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**Child soldiers, armed conflicts, and tactical innovations**

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Child Soldiers, Armed Conflicts, and Tactical Innovations

by

Robert M. Tynes

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Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
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Child Soldiers, Armed Conflicts, and Tactical Innovations

Abstract:

Most armed conflicts in the late 20th and early 21st century involve the use of child soldiers. Children have been used in wars before the modern era, but this study argues that a shift has occurred in contemporary conflicts. Child soldier use has become a tactical innovation. Fighting factions utilize children as soldiers in order to gain an advantage on the battlefield. Several different analytical approaches are used in order to test the argument. First, a large-N regression analysis (1987-2007) reveals that depending on the dyadic relationship between government and opposition forces, intensity of war, military expenditures per GDP, political terror, troop size, polity and education correlate with child soldier use. Second, a historical analysis suggests that a century of youth empowerment, an increase in the ambiguity regarding the sanctity of civilian life in war, and exponential leaps in war technology all contributed to a shift in norms about children in the battlefield. Third, a social network analysis demonstrates the structural connection between groups that use child soldiers. The tactical innovation flows along pathways linked by multiple guerilla learning centers. The most prominent center is the Libyan guerilla training camps of the 1980s. Lastly, a single case study of the civil war in Sierra Leone offers insight into the ground-level dynamics of child solider use and how the practice can produce political opportunities. Policy suggestions centered on prevention, compellence and protection are offered in the concluding section.
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Chapter 1: Why use Children in War?

Martin P. was a child. He lived in Uganda. He knew how to march in formation, how to load and fire a submachine gun and how to kill. He fought twice for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA kidnapped him for use as a soldier in their insurgency against the Ugandan government. James P. was also abducted by the LRA. He had a similar experience. “What did I do with the LRA during my time in captivity?” he said, “Killed people, beat up people and looted property. This was under order from the commanders; when we approached a village, some persons would be singled out. We were never told why these people and not others, we were simply told that this one had to be killed” (Human Rights Watch 2003a, p. 10). Both of these boys were caught up in a conflict that has lasted almost 20 years.

In Sri Lanka, a child, who trained at the age of 11 to fight for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), explained how he was programmed to seek revenge for the killing of his friends. He said, “…he was shown videos of dead women and children and told that his enemies had done this. Soon afterwards he was involved in attacks on several Muslim villages near Batticaloa. When recounting one attack, he described how he had held a child by the legs and bashed its head against a wall and how he enjoyed hearing the mother’s screaming. He said they deserved to die” (Amnesty International 1998, p. 38)

In Columbia, a boy who joined a paramilitary group at the age of seven told his story and why he fled: "They give you a gun and you have to kill the best friend you have. They do it to see if they can trust you. If you don't kill him, your friend will be
ordered to kill you. I had to do it because otherwise I would have been killed. That's why I got out. I couldn't stand it any longer." Meanwhile, a 12 year old from Iraq appeared proud to fight, saying "I joined the Mahdi army to fight the Americans. Last night I fired a rocket-propelled grenade against a tank" (Coalition to Stop 2007a).

Despite the popular image of child soldiers being mostly African, thanks to the success of the movie, “Blood Diamonds”, and novels such as *A Long Way Gone* (Beah 2008), *What is the What* (Eggers 2006) and *Beasts of No Nation* (Iweala 2006), the social problem is, in fact, a global phenomenon. According to Human Rights Watch (2006), the practice is geographically dispersed in over 30 different countries all over the world, occurring in states such as Columbia, Mexico, Peru, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Algebra, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, New Guinea, Sri Lanka, East Timor, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As will be shown, guerilla forces and government armies alike are incorporating children into their ranks. “These young combatants participate in all aspects of contemporary warfare. They wield AK-47s and M-16s on the front lines of combat, serve as human mine detectors, participate in suicide missions, carry supplies, and act as spies, messengers or lookouts” (Human Rights Watch 2006).

The most commonly cited figure for number of children involved in conflicts is 300,000 (Human Rights Watch 2006), but that estimate is not necessarily the most accurate figure as raw data on ages and recruitment rates are difficult to find and to validate (Alternet 2006). We do know however that the age range spans from just under
the age of 18 to as young as 8 years old.¹ Those most likely to be recruited are the poor, those living in combat areas, displaced persons, those split up from family, and the under-educated (Woods 1993; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett, McCallin & O’Shea 1996). Boys are not the only recruits though. Girls are pulled into the conflicts as well:

In addition to combat duties, girls are subject to sexual abuse and may be taken as “wives” by rebel leaders in Angola, Sierra Leone and Uganda. In Northern Uganda, Human Rights Watch interviewed girls who had been impregnated by rebel commanders, and then forced to strap their babies on their backs and take up arms against Ugandan security forces (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Singer (2005) and others (Machel 1996; Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Stohl 2002; Stohl, Schroeder and Smith 2007) assert that the proliferation of smaller armies and lightweight weaponry has been a huge part the problem. The “availability of small arms is without question a contributing factor to the use of child soldiers” (Stohl 2002). Guns are not nearly as heavy as they used to be, and they are much easier to fire. Training and supplying children with small, lethal weaponry has had effects beyond the battlefield:

After a conflict small arms may become instruments for other forms of violence such as crime and banditry. In some areas, these surplus weapons may create a culture of violence that traps whole societies in an endless cycle of war. When children have no experience with or exposure to non-violent conflict resolution, small arms become the tools for conflict resolution (Stohl 2002).

Stohl’s argument implies that empowering children with guns during a conflict has the potential to change not only power relations but also the culture.

Gun-toting children storming across the battlefield appears to be relatively modern phenomenon. As Singer (2001-2002) points out, medieval knights had young

¹ The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) defines child soldier as outlined in the Cape Town Principles: “‘any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. Thus, ‘child soldier’ does not only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried weapons.’ The definition is intentionally broad so as to extend protection to as many children as possible and to ensure their inclusion in demobilization and reintegration programmes” (UNICEF 2003, p. 14).
servants handle and care for their weapons, and the Germans enlisted children for the Hitler Jugend force during World War II, but these are not standard practices for most armed forces. Rosen (2005) finds an abundance of children used in battle in the 1800s. He states that the American Civil War was a war of “boy soldiers,” and that “historical analysis suggests that between 250,000 and 420,000 boy soldiers, including many in their early teens and even younger, served in the Union and Confederate armies” (p. 5). There is evidence that children as young as 8 years old had enlisted.

Nevertheless, the wide-spread use of child fighters is essentially a recent innovation in warfare, much more prominent after World War II. As will be demonstrated, the use of children to gain leverage in a conflict becomes apparent during the Vietnam War; it then travels through the practices of the Khmer Rouge and on into numerous insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Africa and South America. In Colombia, today, child soldiers “are nicknamed ‘little bells’ by the military, which uses them as expendable sentries, and ‘little bees’ by the guerillas, because they ‘sting’ their enemies before they know they are under attack” (p. 42). On the African continent, the problem is extremely pervasive. Child soldiers are either assisting the insurgency or the government (or both), “in nearly every one of its wars” (Singer 2001-2002, p. 43). And in Afghanistan, the Taliban has fine-tuned the practice, forming cadres of suicide bombers, ages 12-18. “[T]hey were trained in weapons handling, preparing of suicide jackets and ambush attacks,” explained one Pakistani military official, and promised a place in heaven—a land of virgins and rivers made of milk and honey (Damon 2010).
Myths

Child soldier research started about three decades ago in 1979 with the work of Dorothea Woods and her partnership with the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) in Geneva (Heckel 2005). Woods (along with Martin McPherson) acted as an advocate against child soldiering and as a researcher, collecting some of the earliest systematic, country-by-country evidence (Woods 1980, 1990, 1991, 1993). She provided brief sketches of what was happening in various countries as well as speculation about why military groups would use young fighters. Probable causes included poverty and manpower shortages (Woods 1993). Graca Machel’s 2 report to the United Nations (1996), “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,” was another major step in child soldier research. The report looked at 24 case studies and covered 30 years of conflict. Machel’s work was based on interviews with government and military official, legal experts, human rights organizations, the media, religious groups, local leaders, and women and children involved in conflicts. She made site visits to about 10 different states, including Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone and parts of the former Yugoslavia. The report lists multiple causes such as: globalization, rapid urbanization and the erosion of the family, weak states, small arms proliferation, the militarization of society, poverty, manpower shortages, and poor education.

For the past 30 years child soldier research has basically followed the trajectory set by Woods and Machel. There have been multiple case studies and historical analyses, based on interviews and secondary documentation. Numerous hypotheses, from small arms trade to an increase in poverty, have been generated in order to explain why

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2 Machel was a member of the armed movement, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), in Mozambique. FRELIMO fought for independence against Portugal from 1962-1975 and trained and utilized child soldiers in the conflict.
insurgencies and governments have trained children to fight. However, very few researchers have performed large-N analyses (see Achvarina & Reich 2006 regression analysis involving conflicts in Africa as one exception, and Høiskar 2001 as the other). This research project addresses the child soldier research gap. The study utilizes a triangulation of methods: performing a regression analysis of armed conflicts ranging from 1987-2007, process tracing the diffusion of norms through insurgency and terrorist networks, and analyzing historical and interview data from U.S. troops, adult fighters as well as child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Hopefully this research project will debunk some of the more common myths that have been generated from past research as well as provide clearer explanations for what might be driving the use of children in battle.

