How patrol officers make decisions : comparing a structural model to a process model

Heidi Bonner

University at Albany, State University of New York, bonnerhe@ecu.edu

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HOW PATROL OFFICERS MAKE DECISIONS:
COMPARING A STRUCTURAL MODEL TO A PROCESS MODEL

by

Heidi S. Bonner

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How Patrol Officers Make Decisions:
Comparing a Structural Model to a Process Model

by
Heidi S. Bonner

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Abstract

A heavy research emphasis on the discretionary decision-making actions by police has led researchers to conduct a substantial amount of work regarding the individual, situational, organizational, and neighborhood influences on police behavior. The culmination of all this work results in one main conclusion – the majority of findings regarding the causes of police behavior are mixed. Further, current models of police behavior account for only a small amount of the variation.

In an effort to expand existing knowledge on police decision-making behavior, this research utilized the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) observational data to conduct two primary analyses of dispute resolution encounters. First, a content analysis of the narrative debriefings of dispute resolution encounters was completed to develop overall themes of decision-making and account for both the depth and breadth of individual officer search for information in deciding on an outcome. Second, a structural model (based on coded observational data) of an arrest outcome in dispute resolution encounters was compared to a process model (based on the narrative data) of the arrest decision.

The content analysis revealed that officers utilize working rules (or, decision making shortcuts) and, further, that the influence of the working rule on decision making behavior is mediated by specific cognitive frameworks. The content analysis also revealed that officers, on average, used less than half of the information that was available to them prior to making a decision.
The comparison of the structural model (estimated using logistic regression) and the process model revealed that both models do quite well in predicting all dispositions. However, overall performance is driven by the fact that arrest is a rare occurrence. When it comes to predicting arrest, the process model performs better in both sites. Much of the information that is important to officers in an arrest decision is included in the process model but is rendered statistically insignificant in the structural model. That is because many of the informational inputs to which officers attend are important but rarely occur and, thus, would not be expected to be statistically significant. Thus, freed from any interpretation regarding statistical significance (and focusing instead on substantive significance), the process model seems to represent a more accurate depiction of the complex nature of the police decision-making.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Marc who, when told I wanted to leave California to go to the University at Albany in New York, asked only once why UC-Irvine wasn’t an option; to my mother Jane, who has supported me in everything I’ve set my mind to, and proved an invaluable source of help when our children were born; and to my boys, Aidan and Cian, who have kept me grounded and remind me what is really important in life.

I also could not have accomplished the completion of my degree without guidance from my committee members: Drs. Robert Worden, David Bayley, Alissa Worden, Bill Terrill, and Sarah McLean. In particular I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Robert Worden, who taught me so much about how to conduct research, and Dr. Sarah McLean, whose support, assistance, and sense of humor kept me going when the light at the end of the tunnel was nowhere to be seen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

“The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself . . . . There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.”

- John Kennedy (quoted in Hammond, 1996)

Introduction

Although discretionary decision-making in the American criminal justice system is taken for granted today, its discovery nearly fifty years ago launched a new paradigm in criminal justice research and policy.¹ Prior to the influential, but little known, American Bar Foundation Survey conducted between 1953 and 1957, the prevailing wisdom (based on a number of crime commission studies) was that criminal justice officials conducted their duties in an impersonal fashion, and “any exercise of discretion was an unwarranted and probably illegal departure from an official’s legal mandate” (Walker, 1992, p. 54). This Progressive Era paradigm gave way, however, once the survey revealed how pervasive discretion was in the criminal justice system.

Since that time, use of discretion has been studied at every point in the criminal justice process. One of the most studied dependent variables in criminal justice theory is the gap between laws that exist and what enforcement actually occurs. This is especially

¹ T.S. Kuhn (1970) argues that all scientific inquiry is guided by a paradigm, which
true of policing research. The police serve an important function in our society and are granted a large amount of power with which to perform their duties. Although police departments are typically characterized as quasi-military, hierarchical organizations, officers are not as regimented as this organizational structure implies. Rather, they generally have an incredible amount of discretion with which to perform their jobs. This combination of power and discretion has prompted a substantial amount of research aimed at understanding not only how police officers and organizations make decisions, but also to ascertain whether or not the decisions made are just and equitable.

A heavy research emphasis on discretionary behavior has led researchers to conduct a substantial amount of work regarding the individual, situational, organizational, and neighborhood influences on police behavior and a number of review pieces have looked at the current state of research since the 1980s (Sherman, 1980) the 1990s (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993) and, most recently, a comprehensive review of policing research since 1968 (National Research Council, 2004). By and large, these reviews all came to the same conclusions – the majority of findings regarding the causes of police behavior are mixed. Further, current models of police behavior account for only a small amount of the variation – even after decades of research, unexplained variation is substantial. Although the work to date has provided many insights into what types of factors police officers use when making a decision, extant research still has a number of limitations. In particular:

- Most researchers rely on regression models (which can describe how people weight and combine information, but not how they search for it) which appear to provide only limited insight into a psychological process such as decision-
making. As Siegal and colleagues (1974) note, “it is generally evident when a decision has or has not been made by a policeman, but the process leading to the decision remains problematic. It is not yet clear what types and how much information is significant to police for reaching decisions under varying circumstances” (p. 132);

- Researchers have focused primarily on the influence of observable extralegal (e.g. suspect demeanor) and legal factors (e.g. level of evidence) which means that the possible influences of factors that are not as easily studied (e.g. non-verbal cues provided by suspects that lead to the identification of suspicious behavior) are often overlooked;

- The majority of inquiries have assumed that officers react to all cues in the same way – for the purposes of most police research, officers are assumed to be homogenous;

- Many researchers have assumed a compensatory model of decision making even though some scholars (e.g. Klinger, 1996; Lundman, 1994) have found that decision making may actually follow a noncompensatory model; and

- Most research has paid too little attention to the temporal sequence of behavior in a police-citizen encounter (notable exceptions are Bayley’s (1986) research on tactical choices and Terrill’s (2003) research on use of force).

The Current Study

For the current study, I seek to address six main research questions:
1) Can qualitative narrative data collected in a field setting be used to build a process model of decision-making?

2) Can qualitative narrative data collected in a field setting be used to supplement a structural model?

3) How much variation is there across officers in terms of the order in which officers’ search for information?

4) How much variation is there across officers in terms of the depth of information search (e.g. how many cues do officers search for before reaching a decision?)

5) Do police officers primarily use compensatory or noncompensatory models of decision-making? Or, does the linearity of the decision-making process vary according to the type of problem faced and the amount of information at hand?

6) Can the complexity of police officer decision-making be explained by a process model?

Protocol analysis, a method that relies on decision makers’ ability to verbally describe their reasoning, has been proposed as a potential method to gain some insight into officers’ cognitive processes. The usual way to gather protocols is to ask subjects to “think aloud” as they work through decisions. Worden and Brandl (1990) believe that protocol analysis could strengthen our understanding of police behavior:

Given the ambiguity and uncertainty of police officers’ task environments, models that include only situational and/or organizational factors, without specifying the processes whereby these cues are translated into choices, are unlikely to explain the performance of any but rather simple police tasks. The cues that are salient, the meaning(s) imputed to them, the goals or objectives toward which officers responses are directed, and their beliefs about how much each of the alternative courses of action will contribute to meeting those objectives, are the premises on which officers’ decisions are likely to rest (p. 303).
However, few policing researchers have employed this method. Protocol analysis could enhance our understanding of police behavior because verbal reports might reveal the amount and nature of information used by officers to make decisions as well as how officers process and evaluate information to make choices.

As Mastrofski and Parks (1990) observed “much of what the police do and how they do it remains unexplored” (p. 476). This dissertation seeks to expand exploration of how police do their jobs, in particular, how do they make decisions in the field when dealing with a citizen who is a suspect or arrestee, in two ways. First, by detailing how questions about police behavior might be answered by using theories and techniques from the judgment and decision making field and, second, by comparing a traditional approach to explaining variance in police behavior (a regression-based model) with a more exploratory process-based model based on narrative accounts of decision-making.

Specifically, I plan to utilize the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) observational data to build both a structural and a process model of decision making. POPN, conducted in Indianapolis in 1996 and St. Petersburg in 1997, utilized several research methods including systematic observation of patrol officers and patrol supervisors, in-person interviews with patrol officers and supervisors, and telephone surveys of residents. POPN observers also collected narrative accounts from officers of the decisions made during ride-alongs. Officers were asked to talk through their decision immediately after making it. These narrative accounts, which are not in the public domain, have not been extensively analyzed. I will utilize the POPN narratives to build a process model of decision-making. Using dispute resolution encounters, I will examine the narratives for elements of process (such as the number of cues to which officers
attend, which ones, and in what order) in order to specify a process model. It may also be necessary to code some cues from the narratives if they have not been captured in the coded observational data. Ultimately, I will test the process model I specify, along with a structural (regression) model, and draw a comparison.
Chapter 2
Overview of Situational-Level Policing Research

Introduction

As noted in Chapter 1, the degree of consensus regarding the causes of police behavior is rather low given the large amount of research conducted to date. With a few exceptions (namely, degree of victim injury/crime seriousness, victim request for arrest, degree of resistance, and suspect demeanor) the findings regarding many of the expected influences on police behavior are mixed. Further, increases in methodological rigor and advances in statistical analysis have rendered some of the factors originally thought to influence police behavior (e.g. suspect race) largely insignificant.

Additionally, much of the work (although not all) completed to date has been based on a limited theoretical foundation (see Table 2.1). Riksheim and Chermak (1993), in their review of empirical police behavior research from the 1980s, noted that theoretical development was lagging behind use of new quantitative techniques. Although some of the research they review makes a “perfunctory acknowledgement of theory, explicit attempts to test theoretically derived propositions or hypotheses are uncommon, and theoretical explanations of quantitative findings are rarer yet” (p. 377). Maguire and Uchida (2007), in their analysis of police organization research, state that, although there are a number of solid theories that have implications for empirical police research, many of the studies they reviewed paid scant attention to them.
Table 2.1: Theoretical Frameworks for Studies Seeking To Explain Variation in Police Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Theory (or theory-ette)</th>
<th>Level &amp; DV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayley &amp; Garofalo (1989)</td>
<td><em>None provided</em></td>
<td>Encounter (use of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (1971)</td>
<td>Hostility thesis</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blumberg (1981)</td>
<td>Goldkamp perspective</td>
<td>Encounter (use of lethal force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crank, Payn, &amp; Jackson (1993)</td>
<td>Policing styles (<em>weakly</em>)</td>
<td>Individual (legalistic, order-maintenance behavior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eitle (2005)</td>
<td>Organizational theory</td>
<td>Organizational (DV arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eitle et al (2005)</td>
<td>Black’s theory of law</td>
<td>Situational (DV arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eitle et al (2005)</td>
<td>Organizational theory</td>
<td>Organizational (assault arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finn &amp; Bettis (2006)</td>
<td><em>None provided</em></td>
<td>Individual (dual DV arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finn et al (2004)</td>
<td><em>None provided</em></td>
<td>Organizational (DV arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich (1980)</td>
<td>Socio-legal framework</td>
<td>Situational (use of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe (1981)</td>
<td>Goldkamp perspective</td>
<td>Encounter (use of lethal force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe et al (1997)</td>
<td>Leniency thesis or Black’s relational distance</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klinger (1996b)</td>
<td>Hostility thesis (Black, 1971)</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (1983)</td>
<td>Wilson’s typology (modified)</td>
<td>Organizational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.1: Theoretical Frameworks for Studies Seeking To Explain Variation in Police Behavior (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Theory (or theory-ette)</th>
<th>Level &amp; DV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Klein (1983)</td>
<td>Wilson’s typology (modified)</td>
<td>Organizational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Klein (1984)</td>
<td>Black’s relational distance</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wilson’s theory of political culture</td>
<td>Organizational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Status characteristics (Brown)</td>
<td>Neighborhood (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wilson’s theory of political culture</td>
<td>Organizational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>None provided</em></td>
<td>Neighborhood (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Visher (1981)</td>
<td>Black’s theory of law</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipes &amp; Mastrofski (1990)</td>
<td>Muir’s typology</td>
<td>Individual (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swanson (1978)</td>
<td>Open/closed systems</td>
<td>Organizational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes &amp; Clark (1975)</td>
<td>Deference exchange</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes et al (1978)</td>
<td>Socio-legal theory of police discretion</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrill (2005)</td>
<td>Social interactionist</td>
<td>Situational (use of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrill et al (2003)</td>
<td>Informal culture</td>
<td>Organizational (use of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visher (1983)</td>
<td>Chivalry theory</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden (1989)</td>
<td>Administrative decision-making theory</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden &amp; Pollitz (1984)</td>
<td>Role orientation</td>
<td>Individual (arrest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-legal framework</td>
<td>Situational (arrest)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, much of the research on police decision-making focuses primarily on the influence of observable extralegal (e.g. suspect demeanor) and legal factors (e.g. level of evidence). Often overlooked are the possible influences of factors that are not as easily studied, such as non-verbal cues provided by suspects (leading to identification of
suspicious behavior). The majority of inquiries into police behavior have also assumed that officers react to all cues in the same way – for the purposes of most police research, officers are assumed to be homogenous. Although the research to date has provided many insights into what types of factors police use when making decisions, there has been too little research conducted that ascertains why they do so and (in particular) theories regarding the psychological nature of decision-making are often ignored in criminal justice literature. Furthermore, a large amount of research has been devoted to individual-level decision-making while a lesser amount has focused on the effect of organizational factors on individual behavior. Additionally, much of the inquiry into police behavior has examined as dependent variables actions that do not occur with great frequency, such as arrest and use of force. Finally, while some researchers have focused on domestic violence (particularly the use of arrest policies in domestic cases) the majority of research has specifically excluded from analysis traffic incidents, and relatively little is mentioned about decisions concerning lower-order crime (such as order maintenance offenses) because they rarely reach the level of arrest or use of force.

The research questions I have posed lead naturally to a focus on the situational influences on police behavior. Although individual and organizational influences may have some effect on the outcome, the primary influence comes from situational elements. Thus, in this review of policing literature I focus on the situational-level influences on police decision-making. Because they have been so dominant in the literature, and because they provide the background for my primary purpose of comparing a structural to a process model, the dependent variables I examine for this literature review include the decision to arrest, the decision to use force, and the decision to stop.
Socio-legal (situational) Influences on Police Behavior

Introduction

Research involving characteristics of situations in which officers make decisions focus on the influence of factors at the encounter level such as strength of evidence, characteristics of the offender, and characteristics of the victim, among others. Discovering how socio-legal factors affect police decision-making is important to researchers because situational elements have a more powerful effect on decision making than individual/attitudinal and organizational factors (National Research Council, 2004). Further, scholars (and the public) have a primary interest in possible discrimination and abuse of authority by the police, so the effect of extralegal considerations (such as race) is frequently studied. It is not unexpected, then, that research examining the relative influence of situational legal and extralegal variables in decisions has dominated criminal justice literature.

In judicial research, the legal metaphor offers a tidy perspective. The legal metaphor states that crime seriousness determines sanction – the more serious the crime, the more serious the punishment. Actions are guided by legal variables alone, and all others are extraneous. This assumption does not exist only in the courtroom – it seems rational, for example, to believe that police arrest offenders based on the strength of evidence coupled with the seriousness of the offense committed. However, research has revealed time and again that for lesser crimes this is not the case; the legal metaphor is simply too unsophisticated an explanation of decision-making in criminal justice (Kautt & Spohn, 2007). Police officers, just like judges, are often influenced by extralegal considerations when making decisions in the field, be it to arrest an offender, use force
against a suspect, or to stop and question a citizen. However, this discretion is relative to legal considerations – criminal justice actors will be more likely to use discretion when legal considerations are not as pressing. For example, “officers have less discretion in situations in which speeding motorists drive by them traveling 30 miles per hour over the speed limit, compared to those traveling 10 miles an hour over the speed limit” (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002, p. 264). Thus, legal and extralegal factors interact in the majority of police encounters with citizens. The form of this interaction, however, and the influence it has on police officer behavior is not fully understood.

**Theoretical Foundations**

**Introduction**

Research that explores the situational factors that contribute to a police decision to arrest, use force, or stop an individual generally focus on two perspectives (Sykes et al, 1978). The first assumes that decisions are limited by legal criteria. In such cases, the main concern is with under-enforcement of the law. The second assumes that decisions are influenced by extralegal criteria. In such cases, the concern is with selective enforcement of the law based on non-legal criteria. Most research has focused on the influence of extralegal factors, those that should “in a moral or legal sense” have no bearing on police dispositions (NRC, 2004). Black and Reiss (1967) noted that “it is perhaps self-evident that the distribution of situational statuses in police encounters has profound consequences for police behavior” (p. 9). However, what form those consequences take is something that is still not fully understood.
Much of the research on the situational influences on police behavior has been conducted on a limited theoretical basis. For example, Garner and colleagues (2002) reviewed 15 uses of force studies and found that only five framed a theoretical perspective. However, these went no further than identifying what types of variables – situational, psychological, neighborhood, or organizational – were included in the analysis. The following section will explore in more detail the theoretical foundations researchers have used to justify inquiry into the situational level influences on police behavior.

The Social Stage in Police-Citizen Encounters

What situational factors researchers focus on depends on the theoretical perspective of the researcher. That situational factors shape police behavior at all was first posited by Black and Reiss (1967) who noted that when police and citizens meet in face-to-face encounters, they meet upon a social “stage.” The degree of control that a citizen can exercise in an interaction depends upon two factors: their status and their “subversive capability,” or ability to undermine the police. Both status and subversive capability are indicators of a citizen’s sanctioning capacity over the police and both are expected to provide cues which officers use to form judgments about how incidents should be handled (Wilson, 1968; Berk & Loseke, 1981, as cited in NRC, 2004).

2 Interestingly, Garner and colleagues (2002) proceed to examine the situational characteristics that contribute to use of force, but provide no additional theoretical basis for their endeavor despite their identified lack of theoretical frameworks provided in previous research.
In order for police officers to identify the “actors” on the social “stage” they must make judgments about the status of the citizens with whom they are interacting. This status comes in two forms; social and situational (see Table 2.2). Social status is carried from situation to situation (e.g. sex, age, race, ethnicity, and social class) and situational status (or role) is defined by the circumstances of the police-citizen interaction. Citizens can be placed in a variety of roles depending on the type of situation to which police are called (e.g. witness, suspect, complainant, etc). Social status is based entirely on extralegal factors (expect, perhaps, where juvenile status may be a legal consideration) while situational status provides both legal and extralegal indicators. This concept will be discussed more fully in the findings section.

Table 2.2: Socio-legal Factors Hypothesized to Influence Police Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Characteristic</th>
<th>Social Status</th>
<th>Situational Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race, gender, social class, age</td>
<td>Level of intoxication, type of evidence, seriousness of offense, complainant preference, age (if juvenile status is a consideration), suspect resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extralegal Characteristic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demeanor, mental state, number of officers present, number of citizens present, location of encounter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Black and Reiss (1967) note that the level of discretion afforded police officers has more to do with the structure of the social stage (e.g. type of actors involved) in a given encounter than with any degree of departmental control. Generally, situations in which there is minimal departmental control (proactive encounters) are the same situations where individual discretion is greatest due to the situational statuses of the
citizens encountered (i.e. a citizen who is considered a suspect has less status that a citizen cast in the role of witness) (p. 10). However, the degree of discretion may be undermined by the subversive capability of the citizen resulting in an encounter that “takes the form of a precarious balance of officer control and submission” (p. 11). The backdrop on the social stage is authority and legitimacy. Assertion of authority is the main form of control available to officers. However, whether or not an officer can effectively exercise his or her authority depends on the willingness of the citizen to accept the exercise of authority as legitimate.

**Socio-Legal Based Theory**

A majority of research on the influence of situational factors is presented under either Black’s theories or the broader “socio-legal framework.” This framework considers the common elements of an encounter that are hypothesized to affect police behavior from a sociological perspective including (among others): citizen race, citizen gender, demeanor, mental/emotional state, the location of an encounter, type of evidence, and seriousness of offense. As noted above, the socio-legal factors officers may consider in an encounter can be classified according to characteristics that are permanent (social status – e.g. race, age, gender) and those that are contingent on the specific encounter (situational status – demeanor, number of bystanders, etc). For simplicity’s sake, the following discussion of specific theories and propositions utilized by scholars examining arrest, use of force, and stop decisions will be separated into these categories.
Theories Based on Social Status

Research on the effect of social status characteristics is often only loosely tied to a theory. For example, researchers have considered the effect of gender, particularly when exploring the relationship between gender and arrest practices. In doing so, however, they are typically testing one of two hypotheses: the leniency hypothesis or the chivalry hypothesis. The leniency hypothesis states that officers are less likely to assert their authority with female victims, particularly when making arrest decisions regarding male-on-female spousal violence (Fyfe et al, 1997). (This leniency may be due to a tendency for police to be more lenient as the relational distance between victims and suspects decreases (Black, 1976) although this theoretical underpinning is often unstated). The chivalry hypothesis states that women receive preferential treatment in the criminal justice process in return for “displaying appropriate sex-role behaviors” (Visher, 1983, p. 6). Thus, when a male law enforcement officer interacts with a female suspect, the encounter becomes one between a man and a woman. In such a situation, gender expectations may “become more salient than strictly legal factors in the official sanctioning of female offenders.” If female suspects do not adhere to their expected roles, then preferential treatment may be revoked (Visher, 1983, p. 6). Visher (1983) found that police officers make arrest decisions for females on the basis of a more limited set of cues. “In police encounters with female suspects, arrest decisions are made on the basis of individual factors, rather than on a large group of situational cues. This may reflect the influence of police officers’ gender expectations on arrest decisions of female suspects” (p. 22).
Research that has principally examined the influence of race in police arrest decisions has been conducted under the general hypothesis that police are more likely to arrest black suspects compared to their white counterparts (most research does not consider other minority groups; see Lundman, 1974 for an exception). Black’s (1976) premise that blacks are less powerful members of society and are, therefore, systematically disadvantaged is often implied in race inequality research although it is often not explicitly stated. A fair amount of research relies solely on ad-hoc hypotheses, which provide alternative explanations for a race effect. Specifically, some of these include: 1) Black suspects offend at a higher rate than white suspects; 2) There is a correlation between race and other factors related to arrest (e.g. suspect demeanor or complainant preference); 3) Blacks are more likely to be confronted by police in a lower status neighborhood, and; 4) Offenders in lower status neighborhoods are more likely to be arrested (Smith et al, 1984).

**Theories Based on Situational Status**

Police interact with citizens in a variety of ways according to their role in an encounter. Citizens can be victims, complainants, bystanders, witnesses, suspects, or disputants. My primary consideration here is citizens who are suspects or disputants. Although it is important to study the behavior of police in regards to citizens in other roles, encounters with citizens who have lower “situational status,” as detailed by Black and Reiss (1967), afford police the most discretion with which to act. It is how police officers choose to act when given the most latitude, and the differences in outcome
between them when confronted with similar types of encounters, that is central to the questions addressed in this dissertation.

The role of demeanor has received a lot of attention in research that focuses primarily on the effect of situational status characteristics. The demeanor hypothesis – that a disrespectful offender will be more likely to be arrested than a respectful one – is offered as an explanation for discretionary decision-making regarding lower level crimes (an offender who has committed a serious crime is unlikely to be let off with a warning no matter how charming he or she may be). There are a number of views regarding the link between demeanor and arrest: 1) offenders who are disrespectful make police officers angry, and those officers get even by making arrest (hostility thesis) (Lundman, 1996a); 2) officers tend to give people a break unless they act disrespectfully (in the words of Van Maanen (1978), when they show themselves to be an “asshole”) or; 3) demeanor is one of the cues police use to perform their jobs competently (Lundman, 1996a).

The hostility thesis links the demeanor of a suspect to the implied level of respect for a police officer’s status. Westley (1952, 1970) was one of the first to note that that respect is an important norm for police. This led to the proposition that police respond punitively to suspects who do not accord them proper deference. Van Maanen (1978) further notes that officers consider a display of disrespect as “an affront,” something that indicates to them that their authority is not being taken seriously. “[Affronts] push the encounter to a new level wherein any further slight to an officer, however subtle, provides sufficient evidence to a patrolman that he may indeed be dealing with a certifiable asshole” (p. 229). Finally, Sykes and Clark (1975) proposed the theory of
deference exchange (which seems to follow from Black and Reiss’s subversive capability). In a police-citizen encounter, officers expect deference to their authority but this expectation can be interpreted by the citizen as superiority. When a citizen refuses to express deference, it may be interpreted as “a rejection of the moral and social fabric and of the officer’s symbolic status.” Each time one of the participants in the encounter acts in a manner that is not expected the defiance increases. “As both actors discredit each other, they exchange roles as threatening and threatened. Actions such as a ‘look,’ a furtive movement, a gesture, or any other difficult-to-measure behavior may replace normative responses” (Alpert & Dunham, 2004, 40-41). However, Worden and Myers (n.d.), in their examination of officer decisions to arrest juveniles, found some evidence that police might be giving breaks to youth who are deferential. In instances where the level of evidence was sufficient to constitute probable cause, officers arrested 42 percent of the disrespectful suspects and 21 percent of suspects who were respectful. Police clearly invoked the law far less frequently than they had the authority to do so, but respectful youth were more likely to benefit from an officer’s lenience.

The demeanor of a suspect may serve as an attitude test but what it may indicate to an officer is not always clear. Disrespect could be construed as hostility, as a failure to defer to officers’ authority, or as a failure to show deference to the law (Brown, 1981). A disrespectful demeanor may not just indicate an affront. How officers interpret demeanor could be linked to the type of problem police are trying to solve (Lundman, 1996a). In that sense, demeanor could serve as an important cue on the “social stage.” Most citizen-police interaction involves minor problems that require informal solutions. A minority of offenders, however, require formal action in order to be persuaded to change their
behavior. As Lundman (1996a) notes a driver who “flunks the attitude test possibly is a driver for whom simple words of warning are nothing more than simple inconvenience. After all, if someone is “crazy-brave” (Muir 1977:145) enough to be impolite to a cop, then there is ample reason to worry about what else that person might do once the officer is gone and mere mortals remain” (p. 308).

Only a few scholars have proposed the adoption of theories that go beyond the rather vague socio-legal framework. Alpert & Dunham (2004) built on the conceptual models developed by Turk (1969) and Sykes and Clark (1975) to propose a new theory called “authority maintenance.” Turk (1969) stated that the formation of authority relationships is inevitable, and the more cultural norms do not match those of an authority figure, the more likely conflict is to develop and Sykes & Clark (1975), as noted above, developed the theory of deference exchange. Authority maintenance theory attempts to explain police-citizen interactions “from a normative and interpersonal perspective rather than from the perspective of psychological characteristics or personal attributes” (p. 171).

Police-citizen encounters are a unique type of social interaction in many ways. First, the balance of authority is a major factor that regulates the interaction between police and citizens. Second, this authority balance is asymmetrical - “the citizen is socialized to view his or her role as passive and accommodating in these encounters while the police officer is socialized and trained to be insistent on and protective of his or her authority” (p. 179). Finally, police-citizen encounters typically violate the principle of reciprocity (when actors have repeated opportunities to mutually reach their desired outcome) because of the disparate authority between police and citizens – the introduction of police force or suspect resistance into an encounter always results in a breakdown of reciprocity.
In another application of specific theory, Terrill (2005) utilizes social interactionist theory to account for police use of force. Social interactionist theory considers the exchange of behaviors between actors within an encounter in light of the situational factors which structure social exchange (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Use of coercion is viewed as a behavior designed to do one (or more) of three things: 1) control others, 2) achieve justice, and 3) assert and protect social identities (p. 109). Control is the only legal purpose for using force. However, officers may also use coercion to achieve justice; that is, officers assign blameworthiness to individuals from both a legal (violation of law) and a moral (violation of social norms) perspective. Those violating a norm may be assigned more blame, and may be subject to higher levels of coercion. Officers may also use more force in situations that threaten their identity. Authority and respect are once again key elements – “officers are socialized to ‘maintain the edge’ and be ‘one up’ on citizens not only to establish control, but to ensure proper respect” (p. 110).

In a similar type of “interaction” approach, Holmes and colleagues (1998) consider the “totality of the circumstances” (p. 104) and posit that officers consider three elements when determining how to respond in an encounter with a citizen. These are threat perception (a multidimensional construct based on situational clues from suspect and environment), offense severity (which may put officer on guard as to what to expect in a given encounter), and the level of suspect resistance. Thus, offense severity and suspect resistance predict threat perception and threat perception predicts the type of coercion used. Basically, a totality of the circumstances approach looks at inherent perceived risk to officers or others in a police-citizen encounter and how that translates
into police officers’ decisions to use force. Holmes and colleagues (1998) find that although level of threat perceived by the officer is an important consideration in determining an appropriate level of force to use, other factors play a role as well. Perceptions of threat and perceptions regarding the appropriate amount of force to be used are related, but the factors contributing to the two concepts are not the same. As the authors note, “intuitively, it makes sense that the same predictors that put officers on ‘alert’ would also prompt them to give or not give suspects one or more warnings before resorting to physical force . . . Instead, the data reveal that these concepts are in fact two distinct concepts” p. 99.3

The Evolution of the Police-Citizen Encounter

As researchers have focused more attention on the situational influences on police behavior, they have been forced to consider the wide variety of actions police have at their discretion. The dependent variables have, in many cases, moved away from dichotomies. However, some research still does not address the complexity of police action.

3 Variables predicting the level of threat include: level of resistance, gender and size of suspect, severity of the offense, suspect demeanor, whether the officer was black, and number of officers at the scene (non-black officers who respond alone are more likely to rate a situation as less threatening than black officers responding with backup). Variables predicting the number of appropriate verbal warnings include: level of resistance, number of years of experience, and whether the situation is police or citizen-initiated. Variables predicting the force used include: level of threat, number of warnings issued, the level of suspect resistance, suspect gender, offense severity, whether an officer carries OC spray, and the number of years the officer has been on the force.
Although arrest is a common dependent variable in policing research, it is a relatively rare event in policing. There are many other types of control options available to police (such as to issue a warning) but these are rarely studied. Arrest continues to be one of the main decision-making behaviors examined. Black (1971) looks at arrest as a social construct, a behavior influenced by social factors. That is, what happens in an encounter that could lead to an arrest “may have less to do with crime and law than with the demands of the situational order, with social etiquette or the pressures of group size or physical space” (p. 107). Arrest results from interaction, and is not just simply a response to what an officer observes. Thus, it is not surprising that arrest could just as easily be the product of extralegal factors as it is legal factors. Sykes and colleagues (1978) argue that “a distinction must be made between arrest (official identification of a citizen as a violator) and enforcement of the law, since arrest is only one means of enforcement. An adequately broad perspective must encompass means other than those specifically prescribed by law or departmental policy; otherwise police behavior cannot be accounted for in most instances” (p. 174).

Bayley (1986) also argues that an arrest dichotomy is oversimplified. Choices made by officers in an encounter are quite extensive, and “the complexity of decision increases as encounters develop” (p. 347). Further, choices made at one stage of the encounter affect subsequent stages.

The analysis suggests that officers anticipate these subsequent decisions – that they know what actions on their part lead to particular outcomes at exit . . . all encounters are not equally open to possibility. In some, police officers appear to make a quick reading of what is required, and then shape the encounter, even during the moment of contact, to produce the results they want (Bayley, 1986, p. 347).
Bayley (1986) also notes that the action that an officer took varied according to the stage of the encounter: contact (the initial intervention), processing (what occurred between contact and exit) and exit (how officers terminated involvement). For example, for disturbances, officers took one of 16 actions ranging from simply leaving without doing anything to offering advice or a promise of future assistance to arresting one of the participants. During a traffic stop, however, officers ended an encounter with one of 12 actions. The majority issued a citation, released the driver with a warning, or made an arrest. Despite findings that officers select from numerous choices, not just “arrest” or “do not arrest,” very little subsequent research on arrest behavior has looked beyond a dichotomy.

The same considerations are true in force research. Fridell and Binder (1992) note that encounters between the police and citizens must be “seen to encompass a pattern of interaction between an officer and an opponent and multiple decisions by both” (p. 386). Most use of force research is concerned solely with the presence or absence of cues deemed to be influential without regard for where each falls in the timeline of an encounter. However, such an approach fails to account for the “interactional” process of police-citizen encounters (Terrill, 2001). Officers may apply many different forms of force in an encounter, and suspects may employ many different forms of resistance, depending on the circumstances of a specific encounter. Thus, it is important to examine the process by which individual police-suspect encounters unfold (Terrill, 2001; 2005).

Binder and Scharf (1980) first noted that “a police ‘decision’ to use, or not to use, deadly force in a given context might be better described as a contingent sequence of decisions and resulting behaviors, each increasing or decreasing the probability of an
eventual use of deadly force” (p. 116). The transactional process they describe has four phases: anticipation, entry, information exchange, and final decision. The anticipation phase is initial notification of a potential encounter (e.g. via radio call). At this point, an officer is already reacting intellectually and emotionally to the cues received and the manner in which information is communicated at this stage, as well as the actual content of the information, can affect an officer’s consideration of alternative actions. The entry phase is the start of an encounter. During this phase, the officer must determine the extent of any danger present, establish his or her authority, clarify his expectations for the citizen, and supplement the information received during the anticipation phase (all of which occurs simultaneously and immediately). The next phase is information exchange, which can vary widely in duration, from only momentary cues to several hours. By the time officers reach the final decision phase, the outcome is typically determined by the choices made at earlier decision points. Holmes and colleagues (1998) also find that there are distinct stages to police-citizen encounters. The first is introduction (gathering of intelligence, ability to gauge how suspect will react to their authority), the second is reflection (engagement with suspect, force may be used to gain compliance if suspect does not respond to authority), and last is the stage of last resort (subduing suspect in most effective manner possible without injuring themselves or the suspect).

All of the preceding discussion highlights the difficulties inherent in not only studying police behavior, but also making generalizations about the influences of variables on different types of behavior. If outcomes are determined by choices made at earlier decision points, then encounters should be studied as an interaction, not as a static event with a single decision point. Additionally, the full spectrum of behavior in a police-
citizen encounter is rarely studied. By focusing on only one type of control option researchers miss the complexity of police decision-making. There is no theory of police behavior that addresses all of these considerations (a tall order, to be sure).

Findings

Introduction

Making a generalization about the situational factors that contribute to variation in police behavior is difficult due to differences in the conceptualization and measurement of key variables as well as the type of encounter being studied (see Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 beginning on page 45). Terrill (2001), when summarizing research that examined the extent of force, noted that the conclusions that can be drawn depend on the data source used. Observational studies conclude that force, and excessive force, is rare while studies based on use of force reports and survey data report varied findings. Research using citizen complaints is the most limited data source, because many incidents that involve the use of force do not result in a complaint. Further, researchers reach different conclusions based on the theoretical framework under which they are operating. For example, the stated influence of socio-legal factors on police behavior can vary by who the citizen is (e.g. Black’s (1976) theory of social distance) or by what the citizen does (e.g. Sykes & Clark’s (1975) theory of deference exchange) (Terrill, 2001; Garner et al, 2002). Again, most of what we know about police behavior is based primarily on two
dependent variables – arrest and use of force. Although they are just two potential outcomes from a host of possible outcomes they provide much relevant information about the types of cues officers might attend to when choosing a course of behavior. I will present the relevant findings in the succeeding sections using a framework that considers the status of the citizen (social or situational) as well as whether the characteristic under study is legal or extralegal (see table 2.2 on page 14).

Social Status

Extralegal factors

Race inequality has been studied throughout the criminal justice system, particularly when it comes to police arrest decisions. The general hypothesis guiding such research is that police are more likely to arrest black suspects compared to their white counterparts (most research does not consider other minority groups; see Lundman, 1974 for an exception). There are a number of theoretical reasons in the literature for racial disproportionality in arrest although not all have been empirically tested. These include: 1) As less powerful members of society blacks are systematically disadvantaged; 2) Black suspects offend at a higher rate than white suspects and; 3) There is a correlation between race and other factors related to arrest (e.g. suspect demeanor or complainant preference) (Smith et al, 1984). Other hypotheses are that blacks are more likely to be

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confronted by police in a lower status neighborhood, and that offenders in lower status neighborhoods are more likely to be arrested (Smith et al, 1984).

In general, findings regarding the effect of race on arrest decisions have been mixed. Some have found that black suspects are more likely to be arrested (Lundman, 1996a; Smith & Visher, 1981; Black & Reiss, 1970; Lundman, Sykes, & Clark, 1978; Smith et al, 1984) including juvenile black suspects (Black & Reiss, 1970). Black male and female suspects are also more likely to be arrested than white male or female suspects (Visher, 1983; Smith et al, 1984). Other researchers have found that race does not influence arrest (Berk & Loseke, 1981; Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Fyfe et al, 1997; Smith & Klein, 1984; Mastrofski et al, 1995). Findings have also revealed that officers were more likely to use force against black suspects (Worden, 1995; Terrill, 2001; Alpert & Dunham, 2004). However, in some cases the effect disappeared when suspect resistance was controlled for (Garner et al, 2002).

When a racial disparity in an arrest or use of force pattern is found, the difference has been attributed to a number of things including the demeanor of the suspect (Black, 1971). Black (1971) found that black suspects are disrespectful more often than white suspects and, while police arrest blacks at a higher rate than whites, “when the arrest rate for respectful black suspects is compared to that for respectful whites, no difference in the probability of arrest is apparent.” (p. 95). Additional studies have concluded that, although police arrested blacks more often than whites, the disparity was due to the fact that black victims requested formal action (arrest) more often than white complainants (Black & Reiss, 1970; Lundman, Sykes, & Clark, 1978).
Race has also received a lot of attention in stop research, particularly as racial profiling concerns gained prominence. A recent study found that blacks constituted 13.5 percent of drivers in an area on the New Jersey Turnpike and 15 percent of drivers speeding. However, they represented 35 percent of drivers stopped and 72 percent of those arrested (General Accounting Office, 2000). Conversely, Zingraff and colleagues (2000) found that young white males were the most severe speeding offenders, and accounted for most of the drivers stopped. Black drivers were pulled over at a slightly higher rate than the denominator indicated, but the increase was not statistically significant (Zingraff et al, 2000).

Researchers studying lethal force decisions have also focused heavily on race. Every study that has examined the relationship between suspect race and deadly force has found that blacks are disproportionately “at the wrong end of police guns” (Fyfe, 1988, p. 189). Why this is so, however, is not clear. Goldkamp (1976, as quoted in Fyfe, 1988) offers two conflicting belief perspectives. In the first, “disproportionate minority deaths [result] from both irresponsible use of deadly force by a small minority of police officers and differential administration of law enforcement toward minority citizens (which in effect produces disproportionately high arrest and death rates for minorities in general” (p. 169). The second perspective asserts that “the disproportionately high death rates of

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5 Many of the findings on race and traffic stops should be interpreted with caution because of the denominator problem. In order to know if the number of stops made classified by race or ethnicity is disproportionate, one must also know if the typical pool of traffic for a given area (also classified by race and ethnicity) is known. Establishing an accurate benchmark for stop research has proven difficult.
minorities at the hands of the police can be explained by the disproportionately high arrest rates of minorities for crimes of violence or by assumptions concerning the suspect’s responsibility for his/her own death in violent police-suspect interactions” (p. 16). If the first perspective is true, then the overrepresentation of blacks as recipients of deadly force could be reduced by attempting to eliminate racism within policing. The second perspective requires a far more complex answer. “If racial disparities in police homicide statistics are largely only another manifestation of whatever forces have placed so many blacks on the low end of the American ladder generally, it follows that they can be eliminated only by major social change” (Fyfe, 1988, p. 190).

Researchers have found that most suspects shot (or shot at) present a credible threat to police (Robin, 1963; Binder & Scharf, 1980; Fyfe, 1980, 1981a; Kobler, 1975a,b; Margarita, 1980; Binder & Fridell, 1984). Blumberg (1981) found that, regardless of race, the majority of those shot by police had attacked officers with weapons. Further, the intensity of police response (number of officers shooting, number of shots fired) did not vary by race. Binder and colleagues (1982) found that the percentage of blacks and whites who attacked officers when they shot was identical and the percentages of both races that fled were about the same. Further, researchers have found that blacks are disproportionately on the receiving end of lethal force, but they are also disproportionately more likely to be engaged in activities likely to get them shot (e.g. homicide, robbery, or other violent crimes) (Matulia, 1985). Fyfe (1981b) discovered that robberies precipitated far more police shootings of black suspects than whites. However, black suspects were twice as likely as whites to be armed with firearms. Geller and Karales (1981) likewise found that 60 percent of minorities encountered by police had
used or threatened to use guns against officers. However, they also found evidence of a race effect – blacks were also more likely than other races to have been shot during flight (without any other resistance). Although the influence of race on lethal force decisions has been examined quite often other situational factors do not do much to explain lethal force behavior. Rather, “on balance, and even though the available data are skimpier than we would like, it appears that the frequency of police use of deadly force is influenced heavily by organizational philosophies, expectations, and policies . . . “ (Fyfe, 1988, p. 199)

Researchers have also attempted to explain differences in arrest rates by organizational and neighborhood effects. Although arrest decisions were not affected by bureaucratization of police agencies, Smith et al (1984) found that a race effect disappeared when the poverty level of the neighborhood was introduced into the model. Police were more likely to arrest in encounters without complainants when poverty level of neighborhood increased leading Smith and colleagues (1984) to conclude that “socio-economic status rather than suspect race is the axis around which arrest discrimination revolves. Both black and white offenders encountered in poorer neighborhoods suffer from discriminatory application of law by police” (p. 243). Thus, it may be that police attend to class differences rather than racial differences (although if such a bias exists it is not at all clear that it is deliberate). In fact, police are more likely to invoke their authority against citizens of lower social class (Lundman 1994, 1996a, 1998; Reiss 1968, 1971; Friedrich, 1977; Worden, 1995; Terrill, 2001).

The exact relationship between race, social class, and police behavior is by no means clear, however. Mastrofski and colleagues (1995) found that social class does not
affect arrest but concluded that this may be because an observational study requires inference about social class, and there is no guarantee that observers’ impressions match those of the officers they are observing. As such, “research that tested the extent to which police officers’ perceptions of social class match those of field researchers would help to establish the nature and scope of reliability problems with the measurement of social class” (NRC, 2004, p. 121). Additionally, Smith and colleagues (1984) found that when an encounter included a complainant neither the race of the suspect nor the socio-economic status of the neighborhood had an effect on the arrest decision. Police were, however, more likely to respond to a white victim’s request for arrest (Smith et al., 1984). Thus, “in the subjective calculus of police decision making, suspects confronted in poorer neighborhoods and black victims appear disadvantaged” (p. 248). Denial of protection to black victims seems to be more racially motivated than more frequent arrests of black offenders.

The gender of the suspect appears to influence both arrest and use of force decisions. Officers were more likely to use force against males (Worden, 1995; Garner, 1996; Terrill, 2001; Garner et al. 2002) and also used less force relative to resistance with female suspects than they did with males (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). Officers are also more likely to “jump the force continuum” when a nonresistant suspect is male (Terrill, 2005). In terms of arrest decisions, some researchers have found that married disputants are less likely to be arrested than unmarried disputants (Fyfe et al., 1997; Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Black, 1971) while others have determined that arrest was equally likely in mixed-gender disputes (Smith & Klein, 1984). In some cases, then, it appears that police
may be equally reluctant to arrest in both domestic and non-domestic disputes (Smith & Klein, 1984).

Why gender differences sometimes result in unequal application of the law is not fully understood. In terms of use of force, it is not clear if officers are being chivalrous or if female suspects simply require less force to control. Research on arrest decisions has not established if officers are being lenient toward females or lenient toward males in spousal abuse. For example, the chivalry theory has been upheld by a number of researchers (Mastrofski et al, 1995; Worden, 1995; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) although suspect race can affect the arrest decision for females but not for males – white females are the least likely group to be taken into custody (Smith et al, 1984). At the same time, Fyfe and colleagues (1997) also tested whether leniency was due to relational distance or the marital status of the suspect and complainant. Ultimately, “while we cannot establish whether the differential leniency observed in our data for cases in which women are attacked by their male partners is due to the spousal nature of the violence or the more general tendency for increased leniency as the relational distance between parties to violence decreases” police officers in the study department were reluctant to arrest men who attacked their female partners (Fyfe et al, 1997, p. 468).6

6 However, the study did not control for the effect of victim preference.
Situational Status

Extralegal Factors

The factors that contribute the most to police use of force are primarily related to how an offender’s disrespect for an officer’s authority (Friedrich, 1980). Toch (1969), using officer and citizen interviews, was the first to empirically demonstrate the escalation of police-citizen violence in encounters. He found that most force was the result of citizen disrespect and, after analyzing the interactional process of encounters, found that half the cases that led to excessive force complaints began with a verbal request that the citizen refused to obey.

Other scholars have likewise found that citizens who were antagonistic (Friedrich, 1977; Worden, 1995; Garner, 1996) or who challenged or defied police authority (Reiss, 1968; Chevigny, 1969) were more likely to be subject to increased use of force (table 2.5). Similarly, an antagonistic or disrespectful demeanor is a significant predictor of arrest (table 2.3) (Smith & Klein, 1984; Visher, 1983; Smith & Visher, 1981; Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Worden & Shepard, 1996; Worden, 1989; Lundman, 1996a; Lundman, 1994). This is true for both male and female suspects (Visher, 1983; Smith & Visher, 1981). Black suspects have been found to disrespectful more often than white suspects (Black, 1971) and police arrest blacks at a higher rate than whites, but “when the arrest rate for respectful black suspects is compared to that for respectful whites, no difference in the probability of arrest is apparent” (Black, 1971, p. 95). Thus, a greater likelihood of arrest is linked to demeanor, rather than race. Police are also likely to consider demeanor in concert with crime seriousness. Black (1971) found that police are less likely to arrest a civil felony suspect than they are a disrespectful misdemeanor suspect. That is,
enforcing authority is more important enforcing the law. The conflicting findings regarding the influence of demeanor led the National Research Council (2004) to conclude that “the effect of demeanor on police behavior may be quite complex, perhaps contingent on other factors: the era (contemporary police may be less prone to apply the “attitude test”), the police department, and even the nature of encounters in which police and suspects interact” (p. 119).

Although there has been a lot of research conducted on the effect demeanor has on officer behavior, many questions remain unanswered. Are officers more lenient with those who are respectful (letting off those who commit crimes) or are they more punitive with those who are disrespectful (arresting when no crime has been committed)? Do officers pay attention to demeanor for other reasons, as Lundman (1996a) suggests? Has the effect of demeanor on arrest changed over time? Is it less important to officers now than it was in the 1970s (Worden & Shepard, 1996)? Finally, what is the exact relationship between arrest and demeanor? Is it a compensatory or a noncompensatory relationship? (That is, can a high value on one cue balance a low value on another – compensatory – or can the changes in cue values not be balanced?)

Compensatory models are additive, and can be linear or nonlinear (one example of a nonlinear model is a curvilinear (polynomial) model). In a noncompensatory model, changes in one factor cannot be compensated for by changes in another. Noncompensatory models are nonadditive and nonlinear. Conjunctive and disjunctive models are examples of noncompensatory models. In a conjunctive model, something is rejected because it fails to meet a minimum level on at least one of the attributes (for example, a home buyer may decide to reject a house that is unaffordable regardless of its features or location). In a disjunctive model, something is accepted because it passes a high standard on one attribute, regardless of its values on other attributes (for example, accepting a job offer based on location regardless of salary or working conditions).
Klinger’s (1996) review of previous research on arrest and demeanor contends that most researchers hypothesize a linear relationship – as disrespect or hostility increases, the odds of arrest increase. However, he found that there is no linear relationship between demeanor and arrest (as did Lundman, 1994). Rather, only a measure of extreme hostility was significant which “suggests that there may be a threshold effect operating whereby displays of hostility exert no effect on arrest until they reach a certain point. It suggests, in other words, that the functional form of the hostility-arrest relationship among noncriminal cases is not linear, but rather takes the form of a horizontal L” (Klinger, 1996, p. 72).

An increased number of bystanders increase the likelihood of force (Friedrich, 1977; Friedrich, 1980; Garner, 1996; Garner et al, 2002), as do an increased number of officers at the scene (Friedrich, 1980; Garner, 1996; Garner et al, 2002). It is possible that force increases in relation to the number of bystanders because officers are trying to control a crowd situation but this cannot be said definitively. Additionally, the causal link between force and number of officers is not definitive. White (2002) found an association between multiple officers on the scene and deadly force incidents. However, this is likely because department policy requires a multiple officer response to robberies and incidents with armed suspects rather than the presence of multiple officers leading to increased levels of force. Officers also use more force when they need to call for backup (Garner et al, 2002). An increased number of backup officers are also more likely to result in an officer jumping the continuum with nonresistant suspects. Further, officers are likely to refrain on the continuum with a resistant suspect if there were few backup officers (Terrill, 2005). Officers may refrain on the continuum because they are more cautious in
their use of force when there are not enough backup officers should the suspect become resistant, or they may feel less need to assert their social identity with fewer officers around.

How an officer is called to the scene also affects how force is used. Arrests in which officer initiates contact are associated with a greater prevalence of force, but not a greater severity of force (Garner et al., 2002) and encounters in which the officer initiated contact were more likely to result in an officer jumping the continuum with nonresistant suspects. (Terrill, 2005). More force is also used when an officer responds to a priority call (Terrill, 2005). However, it is not clear why this occurs. Is it because an officer is primed for greater resistance from a suspect given the way the call is introduced? Or, is more force required in such situations because the encounter is actually more dangerous?

