, it is no use to unmask the face so as to
see what is behind it as a Sadean hero peels off the skin of “a female dancer” to see
what is behind it even after he takes off her clothes (SVII, 14).

Our face is a mask to veil the nothingness of our self and is a semblance which
curiously resembles the nothingness of our self. Our face which resembles our self is
truer than our self precisely because it shows our nothingness when it turns into
something unseeable and consequently it should be masqueraded, made up, and
clothed in order not to be revealed in its nakedness. Thus our face as a semblance of
our self functions as a mask to veil our nothingness. “The meaning of the word
‘semblance,’” says Juan-David Nasio, “is opposed to the colloquial sense, ‘to seem to
be’ or ‘to act as if.’ … [I]t is rather a state, an inner disposition toward oneself” (75).
According to him, the inner disposition toward oneself is characterized as the
concealment or masquerade of one’s own lack or void. Thus the “semblance is
something whose function is to mask nothingness. As such, the veil is the first semblance” (Miller 2000, 14). Then, our face is another semblance which helps us to veil nothingness of our self. Through the semblance of our self, our face as the mask, our self-image, we come to veil our own lack of unity and totality. “It is,” says Lacan, “only on the basis of the clothing of the self-image that envelops the object cause of the desire [object a] that the object relationship is most often sustained” (SXX, 92). In other words, the clothing of our self-image or the specular image allows us to clothe our nakedness or nothingness. Our self-image or our face which curiously resembles our self allows us to see each other’s face by not seeing the gaze as the a which is unseeable in the specular field. We human beings make up, clothe, and mask our self’s nothingness with human culture and such make-up, clothing, and masquerading themselves are some things which make us human.

The problem here is how we can respond to the monster who is a lack in the specular field, who is unseeable in the field, and thus who should be securely veiled. Most important of all, the monster’s face and appearance themselves are so ugly and monstrous that they should be masked in order for us to confront him securely. As shown above, the semblance is the inner disposition toward oneself, toward one’s own lack. If the semblance is accepted as something to mask the lack, then even its colloquial sense, to act as if, could be restored. Thus, first and foremost, to be the
semblance of the other is to act as if we resemble each other, masquerading our own lack and nothingness. Thus, far from assuming the semblance of the fullness of the Other, we ought to act as if we resemble the other who masks his own lack and nothingness. If we resemble each other, we resemble each other’s nothingness. And then, we may well masquerade nothingness by being the semblance to each other.

From his birth, however, the monster is deprived of the chance of having his semblance and of being the semblance of human beings, without knowing how to veil his ugly face and terrible appearance. As a result, he emerges as “a monster, a blot” whose existence is unseeable and unspecularizable in the scopic field. Here the problem is how to respond to our semblance like the monster who contains the gaze as the a, or rather, which is the a itself, as much as we human beings contain the gaze.

This is an ethical imperative: “Act as if you are a semblance to the other, a semblance with which the other can reflect his own being and through which he masks his own lack or nothingness.” This as-if-ness that we are the semblance to each other, this fiction of likeness to each other, makes it possible for us to be born into human beings while masking our own lack or void. If we identify ourselves as the semblance of the Other, then we might misrecognize ourselves as full or perfect as the Other. Then, what if there appears such an ugly, monstrous being as Victor’s creature who lacks the supposed fullness and unity of humanity? Most of all, Victor refuses to
be the semblance of his child, the semblance with which his child reflects his own existence. As a result, failing to find his semblance, the monster who couldn’t be assimilated to human society emerges as an absolute alterity and finally his naked existence comes to be exposed to us without a veil or mask. As far as he is veiled behind a curtain at his birth, his existence is not threatening as I will explain later.

When Victor sees his eyes which are veiled behind the curtain, they seem to be more or less tolerable for Victor. But at the last moment when the monster unveils himself, his eyes turn into the gaze as the object \( a \) and then Victor comes to confront the horrible gaze directly. Victor finally runs away from his horrible child and from then on the tragedy of the monster starts.

In order to become a human being, the monster as a human baby needs his *Nebenmensch* (neighbor). The *Nebenmensch* is “an unusual German word meaning something like ‘the next-man’ or ‘adjoining-person’” who, as Freud notes, is “an object … which resembles the subject” (Reinhard 29, 30). As such, the *Nebenmensch* is defined as the semblance that resembles the human subject. The *Nebenmensch*, says Freud, is “simultaneously [the subject’s] first satisfying object and further his first hostile object, as well as his sole helping power. For this reason it is in relation to a fellow human-being [*Nebenmensch*] that a human-being [*Mensch*] learns to cognize” (Reinhard 30). In *Poetics* Aristotle observed that mimesis is rooted in human nature.
Whereas in Aristotle, mimesis is defined as imitation of reality as much as tragedy imitates life, in psychoanalysis it is defined as the imitation of the *Nebenmensch*, the semblance. As such, through the relation between *Mensch* and *Nebenmensch*, through his mimesis of his fellow human being, a human being is born into a human being. Significantly, the *Mensch* and his nature couldn’t be explained without the presence of the *Nebenmensch* who is the exact object of mimesis and cognition, whereas the word *Nebenmensch* (*neben* + *Mensch*, beside + man) derives from the word *Mensch* – in a similar way, a Chinese character *ren*, 人, which means man, denotes a hieroglyphic figure of two men who are leaning to each other.

The monster has no neighbor who is an object of imitation and identification and consequently he ends up identifying himself as the monster. Although Victor’s creature considers himself a monster, he is a human being as our *Nebenmensch*, who is “beside yet alike, separation and identity” (*SVII*, 51): separation or distance which is called proximity; and identity which is constructed through semblance or fiction. Victor’s creature is alike, but not identical to human beings as we are alike, but not identical to each other. The monster says, “my form is a filthy type of yours” (*Frankenstein*, 130). That is to say, he is a filthy type of human being, but nonetheless he belongs to us. The monster is too ugly and monstrous, but he is like man as far as his ugliness and monstrosity themselves are a part of humanity. Thus, the monster as
our *Nebenmensch*, is both distant and close to us. The monster is distant in the sense that he is always outside human society because of his ugly face and terrible appearance. Nonetheless, he is beside or among (*neben*) us, in the sense that he always returns to remind us of how he was excluded from the human community. He curiously resembles us in that he who is forced into absolute solitude feels alone and tries to find his *Nebenmensch*.

The monster is our semblance, our *Nebenmensch*, who resembles us who are the beings of nothingness. By contrast with Victor, who is a modern man and who attempts to create a new species and stands for the impossible desire of making human beings perfect, the monster shows that we human beings are the beings of a lack or void. However, Victor as the modern man assumes himself to be as perfect and unitary as the Other does, while rejecting the monster, the being of a lack. Whereas Victor considers solitude as consolation, the monster who feels “imperfect and solitary” wanders around to look for his semblance, his *Nebenmensch* (*Frankenstein*, 110). After he fails to encounter his semblance who resembles him, he returns to his (M)other Victor. Indeed, what the monster might want is that Victor should become his semblance, his *Nebenmensch*. But he refuses his child as his semblance even after he is moved by his child’s life story of misery and misfortune. Even when Victor is left all alone; and even when his parents and relatives have all passed away, he
doesn’t accept the monster as his child. After the monster destroys all that Victor has, including his life, he vanishes “in darkness and distance” and is left all alone once again (Frankenstein, 223).