Some of the more common, popular images of child soldiers—that of poor, drug crazed Africans with AK-47s—have been pulled from past research. Despite the emotional appeal of the irrational, wild child or tiny victim image, these are one-dimensional heuristics that do not fully explain why youths are being militarized.

*Myth #1: Poverty*

If, for example, we examine the Real Gross Domestic Income (RDGI), according to the state where each armed conflict occurred from 1987-2007, we find that poverty pervades,

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3 Data is drawn from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009). Real Gross Domestic Income is in constant dollars and Income dollars in terms of trade is in 2005 Constant Prices. "The RGDPPTT variable is Gross Domestic Income and follows the recommended method in the UN System of National Accounts. This revised procedure is also consistent with the current and past treatment of the net foreign balance in PWT. RGDPPTT is the 1996 international price value of domestic absorption of a country in a given year plus current exports minus current imports deflated by the deflator and the 1996 PPP of domestic absorption." (Heston, Summers & Aten 2008, p. 20).
regardless of whether or not child soldiers are involved. For a total of 107 armed conflicts, 83 involved child soldiers and 24 did not. The RDGI mean for “yes” child soldier use was $2,812.49, and the RDGI mean for “no” child soldier use was $3,018.64. Hence when conflicts did not have children in combat, the RDGI was only slightly higher, by $206.15. Furthermore, the RDGI world average from 1986-2007 (which is the time frame that the data drawn from) was $9,987.47. The comparison shows that states that had armed conflict—both for child soldier use “yes” and child soldier use “no”—sit in the bottom third of the RDGI world rankings. Poverty appears to be more closely correlated with armed conflict than with child soldier use.

Myth #2: All Child Soldiers are Drugged

As for drug use and child soldiers, insurgencies, such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), have used cocaine and amphetamines to motivate the young to fight (Abdullah and Muana 1998; Sesay and Ismail 2003; Ellis 1998). However this is not necessarily the standard operating procedure for all groups that engage young combatants. When analyzing all armed conflicts in Africa from 1960-2006, Tynes (2007) found that drugs were utilized in less than 50% of the states where children were involved in battle. Rather than encompassing the entire continent, drug use tended to parallel illicit drug trade routes. So, more insurgencies in West Africa tended to access drugs for their troops, because cocaine

---

4 For this study, child soldier is defined as anyone 15 years of age or younger “who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messenger and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms” (UNICEF 1997, p. 8). The age of 15 was chosen as it aligns with international law as proscribed in 1989 by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations 1989). More on this delineation will be discussed in Chapter 3.
flowed from South America through West Africa and on into Europe. When cocaine was readily available, insurgencies were more likely to access it and feed it to their young fighters.

Myth #3: It’s an African Thing

Another generalization about child soldier use is that it takes place in Africa\(^5\) and that it is mostly guerrilla troops that train and deploy young combatants. When looking at the 83 armed conflicts\(^6\) that had child fighters (1987-2007), we discover a regional spread of the phenomenon. Africa contains 26 of the conflicts (31.3%), Asia has 26 (31.3%), Europe’s share is 11 (13.3%), the Middle East has 11 (13.3%) and North and South America make up the remaining 9 (10.8%) armed conflicts with child soldier use. A rough sketch with the data demonstrates that child soldier use is not African-centric. An analysis of opposition versus government child soldier use also helps to clarify misperceptions. When children are used on the battlefield (83 armed conflicts), the breakdown is as follows:

- Used by government only = 13.3% (11)
- Used by opposition only = 36.1% (30)
- Used by both sides = 50.6% (42)

So, governments used child soldiers in a total of 63.9% of the conflicts and the opposition used child soldiers in a total of 86.1% of the conflicts. The results demonstrate that many

\(^5\) Easterly (2010) criticizes the media for perpetuating the Africa as a child soldier haven, especially the use of shock imagery by newspapers such as the *New York Times.*

\(^6\) Note here that armed conflicts is the units of analysis. In the regression analysis detailed in Chapter 3, the unit of analysis shifts to dyads of groups within the armed conflicts.
governments are culpable when it comes to having youths (15 years of age or under) in their ranks.

These cursory statistics on child soldiers and poverty, drugs, regions and governments/insurgencies are but an initial step towards refining the underlying determinants for child soldier use. The following research offers a much more rigorous consideration of the social problem. Nonetheless, the conclusions developed herein are not meant as final pronouncements, but rather as an addition to the field as well as an indication of new directions to be explored.

**Tactical Innovation**

This study tackles the question: Why are children used in battle? The quick answer might be that children are used because more troops means more fighting power. The issue becomes more complicated, though, if we consider that child soldier use has not been the norm until the 20th century. “While there were isolated instances in which children did serve in armies or other groups at war, a general norm held against child soldiers across the last four millennia of warfare” (Singer 2006, p. 15). Moreover, Bennett (1998) deflates the specific claim that using children in combat is a “legitimate African tradition”:

…*children* were not recruited to regiments nor did they bear arms. At most, as we have seen in the case of the Zulu, children gave incidental support as non-combatants. While a degree of uncertainty might always exist about a recruit’s precise age, the evidence is clear that men were drafted into regiments three or four years after puberty, and it should also be noted that (contrary to current practices) *girls* were never used as combatants (Chapter 5).

An important marker for when a child can become a soldier is puberty, and whether or not a person has passed through an initiation into adulthood. Among the Mende of Sierra
Leone, boys who have not performed puberty rites in the secret society of Poro are not allowed to fight in battle or even act as spies no matter how old they may be (Confidential Source 2007). The focus is less on age, which may vary from 12-18, and more on a biological and social transition.

Conversely, Rosen (2005) counters general claims that child soldiering is a recent phenomenon, stating that it is prevalent throughout history. He cites evidence such as from 17th century Europe when 11-13 year olds served as commissioned officers in the army and navy; during the American Revolution there were 12-13 year olds in General Thomas Gage’s regiment; and, the Cheyenne of the 19th century had 14-15 year old warriors. The modern shift, says Rosen, is that previously battle was seen as “ennobling” children, whereas today battle is seen as doing damage, making the child “an abused and exploited victim of war” (p. 6). His argument is not meant to downplay the brutality of war, but to refocus our attention on the cultural constructs that are being masked as well as reformed. Part of his point is to insert international-level forces into the equation:

The problem of child soldiers…is part of a global politics of age in which humanitarian and human rights groups, sovereign states, and the United Nations and its administrative agencies battle over the rights and duties of children over the issue of who is a child and who is a child soldier. The child soldier crisis is part of a contested domain of international politics in which childhood serves as a proxy for other political interests” (p. 2).

With Rosen’s argument it becomes important to consider that the construct of the child is not only being leveraged by insurgencies and state militaries, but also by humanitarian political entrepreneurs in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). It is a valuable argument because it dissipates the normative bias that surrounds the issue, the claim that the problem is “out there” with insurgents and governments is reintegrated with the global community.
My research sits beside Singer’s and Rosen’s work, acknowledging that youth have been involved in various battles over the last several centuries, and that international social forces have had a major influence on the child soldier discourse, creating the “bad guys” and the “good guys.” My findings however suggest that there has been a significant shift in the 20th century—something new is happening. Rather than children being merely troop builders, this project argues that following World War II, children have become part of a larger war-fighting strategy. As Singer (2006) notes, “While not formalized in a drill manual, it represents a new body of fundamental principles, deliberate instrumental choices, and transferred teaching about how to fight” (p. 6).

I begin by positing that the use of child soldiers is a tactical innovation (McAdam 1983). Most guerilla groups lie outside the established polity and as such are social movement organizations (SMOs) that must seek alternate forms of power in order to overthrow the established political institutions. One method of power-building is through negative inducements, which involve “the creation of a situation that disrupts the normal functioning of society and is antithetical to the interests of the group’s opponents. In essence, insurgents seek to disrupt their opponent’s realization of interests to such an extent that the cessation of the offending tactic becomes a sufficient inducement to grant

---

7 For the purposes of this project, SMOs are defined in accordance with Lofland (1996). He asserts that SMOs are the more persistent forms of insurgent realities. They are “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought to be organized that, at the time of their claims-making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society—the then dominant constructors of what is realistic, reasonable, and moral” (pp. 2-3). In the case of intrastate war, the regime in power is the mainstream social force. While it might be argued that some insurgencies are more like criminal gangs than social movements (e.g. the American Civil Rights movement), I contend that the armed conflicts which have occurred since World War II all involve groups making claims about who has the right to power and ownership of the state. They are similar to “positive” social movements in their claim-making and existence outside mainstream society. Whether it is the RUF in Sierra Leone calling for end to corrupt government or the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda on a holy mission, these organizations all incorporate social/philosophical agendas into their movements. The insurgencies may or may not be faithful to their agendas in the end; nevertheless, it does not negate existence of the claim in their discourse.
concessions” (pp. 735-736). In other words, a group will utilize an extreme, often morally “bad” tactic, to demonstrate how far they are willing to go for victory. The act appears to step beyond the rational and into the realm of the irrational. For the opponent, the negative action might seem almost without a rational counter attack. When children are used as combatants, this field of irrational behavior is invoked. Political entrepreneurs such as Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Joseph Kony of Uganda, and Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo realize the latent, irrational power of young soldiers and capitalize on its potential. “[T]hese men, and many like them, realized that arming children could serve as a means to gaining military capacity” (Singer 2006, p. 54). Ultimately, insurgents and government militaries use child soldiers in order to increase political opportunities.