**Legal Factors**

When it comes to the effect of legal situational variables on officer behavior, the available evidence suggests that factors may work in concert with one another (including extralegal factors). For example, officers are more likely to use force when the suspect is involved in a violent offense (Garner, 1996; Garner et al., 2002) or if the citizen is suspected of a felony (Friedrich, 1977). Force is also more likely when citizens are in conflict with one another or when officer safety is an issue (table 2.5). Garner et al. (2002) utilized two separate measures of force – one that simply measured whether or not physical force was used (prevalence of force), and one that measured the severity of force on a scale from 1 to 100. Using three separate models, Garner and colleagues (2002) found that a violent offense significantly affects the prevalence of force, but the effect
disappears when suspect resistance is added. However, when the severity of force measure is used (still controlling for suspect resistance) the effect of a violent offense is again significant. He and colleagues conclude that “there may be some sort of intersection among the nature of the offense, the suspect’s resistance, and the police use of force that may be overstated or missed if only one model or one measure of force was used to test its effect” (p. 735).

Others studies that have examined the effect of suspect resistance have also found that officers are more likely to apply greater levels of force when faced with citizen resistance (Reiss, 1968; Terrill, 2001; Garner et al, 2002). In one study, “when suspects who display an antagonistic demeanor toward the police (but no physical force) are compared with suspects who display a civil demeanor, the odds of the police using physical force increase by 163%. When suspects who use physical force against the police are compared with suspects who display a civil demeanor, the odds of the police using physical force increase by 1800%” (Garner, et al, 2002, p. 738). Thus, for Garner and colleagues (2002) suspect resistance has a much greater effect on the use of force than suspect demeanor. However, Alpert and Dunham (2004) found that officers use increasing levels of force as suspects become more aggressive, but they do so while decreasing the force/resistance ratio.

Likelihood of arrest also increases as the offense becomes more serious (table 2.6) (Black & Reiss, 1970; Smith & Visher, 1981) and more serious incidents are also an important predictor of deadly force (White, 2002). However, Visher (1983) found that the effect of violent offenses on arrest for females is not significant. Other variables significantly related to arrest cause the effect of violent crime to disappear – females who
commit violent crimes are often young and black, and victims frequently request arrest (all variables that increase the likelihood of arrest). Additionally, victims are more likely to request arrest if the offense is a felony (Smith & Visher, 1981). Some researchers found that officers are also more likely to arrest when weapons are used (Fyfe et al, 1997). However, Smith and Klein (1984) found that while violence increased the probability of arrest, the mode of violence (weapon or no weapon) did not independently contribute to the probability of arrest.

Researchers have not generally examined any link between the strength of evidence and use of force. However, in terms of arrest behavior, variation in the strength of the evidence available affects officer behavior (Mastrofski et al, 1995; Black, 1971). For example, Black (1971) found that for misdemeanor situations, the arrest rate is about two-thirds when the officer observes the offense but only one-third when the evidence is citizen’s testimony. Victim injury does not increase the likelihood of arrest (Fyfe et al, 1997; Smith & Klein, 1984; Berk & Loseke, 1981). However, Berk & Loseke (1981) note that a null finding regarding the influence of injury on arrest may be because injury is evidence of a felony and arrest is automatic. Not all injuries result in felony charges, however, and evidence that a felony injury exists does not guarantee an arrest.

The influence of offender intoxication on arrest decisions has not been widely studied. However, offenders who were intoxicated (Friedrich, 1977; Worden 1995; Garner, 1996; Terrill, 2001; Garner et al, 2002) or who displayed signs of drug use (Terrill, 2001) were more likely to be subject to force. Terrill (2005) also found that drug or alcohol use by the suspect significantly contributed to a jump in the continuum which he speculates may be because officers become more frustrated when dealing with these
types of suspects. However, Alpert and Dunham (2004), in their analysis of the force used against the resistance provided by the suspect, found that officers use less. They conclude “officers temper their level of force when they recognize the suspect is not in total control of their behavior” (p. 84).  

If officers are using more force against intoxicated citizens it is not clear if it is simply because they are drunk (and a drunk citizen upsets an officer’s moral code) or because intoxicated citizens are more difficult to deal with, resulting in force (Garner, 1996).

Researchers have generally found that the probability of arrest increases significantly when the complainant wanted arrest (Smith & Klein, 1984; Smith & Visher, 1981; Visher, 1983; Black, 1971; Black & Reiss, 1970). Additionally, police often honor requests for leniency as well (Black, 1971; Smith & Visher, 1981). This is true regardless of whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony (Black, 1971), although a victim is more likely to request arrest if it is a felony offense (Smith & Visher, 1981). Victim preferences for arrest are also usually adhered to regardless of suspect gender (Visher, 1983) or age (Black & Reiss, 1970) although a victim is more likely to request an arrest if the suspect is male (Smith & Visher, 1981). The presence of bystanders also makes victims less likely to request an arrest (Smith & Visher, 1981).

At least one study found the police were more likely to respond to a white victim’s request for arrest (Smith et al, 1984). Smith et al (1984) found that “in the subjective calculus of police decision making, suspects confronted in poorer

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8 There were two departments studied - this was found in Miami-Dade but not in Prince George.
neighborhoods and black victims appear disadvantaged” (p. 248). Additionally, request for arrest in high- and middle-status neighborhoods were significantly more likely to result in arrest than requests made in lower-status neighborhoods (Smith & Klein, 1984). Thus, denial of protection to black victims or victims in lower-class neighborhoods seems to be more racially motivated than more frequent arrests of black offenders.

The strength of evidence also plays in role in whether or not police adhere to a complainant’s preference for arrest – arrest is much more likely when evidence is strong as opposed to weak (Mastrofski et al, 2000). Black (1971) found that the probability of arrest when the complainant prefers arrest and when police observe offense is 95%; when police observe the offense, but the complainant preference is for leniency, the arrest rate drops to one-fifth. He also observed that complainant preference is more powerful than evidence, “though the two operate jointly” (p. 93).

When it comes to the influence of legal variables on police decisions, suspect resistance plays a greater role in force decisions than in arrest or stop decisions. However, overall, researchers examining use of force have more carefully separated the relative influences of suspect demeanor and suspect resistance than have researchers examining arrest decisions so this may need further inquiry. The relative strength of the evidence appears important in an arrest decision but has rarely been considered in use of force research (a notable exception is Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002). Crime seriousness appears to have a significant influence on both arrest and deadly force decisions.
Conclusion

Although research on the effect of situational variables on arrest decisions tells us what things officers pay attention to, it does not tell us why they pay attention to certain cues or what meaning they might evoke. The lack of an integrated theoretical model makes understanding police decision making difficult. Equally problematic is that available literature on police behavior generally “paints an impressionistic image” of decisions and, thus, the “the relative contribution of various predictors . . . remains problematic” (Smith & Visher, 1981, p. 168). Smith and Visher were speaking of the decision to arrest, but the same could be stated for any police decision. Egon Bittner (1970) put it best when he stated that “the role of police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies” (p. 46). Defining, measuring, and understanding the “intuitive grasp” police officers have on encounters with citizens has largely eluded police researchers.

In general, research has shown situational, extralegal factors to have weak or inconsistent effects on police behavior (Bernard & Engel, 2001) and the theoretical utility of situational variables to explain police behavior is limited primarily to the arrest decision with only modest effects on more informal actions (Worden, 1989). Researchers that have examined the use of force note that while situational factors explain more of the variation in use of force than individual or organizational factors, they still do not explain very much. For example, Friedrich (1980) found that 18 factors thought to influence use of force accounted for only 12 percent of the variation in use of force. He concluded that
“either our theoretical understanding of the phenomenon is very weak or our methodology for studying that phenomenon is very weak or both” (p. 96).

What appears clear from the evidence amassed to date on the influence of situational influences is that they are contingent on multiple factors – facets of the encounter, of the officer, of the citizen. A citizen who acts one way in response to officer direction may well provoke a subsequent response that is completely different from the response that might result from the citizen acting another way. Similarly, two different officers faced with the same type of encounter and citizens who act in a similar manner may arrive at different outcomes. This inability to account for such contingencies may be why the findings from so much situationally-based research have been mixed, and is also a reason to pursue whether or not a process model of police behavior may provide more explanatory power.

Protocol analysis, as mentioned in the introduction, is a viable method for gathering data on police decision-making behavior. It could enhance our understanding of police behavior because verbal reports might reveal the amount and nature of information used by officers to make decisions as well as how officers process and evaluate information to make choices. However, adapting protocol methods to the field of police decision making is not without some challenges and considerations. First, it is not known if officers can verbalize the information they process in making decisions. Second, it is not known how long information can be accurately recounted in verbal reports. It is not feasible for police officers to provide concurrent reports of decision making so the best time to get a retrospective report is right after the task has been completed. For this reason, in-person observation presents the best strategy for collecting protocol reports.
from police officers. Third, it is not known if officer responses become automated as police tasks are performed repeatedly. Familiarity leads people to rely more on assumptions and the degree to which police officers rely on inferences is not known. A verbal report of decision making may include both actual information used and information inferred, and the two must be disentangled (Worden & Brandl, 1990).
Table 2.3: Empirical Studies Seeking to Explain Variation in Police Use of Force Behavior (Extralegal Social and Situational Influences): Construction of Key Variables and Key Findings  
(framework for organizing table is adapted from Maguire & Uchida, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data Collection</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</th>
<th>Demeanor</th>
<th>Suspect Race</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpert &amp; Dunham (2004)</td>
<td>Department records (use of force) (1996-1998); one police department (N = 1,038)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force (force factor)</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Anglo, black, Hispanic</td>
<td>Officers used less force relative to resistance with female suspects than they did with males. Suspect race was not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayley &amp; Garofalo (1989)</td>
<td>Observation (1986 New York City); one department; 3 precincts (N = 467 police-citizen encounters that had some possibility of violence)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force</td>
<td>Use of obscene or insulting remarks or gestures</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Police did not find it necessary to use force in 85% of the encounters. Use of obscene or insulting remarks or gestures by the citizen is a significant predictor of force (however, it occurs infrequently in use of force incidents so its explanatory power is limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blumberg, 1981</td>
<td>Department records (IAD shooting reports; 1971-1978 APD, 1969-1978 KCPD); 2 departments (N = 285)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of lethal force</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Situational characteristics of shootings are similar regardless of victim’s race (race does not influence the use of lethal force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engel et al (2000)</td>
<td>Observation (PSS - 1977); 24</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force</td>
<td>Disrespectful or hostile</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Police more likely to use force against disrespectful suspects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>Suspect Race</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friedrich (1980)</td>
<td>Observation (1966 Reiss data); eight precincts (N = 5,391)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force (reasonable, excessive)</td>
<td>Deferential, civil, antagonistic</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Relationships between force and situational characteristics are weak. Race of the offender does not exhibit much of an effect. Behavior of the offender has the most influence on the amount of force used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe, 1981</td>
<td>Department records (firearms discharge/assault reports; 1971-1975); one department (N = 3,139)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of lethal force</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>white, black, Hispanic</td>
<td>“Blacks make up a disproportionate share of shooting opponents reportedly armed with guns and a disproportionate share of those reportedly engaged in robberies when police intervened” (p. 104). The level of criminal activity, not race, influences the use of lethal force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garner et al.</td>
<td>Department records</td>
<td>Encounter (arrest only); Civil or</td>
<td>white,</td>
<td>More force used against male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>Suspect Race</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>al (2002)</td>
<td>(arrest); six police departments (N = 7,512)</td>
<td>use of force (prevalence of force - five elements of force; severity of force - maximum force scale)</td>
<td>“antagonistic”</td>
<td>black, Hispanic, other</td>
<td>suspects; more force used against black suspects (but effect disappeared when controlling for “antagonistic” resistance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrill (2001)</td>
<td>Observation &amp; interview (POPN data); two departments</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force (continuum)</td>
<td>Respectful or disrespectful</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Force more likely against nonwhites. Citizen disrespect had no influence on use of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrill (2005)</td>
<td>Observation; (N = 3,544 police-suspect encounters, 6,523 sequences of force-resistance)</td>
<td>Encounter; whether or not use of force continuum was followed in encounter</td>
<td>Respectful or disrespectful</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Race had no effect on whether or not officers jumped or refrained on the continuum. Suspect disrespect not significantly related to jumping the continuum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden (1994)</td>
<td>Observation; (PSS - 1977); 24 departments (N = 5,688)</td>
<td>Encounter; no force, reasonable force, improper force</td>
<td>Detached, hostile/antagonistic, other</td>
<td>white, black, other mixed</td>
<td>Both reasonable and improper force is more likely to be used against black suspects and antagonistic suspects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.4: Empirical Studies Seeking to Explain Variation in Police Arrest Behavior (Extralegal Social and Situational Influences): Construction of Key Variables and Key Findings
(framework for organizing table is adapted from Maguire & Uchida, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data Collection</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</th>
<th>Suspect Race</th>
<th>Demeanor</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black (1971)</td>
<td>Observational study (year?); one police department (N = 288)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Degree of deference coded from “clues” from suspect behavior</td>
<td>Arrest rate for respectful blacks and respectful whites is the same. Black suspects are more disrespectful than white suspects are. Police are less likely to arrest a civil felony suspect than a disrespectful misdemeanor suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engel et al (2000)</td>
<td>Observation(PSS - 1977); 24 departments (N = 1,082 encounters involving traffic suspects; 1,461 encounters involving non-traffic suspects)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>Disrespectful or hostile (noncompliant or verbally resistant)</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Suspect demeanor significantly predicts arrest. Police are more likely to arrest a nonwhite suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe et al (1997)</td>
<td>Departmental records (assault incidents)</td>
<td>Encounter (incident), arrest</td>
<td>both parties white; both parties black;</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Race of involved parties did not affect likelihood of arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Suspect Race</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klinger (1994)</td>
<td>Observational study (Miami-Dade) (N = 245)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Civil, moderately hostile, highly hostile</td>
<td>Demeanor does not have an independent effect on arrest when crime is adequately controlled for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klinger (1996b)</td>
<td>Observational study (Miami-Dade) (N = 245)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>all parties black, all Hispanic, all white, mixed race (4 dummies)</td>
<td>Demeanor at outset: civil, moderately hostile, highly hostile; demeanor: nonhostile, hostile; demeanor: apologetic, deferential, demeaning, openly hostile; demeanor: other demeanor, very hostile (4 variables)</td>
<td>Extreme hostility measure is only measure that is significant (becomes insignificant when two influential cases are removed). Findings suggest that hostility-arrest relationship is not linear; may take a horizontal L shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Klein (1984)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 333)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Antagonistic or civil</td>
<td>Suspects who were antagonistic were significantly more likely to be arrested. Race did not influence the likelihood of arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Visher (1981)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>white, other</td>
<td>Antagonistic or civil</td>
<td>Antagonistic demeanor increases probability of arrest. Black suspects are more likely to be</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Suspect Race</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smith, Visher &amp; Davidson (1984)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 167)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>black, nonblack</td>
<td>Coded “1” if suspect is antagonistic toward the police</td>
<td>For encounters without complainants, the effect of race on arrest disappears when poverty level of the neighborhood is introduced. Black females are more likely to be arrested than white females. For encounters with complainants, suspect race and neighborhood status have no effect on arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes &amp; Clark (1975)</td>
<td>Observational study (1970); one police department (N = 1,466)</td>
<td>Encounter; police behavior</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Statements coded as either respectful or disrespectful</td>
<td>As citizen status declines, the level of deference declines. Amount of deference displayed by officers is less than that of citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes, Fox, &amp; Clark (1978)</td>
<td>Observational study (3 Midwest departments) (N = 520)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest (as a proxy for labeling a suspect as a violator)</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Number of impolite statements</td>
<td>Legal and organizational policy criteria mattered first when it came to an arrest decision. After that, chances of arrest increased significantly for those who were disrespectful or threatened officer safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visher (1983)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 1,466)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Ordinal scale: civil (0) to extremely antagonistic (4)</td>
<td>Black male and female suspects are more likely to be arrested than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Suspect Race</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<td>their white counterparts. Suspect demeanor is a significant predictor of arrest for both male and female suspects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977) 24 police</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-</td>
<td>Encounter; DV arrest</td>
<td>white, nonwhite</td>
<td>Statements coded as “businesslike, friendly, apologetic” or “sarcastic, disrespectful, hostile”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>departments (N = 785)</td>
<td>1977); 24 police departments</td>
<td>(N = 167)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Race had no effect on arrest. Disrespectful behavior increased the probability of arrest.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.5: Empirical Studies Seeking to Explain Variation in Police Use of Force Behavior (Legal Situational Influences): Construction of Key Variables and Key Findings
(framework for organizing table is adapted from Maguire & Uchida, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data Collection</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</th>
<th>Level of suspect resistance</th>
<th>Level of suspect impairment</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpert &amp; Dunham (2004)</td>
<td>Department records (use of force) (1996-1998); one police department (N = 1,038)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force (force factor)</td>
<td>None, verbal non-compliance, defensive resistance, active resistance, aggravated active resistance, active resistance (deadly weapon)</td>
<td>Drugs or alcohol</td>
<td>As suspects become more aggressive, officers use increasing levels of force, but they do so while decreasing the force/resistance ratio. Officers use less force relative to resistance with impaired suspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayley &amp; Garofalo (1989)</td>
<td>Observation (1986 New York City); one department; 3 precincts (N = 467 police-citizen encounters that had some possibility of violence)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force</td>
<td>Presence of weapon</td>
<td>Drugs or alcohol</td>
<td>Police did not find it necessary to use force in 85% of the encounters. Presence of a weapon is a significant predictor of force (however, it occurs infrequently in use of force incidents so its explanatory power is limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blumberg, 1981</td>
<td>Department records (IAD)</td>
<td>Encounter, use of lethal force</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Situational characteristics of shootings are similar regardless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Level of suspect resistance</td>
<td>Level of suspect impairment</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engel et al (2000)</td>
<td>Observation(PSS 1977); 24 departments (N = 1,082 encounters involving traffic suspects; 1,461 encounters involving non-traffic suspects)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest, use of force, citation</td>
<td>Suspect fights with officer</td>
<td>Drugs or alcohol</td>
<td>Force is more likely if suspect shows signs of drug or alcohol use, or if suspect fights with the officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich (1980)</td>
<td>Observation (1966 Reiss data); eight precincts (N = 5,391)</td>
<td>Encounter (all incidents in which citizen encountered was a potential offender); use of force (reasonable, excessive)</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Sober, some signs of drinking, drunk</td>
<td>Relationships between force and situational characteristics are weak. Behavior of the offender has the most influence on the amount of force used. Offenders who are drunk are susceptible to more force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe, Department</td>
<td>Encounter, use of Type of event, type of</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>“Blacks make up a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Level of suspect resistance</td>
<td>Level of suspect impairment</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>records (firearms discharge/assault reports; 1971-1975); 1 department (N = 3,139)</td>
<td>lethal force</td>
<td>weapon, officer injury</td>
<td>disproportionate share of shooting opponents reportedly armed with guns and a disproportionate share of those reportedly engaged in robberies when police intervened” (p. 104). The level of criminal activity, not race, influences the use of lethal force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garner et al (2002)</td>
<td>Department records (arrest); six police departments (N = 7,512)</td>
<td>Encounter (arrest only); use of force (prevalence of force - five elements of force; severity of force - maximum force scale)</td>
<td>Physical resistance (use of any weapon or weaponless tactic)</td>
<td>Intoxication</td>
<td>Prevalence of force is greater if suspect is intoxicated; suspects who display an antagonistic demeanor toward the police or who use physical force are more likely to be subject to force than civil suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrill (2001)</td>
<td>Observation (POPN data); two departments</td>
<td>Encounter; use of force (continuum)</td>
<td>Resistance: none, passive (inactivity), verbal, defensive (attempts to evade police control), active (attempts or actual attacks on an officer)</td>
<td>Drugs or alcohol</td>
<td>Greater levels of force against those who are resistant, and against those who show signs of alcohol or drug abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Level of suspect resistance</td>
<td>Level of suspect impairment</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrill (2005)</td>
<td>Observation; (N = 3,544 police-suspect encounters, 6,523 sequences of force-resistance)</td>
<td>Encounter; whether or not use of force continuum was followed in encounter</td>
<td>“Acts that thwart, obstruct, or impede an officer’s attempt to elicit information; failure to respond or responding negatively to an officer’s commands or threats; and any physical act, proactive or reactive, against an officer’s attempt to control the suspect” (p. 115)</td>
<td>Drugs or alcohol</td>
<td>Officers were less likely to refrain when suspects initially showed physical resistance. Drug or alcohol use significantly contributed to a jump in the use of force continuum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden (1994)</td>
<td>Observation; (PSS - 1977); 24 departments (N = 5,688)</td>
<td>Encounter; use of reasonable force, use of improper force</td>
<td>Tried to use gun or knife, fought with officer</td>
<td>Sober, drinking/using, drunk/stoned</td>
<td>Both reasonable and improper force is more likely to be used against drunken suspects and suspects who physically resist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.6: Empirical Studies Seeking to Explain Variation in Police Arrest Behavior (Legal Situational Influences): Construction of Key Variables and Key Findings
(framework for organizing table is adapted from Maguire & Uchida, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data Collection</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Crime Seriousness</th>
<th>Complainant preference</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black (1971)</td>
<td>Observational study (year?); one police department (N = 288)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>Police witness, citizen testimony, other evidence, no evidence</td>
<td>Felony or misdemeanor</td>
<td>Arrest, unclear, no arrest</td>
<td>Probability of arrest is higher in crimes that are more serious. Arrest rate for misdemeanors is higher when officer observes the offense. Probability of arrest when police observe offense and complainant requests is high. The arrest rate drops when police observe offense and complainant requests leniency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engel et al (2000)</td>
<td>Observation(PSS - 1977); 24 departments (N = 1,082 encounters involving traffic suspects; 1,461 encounters involving non-traffic suspects)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Ordinal (no crime, minor property, minor violent/major property, moderate violent, major violent)</td>
<td>Victim requests arrest</td>
<td>Arrest is more likely if victim requests arrest, or if encounter involves a serious offense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Crime Seriousness</td>
<td>Complainant preference</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyfe et al (1997)</td>
<td>Departmental records (assault incidents) (N = 356)</td>
<td>Encounter (incident), arrest</td>
<td>Degree of injury</td>
<td>Weapon used</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Injury did not affect arrest likelihood, but weapon use and attack on the officer did increase the likelihood of arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klinger (1994)</td>
<td>Observational study (Miami-Dade) (N = 245)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>No crime, minor property, minor violent and major property, moderate violent, major violent</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Demeanor does not condition police to arrest; police tend to arrest hostile citizens because they are more likely to commit crimes in front of (or to) police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klinger (1996b)</td>
<td>Observational study (Miami-Dade) (N = 245)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>Violence between citizens, attack on officer</td>
<td>Ordinal (no crime, minor property, minor violent/major property, moderate violent, major violent)</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Only findings reported relate to demeanor (conducting a reanalysis in response to Lundman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; DV</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Crime Seriousness</td>
<td>Complainant preference</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Visher (1981)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 742)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Felony or misdemeanor</td>
<td>Two measures – victim requests formal disposition, victim requests informal disposition</td>
<td>Request for arrest increases chance of arrest while request for leniency increases chance of no arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Visher &amp; Davidson (1984)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 167)</td>
<td>Encounter; arrest</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Property, violent, vice, public order, interpersonal</td>
<td>Victim wants arrest, victim does not want arrest/no preference</td>
<td>White victims are given preferential treatment compared to black victims – police are more likely to respond to a white victim’s request for arrest, and more likely to arrest for a property offense if victim is white.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes, Fox, &amp; Clark (1978)</td>
<td>Observational study (3 Midwest departments) (N = 520)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest (as a proxy for labeling a suspect as a violator)</td>
<td>If action can be considered criminal</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>Legal and organizational policy criteria mattered first when it came to an arrest decision. After that, chances of arrest increased significantly for those who were disrespectful or threatened officer safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Unit of Analysis &amp; Evidence</td>
<td>Crime Seriousness</td>
<td>Complainant preference</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vischer (1983)</td>
<td>Observational study (PSS-1977); 24 police departments (N = 785)</td>
<td>Encounter, arrest</td>
<td>Four different variables coded by offense type: violent, property, disputes, public-order</td>
<td>Requests arrest</td>
<td>Police adhere to victim preference for arrest regardless of the gender of the suspect. Females suspected of property offenses are more likely to be arrested, but a violent offense has no effect on arrest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden &amp; Pollitz (1984)</td>
<td>Observational study (1977); 24 police departments (N = 167)</td>
<td>Encounter; DV arrest</td>
<td>Injury, woman alleges violence</td>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>Probability of arrest increased when woman signed a complaint. Arrest is more likely when violence is alleged, and both parties are at the scene.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3
Insights from the Judgment and Decision Making Field

Introduction

Clearly, the police officer decision-making process is a complex one and a few studies of police behavior have examined multiple levels of influence on officer behavior. These preliminary inquiries note that “while the encounter itself provides some information on which officers can act, the police organization determines the relative weight that officers attach to various aspects of police-citizen encounters” (Smith & Klein, 1984, p. 93). Worden (1989) introduced administrative decision-making theory as a way to explain the multi-level influences on police officer behavior. He noted that behavior cannot be explained solely through individual and situational attributes and factors; organizational factors need to be included as well. Under administrative decision-making theory, certain decisions link the objective reality of police-citizen encounters to officers’ choices of action. Worden (1989) notes that:

Each situation presents officers with a plethora of cues whose practical meanings are not self-evident. As a result, officers can subscribe to very different cognitive representations of the same event . . . Furthermore, the causal structures that underlie the phenomena with which officers deal are only dimly understood, and thus the technology of policing is fraught with uncertainty. One might consequently observe variation in officers’ choices among alternative courses of action even in situations with similar meaning for the officers; officers with the same objectives and similar values can quite reasonably choose different courses of action in the belief that they will achieve the same outcome (p. 672-73).

Alpert & Dunham (2004) also recognized that individual interpretations can affect behavior. The level of force legally allowed police officers is defined in *Graham v. Connor* (1989) under the objective reasonableness standard. Force must be “objectively reasonable in view of all the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.” However, Alpert & Dunham note that objective analysis is often
not possible in real-world experiences and the Supreme Court standards are difficult to
apply because each person perceives each situation differently. How these perceptions
may differ, however, has not been studied.

It seems clear that variation in police behavior is not best explained by focusing
on a singular level of analysis. However, multi-level models of policing are rarely used
and studies that have considered the variation in choice among each individual officer
have been ethnographic works that group officers into typologies. Within the judgment
and decision making field, however, individual variation in judgment is a topic of
frequent study. In this chapter, I turn to a brief description of some of the theoretical
underpinnings and methods employed by this field in an attempt to link them to future
research on police behavior. The J/DM field has considered the decision making process
from a different perspective than the policing field. Examining how it has addressed some
of the common assumptions about decision making may provide a jumping off point for a
new type of police behavior research that blends elements of both the policing and J/DM
fields.

**Introduction to Judgment and Decision Making**

**Judgment versus Decision**

As the name implies, the judgment and decision making field considers judgments
and decisions separately. The process of judgment involves the “integration of

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information from multiple uncertain sources of information (called ‘cues’)’” (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988, p.2). A judgment, then, is a belief that is arrived at after considering several items of information. Uncertainty is always associated with judgment (if there is no uncertainty, there is no need for judgment) and making a judgment usually involves both analysis and intuition. A decision, on the other hand, implies some action. Decisions usually involve tradeoffs and are rarely value free. In decisions made by individuals, individual values matter. However, in decisions made by experts and professionals, personal values should be excluded to the extent possible. Making a decision generally involves making one or more judgments.

**Origins**

The judgment and decision making (J/DM) field is vast, and there are different origins for different approaches. Two primary sources of the current J/DM field of study are economics and psychology, with mathematics hovering “above, beyond, or around them, thus providing the logical context for the study of judgment and decision” (Hammond, McClelland, Mumpower, 1980, p. 21). Under an economics approach, people are believed to decide on a rational course of action based on their values and beliefs about the likely occurrence of events (probabilities). The main inquiry under this approach is to determine the consequences of choices and actions that follow from certain utilities and beliefs. The psychological approach, on the other hand, builds on theories of perception to explore the sources of beliefs and preferences.

J/DM utilizes normative, descriptive, and prescriptive theories and models. Normative and prescriptive decision theories are theories about how decisions should be
made; a descriptive decision theory is a theory about how decisions are actually made. Thus, a normative model demonstrates how decisions should be made. Normative theories are based in formal logic, probability theory, and decision theory. Such theories give the decision maker rules to follow to make decision processes rational. Descriptive models are designed to reproduce the behavior of the decision maker, and prescriptive models are designed to produce decisions that are optimal according to a normative theory of decision making (Stewart, n.d.). Baron (2007) describes the distinction in the following way: normative models look for systematic deviation from norms (biases), descriptive models try to explain found biases, and prescriptive models try to correct biases (improve judgments according to normative standards).

When it comes to determining how people “should” make decisions, researchers in the J/DM field generally agree that it refers to how decisions should be made in order to be rational. Mental processes are considered rational when they help us achieve our goals (Over, 2007). Simon (1957, 1983) best illustrated this concept when he discussed bounded rationality and satisficing, a term that means to satisfy ourselves while falling short of the ideal of maximizing expected utility. As Over (2007) notes:

Reasoning consistently with supposed normative rules is worthwhile for rational action as long as it is an effective instrument for achieving goals. . . Our beliefs and judgments may sometimes be too vague or sloppy to be fully consistent with logic, probability theory, or decision theory. This does not necessarily mean that we should spend time and energy making our beliefs and judgments precise or consistent. . .we can sometimes do better by relying on heuristics, which are bounded and satisficing procedures for performing inferences or making decisions (p. 6).
Coherence and Correspondence

By the mid-20th century there were two approaches to studying judgment and decision making. In brief, coherence theory seeks to describe the process by which a person’s judgment reaches rationality – that is, what factors affect whether or not an individual decision-making process results in a rational decision? Correspondence theory, on the other hand, is interested in the process by which a person’s judgment reaches accuracy – that is, was the prediction correct and what factors affected the accuracy? The main difference between the two metatheories is the standard for success.

Coherence theory, introduced by Edwards (1954) emphasized rationality in decision making. He hypothesized that the mind worked in the same way as Bayes’ theorem and “showed how various propositions about the rationality of human judgment under uncertainty could be empirically tested against a defensible standard, a mathematical probabilistic theory” (Hammond, 1996, p. 4). Correspondence theory, introduced by Hammond (1955), is based on the general theory of cognition under uncertainty posited by Egon Brunswik. Correspondence theory focuses on the “correspondence of ideas with facts, rather than on the coherence of ideas with ideas” (Hammond, 1996, p. 4). To put it another way, correspondence focuses on the accuracy of judgments (regardless of their rationality) and coherence focuses on the rationality of judgment (regardless of their empirical accuracy).

Coherence research measures the quality of judgment against the standards of logic, mathematics, and probability theory. The fundamental tenet of the coherence metatheory is that probabilistic thinking is important if people are to cope with uncertainty (uncertainty leads to irrationality, which leads to error). However, people are
not good at making probability judgments. Timmermans and colleagues (1996) note the following regarding physicians and their use of probabilistic thinking:

Accurate estimations of probability in diagnosis and prognosis are important for physicians, because these probabilities influence their diagnostic and therapeutic decisions. Objective probabilities, based on epidemiological research, are often not available. In these instances, physicians must rely on their own judgment and apply their probability estimates to individual patients. Research has shown that the accuracy of probability estimates of both experts, such as physicians and of lay people in general is often inadequate (p. 107-108).

Coherence theory assumes that people make errors in judgment because their uncertainty leads to irrationality and different judgments by different people about the same things occur because they are using different heuristics. Training people in probability and statistics, eliciting subjective probabilities, and decomposing judgment are all expected to reduce errors in judgment (Stewart 2008 – cite PowerPoint).

Correspondence research, on the other hand, measures the quality of judgment against the standards of empirical accuracy. The fundamental tenet of the correspondence metatheory is that human competence in making judgments and decisions under uncertainty is impressive. However, sometimes performance is not equally impressive (task conditions sometimes degrade the accuracy of judgment). (Stewart 2008 – cite PowerPoint). Errors in judgment under the correspondence standard are the product of multiple sources including bias, unreliability in the way information is acquired and processed, uncertainty in the environment, and the accuracy of the information system. Under the correspondence standard, judgment can be improved by making environmental changes (to improve the fidelity of the information system, for example) and using training and cognitive aids to address unreliability and bias.
Hammond (1996) states that coherence and correspondence are not competing theories but rather “are complementary theories about cognition that takes place under different conditions, conditions that induce subjects to employ different theories of truth” (p. 104). There is no middle ground between coherence and correspondence (there is no “compromise” theory that accommodates them both). However, Hammond (1996) argues that they can coexist in a state of complementarity. Each theory applies to the competence of human judgment – people are capable of using multiple fallible indicators as well as stored knowledge and both have value.

When considering how judgment and decision making models might be applied to police behavior, I am more concerned with how real decision makers make decisions, or “the way the mind works in relation to the way the world works” rather than the ideal way decisions should be made or “the way the mind works in relation to the way it ought to work” (p. 106). Thus, in this section I discuss the role intuition and analysis play in decision making and briefly consider some of the methodological implications from judgment analysis – a descriptive modeling process – in order to present new approaches that could be applied to enhance our understanding of police behavior.⁹

**Intuition and Analysis**

Analysis and intuition are usually viewed as mutually exclusive concepts and generally thought to be in conflict. Analysis is a “step-by-step, conscious, logically defensible process” whereas intuition is a “cognitive process that somehow produces an __________________________

⁹ Worden and Brandl (1990) proposed the use of protocol analysis in police behavior research nearly 20 years ago.
answer, solution, or idea without the use of a conscious, legally defensible, step-by-step process” (Hammond, 1996, p. 60). The rivalry between intuition and analysis was recognized by such early policing scholars as Bittner (1970) who noted that policing involves an “intuitive grasp of situational exigencies” (p. 46). Part of police training encourages officers to “go with their gut” while, at the same time, it requires careful consideration of the law and rules of evidence. It only makes sense that the policing profession involves elements of both the intuitive and the analytical. The same is true in legal thought, as evidenced by Oliver Wendall Holmes’ famous statement:

The life of law has not been logic, it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics (as quoted in Hammond, 1996, p. 68).

As Hammond (1996) notes, Holmes is clearly indicating the role of intuitive cognition and also recognizes that irreducible uncertainty in the law is unavoidable by linking certainty with logic and uncertainty with experience. As he did with coherence and correspondence theories, Hammond (1996) argues that intuition and analysis do not have to compete with one another. Rather, they serve as anchors for a spectrum of cognition that ranges from analytical to intuitive – a cognitive continuum.

Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) views modes of cognition as ordered on a Cognitive Continuum Index with intuitive cognition at one end and analytical cognition at the other (Hammond, 1996, p. 147). Forms of cognition that lie between the two poles (those that include both elements of intuition and analysis) are
“quasirationality” or “common sense” (Hammond, 1996, p. 150). Hammond (1996) rejects the analysis-intuition dichotomy because it has “served us badly” by eliminating common sense from the research agenda (p. 147). In doing so, “it excludes from our theory and research our most frequently employed cognitive activity, and it does so by reducing cognition to extreme forms rarely employed or encountered in our normal existence” (p. 148). Characteristics of intuition include low cognitive control, rapid data processing, and low conscious awareness (see Table 3.1). Errors in judgment are normally distributed when using an intuitive thinking process. Conversely, characteristics of analysis include high cognitive control, slow data processing, and high conscious awareness. There are few errors when an analytic thinking process is used, but when they occur, the errors are large. Cognition is not a static process – as cognitive activities more along the continuum, the mix of analytical and intuitive components that make up quasirationality will change.

Hammond (1996) further refines Brunswik’s idea of quasirationality, the mode of thought most commonly aligned with common sense. Information is available in the natural world via multiple fallible indicators. In order to increase our competence in judgment, we also engineer many infallible indicators. Depending on the task at hand, people face a mix of fallible and infallible indicators that must be considered when making a judgment and “it is this differential in information that moves cognition toward a greater use of intuition or analysis” (Hammond, 1996, p. 163). The Hammond/Brunswik concept of quasirationality should not be confused with Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that an individual will seek a satisfactory solution for their purposes rather than trying to find the optimum answer (“satisficing”). Although the concepts of quasirationality and bounded rationality were similar in the literature about fifty years ago, Simon has since made clear that he does not believe intuition has any role in rational cognitive processes and the two terms now define quite separate concepts. See Hammond, 1996, p.166-167 for a discussion. Also see, H.A. Simon (1992). What is an “explanation” of behavior? Psychological Science, 3, p. 155.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Intuitive and Analytical Cognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intuitive Cognition</th>
<th>Analytical Cognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vicarious functioning, shifting cue utilization</td>
<td>Systematic, consistent use of cues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear function forms relating cues to judgments</td>
<td>Nonlinear function forms relating cues to judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictorial metaphors predominant</td>
<td>Quantitative metaphors predominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw data or events stored in memory</td>
<td>Complex organizing rules stored in memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast response time</td>
<td>Slow response time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted average organizing principle</td>
<td>Any other organizing principle (e.g. Bayes’ rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low cognitive control</td>
<td>High cognitive control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low reliability of judgments</td>
<td>High reliability of judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to describe the judgment process</td>
<td>Keen awareness of judgment process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low confidence in judgments</td>
<td>High confidence in judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many errors, but they are small</td>
<td>Few errors, but they are large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal distribution of errors</td>
<td>Non-normal distribution of errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in cognition limited to weights</td>
<td>Radical, rapid change with new information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right hemisphere predominant</td>
<td>Left hemisphere predominant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Just like forms of thinking can be ordered on a cognitive continuum, Hammond (1996) argues that tasks can be ordered on a Task Continuum Index according to their capacity to induce intuition, quasirationality, or analytical cognition (Hammond, 1996, p. 180). A task that induces intuition has a large number of cues (many of them redundant) (see Table 3.2). Cues are measured perceptually, they are displayed simultaneously, and the time period for making a judgment is brief. Conversely, a task that induces analysis has a small number of cues which are not redundant. Cues are objective and provide a reliable measurement, they are displayed sequentially, and the time period for making a judgment is long. Mixtures of task characteristics from both sides of the table tend to induce quasirationality.
Table 3.2: Task Characteristics That Produce Either Intuition or Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inducing Intuition</th>
<th>Inducing Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiar task</td>
<td>Unfamiliar task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No prior training or task information</td>
<td>Prior training and task information given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many (&gt;5) cues presented</td>
<td>Few (2-4) cues presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous cue presentation</td>
<td>Sequential cue presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercorrelated cues</td>
<td>Orthogonal cues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normally distributed cues</td>
<td>Skewed, peaked, multimodal, or binary distributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictorial cue representation</td>
<td>Quantitative cue presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject measures cue levels</td>
<td>Objective measures, pointer readings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many alternatives on judgment scale</td>
<td>Few alternatives on judgment scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid response required</td>
<td>Open response time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normally distributed criteria</td>
<td>Skewed, peaked, multimodal, or binary criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear functions relating cues to criteria</td>
<td>Nonlinear functions relating cues to criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No available organizing principle</td>
<td>Organizing principle readily available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal cue weights</td>
<td>Unequal cue weights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear organizing principle</td>
<td>Nonlinear organizing principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome knowledge available</td>
<td>Outcome knowledge not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal or no feedback</td>
<td>Cognitive feedback</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A look at Table 3.2 above gives some insight into how police officers might move between analysis and intuition depending on the task characteristics. Patrol officers encountering citizens on the street may fall differently on the continuum than detectives reviewing case files. Different types of police functions may induce different mixes of analysis and intuition just like different police officers may have differing modes of cognition (e.g. a rookie officer faced with a new task compared to an experienced veteran facing a familiar task). Though I am not proposing to test CCT, providing some background on the intuition-analysis dichotomy serves a useful purpose; that is, there is much more to the decision-making process than the outcome.
Methodological Considerations

The J/DM literature has examined a number of methodological considerations relevant when one seeks to describe the relationship between a judgment and the information used to make that judgment (see Cooksey, 1996a, 1996b; Stewart, 1988; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Holzworth, 2001). This section will briefly highlight some of the main issues. In doing so, as I did by presenting information on coherence and correspondence and intuition and analysis, I hope to highlight some of the issues that should be considered in models of police decision-making.

Representative design

Portions of the J/DM field stress that research is best conducted in the field. Real environments are not neatly, orthogonally designed and classical experimental design will “preclude us from obtaining knowledge that generalizes across situations in which multiple influences are partial and entangled – that is, to the world in which we live” (Doherty & Kurz, 1996, p. 126). As Cooksey (1996b) notes, “whereas systematic experimental design seeks to disentangle variables in the ecology so as to render them appropriate for orthogonal factorial designs, representative design seeks to study behavior under the naturally occurring entangled conditions in the ecology . . . By conducting studies under conditions representative of the natural ecology of the organism, we obtain a far more generalizable understanding of behavior” (p.151). The sample of situations

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\]

Of course, much of the nature of police decision-making research has precluded use of a true experiment model.
must vary, and the sample must vary the way the environment varies. However, Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), in their meta-analysis of 249 lens model studies, found that most studies were generally not guided by the principles of representative design. In most cases it was not clear to which population results should or could be generalized. They note that “laboratory studies differed from field studies on several dimensions and, therefore, laboratory results should not be blindly extrapolated to judges’ natural habitats” (p. 423).

**Representative tasks**

The task in the study needs to be in the same form as when the judge ordinarily performs the task (in terms of how information is presented and if cues are coded in a way that allows the judge to express his or her usual policy). How the task information is presented is often problematic because judges are usually not seeing real people, just representations based on a set of coded cues. This is known as the “paper people” problem – do paper people provide the same information for judgment as real people? (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). Most studies do not have representative task conditions which presents validity considerations (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). Further, relatively few studies have compared the use of paper cases to real cases and how it relates to the performance of judges. Researchers that have explored the problem have done so in a variety of ways which makes drawing conclusions based on empirical evidence difficult. Stewart (1996) in a review of sixteen studies that examined the paper people problem found that studies comparing the results of the analysis of judgments find differences between paper and real cases while those that compute correlations between paper and
real cases find a high degree of similarity. Thus, whether or not using vignettes to
ascertain judgment policies is externally valid remains an open question.

Studies must also use judges that are representative. That is, if they are studying
experts they must use experts. If inexperienced judges are used, they have no developed
d judgment policy, and no experience with the judgment task. Similarly, an expert that is
asked to make a judgment he or she has never made before has no developed policy from
which to draw.

Is the judgment process linear?

Some research has compared the linear model to alternatives (e.g. Wiggins &
Hoffman, 1968; Goldberg, 1971; Einhorn, 1970). This method of comparing the linear
model with other models is useful if all plausible alternatives are included (a negative
outcome may indicate that the relevant nonlinear model was not included). However,
judgment analysis tends to utilize cues that are intercorrelated, and “it is quite difficult to
discriminate among different models with tasks containing positively intercorrelated
cues” because “the judgments predicted from all models will be highly intercorrelated,
and any test of differences among models will therefore have low power” (Brehmer &
Brehmer, 1988, p. 91).

Twenty years ago, Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) concluded that, while judges’
policies are linear most of the time, they are sometimes configural and the validity of the
linear model as the mode for the judgment process could not be taken for granted (p. 93).
At the same time, Stewart (1988) contended that the linear model should be abandoned
reluctantly as it can describe complex processes in a way that is more easily understood
by a judge than a more complex model that more accurately represents the process. More recently, the conclusion appears to be that the judgment process is adequately described by a linear model (with fewer cues needed than most believe). As Doherty & Brehmer (1997) (as quoted in Holzworth, 2001) note:

Human judgment entails a set of imperfectly reliable processes by which the person identifies relevant variables, gives weights to these variables according to their perceived importance, and combines them into a judgment. The combination rule may well depend on the task . . . but in a great many task environments the combination rule appears to be well-described by a linear model. If there is to be a challenge to the use of linear models in the scientific study of human judgment, the challenge should be directed at this conception of the judgment process, rather than at the use of regression analysis or the analysis of variance. The conception of human judgment emerging from regression studies of human judgment can be refuted only by evidence that shows that judgment is something other than a matter of combining pieces of information that are weighted according to their importance. So far, such evidence has failed to materialize (p. 546-547).

However, while Ford and colleagues (1989) agree that the linear model is robust they also eloquently summarize views in the field regarding the limitations of the linear model to model cognitive processes. Specifically:

The goodness of fit of the linear model is posited to be more a function of the characteristics of the tasks used and the insensitivity of the linear model than a characteristic of human decision behavior. In addition, the predictive power of the linear model can occur despite a seriously flawed model as two or more decision models may be algebraically equivalent yet be suggestive of radically different underlying cognitive processes. Consequently, some researchers have concluded that cognitive processes cannot be understood by simply studying input-output relationships and that the linear model is rarely sufficient when one is interested in the process being modeled. From this perspective, the predictive benefits of linear models must not be accepted at the expense of denying the existence and substantive meaning of nonlinear judgmental processes (p. 76).

Other types of models include the additive nonlinear and nonadditive models. The additive nonlinear model is a compensatory model. That is, the effects of cues are
additive, but the relation between cue and judgment is a nonlinear function (since it is a compensatory relationship, a high value on one cue can compensate for a low value on another cue). An example is a polynomial (curvilinear) model. Nonadditive models are noncompensatory. That is, the impact of cue on overall judgment depends on levels of other cues or judgment depends on a pattern of relations among cues or the principle for combining cues into judgments depends on levels of one or more cues (since it is noncompensatory, changes in one cue cannot be compensated for by changes in another cue). Examples of nonadditive models are conjunctive (in which a minimum judgment is given unless all cues reach a cutoff value) and disjunctive (a cutoff on any one cue must be satisfied) (Stewart, 1988).

Do people have insight into their own judgmental process?

In order to compare a valid model against subjects’ self-reports and their judgments, it is necessary to know the real nature of the model for judgments. Thus, knowing whether people have insight into their own judgmental process is essential. In their review of research, Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) stated that the studies that had been conducted to date made it impossible to draw any conclusions – some studies indicated that people had considerable insight while others indicated they had almost no insight. Since then much research has drawn the conclusion that judges have little insight into their judgment policies. However, Holzworth (2001) points out that the standard measure to determine the level of insight is the degree of correspondence between judges’ verbal estimates of cue importance and their statistically derived importance
weights. When another measure of insight is used, there is evidence that people have more insight than is usually concluded (Reilly & Doherty, 1989, 1992).

**How many cues are used in judgment?**

Most studies employ eight or fewer cues. How many cues are actually used is difficult to answer for this very reason. Since most studies only present a small number of cues it may represent a small subset of all cues that may be available for a judge. However, even with a limited number of cues at their disposal, study subjects still use only a fraction of the cues available. This “may simply indicate that the subjects only found a subset of those to which they usually pay attention in the cue set presented, rather than any fundamental limitations in the ability to use many cues” (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988, p. 101).

**How different are individual judges?**

It might be expected that the judgment policies of experts who had been performing similar tasks for many years would be similar. However, Brehmer and Brehmer (1988), in their review of judgment studies, concluded that there were substantial differences among judges with respect to the number of cues used, which cues were used, the organizing principles employed, the weights assigned, and the degree of consistency and insight. In some cases, these differences may have been exaggerated by using orthogonal sets of cues. However, studies that preserved the cue intercorrelations indicated that “individual differences in policies do not simply express different ways of achieving the same performance by use of redundant cues” (p. 104). Holzworth (2001)
also concluded that judges are not consistent in how they use cues. Since no judgment analysis study accounts for all of the variance either the researcher has not included all relevant cues, or the judge has been using the cues inconsistently.

To summarize, Brehmer and Brehmer’s (1988) conclusion from twenty years ago still largely holds true today. They found that:

While policies are often linear, they are sometimes nonlinear and configural. We find that subjects seldom use all cues, but we cannot predict how many cues, or which ones they will use. We find that subjects are inconsistent, and that inconsistency is a monotonic function of the level of uncertainty in the task, but that the correlation between inconsistency and task uncertainty is far from perfect. Finally, although with most kinds of measures most subjects in most studies show little insight into their own judgmental processes, some subjects apparently possess considerable insight” (p. 107).

**Structural and Process Models of Decision Making**

Studies of judgment devolve from two points of view: process and structure. Process studies are concerned with how judgments are formed over time – what happens between the moments the cues are presented and the moment judgment is produced. Structure studies focus on judgmental output and try to decompose judgment in terms of input variables (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988).

**Structural versus process-based models**

As Einhorn and colleagues noted in 1979, the “emphasis on cognitive processes draws attention to the discontent of many decision researchers with the ability of statistical models to provide insight into psychological processes” (p. 465). Use of a regression model in judgment and decision-making research is problematic because it
assumes that the same cues are used in the same way when making similar judgments. A regression model can describe how people weight and combine information, but not how they search for it. It cannot account for the limited cognitive processing capability of the human mind, and the fact that judgment strategies are chosen in relation to the structure and demands of the task (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). In other words, it “does not allow for flexibility in vicarious functioning, whereby different cues may be substituted for each other on different cases” (Dhami & Harries, 2001, p. 9). Current linear lens model technology does not capture how people may be processing information within the lens model framework (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). Further, there is nothing about the lens model framework that implies that multiple regression is the sole organizing process (Hammond, 1996a). Despite these considerations, social judgment theorists generally assume a linear compensatory model when modeling judgment policies.

Criticism of regression models is not limited to just the judgment and decision making field. Worden and Brandl (1990) note that use of structural models to explain police decision making has not been that successful because the “cognitive processes through which stimuli are perceived, and by which these perceptions are connected to choice, constitute a “black box” in this research” (p. ?). Further, the task environment of a police officer is ambiguous and uncertain so structural models that cannot consider vicarious functioning are not that helpful in explaining police behavior. In 1997, Doherty and Brehmer noted that “the conception of human judgment emerging from regression studies of human judgment can be refuted only by evidence that shows that judgment is something other than a matter of combining pieces of information that are weighted
according to their importance. So far, such evidence has failed to materialize” (p. 547). It is my hope that my dissertation will provide some of this preliminary evidence.