Their Solitude

Through her fiction Frankenstein, a genealogy, a counter-memory of modern man and his semblance, Victor and the monster, Mary Shelley raises an ethical question “what is man for man?” while problematizing the question “what is man?” The question “what is man for man?” is ethical in the sense that the question asks us how to ethically respond to the other. Contrary to the question “what is man?” concerning human nature, Shelley’s question concerns the ethical relationality between men. As I have said above, “what is man?” is the question which is raised by modern man about himself; and thus the question could be answered by a single man in solitude. Asking himself the question in his absolute solitude, paradoxically enough, modern man seems to be born feeling the greatness of humanity as we see in Kant’s narrative. The question “what is man?” is also asked by Victor who explores the knowledge of man to the point of creating a new man in his solitary laboratory. Unlike Victor who regards solitude as consolation, however, the monster doesn’t endure his forced
solitude and thus eagerly wishes to find his *Nebenmensch*. Thus, the monster who is abandoned to absolute solitude and excluded from human society returns raising the question “what is man for man?” and problematizing the mythical birth of modern man.

Mary Shelley, says Monette Vacquin, “sensed with terror the enigma that man is for man” (30). When Shelley was reading *Caleb Williams* and *Maria*, she must have been terrified to see how man makes those who are not guilty or insane a criminal or a madwoman. Shelley’s answer to the enigma might be as follows: “man is to man a God” both as a helper or as a destructor (Spinoza 99). For Benedict de Spinoza, man as a social being needs another man as his helper in a good encounter. Men, says Spinoza, “are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent” (99). In Spinoza’s ethics of joy, man is closest to man in his power among living beings on earth and thus he could be the best helper to another man in a good encounter. In a bad encounter, man’s neighbor might be a destructor as poison kills his body. In Shelley’s fictional narrative *Frankenstein*, to be a human being, the creature needs his *Nebenmensch*, his semblance. Thus Victor, a (M)other, might be the best helper for his child, the monster, but he refuses. In her fiction of a human being who becomes a monster after

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19 As for Shelley’s reading of her parents’ novels, see Pamela Clemit, 31-2.
he is forced into solitude without *Nebenmensch*, Shelley raises ethical questions “what is man for man?” and “What is the *Nebenmensch*?”, replacing Kant’s narrative of the birth of modern man, a master narrative which seems to culminate in his anthropological question of “Was ist der Mensch?”

At the end of the age of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant laid the foundation of modern anthropology by raising the question “Was ist der Mensch?” which was added to “his traditional trilogy of questions … What can I know? What must I do? What am I permitted to hope?” (*OT*, 341) – those of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Critique of Judgment* (1790) respectively. According to Foucault, even though the question “what is man?” is explicitly manifested in his later works, including *Anthropology* (1798), *Logic* (1800), and *Opus Postumum* (1804), from the beginning of his career, his anthropological reflection on man encompasses and encircles his whole works. In his lecture courses on anthropology in 1772-73, as Foucault notes, Kant already had “a certain concrete image of man … [which] managed to reap the rewards of the critical experience” (*IKA*, 17). Thus, the three *Critiques* “would have also played a constitutive part in the birth and the development of the concrete forms of human existence” (20). While unfolding the image of man in *Critique of Judgment*, Kant finds it in the fictions of “novelists and writers of Robinsonades,” a literary genre of the desert island novels,
where the modern man is born in his desert island (Kant 1987, 137). What Kant found in the novels might be his own image, “standing in the dark of the night, admiring the starry heavens above him and the moral law within him,” in his solitude, in his celibacy (Zupančič 160).

Even in his absolute solitariness, the Kantian subject is born while feeling the greatness of the human mind and the totality of humanity. In *Critique of Judgment*, Kant discusses human community, “*sensus communis*,” and “universal communicability” which are based upon aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime (87, 88). Ironically enough, the subject feels universal communicability even in his absolute solitude in which he has no listener except himself. Significantly, Kant regards “isolation from all society as something sublime” (136). Although the Kantian subject is deserted “on some island unknown to the rest of the world,” he appropriates his own solitude for the greatness of humanity which is something “universally *communicable*” (137, 136). Therefore, far from being driven mad, that is, becoming a psychotic in his absolute solitude, the subject curiously feels the greatness of the human mind which is something communicable in the world without others.

Ironically enough, what Kant explicates in *Critique of Judgment* is the way the formation of modern subjectivity was possible with the rise of Robinsonades, a literary genre of desert island novels. Indeed, Kant refers to Robinsonades in terms of
the absolute solitude of modern man, not to history. That is to say, it might be impossible to find the modern man of absolute solitude in reality or history except for fiction: if any human being was in total solitude for a long time, he might become insane.

In *Critique of Judgment*, as I have said above, Kant regards “isolation from all society as something sublime” (136). The Kantian subject seems, fortunately, to succeed in elevating his absolute solitude into something sublime for the greatness of humanity. In Kant’s explication of aesthetic judgment, at the moment of encountering the sublime object which is uncontainable (in the mathematic sublime) or overwhelming (in the dynamic sublime), the imagination which is a synthesizer of sensory data and which forms a unity of images of the beautiful object fails. Thus the imagination of the mind “strives to progress toward infinity” in order to measure and to perceive that object, but it only feels its own “inadequacy,” and then creates “the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power,” to wit, the totality or wholeness of humanity beyond the sensible world (106). In this process, “the mind listens to the voice of reason within itself, which demands totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that we can never apprehend in their entirety but do (in presentation of sense) judge as given in their entirety” (111). Hearing the voice of *reason* which calls for him to totalize the untotalizable, the Kantian subject finally
comes to feel the totality or wholeness of the human mind which is universally communicable even in his total solitude.

In his discussion of aesthetic judgment, Kant uses some acoustic metaphors, such as “the voice of reason” “universal voice,” “universal communicability,” and “vocation” (111, 59, 114, 88). Thus, in the isolation from all society and in Robinsonade reclusiveness, the Kantian subject feels something sublime which is universally communicable and hears a universal voice, a voice within, which calls for a vocation.

Hence, the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation.

But by a certain subreption (in which respect for the subject is substituted for respect for the idea of humanity within our[elves, as] subject[s]) this respect is accorded an object of nature that, as it were, makes intuitable for us the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive powers over the power of sensibility. (114)

What is such a universal voice or vocation? Who calls? Whose appellation? Who claims the vocation for the subject? What voice makes the subject who suffers the crisis of humanity feel his own superiority? Is such a vocation or calling voice within or the voice of God? – the word “vocation” comes from Latin vocation (summon), from vocare (to call), and from vox (voice).
As a matter of fact, it is Kant himself who hears the voice of God in his solitude. Thus Kant hears the voice, without knowing what it wants from him and where it comes from. Lacan says:

One sees what motives Kant to hold this object [the voice] as having eluded any determination by transcendental aesthetic, even if it does not fail to appear in some protuberance of the phenomenal veil, lack neither hearth nor home, nor time in intuition, lacking neither a mode which is situated in the unreal, nor effect in reality: it is not only that Kant’s phenomenology is in default here, but the voice, however mad, imposes the idea of the subject, and that the object of the law must suggest a malignity of the real God. (“Kant with Sade,” 61).

The voice “does not fail to appear in some protuberance of the phenomenal veil.”

Here, it is assumed that phenomenon or appearance veils its noumenon or its reality. However, the veiled noumenon or reality appears only in protuberance of the veil which is called phenomenon or appearance, but not penetrating it. In other words, the voice appears only by being veiled. Most of all, the voice of God should be veiled by thunder and smoke and mediated by some prophets, as in the Biblical narrative of Moses who mediates God’s voice, since it will destroy our darkened intellect if God’s immense light shines directly on us. It unveils itself only by veiling its light because
man cannot bear it, and then God’s voice finally transforms into the Ten Commandments and the Word which has existed from the beginning.

