Participation, collaboration, and nonparticipation in civil war

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Participation, Collaboration, and Nonparticipation in Civil War

by

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Abstract

The size of armed forces holds significant meaning for belligerents in civil war. Given that a large size of forces advantages an armed group in fight with the opponent, it should seek to expand the size of the forces as long as it can exercise close control over and have enough resources to manage them. Civil war involves the government and rebels, both of whom compete for the domestic popular support and recruits and often have areas where each of them can exclusively exert influence over civilians (i.e., the stronghold). In such a context, the pool of available participants for the group expands up to its limit as the area controlled by the group expands, but that the group's capacity for recruitment decreases toward the territorial boundary with the opponent-controlled area. Although a civil-war group can expect to acquire recruits in a stronghold, rivalry with the opponent in contested areas checks the group's mobilization of combatants. Given a difference in a group's influence between the stronghold and contested areas, the group will adopt varying mobilization strategies across regions. When the group seeks to mobilize combatants in the stronghold, it can use coercion as a means of mobilization. Within contested areas, in contrast, the group does not rely on the participation of all potential recruits but on that of dedicated participants because the latter are not as readily deterred from enlisting with the group as would be forced participants.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Theme of this Study

Numbers of people have been mobilized into armed forces in civil war. As the collective action theory argues, the combatants who enlisted in either government or rebel forces could have opted instead to act as free-riders for the sake of avoiding personal risk until others were able to bring about the results they desired. Nevertheless, numerous civilians participated in armed forces throughout the many episodes of political unrest. In Cambodia, where the protracted civil war had lasted until 1992, there existed 200,000 regular troops and 250,000 militiamen of all parties in the last year of the war. And over 200,000 paramilitary troops had been disbanded, and nearly 3,000 guerrillas demobilized when the Guatemalan Civil War ended in 1996.

Why were such a large number of people involved as combatants in these wars? The causal relationship between those individuals’ motivations and participation is indeed complicated. This is because the same factors that are known to encourage participation in some people may actually inhibit participation in others. In this sense, the acknowledged “typical” pattern of participation may obscure the existence of other important causal factors because a generalized explanation does not capture the contradictory tendencies (Viterna, 2006, p.2). Considering this discrepancy, some scholars use different logics of participation in combination. For instance, Humphrey & Weinstein (2008) examined diverse hypotheses regarding participants’ motivations, recognizing that prominent accounts of reasons for enlisting are not necessarily contradictory but, rather, coexist in a single civil war (p.437). Their reasoning is
convincing simply because there appears to be no single dominant determinant of participation in civil war. However, it is still problematic in that this view may lead to resigning any hope of uncovering an explicit analytical framework for this theme. Therefore, what is called for in order to accurately capture the civilian involvement in civil war is a framework that enables us to outline the multiple paths to active participation. This study aims to establish such a framework and, thereby, offer coherent explanations for this political and socially significant topic.

A better understanding of civilian participation in civil war would also serve to contribute to our knowledge about the causes of military activism and help those who are concerned with post-conflict reconstruction find necessary policies for, for instance, the social rehabilitation of ex-combatants. Understanding their motivation is integral for policy-makers; the establishment of a stable economic infrastructure is needed in post-conflict societies in which civilians’ engagement with conflict had been motivated by material incentives, and the saliency of politicized participation would remind us of the importance of institutional reform in such countries. It is beneficial to at least understand why people participated (or had to participate) in armed forces in a systematic way when we strive to design a post-conflict society that is free from not only the causes of the war, but also the negative determinants that drove them to become involved.

Civil war, with which this study deals, is a specific type of conflict. Paying attention to the arena, actors and rivalry, Small & Singer (1982) define civil war as military action, internal to the mother country, with the active participation of the national government, and with effective resistance by both sides (p.210). In addition, they require civil war to have had a total of more than 1,000 battle-related deaths so as to
demarcate it from low-intensity armed conflicts; this threshold is indeed arbitrary but employed in other studies as well (e.g., Sollenberg & Wallensteen (1995)).

Defining civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities,” Kalyvas (2006) does not explicitly necessitate the involvement of a government, but instead introduces the idea of an intrastate division of sovereignty (p.17). This works in the same way as the threshold of intensity in Small & Singer (1982) because the presence of a domestically fragmented sovereignty as a requisite of civil war excludes violent protests, communal riots, crime, low-level banditry and genocide, all of which leave sovereignty intact (Kalyvas, 2006, p.19).

The division of the sovereign entity into multiple armed groups entails territorial division. The word territory is often used to imply the legal concept of sovereignty, meaning that one supreme authority exists in a single political unit (Flint & Taylor, 2000, p.156). Despite the understanding that spatial activities within boundaries accompanied by control over the area (i.e., territoriality) are found on various scales, the functions of territory have often been connected to state sovereignty, in particular, because the territorial framework provides for the basic elements of state such as citizenship and narratives of identity. One of the assumptions sustaining this association between territoriality and the state is that the territorial state is the container of the sub-national society (Paasi, 2003, p.117). In civil war, state-society relations often deviate from this understanding; while some territories to which societies belong are controlled by state actors, others may fall to rebel commands that are outside the range of state sovereignty.

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1 See Sack (1985, p.25).
In such a context, however, territoriality is still significant in that it accordingly assigns people, things and relationships to a designated category, demands their possession or exclusion, and enforces control over them (Sack, 1985, pp.21-2).

The focus on sovereign and territorial division is not meant to suggest that the definition of civil war is confined to conflict without any external actors; but rather, it can often be characterized as a war involving both foreign state and non-state actors having stakes in a country. For instance, in the Cambodian Civil War (1970-75), Lon Nol’s coup d’état to overthrow the Sihanouk administration and his subsequent alignment with the U.S. were foreshadowed by Sihanouk’s shunning of the U.S. (e.g., his rejection of foreign aid) (Isaacs, 1999, p.198). And, in addition to the fact that Sihanouk went into exile in Beijing after the coup, Khmer Rouge forces were dependent on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces until the Khmer Rouge was able to take over on its own at mid-point of the conflict (Kirk, 1974, pp.93-4). The involvement of external actors cannot be overlooked, and the basic structure of the war may be framed as an internationalized regional conflict. However, membership to a sovereign entity was shared by essential belligerents (i.e., Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge), and such a dimension is best analyzed as civil war (Kalyvas, 2006, p.18).

Then, what does participating in this particular type of conflict mean? This study considers participation to be a subset of collaboration. How to conceptualize forms of collaboration varies from scholar to scholar, but it is common to recognize that different levels of collaboration can be captured on a spectrum or a linear elevation. Given that civilians’ collaboration is contested between a government and rebels, according to Mason (2004), their active and overt collaboration with the government’s operations (i.e.,
participation) and betrayal against the rebels are at one end of the spectrum. In contrast, at the other end of the spectrum is participation in the rebel organization and betrayal against the government. In between there also exists passive tolerance of those actors (e.g., refraining from taking any action against them), and active but covert collaboration with their operations (e.g., the provision of intelligence to the opposition and of logistical support and sanctuary for forces). Kalyvas (2006) equates betrayal (“defection,” in his wording) against a group with collaboration with its rivals and he disaggregates it into levels, which partially overlaps Mason’s conception. That is, noncompliance is defined as actions such as complaining and criticizing, tax evading, shirking, and fleeing; informing is the act of providing information about a group to its rival; and switching sides coincides with civilians’ openly collaborating with the opposition (e.g., the establishment of militia) (pp.104-6). Petersen (2001) also considers that individual roles can be arrayed on a continuum. Speaking of collaboration with rebels, his graph starts at neutrality, in which civilians do nothing for or against any groups, and then elevates from unarmed and unorganized opposition against the government (e.g., attending a mass rally or writing anti-regime graffiti) to direct support of or participation in a locally-banded armed organization, and participation in mobile and armed organizations (i.e., membership in rebel forces) (pp.8-9). Although I take into consideration the multiple levels of collaboration, the final point on the aforementioned spectrums (“active and overt collaboration” in Mason and “participation in mobile and armed organization” in Petersen) takes up the focus of this study.

A primary stance of this study is that a single armed group employs multiple recruitment strategies according to contexts, with the focus being on the diversity in
participants’ reactions toward the group’s control over fragmented territory. Although the understanding of civilian participation has been advanced by recent studies of civil-military relations in civil war, they do not sufficiently address the above thesis. For instance, it may be likely that each armed group adopts a distinctive strategy of recruitment and that a specific strategy has a one-to-one correspondence with that group’s features. However, this sketch does not work out unless the group always adheres to one specific mobilization measure over time and across situations. The measures rather range from voluntary recruitment to the involuntary mobilization of combatants. The focus on armed actors’ territorial control may help us understand why they have to employ different recruitment strategies in different contexts, in which the level of civilian collaboration with the group degrades as the level of territorial control lowers. However, again, an observation that all individuals do not uniformly respond to their environments makes a further exploration of civilian participation necessary. Thus, this study examines civilian participation in armed forces by taking into greater consideration potential participants who would react differently to their environment across contexts, and seeks to answer the question of why civilians differently participate in an armed group across regions by considering multiple mobilization strategies taken by the group.

Pursuing the above objectives, this study attempts to contribute to the development of literature on civil war. Before getting into the theme, it is meaningful to review how this study is positioned in the entire literature, as is outlined in the next section. As for recent civil war studies, it is necessary to note that their focus has shifted from overall causes to micro-foundations. Although the debate over causes of civil war
has not yet been settled,\(^2\) this shift has made researchers pay attention to not only the onset but also the process of conflicts. It, furthermore, does not merely suggest a shift in research subjects, but has introduced a micro-level approach to the literature. This approach allows us to effectively capture components of civil war (e.g., violence against civilians) by disaggregating units of analysis, for instance, from country to local villages, or individuals. Literature on civilian participation in armed forces has also been advanced by the micro-level (mostly individual-level) analyses. Although exploring the micro-level relationship between a theoretical model and empirical findings, this study seeks to explore micro-level implications observed at macro-level as well.

**Approaches to Civil War Studies**

*Major Debates*

In the late 1990s, scholars began studying the causes of civil war onset through an econometric approach.\(^3\) The grievance-greed debate, over whether civil wars arose from peoples’ grievances or from greed, soon came to dominate the literature on civil war and did so until the mid-2000s. Those arguments that focus on grievance as a major cause of civil war were derived from views that connect rebellion to social strains such as high-level inequality, government repression and lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions (e.g., Borjas, 1992; Cramer, 1999; Goodhand, 2003; Homer-Dixon, 2003).

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\(^2\) Unlike influential empirical studies in the 1990s that emphasize the importance of rebels’ opportunities, recent works argue that inequality is a major cause of domestic armed conflicts. For instance, see Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch (2011).

\(^3\) The studies that employ the approach are characterized by components such as a dependent variable indicating civil war onset or incidence, independent variables that represent possible causes of conflict, and a regression-based test of these determinants (Blattman & Miguel, 2009, p.31).
In contrast, those that emphasize greed based on economic opportunities or the availability of resources originate from Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime. In this view, rebellion is analogized to an industry that profits from looting (Grossman, 1999) or quasi-criminal activity (Collier, 2000b).

Some important empirical studies tend to support the latter view. For instance, Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 1999) and Collier (2000a) argue that the rebels’ ability to finance their organizations is a more robust predictor of civil war onset than are grievances, which are commonly observable in many countries (but not upsetting enough to cause the outbreak of war). Their argument is based on empirical results showing that the proportion of natural resources in total exports, operationalized as potential for providing rebels with the financial or management ability to maintain their organizations, is associated with a higher risk of civil war, while a country’s ethno-linguistic fractionalization, income inequality and democracy do not have predictive power. In later refinements of their model, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) broaden the concept of greed so as to equate it with the opportunity structure for rebel mobilization, and still argue that the viability of rebellion based on political opportunity is more significant than grievances as a determinant of civil war onset.

The dichotomy between grievance and greed may seem like a rehashing of grievance theses (e.g., Gurr, 1968, 1970) but neglecting the contribution of the

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4 See also Collier & Hoeffler (2001, 2002).

5 This variable is expected to capture the ease of instant taxation by looting. However, it is important to note that some natural resources are “lootable” but others are rather “obstructable.” Ross (2002) claims that, unlike diamonds or drugs, oil cannot be easily plundered by unskilled groups and individuals. Rather, it is associated with such rebellious activities as blowing up pipelines, extracting revenues from oil companies, and kidnapping oil workers and managers.
“contentious politics” approach (for instance, by equating political opportunity structure with greed). This would be because the grievance-greed debate largely skirts the progress made by this approach. According to Tarrow, the severance between various forms of contention in the debate reflects the above-mentioned scholars’ way of viewing civil war; that is, civil war is captured distinctly from nonviolent and less lethal contention (Tarrow, 2007, p.589). In this sense, they do not owe their construction of analytical frameworks to the “contentious politics” literature.

Fearon & Laitin (2003) is another example of such works, yet it has had a major impact on the debate. Taking a country-year approach, they came up with the widely-used formulation found in most of the cross-country studies that followed, where the dependent variable is the onset of civil war in a given country in a given year and the independent variables are lagged per capita income, population, geographic and political controls (e.g., natural resources and democracy measures), social controls (e.g., infant mortality and ethnic and religious fractionalization), a history of conflicts, war-prone neighbors, diasporas, and regional and time effects (e.g., the Middle East and North Africa and the 1960s) (Blattman & Miguel, 2009, p.32; Kalyvas, 2007, p.418). As did Collier & Hoeffler, Fearon & Laitin obtained a result indicating that proxies for grievances (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization) are not statistically significant, in addition to finding that opportunities favoring rebellion (e.g., rough terrain) increase the risk of civil war.6

6 The difference between these two groups of scholars is in how they have interpreted the implications of the independent variables. For instance, although Fearon & Laitin find that oil-dependent states are more prone than others to the risk of civil war, they regard this as an effect of the weak state that often grants unbalanced privilege to particular groups of people, dismissing the resource-predation thesis offered by Collier & Hoeffler
Micro-level Analyses

Subsequent studies have contested the various premises upon which these key studies are based. For instance, given that civil war onset represents the involvement of a considerable number of people in the conflict, more recent works point out that it is unclear how much grievance or greed accounts for their motivation to participate. These factors may drive a certain proportion of the population to rebel (especially rebel leaders and core members) at the war’s point of onset, yet many others become involved long after the war has begun, “driven by incentives and constraints that are byproducts of the war and result from innovative and adaptive strategies devised by the rival actors in the course of the war” (Kalyvas, 2008, p.1063). One of the points of the “New-War” thesis, which was an attempt to explain armed conflicts after the Cold War, informs us about the environment in civil war. It argues that Post-Cold War intra-state wars have used measures of warfare that intend to control populations through violence and to homogenize them through forced expulsion. In other words, armed actors attempt to seize territory not through military methods but through control of the population. To impose order on society and enforce loyalty, they often deliberately use fear and terror

(Sambanis, 2004, p.261). According to Fearon & Laitin, proxies for state capacity and strength (e.g., per capita income) are robust predictors of the onset of civil war; that is, a state’s inability to police the countryside is a situation that favors rebellion. Collier & Hoeffler’s emphasis on the impact of natural resources does not deny attention to state capacity. However, they also use per capita income to measure state strength, assuming not only that rich states are bureaucratically more capable and have more resources to defend themselves against rebellion, but also that higher income increases opportunity costs of rebellion.

7 According to the thesis, in addition to the fact that wars in the post Cold War era tend to be intra-state and entail coercive civil-military relations, they are fought over identity and characterized by self-financing, with income generated by access to natural resources and illegal transnational trade, or by support through external channels such as diasporas.
and create a climate of insecurity (Kaldor, 1999, p.97-99). In such a context, most of those who are controlled by the armed actors follow them due to neither grievance nor greed. These points, in particular, are relevant to this study.

The scope of those preceding studies is also limited because it mostly represents a static depiction of the onset of civil war. Although their data differ in that Collier & Hoeffler drop observations of ongoing civil war and Fearon & Laitin code those periods as “0”s in order to consider war onsets that occur in countries with ongoing civil war, both deal with war onset (Sambanis, 2004, p.261). Kalyvas criticizes their sole focus on war onset because, as he insists, these approaches assume that rebel leaders and followers participate in civil war with a specific motivation that is unchangeable throughout the war (Kalyvas, 2008, p.1063). However, along with the fact that the process of civil war is rather dynamic and is featured with strategic interplay between actors (including belligerents and civilians), their preferences and objectives are not constant over time but subject to change as the war progresses.

The factor that makes our understanding of civil war particularly onerous is its causal complexity and heterogeneity consisting of different types of actions, processes, occurrences, and events (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998, p. 446). There has been the argument, therefore, that the cases of civil war need to be disaggregated into minute observations; this allows us not only to increase the number of cases but to note the variations of violence (Kalyvas, 2006; King, 2004).

*Microfoundations of Civil War Examined at Multiple Levels*
To explore civilians’ participation and nonparticipation in civil war, this study takes notice of the dynamics of civil war and benefits from a micro-level perspective that disaggregates incidents and specifies actors involved in the war, rather than the country-year framework. Since the interest of this study is on the microfoundations of civil war, civilians’ participation or nonparticipation in armed forces (rather than civil war onset), a lower-level view is appropriate. As discussed above, motives for participation cannot be reduced to the dichotomy between grievance and greed because they largely vary at the individual-level.

A higher-level of analysis, however, is meaningful in itself in that it is considered to reflect micro-level dynamics of civil war, and the analyses at multiple levels are not necessarily disunited. For instance, even models elaborated by Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin are based on a theory of potential rebels’ behavior. What makes their works feature as macro-level analysis is their use of country-level data to test hypotheses. Since the data do not directly capture micro-level dynamics, however, such a causal inference across different levels of analysis requires caution. Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis (2005) argue that this missing link between individual-level theories and country-level data can be filled by case studies that detail how variables in empirical tests influence an outcome (p.19). Another way of justifying the cross-level inference would be its use as a guideline for researchers to gather as many observable implications as possible (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). The cross-level inference suggests the collection of data in diverse contexts that are consistent with a theory so that researchers

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8 For instance, it allows us to explain how individual incidents are grouped in the form of civil war. Sambanis (2004) defends this approach, arguing that the “interesting question is how and why disparate private motives for violence are disciplined into a single organizational form, such as civil war” (p.263).
can then make their explanations more powerful and certain. Following this guideline, data collection should not be restricted to the data at the original level of analysis but rather should be expanded to those at different levels of aggregation. The rationale for this is that a theory elaborated at one level may have implications at other levels of analysis and, in this case, researchers can use data from all those levels to collect information about the theory (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p.30). This multiple-level approach to data collection and theory-testing furthermore allows that the data in a single study can be at various levels and also be asymmetric so that, for instance, it can comprise “a detailed study of one province, a comparative study of two countries, personal interviews with government leaders from only one policy sector, and even a quantitative component” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p.48).

This study focuses on different levels of civil-military relations according to cases and methods. Chapter 4 looks at individuals within local districts in the Cambodian Civil War, while Chapter 5 reviews more overarching changes in the civil-military and rebel-government relations over time in the Guatemalan Civil War. Expanding the scope to additional cases of civil war, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 6 then treats an armed rebel group as a focus of analysis. Considering that individuals’ participation in armed forces influences the troop size of the forces and the military balance between the government and rebel groups, these factors comprise some of the observable implications of each civilian’s behavior. It is true that there is great variation across the units of analysis. For instance, during the armed conflict between the Turkish government and Kurdish rebels that erupted in the 1980s, while certain Kurdish townships decided to support the central government, individuals within those towns collaborated with the
rebels, or vice-versa (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007b, pp.209, 212-3). Consequently, it is meaningful to direct attention to multiple levels to explore what the theory can and cannot capture at each level. The following first briefs the cases and why they were selected for this study and then discusses my reasons for studying each case at a designated level of analysis.

Empirical Analyses
Case Selection: The Cambodian and Guatemalan Civil Wars
This study majorly examines two cases of civil war, those in Cambodia (1970-75) and Guatemala (1960-96). A theoretical model elaborated in Chapter 3 guides the selection of the cases and structures the narratives so that the cases can address points implied by the model. The case studies are aimed at providing empirical findings that may refine and expand that model of civilian participation in civil war.

It would be fair to claim that a mix of several independent variables in the model complicates the appropriate selection of cases. The case studies in this study focus on a limited number of cases, while it needs many cases to sufficiently control variation in independent variables. Random selection is a good sampling method to reduce the risk of selection bias, yet it may lead to the inclusion of a civil war sample in which domestic civilians are not predominantly mobilized. Such a case may, nevertheless, be meaningful because we can still use it to examine its relationship with the model. In other words, “negative cases,” in which civilian participation is absent, seem to be able to reinforce or recast conclusions drawn from the positive cases (see Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis, 2005, p.21). However, since this study targets civil-military relations conditioned by the
government-rebel competition over domestic popular support and recruitment by referring to a few cases that may not have sufficient variation in multiple dimensions, it would be better to choose examples from an already limited universe of cases that are firstly defined by the presence or absence of domestic civilians’ participation in armed forces in a given civil war. This neither means that literally all civilians participated in armed forces in the cases, nor that all the armed groups were eager to mobilize combatants from the local population. Through the cases we can rather explore the variation in participation at individual-, group-, or regional levels.

Another reason to consider a strictly defined pool of cases is the possible existence of unit heterogeneity even between cases that share the same baseline criteria. For instance, foreign assistance from another country may influence civilian participation. Incumbent forces benefited by financial or military assistance from a foreign government can sufficiently equip themselves, and as the following chapters argue, a higher level of military capability lowers individuals’ threshold of participation in the forces. Beyond this net military-capability, a foreign government’s backing may furthermore appeal to additional recruits due to that government’s seal of approval; in other words, there would be a significant difference in military capabilities between forces blessed by foreign assistance and those without such a favor, even if they are equally equipped.

Thus, if the assumption of homogeneity between randomly selected cases is violated, comparing those cases is not easy. A possible alternative is to choose cases sharing important features with each other. The employment of this approach constrains the implications of this study because it allows me to explore only “within-systems relationships” (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp.57-9). In these senses, like other
theoretical models in the social sciences, the one discussed in this study is limited in terms of its applicability. To put it concretely, this study focuses on a conflict between a government and rebel groups that features specific components such as territory (e.g., stronghold and contested areas) and the same pool of potential recruits for which to both actors compete.

Both the Cambodian and Guatemalan Civil Wars share features such as the existence of territory within the countries controlled by both the government and rebels, in which they could exclusively exert their clout, and the common pools of recruits, for which both sides competed. Unlike in other cases where rebels were consolidated outside the borders and occasionally attempted to penetrate into the country (e.g., the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPT) was based in Uganda during the civil war, 1990-94), the rebels in Cambodia and Guatemala did seize control of some areas within their respective countries. Moreover, even if a certain proportion of the population was under rebel control, the governments frequently attempted to entice those civilians from the rebels. Since having a population to control provided the rebels with a source of tax, materials and recruits, they also made every effort to attract civilians or to keep them under their strict control.

Seen from the standpoint of military balance, both the Cambodian and Guatemalan Civil Wars can also be mostly captured as wars in which the military technology of the rebels lags behind that of the state yet the rebels are still able to establish territorial control in peripheral areas (Kalyvas, 2007; Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). Throughout the Guatemalan Civil War, the rebel forces were confined to guerrilla activities, while the government resorted to airstrikes in the countryside. Although the
Khmer Rouge eventually overwhelmed Lon Nol’s government forces at the end of the war, the government, under support from the U.S., was still able to conduct large-scale airstrikes on hamlets that were suspected of taking sides with rebels. This criterion excludes other cases of civil war wherein rebels do not have to take on guerrilla strategy because they are not able to confront government forces using heavy weaponry (e.g., the civil wars in Biafra, Nigeria (1967-70), Abkhazia, Georgia (1992-94), Nagomo Karabach, Azerbaijan (1991-94), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95)), the government is unable (or even unwilling) to organize systematized counterinsurgency operations due to its lack of military capability (e.g., the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville (1993-97)), and in which rebels successfully carry out a coup d’état.

However, this does not mean that these two cases of civil war are alike in all aspects; there instead exist significant differences in some aspects, for example, as in the source of incentives for voluntary participants. One may point out that the Cambodian and Guatemalan cases differ in their “master cleavage” (Kalyvas, 2007, p.426); that is, we cannot deny that the former was fought over ideological disagreement and the latter case had eventually taken on an aspect of ethnic war. Sambanis (2001) empirically explores causes of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, following the coding procedure that identifies a violent conflict as an ethnic one when he observes an episode between a government and ethnic challengers in which they seek major changes in their status (p.262). He concludes that each type of civil war is associated with different sets of determinants.⁹ Although ethnic minorities in the periphery were preferentially mobilized by rebels in the Cambodian Civil War, many more Khmer people also joined the

⁹ For instance, ethnic civil wars are due mainly to political grievances rather than lack of economic opportunity, and ethnic heterogeneity is related differently to each type of wars.
rebellion, and the war was fought over ideology and a future political and economic system. In contrast, it is not possible to regard the Guatemalan Civil War entirely as a non-ethnic war. The war originated in the failed coup by military officers in 1960 and their alliance with socialist factions. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, the rebels were rather separated from the population residing in the eastern region. However, contemplating their defeat by the government, the remaining guerillas moved westward and began mobilizing indigenous people in the highlands into rebellion in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The mobilization of those people consequently made the government and the army, whose key posts were occupied by Ladinos, consider indigenous people, including Mayas, as subversives. In fact, the counterinsurgency operations mostly targeted indigenous communities in the western highlands and this led to an enormous number of victims.

Whether a conflict is captured as ideology-based or ethnicity-based should not be neglected in the exploration of civilian participation. In the Cambodian Civil War, those who volunteered for the Khmer Rouge forces tended to have been influenced by its egalitarian ideal, whereas the non-Ladino identity largely framed the priorities and preferences of indigenous people in the Guatemalan Civil War. These details lead us to observe variation in the interactions between the belligerents and the civil-military relations across the cases. Given these differences, it is interesting to examine how the major incompatibility issues in war each affect the processes of civilian participation in armed forces.

However, this study also assumes that the process of civil war levels this divergence in some contexts. Kalyvas (2008) observes that, when an armed group is
willing to mobilize defectors from ethnic rivals, ethnic identities neither always remain stable nor fixed throughout the conflict, but rather may “soften;” that is, the argument doubts the assumption that few people can be mobilized by the opposing group and considers that an ethnicity-based war resembles an ideological war, in which the government and the rebels contest for the fickle loyalties of the people (pp.1045-7). For instance, the control of a certain population by an armed group often results in a set of incentives and constraints imposed upon the residents (e.g., material rewards, the benefits of collaborating with an armed group that is perceived as winning, and coercion), which leads them to side with the group exercising control (p.1059). In such a situation, the difference in the source of cleavage between the cases barely makes sense for the mobilization of combatants by armed forces.

Given the common features between the two cases, this study seeks to capture them in a single framework. Again, this does not deny the possibility that the cases differ in their details (e.g., source of incentives to participate), and it is probable that the recruitment of combatants observed in the Cambodian Civil War somewhat deviated from that in the Guatemalan Civil War. Although those divergences are expected to fall under the scope of the model discussed in the following chapters, the gaps between the cases serve to offer useful insight to refine and expand on the model.

Application of Multiple-level Approach I (Micro-level)

Individuals are the primary unit of the inquiry into civilian participation in armed forces. The literature on participation in civil war has indeed been expanded by studies whose unit of analysis is the individual (e.g., Arjona & Kalyvas, 2011; Blattman & Annan, 2007;
Guichaoua, 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a; Oyefusi, 2008; Viterna, 2006; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2003). Those individuals are typically ordinary people caught in a civil war environment, yet also have some agential power because their collaboration with armed forces may largely determine possible outcomes of the war by influencing the military balance between the government and rebels.

Individual civilians are faced with choices such as whether to flee, whether to defect, whether to participate, and if so, which side to participate in. Although their agonizing decision-making vanishes at the macro-level, which treats civilians as an aggregate unit, the individual-level analysis accommodates the differences between those civilians in the cross-fire.

The first case study of Chapter 4 explores civil-military relations in the Cambodian Civil War, relying on individual-level findings. The characteristics of this war during its limited term (1970-75) make the micro-level analysis effective. That is, although the war includes some complexity, it offers a relatively simple frame; two major armed actors (i.e., Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge) played important roles in competing for the popular support and recruits throughout the civil war. This schema enables us to focus on the limited number of armed groups that had influence over civilians and to contextualize the civil-military relations more easily.

To further specify its scope in focusing on local districts, the chapter employs data taken from personal interviews with local residents. We should, first, note inherent problems when attempting to identify motivations through the interview process, as

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10 In Lockyer’s words, “research conducted at the individual level of analysis seeks to explain the course and nature of the civil war through emphasizing the interpersonal ambiguity and uncertainty brought on by the civil war” (Lockyer, 2008, p.15).
Elster (2009) claims that it is important to question whether a professed or alleged motivation may be spurious (p.21).\textsuperscript{11} Civilians’ behavior during civil war is largely determined by their informed understanding of the immediate war environment and the options presented to them by those circumstances. For instance, their decisions tend to be influenced by their assessment of what types of conflict behavior have been successful and acceptable to the government in other regions (Beissinger, 2002). However, confessed motivations may appear to be biased when respondents have interpreted identical questions in different ways (response incomparability)\textsuperscript{12} (King \textit{et al.}, 2003). Because diversity in local cultures, norms, institutions, and historical experiences often results in different points of reference and misunderstandings for some interviewees, researchers’ questions may consequently be understood differently from that which is intended to be the same for all respondents (Bohara, Mitchell & Nepal, 2006, p.110). In addition, their motivation recalled in the current interview is supposed to be able to account for the reasons of past behavior and decisions (an interview is usually conducted after the civil war in concern). This may be problematic because 1) the participants’ and nonparticipants’ memory of the war may be vague, and 2) their responses may be distorted as the result of conflicts; respondents may overestimate their chivalrousness and heroism or underestimate the predicament at the time of participation if the rebellion had succeeded.

\textsuperscript{11} To avoid the problem, Elster himself suggests that researchers rely on materials that are less likely to be influenced by misrepresentation (e.g., letters, diaries, reported conversations, uncensored drafts, and observations by third parties) (p.25).

\textsuperscript{12} This problem is recognized also as differential item functioning (DIF) (King \textit{et al.}, 2003, p. 568).
One of the ways to alleviate these drawbacks is to cross-check data obtained from interviews. Since relying on a few information sources that are potentially biased is likely to prejudice a conclusion, it is necessary to make an effort to compare interview data collected from various populations and environments; individuals’ recollections may vary in terms of their attributes and experiences under specific sociopolitical circumstances. Following this procedure, I insist that interview data are an effective source that is able to capture the dimension with which this study aims to deal. The greatest advantage to employing such data is that I can obtain primary information on the civil-military relations during the civil war in question. While previous studies, of course, inform us about possible determinants of civilian participation in civil war, they do not always focus on aspects in the particular cases this study pays attention to. This study employs interview data to examine specifically participation in the Cambodian Civil War within a limited location, namely, three districts in Battambang province. The data are invaluable in that, without them, literature does not supply the necessary information about this specific topic within the specific time-frame and geographical context. Additionally, the data may deviate from or, alternatively, confirm existing knowledge. In Chapter 4, referring to a survey design which includes sampling method and manner of interviews, a detailed discussion of the actual data covers their advantages and disadvantages peculiar to the long-after-the-fact interviews in post-conflict society.

Application of Multi-level Approach II (Macro-level)

Variation in civilian participation in civil war can be observed between not only individuals but also between groups. It is important to understand the participation across
groups because their organization inevitably reflects the participation of the individuals’ participation in them. An effective measure of capturing the implications of civilian participation in this way is to treat not the individual but the group as a unitary actor. Assuming that, despite actual internal fractures, various elites, sub-groups, and individuals of which a government or rebel group is comprised can be clustered into a single actor, this approach rarely identifies any actors other than armed groups with substantial influence over civilian participation, and undervalues interactions between civilians themselves (see Lockyer, 2008, p.8).

In this perspective, the interaction between the government and rebels, which is constrained by their political and military capabilities, would be a key determinant of the nature of a conflict. Considering that civil-military relations is one of the components of the conflict, it is crucial to understand the effect of the interaction between armed groups upon civilians’ behavior. Chapter 5 is organized so as to capture the shift in structural contexts during the Guatemalan Civil War and the resulting impact upon the relationship between armed actors and civilians, and mobilization strategies over time. Given that the rivalry between the government and rebel forces underwent several transformations, the war offers a case rich in its variation of structural contexts. The case of the Guatemalan Civil War, therefore, provides a good source to observe the pattern of interactions between armed forces that determined and altered local civil-military relations. In reference to these dynamics, the chapter seeks to identify whether the individual-level theory has implications at the macro-level.

The movement to another level of analysis may involve the introduction of variables not inherent in the original level but applicable to a new one (King, Keohane &
Verba, 1994, p.225). The individual-level analysis can explore civilians’ purposes and intentions, but the macro-level analysis can only indirectly make conjectures through the observation of the ends toward which those civilians are impelled by the structural contexts. This may pose a serious problem because it ultimately raises the question of whether or not each civilian indeed pursues their own goals in civil war. Individuals are relatively entitled to spontaneity from the perspective at the micro-level (even when “reluctantly” participating in armed forces, they may choose to do so in order to avoid anticipated risks), but they are identified as being driven by their environment when the focus shifts to the macro-level. This understanding can in turn raise the question of whether this study examines civilian participation in terms of the objective factors that influence the behavior or in terms of the individual’s perception of those objective factors (see Singer, 1961, p.86).

This study considers not only that individuals’ perceptions comprise an important variable in the explanation of their participation or nonparticipation in civil war, but also that such a perception is observable at a higher level and can be equated with macro-level variables. To provide a framework tested both by interview data and secondary sources, this study considers that individuals select the course of action they believe will offer them the highest payoff. That is, when the expected benefits of participating in or supporting the rival group seem to exceed the expected costs, and those benefits are higher than the payoff for other alternatives, individuals will take action; and in contrast, when the costs of participating overwhelm the benefits, or another choice seems more attractive, they will avoid cooperating. The criticisms of such an explanation being at least that a model reduces the motivations and incentive structures of potential and actual
participants to a narrow view of cost and benefit (see Cramer, 2002) and that it aspires to build universalistic explanations (see Korf, 2006), in this study, I intend to correct these shortcomings, by accepting the assumption that individuals’ choices are based on structurally constrained and socially conditioned values. Taking into consideration these components also allows us to look at specific contexts and places in which they encourage or discourage individuals to participate. Our nuanced understanding about individuals’ participation would be facilitated by the focus on context.

Thus, the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 reveal the process of how civilians participate in the civil wars. The narratives in these qualitative analyses are expected to be able to show the sequence of events and examine how various determinants influence civilian participation. This study also includes a large-N statistical analysis of rebel troops (Chapter 6). Quantitative analysis is commonly a good way to explore the covariance between a dependent variable and potentially important explanatory variables. Chapter 6, in the same vein, indicates that there are some significant correlations between characteristics of rebel groups and their mobilization of combatants. In this sense, this study benefits from a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analyses rather than from a reliance on only one method.

Chapters 5 and 6 are identical in that they treat not individuals but groups as a unit of analysis and, therefore, more or less postulate a high degree of uniformity in individuals’ decision-making. However, a significant difference is in their scope; while the discussion in Chapter 5 is limited to a specific case, Chapter 6 explores the applicability of the model by taking more cases into consideration. Given some assumptions of the model, the cases of qualitative analyses are ones that share specific
features with it. The large-N quantitative analysis in Chapter 6 allows me to test its validity by referring to cases with and without those characteristics. Due to a limited number of cases qualitatively examined in this study, the cases of Cambodia and Guatemala are not chosen according to the variance in their independent variables. Yet the statistical analysis contrarily deals with cases that vary in terms of both independent and dependent variables (the latter is measured by the variance in size of rebel troops). Therefore, this approach provides a broader perspective by adding more implications observed at a different level than that of the model developed in Chapter 3.

The Structure of this Dissertation
The following two chapters aim to discuss how this study is situated in the literature on civilian participation in civil war and to consider the theoretical aspect of this study. In Chapter 2, I review the literature, focusing on the organization theories of recruitment and theories of control. The former is insightful in that it shows how the choice of mobilization strategy of armed groups determines who participates in the action. The latter provides answers to the questions that the former leaves unanswered, by focusing on the association between territorial control and civilian collaboration with armed groups. However, to offer a perspective that moves beyond the existing literature, I problematize its assumptions that armed groups are all one of a kind and that civilians are apolitical in the context of civil war.

Chapter 3 is aimed at establishing theory and hypotheses pertaining to civilian participation and non-participation in armed forces. To relate key findings and introduce critical associations for theoretical consideration, I firstly take up such issues as rivalry...
between the government and rebel forces, armed groups’ control and violence, and coercive and non-coercive civil-military relations for discussion. Next, in order to reveal that participants are differently motivated to join armed forces, I emphasize that participants’ reasons for enlisting in armed forces are not homogeneous across contexts and that there exist those who act differently from what is assumed by current theories of control.

Chapters 4 through 6 consist of empirical analyses. Chapter 4 explores the civil-military relations in the Cambodian Civil War during 1970-75. The major findings in this chapter, that the motivation of participants in armed forces varied across war situations and structural contexts by which they were surrounded, are drawn from case studies in three local areas. Interviews with local residents reveal that while both the government and the rebels relied not only on the non-coercive mobilization of combatants but also on coercive measures within their designated zones of control, they were both forced to search for highly motivated volunteers within the opponent’s zones.

Chapter 5 discusses the Guatemalan Civil War between 1960 and 1996. Throughout the war, each time the rebels organized and revolted against the government, the government counteracted the insurgent activities. As the rebels were never able to outstrip the government during the war, rebel-controlled areas were frequently regained by the government forces. Civilians who were caught in the crossfire were required to decide who they would support and whether they would join either of the armed forces each time rulers were replaced. This chapter examines the periodic changes in the structural contexts of civil war and the subsequent reactions of civilians over the countryside, by focusing on how and whether or not modifications in the structural
contexts can be shown as having superseded existing practices and having determined individual participation in the armed forces.