**Process-Tracing Approaches**

Process tracing approaches examine the information accessed to form a judgment as well as the order in which information was accessed. This information is then used to make inferences about the decision strategies employed. There are two major process-tracing approaches used: protocol analysis and information boards. Protocol analysis (previously described in more detail in chapter 3) requires the decision maker to think aloud while making a decision. Verbal statements are then coded to test hypotheses about a model or theory of decision process. In research using an information board method, participants explicitly search for information and researchers can analyze a decision maker’s depth and pattern of search.

Ford and colleagues (1989) reviewed 45 studies using process tracing approaches and found that increasing task complexity (the number of alternatives or dimensions) increases the likelihood that subjects will use nonlinear strategies to make their task more manageable. Further, most research has focused on the effect of the task rather than on the environment and person characteristics of the decision behavior. A major focus of this research has been the use of compensatory or noncompensatory strategies by decision
makers but little has been reported in regards to the type of noncompensatory strategy used. The authors reach two major conclusions about process tracing approaches:

1) There is extensive use of noncompensatory strategies in completing the problem task and process tracing studies are, consequently, providing different types of information than the results of research that uses a structural model.

2) The complexity of the task is strongly related to the strategy used by the decision maker.

Policing is a highly complex task and using a variation of a process-tracing approach might well provide a wealth of information beyond that found when using a structural model.

**Previous Studies using Protocol Analysis**

A number of policing scholars have utilized variations of process tracing techniques – protocol analysis has been used most frequently. A common technique is to perform content analysis of thought protocols (usually obtained via a vignette study). In such studies, officers write down open-ended thoughts about a script and then answer a number of additional questions – these “thought protocols” are then analyzed.

This is due largely due work by Newell & Simon (1972) who emphasized “if behavior is demanded by the task situation and the subject exhibits it, then the behavior tells more about the task environment than about the decision maker. If put into a different task situation, the person would act differently. They contend, therefore, that a theory of problem solving cannot predict behavior unless it encompasses both an analysis of the task and an analysis of the limits of rational adaptation to task requirements” (Ford et al, 1989, p. 104).
Researchers have used thought protocols to examine decisions regarding arrest and commitment decisions in domestic assault situations (Finn & Stalens, 1997), dual arrest decisions in domestic assault cases (Finn & Bettis, 2006), and the use of deadly force (Dwyer et al, 1990). Both Finn and Stalens (1997) and Finn and Bettis (2006) used a 2x4 between subjects vignette design to collect data and the resulting “thought protocols” were content coded. Dwyer and colleagues (1990) utilized 60 separate crime scenarios. In one case (Finn & Stalens, 1997), it is worth noting, the researchers identified the fact that cognitive processes did not occur in a natural environment as a limitation.

Narrative debriefings of officers, conversely, have been collected in a natural environment. In addition to the POPN data (which, as noted, has not been extensively analyzed) Schafer and Mastrofski (2005) used observation, debriefings, and structured interviews to analyze stop and sanction behavior in traffic enforcement situations. Dunham and colleagues (2005) also used narrative debriefings to study an officer’s formation of suspicion as well as his or her decision to stop and question a citizen. In the Dunham study, observers were trained to take note of occasions when officers appeared to notice a suspicious person but decided not to act on it. Observers probed officers about what he/she was thinking at the time suspicion was formed; the reasons for forming suspicion were coded into four separate categories. Finally, another variation of protocol analysis was used by Dixon and colleagues (2008). In a study examining the influence of race on police-citizen encounters, they performed a content analysis of videotaped interactions during traffic stops.
Previous Studies using Information Boards

Another process-tracing technique is the use of information boards. Although this is a somewhat common methodology employed in other fields it has been used (to the best of my knowledge) in the area of policing only twice. In 1974, Siegal and colleagues utilized an information board technique to examine the amounts and types of information police officers use, and the decision making patterns they employ, when determining the outcome of an encounter with a drunk and disorderly citizen. They found that the amount of information needed varied widely by officer (from one subject who needed just one piece to another who needed 18 pieces). Officers gave the attitude of the offender significant weight, and Siegal and colleagues speculate that the variation in the amount of information officers used to make a decision may be because of the dissonance officers’ face when presented with certain types of information (e.g. attitude of offender) which requires them to process additional pieces of information in an attempt to reduce or eliminate the dissonance. The findings from their study suggest that “police demonstrate individualized preferences for varying amounts and kinds of information for arriving at a decision, as well as preferences for adhering to a certain sequence in information processing. For some police, one piece of information is regarded as highly significant; for others, the same piece of information is thought to be rather unimportant. Some police use varying amounts and types of information to arrive at the same decision, while others use basically similar information search patterns to arrive at a different decisions” (p. 144).

Brandl (1991) completed a dissertation that examined the influences on detective decision-making behavior in robbery and burglary cases based on Black’s theory of law.
Specifically, he first employed a structural model to describe the relationship between information inputs (in the form of victim and offense characteristics) and detectives’ decisions to select a case for follow-up investigation and allocate varying amounts of time to an investigation. Second, he utilized verbal protocols to describe the cognitive processes associated with these decisions in terms of the depth, content, and linearity of search. Brandl (1991) concluded that “in light of the observational data, one is left to conclude that Black’s theory, and (by implication) regression analyses, miss much of the complexity of detectives’ decision making . . . the influence of victim characteristics was largely masked. Accordingly, it appears that the processes involved in detectives’ decision making do not parallel the assumptions of additive statistical models: each potential influence is not considered and weighed independently” (p. 411).

Although Brandl’s (1991) dissertation provides a jumping off point for my research, there are a number of differences between his research and what I propose to do. Firstly, Brandl focused on detectives while I will examine the decision process of patrol officers. Second, the methodology employed and the data collected are different – Brandl utilized investigative reports and an information board to gather data on the decision to investigate robbery and burglary cases. I will use the POPN data (observation and narrative debriefings) to investigate the arrest decision by an officer in dispute resolution encounters. Finally, by using an information board, Brandl was able to manipulate aspects of the information utilized. Since the POPN narrative data was collected in the field immediately following real-life encounters with citizens I am unable to employ similar controls.
Conclusion

In 2001, Dhami and Ayton published an article that examined bail decisions by magistrates in England. In their conclusion, Dhami and Ayton (2001) note that researchers interested in legal decision making should reconsider use of regression models. In particular, they highlight the fact that “researchers continue to paint a complex picture of human judgment and they seem to have overlooked an indication that individuals may be using simple strategies from the regression models themselves. This is the finding that usually only a handful of cues . . . are statistically significant” (p. 162).

Further, in 1990, Worden and Brandl promoted the use of protocol analysis as a means to strengthen understanding of police decision making. They noted:

> Given the ambiguity and uncertainty of police officers’ task environments, models that include only situational and/or organizational factors, without specifying the processes whereby these cues are translated into choices, are unlikely to explain the performance of any but rather simple police tasks. The cues that are salient, the meaning(s) imputed to them, the goals or objectives toward which officers responses are directed, and their beliefs about how much each of the alternative courses of action will contribute to meeting those objectives, are the premises on which officers’ decisions are likely to rest” (p. 303).

Whether or not Dhami and Ayton’s (2001) findings hold for police decision making remains to be seen. It is possible that we are looking for complexity where it does not exist. Perhaps police officers (in different ways at different times) also base their decisions on one cue. It is also possible that police decision making is more complex than we’ve realized. In research examining police encounters with juveniles, Worden and Myers (n.d.) found that the situational factors commonly accounted for in police research neither adequately explain the arrest decision, nor an officer’s choice among non-arrest alternatives. As they note, “it may be that our models of police behavior omit important
decision cues in the situation . . . that the factors included in our models do not have the same effects on the decisions of all officers . . . [or] that the meaning of situational cues would vary across police departments” (p?).

Policing scholars are working within a rather limited theoretical box. Few theories consider the influences of all levels of an encounter, and none consider all possible actions in an encounter. Further, underscoring most research on police is an assumption that compensatory models are an accurate assessment of how people think. However, the standard compensatory models predominantly used by policing scholars cannot take into account vicarious functioning (that equivalent judgments can result from different patterns of cues). In order to truly understand how officers make judgments (whether they arrive at the same one but focus on different cues to get there, or arrive at different judgments about the same thing) we can no longer explain away individual variation as random error.

As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, the recognition that discretion existed in criminal justice resulted in a new paradigm for research – I believe it is time for another paradigm shift. Only by expanding on “business as usual” can we hope to expand our understanding of how numerous interrelated factors influence officer behavior in a given moment (or, conversely, how a single factor influences officer behavior in a given moment). In the next chapter I discuss my plan for doing this.
Chapter 4
Methods

Introduction

For this research I focus on one specific domain of police work – dispute resolution. I believe that this domain represents a common type of police work and provides for a variety of resolutions. Using this domain as a starting point, I will consider the following analyses:

1) A content analysis of the narrative debriefings of dispute resolution encounters to develop themes of decision-making and account for both the depth and breadth of individual officer search for information in deciding on an outcome; AND

2) Comparison of a structural model (based on coded observational data) of a single outcome (arrest) in dispute resolution encounters to a process model (based on narrative data) of the arrest decision.

By conducting these two analyses I hope to examine not only the value of using process models to depict officer decision-making, but also to illustrate how qualitative data can enhance structural models. I describe each in further detail below.

Description of the Data

The Project on Policing Neighborhoods, conducted in Indianapolis, IN and St. Petersburg, FL in 1996 and 1997, allowed for in-person observation of police officers at work. Observers took brief field notes during each ride-along and, within one day of the observation session, recorded their notes into five types of forms: a single narrative form
for the entire ride-along, and four types of coded forms: ride, activity, encounter, and citizen. Of interest in this study is the information collected on the narrative, encounter, and citizen forms. Encounter forms were used to describe face-to-face interactions between police officers and the public and captured such details as the location of the encounter, how the officer arrived at the encounter, the type of problem, and the various actions taken by the officer to resolve the problem, among other things (refer to Appendix A for the complete encounter form and instructions used in coding). Citizen forms were used to record the characteristics of the citizens that police encounter while on patrol and included such things as the citizens’ age, race, apparent wealth, any indication of alcohol use, drug use, or mental disorder, and numerous possible requests and actions that a citizen might pursue in the course of an encounter (refer to Appendix B for the complete citizen form and instructions used in coding).

POPN observers were also instructed to debrief officers after certain encounters in order to provide “insight into their thought processes and perceptions” (POPN Observation Notebook) – these debriefings were recorded on the aforementioned Narrative Form (refer to Appendix C for narrative form instructions). Debriefings were supposed to occur in the following types of encounters:

- Situations where the citizen was rebellious (e.g. noncooperative, threatening, resistant, etc);
- Situations in which the citizen might become rebellious (e.g. officer makes an arrest, the citizen appears to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the citizen appears to be mentally ill, etc);
• Situations where the officer is making an obvious attempt to persuade a citizen to do or not do something;
• In instances where the citizen asks the officer to do something beyond the normal routine of answering a call;
• Highly ambiguous situations;
• Cases where the officer has to consider alternative options about what to do;
• Situations where the officer is engaging in aspects of COP or POP;
• Any situation in which you were curious about what was on the officer’s mind during the encounter.

The purpose of the debriefings was to capture information that an observer would not have known unless an officer told him or her. In particular, debriefings were intended to capture the following:

• What an officer perceived as important during an encounter;
• What interpretation he/she gave to those perceptions;
• What factors influenced the officer’s response;
• What the officer was trying to accomplish in an encounter; and
• How the officer felt about the encounter at the conclusion.

The POPN study, as far as I am aware, is the first large-scale study to provide qualitative data of police decision-making in the field. A review of POPN-related studies completed
to date revealed that the narrative debriefings (which are not accessible via the ICPSR) have rarely been analyzed to address questions about officer behavior.¹³

**Decisions as Outcomes**

**Case Selection Procedure**

POPN observers gave each encounter a problem code at the beginning and the end of the encounter (a complete list is provided in Appendix D). In order to select encounters for inclusion in this study the end problem code was used. If an encounter was classified as follows, it was counted as a “dispute” encounter:

- Noise disturbance
- Arguments, participants unspecified
- Domestic argument
- Non-domestic argument
- Keep the peace – prevent potential argument
- Juvenile problem/disturbance
- Harassment/stalking
- Family trouble
- Inter-group conflict
- Neighbor trouble
- Gang conflict

- Labor-management problems
- Civil disorders
- Physical injury inflicted by persons
- Threatened physical injury
- Fight (physical)
- Domestic fight with injury
- Non-domestic fight with injury
- Simple assault
- Domestic assault with injury
- Non-domestic assault with injury
- Aggravated assault
- Domestic aggravated assault
- Non-domestic aggravated assault
- Landlord-tenant dispute
- Gang fight

Encounters were also only included if one of the citizens was described as a suspect or disputant. Since the main purpose of this study is to examine the exercise of discretion by police officers it is important to only include those encounters for which discretion is possible (i.e. an officer is unlikely to warn, cite, threaten, arrest, or use force against a citizen who is not cast in a suspect/disputant role). Since a single encounter may involve multiple citizens the unit of analysis is the citizen, not the encounter. Separate citizen and
encounter files were merged together to create a master citizen-exploded file (i.e. each case represented a separate citizen with the appropriate encounter data attached). In Indianapolis, 522 suspects/disputants were involved in 345 dispute encounters. These 522 suspects/disputants accounted for roughly 24% of the citizens in all dispute encounters. In St. Petersburg, 353 suspects/disputants were involved in 246 dispute encounters. These 353 suspect/disputants accounted for roughly 22% of the citizens in all dispute encounters.

Variables

Dependent Variable

The majority of studies of police behavior have focused on a single type of behavior (e.g. arrest or use of force). Additionally, a number of researchers have relied on dichotomous dependent variables (particularly research studying arrest decisions). Use of force researchers have, in recent years, moved beyond dichotomies to continuum measures and have also transitioned from a focus on deadly or excessive force to a focus on all force behavior.14 As Terrill (2001) notes “just as there are instances when force may be excessive, there are times when force may be needed but was not used. So, failure to include all cases when physical force may be reasonably needed prevents one from

14 A force continuum is a policy framework that guides use of force. Continuums contain two principles: proportionality (police must apply a level of force that is proportional to the resistance encountered) and incrementalism (if a given level of coercion does not achieve suspect compliance, force should be escalated, but only in small increments) (Terrill, 2005).
uncovering important factors associated with the use or nonuse of physical force” (p. 22). This allows for a full consideration of the spectrum of behavior whether or not action is taken – when it comes to police discretion, doing nothing when action is needed may be as meaningful as doing something that may be outside the scope of authority.

The review of existing research on police behavior indicated that no matter how the dependent variable is conceptualized and measured, most scholars interested in police behavior focus on a particular outcome. Thus, since it is a common dependent variable in the extant literature, I will conduct the analysis using arrest as an outcome. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, some researchers have called for the consideration of a range of control options rather than a singular focus on, for example, just the arrest or use of force option. These include:

- Black (1980): Six-fold measure of police action based on “style of law” (therapeutic, compensatory, conciliatory, penal, prevention, other)
- Sykes & Brent (1983): Nine-step scale that rank-orders police action according to the severity of the outcome for the offender
- Bayley (1986): 17-category scale used to measure the tactic officers used to “terminate” a dispute
- Smith (1987): 3-fold measure of police action (mediation, separation, arrest)

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15 In 1996, Klinger summarized the efforts to date to quantitatively measure law (p. 392-393).
• Worden (1989): 16-fold behavior indicator of various permutations of four actions taken during a dispute resolution encounter (mediation, separation, counseling, coercion)

• Klinger (1996c): 5-category scale ordered according to the “highest form of authority used” with additional points for arrest and type of booking charge

• Worden and Myers (n.d): 5-fold measure of police action (release, advise, investigate, command/threaten, and arrest)

Since Klinger’s (1996c) proposal of a formal authority scale, little additional effort has been made to quantify law as a scale other than Worden & Myers unpublished effort. Thus, I will examine additional forms of action police may take besides arrest when examining the decision as a process (explained in more detail below). The coded POPN data contain a variety of actions police might undertake, not all of which represent an action linked to formal authority. All possible actions are listed below, with those representing some form of control highlighted in bold

- Threaten to issue a citation
- Issue a citation
- Notify, promise, threaten to notify another agency (includes, among others, service, criminal justice-related, city, and neighborhood)

Since Klinger’s (1996c) proposal of a formal authority scale, little additional effort has been made to quantify law as a scale other than Worden & Myers unpublished effort. Thus, I will examine additional forms of action police may take besides arrest when examining the decision as a process (explained in more detail below). The coded POPN data contain a variety of actions police might undertake, not all of which represent an action linked to formal authority. All possible actions are listed below, with those representing some form of control highlighted in bold

16 Ask/tell consists of six different subcategories of action: suggest, request, persuade, negotiate, command, and threaten.
• Check for outstanding warrants (not included in scale because it does not involve direct interaction with citizen)

• Threaten to charge

• Arrest

• Interrogate

• Conduct a search

• Use force - threatens to use physical force

• Use force - use a firm grip/non-pain restraint

• Use force - handcuff

• Use force - use pain compliance

• Use force - use impact/incapacitation methods

• Use force - draw or discharge weapon

• Ask/tell to sign a formal complaint

• Ask/tell not to sign a formal complaint

• Ask/tell to use legal process to solve problem

• Ask/tell to seek the help of other service agencies to solve problem

• Ask/tell to help another person

• Ask/tell to seek the help of family/friends

• Ask/tell to leave another person alone, stop bothering them, or leave the premises

• Ask/tell to cease disorderly behavior

• Ask/tell to discontinue illegal behavior
• Ask/tell to provide information
• Ask/tell to call police if problem reoccurs
• Ask/tell to not call police if problem reoccurs
• Police show disrespect

**Independent Variables**

The independent variables used for this analysis are described in Table 4.1.

**Analyses & Hypotheses**

Since the arrest dependent variable is a dichotomy, I will use logistic regression to estimate the equation. As I am not testing a specific theory, the hypotheses for this research are derived from existing literature. I have developed 15 hypotheses.

**Hypothesis #1:** Indicators of violence (e.g. presence of a weapon, threats or actual assaults of police) are more likely to result in arrest.

**Hypothesis #2:** Citizens who are impaired (either under the influence of drugs or alcohol or mentally impaired) are more likely to have their actions result in an arrest. I believe that such citizens are viewed by officers as more of a threat because of the unpredictability inherent in their impairment and more control will be used as a safety consideration.

**Hypothesis #3:** Citizens who flee or attempt to flee are more likely to have their actions result in an arrest. It is likely that officers view actual or attempted flight as a sign of disrespect and respond with greater authority.
Table 4.1: Variables Used in Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>Whether or not citizen was arrested (dichotomy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen had weapon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen threatened to assault the police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen assaulted the police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen fled or attempted to flee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen under influence of drugs/alcohol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another involved citizen requested police arrest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another involved citizen requested police not arrest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another involved citizen requested police warn or threaten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another involved citizen requested police make another citizen leave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another involved citizen requested police file a report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police held arrest warrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police held search warrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of evidence (scale based on multiple variables)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict with other citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen appeared mentally ill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen was disrespectful to police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen race/ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen wealth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge of citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance among disputants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indication of potential violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officers at scene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bystanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both disputants present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Hypothesis #4**: A request for arrest from an involved citizen will be more likely to result in an arrest while a request for no arrest will be more likely to result in no arrest.

**Hypothesis #5**: As the level of evidence increases the likelihood of an arrest is greater. More evidence of wrongdoing results in less opportunity for discretion because the range of options is more clearly defined.

**Hypothesis #6**: The more serious the crime, the more likely it is for a citizen to be arrested. As with the level of evidence, the more serious the crime the less opportunity there is for discretion because the range of options is more clearly defined.

**Hypothesis #7**: Citizens who are disrespectful are more likely are more likely to have their actions result in an arrest.

**Hypothesis #8**: Male citizens will be more likely to have their actions result in an arrest. As police officers are still predominantly male, I believe that leniency towards females will result in an effect on males.

**Hypothesis #9**: Age will not have an effect. However, younger males will be more likely to be arrested.

**Hypothesis #10**: The race/ethnicity of the citizen will not have an effect. However disrespectful blacks will be more likely to be arrested than respectful blacks or whites, or disrespectful whites.

**Hypothesis #11**: Wealthier citizens will be less likely to be arrested.

**Hypothesis #12**: An officer who has knowledge of a citizen will be less likely to likely to be arrest him or her.

**Hypothesis #13**: As the relational distance between disputants decreases, officers will be less likely to arrest.
Hypothesis #14: When either the number of officers or bystanders at the scene increases, officers will be more likely to arrest. I hypothesize that crowd situations are more likely to result in shows of authority.

Hypothesis #15: When both disputants are present at the scene, officers will be more likely to arrest.

Limitations of the Data Set

Observational studies such as POPN provide strong data although they do have some potential limitations. Although the information is collected by an impartial third-party, officers may still alter their actions because of the presence of the observer. However, empirical evidence suggests that the validity of observational data is high (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990; Spano, 2003) and reactivity is not generally a concern (Worden, 1989). Reiss (1971) noted that “it is sociologically naïve to assume that for many events the presence or participation of the observer is more controlling than other factors in the situation (p. 24; as quoted in NRC, 2004). Additionally, observational study is labor intensive and expensive and, in the case of more rare events such as use of force, it can be an inefficient way to collect data (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). Because it requires permission and cooperation from the police department (indicating a high willingness to be studied) the findings produced from observational research may not be generalizable (Fyfe et al, 1997). Also, because observers are not trained police officers, 

17 At least the way force has traditionally been conceptualized. Terrill (2001) offers an alternate view by including verbal commands/threats, pat downs, and handcuffing.
they may also miss subtle non-verbal behavior between citizens and the police that might provide additional explanation on the causes of police behavior (one example is “blading,” when a citizen angles his or her body into a position that is considered combative by police officers; an observer may miss this type of subtle body positioning). Officers might also base decisions on bias and intuition that is not readily discernible from their observed behavior (Siegal et al, 1974).

Finally, observation is not well suited for determining the cognitive processes utilized when officers make a decision to NOT take action because, in such a case, there is no behavior change to observe. Additionally, the cognitive processes used to reach a decision to act may be different from the cognitive processes used to reach a decision not to act (Siegal et al, 1974; Terrill & Paoline, 2007). As Siegal and colleagues (1974) note “differences may lie in the amount of information they use, the types of information used, the order in which the information is sought and selected, etc. One cannot simply infer that the process leading to a decision to arrest is the obverse of that to not arrest. Therefore, any reliable method should enable the researcher to study the universe of police decisions, that is, decisions leading to both arrests and nonarrest situations” (p. 133). Further, the process of a decision to not arrest leads to a secondary decision process – what do officers do instead, and why (Terrill & Paoline, 2007)? For these reasons, I am also proposing to examine the decision as a process. The narrative accounts collected as part of the POPN protocol may well ameliorate some of the concerns noted above about using observation as a data collection method.
Decisions as Processes

As discussed in chapter 3, examining decisions as a process takes quite a different approach from the structural models that are used to examine a decision as an outcome. Structural models study the underlying cognitive process by linking inputs to outcomes. Cognitive process is inferred when a structural model is used. Process models, on the other hand, focus on the steps between the information inputs and outcomes. In a process model, the strategies people use in arriving at a decision are the main focus of inquiry (Ford et al, 1989). Wilson and colleagues (1973), in a study of parole decision-making, found that different people use different items of information even when they arrive at the same conclusion. They concluded that decision makers may be of several “types” and the difference among them in regards to information search strategies may be important. Thus, I argue, it is as important to study the way a decision is made as it is to study the result of a decision.

The Current Study

The current research does not follow a pure process tracing approach. Unlike some previous research which focuses on decision-making in an artificial setting (necessary to conduct information board studies or to collect thought protocols) the POPN narratives were collected in the field. The collection of narrative debriefings in a natural environment is, obviously, not as controlled as collecting such data in a more restricted setting. However, although collecting such data may come at a cost, it also provides numerous benefits.
As Mastrofski and Parks (1990) note, “purely behavioral studies of police cannot explore cognitive aspects of police work, nor assess their relevance for police actions in dealing with the public. Despite this, many behavioral studies infer cognitive aspects of police decision making from analyses of more readily observable aspects” (p. 477). The authors further believe that “rather than focusing on perceptions and pre-dispositions reported in surveys far removed from actual police work, we believe police cognitive process must be studied in natural environments where decision making in actual incidents links cognition to action” (p. 478). Mastrofski and Parks (1990) tested the use of narrative debriefings with trained observers and found they can yield a number of important insights. Specifically, debriefings can help clarify how judgmental issues were resolved (e.g. by providing a rationale for why a citizen was not arrested even though a specific judgment cue indicating arrest was present). A structural model would not provide an explanation for this discrepancy, and its explanatory power would be reduced. Thus, debriefing data can serve as a source of insights for interpreting the results of a structural model. Debriefings can also reveal how moral issues are resolved, and also highlight the importance of “mood” (p. 491).

Brown (1981) describes three dimensions to mood – energy level (how hard one feels like working), emotional displacement (projecting personal feelings onto the public) and boredom. Mood can temporarily affect an officer’s style which can significantly affect behavior. Mastrofski and Parks (1990) observe that researchers do not have much evidence on the influence of mood on behavior “but what if mood were to account for a significant portion of the unexplained variance in police behavior? It would suggest that police decision making is more arbitrary and whimsical than currently credited in many
professional and academic circles” (p. 482). Observers were asked to report all comments and actions (including those unsolicited or not related to an encounter) and found that mood was noted as the reason for a course of action by an officer in 19 percent of the encounters. Debriefings can also monitor other types of “internal” stimuli (e.g. an officer not citing a drunk because of an urgent need to go to the bathroom). “The influence of these seemingly arbitrary factors is given far more credence by police than researchers, yet there has been no systematic effort to determine the extent of their influence on police decision making” (p. 483). Whether or not the POPN data can provide similar insights is a question that must still be explored.

Mastrofski and Parks (1990) also provide a number of ways in which narrative data can be used quantitatively. For example, verbal reports could explain more variance in observed behavior because factors mentioned in the debriefing process could be added as dummy variables in a regression equation along with literature-identified variables. A researcher might also look for patterns in debriefings to identify officer typologies. Finally, debriefings could be utilized to describe the cognitive process used for decision-making in terms of how the search for information varies in terms of amount of information used and how information is prioritized and weighed. It is this latter purpose that I am interested in. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, I am interested primarily in using such data to describe the cognitive process and to provide additional explanatory power in a structural model. However, I allow for the possibility that the data will not permit me to fully execute what I plan to do. If that turns out to be the case, the research still has value because it reveals that a promising data collection strategy either does not fulfill its intended purpose or could have been executed better.
Analysis

There are numerous perspectives when it comes to how researchers conceptualize meaning through qualitative analysis. Some of the more prominent orientations (eloquently summarized by Dey, 1993) include Patton’s (1980) interpretive approach which “emphasizes the role of patterns, categories and basic descriptive units;” Bliss and colleagues (1983) network approach which focuses on categorization; the ‘pattern coding’ utilized in the quasi-statistical approach of Miles and Huberman (1984); and Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) ‘grounded theory’ approach toward ‘coding’ data” (p. 5). Ideally, the method used to analyze the data is selected in concert with research question development and data collection. However, because I am working with data that has already been collected, I am constrained by the method I can choose to analyze it. Use of grounded theory, for example, (the method most suited to what I propose to do) requires one to go into the field and collect data prior to developing research questions. Despite the differences in how data organization is approached, however, “the common emphasis . . . is on categorizing the data and making connections” (Dey, 1993, p. 5). Thus, I propose to focus simply on content analysis without attempting to place its use in a broader epistemological context.

Content Analysis

Determining the cognitive process involved in decision making requires a different methodology than the one employed to study the relationship between information inputs and outcomes. The term content analysis can be generally defined as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative
material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p. 453). The details of “how” may differ, but the core of qualitative analysis is selecting a bit of data and assigning it to a category. Detailing how categories should be created and how data should be assigned, however, is impossible at this stage. Categories should reflect the data, so they cannot be fully formed ahead of time (although prior literature may inform their development) (Dey, 1993). Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw (1995) insist that, for qualitative data, analysis pervades all phases of research. In the view of the authors, analysis is “at once inductive and deductive, like someone who is simultaneously creating and solving a puzzle, or like a carpenter alternately changing the shape of a door and then the shape of a door frame to fit it” (p. 144). They note six different phases for processing fieldnotes, the same type of data collected under the POPN protocol. They are: close reading, open coding, writing initial memos, selecting themes, focused coding, and developing integrative memos.

Close reading involves reading notes as a whole and in order (treating notes as a dataset). The researcher should mentally ask questions such as what assumptions subjects are making, and what specific means and/or strategies are being used (questions that give priority to processes rather than to “causes” or the internal “motives” of subjects). Open coding means sifting through and categorizing small segments of the fieldnote record and writing words/phrases that identify analytic dimensions and categories. Open coding is uncertain and an evolving process. Fieldnotes are often unwieldy at this stage but that is a good thing – “codings leading in many different directions . . . will suggest a myriad of possible issues and directions” (p. 156). Writing initial memos is the next phase, and it is generally more analytic than in-process commentaries. Initial memos can be a series of
“observations” on a single fieldnote or an attempt to specify a particular analytic issue that cuts across a number of particular incidents. Open coding and development of initial memos will result in far more themes than can be addressed in a cohesive fashion. The researcher can determine which themes should be given more attention in following ways:

1) Give priority to topics on which there is a substantial amount of data and which reflect underlying patterns of activities in the study, or
2) Give priority to what seems to be important to subjects, what engages a lot of their time and energy.

Once dominant themes have been identified, the researcher should sort the fieldnotes into their respective themes. The next step is focused coding which is “fine-grained, line-by-line analysis of the notes” which involves “building up and elaborating analytically interesting themes, both by connecting data that initially may not have appeared to go together and by delineating subthemes and subtopics that distinguish differences and variations within the broader topic” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, 160). Finally, integrative memos are used to elaborate ideas and begin to tie bits of data together. The purpose of writing integrating memos is to “explore relationships between coded fieldnotes and to provide a more sustained examination of a theme or issue by linking together a variety of discrete observations” (p. 162). The central task of such memos is to develop theoretical connections between excerpts of fieldnotes.

Analyzing qualitative data in the manner described above is wholly inductive, and it is complex – it is not testing theory. Rather, “the ethnographer’s assumptions, interests, and theoretical commitments enter into every phase of writing an ethnography and
influence decisions that range from selecting which events to write about to those that entail emphasizing one member’s perspectives on an event over those of others. The process is thus one of reflexive or dialectical interplay between theory and data whereby theory enters in at every point, shaping not only analysis but how social events come to be perceived and written up as data in the first place” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, 167).

Using the manner detailed above, I will perform a content analysis of the narrative data. I will again focus on “dispute” encounters and, in addition to reviewing each narrative for data on the order and content of information search I will also review the narratives for specific themes regarding the “whys” of decision-making. At this stage (having not yet done the analysis) it is difficult to specify what these themes might be. However, having scanned some of the narrative accounts I expect to find such things as personal limitations (e.g. time constraints, end of shift), suspect behavior (e.g. suspect was nice, suspect did not deserve arrest, etc) and more. I will utilize NVivo software – software specifically designed for qualitative analysis – to help me transform the narrative data into themes and categories. I have three priorities for the content analysis.

First, as noted above, I plan to analyze all dispute encounters to further examine the variation in how officers search for information. Specifically, I will examine the narrative data in order to determine the content of search by officers, to determine the depth of search by officers, and determine the linearity of search by officers.18 The

18 This is the same analytic strategy (albeit using a different type of data) employed by Brandl (1991) in his dissertation.
content of search refers to the specific pieces of information that are examined when making a decision. By examining the narrative data I hope to gather insight into the factors most often considered (and the factors deemed most important) by patrol officers when determining how much control to exert in a police-citizen encounter. The depth of search refers to the proportion of total information examined before making a decision (in this case, the amount of information referenced by the officer in the narrative divided by the total amount of information available as indicated by the coded observation data). Examinining the depth of search is one way to infer the linearity of search – searching a large proportion of information implies a linear strategy while searching a small proportion implies a non-linear strategy.

Second, I will develop themes that summarize why officers make the decisions they do. Specially, what accounts for the use of more or less control by police officers in encounters with citizens?) What prompted a decision one way or another? What are the reasons for why behavior does not conform to the way indicators said it would (e.g. arrest was warranted but not made)?

Finally, by focusing on the patrol officers’ verbal reports of search patterns and cognitive steps, I will build a process model of decision making using arrest as an

19 I recognize that this will not account for informational cues that were observed but not remarked upon.

20 When there is a lot of information available (high task complexity) people tend to use a non-linear strategy in order to limit the amount of information to be processed which simplifies the decision task. Thus, using just a small amount of information implies a non-linear approach while using a large proportion of information implies a linear search strategy.
outcome. I propose to build a single simulation model from the process models at the encounter level (see example — for illustrative purposes only - in Figure 4.1 below) and test how well it predicts the outcomes noted in the narratives. \(^{21}\) I will use a series of if statements to determine how well the culmination of the separate paths in the simulation model predict the outcome (by examining the ratio of false positives to true positives). Depending on how complicated it is to build a single process model I may use a sample of encounters to develop the model for this final step. I will then compare the simulation model based on process to the structural model (using the same sample of officers, if necessary, in the structural model) and compare the explanatory power of each.

**The Process Dataset**

In Indianapolis, there were 612 distinct dispute encounters. In some cases, a series of encounters were related but coded separately as officers moved to different locations to resolve a dispute (e.g. going to a different location to interview a suspect). For the purposes of both process and theme coding, data from these encounters were treated as a single encounter. In most cases, the debriefing for the encounter occurred at the end of the series and encompassed the totality of events. In Indianapolis, this occurred 30 times (in 18 cases, two distinct encounters were treated as one, in three cases, three distinct encounters were treated as one, and in two cases, four distinct encounters were treated as one).

\(^{21}\) Another option for specifying the process model would be to build brief process models for each encounter and then, for officers who have faced more than one dispute resolution encounter, build models for each officer. This would allow for comparisons of process among officers.
Figure 4.1: Hypothetical Process Model of Police Officer Decision Making

Offense is serious/violent

Yes

High level of evidence at scene

Yes

Victim present and requests arrest

ARREST

Yes

ARREST

No

Suspect disrespectful

Yes

ARREST

No

DO NOT ARREST

No

Victim present and requests arrest

No

Victim present and requests arrest

Yes

ARREST

Offender displays weapon or resists physically

Yes

ARREST

No

No
one). Thus, the actual number of dispute encounters considered was 582. For 251 of these encounters, no suspect or disputant was present. Since such encounters provided little in the way of process to code (most just hinged on victim testimony) and also did not result in much variety in decision making (as there was no suspect present) they were dropped from the process and theme analysis. In a large number of dispute encounters, an officer other than the observed officer served as the primary officer or determined the final action in the encounter. This occurred for 78 dispute encounters. In a small number of cases, the observed encounter was not actually a dispute or there was no process to code (e.g. in the case of a noise complaint where the officer simply tells the disputant to turn the music down). These 19 cases were dropped from analysis. Finally, some encounters did not contain debriefings. For these 30 encounters, process was coded but theme, obviously, was not. Thus, for Indianapolis, out of 612 distinct dispute encounters, 234 were coded for process and 204 were coded for themes (refer to Table 4.2).

In St. Petersburg, there were 452 distinct dispute encounters. As in Indianapolis, a series of encounters that were related were considered as a single encounter. In St. Petersburg, this occurred 28 times (in 18 cases, two distinct encounters were treated as one, in four cases, three distinct encounters were treated as one, and in six cases, four distinct encounters were treated as one). Thus, the actual number of dispute encounters considered was 408. There were 173 encounters in which there was no suspect or disputant – these were dropped from analysis. Also dropped were 73 cases where someone other than the observed officer served as the primary officer or made the final decision. Seven additional cases were dropped because the observed encounter was not actually a dispute or there was no process to code. Finally, there were 18 encounters that
did not contain debriefings. Thus, for St. Petersburg, out of 452 distinct dispute encounters, 155 were coded for process and 137 were coded for themes (refer to Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Final N for Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total dispute encounters</th>
<th>Multiple treated as single</th>
<th>No suspect</th>
<th>O1 not primary</th>
<th>Not a dispute</th>
<th>No process to code</th>
<th>Total coded for process</th>
<th>No debrief</th>
<th>Total coded for theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indianapoli</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>(-30)</td>
<td>(-251)</td>
<td>(-78)</td>
<td>(-13)</td>
<td>(-6)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>(-30)</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersbur</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>(-44)</td>
<td>(-173)</td>
<td>(-73)</td>
<td>(-5)</td>
<td>(-2)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>(-18)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chapter 5  
Content Analysis Findings

Introduction

This chapter details the findings from a content analysis of the narratives of dispute resolution encounters. The first section describes the themes related to decision-making in dispute encounters and the second section examines the general depth and breadth of individual officer search for information in deciding on an outcome. The narrative summaries of POPN encounters contained two parts. The first was a narrative summary of the encounter as it unfolded. It is from this summary that elements of process were coded. The second was a short debriefing of the officer regarding the decision made. Themes of decision making were coded from the debriefing section.

Themes Related to Officer Decision-Making

As noted in chapter 4, 204 encounters in Indianapolis and 137 encounters in St. Petersburg were coded for themes related to officer decision-making in disputes. A theme is a common thread that runs through the data, an overarching umbrella to group like findings together. For this research, the content analysis revealed two basic themes related to officer decision-making: Evidentiary Standards and Managing Situations. Within these themes, officers scan for the presence or absence of different types of

22 It is worth noting that the primary purpose of coding the narrative accounts was to develop an understanding of process which could be used quantitatively. I recognize that coding so many accounts purely for qualitative purposes would have been excessive.
information. Much of this information can be grouped into categories of similar information (e.g. information relating to crime seriousness). Categories allow officers to put an encounter into a personal context; it provides a way for officers to frame a current encounter according to a previously experienced situational element. Put simply, officers use categories to frame their current experience according to their past experience. The presence or absence of a category triggers a working rule that officers use to conduct their job. Working rules amount to decision-making “shortcuts.” If a current encounter is similar to a previous encounter (if similar information was utilized and deemed important), officers can utilize a working rule to aid in the decision making process. For example, one category under Evidentiary Standards is Crime Seriousness. In most cases, if there is a single injury present, officers will arrest the non-injured party. In this case, the working rule is injury equals arrest.

I will present the findings for each of these two themes, discussing first Indianapolis and then St. Petersburg and then comparing the findings between the two sites. Although it might be conventional to combine the data from the two sites together for a quantitative analysis (including a variable that controls for location) one of the values of qualitative analysis is being able to explore similarities and differences in depth. In this case, the thematic coding revealed enough differences between officers in the two departments that it seemed prudent to separate them.

I also found four themes that do not directly affect decision making (that is, they do not lead to a working rule in the same way that the Evidentiary Standards and Managing Situations themes do) but they may mediate on the use of a working rules; these are best described as cognitive frameworks. These four themes are Classifying
Citizens, Classifying Situations, Frustrations, and Individual Officer Style and Preferences.

Although I did not set out trying to place the qualitative findings into a previously developed context, the working rules and cognitive framework themes are similar to the cognitive schemas described by Stalens and Finn (1995). Briefly, Stalens and Finn utilized schema theory for their research on police officers’ interpretations of domestic assault. Schema theory is based on two different types of knowledge people access through memory – content knowledge and procedural frames. Content knowledge is previously stored information about categories or groups of people and events. Procedural frames hold the rules about how to respond given certain information and inferences. These frames “help define the meaning of different situations” and “contain rules about what questions are relevant to ask and what criteria are relevant to consider when making a decision” (Finn & Stalens, 1995, p. 290).

Considered in this vein, working rules are similar to procedural knowledge and cognitive frameworks are similar to content knowledge. In the same way that different standards of evidence, for example, become familiar, so too do experiences with different types of citizens and situations. Officers do not “wipe the slate clean” between encounters. Prior experience and departmental culture, among other things, contribute to the development of frameworks as well. As noted above, for these four themes I will address the findings in each site separately, and then consider the similarities and differences between them. It is important to note that some indicators may fall under more than one theme because they have multiple meanings. Qualitative analysis does not always lead to easy categorization and the same is true for the findings from the officer
deb briefings. In some cases, the same statement may fall into two themes. For example, level of intoxication is an evidentiary consideration and it may also be considered a frustration.

How these themes influence officer action is complicated. At times, in deb briefings, officers described working rules as a general way of doing business, but they did not pertain to the immediate encounter. Officers also occasionally described certain frameworks in debriefings but they did not always lead to a decision (in other words, an officer may hold an opinion about a citizen but it may not affect the course of action taken). Figure 5.1 provides a hypothetical visual for how these themes might interact. Determining the relative influence of themes on officer decision-making is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, if one considers that everything police officers do in an encounter relates to “managing” the situation in some way, it stands to reason that the other themes might influence the ultimate outcome to varying degrees. Similarly, different themes might influence other themes which will impact the ultimate decision made. For example, the way an officer classifies a citizen or a situation may have an influence on the working rules accessed when it comes to evidentiary standards. Alternately, frustrations may impact how an individual is classified, or certain preferences or working styles of an officer may influence how a situation is classified. Thus, how much these thematic categories overlap and influence one another, and how much that influence has on an officer decision, depends largely on the individual officer.
The Influence of Working Rules

Evidentiary Standards Theme

In Indianapolis, officers alluded to information related to an evidentiary standard working rule in their debriefings 95 times (refer to Table 5.1). In St. Petersburg, this occurred 89 times. Categories under the Evidentiary Standard theme allude to questions of evidence officers may consider in making a decision and consist of those situational-legal informational inputs commonly found in a regression model of decision-making (refer to Table 2 in chapter 2). Categories under the Evidentiary Standard theme consist of victim preference, crime seriousness, the age of the involved parties, a citizen’s level of intoxication, and believability (a form of evidence related to victim and suspect testimony).
Indianapolis

Officers often utilize working rules regarding evidence to resolve a dispute. Officers tended to follow victim preference in dispute encounters noting, for example, that an arrest was not made because the complainant declined to press charges or that a report was filed at the request of the complainant. If there is no request for action made either way, officers generally take no action. One officer noted that “there wasn’t much they could do since the mother didn’t tell them what she wanted” [312:5]. In only a couple of situations did officers specifically state that they deliberately ignored victim preference when making a decision. In one such situation, the officer inferred that the victim was afraid of the consequences for requesting arrest and so put the onus for action on himself [139:17].

Officers indicated they had a pretty straightforward rule when it came to crime seriousness – an injury equaled arrest. In debriefings a number of officers indicated that a visible injury to a victim was the only evidence needed. Conversely, officers declined to arrest when evidentiary requirements were not met. One officer stated that “in order for me to arrest someone, I have to see evidence and there has to be witnesses” [61:7]. Another noted that “they usually need some type of visible injury to make an arrest for a battery that didn’t occur in their presence” [372:15]. Other officers likewise decided against arrest for an assault or battery because there were no visible injuries [89:6, 353:6].

23 Specific examples referenced in text are identified by the ride and encounter number assigned in original POPN SPSS dataset.
Interestingly, though, when more than one party was injured officers generated multiple working rules. In one instance, the officer noted that each party had injured the other and both would go to jail as a result [174:8]. In another, the officer looked for the greater harm – the citizen who had inflicted the most damage was the one arrested [409:1]. Finally, another officer explained to both parties that “since they had both been injured, if they wanted to file charges they would need to go to the prosecutor’s office” [271:3]. In this case, a dual injury meant no arrest.

When the suspects or disputants are juveniles, officers tend to handle the encounter in an informal manner. Oftentimes, misbehavior is chalked up to youthful indiscretions; one officer commented that “kids are kids and they will fight” [283:5]. When the problem is not serious, police tend to defer to parents to handle things. As one officer noted, “the parents could handle this a lot better than the police so they would leave it up to them” [134:8]. Another stated that he thought “the boy’s father would take care of the problem as he seemed to be concerned about what they were doing” [316:15].

Officers often appeared to consider the degree of intoxication of suspects when they decided on a course of action. For some officers, intoxication was a reason to handle the encounter informally. One noted that since the citizens were under the influence “it is proper to separate them and let them cool down” [85:7]. Others used evidence of intoxication as a reason to ignore the situation, either because the officer did not want to deal with the intoxicated parties [362:12] or because the fact that both parties were drinking meant “there is no reason to take someone in” [409:1]. In more formal resolutions with individuals who were under the influence, officers tended to treat such suspects differently. In one particular situation dealing with an intoxicated suspect, the
officer noted that drunken individuals are impossible to reason with and so he “danced around the subject of whether or not he was going to be arrested” [34:1]. Another stated that the suspect appeared to be on something and “could have snapped at any time” and so he was careful not to provoke him [161:7].

The largest segment of evidence considered by officers has to do with something that is not easily quantified – believability (n = 37). Officers spend a large portion of time in any given encounter trying to make judgments about what is the truth. In some cases, officers made statements about believing one party over the other and that helped drive their decision. Officers often caught citizens in a lie. In one case, the officer stated that catching the suspect lying about her identity gave him reason to distrust her [49:1]. In another, the victim offered to lie about the suspect hurting her if it meant the suspect would go to jail [61:7]. In such cases, officers can easily make a decision for the other party. Officers also compare victim testimony to other evidence to determine the truth. As one stated (regarding a claim of assault), “it’s funny how he said he was jumped by four guys and there was not a mark on him and his clothes were not torn” [414:12].

However, in some instances, the “he said/she said” component of many dispute encounters can leave officers incapable of rendering a decision (or, unwilling to follow through on the action they want). A number of officers noted that there are two sides to every story which can make it difficult to ferret out the truth. Officers commented that there were “two sides to every story” [308:24] or that “there was probably a little bit of truth to both stories” [410:2]. Absent any additional evidence, in a he said/she said situation an officer’s ability to act is often limited. One noted that without clear evidence of which suspect was at fault it would not “be fair to take one in and not the other”
Another pointed out that when both parties are in trouble with the law they will just try to get each other in trouble [142:10].

In a small number of encounters, officers mentioned additional types of evidence as playing a role in decision-making. What is most interesting, perhaps, is how infrequently things like extralegal considerations like gender, social status, sexual orientation, age, and race were mentioned by officers as considerations when making a decision. Weapons were rarely used in dispute encounters and officers did not have to consider them as evidence very often when deciding a course of action. When they did, mere acknowledgement of a weapon was not enough – officers had to see one to act on one. One officer described his “formula” for a neighborhood fight – there were no weapons involved, he did not make any arrests [238:5]. Lack of conflict between citizens was also a reason not to arrest. One officer declined to arrest both parties because they were “not very hard to deal with” – in this case, lack of conflict (i.e. making the officer’s job easier) was rewarded with leniency [174:5]. Similarly, the relationship between the victim and offender was only mentioned a few times. When officers did consider it, they revealed a hesitation (absent other evidence of a crime) to intervene between married couples [84:3, 353:6], and in situations involving lease agreements [261:1].

___________________________

24 This does not, of course, mean that officers may not consider such things. However, they were not mentioned with great frequency in debriefings.
Table 5.1: Comparison of Thematic Findings in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th></th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidentiary Standards</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim preference</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness (level of injury)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of involved parties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol involvement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believability</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of evidence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managing Situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expediency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal action not warranted</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim needs to take responsibility</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of arrest</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of arrest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working Rules</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classifying Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior knowledge of citizen/house</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathetic victim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsympathetic/undeserving victim</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame the victim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsympathetic suspect</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathetic suspect</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classifying Situations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element of danger/risk</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpredictability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior knowledge of location</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frustrations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasting time</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futility</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame the police</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice not served</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens think they know the law</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other officers/dispatch</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1: Comparison of Thematic Findings in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Officer Style/Preferences</th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach to encounter</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empathy</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distancing</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CYA</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officer proactive</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Call type preferences</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive Frameworks</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**St. Petersburg**

Officers in St. Petersburg also often utilized working rules regarding evidence. Officer references to working rules related to victim preference were slightly more common in Indianapolis than in St. Petersburg (13% of all Evidentiary Standards in Indianapolis compared to 10% in St. Petersburg). When victim preference was mentioned in St. Petersburg debriefings the working rules were the same – a request for an arrest or report lead to an arrest or report, and a request for no action led to the officer taking no action.

In terms of crime seriousness, most of the references in St. Petersburg had to do with encounters for which there was no injury. As in Indianapolis, no injury meant no arrest – as one officer noted, “the only way he could have made an arrest is if there was some type of violence used against either party” [156:9]. Officers in St. Petersburg did not reference injuries in their debriefings as often as they did in Indianapolis (possibly because their disputes were not as serious as in Indianapolis) so there are no working
rules regarding dual injury and only limited insight into how injury influences decision-making. When officers did mention injury, the working rule is the same – an injury equals arrest.

The age of the involved parties in St. Petersburg was rarely referenced in debriefings (only 3% of all Evidentiary Standards categories compared to 11% in Indianapolis). In contrast, however, believability was the most prominent category (n = 43). This was also the case in Indianapolis, but in St. Petersburg believability accounted for 48% of all Evidentiary Standards categories. Clearly, for St. Petersburg officers, a large number of encounters consist of trying to ferret out the truth. As in Indianapolis, officers could often discern who was telling the truth and who was not (or, at least they believed that they could). One officer stated, for example, that “he was more likely to believe C2’s story, because at least it made sense” [20:3]. Other officers stated they knew with a fair degree of certainty that a citizen was lying [104:2, 136:12, 186:4] or that some people are habitual liars and they “lie to the point where they have no conscience” [403:9]. In some cases, a suspect’s actions give them away – one officer commented that “whenever someone without ID has trouble spelling his name or gives a fairly common name, that indicates it is a false name” [246:3].