The voice which is hidden behind the phenomenal veil makes Kant desire to see behind it and thus he comes too close to the veiled voice without knowing what it is. Ironically, what Kant comes to glimpse behind the veil is that his God has no face. “One might think,” says Lacan, “that Kant is under pressure from what he hears too closely, not from Sade, but from some mystic nearer to home, in the sigh which stifles what he glimpses beyond having seen that his God is faceless” (“Kant with Sade,” 61). As soon as Kant glimpses beyond the veil, he becomes stifled at the faceless voice which might come from something which “must suggest a malignity of the real God” (61). Does this malign God demand of Kant to endure his absolute solitude to the point of feeling it as something sublime? Perhaps the reason why his God is faceless is because Kant shuts his eyes when confronting his God’s malignity. Indeed, his God is so cruel that he forces Kant into absolute solitude and then if Kant fails to endure it, he might be driven insane. Then what if the veiled voice comes from the ugly and the monstrous which are excluded from Kant’s discussion of the beautiful and the sublime? Isn’t his God the ugly and the monstrous which make his aesthetics perfect by being excluded from it? As the monster says to Victor, “I am your master; – obey!”, the veiled voice Kant hears demands of him to obey and oblate his life
Although Kant eagerly wants the veiled Word to be fully unveiled, such “naked revelation” only results in his own death, that is, the complete oblation of himself, which his faceless God wants from him ("Kant with Sade," 59).

Hearing the veiled faceless voice which comes too close to him, Kant invents the aesthetic technique of taking a distance from the object of aesthetic judgment, which becomes dangerous if it is too close. Although he seems to insist on the proper feeling of wholeness or totality, establishing distance is just a stratagem to escape “the bewilderment or kind of perplexity” caused by the magnitude of the sublime object (Kant 1987, 108). The subject must maintain a proper distance lest he feel the collapse of the wholeness of the object. However, such an architectonic perspective is just about human monuments, for example, the pyramids and St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome as in Critique of Judgment. So, one can easily take the proper distance because they are constructed within the limit of human imagination without any danger. However, Kant’s pathological anxiety, which is different from mere perplexity, derives from the monstrous object which gives “actual danger” when it comes too close (109).

Ironically enough, his anxiety of the veiled voice drives him to approach too closely to it, asking “who is speaking?”

From behind the veil, what Kant is supposed to hear is the question “what is man?” but he ironically hears the question “what is man for man?” which comes
from the monster who comes too close to him. Trying to answer the question “What is
man?” in “Ideas for a Universal History,” Kant says:

Man is an animal which, if it lives among others of its kind, requires a master.

For he certainly abuses his freedom with respect to other man. … He thus
requires a master, who will break his will and force him to obey a will that is
universally valid, under which each can be free. But whence does he get this
master? Only from the human race. But then the master is himself an animal,
and needs a master. … For each of them will always abuse his freedom if he
has none above him to exercise force in accord with the laws. The highest
master should be just in himself, and yet a man. (1963, 17)

Strangely enough, Kant seems to explicate the question “What is man?” through the
question “What is man for man?” In his definition, man is an animal who needs
another man as his master. As such, man needs a master above who needs a master
above ad infinitum. Through this infinite progression, Kant might reach the highest
master. Then what if his master is not above or the highest? What if his master is
behind his back or behind the phenomenal veil? Or what if the ugly and the monstrous
which are excluded from his aesthetics return to him?

Here, Kant uses a strategy of the infinite postponement of the advent of the
highest master, in order not to encounter him in the present. It seems that Kant knows
very well that the advent of the highest master as a new man is impossible in the present. He thus prophesizes that his advent “will be very late and after many vain attempts” (Kant 1963, 18). Now, actualizing Kant’s image of man, the Kantian man coming from the future might progress to the history of Spirit which unfolds by itself in the progress of history. Then what if what comes from the future of human history is the monster, not the highest master as a new man, as much as a new man such as Victor aims to create, turns out to be the monster? Remarkably, in his discussion of the sublime, Kant banishes “the monstrous” not only because it cannot be totalizable, but because it “nullifies the purpose” of the sublime, the purpose of achieving the greatness of humanity (Kant 1987, 109). Thus, the monstrous which is excluded in Kant’s configuration of the image of modern man returns and haunts Kant’s philosophy and anthropology. Thus the Kantian subject suffers from the voice of the monster who is too close to him, asking “what is man for man?”

Unlike Kant who knows that the perfect man is impossible in the present, Victor as a psychotic believes that he can achieve perfect knowledge of man and control man’s life and death. In his psychosis, Victor regresses to his womb-like laboratory where he himself is born into the modern man whose birth was prophesized by Kant and where he comes to conceive his child. At the moment of giving birth to his child, however, the laboratory as a refuge of solitude turns into a
horrible place where the monster is born. Therefore, the solitary laboratory is symbolized as a birthplace of the modern man. In his absolute solitude, Victor, who believes in modern science, attempts to create a new man and thus he, who voluntarily escapes into the solitary laboratory to create a new life, becomes totally devoured by the delusion of science. For human beings, the most monstrous thing is to believe that one can create a new man, a perfect human. Ironically enough, however, it is at the very place of absolute solitude that Victor’s monstrous creature is born, but not a perfect human. As such, Victor himself, whose attempt at the creation of a perfect human turns out to be a failure, witnesses the birth of the modern man who is a being of a lack and nothingness and who indeed cannot be perfectible.

Running away from his monstrous child who embodies the failure of the creation of a perfect man, Victor who considers solitude as consolation once again escapes into solitude. Wandering the Alps alone and confronting “the solitary grandeur of the scene,” Victor, as a Kantian subject, comes to be enthralled with “a sublime ecstasy that gave wings to the soul, and allowed it to soar from the obscure world to light and joy” (Frankenstein, 97). At that very moment, however, the monster returns and interrupts Victor’s feeling of the sublimity of humanity, just as the monstrous which Kant wanted to expel in his discourse of the sublime haunts his philosophy. Unlike Victor who says that “solitude was my only consolation,” the
monster feels imperfect and solitary (110). Therefore, in his absolute solitude, the monster is condemned to wander around to search for a being that resembles him. But he fails and then he finally returns and commands his creator to create a female fellow-creature, his semblance, his *Nebenmensch*. As such, forced into absolute solitude, the monster starts to haunt humanity by raising the questions “what is the *Nebenmensch*?” and “what is man for man?”

Contrary to Kant’s narrative, Shelley’s fiction, a counter-memory of modern man and his semblance, tells an alternative history which is different from Kant’s universal history in which the subject is supposed to, or rather should, progress toward the impossible future from which the perfect man is supposed to be coming. The monster wishes for human love and benevolence in his total solitude, and yet his desire for love is always betrayed. Separated from human community and deserted into total solitude, he becomes the monster. Attacking society which drives the monster into total solitude, Shelley speaks through the voice of the monster: “It is true, we shall be monsters, cut off from all the world” (*Frankenstein*, 145-6). The question which Barbara Johnson asks in her discussion of Mary Shelley’s *The Last Man* should be raised again in terms of *Frankenstein*: “Would the word ‘man’ still have the same meaning if there were only one left?” (258). Not only would the word “man” lose its meaning, but also his existence itself, if man exists alone without his
neighbor. Prior to The Last Man, Frankenstein is the story of human beings like Victor and the monster both of whom are left alone to the point of absolute solitude. Toward the end of the novel, even when Victor is left all alone, he doesn’t accept the monster as his child, his semblance. The monster is left alone once again when his (M)other Victor dies. He finally vanishes “in darkness and distance.” Then, he who is an indestructible being might haunt humanity to the end of human history until there is only one being left, the monster.