Focusing on troop size of rebel groups over a limited time period, Chapter 6 quantitatively examines the hypotheses pertaining to the participation of civilians as combatants in armed groups and provides empirical evidence to capture the associations between structural contexts in civil war and civilian’s reactions to them.

Chapter 7 concludes this study by reviewing its main arguments, findings and contributions toward current and future literature on recruitment in civil war.
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Recruitment in Civil War

Introduction

This chapter looks at the literature on recruitment in civil war and considers conditions under which civilians opt to participate in armed forces. It begins by highlighting differences between collective action in civil war and that in noncivil-war situations. In reference to the “contentious politics” thesis, it is possible to argue that civil war is a continuation of low-level or nonviolent conflict. There are indeed models connecting low-intensity contention with civil war (e.g., Davenport, Armstrong, & Lichbach, 2006; Lichbach, Davenport, & Armstrong, 2004; Sambanis & Zinn, 2003). Dynamics of massive armed-conflict, in this sense, may be captured by concepts used in studies of collective action in contexts broader than civil war. However, this study would rather benefit from contributions by studies noting the peculiarity of civil war because components such as armed groups and fragmented sovereignty, which cannot be dismissed in an exploration of civilian participation in civil war, uniquely influence civil-military relations.

For this objective, two theories are most germane, organization theories and theories of control. Given the diversity of solutions for the collective action problem and mobilization strategies employed by armed groups, organization theories of recruitment examine why individual groups undertake particular mobilization strategies. These theories are insightful in that they reveal how the choice of strategy determines who participates in the action, yet questions remain unanswered: “Why does a single group adopt not only one measure but also combine multiple strategies in their mobilization
efforts?” and “Why are the participants recruited differently by the group across regions?” To explore these points, I address the need to frame the diversity in recruitment strategies so as to capture a spectrum between the paths of civilian voluntary and involuntary participation. Although theories of control provide a lead to answers for the above questions by focusing on the association between territorial control and civilian collaboration with armed groups, their implications are still bound by the assumption that all armed groups are one of a kind and that civilians are apolitical in the context of civil war. This chapter offers a view that moves beyond the limitations of the existing literature on recruitment in civil war by disaggregating civilians’ patterns of behavior.

Collective Action and Sociopolitical Movements in Civil War

Constraints to Participate (Costs of Nonparticipation)

Even assuming popular support for their objectives, mobilization in civil war is contingent on how successfully belligerent groups can solve the collective action problem. In other words, they must be able to convince civilians to accept the potential for private risks and losses stemming from fighting or punishment by rival groups. Therefore, the collective action problem in civil war can be translated into the understanding that no matter how much one may despise the opponent, that person will be better off abstaining from any collective activities when non-cooperators become dominant in society, with the ultimate result being that no one will participate in the collective action under these

13 Consensus has not necessarily been reached as to whether the protection of civilians by armed groups is considered public goods (Heath et al., 2000) or selective incentives (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007) for potential collaborators.
circumstances (i.e., the paradox of revolution) (Buchanan, 1979; Kavka, 1982, 1986; Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1971).\textsuperscript{14}

An understanding of this paradox, which shows that humans often face social dilemmas in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality, represents an achievement of the collective action theory (Kollock, 1998, p.183). Free-riding, a problem that challenges the objective of cooperation in collective action, is evidenced when a group member with ambition to maximize short-term self-interests independently of others’ choices is able to access non-excludable public goods in joint supply\textsuperscript{15} regardless of whether he/she has contributed to the provision of the goods and is consequently tempted to “free-ride” by withholding contributions for the creation or maintenance of those goods (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2003, p.248; Samuelson, 1954). In other words, the individual is confronted with the cost of generating a benefit shared by all others but has an incentive to avoid that cost. It is important to note that these goods are non-rival (Cornes & Sandler, 1986); that is, all members are entitled to the existing goods.\textsuperscript{16} Accordingly, for each individual to use as many resources as possible without

\textsuperscript{14} When applied to collective action in civil war, prospect theory would predict that individuals are more likely to accept risks (i.e., participate in collective action) “when they come to see losses as personally meaningful, when personal losses are tied to group conditions, and when rebellious action is framed as an option to escape losses” (Masters, 2004, pp.708-11).
\textsuperscript{15} Public goods are non-excludable and in joint supply in that it is impossible to prevent relevant people from consuming them and that an individual’s consumption does not reduce amounts available to anyone else (Hardin, 1982). The dilemmas associated with those goods are due to the disparity between the level of resources jointly spent by plural individuals for the production of the goods and the level of the goods that are actually provided (i.e., the production function) ( Heckathorn, 1996; Marwell & Oliver, 1993).
\textsuperscript{16} If the goods are subtractable and an individual’s use of them diminishes availability to others, the resulting social dilemma will concern a compromising of common-pool resources. A classic example of this is the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968; See
contributing towards the replenishment of those resources, because he/she is tempted by the immediate benefit, the result would be a higher cost shared by all members (Kollock, 1998, p.188). Moreover, if every member were to decide not to contribute, all would become worse off than they otherwise would have been because, as a consequence, the public goods could not be provided.

Collective action in civil war is akin to that in other situations, but at the same time differs significantly. Not only does the success of collective action in civil war seem independent of any single person’s contribution to its efforts, but also the benefits are uncertain or unknown because the chances of its success are low and there is no assurance that it will bring about substantial improvement to the status quo (Mason, 2004, pp.90-1). The second point in particular (i.e., no guarantee of improvement) is significant because failure in the provision of “public goods” (e.g., organizing rebel groups) does not always result in members’ being worse off and the “status quo” (e.g., the absence of armed conflict), rather, may be able to guarantee not only one’s life but also income from routine production activities.  

As Olson’s (1965) thesis on social dilemma inspired the resource mobilization theory, the collective action theory also affected theories on mobilization processes of sociopolitical movements. The resource mobilization theory assumes that collective action is comprised of a set of choices made by groups to advance their collective interests. Since any studies whose views were directed toward Olson’s thesis were preoccupied with specifying selective incentives in collective action, resource

\[\text{also Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977, in which too little cooperation among participants leads to the overuse or destruction of resources.}\]

\[17\text{ However, there is still a counterview to this argument. See the following section on nonmaterial selective incentives.}\]
mobilization theorists inevitably attempted to respond with a variety of alternative solutions to the problem of mobilization. They contend that a group’s mobilization of resources would have an impact on the collective action problem, although those groups may vary in aspects such as their ability and effectiveness of framing and the supply of goods, professionalization, flexibility, the structure of the group and leaders’ command over members, geographical features, and external financial support (e.g., Hechter, 1987; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978).

Collective action in civil war may be analogous to that identified in orthodox sociopolitical movements. For instance, although group size is considered to be negatively associated with the likelihood of collective action, a threshold of a certain number of participants will actually lower the costs of mobilizing other followers because those who are free-riders will be encouraged by a critical mass of existing members and their commitment and willingness to cooperate (i.e., the bandwagon effect) (Granovetter, 1978; Muller & Opp, 1986; Rasler, 1996; Schelling, 1973, 1978). The assurance that there exist many other participants can be guaranteed by contract-by-convention (Hardin, 1982), leaders or political entrepreneurs (Chong, 1991; Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Young, 1971; Taylor, 1987), and group norms (Bhavnani, 2006; Coleman, 1990; Hechter, 1975).

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18 The role of convention in interest groups, which Hardin (1982, pp.221-3) points out, is analogous to that in armed groups in civil war. For instance, historical circumstances in certain areas where rebellious movements have been active may contribute to the support of anti-government movements because the residents are more likely than those elsewhere to find themselves in networks of social relations with organized dissidents.

19 Dissident leaders may convince followers that 1) their problems are shared also by people in other communities, 2) the current conditions are unjust, 3) the state is responsible for their grievances, and 4) each one’s contribution to the movement is significant for the overthrow of the present situation (Mason, 2004, p.88).

20 For instance, Hechter (1975) argues that when individuals perceive that their life chances are bound to virtue of membership in a particular group, they will either leave
However, when collective action entails frequent military encounters and long-term duty in a severe environment, individuals’ private risks (e.g., injury and death) and losses (e.g., time, energy, and material resources) become enormous. Requiring high group cohesion, collective action in civil war, as well as in some forms of sociopolitical movements, often is analogized to this situation. Therefore, it is natural to wonder why individuals would wish to join a dangerous enterprise that may fail (Graham, 2007, pp.244-5; McCormick & Giordano, 2007, p.300). In responding to mobilization strategies, individuals are motivated by not single but multiple factors such as social (e.g., family and acquaintances), political (e.g., the level of government repression) and organizational incentives (e.g., the subversive group’s resources and its recruitment policy) (Florez-Morris, 2007, pp.632-3). Hirschman (1982), Margolis (1982) and Mason (1984) provide a view that differs from the Olsonian solution to the collective action problem, reconsidering and denying the premise that participation in collective action in the context of civil war is more costly than non-participation. They contend that although collective action will occur when the desire for public change is so strong that those affected place a high value on participation, terror against civilians also makes the choice of non-participation costly and participation relatively less costly. As participants, the group, or come to consider that they share vital interests with its members and to engage in political activity. In the latter case, those individuals are willing to accept the group obligations that are imposed on each member as a condition of access to the joint good (Hechter, 1987, p.10).

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21 As mentioned below, some deny the premise that participation in collective action in civil war is more costly than non-participation due to the frequent use of violence toward civilians.
combatants in armed forces are not the target of violence against civilians and, in that position, they may also be able to protect themselves from assaults by other armed actors (Azam, 2006; DeNardo, 1985; Goodwin, 2001; Mason, 1989; Mason & Krane, 1989; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a). Non-participation is costly in another sense because the means employed to mobilize civilians for military service are not always persuasive and can vary from making use of sentiments of solidarity to resorting to coercion and terror (Maclure & Denov, 2006, p.123; See also Blattman & Annan, 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Kalyvas, 2007; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a). The imbalance of power between civilians and armed forces allows the latter to rely more on a mobilization strategy in which they merely hint at the use of punishment for non-cooperation.

Incentives to Participate (Purposive Enlistment)

Considering that civilians desire to maintain their existing standard of living when under military control, both Humphreys & Weinstein (2008) and Richards (1996) show that locals collaborate with armed groups for the minimum fulfillment of their economic needs so that the lives of the populace are not entirely disrupted by the military’s presence. However, civilians often stand to benefit from actively engaging in conflict in terms of not only improved socio-economic status and opportunities (e.g., Degregori, 1998; Kedward, 1993; Levine, 1987) but also the prospect of looting and the

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22 Mason (1996) contends that, when state repression becomes indiscriminate, civilians are more likely to join the rebels for the sake of their survival (See also Mason, 1992).

An armed group whose material resources are abundant and whose willingness to distribute those resources to civilians seems credible is likely to effectively win the support of a population and gain participants through the use of selective incentives (McCormick & Giordano, 2007, p.306). Belligerents in civil war, on the other hand, are often required to manipulate those civilian basic economic needs to gain support; for instance, “road blocks, the issue of permission for access to infrastructure and markets, and restrictions of population movements are commonly used strategies by armed groups” in order to not only control populations but also guarantee at least some level of cooperation (Justino, 2009, p.319).

Beyond these material incentives, those based on friendship and kin ties also help to solve the collective action problem. In this sense, peer pressure, community norms and sanctions, which originate in these personal associations, can be regarded as key determinants of individual participation in collective action within the context of political violence (e.g., Pinchotti & Verwimp, 2007; Verwimp, 2005). For instance, Taylor (1987) emphasizes norms of reciprocity through which actors’ heroic actions in rebellion first drive others into high-risk collective action; in other words, those followers are motivated by feelings of social obligation or of moral self-satisfaction in fighting on the side of

\[^{23}\text{Speaking from an economic perspective, whether economic motivations are opportunistic or not, individuals’ opportunity costs for participation in acts of violence are likely to be low because under the circumstances they cannot expect sufficient returns from regular economic activities (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Grossman, 2002; Walter, 2004). This, for instance, is when unemployment is high and returns from productive activities such as agriculture are low.}\]
justice (Argo, 2009, p.654). According to Taylor, high levels of community identity$^{24}$ are preferable in collective action because there is less need to offer other selective incentives to potential participants. Petersen (2001) also contends that strong, tightly-knit communities not only promote norms of reciprocity and attach significance to status rewards, but also allow for the better monitoring and sanctioning of non-cooperators which, in turn, enables collective action.

These material and non-material inducements have been the standing explanations for civilian participation in civil war. However, they still encounter criticism, allowing that:

- No selective goods distributed to contributors should emerge, given that a person selfishly refuses to devote his/her private wealth to the dispensation of material selective incentives for others (Oliver, 1993, p.273).
- The cost of selective incentives would be prohibitive and the collective action would reach an impasse if each member needs to be given private (material) benefits (Chong, 1991, pp.32-3; Lichbach, 1994, p.390; Van Belle, 1996, p.109).
- Collective action is likely to collapse due to the desertion of members whenever it suffers a setback if all selective incentives are not relevant to the goal of the movement and are equally appealing to people who do not necessarily support the goal$^{25}$ (DeNardo, 1985, p.56; Mason, 2004, p.95).

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$^{24}$ Taylor defines a strong community as one with a membership that has shared values and beliefs, direct relations between members, and practices of repeated reciprocity within the community.

$^{25}$ Sánchez-Cuenca (2008) argues that some people might have preferences that surpass narrow self-interest to overcome the collective action problem (p.374).
To respond to these points, an alternative angle of capturing civilians’ incentive to participate is helpful. Some scholars consider the incentive as something consistent with the purpose of collective action; for instance, the sense of self-esteem from participation (Collins, 1999; Opp, 1986), adventurous excitement (Kitson, 1960), and the yearning for dangerous activity (Tishkov, 2004)\(^\text{26}\) have been applied as examples of incentives to account for collective action in civil war. Sanin (2003) contends that those who enlisted with the Colombian guerrillas were motivated by vengeance, prestige, fear, hate or excitement,\(^\text{27}\) and Graham (2007) shows that the Nepali rebels, in the civil war that began in 1996, joined guerrilla activities for psychological reasons such as ideological attachments to the principles of Maoism, the cause of ethno-regional advancement, and vengeance against police aggression.\(^\text{28}\) Wood (2003) suggests that emotional benefits and the pleasure of taking part in rebellious collective action played significant roles in the Salvadoran Civil War, observing that expressing moral outrage and feeling pride were sentiments available only to participants in the rebellion.

These arguments are significant in that they recast participation in civil war from a cost to a benefit, in contrast to the Olsonian view that selective incentives are unrelated

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\(^{27}\) Not only the Colombian guerrillas but also other insurgents are reported to have joined the rebellion due to emotions such as anger and moral outrage, and the desire for revenge (Adams, 1994; Berman, 1974; Brown, 2001; Horton, 1998; Iyer, Shmader & Lickel, 2007; Thaxton, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; West, 1985. Fear and revenge can motivate people to participate in pro-government militias as well (Anderson, 2005).

\(^{28}\) This also refers to one’s sense of belonging to a group (Deaux et al., 2006; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) and success in achieving group goals (Klandermans, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987).
to the purpose of collective action (de Voloo, 2006, pp.151-2), and may cast doubt upon the assumption that civilians are normally consumers and occasionally become producers of public goods (Brook, 2001, p.265).

Although it does not exclude the possibility that participants still benefit not only from enlistment itself but also from side benefits, the view considering participation in an armed group purposive in itself allows us to identify those who are eager to join the forces primarily due to the commonality between participants’ and the group’s objectives. Along with this perspective, as the prior section briefs, the enormousness of cost for non-involvement in an armed group also sheds light on the individuals who have no choice but to enlist for their safety for reasons peculiar to civil war. This study deals with these two types of potential participants in collective action as the central figures. To explore how these participants are mobilized, the following sections review separate theories focusing on armed groups and territorial control, which also need to be reframed in order to locate these participants in a context of civil war.

Unanswered Questions

Organization Theories of Recruitment

The preceding sections reveal that various solutions to the problem of collective action in civil war have been provided, and that the paths civilians take to participate in collective action vary from recruitment appealing with selective incentives to mobilization resorting to coercion. Selective incentives, not necessarily bound to material benefits, help groups

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29 Wilson (1974) also claims that purposive selective incentives can exist when the collective good is political.
mobilize their contributors because, unlike argued by the Olsonian view, participation in itself may be the ultimate intention.

As to voluntary recruitment appealing to participants’ material or non-material incentives, Weinstein proposes that researchers ask why armed groups undertake different mobilization strategies and investigate how the choice of strategy determines who participates in the action. In his words, it is important to consider “why some groups appeal to combatants’ short-term, material interests and why others activate ethnic, religious, or ideological identities to motivate participation” and “how different recruitment strategies shape the characteristics of the membership that groups are able to attract” (Weinstein, 2007, p.96, 100).

Weinstein himself offers an answer to these questions by focusing on resource endowments. He contends that a group rich in resources or external support is more likely to attract opportunistic participants who are less faithful to the group and whose main motivation is to loot, although more committed individuals are preferred and recruited by an armed group whose resources are scarce. While the former is likely to be rich in economic endowments that can fund salaries and materials distributed to its participants, the significant effect of such endowments is that they reduce the importance of trust in the relationship between group leaders and recruits (Weinstein, 2007, p.101). In contrast, although the latter may lack material resources distributable to the supporters, if the presence of social endowments can make promises of future rewards for the followers credible, those endowments will serve to strengthen the unofficial contract between leaders and combatants. Weinstein argues that a group with such social endowments tends to rely on the use of nonmaterial recruitment strategies, especially where norms of
reciprocity are present and are reinforced by people’s interaction through ethnic and religious networks, formal associations, and tight-knit communities (Weinstein, 2007, pp.101-2).

This argument advances the thesis which reasons that when armed groups who have local ties with the population have clear guidelines regarding combatant behavior and mechanisms for enforcing discipline, they can easily find traitors and discipline with the use of force, whereas groups lacking such political and social ties tend to have difficulty in identifying defectors, which often leads to civilian abuses (Weinstein, 2007, pp.10-2).30 Another related thesis on the structure of armed groups implies that members whose group is poorly organized may arbitrarily commit to civilian abuses because the group often lacks the mechanisms for efficiently identifying and punishing non-cooperators (Hultman, 2007, p.207; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006: Weinstein, 2007; Zahar, 2001). Additionally, groups that suffer from low revenues (Azam, 2002) and those that defy their own ill fame (Martin, McCarthy & McPhail, 2009, p.826)31 may also engage in violence against civilians to win their compliance.

Metelits, however, posits that these theses account for neither shifts in resource endowments nor in the group’s treatment of civilians (Metelits, 2010, p.23, 25). In

30 This is because the former, due to its shared identities or ideologies with the population, can construct relationships with civilians that allow its effective recruitment, extraction of resources and governance. On the other hand, the latter rarely constructs institutions with the local population that provide it with necessary information for effective control and the selective punishment of defectors. Since the infrastructure of this type of rebel group is based on the abundance of material goods and participants that are held together by material rewards (although the amount of necessary resources is supposed to be constant), these groups are permissive of civilian abuses in order to maintain their membership (Weinstein, 2007, pp.204-6).
31 Armed groups may also seek media attention and the opportunity to present their agenda to an audience (Lewis, 2000, McCormick & Giordano, 2007).
addition to the fact that resource endowments of groups in civil war often change due to factors such as the war situation and external support, the treatment of civilians may shift even when resources are constant. More significantly, these theories about armed organizations leave two questions unsolved: “Why does a single group adopt not only one measure but also combine multiple strategies ranging from voluntary recruitment to involuntary mobilization?” and “Why are the participants recruited differently by the group across regions?”

This study seeks to answer these questions by considering the observation that armed groups in civil war use multiple mobilization measures in combination according to context and by supporting the view that the manner of mobilization ranges from voluntary to involuntary recruitment which lies somewhere along a continuum representing a mix of both strategies. In this sense, mobilization strategies of armed groups go beyond Weinstein’s scope (i.e., voluntary recruitment that appeals to either material incentives or consistency of identities between the groups and recruits) and should be expanded to include involuntary mobilization. In this study, the Guatemalan case reveals that both the government and rebel forces mixed coercive mobilization with non-coercive mobilization; government forces not only recruited combatants but also

32 Metelits (2010) observes that some groups shift from solicitous to the violent treatment of civilians, and vice versa, even in cases where resources remain fixed. She rather argues that coerciveness of governance is a function of active rivalry between groups because, given that the presence of rivals and competition leads to a scarcity of resources, the “most efficient method of extracting resources quickly is through the use of force” (p.27). The groups, therefore, behave in a less coercive manner toward civilians when they are not faced with rivals (Metelits, 2009a, pp.10-1). Kasfir (2005) also observes that the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda could establish non-coercive democratic village management in territories it controlled when the NRA soldiers were secure and that it withdrew this commitment when it was under military pressure.

33 For the discussion of contractual and coercive civil-military relations, see Metelits (2009b).
obtained young males through coercive mobilization, and rebels also forced civilians to serve in their forces by hinting at the use of punishment for non-collaboration. The Cambodian case also shows that both the government and rebel groups relied not only on the non-coercive mobilization of combatants but also on coercive measures according to environment. The two cases differ from each other in terms of the characteristics of belligerents and civilians, but are identical in that similar processes of mobilization occurred. The perspective that contrasts voluntary and involuntary recruitment highlights the purposes of the armed groups more than does the view that merely distinguishes recruitment strategy based on material incentives from that based on identity.

*Theories of Control*

Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2008) survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone suggests that explanations of participation focusing on material and non-material benefits attracting volunteers are not applicable to forced recruits and that an alternate framework to capture both voluntary and forced recruitment is needed. However, while their survey sheds light on the contrast between voluntary and involuntary recruitment, these different mobilization strategies remain undertheorized in their empirical observation and even in the literature on recruitment in civil war (Eck, 2010, p.26). Theses focusing on territorial control by armed groups, nevertheless, offer an insightful view on the diversity of mobilization strategies that a single group may take and of pathways which civilians follow when they participate across situations. In addition, a benefit of introducing the concept of territorial control is that it allows us to reframe collective action so that we can
capture mobilization processes that range from voluntary recruitment to the coercive mobilization of combatants.

The theories of control in civil war provide a lead to answers to the questions previously posed (i.e., “Why does a single group adopt not only one measure but also combine multiple strategies ranging from voluntary recruitment to involuntary mobilization?” and “Why are participants recruited differently by the group across regions?”) by disaggregating the degree of territorial control and its impact on civil-military relations. Since civil-military relations in civil war should refer to civilians’ relationships with not only state militaries but also with rebel forces that often establish state-like governance, including collecting taxes, organizing policing and administering justice, a government and rebels are akin in their ways of controlling civilians. To capture the similar relationship between civilians and both government and rebels, Kalyvas conceptually identifies five zones according to the level of control assumed by either the government or the rebels. In the first, the government exercises full control in the zone and can prevent rebels and civilians from interacting. For the second, the government has secure but incomplete control in the zone where rebel activities are in operation, and guerrillas can occasionally visit by night. Similarly, third, the rebels’ stronghold (i.e., so-called base areas or liberated areas) is under full rebel command, which prevents government forces and cadres from entering the zone. Fourth, the rebels assume secure, but incomplete, control in some areas. And fifth, an intermediate zone exists in which both the government and the rebels can exercise equal leverage (Kalyvas, 2006, pp.211-3). Because of varied levels of control, political actors must deal with three types of populations: those who are under their full command, those who are under shared
command, and those outside of their control. Collaboration with certain actors is obtained from the population controlled, and often is arrived at through coercive measures in which most civilians tend to obey their ruler (non-followers are likely to be punished).\textsuperscript{34} This argument implies that the higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor and the lower the level of defection. In contrast, in an area contested by the government and rebels, most civilians are likely to take a position of fence-sitting or passive neutrality because they face the potential risk of being punished for desertion or even non-cooperation. Fence-sitting and passive neutrality, in this case, could involve helping both sides at the same time because threats of punishment from either or both sides spur collaboration even though many civilians would prefer to remain uninvolved (Kalyvas, 2006, pp.111, 132, 226-8).

These functions of territorial control do not discount the role of identity appeals, but rather can frame other reasons for civilians’ motivation for participating in armed forces. Armed forces seek to not only physically seize but also psychologically grasp local societies and civilians for the purpose of gaining the public support in zones under their control. This strategy is fundamental for armed groups not only because they can obtain provisions and material goods, but because their presence facilitates the mobilization of civilians. Even when armed forces do not have the capability of providing the local people with sufficient material benefits, their seizure of a society and the

\textsuperscript{34} Kalyvas (2006) raises additional mechanisms that translate control into collaboration: shielding, mechanical ascription, credibility of rule, the provision of benefits, monitoring, and self-reinforcing by products (p.124).
establishment of governance may enable them to generate non-material incentives through exclusive indoctrination.

The association of territorial control with identity appeals seems straightforward, although paradoxically so because these appeals may be replaced by other incentives offered by rival groups as their influence on the areas is enhanced.\(^{35}\) The assumption of this argument is that these appeals are considered less effective unless they accompany territorial control because most civilians are apolitical in that they are prone to attach more importance to surviving rather than dying a martyr to their cause (e.g., Kalyvas, 1999; Mason, 1989; Migdal, 1974; Tullock, 1971).

However, theories of control do not adequately predict how the character of civil-military relations differs across civil wars and pay scant attention to the internal structure of individual groups and their behavior. Although those theories specify patterns of interaction between armed groups and civilians that are believed to be observable across cases (e.g., Kalyvas’s modular “zones” framework), they dismiss the impact of particular membership and the structure of armed groups upon civil-military relations (Weinstein, 2007, pp. 258-9). Beyond these points, I problematize the uniform function of territorial control. Although theories of control assume that territorial control overcomes the incompatibility in ethnic, religious or ideological identities between an armed actor and civilians (and the former can draw collaboration from the latter), this study considers that it does not always transform civilians’ preferences and priorities based on their beliefs and experiences, or consistency with their groups.\(^{36}\) Rather, the following discussion is

\(^{35}\) It is observed that a sense of ethnic identity can also become blurred and civilians will then collaborate with armed forces of other ethnicities (Kalyvas, 2008).

\(^{36}\) For criticisms of theories of control from this perspective, see Metelits (2010).
based on the view that civilians who are motivated by these factors are less influenced even when controlled by those who are incompatible in identity.

*Perspective on Participants across Groups and Control*

Each of two major approaches to civil-military relations in civil war (i.e., organization theories and theories of control) addresses the issue of mobilization of civilians by armed groups. First, organization theories aim to explain why each armed group adopts a distinctive strategy of recruitment, focusing on their organizational endowments (e.g., resources), and imply that a specific strategy has a one-to-one correspondence with that group’s endowment. Weinstein (2007) reveals that a group rich in resources can employ strategy that arouses participants’ material interests and tends to attract opportunistic participants whose primary motivation is short-term (material) gains. In contrast, another group whose material resources are scarce relies on the recruitment of those who show consistency with the group in terms of ethnic, religious or ideological identities, and uses the promise of future rewards and appeals to the cooperate norms based on social networks. This study doubts this one-to-one correspondence between a group’s endowments and its recruitment strategy, and rather assumes that the group uses various mobilization measures simultaneously and in combination, ranging from voluntary recruitment to the involuntary mobilization of combatants. Second, theories of control imply that an armed group may have to use different recruitment strategies in different contexts because, as Kalyvas (2006) shows, it deals with three types of populations: those who are under its full command, those who are under shared command with its rivals, and those outside of its control. Civilian collaboration with the group comes from the
population that it controls, often through coercive measures. Although this thesis does not necessarily contradict the possibility that control facilitates the role of identity appeals in recruitment, it still maintains that the level of civilian collaboration with the group degrades, even if the relationship between the group and civilians is based on ethnic, religious, or ideological identity, as the level of territorial control lowers. However, I argue that the thesis overemphasizes the role of territorial control and dismisses the potential participants who would refuse to apostatize even under the control of a group that is incompatible with their identities. These gaps in the literature require us to explore why a single armed group in civil war employs multiple recruitment strategies according to contexts, with the focus being on the diversity in participants’ reactions toward territorial control by the group.

To capture both the multiple mobilization strategies of armed groups and the various ways that civilians join armed forces, this study pays greater attention to participants in the groups who would react differently to their environment across contexts than does the existing literature on recruitment in civil war. By shedding light on the variations in individuals’ mobilization, I address the questions that are as yet unanswered by organization theories of civil-military relations; that is, why does a single group adopt multiple strategies and why are the participants recruited differently by that group across regions? In addition, in reference to the differences in motivation between individuals, this study aims to cover the insufficient consideration that theories of control have given to the diversity in recruits’ patterns of behavior.

The following chapter attempts to capture how individuals respond to collective action in civil war. More specifically, because the value of participation in each action
will be determined by the following elements, the chapter explores how participants pay for their costs, how they respond (by referring to a willingness to pay for that collective action), and what costs they are willing to accept (Clawson & Knetsch, 1966). In civil war, participants’ costs are twofold. First, the cost of non-participation distinguishes collective action in civil war from that in other situations; civilians often face coercive mobilization by an armed group in which non-cooperation would entail an enormous risk of punishment by that group. Second, the cost of participation in an armed group also derives from the risk of punishment by the rival groups. As discussed above, it is true that those who do not arm themselves or are not protected by an armed group are vulnerable to assaults by other armed actors which make non-involvement in the group also costly. However, government soldiers are still the primary target of the rebels and rebel combatants are also a government’s main attack objective. In addition, both sides are in constant fear of defection by the population under their control because covert information disclosed by defectors may help the enemy determine such internal situations as the location of military bases and the strength of troops; therefore, each will exert all possible efforts to prevent defection and also identify and punish potential traitors. Civilians who intend to participate in the rebel group take into consideration the possibility of being punished by the government, and those who concern themselves with the government forces, likewise, comprehend the potential for being the rebels’ target.

The contingent valuation literature in economics often conducts a survey in order to elicit a consumer valuation at different hypothetical levels of cost (Bishop & Syme, 1995; Cameron, 1992; Green, 1992; Green, Kahneman, & Kunreuther, 1994; Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992; Portney, 1994).

Many massacres committed by the rebels are reported in villages where residents defected by joining newly formed militias (Kalyvas, 1999).
This association between costs and collective action does not deny the role of structural context. Rather, the cost of civilians’ enlistment is contingent on their environment. Civilians are more likely to support armed forces when their chances of detection and punishment by other groups decrease and the payoffs for their acts increase; any countermeasures that an armed group can take to diminish the risk of their participants’ being identified and punished by other groups should increase those residents’ willingness to cooperate with the group (Mason, 2004, p.166). Therefore, for instance, in a location within or near government-controlled areas, the cost of joining the rebels increases because the government can establish control to patrol in the area and easily identify spies and traitors.

Moreover, this study attempts to take a closer look at the issue of sensitivity to cost and how it differs among individuals, and to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary participants, whose costs and change in costs have been considered uniform in the existing literature. This perspective assumes that recruits who voluntarily join an armed group and are committed to their activities would be not only free from the cost of being punished as non-cooperators by their own group but also relatively insensitive to the cost of being punished by the rival group.\footnote{Findley & Young (2006) make a similar argument. They point out that Leites & Wolf (1970) neglect elasticity in their discussion concerning counterinsurgency.} In contrast, involuntary participants, who reluctantly join the group due to a greater risk of punishment for non-cooperation and are sensitive to the cost of taking sides with one of the armed groups, would be more likely to
join the group in a location that is strictly controlled by the group, but to reject an incentive to participate when its control becomes weak.  

**Conclusion**

Since the dilemma of mass mobilization in civil war is analogous to that in orthodox sociopolitical movements on some points, scholars have offered various solutions to the “paradox of revolution,” applying the framework of the collective action theory. It still can be noted that, in civil war, individuals’ risks and costs of participation are usually great and that mobilization strategies include not only persuasive but coercive means.

The recent literature on recruitment in civil war has tackled the research question that asks why individual armed groups assume specific mobilization strategies that corresponds one-to-one with the specific endowments and situations of the group. Organization theories of recruitment address this query by focusing on the resource endowments of groups and argue that different endowments attract different pools of recruits. Although the theories reveal that whether or not a group is rich in resources determines who participates in the group, they have left unanswered questions. That is, “Why does a single group adopt not only one measure but also combine multiple strategies ranging from voluntary recruitment to involuntary mobilization?” and “How are participants recruited differently by the group across regions?”

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40 In Weinstein’s (2007) terminology, a voluntary participant can be analogized with a high-commitment individual who is willing to make costly investments, and a reluctant participant with a low-commitment individual who seeks short-term gains. However, a voluntary participant may overlap a low-commitment individual, for example, when he/she participates in an armed force not for political reasons but for a “short-term” pecuniary gain.
It is important to note that theories of control in civil war provide certain insights to these questions. The theories emphasize the role of control and its association with civilian collaboration with armed forces, arguing that, if the level of control in a certain area is high, the level of civilian collaboration is also high. Territorial control, on the one hand, enables an armed group to exclusively mobilize combatants from its controlling zones, but on the other hand, lack of control prohibits the group from accessing civilians.

This argument is based on the assumption that civilians are hardly politically driven. Although there exists a large body of apolitical civilians who are willing to comply with a ruler that is incompatible with them in identity, this study does not view this assumption as unproblematic. Assuming that the primary cost of individuals’ participation in an armed group is punishment by rival groups and that the cost of non-participation is punishment by their own group, the analytical framework in the next chapter responds to the above questions. The model also presupposes that the costs of civilians’ participation and non-participation are subject to change according to their environment and that there is a difference in the sensitivity to costs among individuals. Employing this perspective, the following chapter provides a lead to filling the gap that has been left by the existing literature on recruitment in civil war.
Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

Introduction

As discussed in the last chapter, the literature on recruitment in civil war has advanced our understanding of why and how civilians participate in armed forces. The most recent theories (i.e., organization theories of recruitment and theories of control), in particular, have drawn our attention to recruitment strategies of armed forces and the diversity of contexts in civil war. However, assumptions in these theories still need to be reframed so that we can capture both a spectrum between the voluntary and involuntary recruitment of combatants and the variety in individuals’ patterns of response according to environment. Acknowledging these gaps in the existing literature, this chapter aims to establish a theoretical model and hypotheses pertaining to civilian participation and non-participation in armed forces during civil war. For this purpose, the following sections relate key findings and introduce critical associations for theoretical consideration, taking up such issues as rivalry between the government and rebel forces, armed forces’ control and violence, and coercive and non-coercive civil-military relations for discussion. In addition, to explore how various contexts differently motivate potential participants to join armed forces, I highlight the understanding that participants in armed forces are not homogeneous across contexts and that there exist those who act differently from what current theories of control assume.

The model discussed in this chapter assumes civil war involving two major parties, the government and rebels, that compete for the domestic popular support and recruits, and that these clearly differentiated parties have areas where each of them can
exclusively exert clout over civilians. I firstly reexamine current literature so as to establish implications reflecting the association between territorial control and participation in armed forces, assuming that if the area controlled by an armed group expands, the pool of available participants expands up to its limit, but that the group’s capacity for recruitment decreases toward the territorial boundary with the opponent-controlled area. I here take the “control” thesis as my basis material because, as the previous chapter points out, it provides useful insight suggesting why the armed group employs various mobilization strategies according to contexts. To show the variation in civilian participation, however, its framework, in which risk of punishment plays the deciding role, requires modifications.

Chapter 2 indicates that there are possibly civilians who would join armed groups purposively even under the severe condition of collective action in civil war. A model on civilian participation in civil war also needs to take into consideration the existence of potential participants who would enlist in forces and may defy punishment by the rival groups. Yet civilians are still a mix of many who are not committed to any party and a few who are committed to a specific party due to their consistency in identity. In the territories where government and rebel forces control most fully, the actor in control, though not completely, can more easily recruit participants and give sanction to potential defectors to the rival side.

The following expands on the argument that both sides rely on a combination of coerced participants and non-coerced participants, but prefer to rely on coercive measures of mobilization in places where they have great clout. Given that the armed group in question does not start with a large core of committed participants and that armed leaders
can employ different mobilization strategies for different types of recruits (i.e., non-coercive recruitment for committed ones and coercive recruitment for less committed ones), coerced recruitment is preferable because the enlistment of fewer voluntary participants may not suffice for the replacement of troops and reluctant participants. And when faced with coerced mobilization by the group, individuals tend to have a pressing reason to participate in order to avoid being punished by the group. I, therefore, develop these findings into a related hypothesis which holds that reluctant participants are major recruits to an armed group to a point of the group’s command beyond which voluntary participants replace them. When the group’s command weakens, a reluctant participant’s willingness to enlist with that group promptly decreases because he/ she faces not only the cost of non-participation (i.e., punishment by his/ her group) but also the cost of participation (i.e., punishment by rival groups).

Moreover, the following hypotheses consider the shifts in participants’ willingness to participate and sensitivity to the cost of participation. As the capacity of an armed group increases, participants in the group become less responsive to the cost of punishment by rival groups. And incentives based on identity increase the willingness of voluntary participants, but that of reluctant participants is increased rather by the threat of punishment for non-participation.

**Reconsidering Recruitment across Contexts**

*Competition and Rivalry*

This section and the following discussion aim to lay out some of the characteristics of civil war that this study assumes; that is, a government and rebels are in a competitive
relationship for the domestic popular support and recruits, and each of them has territorial areas in which they can exclusively govern civilians. These points significantly affect how armed forces attempt to collect their combatants; they tend to consider that all potential participants, except for those who are under the opponent’s exclusive control, are subject to mobilization. More importantly, both sides attempt not only to render their own mobilization of combatants feasible but also to render the rival’s mobilization infeasible through the provision of both material and non-material goods (e.g., security and freedom) to civilians, or the repression of those who collaborate with the rival.