Just like in Indianapolis, however, there are a number of occasions when officers cannot determine the truth. One officer noted that it is “a good rule to believe one half of what each party in a dispute says” [215:1]. Another noted that “there was no way to really tell what had happened, as he was getting three stories, C3’s version being right in the middle” [218:4]. So much of the information available in an encounter hinges on the testimony of the parties involved. Absent additional evidence, officer’s options are
limited when the truth is hard to come by. As one officer stated, “If I could read minds, I
would be doing some other line of work” [404:16].

As in Indianapolis, when dealing with individuals who were under the influence, St. Petersburg officers tended to ignore the situation or handle it informally. Similar to Indianapolis, officers noted the difficulty in dealing with individuals who were intoxicated and, in some cases, determined it was “better to ignore” the suspect [248:7]. Other officers noted that it was “impossible to reason with a drunk person” [632:10] and, in one case, admitted that the decision not to arrest was because the suspect was drunk [166:5].

Officers in St. Petersburg, unlike officers in Indianapolis, also occasionally made reference to a more general lack of evidence as a reason to not arrest (accounted for 10% of all Evidentiary Standards categories). In some cases, officers cited a lack of “proof” [44:3, 51:5] or witnesses [248:1]. As one officer stated, he could “never arrest someone unless he was certain that the person was somehow involved” [399:3].

Managing Situations Theme

Officers referenced information related to the Managing Situations theme in debriefings 97 times in Indianapolis and 103 times in St. Petersburg. Although most of what police do can be considered “managing situations,” many of the considerations of when to use arrest are considered in the Evidentiary Standards theme. Thus, the Managing Situations theme consists largely of categories of other action police take short of arrest (or, in some cases, how they determine to take no action). With the exception of
use of force, most working rules in this theme related to categories that had to do with the resolution of an encounter.

**Indianapolis**

Force was occasionally used during an encounter and officers revealed a variety of working rules for when and how they employed it. In the majority of cases where force was used, officer displayed a tendency to “jump the force continuum” (Terrill, 2005). In one case, force was used to intimidate – the officer handcuffed the juvenile suspect to scare him because if he “is a little scared his attitude will change and he will choose to leave” [212:2]. In this particular situation, the officer was met with verbal resistance and, after repeated threats of force (a proportional response to verbal resistance), responded with handcuffing. In this situation, the response was appropriate.

In other cases, force is used to control a situation. One officer, dealing with a suspect in a crowd situation, used mace because the suspect “was trying to get his gang members riled up so they would start a mini-riot” [61:12]. In this encounter, the suspect was resisting verbally and the officer jumped the continuum to pain compliance. Terrill (2005) found that officers were likely to jump the continuum with resistant suspects if

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25 Force continuums are utilized to ensure that any force utilized in a police-citizen encounter is proportional to the resistance seen from the suspect and, further, that any escalation in force occurs in small increments. Jumping the force continuum refers to force that does not adhere to these principles. In a typical force continuum, no resistance is met with no force, passive resistance is met with a command, verbal resistance is met with a threat, defensive resistance is met with restraint and control techniques, and active resistance is met with pain compliance/takedown techniques followed by (if necessary) impact force (Terrill, 2005).
they did not take advantage of repeated opportunities to comply because they become frustrated with the suspect’s noncompliance (p. 134). Thus, it is possible in this situation that the officer responded with a disproportional amount of force because the suspect verbally resisted numerous times. Another officer, again in a crowd situation, handcuffed the suspect upon arrival to “let the citizens know that he was there and that he meant business” [309:1]. This is similar to Terrill’s (2005) finding that officers sometimes jumped the force continuum with nonresistant suspects not for the purpose of control but as a means to establish their social identity (p. 128). In the above referenced case, the officer was responding to a situation of citizens in conflict but had not been subject to any resistance from the suspect before deciding to handcuff him.

Officers also stated that they tempered force against females. For example, one noted that he started to grab the suspect by the throat but, after realizing she was female, pushed her away with his forearm instead [412:2]. Another admitted to wanting to “take her down much harder” while handcuffing a suspect – he desisted because she was pregnant [169:11]. In one instance, an officer referred to what appeared to be an excessive use of force following verbal disrespect by the suspect. The officer admitted that the force employed may have been excessive but he justified it as protective (in this particular situation, his partner initially used force near the top of a staircase and the primary officer was “afraid C2 was going to fall down the stairs and really get hurt and by throwing him in the corner he was trying to be sure the man did not go down the stairs”) [383:6]. Later comments by the same officer, however, clearly implied that the amount of force used was payback for the suspect being verbally disrespectful [383:6].
Officers, in some cases, also choose to forgo formal involvement because it was more expedient. In this case, the working rule is that if it is personally inconvenient, formal resolution is not necessary. In one example, the officer noted that he hoped the suspect would leave in a cooperative way “so he wouldn’t have to fill out any paperwork” [212:2]. In another, an officer declined to stay at the scene because he was hungry and wanted to get something to eat [331:3]. Finally, another officer decided against arresting two suspects because there were three young children in the house. If they arrest the suspects, “they have to call in social workers to take care of the kids and it will take a very long time to finish the procedure” [85:3].

In a large number of encounters (n = 28), officers utilized a working rule to determine when formal police intervention was not warranted at the resolution of an encounter. For some, it was because the dispute was civil in nature, such as an argument about payment [259:10], a custody situation [309:2], or a dispute between landlord and tenant [308:20]. One officer noted that community property was one of the biggest problems because “people just didn’t understand that once they got married everything they had belonged to their spouse as well” [314:4]. In other cases, the officer determined that no criminal action had occurred, such as when one officer stated that he could not have arrested the suspect for making threats [410:2]. Similarly, some action was considered too minor to be worthy of police attention. For example, one officer declined

26 Although another possible interpretation is that this officer might not want to call in social services because she is concerned about the use of scarce public resources, the overall tone of the encounter, and the officer’s clear frustration with the inebriated participants, make it clear that it is a decision made more out of personal expediency rather than concern about proper allocation of limited public assets.
to write a report on two boys fighting because “that was what many boys do” [387:4]. Another declined to arrest for “possession of such a small amount” of marijuana [238:8].

Officers also limited their role if they had no basis for action, such as in cases where a formal order was necessary but not present. Such encounters included those where a restraining order was necessary [9:1] or where it was necessary to place a suspect on a trespass list before he could be compelled to leave [261:1]. Finally, officers had no need to take formal action when the problem solved itself. In most cases, this was because one party in the dispute volunteered to leave.

Officers also limited their actions at the resolution of a dispute if they felt that the victim needed to take some responsibility as well. In debriefings, officers maintained that victims have to help the police in order to be helped. One officer did not arrest a suspect because the victim had not secured a restraining order. He stated that “it would have been easier to take him downtown than way over to where we did take him but the victim has not made any effort” [162:24]. Another noted that after some domestic calls the victim asks if the police are going to wait until she is dead before doing anything. The officer stated that her response was always that the woman should leave the house if she felt her life was in danger [245:10]. In a similar vein, officers made judgments about a victim’s willingness to follow through and, if they decided follow through was unlikely, used it as justification for not taking action. In one case, the officer said it was up to the female when making an arrest and since the victim left the scene the officer “inferred that she wouldn’t file charges or testify in court” [108:1].

When a stronger police stance was necessary to resolve a dispute, officers used the threat of arrest effectively (n = 16). In some cases, officers admitted to using bluffs –
that is, threatening arrest even if it was not justified to resolve a dispute. For example, one officer used the threat of arrest to compel the suspect to leave for the night. He admitted that his main concern was removing the suspect from the situation and that sometimes police have to “rely on a somewhat questionable arrest to do so” [372:15]. Another stated that he resorted to threatening arrest in order to resolve the dispute even though he never would have arrested the suspect for such a minor transgression. He reasoned that if he “acted authoritarian enough, the suspect would not question it” [509:3]. Officers also used the threat of arrest to guard against a return visit by police. As one officer noted, “it is a good idea to warn the parties that if the police have to return they will make an arrest [because] this usually encourages citizens to work the problem out on their own in a peaceful manner” [353:6]. Terrill and Paoline (2007), in their analysis of alternative actions used when arrest was warranted, found that threat of arrest was the most frequent non-arrest action used. The current qualitative findings regarding the rather liberal use of the threat of arrest seem to corroborate their findings.

Officers who threatened arrest made good on this threat – a return visit did equal arrest. As one officer noted, the second time they had to go somewhere they looked for a reason to arrest the suspect [228:4]. There is no doubt that ignoring an officer’s warning to desist tended to result in jail. In the view of one, the “suspect had been warned several times not to come back, but he had, so he got arrested” [258:18]. Similarly, another stated that “he had no choice but to arrest the suspect after the warning they gave her” [409:13]. Officers also utilized arrest as a short-term solution. One stated that arresting the suspect was “a way of taking care of the problem for the day” [233:6]. This is similar to Bittner’s
(1967) conclusion that police officers do not really enforce the law, even when they invoke it, but rather use it as a resource to solve practical problems in keeping the peace.

However, arrest as a resolution to a dispute was rare. Officers were far more likely to utilize working rules to determine when not to arrest in a dispute. For some, the particulars of an encounter resulted in leniency. For example, one officer decided not to arrest because the suspect was attending his daughter’s birthday party [374:2]. Officers also made a decision not to arrest simply out of practicality. In one case, the officer concluded that there were too many people involved in the encounter to arrest anyone [409:1]. In others, a decision not to arrest was due to apathy. In one, the officer explained that he “didn’t worry too much about not arresting someone because If they were doing something illegal they would probably do it again and he would get them. If they didn’t do it again then that was what society wanted anyway” [306:6]. Reasons of leniency and practicality were also cited by Terrill & Paoline (2007) in their qualitative analysis of officers’ reasoning behind decisions not to arrest.

Many of the disputes officers face are domestic in nature. Not surprisingly, in a number of debriefings officers provided a working rule for responding to a domestic call – remove one party. The rationale behind the rule was that removing one individual from the scene would lessen the chances of police having to return. As one officer explained, “it was better to make sure that a person left so the police would not be called back later to deal with a situation they should have taken care of the first time” [241:23]. In one encounter, the officer even drove the suspect away from the scene because he believed if they left the suspect at the scene “he would go back to the house immediately after they left and it might cause another conflict” [86:23]. However, not all officers followed this
rule when it came to domestic encounters. One officer stated that she “rarely made people leave” [271:3] and another noted that his role in such encounters is to serve “mostly as a peace keeper” [361:14].

**St. Petersburg**

The use of force category was rare in both sites, but it was very rare in St. Petersburg. Use of force made up just 1% of the categories related to Managing Situations in St. Petersburg compared to 7% in Indianapolis. In that one case, the officer noted that he was glad the suspect gave some resistance because he “likes to start out his nights like this” [170:1]. Based on officer debriefings, however, that type of “cowboy” mentality was a rarely held view by St. Petersburg officers.

Similar to Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg were candid about when their resolution of an encounter amounted to the most expedient solution (12% of all Managing Situations categories compared to 9% in Indianapolis). Officers made comments about an arrest not being worth the time [39:3] or not wanting to deal with troublesome citizens [122:12, 405:7]. In some circumstances, officers were clear that their expedient response was influenced by the fact that someone else could handle the problem. One officer declined to take any action in an encounter because it was a “code inspector problem” [259:10]. In a few cases, officers chose an expedient route due to existing paperwork demands. As one officer commented, he “did not arrest C2 because he was already going to be at the station all fucking morning doing paperwork on the man that committed the initial burglary/aggravated battery and he did not feel like doing another report on C2 as he was more or less defending himself” [467:10].
St. Petersburg officers were also very similar to Indianapolis officers when it came to determining when formal action was not warranted. Debriefings indicated that they developed the same types of working rules when it came to determining if the encounter was civil in nature or only a minor criminal matter. Similarly, if a problem solved itself there was no need for formal police intervention nor was there a need if a formal order was required but not present. Officers in St. Petersburg also limited their actions at resolution of a dispute if, similar to officers in Indianapolis, they felt that the victim needed to take some responsibility for resolving the dispute as well. If, for example, victims had not secured a restraining order [632:10, 636:9] or refused to provide any evidence of wrongdoing [32:5, 47:3, 104:2, 224:9] there was little officers could (or were willing) to do.

One interesting difference between Indianapolis and St. Petersburg when it came to the Managing Situation theme was the dominance of the threat of arrest category in Indianapolis (17% of all Managing Situations categories) and its complete absence in St. Petersburg. Officers in St. Petersburg made no mention of using the threat of arrest to resolve a dispute in their debriefings. When arrest was used, though, there were differences in its use between the two sites. In Indianapolis, the threat of arrest was used to guard against a return visit and, if officers did return, they often made good on their threat. Officers did not develop the same working rule in St. Petersburg. Rather, arrest was used as a short-term solution (similar to Indianapolis) but officers in St. Petersburg also developed working rules about arrest when there is a warrant and when the suspect could not verify his or her identity. As one officer stated, he would have normally just issued a trespass warning but he had to arrest the suspect because he “did not have a
photo ID on him and could not positively verify where C1 lived” [246:3]. Officers in Indianapolis either did not develop these working rules or they did not come up in debriefings. The working rules leading to decisions not to arrest were similar in both sites. As in Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg declined to arrest as a matter of leniency, when evidence was lacking, and, in a few cases, out of apathy.

In terms of dealing with domestics in particular, officers in both sites developed similar working rules. However, officers in St. Petersburg appear slightly more cautious about the resolution of a domestic. In the majority of cases, officers ensure one party leaves the scene. Indianapolis officers were slightly more willing to take a limited role in domestic situations. Officers in St. Petersburg appear to have more of a “CYA” mentality than Indianapolis officers (discussed in further detail below) and this may account for the slight differences between the two sites in resolving domestic disputes.

The Influence of Cognitive Frameworks

As mentioned previously, there were four themes that did not directly result in the creation of a working rule (refer to Table 5.1). It is not clear exactly how these themes influence decision-making, but it is clear that officers develop numerous opinions about the citizens they encounter, the situations they face, and the often frustrating nature of police work. They also revealed some categories of frameworks relating to individual style and preference that likely influence decisions when resolving disputes. Each will be discussed in turn.
Classifying Citizens

Indianapolis

Officers tended to put citizens into categories when resolving a dispute situation (n = 88). Categorizing a victim or offender by some sort of general “type” helped the decision process for many officers. Officers often expressed a familiarity with citizens (n = 23) noting either that they were prone to have problems or that they typically were not involved with police and, thus, the current encounter was unusual. Oftentimes, officers claimed prior knowledge of family situations or neighborhood problems which they sometimes projected onto other relatives. One officer, in an encounter with a juvenile, claimed prior knowledge of the child’s uncles and was relatively harsh in his treatment of the juvenile given the minor crime committed. He stated in the debriefing that if the juvenile was “anything like his uncles he was an extreme turd and would ultimately end in jail someday” [387:4]. In many encounters, the officer knew the individual had a reputation for criminal involvement. Such a reputation from previous encounters tended to color the existing encounter. In one instance the officer, making reference to his familiarity with the citizen, informed the observer at the start of the encounter that the complainant was a “bitch” [169:11]. Another noted that the suspect had “been the thug of the neighborhood for too long. He sold dope, did drive-by shootings, and fired shots at old ladies” [262:6]. In another encounter, the officer noted that he had been to the house 10 times in the past month and arrested the suspect three times in the last week. He concluded that “it’s getting to the point every time I see her I arrest her” [419:23].

Officers also noted a familiarity with mental health status when making a decision in how to resolve a dispute. In cases where the suspect appeared mentally disturbed,
officers moved with caution. One officer, handling an encounter with a suspect who was known to him, stated that “when dealing with C2 he was to be a little more gentle than he typically is with other citizens because C2 gets scared easily” [364:3]. Another officer decided against making a call for “Immediate Attention” because the rules for such a call dictate that the emergency personnel must strap the individual down when transporting in the ambulance. This officer did not feel that such an action was “suitable for the suspect who was already so distressed and really needed counseling, not any further trauma” [470:3].

The amount of deference shown an officer also contributes to how an officer classifies a citizen (n = 12). Although, as has been oft-debated in the literature, a disrespectful attitude should not be considered as “evidence” (since being disrespectful is not against the law) officers do consider attitude when making an arrest decision. One officer described his style of policing as “treating citizens as they treat you” [120:2] and another stated that he makes the decision on whether someone goes to jail or not based on whether or not they give him an attitude [217:2]. In a number of cases, officers stated that offenders “talked” their way into jail. As one officer noted, if the suspect had cooperated she never would have checked him out – she only checked for priors because of his “bad attitude” [215:10]. In another, the officer stated that the suspect could be home instead of in juvenile if she had been respectful [231:17]. A disrespectful attitude also has other consequences such as invalidating testimony (one officer admitted to not caring about a citizen’s concerns because of his attitude [196:4]) and inviting the use of force. In the words of one officer, he hoped the suspect “had a hell of a headache in the morning and remembered to never smart off to another police officer” [383:6].
Officers also made a large number of judgments about citizens which they referenced in their post-encounter debriefings and how a victim or suspect was classified also made an impact on officers’ decision making. Officer comments revealed that their views toward citizens could be either sympathetic or unsympathetic. Sympathetic victims were viewed with compassion – one officer deliberately separated a victim of domestic violence from her husband in order to gain her side of the story. As he noted, he “got the impression that she was afraid to talk and might talk if the suspect wasn’t’ around” [8:1]. Sympathetic suspects were viewed with something close to respect because, for example, they had told the truth [232:5] or because the officer believed they had unknowingly gotten caught up in something they could not handle [264:7].

Unsympathetic victims, on the other hand, were deemed to be disrespectful of officers’ time [8:15, 180:1] or were deemed less deserving of the law’s intervention because of their involvement in drug activity [36:5]. Deeming a victim as unsympathetic had implications for the way officers treated them. One officer, for example, claimed he was about ready to “lock her up because she was so annoying” [217:2]. Another claimed a preference for not working where the “poor white trash live” because he cannot handle working with victims from that area [222:7]. Still another, expressing disdain for the victim’s living conditions, stated that she was “more worried about the roaches than the people” [417:4]. In short, by making assumptions and judgments about those they came in contact with (such as by deeming victims to be unsympathetic or undeserving) officers could potentially deem such victims less worthy of police assistance.

Officers did clearly ignore victim preference when they deemed the victim to be undeserving – in a small, but still disturbing, number of domestic violence cases, officers
demonstrated a “blame the victim” mentality. One officer stated that if he filed a report the victim would not follow through with the complaint anyway so he “saw no point in making an arrest” [255:5]. Another, when encountering a situation where the suspects (the victim’s uncles) had assaulted the victim (a known drug dealer), commented that he was ignoring the victim’s preference for arrest because he agreed with what the suspects had done. As he told the suspects, “I think it’s great you care enough about him to get him away from the drugs, but you are in the wrong in the eyes of the law and I’m doing you a favor by not arresting you” [36:5]. Finally, another officer noted that the victim “can call the police but she can’t call for a ride” to remove herself from the situation. He further noted that the victim “needs someone to beat her for being so stupid and letting the suspect beat her in the first place” [214:5]. Although it is a minority view, officers who view victims of domestic violence as unworthy of police attention are problematic.

An analysis of the handful of encounters where victims were classified as either unsympathetic or undeserving in such a manner revealed that officers in such cases declined to arrest, threaten arrest, or file a report (choosing instead to more informally separate the involved parties). However, encounters in which officers determined victims to be unsympathetic also happened to be encounters in which there were no injuries, and in which the victim had specifically requested arrest. Encounters in which officers deemed victims to be undeserving were a different matter. As already mentioned above, officers did ignore victim injury as well as victim requests to file a report and arrest the suspects. It is a subtle distinction, but there does appear to be a line between classifying a victim as "unsympathetic" and classifying a victim as "undeserving." There are too few cases in this sample to fully investigate officers' views on victims classified in this
manner, but it is worth exploring further in future inquiry how officer views regarding victims translates into specific action or inaction.

Officers, not surprisingly, also often classified suspects and disputants as unsympathetic as well, expressing opinions about living conditions, lifestyle choices, or parenting abilities. In some debriefings, officers referred to citizens as “idiots” [18:4, 417:3] and “punks” [191:15, 398:16]. Some made assumptions about incest and promiscuity. One officer surmised that a family “had incest written all over it” and concluded that people like that should not raise kids [128:8]. Another noted that the victim had a legitimate reason to worry about her children being at her ex-husband’s because “out here it doesn’t matter whether or not you’re related when it comes to shit like that” [400:5]. Officers also made class distinctions stating, for example, that the trailer park consisted mostly of “white trash” [271:9] or, after resolving a dispute, noting to the observer “how quickly things can start in these low income apartment buildings” [412:2]. Opinions about parenting skills were also revealed in debriefings. In some, officers lamented parents’ inabilities to control their children as the police were called in to resolve the situation. In others, they noted that the parent’s behavior set a bad example for the child. Such classification affected how an officer interacted with citizens but, interestingly, in no dispute did officers’ opinions about parenting result in the removal of minor children.

**St. Petersburg**

As in Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg used information about an encounter to put citizens into categories when resolving a dispute. The proportions for each
category, however, were quite different. The most common classification consisted of being familiar with a citizen due to prior involvement. In St. Petersburg, this category accounted for 39% of all Classifying Citizens categories (compared to 26% in Indianapolis). As in Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg professed prior knowledge of mental illness or impairment. For example, one officer predicted that he would be called back to the location the next day because the suspect was a “mental patient and often forgot, or refused, to take his drugs” [32:4]. Officers also expressed familiarity with neighborhood or family situations, and with individuals with whom they had had prior contact noting, for example, that the suspect was a “known drug dealer” [159:1] or gang member [39:3] or had been arrested previously [185:2, 251:11, 636:9].

Disrespect was present in the same proportion of encounters in both sites (13% of all Classifying Citizens categories in both sites) but was considered differently. Officers in St. Petersburg referenced the influence of disrespect in more cases with juveniles than was mentioned in Indianapolis. That may explain why disrespect did not lead to the same type of action. Whereas in Indianapolis there were multiple working rules developed in accordance with disrespect (such as inviting force or references to a suspect “talking” his or her way into jail) disrespect in St. Petersburg did not have the same influence on officers. In some cases, officers did note that CONTINUED disrespect would have consequences, but initial disrespect did not. For example, one officer stated that if a disputant “kept on talking the way he was” he would have arrested him for interfering with the arrest [372:3]. Another noted that if the suspect had not moved as he was walking toward him, he would have been arrested [227:7]. In one case, the officer commented that he was likely to arrest for a violation of a restraining order, but he would
have to “see the husband’s attitude” [645:4]. Despite those examples, however, disrespect in St. Petersburg seemed to lead to action less than in Indianapolis. Officers made note of it in their debriefings, but did NOT act on it very often. One officer stated that “despite the fact that the suspect had been disrespectful to him at the beginning of the encounter, he had not wanted to make the decision to arrest until he had talked to everyone involved” [40:1].

Officers in St. Petersburg also occasionally deemed victims to be undeserving or unsympathetic (8% of all Classifying Citizens categories). In some cases officers classified the victim as unsympathetic if they had brought the problem on themselves. As one officer noted, the victims had “gotten themselves into that mess by letting their son mooch off them for so long” [407:9]. Officers also did not like victims who had an attitude. One commented that he had “been tempted to threaten C1 with filing a false report just because C1 had been so smug” [51:4]. However, officers in St. Petersburg who classified victims as unsympathetic seemed to do so with less disdain than did officers in Indianapolis. In St. Petersburg, unlike in Indianapolis, there were no debriefings that indicated officers ignored victim preference if the victim was undeserving. In other words, St. Petersburg officers did not reveal the same “blame the victim” mentality that was present among a minority of Indianapolis officers.

The same appeared to be true for classifying disputants and suspects as unsympathetic. Again, officers in St. Petersburg made such classifications less often than officers in Indianapolis. In Indianapolis, 33% of all Classifying Citizens categories were unsympathetic suspect compared to 22% in St. Petersburg. As with unsympathetic victims, even though officers classified some suspects as unsympathetic, they appeared to
do so with less disdain than officers in Indianapolis. Officers in Indianapolis referred to living conditions, parenting ability, and made assumptions about incest and class distinctions when referring to unsympathetic suspects. Officers in St. Petersburg resorted primarily to name calling, stating suspects were “scumbags” [198:5, 221:13], “stupid” [39:3, 433:14], “punks” [457:5], and “bitches” [436:5].

Classifying Situations

Indianapolis

Officers also occasionally classified a situation upon arrival to an encounter (n = 14). In some cases, officers considered the element of danger or risk upon entry to an encounter – debriefings revealed both concerns about potential violence and safety considerations. Some of this concern stemmed from limited information from dispatch. One officer responding to a “call unspecified” stated that “you just don’t know and you can never assume anything.” He responded with considerable haste because he believed the call might be for a female off duty officer in need of help. [14:4]. Another officer was very bothered by the limited information he received on his MDT about a domestic incident. He commented that “it is situations like this where an officer goes in blind that are dangerous. You could walk in and ask ‘Did you call the police?’ – ‘No, she did’ and BLAM” [180:1]. There is no doubt that uncertainty changes officer actions. One officer drew his weapon upon arrival because “whenever he is unsure about the circumstances surrounding a dangerous suspect he takes extra precaution” [374:3]. Others, reflecting the time period during which POPN data was collected, expressed reservations about interacting with victims and suspects who were bleeding. One expressed being wary of
blood at crime scenes because of the risk of blood borne pathogens [33:2]. Another stated that he would not normally have asked the suspect to sit so many times, he would have just “slammed him down,” but he did not because of the blood [162:14]. It can be assumed that the prevalence of the AIDS epidemic during the data collection timeframe contributed to the vocalization of this particular safety concern.

In a small number of debriefings, officers noted the unpredictable nature of their work stating that calls can change quickly. One described an encounter as something that appeared to be fairly minor at first because it was dispatched as a 911 hangup but it “escalated quickly” [362:10]. Another noted that the call had originally come over as a vandalism report and “see what it can turn into” [303:5]. In such situations, officers have to reclassify the framework under which they have entered an encounter as it is not unfolding as expected. In the previous example, dispatch indicated a vandalism call and the officer, presumably, expected the encounter to unfold in a similar manner to previous vandalism calls. Upon realizing that the encounter was not a vandalism call but was instead a domestic dispute the officer has to reframe the situation and adjust his expectations. Officers also noted prior experience with certain locations which may influence their actions. In one case, a street was part of a nuisance abatement effort so the officer had to make a report [147:5]. Other officers made a point to note previous runs to problem addresses such as “getting runs to that apartment constantly” [272:5] or that “the area always generates a lot of fights with kids” [229:8]. Prior unfavorable knowledge of a location may color an officer’s experiences with the citizens involved.
St. Petersburg

Officers in St. Petersburg also classified situations but, like Indianapolis, this was not a very prevalent theme (n = 12). Expressions of the potential for violence or considerations for safety were common in debriefings. One officer noted that he was greatly outnumbered in the encounter and wanted to settle the incident as quickly as he could [259:10]. Another, responding to a domestic, commented that homosexual domesticas were “among the most violent and pose a very high risk for the officer” [107:3]. Officers also indicated that some citizens purposely claimed the call was more serious than it was to make the police respond faster – in one, they claimed there was a gun involved because they knew officers would consider it urgent [94:2]. As in Indianapolis, there seems to be some minor indication that officers are aware of the burgeoning AIDS epidemic. One officer left a scene without resolving it because he did not want to deal with any “bleeding fags.” He further stated that he “genuinely hoped C1 and C2 resolved their differences but that he was not going to expose himself to a health risk in order to help them” [50:6].

Officers in St. Petersburg did not make mention of unpredictability in their debriefings, but they did note how familiarity with an area may affect their response to a situation. For example, one officer noted that when an area’s residents become known for making calls sound more serious than they are, the calls are taken less seriously over time [94:2]. Others noted problem areas that receive numerous calls such as a low-income housing complex [94:8], a juvenile facility [95:3], and a trailer park [640:6]. One officer stated that the community pool is a problem because “every time the pool is about to close and it is time for the kids to go home there is always a fight” [457:5].
Frustrations

Indianapolis

Officers often expressed frustration in their encounters with citizens (n = 62). In particular, a large number of officers expressed frustration over calls they deemed a “waste of time.” Officers responding to minor calls often expressed disbelief that the police had been called. For example, one officer stated he “could not believe someone actually called the police because of a few water balloons” [140:2]. Another noted that the call was “a problem that should have been handled within the home” [391:2] while another questioned why police were necessary when “it was a problem that any half way intelligent individual could handle on their own” [390:1]. Finally, one officer, after responding to a “bogus call,” stated that “there was no reason for us to be there. What you saw back there was just asinine. But that’s the kind of calls we get. A bunch of monkey calls like that one” [6:12]. According to the observer’s classification of the type of problem encountered, calls that officers deemed to be a waste of time consisted primarily of domestic arguments, neighbor trouble, and domestic and non-domestic fights.

Officers tended to consider such calls a waste of time because they had more important things to do. One commented that he would “rather go on a triple murder than on a run like this” [144:10]. Another, after a shooting call with multiple victims came over the radio, stated to the observer “it was a shame he was out wasting his time bullshitting around and babysitting the victim and suspect” [17:4]. Others noted a manpower shortage when responding to “nuisance calls.” One officer noted that with the manpower shortage they “do not have time to throw away on these type of calls” [14:4].
Similarly, another stated that “this was a huge waste of time on this particular night because of the short amount of officers that were on duty that night” [380:1].

A second major frustration expressed by officers was futility. In many encounters, police expressed the opinion that a police presence does not solve anything. Officers repeatedly predicted that they would be returning to the location later in their shift. As one predicted, the police “would get another run out here today because the guy was so stubborn about leaving” [117:10]. Another stated that she did not think anything had been solved and that “the police will most likely have to come back out sometime soon for the same thing” [142:10]. In a third example, the officer “gave them an hour and a half before they got another run at the location and it would probably be a huge fight” [267:1]. The feeling that police intervention did not prevent a return visit was a fairly widespread frustration among officers.

Officers also felt a sense of futility about the limits of what police can accomplish, that the trouble will continue but they will not be able to help the victim. One officer predicted that the victim will receive a beating from the suspect for “putting him through the hassle with the police.” He further stated that what usually happens is the citizens are “nice and kiss face in front of the police but as soon as we’re gone . . . POW” [14:4]. Another jokingly lamented that “they’ll end up killing each other. But what are you gonna do?” [4:8]. Finally, another officer stated that the victim is “going to end up getting killed. We can’t protect him all the time. He owes too many people money, and they will probably get him tonight” [422:6].

In a few encounters, officers expressed frustration about their inability to make everybody happy (or, citizens’ tendencies to blame police for their troubles). As one
officer noted, “I can’t understand why people call the police and then tear into them when they arrive” [184:9]. Another stated that “it is aggravating when people called the police but then did not want to listen to what they had to say” [228:11]. Finally, one officer professed that he loved his job, but that one of the things he did not like “was the fact that officers can never make everyone happy” [309:1].

Officers were also frustrated when they felt justice was not served. In some cases, their sympathy was for the suspect. One officer stated that he “hated that the wife had to be arrested because he knew she was the victim but she had violated the restraining order which she herself had filed” [34:1]. In other cases, they blamed the system. One officer had frequent involvement with a suspect who had been placed on an electronic tether for selling drugs. He lamented that the tether was not working because the suspect could still deal out of his yard and said he “planned to bust the suspect for violating his probation until he was eventually locked up” [262:6].

Finally, officers also expressed their frustrations at citizens who think they know the law. One noted that “everyone thinks you need a warrant and they know more than the law” [286:15]. Another stated that other people “didn’t know the streets like officers do” [315:11]. Although it was an infrequently stated frustration, officers (not surprisingly) do not like citizens telling them how to do their jobs.

**St. Petersburg**

Officers in St. Petersburg expressed a number of same frustrations that officers in Indianapolis did. Debriefings indicate that frustrations regarding calls that are considered a waste of time (n = 16) and the feeling that the work they do is futile (n = 29) were the
most common. Although not as large a number, St. Petersburg officers also expressed frustration over the tendency of citizens to blame the police and the feeling that, in some cases, justice was not served. These four aggravations were common to both sites, and made up the majority of the categories under the Frustrations theme (94% in Indianapolis and 85% in St. Petersburg).

Other categories, though they were only a small minority, were reflected differently. In Indianapolis, some officers expressed frustration about citizens thinking they knew the law. That category was not present in St. Petersburg. Similarly, there were two categories in St. Petersburg that were not expressed in Indianapolis. First, officers expressed frustration with either other officers or dispatch. Again, this was not a large component of the overall Frustrations theme, but officers noted in debriefings that their jobs were harder if others had not done theirs. For example, one officer stated being upset because another officer who had been called about the same problem had not turned in paperwork on the trespass order [98:6] and now he would have to do it. Another expressed frustration with officers who would not take the call when dispatched but would volunteer for backup after he had taken the call [467:10]. In another encounter, the officer expressed frustration with dispatch because they had sent her into a homosexual domestic (deemed more dangerous) without backup [107:3]. Second, officers expressed frustration over the criminal justice system noting, for example, doubts about the State Attorney pursuing a case [228:5] or the juvenile justice system [248:1, 279:2]. Some officers consider the system to be too lenient. One stated that the juvenile justice system is “too lenient” [279:2] and another noted that he had arrested juveniles “several times for the same offenses, and the juvenile court just let them out again” [248:1].
Individual officer style and preferences

Indianapolis

A final cognitive framework theme was individual officer style and preferences. Officers expressed differences in how they approached an encounter, how they tended to interact with citizens, and how they viewed their jobs. For example, many officers disclosed in their debriefings that they preferred a more congenial approach when initially responding to a dispute. As one stated, she “tried to approach people with the philosophy that you can catch more flies with honey than vinegar” [228:10]. Another stated that she liked to “try and talk things through first” and if that does not work then she will consider arrest [142:10]. Others mentioned the desire to be “as least intrusive as possible” [232:2] or to “not go into a situation in a heavy-handed way if it could be avoided” [228:4]. After the initial entry into the encounter, some officers indicated that they altered their communication technique depending on the type of citizen encountered. For example, after an encounter with juveniles, one officer revealed that he deliberately spoke in a “loud and stern tone with children” because he felt it was “effective in getting his point across” [44:2]. Another noted that females tend to be hesitant to share information in domestic disputes and it “sometimes takes some coaxing to get them to explain the problem” [356:5].

Some officers revealed an empathetic stance in their debriefings. Officers tended to identify with the citizens they encountered empathizing with individuals going through a divorce [470:3] or understanding the frustrations faced by landlords [308:14, 395:15]. In other cases, officers expressed a general sympathy for the situation, particularly if there were children involved [180:7, 228:10, 271:6]. In contrast, a couple of officers
revealed that they preferred to keep their distance. For example, one noted that she preferred to know as little about people’s personal lives as possible – she just tried to “settle the problem and then get out” [252:10].

When it came to call type preferences, officers mentioned domestic calls in particular in their debriefings. Those who did tended to view such calls with dislike. One officer noted that most domestic calls are “all bullshit” [18:4] while others professed a hatred [144:10, 211:14, 380:1] or dislike [180:1] for domestic calls. However, one officer noted the variety of experience in domestic situations noting that “100 domestic calls may turn out to be 100 different situations” and it was “interesting to handle different situations” [97:1]. Clearly, some officers go into an encounter with preconceived notions about what to expect.

**St. Petersburg**

As in Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg expressed their views on how to interact with citizens at the start of an encounter, albeit in smaller numbers. In St. Petersburg, the approach to encounter category accounted for 8% of all Individual Officer Style and Preferences categories (compared to 24% in Indianapolis). Those few officers who did express an opinion in debriefings stated that a positive approach to police-citizen encounters was more effective. As one officer noted, people want to know that “they are dealing with a human being and not a robot in uniform” [608:27]. One officer explained that the most important thing she can do in a domestic dispute is “to build a good first impression with the police” so the victim would not hesitate to call in the future if there were any more problems [342:2].
Similar to Indianapolis, officers in St. Petersburg also described both empathetic and detached demeanors in involvement with citizens. Some preferred to try and put themselves in the citizens “shoes” [318:8]. One officer stated that “when it was relevant to the problem at hand he tried to tell people about his own life experiences” because “people might see him as a human being if they knew he’d dealt with many of the same problems they were facing” [608:27]. Other officers expressed a preference to remain “neutral” [342:9] or “detached” [341:6]. As one officer complained, in certain calls “the participants want to tell him their whole life story and he has to struggle to get them to focus on just getting through the night without killing each other” [261:8].

There were also similarities between officers in both sites when it came to call type preferences. As in Indianapolis, domestics were the only call type mentioned and, for the most part, officers disliked them. However, officers in St. Petersburg differed from Indianapolis officers in that they frequently stated they took a “cover your ass” approach in certain situations [40:1, 170:1, 227:6, 642:2]. This category accounted for 30% of all Individual Officer Style and Preferences category in St. Petersburg compared to 5% in Indianapolis. In particular, officers took a CYA approach to ensure they were covered if there was further trouble or if they felt a citizen was going to lodge a complaint. For example, one officer stated that it was important to make all parties in a dispute happy, particularly older citizens because they “tend to make complaints about officers” [168:7]. Another officer expressed frustration that he now has to write a report about an encounter because the citizen is “going to make a complaint against them” [645:5].
When it came to ensuring that officers are “covered” in case of further trouble, one officer noted that the “new laws” made most officers lean toward making the arrest while another stated that any time an officer has to use force with a suspect it is a “good idea to arrest the citizen for resisting” – by doing this it “covers your ass” [170:1]. In another example, the officer noted he would not usually “write a report for an incident like this” but he would “just to cover the department in case something happened” [215:1]. Other officers were clear that domestic situations in particular prompted a CYA approach. One officer stated he “hates” domestics because “frequently it gets turned around on the police the next day. The man comes back and beats the woman up, than [sic] the woman reports that she had the police there the night before” and she told the police “he was beating her up but they didn’t care” [104:2]. In this type of case, the officer continues, officers “absolutely had to write a report just in case something like that did happen.” Another explained that he could “get in trouble” if something happens in the future and there is no report – now, “if C2 comes back and kills C1, I will not be held accountable” because “it will be on record that the police have been called to the house for a domestic” [645:3].

The Decision Process

In addition to coding the officer debriefings for theme, the narrative summary of the encounter was also coded for the process of a decision. As noted above, for Indianapolis, out of 612 distinct dispute encounters, 234 were coded for process and, for St. Petersburg, out of 452 distinct dispute encounters, 155 were coded for process (refer to Table 4.2 in chapter 4).
Narratives were mined for any additional contributors to the final decision not provided for in the coded dataset (e.g. what type of additional information an officer solicits) as well as to determine which pieces of information officers deliberately solicited as they went through the process of making a decision. A cue was coded as solicited if the officer asked for the information or made an attempt to get information from another source. A readily available cue (e.g. injury, age of the suspect, etc) was coded as accessed if the officer mentioned its importance somewhere in the narrative account or debriefing. Obvious cues (those in which the officer had no choice but to be aware of it, such as a major injury) were coded as well even if they were not specifically mentioned. Coded cues were also given an “access point” in the data set – solicited (officer asked for information), volunteered (suspect or victim provided information without being asked), disclosed (e.g. officer states prior knowledge of participant), or experienced (a cue so obvious it had to be relevant, a cue the officer responds to (e.g. citizens in conflict), or the importance of cue was mentioned in narrative or debriefing). Information specifically disregarded was coded as well. Such cases included instances where the officer asked for the victim/complainant preference (and then specifically stated later that it did not factor into the decision) and stated disregard for a legal status (e.g. suspect had a warrant but the officer declined to arrest).

The decision process also consists of interim and final decisions. Oftentimes, the officer may make an initial decision and, if additional information is offered or solicited, reach a different, subsequent decision. These interim and final decisions were coded as well. Cues that significantly alter an officer’s decision process (e.g. prompted the officer to change from a decision to arrest to a decision to not arrest) are referred to as “game
changers” and were also coded. Coding of cues and decisions stopped once the narrative indicated a final decision has been reached (which can, and often does, occur early on in the encounter). For the decision process, up to ten cues were coded. In addition, up to four interim decisions were coded prior to the final decision (appendix E provides a listing of the possible cues and decisions).

**Decision Cues**

In Indianapolis, for more than half of the encounters (63%), officers considered four cues or fewer before making a decision (table 5.2). In 81% of the encounters, officers considered five cues or fewer and in 91% of encounters they considered six cues or less. Thus, in only 22 (9%) encounters were seven or more cues considered by officers. St. Petersburg officers, likewise, considered a relatively small amount of information before making a decision (table 5.2). In more than half of the encounters (61%), officers considered four cues or fewer before making a decision. In 76% of encounters, officers considered five cues and in 83% encounters they considered six cues (table 5.2). In only 27 (17%) encounters were seven or more cues considered by officers. Overall, St. Petersburg officers considered slightly more cues on average in an encounter than Indianapolis officers.

In Indianapolis, the most common cue considered, by far, was testimonial evidence from an involved party (table 5.3). This was the first cue for officers in 67% of encounters and it remained prominent for subsequent cues (largely because officers would interview all involved parties as a first step). In cases where testimonial evidence was not the first cue, officers first considered the fact that citizens were in verbal or physical conflict (5.9% of encounters), that the involved party was not a minor (4.7% ),
evidence of physical injury (3.8%), and evidence of use of drugs or alcohol (3.8%). In 8.5% of encounters, the first cue considered was coded as “other.” This included primarily such things as an officer having previous knowledge of the location or involved citizens or an officer returning to a location previously visited. The majority of cues were solicited (table 5.4).

Table 5.2: Total Number of Cues Considered by Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th></th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Cue</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Cues</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Cues</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Cues</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Cues</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Cues</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven Cues</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight Cues</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine Cues</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten Cues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query additional info</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in verbal/physical conflict</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests action</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intoxication</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party requests action</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leaves voluntarily</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No warrant found</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unwilling to leave</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon use</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confession</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property damage</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests no action</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No injury</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved party returns to scene</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect resists/threatens</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties at scene</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental illness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect tries to flee</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Frequency of Cues Considered by Officers (Indianapolis)
Table 5.3: Frequency of Cues Considered by Officers (Indianapolis) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 1</th>
<th>Cue 2</th>
<th>Cue 3</th>
<th>Cue 4</th>
<th>Cue 5</th>
<th>Cue 6</th>
<th>Cue 7</th>
<th>Cue 8</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No intoxication</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of formal order</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue Total</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In only four encounters were nine cues coded, and in only one encounter were 10 cues coded. These were excluded from the table.
Table 5.4: Manner in Which Cue Was Provided (Indianapolis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 1</th>
<th>Cue 2</th>
<th>Cue 3</th>
<th>Cue 4</th>
<th>Cue 5</th>
<th>Cue 6</th>
<th>Cue 7</th>
<th>Cue 8</th>
<th>Cue 9</th>
<th>Cue 10</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referenced</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteered</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicited</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue Total</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of testimonial evidence, suspect or disputant testimony was the most common type followed by victim testimony (table 5.5). In 44% of the cases where victim testimony was present, the victim accused the suspect of assault or of threatening assault. In slightly more than half of the cases (56%) the victim accused the suspect of some other type of wrongdoing. Physical injury to citizens was rare. In 40% of the cases where an injury was present in an encounter, the victim alone was the injured party.

Table 5.5 Type of Testimonial Evidence Provided

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From victim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuses suspect of assault</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuses suspect of threatening assault</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuses suspect of wrongdoing</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denies any problem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From suspect/disputant</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From third party</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From witness</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From officer already on scene</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals do not add up to testimony cue totals in tables 5.3 and 5.5 because there could be multiple testimony cues of the same type in one encounter.
As in Indianapolis, the most common cue considered in St. Petersburg was testimonial evidence from an involved party (table 5.6). This was the first cue for officers in 69% of encounters. In cases where testimonial evidence was not the first cue, officers also considered the fact that the citizens were in verbal or physical conflict (5.2%) or the involved party was a minor (3.9%). In 13.5% of encounters, the first cue considered was coded as “other.” This included primarily such things as an officer having previous knowledge of the location or involved citizens or an officer returning to a location previously visited. The majority of cues were solicited or volunteered (table 5.7).

Similar to Indianapolis, suspect or disputant testimony was the most common type followed by victim testimony (table 5.5). The breakdown of type of victim testimony was nearly identical to Indianapolis, but in St. Petersburg, 6% of the victims interviewed denied any had occurred problem. Physical injury to citizens in St. Petersburg was also rare. In 61% of the cases where an injury was present in an encounter, the victim alone was the injured party.
Table 5.6: Frequency of Cues Considered by Officers (St. Petersburg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cue</th>
<th>Cue 1</th>
<th>Cue 2</th>
<th>Cue 3</th>
<th>Cue 4</th>
<th>Cue 5</th>
<th>Cue 6</th>
<th>Cue 7</th>
<th>Cue 8</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query additional info</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in verbal/physical conflict</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intoxication</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party requests action</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leaves voluntarily</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No warrant found</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unwilling to leave</td>
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<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon use</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confession</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property damage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests no action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No injury</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved party returns to scene</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect resists/threatens officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 ---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6: Frequency of Cues Considered by Officers (St. Petersburg) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 3</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 4</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 5</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 6</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 7</th>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 8</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties at scene</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect tries to flee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant found</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue Total</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In nine encounters, nine cues were considered; in six encounters, 10 cues were considered. These are excluded from the table.*
### Table 5.7: Manner in Which Cue Was Provided (St. Petersburg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cue 1</th>
<th>Cue 2</th>
<th>Cue 3</th>
<th>Cue 4</th>
<th>Cue 5</th>
<th>Cue 6</th>
<th>Cue 7</th>
<th>Cue 8</th>
<th>Cue 9</th>
<th>Cue 10</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referenced</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteered</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicited</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue Total</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Interim and Final Decisions

In 46% of cases in Indianapolis, officers made no interim decisions before reaching a final decision – the cues considered were enough evidence (table 5.8).

### Table 5.8: Total Number of Interim Decisions Made by Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Interim Decisions</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Interim Decision</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Interim Decisions</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Interim Decisions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Interim Decisions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the remaining encounters, the majority of officers made one interim decision before reaching a final decision. In only 5% of encounters did officers make three or four interim decisions before reaching a final decision. Interim decisions were occasionally a preliminary final disposition (until additional information changed the officer's mind about the action to be taken) but were more commonly about the next steps an officer took to gather more information.

In 17.5% of encounters in Indianapolis in which an interim decision was made, the most common first interim decision was to proceed to a different location to interview another party (table 5.9). Other first interim decisions were to threaten jail or arrest (7.1%), handcuff the suspect (6.3%), encourage a party to leave (5.6%) or determine no further action was needed (5.6%). The most common second interim decision was to run a warrant check (14% of encounters in which officers made a second interim decision). Overall, in terms of all interim decisions made, the most common were to proceed to a different location to interview, to run a warrant check, to threaten jail or arrest, or to handcuff the suspect.
Table 5.9: Frequency of Interim Decisions Made by Officers (Indianapolis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Description</th>
<th>Interim Decision 1</th>
<th>Interim Decision 2</th>
<th>Interim Decision 3</th>
<th>Interim Decision 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed to a different location to interview</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run warrant check</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten jail/arrest</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handcuff suspect</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search suspect</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order party to leave</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take no further action</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage party to leave</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for additional resources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate parties to avoid conflict</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search house/yard/car</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draw firearm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use force</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest/take to juvenile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cite/ticket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide advice</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in leaving premises</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed to a different location to observe crime scene</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate parties to interview</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

163
Table 5.9: Frequency of Interim Decisions Made by Officers (Indianapolis) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interim Decision</th>
<th>Interim Decision 1</th>
<th>Interim Decision 2</th>
<th>Interim Decision 3</th>
<th>Interim Decision 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take description of suspect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest restraining order</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruct parties to stay away from one another</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in retrieving property</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File report</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Decision Total</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 41% of cases in St. Petersburg, officers made no interim decisions before reaching a final decision – the cues considered were enough evidence (table 5.8). In the remaining encounters, the majority of officers made one interim decision before reaching a final decision. In only 7% of encounters did officers make three or four interim decisions before reaching a final decision.

In 23.1% of encounters in which a first interim decision was made, the most common decision was to proceed to a different location to interview another party (table 5.10). Other first interim decisions were to run a warrant check (9.9%), separate the parties to avoid additional conflict (7.7%), or to call for additional resources (6.6%). Overall, in terms of all interim decisions made, the most common were to proceed to a different location to interview, to run a warrant check, to call for additional resources, or to separate parties to avoid conflict. As might follow from the thematic findings regarding threat of arrest, St. Petersburg officers choose to utilize the threat of jail or
arrest less slightly less frequently than Indianapolis officers (5% of interim decisions made compared to 8% in Indianapolis). They were also less likely to take the step of handcuffing a suspect as an interim measure (0.7% of interim decisions compared to 7% in Indianapolis). Conversely, St. Petersburg officers were more likely than Indianapolis officers to call for additional resources or to separate parties to avoid conflict.