Whether or not the insurgents force the hand of the opposing regime depends upon numerous variables, and the process is not a one shot approach. Rather, as McAdam (1983) states, the introduction of a tactical innovation can set off a back and forth process whereby the opposition counters with a tactical adaptation, leading to another tactical innovation, and so forth and so on. The overall process is known as tactical interaction. Brett, McCallin and O’Shea (1996) observed this phenomenon in their 24 case studies, stating “the recruitment of children into armed opposition groups often fuels under-age recruitment into government armed forces and vice versa” (p. 4).

With many insurgencies, child soldiers are a tactical innovation that becomes very difficult to counter, and hence, political opportunities increase. Political opportunities are when an event or social process “serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (McAdam 1982, p. 41). Child soldiers
have become essential to what Hammes (2006) labels as today’s “evolved form of insurgency,” or fourth generation warfare (4GW), which is less about hitting force with force and more about directly attacking “the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will” (p. 2). The overall strategy originates with Mao Tse-tung, whose theory of protracted war helped the Chinese Communist Party defeat Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists after decades of fighting. Mao’s philosophy is about adapting tactics to “introduce the element of surprise, set ambushes, concentrate superior numbers at any selected point, choose the time and place of fighting, avoid all evenly-matched or unfavorable engagements, escape mopping-up campaigns, and contribute to the demoralization of the enemy’s rank and file.” (Johnson 1968, p. 437). Mao’s protracted war strategy has been utilized by post-WWII insurgencies including the Viet Cong in Vietnam, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Al Qaeda globally.

As a subset of the strategy, child soldiers are a high-capacity tool utilized against armed forces that are often technologically superior. The tactic works at ground-level and is based on human-to-human contact. When child soldiers enter battlefield, some actors are immobilized while others are more readily mobilized. The effect has at least three significant dimensions: the creation of moral dilemmas, the fortification of troops, and the relocation of fear in the social system (See Diagram 1 below).
Moral dilemmas are problems that play out at the individual level in military officials as well as foot soldiers. This psychological dynamic involves an internalized conflict: when you have to make a choice between two actions and you have valid moral reasons why you should do both of those actions. However you can only pick one of those actions. A dilemma arises because a complex problem is being reduced into one solution. It is an irresolvable situation that must be resolved. Of course, you can choose one or the other path, but in a “genuine moral dilemma it must be …true that neither of the conflicting requirements is overridden” (McConnell 2006). “For instance, as a soldier engaged in battle, you must (a) protect civilians from harm and death and (b) defeat your enemy (because your cause—what you are fighting for—is just)” (Tynes 2008, p. 38). Both choices are imperatives.

For troops in armed conflict faced off against young fighters, the dilemma becomes a choice between killing the enemy and at the same time killing a child. Hence, kinetic action against the insurgents becomes much more complex and difficult to resolve, thereby increasing the power of the group using child soldiers. A study by
psychologists using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) has demonstrated that brains faced with moral dilemmas engage in emotional processing as well as cognitive processing, depending upon the complexity of the dilemma. (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen 2001). Translated to the battlefield, the result might be a soldier whose rules of engagement schema is infiltrated by sympathy for youth schema, which diminishes his/her response rate and increases vulnerability. And if the soldier is not killed first, but instead, kills a child, the effects last well beyond the fighting. When British troops faced off with child combatants in West Africa in 2001 and 2002, numerous soldiers experienced clinical depression and post-traumatic stress disorder after battling with them (Singer 2005). African troops have also been affected by the tactic. Members of Uganda’s military, the Uganda People’s Defense Force, have been psychologically disturbed by having to fight against children and alongside them. For these soldiers, the dilemma is about killing children as well as seeing their own leaders contribute to and benefit from the problem (Neu 2004).

The second dimension of tactical innovation, that of troop fortification, translates into more troops for the insurgents. As Singer (2006) states, “Any organization willing to use children as fighters will usually be able to field a force well beyond what they would be able to do without them. With this, the balance of potential forces in a war is shifted” (p. 95). According to Woods (1993), this became part of the mujahidin’s survival tactic against the Soviet Union. The mujahidin recruited young fighters in order “to supplement the crumbling armed forces” (p. 14). While this may appear to be straightforward method for building troops, with children the threshold of resistance to recruitment becomes much lower. Children are more readily coerced (often kidnapped and then threatened
with death if they do not join the insurgency) and reprogrammed (controlled by the insurgents in some cases through the use of drugs such as cocaine). In Sri Lanka, guerilla leaders recruit children because “…they are easily conditioned and motivated, and can be put into battle with less training. Although children are put into more danger, they too are of greater danger to their adversaries” (Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996). Similarly, Blattman (2007) finds in his case study of northern Uganda: “armed groups with few or limited resources forcibly recruit young adolescents because they offer the optimal combination of effectiveness and ease of retention” (p. 3). This is unlike the process of recruiting adults for rebellion, which involves many more obstacles to mobilization. Additionally, even when the opposition counters by protecting them in refugee camps, the problem worsens. Achvarina and Reich (2006) find that in the case of African conflicts, greater access to refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps correlated with an increase in child soldier recruitment. Also, the more camps there were for the protection of children, the greater the consolidation and vulnerability. Refugee camps become child soldier collection points for insurgents “The practical result is that a high-risk pool of potential recruits is created.” (p. 140).

The third dimension involves relocating fear in the social system. Insurgencies attempt to usurp the state’s/ruling regime’s ability to institute fear. States/ruling regimes need the power of fear in order to maintain social control. When an insurgency uses children in battle, they undermine the authority of the opposing regime. Fear is extracted from the rulers/elites/leaders and relocated in the child. The result is a severe strain on the

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8 This position is grounded on Migdal’s (2001) definition of the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (pp. 15-16).
social structure\(^9\) that can immobilize citizens, especially those who might otherwise mobilize for collective action against the insurgents. It is “just one aspect in a larger campaign carried out by an armed group, designed to intimidate local civilian communities” (Singer 2006, p. 60).

This is a form of what Chabal and Daloz (1999) call the political instrumentalization of disorder. Chabal and Daloz claim that the brutality in civil wars in Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone served an instrumental purpose, which aimed at dismantling the state. During Sierra Leone’s decade-long civil war, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) used child soldiers to devastate the civilian population and to help dissolve the state. It was not until the rise of an opposition, known as the Civil Defense Force (CDF), that the RUF began to suffer serious setbacks in their insurgency. The CDF was an indigenous group of fighters that possessed a strong knowledge of warfare in the bush; notably, they were also accused of using child soldiers as combatants. The civil war in Sierra Leone became a case wherein civilians finally overcame the immobilizing effects of the RUF’s re-location of fear. However, the new civilian SMO countered the RUF’s tactical innovation with a parallel tactical adaptation—the CDF appropriated the RUF’s relocation of fear. The CDF began using child soldiers too (Sesay and Ismail 2003).

Relocating fear in the society for many insurgencies also means retraining the children, providing them with new social norms and cosmologies. Creating a new social structure was key to Joseph Kony’s power in Uganda:

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\(^9\) Social structure is “a patterned system of the social relationships of actors” (Parsons 1964, p. 230). The core of the social structure are institutions, or those systems “of patterned expectations defining the proper behavior of persons playing certain roles, enforced by both the incumbents’ own positive motives for conformity and by the sanctions of others” (p. 231).
Indoctrination into the LRA was a complex process of spiritual training, misinformation, and the strategic use of fear and violence. Spiritual practices appear central to motivating recruits and can be seen as an attempt to create new social bonds based on a shared cosmology (as well as fear). Kony created a cult of mystery and spiritual power which few abductees or civilians disbelieve even now (Blattman 2007, p. 18).

In Sierra Leone, the RUF attacked the reigning powers of state and society in part through re-initiating children into an alternate form of patronage (Murphy 2003). Richards (1996) claims that this was part of the insurgency’s attack on the state, that the “only means to attack a patrimonial elite is to terrorize rural communities that have gained little or nothing from patrimonialism. This pits the power of the new initiation against the old” (p. 83). It is “the social production of dependency on patronage when local and national structures fail to provide for the social and economic needs of youth” says Murphy (2003, p. 62). The insurgency then potentially becomes the new holder of the legitimate use of force.