Lichbach (1995a) applies theories of collective action to the study of conflict. Exploring the collective action problem that rebels encounter, he emphasizes the importance of state-society linkages since “collective dissent implies a challenge to the state’s domination of civil society” (Lichbach, 1995a, p.337). However, governments are not inactive actors, either; rather, they “engage in policies of social control to maintain their dominance and the dominance of their allies in civil society” (Lichbach, 1995a, p.337). In civil war, on the one hand, a government often attempts to decrease a rebel’s selective incentives by providing basic economic improvements, security and freedom or to increase the participants’ costs by repressing rebels and their supporters. On the other hand, rebel groups also attempt to counter the government by obtaining public support and, from this relationship, recruiting members (Weinstein, 2005, 2007). Mason, in his book dealing with the peasant rebellions, additionally describes the relationship:

The state and its revolutionary opposition compete with each other for the support of peasants and other non-elites by offering them variable mixes of rewards and
punishments. Each seeks to elicit behaviors that are supportive of its own claims to power and authority, and each seeks to deter behaviors that are supportive of its rival’s claims to power and authority (Mason, 2004, p.146).

Therefore, the government and rebel groups are in competition in that both of them try to obtain public support and recruit combatants, and that the government tries to break support links between the rebels and the civilians that provide supplies, sanctuary, and recruits for the rebellion (Findley & Young, 2007, p.380). Rebel groups also seek to monopolize collaboration from civilians and attempt to prevent the locals from collaborating with the government, they also try to encourage defection from the rival side (See Herbst, 2000, p.26; Kalyvas, 2006, p.104). This perspective is reflected in studies that deal with the competition between government and rebel groups over public support and recruitment (e.g., Azam, 2002; Gates, 2002; Grossman, 1995; McCormick & Giordano, 2007; Opp, 1991; Mason, 1996).

Since the relationship between a government and a rebel group is interactive, their success in the mobilization of combatants partially depends on the rival’s strategy. For instance, given that the government imposes some sanctions on the population, the relative importance of services and goods the rebels offer civilians also has an impact on the locals’ support for the rebels (Heath et al., 2000). It is also important that the rebels often elicit not merely cooperative behavior but empathy or a sense of camaraderie from the population as this can render the government’s militarized counterinsurgent

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41 Rebel capabilities may be determined by their ability to obtain support from the civilian population (Wood, 2010). Wood claims that weak rebel groups that lack these capabilities are unable to provide their supporters with sufficient material incentives to encourage voluntary collaboration.
operations, which create resentment against the incumbent, counterproductive (Young, 2007, pp.24-5). These findings suggest that popular support and recruitment in civil war need to be captured in a framework that takes into consideration the competitive relationship between the government and rebels. While the rebels attempt to arouse collaboration in potential supporters and participants through incentives such as the provision of security and wages or the appeal to identity, the effectiveness of services, goods and indoctrination is still contingent on the outcome of the government’s countermeasures and its ability to offer the same things because those measures are aimed at regaining the popular support and recruits from the rebels.

Despite objectives shared by the government and rebels, it would be incorrect to assume that these groups are of equal condition. First, as seen in their guerrilla strategies, rebel groups are often weaker than the government because the incumbent maintains superiority over its organized military, financial resources and institutionalized methods for mobilizing citizens (Mason, Fett, & Weingarten, 1999; Mason & Fett, 1996) and, therefore, tend to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy. While in weaker states, the opportunity costs for the rebels are lower and the possibilities of successful rebellion higher, stronger states can highly constrain the rebels’ opportunity structure (Pearce, 2005, p.161). 42 Second, however, in terms of the level of popular support required by the government and the rebels, while the government often needs to convince the population to cooperate by informing about and weakening rebel organizations, civilian passive

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42 In order to raise the government’s costs for fighting, weak rebels tend to engage in the killing of civilians. Hultman (2007) argues that this militarily cheaper and easier strategy may eventually impose costs on the government because such action challenges its authority, as the government is responsible for the protection of civilians, and also because it causes social disorder (p.206).
tolerance for the rebels commonly allows for their survival (Leites & Wolf, 1970; Mason, 2004). The rebels may also be at an advantage due to their greater level of local knowledge which can be attributed to their being more mobile than government forces. In a context involving linguistic diversity, because rebels often consolidate in areas where they also speak the local dialect, they are apt to become familiar with the people and, therefore, the interests of the population (McFate, 2006, p.57).

Uncertainty makes the situation even more complicated. Both the government and rebels are likely to rely on limited information regarding the opponent’s strength and the resources available to them, and thus potential effects of their strategies remain uncertain. The government’s misperception of the rebels’ strength, in particular, occurs when it fails to capture the local and social institutions that provide the rebels with support (Findley & Edwards, 2007, p.590), and incomplete information about those internal group structures and institutions may cause armed actors to initiate a conflict (Fearon, 1995). In consequence, both the government and rebels tend to use each other’s behavior as “guidance for their own actions” (Carey, 2006, p.3).

Metelits (2009a) broadly argues that “competition, or the presence of active rivalry, occurs when insurgent groups confront other organizations that extract from the same resource pool” (p.2). Considering the substantial differences in their capacities and possible strategies determined by evolving civil-military relations between the

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43 Therefore, scholars of counterinsurgency emphasize the importance of intelligence as one of the conditions for successful counterinsurgency practices (e.g., Sepp, 2005).
44 In his formal theory, Skaperdas (2002) shows that warlords compete for turf where taxable resources and rents from mines are available, and that the competition between them often results in “lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting” (p.435).
government and the rebels in the context of civil war, those issues should be discussed separately for each side and will be addressed in the following sections of the chapter.

*The Government*

Accommodative or “hearts and mind” counterinsurgent strategy is aimed at restoring the popular support for the government and preempting civilians from participating in or supporting rebel groups by providing civilians with political and economic benefits. While the effectiveness of the strategy depends upon the range of beneficiaries and the amount of benefits received, it is most successful when it renders the rebels unable to elicit support back from civilians (Mason, 2004, pp.146-9).

It is, however, necessary to mention the potential disadvantages of accommodative strategy. First, civilians are likely to take part in rebellious collective action when the government makes concessions to the rebels and those civilians consider dissident activities as a reasonable way to achieve their goals (Rasler, 1996; Muller & Opp, 1986). Second, it is ineffective in areas where the rebels destabilize local security because public services such as the building of schools, bridges and ditches cannot compensate for the loss of one’s life (Findley & Young, 2007, p.381). Third, the improvement of living standards may impair the government’s effort because economic improvements result in funds for the population that can then be plundered by the rebels for their own benefit (Findley & Young, 2007, p.381; Leites & Wolf, 1970, pp.20-1).

In the case in which the government is required to control civilians in its surveillance network because rebels may have infiltrated into the population, it will often rely on the mobilization of paramilitaries. These armed men, who are organized in groups
based on a military model of, and are dependent on, the existing armed forces, play a significant role not only in the maintenance of physical security but also in the gathering of information pertaining to guerrilla activity. However, restrictions imposed by them on civilians’ liberties, as well as their coercive nature in recruitment, may in fact undermine the popular support for the government (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1976).

As discussed in the preceding chapter, existing theories of recruitment in civil war consider that violence determines individuals’ priorities. Although economic opportunities may matter at the beginning of civil war, once the logic of violence comes to dominate people’s lives, individual survival becomes the priority for most (e.g., Kalyvas, 1999; Lichbach, 1995a, p.58). In this regard, the existence of violence often accounts for civilians’ collaboration with and participation in armed forces, and state repression, in particular, yields various reactions on the part of the rebels. It does not necessarily bring an end to rebellion but leads nonviolent activists to shift tactics from dissent to violent insurgency because it may leave rebel leaders no alternative but to arm themselves (Francisco, 2000; Garrison, 2008, p.130). Since an organized social movement has already overcome the collective action problem, it is relatively easy for its leaders to organizationally resort to resistance (Mason, 2004, p.145).

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45 Aguilera Peralta & Beverly (1980) distinguish such paramilitary groups from irregular groups, which are military groups “acting with structural, tactical, and strategic autonomy from the regular army and police” (p.110).
46 In such a situation, civilians may tolerate the activities of militias (Kowalewski, 1992, pp.71-3). It is also observed that, in the mid and late 1980s, those who were exposed to guerrilla assaults tended to support civil patrollers in Guatemala.
47 Repression is “behavior that is applied by governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties” (Davenport, 2000, p.6). For the literature on state repression, see Francisco, 1995, 1996; Hibbs, 1973; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998; Opp, 1994; Opp & Roehl, 1990; Rasler, 1996; Sherman, 1993; Tilly, 1978.
Government violence\(^{48}\) is considered to be counterproductive also when it arouses grievances among the population, especially if it is perceived as indiscriminate (Anderson, 2005, pp.46-7; Hashim, 2006, pp.99-104; Kalyvas, 2006, p.155; Tishkov, 2004, p.142). Therefore, the rebels may intend to provoke state overreaction in government-controlled areas where their influence is shaky (Lyall, 2009, p.335).\(^{49}\) However, to automatically make a connection between the government’s indiscriminate repression and civilians’ collaboration with the rebels may be a logical flaw because it assumes that the rebels can always afford to protect vulnerable civilians (Wood, 2010). In addition, the effect of indiscriminate regime violence is conditional on the capability and structure of the rebel group, and such violence initially makes civilians merely indifferent in their support for either the government or the rebels (Moore, 1995, p.434).\(^{50}\)

The Rebels

The rebels are a subset of the population and recruits usually come from the set of civilians. This implies not only that counterinsurgent operations that target the rebels embroil civilians as collateral victims, but also that the rebels depend on the same

\(^{48}\) Indiscriminate violence occurs when its selection criteria are blurred (Kalyvas, 2006, p.148).

\(^{49}\) The rebels may choose to sit back and watch the government’s indiscriminate violence against civilians who have been unfriendly to them (Kalyvas, 2006, pp.157-8).

\(^{50}\) The causal relationship is also undetermined because we do not have enough counterfactual evidence (that is, an increase in the number of rebel troops given the absence of state indiscriminate violence) and clues to show direct causality, rather than indirect through some intervening variables. Lyall (2009) argues that indiscriminate state violence erodes rebel resources through forcible population resettlement because it reduces the population that functions as a rebel’s tax base and guarantees its supply lines, and it imposes constraints on the rebels if civilians blame them for inaction against state violence, and then if the rebels need to change current tactics in order to prevent civilian defections (pp.333-4, 336-8).
population for their supply of support, which varies with the phase of civil war and organizational and territorial needs (Lilja, 2009, pp.309-10). In fact, while territorial control allows rebels to procure materials, human resources, and information from civilians under their control, methods of control largely vary with the degree to which the rebels depend on civilians for those supplies. The day-to-day contact with fellow civilians, moreover, allows the rebels to establish social norms, public services and physical security (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2011; Kalyvas, 1999) to mobilize civilians by providing an alternative framework for the incumbent (Findley & Young, 2007, pp.384), and to receive better information about the activities of opposing armed forces through the local networks formed by their civil support groups (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2007).

The rebels often attempt to establish state-like governance, which includes the collection of taxes, organization of policing, administration of justice, and drafting of combatants, particularly in areas where their control is solid (Kalyvas, 2006, p.219). The rebels’ incentive to build formal structures of governance over civilians varies with their available resources (they are driven by the need to organize civilian labor for realizing economic gains from natural resources and agricultural products) and purpose. In order to maintain a cooperative relationship with civilians, the rebels are often required to establish governmental systems that may share such characteristics as: 1) a structure for joint governance, involving both the rebels and civilians in decision-making processes; 2) restraint on the rebels’ extraction of resources; and 3) reinforced cooperation through

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51 For instance, the rebels’ strategy of control is determined by information (Kalyvas, 2006), finances (Weinstein, 2007), their violence as a signaling device (Hultman, 2007), or constituent pressure (Mampilly, 2007).
shared beliefs and repeated interaction between both groups (Weinstein, 2007, pp.169-71, 173).

In addition to the establishment of government-like systems, rebels often rely on loosely organized social institutions (Findley & Edwards, 2007, p.587). Those institutions include complex social networks, training programs, and supply lines or material sources, and therefore, tend to co-exist with other institutions so that the rebels can increase their substantial support-base, take advantage of local societies (e.g., villages) to mobilize the civilians, and promote allegiance and norms in their favor (Findley & Edwards, 2007, pp.588-90; Mason, 2004, p.109).

It is reasonable to consider that the rebels’ capabilities vary according to their degree of control. Rebel groups are likely to have greater access to information and resources in their own strongholds, whereas they are denied this advantage in areas where the government dominates. In regards to control in civil war, armed actors resort to violence as an effective means of command in situations that lack sufficient military resources for the establishment of total control (Kalyvas, 2006, p.145). While indiscriminate violence both by the government and the rebels is unlikely in each of their full-control areas, where they face less uncertainty, it is more likely in the contested areas where both actors attempt to make civilian defection to the other side costly because they lack reliable information and the identification of traitors is based on precarious speculations (Kalyvas, 1999).

Willingness to Participate in Civil War
In this section, I restructure some of the implications from the above discussion, in order to not only draw up a hypothesis but also lay out material that will be expanded upon in the following sections.

Following the above discussion, both government and rebel groups compete with each other not only for triumph over the adversary but for support and recruits from the population. On the one hand, the government tries to increase the civilian cost of collaborating with rebel forces as well as the benefit of collaborating with the government forces; but, on the other hand, the rebels attempt to increase the civilian cost of collaborating with the government forces and also the benefit of furthering the cause of the rebel forces.

With regard to participants in civil war, the decision to join armed forces depends upon how they will act strategically according to the costs of participation and nonparticipation. Considering the scramble for collaborators between belligerents in civil war, a significant cost of an individual’s participation in an armed group is punishment by a rival group in its attempt to find enemies, as well as the cost of punishment by the group that controls him/her for non-cooperation. As both the government and the rebels fear defection by the population, they each will attempt to identify and punish potential traitors. Those who participate in government forces weigh the possibility of being punished by the rebels, and individuals who join the rebel group are therefore the government’s targets. In reference to civilians’ participation as combatants in civil war, the level of their willingness to enlist in armed forces represents how much cost they can
bear for participation in such risky collective action that may entail death in battle and repression.\textsuperscript{52}

Thus, civilians are more likely to collaborate with an armed group when their chances of detection and punishment by other groups are low or decrease. As Mason (2004) argues, countermeasures that the group can take to reduce the risk of their participants being identified and punished by other groups should increase the willingness of those civilians to cooperate with the group (p.166). For instance, in a location within or near government-controlled areas, the cost of joining the rebels increases because the government can establish itself to patrol in the area and easily identify spies and traitors. Likewise, within or near areas under rebel command, the cost of participating in government forces is high.

This relationship between control and competition accounts for the number of civilians who potentially participate or do not participate in an armed group; Figure 3.1 illustrates the previous discussion. If we suppose that the government and the rebel forces compete for the population divided into four patterns of collaboration, (I), (II), (III) and (IV), in which civilians collaborate if their willingness for collaboration exceeds the costs of punishment by a rival group, the size of each segment is contingent on the structural contexts in civil war. The population in each pattern of collaboration comprises potential participants in an armed group. For instance, in a stronghold of the government, the cost of participating in government forces ($C_G$) is relatively low and the perpendicular line of

\textsuperscript{52} As Klandermans (1985) suggests, willingness to participate is different from actual participation because willingness is theoretically one of the conditions for actual participation. However, it is also true that, prior to individuals’ actual participation, there are almost no better indicators available for researchers. Also for organizers, estimations of willingness have a significant meaning in determining their strategy. In this sense, willingness to participate should be considered relevant on its own.
C_G shifts to the left. At the same time, since the cost of participating in rebel forces is very high due to the high possibility of denunciation, C_R shifts upward. The context in the stronghold of the government consequentially increases the population (III) and diminishes the population (I) (the changes in the size of (II) and (IV) depend on the ratio of shifts in C_G and C_R). In contested areas, civilians are more indifferent as to their preference for the government forces or the rebel forces, given that their priority is survival and that the cost for siding with either group becomes low. This shift results in a decrease in the size of the neutral population (IV) and an increase in the flunkeyist population (II) by keeping both (I) and (III) constant, provided that the ratio of shifts between C_G and C_R is the same. Beyond the area at which the government exerts greater clout, the lines of C_G that are gradually revised to the right and C_R revised downward diminish the size of potential participants in the government forces and expand the pool of recruits for the rebel forces.\(^{53}\)

The above findings coincide with the environments surrounding civilians in civil war. While civilians would prefer remaining uninvolved to being caught in the crossfire between armed groups, the structure of the war forces them to support one, or even accommodate both, group(s)\(^{54}\) because it does not allow them to remain neutral.\(^{55}\)

\(^{53}\) This model belongs to the studies that resemble the competition over “market” shares between opposing armed actors (DeNardo, 1985; Leites & Wolf, 1970; Mason, 1996; Tullock, 1971). Garrison (2008) also takes into consideration the population of competing sides and their attributes in order to examine the changes in the sizes of supporters.

\(^{54}\) For instance, when demanded (or threatened) by an armed group, civilians often have to provide the group with supplies including food, water and shelter.

\(^{55}\) Civilians often support both groups because the armed forces are able to manipulate civilians’ short-term estimates of fear and gain, thereby giving them reason to resort to aiding both sides (Mason, 2004, pp.146, 159).
Hypothesis 1: The pool of available participants expands up to its limit as the area controlled by an armed group expands, but the group’s capacity for recruitment decreases toward the territorial boundary with the opponent-controlled area.

Figure 3.1 Patterns of Civilian Collaboration

(I): Civilians collaborating with the rebels
(II): Civilians collaborating with both
(III): Civilians collaborating with the government
(IV): Civilians collaborating with neither

$W_G$: Willingness to collaborate with the government
$W_R$: Willingness to collaborate with the rebels
$C_G$: Cost of collaborating with the government
$C_R$: Cost of collaborating with the rebels

56 For the original discussion of this figure, see Breidert (2006).
Disaggregating Participants

Underlying Assumptions in the Literature

The preceding section has examined how civilians would collaborate with armed forces in civil war according to identified structural contexts. The extent to which armed forces control civilians is significant because it determines the size of the population that sides with the forces. That is, an armed force’s superiority in the area under its control results in an expansion in the population that supports the group. Theories of control are advantageous in that they can capture the change in support bases across regions; while a group wins a large support base in areas where it exclusively controls, it does not in areas which its rivals seize. Control by armed forces, therefore, determines the size of the population collaborating with them. The underlying assumptions in this argument are not only that civilians are submissive to those who rule them, often through violence, but also that they react accordingly to minimize the possibility of punishment by their rulers. However, given that the competition for support bases between armed groups is not zero-sum (for instance, as in Figure 3.2, there exist people who collaborate with the rebel forces near or within the government’s area), an answer to the following is not evident: Is civilian participation in a rebel group in its stronghold motivated by the same incentives as participation in the group near or within the government’s stronghold? With regard to civilian participation in armed forces, this study raises this question and emphasizes the need to distinguish reluctant and voluntary participants, who differ in their sensitivity to cost of participation. The following sections consider how these individuals are mobilized across the structural contexts.
Figure 3.2 Civilian Collaboration across Territory of Control

(I): Civilians collaborating with the rebels
(II): Civilians collaborating with both
(III): Civilians collaborating with the government
(IV): Civilians collaborating with neither

Reluctant and Voluntary Participants

According to Kalyvas, a coercive measure of governance, which sometimes entails even violence, is superior in terms of cost performance to the provision of selective incentives (Kalyvas, 2006, p.165). Although Weinstein goes beyond the following statement, he also considers governance shared by both (rebellious) armed groups and civilians costly:

…governance presents significant costs that some groups are unwilling to bear.

Participatory governance, for example, imposes logistical constraints on the operations of a still-emerging insurgency. Rebel commanders find themselves responsible not only for the needs and safety of their units but also for those of civilians, who present their own demands to the rebel leadership, possibly threatening the flexibility of rebel leaders to make strategic choices important to
their organizations’ survival. Shared governance implies a partial loss of command and control, moreover, making rebel decisions subject to the influence of civilians (Weinstein, 2007, p.171).

However, for Metelits (2009a), “contractual relations” with civilians are less costly and preferable to coercive measures for the armed groups because those relations enable them to extract resources more efficiently and to count on a steady supply of resources (p.2). As previously discussed, not only the government but also the rebels provide security and public goods, and even establish local institutions.

There is much evidence to indicate that armed forces in civil war need to use both measures in combination according to context. When an armed group is small and the proportion of supporters with strong commitment is relatively large, the group does not even have to resort to coercive measures because their dedication is credible. The amassing of combatants is in fact often initiated with the recruitment of those members because sufficient numbers of such motivated and dedicated combatants guarantee the quality of troops. Those groups of people tend to be risk-accepting in that they dare to take part in an inchoate collective action that may fail and comprise part of the population of “high-commitment” collaborators57 (Weinstein, 2007, pp.8-9). The proportion of those collaborators to uncommitted individuals is likely to remain constant because armed groups seek “active collaboration from a small number of dedicated supporters and passive but exclusive collaboration from the population at large” (Kalyvas, 2006, p.104).

57 Weinstein defines high-commitment individuals as those who “are dedicated to the cause of the organization and willing to make costly investments today in return for the promise of rewards in the future” (Weinstein, 2007, p.9).
Moreover, the participation of more risk-acceptant combatants who usually join first (i.e., a critical mass of existing members) “reduces the risks of penalties for subsequent recruits and enhances the group’s prospects of victory, eventually inducing more risk-averse sympathizers to join as well” (Mason, 2004, p.167; See also Lichbach, 1995a, pp.114-6).

However, as the group grows and its territorial control expands, not only is a sophisticated structure of governance warranted, but also the expansion of governance eventually leads to an increase in the number of those who passively collaborate with the group. Due to the expansion in the number of those who are less committed, such governance, which is observed in government- or rebel-controlled areas, requires more than contractual rules in order to achieve collaboration and prevent the defection of residents, that is, it necessitates coercive measures as well.

The government and rebels thus employ different mobilization strategies for different purposes and balance those strategies according to contexts; they can rely on contracts to recruit committed individuals, but may have to resort to more coercive measures to prevent less committed individuals from leaving. Following Weinstein’s (2007) view that participatory or shared governance with civilians is costly for armed groups that control certain areas, these groups are likely to use coercion to mobilize their combatants in places where they can establish influence. Given that the enlistment of voluntary participants does not suffice for the replacement of troops, coercive mobilization, whether it is semi-conscription or not, is often efficient in such a context. In other words, they do not have to necessarily pursue hearts and minds to further the war.
effort because their compelling power will eventually render civilians’ cooperation certain.

Figure 3.3 illustrates these arguments. Suppose that a rebel group seizes complete control at $P_0$ and its control weakens toward the areas controlled by the government. For the reasons discussed above, individuals would have strong reasons to participate in the rebel forces at $P_0$. In other words, civilians are more likely to support an armed group when their chances of detection and punishment by the rival group are limited and the payoffs for their collaboration are relatively high. However, as a location moves toward government-controlled areas, the cost of joining the rebels increases because the government can patrol in the areas and easily identify spies and traitors. An individual’s willingness to join the rebel forces, consequently, is lowered near the government’s areas.

![Figure 3.3 Willingness for Participation in Civil War](image-url)

Willingness to Participate in Rebel Forces

Cost of Participation in Rebel Forces

$W_A$ $P_0$ $P_1$ $P_2$
The rate at which the willingness to participate in the rebel forces declines as the cost of participation increases would vary between individuals. For individuals’ participation in armed forces, there exist two differentiated types of declining rates. First, individuals who are indifferent to siding with a particular group and sensitive to the risk of punishment by the rival group immediately lose their willingness for participation as the cost increases. However, second, those whose willingness relatively persists differ from the first type of individuals in that their commitment to the group’s activities or goals abates their sensitivity to the risk of punishment by the rival group. These individuals are assumed to be those who are eager to collaborate with the group. In this sense, a participant who willingly volunteers for armed forces would be relatively insensitive to cost of participation (See Findley & Young, 2006). In contrast, a reluctant participant, who joins the forces mostly in order to avoid punishment by those in command, would be more likely to join the forces in a location under their strict control, but to reject a motive to participate with them when their control weakens. They are, therefore, likely to keep their distance from the rebels in places where the rebels are contested by the government or where the government can effectively repress them. As Gates (2002) argues, recruits from contested areas are the most expensive for armed forces to maintain because such combatants are likely to defect to other sides. A better strategy of mobilization in contested areas, therefore, is not to rely on all potential

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58 In Weinstein’s (2007) terminology, a voluntary participant can be largely analogized with a high-commitment individual, while a reluctant participant may not only be an individual who is coerced to participate but even a low-commitment individual.
recruits but to search for committed participants.\textsuperscript{59} Consequentially, in areas where the government seizes firm control of local villages, rebel recruits would be only voluntary participants who are relatively less sensitive to the cost they might sustain and strongly committed to rebellion because of preferences and priorities based on their beliefs and experiences or ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological consistency with the group (Findley & Young, 2007, p.383).

\textit{Proposition 1: A reluctant participant in an armed force is more sensitive to the cost of participation than a voluntary participant.}

The pool of voluntary participants is, however, generally small\textsuperscript{60} although an armed group can usually supply itself with additional participants as the need arises. Given that committed civilians first respond to the group’s effort of recruitment, the leaders do not have to resort to coercion to recruit those participants but rather wait for them to enlist. While there is the information asymmetry between armed leaders and civilians in terms of the identification of committed recruits, the leaders can often solve this problem through the collection of information about recruits’ past behavior, reliance on their reputation, and screening by induction (Weinstein, 2005, pp.606-7).

However, in contrast, it is efficient for the leaders to use coercive measures to mobilize uncommitted participants. When the armed force cannot increase troops through processes of voluntary recruitment and seeks to mobilize those uncommitted participants

\textsuperscript{59} The population of such people may sometimes consist of potential political entrepreneurs, who organize themselves against the ruler (Moore, 1995, pp.440-1).
\textsuperscript{60} See Lichbach (1995b).
in their strongholds, the conscripted are less likely able to reject the mobilization effort without justifiable reason because those found to be uncooperative might be regarded as enemies and even punished by the ruler. Participants always take into consideration the risk of joining military activities, but, in this type of situation, the relative cost of participation is diminished because withholding assistance from the armed group would be much more costly. In locations where the force exclusively interacts with civilians, unchallenged control of the group enables it to effectively detect and punish non-support and betrayal. The possibility that these uncommitted-recruits may be punished by the group for non-cooperation serves to strengthen the willingness for them to join. Unless the force is incapable of hinting at the use of coercion, the constraint on a reluctant participant at the point of full control is greater and, therefore, has a greater impact on his/ her enlistment than does that on those who have voluntarily joined in advance.

**Proposition 2:** In the stronghold of an armed force, the willingness of a reluctant participant to join the group is greater than that of a voluntary participant.

**Implications**

Considering the proposition that a reluctant participant is more sensitive to the cost of participation and has a greater motive to join armed forces at the initial point than a voluntary participant, the levels of these recruits’ willingness for participation are reversed at P₁. This implies that reluctant participants in armed forces are more salient than voluntary participants between P₀ and P₁ because the former’s willingness is greater than that of the latter, and mobilizing the former is a less costly strategy for armed forces.
In contrast, voluntary participants come to be salient between \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \), which is the intersection point between the line plotting the level of their willingness for participation and \( W_A \) (armed forces set a limit on participants’ motivation so that they can screen trustworthy combatants). Given that armed forces are familiar with both the typical distribution of willingness for participation and its rate of change for the two pools of potential participants (i.e., the committed and uncommitted), they (the forces) are likely not to underestimate but to overestimate the size of each pool in designated areas and will continue to employ their mobilization strategies accordingly to each type of recruit.

**Hypothesis 2:** Reluctant participants are major recruits to an armed group up to a point of command of the group beyond which voluntary participants replace them.

The change in a potential participant’s belief in the degree of danger of being involved in a military activity shifts his/her willingness for participation. The believed danger may increase when one faces events such as the presence of opponent forces, the failure of an action, or unfavorable military reports. Since a favorable predisposition toward one’s relative safety in war is vital in mobilization, armed forces make every effort to develop this attitude as much as possible within their groups. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, for example, had initiated its military activities with a small number of core members in 1975, but had been suffering from difficulties in mobilizing new recruits from the rural population. The TPLF’s troop size increased five-fold in the early 1980s when the group succeeded in shifting a motivation of potential followers; the group convinced them that it was capable enough to militarily
defeat the incumbent (Young, 1998: 124-5). Moreover, Wood (2003) finds that Salvadoran rebels attempted to shift civilians’ perceived values toward enlistment through discussion and persuasion; they not only spread news of government atrocities but also persuaded potential participants that the costs of participation were less than thought (pp.271-2). Both groups attempted to make their recruits insensitive to the risk of punishment and retaliation by the government forces. This shift in sensitivity to the potential cost of participation generates an additional effect on recruitment by allowing an armed group to recruit extra combatants who would not have previously participated near the rival’s area where their perceived cost largely exceeded their willingness to participate.

A potential participant thus evaluates the potential danger based on the capacity of the group, including both the number of other participants and fighting capability. The capacity of an armed group fluctuates throughout civil war because of both endogenous changes in the group’s strategies and exogenous changes in the military environment. For instance, the entry of new belligerents, major battlefield victories/losses or developments in war technology can cause strategy shifts and eventually re-order relationships between political actors and civilians (Wood, 2010, p.605). An individual, whether participating in an armed group reluctantly or voluntarily, becomes less sensitive to the cost of participation as the capacity of the group increases and more sensitive as the capacity of the group decreases.

**Hypothesis 3:** A greater capacity of an armed group makes (potential) participants less responsive to an increase in the cost of participation.
Participants’ motivation may diminish when their priority changes. For instance, Korf (2006) claims that the rebels in Sri Lanka were more willing to fight in the early stage of the civil war, but they became less enthusiastic about defeating their enemies later on because their incentives based on pride and grievance switched to those deriving from greed (pp.119-20).

To prevent their combatants from losing motivation, armed forces, for instance, by promoting the willingness and commitment of their other members, attempt to convince potential participants that their activities are justifiable, and thereby show their own participation to be self-rewarding. While incentives such as wages and loot or basic public services, including order and security, may win support from a broader population of apolitical civilians (Mason, 1989; Migdal, 1974, Tullock, 1971), identity appeals are more likely to arouse motivation in potential voluntary participants, in particular.

_Hypothesis 4: Selective incentives based on consistency in identity with an armed group increase the ratio of (potential) voluntary participants’ willingness to participate to a certain level of the cost of participation._

As discussed, armed groups may also mobilize combatants through some forms of coercion by hinting at or exercising punishment for non-cooperation. The willingness for potential reluctant participants to participate will rise if the groups effectively inform those who are under their control that a refusal to participate is directly linked with punishment.
Hypothesis 5: The probable punishment of non-participants by an armed group increases the ratio of (potential) reluctant participants’ willingness to participate to a certain level of the cost of participation.

Figure 3.4 Shifts in Willingness for Participation in Civil War

The results of the increase in both the strength of an armed group and incentives (for committed individuals)/constraints (for uncommitted individuals) are shown in Figure 3.4. The impact of the increase in the group’s strength (i.e., the slopes are less steep) is greater when the cost of participation is greater, while the range of the increase
in willingness to participate caused by incentives/constraints (level of willingness for participation moved upward) remains constant at all levels of cost. This may imply that while there is no significant difference in the impact of rewards for participation and the risk of punishment for non-participation on participants between areas, a stronger armed force is more appealing to potential participants who are close to contested areas than to those who are in its strongholds because, in an uncertain situation (i.e., the absence of a dominant ruler), the group’s strength (rather than exclusiveness of control), which is connected with the ability to provide security, becomes a significant indicator for civilians (even for potential voluntary participants due to the increasing cost of participation) to determine whether or not they should side with the group. As a result of the increase in all of these factors, the range in which a reluctant participant’s willingness exceeds that of a voluntary participant expands (from $P_1$ to $P_1'$) as the entire range of possible mobilization expands (from $P_2$ to $P_2'$). In addition, the new point at which the lines intersect represents a higher level of willingness for participation than does the original point.\footnote{The increase in only one of the factors, i.e., incentives/constraints or military capacity, leads not to the expansion from $P_1$ to $P_1'$ but merely to the increase in level of willingness at the intersection point.} A participant in the armed group, therefore, shows greater willingness for joining, even if he/she is reluctant, until the cost of participation comes to exceed his/her willingness.

A disproportionate shift is likely when the perceived cost of participation goes up and the increase in incentives/constraints is not large enough to surpass the original level of willingness to participate. This result tends to occur when a person is sensitive to the cost of participation (e.g., because a group they may join is extremely weak) despite
higher motivation. Such a situation might be analogized with a group using terrorist measures that is able to retain individuals due to identity-based selective incentives it can offer potential participants or the possibility of punishment for non-collaboration but is militarily weak,\textsuperscript{62} whereby the pool for recruits in the group tends to be easily exhausted. Therefore, such a group would seek to strengthen its military capacity and expand the territory it controls in order to make itself accessible to more potential participants.

It is also important to note that the disproportionate shift in incentives/constraints between reluctant and voluntary participants changes the extent of involuntary and voluntary recruitment. That is, the increasing willingness of uncommitted recruits to participate through credible punishment, voluntary participants’ motivation being constant, signals an armed group that forced recruitment would be an efficient mobilization strategy. Similarly, the increase in voluntary participants’ incentives informs the group that voluntary recruitment would be appropriate and consequentially enlarges the extent of voluntary-based recruitment. The proportion of combatants who voluntarily enlist and who are coerced to participate in the group is thus contingent on such triggers as the threat of negative sanctions and the presence of positive incentives. Furthermore, a scramble for recruits between armed groups is influenced by their seizure of territory and military capability. Although I base the model on the initial settings displayed by the propositions (i.e., differences in willingness to join armed forces between voluntary and reluctant participants), how many of the specific types of participants are actually

\textsuperscript{62} Military strength or weakness of an armed group is relative (e.g., Wood, 2010). For example, it is possible that a “stronger” rebel group among other rebel groups across a country can be weak if the government forces in a given country are more militarily capable than the group. For this reason, the military strength of the group is independent of the material or social endowments contested by its rivals.
distributed between the groups heavily depends on a variable assemblage of these factors.  

Like the shift in the level of incentives/constraints, a decrease in perceived cost does not always bring about a greater willingness for participation. These changes result in willingness irresponsive to the cost of participation, but its values may shift entirely lower. This implies that an imbalance in a group between military strength and unpopularity, or the ineffective control of civilians, forces the group to recruit relatively less dedicated individuals from a wider context. This situation makes a group more vulnerable to the loss of territory it controls in terms of accessibility to potential participants because it largely has to rely on a pool of future combatants who are available from a wider area but less committed. Unless the group can provide any incentives based on identity to attract potential participants, it is likely to resort to harsher coercive measures to mobilize reluctant participants in its stronghold once it starts losing its access to a population of civilians in contested areas.  

The presence or absence of access to potential participants by armed groups is determined by a range of territorial control. Tactical military decisions may determine shifts in control. For example, changes may be brought on by the decision of the government to drive the rebels from a certain village and occupy it. When the rebels lack

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63 For the proportion of recruits forced versus non-forced, Beber & Blattman (2010) explore the extent to which 39 African rebel groups strategically used forced recruitment as a recruitment strategy. Eck (2010) also examines the balance between voluntary and involuntary recruitment in the Nepali Maoist group, using a measure of the number of persons abducted.  
64 This exact point may coincide with Weinstein’s (2007) argument that rebel groups with little social endowments are more likely to use coercive measures against civilians. In addition, my discussion partially agrees with Wood’s (2010) point that less capable groups tend to resort to civilian abuses.
the capability to counter such an invasion, which commonly occurs, they often flee with a number of local collaborators. The village, however, remains a contested area if the rebels decide to persist in the surrounding area and engage in counterattacks against the government forces. But when the rebels decide to leave the area, the village will come under full control of the government (that is, “consolidation of control”) (Kalyvas, 2006, p.213). Inversely, consolidation of rebel governance, whether relatively formal or not, occurs when the rebels replace local state institutions with their own structure of governance (Tilly, 1978, pp.191-2), which usually (but not always) entails the protection of civilians, the maintenance of security and stability, and the promotion of economic well-being (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p.35). Goodwin (1997) and Wolf (1969) argue that the rebels can establish bases in areas where they are secured from government forces and can provide residents with selective benefits.65

The range of an armed group’s controlling area can be theoretically extended from $P_0$ to $P_A$ at the maximum because it represents the areas where reluctant participants are available for the group. Since the area beyond $P_A$ is more contested with other groups and there exist no civilians who can be exclusively mobilized, a force must rely on the recruitment of voluntary participants within that location. The range of area controlled by the armed group often falls between $P_0$ and a certain point between $P_0$ and $P_A$ due to their competition with other groups, although the influence of the group does not equally

65 In addition, Koc-Menard (2007) empirically shows that the rebels are unlikely to consolidate in areas where counterinsurgent forces are strong and that they are also unlikely to control regions where the level of political pluralism is high, but likely to consolidate in regions where counterinsurgent forces are weak and the level of political pluralism is low.
extend over the area, while its clout incrementally downgrades toward the opponent-controlled areas.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed how civilians’ willingness to participate in armed groups is formed and how it fluctuates according to the structural contexts in civil war that reflect the rivalry between the government and rebels over the popular support and recruits. The level of participants’ willingness for participation does not remain constant, but rather shifts over time and space. Even individuals who intend to participate in a rebel group, due to their identities or beliefs, weigh the possibility of being punished by the government, and those who support the government forces recognize that they are the rebels’ target. The cost of siding with a group (i.e., punishment by a rival group) eventually exceeds the advantage of collaboration (i.e., obtainment of selective rewards and avoidance of punishment by their group, respectively). Under such circumstances is civilians’ willingness to participate in armed forces strengthened or weakened by a groups’ ability to guarantee their relative safety, the provision of identity-based selective incentives, and the threat of punishment of nonparticipation.