Victor, an Obsessional Psychotic

Pursuing Kant’s anthropological question “what is man?” to its extreme, Victor Frankenstein tries to seek out the origin of man’s life and the cause of death. Victor, a mad scientist, incorporates the injunction of contemporary human sciences, to “Create a new man.” As a matter of fact, the reason why he wants to create a new life comes from his failure of mourning and symbolizing his mother’s death. In order to solve the conundrum of life and death, he searches for the origin of life and the cause of death. Thus he aims to create a man as beautiful and perfect as he imagines himself to be, but the creature turns out to be an ugly, monstrous one who embodies his own failure of the creation of the perfect man. Victor who incorporates the imperative of modern
sciences, or rather who is completely devoured by the delusion of science, comes to believe that he can achieve “the creation of a human being” (*Frankenstein*, 53). In his psychotic certainty, in the first enthusiasm of success of knowing the cause of life and bestowing animation upon lifeless matter, he says: “Life and death appear to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species would bless me as its creator and source. ... I might in process of time renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption” (54).

Finally breaking through the boundary between life and death, he comes to create a human being who becomes a monster.

The reason why Victor strives to solve the conundrum of life and death derives from his failure of mourning and symbolizing his mother’s death. By confronting her death, Victor might be trapped within the unresolvable mystery of life and death.

Ironically enough, on the very night of his creation of a new life, his dead mother returns in his dream. After Victor “saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open,” he becomes enthralled with horror of his own product and then he tries to “compose my mind to sleep … endeavouring to seek a few moments of forgetfulness” (57-8). He says:

But it was in vain: I slept, indeed, but I was disturbed by the wildest dreams. I thought I saw Elizabeth [Victor’s step sister and fiancé], in the bloom of
health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt. Delighted and surprised, I embraced her; but as I imprinted the first kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared to change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms; a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms crawling in the folds of the flannel. I started from my sleep with horror… I beheld the wretch. (58)

In his dream in which he endeavored “to seek a few moments of forgetfulness,” Victor encounters the beautiful life of his lover, but it soon turns into his dead mother just after his kissing his lover. At the very moment when the beautiful life becomes his dead mother, Victor awakens into reality in which an inanimate dead thing comes to an animate life. Thus, between being asleep and awake, between dream and reality, Victor sees the monster who is the result of his effort to give life, but who destroys him. His dead mother whose death Victor failed to symbolize returns in his dream, reminding him of irretrievable death itself and then at the very moment of awakening, the monster who is a reminder of death emerges.

Man’s “first symbol,” says Lacan, “in which we recognize humanity in its vestiges is the burial, and death as a means can be recognized in every relation in which man is born into the life of his history” (Écrits, 262-3). Man’s death, an absolute alterity, must be symbolized into human life even though it cannot be
completely symbolized. By symbolizing the unsymbolizable death, “man is born into the life of his history.” Victor, however, fails to mourn and symbolize his mother’s death in order for her not to return and haunt him. About his mother’s death, Victor says “I need not describe the feeling of those whose dearest ties are rent by that most irreparable evil; the void that presents itself to the soul” (Frankenstein, 43). His mother dies leaving an unrepayable symbolic debt, that is, the conundrum of life and death to her son Victor who might feel guilty about letting her die. The symbolic debt and his guilt are the reason why he becomes compelled to “banish disease from the human frame and [to] render man invulnerable to any but a violent death,” for example, his mother’s irreparable death (40). As Rose Lucas says, Victor’s desire to create a new life comes from “the fundamentally excessive desire to deny the inevitability of death and, in particular, the loss of his mother and his concomitant failures either to prevent her death or to confront it and mourn her loss” (63). As a way of paying off his symbolic debt and of relieving his guilt, Victor attempts to create new life. His attempt however is destined to fail because his own way to symbolize death itself and his effort to create the perfect man are impossible. While trying to solve the conundrum of life and death, Victor is born as an obsessional neurotic, such as Hamlet and Kant who become obsessed with the Other’s demand and desire the impossible as a proper object.
For Hamlet, “to be or not to be, that is the question.” Typically, the question of life and death, of whether he is alive or dead, is that of the obsessive neurotic. As Victor’s mother dies bequeathing a symbolic debt which is unresolvable, Hamlet’s dead father returns asking for revenge for his murder. After that, Hamlet becomes obsessed with his father’s demand. Until the moment of revenge, he might feel like a dead man, feeling guilty at not fulfilling his father’s demand. Hamlet lives for the desire of his father, and he willingly sacrifices himself for him. “Hamlet,” says Lacan, “is constantly suspended in the time of the Other, through the entire story until the very end,” until the advent of the hour of his Father (“Desire in Hamlet,” 17). Toward the denouement of the tragedy, thus, Hamlet is destined for death, precisely because he is willing to pay the symbolic debt with his “pound of flesh which is mortgaged [engagé] in his relationship to the signifier” (28), for example, the father’s imperative: “Remember me.” Once Hamlet becomes obsessed with the memory of the dead and with the demand of his father, he is born into the obsessional who willingly devotes his life to the Name of the Father. Like Hamlet, Victor sacrifices his life to repay the symbolic debt and thus says: “One man’s life or death were but a small price to pay for the acquirement of the knowledge which I sought,” the knowledge of man’s life and death (Frankenstein, 28).

As such, the obsessional neurotic comes to be born in the field of the Other,
while desiring the desire of the Other, which is impossible to attain. The Other demands the obsessional to complete the impossible which the subject desires to the point of his own death. “[H]ysteria,” says Lacan, “is characterized by the function of an unsatisfied desire and obsession by the function of an impossible desire” (“Desire in *Hamlet,*” 17). Remarkably, the hysteric and the obsessional are a good couple: the hysteric whose desire can’t be satisfied because her desire for what she wants is insatiable; and the obsessional who desires to satisfy the unsatisfying hysteric, which is impossible. Dora’s father, an obsessional, tries tirelessly to satisfy the insatiable desire of “his wife, his lover, [and] his daughter” who are hysterics (Webster 131). As such, the obsessional neurotic desires the impossible to satisfy the Other’s demand to the point of self-sacrifice.

Unlike Victor and Hamlet, Kant seems to know that the symbolic debt cannot be repayable, that is, it’s impossible for him to pay off his debt to the Other. As for Kant, the symbolic debt which the Other demands of him to repay might be the complete revelation of the highest master as a new man. As I have shown above, however, Kant knows that it is impossible in the present and thus he prophesizes his advent. Here, Kant, as a normal obsessional neurotic, uses “a strategy of postponement to defer the encounter with the Thing” (Dolar 1991, 23). The Thing or noumenon which is veiled behind the phenomenon might be the highest master. Thus
the encounter with the Thing in Kant’s thought might be the complete revelation of
the highest master in the present. Then, why does he prophesy that he is coming from
the future, while implying that he doesn’t exist in the present? Is it because he knows
that his God or his highest master is much too malign and monstrous? Paradoxically,
Kant says: “The highest master should be just in himself, and yet a man” (1963, 17).
Could the highest master, as Kant hopes, still remain as a man who comes to achieve
absolute freedom and power which are not curbed by another master above? Might he
turn into a tyrant as human history evidences? Thus the highest master who is yet a
man is impossible, at least in Kant’s time. Thus Kant only prophesies that the highest
master is coming from the future. Unlike Kant, Victor, a mad scientist, who
completely embodies or in-corporates the highest master, or rather who is totally
devoured by him, seems to become an avatar of the contemporary human sciences
whose final purpose is to create a new modern man who is their perfect object and
subject as we have seen in the previous chapters.