**Evolution of a norm**

Even if one concedes that using child soldiers as a tactical innovation might create moral dilemmas, might amplify recruitment, and might relocate fear in the social system; and even if one can entertain that these dimensions might increase political opportunities for insurgents, there still remain lingering questions: Why use child soldiers? Why not engage in a less morally reprehensible practice? Why not harness the power of NGOs? After all, an insurgency might be more successful in the long-run if it were to enlist the help of the international community (see, for instance, the tactics employed by the Zapatistas in Mexico as outlined in Bob 2005). Beyond the tactical advantage that this
strategy appears to have, I am interested in why some groups (insurgencies and/or states) are willing to break a widespread cultural norm against using children in battle.

The most comprehensive explanation, I argue, is that the acceptability and unacceptability of child soldiers has not been a one-note affair. For the last 100 years, the norm has developed, evolved, and multiplied. As will be discussed later, the practice has grown out of a decline in the sanctity of civilian life on the battlefield, and a rise in youth empowerment globally. The confluence of these social forces has contributed to the construction of the child soldier norm. Additionally, rapid advances in war-technologies have made child soldiers a utilitarian choice for insurgencies.\(^\text{10}\) Even though it may be morally repugnant to many people, child soldier use has become a legitimate option.

In fact, child soldier use is the norm in the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century, whereas the international norm prohibiting child soldier use is relatively new. The prohibition against child combatants was introduced into international law a little more than 30 year ago with The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention (Rosen 2005). The Protocols advocated against using anyone under 15 years of age in hostilities and suggested special consideration for children caught up in armed conflict (United Nations 1977). Subsequent international agreements include: the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which introduced the prohibition against recruiting anyone under 18 years of age (United Nations 1989); and, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000), which addressed in more detail guidelines for the child’s role in armed conflict and set the age limit for any type of

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\(^{10}\) This line of reasoning builds on Ahlstrom’s (1991) work which tracks civilian casualties rates in wars over the last 200 years. He shows how soldiers were the main casualties of war before the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century, but by the late 1980s, 75% of deaths in armed conflict were civilians (p. 19). Ahlstrom remarks that “...there have been two major change over the last two centuries: the scale of warfare and its impact on the civilian population” (p. 6).
participation in combat at 18 or older (United Nations 2000). These three pieces of international law are part of the current movement to re-shift the global norm away from child soldier use. However they are not yet the commonly accepted guidelines on the battlefield. Understanding this ground-level reality of child soldier use helps us address the moral complexities involved in this social/political phenomenon.

**The Layout of the Project**

The chapters that follow all point back to one central thesis—that child soldier use from 1987-2007 is a tactical innovation. If there is an increase in the likelihood of tactical function, then there will be an increase in the likelihood that children will be used in armed conflict. This hypothesis challenges the existing literature, which cites independent variables such as poverty, education, globalization and unemployment as the driving forces behind child soldier use. Chapter 2 will review and explore previous studies regarding child soldiers and present a methodological foundation for the project. The methodology utilizes Lichbach and Zuckerman’s (1997a) and Lichbach’s (2003) tripartite breakdown of theoretical approaches in comparative politics—culture, structure and rational choice. The current child soldier literature will also be analyzed according to methods used by other researchers in order to demonstrate the lopsided focus of work executed to-date, and to support Laitin’s (2002) argument in favor of a cross-fertilization of methods.

Chapter 3 takes a structural approach to the problem, testing multiple independent variables from the literature review as well proxy variables for tactical advantage. It is a large-N, logistic regression looking at child soldier use by 283 different dyads
(governments plus opposition force) from 1987-2007. The data is drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict dataset of armed conflicts spanning 1946-2008 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002). The findings suggest that tactical advantage could be a significant driving force behind child soldier use, and that control variables, such as poverty and lack of educational opportunity, are not as significant for the 20 years of armed conflict examined in the study.

Chapter 4 examines the child soldier phenomenon within a historical framework. It provides an analysis of the evolution of the child soldier norm, offering a narrative explanation of how the practice is produced from global social forces. Chapter 5 presents a general social network map of how the practice might have been transmitted across insurgencies. The mapping takes a culture-based approach, premised on Mitchell’s (1969) assertion that norms need networks for development, transmission, and transformation. The social network for child soldier use includes a diffusion of norms from the Vietnam war theater and through multiple terrorist training camps in Libya, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Chapter 6 presents a case study of child soldier use in West Africa. Data is drawn from interviews with military and government officials, civilians and former child soldiers. Their stories and explanations provide a ground level view of children in combat and help to highlight the inner workings of tactical innovations: moral dilemmas, troop fortification, and relocation of fear. Discussions with informants and ethnographic evidence are drawn predominantly from fieldwork in Sierra Leone. Supplementary
interviews with American soldiers also contribute to the goal of this chapter, which is to shed insight into the rational choice aspects of child soldier use.

Chapter 7 synthesizes the findings from the previous three chapters, reflecting on the most essential points of the research project, potential weaknesses, and further lines of research. The chapter then outlines the current state of policy concerning child soldier use. This section delineates the most pertinent international agreements and judicial actions and touches on state-level approaches to the problem. Suggestions for where policy and strategies should focus next are provided, especially in the military arena and in communities. Hopefully findings from the study will spur others to look even more deeply into the phenomenon of child soldier use and develop methods for deterring the practice.
Chapter 2: Explaining Child Soldier Use

The Body of Knowledge

Three decades of research into the problem of child soldiers has produced numerous potential causes. The work initiated by Woods (1980, 1990, 1991, 1993) and furthered by Machel (1996) has generated multiple branches of explanatory variables. Subsequent research has helped us hone in on what lies at the end of those branches, i.e. many of the essential driving forces behind child soldier use. Separating the correlates of war from the correlates of youth combatants can be somewhat sticky; nonetheless, researchers have proposed quite a number of independent variables that appear as underlying factors that potentially tip the scale towards child soldier use. The primary focus has been on weak states/poverty, militarization, globalization and the tactical function.

The first, and overarching, theme in the literature is the premise that weak states provide fertile terrain for child soldier recruitment. When a weak state is pulled into armed conflict, multiple variables increase the likelihood that youths will volunteer, or will be forcefully recruited, to fight. Poverty, according to Woods (1993), Machel (1996), Cohn & Goodwin-Gill (1994), Brett, McCallin & O’Shea (1996), Barnitz (1997), Sesay and Ismail (2003), Twum-Danso (2003), Singer (2006) and Wessells (2002, 2006), creates the environment whereby children lose the security of the state, and either see fighting and the shelter of an insurgent group as more socially and/or economically reliable, or are made more vulnerable to coercion and compulsory conscription. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994) assert that for many young soldiers, volunteering is the rational
choice, an attempt to “counter children’s feelings of helplessness, vulnerability and frustration” (p. 31). This is not to say that children are fully exercising their free will, but rather that they are making a rational choice that is severely constrained by structural variables such as poverty. Woods (1993) found that some parents in Burma were sending their children to fight for the Karen Army because “it provides clothes and two meals a day” (p. 18). And even if press-ganged into service by armed groups in countries such as Ethiopia, El Salvador, Burma/Myanmar or Liberia, children still might view the situation as favorable: “In situations of deprivation, the gun…can become an entry point to food and survival (Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996).

Historical analysis and ground-level interviews with children have demonstrated that poverty certainly can influence their decision-making—to fight or not to fight. However, studies by Achvarina & Reich (2006) and Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, & Rustad (2007), which provide quantitative analyses of child soldier recruitment, find only a partial correlation with poverty rates. Achvarina & Reich’s (2006) study of 19 intrastate African conflicts also disputes the claim that poverty might even have a threshold effect “because while richer countries may not use child soldier in intrastate conflict, child soldiers do not serve in all intrastate conflicts in poor countries” (p. 163). In their logit regression of 690 sub-national regions in 52 African countries from 1990-2004, Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, & Rustad (2007) show that poverty variables are generally insignificant except for some possible influence from high infant mortality rates, a variable that Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994) had previously identified as important to the child soldier equation.
Several other variables are bundled together in the weak state argument. According to Cohn & Goodwin-Gill (1994), Machel (1996) and Wessells (2002, 2006), a decrease in education and educational opportunities influences recruitment and volunteering. Machel (1996) draws a correlation between education and child soldiers from Afghanistan in the 1990s: “approximately 90 per cent of children now have no access to schooling, [and] the proportion of soldiers who are children is thought to have risen in recent years from roughly 30 to at least 45 per cent” (p. 16). Here, as with poverty, we see a costs/benefits framework at work. In Sri Lanka, “inadequate education,” says Cohn & Goodwin-Gill (1994), “can make the LTTE seem like a viable option” (p. 34); one that many insurgencies capitalize on by creating educational institutions of their own to cultivate children into soldiers. Lack of employment opportunities can also invoke a sense of despair and/or can turn fighting in armed conflict into a viable job option (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Sesay and Ismail 2003). In the decade-long Sierra Leonean civil war, “youth either joined pro-government or rebel factions because they perceived soldiering as an opportunity to earn a leaving in the absence of educational opportunities and the exiting limited economic prospects in the country” (Sesay and Ismail 2003, pp. 151-152). As a consequence, the social and economic ties that youth develop while as combatants can develop into solidified ways of being. Children, who may have had very little before entering an armed conflict, become empowered from securing their own livelihood in combat. Hence, jobs become important in persuading child soldiers to stop fighting (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994), and demobilization programs that forsake job skill development programs miss the long-term structural problems surrounding child soldiers.
(Mustapha 2006). In post-war Sierra Leone, boosting employment rates is, says Mustpha (2006), an imperative for the well-being of the child as well as the state: “A gainfully employed ex-combatant is less dangerous than an unemployed ex-combatant” (p. 66). The concern is that the cycle of war and child soldier use will be repeated, that youths will return back to an institution that offer more stability for them—thuggery or even armed conflict.