The discussion in this chapter is based on several assumptions and is restricted to civil wars that involve the government and rebels both competing for domestic popular support and recruits and also possessing territorial areas where each party can exclusively control civilians. Furthermore, not only are those civilians assumed to consist of many who are indifferent to either party and a few who are committed to a specific side, but also voluntary participants equated with those recruits who are committed due to
consistency in identity with recruiters (and exclude uncommitted ones, in this meaning).

There are several justifications for these assumptions. First, local environments in civil war often reduce rivalry to a bipolar conflict between two distinctive actors who are influential due to their control over civilians (Kalyvas, 2006, p.208). Second, civilians tend to provide accommodation to both warring actors unless they are faced with the threat of punishment for such provision of favors. And third, whether or not volunteers are initially motivated by purposes unrelated to the goal of collective action, a certain consistency of identity would be necessary for them to choose which group to join.

However, it is still necessary to note that the model presented in this chapter does not represent the entire complexity in civil war. Rather, modeling the civil-military relations aims to establish a baseline to assess its explanatory ability against empirical findings. In this sense, this study, like others, accommodates some findings that deviate from the model. Empirical analyses following the current chapter not only test the hypotheses but also clarify those deviations.

In Chapter 4, narrowing the scope to a limited field, I focus on the differences in civil-military relations between the government-controlled and rebel-controlled areas that coexisted in the Cambodian Civil War. Chapter 5 deals with chronological shifts in structural contexts and civilians’ reaction to them in the Guatemalan Civil War, and Chapter 6 quantitatively analyzes the impact of the above determinants on the total size of rebel groups across cases of civil war.
Chapter 4: Cambodia, 1970-75

Introduction

The July 26, 2010 Cambodian war crimes tribunal verdict against Tuol Sleng prison director Kaing Guek Eav marked the first time that the United Nations-backed court had convicted a former Khmer Rouge official for crimes committed against humanity by the 1975-79 regime. The decision inevitably shed light on the regime’s rule over the country during that timeframe. Despite having turned to the mass murder of civilians after militarily defeating its enemies, the Khmer Rouge had nevertheless initially engendered wide popular support during the Cambodian Civil War of 1970-75.

Because the majority of Khmer Rouge recruits suffered from debt, landlessness and poverty, they despised those of the wealthy class and were enticed by the rebel propaganda that promised an egalitarian society. The Khmer Rouge sought to stimulate class resentment among the population and encouraged rural villagers to outrage and revenge against the rich (Procknow, 2009, pp.3-4). Poor peasants and inhabitants of the mountainous and forested regions of the remotest of villages represented those who had been the most neglected by the regime and, as such, were recognized by rebel leaders as their main pool for recruitment and as ideal candidates for their core cadres (Sihanouk, 1980).

The Khmer Rouge flourished and was able to maintain influence over the Cambodian population while expanding its control across the country. Likewise, the Lon Nol government also made every effort to hold the population under its subjection. As the literature on civil war dynamics reveals, the government and the rebel group were in
competition for the acquisition of public support and combatants, and the government was typically too absorbed in its own agenda to be able to break the support links between the rebels and the civilians that provided supplies, sanctuary, and recruits for the rebellion (e.g., Findley & Young, 2007, p.380). Lon Nol’s government, to a certain extent, indeed succeeded both in achieving popular support and recruiting combatants across the country and many civilians, showing their allegiance to the new rule, joined the government army in the belief that it represented the likely successor to the collapsed Sihanouk administration (Colletta & Cullen, 2000, p.31).

This chapter seeks to explore civil-military relations in the Cambodian Civil War, which endured from 1970 to 1975. During this conflict, the motivation of participants in armed forces varied across war situations and structural contexts. To examine the relationship between the structural contexts and the recruitment of combatants, this chapter focuses on three districts in Battambang province, referring to findings obtained from interviews with local residents who were living there during that span of time. The area of Battambang represents a territory that experienced a mixed balance of government and rebel control and is, therefore, well suited to the focus of this analysis; the Lon Nol government maintained clout in certain areas of the province until the final stages of the war, while the Khmer Rouge steadily expanded its command over the province.

Thus, this chapter takes a different approach from that on the case study of the Guatemalan Civil War. The following chapter aims primarily to capture the shift in structural contexts during the civil war and its impact upon the relationship of armed actors with civilians and their mobilization strategies over time. In the Guatemalan Civil
War, the rivalry between government and rebel forces underwent several transformations. In each cycle of insurgent uprisings, multiple rebel groups began seizing control of rural areas, but government forces largely suppressed and confined the rebels to limited territories. This repeated pattern of displacement both determined and altered local civil-military relations.

In tracing the historical processes of the war, the case study of Guatemala identifies long-term patterns of territorial control, armed actors’ mobilization strategies, and civilians’ reactions. The Cambodian Civil War, of course, cannot be captured as a conflict devoid of complexity (e.g., the repeated replacement of armed rulers in local areas that would alter civil-military relations). However, this war in its limited term (1970-75) presents a somewhat straightforward schema, in which the main domestic armed actors who competed for popular support and recruits were restricted to only two, namely, Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge, and this scenario remained constant until the rebels won the civil war in 1975.

I find that taking a snapshot of and exploring this particular structural context in a focused scope are useful to explore civil-military relations in the civil war because the aspect in question remains rather constant over time. For this purpose, this chapter narrows its scope to districts in a specific Cambodian province and uses data taken from interviews with local residents. I employ interview data because they can offer first-hand sources about the interaction between armed actors and civilians, and secondary sources on particular places and events tend to be limited. Nevertheless, while interview data provide us with detailed information about local events, they are not always suitable for the purpose of capturing the overall characteristics of the war. The mere accumulation of
such information collected in a specific location does not necessarily give us an all-encompassing view of the interaction between armed and non-armed actors across the entire country. To briefly review overall civil-military relations in the civil war, discussion beyond the scope of my interviews will necessarily be complemented with secondary sources.

After presenting an overview of the historical background of the war, I discuss civil-military relations by armed groups and then deal with the cases. The remainder of this chapter is aimed at arguing that while both Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge relied not only on the non-coercive mobilization of combatants but also on coercive measures within their designated zones of control, they were both forced to search for highly motivated volunteers within opponent-influenced territories. When the armed forces mobilized combatants, they mingled these strategies, and therefore, local civilians were confronted by both coercion and persuasion. This argument is based on important components of the model discussed in the previous chapter. The interview data examine whether and how much the cases of local districts conform to the models and can explain the mechanisms of recruitment, each of which corresponds to the hypotheses. These include positive relationships between military capacity and effectiveness of recruitment, between identity-based selective incentives and voluntary participation and between threat of punishment and reluctant participation; and structural features such as the decline of armed groups’ capability for recruitment toward the territorial boundary and replacement of reluctant participants with voluntary participants according to context.

The Civil War, 1970-75
The overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s regime on March 18, 1970 and the establishment of the Khmer Republic later that year by Lon Nol determined the course of civil war over the next five years, as Sihanouk’s continued popularity in the rural areas, despite antipathy toward him among the urban population, largely framed the actions of the belligerents of the war.\textsuperscript{66} On March 26, following Sihanouk’s call for uprising against Lon Nol, peasant-dominated demonstrations against the new regime indeed erupted in Kompong Cham where dozens of people were killed and injured by insurgents in the governor’s mansion (Deac, 1997, p.69). By the end of April of the same year, the rebels had gained a significant military achievement, having carried out at least twenty-nine major attacks between April 3 and 24. It was reported on April 17 that the coalition of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, which had been fighting the United States and had penetrated Cambodia’s land in order to gain its sanctuaries even before 1970, had more than doubled its area of control in Cambodia. Penetration into Cambodia by these groups served to increase the momentum of the Cambodian rebels who not only shared a common communist orientation with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong but also remained dependent on them until they were able to take over on their own at midpoint of the conflict (Kirk, 1974, pp.93–4). Soon after the penetration into Cambodia, a number of main roads between the capital and other major cities were cut off by the Cambodian rebels backed by Vietnamese forces. In addition, northeastern provinces such as Kratie, Mondolkiri, Ratanakiri and Stung Treng, which were isolated, also came under rebel control (Etcheson, 1984, p.237; Kissinger, 1979, pp.467-92; Kosut, 1971, pp.67-9). The Khmer Rouge alliance with Sihanouk and participation in the Royal Government of

\textsuperscript{66} Sihanouk’s popularity played a significant role also in the Khmer Rouge’s recruitment of local villagers, as further discussed.
the National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) were among the rebel’s greatest advantages as this affiliation helped the group gain popular support and new recruits on the basis of Sihanouk’s popularity. Consequently, territory controlled by the Lon Nol government was very limited as early as the end of the year, and it was in fact pointed out that rebel forces by then “exercise(d) relatively unhindered control in fully two-thirds of Cambodia’s territory” (Gordon & Young, 1971, p.39).

The heavy reliance of the Khmer Rouge on Vietnamese forces for support in their operations throughout 1971-72\(^\text{67}\) contributed to the expansion of their controlling area and their military capability, both of which were significant determinants of how and how much the Khmer Rouge were able to recruit combatants. During this time span, however, the rebel army also became larger, better organized, and more self-confident (Chandler, 1992, p.95). In the countryside, several districts near Phnom Penh were involved in full-scale civil war, but the lightly populated areas of the country were abandoned to the rebels by the end of 1971, as was the densely populated southwest (Chandler, 1992, p.97). The last major offensive against the rebels, and the most significant military operation of the Lon Nol government during this period aimed to open Route 6 connecting Kompong Thom and Phnom Penh, was Chenla II (August 20-December 3, 1971). However, overextended lines strung along the road by government forces were thoroughly defeated by the rebels (Poole, 1972, pp.152-3) and as a result, rebel forces continued to control half of the country while government forces were confined to the urban areas (Map 4.1). More importantly, the Khmer Rouge victory in this battle brought about their successful replacement of North Vietnamese troops (Hood & Ablin, 1990, p.xxvii).

\(^{67}\) Lon Nol’s government and U.S. officials estimated that there were 45,000-55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in the country in 1971 (Poole, 1972, pp.152-3).
Map 4.1. Territorial Control of Lon Nol Government and the Khmer Rouge.

Source: Caldwell & Tan (1973)
By 1973, the Khmer Rouge had become so strong in size and capability that they were able to function effectively without direct support from North Vietnamese or Viet Cong forces and by spring of 1973, the government army had lost control of most of the countryside. All roads leading to Phnom Penh were blocked and by early summer, battlefronts were located no more than ten to twenty miles from the capital in all directions (Isaacs, 1999, pp.219-20). Although government forces had regained some lost territory around the capital city and had recaptured rural inhabitants from Khmer Rouge control in early 1974, the rebels entered Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975 and immediately began the forcible displacement of residents to the countryside.

Civil-military Relations and Mobilization Strategies

*Lon Nol Forces (FANK)*

After the overthrow of Sihanouk in 1970, the Lon Nol government recalled veterans and reservists to its armed forces, the Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK), and they also absorbed the Cambodian national police guard units. The government also requested all males aged 18 to 45 to “volunteer” for duty in its army. On June 25, the government stepped up its general mobilization with males between the ages of 18 and 60 required to perform military service or join supporting organizations. As had been the government’s optimistic expectation, FANK came to number 150,000-200,000 by the

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68 The government imposed martial law on June 1, 1970.
end of the year (Deac, 1997, pp.71, 87; Simon, 1974, p.36).\(^6^9\) Statistics in 1971 estimate that there were 140,000 militiamen for the defense of villages in addition to the regular troops composed of volunteers and conscripts (Poole, 1972, p.152). However, despite American aid to the Cambodian government, the military was operating without a ration system and was, therefore, unable to operate beyond relative proximity to village markets.\(^7^0\)

Lon Nol’s control in the capital was in general solid, even though he was not advantageous in the war situation. As an example, the government could at least require inhabitants to raise chickens and plant vegetable gardens in order to alleviate the problem of an overextended population and threatened supply lines around the city (Deac, 1997, p.87). This base of popular support was eventually eroded, however, due to increasing inflation and a repressive administration whose notoriety even resulted in the defection of substantial numbers of administrative elites to the resistance (Isaacs, 1999, p.249; Simon, 1974, pp.42-3).\(^7^1\) But some rural residents showed even stronger support for Lon Nol, at least in the 1972 presidential election, because they were under protection from the Khmer Rouge by government troops. At the same time, there were government soldiers who had to beg food from villagers to feed themselves and their families because they had not been paid for several months; regional military officers routinely misrepresented

\(^{69}\) It was reported that FANK’s strength had increased to 200,000 by January 1971, but 10 to 50 percent of that number consisted of nonexistent “phantom soldiers” disguised by officers to obtain extra payrolls (Deac, 1997, p.110). The problems remained unresolved throughout the civil war (Isaacs, 1999, p.219).

\(^{70}\) There was no pay allotment system for most units, either (Isaacs, 1999, p.247).

\(^{71}\) It is also reported that more than 3,500 soldiers in service deserted at the beginning of 1975.
the number of troops to the administration and misappropriated money from payrolls for rank-and-files (Deac, 1997, pp.123).

However, in contested areas between the government and rebels, many villagers chose not to remain in fear but, giving up their livelihood of rice production for consumers, flee to towns and cities, or into areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, p.347). Some sources claim that there existed civilians providing some form of support to the rebels, although most villagers superficially showed their allegiance to the Lon Nol government (e.g., Allman, 1971, pp.21-3; Norton, 1971, pp.22-4). Moreover, in some areas, the government army was unable to patrol against the rebels for more than a day or so due to its dependence on regular distribution channels for materials (Isaacs, 1999, pp.189-91). This absence of government control in the countryside subsequently came to be exposed as early as the end of 1970, and most government officers had abandoned their patrol into that territory by 1972 (Gordon & Young, 1971, p.39; Isaacs, 1999, p.208).

Not only did Lon Nol government forces brutally kill pro-Sihanouk demonstrators but rebels and prisoners were also the target of execution (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, p.299). In addition, local villages were bombed by Lon Nol forces with the help of the United States on the off chance that the Cambodian rebels might be hiding in those areas (Short, 2004, p.249). Map 4.2 illustrates the extent of air raids by the Lon Nol government and U.S. forces. This government repression, along with Sihanouk’s appeal for resistance

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72 Thousands of rural villagers flowed into Phnom Penh to escape the air raids and to seek safety in early 1973, and as a result, the population of the capital came to double. For more on the repercussions resulting from the air raids, see also Hood & Albin (1990, p.xxx) and Mayotte (1992, p.23).
against the government,\textsuperscript{73} resulted in many desertions to Khmer Rouge forces allied with Sihanouk.\textsuperscript{74} The U.S. bombing prompted many young men and women to turn toward the rebellion. Local villagers who had lost family members or whose houses had been destroyed came to hold a grudge against the U.S. and the Lon Nol government and joined the rebels because efforts at reconstruction were too costly; many had to sell off property and were even left with heavy financial debt (Hinton, 2005, p.57).

Map 4.2. U.S. Bombardment on Cambodian Territory.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map4.2}
\end{center}

Source: Kiernan (2004, p.352)

\textsuperscript{73} Viet Cong soldiers helped Sihanouk spread his appeal by playing recordings of his broadcast in villages (Short, 2004, p.206).

\textsuperscript{74} The official name of this allied force is the People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (PNLAF).
The Lon Nol government had intended to conduct a general mobilization of the population with expectations of the success in Chenla II, with the possibility that government forces might be able to regain additional civilian population from the Khmer Rouge (Deac, 1997, p.113). Since this plan was checked by defeat in the battle, the government came to lack troops and had to urgently amass combatants. The first draft law since the outbreak of the war was put into operation in July, 1973. During the draft, military police often “roamed through the streets rounding up frightened young men,” although those who had money were fortunate enough to be able to “buy their way out of the induction centers” (Isaacs, 1999, p.230).

In order to replace lost troops due to casualties and desertions, a second conscription campaign was initiated in March, 1974. Since the bracketed age group of 18-25 had been drained, males between 25 and 35 were called up this time. However, although the rebels still had access to new recruits in 1975 due to the expansion of their controlling area, the government, in desperation, hiked the draft age to 50 because of an increasing number of desertions and battle losses (Deac, 1997, pp.195, 217). In January, Lon Nol even ordered police to press-gang men on the streets, although this measure resulted in failure because of the same loophole as in the first conscription campaign (i.e., most of those confronted were allowed to go home if they or their families handed over money) (Isaacs, 1999, p.248).

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75 It is reported that nearly 20,000-30,000 men had been conscripted by the beginning of 1975 (Isaacs, 1999, p.248).

76 Full conscription was neither conducted nor enforced throughout the civil war (Vickery, 1982, p.109).
Volunteers for Lon Nol forces consisted primarily of non-communists, many of whom were living in cities. These citizens tended to think that the war was caused by the invasion of the country by hateful Vietnamese, and, for this reason, thousands of young men enlisted in the army (Chandler, 1992, pp.93-4). This nationalist idea, based on anti-Vietnamese prejudice, played a significant role in the acquisition of new recruits, and young men and women by the thousands subsequently volunteered for service for the purpose of fighting the Vietnamese (Isaacs, 1999, pp.204-5). However, since government forces were largely defeated by the rebels, many of these volunteers were wounded or lost in battle and the government then had to fill the shortage of troops by conscripting combatants.

The Khmer Rouge and the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK)
Khmer Rouge troops numbered about 3,000 in 1970, but the mid-1971 estimate was 85,000. Its size rapidly increased, and there existed 120,000-150,000 regular and irregular troops by mid-1972, and 200,000 by the end of that year (Deac,1997, p.112; Kiernan, 2004, p.345; Simon, 1974, p.21). While Lon Nol forces witnessed the corruption of payrolls resulting from the prevalence of “phantom soldiers,” the Khmer Rouge combatants were all unpaid (Chandler, 1992, p.97). However, Khmer Rouge cadres at least promised rewards (a higher standard of living once capitalism and imperialism were abolished) to potential recruits and peasants, and they were motivated by this assurance (Kiernan, 1993, p.4).  

77 Along with the volunteers for government forces as discussed in the previous section, this group of individuals satisfies the requisite for the high-commitment recruit who was willing to participate in an armed force for the benefit of long-term and future rewards.
The existence of such potential volunteers is compatible with the finding that the majority of peasants were not widely drawn to the rebel’s proposals (Kiernan, 1996, p.7). That is, while the influence of the Khmer Rouge over the rural society may have been limited due to its heavy dependence on North Vietnamese forces (Simon, 1974, p.122), its base of support was still the peasantry and ethnic minorities,\(^78\) and ideological promises encouraged part of the population to volunteer. However, on the other hand, while the Khmer Rouge controlled two to three million out of a population of seven million at midpoint of the war,\(^79\) those who dared to voluntarily participate in rebel forces were fewer than those who preferred not to become involved.

The rebel’s armed propaganda teams appeared in the countryside to proclaim loyalty to Sihanouk and opposition to the coalition between the United States and Lon Nol, and to organize self-governance for new village and sub-district chiefs (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, p.350; Kiernan, 2004, pp.315-6). When entering villages, the Khmer Rouge cadres held meetings for the villagers in order to explain their struggle, recruit volunteers, and tell those who were not willing to join the resistance that they must not obey the orders of the Lon Nol government (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, p.313). This rural (Weinstein, 2007). Moreover, the rewards promised by rebels were not simply material but significantly oriented to ideological appeals as the abolishment of capitalism was considered indispensable for a higher standard of living.

\(^78\) Even before 1970, the central government’s intention of capitalizing on the rebels’ weakness in the cities and corralling civilians for counterinsurgency had served to increase the rural population’s isolation from the urban political administration, and to strengthen peasant support for the resistance (Kiernan, 1982a, p.191).

\(^79\) Simon also argues that Lon Nol’s government maintained control that was limited to the major cities and, therefore, there was a political vacuum in the countryside where the rebels could move in (Simon, 1974, p.119). As a result, they headed toward the rice-growing areas and cut off routes into the capital and other major cities (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, p.304).
administration was put into operation by a mass organization of poor peasants and their youth (Girling, 1972, p.560; Kiernan, 2004, pp.345-6).

Khmer Rouge forces also implemented a series of reforms within their zones of control. First, rents were reduced and usury was abolished. Second, political education was introduced as a means to promote adherence to peasant associations and participation in cooperatives, mutual aid teams, and trade unions. Third, methods of cultivation were improved to increase production in those areas. And fourth, the land of landlords aligning with the government was confiscated for distribution to landless peasants (Caldwell & Tan, 1973, pp.350-1).80

However, it is reported that the Khmer Rouge soldiers often acted abruptly when moving into villages, while the cadres were observed to behave properly toward the local residents. One villager interviewed remembered that a rank and file had come by and given residents a schedule of what to do and how to live without allowing for the option of refusal (Frieson, 1991). The Khmer Rouge, in fact, had started the collectivization of local people and their farmlands within its areas of control at the midpoint of the war (Hood & Ablin, 1990, p.xxix). With its objective to produce enough food for its forces and establish a socialist system of rule, it abolished private property and organized people into groups of families to perform tasks set by the party (Chandler, 1992, p.105).

Thus, local residents in areas under the rebel’s exclusive control had experienced an organizational and ideological change even before 1975, when the Khmer Rouge seized control of the entire country. In contested areas, however, there was great turmoil

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80 They also selected militiamen, from local populations, who performed economic and social as well as military tasks, particularly in agricultural production; they were farmers by day and soldiers by night until they were replaced by full-time youth militiamen (Caldwell and Tan, 1973, p.352; Kiernan, 1982b, p.285).
and destruction, and many villagers escaped from the countryside to Phnom Penh to assure their security under the government’s jurisdiction (Ebihara, 1990, p.22; Hood & Ablin, 1990, p.xxx). Kirk (1975) claims that the Khmer Rouge intended to insure that it “would exercise tight enough control over the populace to be able to seize those enclave areas held by the government” (p.59). Koh Kong province, for example, experienced a significant change in its control in 1972. Then, when the rebels came in for the first time, they maintained a cooperative relationship with the local people. However, after they were replaced by other cadres in 1974, control became more coercive. Young men who were 16 years of age and older were recruited to the armed forces and those who refused to join the army were punished (Kiernan, 1982b, pp.275-6). As discussed in Chapter 3, this study recognizes that as the Khmer Rouge grew and seized more territory, its expanded governance led to an increase in the number of those who were less committed because it came to control not only areas supportive of the rebels but also those unfriendly to them. This governance required the Khmer Rouge to frequently rely on coercion in order to draw collaboration and prevent the local residents from defecting to the government. Although the rebels were pushing toward a victory in 1974, they could not ignore the context of civil war and the possibility that any traitors to the government would undermine the rebel base of support and jeopardize their forces.81

81 There are other possible explanations for this shift in recruitment method. For instance, Metelits (2010) claims that armed groups in civil war shift their treatment of civilians from non-coercive to coercive, and from coercive to non-coercive, as the rivalry between groups shifts. When the presence of rivals brings about a scarcity of not only material but also human resources, given that the employment of force is efficient for the purpose of extracting these resources, the groups behave in a more coercive manner toward civilians. And accordingly, their relationship with civilians becomes less coercive if they are less threatened by the rivals (see also Metelits, 2009a). Eck (2010) similarly contends that conflict dynamics determines if and when armed groups use coercion against civilians;
The Khmer Rouge had also adopted a recruitment strategy of amassing soldiers by taking villagers to the forests of some provinces, including Battambang, Kompong Chhnang and Kampot, even as early as the time of the 1968 revolts (Kiernan, 2004, pp.269-70). In order to avoid U.S. bombardment, some entire villages were moved by the Khmer Rouge not only to its own areas, but to remote mountain and jungle regions where the relocated villagers were forced to work in cooperatives of 30-40 families who farmed the land in a collective manner (Short, 2004, p.246).

Although disaffected intellectuals and the middle classes were also drawn to the insurgent’s ideals (Hinton, 2005, p.58), the Khmer Rouge troops mainly consisted of poor peasants and ethnic minorities. Local Khmer Rouge cadres would often persuade peasants to join by registering in their district, sub-district or with their village chiefs (Procknow, 2009, p.4). While Khmer Rouge forces were comprised of raw conscripts along with veterans of the pre-1970 rebellion, early rebel recruits in the areas where the Lon Nol government introduced conscription were also volunteers. The government’s

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they tend to rely on coercive measures of recruitment when their military imperatives require an increase in troops. Although they may employ non-coercive measures whenever they can, they often have to have an adequate number of troops, whether or not recruits are collected through forcible mobilization, for example, when they confront high levels of military engagement with rivals and the loss in battle needs to be promptly recovered with the provision of additional recruits. Thus, both explanations assume that compelling circumstances force the armed groups to use coercion, although such a manner is not costless because they always need to keep resorting to coercion so that a steady supply of resources is not interrupted (Metelits, 2009a, p.2), and because combatants mobilized through coercive recruitment are less committed to the groups and often escape or even desert to rival groups (Eck, 2010, p.26). However, neither thesis fits well into the shift in recruitment methods of the Khmer Rouge during this period because Khmer Rouge forces no longer necessarily faced severe rivalry with, but rather largely overwhelmed, the government forces.

Their motivation was not always political. Some joined because they liked the idea of becoming soldiers, some wanted to get out of their villages, while others were teased by
dominant control, which allowed it to conduct conscription, determined the pattern of those who would join the rebel group. Since Khmer Rouge forces were largely excluded from such an area, they could not afford to conduct conscription and instead sought for highly committed volunteers there. Examining cases in Battambang province, the following section considers the relationship between territorial control and patterns of civilian participation in armed forces.

**Case Studies in Battambang Province**

*Historical Background*

Battambang province is a region that has seen many historical periods of unrest caused by the eighteenth and nineteenth-century wars with the Thai monarchs. The province served as a base for the Vietminh and Issarak guerrillas during the first Indochina War, which was originally fought for Vietnam’s independence and eventually extended to the Cambodia question (France abandoned its suzerainty of Cambodia in 1953). Battambang province remained an unstable area because the Khmer Serei forces from Thailand, whose leader had been Prime Minister during the Japanese occupation in World War II, operated cross-border missions to counter the newly established regime headed by Sihanouk. The local communities also experienced social and economic conflicts; tenants who suffered from harsh living conditions shared nearly a third of the rural population, and those of the province were discontented by the low prices of rice fixed by the government after 1965 (Delvert, 1961, p.639).

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83 Issarak is the anti-French, Khmer nationalism movement backed by the Thai government.
The province, therefore, had a tradition as host of unrest and instability. This environment tended to help insurgents take advantage of the weak influence of the central government. Kiernan argues that “the popular support for the Khmer Rouge in Battambang was partly due to the local roots of some of the rebel leaders” (Kiernan, 1982a, p.185). Peasant disaffection for the central authority also resulted from the government’s intervention to appoint village chiefs and officials. Prior to 1968, village chiefs were elected by the villagers, even though the provincial authorities usually selected the candidates, and direct appointment by the government appeared to be a repression of the rural administration by the central authority, at least to many peasants who respected the autonomy of village affairs. Corruption and increased administrative domination also engendered grievances among peasants (Kiernan, 1982a, p.185).

The Khmer Rouge’s strategy in the province was partly derived from an earlier shortage of military troops and resources; the rebels had kept it relatively quiet by avoiding large-scale encounters with Lon Nol forces until 1974 because for them (the rebels) it was “a key source of food, medicine, and other goods provided by greedy local officials” (Deac, 1997, p.208). In fact, there had been a committee in place, established by the provincial governor, which was expected to facilitate conflicts between the government and rebel sympathizers, and resolve abuses by soldiers on both sides against civilians (e.g., for taking villagers’ properties and executing civilians). By 1975, however, the route between Phnom Penh and the region of the province and Lake Tonle Sap had been seized by the rebels, and this made the government’s supply to the capital difficult (Deac, 1997, pp.213-4).

84 Interview by the author, June 14, 2009, Ta Thok village, Thipakdei commune, Koas Krala district, Battambang province, Cambodia.
Fieldwork

Within Battambang, each district or sub-district has historically witnessed distinct civil-military relations due to such factors as military balances and proximity to administrative and/or military bases of the belligerent groups throughout the civil war. To examine the variation in structural contexts across the districts and villagers’ reactions to them, three locations were selected for this study. First, the northwestern part of Battambang district, which contained the provincial seat where the government had been controlling until a later phase, experienced a strong government influence. Second, eastern Banan was more characteristically a “contested area” between the rebel and government forces than was northwestern Battambang. As my informants from that district revealed, although there existed variations in the relationship between civilians and Khmer Rouge cadres, they frequently came into the villages for the purpose of requesting rations and calling for recruits from villagers, while the objective of the government forces had been to seize control. Among the districts studied, the Khmer Rouge established its presence primarily in the third location, western Moung Ruessei. It was from this district that the Khmer Rouge moved whole populations of some villages to their forests and from which many villagers joined the rebel forces.

Key findings from the study of these locations are based on interviews that took place during two time frames, December 2008 – January 2009 and May – July 2009. All interviews throughout the entire fieldwork were conducted by myself with the support of an English-Khmer interpreter. My interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, and included women and men, former rebel and government supporters, combatants and
civilians, low-to-middle-rank commanders and rank and files, and local officials and commoners. The in-depth interviews with my informants, which generally lasted for one to two-and-a-half hours, revealed how both the rebels and the government competed with each other to win the popular support and recruits from local villages, and also how villagers reacted to their structural contexts.

In 2000, the northwestern part of Battambang district and western Moung Ruessei were split into the districts of Thma Koul and Koas Krala, respectively. There, I interviewed 95 villagers in all, 32 from Thma Koul, 31 from Banan and 32 from Koas Krala (Map 4.3). Because of the need to confirm the data I collected during interviews, the research sites were restricted to those three districts so that limited information could be accumulated from a specified geographical scope and checked between interviews. Most of the interviewees were drawn by snowball sampling, although I at first relied on the roster of ex-government combatants who were demobilized in 2000 by the Cambodian government.85 Because eight to nine years had passed since their demobilization, it was not possible to contact all ex-combatants as they might have relocated or were by then deceased. In addition, identifying and locating an entire population of appropriate informants, necessary for the probability sampling, was not easy to accomplish because my interviewees had to be villagers (desirably a balance of combatants and civilians) who had had personal experiences of the civil war within certain areas.86 Therefore, I relied mainly upon each interviewee to introduce me in turn

85 Former rebels (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) in the civil war after 1979 were integrated into the government forces after the peace agreement was achieved in 1992. Khmer Rouge soldiers also joined the government army after its dissolution.
86 Before starting each interview, I asked the interviewee about his/her age and birthplace. If the individual had been too young or outside the research sites during the civil war, I
to another person in the village at the conclusion of my interview with them. Although I used a roster of ex-combatants and took a snowball sampling, I tended to visit village chiefs, commune councilors, and other influential persons in local places within these districts and explained the purpose of my fieldwork before starting interviews. These contacts occasionally accompanied me on visits to interviewees’ houses in order to make introductions and assure that informants felt at ease. Their support was integral especially when I conducted interviews with former Khmer Rouge cadres in Koas Krala, who were likely to be cautious about relating their personal experiences.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{87} As others did, I found local residents willing to talk about their painful experiences with me (e.g., Smyth & Fay, 2000, p.3), but there were also villagers (especially former Khmer Rouge cadres) who declined to participate in an interview and to answer my questions. This may be because the ongoing Khmer Rouge trials have implanted a fear of the risk of being sued (even though only high-rank officials are on trial).
Before examining the patterns of civilian participation in the armed forces in each district, the reliability of my interview data should be scrutinized as fieldwork in the various research sites has some possible drawbacks. One of the issues is whether sufficient trust existed between the interviewees and the interviewers (the interpreter and myself). Since the subjects of interview were those who tended to have had traumatic experiences during the war, their personal comfort level with us was important not only
for us to obtain reliable data but even also to conduct interviews. Although we visited most villages several times and went back and forth between neighboring hamlets to find possible samples, the fieldwork, including the extraction of samples and the conducting of interviews, was completed in a very limited timeframe. This brevity of my stay in the research sites in itself may have undermined the reliability of the interview data because it was possibly not enough time for me to build trust with the subjects. It is also possible that the researcher’s lack of sufficient experience and skills in fieldwork may have impaired the expected depth and comprehensiveness of information taken from the interviewees. While I had grown relatively accustomed to interviewing local people by the end of my stay, it is fair to note that, as the fieldwork proceeded, my semi-structured and open-ended questions for the respondents largely converged into the primary concerns of this study (e.g., armed actors controlling a certain place and their mobilization strategies, and civilians’ participation in armed forces and their motivation). I would often happen upon unexpected individual recollections from particular respondents, but the format of the interview became less flexible toward the end of the fieldwork. This fixation on interview questions negatively influenced the interpreter as well in that narratives from different respondents tended to be transposed with similar phrasing. The following paragraphs mention additional details about potential problems with my fieldwork method, such as issues of anonymity, informed consent, and bias in oral sources.

Although my interviews took place long after the war, the data collected through interviews contain information in which the respondents’ political preferences and biographical details (e.g., past participation in armed groups) are evident and, therefore,
the confidentiality of the information and anonymity of the subjects are crucial. Following the methods of fieldwork adopted by other researchers, in addition to keeping the data collected under strict surveillance, I neither recorded names nor taped interviews for the sake of anonymity. Rather, notes were taken and later transcribed (see Wood, 2006).

Field research in post-conflict areas requires informed consent, by which respondents should understand the potential risks that they may run by granting interviews. There exists the possibility, for instance, that the interview may not only cause the individual repeated trauma through recollections of violence and grief, but also might expose a respondent’s past experiences to others. For the purpose of obtaining consent and to ease the problem of asymmetrical power relations with interviewees as much as possible, a short form of consent was conveyed orally to the subjects as a written record would have linked them to this project and could potentially pose a risk to them. Additionally, it was likely that some of the respondents would not be fully literate; therefore, verbal communication regarding consent was most appropriate.

The approach taken in the interview process was specifically tailored to this study. Contact with local actors assured the necessary and invaluable first-hand perspectives on incidents in the civil war. Reliance primarily on official sources would have been inappropriate because these sources would not have represented the targeted group of participants. Although often useful for us to explore how and when a large-scale shift in structural context (e.g., overall status of territorial control) occurred in past civil wars, those sources may be of limited avail to reveal participants’ exact motivations for enlisting with the armed forces when the sources are over-represented by an elitist view
of the conflict. However, it is still important to note that oral sources can be problematic, too; recollections can be self-contradictory, incomplete and biased. Not only can they be influenced by their confusing nature, time, complex psychological and cognitive processes, and subsequent events (Brown & Fernández, 1991; Goldberg, 2003; Mendelsohn, 2002), but they are often reshaped by political actors and the post-civil-war state so that those recollections consequentially become consistent with the dominant narratives (Kalyvas, 2006, p.402).

Of utmost importance in reviewing my findings was to be cautiously aware of the potential for bias relative to the political views held by the interviewees. Each actor’s ideas may have highly depended on his/ her background or former position (e.g., as government officials, rebel supporters, or disaffected ex-combatants), and, accordingly, findings extracted from elite-level interviewing had to be double-checked by interviews with rank-and-file combatants and civilians, and vice versa. Similarly, recollections by former rebels were contrasted with those of government soldiers and sympathizers. Weinstein contends that it is necessary to aggregate personal narratives and maximize variation in a broader context by examining how armed groups and civilians interact over time and in different regions (2007, p.355). In my fieldwork in Battambang province, this “broader context” corresponds to each of the three research sites and the aggregation of narratives within each region was designed to allow for a certain variation in participants’ motivation and armed actors’ recruitment measures. For my interviews, as nearly forty years had passed since the outbreak of the civil war and because exchanges with the interviewees were conducted through an interpreter, which likely would have had an effect on language nuance, reliability of information collected from those narratives
needed to be confirmed through the procedures outlined above.\textsuperscript{88} The samples considered include those of individuals whose ages ranged from 48 to 87 at the point of interview.

\textit{Northwestern Battambang}

Villages in the northwestern part of Battambang district were controlled largely by Lon Nol forces, and the government army had a camp nearby from which soldiers came into the villages to patrol.\textsuperscript{89} Although Lon Nol troops were supposed to enter villages to protect local residents from the rebels, a local resident recalls that the government soldiers and civilians did not necessarily get along because the authority was frantic with new recruitment.\textsuperscript{90} The government soldiers came to village houses both during the day and at night for the purpose of conscription. In one village of the district, for instance, men between the ages of 20 and 50 were mobilized.\textsuperscript{91} Here, the government requested villagers to join not only the military but also the militia (the vigilance group of the village) and required them to secure weapons (e.g., if a family had five members, they had to buy five guns) and participate in the building of village walls. Another informant,

\textsuperscript{88} As these specific issues (i.e., years and communication) were prevalent throughout the samples, one may question whether the cross-checking procedures discussed were appropriate. I still insist that open-ended questions for the respondents were effective to collate details between recollections. For instance, some informants remembered the Khmer Rouge’s assault of villages more clearly than the government’s conscription, while others had a vivid memory of the latter. In each interview, I could repeatedly ask related questions on a subject and delve into a specific topic, if necessary. As a result, each interview came to highlight particular aspects of the conflict more than others. Although, as expected, recollections frequently overlapped, they also varied significantly. This study assumes that these differentiated data are cross-checkable.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.

\textsuperscript{90} The authority, according to an informant, attempted to conscript villagers two to three times a month at maximum. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.