Contrary to the normal obsessional neurotic who tirelessly defers repaying his
symbolic debt, Victor, a psychotic, believes that he can pay off the symbolic debt, that
is to say, he can achieve perfect knowledge of man’s life and death. Instead of “the
apparent oscillation between knowledge and belief” (Dolar 23), Victor indeed passes
over to the domain of belief that he has penetrated the impossible knowledge of life
and death in his madness, his psychotic certainty, and thus he says: “In a fit of enthusiastic madness, I created a rational creature” (*Frankenstein*, 217). Thus Victor comes to completely incorporate the injunction of the modern human sciences, “Create a new species, a new modern man.” However, even before he passes into his own madness, psychotic belief, Victor suffers from anxiety, that is to say, uncertainty of the result of his project. If he stopped at the moment of his own anxiety; and if he managed to endure the anxiety which signals the impossibility of the perfect knowledge of life and death, or at least, the impossibility of the creation of the perfect man, he could stop at the moment. Thus, when the monster opens his eyes and unveils a curtain; when the object of Victor’s anxiety is unveiled and appears in reality, Victor runs away from the object of his anxiety, instead of enduring it.

In his psychotic certainty, he indeed believes that he can create the perfect man like himself. But when he encounters his creature who is much too ugly, he comes to be horrified at the “monstrous embodiment of his failure” (Copjec 139). Then, what if he was satisfied with this imperfect creature who embodies his own imperfectability and who mirrors his own nothingness? If so, he could get along well with his child, his semblance who is imperfect like Victor himself. Then, the creature might well not have turned into the monster. As a matter of fact, the creature, who is like Victor himself, is a man who is born with a lack and thus needs parental care in order to be a
man. However, Victor who believes in science and in man’s perfectibility doesn’t approve of his failure, that is, the monster. Thus, one could say that Victor, as a mad scientist who is devoured by the delusion of science, believes that he is omnipotent and omniscient to the point of the creation of the perfect man. This is the reason why he can’t stand the imperfect, ugly creature and why he rejects his child who is a being of lack and who signals Victor’s nothingness.

Forsaken by his bad (M)other, Victor’s creature turns into “a monster, a blot upon the earth,” who is unseeable and unsayable. He thus emerges as the being of the gaze and voice as the object a which is an object unspecularizable and unsymbolizable, which is a lack in the scopic and vocative field of the Other, and which disrupts the supposed totality of humanity. It is at the very moment when the creature opens his eyes and mouth that the beautiful object of the human sciences turns into the ugly, monstrous object and that Victor is disenchanted with his impossible project of the creation of the perfect man, which results in the creation of the monster who is the surplus product of modern sciences. When the creature opens his eyes, the creator shuns his eyes confronting the creature’s horrible gaze; when the creature opens his mouth and speaks his inarticulate sound, his first cry, the creator doesn’t respond to the creature’s cry for love. As such, the monster is abandoned by Victor, but he returns and disrupts the supposed unity and totality of humanity which
Victor wanted to actualize through his creation of a new man, but only results in making a monster.

The Monstrous Gaze

Abandoned by his bad (M)other and forced into absolute solitude, Victor’s creature becomes “a monster, a blot upon the earth” who is unseeable in the scopic field of the Other. This tragedy of the monster starts from the moment of his birth when he opens his eyes and mouth, when he sees and calls his (M)other who abandons his child into infantile helplessness. Seeing his child opening his eyes, Victor is horrified and he comes to realize that his attempt to create a beautiful life turns out to be a failure. At the moment of opening his eyes, the monster emerges as the being of the gaze from which Victor runs away in horror. Opening his eyes, the monster pulls back a curtain which veils the monster himself and then Victor comes to directly confront the monstrous gaze. Finally, his naked existence, ugly face, and terrible appearance appear in reality without a veil. Confronting the being of the gaze, Victor abandons and escapes from his child who loses his proper object of identification, the (M)other. As a result, the monster identifies himself as a monster as people see him, while projecting and reflecting his ugly face and terrible appearance in the mirror of the
Other. Seeing himself in a pool, he only sees his own “miserable deformity” from which everybody desperately tries to escape (Frankenstein, 114). Hiding himself behind a veil of darkness, however, he ironically comes to know how to veil his own horrible existence. Thus, when he confronts Victor, he puts his hand before Victor’s eyes in order not to let him see his ugly, monstrous face. Through this way of veiling his own horrible existence, he speaks of himself and Victor hears him.

Victor’s attempt to create a beautiful object who is like himself only results in the creation of an ugly creature. While he sees his child, he says “Beautiful!” But when he sees “the dull yellow eye of the creature open,” he becomes enthralled with horror. He says:

I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs. How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were
set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips. (57)

Victor becomes horrified at “his watery eyes” with which “these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast.” When Victor feels horror at his creature when he sees his eyes open, he tries to “compose my mind to sleep … endeavouring to seek a few moments of forgetfulness” in which ironically his dead mother returns (57-8).

Awarening into reality from his nightmare, Victor confronts the monster. Although Victor is horrified at “his watery eyes,” it seems that the monster is not genuinely threatening and still remains as an endurable object not only because he is veiled, but also because he might not gaze at him. But at the moment when the monster unveils himself by removing the curtain, the eyes turn into the gaze and then Victor comes to confront it directly. Victor describes:

I started from my sleep with horror, … I beheld the wretch – the miserable monster whom I had created. He held up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if eyes they may be called, were fixed on me. His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks. He might have spoken, but I did not hear; one hand was stretched out, seemingly to detain me, but I escaped, and rushed down stairs. (58)

At what point does Victor feel horror and run away from his child? Exactly at the moment when the monster unveils the curtain and when the eyes are fixed on him, the
eyes turn into the gaze as an object and then Victor comes to encounter the gaze directly. Furthermore, at the moment when the monster stretches his hand toward Victor, aesthetic distance disrupts which should be properly maintained in order for the object not to become dangerous as in Kant’s aesthetics. Finally, the creature as a beautiful object turns into a monstrous one which threatens his creator because he comes too close to him.

“The point,” says Meladn Dolar, “that Frankenstein cannot endure, during the creation of the monster, is the moment when the creature opens its eyes, when the Thing renders the gaze – it is this opening that makes it the Thing” (1991, 20).

However, it seems that the process of the emergence of the gaze is a little bit more complicated than Dolar’s elaboration. As I have shown above, the being of the gaze emerges when the eyes are unveiled by lifting his eyelids, when the curtain is unveiled, when his eyes are fixed on Victor, and when his existence comes too close to him through the disruption of aesthetic distance. As a matter of fact, the monster is “the being of the gaze” whose existence itself, including his eyes, his face, and his appearance, is unseeable and unspecularizable in the scopic field (20). Contrary to Dolar’s assertion that “the monster’s terrible appearance is only a mask, an imaginary cover to provide a frame for his gaze,” his terrible appearance and ugly face are the being of the gaze which should be veiled or masked, not a mask or an imaginary
No doubt, his appearance or face is an imaginary cover even if the cover is an ugly, monstrous self-image, not a beautiful, narcissistic one. Thus this cover itself should be veiled by another cover because it is much too ugly, as much as our naked face or appearance should be masked with a cover without which our nakedness might terrify us. As such, we wear makeup, masquerade, and clothe our naked face or appearance with the specular image, self-image. Then, what if our self-image, our face, or our appearance is denuded and thus appears as ugly or monstrous? Or, what if our naked appearance or face is de-covered once again as a female dancer is skinned alive? In Frankenstein, the monster’s appearance in reality is so horrible that people avoid confronting him. Thus the monster should be enveloped or masked in order for us not to confront him without a veil, as much as our naked appearance and face should be clothed, masqueraded, and made up with our specular image. When the monster who doesn’t know yet how to veil himself finally unveils the curtain, the monster as the being of the gaze emerges and Victor runs away in horror from it.