Vulnerability and expendability of the child are general themes imbedded in the child soldier discourse. Researchers have pointed to an increase in the orphan population (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Barnitz 1997; Twum-Danso 2003; Singer 2006; Wessels 2002 & 2006), or an increase in adult mortality (Machel 1996) as variables that encourage a decrease in defenses for children. Youths become less protected, less grounded, and more disposable. Orphans are seen as easy prey, victims of family disruption. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994) claim that in the 1980s, Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA) became a refuge for parentless children. Orphans can reclaim a “close-knit family structure” in insurgent or government armies (p. 35). Achvarina and Reich (2006) criticize the orphan correlation for being based largely on anecdotal evidence. They counter stating that there are numerous narratives “repeated elsewhere about parents shot dead for refusing to hand their children over to governmental or rebel forces. (p. 135)”; and that their regression analysis of African conflicts reveals no statistical correlation between orphan rates and child soldier recruitment rates.

Rosen (2005) refutes the general claim that children are used because of their vulnerability, citing the important role that many youth played in World War II. He
states: “Children and youth played a major role in partisan resistance against the Germans. They formed the core of the urban partisan units and were an important component of many forest partisan groups” (p. 21). The Lithuanian Division of ghetto fighters and partisans included about 300 people who were between the ages of 15-10. Rosen further supports his claim with two other case studies of Sierra Leonean and Palestinian youths. His research does not dispute the fact that many children are abducted and forced into military ranks, but it does undermine the thesis that the child victim is a causal force driving the recruitment of children.

It could be, proposes Singer (2005), that children are much more available for recruitment because youths are outnumbering adults. He points to an explosion in the youth population, especially in Africa, as a contributing factor. The fallout from an increase in more children is a larger labor pool (for illegal economies and/or fighting forces) to draw from as well as a decrease in the influence of older generations, who are now outnumbered. As a result, youths become less socially constrained: “the typical stabilizing influences of elders are lessened by the overall mass of youth. The lost youths are more easily harnessed into more pernicious activities that can lead to conflict” (p. 41). The role flip is from child as agent-victim to child as agent-perpetrator. This tips the balance in favor of cheap labor force that is more attuned to armed conflict. “With their ready availability and easy transformation into combatants, children now represent a low-cost way to mobilize and generate force” (p. 53).

The second theme in the child soldier literature is based on the idea that children are primed to fight, thanks to the proliferation of armed conflict globally. Many researchers suggest that there has been a widespread militarization of daily life (Cohn &
Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Wessells 2002 & 2006). War after war after war sets the stage for child soldier use, almost making battle a tradition in itself, one that sets less and less of a distinction between civilian and soldier (Singer 2006). Machel (1996) supports her position with state spending statistics, which, she argues, express just how militarized sub-Saharan Africa is:

…between 1960 and 1994, the proportion of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to military spending rose from 0.7 per cent to 2.9 per cent. The region’s military expenditure is now [in 1996] around $8 billion, despite the fact that 216 million people live in poverty (p. 71).

Militarization of all facets of life has produced a “moral vacuum,” states Machel, “a space in which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as soldiers” (p. 9). Children become caught up in a system of structural violence, wherein violence is the norm and in which revenge is acceptable (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Singer 2006). All-pervading militarization has also over-glorified war, such that children sometimes view fighting as prestigious, as a pathway to gaining their adult identity or at least as a way to relieve peer pressure (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Barnitz 1997; Singer 2006).

Even though these authors suggest that the militarization of daily life is part of a new war style, which is “far more brutal and criminalized” (Singer 2006, p. 38), the infusion of military ideology and discipline was apparent hundreds of years ago. In 17th century Europe militarization extended all the way down to the level of the child (Foucault 1979; Aries 1962). And, notes Rosen (2005), “military discipline was thought to have a particular kind of moral virtue” (p. 7). This image stands in contrast to today’s negative image of a victimized or inglorious child soldier. The addition of Rosen’s
historical analysis to the fieldwork of Machel and others does not mask the brutality of child soldiering, though. Rather, by revealing the lineage of the ennobling aspects of war, we gain a more complex understanding of the construction of norms surrounding war-fighters. Prestige, or revenge, may be the reason why children say they want to become soldiers, but they are not necessarily new rationales, nor causes.

Globalization is another modern era theme that previous studies have delineated as a culprit for child soldiering. Machel (1996) frames the entire problem as a result of global forces that exacerbate poverty: "countries caught up in conflict today are also under severe stress from a global world economy that pushes them even further towards the margins" (p.13). Globalization increases individualism and the pool of political entrepreneurs who capitalize on self-interest; and globalization leads to rapid urbanization, market-based values and the erosion of family values (Machel 1996). Honwana (2006) agrees, asserting that the world economy and structural adjustment programs have led to the “crisis of the postcolonial state” in Africa, where:

…inequalities have widened and livelihoods have become more insecure, straining and weakening the social fabric. Household and community capacities to nurture and protect the young have declined, and social norms and value system to protect children have weakened. This trend has resulted in the commodification of children and a revaluation that has induced an increase in child labor, including child soldiering (p. 46).

The global market is also pushing the proliferation of small arms, which, according to Machel (1996), Brett McCallin and O’Shea (1996), Singer 2005, Singer (2006), Barnitz (1997), Stohl, Schroeder and Smith (2007), is enabling insurgents, helping them make soldiers out of children. The theory is based on the premise that there are hundreds of small arms producers and millions of guns in the world. The Small Arms Survey (2001) estimates that in the 1980s there were 196 legitimate small arms companies and by 2000
that number had increased to 600 companies worldwide (p. 11). The global production of military-style small arms (excluding the United States production) from 1980-1999 totaled more than 43 million new weapons (p.13). This flood of small arms has spread throughout Asia, Africa, South America, and so forth. AK-47 assault rifles from Russia, three million rounds of ammunition from Egypt and 20,000 rifle grenades from South Africa all entered into Rwanda and were utilized during the 1994 genocide (pp. 206-207). The small arms are not only increasing the likelihood of armed conflict but are also changing the dynamics of soldiering: “The ready availability of simple-to-operate lightweight automatic weapons has transformed the capacity of children to serve as combatants on something approaching an equal footing with adults” (Brett, McCallin and O’Shea, p. 11). The small arms proliferation equation is: an easy-to-carry, easy-to-fire, deadly weapon, plus an easily coerced child, equals a plethora of new under-aged troops.

Both Rosen (2005) and Achvarina and Reich (2006) challenge the small arms hypothesis, however. The AK-47, says Rosen, has been around since 1949 and was used by liberation groups well before the child soldier “crisis” occurred. And the weight of the AK-47 (9 pounds, 7 ounces) is about one pound more than the U.S. rifle musket (8.88 pounds) used in the American Civil War. The Civil War South carried British Enfield rifles that weighed less than 9 pounds, and Sharps carbine rifle was about 8 pounds (pp. 14-15). Rosen adds that child soldiers are lugging around much heavier weapons today, such as fighters for Hizbollah who carry anti-tank weapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), which weigh just over 15 pounds (Gander 1998, pp. 354-355). Achvarina and Reich (2006) question the “ease of handling” suggestion for small arms, many of which have a strong recoil action; and oftentimes, children are not given guns, but perform a
multitude of non-battlefield tasks, including cooking and carrying supplies. Finally, Achvarina and Reich (2006) discuss the problem of operationalizing the small arms variable for a quantitative analysis. They state that global data on small arms is incomplete and therefore cannot be utilized to the small arms hypothesis: "Figures on this trade are difficult to obtain and notoriously unreliable; they fail to take into account indirect transfers through neighboring countries by rebel force purchases, and tend to omit long-term transfers resulting from past proxy wars" (p. 137). Consequently, past studies on child soldiers (Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Singer 2005; Singer 2006; Barnitz 1997; Stohl, Schroeder and Smith 2007) provide evidence from history, interviews, and general statistics about small arms production, but none test the small arms variable at the large-N level.