Table 5.10: Frequency of Interim Decisions Made by Officers (St. Petersburg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interim Decision 1</th>
<th>Interim Decision 2</th>
<th>Interim Decision 3</th>
<th>Interim Decision 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed to a different location to interview</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run warrant check</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for additional resources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate parties to avoid conflict</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten jail/arrest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage party to leave</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take no further action</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order party to cease behavior</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate parties to interview</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest restraining order</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruct parties to stay away from one another</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order party to leave</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in leaving premises</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed to a different location to observe crime scene</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cite/ticket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.10: Frequency of Interim Decisions Made by Officers (St. Petersburg) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interim Decision 1</th>
<th>Interim Decision 2</th>
<th>Interim Decision 3</th>
<th>Interim Decision 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search suspect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search house/yard/car</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handcuff suspect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide advice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retrieving property</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest/take to</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juvenile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Decision</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of a final decision, the most common decision in both sites was to take no further action (17.1% of decisions in Indianapolis and 21.3% of decisions in St. Petersburg) (table 5.11). In Indianapolis, the next most common decisions were to order a party to leave (14.5%), arresting a suspect or taking a suspect to juvenile (12.8%), and instructing parties to stay away from one another (10.7%). In St. Petersburg, the next most common decisions were to arrest a suspect or take a suspect to juvenile (17.4%), ordering a party to leave (9.7%) assisting a party in leaving (9.7%), or ordering a party to cease a behavior (9%).
Table 5.11: Final Decision Made by Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th></th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take no further action</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide advice</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest going to prosecutor to press charges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest restraining order</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take description of suspect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for additional resources</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in leaving premises</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist party in retrieving property</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage party to leave</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order party to cease behavior</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruct parties to stay away from one another</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order party to leave</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File report</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten jail/arrest</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest/take to juvenile</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>234</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a small number of encounters in both sites, officers experienced a cue that resulted in a “gamechanger.” A gamechanger was an influence that moved an officer from a less punitive to a more punitive decision, or vice versa. A gamechanger occurred in Indianapolis 12 times and in St. Petersburg one time.

For Indianapolis, in two of these cases, the change in decision was due to a restraining order. In one instance, the officer had not planned to arrest what was initially the victim in the encounter but felt compelled to do so after learning she had violated a restraining order. In another, the officer planned to arrest the suspect but changed his
mind after learning the victim had not secured a restraining order. Instead, he assisted the victim in leaving the premises.

In three of the encounters, a change in the parties involved changed the officer’s mind. In one instance, the officer planned to take no further action but the victim returned to the scene. After that occurred, and he secured victim testimony, he ordered the suspect to leave. In another encounter, the officer planned to arrest but the victim left the scene before providing additional evidence. The officer in that case then declined to take further action. In the final encounter, the suspect returned to the scene and the officer made an arrest.

Officers also changed their minds as a result of victim or suspect behavior. In two cases, the suspect threatened the victim as the officer was leaving the scene. In one instance, the officer had initially ordered the suspect to leave and instead ended up arresting him. In another, the officer had decided to leave without taking further action and the threat resulted in an arrest. In another two cases, suspect disrespect led to a gamechanger. In one, continued disrespect after a warning resulted in arrest (changed from threat of arrest to arrest) and in another, the disrespect led to a warrant check which resulted in arrest.

Finally, in three of the encounters, the officer changed his or her mind due to some unique circumstances. In one case, the officer planned to take no further action until he learned from another officer that the disputant was not intoxicated. Once he discovered that (and perhaps deemed the citizen to be more deserving than the others involved) he assisted the disputant in leaving the premises. In another encounter, the officer had planned to give a citation but declined to do so after a friend of the officer and
involved party requested leniency. In the last example, the officer had handcuffed the suspect and planned to arrest until the victim volunteered to fabricate additional evidence. At that point the officer released the suspect and ended the encounter by threatening arrest.

In St. Petersburg, only one encounter included a gamechanger and it was due to another officer’s input. In this instance, the observed officer had decided to charge the suspect with Driving While License Suspended but commented to the sergeant on scene that he had not decided if he should also arrest him for battery. The sergeant told the observed officer that he had overhead the suspect telling his girlfriend that he was going to jail. The primary officer then stated that he would “accommodate him then and take him to jail” and proceeded to handcuff the suspect.

**Data Limitations**

Overall, the narrative observations and debriefings were quite detailed. In many cases, observers captured an extensive amount of information which made deriving data on process and rationale a worthwhile endeavor. However, although the POPN narratives provided a rich amount of data on both themes related to decision making and the process of a decision, limitations did exist. As noted, not all dispute encounters contained a debriefing. Obviously, insight into officer decision-making was lost when the officer was not debriefed. In some cases, it was clear that the officer went immediately to another call and the opportunity to debrief was lost. In others, the observer attempted to solicit more information from the officer and was unsuccessful. In most cases, however, it was not clear why a narrative account did not contain a debriefing. Although this is purely
speculative, in such cases it might have been due to the skill level of the observer. Although observers went through extensive training, it is reasonable to assume that not all were as motivated or as interested as their peers in obtaining needed information.

Debriefings were often limited. Observers were instructed to ask officers to relate WHY they made a certain decision but debriefings did not always include an explanation. Given the sometimes random assortment of information contained in a debriefing, it might be assumed that officers were indeed asked to provide a rationale and simply never actually answered the question. It highlights the difficulty in trying to obtain this type of information over a sustained period. Observers are attempting to collect certain information but they must also balance that need with the need to maintain good rapport with the officer they are observing. Such rapport would be lost if an observer repeatedly called an officer out for not providing enough information. Debriefing of this nature requires a certain amount of skill and it can be assumed, as noted above, that some observers were more skilled (and perhaps more invested) in the outcome than others. Additionally, there was likely an understandable time delay between observation and the write-up and coding of the observation. The act of observing throughout an officer’s shift and the subsequent data input resulting from that observation are both labor-intensive activities. There was inevitably some information that was lost as a result of a time delay.

In terms of the coded observational data, which was used to help refine the number of encounters that needed to be coded, challenges existed as well. The coded observational data did not always agree with the narrative account (e.g. would say O1 was primary, but another officer was, or the encounter would be labeled a dispute but it was not). This did not occur with great frequency, and such encounters were easily
dropped from analysis, but it is impossible to say how many may have been misidentified that should have been included. Overall, though, the narrative summaries were largely congruent with the coded observational data.

In encounters with multiple officers, O1 was sometimes listed as the primary officer and was sometimes not. Initially, encounters were added to the dataset if O1 was listed as primary or if there was equal responsibility between the primary officer and his or her partner at the scene. Ultimately, though, the encounter was only kept and coded if the observed officer made the FINAL decision. However, in encounters where both officers play a role and take action, it is difficult to know the primary officer’s decision process and what influenced his or her decisions.
Chapter 6
The Arrest Decision: Comparing a Structural Model to a Process Model

Introduction

In this chapter I compare a structural model of the arrest decision to a process model of the arrest decision. As in the last chapter, the results for each site will be discussed separately. As I discussed in chapter 4, a process model allows one to examine how decision makers search for information. Often, individuals arrive at the same conclusion, but they use different items of information to get there. A process model allows one to examine those different pathways.

Further, the qualitative analysis conducted in chapter 5 revealed some variables that cannot be easily measured in a structural model. However, it must be pointed out that many of the variables do overlap. Things like physical injury or characteristics of the involved citizens such as mental illness, use of drugs or alcohol, or juvenile status are common to both datasets. Also common are typical factors that lead to arrest such as suspect demeanor, or the nature of conflict between citizens, or the level of resistance against an officer.

However, there were some additional items of information gleaned from the narratives that were not present in the original data that was coded for statistical purposes. Although the original dataset provides information on various levels of evidence (e.g. police observed evidence or police heard claims from others) it does not provide details on what that evidence is. For example, the narratives provide additional information on the presence of property damage, physical evidence (e.g. blood) that
indicates an assault, and specific claims made by victims (e.g. accusing the suspect of assault). The narratives also provide additional suspect actions that may have an influence on a decision such as when an involved party returns to the scene mid-encounter or when a citizen leaves voluntarily before being asked to do so. Such actions may change the outcome of an encounter, but they are not accounted for in the original dataset used for structural models. Is this additional information theoretically relevant? Perhaps not, but examining in more detail what officers deem important may prove useful.

In some cases, the information gathered is common to each form of data but additional details are available from the narratives. For example, both the data collected for structural purposes and the textual data contain information about the presence of a weapon. The narratives, however, contain additional information about how the police officer came to know about the weapon (e.g. did dispatch indicate there was one on scene, did the suspect display it, or did another involved party indicate a weapon was present?). Perhaps these details may be not be overly relevant to the overall decision regarding arrest but they do reveal the complexity in which information is presented to an officer.

Collecting information on the process of a decision also allows one to collect data on how the information was solicited. The narrative accounts made it possible to determine how police gathered the information they used in their decisions (i.e. did a citizen volunteer it, did the officer specifically request it, etc). The data collected for structural purposes captured information on various actions police requested of citizens, but did not indicate when officers deliberately solicited additional information. Knowing
what information officers deliberately seek out may be important to better understanding the complexity of police officer decisions in the field. The narratives revealed that officers often inquired about such things as custody arrangements regarding a minor child, living arrangements (i.e. who has a legal right to be in residence), whether or not a formal/legal order (e.g. restraining order) is present, and, in the case of encounters with juveniles, whether or not a parent is present.

Collecting information on the process of a decision also allows one to consider the order in which information is gathered and what items are most important to officers as they deliberate a decision. It is not possible to consider temporal sequence using the data collected for regression-based purposes. Examining the narratives also revealed the final decision for an encounter. If arrest was not the final decision, it is difficult to tell what the final outcome is in the original coded dataset. As mentioned in chapter 5, the narrative coding revealed both interim and final decisions. Many of these, such as running a warrant check, citing an offender, threatening arrest, and searching a suspect, are present in the original coded dataset. However, there is no way to know if these are interim or final decisions. Further, officers took some actions that are not captured in the data intended for regression-based analysis. For example, officers often proceeded to different locations to continue their investigations or assisted a citizen in leaving the location of an encounter. Officers also concluded an encounter by taking no further action. This occurred with some frequency but there is no way to determine this from the original coded dataset (although one can determine if an officer took none of the behavioral actions that were captured).
Compensatory versus Non-compensatory Strategies

As noted in chapter 3, researchers in the judgment and decision making field often consider the difference between a compensatory and a non-compensatory decision strategy. A compensatory strategy is a linear search strategy and a non-compensatory strategy is a non-linear strategy. Use of a compensatory (or linear) strategy means an individual examines all of the information available for a set of alternatives, mentally assigns weights to each piece of information, sums all of the weights of each alternative (positive and negative) and then chooses the alternative with the highest overall score. A police officer who makes linear decisions may look at an encounter in the following way:

Both the victim and the suspect are present. The suspect is contrite and the victim is requesting no arrest. There is substantial evidence of wrongdoing. In the officer's view, the current suspect and victim actions cancel out the level of evidence and the suspect is not arrested (for this officer, the request of the complainant and the attitude of the suspect is compensating for the level of evidence).

Use of a non-compensatory (or non-linear) strategy means an individual looks at only some of the information available and the mental weights assigned are not summed and considered as a whole. A low score for one piece of information cannot be compensated for a high score on another. A police officer who makes a non-linear decision may look at an encounter in the following way:

Both the victim and the suspect are present. The suspect is contrite and the victim is requesting no arrest. There is substantial evidence of wrongdoing. In the officer's view, the evidence is compelling enough that it is the only information needed (there are a number of different non-compensatory decision strategies - this is an example of lexicographic). The victim request and suspect attitude do not even come under consideration and cannot compensate for the level of evidence as they did in the first officer's case.
The linearity consideration is important because regression-based models (structural models) assume that decision makers are using a compensatory (linear) decision. However, more complex tasks (such as a police encounter with a suspect where there are many pieces of information to consider in a short amount of time) have been associated with non-compensatory (non-linear) strategies. Non-linear strategies help simplify the amount of information that needs to be processed. In order to consider what type of decision strategy officers are using in dispute resolution cases, two analyses will be conducted: depth of search and content of search.27

**Depth of Search**

Depth of search is the proportion of total information examined prior to reaching a decision. As mentioned previously, a traditional regression model assumes that an officer would examine all pieces of information available. If this is true, if an individual searches a large proportion of the information available, the inference is that he or she is using a linear strategy and a statistical model accurately depicts the decision process. A model based on narrative description of the decision process can help determine if this is actually the case.

In order to determine depth of search, the number of cues considered by officers in the process dataset (which contained the number of pieces of information actually considered) was compared to the number of cues possible in the original coded dataset

27 I had originally planned to calculate linearity of search as well (as Brandl, 1991, did in his dissertation) but the formula is not designed for the type of information I coded.
model (which contained the number of pieces of information available to be considered) (refer to appendix F). Depth of search was calculated by using the process dataset as the numerator and the structural dataset as the denominator.

**Indianapolis**

As noted previously, in Indianapolis, the process dataset revealed that officers considered between one and 10 cues before making a decision. In the majority of cases, officers considered four cues or less. In the original coded dataset there were 26 potential cues that could be considered by officers. The most an officer considered was 17. Of those, five cues were constant – citizen gender, race, age, wealth, and the relationship between citizens. Thus, for the structural model officers considered between five and 17 cues.

Depth of search was calculated by dividing the number of cues considered in the process dataset by the number of cues considered in the original coded dataset (Table 6.1). In the majority of encounters in Indianapolis (69.6%), officers considered between 20% and 59% of the cues available to them. In 7.5% of the cases officers consider less than 20% of the cues, and in 18.8% they consider more than 60%. In a small number of cases (4.2%), the percentage was greater than 100. This is due to the fact that the process 28 This is similar to the analysis conducted by Brandl (1991) in his dissertation. 29 The process dataset and the original coded datasets were not directly comparable (the process dataset considers the encounter in its entirety while the original coded dataset is based on the citizen, not the encounter) so some adjustment to cue totals was necessary. The coding of the process model was done purposefully as one of the key considerations in this research effort was to determine if there was utility in considering the information processed by an officer in an encounter with a citizen in a novel way. However, it did create some challenges in analyzing depth of search.

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model considered all forms of citizen testimony as cues while the structural model did not. Thus, in some cases, it was possible for the cues in the process model to exceed the cues in the structural model. The mean depth of search in Indianapolis across all encounters was 0.46, or 46% of information was accessed.

At least as articulated to observers (it is, of course, impossible to know if officers are influenced by certain cues and just never articulate their importance), the majority of officers consider a relatively small amount of the information available to them before making a decision. As was noted in chapter 5, officers often made a decision about an outcome long before an encounter concluded. Thus, in many cases, additional information is never utilized by an officer before rendering a decision. The order in which information is presented and considered is important and does seem to indicate that there is a “tipping point” of sorts in which additional information is no longer necessary in order to make a decision.
### Table 6.1: Percentage of Cues Considered by Officers (Process Cues Used versus Structural Cues Available)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1% and 9% of cues used</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 10% and 19% of cues used</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 20% and 29% of cues used</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 30% and 39% of cues used</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 40% and 49% of cues used</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 50% and 59% of cues used</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 60% and 69% of cues used</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1: Percentage of Cues Considered by Officers (Process Cues Used versus Structural Cues Available) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Encounters</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 70% and 79% of cues used</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 80% and 89% of cues used</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 90% and 99% of cues used</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% or more of cues used</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

St. Petersburg

The results were similar in St. Petersburg. Like in Indianapolis, the process dataset revealed that officers considered between one and 10 cues before making a decision. In the majority of cases, officers considered four cues or less. In the original coded dataset there were 27 cues that could be considered by officers. The most an officer considered was 18. Of those, five cues were constant – citizen gender, race, age, wealth, and the relationship between citizens. Thus, for the original coded dataset officers considered between five and 18 cues.
The findings regarding depth of search in St. Petersburg were very similar to Indianapolis (table 6.1). In the majority of encounters in (73%), officers considered between 20% and 59% of the cues available to them. In 7.2% of the cases, officers consider less than 20% of the cues, and in 15.1% they consider more than 60%. In a small number of cases (4.8%), the percentage was greater than 100. The mean depth of search in St. Petersburg across all encounters was 0.46, or 46% of information was accessed.

Content of Search

A portion of chapter 5 examined the content of search by considering the cues officers considered, and the order in which they were considered. However, this analysis can be taken a step further by quantifying the importance of the information used. By considering the number of pieces of information used, and the order in which they are considered (as information accessed early in the decision process is considered more important) it is possible to calculate the importance of each piece of information across officers (and, were there enough cases, within officers as well). The way that information is used (what is considered important) indicates compensatory or non-compensatory strategies.

This analysis is the similar to the one conducted by Brandl (1991) in his dissertation (appendix G). In order to quantify the content of search, information is scored according to an "importance scale." The first piece accessed receives a score equal to the total number of pieces of information available (n), the second piece accessed receives a score of n-1, and so on. Information not used receives a score of 0. Because this analysis is based on information collected in a field setting (as opposed to a more
controlled information board experiment) I did make some modifications to the analysis. Once all of the pieces of information were assigned scores they were consolidated into more manageable categories (Table 6.2). This resulted in 30 information cues. Thus, any piece of information could receive a score between 0 and 30. However, in the process dataset, officers in the majority of encounters considered fewer than 10 cues. So, scores were typically either 0 or between 20 and 30. The process dataset, again because information was coded as officers utilized it, also contained encounters where certain pieces of information were considered multiple times (e.g. suspect testimony). In such cases, the information type was assigned the highest score received and subsequent information was adjusted so there were no gaps in scoring.30

**Indianapolis**

Table 6.2 provides the average importance scores for each type of information potentially available in encounters in Indianapolis. As one might expect, given their prominence in every encounter, suspect and victim testimony had the highest average importance scores. Both suspect and victim testimony can be broad sources of

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30 The analysis was also considered using multiple scores for information considered multiple times in one encounter (that is, for example, if suspect testimony received scores of both 5 and 3 it was counted as an 8). The average score for such pieces of information was higher, but it did not change the overall conclusion regarding which pieces of information were considered most important. Averages were also calculated by considering scores without adjustment (that is, cues were scored at 30, 28, 27, and 25 to account for multiple occurrences of the same type of information instead of adjusting to 30, 29, 28, and 27). The results were no different if the averages were calculated in this manner.
information for officers. As I coded from the narratives, suspect testimony generally consisted of the suspect denying the allegation (or telling his or her side of the story in an attempt to sway the officer that he or she was "in the right").

Table 6.2: Average "Importance Score" for Information Present in Dispute Resolution Encounters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect testimony</td>
<td>21.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.01</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim testimony</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query additional information</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (other)</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests action</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness testimony</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of use of drugs/alcohol</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved party is a minor</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in verbal conflict</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party requests action</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of disrespect</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leaves voluntarily</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party testimony</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in physical conflict</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No warrants found</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon use</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unwilling to leave premises</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confession of wrongdoing</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of property damage</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim requests no action/assistance</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (prior knowledge of citizen)</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (prior knowledge of location)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No evidence of physical injury</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer testimony</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved party returns to scene</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (return to prior location)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties at scene (crowd/bystanders)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect attempts to flee scene</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrants found</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If a suspect admitted wrongdoing, that was coded separately as a confession. Victim testimony was also coded in numerous ways. Most victim testimony, not surprisingly, involved an accusation of some sort. Victim testimony was coded as either accusing a suspect of assault, accusing a suspect of threatening assault, or accusing a suspect of some other sort of wrongdoing. If the victim denied any problem, it was coded as such. Victim requests for some sort of action (or requests for no action) were coded separately.

Thus, there are different types of information an officer can glean from "testimony" and officers are, presumably, interested in WHAT an individual says not just that an individual was there to say it. An analysis of what was contained in victim testimony revealed that it was important to the arrest decision. A victim was present in 60% of encounters that led to an arrest. In 72% of those encounters, the victim accused the suspect of assault (compared to 31% of encounters that did not lead to arrest). The content of testimony is clearly important.

However, for purposes of addressing content of search the initial consideration is WHEN an officer asks an individual for information. That is, at what point in the timeline to a decision does victim and/or suspect testimony become relevant? Although the information contained in verbal reports to officers certainly influences the decision process, I chose not to divide victim testimony into its various components for this content of search analysis.

The third most important type of information for officers in Indianapolis was additional information solicited about the situation. So, for Indianapolis officers, the three most important pieces of information were related to verbal queries (or verbal information that was volunteered) about the encounter. The fourth most important piece
of information was "other" which includes a host of rather random cues and, as such, is not useful to consider. A victim requesting some form of action was the fifth most important piece of information considered by officers, followed by evidence of an injury, and verbal testimony from a witness. The eighth most important piece of information considered was whether or not there was evidence of use of drugs and/or alcohol. Whether or not an involved party was a minor and whether or not citizens were in verbal conflict were also important to officers.

**St. Petersburg**

When it came to the top ten pieces of information, officers in St. Petersburg and officers in Indianapolis considered many of the same types of things important. However, where they ranked in terms of importance did vary (table 6.2). In both sites, suspect and victim testimony topped the list. As in Indianapolis, an analysis of what was contained in victim testimony revealed that it was important to the arrest decision. A victim was present in 70% of encounters that led to an arrest. In 68% of those encounters, the victim accused the suspect of assault (compared to 19% of encounters that did not lead to arrest). In St. Petersburg, though, witness testimony was considered third in terms of importance (as opposed to 7th in Indianapolis) and citizens in verbal conflict was considered fourth most important (as opposed to 10th in Indianapolis). In Indianapolis, a victim requesting action was fifth most important. However, in St. Petersburg, a victim request ranked 11th. The site specific differences in terms of what officers deemed important is interesting.

Looking beyond the top ten ranked cues also revealed some interesting differences between the two sites. For example, in St. Petersburg, officers having prior knowledge of
a citizen ranked 14th in terms of importance but in Indianapolis it was 22nd. Similarly, officer testimony in St. Petersburg ranked 15th while it was only 25th in importance in Indianapolis.

The Current Analysis

The remainder of this chapter will consider a comparison of a structural and a process model for arrest for both sites. Because it is difficult to directly compare the structural model and the process model in terms of variance explained, a comparison of the accuracy of the predictive ability of each model will be used instead. Table 6.3 describes the variables used in the logistic regression analysis.
## Table 6.3: Description of Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = citizen under the influence, 0 = no signs of intoxication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = suspect has weapon, 0 = all other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = verbal, defensive, or active resistance, 0 = no resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Summative index (0-8) of evidence relating to suspect’s violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = serious offense, 0 = all other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = no conflict, 2 = calm verbal, 3 = agitated verbal, 4 = threatened assault, 5 = assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim injury</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = victim sustained an injury, 0 = no injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request arrest</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = another involved citizen requested police arrest, 0 = request not made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request no arrest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 = another involved citizen requested police not arrest, 0 = request not made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental impairment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = citizen mentally impaired, 0 = citizen not mentally impaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = suspect disrespectful, 0 = all other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = male, 0 = female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 = child (0-12), 2 = teen (13-17), 3 = young adult (18-29), 4 = adult (30-59), 5 = senior (over 60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = nonwhite, 0 = white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 = chronic poverty, 2 = low, 3 = middle, 4 = above middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>1 = officer has knowledge of citizen, 0 = officer has no knowledge of citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 = citizens know each other, 0 = citizens are strangers/no other citizen present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = officer expects violence, 0 = no expectation of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officers</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Number of additional officers present at encounter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bystanders</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Number of bystanders present at encounter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim present</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1 = victim present, 0 = victim not present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When considering prediction, one is concerned with how well the predicted outcome agrees with the actual outcome. If the result of the test corresponds with reality, then a correct decision has been made (e.g. test predicts arrest and an arrest occurred). If the result of the test does not correspond with reality, however, an error has occurred. In prediction, there are two types of errors: Type I and Type II. A Type I error (or a false positive) occurs when the test predicts arrest but arrest does not occur (refer to Figure 6.1). A Type II error (or a false negative) occurs when an arrest actually occurred but the test predicts no arrest.

**Figure 6.1: Type I and Type II Errors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed</strong></td>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>True Negative</td>
<td>False Positive (model predicts arrest but no arrest occurs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>False Negative (arrest occurs, but model does not predict arrest)</td>
<td>Type II Error</td>
<td>True Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering the ability of a test to correctly predict the outcome, a number of things should be considered, including sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, and accuracy (Table 6.4). Sensitivity is the ability of the model to identify positive results or, the ability to predict arrest when arrest actually occurs. It is calculated by dividing the number of true positives by the number of true positives plus the number of false negatives. A test with a high sensitivity has a low Type II error rate. Specificity, conversely, is the ability of the model to identify negative results
or, how likely it is to predict no arrest when no arrest actually occurs. It is calculated by dividing the number of true negatives by the number of true negatives plus the number of false positives. A test with high specificity has a low Type I error rate.

Table 6.4: Determining the Ability of a Test to Predict the Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Calculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity</td>
<td>Ability of model to identify positive</td>
<td><strong>TP/(TP + FN)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity</td>
<td>Ability of model to identify negatives</td>
<td><strong>TN/(TN + FP)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Predictive Value</td>
<td>Likelihood of arrest if model predicts arrest</td>
<td><strong>TP/(TP + FP)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Predictive Value</td>
<td>Likelihood of no arrest if model predicts no arrest</td>
<td><strong>TN/(TN + FN)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>Percentage of test results correctly</td>
<td><strong>(TP +TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>identified by the test</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The positive predictive value is a measure that states how likely someone is to have been arrested if the model predicts arrest; that is, among all citizens for whom the test predicts arrest, how many are actually arrested? It is calculated by considering the ratio of true positives to all positives (combined true and false). The negative predictive value is a measure that states how likely someone is to have not been arrested if the model predicts no arrest; that is, among all citizens for whom the test predicts no arrest, how many are actually not arrested? It is calculated by considering the ratio of true negatives to all negatives (combined true and false). The rarer the outcome (in this case, arrest) the lower the positive predictive value and the higher the negative predictive value. Finally, accuracy is the percentage of test results correctly identified by the test (true positives + true negatives divided by the total number of test results).
Indianapolis

Structural Model of Arrest

The data file for the structural model consists of the same encounters in the process model; that is, dispute encounters for which a suspect or disputant is present. Since the structural dataset is case-based (that is, each case represents a citizen) and the process dataset is encounter-based, it was important to ensure that all possibly available information recorded from the narratives was available in the structural dataset. Thus, care was taken to ensure multiple encounters deemed to be related were included during the initial file development.

The dependent variable for the structural model is a dichotomy and logistic regression was used to estimate the equation.\textsuperscript{31} \textsuperscript{32} It should be noted that arrest is a rare outcome and, because of that, there were some difficulties in estimating the logistic model. These difficulties are noted in the footnotes. The independent variables are described in Table 6.5.\textsuperscript{33} The bivariate breakdown of variables relevant to arrest is provided in Table 6.6. The evidence scale utilized was derived from Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes (1995).

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{31} A check of the studentized residuals revealed no concern regarding outliers (out of 384 cases, only nine had studentized residuals greater than 2).
\textsuperscript{32} Auxiliary regression equations were estimated and revealed no collinearity concerns.
\textsuperscript{33} Originally, existence of a warrant was one of the independent variables in the equation. However, it could not be used because it was so infrequent it had too much influence on the model and created problems with the estimation (the standard error was extremely large). Additionally, resistance was originally measured as a scale. However, there were so few cases of resistance that measuring as a scale caused the logistic estimate to be extremely large. Resistance was converted to a dichotomy to account for this problem.
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics for Indianapolis (N = 384)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent: Arrest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes: 36)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No: 348)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim injury</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request arrest</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request no arrest</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental impairment</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of officers present</td>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizens present</td>
<td>1-50</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim present</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.6: Bivariate Breakdown for Variables Relevant to Arrest (Structural Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indianapolis Arrest</th>
<th>St. Petersburg Arrest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (N = 348)</td>
<td>Yes (N = 36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Drug Use/Alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>282 (81.0)</td>
<td>21 (58.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66 (19.0)</td>
<td>15 (41.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon on Scene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>342 (98.3)</td>
<td>33 (91.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6 (1.7)</td>
<td>3 (8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Suspect Resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Passive</td>
<td>340 (97.7)</td>
<td>32 (88.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than Passive</td>
<td>8 (2.3)</td>
<td>4 (11.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of Evidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>223 (64.1)</td>
<td>2 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>28 (19.5)</td>
<td>7 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24 (6.9)</td>
<td>7 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21 (6.0)</td>
<td>7 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (1.4)</td>
<td>8 (22.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 (1.4)</td>
<td>1 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 (0.6)</td>
<td>4 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Seriousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>251 (72.1)</td>
<td>18 (50.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97 (27.9)</td>
<td>18 (50.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conflict Between Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Conflict</td>
<td>129 (37.1)</td>
<td>10 (27.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calm Verbal</td>
<td>90 (25.9)</td>
<td>7 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agitated Verbal</td>
<td>108 (31.0)</td>
<td>9 (25.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened Assault</td>
<td>15 (4.3)</td>
<td>6 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>6 (1.7)</td>
<td>4 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Victim Injury</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>340 (97.7)</td>
<td>30 (83.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 (2.3)</td>
<td>6 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request Arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>320 (92.0)</td>
<td>28 (77.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28 (8.0)</td>
<td>8 (22.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request No Arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>336 (96.6)</td>
<td>33 (91.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 (3.4)</td>
<td>3 (8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Mental Illness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.6: Bivariate Breakdown for Variables Relevant to Arrest (Structural Model) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>Arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (N = 348)</td>
<td>Yes (N = 36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>339 (97.4)</td>
<td>35 (97.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9 (2.6)</td>
<td>1 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disrespect</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>302 (86.8)</td>
<td>17 (47.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46 (13.2)</td>
<td>19 (52.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expectation of Violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>313 (89.9)</td>
<td>24 (66.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35 (10.1)</td>
<td>12 (33.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logistic results reveal that only a few variables have a statistically significant impact on the arrest decision (Table 6.7). Logistic regression results are reported in terms of both log odds and odds ratios. Log odds are not easily interpretable so the odds ratios, transformed into the percentage change in odds, will also be considered.
Table 6.7: Logistic Regression Estimates for Indianapolis (N = 384)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B (log odds)</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Exp(B) (odds ratio)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim injury</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request arrest</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request no arrest</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental impairment</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officers</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizens</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim present</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept = -7.381 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood = 104.826</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2 = 134.122$ (p &lt; .000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2 = .636$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not surprisingly, the amount of evidence available is a significant predictor of arrest. Each additional point on the evidence scale increases the log odds of arrest by 0.91. Alternatively, for every additional point on the scale of evidence available, the odds of arrest increase by 149%. Citizens in physical conflict also increase their odds of arrest,
in this case by 94% (log odds = 0.66). The factor that had the most impact on arrest, however, was the demeanor of the suspect. Suspects who were disrespectful increased the log odds of arrest by 2.29 (or, the odds of arrest increased by 886%). The number of citizens and the number of officers present at an encounter were also significant. An increase in the number of citizens present decreased the log odds of arrest by 0.15 (or, the odds of arrest decreased by 13.6%). The more officers on the scene, the greater the odds of arrest. For each additional officer present, the odds of arrest increased by 210% (log odds = 1.12). Although not significant at the 0.05 level, the race of the suspect was close enough to warrant mention. Being a nonwhite suspect decreased the log odds of arrest by 1.13 (or, being a minority decreased the odds of arrest by 68%).

Surprisingly, evidence of victim injury was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest. However, the effect of injury is large - the odds of arrest increase by 405% if an injury is present. The thematic findings indicated that officers considered injury to the victim to be an almost automatic arrest. Its lack of statistical significance here may be due to the small amount of major injury coded in the observational data set - only a very small percentage of encounters included a serious injury to the victim. There is no doubt that injury is analytically significant as, again, despite its lack of statistical significance the effect of victim injury on the odds of arrest is quite large.

The regression estimates also indicate that a request for arrest was not statistically significant. Officers also indicated in debriefings that they tended to follow victim preference. However, that assertion was not borne out by the logistic findings. Use of a weapon and resistance against the officer were also not statistically significant. This may be due, however, to the fact that encounters in which a weapon was present or in which is
suspect exercised considerable resistance were rare. As mentioned previously, there were some challenges in estimating the logistic model and additional small cell problems might still be a factor. Despite their lack of statistical significance in the model, both resistance and evidence of a weapon had large effects - displaying resistance increased the odds of arrest by 104% and evidence of a weapon increase the odds of arrest by 42%.

Also of interest for this analysis is the predicted classification table, which is reported as part of the standard SPSS logistic regression output. The predicted model shows how many cases are correctly predicted by the full logistic regression model and how many cases are not correctly predicted. The standard cut rate (0.5) was used. As Table 6.8 reveals, the logistic model for Indianapolis correctly predicts 94.8% of the cases. The sensitivity of the model is 56% and the specificity is 99%. Thus, this model has a very low Type I error rate. Finally, the positive predictive value is 83% and the negative predictive value is 99%. As expected (because arrest is a rare outcome) the negative predictive value is very high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.8: Predicted Values for Logistic Regression (Indianapolis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predicted</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Process Model of Arrest

The process model was developed by considering the thematic findings discussed in chapter 5, a consideration of crosstabs comparing variables of interest to an arrest outcome, and the actual pieces of information (in the order in which they were considered) officers used for each encounter that led to an arrest. The bivariate breakdown of variables relevant to arrest is provided in Table 6.9.

Table 6.9: Bivariate Breakdown for Variables Relevant to Arrest (Process Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indianapolis No (N = 204)</th>
<th>Indianapolis Yes (N = 30)</th>
<th>St. Petersburg No (N = 128)</th>
<th>St. Petersburg Yes (N = 27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Injury to Victim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>198 (97.1)</td>
<td>22 (73.3)</td>
<td>125 (97.7)</td>
<td>20 (74.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6 (2.9)</td>
<td>8 (26.7)</td>
<td>3 (2.3)</td>
<td>7 (25.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Preference is for Arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>202 (99.0)</td>
<td>28 (93.3)</td>
<td>127 (99.2)</td>
<td>27 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2 (1.0)</td>
<td>2 (6.7)</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Preference is for No Arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>194 (95.1)</td>
<td>29 (96.7)</td>
<td>125 (97.7)</td>
<td>27 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10 (4.9)</td>
<td>1 (3.3)</td>
<td>3 (2.3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimonial Evidence from Victim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>105 (51.5)</td>
<td>12 (40.0)</td>
<td>65 (50.8)</td>
<td>8 (29.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuses suspect of assault</td>
<td>31 (15.2)</td>
<td>13 (43.3)</td>
<td>12 (9.4)</td>
<td>13 (48.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuses suspect of threatening assault</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 (3.4)</td>
<td>1 (3.3)</td>
<td>11 (8.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denies problem</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4 (3.1)</td>
<td>1 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimonial Evidence from Witness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>177 (86.8)</td>
<td>23 (76.7)</td>
<td>99 (77.3)</td>
<td>8 (29.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27 (13.2)</td>
<td>7 (23.3)</td>
<td>29 (22.7)</td>
<td>19 (17.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect/Disputant Disrespect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>185 (90.7)</td>
<td>23 (76.7)</td>
<td>121 (94.5)</td>
<td>24 (88.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19 (9.3)</td>
<td>7 (23.3)</td>
<td>7 (5.5)</td>
<td>3 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.9: Bivariate Breakdown for Variables Relevant to Arrest (Process Model) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indianapolis Arrest</th>
<th>St. Petersburg Arrest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (N = 204)</td>
<td>Yes (N = 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Drug Use/Alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>177 (86.8)</td>
<td>24 (80.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27 (13.2)</td>
<td>6 (20.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Mental Illness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>201 (98.5)</td>
<td>30 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3 (1.5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>204 (100)</td>
<td>29 (96.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect/Disputant is a Juvenile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>185 (90.7)</td>
<td>27 (90.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19 (9.3)</td>
<td>3 (10.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon on Scene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>200 (98.0)</td>
<td>27 (90.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4 (2.0)</td>
<td>3 (10.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Formal Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>204 (100)</td>
<td>29 (96.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in Physical Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>196 (96.1)</td>
<td>22 (73.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 (3.9)</td>
<td>8 (26.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Returns to Scene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>201 (98.5)</td>
<td>28 (93.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3 (1.5)</td>
<td>2 (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer has Prior Knowledge of Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>190 (93.1)</td>
<td>28 (93.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14 (6.9)</td>
<td>2 (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bystanders Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>201 (98.5)</td>
<td>28 (93.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3 (1.5)</td>
<td>2 (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Unwilling to Leave Premises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>194 (95.1)</td>
<td>27 (90.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10 (4.9)</td>
<td>3 (10.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In considering these three things, I developed a number of models to test which best predicted the arrest outcome. This was a wholly inductive exercise that involved some trial and error. I started with models that utilized information gleaned from the thematic findings combined with the results of the crosstabs to determine which combinations of variables were most likely to produce an arrest decision. The next set of models utilized some additional refinement of some of the cues (e.g. providing more detail about what the victim testimony revealed), and the final model more closely considered the exact combinations of cues used for arrest decisions. The final model is presented in Figure 6.2. Table 6.10 provides the results of the process model.

As Table 6.10 reveals, the process model for Indianapolis correctly predicts 94.9% of the cases. This is nearly identical to the overall accuracy of the Indianapolis logistic regression model. The sensitivity of the model is 83.3% and the specificity is 96.7%. Thus, as with the structural model, this predictive model has a very low Type I error rate. However, the process model for Indianapolis has a much higher sensitivity than the structural model - it does better at predicting the arrest decision. Finally, the positive predictive value is 76.7% and the negative predictive value is 96.6%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>No Arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10: Predicted Values for Process Model (Indianapolis)
Figure 6.2: Process Model of Arrest (Indianapolis)
St. Petersburg

Structural Model of Arrest

A similar logistic regression equation was estimated for St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{34} \textsuperscript{35} The independent variables are described in Table 6.11.\textsuperscript{36} Refer to Table 6.6 for the bivariate breakdown of variables relevant to arrest. Similar to Indianapolis, the logistic results reveal that only a few variables have a statistically significant impact on the arrest decision (Table 6.12). However, many are not the same variables revealed in the Indianapolis analysis. As before, both log odds and the odds ratios will be reported.

As in Indianapolis, the amount of evidence available is a statistically significant predictor of arrest. Each additional point on the evidence scale increases the log odds of arrest by 0.894. Alternatively, for every additional point on the scale of evidence available, the odds of arrest increase by 144%. Also similar to the Indianapolis results, suspects who were disrespectful increased the log odds of arrest by 2.502 (or, the odds of arrest increased by 1121%). Unlike in Indianapolis, however, a victim requesting an arrest was statistically significant. A victim requesting arrest increased the odds of arrest for a suspect by 1017% (log odds = 2.413). Also statistically significant was the seriousness of the crime. The log odds of arrest increased by 3.010 for a suspect involved

\textsuperscript{34} A check of the studentized residuals revealed no concern regarding outliers (out of 252 cases, only five had studentized residuals greater than 2).
\textsuperscript{35} Auxiliary regression equations were estimated and revealed no collinearity concerns.
\textsuperscript{36} Originally, existence of a warrant was one of the independent variables in the equation. However, it could not be used because it was so infrequent it had too much influence on the model and created problems with the estimation (the standard error was extremely large). Additionally, resistance was originally measured as a scale. However, there were so few cases of resistance that measuring as a scale caused the logistic estimate to be extremely large. Resistance was converted to a dichotomy to account for this problem.
in a serious crime (1930%). Mental health of the suspect was also statistically significant. Being mentally impaired decreased the odds of arrest for a suspect by 99% (log odds = -4.687). Finally, the factor that had the greatest influence on arrest (at least in terms of statistical findings) was resistance. A suspect who was resistant increased the odds of arrest by 6431% (log odds = 4.179).

Table 6.11: Descriptive Statistics for St. Petersburg (N = 252)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent: Arrest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes: 30)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No: 222)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>0-7</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim injury</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request arrest</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request no arrest</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental impairment</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of officers present</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizens present</td>
<td>1-100</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim present</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike in Indianapolis, citizens in physical conflict was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest. However, conflict that reached the level of physical assault was very rare so this is not that surprising. The number of citizens or the number of officers present at the scene was also not significant. Similar to Indianapolis, however, evidence of victim injury was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest and neither

### Table 6.12: Logistic Regression Estimates for St. Petersburg (N = 252)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B (log odds)</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Exp(B) (odds ratio)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug/alcohol</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>65.31</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime seriousness</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim injury</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request arrest</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request no arrest</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental impairment</td>
<td>-4.69</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>12.21</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Level – Social Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational distance</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encounter Level – Situational Extralegal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officers</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizens</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim present</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept = -11.924 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood = 66.291</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ 117.681 (p &lt; .000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$ = .720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
was use of a weapon (and, in neither case was the size of the effect very big). Again, though, these are rare occurrences in an encounter. The thematic findings reveal that, despite their lack of statistical significance in the logistic regression results, such factors (when they are present) do matter to officers when making an arrest decision.

As in Indianapolis, the predicted classification table is also of interest. As Table 6.13 reveals, the logistic model for St. Petersburg correctly predicts 96.4% of the cases. The sensitivity of the model is 80% and the specificity is 99%. Thus, this model has a very low Type I error rate as well as a fairly low Type II error rate. Finally, the positive predictive value is 89% and the negative predictive value is 97%. The St. Petersburg model is slightly more accurate than the Indianapolis model.

Table 6.13: Predicted Values for Logistic Regression (St. Petersburg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>Percentage Correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Percentage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>96.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Process Model of Arrest**

As in Indianapolis, the process model was developed by considering the thematic findings discussed in chapter 5, a consideration of crosstabs comparing variables of interest to an arrest outcome, and the actual pieces of information (in the order in which they were considered) officers used for each encounter that led to an arrest. Refer to Table 6.9 for a bivariate breakdown of variables relevant to arrest. In considering these three things, I developed a number of models to test which best predicted the arrest
outcome. The final model is presented in Figure 6.3. Table 6.14 provides the results of the process model.

As Table 6.14 reveals, the process model for St. Petersburg correctly predicts 96.1% of the cases. This is nearly identical to the accuracy of the St. Petersburg logistic regression model. The sensitivity of the model is 85.2% and the specificity is 98.4%. Thus, as with the structural model, this predictive model has a very low Type I error rate. Additionally, the process model is better than the structural model at predicting arrest. Finally, the positive predictive value is 92.0% and the negative predictive value is 96.9%. The process model for St. Petersburg has both a higher sensitivity than the structural model, as well as a higher positive predictive value.

Table 6.14: Predicted Values for Process Model (St. Petersburg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>Percentage Correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Arrest</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.3: Process Model of Arrest (St. Petersburg)

- Disrespect
- Officer testimony
- Evidence of drugs/alcohol
- Witness testimony
- Victim request to arrest
- Involved party is a minor
- Evidence of injury
- Evidence of property damage
- Confession
- Victim requests suspect leave
- Warrant
- ARREST
- Evidence of weapon
- Citizens in conflict
- Involved party returns
- Prior knowledge of location
- Suspect attempts to flee
- Victim requests arrest
- ARREST
Conclusions Regarding Structural Models

Chapter 4 highlighted fifteen hypotheses to be tested using logistic regression. As already noted, many of these hypotheses were not borne out. Each will be considered in turn here so the findings between the sites can be directly compared.

Hypothesis #1

Indicators of violence, such as the presence of a weapon or threats or actual assaults of police, would be more likely to result in arrest.

In Indianapolis, neither the presence of a weapon, nor the threat of or actual assault on police, was a statistically significant a predictor of arrest. Incidences of assault on police were very rare, and were included in a measure of overall resistance. In St. Petersburg, the presence of a weapon was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest. However, resistance was. Again, though, assaults on police were rare and most forms of resistance measured by the variable consisted of refusals to follow police demands, not more serious forms of resistance such as assault. Thus, their lack of statistical significance is not surprising. In developing the process model, however, it is clear that officers did take assault and evidence of a weapon into consideration when an encounter ended in arrest.

Hypothesis #2

Citizens who are either mentally impaired or under the influence of drugs or alcohol are more likely to be arrested.
Being under the influence of drugs or alcohol had no influence on arrest in either site. This was also borne out in the thematic findings and in the development of the process model. A suspect that is under the influence does not seem to solely influence an arrest decision. The process model indicates, however, that a suspect under the influence combined with other factors can lead to arrest. In St. Petersburg, a suspect who was mentally impaired had lower odds of being arrested than a suspect who was not mentally impaired. This finding was not found in Indianapolis, however.

**Hypothesis #3**

Citizens who flee or attempt to flee are more likely to have their actions result in an arrest.

A citizen attempting to flee from the police prior to arrest was extremely rare (it only occurred one time in St. Petersburg). Fleeing from the police was considered a form of resistance and was included in the resistance variable. As mentioned, resistance was statistically significant in St. Petersburg, but not in Indianapolis.

**Hypothesis #4**

A request for arrest from an involved citizen will be more likely to result in an arrest while a request for no arrest will be more likely to result in no arrest.

In Indianapolis, a request for arrest or a request for leniency had no influence on decisions to arrest. In St. Petersburg, a request for no arrest was not significant. However, a request for arrest was a statistically significant influence on whether or not the suspect was arrested. However, the thematic findings indicated that officers tended to follow
victim preference and victim preference (in the form of both requesting arrest and requesting a suspect leave) was included in the process model.

**Hypothesis #5**

As the level of evidence increases the likelihood of an arrest is greater. More evidence of wrongdoing results in less opportunity for discretion because the range of options is more clearly defined.

This hypothesis was borne out in both sites. The level of evidence was a statistically significant predictor of arrest.

**Hypothesis #6**

The more serious the crime, the more likely it is for a citizen to be arrested. As with the level of evidence, the more serious the crime the less opportunity there is for discretion because the range of options is more clearly defined.

Crime seriousness was not statistically significant in Indianapolis. This was a surprising finding and it may indicate a problem with the model. Crime seriousness in St. Petersburg, however, was statistically significant and increased the odds of arrest substantially. Crime seriousness in the thematic findings, and the process model, was reflected as victim injury. As has been discussed, victim injury does appear to influence the arrest decision.
Hypothesis #7

Citizens who are disrespectful are more likely to have their actions result in an arrest.

A disrespectful demeanor was a statistically significant predictor of arrest in both sites. Although some recent research has suggested that the importance of demeanor is reduced when one controls for suspect resistance (e.g. Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002) this was not the finding in this study. Being disrespectful clearly influenced the arrest decision. However, as was mentioned previously, there were very few cases of more serious forms of resistance. It is impossible to say what the finding regarding demeanor would be if resistance was a stronger variable. The thematic findings and the process model also bear out the disrespect is influential when it comes to an officer's decision regarding arrest.

Hypothesis #8

Male citizens will be more likely to have their actions result in an arrest. As police officers are still predominantly male, I believe that leniency towards females will result in an effect on males.

Gender was not a statistically significant factor in either site and gender was also not a consideration in the process model or the thematic findings.

Hypothesis #9

Age will not have an effect. However, younger males will be more likely to be arrested.
Age by itself was not statistically significant predictor of arrest in either site. To determine if age operated with gender to create an effect, a separate logistic regression equation was estimated which included an interaction variable for male and young\textsuperscript{37} (along with an interaction variable for nonwhite and disrespectful). Including this interaction term did not change the result – being young and male was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest either.

In regards to the thematic findings, officers indicated that juvenile status meant the encounter was handled more informally. In the process model, however, having a suspect who was a minor did lead to arrest in some cases. However, juvenile status alone was not enough. In such instances, other important considerations, such as victim injury, a victim accusing assault or suspect disrespect was present.

**Hypothesis #10**

The race/ethnicity of the citizen will not have an effect. However disrespectful blacks will be more likely to be arrested than respectful blacks or whites, or disrespectful whites.

In neither site was race alone a statistically significant predictor of arrest (although, in Indianapolis it came very close to being significant indicating that the relationship between minority status and arrest is negative; however, the size of the effect was small). To determine if there is an interaction between race and demeanor, a separate logistic regression equation was estimated which included an interaction variable for

\textsuperscript{37} Young included teen and young adult.
nonwhite and disrespectful (along with an interaction variable for young and male). Not only was this interaction term not statistically significant, in St. Petersburg it also rendered demeanor (previously significant) insignificant. Race was also not a consideration in the thematic findings.

**Hypothesis #11**

Wealthier citizens will be less likely to be arrested.

Wealth was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest in either site (although the expected direction of the coefficient was as expected). Wealth was also not a consideration in the thematic findings.

**Hypothesis #12**

An officer who has knowledge of a citizen will be less likely to arrest him or her or subject him or her.

Officer knowledge of a suspect had no statistical influence on whether or not a suspect was arrested in either site. However, the effect of officer knowledge in Indianapolis was quite large. If an officer had knowledge of a citizen the odds of arrest increased by 205%. This is in line with the thematic findings which revealed that prior knowledge of an individual or an address could influence an arrest decision in part because it generated increased attention on the citizen. The process model bears this out as well - when an arrest decision includes the consideration that the citizen is known to the officer it is also coupled with the existence of a warrant or a confession from the suspect. In the former, previous knowledge of the citizen may mean the officer is more
inclined to check for warrants; in the latter, previous knowledge of the officer may make the suspect more likely to confess (perhaps out of a sense that he or she is unlikely to get away with the crime since the officer is already knowledgeable about previous criminal activity).

**Hypothesis #13**

As the relational distance between disputants decreases, officers will be less likely to arrest.

The relationship between the involved parties had no influence on whether or not a suspect was arrested in either site. Although relational distance was not a consideration in the process model, the thematic findings did reveal some undertones of a bias against victims who were assaulted by intimates. There was not enough evidence to draw any definite conclusions about this; however, it is worth exploring further.

**Hypothesis #14**

When either the number of officers or bystanders at the scene increases, officers will be more likely to arrest. I hypothesize that crowd situations are more likely to result in shows of authority.

In Indianapolis, additional officers on the scene had a statistically significant positive effect on the odds of arrest. It is possible that additional officers on scene indicate a more serious crime in which arrest was already likely. The presence of bystanders was also statistically significant, but it decreased the odds of arrest. In debriefings, officers indicated that they were hesitant to take formal action in a crowd
situation unless it was very serious in order to avoid inciting more trouble. This may be the case here. In St. Petersburg, neither the presence of additional officers on the scene nor the presence of bystanders was a statistically significant predictor of arrest.