At the very moment of opening his eyes, of unveiling the curtain, of fixing them on Victor, and of stretching out his hand, the monster as the gazed-upon object turns into the gazing subject. At this moment, Victor is subjected to the gaze of the monster and enters into “the level of reciprocity between the gaze and the gazed at”
(SXI, 77). However, confronting the monster’s ugly face, terrible appearance, and horrible gaze, Victor rejects the reciprocity through which the monster was supposed to identify himself as resembling him. Unlike a very small child in the mirror stage who identifies himself with his (M)other through the specular reciprocity of seeing and being seen, Victor’s baby is deprived of having a semblance, a mirror of the (M)other, who is the object of his specular identification. In the specular reciprocity of seeing and being seen, the subject, like a small child in infantile narcissism, sees the other, a mirror, through and in which he can see himself. That is to say, he can see himself only through the mirror called the Other, but not seeing his own lack or void which is veiled or enveloped by his own specular image. This is the process of imaginary identification in the mirror stage where he identifies himself with his own specular image which is reflected in the mirror of the Other. Moreover, this specular identification fundamentally depends on the misrecognition of himself as full and unitary as the (M)other in infantile narcissism – it is misrecognition precisely because a baby is not full and unitary as much as the (M)other is not.

As such, in the specular field of the Other, the subject is constituted through specular identification with the Other, but yet, having his eyes “not to see” his own lack or void (SX, 384). He does not, or cannot, see his own nakedness precisely because it is veiled or masked by his own specular image, i(a): the specular image
which is noted by \( i(a) \) envelopes the \( a \) which is not projected onto the mirror, the

Other. While identifying the specular image as full and unitary as the Other, the

subject imagines that behind the specular image, there exists the all-seeing gaze of the

Other which is supposed to guarantee the unity or wholeness of the specular image.

As such, the gaze of the Other is assumed to pre-exist us and so solicits our gaze upon

it, it “opens the domain of visibility” and makes possible our specular relation with

the other, allowing us not to directly confront our own lack or void (Shepherdson

1997, 77). And then, the subject “is haunted by a peculiar, invisible, and tyrannical

presence, a presence that cannot be seen but that looks at us” exactly because the

Other who is unseen as well as all-seeing is veiled (78). Or rather, the Other should be

veiled because he who has been heralded as omnipotent and omniscient never exists.

Behind the veil, behind the specular image, “there is nothing in itself, there is

the gaze” as the object \( a \), instead of the supposedly all-seeing presence (SXI, 103).

This nothing-behind-the-veil presents an experience of anxiety. Here, because it is

believed that the veil conceals something unseen, it provokes anxiety for the subject

being driven to see behind it. As for anxiety, it is usually said that it has no object

whereas fear has an object. However, Lacan revises this conception as follows:

anxiety “is not without an object” (Television, 82). And then, he adds that the object is

the object \( a \) which is a lack or nothingness, which is what we are missing or lacking in
our specular reciprocity and which is what is veiled by our specular image, our face, our appearance. As Lacan says, “the object a is most masked and with it the subject is, as regards anxiety, most secured” (SX, 376). However, there appears anxiety on the part of the subject when the missing part of our self, that is, the a emerges in the specular field, when there appears a blind spot on the surface of the image, and when our specular image, our appearance, our face, becomes uncanny. In *Frankenstein*, the monster whose existence is unseeable and thus should be securely veiled emerges as a lack or void which disrupts the specular reciprocity of seeing and being seen. In short, behind our self-image or our face as the mask, there is the gaze as the object a which is a void or hole in the field and thus which should be the most securely veiled.

Most of all, the supposedly all-seeing presence is not total and unitary to the extent that in the scopic field there appears the gaze as the lack or void which disrupts such unity. When the veil which veils nothingness unveils; and when our face or our appearance turns into something unseeable, there appears the anxiety of veiled nothingness which makes even the supposedly all-seeing Other shut his eyes. Confronting the monster, the being of the gaze, the (M)other Victor refuses the reciprocity of seeing and being seen and refuses to be the semblance with which the monster may well identify himself and through which he may well mask and veil his own terrible appearance. When the curtain is unveiled, the monster who is the object
of Victor’s anxiety appears in the specular field. And thus, Victor as a good (M)other should act as if he is a semblance to his baby and should guarantee his child’s self-image as full and unitary as himself in order to help him veil his lack of unity. Victor, however, fails to tolerate the object of anxiety, the monster, who is his semblance who resembles his nothingness. As a matter of fact, Victor runs away from the “monstrous embodiment of his failure,” the monster, who reflects his own impossible project of the creation of the perfect man (Copjec 139).

The monster emerges as something unseeable and unspecularizable in the scopic field of the Other when his naked face and appearance are unveiled. Projecting only his terrible appearance and ugly face in the specular field, the monster by chance comes to see his own mirror image in a pool and he says:

“At first, I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity.” (114)

This scene reminds us of the myth of Narcissus in which he falls in love with his own image which is reflected in a pool and which is more beautiful than he imagined. Unlike Narcissus, however, the monster only sees a miserable deformity which is
mirrored in a pool and which is uglier than his imagined self. “This miserable deformity” from which everybody flees, this mirrored image in the pool, is nothing but an image which is reflected in the mirror of the Other. As a matter of fact, in Victor’s early description, the monster was beautiful and well-proportioned before he appears in reality as the being of the gaze. Only once he opens his eyes, unveils the curtain, fixes them on Victor, and stretches out his hand, does the beautiful baby turns into an ugly, monstrous object. Seen by his (M)other as a monster, therefore, the monster comes to see only this miserable deformity in the pool and identify himself as a monster incorporating the gaze of the Other who looks at him as such.

Realizing his fatal deformity, the monster ironically comes to know how to conceal his own existence. Most of all, the reason why he hides himself behind a veil of darkness is to escape from people’s eyes which see him as the monster. When he returns and confronts Victor who desperately tries to escape from him, the monster puts his hand upon Victor’s eyes in order for him not to directly see his terrible existence instead of tearing out Victor’s eyes or his own eyes as in the tragedy of Oedipus Rex. To Victor who says to the monster, “Begone! Relieve me from the sight of your detested form,” the monster replies, “I relieve thee, my creator … thus I take from thee a sight which you abhor. Still thou canst listen to me, and grant me thy compassion” (101). This taking sight by placing his hand before his eyes is one way...
to veil or hide the one who is the being of the gaze. As Lacan says, our humanity is a comedy in which we “have eyes in order not to see” our lack or void which is a missing part of our self-image (SX, 384). This is the reason why the monster deprives Victor of sight in order to help his eyes not to see the monster himself, while demanding him to listen to his life story of misery.

In a similar way, Walton (who is a witness to the last apparition of the monster at the end of *Frankenstein*) manages to endure the monster who is the being of the gaze by looking awry at him, by having his eyes not see him. Walton says, “I approached this tremendous being; I dared not again raise my eyes to his face; there was something too scaring and unearthly in his ugliness” (*Frankenstein*, 219). Looking awry at the gaze is one way to encounter it, which is an ethical attitude toward the monster who is both absolute alterity to us and the semblance of us. In this way, we could temper the furious gaze of the monster and hear his story as Walton hears him and witnesses his last disappearance in darkness and distance. Instead of running away in horror from the monster, the object of anxiety who signals our nothingness or lack of unity, through this looking awry, we could endure it when it emerges as a lack or nothingness by which we feel the anxiety of being devoured.