\textsuperscript{91} Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
however, considers that the relationship between villagers and government soldiers was not that bad because the soldiers never forced the local residents to offer any commodities\textsuperscript{92} or because they (the soldiers) were originally from the villages in which they stayed and, therefore, were not perceived as menacing.\textsuperscript{93}

An interesting case of government control was in Thmei village where rebel forces never entered nor did the government conduct conscription, although 18-55 year old males joined the village militia under the village chief’s control.\textsuperscript{94} The Khmer Rouge never came by the hamlet because it was deeply surrounded by other villages and they were afraid that their troops might not be able to retreat if they were to enter.\textsuperscript{95} Villagers met Khmer Rouge cadres only outside the village, for example, when fishing at Lake Tonle Sap.\textsuperscript{96} One of my interviewees was persuaded to join the resistance by a face-to-face encounter with a Khmer Rouge cadre because he felt at the time that the rebels’ idea of liberating the country and fulfilling the goal of creating an egalitarian society was appealing.\textsuperscript{97}

Khmer Rouge cadres were able to enter some villages in order to collect food and clothes, and while there, propagandize villagers, fight government soldiers and militiamen, and locate incumbent officials and government supporters. Those villages near Lake Tonle Sap especially were easy places for the rebels to visit because the bush around the lake offered them perfect hiding places. Rebels sometimes gathered locals for

\textsuperscript{92} For instance, Ang Cheung village. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009.
\textsuperscript{93} Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{94} Interviews by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village and July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
\textsuperscript{95} Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
\textsuperscript{96} Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
\textsuperscript{97} He remembers that the rebels attempted to persuade villagers especially in 1972 and 1973. Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
propagandizing meetings when government forces were absent, and the cadres at first had maintained a good relationship with villagers.  However, since villagers’ submissiveness to the government stimulated the rebels’ anger and the Khmer Rouge forces in fact came to consider villagers as enemies, they began burning houses and assaulting local residents at an early stage of the war when they entered hamlets.

In contrast, the influence of the Khmer Rouge was null in other villages because the cadres could never afford to disperse themselves to those areas or never committed violence while there. Most informants recall that security remained consistent despite conscription by the government, as for example, in Ang Tboung, Chrouy Mtes and Ta Sei villages. However, the rebels did have their collaborators even in places into which they did not step. For instance, in Ang Tboung village, collaborators were responsible for carrying food to the rebel’s camps. These were ordinary villagers rather than officials and village chiefs, but served both the rebel group and the government because 1) the village was primarily controlled by the government and 2) they were often persuaded or threatened by the Khmer Rouge when they happened to meet the guerrillas. Therefore, a situation existed whereby if the government or the Khmer Rouge knew that a villager was working for the opposition, the villager would be punished. Ten villagers, in fact, were executed by the rebels in Ang Tboung village.

98 Interviews by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tboung and Tumpung Cheung villages.
99 Villagers were not necessarily reluctant to buy guns because they were always threatened by the Khmer Rouge. Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
100 Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village.
As in other regions of Cambodia, village chiefs played a significant role in collecting conscripts;\(^{101}\) in Ang Tboung village, the village head visited house by house in the company of Lon Nol soldiers.\(^{102}\) An interviewee recalls that the authority arrested and sent even parents to the commune office if their sons evaded conscription without any justifiable reason (however, if they returned to the office and joined the army, the parents would be released).\(^{103}\) But in Tumpung Cheung village, an informant remembers that the government forces did not conscript soldiers but accepted only resident volunteers who were persuaded and recruited at meetings held at the commune office.\(^{104}\) Yet almost all the men in Tumoung Tboung joined the village militia after attending local meetings held by village and commune chiefs.\(^{105}\)

Each of these interviewees differs in their opinion as to whether or not the government’s mobilization was compulsory, most likely because the government adopted two steps in its tactic to acquire soldiers whereby 1) village chiefs at first drew up a list of potential conscripts, and then had the list delivered to a military camp and called for volunteers, then 2) soldiers or village militiamen came to take villagers if some of them attempted to flee or refused to join. A villager who had attempted to escape from conscription states that, in reality, nobody could refuse to join the army if his name was listed and because of this, many villagers enlisted for the army. The only way to avoid

\(^{101}\) One interviewee was told by a village chief that he was old enough to join the army when he became 18 years old. Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village.

\(^{102}\) Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Tboung village.

\(^{103}\) Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Tboung village.

\(^{104}\) Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.

\(^{105}\) Interview by the author, June 28, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
conscription was to hide out in the forests.\textsuperscript{106} However, males who did not volunteer would inevitably be conscripted.\textsuperscript{107} In a village where men fled frequently, government forces adopted strong-arm tactics; Lon Nol soldiers drove in with trucks and conscripted young men from wherever the soldiers happened to find them.\textsuperscript{108}

Village militias were also an important component of the government’s strategy of countering the Khmer Rouge. In fact, most men in each village (the young and old, the rich and poor) belonged to the militia. For instance, in Chrouy Mtes village, all returning conscripts were immediately integrated into the village militia;\textsuperscript{109} in Ang Cheung village, villagers were forced to buy guns and even the poorest had to sell their cows to buy weapons;\textsuperscript{110} and in Ang Tboung village, a family that had young sons was required to send them to the militia (they, likewise, would have been threatened with imprisonment for not cooperating).\textsuperscript{111}

It is obvious that young men around the age of 18 were the major target as recruits for both the government and the rebels because they were naïve and that young boys were known to try to elude conscription because they did not really understand who they would be fighting.\textsuperscript{112} However, volunteers for the government forces were at least often motivated by antipathy and resentment against the Khmer Rouge due to the group’s assaults on villages,\textsuperscript{113} and many of these volunteers were school teachers who were

\textsuperscript{106} However, a money quota to the officials allowed conscripts to return home. Interviews by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village and July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{108} Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
\textsuperscript{109} Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{111} Interview by the author, July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
welcomed particularly because of the expectation that they would be able to persuade others.\textsuperscript{114}

In contrast, and related to the rebels’ reliance on collaborators in terms of their confidential activities, while those who joined the Khmer Rouge had often suffered from political double-binds between the government and rebels, some of them had existing troubles in their villages (and, in certain cases, returned to kill villagers with whom they had had conflicts).\textsuperscript{115} The rebel group was also a receptacle for youngsters who were not only politically motivated but were also experiencing conflicts with their parents.\textsuperscript{116} Since those who joined Khmer Rouge forces from this area of the district were originally under government control and surveillance, they had sufficient reasons to dare to collaborate with rebels and eventually leave villages in defiance of the risk of denunciation by neighbors and the danger in military affairs in the field.

Since all lands were occupied either by the government or rebels, it was almost impossible to be neutral. The comment of an informant describes this situation, “If you go to forests, a tiger (the Khmer Rouge) is there, and if you go to a river, a crocodile (Lon Nol) is there.”\textsuperscript{117} One former government soldier deserted to the rebel army for his safety because he was suspected by the authority of being a Khmer Rouge collaborator.\textsuperscript{118} However, while the major supporters of the Khmer Rouge were the poor peasants throughout the entire country and the rebel’s propaganda impressed the poor in the

\textsuperscript{114} Interview by the author, July 5, 2009, Thmei village.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village.
\textsuperscript{116} Interviews by the author, July 18, 2009, Ang Cheung village and July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{117} Interview by the author, July 11, 2009, Ta Sei village.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
district as well,\textsuperscript{119} there were some who fled back to their original villages after encountering worse living conditions in the forested areas.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{Eastern Banan}

Villages in eastern Banan remained relatively safe from rebel activity before Sihanouk’s overthrow, but the security of the region deteriorated after 1970. Villagers experienced not only severe fighting between Lon Nol forces and the rebels, but some of their houses were also burnt by the Khmer Rouge cadres, as in Bay Damram village, even though the village was controlled by Lon Nol forces.\textsuperscript{121} Other villages had similar experiences; for instance, rebel forces entered Tuol Chraniteng village not only to take rations but also to identify government supporters.\textsuperscript{122} Villagers often fled to Battambang city or into the forests for their safety when the rebels came in for these purposes.\textsuperscript{123} Khmer Rouge cadres entered every village in order to find government militiamen and collaborators including village chiefs and other officials; they were, however, engaged in the displacement of local residents in certain locales, although not in all villages. An informant in fact reports an incident when the Khmer Rouge attacked villages and displaced the villagers to forests.\textsuperscript{124} The villagers, therefore, remember the visits by the Khmer Rouge very well even when they came in to request food and demanded villagers

\textsuperscript{119} Interviews by the author, July 4, 2009, Tumpung Tboung village, and July 18, 2009, Ang Tboung village, and July 19, 2009, Ang Cheung village.
\textsuperscript{120} Interview by the author, July 12, 2009, Chrouy Mtes village.
\textsuperscript{121} Interviews by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
\textsuperscript{122} Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Toul Chraniteng village.
\textsuperscript{123} Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
\textsuperscript{124} Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
to carry it to the forests for them.\textsuperscript{125} As much as villagers suffered from Khmer Rouge attacks, it is known that the rebels were able to remain in villages for only a couple of hours at a time because the government forces were either stationed there or were positioned around the hamlets.\textsuperscript{126} In contrast, there were also villages in the district, such as Doang village, where the Khmer Rouge did indeed seize control.\textsuperscript{127}

Lon Nol soldiers overall maintained good relationships with villagers throughout eastern Banan so that they could request them to join the militia.\textsuperscript{128} Under the control of the central government, village chiefs were in charge of deciding how many militiamen were needed in their villages. In Bay Damram village, each family that had any boys was required to send at least one to the village militia; as a result, there existed over 100 militiamen in the village organized into groups of 10 men.\textsuperscript{129} However, most militiamen were so ill-equipped and ill-trained by the government that many often fled along with the villagers when the Khmer Rouge forces made a routine visit.

Although most residents supported the government, whether reluctantly or not, some in fact collaborated with the resistance in the area. An interviewee said that his father had been a government officer in the Sihanouk era and was keeping a secret connection with the Sihanoukist insurgents in the dissident coalition even after the loss of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[125]{Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.}
\footnotetext[126]{Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.}
\footnotetext[127]{Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.}
\footnotetext[128]{Militiamen were in charge not only of defending villages by themselves but also escorting government soldiers when they came by the villages. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.}
\footnotetext[129]{Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village. The interviewee, who used to be a group leader taking care of 10 families, remembers that the government forces did not request any other things from the villagers.}
\end{footnotes}
his position in 1970.  

At the same time, the government engaged itself in community networks of policemen, military soldiers and local officials for the purpose of identifying and investigating rebel collaborators in villages.

In reality, however, most villagers who were hammered and squeezed from both sides tended to balance the demands on them. For instance, the Khmer Rouge cadres came into villages to request foodstuff from villagers when government forces were absent. For ordinary villagers, providing the rebels with rations was a dilemma for which they might be punished by the government, but also for which they might be killed by the Khmer Rouge or not allowed to work safely on farm lands if they were to refuse the rebels’ requests. Therefore, villagers made every effort to offer the rebels what they requested and sometimes even carried food to the forests during the night so that this movement would go unheeded by the government forces. Government forces also coerced residents to cooperate, and therefore, what villagers had to offer were not only material goods but also information about the rebels’ confidential activities.

In eastern Banan, the Lon Nol government conducted conscription in most places, although some villagers recognized it not as conscription but as normal recruitment (that is, they considered the recruits as volunteers). Informants in Tuol Chramien and Kampong Chaeng villages remember trucks of government soldiers coming into the villages to take young men and also villagers being ordered to go to a

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130 Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Enteak Chit village.
131 Interview by the author, December 20, 2009, Banan village.
132 Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Bay Damram village.
133 Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
134 One informant insists that there was no conscription, at least in Ta Kream village. Interview by the author, June 27, Ta Kream village.
135 Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Enteak Chit village. In this village, according to the informant, the village chief determined who would go into the military.
district office where they were conscripted. But, in Kampang village, drawing up lists of the names of young men, a village chief himself sent those listed to the military, and no soldiers interfered in this process.

As in villages in the northwestern part of Battambang district, young males aged 18 years and older were those primarily conscripted by the government, yet even villagers who were not enlisted by the army were requested to buy guns and join village militias. Village chiefs were in charge of the mobilization of militiamen as well as the management of militias, and the chiefs did not necessarily employ undisguised coercion (e.g., abduction) to collect village guards. They rather made use of the government’s influence over this region. Villagers could not really refuse to cooperate because they otherwise might have been expelled from the village or recognized as Khmer Rouge sympathizers. This mobilization of civilians, which was not fully coercive but unavoidable, contributed to the establishment of a militia system in the region. Those who tried to avoid conscription were largely frightened by the prospect of military service because they knew that many government soldiers had been killed by the Khmer Rouge or because they had families to provide for. Inasmuch as conscripts would be released if they offered some amount of money to the government, the poor who could not afford to do so were largely mobilized.

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136 An ex-government combatant in Doang village also utters that he was told to attend a Banan district meeting and was conscripted there. Interview by the author, December 28, 2008, Doang village.
137 Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chram village.
138 Interview by the author, January 10, Tuol Chram village.
139 Interviews by the author, January 3, Enteak Chit village, 10, Sdau village, and 11, Bay Damram village.
140 Interview by the author, January 11, 2009, Kampong Chaeng village.
141 Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Tuol Chram village.
When being conducted, government conscription was persistent in this area of the district. An interviewee in Bay Damram village remembers that Lon Nol forces came from cities such as Phnom Penh and Battambang city and mobilized even students. In another case, it was recounted that a son from each family had to be sent to the army, and government forces came by to draft farmers randomly, even from the fields.\textsuperscript{142} As a result, many men did attempt to elude conscription, escaping to and staying in forests for several days or even weeks (and then returning to their villages).\textsuperscript{143} However, for those who volunteered for service in the government forces, conscription did not in actuality appear compulsory; although even volunteers joined the forces after the government’s call for enlistment, this initial request was intended to lure committed individuals from the entire population of potential participants. For instance, one of those recruits, who formerly had been a security guard of a sugar mill, was induced to join the government force to fight the rebels.\textsuperscript{144} On the other hand, while the government forces indeed called for volunteers at first, those who had refused to enlist voluntarily were conscripted at night by government soldiers who entered the village expressly for that purpose.\textsuperscript{145}

Even though individual observances and comments about security in local areas are varied, it can be said that a sense of insecurity certainly drove some local villagers to volunteer for the government forces.\textsuperscript{146} Volunteers were often motivated by a fear of the risk of security and by their resentment toward the enemy. An informant insists that he joined with the Lon Nol government force because he wanted to defend the country and

\textsuperscript{142} Interview by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
\textsuperscript{143} Interview by the author, December 27, 2008, Bay Damram village.
\textsuperscript{144} Interview by the author, December 20, 2008, Banan village.
\textsuperscript{145} Interview by the author, January 3, 2009, Changhour Svay village.
\textsuperscript{146} Interviews by the author, December 20, 2008, Bay Damram village.
to revenge the killing of his relative by the Khmer Rouge. According to him, he was not
motivated by pecuniary incentives, but admits that there had been peer pressure from his
girlfriends who tended to think that boys should be at the front, not behind. Another
man volunteered for the government force for his personal safety, knowing that the
Khmer Rouge suspected he was a government collaborator and had tried to kill him when
they arrested him in a field.

One informant assumes that those who joined the Khmer Rouge from eastern
Banan were convinced by its ideas, and that villagers who did not participate in the
resistance were not attracted by their thoughts or their practice of living in the forests.
Another informant in Changhour Svay village had refrained from participating in the
Khmer Rouge because of having a wife and children, although his mother and older
brother who were members strongly urged him to join. The Khmer Rouge’s influence
in eastern Banan was more salient than that in the northwestern part of Battambang
district. The rebels’ relatively frequent and close contact with civilians allowed them
(Khmer Rouge cadres) to coercively take civilians from this area. In this sense,
volunteering was not the sole way of joining rebel forces in this region. As the rebel
influence grew, their mobilization of combatants became more full-scale.

The next case addresses the structural context in the western part of the Moung
Ruessei district where the Khmer Rouge most largely seized control of residents and
government forces were able to sporadically approach them.

147 Interviews by the author, December 20, 2008, Bay Damram village.
148 Interview by the author, June 27, 2009, Tumpung Cheung village.
149 Interviews by the author, January 10, 2009, Sdau village.
Western Moung Ruessei

A former group leader of the Khmer Rouge asserts that Krang Svat village was more or less controlled by the Khmer Rouge even though Lon Nol forces had attempted to establish complete control of the village by dislodging the rebels.\textsuperscript{151} The villagers had joined the Khmer Rouge around 1970-73 when government forces withdrew from the village and no one, except those who did not obey the insurgent rule, had been executed until 1976.\textsuperscript{152} A villager recalls, however, that the locals had to be “all smiles with” and collaborate with both sides for their safety (even when Lon Nol temporarily seized the control of the village, the villagers paid small taxes but conscription was not conducted).\textsuperscript{153}

From Krang Svat, which suffered from U.S. bombardments, villagers were moved to forests by the Khmer Rouge at the beginning of the civil war (when Lon Nol forces were pushed outside the village) and remained there for about five years. An informant shares that the displacement was not necessarily forcible and that no one refused to go to the forests.\textsuperscript{154} Unlike the villages that Lon Nol forces occasionally attacked, the places to which villagers were moved remained relatively safe from wartime destruction; the Khmer Rouge forces and militias protected those villagers, who were Khmer Rouge

\textsuperscript{151} Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village. However, another interviewee argues that the Khmer Rouge could not perfectly control the village and this is why the rebels took residents into the forests. Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Krang Svat village.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svat village. An interviewee insists that local residents in the village were ethnic minorities. Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village.
\textsuperscript{153} Interview by the author, June 7, 2009, Krang Svat village.
\textsuperscript{154} Interview by the author, May 31, 2009, Krang Svat village.
members themselves, and there was a sufficient supply of food. Additionally, Lon Nol forces rarely came by to seize their properties.\footnote{155 Interview by the author, May 30, 2009, Krang Svat village.}

Over 100 families resided in the forested area to which villagers from Krang Svat village were moved, and the rebel administration organized those residents into groups of 15 families in order to make farming easier and more efficient, and for the eventual support of its army, in which young men were required to spend most of their time. The groups were under the control of commune and village chiefs who were in charge of persuading villagers not to desert; those chiefs also had the right to investigate and execute those who betrayed the rebels.\footnote{156 Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.} In this area, all men between the ages of 18 and 40 were conscripted by the rebel forces once they were displaced to forests; single men had to enlist, but those who were married were allowed to delay their enrolment.\footnote{157 Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.}

Villagers in Chhnal Moan village were also displaced by the Khmer Rouge when the government forces were pushed back. Although only Cambodian rebels had appeared in the village before 1970, when only their spies could stay in the village and government soldiers could yet come in to take properties from villagers, after the year’s end, the Khmer Rouge engaged North Vietnamese troops in a cooperative effort to gain control of the village.\footnote{158 Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.} Villagers immediately began collaborating with the Khmer Rouge after the cadres came in and some men were selected at that time for the army (which was small and ill-equipped) based on their physical condition.\footnote{159 Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village. Some government officials belonged to both the authority and the resistance and offered food and
The population of Koas Krala village was partially moved by the Khmer Rouge. An informant remembers that the village was like a battlefield and had been separated into two parts by the government and rebels (conscription by the government was still in existence). As a result, almost half of the population was displaced by the Khmer Rouge while the rest of the residents escaped to Battambang city. Since villagers did not strongly support any particular side, the separation was not apparently based on their political preferences. An interviewee comments, “Some were just lucky and the others were unlucky.” However, villagers were neither recruited nor conscripted by the Khmer Rouge because they had already acquired many cadres from other places and did not trust villagers from Koas Krala village, which was not fully influenced by rebels and may have been comprised of government sympathizers.160

In some villages where they were successful in moving villagers (e.g., Krang Svat village), Khmer Rouge forces “conscripted” most of the men between the ages of 18 and 50.161 A villager in Krang Svat village recalls that no one could refuse to join their forces but that some people escaped during the night to join Lon Nol’s side.162 Although it is assumed that there were almost no volunteers for the rebel forces from Krang Svat village, some men between the ages of 17 and 35 volunteered from Banteay Char village.163 In

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160 Interview by the author, June 20, 2009, Prey Sen village.
161 Interview by the author, June 13, 2009, Kan Tuot village.
163 Interview by the author, June 21, 2009, Krang Svat village.
164 Interview by the author, June 6, 2009, Banteay Char village.
contrast, however, it is reported that the government forcibly mobilized villagers in some places such as Koas Krala and Beong Chhneah villages.  

Logistical conditions of armed forces were likely to differentiate villages under government control from those under rebel control, and villages with volunteers for the rebel forces from those with no volunteers. While western part of the district was mostly controlled by the rebels, some villages were still accessible to government forces. Although unrepresentative, those villages were the places from which the government could take civilians. In addition, rebels may have begun coercively mobilizing combatants in some villages as soon as they arrived there, but may not have been able to do so in others. In the former case, it is likely that there would be fewer “volunteers” who could take time to decide to join forces than in the latter.

The rebels were known to have come to discriminate against certain backgrounds. An example of this bias is revealed by a villager whose father used to be a commune chief of the Sihanouk administration who supposedly had an unacceptable background, according to the rebels’ principles emphasizing the rabble’s new role, and was not allowed to join the army.  

Civil-Military Relations, Mobilization Strategies and Civilian Participation in Armed Forces

Table 4.1 illustrates the differences in civil-military relations by government and rebel forces and the mobilization of combatants, and the types of civilian participation across

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164 Interviews by the author, June 13, 2009, Kan Tuot village and June 14, 2009, Rav village.
districts. Representing three distinct populations under varied authority, the northwestern part of Battambang district was largely controlled by the Lon Nol government, eastern Banan was positioned midway between a government-controlled area and a contested zone, while western Moung Ruessei was seized by the Khmer Rouge. However, each of the districts was never immune to the influences from either side. In northwestern Battambang, Lon Nol forces enjoyed predominant control over the district, while the relationship between Khmer Rouge cadres and civilians was limited to sporadic encounters. In eastern Banan, the rebel influence across the area tended to be on par with the government’s clout. In contrast, the case of western Moung Ruessei shows that given an area of predominant rebel control, relations with civilians were of a state-like governance. Khmer Rouge cadres administered the district by providing them with certain services, such as public order and security. The table also demonstrates that whoever predominantly controlled an area largely determined the mobilization strategies of the armed groups; as Hypothesis 2 implies, a group’s predominant access to the residents of a given area allowed it to not only recruit volunteers but coercively mobilize conscripts, while the absence of access left it no alternative but to rely on volunteers. The coercive mobilization of combatants was a measure undertaken under the pressure of necessity because the population of committed recruits was likely to be small. The interviews, for instance, reveal that there were civilians who were mobilized by rebel forces but eventually fled back to their original villages after encountering severe living conditions in the forested areas and battle fields.
The extent of control and access to civilians largely determine an armed group’s capability for recruitment; while the capacity is great in the group’s area of control, it declines toward the territorial boundary with the rival group (Hypothesis 1). For instance, in northwestern Battambang, the Khmer Rouge could not systematically mobilize combatants because its interaction with civilians was limited to assault against them, the
recruitment of collaborators and the procurement of materials (e.g., food and clothes). Similarly, although the government frequently attempted to take young men away from the fields, limited connections between government local officials and civilians also prevented Lon Nol forces from conducting systematic conscription in western Moung Ruessei.

The interview data suggest that the relationship between military capacity of the forces and their recruitment of combatants is variable across these areas of control (Hypothesis 3). First, the armed forces’ reliance on poor equipment had repercussions on their recruitment of combatants. For instance, in eastern Banan, territory that was competed for by the government and rebels, the prospect of military service for government forces, in which many soldiers had been victimized in fight with the Khmer Rouge, was a major reason for civilians to elude mobilization by the incumbent. Since the district was an area more or less contested by the belligerents and less entirely controlled by either side, the willingness of uncommitted recruits to participate decreased with the increase in the cost of participation. Second, however, the presence of the forces overcame any repercussions deriving from military weakness in areas that were controlled by the forces more firmly. Like other rebel forces, the rebellious conspiracy in Western Moung Ruessei was initiated by contact between civilians and small and ill-equipped rebel forces. The prospect for failure in rebellion due to accompanying injury or death would render recruits hesitant to participate in rebel forces, yet the extensive influence of rebels in the district, which allowed Khmer Rouge cadres to employ coercive measures of mobilization, trumped any apprehension for being involved in military activities.
As for voluntary participants, the interview data suggest that non-pecuniary selective incentives deriving from ideological identity played a significant role in their enlistment for both government and rebel forces (Hypothesis 4). Local residents in eastern Banan recalled that those who voluntarily joined Khmer Rouge forces seemed to have been attracted by its ideological appeals. Also, that one volunteered for government forces was viewed as a gauge to distinguish this committed person from the other potential recruits. Volunteering for the rival group from his/her ruler’s territory required enough reason because it may have been accompanied by the risk of denunciation by neighbors and danger in military affairs in the field (i.e., cost of participation).

Interviewees’ recollections indicate that there were those who volunteered for Khmer Rouge forces from northwestern Battambang, in which the government’s influence was greater than that of the rebels. It is, however, still important to note that voluntary participants’ ideological consistency with the armed groups was generated within the process of the war. For instance, government’s recruits were often motivated by a sense of insecurity due to the rebel assault of villages. Interviews (e.g., in eastern Banan) reveal that the assault of local residents by rebel forces led to antipathy and resentment against the rebellion, which drove voluntary participants to enlist so as to, say, “defend the country.”

Hypothesis 5 holds that there is a positive relationship between the threat of punishment for non-cooperation and reluctant participation. One of the distinctive ways of imposing punishment and hinting at further penalty was to detain parents whose sons evaded government conscription. This particular exercise was conducted in villages in northwestern Battambang, in which the government’s clout allowed Lon Nol soldiers to
visit house by house with village chiefs for the mobilization of combatants. Although rebel influence was relatively weak in this part of the district, it was more salient in eastern Banan. The relatively frequent and close contact between rebels and civilians there led to the rebels’ mobilization of combatants by their threats of punishment.

_Gaps between the Model and Empirical Findings_

The interview data are thus employed to capture distinctive patterns of civil-military relations in the civil war. They represent unique courses of civilian participation and nonparticipation in the armed forces across different areas of control. However, as the data provide relatively static views on the contexts in the three districts, they do not explicitly illustrate consequences resulting from changes in military balance and control of territories. The focus of the narratives is on identifying some major causes that encouraged civilians to join forces or to refrain from collaborating with a specific belligerent (e.g., fragmentation of territorial control, identity appeals, and the threat of punishment).

Furthermore, although the model presumes that armed groups employ different mobilization strategies in different contexts and with different populations, it shows no other distinction between recruits except that between voluntary and reluctant participants. Interview data and secondary sources reveal that adult males were the primary recruits for both government and rebel forces. The range of age for conscription, of course, varies due to war situation; the government raised the draft age when it came to lack sufficient numbers in the population for the mobilization of combatants. Interviewees’ recollections do not agree on the specific range in age for mobilization, either, and it is likely to have
varied between local administrative units. Females were not necessarily excluded from armed forces and indeed played an important role in battles; young women, for instance, enlisted in government forces for nationalistic reasons (Isaacs, 1999, pp.204-5). Relying on interviews, however, I find that men were the main target of recruitment for both the military and militia. The reason that parents were taken to local administrative office by government officials is that they had sons who eluded its conscription. But whether recruits were men or women, or even young or old, armed forces sometimes limited their targets to a particular group of people; for instance, the Khmer Rouge welcomed healthy peasants for its forces, yet did not accept those who had been affiliated with governmental organizations.

As for reluctant participants, the discussion of the coercive recruitment of combatants in the model still admits a degree of a free agent as to who is faced with a choice between participation and sanction and then joins the armed forces. However, the narratives see a more forcible approach. For instance, secondary sources claim that Lon Nol soldiers hauled civilians onto a truck. Interviewees also recall that government conscription often appeared brutal, while it initially called for voluntary participants; soldiers and village militiamen took those who had attempted to elude conscription in northwestern Battambang. Although these conscripts can be considered uncommitted individuals, the threat of punishment for non-cooperation did not effectively signal them to collaborate with the forces. In addition, perception of the threat of punishment indeed varied between individuals. While some underestimated the threat and attempted to evade conscription (yet were eventually levied), others saw the government’s conscription as a normal recruitment of volunteers. Those who viewed conscription in this way included
both civilians who volunteered for the forces and those who thought that all conscripts did, in fact, volunteer. In this case, they did not even perceive the threat of punishment.

Interpreting voluntary participants’ motivation is another issue. Even if interviewees confessed that they enlisted in rebel forces for ideological reasons, it is possible that commonplace troubles could have motivated villagers to join. For youngsters, conflict with their parents was also a major reason to drive them from villages. Thus, the interviews find ambiguity in voluntary participants’ motivation because it may not have originated from discontent with an entire social system but could have been associated with a discord with neighbors and family members.

Finally, although the focus on individuals explains the variation in motivation for participation and nonparticipation, it does not sufficiently capture the presence or absence of the mobilization of combatants between villages. Many residents in western Moung Ruessei happened to be displaced by the Khmer Rouge, yet those in Koas Kraal village were neither recruited nor conscripted by rebels because the forces had already had many combatants mobilized from other places and did not really place confidence in those displaced from that village. Also, as for the government’s mobilization of military soldiers, civilians were conscripted in some villages (e.g., Koas Kraal and Beong Chhneah villages) but not in others (e.g., Thmei village). This gap between villages would have been contingent on a number of structural determinants beyond individuals’ motivations, including military balance, the extent of control, and the long-term mobilization strategies of the armed groups.

**Conclusion**
Considering some of the gaps between theory and evidence, the empirical findings at micro-level should be complemented by a perspective with a broader scope. The interviews expose structural contexts in the three districts that had major impact upon armed actors’ measures for mobilizing combatants and civilians’ participation in forces. Although the details on the local situations are tailored to be comparable between the cases and expected to fill the gap that literature on the civil war has not covered, it is needless to say that implications obtained from my fieldwork are applicable primarily to the cases examined. Moreover, the snapshots shown above not only focus on only distinctive patterns of civil-military relations in each case but also seem rather static.

The shifts in mobilization strategies of the armed forces and civilians’ motivations for participation were contingent also upon country-level contexts. Volunteers for Lon Nol forces were primarily extracted from the scant pool of individuals who were preoccupied with their nationalist ideas and by antagonism toward the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge. Since the government army often could not afford to pay enough wages to its soldiers, there were almost no other selective incentives to attract volunteers except for the use of nationalist appeals. In this situation, the required draft age for government conscription was hiked and government officials even began press-ganging civilians as the age group between 18 and 25 had been drained by early 1974. However, these increases in the draft age and shifts in mobilization policy were fostered also by the government’s loss of territorial control and its weakened military capacity. After the defeat in Chenla II, Lon Nol forces did not recover its military capacity and the Khmer Rouge seized more major supply lines and tactical bases. The government’s mobilization ability was extremely vulnerable to the loss of territory because it lacked resources from
which selective incentives could be offered to potential participants for its army. Reluctant participants who were coercively mobilized from the government-controlled areas consequentially became the primary pool of recruits for Lon Nol forces.

Along with its increasing military capability, the Khmer Rouge succeeded in attracting civilians (especially poor peasants) by relying on such means and opportunities as ideological appeal, socioeconomic reforms in local administration, Sihanouk’s popularity, and the U.S. bombardment on local villages. Instant pecuniary incentives were rarely used to motivate individuals to participate in the rebel forces as Khmer Rouge combatants were unpaid. Although the Khmer Rouge did not consider urban dwellers, who were mainly controlled by the government, as subjects of recruitment, the expansion of territory controlled by the group in the countryside allowed it to access more local civilians. As rebel control was consolidated over the country, the Khmer Rouge introduced coercive measures to administer the population. Seen also in strongholds of the Lon Nol government, the areas that the Khmer Rouge exclusively controlled had a function that enabled it to coercively mobilize combatants, it having occasionally displaced local villagers to remote areas for this sole purpose.

The treatment of civilians by both Lon Nol and Khmer Rouge forces ranged from coercive to contractual measures. When armed forces have access to a sizable number of committed recruits, they are not forced to resort to coercive measures of mobilization. However, the expansion of territorial control eventually leads to an increase in the proportion of those who passively cooperate with a given force. And due to the expansion of the numbers of less-committed recruits, the administration of civilians subsequently requires costly coercive measures in order to achieve collaboration and prevent defection.
Chapter 5: Guatemala, 1960-96

Introduction

The previous chapters have provided theoretical consideration and empirical evidence for civilians’ participation in armed forces in civil war and established that although the pool of available recruits expands as the area controlled by an armed group expands, the group’s capacity for recruitment decreases toward the territorial boundary with the opponent-controlled area. Beyond this premise, in Chapter 3, I hypothesize that reluctant participants are major recruits to an armed group to a point of the group’s command beyond which voluntary participants replace them, since although both government and rebel forces rely on a combination of coerced participants and volunteers, they prefer to rely on coercive measures of mobilization in areas of their full control. Reluctant participants coerced by a group after the enlistment of voluntary participants tend to be under strong constraints to join in order to avoid being punished by the group. Additionally, the chapter proposes hypotheses pertaining to the effects on participants’ willingness for participation and sensitivity to the cost of participation, namely, that the greater capacity of an armed group makes (potential) participants less responsive to the cost of punishment by rival groups and that incentives based on identity encourage voluntary participation, but reluctant participation is brought about rather by the threat of punishment for non-participation.

Chapter 4 covers the empirical findings in the Cambodian Civil War. Evidence majorly shows that a group’s predominant access to the residents of a given area allowed
it to not only recruit voluntary participants but coercively mobilize conscripts, while the absence of access left it no alternative but to rely on volunteers. Moreover, the focus on individual-level reasons for collective action allows me to observe the variation in civilians’ motivations for participation and nonparticipation in the armed forces.

This chapter examines the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-96) in detail. The Guatemalan war is an appropriate case for my model because the focus of this study corresponds to the most salient characteristics of the war; the conflict between the Guatemalan government and rebel groups features specific components such as territory (e.g., stronghold and contested areas) and the same pool of potential recruits for which both actors compete. As Wickham-Crowley (1992) argues, the rebels were an effective rural government and achieved dual power against the government (p.192). The implication is not only that both the government and rebel groups seized control of domestic areas, but that they frequently attempted to entice civilians from their opponents’ control.

It is true that an entire picture of the civil war would exceed the model in Chapter 3. First, the war had the involvement of multiple major armed groups; although the government had been maintaining itself as a united entity, several rebel groups emerged throughout the war. This apparently was the reason for the complexity of interactions between the belligerents. Second, the war was not free from involvement by outside intermediaries. For instance, the U.S. helped Guatemalan military officers not only to overthrow a leftist government in 1954 but also to carry out counterinsurgency operations afterwards. In contrast, rebels of the 1960s were supported by the Cuban government. Third, territorial control by an armed group did not always lead to the seizure of local
population. The Guatemalan Party of Labor (PGT), a communist party and armed rebel group, mainly consisted of former urban dwellers, yet did not seek to mobilize indigenous residents even when driven to the countryside by government forces.

However, this study still insists that the model is able to capture the generic nature of the Guatemalan case. Even when the government is confronted by several rebel groups, local contexts are often characterized by a dyadic relationship between two parties. Given that not only a group’s attributes but also the military balance with its rival play an important role in the recruitment of combatants, the dyadic framework is useful. Furthermore, the membership of armed actors involved in the war can be minimized to those who compete for fragmented sovereignty that is likely to be accompanied by popular support and recruits. In this sense, the case study focuses on groups that substantially held territories of control and excludes those that did not. Also, although armed actors’ motivation to mobilize local residents was not always present, almost all groups in the Guatemalan Civil War found it advantageous to recruit combatants in their areas of control, which agrees with the assumption that armed groups collect combatants in such areas. Interpreting the PGT’s mobilization strategy therefore requires caution, and Chapter 6 also readdresses the issue (the presence of access to, and will to, mobilize local population) in a broader context.

By examining the changes in military and civilian patterns throughout the Guatemalan Civil War, this chapter aims primarily to capture the shift in structural contexts during the war and the resulting impact upon the relationship between armed actors and civilians, and mobilization strategies over time. Since the war was rich in its variation of structural contexts, the rivalry between the government and rebel forces
underwent several transformations. Once rebel groups began seizing control of rural areas, government forces largely suppressed and confined the rebels to limited territories; this pattern of displacement both determined and altered local civil-military relations. In contrast to Chapter 4 that reveals the static variation in civil-military relations from district to district by using the interview data, this chapter rather looks at long-term trends of territorial control, armed actors’ mobilization strategies and civilians’ reactions, and discerns how and whether or not modifications in the structural contexts superseded existing practices and determined civilian collaboration with and participation in the armed forces. The Cambodian Civil War may also be employed so as to show how the shift in structural contexts influenced civilian participation in armed groups. However, although the war in Cambodia was indeed dynamic, it was less diverse in armed actors; the main belligerents throughout the conflict were only Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge. I consider the Cambodian case to be advantageous for the comparative analysis of structural contexts at a specific point in time.

For the above objective, an approach that treats armed groups as analytical units is useful because it will reflect a majority reaction to situational environments, while the micro-level view captures the difference in decision-making between individuals. The individual-level variance in terms of participation in armed forces is crucial in this study, yet it may be too intricate to trace the long-term patterns of civil-military relations. With the individual-level variation necessarily minimized at this point, this chapter highlights the changes in structural contexts and benefits from a macro-perspective.

The macro-level dynamics of civil war (e.g., military balance and troop size of armed forces) reflect the theoretical discussion of the preceding chapters. To connect the
empirical details with those implications, this chapter first presents an overview of the Guatemalan Civil War between 1960 and 1996. Dividing the war into two cycles, the next section grasps the flow of events. I adopt the framework in which these cycles are discussed separately because a major change in armed actors occurred between these cycles. The chapter then turns to discussion of the structural contexts and recruitment with a focus on their shift over time. This section is organized so as to shed light on the connection between the theoretical model and findings from the case study. More specifically, I discuss the validity of the hypotheses in the following order: military capacity and recruitment (Hypothesis 3), threat of punishment and reluctant participation (Hypothesis 5), decline of armed groups’ capability for recruitment toward the territorial boundary (Hypothesis 1), identity-based selective incentives and voluntary participation (Hypothesis 4), and replacement of reluctant participants with voluntary participants, and *vice versa*, according to context (Hypothesis 2). These analyses are followed by the indication of some gaps between theory and evidence, and summaries of shifts in civil-military relations in the Guatemalan Civil War.