A fourth area of child soldier research examines the tactical aspects of the practice. The focus here is on how child soldier use might be needed by armed groups and the advantages that young soldiers might provide. The most prevalent factor singled out is that child soldier use is about troop shortages and maximizing recruitment (Woods 1993); Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Twum-Danso 2003; Singer 2006; Wessells 2002 & 2006; Blattman 2007). Woods’ (1993) study is one of the earliest to single out “manpower shortages” as a causal influence. Quite simply, she saw it as “the temptation to kidnap children to fill quotas” (p. 9). The need for people to fight is apparent, according to (Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996) in armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma/Myanmar, Guatemala, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Sudan and Former Yugoslavia. The underlying rationale is that children are easy to recruit, a “low-cost way for armed forces to generate force” (Singer
2006, p. 95). And the amount of power that these troop additions can generate is significant: “Any organization willing to use children as fighters will usually be able to field a force well beyond what they would be able to do without them. With this, the balance of potential forces in a war is shifted” (p. 95). Blattman (2007) tests the troop maximizer hypothesis in his case study of the Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. Interviews with 462 abducted male youth led Blattman to conclude that children are recruited when the benefits far outweigh the costs. He states, “armed groups with few or limited resources forcibly recruit young adolescents because they offer the optimal combination of effectiveness and ease of retention” (p. 3). More specific findings include:

1. “military effectiveness seems to increase in age”; the younger the child the less likely to have a gun;
2. material costs between having adults or having children in ranks is basically equal;
3. “the retention of children was much greater”; greater than twice as long;
4. children were “more easily indoctrinated, terrified and disoriented than adults”;
5. the ideal target age was 14-16 (p. 2).

Blattman’s study is one of the few that closely examines the motivations of opposition groups. Most research looks at the larger structural influences and the child’s point of view. Even though Blattman draws data from the experiences of the children in Uganda, we do get a deeper glimpse into what an insurgent force (the Lord’s Resistance Army) might be thinking. The shortcoming is that his research is a single case study of one of the most aggressive and brutal insurgencies. Known for its kidnappings of thousands of children and its battlefield brutality, Joseph Kony’s LRA represents a low moral threshold, a group that has had no problem in violating international law. Hence the costs for this type of group might start out at a much lower level than other groups, such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK have used children in their ranks,
however, their striving for statehood might possibly increase the costs involved in the child soldier use equation. Nevertheless, Blattman’s findings offer a finer explanation for troop shortages.

Achvarina and Reich (2006) approach the recruitment issue from a different angle. They advocate looking beyond structural variables, especially if we want to formulate policy from their findings. Their key variable, one that is a new addition to the literature, is access to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Achvarina and Reich argue that rebel groups are more likely to recruit children when they are readily available, via refugee camps. The emphasis, they say, should be on supply and not demand. The study runs multiple regressions on 19 cases of intrastate African conflicts from 1975-2002 and analyzes to Liberian conflicts. Their main finding is that there is little correlation with structural variables, specifically poverty and orphan rates, but access to refugee camps is significantly related to child soldier recruitment ratios. They conclude that “…large numbers of children congregated together in easily identifiable locations, if left unprotected, make an easy target as recruits for belligerents” (p. 163). The quantitative data coupled with two crucial case studies is convincing, but it should be noted that Achvarina and Reich’s (2006) study is limited in scope. They study only African armed conflicts. Expanding the database to include armed conflicts and refugee camps worldwide would strengthen their conclusions. But even if they did find similar results for all rebel groups, there would still be the problem: Why do governments recruit child soldiers?

The idea that child soldier use is a tactical innovation might help answer why governments recruit underage youth. Answering the question, though, must begin with an
exploration of the broader strategy of gaining an advantage with children. The tactical advantage approach has been touched on in the literature, but it is has not been thoroughly tested. Twum-Danso (2003), Honwana (2006), Singer (2006, 2007) and Wessells (2002, 2006), acknowledge the tactical qualities of child soldier use. For Honwana (2006), “the creation of child soldiers does not constitute an isolated, random incident. Child soldiering is part of a warfare strategy that is shared across lines of combat and war zones…what happened to children during the wars in Cambodia, Uganda, and Sierra Leone and what happened in Mozambique and Angola are very striking” (p. 44). In “New Children of Terror,” Singer (2007) states that terrorists recruit children for both strategic and tactical reasons. He offers evidence from both the Irish Republican Army and Palestinian groups. Using children was strategic during the Intifadas, because it brought international attention to the Palestinian cause through television images of children burning tires and throwing Molotov cocktails. Pulling youth into the battle zone was strategic for Palestinians in that it preyed on the opposition’s moral vulnerability:

Israeli troops had a standing order to not shoot live ammunition against children under the age of twelve. So Palestinian gunmen began to work in tandem with the children, using their efforts to draw out Israeli troops as well as provide a screen for sniping (p. 108)

Earlier child soldier research looked at broad guerilla strategy; Machel (1996) and Brett, McCallin and O’Shea (1996) and Høiskar (2001) honed in on the duration of a conflict, suggesting that it that might be a cause and effect dynamic with strategic implications. The longer the armed conflict went on, the greater the need for more troops (i.e. children), and, the more children were involved, the longer the conflict dragged on. The need for more troops is about recruit maximization; however, the concept of lengthening
the war becomes about developing an advantage. This observation aligns with Mao’s concept of protracted war and how to defeat an army far superior than your own. Lengthening the war helps the insurgents gain a psychological edge over the more powerful opposition, draining their resources and will far beyond what was expected. McCallin and O’Shea (1996) also noticed that governments were reacting to child soldier use by rebel forces. Traces of a tactical interaction started to emerge: “the recruitment of children into armed opposition groups often fuels under-age recruitment into government armed forces and vice versa” (p. 4).

**Methodology**

This study is grounded in the tactical function/child soldier use relationship. Previous child soldier studies have provided an abundance of testable variables, but I argue that tactical advantages and innovations is the next arena that needs exploring. My methodology is based on a further examination of the theoretical schools that the literature has supported so far—either structure, rational choice, culture —and of the methods utilized. I begin with Lichbach and Zuckerman’s (1997a; 1997b) and Lichbach’s (2003) discussions on comparative politics research.

In “Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politic: An Introduction,” Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997b) suggest that in order to progress an area of study in comparative politics, it is important to understand the theory-base of the past literature for that area of study. If you analyze the underlying assumptions of the research, you can recognize the strategies employed by the researcher(s), which will then reveal what has been ignored or unexplored. These assumptions can affect the level of analysis utilized as
well as the types of models created. The ontology of the researcher, argues Lichbach (2003), sets the foundation for, limits the framework of, the object of study—be it civil war, democratization, or child soldiers. This approach introduces meta-analysis into literature reviews, realizing that even though the political scientist strives for objectivity in her/his work, she/he influences the possible answers to the social problem well-before the drafting of the research design.

To comprehend the effects of researcher ontology, Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997b) break comparative politics into three schools of thought: structure, rational choice, culture. Structuralists tend to be realists who study how different types of structures contain causal processes and dynamics. They “explore relations among actors in an institutional context” (Lichbach 2003, p. 19), how structures create outcomes and shape actor behavior. They often take a typology approach to comparison and try to tie descriptions to generalizations. Faults of an approach grounded in structure include: an iron cage determinism, an absence of agency, and, as a consequence, the notion of volunteerism. For child soldier research, poverty and infant mortality rate variables fit within a structuralist framework (See, for example, Woods 1993; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Barnitz 1997; Twum-Danso 2003; Singer 2006; Achvarina, Vera., R. Nordás, G. Østby, and S. Rustad 2007). The strength of this approach is that it considers the global social forces that might pre-determine a child’s vulnerability to recruitment. The drawback of structure-based work is that it might ignore the agency of the child, even when the child makes it clear that they chose to become a soldier. When Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994) find evidence of children volunteering to fight, they are not convinced that these youths are agents of their free
will. They argue that children might not have the “cognitive capacity” to assess abstract ideas such as “nation and “having a cause” (p. 35). While it is important to view the evidence with an eye of complexity, Cohn and Goodwin-Gill risk skewing their findings with the iron cage determinism that Lichbach (2003) warns of.

Rationalists frame social dynamics within a world of rational individuals, studying “how actors employ reason to satisfy their interests” (Lichbach 2003, p. 19). Rational choice is about actors maximizing their advantage. The analysis begins at the individual level and moves to ideas about collective actions, choices and also institutions (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997b). Rationalists look for universal laws for behavior. Its positivist method lends rigor to its arguments, but it can also become too dependent on materialism and thereby miss cultural influences and differences. Other faults of rational choice include: losing value and context, an overemphasis on action (over structure), and a mechanical-behavioral view of subjectivity (Lichbach 2003). Blattman’s work with child soldiers in Liberia is explicitly a rational choice approach. After interviewing 462 abducted male youths in Northern Uganda, he finds that:

Rebel leaders have an incentive to recruit any civilians that are expected to yield some military benefit. Since rebel groups are constrained in their resources and their ability to monitor and manage a force, however, they will tend to target those civilians that are expected to offer the highest net benefits—an amount determined largely by their military value, their cost of recruitment and maintenance, and their likelihood of desertion (p. 1).