**Hypothesis #15**

When both disputants are present at the scene, officers will be more likely to arrest.

Although it was expected that the odds of arrest would increase if both parties were present (because the presence of a victim would result in more evidence against a suspect), a victim at the scene was not a statistically significant predictor of arrest in either site.

**Conclusions Regarding Process Models**

As mentioned earlier, for both sites the process model predicted arrest better than the structural model. In Indianapolis, the sensitivity of the structural model was 55.5% and the sensitivity of the process model was 83.3%. For Indianapolis, the process model predicted arrest far better than the structural model. In St. Petersburg, the sensitivity of the structural model was 80.0% and the sensitivity of the process model was 85.2%. Although not as dramatic a difference as in Indianapolis, in St. Petersburg the process model also predicted arrest better than the structural model. Overall, though, both the structural and the process model do quite well at predicting arrest.

Another consideration for this research was whether or not police officers are using a compensatory or a non-compensatory strategy when making decisions in dispute
resolution encounters. Two different analyses were conducted: depth of search and content of search. Depth of search is the proportion of total information examined. If an individual searches a large proportion of information, the inference is that he or she is using a linear (compensatory) strategy. In both Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, the mean amount of information accessed by officers was 46%. Thus, it appears from this measure that officers are using a non-linear decision strategy.

The way that information is used (what is considered important) also indicates compensatory or non-compensatory strategies. Thus, an analysis of the content of search was conducted as well. The order in which information is accessed indicates its importance (information collected first is presumed to be more important than information collected later). For research conducted in a controlled setting, such as an information board experiment, officers control what information they examine first. The link between importance and order of search is much clearer in such settings. For research conducted in the field, officers do not have complete control over what information is presented to them first. So, an analysis that bases the degree of importance on the order of information received in a field setting may not be as straightforward as data collected in a controlled setting. Also, some types of information are presumed important, but rarely occur (e.g. warrants found). Thus, this analysis is certainly exploratory.

That said, there were some interesting findings when the cues with the highest average importance scores were compared to the cues found statistically significant in the logistic regression analysis. For Indianapolis, five variables in the structural model were statistically significant predictors of arrest: the number of officers present, the number of
citizens present, the level of evidence available, whether or not there was verbal or physical conflict between the involved parties, and whether or not the suspect was disrespectful to the primary officer. A comparison of these five variables to the ten most important cues in the process model reveals some similarities and some differences. The presence of bystanders was statistically significant in the structural model, but it did not receive a high average importance score in the process model (it ranked 28th). Disrespect was also statistically significant in the structural model, but was only ranked 12th most important in the process model. However, the qualitative analysis revealed that suspect demeanor did play a role when it came to Indianapolis' officers decisions regarding arrest. Citizens in conflict was statistically significant in the structural model and citizens in verbal conflict received the 10th largest importance score in the process model. Level of evidence was also statistically significant in the structural model and many of the components that contribute to the evidentiary scale (suspect, victim, and witness testimony, evidence of injury, and evidence of drug or alcohol intoxication) were deemed important in the process model as well. This is congruent with the qualitative findings regarding evidence and arrest, particularly officers' views regarding victim injury. Some cues that received high average importance scores were not statistically significant in the structural model. These included a victim requesting some form of action and juvenile status of an involved party. Neither age nor victim request for arrest were statistically significant predictors of arrest in the structural model.

The findings in St. Petersburg were similar. For St. Petersburg, six variables in the structural model were statistically significant predictors of arrest: degree of suspect resistance to the officer, crime seriousness, the level of evidence available, whether or not
the suspect was mentally impaired, whether or not the victim requested arrest, and whether or not the suspect was disrespectful to the primary officer. Interestingly, the Indianapolis model and the St. Petersburg model share only two statistically significant predictors in common: level of evidence and disrespect.

As in Indianapolis, a comparison of these six variables to the ten most important cues in the process model reveals some similarities and some differences. As mentioned, many cues in the process model overlap with the evidentiary scale used in the structural model and this was the case in St. Petersburg as well (suspect, victim, and witness testimony, evidence of injury, and evidence of drug or alcohol intoxication). Injury (in the process model) is also correlated with crime seriousness in the structural model since crime seriousness is based on the type of crime. Level of resistance to the officer was statistically significant in the structural model, but measures of resistance (e.g. suspect fleeing or assaulting the officer) did not receive high average importance scores in the process model. As in Indianapolis, disrespect was statistically significant in the structural model for St. Petersburg, but was only ranked 16th most important in the process model. The qualitative analysis for St. Petersburg revealed that officers there, unlike officers in Indianapolis, did not consider suspect demeanor as important when it came to decisions regarding arrest. A victim requesting arrest and a mentally impaired suspect were statistically significant in the structural model but did not receive high average importance scores in the process model. Some cues that received high average importance scores were not statistically significant in the structural model. These included citizens in conflict, another party requesting some form of action from the police, and juvenile status of an involved party.
Again, this analysis was exploratory. The narrative data collected as part of POPN was not intended for this purpose and, as mentioned, the assumption that what officers consider first is most important is a considerable assumption. An information board study, where participants can chose the order in which information is received, may be better suited for this type of inquiry. The debriefings also presented some challenges. It may be that officers were largely unable to articulate their decision process. It may be that the observers were unable to appropriately prompt officers to retrace their steps. Whatever the reason, the debriefings were not as helpful in determining which pieces of information were most instrumental in reaching an arrest decision. Future observational research of this kind should take into account the kind of participant instruction that would be necessary to generate appropriate data.
Chapter 7
Discussion

Introduction

The impetus for this research was a desire to explore an alternative way of explaining police decision-making behavior. In addition to summarizing the current criminal justice literature on the situational influences on police behavior, I also explored the theories and research methods from the judgment and decision making field in order to consider a different perspective on the study of behavior. Drawing on the substantial work done in both fields, I utilized observational data collected in two cities in 1996-1997 for the Project on Policing Neighborhoods to build both a structural model and a process model of decision making. Additionally, I analyzed the narrative data in greater detail to explore overall themes of decision making and specific elements of the arrest decision-making process.

This final chapter is a discussion based on the results of this research. It is divided into four sections. The first section provides a look inside the "black box" of the decision making process by considering the thematic findings. In the second section, I discuss the arrest decision as both an outcome and a process and revisit the comparison of the structural and process models. The third section addresses the research questions posed in the first chapter. Finally, the concluding section provides a consideration of the study's limitations and directions for future research.
In Their Words - The Arrest Decision Process

As part of the qualitative analysis, I found six distinct themes. Two were directly related to decision making - Evidentiary Standards and Managing Situations - and led to the development of working rules (or, decision-making shortcuts). Four did not directly impact decision-making but were hypothesized to mediate on the use of a working rule. These four, termed cognitive frameworks, included Classifying Citizens, Classifying Situations, Frustrations, and Individual Officer Styles and Preferences.

As previously mentioned in chapter 5, the overall organization of the thematic findings closely resembled Finn and Stalens' (1995) use of schema theory. That is, working rules (as I term it) are similar to procedural knowledge and cognitive frameworks (as I term it) are similar to content knowledge. Thus, there is support for the premise that officers find familiarity in repetition (they learn from experience) and similar experiences will lead to similar results because officers are “framing” the current situation in the context of a previous one. Further, it appears as if the themes I uncovered interact with one another to varying degrees (refer to figure 5.1). How much overlap and influence exists in any given situation, and how much that influence has on an officer's decision, is largely dependent on the specific situation and the officer.

The thematic findings revealed a wealth of insight into officer decision-making behavior and I will revisit some of those findings here. The most important considerations for officers making an arrest decision in a dispute encounter had to do with assessing the level of evidence available. Crime seriousness, which in the thematic findings consisted solely of a consideration of the level of injury, was a paramount concern for most officers. In many cases, officers stated that if a victim injury was
present, it was the only evidence needed. The age of the involved parties was also of concern. By and large, officers tended to treat encounters involving youthful offenders in a more informal matter. Barring additional evidence, suspects who were under the influence were also treated informally. A significant portion of the evidence officers must consider has to do with verbal reports from the involved parties and an officer's belief that he or she has a handle on "the truth." Officers were candid about their inability to determine "what really happened" in many encounters. In most cases, concrete evidence that would render an arrest decision fairly easy to make was hard to come by.

Thematic findings also revealed that officers made judgments about the best use of their time as well as the limits of the police function in order to determine how to resolve a dispute. In some cases, personal considerations (e.g. avoiding lengthy paperwork or being hungry) resulted in an informal decision that was more expedient for the officer. Officers also handled a number of calls for which they were called to "do something" but had no legal basis to act because the dispute was civil in nature. In some instances, officers resolved a dispute in an informal manner if a legal order was necessary but not present (e.g. a restraining order) or in cases where they perceived the victim would not follow through.

It is interesting to note that, as rare as an arrest outcome is, much of initial focus for officers involved in the POPN study is an arrest/no arrest decision. That is, it appears that officers may weigh evidentiary considerations first to determine if arrest is appropriate. If sufficient evidence of a crime is lacking or, in rare cases, the officer determines the victim is not worthy of the full protection of the law, then a "no arrest" decision is made. Once that decision is made, officers consider what other options short
of arrest can be taken. Officers also sometimes had sufficient evidence to arrest but declined to do so for a myriad of reasons including a desire to be lenient given the particular circumstances of the case (e.g. not wanting to arrest a father at his daughter's birthday party), out of practicality (e.g. too many involved parties), and, sometimes, out of apathy.

What to do next sometimes varied between the two sites. For example, officers in Indianapolis often used the threat of arrest to gain compliance. In St. Petersburg, the threat of arrest was completely absent when officers were debriefed on their actions in an encounter. It is an interesting finding regarding the ways in which officers in different jurisdictions may handle similar encounters in completely different manners. A common tactic in both sites was to ensure the informal physical removal of one party either by ordering the suspect from the scene or, in rare cases, by driving the party to another section of the city. In both instances, removal of one party was to ensure officers would not be returning to the scene for the rest of their shift. If they were called back, especially after ordering a party away, an arrest usually followed. Officers tended to view such disregard for warnings as a lack of regard for their authority (and, therefore, a lack of respect) and acted accordingly.

The thematic findings also revealed that officers tended to put both citizens and situations into categories. Officers were quite candid in their debriefings about the oftentimes low opinion they held of the people they came in contact with. In many cases, this was because the responding officer had previous negative run-ins with one or more of the involved parties. Again, revisiting the idea that officers tend to frame the current encounter in light of their past experience with similar encounters, it is not surprising that
officers mentally classify the citizens they come in contact with according to "type." Of course, if it is a citizen with which the officer is familiar, they already have specific (usually negative) information about the individual and tend to consider that citizen according to that negative impression. In some cases, though, the officer's prior knowledge of a citizen was beneficial. In debriefings, a handful of officers discussed knowing the involved party had mental health issues and so they tailored their actions (e.g. used a more gently tone or response) accordingly. If the officer is unfamiliar with an individual, however, they appear to consider him or her in light of other experiences with citizens who are superficially similar. Waegal (1984) touched on this point in his qualitative research on police use of deadly force. He noted that "police work commonly involves relying on minimal cues to assess the character and likely behavior of persons encountered" (p. 148). The use of stereotyping is common because it allows an officer to link different types of police behavior to different categories of citizens (Waegal, 1981). Stereotyping can be a useful tool for an officer in the field, but it also involves frequent use of negative stereotypes. Negative stereotypes are commonly used in "dealing with persons displaying specific attitudes, behaviors, or characteristics such as race or type of dress." Further, persons characterized in a negative manner are "viewed as different in essential ways from respectable citizens [and] their imputed moral inferiority renders them deserving of harsh or abusive treatment" (Waegal, 1984, p. 148).

Although officers often made unflattering judgments about suspects (likely similar to the manner described above) they did, on some occasions, also deem victims to be undeserving based on extralegal conditions such as social status or relational distance. On these rare occasions, victims classified as undeserving were considered to be less
worthy of the law's intervention. This "blame the victim" mentality seemed to be reserved for those who were involved in drug activity and female victims of domestic violence (because officers who took this view felt such victims should be able to remove themselves from such situations). This type of classification of victims, however, was found only among officers in Indianapolis. Officers in St. Petersburg did not display the same "blame the victim" mentality that was present among a handful of Indianapolis officers.

The deference shown to an officer also contributed to how an officer classified a citizen and a review of the debriefings revealed that officers do consider attitude when making an arrest decision. In some cases an officer had already decided not to arrest and was moving toward another resolution when the suspect's attitude changed his or her mind. Officers were clear about the fact that many suspects "talked" their way into jail. Interestingly, although officers in both Indianapolis and St. Petersburg often referenced disrespect in their debriefings, they approached it in different ways. Indianapolis officers were quick to act on incidences of disrespect, clearly viewing a "bad attitude" as an affront to their authority. St. Petersburg officers, however, generally did not act on disrespect unless the suspect was repeatedly disrespectful.

Officers also revealed their jobs involved a large number of frustrations. Having to respond to minor calls that officers considered to be a "waste of time" was an oft-expressed frustration by observed officers. This was particularly true if the officer felt there was something more important that he or she should be doing (e.g. responding to a shooting call) or if they felt that there were not enough officers on the street. Another major frustration expressed by officers was futility, or the sense that a police presence
rarely solves anything. Officers were largely fatalistic in their opinion that they could actually solve any problems. The general consensus in such cases was that officers would be returning to a scene because the current intervention was not going to be enough to prevent further trouble. Officers definitely felt that there were limits to what they could accomplish.

**Outcome versus Process - Comparing Two Models**

An analysis of the process of an arrest decision provided an interesting look into the type of information officers consider as well as how the order in which those informational inputs are experienced (discussed in more detail below) can move an officer through a number of interim decisions before a final decision is reached. In 46% of the cases in Indianapolis (and 41% in St. Petersburg) officers made no interim decisions before reaching a final decision. In most of the rest of the encounters, officers only made one interim decision before reaching a final decision. These interim decisions were occasionally a preliminary final disposition (until additional information changed the officer's mind about the action to be taken) but were more commonly about the next steps an officer took to gather more information (e.g. going to a different location to interview another party or to run a warrant check).

The analysis provides support for the contention that, as Bayley (1986) and others have maintained, the process of an arrest decision is much more complex than most research considers. Officers do not react to a set of circumstances all at once but rather consider information piecemeal and in light of other inputs over the course of an encounter. Put simply, information received early in the encounter affects how latter
information is both received and perceived, and interim decisions affect final decisions. Binder and Scharf (1980) considered the idea of a transactional process in their study of use of force. Their findings could just as easily be applied to the decision to arrest based on the results regarding process in this research. That is, the decision to arrest is a "contingent sequence of decisions and resulting behaviors, each increasing or decreasing the probability" of an arrest (p. 116).

In order to provide a comparison between a model that depicts the process of a decision with a model that depicts the outcome of a decision, I utilized two datasets. The first was the original coded POPN dataset which, like other sets of observational data, has been subjected to regression-based analysis. I developed a second dataset from the narrative accounts of decision making in order to build a process model of decision making. In addition to comparing the models from these two datasets in order to determine how well each predicts the arrest decision, I also conducted a set of analyses to determine if decision-making is compensatory or non-compensatory. As previously mentioned, this consideration is important because regression-based (structural) models assume that decision makers are using a compensatory (or linear) decision strategy. However, more complex tasks (such as a police encounter with a suspect) have been associated with non-compensatory strategies. The results from these analyses are considered in more detail below, in the section that revisits my research questions.

Logistic regression was used to estimate the structural model and the results reveal that only a few variables have a statistically significant impact on the arrest decision. In Indianapolis, these consisted of the amount of evidence available, whether or not the citizens were in physical conflict, and the demeanor of the suspect. An increased
amount of evidence, fighting with another citizen, and being disrespectful all increased the odds of arrest. Also in Indianapolis, if there were more citizens on the scene the odds of arrest decreased, while more officers on the scene increased the odds of arrest. In St. Petersburg, an increased amount of evidence, a suspect who was disrespectful, a victim requesting arrest, a more serious crime, and a suspect who was resistant all significantly increased the odds of arrest. A suspect who was mentally impaired significantly decreased the odds of arrest.

As has already been discussed in chapter 6, a number of variables (considered in light of prior research) were expected to have a statistically significant impact on the arrest decision and did not. In Indianapolis, this consisted of victim injury, victim preference, use of a weapon, and suspect resistance against an officer. In St. Petersburg, this consisted of victim injury, use of a weapon, and citizens in physical conflict. In all cases, a review of the thematic findings and the development of the process model lead me to conclude that these factors are important considerations in the arrest decision and, discounting the lack of statistical significance, they wield rather large effects. Injury, weapon use, and physical resistance, though, occur with relative infrequency in dispute encounters so their lack of statistical significance is not surprising. However, if one were to focus solely on p-values, one would conclude that they did not impact the arrest decision. The thematic findings and process analysis, and a consideration of the size of the odds ratio, however, show that they do.

Bushway and colleagues (2006) note that, for the criminology and criminal justice fields, research "equates statistical significance with substantive significance" (p. 4). Thus, the important distinction between statistical significance and substantive
significance cannot be discounted. Oftentimes, when social science researchers interpret regression results they tend to focus solely on statistical significance and ignore the size of the effect. However, as Bushway and colleagues argue (2006), “[t]he size of the effect should drive the evaluation of the analysis, not its statistical significance. As such, effects can be analytically uninteresting (i.e., trivially small given the topic at hand) and statistically significant. Effects can also be analytically interesting and statistically non-significant” (p. 2).

In some cases, the results of the logistic regression are in line with previous research. The more evidence available, the more likely an officer will arrest. Similarly, more serious offenses (presumably, those with more evidence) are more likely to result in arrest (Black & Reiss, 1970; Smith & Visher, 1981). Evidence can take many different forms, however. Some research has found that arrest is more likely when strong evidence is combined with a victim request for arrest (Mastrofski et al, 2000; Black 1971). In the process dataset, victim testimony provided some of this evidence for officers. If victim testimony was present in an encounter, the victim tended to accuse the suspect of some sort of wrongdoing less than assault. Injury was fairly rare. In 44% of cases in Indianapolis and 44% of cases in St. Petersburg where victim testimony was present, the victim accused the suspect of assault or threatening assault. Victim injury was not significant in the structural model, but it may be that injury is evidence of a felony and arrest is, therefore, largely automatic. The thematic findings and components of the process model clearly indicate that injury is an important consideration. Additionally, victim preference is usually followed, and victims are more likely to request arrest in a serious offense (Smith & Visher, 1981). The current research also indicates that officers
tended to follow victim preferences (but it would be worth exploring further how much
test victim preference dovetailed with additional evidentiary considerations).

Most previous research has also found that demeanor plays a role in arrest
decisions (Smith & Klein, 1984; Visher, 1983; Smith & Visher, 1981; Worden & Pollitz,
1984; Worden & Shephard, 1996; Worden, 1989; Lundman, 1996a; Lundman, 1994). A
disrespectful demeanor was a significant predictor of arrest in both sites, and the thematic
findings and the process model also lead to the conclusion that disrespect is influential
when it comes to an officer's decision regarding arrest. As mentioned, though, the
thematic findings revealed a difference between departments in terms of reaction to
disrespect. Thus, there is some support for the National Research Council's (2004)
conclusion that the effect of demeanor on police behavior is complex and contingent on,
among other factors, the police department (p. 119).

Previous research has considered the effect of gender and some scholars have
found that married disputants are less likely to be arrested than unmarried disputants
(Fyfe et al, 1997; Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Black, 1971). There were no statistically
significant findings regarding gender or relational distance in the structural model.
However, the thematic findings did reveal that a small minority of officers in Indianapolis
demonstrated a "blame the victim" mentality when it came to victims of domestic
violence. This may be a function of relational distance and some officers' views of female
victims and/or their previous experiences in similar situations.

In terms of race, the previous research findings for various outcomes are mixed
and often the result of interactions with other factors such as suspect demeanor (Black,
1971) or a racial disparity in victim request for arrest (Black & Reiss, 1970; Lundman,
Sykes, & Clark, 1978). Scholars who have found a racial disparity indicate that denial of protection to black victims seems more racially motivated than more frequent arrests of black offenders (Smith et al, 1984). There was no significant finding regarding race in the structural models, even when a disrespectful nonwhite interaction term was introduced. Race was also not a factor in the thematic findings or the process model. However, officers did make a number of judgments when they encountered citizens, especially lower-class citizens (many of whom were black). It would be interesting to further explore how race and class intersect when it comes to officers' determination regarding worthiness of police intervention.

A major component of this research was the direct comparison of the structural and process models in terms of the ability to predict arrest. In both sites, both models do very well. In Indianapolis, both the structural model and the process model accurately predict 95% of all dispositions. In St. Petersburg, both the structural model and the process model accurately predict 96% of all dispositions. However, that overall performance is driven by the fact that arrest is a rare occurrence. When it comes to predicting arrest the process models perform better in both sites. In Indianapolis, the process model correctly predicts 83% of the arrest decisions while the structural model correctly predicts 56%. In St. Petersburg, the process model correctly predicts 85% of the arrest decisions while the structural model correctly predicts 80%.

Overall, however, one model is not dramatically better than the other. What is important, though, is that much of the information that is important to officers in an arrest decision is included in the process model but is rendered statistically insignificant in the structural model. The structural model is not wrong. Many of the informational inputs to
which officers attend are important but rarely occur and, thus, would not be expected to be statistically significant. However, when one considers how statistical significance is usually interpreted in regression results, the structural model is at a disadvantage. Thus, freed from any interpretation regarding statistical significance (and focusing instead on substantive significance), the process model seems to represent a more accurate depiction of the complex nature of the police decision-making.

Revisiting the Research Questions

I considered six research questions in this study. In the first, I asked if qualitative narrative data collected in a field setting could be used to build a process model of decision-making. My results show that such data can be used to develop a process model and, further, that the process model performs equally as well as a structural model when it comes to predicting an arrest decision. Friedrich (1980), after finding that factors thought to influence the use of force only explained 12 percent of the variation, concluded that "either our theoretical understanding of the phenomenon is very weak or our methodology for studying that phenomenon is very weak or both" (p. 96). This research provides some support for using another methodology to better understand the situational influences on police behavior.

In the second research question, I asked if qualitative narrative data collected in a field setting could be used to supplement a structural model. It was feasible to distill information from the narratives but, as I detailed in chapter 6, many of the informational "cues" coded from the process dataset were the same as the cues included in the original coded dataset. In many ways, the process model corroborates the structural model (but
for some evidence - noted below - that decision-making is non-compensatory). Thus, in this instance, the additional information about certain informational cues was limited and adding them to the structural model in an attempt to better explain behavior did not seem to provide much theoretical benefit.

The next three research questions considered how much variation there was across encounters in terms of the way officers utilized the information at their disposal in an encounter. In the third research question, I asked how much variation there was in terms of the order in which officers searched for information. An assessment of the process dataset revealed that the first cue officers considered was generally testimonial evidence from an involved party (occurred first in 67% in Indianapolis and 69% in St. Petersburg) and it remained prominent for subsequent cues. Not surprisingly, officers entering an encounter generally start with a request or an order for someone to tell them what is going on. When some form of testimonial evidence was not the first cue, the first type of information officers receive is generally visual (e.g. observing citizens in some form of conflict or observing evidence of a physical injury).

I also conducted an analysis of the relative importance of each type of information by assigning an "importance score" according to its placement in the decision process. The pieces of information deemed most important by this analysis were those provided in a verbal manner. Victim and suspect testimony and additional information solicited by the officer were the three most important pieces of information in Indianapolis, and victim, suspect, and witness testimony were the three most important pieces of information in St. Petersburg. However, this content of search analysis was exploratory and data collected in a field setting do not seem to perform as well as those collected in
controlled settings. In more controlled settings (such as information board experiments) officers control what information they receive first. Thus, in the current research, it is difficult to conclude that information that receives the highest importance scores is actually the information officers perceive as most important. If nearly every encounter included an injury or a warrant, for example, it is safe to assume that those pieces of information would have been at the top of the list in terms of importance. However, the rarity of such pieces of information may mean that their actual importance was obscured by the sheer volume of other forms of data that, to an officer, are actually less important.

The fourth research question asked how much variation there was across encounters in terms of the depth of information search (e.g. how many cues do officers search for before reaching a decision?) An examination of the process dataset revealed that officers generally consider between one and 10 pieces of information (63% of officers in Indianapolis and 61% of officers in St. Petersburg considered four cues or fewer). But that only provides a finding regarding how much information was actually used. In order to determine depth of search, the number of cues considered by officers in the process dataset (which, again, is the number of pieces of information actually considered) was compared to the number of cues available in the original coded dataset (which is the number of pieces of information available to be considered). The depth of search analysis revealed that in both sites the mean depth of search across all encounters was 46%. That is, on average, officers used less than half of the information that was available prior to making a decision.

In the fifth research question, I asked if police officers primarily use compensatory or non-compensatory strategies of decision-making. Based on my
exploratory analyses, I conclude that decision-making by police officers in the field is largely non-compensatory. Officers do not consider all of the cues available to them and what is important to one may not be important to another. This is an important consideration because it means that regression coefficients in a structural model (which represent an average effect across officers) conceal this individual variation. As I noted in my introduction, regression-based research has to assume that officers are largely homogenous. However, it is clear from both the analysis of process and the thematic findings that they are not. Officers do not consider and weigh each piece of information as it is presented and, further, the amount of information required by each officer in order to make a decision varies widely. This is similar to what Siegal and colleagues (1974) found in their study using information board protocols. They determined that the amount of information needed varied widely by officer. Further, their findings suggested that "police demonstrate individualized preferences for varying amounts and kinds of information for arriving at a decision, as well as preferences for adhering to a certain sequence in information processing. For some police, one piece of information is regarded as highly significant; for others, the same piece of information is thought to be rather unimportant. Some police use varying amounts and types of information to arrive at the same decision, while others use basically similar information search patterns to arrive at different decisions" (p. 144).

Interestingly, how compensatory or non-compensatory the decision-making process is may be a function of the type of police work conducted. For example, this research of patrol officers in the field indicates that decision-making is non-compensatory. However, Brandl (1991), in his analysis of detective decision-making
found that most decisions were made using compensatory strategies. Thus, the style of decision making could be related to context in which the decision maker is making the decision. Detectives, for example, perform a different type of work and receive information regarding cases in a manner that is wholly different from patrol officers solving problems in the field. It stands to reason that decision making performed in different settings, for different purposes, and under different pressures (including time) could result in different decision-making styles. Considered in this view, police decision making can be both compensatory and non-compensatory. For patrol officers responding to disputes, however, it seems to be largely non-compensatory.

Finally, in the last research question I asked if the complexity of police officer decision-making could be explained by a process model. In short, yes. Statistical models cannot provide insight into psychological processes. Regression assumes that the same cues are used in the say ways when making similar judgments. But, the process model shows that officers use many different cues in many different ways to arrive at an arrest decision. There is no doubt that linear models are robust and decision-making behavior, at its core, is a matter of the decision-maker combining pieces of information that are weighted according to importance. But, is the weighing of evidence a linear process? The way in which officers consider and combine information may be conducted in a more economical manner than a regression model implies. A linear model can be flawed and still be predictive; what it cannot do is accurately model the process of a decision.

Ford and colleagues (1989) argue that "the predictive benefits of linear models must not be accepted at the expense of denying the existence and substantive meaning of nonlinear judgment processes" (p. 76). Brandl (1991) concluded that "regression analyses
miss much of the complexity of detectives' decision making" and that "the processes involved in detectives' decision making do not parallel the assumptions of additive statistical models: each potential influence is not considered and weighted independently" (p. 411). My findings are similar. The analysis of the narrative data makes it clear that police officers generally do not consider all information at hand before making a decision and, further, that there is some evidence of a "tipping point" - for some officers, a particular cue (be it disrespect or a victim injury) leads directly to a decision without consideration of any other pieces of information.

Limitations and Future Directions

In conducting this research, the characteristics of the narratives and the debriefings presented some challenges. Not all dispute encounters contained a debriefing which meant some insight into officer decision making was lost. This may be due to the skill level of the observer - some may not have been as motivated or as interested in obtaining needed information about the how and why of the decision making process - or it may have been due to the obstinacy of the officer. Additionally, the narrative debriefings rarely presented an officer's result of "thinking aloud." Thus, although informative in other ways, rarely did they provide for a first-hand account of how officers arrived at the decision. Thus, elements of process (the cues to which officers attended and the order in which they did so) were pulled from the narrative summaries. Although this provided a fairly comprehensive assessment of the process of each decision, it did require some judgment on my part, judgment that may have introduced some error. In future research that focuses on collecting thought protocols in the field it will be important to
ensure that observers are adequately trained (and officers are adequately instructed) in how to retrace what they were thinking as they made a decision. If it is possible to gather data that is more true to a "think aloud" format it may be a better source of information for the development of a process model.

It was also sometimes difficult to pull out the observed officer's process to a decision when other officers were on scene. Care was taken to ensure that only information obtained from the primary officer was coded but this was certainly subject to error. Further, determining the relative influences on an arrest decision becomes more complex when another officer is also obtaining and providing information. As messy as these data sometimes were to analyze, however, proponents of representative design in the judgment and decision making field point to the necessity of studying behavior in the field rather than in the lab in order to obtain a more generalizable understanding of behavior. The "real world" is messy, and it is important to conduct research in an environment in which "multiple influences are partial and entangled" (Doherty & Kurz, 1996, p. 126). Gathering verbal protocols in the field, even with the best of instructions, may still not be ideal, but it may be necessary to accurately model decision-making behavior.

What this research does do is demonstrate that a process model of decision-making can be developed from narrative accounts of decision making process and, further, that they perform as well as, and in some respects better than, structural models in predicting outcomes. The benefit of a process model is that it allows for the complexity of decision making in the field, complexity that is obscured in regression model. Such a method can be utilized for other types of decisions or to analyze non-dispute decisions.
that lead to arrest. For example, once officers decide that arrest is not appropriate, how do they determine what action to take? What information inputs (or lack of information) result in a tipping point between arrest and no arrest? How does this analysis hold up for other types of encounters (e.g. traffic stops)?

Rather than focusing on a particular decision outcome, process models can also be developed for individuals. Other than typologies, differences among individual decision makers are rarely considered. It would be worthwhile to utilize the POPN data for such an analysis as some officers were subject to multiple observations. A comparison of their similarities and differences would be informative and future research could detail how differences among officers affect both the process and the outcome of certain decisions (beyond just arrest).

The thematic results also revealed some interesting findings regarding the type of victim. Specifically, some officers viewed particular citizens as unsympathetic or undeserving. In some cases, this classification was based solely on the class of the victim. Additional analysis on treatment of victims across the board (not just those in dispute encounters) would be instrumental in exploring further how officers form such views (and if it is an intersection of race and class) and how such views regarding victims translates into specific action or inaction. The thematic results also revealed that officers tend to treat juveniles (both victims and suspects) differently. Future research could explore this in greater detail by focusing solely on encounters that include juveniles as the primary participants.
Appendix A: Encounter Form Instructions and Encounter Form
ENCOUNTER FORM INSTRUCTIONS

2. Rides are numbered sequentially for each observer, each observer being assigned a unique range. If you are reassigned to a new officer or team of officers in the middle of an observation session, you must terminate the first ride and begin a second ride, assigning the second ride the next ride number in the sequence (see items 5 & 6 below).

If you use up all of the ride numbers in your assigned range, see your team leader for additional ride number assignments.

3. Enter the encounter number from your observation work sheet. The first encounter of the ride is numbered 1, the second is 2, etc.

4. Events include both activities and encounters. This number indicates the sequence in which this particular event occurred during this ride. For example, if 3 activities and 1 encounter preceded this activity, then the event sequence number of this activity would be 5.

5. An incident is an occurrence that links events because of common citizen participants or a common problem specific to that occurrence. It provides a way of tracking various events that are related in this way. Some examples of events that would be linked by a common incident are described below. The numbers in the examples are Event Sequence Numbers with "activity" or "encounter" placed in front of the number. This reflects how these would be labeled on your narratives.

- O1 is dispatched to the scene of a bicycle theft (Activity 5: En route to scene of bicycle theft). Upon arrival at scene, O1 takes a report from C1, the owner of the bicycle (Encounter 6).

- O1 is dispatched to the scene of a domestic (Activity 10: En route to scene). Upon arrival O1 has encounter with citizens and arrests C2, who is sent to jail in a paddy wagon (Encounter 11). At the end of encounter, O1 takes 10 minutes in his car to fill out paperwork on the encounter (Activity 12). O1 drives to the jail to book C2 (Activity 13). At the jail O1 books C2 (Encounter 14). Much later in the shift O1 gets another dispatched call to return to the scene of the first dispatch to deal with C1, the victim of the beating, who has called to complain that C2 called her from jail and said that when he was released he would beat her again (Encounter 45).

- O1 is dispatched to the scene of a vandalism (Activity 10: En route to scene). At the scene she engages in an encounter with C1, the victim, who tells her that three juveniles down the block did it (Encounter 11). O1 drives down the block to talk to the juveniles (Activity 12). She questions the juveniles at their parents' house
and they implicate another juvenile who lives in the adjacent beat, but they don’t know exactly where (Encounter 13). O1 then drives to the area of this juvenile and drives around looking for him on the street, but doesn’t locate him (Activity 14). Later during the shift, O1 speculates that this vandalism may fit into a pattern of gang-related activity on her beat, so she stops by an informant’s hangout to talk to him about what’s going on with his gang (Activity 33 and Encounter 34).

- O1 receives a telephone call from his block-watch captain about helping to get trash cleaned up in the neighborhoods public areas. He then telephones the city’s Sanitation Department to see if he can arrange for people to be assigned for a special clean up using neighborhood volunteers to assist (Activity 15). Later on the shift he drives to a neighborhood association meeting to talk to a large group of citizens about his project and enlist their support (Activities 25 and 26). Finally, toward the end of his shift, he meets with his supervisor to describe what he has accomplished on this project (Activity 60).

- O1 receives a call to a report of a gunshot. He proceeds to the scene (Activity 12). At the scene he looks around for witnesses but doesn’t find anyone (Activity 13).

**When NOT to use an incident number.** Never give roll call an incident number.

Incident numbers are reserved for events related to situations in which the officer is attempting to deal with a specific problem arising from a specific event. Normally this will be traceable to a specific, key triggering event observed during the shift (often an encounter with a citizen or a contact with another officer or public servant who identifies a problem for the officer’s attention). Events that are only related because they are similar or deal with a similar problem (but not the same triggering event) are not linked by the same incident number. For example, an officer may have decided to take on as a problem-solving effort, intensively patrolling a particular street corner to deter drug dealers from hanging out there. The officer's problem-focused activities would NOT be linked with a common incident code—unless and until there was a triggering event observed or reported by the officer (the event may have occurred on a previous shift).

Incident numbers are assigned sequentially, based on when the triggering event occurred. Many times the triggering event will be a dispatch, where the event that describes it is the activity that notes "En route to dispatched call to deal with XXXXX." The next activity or encounter is often tied to that triggering event, and would share the same incident number. And if some later event is also linked to this incident, it too would get that same incident number.

The first incident noted receives a code of 1 (so all related events receive that code when you are responding to the Incident Number item). The second incident noted receives a
code of 2, and so on.

If an event is unrelated to an incident, SIMPLY LEAVE THE INCIDENT NUMBER A MISSING VALUE (-9).

6. An encounter begins when the officer and citizen first begin communicating with each other. Thus, an encounter does not necessarily begin when the officer first arrives at the scene of an assigned call. It only begins when the officer first encounters a citizen and one of them begins communication.

7. An encounter ends when the communication ends between all citizens involved in the encounter and the officer. This usually occurs when the citizen or the officer depart the scene. Temporary gaps in communication with citizens present do not end an encounter as long as the officer and citizen are in proximity and at least one is attending to the other.

For example, an officer responds to a "cold" burglary call. After interviewing the homeowner, the officer tells the citizen he'll walk around the house and look for evidence. The officer leaves the citizen's presence to do this, but then returns to the citizen to speak further with him about what evidence he found. This is all one encounter.

Another example: an arrested citizen may be placed in the back of the officer's squad car after an investigation involving communication with that citizen and others. Once the citizen is in the car, the officer and citizen may say nothing to each other during the ride to the station, but the encounter still continues because they are in proximity and the citizen is in that officer's custody. However, if the officer places the citizen in a paddy wagon for the trip to the station, then the citizen is no longer close enough to continue communication if one of them wanted to do so, and the encounter ends. A subsequent encounter may begin at the station when the officer meets the paddy wagon and resumes custody of the prisoner.

8. **Code 1**: "Officer acted on own without apparent ..." should be used when there is no command, suggestion, or request from others that the officer engage in this encounter. Usually, officer initiated encounters will receive this code, unless there is a specific statement from someone else that the officer should engage in this encounter at this time. An officer who observes a traffic infraction and stops the vehicle would be an instance of officer acting on his/her own without apparent request, notification, or command from others without the aid of any other information source.

Suppose that an officer is dispatched to an address to deal with a problem. Once there the officer decides to go somewhere else to deal with the problem (perhaps no one is at that address). An encounter arising from this decision (going somewhere else) should be coded as "officer acted on own without apparent request..." (code 1) because he did not
receive information about going to that second location from someone else. He decided on his own.

**Code 2:** “Dispatcher”- Suppose an officer hears about a problem at some address but the dispatcher does not dispatch this officer. The officer decides on his/her own initiative to go to the scene of the call. You code this item as “dispatcher” (code 2), because the dispatcher is the information source for this mobilization. Do this whether or not the officer notifies anyone else about what he/she intends to do/has done.

**Code 3:** “Supervisor/administrator...”-The same principle applies to encounters initiated based on information or orders received from a supervisor/administrator or information/request from other officers of the same rank. They are the information source and should be coded as such.

**Code 4:** “Other officer...”-see above

Code 5: “Citizen (on-scene)”- is for cases when a citizen hails or summons an officer face-to-face directly—without going through the dispatcher or other police. For example, a stranded motorist waves an officer over. Or a citizen from a crowd walks up to an officer and asks directions. Or a citizen at a previous encounter gives an officer information that the officer uses to go to the next address, resulting in this encounter.

**Code 6:** “Citizen (by telephone, other)”-is for cases when a citizen calls, pages, or communicates a request by some other non-face-to-face means.

9. Use code 1 if officer engaged in activity without being instructed to do so by higher authority.

If officer received no instructions but did it on his own and notified higher authority of his intentions, use code 6.

Work assignments received from the dispatcher will receive code 2. Assignments received from a supervisor/administrator will receive code 3. If the officer receives an assignment or instructions from both the dispatcher and supervisor/administrator (one immediately followed by the other), use code 4. Use code 5 for situations where you know the officer received instructions from higher authority, but you are not sure which one. If the officer receives a request or something that sounds like instructions from another officer who is not the observed officer’s supervisor or higher ranking officer in the department, use code 1. If another officer of the same or lower rank is relaying instructions from the officer’s superior, then use codes 2-5, as appropriate.

10. Code 7 is reserved for those on-scene officer initiated encounters where there was no indication of prior officer-initiated “en route” activity (see instructions for Q-8 above).
Note that a routine traffic stop would be coded as "7" not applicable: officer at scene at beginning of encounter.

12 & 14. "Mass private property" means areas that are owned privately (by businesses), but to which the general public has ready access and is encouraged by the owners to use. Some examples of outdoor mass private property are recreation theme parks, sports stadiums, golf courses, store parking lots. Examples of indoor mass private property include various businesses, retail stores, malls, indoor sports arenas, private hospitals, inside a gas station or convenience store. A property does not need to be "large" to be considered mass private property.

You will need to be careful to distinguish public and mass private locations. Some hospitals are public, some private. The way to distinguish such spaces is by ownership. Some sports facilities are publicly owned, and some private. If you are unsure about a given space, you may ask the officer. A listing of frequently visited public and mass private facilities will be made available to you to assist in coding these.

15. This item refers to the level of lighting without portable illumination (flashlights) provided by the police.

Level of illumination refers to the condition in the space where this activity took place. If it is the middle of a moonless night outdoors, but the activity takes place inside of a well-illuminated building, then code the level of illumination in that building.

When encounters take place in areas of varying illumination levels, select the level of illumination that accounts for the largest portion of the time covered by the activity.

16. This "indication" may come from the dispatcher, other officers, or from the officer's own knowledge (revealed by comments). This information may have been made available at any time before this encounter began.

17. A brief encounter is some form of verbal communication or physical contact between police and public that does not satisfy the requirements of an encounter because the communication was less than a minute in length and involves fewer than 3 exchanges. This may include commands or requests from police to citizens. It may also include requests, demands from citizens to police. Do not count communications that are only waves or other gestures or simple "Hello, how are you?" forms of communication.

Brief encounters must involve police business. If a police-citizen interaction lasts less than a minute, and involves fewer than 3 exchanges, and does not involve police business, it may be classified as a "casual" encounter. See below.

Common forms of brief encounters are: police telling citizens to stop doing something or
start doing something, requests for information that do not involve extended communication.

**Traffic Stop Exception:** Traffic stops are never coded as brief encounters, even if they take less than a minute. Because of the potential for enforcement, many items relevant to the full encounter are relevant.

Coding an event as a brief encounter skips most of the subsequent items on this instrument. Be careful not to "back" into these items from Q-4 and code them. If this is a brief encounter, then items 18-47 should all be left with missing values (-9).

A **casual encounter** is any encounter [of any length] during which there is NO obvious police business or problem presented to police. That is, for a casual encounter to occur, the police are neither asked to act in their official capacity, nor do they act in that capacity. When BOTH of these conditions are satisfied, the encounter is coded as casual. If only one condition is satisfied, then the correct response to this is NO (or ‘brief encounter’ if that applies).

An example of a casual encounter is a police officer ordering a snack or meal, during which there is no conversation about problems that are police business; the officer merely orders a meal or snack. If O1 orders his meal from the wait staff (involving a minute or more or 3 exchanges), that constitutes a casual encounter. However, if the O1 is served lunch and spends 20 minutes eating it by himself, that would be coded an activity (Activity Code 801) and is not part of the casual encounter. Brief wait staff interruptions during the meal (to ask if O1 needs anything else or to give him the bill) do not constitute new casual encounters unless they are longer than a minute or more than 3 exchanges.

Another example of a casual encounter is a police officer spending time with a friend, family member, or acquaintance and the nature of the interaction is purely personal. No police business is brought up by either party, police or citizen. Coding this item as a casual encounter follows the same skip pattern as the brief encounter.

Examples of problems that do concern police business would include discussions of a citizen’s immediate problem, conversations about past crime or security problems experienced by the citizen or the citizen’s establishment, or previous incidents the police handled at the store or in the neighborhood. These discussions would not be considered "casual."

18. See Problem Codes section of your notebook. Select the code that most closely characterizes how the dispatcher described the situation. If more than one problem was described, select the one emphasized most by the dispatcher. If that cannot be determined, select the one that was last mentioned by the dispatcher.
19. Select the code that best indicates how it appeared that the officer defined the problem at the beginning of the encounter. If more than one problem applies, select the one that applied first.

20. Select the code that best indicates how it appeared that the officer defined the problem at the end of the encounter. If more than one problem applies, select the one that appeared to be most important to the officer.

21. If a second problem applies, select the code that best indicates how it appeared that the officer defined the problem at the end of the encounter.

22. Code "yes" when the officer makes reference to repeated occurrences of this problem with these citizens or at this address. The officer should explicitly link the people or place involved to the larger problem. If the officer indicates that this event is like other events or caused by the same forces as other events, code yes. For example, an officer may say that a poorly run tavern is the reason for all the rowdiness on a given street corner, then that would suggest a larger problem.

23. Select the problem code that best captures how the officer characterized the larger problem. It may be (although does not necessarily have to be) the same problem code as assigned to this particular event. This may, or may not, be the same code as used in items 18-21. It depends on how the officer characterized the larger problem.

24. Code a YES on this item ONLY if the police tried to determine the nature, extent, or causes of this problem DURING THIS ENCOUNTER. This question asks you to indicate whether the officer undertook some investigation of the problem— one that clarified what it was, one that tried to determine its scope, or one that attempted to determine what was causing it. To receive a code of YES, the investigation should go beyond merely trying to identify suspects or wrongdoers.

Refer to the example for question 19 above. If the officer were to search the neighborhood for a burglary suspect this would not be an instance of prevention. However, this question would be coded "yes" if the officer were (as a result of identifying alleys as an exit route) to call a local landlord to close off that alley from public access.

Example: O1 responds to a dispatched burglary call. At the call O1 learns that several other nearby homes have been burglarized in the past week. If O1 begins asking the victims neighbors about the burglary to determine how burglars are able to enter and exit the neighborhood without being seen—— then O1 is trying to determine the nature, extend, or causes of the problem. Conversely, O1 arresting a suspected burglar is NOT an example of the police trying to determine the nature, extent, or causes of the problem.
25. Code a YES on this item ONLY if the police were trying to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of the problem. That is, their actions must go beyond merely resolving the problem in the presenting situation. Police action must be clearly future oriented (beyond the end of the work shift).

An officer telling a citizen to “get that headlight fixed” or “keep the speed down” is not considered prevention. An example of prevention would be an officer giving a domestic violence victim a pamphlet on counseling/shelters. Another example is an officer calling another agency to look into the situation (child protective services). Again, the act must clearly be future oriented. Note: an arrest of a perpetrator is not ordinarily considered prevention, even though this act may immediately incapacitate a citizen (thus preventing some future crimes).

26. A long-term plan means that the officer must have planned this activity prior to this ride. Plans that are developed during this ride, or spur-of-the-moment plans are not considered long-term. If the officer indicates (at any time) that he/she intended to deal with this problem prior to this shift then code this as ‘yes.’ Cues would include verbal statements by the officer about an existing plan or project.

Example: Officer tells you he/she routinely talks to low level drug dealers in a particular park where there is a drug problem. Such a statement would be a sign that indicates that the encounter was part of a long term plan.

Example: By way of comparison, a different officer may talk to the same dealer, but never indicate that they are conducting a planned activity. In the latter instance, this question would receive a “no”.

Instances where O1 is simply “putting out the fire” (e.g., separating a couple in a domestic dispute to which he was dispatched) would not be considered long term in nature, and thus not coded “yes.”

28. You will need to look for a variety of cues to determine this. The officer who does most of the communication with the main citizen participants is one cue. Another is an officer who gives directions to other officers present. If other officers present ask an officer what he/she wants to do, that too indicates that they are deferring to the preferences of the other officer.

Codes 1-3 are to be used when you are observing a 1-officer unit. In this case, any O2 described in your narrative (e.g., a backup) is considered to be “other police.”

Codes 4-6 are to be used for 2 officer (or multi-officer) units. Here, O2 refers to the O2 designated on your Ride Form. “Other police” refers to officers other than O1 or O2 of the unit to which you are assigned.
Use Code 7 when you are unable to determine which officer took the decision-making lead—whether you were observing a 1-officer or 2-officer unit.

29. Include communications by telephone, radio, and mobile-digital terminal, as well as in person.

In some cases the officer will send/receive a call or message, and it will not be clear to you whether the other party is a nonsupervisor or a supervisor (see Q-31). You may ask the officer "Who was that?" or "What was that about?"—as long as you can make it seem like a natural outgrowth of your curiosity about what is going on. You want to avoid doing this constantly, however, as this may sensitize the officer to this issue.

If you are unable to determine whether the other party was a nonsupervisor officer or supervisor, then do not code it as either and note it in your narrative.

30. If more than one, select the one that occurred last.

31. Include communications by telephone, radio, and mobile-digital terminal, as well as in person.

In some cases the officer will send/receive a call or message, and it will not be clear to you whether the other party is a nonsupervisor or a supervisor. You may ask the officer "Who was that?" or "What was that about?"—as long as you can make it seem like a natural outgrowth of your curiosity about what is going on. You want to avoid doing this constantly, however, as this may sensitize the officer to this issue.

If you are unable to determine whether the other party was a nonsupervisor officer or supervisor, then do not code it as either and note it in your narrative.

32. Include communications by telephone, radio, and mobile-digital terminal, as well as in person.

In some cases the officer will send/receive a call or message, and it will not be clear to you whether the other party is a nonsupervisor or a supervisor (see Q-28). You may ask the officer "Who was that?" or "What was that about?"—as long as you can make it seem like a natural outgrowth of your curiosity about what is going on. You want to avoid doing this constantly, however, as this may sensitize the officer to this issue.

If you are unable to determine whether the other party was a nonsupervisor officer or supervisor, then do not code it as either and note it in your narrative.

34. If more than one, select the one that occurred last.
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39 & 42. Include officers of all ranks and units (uniformed and not uniformed) and officers from other departments as well as the study department.

40 & 43. Nonsworn service personnel refers to people who are acting in an occupation that has a legitimate function at the scene of this event. It could include paramedics and other medical personnel, fire fighters, social workers, parking enforcement officers, code enforcement officers, sanitation workers, security guards, and so on.

41 & 44. A citizen participant is someone who is identified on a citizen form. Bystanders are people who are gathered at the scene and focused on the situation at hand. Add the number of both types of citizens together for this item. Since an encounter cannot begin until there is at least one citizen present, there must always be at least 1 here.

45. Include information sought from the dispatcher or the mobile-digital terminal.

47. This item must receive a code of 1, 2, or 3 unless this was a brief encounter. Brief encounters will skip this item altogether, leaving it coded -9.

48. Select the code that best indicates how it appeared that the officer defined the problem. If more than one problem applies, select the one that applied first.

If the encounter involved personal business (e.g., buying a soft drink), use code 851. If the encounter involved casual conversation only use code 850.

This item is applicable only for brief or casual encounters. For full encounters the correct code is -9.