**The Guatemalan Civil War**

The Guatemalan Civil War, which endured from 1960 to 1996, had two distinct phases, rebel upsurge in the 1960s and government counterinsurgency operations, which began in the 1970s and lasted until the early 1980s (Booth, 2000, p.1). The initial rebel forces were formed by army officers following their unsuccessful coup in 1960, but during that course of the war, the government fatally demolished those rebel organizations. Although rebel activities were concentrated in the eastern region, the rebels were contained there
not only by a counterinsurgency effort but also by the government’s introduction of measures such as death squads and the arranged disappearance of civilian opposition figures (Jonas, 2000, p.21).

The second cycle of the war, in particular, is recognized as the period of *La Violencia* (The Violence)\(^{166}\) in which many indigenous people were mobilized into guerrilla activities, as the rebels who had been active in the first cycle had come to attach greater importance to the seizure of the country’s western highlands that were resided by a large population of those natives. As detailed later in the chapter, counterinsurgency operations over the course of the conflict involved a critical shift from a strategy of occupation in the 1970s to the use of minimum force and a focus on civil affairs in the 1980s (Schirmer, 1999, p.8). However, the above mentioned government’s response to the rebellion, especially during the terms of the Lucas García (1978–1982) and Efraín Ríos Montt (March 1982–August 1983) administrations, was indeed characterized by the mass murder of civilians (mainly indigenous people) who were regarded as rebel collaborators, in addition to the destruction of the urban base of rebel support. After the scorched-earth operations, which aimed to pacify entire communities in the western highlands, the government intended to control the population through such measures as civilian self-defense patrols and the establishment of “development poles.” Although the rebels had resurfaced in the late 1980s, having redefined their strategy after their defeat in the counterinsurgent operations, they sought a negotiated end to the war in 1996 (Jonas, 2000, p.18).

\(^{166}\) For a detailed discussion on *La Violencia*, see Sanford (2003, pp.14-5).

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May treats the cycles of the war as time periods, both of which can be disaggregated into sequential phases of “turmoil,” “coordinated counterattack,” “internal war,” and “reactionary terror” (May, 2001, pp.68-69). In each course of confrontation between the government and the rebels, the rebels revolted and attempted to expand their influence over the country, and each time the government counteracted their activities. Since the rebels were never able to overwhelm the government during the civil war, rebel-controlled areas were frequently regained by the government forces. Civilians who were caught in the crossfire were required to decide who they would support and whether they would join either of the armed forces each time rulers were replaced. In this sense, the Guatemalan Civil War proves to be an appropriate case through which to examine the periodic changes in the structural contexts of civil war and the subsequent reaction of civilians over the countryside.
The 1960s and the mid-1970s

As in other cases of civil war, external actors played significant roles throughout the Guatemalan Civil War. The democratic nationalist Revolution of 1944 and its violent U.S.-sponsored termination in 1954 had created preconditions for the conflict (Jonas, 2000, p.17). In addition, the U.S. continued to support the Guatemalan government after
the overthrow of the “leftist” regime, while the rebels were supported by Cuba. The failed
coup attempt of 1960 in the capital, Guatemala City, which was led by military officials
(e.g., Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa) discontented with the government and caused by
conflicts between younger and older officers, led to the activation of leftist rebel
movements when those officials fled to the eastern regions of Izabal and Zacapa, which
are away from the capital and adjoin Honduras, and there organized guerrilla forces.
Armed rebel organizations such as the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Revolutionary
Movement of 13th November (MR-13) later came to be the main guerrilla organizations
fighting the government. In addition to these rebel groups, the Guatemalan Party of Labor
(PGT), which had been an umbrella organization of the FAR until 1968, also played a
significant role in the armed struggle.\footnote{For the changing alliances of the rebel groups, see May (2001, pp.105-8).}

While each of these rebel groups had no more than 500 troops, they began to
attack local police stations and army outposts and barracks during 1961-62 by setting
traps and ambushes, carrying off weapons, and demoralizing government troops (Landau,
1994, pp.161-2; Schirmer, 1999, p.16). Also, from 1963 to 1966, the rebels conducted
small-scale attacks targeting the government patrols that would penetrate the areas
occupied by the rebels. The rebel forces from this period are considered to have had
tactical superiority over the government forces, which were initially ill-prepared for
guerrilla warfare (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, pp.95-6).

However, the rebel movement of the 1960s deteriorated and troops had to seek
refuge in the mountains after government forces broke their fronts and captured a number
of rebel leaders around 1966. The government’s counterinsurgency operations included
the use of mobile military police, death squads, and torture during the campaign of 1966-
67, in which many rural Ladinos as well as rebel cadres died (McClintock, 1985, p.64; Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p.67, 80, 83). The government’s operation was so exhaustive that more than 9,000 military commissioners, former army personnel who played the role of paid informants, were stationed in villages throughout the country; the military often delegated the exercise of their operations to loyal civilians (e.g., large landowners) in the unofficial death squads, as their purposes (i.e., the repression of dissidents) coincided (Eckhardt, 2006, pp.32-3; Handy, 1984, p.161; May, 2001, pp.56-7).

Rebel forces in the 1960s more or less gained support from the Ladinos in such departments as Izabal and Zacapa, in which they were based, rather than in other areas such as the central highlands and the south coast. Outside their areas of popular support were neither the FAR nor the MR-13 really able and willing to extend their operations, partly because they had scarcely any knowledge about the locality (Paige, 1983, p.715). Also, while civilian collaboration with rebels was based on support from the Ladino population that was dominant in the eastern departments, rebel leaders tended to look down on the indigenous residents because of their “backwardness” and viewed those people as not “mature” enough to join their forces (Dunckerley, 1988, pp.454, 508).

168 It is estimated that the operations murdered about 12,000 people between 1966 and 1970 (Lykes, Beristain & Pérez-Armiñan, 2007, p.369). Despite a number of victims, Ball, Kobrak & Spirer (1999) show that the government repression against civilians was relatively selective in the 1960s but less careful in the 1970s in targeting those who were considered to be affiliated with the rebels.
169 These anti-rebel groups included the White Hand, the National Organized Anti-Communist Movement (La Mano), the New Anti-Communist Organization (NOA), and the Guatemalan Anti-Communist Command (CADEG). Anderson (1988) demonstrates that these groups were ‘simply army and police units operating under another name,’ having their headquarters in military bases.
The mid-1970s and the 1980s

In the 1970s, survivors of the rebellious movements of the 1960s reorganized rebel forces and initiated a new assault on the government forces by mid-1975. Their revised guerrilla strategy emphasized the “evil influence of the bourgeois political orientation” and focused more on the indigenous-based struggle (May, 2001, p.125; Schirmer, 1999, p.61). They had abandoned the east by this point of the war and sought the geographical and social base necessary for guerrilla warfare in the western highlands, where the country’s indigenous people resided (three-quarters of them were Mayans). In 1972, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) was organized into fronts in Quiché and Huehuetenango (May, 2001, p.62). The Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA) was organized in the 1970s, and the FAR was ongoing. Despite slight differences in ideology and focus (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.41), these groups eventually formed an umbrella organization known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982.

The rebel groups, whose primary leaders were left-wing Ladinos, did not always have roots in the existing movements often led by Pan-Mayan intellectuals or radicalized Catholic activists, whose focus was the pursuit of such things as human rights, rural development and cultural edification (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.39; May, 2001, p.128; Rubin, 2004, p.121). Nevertheless, indigenous and peasant groups were their main source of mobilization because the rebels regarded these groups as deprived of socioeconomic
rights and were able to play on this disadvantage to their own advantage (Zur, 1998, p.69).\[^{170}\]

The 1976 earthquake, in which over 23,000 people died and 75,000 were injured, left a million people homeless and directly hit the poor, in particular (May, 2001, p.62). This situation brought the creation of alliances between the homeless and workers because the reconstruction effort was not apportioned equally between the urban and rural residents, nor between the Ladinos and indigenous people. The devastation in the countryside, where the population was mainly indigenous, fostered a sense of social isolation from the urban Ladinos. This led to the emergence of several nonviolent popular organizations whose original focus had been to serve as conduits for international aid in those remote areas. Whether nonviolent or not, the existence of these popular organizations based on discontent among the poor in the rural regions was recognized by the government as a potential basis for rebellion. In response, in order to prevent future rebellion, government forces began establishing military bases and garrisons throughout the rural areas and initiated a strategy that involved the arranged disappearance and assassination of important (select) activists of popular organizations in both the capital and other cities by 1978 (Fried et al., 1983; Handy, 1984, pp.172-76; Sanford, 2003, p.121).

During this period of civil war, the government carried out its scorched-earth operation, which targeted highland villages. Although right-wing death squads assaulted

\[^{170}\] Some of the government’s redevelopment projects in the 1970s disadvantaged indigenous people. One of those projects aimed at opening an arterial road from the Atlantic coast to the Mexican state of Chiapas, for instance, led to the occupation of lands along the road by military officers and the displacement of indigenous villagers to cooperatives (Anderson, 1988, p.31).
activists as well as many other civilians prior to 1982, the peak of the operation occurred in this year when government forces pacified entire communities without carefully observing the extent to which those communities collaborated with the rebels, and committed human rights violations (e.g., murder, torture, and rape).\textsuperscript{171} This operation consequently not only took many civilian lives, but also displaced the remaining; it additionally militarized the countryside through the establishment of institutions such as model villages and civil patrols.\textsuperscript{172}

Although all communities infiltrated by the rebels were victimized by the government, the highland Mayans were the major victims. The rebels also murdered, in particular, highly regarded people such as government soldiers, agents or supporters (Landau, 1994, pp.172-3) and even committed mass murders of indigenous people after local communities came under the control of civil patrols (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.16). However, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, the Mayan people were those who were targeted the most, and most violations in the civil war were perpetrated by the government forces.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{171} Leiby (2009) shows that the government’s sexual violence in Guatemala was indiscriminately targeted at indigenous peasantry in order to spread fear and terror across ‘suspicious’ communities. The rebels were also responsible for about one percent of all events involving sexual violence (pp.465-6).

\textsuperscript{172} The government’s military control over the populations in the countryside was so overwhelming that acts such as privately making fun of the military or arriving late at civil patrol duty were viewed as symbols of defiance (Manz, 1988, p.62).

\textsuperscript{173} For the role of the police in the repression, see Glebbeek (2001).
Evaluations of the rebels’ strength and viability in the 1970s and early 1980s vary. Some argue that the initial state violence drove local civilians and civil organizations, such as the Committee of Peasant Unity (CUC), to the rebels’ side and that the rebel troops depended on 360,000-500,000 supporters in early 1982 (Schirmer, 1999, p.61). Backed by these supporters, the rebels exercised attacks between mid-1981 and 1982, interrupting the traffic of goods and people, assaulting infrastructure, impeding commerce and threatening the military’s mobility (Manz, 1988, p.15; Zur, 1998, p.69, 70). Others would claim that, while the rebels in the jungle were able to survive under the army’s offensive in the mid-1970s, their mere survival did not alter the military balance and, rather, they suffered from a lack of food and lodging, as has been reported by the government forces that were supported by the U.S. Special Forces personnel (Landau,
1994, pp.173-4). Whether or not this evaluation underestimated the rebels’ strength, the
government’s mass murder of indigenous people in the countryside, nevertheless,
resulted in the rebels’ seeking refuge in the mountains and neighboring countries, or their
surrender to the military.

However, it is also true that the rebels were not annihilated by the government
forces. Although the rebel forces were only small bands, they were still active in the mid-
and late-1980s.¹⁷⁴ For instance, the rebels did not have any head-on collisions with the
government forces, and they continued to employ such measures as ambushes, sabotage
and attacks on isolated military outposts and also seized some remote villages for
propaganda in the southern departments of Esquintla and Suchitepequez, in the northern
department of Petén, in San Marcos, and in Solola (Manz, 1988, p.64). Into the early
1990s, the situation remained the same; the rebel forces controlled no major territory
beyond these villages, lacked the capacity to manage massive operations, and could only
disrupt economic activities to show off their presence. Considering this unfavorable
situation, in 1986, the rebels modified the strategies that had focused on the military
struggle and began to propose negotiations with the government in an effort to arrive at a
political settlement to the civil war after the restoration of civil rule. (Barry, 1992, pp.67-
9; Jonas, 2000, p.30).

The Structural Contexts and Recruitment

Military Capacity and Recruitment

¹⁷⁴ Preti (2002) examines the thesis of ‘civil war as business’ or as ‘cooperative conflict,’
referring to the fact that the strong government forces did not completely defeat the much
weaker rebel forces and that the war was prolonged.
Throughout the civil war, the gap in military capability between the government and rebel forces checked the rebels’ ability to recruit combatants in two ways. First, scattering rebel forces from many of the inland villages, government forces successfully removed their opponent’s influence in those communities. Secondly, potential participants in rebel forces hesitated to enlist because of the fear that poor equipment and training in the forces could endanger their lives.

During the period of 1966-68, government forces conducted a pacification operation in the departments of Izabal and Zacapa and Sierra de las Minas, and scoured the areas of rebel activity; rebel enclaves and villages viewed as sheltering guerrillas were bombed by the air force, and suspected rebel areas were swept by ground forces (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.28; Landau, 1994, p.164). The most remarkable outcome for the government was that it not only reduced the number of rebel units to a minimum but also severed them from the population, although remnants of the guerrilla forces persisted in the isolated and less dense regions that had difficult terrain and climate, while the urban front continued to carry out terrorist activities (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, p.98-9). As a result, the rebels were unable to shift from guerrilla activities to a strategy of popular resistance throughout the duration of the war (Sierra Pop, 1983, p.327).

The imbalance of military capability between the government and rebel forces did not change in the 1970s and 1980s. In the areas that they initially controlled in the western highlands, rebels were able to mobilize local civilians. However, this may be considered one of the determinants that instigated the government’s repression. In his

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175 According to Landau (1994), the government troops were poorly trained and paid. Moreover, the officers lacked professionalism and, rather, worked for politicians who ‘either owned large property or represented one the oligarchs’ (p.162).
books, *Between Two Armies* and *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*, Stoll emphasizes that the government repression was a reaction to rebel organizing and ambushes, partially aiming at characterizing rebels’ activities as the trigger of state violence. Counterinsurgency campaigns indeed concentrated on the northern part of Quiché, especially in the Ixcán area, where the cooperative movement and Catholic Action had been present, or in the Ixil Triangle area where rebels had received popular support (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.87).

Counterinsurgency operations prior to 1982 did not destroy the society in the highlands as the selective targets were mainly in the urban areas. However, when targeting whole communities, the government’s scorched-earth operations in the early 1980s did not make a clear distinction between “listeners” and “involved;” in other words, they assumed that all indigenous people in the designated areas were subversives (Stepputat, 1999, p.64; Zur, 1998, p.83).176 Started in Chimaltenango and intensified in the Ixil Triangle, the assault against over 400 indigenous villages was aimed at removing potential food and shelter sources from the guerrillas’ reach (Falla, 1994, p.60; Torres, 2004, pp.13-4). In contrast to previous assassinations, massacres were committed in public spaces, and casualties were massive; about 90,000 persons were murdered and one million people fled their homes (Manz, 1988, p.7; Sanford, 2003, p.129).

The government campaign drastically reduced rebel troops not merely because rebel soldiers were lost in battle but, as in the 1966-68 counterinsurgency operations

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176 Falla also examines the escalation of state violence over time and divides the phases of violence into phases of selective repression during 1975-81 and of scorched earth in 1982, detailing sub-phases in each period (Falla, 1994, pp.181-4).
addressed above, because it also severed many of the forces from the local populations by assaulting their local bases (Landau, 1994, p.184).

A second point that made potential participants hesitant to enlist due to the forces’ weakness is related to the rebels’ relationship with civilians after the counterinsurgency operations. For instance, when being confronted with the government’s counteroffensives and bombardments in the early 1980s, the rebels were unable to protect the civilians and recruits under their control and, instead, retreated because they did not have the organizational capacity and weapons necessary for their defense. They even deserted those whom the government accused of having been affiliated with the subversives and had provided with food and shelter (Eckhardt, 2006, pp.34-5; Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.97; Lovell, 1988, p.46; Stoll, 1993, pp.126-7). When these defenseless and vulnerable communities were attacked by the government forces, many civilians were victimized. As a result, those civilians came to the realization that the rebels had promised more than they could provide and had failed to protect them. This caused many indigenous combatants and collaborators to begin to abandon their affiliation with the rebels by mid-1982 (Barry, 1992, p.66; Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.98).

Those civilians who were deserted by the rebel groups had four alternatives for survival. First, some attempted to seek refuge in the nearby forests and mountains, and stayed there; second, others lay concealed in the squatter settlements in Guatemala City by hiding their backgrounds; third, others fled into neighboring countries, such as Mexico, in search of refuge; and fourth, others were displaced to communities reconstructed by the government and, in many cases, served in civil defense patrols (Lovell, 1988, p.47). Although it is necessary to note that some others still followed and joined the rebel forces,
the rebels’ lack of military capability relative to government forces in fact undermined their base of popular support.

_Threat of Punishment and Reluctant Participants_

Both government and rebel forces exercised violence against civilians. During the period of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, although government-sponsored practices of forced disappearances and the use of death squads were aimed at dissidents, an unignorable purpose of these measures was to control the population through fear and intimidation. While the rebels did not adopt the exact measures employed by death squads, they did engage in the kidnapping of political representatives and landlords (Barry, 1992, pp.45-6; Garrard-Burnett, 2010, pp.29-30; Stepputat, 1999, p.59; Trefzger, 2001, p.90). Thousands were killed or embroiled by government repression, including not only members or supporters of the rebels but also civilians who were suspected to have previously had progressive ideas, friends or relatives of the victims, and those who had sentimental or business conflicts with the members of the paramilitaries (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, pp.102-9). The government’s commitment to disappearances and killings had intermittently lasted until the mid-1970s both in the urban and rural areas.\(^{177}\)

The armed forces exercised violence or intimidation not only against potential enemies but against civilians under their current control. Regarding the rebel mobilization

\(^{177}\) Aguilera Peralta & Beverly (1980) characterize death squads as irregular groups “acting with structural, tactical, and strategic autonomy from the regular army and police” that conducted these violent measures during the 1960s, and the massive extent of terror was due to the spread of those groups that were permitted to operate. In contrast, after 1970, the role of paramilitary groups, which were made up by armed men “outside the personnel of the state security apparatus but dependent on and directed by it,” became more salient than that of irregular groups (pp.110-1).
of combatants after the mid-1970s, there were those who were coerced by the rebel cadres to enlist in the forces (Eckhardt, 2006, pp.33-4) and others who lacked ideological orientation (Le Bot, 1995). Stoll (1999) describes that civilians were on “the horns of a dilemma” (p.10); if they collaborated with the rebels, the government forces would punish them, but if they cooperated with the government, the rebels would kill them.\footnote{See also Sanford (2003, p.86).}

For instance, many indigenous Ixils initially joined guerrilla activities for practical reasons:

Since the guerrillas were less homicidal and more appealing than the soldiers, for a time many Ixils looked to them for protection against an enraged army. But most had not joined the guerrillas as a way of meeting their own needs. Instead, they did so to survive the repercussions of the EGP’s own strategy (Stoll, 1999, p.10).

Stoll adds that those who were mobilized by the rebel group in this way sooner or later came to be less committed because their allegiance with the group was not deeply rooted. Hence, the local people may have collaborated with the rebels due not to preexisting grievances, consciousness-raising or ideological appeals, but to coercive pressures caused by the blows and counterblows between two armed forces; in other words, their support for the rebels may have as easily been committed to the government’s side (Stoll, 1993, p.20, 95).

However, as rebel forces were driven off by the government and their territorial bases replaced by government-controlled areas in the early 1980s, those civilians who
had been under rebel control came to be subject to mobilization by the government and army officials. Popular bases seized by the rebels were not only “eroded by the bombardment of native settlements, the destruction of personal property and belongings, the burning of crops and supplies, the killing of livestock,” but also reorganized into “model villages” in the western highlands, where hamlets had been razed by the government forces. “Development poles” (e.g., the Ixil Triangle in southern Quiché, Chisec in Alta Verapaz, Chacaj in Huehuetenango, and Playa Grande in northern Quiché) were established as local centers of production and commerce (Lovell, 1988, pp.46-7; Schirmer, 1999, p.70; Smith, 1990, p.16; Stepputat, 1999, p.62; Stoll, 1993, p.158).179 Housing was erected for those who had been displaced from the hamlets that had been destroyed; however, it was purposefully concentrated to impede the rebels from approaching the inhabitants of the villages.

As a counterinsurgency campaign, the Ríos Montt regime (1982-83) designed these programs in contrast to Lucas García regime’s policies that attached more importance to the annihilation of enemies, “all-out 100 percent random slaughter” (Schirmer, 1999, p.62).180 One of the purposes of these government-controlled villages was to provide civilians with development that was expected to reduce the potential for future rebellion (Preti, 2002, pp.108-9). This idea was derived in particular from the National Plan of Security and Development in 1982, which claimed that the country should spend 70 percent of its effort on regaining the popular support through

179 The government’s costs for establishing the system were not minute. The cost in 1986 for incorporating a person into a model village was 1,144 quetzal. For details of this calculation, see Manz (1988, pp.208-11).
180 Torres (2004) contends that counterinsurgency policies should be viewed as socio-economic policies of governance because the government forces tried to establish a privileged position in their political and economic spheres.
psychological operations and development projects ("Beans") and 30 percent on continuing to exterminate subversives ("Bullets") (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, pp.86-7; Schirmer, 1999, p.23). The government forces’ civilian affairs branch (S-5) attempted to win the hearts and minds of those who were relocated to the government-controlled villages, employing strategies such as the Food for Work program, in which community work was paid with food (e.g., rice, corn, beans, milk, pre-cooked wheat, etc.) and which were accompanied by limited reforms (e.g., wage hikes, land-sales programs, expanded social services) (Barry, 1992, p.47; Schirmer, 1999, p.73; Torres, 2004, p.12).¹⁸¹

Another purpose, however, was to establish a surveillance system and a web of intelligence, by militarizing the population, so that suspected “subversives” could be screened out of the population under the government’s control. For instance, in addition to the installation of a garrison at the entrance of a village, government forces relied on the cooperation of neighbors for mutual surveillance, which brought about not only the guerrillas’ risk of being detected on the occasion of their visit to the village but also danger for each civilian in that any self-seeking behavior would be viewed as subversive because of the government’s assumption that everyone within the community, or even each family unit, was an ally, and everyone outside was an enemy (Sanford, 2003, p.139; Stepputat, 1999, p.72; Stoll, 1993, p.163; Zur, 1998, p.119). Residents in these villages under government’s surveillance were mobilized into corps of civil patrol. As discussed below, those civil patrols did not entirely correspond to reluctant participants, yet they

¹⁸¹ In addition, many returnees from refugee camps or rebel-controlled areas not only had to work on the construction of military bases and model villages or to cook for soldiers and residents, but also were required to receive ideological education (Stepputat, 1999, p.70).
would not have taken part in the government-led civil patrol without the context being that government officials had coerced them into collaborating, either.

*Decline of Armed Groups’ Capability for Recruitment toward the Territorial Boundary*

The effect of territorial control by an armed group on the recruitment of combatants, however, is weaker on the periphery of the group-controlled area. In other words, the group’s capability for recruitment declines toward the territorial boundary with its opponent.

The rebel groups of the 1960s headed for the eastern departments of Izabal and Zacapa, and became involved with the population of Ladino peasantry that had been deprived of their lands by large cattle ranchers, proclaiming that their objective was to represent the interests of the non-elite sectors (Barry, 1992, p.65; May, 2001, p.103). Yet, for the rebels, to render their bases inaccessible to government officials was as important as their relationship with the local civilians. For instance, the FAR established its bases also in the eastern area of the country, the Sierra de las Minas area, from which they would assault military patrols and outposts (Landau, 1994, p.163; Paige, 1983, pp.711-4). In addition to attack upon government forces from these bases, the rebels sought to establish “liberated” zones with the support of the local population (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, pp.95-6).

However, in the initial stages of the war, the rebels of the early 1960s, whose bureaucratic organizational structures were hierarchical and whose leadership was both powerful and disconnected with the rank and file, lacked major ties with the masses (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, p.95; May, 2001, p.155; Trefzger, 2001, p.90). For
this reason, by the mid-1960s, the rebels began attempting to organize the peasantry and their mobilization efforts were somewhat successful in some cases. There were rebel recruits who came from remote villages in which dissident clerics approached civilians to build consciousness for political and social inequality. In addition, thanks to spies and local civilian guides, the rebels were able to avoid encounters with the government forces (Landau, 1994, p.162, 164). As an example, although the MR-13 was initially filled with former military officers, it eventually developed a relationship with the popular base of Ladinos in Izabal by establishing town committees and encroaching on the government’s command. Although vulnerable to counterinsurgent attacks, defense patrols were required by the group’s leaders to be set up in these towns. However, there also existed rebel factions that were isolated from the population; for instance, the PGT primarily was comprised of urban-based intellectuals and had no recruiting scheme (May, 2001, pp.108-9).

Whether or not they relatively succeeded in their efforts of popular recruitment, these rebel activities drew little reaction from residents in the western highlands. According to Carmack (1995), due to the residents’ support for conservative parties and the presence of military regimes, civilians in a town of the Totonicapan department, Momostenango, did not show any sympathy for the rebels, and the Ladinos and indigenous people living in the central and western regions, who were less familiar with the rebellion in the eastern region, viewed them as disrupters of commerce or merely as thieves (p.368).

Remnants of the rebel forces of the 1960s abandoned the eastern regions and moved to the western highlands in the 1970s; with this relocation, the territorial boundary
between the government and the rebels also shifted westward. This boundary largely determined a demarcation line for the areas from which the government and rebel forces dominantly recruited combatants.

Disaggregating the geographical zones into the core and peripheral areas to the regional marketing system, Smith (1990) demonstrates that zones of regional economy overlap with those of armed groups. More concretely, the rebels at this time showed little attempt to recruit civilians from the major highland towns (the “core” area in Map 5.2), and those same residents hardly experienced the government’s forced displacement or massacre except for a few kidnappings and the assassination of community leaders. In contrast, the residents in the rural highlands (the “periphery” area) largely suffered from the government repression. To distinguish the government-controlled areas from rebel-controlled areas, the army had assigned a colored pin to each village on a map; the red zones were in rebel territory, the white zones (with green pins) in government territory, and the pink zones in between them (Schirmer, 1999, p.48). Hence, the “core” area was identified with the pink or white zones, while the “periphery” area with the red zones. Smith confirms that the rebels were active in this red zone; for instance, the EGP was engaged in mass mobilization primarily in the Ixil area, which was remote and less populated and, therefore, initially guaranteed the rebels’ security. It is noted that their presence did not automatically guarantee popular support from the local civilians, despite the government’s viewing them as subversives, because the guerrilla units were often stationed in empty areas from which the population had been forcibly displaced by the government (Smith, 1990, pp.15-6, 18). The situation being that few people had
volunteered for the government forces, nevertheless, made the EGP a major actor in the Ixil area.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{182} The group was comprised of local irregular forces that ‘would serve on self-defense committees, cut telegraph lines, blockade highways with nails, barricades, and fallen trees in both directions to prevent the army from reacting in time when EGP guerrillas occupied a village’ (Schirmer, 1999, p.41).
Map 5.2 The Core and Peripheral Zones of the Regional Marketing System.

After the massive government repression in the western highlands around 1982, rebel-controlled areas shrank, and consequentially, the areas where the government had dominance over civilians expanded. Yet, the government’s clout was also restricted by its territorial boundary with the rebels. For instance, the mountainous and lowland areas of northern Quiché (e.g., Ixcán and Sierras) became almost the only hiding place for internally displaced people who did not follow the government forces and eluded their control, including recent returnees from refugee camps in Mexico, because its location was not easily accessible.

Falla (1994) provides a detailed discussion of life in this region. Although government forces occasionally were able to locate the occupied hamlets and assaulted residents through bombings, sweeps, artillery and psychological persuasion (the peak of the offensive was in 1987), they rarely seized those people under rebel control; the EGP’s presence in these villages prevented the government forces from disturbing them, penetrating the area or establishing control. While the residents were not militarily confronted by the government, they set up their own relatively secure and organized communities, calling themselves Communities of Population in Resistance (CPRs), which were tacitly in favor of the rebels, within the territory around which the EGP had heavy influence (p.194, 202-3).\(^{183}\) Although the government uniformly regarded these communities as “red zones,” the civil-rebel relations ranged from communities armed by the rebels and living under rebel control to those living under rebel influence but unarmed, and those having had a one-time-only encounter with the rebels (Sanford, 2003, p.132). Therefore, the rebel authority, in some cases, administrated educational and political

\(^{183}\) Falla, however, denies an easy ideological correspondence between the CPRs and the rebel groups (p.207).
agendas within a community, obligating civilians to collectively contribute to the
community and arming them for self-defense. Although rebel leaders occasionally made
concessions for the residents’ demands (e.g., refusal to participate in collective work, the
purchase of agricultural goods, and even secession to the government forces), those
demands were frequently discouraged and met with punishment by the rebels (Stoll, 1993,
p.148, 150). In such situations, “EGP recommendations to the civilian population became
orders” (Sanford, 2003, p.101).

Small bands of people in this area had eventually regrouped into larger groups for
facilitating agricultural production and security under the severe living conditions.
Moreover, the constant fear of detection by government forces and civil patrols required
them to be disciplined and vigilant:

Members of the CPRs devised ways to prevent roosters and turkeys from revealing
their presence, and children quickly learned the necessity for complete silence during
periods of emergency. All cooking had to be done (and is still done) while dark so as
to not reveal their location through the smoke. Within minutes an entire encampment
can evacuate, and the people, including children, hide in predesignated areas of the
rain forest or huddle in crude bomb shelters to wait out an attack (Falla, 1994, p.204).

Falla also emphasizes that strong community solidarity was salient in the CPRs;
risks surrounding the residents made their vision and purpose collective and “demanded
an active engagement, organization, consensus, and reaching out to establish solidarity
links essential for their survival” (Falla, 1994, p.207).
Identity-based Selective Incentives and Voluntary Participants

Thus, territorial control by an armed group prepared an environment wherein civilians under its control would collaborate with the group because the exclusive control over civilians allowed the group to coercively mobilize combatants into the forces. This seems to confirm the argument that civilians join armed forces so as to avoid punishment because they attach a greater importance to their survival rather than to their political beliefs. In other words, even if those civilians have a connection with a specific group, they might collaborate with another group that was to assume control over them. However, it would be prudent for us to examine whether civilians under the control of armed forces typically had unyielding beliefs.

For instance, the shifts in the structural context in the eastern region of the 1960s, where the rebels were driven off by government forces and government control intensified afterward, resulted in the desertion of rebel cadres and collaborators to the government’s side, and even to militia groups that fought the rebels. It is important that the desertions may have occurred due to the lack of a “vanguard” in the local population; the rebel groups were so fragmented and occupied with factional disputes that sufficient attention was not paid to mass mobilization (Aguilera Peralta & Beverly, 1980, p.97, 111-2). Trefzger (2001) also claims that, since the rebel groups were lacking in support from the population, they were vulnerable to counterinsurgency operations in the mid-1960s. A closer look at this region in the 1960s reveals that the changing context had overturned civilian collaboration with the rebel forces, the situation being that sources for substantial and lasting popular support were lacking.
Remnants of these rebel forces eventually came to view that their defeat during the 1960s was caused by the lack of support from and connections with local civilians. While the rebel groups of the 1970s and 1980s had a Ladino leadership (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.37; Thorp, Caumartin & Gray-Molina, 2006, pp.462-3), they attempted to build political and logistical bases and slowly and secretly gained popular support from indigenous people in the western highlands, whom rebels proclaimed were deprived (Manz, 2004, p.96; Steputat, 1999, p.59; Stoll, 1993, p.62). Sanford (2003) finds that rebel activities included

- guerrilla representatives clandestinely building on already existing community organization as a part of guerrilla strategy without organization member knowledge (i.e., participants were sometimes unaware that their local group was coordinated by the guerrilla), knowing community participation in clandestine meetings with guerrillas, publicly called meetings with guerrillas in the central village plaza, recruiting guerrilla cell leaders and informants, heightened community participation in publicly known or clandestine guerrilla organizations, guerrilla participation of unarmed civilian sympathizers, selective arming of community members designated as responsables by the guerilla, guerrilla military operations including threatening and disappearing community members identified as army informants, and discovery

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184 In the many hamlets they entered, while they spared no efforts on learning local languages, even indigenous people accompanying the rebel forces encountered dialects they did not understand (Landau, 1994, p.170; Manz, 2004, p.74). In addition, civilians initially kept their support secret for both their safety and the sustainability of the movement (Wilkinson, 2004).
of the dead bodies of “accused” army informants in outlying areas of village (pp.126-7).

The EGP spent over three years on the establishment of a committed popular base before its first public act in 1975 and another four years before openly going into hamlets in the highlands to the south (May, 2001, p.127; Stoll, 1993, p.67). The EGP’s strategy typically was to initiate contacts with individuals of each household followed by the organization of community meetings and networks; this was a pattern that was observed across departments (Sanford, 2003, p.83). In addition, in the western town of Momostenango, educated indigenous figures had begun organizing study groups and publishing a newspaper by the late 1970s in order to expand political awareness. The ORPA also entered the town between 1980 and 1982, spreading leaflets and painting slogans on the walls of the village center with the support of the local residents (Carmack, 1995, p.371). It is still important to note that the PGT did not pay as much attention to attracting indigenous people in the western highlands as did other groups, but rather continuously adhered to urban trade unions and student organizations and those in the southern and Atlantic coasts, which comprised a very small portion of the entire population across the country. This practice consequently impeded the improvement of the group’s mobilization ability (Manz, 1988, p.15; May, 2001, p.130).

Literature on civilians’ motivation for voluntary participation in rebel activities across cases more or less accounts for that of the indigenous people in Guatemala. For instance, local residents expected some material gain from collaborating with the rebels.
Examining female combatants, Zur (1998) finds not only that some were persuaded by their friends and relatives to attend rebel meetings, but that material prospects (e.g., land and higher wages) were attractive to them (p.84). Furthermore, while testimonies from ex-combatants reveal that they were unpaid (Stoll, 1993, p.138), opportunistic motivations cannot be overlooked. Local rebel leaders profited from their powerful new status connected to short-term economic gains that emerged from racketeering and the abuse of solidarity funds, in particular during the early 1980s, and, for some of them, the continuation of the war was not their means but purpose (Eckhardt, 2006, pp.34-5; Preti, 2002, pp.107-8). Indeed, while some civilians stayed in rebel forces for more than fifteen years, others joined for only a few years (Manz, 2004, p.106). However, material prospects (e.g., improvement of economic status) are often connected to a high level of social conscience and awareness about deep-seated social injustice (Hauge, 2007, pp.8-11). It is important to note that rebel leaders viewed their success in recruitment as showing that victory was possible and could occur in the near future. In addition, recruits were pulled also by the anxiety of losing their lands and the difficulty of achieving peaceful social change (Manz, 2004, pp.103, 107-8).

While the government’s repression motivated many civilians to be submissive to the incumbent, this was viewed as a social injustice by voluntary participants in rebel forces. By the mid-1970s, the indigenous population in the western highlands, which had been mainly controlled by the government but had begun being infiltrated by rebels, were split into traditionalists, the commercial middle class who joined right-wing groups, and

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185 Hauge & Thoresen (2007) argue that the motivation for joining the Guatemalan rebel forces did not vary between male and female.
those who joined the Ladino mass organizations and eventually the rebellious armed forces (Schirmer, 1999, p.39). Although the government’s use of selective assassination may have been effective in suppressing support for the rebels in the short run (Premo, 1981, p.431), it pushed the people in the third category, in particular, into the rebels’ activities in order to protect themselves against the government’s forces (see Falla, 1994; Stoll, 1993). That is, in addition to rebel propaganda, the selective government repression, which later extended to target local leaders, mayors, teachers and members of cooperatives (Thorp, Caumartin & Gray-Molina, 2006, p.463) in the mid-1970s (e.g., kidnappings and forced disappearance) inadvertently promoted support for the rebels (Sanford, 2003, p.128; Stoll, 1993, p.78). At the same time, due to the government’s lack of familiarity with locality, the violence against civilians in the rural areas was not entirely systematized and effective (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, 1992), and such indiscriminate violence also pushed some civilians to seek refuge in the rebel groups. The CUC, a national peasant and labor organization that would eventually go into an armed struggle, indeed became active in the aftermath of the government-sponsored massacres during 1978-80 (Jonas, 2000, p.23). In terms of rebel recruitment, government repression had a significant impact.

*Replacement of Reluctant Participants with Voluntary Participants*

The threat of punishment and identity-based selective incentives were key factors in the mobilization of combatants. Although reluctant and voluntary participants were not

187 According to Wickham-Crowley (1991, 1992), rebel violence against civilians had two factors, vulnerability to information leakage and representation as legitimate authority.
entirely segmented in their places of residence, armed groups tended to employ each of their strategies according to context; that is, coercive measures were used to mobilize reluctant participants and non-coercive measures were used to recruit voluntary participants. Furthermore, the groups mobilized reluctant participants mainly in their areas of control, but searched for volunteers for the forces near the rivals’ areas.

The structural contexts of the civil war after the mid-1970s help us understand the use of mobilization strategies, distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive measures. In villages under rebel control, those who were forced to join rebel forces coexisted in each hamlet with local sympathizers who actively engaged themselves in propaganda and training, and even in battle (Zur, 1998, p.83). For instance, Landau (1994) points out that teenagers were among the first recruits as ‘their seething indignation over the daily dose of injustice had primed them to absorb the guerrilla message’ (p.180). Stoll (1993) also points out that ‘political activists, survivors of government kidnappings, traders seeking profits, and youth looking for adventure’ were those who were firstly attracted by the rebels (p.119). However, given the threat of punishment for non-cooperation, rebel control over these villages provided the civilians with the motivation to collaborate with them. By organizing civilians and training them in self-defense and about their early warning system in order to prepare for counterinsurgent offensives, the rebels in effect made local people de facto participants in guerrilla activities, or surrogates for the rebels, so as to place them in opposition to the government forces (Manz, 2004, p.116; Morrissey, 1987; Zur, 1998, p.82). When attacked by government forces, the residents of such villages often took refuge until the forces left.
The government forces regarded such empty villages as a sign of collaboration between the rebels and the villagers (Stepputat, 1999, p.64).