Blattman continues on to universalize from his single case study, stating: “any theory of child soldiering is in essence a collection of hypotheses about relative military effectiveness, cost, and ease of retention of children versus adults” (p. 13). While his rational choice explanations may seem concrete and parsimonious, they ignore the influence of norms and social prohibitions involved in the issue. Why was the Lord’s
Resistance Army willing to break cultural taboos and force children to fight? This is not the recruiting practice of the English armed forces. Is it merely a matter of altering the cost/benefit ratio? If we lower the costs for the English, will they too abduct children? And even if this is plausible, why are there norms against child soldier use? Lichbach’s (2003) remarks about rational choice losing value and context are pertinent to Blattman’s work; not to diminish his findings but to realize that it is only a partial picture of the child soldier phenomenon.

The third school of thought—culture—focuses on norms, values, beliefs and identities. Culturalists are interpretivists who provide nuanced, detailed readings of social dynamics. They examine the “webs of significance” (Geertz 1973, p. 5), looking for the “rules that constitute individual and group identities” (Lichbach 2003, p. 19). The emphasis is on meaning and how it shapes social/political behavior. Faults of the culture approach include: the potential for tautological explanations and/or deterministic conclusions, and an over-reliance on the unobservable—even preferred over the visible. The militarization of daily variable in child soldier research emanates from culture point of view. It is the notion that when a society is heavily infused with the signs and symbols and practices of war, it is more likely to produce child soldiers. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994) read the rituals of the Tamil Tigers as all about creating a military culture deep within the educational system:

The Sri Lankan LTTE has been known to broadcast Rambo-like TV movies of live combat training and actual combat, parade young soldier units before school children as they emerge from classes, conduct military training inside school grounds, and give talks at schools about the need for soldiers to man all the guns they have…Tamil children spend one or two hours per day out of school digging bunkers, a form of ‘militarized civic duty’ and are eventually asked to join the LTTE. (p. 31).
Clearly, we see evidence of a methodical indoctrination process. Added to this is a government response to the LTTE insurgencies, which includes police and soldiers patrolling the streets and numerous checkpoints.

But how does this cultivation of a military culture differ from Israel’s or the United States’? There are numerous armed checkpoints in Israel, military personnel pervade the cities, and citizens are required to serve in the armed forces. The only difference might be the age at which citizens are incorporated into the fighting. Israel has generally not violated international child soldier laws whereas many Palestinian groups have. In the United States, there is also a heavy infusion of militarization, even for the young. Beyond G. I. Joe action figures, Nerf N-Strike Longshot CS-6 rapid-fire dart guns, and Transformer action moves, we find the U.S. Army building an “educational” facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Army Experience Center (AEC) is located at the Franklin Mills Mall. Inside the 14,500 square foot complex, there is a gaming arena with 79 gaming stations, featuring X-box 360 and Alienware. Visitors “can play the latest, most popular gaming titles, go head-to-head in tournaments, or just enjoy an afternoon as a virtual soldier” (U.S. Army 2010). The AEC also has several simulators that visitors can use—a Black Hawk helicopter, an Apache helicopter and an armored HMMWV. All three include simulated weapons. In addition to Army recruiters being on hand in the facility, there is a gift shop that sells Army-branded goods. The AEC does not allow small children to use the games or the simulators, though; it sets an age limit of 13 years or older. The AEC is an example of how the militarization of daily life unfolds in the United States; despite this, the United States does not use child
soldiers. The Israelis and U.S. examples might show that the militarization of daily life variable is overly deterministic; and this potential for an error in logic might be a weakness that the culture approach produced.

In an effort to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of child soldier research, the following table (Table 1) sorts work the authors, according to the most salient comparative politics theoretical approach implicit in their studies. The categories are structure, rational choice and culture. There are three additional columns for research that balances two of the approaches. Note that several studies appear in multiple columns because they have independent variables that fit in different schools of thought.

As shown by the groupings in Table 1, the preponderance of research sits in the structure-rational choice realm. Much of this work views structure as creating an environment wherein child soldier use becomes a rational, cost/benefit dynamic. It is a dialectical relationship with structural variables encouraging rational choice variables and rational choice variables reinforcing structural variables. For example, a weak educational system increases the appeal of volunteering and fighting for change; fighting becomes a worthy pursuit. The result is more armed conflict. More armed conflict further destroys the state and its ability to deliver education, even after the conflict is over. The result is former youth combatants become further disillusioned with the state and potentially turn to conflict again as a rational choice for affecting change. Wessells’ (2002) ecological framework of macro-level and micro-level risk factors for child soldiering epitomizes the dialectical quality as well.
The rational choice-only approach is heavily represented in the field of child soldier research. Early work (Woods 1993) introduced the cost and benefits mindset and later studies (Blattman’s 2007) fine-tuned their theories with findings that supported this point of view. The structure- and culture-only positions are ever-present in the child soldier literature as well, and include the same basic set of social researchers. What is most notable, though, is that there are little-to-no bridges between culture and the other
two schools of thought. Only Rosen (2005), who blends culture and structure, has made a connection. Because the child soldier phenomenon is partly about norms, about the transition from childhood to adulthood and about at what age it is acceptable to kill others in conflict, it is surprising to see very few studies not including cultural factors in their models. One goal of this project will be to address this disconnect. Child soldier research so far has obviously found that structure and rational choice have a strong influence on the phenomenon. Culture should now be pulled more deeply into the equation so that it can intertwine with structure and rational choice. Exploring the child soldier problem with all three schools of thought might minimize the faults embedded in each ontology. The result hopefully will be a richer explanation for why child soldier use occurs.

A second approach to methodological decision-making is proposed by David Laitin (2002) in “Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline.” Laitin advocates for what he describes as the emergent methodological “consensus” of the 21st century, a “tripartite” approach that blends statistical studies, with formal model making, with a narrative approach. Unlike Lichbach and Zuckerman’s (1997b) and Lichbach’s (2003) emphasis on paradigms within the discipline, Laitin concentrates on methods. First he highlights the utility of statistics, saying that it is about finding similarities across a large number of units. Statistical analysis is valuable for questions that revolve around propensity, and for testing the explanatory power of variables. Second, Laitin describes formal models, saying that they are for developing an internally consistent logic to the relationship between variables in order to make causal stories more “coherent and noncontradictory” (p. 631). Once the model is fine tuned, says Laitin, the researcher can move on to statistical analysis. Finally, narrative methods are about tracing histories and
theorizing “the translation of values on independent variables onto values on dependent variables” (p. 631). Narratives are useful for questions of process and for describing/analyzing outliers and anomalies.

After parsing the discipline up into three methods, Laitin presents literature reviews for three variables—democracy, order and capitalism—and places each study into a category of either works that use statistical analysis, or works that develop formal models, or works that use narratives. By dividing past research up by methods used, Laitin argues that the researcher builds an inventory of what is known about the variables and outcomes. With this inventory, the researcher can then visualize where the gaps in knowledge are for the subject being studied. Ultimately Laitin is arguing for a cross-fertilization of methods in order to fill those gaps. In the end, this may entail either conducting a study using a single method that is lacking in the literature, or possibly mixing methods in a single project.

In the tradition of Laitin (2002), I have parsed the child soldier literature according to statistics, formal models and narratives (See Table 2). What becomes most apparent with the Laitin categorization of the child soldier literature is that narratives are the dominant method. Only two studies have utilized statistical analysis (Achvarina & Reich 2006; Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, and Rustad 2007) and only one article (Wessells 2002) begins to develop a complex (but not quite formal) model to describe the social phenomenon. In “Recruitment of Children as Soldiers in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Ecological Analysis,” Wessells (2002) formulates an ecological systems framework to model the risk factors that increase the likelihood of children volunteering or being forcibly recruited for armed conflict. His system incorporates both macro-level
Table 2: Child Soldier Research Grouped By Methods Utilized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Formal Models</th>
<th>Narratives</th>
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(for example, oppression, militarization, ideology and armed conflict) and micro-level (for example, separation from family, poor education, crime, ethnic conflict) risk factors.

Wessells model is comprehensive however it does not extend into the formal model arena of mathematical representation. The overall lack of formal models in child soldier research might be due to the fact that child soldier recruitment rates are difficult to attain. The field does not have hard numbers, which would become essential for gauging the predictive power of formal models.
This study addresses the lopsidedness in methods in the child soldier literature. Similar to past work, narratives remain integral to analyzing and assessing the problem and will be included throughout. I will also utilize statistical analysis since the phenomenon is in part a question involving propensity. Finally, a model, akin to Wessells’ (2002) is presented based on the tactical functions of child soldier use. The aim is to move towards Laitin’s (2002) proposition of cross-fertilization.