49. When traffic and ordinance citations are issued, this item should be coded yes.

50. Observing directly can include a mixture of both visual and aural observation. If you could not both see and hear what was going on for part or all of this activity, you must decide whether your inability to both see and hear prevented you from knowing what was going on. If your knowledge was impaired in this way, then you should exclude that portion of the time from your estimate. If you code less than 100% for this question, please indicate why that is so in your narrative.

51. Present means close enough to be observed by your assigned officer.

53. Code yes if there was a change due to either your presence or that of another observer.
ENCOUNTER FORM

1. Site number?
   1 Indianapolis
   2 St. Petersburg

2. Ride number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

3. Encounter number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

4. Event sequence number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER OF THIS EVENT IN ORDER OF OCCURRENCE DURING
   THE RIDE, COUNTING BOTH ACTIVITIES & ENCOUNTERS THAT
   OCCURRED PREVIOUSLY.

5. Incident number?
   ENTER THE INCIDENT NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.
   IF THIS ENCOUNTER IS NOT RELATED TO ANY OTHER EVENT DURING
   THIS RIDE, ENTER -9.

6. Time encounter began? (24 hour clock)
   0000 = midnight  1200 = noon

7. Time encounter ended? (24 hour clock)
   0000 = midnight  1200 = noon

8. What information source led directly to this encounter being
   undertaken?
   1 officer acted on own without apparent request,
      notification, or command from others
   2 dispatcher
   3 supervisor/administrator (include roll call)
   4 other officer requested/notified
   5 citizen (on-scene)
   6 citizen (by telephone, other)

9. At the time this encounter began, or immediately before, what higher
   authority in the department instructed the officer to engage in this activity?
5/18/97

1 no higher authority gave instructions
2 dispatcher
3 supervisor/administrator
4 both 2 and 3
5 higher authority gave instructions, but not sure who
6 no instructions from higher authority given, but officer notified higher authority of intentions to do activity

10. How did officer proceed to the scene of this encounter?
1 by motor vehicle: within posted speed; no lights/siren
2 by motor vehicle: within posted speed; lights/siren
3 by motor vehicle: above posted speed; no lights/siren
4 by motor vehicle: above posted speed; lights/siren
5 by foot/bike: walking/normal speed
6 by foot/bike: running/above normal speed
7 not applicable: officer at scene at beginning of encounter

11. Initial geographic location of encounter?

ENTER 6-DIGIT GEOCODE FROM OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

Intersecting streets:
1st Digit: 1=North 2=South
2nd-3rd Digit: 100-block designation
4th Digit: 3=East 4=West
5th-6th Digit: 100-block designation

12. Nature of initial location of encounter?
1 public property, outdoors (e.g., road, sidewalk, park)
2 public property, indoors (e.g., government building)
3 police facility, outdoors (e.g., police parking lot)
4 police facility, indoors (e.g., police station)
5 private property, outdoors (e.g., yard, front porch)
6 private property, indoors (e.g., home)
7 mass private property, outdoors (e.g., sports facility)
8 mass private property, indoors (e.g., shopping mall)
9 other

13. At any time during this ride did the police indicate or show that they had prior knowledge of this location? SELECT HIGHEST APPLICABLE NUMBER.

1 no
2 yes, information from roll call
3 yes, heard about it from department or other officers (not roll call)
4 yes, direct knowledge from prior visits
5 yes, police showed prior knowledge of location, but
basis of knowledge not clear

   - 9 NO SECOND LOCATION—NOT APPLICABLE
   1 public property, outdoors (e.g., road, sidewalk, park)
   2 public property, indoors (e.g., government building)
   3 police facility, outdoors (e.g., police parking lot)
   4 police facility, indoors (e.g., police station)
   5 private property, outdoors (e.g., yard, front porch)
   6 private property, indoors (e.g., home)
   7 mass private property, outdoors (e.g., sports facility)
   8 mass private property, indoors (e.g., shopping mall)
   9 other

15. What was the level of illumination when this encounter began?
   1 Daylight/brightly lit room: could readily distinguish facial features and hands of persons if present
   2 Dim lighting: could distinguish profile or overall size of persons or objects
   3 Near darkness: could distinguish movement or presence of something, but not enough light to determine size or nature of object
   4 Total/virtual darkness: unable to see anything

16. Before the encounter began, was there any indication of anticipated violence at the scene?
   1 no
   2 yes, from officer
   3 yes, from other source
   4 yes, from both officer and other source

17. Was this a BRIEF/CASUAL ENCOUNTER?
   1 no
   2 yes, brief encounter [GO TO Q-48]
   3 yes, casual encounter [GO TO Q-48]

18. Type of problem—as radioed by dispatcher or others:
    CODE -9 IF NOT DISPATCHED OR RADIOED BY OTHERS
    OTHERWISE, ENTER PROBLEM CODE.

19. Type of problem as it appeared at beginning of encounter:
    ENTER PROBLEM CODE.

20. Type of problem as it appeared at end of encounter:
Most Important Problem?

ENTER PROBLEM CODE.

21. Type of problem as it appeared at end of encounter:
Second Most Important Problem?

ENTER PROBLEM CODE.

CODE – 9 IF NO SECOND PROBLEM IS APPLICABLE.

22. Did the police indicate that the problem in this encounter
is part of a larger problem than just the circumstances of
this event?

1 no [GO TO Q-25]
2 yes

23. What was the nature of the larger problem identified by the
police?

ENTER PROBLEM CODE.

24. During this encounter, did the police try to determine the
nature, extent, or causes of the larger problem?

1 no
2 yes

25. During this encounter, did the police try to PREVENT the
occurrence or recurrence of the problem?

PREVENTION EFFORTS MUST BE FOCUSED ON PERIOD BEYOND THE
END OF THE SHIFT

1 no
2 yes

26. Was this encounter part of a long-term plan or project to
deal with this problem? [LONG-TERM = LONGER THAN THIS RIDE]

1 no [GO TO Q-28]
2 yes, plan focused on specific people or location
3 yes, plan focused on this kind of problem in general
4 yes, unable to determine nature of plan

27. Who created the plan or project of which this encounter was
a part?

SELECT HIGHEST APPLICABLE NUMBER
28. Who took the decision-making lead in this encounter?

1. O1 only
2. O1 and other police shared equally
3. Other police, but not O1
4. O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
5. O2 only (2-officer unit only)
6. O2 and other police shared equally (2-officer unit only)
7. Unable to determine

29. Did O1 receive advice, guidance, or instructions during this encounter about what to do from a NONSUPERVISOR police officer?

IF MORE THAN ONE, SELECT THE FIRST THAT OCCURRED.

1. No [GO TO Q-31]
2. Yes, take an action
3. Yes, do NOT take an action
4. Yes, other

30. What action was O1 advised to take or not take by another NONSUPERVISOR police officer?

1. Arrest/cite someone
2. Use force/more force on someone
3. File an official report/how to report the matter
4. Notify/summon supervisor
5. Mobilize other police/nonpolice for assistance
6. Counsel, advise, mediate w/citizen(s)
7. Give citizen other personal assistance
8. Leave scene/do as little as possible
9. Other

31. Did the officer request input from the SUPERVISOR during this encounter?

INCLUDE RADIO/MDT/TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

1. No
2. Yes, information, advice, or instruction
3. Yes, supervisor presence
4. Yes, both 2 and 3
5. Yes, not sure which of the above
32. At any time during the ride did the police discuss this encounter with a supervisor? [INCLUDE RADIO/MDT/TELEPHONE]

1. no [GO TO Q-35]
2. yes, before encounter only
3. yes, during encounter only
4. yes, after encounter only
5. yes, before and during encounter
6. yes, before and after encounter
7. yes, during and after encounter
8. yes, before, during, and after encounter

@ 33. Did the supervisor tell the officer what to do regarding THIS encounter?

IF MORE THAN ONE, SELECT THE FIRST THAT OCCURRED.

1. no [GO TO Q-35]
2. yes, offered suggestion only: take an action
3. yes, offered suggestion only: do NOT take an action
4. yes, ordered officer: take an action
5. yes, ordered officer: do NOT take an action
6. yes, could not determine which of 2-5 applies

@ 34. What action was O1 advised/ordered to take or not take by the supervisor?

1. arrest/cite someone
2. use force/more force on someone
3. file an official report/how to report the matter
4. notify/summon higher supervisor
5. mobilize other police/nonpolice for assistance
6. counsel, advise, mediate w/citizen(s)
7. give citizen other personal assistance
8. leave scene/do as little as possible
9. other

@ 35. For what percentage of the encounter was a supervisor present?

ENTER A NUMBER BETWEEN 0-100. "PRESENT" MEANS OBSERVABLE BY THE OFFICER. RADIO/MDT/TELEPHONE CONTACT DOES NOT COUNT AS BEING PRESENT.

[IF ZERO GO TO Q-39]

@ 36. What is the identity of the first supervisor present?

USE OFFICER ID CODE.

ENTER 9999 IF SUPERVISOR'S IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN.
37. What is the identity of the second supervisor present?

USE OFFICER ID CODE.

ENTER 9999 IF SUPERVISOR'S IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN.

ENTER ZERO IF THERE WAS NO SECOND SUPERVISOR PRESENT. [IF ZERO, GO TO Q-39]

@ 38. What is the identity of the third supervisor present?

USE OFFICER ID CODE.

ENTER 9999 IF SUPERVISOR'S IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN.

ENTER ZERO IF THERE WAS NO THIRD SUPERVISOR PRESENT.

@ 39. Upon arrival at the scene, how many police officers were already present?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 40. Upon arrival at the scene, how many non-sworn service personnel were already present?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 41. At the beginning of the encounter, how many citizens (bystanders + participants) were present?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 42. Including your assigned officer(s), what was the maximum number of officers present at any one time during the encounter?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 43. What was the maximum number of non-sworn service personnel present at any one time during the encounter?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 44. What was the maximum number of citizens (bystanders + participants) present at any one time during the encounter?

ENTER NUMBER.

@ 45. Did the police seek information from any source other than citizen participants during this encounter?
From what source did they seek information?

ENTER AGENCY CODE. IF MORE THAN ONE, ENTER THE ONE WITH WHICH MOST TIME WAS SPENT.

Did the observed police call for more police officers to go to the scene?

DO NOT CODE THIS ITEM \(-9\) UNLESS THIS WAS A BRIEF ENCOUNTER.

Type of problem/situation? [SELECT MOST IMPORTANT]

ENTER PROBLEM CODE

Did the police file an official report or indicate an intention to file an official report regarding this encounter?

What percentage of this encounter did you observe directly?

ENTER A NUMBER BETWEEN 0-100.

Was another project observer present during this encounter?

What was the identification code of the observer present?

IF MORE THAN ONE OBSERVER PRESENT, SELECT THE NUMBER OF THE FIRST ONE YOU OBSERVED]

Did the police change their behavior because of your or other observer presence?

1. no significant change [GO TO Q-56]
2. yes, a little change
3. yes, a substantial change
54. In what way did the police change their behavior during this encounter because of observer presence? 
SELECT HIGHEST APPLICABLE NUMBER

1 police more inclined to get involved
2 police less inclined to get involved
3 police more inclined to arrest or cite
4 police less inclined to arrest or cite
5 police more inclined to use force
6 police less inclined to use force
7 other

55. What is the basis of your judgment that police changed their behavior because of observer presence?

1 police stated that their behavior changed
2 observer inferred it from behavior or manner of police
3 other

56. Did you perform any police tasks during this activity?

1 no
2 yes, offered police information, advice, or an opinion
3 yes, performed some physical aspect of police work
4 yes, had more than casual communication with citizens
5 yes, two or more of the above
Appendix B: Citizen Form Instructions and Citizen Form
CITIZEN FORM INSTRUCTIONS

2. Rides are numbered sequentially for each observer, each observer being assigned a unique range. If you are reassigned to a new officer or team of officers in the middle of an observation session, you must terminate the first ride and begin a second ride, assigning the second ride the next ride number in the sequence (see items 5 & 6 below). If you use up all of the ride numbers in your assigned range, see your team leader for additional ride number assignments.

3. Enter the encounter number from your observation work sheet. The first encounter of the ride is numbered 1, the second is 2, etc.

4. Citizens who participate in an encounter with police are assigned an identification number. Take this number from your observation worksheet. Normally this number is assigned to citizens in the order in which they first appear in the encounter narrative. Citizen numbering begins anew with each new encounter. However, if there are two or more encounters involving the same citizen during the ride, you may use the same citizen numbers across the two encounters. A maximum of 15 citizens can be coded per encounter. It is extremely unlikely that you will have more than this, but if so, code the first 15 encountered (1-15).

5 & 6. Select the Citizen Role Code option that best characterizes the officer's perspective on this citizen. The citizen's final role code will often be what it was for item 5. Code it as different only if there is a clear indication that the officer changed his/her view of that role. An example of a clear indication is a victim/complainant in a domestic dispute who ends up getting arrested for fighting with an officer when the officer does not comply with her request not to arrest her husband. Another example: An officer who mistakenly believes that someone is an offender and handcuffs him/her, only to find out from witnesses that the handcuffed person is actually the victim. The officer removes the handcuffs and apologizes to the person, asking if he/she would like some help. There are certain times when suspects are released by the police without arrest, but this is not necessarily because the police believe the person is no longer a suspect. It is because they have inadequate evidence to justify holding them, arresting them, or citing them. Or the police may simply feel that doing these things is too much work. You may not know why the police let someone go unless they mention it in debriefing. In the absence of a clear indication that the officer thinks that a suspect is vindicated, code the final role the same as the initial role.

7. In rare instances you will be unable to determine the sex of a citizen. You may inquire of the officer what the officer believed the citizen's sex to be. If you cannot determine the citizen's sex with confidence, code -9. In cases of transvestites (cross-dressers), code the presumed biological sex, not the image presented by the citizen.
The following cues should be used to select coding category. The citizen's appearance and dress, the citizen's property and possessions, information provided by the citizen about his/her income or possessions (job, home, other resources). Base this on whatever information is available to the officer, as well as the citizen's appearance. For example, if the officer knows that a shabbily dressed person is an eccentric wealthy person, then the officer's knowledge will "override" appearances.

If a citizen has no job but has other sources of wealth (owns property, has investments, depends upon parents or other family members), take into account those other sources of wealth in selecting this code. Youths and dependents should be presumed to have the level of wealth of those who are responsible for them (e.g., parents, spouses), unless the citizen's status is known to be different from the parent's, spouse's, or custodian's.

1. chronic poverty: someone who appears not to have a domicile that can shelter them from the elements. Someone who has no regular food, shelter, or clothing. Put a homeless person in this category. Ordinarily persons in this category would not own a functional motor vehicle.

2. low: someone who has regular food, shelter, and clothing, but can provide these things only at very modest levels at or only slightly above subsistence. People who are on welfare or rely on low paying (minimum wage) jobs belong in this category. Persons in this category may own a functional motor vehicle, but it would be of very modest value (old, dilapidated).

3. middle: people with jobs above minimum wage or otherwise able to support themselves and their families. This category represents a broad range of wealth and occupations—from what has typically been called "working" class (factory workers and skilled labor) to teachers, small business owners and managers, low and mid-level government employees.

4. above middle: people whose appearance and possessions suggest the capacity to afford many luxury items (e.g., large, well-kept homes, luxury automobiles, expensive clothes and jewelry).

Often you will rely upon a variety of indicators (dress, speech, home, possessions, occupation) to determine which category best suits the citizen. If you are presented with conflicting information (e.g., modest or shabby appearance but an occupation or home that suggests much greater wealth), you should take the totality of cues into account and select the category that best seems to fit over all.

NOTE: This item does not ask you to judge the esteem in which society holds this individual or the individual's social standing in the neighborhood, larger community, or
with the police. You are asked to make the best judgment possible of this individual’s level of wealth, regardless of how he or she obtained it and how others may feel about this individual or his/her occupation.

11. To receive a code other than 1 (none), the citizen should clearly be presenting him/herself as a representative of an organization.

12. The officer may reveal his/her prior knowledge by the way he deals with the citizen during the encounter or what he tells you during debriefing. The citizen too may reveal the nature of the officer’s prior knowledge by his/her manner of dealing with the officer.

13. Use any references by the officer or any citizen about where this citizen lives, works, or owns property. If the officer is not acquainted with the citizen, this information often becomes known if the citizen produces a driver’s license or other ID bearing home address.

14. If a citizen has the smell of alcohol on his/her breath, but there are no behavioral indications of intoxication, code 2. Slight behavioral indications mean speech that is only slightly slurred. The citizen understands and can respond in a comprehensible fashion to all queries. Strong behavioral effects are those that indicate severe impairment of mental or motor skills. Code 5 (unconscious) if the citizen at any time during the encounter lost consciousness.

15. Mental disorder refers to an inability to perceive situations as a reasonable person would or to control one’s emotions and actions. Further, there must be some indication that it is a chronic (continuing) condition, not one arising from the immediate circumstances (e.g., anger or frustration arising from a personal conflict).

16. Minor illnesses and injuries are those which are not life threatening or do not pose the risk of permanent disfigurement or disability if not attended to. For example: shortness of breath, minor bruises and abrasions, wounds that are not bleeding profusely would fall into this category.

Serious injuries/illnesses are those which are life threatening or pose the risk of permanent disfigurement/disability. For example: strokes, heart attacks, seizures, profusely bleeding wounds (arterial), wounds penetrating body cavities, shock symptoms, broken arm or leg.

17. “Jump and reach” refers to a distance from the citizen that he/she could jump and reach the weapon. A weapon may be construed as anything that a reasonable person would construe under the circumstances as being a potential instrument of physical harm or incapacitation. Many ordinary items manufactured for other purposes may be used as weapons (baseball bats, metal pipes, hammers, a pot of boiling water). If someone uses
one of these things in a threatening manner or circumstances suggest that they might do
so, then this should be coded as a yes. Thus, a kitchen knife lying on the counter within
jump and reach of someone suspected of a violent crime would qualify as code 4.
However, if the citizen is a person who complained about noisy neighbors and happened
to be paring apples when the police arrived, under these circumstances, the knife lying on
the counter would not be considered a weapon. Firearms are considered weapons under
any circumstance, whether believed to be loaded with ammunition or not.

18. Weapons are concealed if they are not in plain view. A pistol in a closed glove
compartment is concealed. A knife in one’s pocket is concealed.

19. Aggressive moves and gestures are considered as threats, as well as verbal threats.

20. This refers to a physical act that produces some contact between the instrument of harm
and the police officer. If there was only a threat of assault, but no contact, then do not
code this as an assault. An assault can include hitting, punching, kicking, bumping, or
striking with some object. It can also include throwing some object and spitting.

21. To constitute “fleeing from the police,” the officer must first give a clear sign to the
citizen that he/she wants the citizen to stop and not leave without permission. Once that
expectation is established, code yes if the citizen leaves or attempts to leave without
police permission or acquiescence.

Some common “flight” situations are when an officer attempts to pull a motor vehicle
over to the side of the road with lights or siren; an officer says “Halt!”, an officer tells
someone they are under arrest or otherwise makes it clear that they are not free to come
and go at will.

It is not flight if the citizen appears merely to be evading or avoiding contact with police—
and the police have not yet given a clear signal for the citizen to stop.

22. Code 2 (yes) only if it is clear that the citizen summoned the police. Simply wanting or
appreciating the presence of the police is not enough.

23. For a detailed discussion of brief and casual encounters, see instructions for item #17 of
the Encounter Form. This is summarized below, followed by additional comments on
how to code whether a specific citizen was involved in a brief or casual encounter.

**Encounter Form Definitions**

A brief encounter is some form of verbal communication or physical contact between
police and public that does not satisfy the requirements of an encounter. This may
include commands or requests from police to citizens. It may also include requests,
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demands from citizens to police. Do not count communications that are only waves or other gestures or simple "Hello, how are you?" forms of communication.

A casual encounter is any encounter during which there is NO obvious police business or problem presented to the police. The police are neither asked to act in their official capacity, nor do they act in that capacity.

Citizen Form Instructions

Whether an individual citizen's encounter with the police should be coded as brief or casual on this item depends.

If you coded this encounter as a brief encounter or a casual encounter on the Encounter Form (Q-17 = 2 or 3), you MUST select 2 (yes, brief encounter) or 3 (yes, casual encounter) on this form.

If you coded this encounter as a full encounter on the Encounter Form (Q-17 = 1), you must have at least one citizen who had a full encounter on the Citizen Form (Q-23 = 1). However, if some citizens in this encounter qualified only for brief or casual encounters during this encounter, you should code them on the Citizen Form as brief or casual.

Example: O1 is at a domestic dispute and has extended discussions with the 2 disputants, C1 & C2. At one point in the encounter, C3 (one of their children) comes into the room and has what qualifies as a brief contact with O1. In this case, C1 and C2 should be coded 1 on this item (Q-23). However, C3 should be coded as 2 on this item.

Coding this as a brief or casual encounter skips most of the subsequent items on this instrument. Be careful not to "back" into these items from Q-132 and code them. If this is a brief encounter, then items 24-126 should all be left with missing values.

25 and every 3rd item thereafter to 44.

This item and subsequent items require you to indicate how the police responded to the citizen's request to do something. The responses are scaled from low to high in terms of the degree of police compliance with the request.

Sometimes the police use several different strategies during an encounter. If more than one approach was used, select the one with the highest number (i.e., the most compliant response).

Codes 4 and 5 require some explanation. A promise to comply requires some specific
statement or affirmation that the officer will do what the citizen requests (but not during
this encounter). For example, a citizen who wants the officer to arrest her husband for
hitting her may decline to do so at the moment (for insufficient evidence), but he may
promise to arrest the husband if she will file a complaint. In this case, item 27 would be
coded 4.

Partial compliance means that in the citizen's presence the officer does some, but not all,
of what the citizen has requested. For example, a citizen locked out of her car might ask
an officer to use a "slim jim" to unlock her car. The officer might decline, but offer to call
a locksmith to help her with the problem. In this case, Q-41 would be coded 5.

28. This question asks you to indicate if the citizen asked the officer to act on his/her behalf
(to advise or persuade) with another citizen. That citizen may be either present or absent
from the scene. If that other citizen is someone acting as a representative of a
government agency or private organization (e.g., business), do not code this item yes.
Instead, code Q-36 yes.

Advice and persuasion are distinguished from warnings and threats (see Q-30) as follows.
Advice and persuasion carry no explicit threat of punishment or coercion by the police.
Warnings do not make the threat explicit in words but are delivered in a tone where there
can be no mistaking that the police intend that punishment or coercion be the
consequence of failure to obey. Threats make the punishment/coercion explicit.

30. See #28 above.

32. Leaving the scene does not mean leaving the room. It means leaving the premises.

39. Enter the agency code if the police contacted or promised to contact another
official/agency/organization—and it was done without any request from any citizen. It is
possible for both Q-36 and Q-39 to receive affirmative responses. Police may comply
with the citizen's request and also initiate an action with another agency on their own
initiative. Note: if the O1 calls a tow truck the agency code is #54 "traffic."

40. Physical assistance is any assistance that goes beyond verbal communication. For
example, transportation, medical assistance, fixing problems with a car or home,
retrieving lost pets, children, and property.

43. Citizens almost always ask officers questions during encounters. Coding a "yes" for this
item should be reserved for those questions where the citizen wants some information on
how to deal with a problem they have. The question may or may not be relevant to the
problem in the presenting situation.

If the citizens' questions focus only on one problem and the police response varies, select
the response with the highest code value that occurs. If the citizen asks several different questions (that is, questions on different problems), and the police respond fully to some and not others, select code 5 (partially complied).

Some examples of queries that officers receive: requests for how to keep a disobedient child under control, how to get to some location, how to get a protection from abuse order, how to improve the security of one's home, what the law allows the citizen to do in a problem with another person, what the law requires the citizen to do in a given situation.

Be careful to distinguish a yes response to this item (request for information) from a yes response to other items where the officer is asked to take some action toward other citizens. Both types may occur, but they are separate queries.

46 and numerous subsequent items.

This question and many subsequent questions ask you to indicate whether the police did something, and if so, which police did it.

Codes 2-4 are to be used for 1-officer units only. In this case, any O2 described in your narrative (e.g., a backup) is considered “other police.”

Codes 5-7 are to be used for 2-officer (or multi-officer) units. Here, O2 refers to the O2 designated on your Ride Form. “Other police” refers to officers other than O1 or O2 of the unit to which you are assigned.

47. Citations and summonses may be issued for some minor criminal offenses, but most will be for violations of the following:

- State traffic control code: most of the Offense Codes in the 5000s range, but note that a few of the violations in this range are for felonies or misdemeanors and may result in an arrest.

- Municipal code violations: Offense Codes ranging from 6,000-7300s. Note that municipal code violations in the 7300-7324 range involve traffic offenses that are separate from State traffic control code.

- State code civil violations: except for state traffic control code, civil violations are not numerous in the Offense Codes. They are designated by a (C) following the description of the offense.

Issuing a citation allows the officer to notify the citizen that he/she is being charged with a legal violation, but the officer does not take the citizen down to the station for the
purposes of charging the citizen, posting bail, etc.

A citizen may be both arrested and cited. For example, a citizen might be arrested for drunk driving and also cited for failure to obey the speed limit. If a citizen is issued a citation (even if also arrested for another offense), item #47 should be coded as yes.

Warning tickets are not citations.

48. Enter the appropriate code from the Offense Codes list. If the citizen was issued a citation for more than one offense, code the first offense listed by the officer.

49. Often this will be some other government agency with law enforcement or regulatory powers relevant to this citizen. It can also be an agency that could withhold or withdraw service from this citizen. Some examples of such agencies are welfare, code enforcement, alcohol beverage control agency, fire department, sanitation department.

51. Warrant checks are often done by radio or mobile-digital terminal, sometimes by telephone.

52. Answer yes if the observed officer(s) physically held a warrant, or if they know that a warrant is held by police at the station or at the court house.

54. The citizen is considered arrested if the police took the citizen into custody for the purpose of charging the citizen with a criminal offense. To be arrested, a citizen should be in custody at the end of the encounter. The point at which the citizen is considered “under arrest” is when the police make clear that he/she is in custody to be charged with a violation of the criminal law.

You will code the citizen as arrested only if the police make clear that they intend to charge the citizen with a criminal offense. Thus, someone who is handcuffed and later during the encounter is released should NOT be coded as arrested. A citizen who is stopped for a traffic offense and receives a citation and then released should NOT be coded as arrested. Nearly always, to be arrested, a citizen should be in custody at the end of the encounter. If in doubt, check with a team leader.

55. Enter the first offense mentioned by the officer to the citizen if there was more than one offense. We are looking for the offense that got the citizen "arrested" in the first place.

BE SURE TO USE OFFENSE CODES, NOT PROBLEM CODES FOR THIS ITEM.

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These items ask you to indicate the evidence available to the officer that this citizen committed a legal offense. For these items, you should draw on evidence available to the officer at any time prior to this encounter as well as what happened during the encounter. For example, in a previous encounter the officer may have received a description from a witness naming this citizen as an offender. Even though that occurred before this encounter, you should include it as evidence.

NOTE: For items 56-59, you will code only the evidence available to the officer before the citizen was placed under arrest as defined above (when the police made clear that the citizen would be charged with a criminal offense).

56-62. These items are completed ONLY if the officer arrested this citizen. If the officer arrested this citizen, the Codit program will automatically skip you from the completion of Q-62 to Q-70. Q-62 through Q-69 will automatically receive -9 for code entries. Those items are relevant only if the citizen was NOT arrested.

56. This item asks you to determine whether two types of evidence were observed by the officer.

Circumstantial evidence (Code 2) involves observations from which the citizen's commission of the crime may be logically inferred. For example, seeing bruised knuckles on a husband who is alleged to have struck his wife on the face, or observing fresh bruises on her face. With circumstantial evidence, the officer did not observe the criminal act, but he may infer that the husband did it from the evidence. Do not code "circumstantial evidence" if the evidence is physical (see Q-57).

If the officer observed an act that appeared to be illegal, then select Code 3. Hunches that a citizen has or is about to commit a crime do not qualify. If the officer "knows" this citizen to be a prior offender, that in itself does not qualify.

However, if an officer sees a car weaving down the road, that constitutes evidence that the driver may be in violation of the drunk driving laws. An officer who sees something that looks like a money-for-drugs exchange between two citizens would receive a 3 code. Observing an act of assault or disorderly conduct also receive a 3 code.

If the police observe both circumstantial evidence and the act itself, select Code 4.

This item does NOT require you to make a judgment about whether the officer's observation satisfied "probable cause" requirements. Simply determine whether the officer observed some behavior or condition regarding this citizen that appeared to constitute all or part of the offense.

57. Physical evidence refers to those items that can be produced in court to support some
allegation of fact. Physical evidence is not testimony, which only people can provide. Typical forms of physical evidence are fingerprints, blood stains, tire marks, documents, property, contraband, money, photographs of people and things, weapons, the readout on breathiest machine. Physical evidence is that which can be submitted to the property room to produce later in court during hearings and trial.

58. This item asks you to indicate whether others (but not the targeted citizen) offered testimonial evidence implicating this citizen in an offense. Codes 2 and 3 refer to information provided by other citizens. Code 3 if citizens offer a first hand (eyewitness) account. Second-hand accounts (hearsay) are the testimony of one citizen about what he heard another person say. If Citizen 1 says that Citizen 2 told her that he saw Citizen 3 break into Citizen 1’s house, then Citizen 1 is offering second-hand testimony about this crime (code 2). [Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in trial, but it may be acceptable under some circumstances. And it may be acceptable at administrative hearings, initial or preliminary hearings, grand jury hearings, and sentence determination].

Code 4 is reserved for information implicating this citizen that was made available to the officer from official sources: roll call, be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) reports, and court documents. These documents may provide the name of the citizen, or they may provide a description of the citizen, car, etc. that would justify an investigative stop.

59. This item refers to self-incriminating testimony by the citizen. A partial confession (code 2) constitutes an admission. It is a self-incriminating statement (against the citizen’s personal interest) that falls short of a full confession to having committed the offense. Guilt may be inferred from an admission that acknowledges facts that, when combined with other facts, will produce such a conclusion. When a driver admits that he has had several drinks, this would qualify as a partial confession.

A full confession is the total acknowledgment of the citizen that he/she is guilty of the offense. If the driver admits to being intoxicated, this qualifies as a full confession.

60. The standard for disrespectful behavior you apply should be independent of anything the officer says or does about whether the citizen showed or failed to show respect to which the officer felt entitled.

To qualify as "yes," the citizen must do something or fail to do something that shows disrespect to the individual or the authority of the police officer. This can include a variety of verbal statements: calling the officer names, making derogatory statements about the officer or his family, making disparaging or belittling remarks, slurs (racial, sexual, lifestyle). Ignoring the officers commands or questions also constitutes disrespect.
If the citizen is argumentative, the citizen may or may not be disrespectful, depending on how it was done. If the citizen disagrees with the officer or questions/objects to his actions—but does so in a polite way—then do NOT code the citizen as disrespectful. However, if the citizen disagrees with the officer by speaking loudly or interrupting the officer, then code this as disrespectful.

Certain gestures and actions are to be coded as disrespectful. "Flipping the bird" (displaying the 2nd finger in the direction of the police), obscene gestures, spitting in the presence of an officer (even if not in the direction of the officer).

Note that this question asks you to evaluate disrespectful behavior only BEFORE arrest (refer to the definition of arrest in the directions to question 54). If disrespectful behavior occurs after the officer has made his intention to arrest clear to the citizen, then you would code this question as "no". However, your encounter narrative should include a description of any disrespectful behavior, including that occurring during or after an arrest.

The standard for disrespectful behavior by the police toward citizens is slightly different from the standard applied to citizen disrespect of police. This is because police have certain authority to command citizens and establish order under emergency or disorderly situations.

The standard for disrespectful behavior you apply should be independent of anything the officer says or does about whether the citizen showed or failed to show respect to which the citizen felt entitled.

To qualify as "yes," the officer must do something or fail to do something that shows disrespect to the individual citizen. This can include a variety of verbal statements: calling the citizen names, making derogatory statements about the citizen or his family, making disparaging or belittling remarks, slurs (racial, sexual, lifestyle). Ignoring the citizen’s questions also constitutes disrespect.

If the officer is argumentative, the officer may or may not be disrespectful, depending on how it was done. If the officer disagrees with the citizen or questions/objects to his actions—but does so in a polite tone—then do NOT code the officer as disrespectful. If the officer speaks loudly, interrupts, or ignores the citizen, then code this as disrespectful—unless the officer does these things in the context of an emergency or disorder that creates the potential for an emergency. An emergency occurs when life, health, or property are in immediate danger. If an officer speaks loudly, interrupts, or ignores the citizen in an emergency or significant disorder, this in itself does not constitute disrespect.

Certain gestures and actions are to be coded as disrespectful. "Flipping the bird" (displaying the 2nd finger in the direction of the police), obscene gestures, spitting in the
presence of a citizen (even if not in the direction of the citizen).

Note that this question asks you to evaluate disrespectful behavior only BEFORE arrest (refer to the definition of arrest in the directions to question 54). If disrespectful behavior occurs after the officer has made his intention to arrest clear to the citizen, then you would code this question as “no”. However, your encounter narrative should include a description of any disrespectful behavior, including that occurring during or after an arrest.

62. If both citizen and police were disrespectful to each other, this allows us to determine who was disrespectful first. If neither party was disrespectful, code this item 0. If only one party was disrespectful, also code this item 0. Use codes 1 and 2 only if BOTH parties were disrespectful BEFORE the arrest.

Note that this question asks you to evaluate disrespectful behavior only BEFORE arrest (refer to the definition of arrest in the directions to question 54).

63-69. See comparable instructions for items 56-62. These items are reserved for those citizens who were not arrested (that is, who were coded "no" on item 54).

NOTE that for these items you include what occurred throughout the entire encounter.

63. Note that a traffic stop often involves the police observing an illegal act (motor vehicle violations). A traffic stop made on hunch or profiling would constitute an exception (i.e., “This car doesn’t belong in this neighborhood” would not constitute an ‘illegal act’), but if subsequent to the stop the driver has no license then that would constitute an ‘illegal act’.

67-69. These questions ask about the disrespectful behaviors of both police and citizens. Refer to the definitions of disrespect provided for citizens (directions to question 60), for police (directions for question 61), and cases where both parties are disrespectful in an encounter (directions for question 62).

For questions 60-62 a reference point of arrest is used to judge when a citizen’s or police officer’s disrespectful behavior should be coded. However, questions 67-69 ask you to evaluate ANY disrespectful behavior that occurs at ANY time during an encounter where no arrest (of this citizen) occurs.

Example: O1 spends 30 minutes talking politely with a domestic violence victim, and she then tells him to “Get the Fxxk out of her home!” O1 leaves without making an arrest. You should code the citizen as disrespectful for question 67.

Indicators of disrespect should be clearly noted in the body of your narrative of that
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encounter.

70. Code this yes if the police questioned the citizen in such a way that it was clear that they wanted information that would establish whether the citizen or his/her colleagues were involved in wrongdoing. Interrogation is typically, but not exclusively, reserved for encounters with suspects and disputants.

72 & 73. Do not consider a "plain view" search (looking at what is in plain view of the officer without moving objects or entering an area in which he/she does not have a right to be). Plain view searches may be conducted with the aid of a flashlight, binoculars, and other visual aids.

For the purposes of this item, you should consider a "frisk" as a search. A frisk is a patdown of the outer clothing (presumably to look for weapons). A frisk may also extend to the inside of an over garment (e.g., an overcoat).

Searches also include reaching into pockets, removing clothing, opening containers and personal belongings, peering into places that go beyond "plain view" (i.e., where the officer would ordinarily not have a right to pry), lifting and moving property to see what it might conceal, body cavity searches.

It is still a search, even if the citizen consents if any of the above activities are conducted. If the search was conducted AFTER an arrest, code this 8 for #73.

75. A firm grip includes any hand contact that allows the officer to control the movement of the citizen.

76. Code this item yes even if the officers eventually removed the handcuffs and released the citizen from custody.

79. Do not count instances where the police are drawing their firearm only to kill a wounded or dangerous animal. This item is reserved for situations where officers have drawn their weapons to protect themselves or control/harm/incapacitate citizens.

80-113. These items follow a pattern of three questions. The first question asks whether the police did something designed to elicit an action by a citizen and how the police first did it. If the police did not make this request or demand, the subsequent two items are skipped.

--suggested only: It was merely a suggestion by the officer without any pressure. The citizen can take it or leave it. The officer appears to have no investment in the citizen's response. He/she is just being helpful. For example: "If you want to, you can sign a formal complaint against your
husband for assault."

--requested only: The officer asked the citizen to do it. The officer clearly has an investment in getting the citizen to do it, but the officer makes no effort to persuade, negotiate, speak authoritatively (command), or threaten the citizen. For example: "Would you be willing to sign a formal complaint against your husband?"

--tried persuasion: The officer tries to convince the citizen to do something because it is the "right" thing to do. It is moral, ethical, legal, in the citizen's best interest, or in the best interest of everyone. Persuasion means trying to change the citizen's mind so that he/she wants to do something. For example: You know that your husband will continue to beat you every time he gets drunk. Some day he's going to beat you real bad, really hurt you, and maybe we won't get here in time to stop it. He might even start in on your kids. You don't want to take that chance, do you? Signing a complaint against him now is the best thing to do."

--tried negotiation: The officer offers something that will benefit the citizen if the citizen will do what the officer wants. Negotiation is offering something positive, not threatening the citizen with something negative. For example: "If you sign a formal complaint, then I'll be able to do something about your husband beating you, but if you don't sign a complaint, then I really can't do anything."

--commanded citizen: The officer commands the citizen to do it. He/she draws explicitly or implicitly on his authority to command citizens--but he/she makes no explicit threat about what will happen if the citizen does not comply. For example: "I want you to sign this complaint now, and I don't want to hear all your reasons why you can't!"

--threatened citizen explicitly: The officer tells the citizen that he/she will punish or see that the citizen experiences negative consequences if the citizen does not comply. Example: "If you don't sign a complaint now, I'm not even going to bother to come back next time; your husband can beat you to a pulp for all I care."

The second question asks you to indicate the last action taken by the police toward the citizen regarding this request. If the police approach did not change during this encounter with the citizen, then enter the same code as you used for the previous item (first approach). Do likewise even if the police used a different approach between the first and last but the first and last were the same.
The third question asks you to indicate the final response of the citizen to the
demand. Sometimes citizens are first noncompliant and
then become compliant. Sometimes they go from compliance to noncompliance.
And sometimes they fluctuate back and forth. For this item you are to select the
response reflecting the last indication given by the citizen.

86. This can include the use of attorneys, the courts, administrative hearings and procedures.

90. If the police mentioned more than one agency, select the one that they most emphasized.
If you can't determine that, select the last one they mentioned.

102. The definition of disorderly behavior includes behavior that may not be illegal (hanging
out on the street corner) as well as low level illegal behaviors (public drunkeness, noise
disturbances). Commands or requests to cease disorderly behavior may also arise out of
an officer's handling of a situation. That is disorderly behavior can occur when citizens
fail to obey police requests or commands. For example, an officer might be dealing with
citizens A and B and ask that A speak first. If B continually interrupts and the officer
requests that B cease that behavior then you should code that as a request for B to cease
disorderly behavior.

105. Code this item yes if the police made clear (or if it would be clear to the average citizen)
that the behavior police wanted discontinued was illegal.

117. Conflict means that the citizen was in an antagonistic relationship with another citizen
present. These may involve disagreement over some goal or the way to achieve that goal.
They may be over personalities (who one is). Conflicts may be engaged in calmly or an
agitated state, peacefully or violently. Conflicts may be in progress before the police
arrive, or they may arise only after the police are on the scene.

If the citizen was in conflict with more than one citizen present, you must select only one
citizen for this item. Select the other citizen with whom this citizen had the most
interaction during the encounter. If two or more other citizens in conflict with this citizen
had the same amount of interaction, then select the one with whom this citizen first
interacted.

Conflict does not have to be direct conflict between C1 and C2. If C1 is telling O1 about
his/her conflict with C2, and C2 is not in the room (or in the vicinity) at that point in time,
there may still be conflict. Q118-121 apply only to those conflicts directly observed.

Indirect conflict occurs when the person the citizen is in conflict with is not at the scene.
For this situation code 117 '0' and 124 as 'yes,' noting the relationship between the
citizen and the person who is not present.
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If the citizen is in conflict with another person present who does not qualify as a citizen participant in this encounter (because he/she doesn't interact with the police), code this item -9. Code Q118-121 about this conflictual relationship.

If the citizen has no direct or indirect conflict with any other person present or not present, Q-117 is coded 0 and Q-124 is coded 1.

123. Code this item "yes" (2-8) if the citizen was clearly in conflict with someone who was not present. This often occurs in domestic disputes, where one of the parties has left the scene before the police arrive.

127-131. These items are relevant only if this citizen is involved in a brief or casual encounter. If this was not a brief or casual encounter, then all of these items will remain coded -9.

134 & 135. Being in police custody means that the citizen was not free to come and go. The following are indications that a citizen is in custody:

- Officer states that citizen is under arrest
- Officer handcuffs citizen
- Officers surround the suspect
- Citizen is placed in a space where he/she is not free to leave (e.g., police vehicle)
- Officer states that citizen is being taken to a place not of the citizen's choosing (e.g., parents' home, alcohol treatment facility, mental health facility, homeless shelter)
- Officer states to citizen that he/she is not free to leave

136 & 137. Emotional state of citizens should be judged on observable cues from the citizen's behavior. You are to code citizens' behavior, not your estimate of the nature of their "inner" feelings. Most citizens behave in a calm manner toward police. Their behavior is neither elevated nor depressed (although they may feel happy, sad, angry, fearful, remorseful). Calm citizens are outwardly "composed" citizens.

The following are clues of elevated outward emotional state--citizens who are not "composed": forceful or sweeping gestures with body, substantially raised or lowered voice, crying, loud laughter, hiding, flinching, avoiding, embracing, kissing, striking someone.

It is possible that a citizen would be BOTH fearful and sad. You should code that emotional state which seems to be the most powerful/dominant exhibited by the
citizen at that time. Thus, you must make the judgment about which category best fits the citizen's emotional state.
CITIZEN FORM

1. Site?
   1. Indianapolis
   2. St. Petersburg

2. Ride number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

3. Encounter number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

4. Citizen number?
   ENTER THE NUMBER FROM THE OBSERVATION WORKSHEET.

5. In what role did the police place this citizen when first encountering him/her?
   ENTER CITIZEN ROLE CODE.

6. What was the final role placed on this citizen by police (at the end of the encounter)?
   ENTER CITIZEN ROLE CODE.
   ENTER SAME CITIZEN ROLE CODE AS PREVIOUS ITEM IF ROLE DID NOT CHANGE.

7. What is the citizen's sex?
   1. male
   2. female

8. What is the citizen's age?
   1. preschool (up to 5 years)
   2. child (6-12)
   3. young teen (13-17)
   4. older teen (18-20)
   5. young adult (21-29)
   6. adult (30-44)
   7. middle-aged (45-59)
   8. senior (60 and above)
9. What is the citizen's race/ethnicity?
   1. white
   2. black
   3. Hispanic
   4. Asian
   5. American Indian
   6. other

10. What was the level of wealth did the citizen appear to have?
    1. chronic poverty (homeless, no apparent means of support)
    2. low (subsistence only)
    3. middle
    4. above middle

11. What kind of establishment was the citizen representing?
    1. none
    2. business
    3. government agency
    4. church
    5. neighborhood organization
    6. other

12. What was the officer's prior knowledge of this citizen?
    SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
    1. no knowledge at all. Citizen is a stranger
    2. knows citizen, but not clear how well
    3. recognizes citizen's face or knows reputation, but no detailed knowledge
    4. knows by name and a little knowledge of citizen, but not detailed
    5. knows citizen very well (personal background, address, friends, family, personal habits)

13. Is there any indication that this citizen lives, routinely works, or owns property at or near the encounter location (within 3 city blocks or 1/4 mile)?
    SELECT HIGHEST APPLICABLE NUMBER.
    1. no
    2. yes, works at or near location
    3. yes, owns property at or near location
    4. yes, lives at or near location
14. Did this citizen appear to be under the influence of alcohol or other drugs?
   1. no indication of alcohol/drug use
   2. indication of use, but no visible effects on behavior
   3. slight behavioral indications (slight speech)
   4. strong behavioral indications (strong speech, difficulty standing/understanding conversation)
   5. unconscious

15. Did this citizen show any signs of mental disorder?
   1. no
   2. yes

16. Did this citizen show any signs of physical injury or illness requiring immediate medical attention?
   1. no
   2. yes, minor injury or illness
   3. yes, serious injury or illness

17. Did this citizen have a weapon in his/her possession or within "jump and reach?"
    SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
   1. no weapon evident [GO TO Q-19]
   2. incapacitating device (mace, pepper spray)
   3. blunt/martial arts instrument
   4. knife/stabbing/cutting instrument
   5. other weapon
   6. firearm

18. Was this weapon concealed from the police at any time during the encounter?
   1. no
   2. yes, on citizen's person
   3. yes, not on citizen's person

19. Did the citizen threaten to assault the police?
   1. no
   2. yes, before the police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   3. yes, during or after police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   4. yes, both 2 and 3 above
20. Did the citizen physically assault the police?
   1 no
   2 yes, before the police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   3 yes, during or after police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   4 yes, both 2 and 3 above

21. Did this citizen flee or attempt to flee the police?
   1 no
   2 yes, before the police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   3 yes, during or after police attempted to arrest or physically control citizen
   4 yes, both 2 and 3 above

22. Did this citizen summon the police to this encounter?
   1 no
   2 yes
   3 not clear whether citizen summoned police

23. Was this a BRIEF/CASUAL ENCOUNTER?
   1 no
   2 yes, brief encounter [GO TO Q-127]
   3 yes, casual encounter [GO TO Q-127]

24. Did the citizen ask the police to arrest another citizen involved in this encounter?
   1 no [GO TO Q-26]
   2 yes

25. How did the police respond to citizen's request to arrest another citizen?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1 ignored request without acknowledging it
2 explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3 declined to comply and explained why
4 promised to comply at some future time
5 partially complied in citizen's presence
6 complied fully in citizen's presence
26. Did the citizen ask the police NOT to arrest or cite someone else?
   1. no [GO TO Q-28]
   2. yes

27. How did the police respond to the citizen's request NOT to arrest or cite someone else?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
   1. ignored request without acknowledging it
   2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
   3. declined to comply and explained why
   4. promised to comply at some future time
   5. partially complied in citizen's presence
   6. complied fully in citizen's presence

28. Did the citizen ask the police to advise or persuade another citizen (not a representative of service organization) to do something?
   1. no [GO TO Q-30]
   2. yes

29. How did the police respond to the citizen's request to advise or persuade another citizen to do something?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
   1. ignored request without acknowledging it
   2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
   3. declined to comply and explained why
   4. promised to comply at some future time
   5. partially complied in citizen's presence
   6. complied fully in citizen's presence

30. Did the citizen ask the police to warn or threaten another citizen?
   1. no [GO TO Q-32]
   2. yes
31. How did the police respond to the citizen's request to warn or threaten another citizen?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence

@ 32. Did the citizen ask the police to make another citizen leave the scene?

1. no [GO TO Q-34]
2. yes

@ 33. How did the police respond to the citizen's request to make another citizen leave the scene?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence

@ 34. Did the citizen ask the police to file a report?

1. no [GO TO Q-36]
2. yes

@ 35. How did the police respond to the citizen's request to file a report?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence
36. Did the citizen ask police to act on the citizen's behalf with a government official/agency, or private organization?
   1. no [GO TO Q-39]
   2. yes

37. How did the police respond to the citizen's request to act on his/her behalf with a government official/agency, or private organization? SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
   1. ignored request without acknowledging it [GO TO Q-39]
   2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why [GO TO Q-39]
   3. declined to comply and explained why [GO TO Q-39]
   4. promised to comply at some future time
   5. partially complied in citizen's presence
   6. complied fully in citizen's presence

38. What agency/organization did police contact or promise to contact on the citizen's behalf?

   ENTER AGENCY CODE.

   ENTER ZERO IF AGENCY/ORGANIZATION NOT CLEAR.

39. What agency/organization did police contact or promise to contact on the citizen's behalf—on their OWN INITIATIVE (without citizen's request)?

   ENTER AGENCY CODE.

   ENTER ZERO IF POLICE DID NOT CONTACT/PROMISE CONTACT ON OWN INITIATIVE.

40. Did the citizen ask the police for physical assistance for self or others?
   1. no [GO TO Q-42]
   2. yes
41. How did the police respond to the citizen's request for physical assistance for self or others?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence

42. Did the police provide physical assistance to this citizen on their OWN INITIATIVE (without citizen's request)?

1. no
2. yes

43. Did the citizen ask police for information on how to deal with a problem?

1. no [GO TO Q-45]
2. yes

44. How did the police respond to the citizen's request for information on how to deal with a problem?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence

45. Did the police provide this citizen information on how to deal with a problem on their OWN INITIATIVE (without citizen's request)?

1. no
2. yes
46. Did the police threaten to issue a citation to this citizen?
   1  no
   2  yes, O1 only
   3  yes, O1 and other police
   4  yes, other police but not O1
   5  yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6  yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7  yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)

47. Did the police issue a citation (or summons to appear before a magistrate) to this citizen?
   1  no  [GO TO Q-49]
   2  yes, O1 only
   3  yes, O1 and other police
   4  yes, other police but not O1
   5  yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6  yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7  yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)

48. For what offense was the citizen CITED?  [FIRST OFFENSE]

   ENTER OFFENSE CODE.