The monster who is unseeable and unspecularizable and who is excluded from the specular relation of seeing and being seen haunts his (M)other Victor. From the
moment of opening his eyes, the monster incessantly haunts him as a “monstrous Image” (*Frankenstein*, 183). “As the images that floated before me became more distinct,” says Victor, “I grew feverish; a darkness pressed around me; no one was near me who soothed me with the gentle voice of love” (178). Haunted by the monstrous image and surrounded by darkness, he solicits the voice of love as the Kantian subject invokes the universal voice in his absolute solitude, but what he hears is nothing but the monster’s haunting voice, his oath of return: “I will be with you on your wedding-night” (168).

**The Monstrous Voice**

After he has failed to encounter his *Nebenmensch*, the monster comes back to his creator in order to demand of him a female fellow-creature. The monster’s speech is so eloquent and persuasive that Victor promises to make one for him. But Victor soon realizes that it might be a disaster for humankind if the monster and his prospective fiancé reproduce by themselves and thus he destroys the female monster. The monster swears that he will destroy Victor’s fiancé, saying “I will be with you on your wedding-night.” In addition to the being of the gaze, at his birth the monster appears as the being of the voice who speaks “inarticulate sounds” which are nothing but a
baby’s cry (Frankenstein, 58). Terrified at the cry, the bad (M)other Victor doesn’t respond to it and runs away from him. Deserted into infantile helplessness, the monster, like any other human child, tries to learn human language by imitating it under cover of darkness. After he is able to speak human language, he returns to his creator to command him to create his female monster; but this time he returns as the monster who speaks articulate language which exceeds human logic, not the inarticulate sounds at his birth. As such, the monster, who is an object unsayable and unsymbolizable and who is excluded from the vocative field of calling and responding, returns and haunts the (M)other Victor, who had to respond to his baby’s cry, but who nevertheless cast him into absolute solitude.

At the moment of his birth, the monster’s voice emerges both as a lack and as an excess in the vocative field of the Other. While Victor sees the monster, the being of the gaze, he also hears the monster’s “inarticulate sounds.” He says:

I beheld the wretch – the miserable monster whom I had created. He held up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if eyes they may be called, were fixed on me. His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks. He might have spoken, but I did not hear; one hand was stretched out, seemingly to detain me, but I escaped, and rushed down stairs. (58)
There is no doubt that Victor heard something which his baby had spoken, but he couldn’t tell what he heard because the sounds are “inarticulate.” As the baby opens his eyelids to see, he opens his lips to speak grinning with his teeth. As much as Victor is horrified at the eyes, he is also horrified at the mouth. At that moment, he might feel the anxiety of being devoured by the mouth whose voice disrupts the vocative field of the Other, the field of meaning. What Victor heard is indeed his baby’s cry for the (M)other to appear. When the creature opens his mouth and speaks “inarticulate sounds,” his first cry, the creator doesn’t respond to the cry as a good (M)other does. Instead, hearing his “inarticulate sounds” which provoke anxiety on the part of Victor because it means nothing as well as everything, Victor becomes terrified at the cry and then he flees from his baby. The baby’s cry is both a lack and an excess in the vocative field: a lack in the sense that it is unarticulated and senseless; and an excess in that it could mean everything that he wants, for example, hunger, recognition, and love.

Although the monster’s cry sounds inarticulate and senseless, it is something which is addressed to the (M)other Victor to appear. According to Dolar, infants’ “solipsism is nevertheless caught into the structure of address” (2006, 27). Thus, an infants’ inarticulate voice, such as his crying and babbling, “although it does not say anything discernible, is already captured in a discourse, it displays the structure of
address … meaningless sounds as gestures of address” (27). Rather, “adults imitate children; they resort to babbling in what is no doubt a more successful dialogue than most” (27). Unlike this successful dialogue of calling and responding between a baby and a mother, the (M)other Victor doesn’t respond to his baby’s cry, “first sign of life, a form of speech” (27). Discussing Victor’s failure to respond to his baby’s cry, Bonghee Oh points out that the monster’s “muttering some sounds … certainly constitute[s] a demand for affective responses similar to an infant’s demand for parental affection” (178-9). In his first cry that Lacan calls “primary language,” a human baby who “is already speaking to us unbeknown to himself” calls for the (M)other to appear (Écrits, 243). The primary language is “unbeknown” to the baby because when he speaks it, he doesn’t know what he is saying. It is just a cry. As a matter of fact, the (M)other’s response has “the power to turn his cry into a call” (569). Through her “all-powerfulness of the response” (569), the baby comes to be born into language and he becomes “humanized by gaining recognition” (243). Unlike the human baby, however, Victor’s baby has never had the chance of gaining recognition and, as a result, fails to become humanized. Although the monster as a human baby always already lies in the vocative field of the Other where he calls for Victor to appear in his primordial language, his bad (M)other doesn’t respond to his call.
Although the monster is abandoned to absolute solitude, he who was born as a human baby having a human nature tries to learn human language. It is his nature to imitate the fellow-creatures which surround him, for example, birds and then humankind. From his infancy when “all the events of that period appear confused and indistinct,” the monster reaches to his childhood and starts “to distinguish my sensations from each other” (*Frankenstein*, 102). Observing the birds, he “tried to imitate the pleasant songs of the birds but was unable” (103-4). Feeling that his voice is not like the birds, he “wished to express my sensations in my own mode, but the uncouth and inarticulate sounds which broke from me frightened me into silence again” (104). Moreover, the monster says, “my voice was very unlike the soft music of their [the De Larceys’] tones” when he tries to imitate human language (*Frankenstein*, 115, my emphasis). The subject, says Lacan, “cannot speak without hearing himself” (*Écrits*, 447). This is the reason why the monster is frightened into silence when he realizes that his own voice is so different from the sounds that he hears from the birds and then from human beings. Until the monster feels that his voice sounds like the other human beings, he might repeatedly monologue by mimicking their voices.

The monster, who has never been taught human language by man, doesn’t speak articulate sounds, but he soon comes to speak human language by imitating it
by himself. In his infantile helplessness, he tries to find “food and shelter” and then he finally reaches the De Laceys’ house (105). Concealing himself in a hiding place and eavesdropping on the family’s conversations, he is delighted with “a godlike science” which is “a method of communicating their experience and feelings to one another by articulate sounds” (112). Exhilarated with “fresh ardour to the acquiring the art of language,” the monster tries to imitate their articulate sounds, but he feels that his voice is unlike theirs. “[M]y organs,” he says, “were indeed harsh, but supple; and although my voice was very unlike the soft music of their tones, yet I pronounced such words as I understood with tolerable ease” (115). Observing how a female Arabian Safie who is the fiancé of young De Lacey learns a foreign language, the monster says, “I should make use of the same instructions to the same end. The stranger [Safie] learned about twenty words at the first lesson; most of them, indeed, were those which I had before understood, but I profited by the others” (117). By imitating how and what Safie imitates, thus, the monster comes to speak articulate sounds even though they are not as sonorant as those produced by human beings’ voices. Concealing himself in the darkness and overhearing the family speaking to each other, the monster as a human baby tries to speak human language and to imitate what he hears. No doubt, the monster who hides himself under the darkness because of his fatal deformity and who has no listener except himself speaks to himself, while
hearing his own voice and being aware that his voice is unlike what he has heard from the other.