To extend surveillance in the countryside, the government established a civil patrol system. There existed a variation in the origin, duty and structure of the civil patrols across municipalities and villages (Manz, 1988, pp.21, 62-3, 108-18, 169; Remijnse, 2001, pp.459-61; Stoll, 1993, pp.99-7), and patrolmen undertook not only communal work such as road construction and maintenance\textsuperscript{188} but also often accompanied military soldiers on sweeps to search for guerrillas or local people hiding in the mountains. Forming platoons, all adult men in a community had to serve mainly 24-hour shifts every few days, depending on the size of a community; in larger villages, a patroller served only 12-hour shift every two months (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, p.100).

Smith notes that, in the mid-1980s, almost all indigenous males in the western highlands between the ages of 16 and 60 were incorporated into the system (Smith, 1990, pp.10-1; see also Barry, 1992, p.53), although Remijnse contends that civil patrols included males between the ages of 18 and 60, and Esparza insists that they were between 14 and 60 (Esparza, 2005, pp.382-4; Remijnse, 2001, p.456). The service was indeed mandatory as those who refused or eluded duty were labeled as subversive and were punished by the government forces or patrol commanders who were named by the military,\textsuperscript{189} although this regulation was loosened by the late 1980s (Jonas, 1991, p.185;

\textsuperscript{188} Work was paid with food between 1982 and 1985, but after 1986, any compensation was cut off (Schirmer, 1999, p.91).

\textsuperscript{189} In Quiché, a recalcitrant villager was often given a vicious beating and even killed by fellow patrollers who feared collective punishment (Zur, 1998, p.104). In some places, a man who missed a turn needed to find a replacement. If no one could substitute for him, he had to pay one to five quetzal (Q5 = $1 in 1993) per turn. Punishment for missing a
In other words, the government established a system by which all people were compelled to serve in a hierarchical order of command (McClintock, 1985; Remijnse, 2001, pp.462-3; Smith, 1990, p.19; Stepputat, 1999, p.61). The enforcement of obligation was strict in conflict areas in the western region (e.g., the Ixcán and the Ixil areas), but less strict in the eastern part of the country because that area was seen as less at-risk (Manz, 1988, pp.39-40).

However, the status of the patrols was rather obscure as they were often exposed in frontlines where they encountered guerrillas. A government officer recalls that “They were ‘tricksters’ in the conflict areas, since they shared the local knowledge and the ease of mobility in the wilderness with the guerrillas, and, in some cases, enjoyed a certain degree of immunity from both sides” (Stepputat, 1999, p.68). Nevertheless, in addition to decreasing the number of crimes within communities of civil patrol, civic patrols succeeded in reducing rebel activities in government-controlled areas to rare and nocturnal visits to homes to ask for food and moral support, while they also had a presence beyond government-controlled areas and contact with relatives in model villages (Carmack, 1995, p.374; Manz, 1988, p.169; Manz, 2004, pp.168-9). It is necessary to note that not all ex-patrollers feel that they were coercively conscripted because protection not only from the rebels, but also from military recrimination, is what local civilians were eager for (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, pp.101-2; Manz, 2004, p.199).

\[190\] Human rights violations committed by patrollers and government soldiers are not counted (Remijnse, 2001, pp.463-4). Rather, village men affiliated with the patrol system became one of the major perpetrators of violence after 1981; for instance, they were forced to engage in the murder of villagers in their own or neighboring village (Eckhardt, 2006, pp.33-4; Schirmer, 1999, p.91; Zur, 1998, p.93).
Sweeping rebels from local villages enabled the government forces to exclusively mobilize those who may have preferred to join rebel forces rather than the army. Although, in 1992, the government began to send conscription notices through the mail, the measure of their recruitment has shown to be largely coercive. Barry, for instance, describes the situation:

… only sons of the rural poor enter the ranks of the army, and for the most part they are recruited forcibly. Typically, army trucks arrive in a village on market days and the feast days of patron saints with the local military commissioner signaling which youth should be recruited (Barry, 1992, p.49).

Manz provides another observation:

The army comes to major market towns to round up the young men who come for the market day. In one case, soldiers boarded a highland bound bus to abduct two young men traveling home. The soldiers yelled to the surprised but helpless witnesses “tell their mothers they’re in the army now.” In another instance, soldiers patrolled the streets and stopped outbound buses following the high school graduation day in the department capital of Huehuetenango, seizing young men of likely age. Only through exceptional means, such as the intervention of a school official or an authoritative religious person, can forced conscription be averted (Manz, 1988, pp.35-6).
Thus, although there were active collaborators with armed forces, both the rebels and government relied on coercive measures to mobilize reluctant participants within areas under their control. In contested areas, however, although both sides largely hinted at punishment for non-cooperation, they were unsuccessful at efforts of conscription. Stepputat describes these situations:

Both parties tried to convince the civilian populations, in particular community leaders, to choose a side in the conflict. Apparently they sought to compromise people, applying the overall logic of “those who are not with us, are against us.” The army undertook nocturnal incursions in hamlets, pretending to be guerrillas detecting and punishing army “ears,” or appeared during “fiestas” making guerrilla propaganda and recruiting young men for the guerrillas, when they knew that many people would be drunk. The guerrillas painted subversive slogans on the walls of all the houses in a village or ambushed soldiers close to the villages. Both parties sought to provoke affirmative actions. While some inhabitants engaged themselves with one or the other, many sought to maintain a pragmatic distance to the conflicting parties (Stepputat, 1999, p.63).

Furthermore, to entice civilians from the opponents’ areas, the armed forces at that point had to employ non-coercive measures of mobilization (i.e., persuasion). For instance, to draw the population away from rebel control, the government offered amnesty not only to civilians but also to rebel combatants who had deserted and agreed to participate in civil patrols (Anderson, 1988, p.55; Manz, 2004, p.126; Sanford, 2003, pp.105-6). Because the
rebels were afraid of such desertion by civilians and of losing that source of labor and recruitment for their forces, they tried to impede them from seeking refuge in the government-controlled zones and employed measures ranging from deception\textsuperscript{191} to coercion. Government amnesty also had an impact upon the rebels’ surrender, to a certain extent,\textsuperscript{192} because the hardship of life in the mountains (e.g., the lack of clothes, medicine, food, and shelter) was enormous (Stoll, 1993, p.125).

\textit{Shift in the Structural Contexts and Recruitment over Time}

The narratives in the preceding sections show that civilian participation in the armed forces in the Guatemalan Civil War was contingent on such conditions as the military capacity of the forces, the threat of punishment for non-cooperation, the difference in capacity for recruitment between areas controlled by the forces, identity-based selective incentives, and the replacement of reluctant participants with volunteers according to contexts.

These factors varied between the cycles of the civil war. For instance, rebel groups of the 1960s were ideology-oriented and made little effort to mobilize ethnic minorities. In contrast, those of the 1970s and 1980s prioritized their targets for recruitment and sought to mobilize indigenous people by establishing rebel bases in the western highlands. Although both groups of rebels defined themselves as supporters of the poor, they focused on different populations for mobilization.

\textsuperscript{191} The civilians were told at meetings that the government forces would kill any former rebel collaborators (Sanford, 2003, p.105).
\textsuperscript{192} Those who surrendered to the government were mainly minor cadres rather than hard-core combatants.
However, in each cycle of the civil war, the effect of military capacity, the threat of punishment and selective incentives on civilian enlistment was less dynamic than the shift in territorial boundary between the government and rebel forces. It was a pattern throughout the war that rebels revolted in the countryside (e.g., the eastern and western mountainous areas) and government forces repressed them. In every insurgent uprising, rebels sought to gain territory where they could exclusively mobilize combatants. Yet, as government forces defeated and swept rebel forces from local communities, civilians were faced with a change of ruler and, consequently, their structural context.

The theoretical model in Chapter 3 claims that the effect of territorial control by an armed group on the recruitment of combatants is stronger in the center of the group-controlled area and weaker on the periphery; that is, the group’s capability for recruitment declines toward the territorial boundary with its opponent. Moreover, armed groups coercively mobilize reluctant participants in their areas of control, but search for volunteers near the rival’s areas. It is important to note that both the government and rebel forces in the civil war coercively mobilized combatants when they could. Both sides mixed coercive mobilization with non-coercive mobilization, although the former tactic was employed only in their controlled zones because the capability to mobilize combatants was ineffective beyond their areas of clout. In places where their control was exclusive, government forces not only recruited volunteers but also coercively collected young males, and rebels also forced civilians to serve in their forces by hinting at the use of punishment for non-collaboration. Whenever control of territory in the countryside fell from rebels’ hands into the incumbent’s, territorial boundary between the belligerents shifted. Such a shift in boundary consequently changed the structural contexts.
determining whether civilians were mobilized coercively or non-coercively and by whom.

In the Guatemalan Civil War, as the government regained the rebel-controlled areas, those civilians who were formerly a subject of the rebels’ exclusive mobilization became the government’s target of mobilization because the rebel’s loss of territory brought about the subsequent loss of population that they potentially could have exclusively mobilized. The government, then, used coercive and non-coercive measures according to contexts; for instance, it relied on the use of amnesty to draw civilians from remaining rebel-controlled areas, CPRs or refugee camps, in order to bring them up as future soldiers or civil patrollers.

_Gaps between the Model and Empirical Findings_

This chapter gives an overview of the macro-level reflection of civilian participation in armed forces. Although undervaluing the individual-level variance, the narratives shed light on the effects of changing situations in the armed groups’ collection of combatants. Due to the focus on groups, individuals’ varied reactions to such an effort of mobilization tend to be overlooked because of this limitation. In other words, the analysis here does not distinguish between participants who may have been differently motivated and, rather, considers the change in the strength of armed forces as a sign of influence by the structural contexts. However, since a purpose of this chapter is to trace the long-term trends of civil-military relations, which is more or less dismissed in Chapter 4, a view based on the group-level variation is useful because it is likely to be free from the greater variation in individuals’ decision-making that would complicate the interpretation of the narratives.
Although the analysis in this chapter does not disaggregate participants in armed forces due to the macro-level view, their profile seems to largely correspond to that of combatants in the Cambodian Civil War. For instance, the main target for mobilization by rebels was a small fraction of the Ladino population in the eastern region during the 1960s which shifted to the indigenous residents of the western region during the 1970s, and among these participants, young males had been the primary recruits. This trend was not confined to the rebel side, but was also applicable to the government’s forces; yet, civil patrols accommodated not only adolescents but also males up to the age of 60. As in the Cambodian case, this does not deny that there were female combatants; scholars such as Hauge (2007), Hauge & Thorensen (2007), and Zurr (1998) carefully examine female rebel fighters’ motivation to participate in the civil war.

Furthermore, the above narratives indicate that the PGT was an exceptional group in that it did not seek to establish a recruitment scheme for the indigenous population. The group’s leaders had been enthusiastic about an armed struggle against the government and granted the centralized direction and leadership to its military section, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), at the March 1965 conference. And the group still adhered to its strategy; in 1967, a leading Guatemalan communist argues that the revolutionary purpose could be carried out only by sticking to armed action (Fortuny, 1967). However, the PGT’s leaders gradually came to lose their military passion and finally abandoned the armed struggle in 1968; they reasoned that their movement was in

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193 This does not mean that the PGT never had any connection with the rural population. Boarding an existing rebel movement, the group also played an intermediary role between guerrillas and rural wage workers. However, the group’s role in linking guerrillas with the masses through preexisting social ties appears to have been at a low level and it lacked widespread rural ties or deep roots in a designated region (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, pp.146-7).
a critical phase and they had failed to win the active participation of the masses
(Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p.193). This attitude among the PGT leaders dissatisfied some
high-ranking military officers of the FAR and eventually led to the separation of the latter
from the former in 1968. The FAR’s leaders had criticized the PGT’s lip-service to the
idea of armed struggle and took exception to their “pseudo-revolutionary idea,” which
put trust in the bourgeoisie to direct state capitalism and evolve peacefully toward
socialism but did not rely on the masses’ ability to take their revolution through an armed
struggle (Gott, 2008, p.78). Considering a certain level of connection between the PGT
members and urban civilians (e.g., university- and party-related intellectuals and
activists), this may exaggerate the stance of the PGT leadership. However, it would still
reflect their passiveness toward establishing any recruitment scheme for indigenous
people. In this sense, the indigenous population in areas where the PGT was militarily
influential had almost no effect on troop expansion or downsizing.

**Conclusion**

The first phase of the Guatemalan Civil War erupted in 1960 and was fought mainly in
the eastern region, but the government successfully suppressed the rebellion through the
use of not only ground forces but also abduction and assassination. Remnants of rebel
groups were revived by the mid-1970s and began to root in the western highlands, where
most residents had hardly had any previous contact with them, because they recognized
the need to gain more thorough and exclusive support from the population than what they
had in the eastern region. After attempts to win support from indigenous people over
several years, rebel bases were being established in the western highlands and rebel
forces began assaulting government officials and landowners, and attacking military garrisons and outposts. However, not only rebel activities, but also their bases, were thrashed by a series of government repressions that were initiated by the selective targeting of suspected subversives and eventually evolved into scorched-earth operations aimed at whole communities. Many of the indigenous communities destroyed by this counterinsurgency operation were reorganized into model villages, in which government forces controlled civilians who had formerly been under rebel control through measures such as civil patrols, ideological education, and development programs.

The shift in territorial boundary influenced the structural contexts of the war and civilians’ subsequent reactions. Yet, it is important to remember that variables which were relatively constant over time also had a significant effect on civilian participation in the armed forces. For instance, throughout the war, the armed forces received voluntary participants. As the narratives mention, it is necessary to note that economic opportunism deriving from wartime privilege granted to armed men, in addition to the provision of materials such as shelter, food, and clothes, was an incentive for participating in armed forces. Not only rebels but also government soldiers and civil patrol commanders often benefited from looting and extortion that was made possible by being an active recruit.

This study, however, stresses that selective incentives based on common identity also motivated voluntary participants to enlist. On the one hand, rebels in both the first and second phases of the civil war were often regarded as subversives not only by government officials but by those who benefited from existing political and economic systems (e.g., landowners and capitalists). Moreover, for many of the civilians who had not been influenced by rebellious ideas, rebels to them were merely equal to criminals or
thieves. It is not deniable that civilians favored serving in the self-defense system in the model villages because it guaranteed their security from rebel attacks. But on the other hand, the rebels’ idea did attract the poor and the youth of the villages because it promised them entitlement, which they otherwise did not have. Rebel forces of the 1960s were joined by such people as high school and university students, small proprietors, workers and peasants, and those of the 1970s and 1980s were filled by many indigenous people from the rural areas.

Although civilians’ recognition of social injustice and the prospect for improved socioeconomic conditions were major motivations for them to volunteer for rebel forces, both rebel and government soldiers used violence to assure compliance from civilians under their control. As the threat of punishment for non-cooperation increased, those targeted civilians were more likely to collaborate with the armed forces, provided that their priority was to avoid punishment.

Moreover, the rebel’s capability of recruiting volunteers as such was checked by their own inability to protect civilians from the government forces. Counterinsurgency operations throughout the war revealed the rebel’s weakness, and civilians were exposed to government counteroffensives each time the rebels were defeated. This resulted in losses in the population on which the rebels were based, and even the defection of rebel cadres and collaborators to the government’s side.
Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

Chapter 5 views civilian participation in the Guatemalan Civil War by focusing on armed groups, whose formations are based on the participation of individuals. Although troop size of armed forces and military balance between the government and rebel groups are a reflection of the participants’ contribution, this broader approach inevitably undervalues the interactions between civilians and only indirectly infers their motivation for participation through structural contexts (and even assumes that the motivation is determined by the contexts). And the variation in decision-making between individuals goes undetected because the focus is on the difference between groups rather than between individuals. One may point out that individuals’ participation in armed forces should be examined at a level other than group-level due to the possibility of ecological fallacy. However, the view provided in the chapter helps to understand macro-level implications of civilian participation in the war by treating an armed group as a major unit of analysis. In Chapter 6, I rely on the same approach, yet seek to expand the discussion of Chapter 5. The preceding case study dealt with the Guatemalan Civil War, which has specific features accordant to the model elaborated in Chapter 3. Furthermore, that case was chosen so as to restrict the scope of discussion, and not to accommodate a variance in independent variables as with the Cambodian case in Chapter 4. The large-N quantitative analysis in the current chapter explores more cases that would vary in terms of both independent and dependent variables.
This chapter examines the hypotheses pertaining to civilians’ participation as combatants in armed groups and provides empirical evidence to capture the relationships between structural contexts in civil war and civilians’ reactions to them. To test the validity of the hypotheses, the current chapter explores the mechanisms by which structural contexts in civil war determine civilians’ decisions to join or not to join armed groups, by looking at troop size of rebel groups over a limited time period. Therefore, the scope may appear limited because it deals with rebel groups only. However, it is specifically the size of rebel groups that reflects participation.

Moving away from the model on individuals’ behavior requires the introduction of variables applicable to the macro-level. The quantitative analysis examines the relationship between troop size of rebel groups and related attributes such as military capacity, the potential to win support from the population, and territorial control in active dyads between government and non-state actors from 1975 to 2001 in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, controlling for other factors that may increase or decrease the rebel troop size. Although some of these variables do not explicitly make an entrance in Chapter 3, each of them is necessary for an analysis of civil war over time, and is represented in the discussion of the model and the case studies. For instance, conflict duration and intensity are important variables in both the cases and the statistical analyses; the protracted high-intensity conflict in Guatemala during the 1980s degraded indigenous people’s motivation to collaborate with the rebels and even decreased the population of potential rebel supporters. The government’s capability to keep civilians away from rebel mobilization, operationalied by level of democracy and GDP per capita in this chapter, is also expected to play an important role in the competition with the rebels for popular
support and recruits. A refinement of the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 is followed by the description of the data and methods, and analysis.

**Refinement of Hypotheses**

Hypothesis 3 reasons that if the military capacity of an armed group increases, recruits to the group become less responsive to the increase in costs. That is, if the group can convince civilians that it is militarily capable and its military operations entail a low cost, the participants’ threshold of joining the group should be lower. The reason for this is that a participant bases the likelihood of his/her survival on the capacity of the group. The capacity of an armed group, of course, is influenced by changes in both the group’s strategies and the environment, as for example, the entry of new belligerents, major battlefield victories and/or losses, and new developments in war technology. In reference to the likelihood of survival, potential participants become relatively irresponsible, or responsive, to costs that their military activities entail. If a rebel group is able to access those who are less responsive to costs, it is likely to have a greater chance of expanding its force. In contrast, when the group is weaker and cannot efficiently attract potential participants, its chances for the mobilization of civilians are highly limited.

*Hypothesis 3.1: Militarily capable rebel groups are more likely to be able to expand their troops.*

Hypothesis 4 contends that the ratio of willingness of recruits to enlistment in an armed group, at a certain level of cost, increases if they are given more identity-based
selective incentives. In other words, motivated individuals are more willing to participate in an armed group than those who are less motivated, given the same conditions. It is, therefore, important for the group to raise the social rewards offered for participation by convincing potential joiners that their activities are justifiable. While it is argued that identity-based appeal is cheap to generate but less effective because most civilians are apolitical and rather attach more importance to their survival, groups that are able to offer any incentives to civilians are advantageous in recruiting combatants. In the context of civil war, the impact of identity-based appeal is still a primary incentive for organizing core members and mobilizing motivated participants across cases.

_Hypothesis 4.1: Rebel groups that can provide identity-based selective incentives for the local population are more likely to be able to expand their troops._

For those who do not dare to volunteer for an armed group, the threat of punishment for non-cooperation would provide a significant motivation for them to join the group (Hypothesis 5). When those in control are hinted by the group that a refusal to participate is linked with punishment, it becomes evident to potential participants that the cost of non-collaboration outstrips that of collaboration. Dominancy in control over civilians not only empowers a group to undertake any mobilization strategies that they see fit, but it also diminishes the possibility that rival groups will interrupt the relationship between the group and those civilians. Therefore, the extent to which the group seizes control of civilians has an impact on the enlistment of those potential reluctant participants.
Hypothesis 5.1: Rebel groups that firmly seize control of civilians are more likely to be able to expand their troops.

As the areas controlled by rebel groups expand, the pool of potential participants also expands, although their mobilization effectiveness decreases toward the territorial boundary of the opponent-controlled area. This statement can be disaggregated into three components. First, it assumes that a rebel group has territory over which it has dominant control and significant influence. This is not meant to imply that a group always controls territory within a country, but that it has a greater chance to establish sovereignty once it seizes control of a territory, by which it is able to offer state-like public services to the residents and gain their exclusive support. Second, in order for the group to mobilize its pool of recruits, access to the local population is needed. It is highly likely that the control of territory will spontaneously lead to the seizure of the population within the area; however, the development of close ties between the group and the local population should also increase the efficiency of mobilization. In other words, the association between territorial control and the levy of residents may not be automatic if the group does not have any established affiliation with them. Third, the expansion of contested areas serves as an advantage to the rebel group because it consequentially extends the population of civilians who can collaborate with the group. The logic of violence in civil war leaves many civilians no option but to follow political actors who have exclusive influence over them. In contested areas, however, flunkeyism tends to prevail among those who fear for their safety because those who collaborate with only one group are
more likely to be the first target of the other groups. While a group’s ability to mobilize civilians tends to be weaker in contested areas than in its stronghold, the residents who were formerly under dominant control by the government in those areas may fall to the rival group. In other words, as rebels extend beyond their territorial stronghold, they may gain sway over additional people despite their weaker influence.

**Hypothesis 1.1:** Rebel groups that dominantly control territory are more likely to be able to expand their troops.

**Hypothesis 1.2:** Rebel groups that have access to the local population are more likely to be able to expand their troops.

**Hypothesis 1.3:** Rebel groups that face broader contested areas are more likely to be able to expand their troops.

Given differences in a group’s clout between the stronghold and its contested areas, the group will adopt different mobilization strategies across regions. When it seeks to mobilize combatants in the stronghold, the group can use coercion as a means of mobilization. Although the group’s leaders do not have to employ coercion to recruit those participants who respond to their call for enlistment, they often find coercive mobilization to be efficient in such a context. Within contested areas, in contrast, the group does not expect all potential recruits to participate but does expect voluntary participants, who are more committed to the group’s activities, to do so because the latter
are not as readily deterred from enlisting with the group as reluctant participants would be, even in a situation whereby a certain level of cost for participating in the rebel group (e.g., denunciation by neighbors and punishment by the government) exists.

*Hypothesis 2.1:* Rebel groups that attract the local population in contested areas with their sociopolitical appeals are more likely to be able to expand their troops.

**Data and Methods**

To test the hypotheses, the UCDP Dyadic Dataset v. 1-2009 (Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008) is employed. The dataset is a dyad-year version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) and includes 2440 dyads between 1946 and 2008 that consist of two opposing actors in an armed conflict in which at least one party is the governmental actor. The ACD defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” per year and per incompatibility (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002). Because the primary interest of the current study is civil war wherein a government and domestic non-state actors compete, the samples of this study exclude interstate armed conflicts. For the same reason, the data also exclude internationalized conflict in which a government is attacked not by domestic actors but by foreign groups (i.e., the dyad between the U.S. and Al-Qaida in 2001). Furthermore, since the ACD counts all armed conflicts with over

\[194\] All dyads of internationalized conflicts, except for this case, are primarily characterized by the confrontation between a government and domestic actors with
25 battle-related casualties, it may include sporadic conflicts that did not develop into “effective resistance” by non-state actors (Small & Singer, 1982, p.210). Focusing the dyads between 1975 and 2001, this study restricts cases by referring to replication datasets based on the ACD and employs samples listed in the datasets that all deal with civil wars.\(^{195}\)

In each dyad, the dependent variable is troop size of a rebel group, and four sources are used to construct this variable. First and primarily, the Expanded Uppsala Armed Conflict Data v. 2.3 (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009a) provides information about the non-state actors involved in civil conflict and the external dimensions of conflicts, including external support and extraterritorial features. The dataset includes the estimates of the size of rebel armed forces between 1946 and 2003. Second, if necessary information is missing from the dataset, this study refers to the estimates of rebel troop size in the UCDP Database. In the UCDP Database, “low estimates” are used because it often relies on numbers that rebel groups themselves claim (that is, “high estimates” tend to be overestimated). Third, the data on the dependent variable is complemented also by estimates provided in the \textit{Military Balance} (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS). Fourth, news sources often include information on troop size of rebel groups and, therefore, are employed to fill in missing data.\(^{196}\)

\(^{195}\) See Buhaug & Gates (2002), Buhaug & Lujala (2005), and Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009a).

\(^{196}\) I use sources in in Lexis Nexis that comprise newspapers, magazines, wire services, broadcast transcripts, and blogs.
Since the relationship between the raw values of rebel troop size and independent variables is suspected to be of a non-linear function form, these values are transformed into the natural log. Figure 6.1 represents the frequency of rebel troop size with a normal distribution curve.

Figure 6.1 Size of Rebel Troops.

Government troop size is also transformed into a natural log format. Figure 6.2 shows the scatter plot of both government and rebel troop sizes. The data on government troops are primarily extracted from the National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer,
Bremer & Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987), which includes the number of military personnel of all state members from 1816 to 2001.\footnote{197}

Estimates in the UCDP database fill in the missing values in the above dataset. The figure clearly shows that government forces are generally larger than rebel forces even though some rebel forces could match government forces in strength (e.g., the Lebanese National Movement/ LNM and Lebanese Army (Aoun) in Lebanon). Not all personnel in government forces are mobilized for counterinsurgency operations because countries must often deal not only with civil wars but also with interstate conflicts as, for instance, when the Indian government was simultaneously confronted by both domestic rebel groups and Pakistan. Yet, the evidence confirms our common view that rebel forces are generally weaker than government forces in strength.

\footnote{197 It also comprises the “Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC),” annual values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and military expenditure.}
For the models estimating the impact of military capacity, identity-based selective incentives, and control upon troop size of rebel groups, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method with fixed-effects controlling for cross-section units and time period is employed. Fixed-Effects regression is the model used to control for heterogeneity caused by unobserved variables that differ between units but are constant over time. In the models, conflict and year, in which active dyads are recorded, are considered as the

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\(^{198}\) When a government confronts more than one rebel group, the conflict may include multiple dyads. For instance, the Iraqi government had been fighting both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) throughout the 1980s. This study takes not a dyad but such a conflict as a cross-section unit because a country-level factor (e.g., population, economic development, and political regime) may possibly influence those domestic rebel groups. That is, I assume that values of rebel
cross-section units and time period, respectively, because each location of civil war is assumed to have a specific pattern of rebel recruitment.

The perceived cost of military activities influences individuals’ incentive to participate in armed forces. This variable is operationalized as military capacity of rebel groups. Potential participants hesitate to join a weak group because participating in such a group may pose a high risk of injury and even death in the battlefield. Civilians’ participation in civil war always entails a certain degree of risk, but combatants who fight in capable forces are less likely to be defeated by their opponents than those who are in less capable forces. This at least implies that, other factors being equal, an armed group with higher military capacity attracts recruits more than a weak armed group does due to their prospect of survival, even when they are engaged in dangerous military operations.

The Expanded ACD dataset contains the data on both rebel groups’ fighting capacity and their ability to procure arms relative to that of governments. The former variable deals with how well a rebel group succeeds in battle against government forces. For instance, the Taliban in Afghanistan during the period of 1995-1996 and the Tutsi rebel force Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 are considered groups that had high fighting capacities. The Taliban gained control of a large territory and eventually captured Kabul, while the FPR also overwhelmed the government’s clout in northwestern Rwanda. In contrast, the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army) in Bolivia and the DSE (Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, the Democratic Army of Greece) in Greece are regarded as less capable groups because the former could

__________________________
troop size in a single country are not fully independent but rather are likely to be correlated. In this sense, a pooled model that requires independence between the values is not adequate for my analysis.
neither spread its influence over the country nor match the strength of government forces, and the latter merely evaded total defeat by the government (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009b).

The extent to which a rebel group can overwhelm government forces has an impact on the incentive of potential participants. However, given that this variable reflects rebel performance in the battlefields, it may be endogenous to troop size; in other words, it is possible that the increase in troop size leads to rebels’ military success. Therefore, to measure military capability of a rebel group, this study takes into consideration the ability to procure arms. Arms may be supplied by foreign patrons; for instance, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Myanmar and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) were provided arms by the Chinese and Soviet governments. In addition, a rebel group may seize arms left by former forces; the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea primarily used weapons that had been leftover on the island since the Second World War (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009b). This variable (i.e., the ability to procure arms) used in the models is transformed into the ordinal scale (1 = low, 2 = moderate, and 3 = high).

The independent variable that relates to the hypothesis predicting the relationships between identity-based selective incentives and troop size is a variable that identifies whether a conflict is fought for identity and/or political regime. This variable is based on two sources. First, it relies on the data constructed by Buhaug & Gates (2002) that suggest whether or not “the rebels originate from different ethnic and/or religious groups than the government.” In a country with several dyads between the government and rebel groups, whether they are based on identity depends on characteristics of the rebel groups,
and both types of conflicts are often ongoing at the same time. For instance, the armed conflict between the Iranian government and Mujahideen e Khalq, from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, is considered a non-identity dispute, but the conflicts in the country over Arabistan and Kurdistan during the 1980s and 1990s are apparently identity-based. It is predictable that such conflicts attract specific groups of people that show consistency with identity-based armed groups, and that those groups can provide participants with selective incentives. Second, I refer to the data on whether the incompatibility of a conflict is related to political regime. The ACD contains a dummy variable indicating that a designated conflict is fought for the governmental system. Colombian rebel groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) had a disagreement over political regime with the incumbent. In this type of conflict, a government-rebel cleavage in how a country should be governed offers an incentive for participation in rebellion to civilians whose view is that the incumbent needs to be overthrown. To measure rebels’ potential to recruit combatants, I sum up these two dummy variables.\(^{199}\) As to the former variable, since the Buhaug & Gates data cover armed conflicts only until 2000, I construct the values for the year 2001 with reference to the UCDP Database, following their coding strategy.

To test a set of hypotheses regarding the association between territorial control and the size of rebel forces, three variables are used. The first is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the rebel group controls territory. Territorial control allows a group not only to establish its base-areas but to exclusively access recruits without

\(^{199}\) As a result, this new variable ranges from 0 to 2.
interference from the government. Rebel groups may search for recruits from contested areas, but they are able to mobilize civilians by either coercive or contractual measures in their strongholds. The second relevant variable identifies the ability of the rebel group to mobilize personnel. The higher potential for mobilization is accompanied by the recognition of identity between rebels and civilians (e.g., the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and local Muslims in the armed struggle against the Philippine government), but the ability is downgraded when it is accompanied by disagreement, even within a single ethnicity, or by ethnic diversity. For instance, although the BRA in Papua New Guinea could recruit a large segment of the population of Bougainville, pro-government militias in the area impeded its mobilization. In addition, Dagestan in the former Soviet Union was so ethnically diverse that rebels had a very difficult time rallying popular support to its cause.

Lower mobilization ability is also characterized by the lack of intention to gain popular support; for example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone relied heavily on the strategies of terrorizing civilians and seizing diamond mines rather than getting along with the local population (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009b). Considering the case of the RUF, it should be noted that it is important to control for rebels’ intention to win the popular support when it seizes control of an area because territorial control does not assure immediate access to a pool of recruits. A dummy variable for whether the rebel group controls territory and ordinal values of (low, moderate and high) mobilization ability are taken from the Expanded ACD dataset.

The third variable measures the extent of conflict zones and is taken from Conflict Sites, 1946-2005, v.2.0 (Raleigh et al., 2006). The dataset is an extension to the ACD and
provides center-point coordinates for the conflict zones and lists of countries in which the conflicts were located, as well as a radius variable to denote spatial extent. In this study, the logged values of the estimated area of the conflict zone in square kilometers are used to measure the impact of the geographical span of conflict areas on the growth of rebel groups. Wood (2010) predicts that, as the size of a conflict area increases, rebel leaders come to lose control over recruits as well as information about recruits’ actions (p.606). However, the expansion of contested areas leads to the government’s loss of recruits who are approached also by rebel groups. Therefore, this study claims that once the rebels’ seizure of territory is controlled for, the expansion of a conflict zone is expected to bring an increase in rebel accessibility to indifferent populations (that is, to belligerents) relative to that of the government forces.

The models include eight control variables. Two of them are measurements of the direct impact of armed conflicts on troop size of rebel forces, conflict intensity and duration. The relationship between troop size and conflict intensity may be bidirectional because we cannot deny the possibility that the latter is the result of an increase or decrease in troop size. The expansion of the size and ability of an armed group allows it to broaden the options, and it is often likely that such a group will attempt to carry out large-scale military operations that are accompanied by a number of casualties. In contrast, a small rebel group would hesitate to make a frontal attack on government forces and rather adopt hit-and-run tactics so that it can prevent the loss of personnel. However, it is still worth controlling for the impact of conflict intensity on troop size because this may stimulate the rebels’ willingness to recruit in some contexts or impede the mobilization ability of rebel groups in others. The variable is operationalized by the
categorical values stemming from the UCDP Database that indicate the number of battle-related deaths in each dyad-year (0 = 25-999, 1 = 1000-9999, and 2 = 10000-99999).\footnote{The Database contains missing values for some cases despite their existence as active dyads. Those are considered as cases of low ‘intensity conflict’ with casualties between 25 and 999.}

The impact of the logged values of conflict duration (years since the breakout of civil war) is also undetermined because the variable itself does not explain whether troop size increases or decreases as a conflict continues. Rebel groups may develop their mobilization ability through their long-term experiences, but it is also possible that a protracted conflict will exhaust the pool of recruits.

For this reason, population size may have to be taken into consideration. Figure 6.2 shows that countries with large populations, such as India and Russia (Soviet Union), possess government militaries whose size greatly exceeds those of other countries. Similarly, large populations should also advantage mobilization efforts by rebel forces in that they can likely access a sizable number of potential recruits. However, considering that both the government and rebel groups compete for the popular support and recruits in civil war, the increase in population size may not simply lead to the increase in troop size of rebel forces given 1) the efficiency of mobilization by the government over the country and 2) the existence of rival rebel groups that compete for recruits. The mean scores of troop size of rebel groups in India and Russia (Soviet Union), in fact, do not necessarily outstrip other rebels’ strength. To measure the government’s ability to mobilize, the logged values of the size of government troops, which are highly correlated with population size ($r = 0.800$), are employed. To control for the diversity of belligerent groups, the number of rival rebel groups in each civil war is counted. Furthermore, since,
for rebel troop size, population density in a conflict would matter in that rebels’ potential recruits are unlikely to be spread out over an entire country, I employ population density in conflict area, elaborated by Buhaug & Lujala (2005).\footnote{This variable is based on the gridded population density data released by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University (CIESIN, 2000) and the UNEP’s (2003) population data.}

Three additional control variables are included to demonstrate robustness across the models. First, a variable that indicates how wealthy a country is (GDP per capita) is used to take a look at material incentives and the effect they have on civilians to participate in rebel forces. If an individual’s income level is large enough to overcome the attraction of looting, then it should also be sufficient to discourage civilians from engaging in military activities for the sake of monetary gain. It is reasonable for us to accept the view that affluence has a limited impact on whether one would collaborate with armed forces in the context of civil war because the logic of violence makes survival primary and the pursuit of wealth secondary (Kalyvas, 1999; Lichbach, 1995a, p.58). Those who are under a lesser influence by armed groups, therefore, may be affected by the level of income more so than people who are controlled by them. In other words, this variable may rather serve to point out the effects of some of the explanatory variables. The level of economic development may also predict a greater size of government troops because it relatively alleviates the dead-weight costs of compensation for voluntary soldiers and consequentially allows the government to recruit more soldiers (Friedman, 1967; Lee & McKenzie, 1992; Ross, 1994; Warner & Asch, 1996). The data on real GDP per capita (constant prices: chain series) rated in U.S. dollars in 2005 is extracted from
the Penn World Table, and the variable is logged and lagged one year. The missing values are filled by the data from Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Lujala (2010).

Second, models include the authority characteristics of states (polity2) taken from Polity IV Project (lagged one year). Analogized with income level, the domestic political institution may influence civilians’ motivation to participate in a rebel group. If civilians are not convinced by rebel propaganda that an incumbent needs to be overthrown, they will be willing to serve for the government rather than for rebel groups. In most cases, a democratic political institution would be resistant to such propaganda. In addition, in order to control for a parabolic relationship between state institution and rebellion (e.g., Hegre et al., 2001), the squared values of polity2 are included in the models. The underlying assumption is that, since autocracies are repressive enough to deter rebellion and democracies peacefully accommodate dissidents, semi-autocracies are more conflict-prone because of both the constraints on the use of force and a lack of avenues for legitimate political dissent. Table 6.1 summarizes variables used in the analysis.