49. Did the police notify, promise, or threaten to notify another governmen agency about citizen's wrongdoing?
   1  no  [GO TO Q-51]
   2  yes, O1 only
   3  yes, O1 and other police
   4  yes, other police but not O1
   5  yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6  yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7  yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)

50. What agency did police notify, promise, or threaten to notify about citizen's wrongdoing?

   ENTER AGENCY CODE.

51. Did the police check for outstanding arrest warrants on this citizen?
   1  no
   2  yes
52. Did the police hold a warrant to arrest this person?
   1 no
   2 yes, held by officer(s) at scene
   3 yes, held by other police or legal authority not at scene

53. Did the police threaten to charge this citizen with a criminal offense?
   1 no
   2 yes, 01 only
   3 yes, 01 and other police
   4 yes, other police but not 01
   5 yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
   6 yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
   7 yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

54. Did the police arrest this citizen?
   1 no [GO TO Q-63]
   2 yes

55. What is the FIRST offense with which the citizen was charged?

ENTER OFFENSE CODE.

56. BEFORE arresting the citizen for this offense, did police observe this citizen engage in an illegal act or observe circumstantial evidence of an illegal act?
SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE
   1 no
   2 yes, observed circumstantial evidence of illegal behavior
   3 yes, observed citizen perform illegal act
   4 yes, observed both circumstantial evidence and observed the citizen perform an illegal act

57. BEFORE arresting the citizen for this offense, did the police observe physical evidence that implicated this citizen in the offense?
SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
   1 no
   2 yes
58. BEFORE arresting the citizen for this offense, did the police hear claims from others that implicated this citizen in the offense?
SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
1 no
2 yes, other citizen(s) had second-hand information implicating this citizen
3 yes, other citizen(s) observed citizen commit the offense
4 yes, this citizen fit the description of someone known to the officer as wanted by the police

59. BEFORE arresting the citizen for this offense, did the police hear this citizen confess to this offense?
SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
1 no
2 yes, partial confession (admitted involvement short of committing offense)
3 yes, full confession

60. BEFORE being arrested, did the citizen show disrespect to the police?
1 no
2 yes

61. BEFORE the citizen was arrested for this offense, did the police show disrespect to this citizen?
1 no
2 yes, 01 only
3 yes, 01 and other police
4 yes, other police but not 01
5 yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
6 yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
7 yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

62. Who showed disrespect first, this citizen or the police?
[CODE 0 IF ONLY ONE OF THE PARTIES OR NONE OF THE PARTIES WAS DISRESPECTFUL]
0 not applicable: only one/none of parties was disrespectful [GO TO Q-70]
1 citizen [GO TO Q-70]
2 police [GO TO Q-70]
63. Did police observe this citizen engage in an illegal act or observe circumstantial evidence of an illegal act?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE

1  no
2  yes, observed circumstantial evidence of illegal behavior
3  yes, observed citizen perform illegal act
4  yes, observed both circumstantial evidence and observed the citizen perform an illegal act

64. Did the police observe physical evidence that implicated this citizen in a legal offense?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1  no
2  yes

65. Did the police hear claims from others that implicated this citizen in a legal offense?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1  no
2  yes, other citizens provided a description, but not citizen's name
3  yes, other citizens provided this citizen's name
4  yes, this citizen fit the description of someone known to the officer as wanted by the police

66. Did the police hear this citizen confess to a legal violation?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.

1  no
2  yes, partial confession (admitted involvement short of committing crime)
3  yes, full confession

67. Did the citizen show disrespect to the police?

1  no
2  yes
68. Did the police show disrespect to this citizen?
   1. no
   2. yes, O1 only
   3. yes, O1 and other police
   4. yes, other police but not O1
   5. yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6. yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7. yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)

69. Who showed disrespect first, this citizen or the police?
   [CODE -9 IF ONLY ONE OF THE PARTIES OR NONE OF THE PARTIES
   WAS DISRESPECTFUL]
   1. citizen
   2. police

70. Did the police interrogate this citizen?
   1. no
   2. yes, O1 only
   3. yes, O1 and other police
   4. yes, other police but not O1
   5. yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6. yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7. yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)

71. Did the police hold a warrant to search for evidence on this
    person or his/her property?
   1. no
   2. yes

72. Did the police conduct a search of any of the following:
    the citizen, the area immediately around the citizen,
    his/her possessions, home, or automobile?
   1. no [GO TO Q-74]
   2. yes, O1 only
   3. yes, O1 and other police
   4. yes, other police but not O1
   5. yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)
   6. yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)
   7. yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)
73. Which search was conducted before the citizen was arrested?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE: Citizen was not arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>the citizen's person</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>area immediately around the citizen</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>citizen's personal possessions</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>citizen's home</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>citizen's automobile</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>two or more of the above</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>search was conducted AFTER arrest</td>
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74. Did the police threaten to use physical force on this citizen? [INCLUDE BOTH VERBAL THREATS AND GESTURES.]

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<td>2</td>
<td>yes, O1 only</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>yes, O1 and other police</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>yes, other police but not O1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>yes, both O1 and O2 (2-officer unit only)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>yes, O2 only (2-officer unit only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)</td>
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75. Did the police use a firm grip or non-pain restraint on this person?

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<td>7</td>
<td>yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)</td>
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76. Did the police handcuff this person?

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>yes, O2 and other police (2-officer unit only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
77. Did the police use pain compliance on this person (hammerlock, wristlock, finger grip, carotid control, bar arm control)?
   1 no
   2 yes, 01 only
   3 yes, 01 and other police
   4 yes, other police but not 01
   5 yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
   6 yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
   7 yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

78. Did the police use impact or incapacitation methods on this person (striking with body or weapon, mace, taser)?
   1 no
   2 yes, 01 only
   3 yes, 01 and other police
   4 yes, other police but not 01
   5 yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
   6 yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
   7 yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

79. Did the police draw or discharge their firearm in this citizen's presence?
   1 no
   2 yes, 01 only
   3 yes, 01 and other police
   4 yes, other police but not 01
   5 yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
   6 yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
   7 yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

80. Did the police ask/tell the citizen to sign a formal complaint?
   FIRST APPROACH
   1 no [GO TO Q-83]
   2 yes, suggested only
   3 yes, requested only
   4 yes, tried persuasion
   5 yes, tried negotiation
   6 yes, commanded citizen
   7 yes, threatened citizen explicitly
81. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to sign a formal complaint?

2 suggested only
3 requested only
4 tried persuasion
5 tried negotiation
6 commanded citizen
7 threatened citizen explicitly

82. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Sign formal complaint)

1 no indication one way or the other
2 refused
3 said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4 did it in police presence

83. Did the police ask/tell the citizen NOT to sign a formal complaint? FIRST APPROACH

1 no [GO TO Q-86]
2 yes, suggested only
3 yes, requested only
4 yes, tried persuasion
5 yes, tried negotiation
6 yes, commanded citizen
7 yes, threatened citizen explicitly

84. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen NOT to sign a formal complaint?

2 suggested only
3 requested only
4 tried persuasion
5 tried negotiation
6 commanded citizen
7 threatened citizen explicitly

85. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (NOT sign formal complaint)

1 no indication one way or the other
2 refused
3 said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4 did it in police presence
86. Did the police ask/tell the citizen to use the legal process to solve their problem? FIRST APPROACH

1. no [GO TO Q-89]
2. yes, suggested only
3. yes, requested only
4. yes, tried persuasion
5. yes, tried negotiation
6. yes, commanded citizen
7. yes, threatened citizen explicitly

87. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to use the legal process?

2. suggested only
3. requested only
4. tried persuasion
5. tried negotiation
6. commanded citizen
7. threatened citizen explicitly

88. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Use legal process)

1. no indication one way or the other
2. refused
3. said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4. did it in police presence

89. Did the police ask/tell the citizen to seek the help of other service agencies to solve the problem? FIRST APPROACH

1. no [GO TO Q-93]
2. yes, suggested only
3. yes, requested only
4. yes, tried persuasion
5. yes, tried negotiation
6. yes, commanded citizen
7. yes, threatened citizen explicitly

90. What was the other service agency/organization police asked the citizen to use?

ENTER AGENCY CODE.
91. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to seek the help of other service agencies?
   2   suggested only
   3   requested only
   4   tried persuasion
   5   tried negotiation
   6   commanded citizen
   7   threatened citizen explicitly

92. What was the citizen's final response to this request?
   (Get help from other service agency)
   1   no indication one way or the other
   2   refused
   3   said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
   4   did it in police presence

93. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to help another person with their problem? FIRST APPROACH
   1   no [GO TO Q-96]
   2   yes, suggested only
   3   yes, requested only
   4   yes, tried persuasion
   5   yes, tried negotiation
   6   yes, commanded citizen
   7   yes, threatened citizen explicitly

94. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to help another person with their problem?
   2   suggested only
   3   requested only
   4   tried persuasion
   5   tried negotiation
   6   commanded citizen
   7   threatened citizen explicitly

95. What was the citizen's final response to this request?
   (Help another person with their problem)
   1   no indication one way or the other
   2   refused
   3   said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
   4   did it in police presence
96. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to seek the help of family or friends with his/her problem?  FIRST APPROACH

1 no [GO TO Q-99]
2 yes, suggested only
3 yes, requested only
4 yes, tried persuasion
5 yes, tried negotiation
6 yes, commanded citizen
7 yes, threatened citizen explicitly

97. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to seek the help of family or friends with his/her problem?

2 suggested only
3 requested only
4 tried persuasion
5 tried negotiation
6 commanded citizen
7 threatened citizen explicitly

98. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Seek the help of family or friends)?

1 no indication one way or the other
2 refused
3 said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4 did it in police presence

99. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to leave another person alone, stop bothering them, or leave the premises?  FIRST APPROACH

1 no [GO TO Q-102]
2 yes, suggested only
3 yes, requested only
4 yes, tried persuasion
5 yes, tried negotiation
6 yes, commanded citizen
7 yes, threatened citizen explicitly
100. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to leave another person alone, stop bothering them, or leave the premises?

2. suggested only
3. requested only
4. tried persuasion
5. tried negotiation
6. commanded citizen
7. threatened citizen explicitly

101. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Leave other person alone, leave premises, etc.)

1. no indication one way or the other
2. refused
3. said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4. did it in police presence

102. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to cease disorderly behavior? FIRST APPROACH

1. no [GO TO Q-103]
2. yes, suggested only
3. yes, requested only
4. yes, tried persuasion
5. yes, tried negotiation
6. yes, commanded citizen
7. yes, threatened citizen explicitly

103. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to cease disorderly behavior?

2. suggested only
3. requested only
4. tried persuasion
5. tried negotiation
6. commanded citizen
7. threatened citizen explicitly

104. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Cease disorderly behavior)?

1. no indication one way or the other
2. refused
3. said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4. did it in police presence
105. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to discontinue illegal behavior? FIRST APPROACH

1. no [GO TO Q-108]
2. yes, suggested only
3. yes, requested only
4. yes, tried persuasion
5. yes, tried negotiation
6. yes, commanded citizen
7. yes, threatened citizen explicitly

106. What was the last approach police used to get the citizen to discontinue illegal behavior?

2. suggested only
3. requested only
4. tried persuasion
5. tried negotiation
6. commanded citizen
7. threatened citizen explicitly

107. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Discontinue illegal behavior)

1. no indication one way or the other
2. refused
3. said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4. did it in police presence

108. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to provide information about the identity or location of a suspected wrongdoer? FIRST APPROACH

1. no [GO TO Q-111]
2. yes, suggested only
3. yes, requested only
4. yes, tried persuasion
5. yes, tried negotiation
6. yes, commanded citizen
7. yes, threatened citizen explicitly
109. What was the last approach police used to try to get the citizen to identify or locate a suspected wrongdoer?

2 suggested only
3 requested only
4 tried persuasion
5 tried negotiation
6 commanded citizen
7 threatened citizen explicitly

110. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Provide information on identity/location of wrongdoer)

1 no indication one way or the other
2 refused
3 said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4 did it in police presence

111. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to control the person or animal responsible for this problem?
FIRST APPROACH

1 no [GO TO Q-114]
2 yes, suggested only
3 yes, requested only
4 yes, tried persuasion
5 yes, tried negotiation
6 yes, commanded citizen
7 yes, threatened citizen explicitly

112. What was the last approach police used to try to get the citizen to control the person or animal responsible for this problem?

2 suggested only
3 requested only
4 tried persuasion
5 tried negotiation
6 commanded citizen
7 threatened citizen explicitly

113. What was the citizen's final response to this request? (Control the person/animal responsible for this problem)

1 no indication one way or the other
2 refused
3 said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4 did it in police presence
114. Did the police tell/ask the citizen to call the police if the problem occurs again?
   1. no
   2. yes

115. Did the police tell the citizen NOT to call the police if the problem occurs again?
   1. no
   2. yes

116. Did the police comfort or reassure the citizen?
   1. no
   2. yes, 01 only
   3. yes, 01 and other police
   4. yes, other police but not 01
   5. yes, both 01 and 02 (2-officer unit only)
   6. yes, 02 only (2-officer unit only)
   7. yes, 02 and other police (2-officer unit only)

117. During the encounter, with what other citizen present did this citizen show conflict?

   ENTER THE CITIZEN NUMBER OF THAT CITIZEN.

   -9 cit in conflict w/other person present who does not qualify as a citizen participant in this encounter
   0 cit was not in conflict with any other citizens present

   [IF 0, GO TO Q-124]

118. What action did this citizen take toward the other citizen when the officer FIRST observed them interact?

   THIS CITIZEN'S FIRST ACTION TOWARD OTHER CITIZEN

   1. no conflictual behavior
   2. calm verbal disagreement (no threats)
   3. agitated verbal disagreement (no threats)
   4. threatened to harm other citizen
   5. assaulted other citizen
119. What action did the other citizen take toward this citizen when the officer FIRST observed them interact?

OTHER CITIZEN'S FIRST ACTION TOWARD THIS CITIZEN
1. no conflictual behavior
2. calm verbal disagreement (no threats)
3. agitated verbal disagreement (no threats)
4. threatened harm to this citizen
5. assaulted this citizen

120. What was the MOST intense action taken by this citizen toward the other citizen during the encounter?

THIS CITIZEN'S ACTIONS TOWARD OTHER CITIZEN: MOST INTENSE SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
1. no conflictual behavior
2. calm verbal disagreement (no threats)
3. agitated verbal disagreement (no threats)
4. threatened to harm other citizen
5. assaulted other citizen

121. What was the MOST intense action taken by the other citizen toward this citizen during the encounter?

OTHER CITIZEN'S ACTIONS TOWARD THIS CITIZEN: MOST INTENSE SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE.
1. no conflictual behavior
2. calm verbal disagreement (no threats)
3. agitated verbal disagreement (no threats)
4. threatened harm to this citizen
5. assaulted this citizen

122. At the conclusion of the encounter, what was the nature of the conflict between these two citizens?
1. one or both citizens had departed the scene
2. amicably reconciled
3. calm disagreement (no threats)
4. agitated verbal disagreement (no threats)
5. threats of harm offered
6. in physical conflict
123. What was the relationship between these two citizens?

1. strangers
2. casually acquainted
3. well acquainted: relatives, household members
4. well acquainted: friends
5. well acquainted: neighbors
6. well acquainted: coworkers, long-term business associates
7. could not determine relationship

124. Was this citizen in conflict with another citizen who was NOT present during this encounter?

1. no
2. yes, strangers
3. yes, casually acquainted
4. yes, well acquainted: relatives, household members
5. yes, well acquainted: friends
6. yes, well acquainted: neighbors
7. yes, well acquainted: coworkers, long-term business associates
8. yes, could not determine relationship

125. Was this citizen encouraged to cooperate with police by another citizen present during this encounter (including bystanders)?

1. no
2. yes

126. Was this citizen encouraged NOT to cooperate with police by another citizen present during this encounter (including bystanders)?

DO NOT CODE THIS ITEM -9 UNLESS THIS WAS A BRIEF ENCOUNTER

1. no [GO TO Q-132]
2. yes [GO TO Q-132]

127. What did the citizen request/demand of the police?

SELECT MOST IMPORTANT

1. nothing [GO TO Q-129]
2. directions
3. information about police or other local services
4. other information/assistance
5. investigate problem/situation
6. deal with people causing problem for citizen
7. greetings, casual conversation
8. other
128. How did the police respond to the citizen's request/demand?

SELECT HIGHEST NUMBER APPLICABLE

1. ignored request without acknowledging it
2. explicitly refused to comply without saying why
3. declined to comply and explained why
4. promised to comply at some future time
5. partially complied in citizen's presence
6. complied fully in citizen's presence

129. What did the police request/demand of the citizen?

SELECT MOST IMPORTANT.

1. nothing [GO TO Q-132]
3. information about other suspect, crime, or disorder
4. other type of information/assistance to police
5. stop doing something disorderly, illegal, dangerous, leave scene
6. greeting, casual conversation
7. goods or services (e.g., purchases)
8. other

130. How did police communicate the request/demand?

2. suggested only
3. requested only
4. tried persuasion
5. tried negotiation
6. commanded citizen
7. threatened citizen explicitly

131. What was the citizen's final response to this request?

1. no indication one way or the other
2. refused
3. said he/she would do it, but didn't do it in presence of police
4. did it in police presence

132. Did the citizen change his/her behavior because of your or other project observer's presence or actions during the encounter?

1. no significant change [GO TO Q-134]
2. yes, a little change
3. yes, a substantial change
133. What is the basis of your judgment that the citizen changed his/her behavior because of your or other observer presence?
1 citizen stated that his/her behavior changed
2 observer inferred it from behavior or manner of citizen
3 other

134. At the beginning of this encounter was the citizen in custody?
1 no
2 yes, had been taken into protective custody earlier by observed officer(s)
3 yes, had been taken into protective custody earlier by other than observed officers
4 yes, had been taken into police custody earlier by observed officer(s)
5 yes, had been taken into police custody earlier by other than observed officers

135. At the end of this encounter was the citizen in custody?
1 no
2 yes, protective custody
3 yes, police custody

136. What best characterizes the citizen's emotional state at the beginning of the contact?
1 not elevated (calm)
2 elevated--fear or anger
3 elevated--happy
4 depressed--sadness or remorse

137. What best characterizes the citizen's emotional state at the end of the contact?
1 not elevated (calm)
2 elevated--fear or anger
3 elevated--happy
4 depressed--sadness or remorse
Appendix C: Narrative Form Instructions
NARRATIVE FORM INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of the narrative form is to record in story-like fashion what you observed over the course of your ride. In it you can record your observations. You will be observing others, and also yourself. You observe yourself when you report your opinions and feelings about what you observed. When you write about your opinions or feelings, you should enclose these in brackets [ ].

The Narrative Form will be recorded using WordPerfect 6.1 software. If you use a different software package, you must remember to save your file as a WordPerfect 6.1 file. You will create a separate WordPerfect file for each ride, and you will give that file the following name RIDEXXX.WPD (where XXX is the number of the ride).

These narratives will be read by humans, and also by computers, using special software designed to help in qualitative data analysis. Consequently, when typing narratives, there are certain keys and functions you are not permitted to use (because they do not convert easily when the files are transformed to files to be read by certain data analysis software). Do NOT use the following keys when writing narratives:

(1) Tab key

(2) Indent function key

(3) Special character keys, such as bullets (∗)

(4) Bold and underlining functions

(5) "Hard" page end (forcing the beginning of a new page)

(6) Footnotes and endnotes.

(7) Fractions such as ½ need to be written out as one-half

Use the following format settings:

• Line: Single space

• Margins: Default width (1 inch), left and right justified

• Page: No page numbering
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- Font: Courier 12 point

If you want to emphasize a word, instead of underlining or bolding it, use ALL CAPITAL LETTERS.

The qualitative software program will scan your narrative text in "blocks," and these blocks will be determined by you, whenever you double-space (paragraph). Because of software limitations, no paragraph should exceed 25 lines.

The structure of recording narratives on the form is as follows. There are three kinds of entries on the Narrative Form: Ride, Activity, and Encounter.

The very first entry you will make on the first line is:

@ride XXX

(Where XXX is the ride number for this particular ride). Be sure NOT to space after the @ and after the last number of the ride. Just hit the <Enter> key to move to the next line. Then begin writing your ride description material.

After you have completed your ride description, double space and enter your first event, which will be either an activity or an encounter. Usually it will be an activity (the roll call). If it is an activity, the entry will look like this:

@activity XXX

If it is an encounter, the entry will look like this:

@encounter XXX

Again, make sure there is no space between the @ and the next letter. Put a space before the activity or encounter number, but no space after. Just hit the <Enter key and begin writing the description of that event on the line below.

The last line of your narrative for a given ride should have an @.

Here's an example of a ride (ride 2) with two activities and one encounter.

@ride 002

 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx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@activity 1
@activity 2
@encounter 3

IMPORTANT!

Note that the number following each event label (activity or encounter) in the narrative is the Event Sequence Number (from your Activity and Encounter coding forms used in the Cอดit software to enter quantitative data). That is, the label tells us whether the event was an activity or an encounter, and the number tells us the order in which it occurred during the ride. Thus, you do NOT number encounters and activities separately in your narratives. There is only ONE event numbered 1 (either an activity or an encounter), ONE event numbered 2 (either an activity or an encounter), One event labeled 3 (either an activity or an encounter), and so on. Failure to number and label events properly will cause MAJOR PROBLEMS for using these data. The ride number and the event sequence number enable researchers to link quantitative and qualitative data.

Some General Narrative Conventions

Do not use people’s names in the narrative descriptions. This applies to all people: police, public, and other public servants.

Your primary officer should be designated as O1, and if you have a secondary officer, that is O2. If you need to designate other officers, you can use O3, O4, etc. When first introducing an officer (who is not your assigned officer) in a narrative, provide a brief description of this officer. For example: “O2 (black female, 30) arrived

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a few minutes later to help O1 deal with the domestic dispute)."

In writing encounter narrative descriptions, you describe all of the people and the actions they take that are important to understanding what happened. Some of these people will be members of the public, whose interactions with the police was significant enough to make that interaction an "encounter" with the police (e.g., more than a minute, 3-exchange rule, physical force). These citizens will never be described by their actual names but will receive a designation of C1, C2, C3, etc. Give citizens this designation in the order of their appearance in the encounter. These will be the same citizens on whom you later enter coded data.

There will also be some people whose actions in the encounter need to be described, but they do not qualify as members of the public. Examples would be other government officials or service providers who are involved in the encounter as service providers (e.g., fire fighters, tow truck drivers, civilian police employees, court personnel). Simply describe these people (e.g., the fire fighter, or the first fire fighter). Do not give these citizens C1, C2, C3, etc. designations. Those are reserved only for those who qualify as members of the public.

Do not use C1, C2, C3 designations in descriptions of people in activities. Just describe them as "the citizen" or the "tow truck driver," the "police clerk," etc.

If you are writing a direct quotation and someone calls someone by their first name, simply select a letter randomly and use that instead of their name. Example:

"Hey Q--! Get over here right now!" (Where Q stands for the name that person was called).

What Goes in the Ride Section

The Ride Section of the Narrative Form is the place for you to record the following in the indicated order:

1. General observations about the department, the beat, the district/precinct, the observed officer or other officers, and the community—which are not tied to a specific encounter or activity, but which come from your making connections between observations or based on comments made by officers during activities that had nothing to do with those activities.

2. General observations about the officer's reactivity to the observer, and
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(3) Whether this ride is part of a split ride.

The Ride section is where you are supposed to summarize and tie together the disparate pieces of what you observed throughout the ridealong. You can refer the reader to specific encounters or activities for examples. You should try to give an overall sense of the observed officer(s) and the area served. Remember, however, writing these summaries here does not relieve you of the responsibility for writing detailed descriptions of the observed officer’s behavior and the areas where the events take place.

Normally you should begin each topic of the ride section with a topic identifier, placed in all capital letters, for easy recognition. See the ride interview instructions below for the specific topics and to identify what descriptions are necessary.

Ride Interview Instructions

For each observation session it will be necessary to report some routine information in the ride section of your narrative. It will be required for you to report the information for the three topics described below for each observation session. If during an observation session you are reassigned to a new officer or team of officers, you must obtain this information for the reassigned officer(s) as well and incorporate it into the relevant ride narrative.

Topics:

OFFICER ASSIGNMENT AND BACKGROUND

Some of this information can often be obtained by listening at roll call. Often the officer will volunteer this information. It’s also an easy opener or ice-breaker to ask how long the officer has been with the department, assigned to the area, etc.

1. Assignment for this ride. Include here the actual beat you were to observe and the actual beat O1 was assigned to. If there is a difference in where your site director told you to ride and the beat where you actually ride please indicate the reason for this in this section. Also include here the officer’s normal assignment. Is O1 normally assigned to this beat or is this only a temporary assignment? In this section you may want to indicate how knowledgeable O1 seemed to be with the beat and the citizens he/she encountered throughout the ride.

2. Assignment history. How long has O1 been a sworn officer in this department? Regularly assigned to this district/precinct?
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3. **Personal characteristics.** What is the officer's race, age, and sex? (Race and sex can be observed without asking).

4. **Other.** Any other information pertaining to how the officer became involved in police work, his/her educational background and prior work experience may also be included in this section.

**REACTION TO OBSERVER**

Do not ask the officer how he/she feels about having an observer present. Sometimes the officer will volunteer this information, but often not. Whether or not the officer addresses this topic directly, you are expected to make some judgments about the officer's attitude and behavior during the ridealong.

In general, be sensitive to shifts or changes in the officer's attitude and behavior during the ridealong.

1. **What was the officer's attitude about having you present?** Facial expressions, tone of conversation with you, and comments to other police are good indicators. Failure to be talkative with you is not necessarily an indication that an officer is negative about you; some are simply not talkative.

2. **In what ways did the officer alter his/her behavior?** Most people alter their behavior in some way when they know they are being watched by people who are going to report what they saw to someone else. However, people get habituated about being observed, they still have to do their jobs, and it is difficult to change well established habits or ways of doing that job.

Officers may alter their usual practice for a variety of reasons: to avoid looking bad or to look good in the eyes of the observer, to demonstrate what police work is like, to titillate the observer or to pique a reaction, or for safety. If you can determine the likely motivation of such changes, indicate what they are.

As with all observation, simply offering hunches about the officer's behavior patterns is not very useful unless you can back it up with something you observed. So try to document your hunches with reference to specific events or patterns of events.

A. Did the officer spend more time in geographic areas that he/she would otherwise have avoided because of your presence. For example, the officer may have wanted to show you a certain kind of person or police
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procedure and was looking for an example. Did the officer avoid a certain area because he did not want to get into a situation with you present?

B. Did the officer initiate certain kinds of contacts or activities more frequently because of your presence? Did the officer avoid certain activities/contacts because of your presence?

C. During contacts with the public or any other activities, did the officer appear to be altering his usual practice because of your presence?

SPLIT RIDE INDICATION

In this section you will indicate whether or not you had a split ride. If you rode with the same officer for the entire shift then you may simply state this. However if during the observation session you were reassigned to another officer or team of officers you must indicate so under this topic. Include the reason for your reassignment as well as the additional ride number(s) utilized to complete the write up and coding for the observation session.

Entering Your Observations on the Narrative Form

Your narrative form should follow the format listed below. The XXXXs represent the space where your narrative description will be entered.

@ride 001
OFFICER ASSIGNMENT AND BACKGROUND
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXTEXTXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

REACTION TO OBSERVER
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXTEXTXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SPLIT RIDE INDICATION
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXTEXTXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
@activity 1
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
What Goes in Activity Descriptions

Activity descriptions should describe what the officer was doing, where he was doing it, how he was doing it, and with/to whom he was doing it. Activity descriptions will tend to be shorter than encounter descriptions, but not always. It is particularly important to obtain detailed descriptions of activities involving community or problem-oriented policing. In these cases, you should ask the officer (at some convenient time during the ride) what his/her impressions were of that activity: his/her purpose and what progress had been accomplished (or not accomplished) by this activity.

Note that there is a special activity code to cover time spent en route to locations to which the officer is dispatched. This is the appropriate place to describe what the officer was told by the dispatcher and any other communication between the officer, the dispatcher, the supervisor, and other officers while your officer was en route to the call. Try to record as closely as possible what the dispatcher told the officer about the call—that is, how the dispatcher described it.

Do not simply write, "En route to domestic disturbance." We need to know the basis on which the officer was mobilized to go somewhere. If the dispatcher ordered it, then be sure that your narrative provides that information. If the officer overheard the dispatcher assign a call to someone else and your officer decided on her own to go to the scene, indicate that. If the supervisor ordered the officer to go, indicate that. As much as possible, we want to know what the officer knows about situations before he/she engages in them. If the officer tells you something about the situation or anticipates something, make note of it. Also include whether the officer proceeded to the scene with a sense of urgency (lights, siren, high acceleration or speeds).

What Goes in Encounter Descriptions

The easiest way to grasp what goes in an encounter description is to imagine that you are writing a description of a scene for a play or movie—so that a movie director can recreate that scene as closely as possible to how it actually occurred. The director needs to be able to say who did what, how they did it, and in what order things occurred. Your description should be sufficiently detailed so that the "director" can pick a "cast" that accurately reflects those actually involved in the encounter and give them instructions on how to "act."
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Encounter descriptions tell what happened during a police-citizen encounter. Each encounter description should include the following:

- Context of the situation in space and time (location, time of day, whether dark or light),
- What citizens were involved and their readily observable characteristics (sex, age, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status and the basis for making that inference, such as dress, appearance),
- A similar description of any other police, if other than your primary and secondary officers were involved,
- What both police and citizens did—including anything that would help the reader understand why police or citizens behaved as they did,
- Whether and how your presence had a detectable impact on what police or citizens did during this encounter, and
- (When appropriate—see below) an account of the officer’s response to your debriefing inquiry about his/her decision making process.

You will not necessarily organize your narrative in the order of topics indicated above. Rather, try to describe the encounter as it unfolded. However, always make the debriefing description the last part of the encounter description. The first paragraph of the debriefing should begin as follows: DEBRIEFING (all capital letters).

Ordinarily you should begin your narrative with a description of how the situation looked at the beginning. If the officer initiated the encounter, you can describe the events leading to his/her intervention. Describe the location and the participants that are on scene at the time of police involvement (describing others as they enter the picture). What part of the beat did it occur in (residential, commercial, industrial area)? Did it occur in a public place? Visible to passers by? Daylight or after dark (if not obvious from the coded Encounter Form’s time entry). If the encounter’s location changed over the course of the encounter, be sure to note that when you get to that part of the encounter, describing that location as well.

As you describe what the officers and citizens did during the encounter, try to capture the sequence of events within the encounter and the nuances of interaction between citizen and officer: not only who did what, but how they did it and how they reacted to what others were doing. That is, your encounter should attempt to capture
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the signals that police and citizens give each other during the encounters.

Many encounters are routine; there is a rather predictable "script," each "actor" playing a well-known role. For example: an officer responds to a minor vandalism complaint, asks a few questions of the victim, takes a cursory look at the damage, completes a report, and is done. Both treat each other with routine courtesy and respect. But you need to be sensitive to all kinds of things that might go on in a slightly different version of that same situation. Suppose that the citizen complainant wants the officer to investigate further than merely taking a report—perhaps talking to neighbors who might have seen the crime taking place, or perhaps talk to some kids that the victim feels are the likely vandals. How did the citizen make that request, and how did the officer respond? Does the officer respond with eager interest, or only a routine, "Thanks, we'll look into it"? How did the citizen react to the officer's response? Did he press the officer to do it, or did he let it ride?

Another important dynamic in the encounter is the desire of the police to control a situation (or at least keep it from getting out of control) and the desire of citizens to get their way—which sometimes means that they openly or subtly resist police control, or even rebel. Police control in obvious ways: by issuing commands, gestures, threats, and even physical force. But they also control in more subtle ways: the questions they ask, by suggestion and persuasion, by negotiation, by their physical posture and demeanor. Citizens rarely rebel openly against police, but they can be more and less cooperative, forthcoming, and supportive of the police. We do not want you to try to read into situations more than is supported by observable evidence, but you should be sensitive to the ways that police try to control a situation and how citizens react. In some situations, what may be most striking is the absence of any police effort to control citizens.

Of course, your narrative should note official actions or those with obvious legal ramifications taken by police: arrests, citations, searches and seizures, use of force, interrogation, filing official reports. Provide as much detail as possible about what happened, when, and how, so that legal analysts can subsequently make judgments about whether the officer's actions conformed with legal requirements. WE DO NOT EXPECT YOU TO MAKE THESE JUDGMENTS YOURSELF; simply provide the relevant information.

As much as possible, your description should be precise in describing the action. If the officer issued someone a citation for speeding, don't merely indicate that the citizen got a speeding citation, but say that it was for doing 55 in a 35 mph zone.

Being Sensitive to Community Policing Issues in Describing Encounter & Activities

10
Because community policing is supposed to be oriented to serving the citizenry, we are particularly interested in your capturing what citizens ask police to do and how police respond.

Because community policing is supposed to mean that officers have greater knowledge of people and places in their assigned beats, we are also interested in your capturing any indications of the level of knowledge officers have of the people they contact and the places they work in. If an officer addresses a citizen by his name (without asking or checking ID first), that is significant. If the officer talks about some aspect of the citizen’s life that shows that the officer has detailed knowledge of the citizen, that is significant.

Community policing—in its problem-oriented form—calls for police to go beyond reacting to the immediate problem and try to see and deal with the bigger picture. The officer might do this in a number of ways:

- He/she attempts to determine if a given problem is part of a larger pattern of such problems. For example, is this case of vandalism one of many that have occurred recently in the neighborhood?

- He/she attempts to determine what the citizen’s perspective on this problem is—what the citizen sees the problem to be.

- He/she searches for some underlying cause or causes of the problem. For example, perhaps in interviews with the complainant and his neighbors, the officer learns that rowdy kids in the neighborhood congregate at a video arcade down the block from the vandalized home, and this serves as an attraction for youths to gather who have little else to do but get into trouble. Or he might check with crime analysis or other officers serving the area to see what they know about this problem.

- He/she takes some action—not just to respond to the complainant’s immediate problem (vandalized property), but to prevent it from happening in the future, to reduce its severity, or make the culprits easier to catch. He might alert the neighbors to the problem and ask them to keep an eye out for suspects, reporting any suspicious activity immediately. He might go down to the video arcade and introduce himself, making his presence felt, mentioning the vandalism, and asking for the youths’ names and ID (hoping to deter them). Or he might suggest to the owner of the arcade that he should not let truants hang out at his place. He might even go so far as to talk to their parents,
suggested that they keep closer tabs on their kids.

- He/she seeks alternatives to traditional enforcement solutions. He may try to get other government or private sector agencies to contribute to problem solving. Perhaps he notifies the youths’ principal that they are sometimes truant and that they could use more attention at school. Or suppose the act of vandalism was really a retaliation for some earlier punitive action taken by the complainant against them for some other reason. Perhaps the officer will try to get the parties to negotiate a solution, serving as a mediator.

- He/she follows up on any action taken, to see if it worked. This might be checking with the complainant and his neighbors a few days later to see if they have seen anything, or perhaps dropping by the arcade to see if the youths are still hanging out there. Or he might follow up with his fellow officers to see if there are any changes in the level of vandalism in the neighborhood. Or he might even check with crime analysis and ask them to get him some data on vandalism.

Sometimes the officer will take these actions on his/her own initiative, and sometimes at the direction of a supervisor. In either case, they still constitute a community policing effort and should be described and noted.

For additional details on the problem-solving aspects of community policing, see the relevant sections of the Activity Form and Encounter Form instructions.

**Making Observations v. Making Inferences**

The fundamental building block of your work product is the observation. We make observations so that someone can make inferences about that observation. If you only make inferences and fail to provide details about the observations that support your inferences, then we do not have an adequate description for others to make their own inferences or judge the merits of the ones you wish to make. Here’s an example:

**Observation:** Her face was red and she spoke in a loud voice.

**Inference:** She was angry.

Maybe you were correct to draw that inference, but that description could also accurately characterize someone standing in the sunlight, yelling for joy. If you also added to your observation that she said, “I hate your guts, you creep!” then you have
made a very strong case for your inference that she was angry.

A common inference you will be asked to make is the socioeconomic status of citizens. You will need to infer this from cues, such as how citizen were dressed, the kind of car they are in, what property they had, what their home and neighborhood were like, their occupation, and their speech patterns. Be sure to include the details of these cues, as well as your judgment about what they tell you about the citizen's socioeconomic status.

Inferences are absolutely necessary in observation. You will be asked to make lots of them, but we also want you to tell us what observations (things you could see, hear, feel, smell, taste) brought you to those inferences. In some cases, you will not be sure how to infer from what you observed. That is OK, since there is often ambiguity in the meaning of what we observe. Simply indicate that the meaning of what you observed wasn't clear and provide your best guidance on what it might have meant.

**Writing Style for Narratives**

We do not expect deathless prose, but we do prefer a clear, concise style. Avoid police lingo ("perp," "scumbag," "asshole," etc.) unless you are directly quoting someone. Bound direct quotations with quotation marks. You are encouraged to use as much direct quotation as necessary to convey what happened, but you are not expected to recount all or most of the comments of police and citizens in this fashion.
**Appendix D: Problem Codes Used in POPN Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Meet complainant</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Public nuisance</td>
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<td>Drunk</td>
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<td>Disorderly</td>
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<td>Vagrancy</td>
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<td>Loitering</td>
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<td>Obscene activity</td>
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<td>Noise disturbance</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Peddling, begging</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Argument, participants unspecified</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Domestic argument</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Non-domestic argument</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Gambling</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Prostitution/soliciting</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Curfew violation or truancy</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Keep the peace - prevent potential argument</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Juvenile problem/disturbance</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Harassment/stalking</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Family trouble</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Inter-group conflict</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Neighbor trouble</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Gang conflict</td>
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<td>Labor-management problems</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Gang problem, general</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Drug violations</td>
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<td>Alcohol law violation</td>
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<td>Illicit drugs (nonalcoholic), general</td>
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<td>Marijuana</td>
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<td>Cocaine/crack</td>
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<td>Other narcotic/illicit drug</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Paraphernalia</td>
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<td>Crowd control</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Parades/public events</td>
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<td>Civil disorders</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>Child neglect</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>Nonpayment of support</td>
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<td>Missing person</td>
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<td>Juvenile runaway</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>Kidnap</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>Medical assistance</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>'Man down'-cause unknown</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>Emergency medical transport needed</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>First aid, resuscitation needed</td>
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<td>Incident Description</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>Obstetric</td>
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<td>Mental disorder, involuntary hospitalization</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>Helping invalid or disabled person</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>Physical injury inflicted by persons</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>Threatened physical injury</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>Fight (physical)</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>Domestic fight w/injury</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Non-domestic fight w/injury</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Simple assault</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>Domestic assault w/injury</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>Non-domestic assault w/injury</td>
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<td>Aggravated assault</td>
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<td>Domestic aggravated assault</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>Non-domestic aggravated assault</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>Child abuse, general, w/injury</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>Incest</td>
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<td>Suspicious person</td>
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<td>Prowler</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>Gunshot</td>
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<td>Screams</td>
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<td>Suspicious circumstances</td>
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<td>Suspected violator</td>
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<td>116</td>
<td>Flight from police/lawful detention</td>
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<td>117</td>
<td>Interference with police</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>Weapons violation</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>Attempted robbery</td>
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<td>122</td>
<td>Robbery of private citizen</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>Att. robbery of private citizen</td>
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<td>124</td>
<td>Robbery of financial institution</td>
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<td>126</td>
<td>Robbery of other commercial establishment</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>Sexual attack</td>
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<td>132</td>
<td>Rape</td>
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<td>Attempted rape</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>Child molestation</td>
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<td>140</td>
<td>Death (‘dead body’)</td>
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<td>Accidental death</td>
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<td>142</td>
<td>Suicide</td>
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<td>143</td>
<td>Attempted suicide</td>
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<td>Homicide</td>
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<td>145</td>
<td>Attempted homicide</td>
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<td>Adult subject of police concern</td>
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<td>Juvenile subject of police concern</td>
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<td>Discovery of missing/stolen property</td>
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<td>Alarm (not fire)</td>
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<td>Alarm (chronic false)</td>
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<td>Missing or stolen property</td>
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<td>Lost property</td>
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<td>Return of lost property</td>
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<td>Threat to take property</td>
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<td>Return of stolen property</td>
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<td>Buying, receiving, possessing stolen property</td>
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<td>Attempted theft, unspecified</td>
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<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
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<td>Attempted motor vehicle theft</td>
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<td>Theft from residence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attempted theft from residence</td>
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<td>Theft from commercial</td>
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<td>Att. theft from commercial</td>
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<td>Shoplifting</td>
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<td>Attempted shoplifting</td>
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<td>Theft from motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Att theft from motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Purse snatched/pocket picked</td>
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<td>Burglary</td>
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<td>Burglary, residential</td>
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<td>Burglary, commercial</td>
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<td>Unwanted/unauthorized entry or presence</td>
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<td>Trespassing, (public) residential</td>
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<td>Trespassing, commercial</td>
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<td>Unauthorized use of motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Att. break-in/including alarms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Break-in, residential</td>
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<td>Att. residential break-in/including alarms</td>
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<td>Break-in, commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Att. commercial break-in/including alarms</td>
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<td>Break-in, motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Suspicious motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Dangerous substance</td>
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<td>Unintentionally damaged property</td>
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<td>Utility problem</td>
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<td>Fire in progress</td>
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<td>Fire alarm/smoke</td>
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<td>Bomb threat</td>
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<td>Vandalism, motor vehicle</td>
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<td>Problems with money/credit/documents</td>
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<td>Forgery or counterfeiting</td>
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<td>Fraud or embezzlement</td>
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<td>Bad check/bad credit card</td>
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<td>384</td>
<td>Refuse to pay</td>
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<td>385</td>
<td>Unfair business practice</td>
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<td>386</td>
<td>Landlord - tenant dispute</td>
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<td>410</td>
<td>Traffic accident</td>
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<td>411</td>
<td>Traffic accident-property damage only</td>
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<td>412</td>
<td>Personal injury-traffic accident</td>
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<td>413</td>
<td>Pedestrian hit-traffic accident</td>
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<td>420</td>
<td>Hit and run</td>
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<td>421</td>
<td>Leaving the scene</td>
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<td>Road block</td>
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<td>Vehicle violation</td>
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<td>Parking violation</td>
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<td>Abandoned vehicle</td>
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<td>Equipment/inspection lacking</td>
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<td>454</td>
<td>Missing or improper license, license plate/registration</td>
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<td>455</td>
<td>Routine check-vehicle violation</td>
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<td>Traffic flow problems</td>
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<td>Traffic signal disorder</td>
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<td>Traffic obstruction or congestion</td>
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<td>Road condition</td>
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<td>Moving violation</td>
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<td>Driving under the influence</td>
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<td>Excess speed</td>
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<td>Assist motorist</td>
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<td>481</td>
<td>Disabled vehicle</td>
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<td>482</td>
<td>Road directions</td>
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<td>505</td>
<td>General request for service</td>
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<td>506</td>
<td>Assist person locked in or out of home, office, oth bldg</td>
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<td>507</td>
<td>Emergency - nature unspecified</td>
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<td>510</td>
<td>Request for surveillance</td>
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<td>520</td>
<td>Escort</td>
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<td>523</td>
<td>Funeral/parade escort</td>
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<td>525</td>
<td>Police protection</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Transport-status of person unknown
Transport-person not in custody
Animal problem
Police-community relations, officer friendly, school visit
Police-comm relations, commercial establishment
Pol-com relations, residential
Information related
Citizen wants information
Case-related crime information
Crime prevention information
Other information
Directions (nontraffic)
Cit wants to give information
Cit: crime-tip information
Cit: not crime tip information
Officer wants information
Off: crime-tip information
Off: Not crime tip information
Off wants to give information
Papers to be served
Arrest warrant to be served
Subpoena/summons to be served
Search warrant to be served
Arrest processing/booking
Transport person in custody
Interrogation
Court proceedings
Civil code problems/violations
Business regulations
Fire prevention
Litter, trash, refuse, and property appearance
Streets and public ways
Pollution, health, and sanitation
Housing
Nuisance property
No problem ('all quiet')
No contact ('gone on arrival')
Do not know problem
Complaint against a police officer
Complaint about police service
Compliments for police
Casual conversation
Personal business
Quasi-personal business
Irrational or crank call to police
861  False report
871  Back up officer - otherwise unspecified, no emergency
874  Assist other department - problem not specified
994  Gang fight
999  Missing/blank
Appendix E: Process Model Dataset Coding Form

Process Model Dataset Cues

Can be:

- Referenced (1)
- Experienced (2)
- Volunteered (3)
- Solicited (4)

1. Evidence of physical injury
   1. To victim
   2. To suspect
   3. To multiple parties
2. No evidence of physical injury
3. Evidence of property damage
4. Testimonial evidence
   1. From victim/service recipient/helpless person
      i. Accuses assault
      ii. Accuses threat of assault
      iii. Accuses wrongdoing
      iv. Denies wrongdoing
   2. From suspect/disputant
   3. From third party
   4. From witness
   5. From officer already on scene
5. Confession of wrongdoing
   1. From suspect
   2. From victim
6. Evidence of use of drugs/alcohol
7. Evidence of mental illness
8. Evidence of disrespect
9. Involved party is a minor
   1. Suspect is a juvenile/minor child
   2. Victim is a juvenile/minor child
10. Victim requests action
    1. Victim requests arrest
    2. Victim requests suspect leave
    3. Victim wants to file charges/make report
    4. Other request from victim
11. Other party requests action
12. Victim requests no action/assistance
13. No warrants found
14. Warrants found
15. Citizens in conflict: verbal
16. Citizens in conflict: physical
17. Suspect assaults officer/physically resists
18. Other parties at scene
   1. Third party present
   2. Crowd/bystanders present
19. Involved party returns to scene
20. Party leaves voluntarily (before being asked to do so)
21. Party unwilling to leave premises
22. Suspect attempts to flee scene
23. Weapon use
   1. Dispatch indicates weapon on scene
   2. Weapon present at scene
   3. Another party indicates
   4. No weapon found
24. Query additional information
   1. Custody of minor child: victim has custody
   2. Custody of minor child: suspect has custody
   3. Custody of minor child: shared custody
   4. Living arrangements: Only victim has right to be there
   5. Living arrangements: Only suspect has right to be there
   6. Living arrangements: Both parties have a right to be there
   7. Location of parent: Nearby
   8. Location of parent: Not nearby
   9. Involvement in drugs
  10. Victim/suspect has another place to go
  11. Formal/legal order: Present
  12. Formal/legal order: Not present
  13. Location of suspect
  14. Victim/offender relationship
  15. Other
25. No evidence of intoxication
26. Violation of formal order
27. Threatening move toward officer
28. Other
Process Model Dataset Decisions

1. Proceed to different location to interview
2. Proceed to different location to observe crime scene
3. Separate parties to interview
4. Separate parties to avoid conflict
5. Run warrant check
6. Take description of suspect
7. Call for additional resources (e.g. EMS, evidence technician, etc)
8. Draw firearm
9. Search suspect
10. Search house/yard/car
11. Handcuff suspect
12. Use force
13. Suggest restraining order
14. Suggest going to prosecutor to press charges
15. Provide advice
16. Instruct parties to stay away from one another
17. Encourage party to leave
18. Order party to leave
19. Assist party in leaving premises
20. Assist party in retrieving property
21. File report
22. Threaten jail/arrest
23. Arrest/take to juvenile
24. Take no further action
25. Other
26. Cite/ticket
27. Order party to cease behavior
Appendix F: Depth of Search

Depth of search was calculated using the following formula (adapted from Brandl, 1991):

\[
\text{depth of search} = \frac{\text{PDA}}{\text{SDA}}
\]

where:
- \(\text{PDA}\) = number of cues from the process model accessed in an encounter
- \(\text{SDA}\) = number of cues from the structural model accessed in an encounter

The following is an example of how the equation is computed (an "x" indicates an accessed cue):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Model Cues Accessed</th>
<th>Structural Model Cues Accessed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enc 1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for:

- Encounter 1: \(\text{PDA}=4;\) \(\text{SDA}=8\); depth of search = 0.5
- Encounter 2: \(\text{PDA}=2;\) \(\text{SDA}=10\); depth of search = 0.2
- Encounter 3: \(\text{PDA}=5;\) \(\text{SDA}=6\); depth of search = 0.8
- Encounter 4: \(\text{PDA}=6;\) \(\text{SDA}=10\); depth of search = 0.6
- Encounter 5: \(\text{PDA}=1;\) \(\text{SDA}=5\); depth of search = 0.2

In this example, the mean depth of search across all encounters is 0.46, or 46% of information was accessed.
Appendix G: Content of Search

In order to assign scores to each cue available within an encounter, the following procedure was used to calculate "importance scores" (adapted from Brandl, 1991).

\begin{align*}
\text{TNI} & = \text{total pieces of information available to be accessed} \\
\text{TNI}^1 & = \text{the first piece of information accessed in each encounter} \\
\text{TNI} - 1 & = \text{the second piece of information accessed in each encounter} \\
\text{TNI} - 2 & = \text{the third piece of information accessed in each encounter}
\end{align*}

The following is an example of how scores were assigned to search patterns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim request</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Disrespect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enc 1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first encounter, victim request was considered first and suspect disrespect was considered second. Conflict and use of a weapon were not considered. In the actual analysis for content of search, 34 pieces of information could be considered - thus, the score for any one piece of information could range from 0 to 34. To determine the overall "importance score" for each type of information, the mean of the assigned scores was calculated. Therefore:

\begin{align*}
\text{Victim request} & = 2.8 \\
\text{Conflict} & = 1.6 \\
\text{Weapon} & = 1.2 \\
\text{Disrespect} & = 3.2
\end{align*}

In this example, disrespect is considered most important, followed by victim request, physical conflict, and evidence of a weapon.
References