This monologue of the monster can be characterized as “primordial monologue” or “egocentric language” in which the monster speaks to himself imitating what he hears (SX, 315, 316). Lacan writes, “a very small child, at the age when the mirror phase is far from having finished its works, monologues before he goes to sleep” (SX, 315). As a matter of fact, the monster’s egocentric monologue occurs simultaneously with his mirror stage of reflecting his self-image to the pool when he reached the De Laceys’ house. This children’s monologue is called “egocentric” by Jean Piaget in the sense that the “monologue [is] directed at himself” (SX, 316). Piaget’s “idea of the egocentricity of a certain childish discourse,” says Lacan, “starts from this supposition that children do not understand one another [and] that they speak for themselves” (330). Remarkably, their language is called egocentric monologue because it can’t be understood by adults. No doubt, their monologic speech is not fully articulated and it sounds as meaningless and senseless as the monster’s cry and inarticulate sounds. This is the reason why the very small child monologues repeatedly, trying to imitate what he has heard as closely as he can. Thus, he monologues before he goes to sleep seemingly wishing to encounter a good listener in his dreams and hoping that his dream comes true when he awakens into
reality.

As a matter of fact, the child’s “primordial monologue” is something which is addressed to the Other. He indeed speaks to the Other wishing his appeal to be reverberated onto the Other and waiting for the advent of a good listener. Thus Lacan insists:

The child, in this discourse, which may be tape-recorded, does not speak for himself, as one says. No doubt, he does not address the other, if one uses here the theoretical distinction derived from the function of the I and the you. But there must be others there … they don’t speak to a particular person, they just speak … à la cantonade. This egocentric discourse is a case of hail to the good listener.” (SXI, 208)

In other words, the child speaks his own primordial monologue which is to “hail to the good listener” who could understand even his inarticulate speech. As a matter of fact, the good listener, for example, a good (M)other, has “the power to turn his cry into a call” (569). Through the good (M)other’s response, “cri pur, a pure scream, is turned into a cri pour, a scream for someone” (Dolar 2006, 28). By being echoed onto the voice of the (M)other, the child’s primordial monologue turns into a dialogue and through this response the child comes to be born into language.

Waiting for the appearance of the good listener, the monster tries to learn
human language by imitating man’s beautiful voice, speaking to himself, hearing his
own harsh voice, and concealing himself under darkness. Although the monster calls
for the (M)other Victor to appear at the moment of opening his mouth and crying
“inarticulate sounds,” the (M)other doesn’t respond and abandons him. However,
although he is forsaken by his (M)other Victor, the monster who is still a human child,
eagerly wants to become a member of the human community while desperately trying
to learn human language and to find the good listener. Thus he speaks to blind De
Lacey who is a good listener thanks to his blindness, but when his fatal deformity
comes to be unveiled to the other family members, the De Laceys expel him. As a
result, Victor’s creature becomes excluded from human community once again.
Although he speaks human language, the monster and his voice can’t be assimilated
to human society, far from becoming humanized.

After the monster came to know his own “accursed origin”, how he was
created, he returns and commands his creator to make a female monster, but this time
he returns as the monster who speaks articulate language (Frankenstein, 130).
Strangely enough, the monster not only speaks, but also excels in human logic. As
Baldick says, “the traditional idea of the monstrous was strongly associated with
visual display, and monsters were understood primarily as exhibitions of moral vices:
they were to be seen and not heard” (45). Like contemporary monsters, the monster
also cannot speak articulate language at his birth like any other human baby, and he is represented in terms of “visual display.” Far from becoming normalized and humanized thanks to human language, he as a speaking subject transgresses human law. He uses it to defend his crimes of murder and to order Victor to make a female monster. When the monster came to know that Victor had destroyed his female fellow creature who died even before birth, the monster swears that he will destroy Victor’s fiancé Elizabeth, saying “I will be with you on your wedding-night.” However, Victor misunderstands the sentence and he thinks that it meant that the monster will kill Victor himself, not Elizabeth. From then on, the traumatic return of the monstrous voice of the “I will be with you on your wedding-night” haunts him.

From his birth, as shown above, the monster is excluded from the vocative reciprocity of calling and responding, through which he was supposed to become a human being by incorporating the reverberating voice of his (M)other Victor. Unlike Victor’s baby, a human baby normally comes to incorporate the reverberating voice of the (M)other and comes to be a human being in the vocative field. The subject is constituted in the vocative field of the Other, where he “hears first of all a ‘You are …’” (SX, 315), for example, “You are like us” – very often parents have a pleasant debate about whom their baby most resembles. Thus, he is constituted “with respect to the function of the locus of the signifying chain,” i.e., “You are …,” “a function
which he hear[s] from the Other” (377). In the auditory identification, the voice of
the Other emits its own message even before the subject asks, “Who am I?” and he
hears it (315). First and foremost, it is only through “incorporat[ing] the voice as
otherness of what is said” and through identifying with the voice of the Other that the
subject is born into language and becomes humanized (318).

As a matter of fact, the voice of the Other is essentially a “voice without a
body” which uncannily haunts the subject, especially when it is not incorporated with
a body and when it falls from the signifying chain (Dolar 2006, 6). The voice of the
Other is like Echo who vanishes leaving only her voice. One could say that the voice
of the Other is narcissistic, or rather, Echoic and thus that it is self-referential. Thus
the voice of the Other should be incorporated by the subject in order for it not to
remain senseless and empty. However, once the voice is incorporated with the
monster, not with a human body, his speech and voice become strangely uncanny and
exceed human language. Therefore, the monster’s voice emerges as the object a which
is a lack and an excess in the vocative field of the Other, especially when it takes the
form of his first cry and his horrible imperative: “You are my creator, but I am your
master; – obey!” (Frankenstein, 167).

With respect to the emergence of the monster, the voice of the Other of the
“You are …” becomes silent because the monster is unsayable and unsymbolizable.
Thus, the ellipses in the “You are …” are indeed the mark of the silence of the Other who was much too talkative and thus who has always spoken to the subject about who he is even before the subject asks “Who am I?” Confronting the monster, every human being is shocked into silence and flees from him in horror. Excluded from the vocative field of calling and responding, thus, the monster is condemned to wander around to get an answer for the question “what was I?”, but he has no semblance or Nebenmensch and thus the question is always “answered only with groans” in his total solitude (Frankenstein, 121). Therefore, the monster who has never heard “You are a man like us” finally talks back with his monstrous voice, saying “I am not like you. I am a monster. Thus, I will destroy you, humankind.”

Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, a fiction, a semblance, which resembles reality and history, but which is truer than both, produces a counter-memory of the modern man and his semblance, the monster, problematizing the mythical birth of the modern man. Excluded from human community and deserted into absolute solitude, the monster who is our semblance or Nebenmensch haunts humanity with his monstrous gaze and voice which were previously soliciting ones for us to reflect our gaze onto him and to echo our voice back to him. He is indeed our semblance who curiously resembles us who are beings of a lack and thus need the semblance or Nebenmensch. If we are left
alone and forced into absolute solitude, we may feel as solitary and imperfect as the
monster. But nobody dares to see him and speak to him. At the very moment of
opening his eyes and mouth, the monster appears as the being of the gaze and voice at
which his (M)other Victor is horrified. From then on, the monster who is unseeable
and unsayable in the specular and vocative fields starts to haunt Victor. Finally, the
monster returns to the deathbed of Victor, the modern man, and then he vanishes in
darkness and distance at the end of *Frankenstein*. The monster who disappeared as
such might still live among (*neben*) us as our semblance or *Nebenmensch* and might
haunt us, modern man, to the end of human history, as far as humanity makes some
human beings the monsters, as he warns us: “It is true, we shall be monsters, cut off
from all the world” (*Frankenstein*, 145-6).


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