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202 The missing values are complemented by the data in Fearon, Kasara & Laitin (2007).
203 Squared value of democracy index is widely used for measuring the inverted U-shaped relationship between state institutions and rebellion. However, Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009a) claims that the deterrent capacity of states and state accommodation should be measured separately because repressive governments may not be effective in defeating rebel groups and democracies often coercively impose limits on rebels (p.576).
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Troop Size</td>
<td>8.614</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>2.996</td>
<td>11.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Control</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Ability</td>
<td>1.535</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility (Government/ Identity)</td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area</td>
<td>11.298</td>
<td>1.491</td>
<td>7.824</td>
<td>14.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility × Conflict Area</td>
<td>14.542</td>
<td>6.433</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>28.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Procure Arms</td>
<td>1.257</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
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<td>1.051</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival Rebels</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>7.811</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>5.076</td>
<td>14.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>6.601</td>
<td>-10.000</td>
<td>10.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (squared)</td>
<td>44.383</td>
<td>27.064</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Troop</td>
<td>11.549</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>6.215</td>
<td>15.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis**

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the multivariate results of whether the relevant variables are effectively able to increase or decrease troop size of rebel forces between 1975 and 2001. Table 6.2 differs from Table 6.3 in that, although the former takes into consideration the mere presence or absence of rebels’ territorial control, the latter includes “effectiveness” of control to estimate the effect of the extent to which a rebel group firmly controls civilians. Models 1 and 7 contain the primary explanatory variables to account for the initial condition, while Models 2 and 8 control for three additional variables, GDP per capita, Democracy and Democracy (squared), to measure the environmental effect on troop size and the characteristics of conflict and rebel groups. Models 3 and 9, instead of GDP per capita, Democracy and Democracy (squared), include the variable that indicates
the size of government troops to consider a more realistic situation where the government and rebel groups compete for popular support and recruits. Models 4 and 10 exclude government troop size but contain population density in conflict area. These models are tested for robustness check, for which I take into account the number of possible recruits available for rebels. Models 5 and 11 then include both of these variables (i.e., troop size of government forces and population density in conflict). Finally, Models 6 and 12 take all the variables into consideration.
Table 6.2 Fixed-Effects Models of Rebel Troop Size,\textsuperscript{a} 1975-2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ability to Procure Arms</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.820</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)***</td>
<td>(0.106)***</td>
<td>(0.104)***</td>
<td>(0.106)***</td>
<td>(0.106)***</td>
<td>(0.108)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility (Government/Identity)</td>
<td>-3.440</td>
<td>-4.156</td>
<td>-4.091</td>
<td>-4.380</td>
<td>-5.241</td>
<td>-5.982</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.853)*</td>
<td>(1.925)**</td>
<td>(1.880)**</td>
<td>(2.014)**</td>
<td>(2.051)**</td>
<td>(2.098)***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Territorial Control</td>
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<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.754</td>
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<td>(0.105)***</td>
<td>(0.104)***</td>
<td>(0.105)***</td>
<td>(0.106)***</td>
<td>(0.108)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Ability</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.686</td>
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<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.716</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)***</td>
<td>(0.080)***</td>
<td>(0.078)***</td>
<td>(0.079)***</td>
<td>(0.079)***</td>
<td>(0.081)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>-0.494</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>-0.506</td>
<td>-0.583</td>
<td>-0.727</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.276)*</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.292)*</td>
<td>(0.293)**</td>
<td>(0.301)**</td>
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<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
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<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.087</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.045</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.032)*</td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival Rebels</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
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<td>(0.033)***</td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.032)***</td>
<td>(0.033)***</td>
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<td>GDP per capita\textsuperscript{ab}</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)*</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (squared)\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Troop\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Density in Conflict\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility × Conflict Area\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)*</td>
<td>(0.163)**</td>
<td>(0.157)**</td>
<td>(0.167)**</td>
<td>(0.170)**</td>
<td>(0.175)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.056)***</td>
<td>(3.238)***</td>
<td>(3.066)***</td>
<td>(3.962)***</td>
<td>(3.956)***</td>
<td>(4.187)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1.124</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>1.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma_u</td>
<td>1.395</td>
<td>1.423</td>
<td>1.356</td>
<td>1.467</td>
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<td>1.481</td>
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<td>sigma_e</td>
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<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.699</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

\textsuperscript{a} Logged, \textsuperscript{b} Lagged.

* significant at 10\% in a two-tailed t-test; ** significant at 5\%; *** significant at 1\%.
Table 6.3 Fixed-Effects Models of Rebel Troop Size,\(^a\) 1975-2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Ability to Procure Arms</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.784</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.106)**</td>
<td>(0.108)**</td>
<td>(0.106)**</td>
<td>(0.109)**</td>
<td>(0.109)**</td>
<td>(0.110)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incompatibility (Government/ Identity)</td>
<td>-4.051</td>
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<td>-5.881</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.870)**</td>
<td>(1.943)**</td>
<td>(1.898)**</td>
<td>(2.043)**</td>
<td>(2.083)**</td>
<td>(2.131)**</td>
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<td>Effectiveness of Control</td>
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<td>0.302</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.052)**</td>
<td>(0.053)**</td>
<td>(0.052)**</td>
<td>(0.053)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization Ability</td>
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<td>0.678</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.082)**</td>
<td>(0.083)**</td>
<td>(0.082)**</td>
<td>(0.082)**</td>
<td>(0.083)**</td>
<td>(0.085)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Area(^a)</td>
<td>-0.352</td>
<td>-0.489</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
<td>-0.530</td>
<td>-0.584</td>
<td>-0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.278)*</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.294)*</td>
<td>(0.296)**</td>
<td>(0.304)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration(^a)</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.033)*</td>
<td>(0.034)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival Rebels</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
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<td>-0.161</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.032)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.034)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(^ab)</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.113)**</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.113)**</td>
<td>(0.113)**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy(^b)</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (squared)(^b)</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Troop(^a)</td>
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<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.057)*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Density in Conflict(^a)</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.177)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility × Conflict Area(^a)</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)**</td>
<td>(0.164)**</td>
<td>(0.158)**</td>
<td>(0.169)**</td>
<td>(0.172)**</td>
<td>(0.177)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>1.124</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>1.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma_u</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>1.406</td>
<td>1.358</td>
<td>1.488</td>
<td>1.479</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma_e</td>
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<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rho</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.816</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

a Logged, b Lagged.

* Significant at 10% in a two-tailed t-test; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Model 1 in Table 6.2 illustrates that primary independent variables, with the exception of conflict area, (i.e., ability to procure arms, type of incompatibility, territorial control, mobilization ability, and an interaction term of incompatibility and conflict area) are statistically significant. Although the variable of incompatibility is negative, the remaining variables have positive relationships with troop size of rebel forces. This should substantiate the arguments that a rebel group can possibly mobilize more combatants if it has higher military ability, territorial control, and an affiliation with the civilian population. As the dummy independent variable, the positive and significant coefficient on the variable that indicates whether a rebel group controls territory suggests that control of territory benefits a rebel group in mobilizing more combatants (the coefficient estimate is 0.710). Although the ability to procure arms and mobilization ability, both of which consist of three-staged ordinal values, are not easily comparable, the results at least demonstrate that the former apparently has a stronger effect on troop size than does the latter. The accessibility to potential recruits enables a rebel group to mobilize civilians into its forces, but it is also highly probable that the forces will be extensively expanded if it becomes militarily more capable.

In Model 1, the explanatory variables on level of incompatibility and conflict area are not entirely straightforward; the former has statistical significance with a negative coefficient and the latter is not significant. To take a closer look at these variables, the regression models include an interaction term between incompatibility and conflict area. All the models are aimed at showing how the presence of the issues of governmental system and identity in conflicts affect civilian participation in rebel forces as the conflict area expands or shrinks.
Since these variables are employed not only to represent the separate effects of identity-based selective incentives and contested areas on rebel troop size (Hypotheses 1.3 and 4.1) but also to estimate rebels’ ability to offer such incentives to civilians in contested areas (Hypothesis 2.1), an interaction term would be an adequate measure of analysis. It is important to note that, given the presence of the other independent variables in the models, the coefficients of the constant represent the expected rebel troop size for a group in hypothetical civil war in which the issues of governmental system and identity are absent and there is no war front. In addition, the coefficients of incompatibility are the difference in rebel troop size corresponding to a unit difference in government- and identity-oriented conflict for a group without war front, while the coefficients of conflict area represent the difference in rebel troop size corresponding to a unit difference in conflict area for a group that lacks sociopolitical appeals. As centering the variables of incompatibility and conflict area does not lower the correlation between the original variables and the interaction term, the interaction term is constructed by simply multiplying the original variables. The models are highly likely to contain the problem of multicollinearity for this reason but do not actually change what the models signify or what they predict.

The effects of incompatibility and the interaction term (incompatibility × conflict area) in Model 1 show that the effect of sociopolitical appeals is negative for a rebel group without a war front, while it is positive for a group that contests territorial areas with the government. That is, even if the group can potentially stimulate civilians’ anti-incumbent feelings, the lack of access to recruits in contested areas will impede the group from increasing their total number of combatants. In contrast, those same appeals can help the group to mobilize combatants in larger contested areas. Therefore, regarding conflict fought for political regime and identity, the distinction between the presence and
absence of conflict areas is meaningful, and the difference in the effect of incompatibility between groups with and without contested areas is also significant. Given the presence of incompatibility, the expected difference in troop size between those groups becomes greater. As for conflict area, once the interaction effects are added, the variable represents the predicted difference between full conflict area and zero conflict area, both of which are devoid of identity-based incompatibility. Although the coefficient for conflict area in Model 1 is -0.363, the variable is not statistically significant. Finally, the constant in Model 1 is the predicted rebel troop size for a group having neither sociopolitical appeals nor contested areas.

Also in Table 6.1, Model 2 demonstrates that all the variables except for conflict intensity and two terms of democracy are statistically significant, at least at the 10 percent level in a two-tailed t-test. The variables such as incompatibility and conflict area have signs which indicate that civilians are less likely to join a rebel group in an environment such as considered in Model 1 despite the term of GDP per capita, which is negatively associated with rebel troop size. Although a higher income level has a negative effect on rebel troop size, the level of democracy does not approach statistical significance. However, the result suggests that these newly added control variables have mitigating effects on some of the independent variables. For instance, variables of territorial control and mobilization ability have weaker effects than those in Model 1, even though the impact of other independent variables (i.e., ability to procure arms and incompatibility × conflict area) increases. Therefore, it may not be necessary for a rebel group with military capability accompanied by both sociopolitical appeals and expanded contested areas to largely miss an opportunity for collecting combatants, even within a
context in which the country enjoys a higher level of economic development that is expected to impede rebel recruitment. While this may imply that, in an affluent society, civilians have weaker incentives to participate in rebel forces even if they are controlled by and have connection to rebels, it still supports the logic that rebels’ seizure of territory and access to civilians promotes the recruitment of individuals.

Models 3 and 4 add an indicator for the size of government troop and population density in conflict, respectively, to the set of variables in Model 1. These models basically demonstrate that the principle relationships between the independent variables and rebel troop size hold the same, illustrating that all variables, except for conflict area in Model 3, population density at conflict level in Model 4, and conflict intensity in both models, are statistically significant. It is important to note that the effect of government troop size is both significant and positive. The government is usually more capable of mobilizing civilians who are indifferent in regards to belligerents than are rebel groups, due to its abundance of resources. However, in a country that accommodates many government troops, a sizable number of civilians could be mobilized also by rebel groups. In contrast, while the addition of government troop size has no impact on the significance of conflict area, this variable becomes statistically significant once population density in conflict is taken into consideration. These models differ in that each of them controls for the approximate size of population in an entire country or conflict area. The effect of population density in conflict areas holds for Model 5; that is, even if a rebel group is active in expanded conflict areas, civilians are less likely to collaborate with a group lacking a source of sociopolitical appeals.
Accounting for income level and democratic institutions, in addition to government troop size and population density in conflict, Model 6 does not generate a different result from that in Model 1. Four of the significant variables (incompatibility, conflict area, rival rebels, and GDP per capita) remain negative. This model converts conflict duration into an insignificant variable, but conflict area into a significant one, keeping the effects of the statistically significant variables unchanged. The results are consistent across the models and mostly confirm that more civilians participate in rebel forces if the group has a higher military capacity, territorial control, and the combination of sociopolitical appeals and expanded contested areas. The variable of number of rebel groups is negatively associated with the dependent variable across the models, keeping statistical significance; it is likely that the increasing number of domestic rebel groups intensifies the competition for the mobilization of civilians and decreases a pie of recruits. The results also show that conflict intensity is never statistically significant, and the impact of conflict duration is concluded to be positive but not fully significant across the models.

To estimate the effect of the level of rebels’ control over civilians, Models 7 through 12 add the variable of effectiveness of control instead of territorial control. Effectiveness of control by a rebel group is statistically significant as it has a positive effect on troop size across the models. Beyond the mere presence of territorial control, the extent to which the group firmly seizes civilians is positively related to the number of its forces. Table 6.3 overall confirms and does not alter the generic findings from Models 1 through 6. Civilians are more likely to join a rebel group empowered by the ability to fight and control, and to establish an affiliation with local populations. Furthermore, the
group’s potential sociopolitical appeals and the extent of its contested areas are paired. The sole presence of each of these factors is negatively associated with rebel troop size, but, once the group accesses more areas where potential participants attracted by those appeals are available, it is likely to enjoy a larger number of recruits. One of the important differences brought out by Table 6.2 is that population density in a conflict area is negatively associated with the number of recruits in rebel forces \((p = 0.087)\) in Model 12]. This model includes the control variables on levels of income and democracy, and government troop size, in addition to the primary independent variables. Since population density at conflict level is not statistically significant in Models 10 and 11, the result may imply that the rebel recruitment of combatants is hindered by government forces and/or the domestic environment (income level and democracy). However, according to the results in Table 6.3, the same mechanism by which variation in civilian participation in rebel forces is explained by the presence or absence of territorial control also accounts for variation in the participation explained by effectiveness of control. That is the case despite the fact that rebel groups have divergent organizational and environmental features.

**Discussion**

The results provide support for Hypothesis 3.1, as the effect of a rebel group’s ability to procure arms on its troop size appears to hold positive across the models. This study assumes that the military capability of the group lowers individuals’ threshold of participation, and that the multivariate analysis reveals that rebels’ equipment is likely to promote growth in its troop size; that is, civilians are more likely to join militarily
capable groups. The increase in military capability of a rebel group may be accompanied by the increase in troop size, but both variables are still independent because the former is attributed to material abundance (e.g., arms and ammunitions), while the latter does not necessitate it.

Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 anticipated the relationship between troop size and territorial control and influence over territory to be positive because a rebel group, having control and influence over a given area, is expected to have access to local people who might join the group in the future. In support, the results demonstrate that interactions between troop size and the relevant independent variables (territorial control and mobilization ability) are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, when a rebel group controls territory and can efficiently access favorable populations, it has a greater chance to develop its troops. In addition, effectiveness of territorial control also matters in rebels’ success in recruitment. Hypothesis 5.1 assumes that rebels’ firm territorial control increases the level of civilians’ collaboration within the territory. The results indicate that effectiveness of territorial control increases rebel troop size; that is, there are differences across rebel groups with regard to the extent to which they seize control of civilians. As expanded below, these findings may be backed by the implication that a rebel group relying on sociopolitical appeals to recruit combatants only from limited geographical areas (i.e., strongholds) tends to have a smaller size of troops. In other words, if civilians in contested areas are not socio-politically attracted by the group, the group’s troop size will be necessarily limited because the population of possible recruits is limitative.
The direct test of Hypothesis 4 is whether the indication of identity-based selective incentives tends to lead to the expansion of rebel troop size (Hypothesis 4.1). The results reveal that the variable is statistically significant and negative across the models. Furthermore, the results pertaining to Hypothesis 1.3 are not straightforward. It is interesting that the size of a conflict area has a statistically significant and negative relationship with troop size, which seems to follow the argument that potential recruits are increasingly found to be outside of the rebels’ control as the size of a conflict zone increases. It may be true that the expansion of a conflict area makes rebel groups uncertain about the local situation. The models at least illustrate that a rebel group with sociopolitical appeals but without any contested areas is unlikely to expand it troops, and a group with war fronts instead of those appeals, is also likely to have smaller troop size. However, this study claims that these findings should be paired. To estimate the effects of both the extent of contested areas and rebels’ potential to provide civilians with identity-based selective incentives, the models introduce an interaction term for these variables. The results are supportive of Hypothesis 2.1, implying that civilians are more likely to join a rebel group that has the ability to attract the local population in contested areas. This finding is consistent across the models that include various control variables; for instance, even in the context of confrontation with government forces, the presence of sociopolitical appeals and contested areas expands rebel troops more so than in the situation in which government troop size is not taken into consideration.

The results in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate that a level of incompatibility has a significant reductive effect on troop size of rebel groups when there are no areas contested with government forces. One may argue that the findings are substantively
meaningless because there are almost no cases in which there are active civil wars and no contested areas. Although the coefficients on Incompatibility × Conflict Area are positive and this reductive effect diminishes as contested areas expand, the tables do not suggest what the effect of rebels’ potential to offer identity-based selective incentives upon civilian participation is when the logged value of conflict area is greater than zero.

Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate how the marginal effects of incompatibility changes across the range of conflict area. The solid sloping lines in the Figures indicate how the marginal effects of incompatibility change with the extent of contested areas. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals around the line determine the conditions under which incompatibility has a statistically significant effect on rebel troop size; this occurs when both upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are either above or both below the zero line on the y-axis. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the marginal effect of incompatibility estimated from Models 6 and 12 respectively. Although the solid and dashed lines in Figure 6.4 are located slightly lower than those in Figure 6.3, few differences are found between these figures. The figures suggest that, while a level of incompatibility has a reductive effect on rebel troop size when the extent of contested area is limited, this reductive effect declines as contested areas expand. Once the logged value of conflict area is more than 15, incompatibility no longer has a significant reductive impact on rebel troop size. However, since all samples in the analysis fall within the logged value of conflict area between 7.824 and 14.006, the effect of incompatibility remains negative throughout the cases of civil war.
Figure 6.3 Marginal Effect of Incompatibility on Rebel Troop Size as Conflict Area Changes (Model 6).
Conclusion

Despite the fact that the effect of selective incentives should be considered with the extent of contested area, the presence of increasing military capacity and territorial control has an important and positive impact on the growth in rebel troops. When these factors are present, rebel groups are likely to have a greater chance to recruit combatants and expand their troop size. This finding is important to better understand the effects of both structural contexts in civil war and rebels’ attributes on the mobilization of civilians.

The analysis does not directly examine whether individuals are more likely to participate in rebel groups. However, troop size is a suitable alternative to capture group
dynamics of civilian participation and it also sheds light on the issue from a different angle. The results reveal that the mobilization of combatants by rebel groups is a function of individuals’ responses to cost in military activities, selective rewards, and the establishment of control over territorial areas. The findings may be partial in that the analysis does not address other potential determinants that have effects on the expansion of rebel troops (e.g., military and non-military support for them by external actors). Those variables by themselves may have significant impact on troop size, or operate on the independent variables in the analysis. And it should not be lost that the analysis considers only the time period between 1975 and 2001. This chapter, however, has attempted to examine the hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 3 that primarily focus on the competition for domestic popular support between government and rebel forces. Likely conditions for the expansion of rebel forces proposed in this chapter suggest itself as a useful framework to understanding individuals’ reaction to them in the context of civil war beyond the cases of the Cambodian and Guatemalan Civil Wars.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Arguments of this Study

*Why do Civilians Participate in Armed Forces and Civil War?*

This study has sought to address the big question, “Why do civilians participate in armed forces in civil war?” Considering that civilian participation in armed forces is akin to collective action in situations other than civil war, social scientists have been attracted by the finding that, while, in theory, the individual should be better off abstaining from any collective activities, numerous civilians participated in armed forces throughout the many episodes of civil war. Despite similarities, however, collective action in civil war is distinctive from that in other situations. In civil war, participants’ benefits are uncertain or unknown because it is not entirely predictable that even success in the collective action will bring about substantial improvement to the status quo. For instance, failure in organizing rebel groups does not always result in members being worse off, and the absence of armed conflict may be able to guarantee not only one’s life but also income from routine production activities. Additionally, private risks and losses in civil war are enormous and the demands of group cohesion tend to be great.

For these reasons, it is natural to wonder why civilians would wish to join a dangerous enterprise that may fail. To provide an answer for this puzzle, literature attempts to reconsider the premise that participation in collective action in the context of civil war is more costly than non-participation. That is, although collective action occurs when the desire for public change is so strong that those affected place a high value on participation, terror against civilians also makes the choice of non-participation costly.
and participation relatively less costly. In addition, non-participation may be costly because the means employed to mobilize civilians for military service are not always persuasive and can vary from making use of sentiments of solidarity to resorting to coercion and terror. The imbalance of power between civilians and armed leaders allows the latter to rely more on a mobilization strategy by which they merely hint at the use of punishment for non-cooperation.

The enormousness of cost for non-involvement in an armed group, which does not coincide with the assumptions in orthodox collective action, sheds light on the predicament of civilians who have no choice but to enlist for their safety for reasons peculiar to civil war. Another cluster of studies attaches importance to the impact of non-material selective incentives. For instance, it applies incentives such as the sense of self-esteem from participation, adventurous excitement, and the yearning for dangerous activity to account for collective action in civil war. These incentives are significant in that participation in civil war can be recast from a cost to a benefit, in contrast to the Olsonian view that selective incentives are unrelated to the purpose of collective action. This view, considering participation in an armed group purposive in itself, allows us to identify those who are eager to join the forces due not to rewards unrelated to their goals but to coincidences between participants’ and the group’s objectives. Considering that the coexistence of coerced and non-coerced participants represents the reality of civil-military relations in civil war, this study deals with the participation of both types of civilians.

Theory and Empirical Findings
To specify the scope of a theoretical model, this study first assumes civil war wherein two major parties (i.e., the government and rebels) compete for domestic popular support and recruits, and where each can exclusively exert clout over civilians. The starting point of my theory construction is a reexamination of the implications in current literature reflecting the association between territorial control and participation in armed forces; that is, if the area controlled by an armed group expands, the pool of available participants expands up to its limit, but that the group’s capacity for recruitment decreases toward the territorial boundary with the opponent-controlled area.

Structural contexts in civil war largely vary, and these contexts differently motivate potential participants to join armed forces. To explore the mobilization of combatants in different contexts, I emphasize the understanding that participants in armed forces are not homogeneous across contexts. Rather, this study assumes that civilians are a mix of many who are not committed to any party and a few who are committed to a specific party due to their common identity.

Given these conditions, armed groups are likely to employ different strategies to mobilize reluctant and voluntary participants respectively. In the territories where government and rebel forces control most fully (i.e., strongholds), the armed actor in control can more easily mobilize participants by hinting of sanction for non-collaborators and defectors to the rival side. Both sides rely on a combination of coerced participants and voluntary participants, but prefer to rely on coercive measures to mobilize uncommitted civilians who remain after committed ones have enlisted. Those coerced by the group tend to be under strong constraints to participate in order to avoid being punished by the group.
If there are differences in an armed group’s clout between the stronghold and its contested areas, the group will adopt different mobilization strategies across regions. When it seeks to mobilize combatants in the stronghold, the group can use coercion as a means of mobilization, and coercive mobilization is often efficient in such a context. Within contested areas, in contrast, the group does not expect all potential recruits to participate but does expect voluntary participants, who are more committed to the group’s activities, to do so because they are not as readily deterred from enlisting with the group as reluctant participants would be, even in a situation whereby a certain level of cost for participating in the rebel group (e.g., denunciation by neighbors and punishment by the government) exists.

I accordingly develop these findings into a related hypothesis which holds that reluctant participants are major recruits to an armed group to a point of the group’s command beyond which voluntary participants replace them. When the group’s command weakens, a reluctant participant’s willingness to enlist promptly decreases because he/she then faces not only the cost of non-participation (i.e., punishment by his/her group) but also the cost of participation (i.e. punishment by rival groups). Furthermore, the following hypotheses consider the shifts in civilians’ sensitivity to the cost of participation and willingness to enlist: As the capacity of an armed group increases, participants in the group become less responsive to the cost of punishment by rival groups. Also, incentives based on identity increase the willingness of voluntary participation, but that of reluctant participation is increased rather by the threat of punishment for non-cooperation.
An important implication of the model is that the level of participants’ willingness does not remain constant, but rather shifts over time and space. Even individuals who intend to participate in a rebel group, due to their identities, weigh the possibility of being punished by the government, and those who support the government forces recognize that they are the rebels’ target. Despite the difference in motivations between voluntary and reluctant participants, the cost of siding with a group (i.e., punishment by a rival group) eventually exceeds the advantage of collaboration (i.e., obtainment of selective goods and avoidance of punishment by their group, respectively). Under such circumstances is civilians’ willingness to participate in armed forces influenced (that is, either strengthened or weakened) by a group’s ability to guarantee their relative safety, the provision of identity-based incentives, and the threat of punishment for nonparticipation.

To test the hypotheses pertaining to the participation of individuals as combatants in armed groups, Chapter 4 seeks to explore civil-military relations in the Cambodian Civil War of 1970-75. I find that a snapshot of a particular structural context in a focused scope is useful for exploring civil-military relations in the civil war because the context in question often remains rather constant over time. Although the war in Cambodia cannot be captured as a conflict devoid of complexity, this conflict in its limited term (1970-75) presents a somewhat straightforward schema; the main domestic armed actors who competed for popular support and recruits were restricted to only two, namely, Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge.

To examine the relationship between the structural contexts and the recruitment of combatants, this chapter focuses on three districts in Battambang province, referring to findings obtained from interviews with local residents who were living there during that...
span of time. Interview data reveal that while both Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge relied not only on the non-coercive mobilization of combatants but also on coercive measures within their designated zones of control, they were both forced to search for highly motivated volunteers within opponent-influenced territories. In the districts in question, the forces that predominantly controlled an area also largely determined the mobilization strategies of the armed groups. For instance, in a government-controlled area, the Khmer Rouge could not systematically mobilize combatants because its interaction with civilians was limited to assault against them, the recruitment of collaborators and the procurement of materials (e.g., food and clothes). Similarly, although the government frequently attempted to take young men away from the fields, limited connections between government local officials and civilians also prevented Lon Nol forces from conducting systematic conscription in any rebel-controlled area.

Chapter 5 examines the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-96) in detail. Examining the changes in military and civilian patterns throughout the war, this chapter aims primarily to capture the shift in structural contexts during the war and the resulting impact upon the relationship between armed actors and civilians, and mobilization strategies over time.

Throughout the war, once rebel groups began seizing control of rural areas, government forces largely suppressed and confined the rebels to limited territories. As government forces defeated and swept rebel forces from local communities, civilians were faced with a change of ruler and, consequently, their structural context. Whenever control of territory in the countryside fell from rebels’ hands into the incumbent’s, the territorial boundary between the belligerents shifted. Such a shift in boundary
consequently changed the structural contexts determining whether civilians were mobilized coercively or non-coercively and by whom. As the government regained the rebel-controlled areas, those civilians who were formerly a subject of the rebels’ exclusive mobilization became the government’s target of mobilization because the rebels’ loss of territory brought about the subsequent loss of population that they potentially could have exclusively mobilized.

Moreover, this chapter looks at long-term trends of territorial control, armed actors’ mobilization strategies and civilians’ reactions, and discerns how and whether or not modifications in the structural contexts superseded existing practices and determined civilian collaboration with and participation in the armed forces, by treating the forces as a primary unit of analysis. Macro-level implications of individuals’ participation are represented by the troop size of the forces and the military balance between the government and rebel groups. Although some of these variables were relatively constant over time, civilian participation in the armed forces in the civil war was contingent on such conditions as the military capacity of the forces, the threat of punishment for non-cooperation, the differences in capacity for recruitment between areas controlled by the forces, identity-based selective incentives, and the replacement of reluctant participants with volunteers according to contexts.

Chapter 6 also treats an armed rebel group as a focus of analysis. However, while the discussion in Chapter 5 is limited to the case of Guatemala, Chapter 6 explores the applicability of the model by taking more cases into consideration. The large-N quantitative analysis in this chapter tests the validity of the model by referring to cases that not only share specific features but also do not. As a result, the statistical analysis
deals with cases that vary in terms of both independent variable (i.e., troop size of rebel groups) and dependent variables (i.e., military capacity, the potential to win support from the population, and territorial control) in active dyads between government and non-state actors from 1975 to 2001 and provides a broader perspective by adding implications observed at a different level than that of the model developed in Chapter 3. To explore under what conditions civilians are more likely to participate in rebel groups, troop size is a suitable alternative to individual-level analysis by which to capture the accumulated consequences of mobilization.

The analysis reveals that despite the fact that the effect of identity-based selective incentives should be considered with the extent of contested area, the presence of increasing military capacity and territorial control has an important and positive impact on the growth in rebel troops. When these factors are present, rebel groups are likely to have a greater chance to recruit combatants and expand their troop size.

**Necessity for Refining and Expanding the Model**

The empirical analyses provide some clues to guide the refinement and expansion of the model of civilian participation discussed in Chapter 3. First, the distinction between reluctant and voluntary participants may not entirely represent recruits’ personal attributes. This study defines civilians’ participation so as to capture their response to an armed group’s mobilization strategies ranging from coercive measures to non-coercive measures. However, this framework does not sufficiently account for the demographic characteristics of recruits; for instance, the model is not able to deduce that male adults were the primary recruits for both Lon Nol’s government and the Khmer Rouge.
Moreover, in addition to the fact that the government raised the draft age when it came to lack a population that was sufficient in size for the mobilization of combatants, interviewees’ recollections do not agree on the range in age for mobilization, which was likely to have varied between local administrative units. In the Guatemalan Civil War, the narratives tell us that young males were also the primary recruits, although civil patrols accommodated not only adolescents but also males of up to the age of 60. To capture these demographic characteristics and the diversity among participants, the model needs to go beyond the distinction between reluctant and voluntary participants.

Second, the narratives observe forcible measures of mobilization more than the model assumes; it considers a reluctant participant as a relatively free agent who is faced with the choice between participation and sanction and ultimately joins the armed forces. For instance, in the Cambodian Civil War, government soldiers and village militiamen rounded up those who had attempted to elude conscription, while they initially called for voluntary participants. Why, then, did those civilians even attempt to evade conscription? One possible answer would be that the threat of punishment for non-cooperation did not effectively signal them to participate in the forces. Perception of the threat of punishment indeed varies between individuals. In the above case, those who sought to evade conscription underestimated the threat of punishment. Since the model presumes that civilians uniformly and accurately perceive the cost of non-participation, its refinement and expansion requires a viewpoint to capture the diversity in individuals’ perception (and misperception) of the threat of punishment for non-cooperation.

These do not deny that there were female combatants in both the Cambodian and Guatemalan wars.

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Third, voluntary participants’ motivation for enlistment may not neatly correspond to their incentives based on identity common to an armed group. Although identity-based selective incentives would play an important role in abandoning ordinary life, commonplace troubles between neighbors and in families can be a motivation that takes precedence over such incentives. Since the model does not necessarily disaggregate how voluntary participants become committed to an armed group, further exploration is needed to type this process and to discern the differences in participation between volunteers themselves.

To the matter at hand, the above finding, which is obtained through interview data discussed in Chapter 4, is insightful in that it seems to confirm flexibility in participation based on ideology incentives. In the Cambodian Civil War, the government’s nationalist, and the Khmer Rouge’s communist, propaganda had effects on the mobilization of voluntary participants. Given that voluntary participants were motivated by such appeals, almost all residents would have been lured to either the government or rebel forces. However, civilians’ communal troubles, for which ideology could have provided a front, might have pushed some of them to go from choosing collaboration with the government to collaboration with the rebels, and vice versa. Although Chapter 5 does not exactly deal with individual Guatemalan recruits’ motivations for participation, their allegiances would have been stronger than those in the Cambodian case, provided that ethnic identity was an incentive for voluntary participants in government and rebel forces during the 1970s and 80s: Thus, civilians cannot dissemble their ethnic identity even when they would seek to be secured by outside armed actors.
Fourth, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that the effect of identity-based incentives is not constant across areas; it becomes greater as contested areas expand, but disappears when I do not take such areas into consideration. This implies that civilians are more likely to join an armed group that has the ability to attract the local population with sociopolitical appeals in contested areas but not in strongholds. Although the model has claimed that the group’s military capability would have a greater impact on civilian participation in contested areas, another exploration is needed so as to examine the effect of identity-based incentives in strongholds, in which both government and rebels would attempt to recruit voluntary participants through such measures as indoctrination and propaganda. More empirical analyses are required to discern whether voluntary mobilization in strongholds is unworthy of consideration.

**Contribution of this Study**

Despite the noted gaps between the theoretical model and empirical findings, it is worth stating points on which this study makes contributions.

To explore civilians’ participation and nonparticipation in civil war, this study takes the process of civil war into greater consideration. I consider this approach appropriate because the interest of this study is in civilian participation or nonparticipation in armed forces rather than civil war onset. This view is accordant with the argument that the cases of civil war need to be disaggregated into minute components as this allows us not only to increase the number of observations but to note the variations of civil-military relations (See Kalyvas, 2006; King, 2004). Since recent important works on civilian participation in civil war have been produced by scholars who analyze the
issue from this perspective (e.g., Arjona & Kalyvas, 2011; Blattman & Annan, 2007; Guichaoua, 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a; Oyefusi, 2008; Viterna, 2006; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2003), this study is aimed at adding to the stock of information for the series of studies on civilian participation in civil war.

In addition, new insights in this study have to be mentioned. Although being based on the existing literature on civilian participation in civil war, my theoretical consideration and empirical analyses are aimed at filling the gaps left by recent works. Critically reviewing organization theories and theories of control, in particular, this study seeks to address questions unanswered and assumptions unexamined by previous studies.

Given the diversity of solutions for the collective action problem and mobilization strategies employed by armed groups, organization theories of recruitment examine why individual groups undertake particular mobilization strategies. These theories are insightful in that they reveal how the choice of strategy determines who participates in the action. For instance, one of these theories addresses this query by focusing on the resource endowments of groups and argues that different endowments attract different pools of recruits. Although the theory reveals that whether or not a group is rich in resources determines who participates in the group, the perspective is limited because it assumes that specific mobilization strategies correspond one-to-one with the specific endowments and situations of the group. In other words, important questions remain unanswered: “Why does a single group adopt not only one measure but also combine multiple strategies in their mobilization efforts?” and “Why are the participants recruited differently by the group across regions?” To explore these points, I address the need to
frame the diversity in recruitment strategies so as to capture a spectrum between the paths of civilian voluntary and involuntary participation.

As for the above questions, theories of control in civil war provide certain insights by focusing on the association between territorial control and civilian collaboration with armed groups. The theories argue that, if the level of control in a certain area is high, the level of civilian collaboration is also high. Territorial control, on the one hand, enables an armed group to exclusively mobilize combatants from its controlling zones, but on the other hand, lack of control prohibits the group from accessing civilians. Yet, their implications are still bound by the assumption that all armed groups are one of a kind and that civilians are apolitical in the context of civil war. While there exists a large body of apolitical civilians who are willing to comply with a ruler that is incompatible with them in identity, this study views this assumption as problematic. My theoretical model rather presupposes that the costs of civilians’ participation and non-participation are subject to change according to their environment and that there is a difference in the sensitivity to costs among individuals.

Thus, major contributions of this study to the literature on recruitment in civil war are twofold. This study 1) argues that the measure of mobilizing combatants does not necessarily have a one-to-one relationship with the attributes of an armed group, but that the group employs strategies ranging from coercive to non-coercive measures so as to mobilize involuntary and voluntary participants respectively and 2) doubts the assumption that civilians are rarely politically driven and claims that they are rather a mix of many who attach importance to survival by avoiding punishment by armed actors and a few who dare to pursue political goals.
Future Research Themes

It is important for armed groups to seize control over civilians and territory because this act allows those armed actors to not only procure provisions but also mobilize combatants. The significance of territorial control is recognized by existing literature on recruitment in civil war which views it as a determinant of both civilian collaboration with armed groups and groups’ violence against civilians. In other words, territorial control is considered a strong explanatory variable that can account for several components in civil war (e.g., recruitment, violence, and governance).

However, this view, which treats territorial control as an independent variable, is disadvantageous for and even lacks a framework for explaining the variable itself. Since territorial control is a given factor in civil war, recent works rarely address what makes territorial control by armed groups possible, although they seek to identify the effect of control upon civil-military relations.

Accordingly, new research in this field could address why and how an armed group establishes and consolidates strongholds in a specific location(s) but not in other areas. The absence of such consideration in existing literature does not mean that no one has explored the determinants that influence an armed group to establish strongholds. Koc-Menard (2007) and McDougall (2009) argue that the location of a rebel stronghold is determined by such factors as geographical characteristics, consistency in identity between armed actors and civilians, level of economic development, the presence or absence of natural resources, and distance from the opponent’s bases.
Despite the findings of these studies, it is not entirely understood why an armed group chooses a specific community to establish its base. Mason (2004) argues that, to take advantage of its mobilization capability, rebel leaders harness already existing social networks and community institutions (e.g., governing councils of corporate villages, churches, schools, extended family and clan ties, and neighborhoods). For instance, since corporate villages were advantageous for organizing villagers for public works projects and other cooperative ventures, the Vietminh seized control of and relied on those village institutions during the wars against France, the U.S. and the government of South Vietnam (Mason, 2004, p.103). As for the Cambodian Civil War from 1970 to 1975, in contrast, the collapse of the rural society caused by the government’s bombing campaign eased the Khmer Rouge’s political control in the countryside (Chandler, 1992, p.101).

The absence of a social institution advantaged the rebels in introducing new rules. Therefore, it would be meaningful to explore whether armed groups seek out a society whose institution remains or another location wherein the institution has collapsed. In other words, it is not clear if the groups make use of existing social institutions by which to establish their rule over civilians or if they prefer not to stand on them but to elaborate a new way of governance.

To answer these questions, we may have to return to organization theories of armed groups in civil war. That is, provided that an armed group has a specific base of support, it is likely to position itself in a society that the group can depend on. For instance, Guatemalan rebel groups of the mid-1970s and the 1980s that were comprised of a sizable number of indigenous participants could be supplied with provisions and recruits by indigenous communities in the western highlands. In this case, the rebels may
have desired to maintain the existing social institutions that they could benefit from.

Although the Khmer Rouge mobilized many ethnic minorities and deprived people, the major incompatibility with Lon Nol’s government was ideology. Since ideology is more flexible than ethnic identity in its appeal to diverse populations, it is interesting that the rebels targeted specific communities in which to establish their control over civilians.
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