The overarching methodology, combines Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997b), Lichbach (2003) and Laitin (2002). Because previous work on child soldier use has been more pointed, focusing on specific case(s) and utilizing only a particular method (mostly qualitative), this study tries to perform a robust testing on the question: Why do groups use children as soldiers in armed conflict? The study combines four different methods: a large-N regression analysis, an historical analysis, a social network analysis, and a single case study. Chapter 3 takes a structuralist approach, executing a binomial multinomial regression analysis of key structural variables emphasized in past literature. The goal is to test the hypothesis: If there is a tactical need, then an armed group is more likely to use child soldiers. The analysis looks at all armed conflict from 1987-2007, coding for child soldier use per dyad. A dyad equals the government force plus an insurgency. Armed conflicts in this time span often have multiple insurgencies which is why the armed conflict was broken down into dyads. The binomial regression codes the dyad either as child soldier use occurring or not occurring. The multinomial regression codes the dyad according to different interactions within the dyad, such as government use only, insurgency use only, both sides using child soldiers, or no child soldier use. Again, the
goal is to test the idea of tactical need, and to see if there might be a tactical interaction occurring.

Chapter 4 and 5 focus on norms and the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003). With this culturalist approach, I will incorporate historical narratives, and will model the social network of insurgency education and training, wherein child soldier use norms have been diffused. (The model will not extend into mathematical representation though, as it would be out of the range of the findings.) The historical analysis examines the last 200 years, searching for socio-historical forces that might have set the stage, or created the environment, for child soldier use in the 20th century. Because child soldier use involves children, there is a moral component that needs to be addressed. Global cultural norms deem the instrumental use of children in war as unacceptable. The regression analysis cannot answer this line of questions. Hence the historical analysis is utilized to address this component of the problem, asking: Why would insurgencies and governments be willing to cross a widespread cultural norm that prohibits using children in war? Why cross that moral boundary? After sifting through the history and uncovering social forces that might potential make the moral boundary less rigid, more malleability, further historical analysis is executed to see where the practice of child soldier use as tactical need emanates. Where does it begin?

Of course, once the root case of child soldier use is discovered, more questions arise. After all, just because one group using children in war, does not mean that further groups will pick up the practice. But, in fact, more and more insurgencies did, which is why a social network analysis is performed in Chapter 5. The question confronted by the analysis is: Once the practice of child soldier use manifests, how it diffuse throughout the
world. I hypothesize that one potential pathway that the tactical innovation spreads is through a global terrorist network that developed in the 1970s and 1980s. The global terrorist network became a communication network linked by terrorist conferences, meetings and centers of learning, and it was through these lines of communication that the child soldier tactic evolved and spread.

Chapter 6 presents the final analysis, which is framed by rational choice. It is a single case study of the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). Because the object of study is a tactic—a phenomenon that takes place at the ground-level between people—a micro-level analysis is needed. The single case study fulfills that need, building a model of child soldier use based upon evidence from fieldwork conducted in Sierra Leone (ethnography and interviews with former child soldiers, members of the military, members of the opposition forces, civilians and government officials). The underlying assumption is that children are used as soldiers because the benefits outweigh the costs. Here, the dependent variable becomes the independent variable and the hypothesis tested is: If child soldier use, then an increase in political opportunities. The aim of the single case study is to understand more fully what might be happening at the individual level.

Chapters 3-6 are an attempt to interlace ontologies and methods. However, the does not assume to cover all facets of the problem. The goal is to activate multiple social science techniques of inquiry, to bring in as many tools as is necessary to understand the phenomenon. Each chapter poses a different question which follows from the findings in the previous chapter. Each method is additive and complimentary. Given the multiple explanations and variables produced so far, the problem of child soldier use warrants such a complex methodology.
One special note: this project is only testing the use of boy child soldiers. The use of girls in armed conflict is a separate and very complicated issue that incorporates issues and gender and culture far beyond the scope of this project. Omitting girls from the equation is by no means meant to lessen the importance of the dynamic.
Chapter 3: Structure and Tactical Need

Post World War II armed conflict has occurred in a variety of forms: intrastate, interstate, extrasystemic, or internationalized political violence. Whether the battle takes place within the state, between two states, against the state but outside its borders, or with multiple state and non-state groups, the goal is to weaken the state. Contemporary armed conflict is, in effect, about weakening the state or creating state failure, about forcing the “complete or partial collapse of state authority” (King and Zeng 2001, p. 623). Armed conflict is a strategy for decreasing the ability of the nation-state to “deliver positive political goods to their people” (Rotberg 2002, p. 85). We know that a state is failing when we observe: a) “the transformation of the state into an instrument of predation” and b) “a loss of the monopoly over the means of coercion” (Bates 2008, p. 2). The goal of opposition forces (i.e. rebel groups or other states) is to usurp the state, or at least to compel the state to yield authority temporarily, and to accumulate state power. When armed conflict occurs, groups utilize different tactics for causing state failure. States with large militaries depended heavily on large-scale force when attacking other groups or states. Smaller insurgencies often rely on more pinpointed actions. Sometimes it is brute force, but other times the action involves a psychological component that tries to leverage a smaller cache of force. In January of 2010, the Taliban blew up schools in northwest Pakistan (Agence France Presse 2010). The goal appears to be to destroy the state’s ability to provide the “positive political good” of education to its citizens and to women in particular. I argue that child soldier use is a similar tactic for gaining leverage and weakening the state. It is one method for maximizing an armed group’s power.

11 The State Failure Task Force takes a less qualitative approach and defines state failure as: “instances in which state authority collapses for several years” (Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Surko and Unger 1995, p. 1).
Taking the tactical approach to the problem necessarily implies a rational choice perspective. But, in the case of child soldier use, weighing costs and benefits and maximizing utility emanates from antecedent structural pressures. Structural variables increase the likelihood that child soldier use will become a rational choice. So, if we examine the problem first through a structural lens, we can start to answer why child soldier use has become a tactic of choice, and why it might be seen by an opposition group as necessary. Later we can move on to the rational choice motivates that develop. As stated earlier, only two pieces of research (Achvarina & Reich 2006; Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, and Rustad 2007) have pulled structural variables such as poverty through the rigors of regression analysis. Achvarina & Reich (2006) and Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, and Rustad (2007) have also broadened the scope of child soldier research to all of Africa. Granted, other studies have made claims about the regional and global structural causes of child recruitment, but only Achvarina & Reich (2006) and Achvarina, Nordås, Østby, and Rustad (2007) have backed up their generalizations with large-N analysis. Here, I am taking the next step, expanding the scope beyond Africa and into the international realm, and conducting a large-N analysis.

**Testing the Need for a Tactic**

Why use children as soldiers? What compels a group (an insurgency or another state) to turn the young into combatants? In order to answer these questions, I compiled a database for examining incidences of child soldier use in armed conflicts that occurred between 1987-2007. The 20-year timeframe was chosen because the phenomenon is not considered a prominent social problem until the late 1970s. The Friends World

The armed conflict sample is drawn UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2008). The dataset defines armed conflict as “at least 25 battle deaths per year and per dyad,” with the conflict involving a government and at least one opposition group (Harbom et al 2008, p. 3). Government, according to UCDP/PRIO, means “the party controlling the capital of a state” and the opposition is “any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility…The focus is on armed conflict involving consciously conducted and planned political campaigns rather than spontaneous violence” (p. 4). Armed conflict is chosen over war in order to capture the more numerous occurrences of political violence that have happened in the
20-year timeframe. The Correlates of War database, which sets the battle death threshold at 1,000, lists about 30 wars up until 1997 (Sarkees 2000), whereas UCDP/PRIO dataset of armed conflict provides a sample size of 122 armed conflicts could be coded for child soldier use.

Because the focus is on tactical functions and tactical interactions, armed conflicts are broken down further to establish the main unit of analysis, that of: dyads. The assumption is that insurgencies and other groups use (or do not use) child soldiers in reaction to state behavior, and that state’s use (or do not use) child soldiers in response to the behavior of the opposition. Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen (2008) note that the dyadic level offers a far more detailed view of the dynamics of armed conflict. They also find that there has been an increase in the number of dyads within armed conflict. Before the mid-1970s, “only around 10% of all active conflicts in any given year consisted of multiple dyads” (p. 702), but that number increased in over the next two decades, reaching up to eight dyads within one conflict in Afghanistan in 1984. Dyads are utilized in this study as a means to acknowledge and account for a range of behaviors that might occur with different dyads and child soldier use. A dyad:

...consists of two conflicting primary parties. At least one of the primary parties must be the government of a state. In interstate conflicts, both primary parties are state governments. In intrastate and extrasystemic conflicts, the non-governmental primary party includes one or more opposition organization(s). A conflict can include more than one dyad. If e.g. a government is opposed by three rebel groups over the same incompatibility, the conflict is made up of three dyads. Note that secondary parties (i.e. intervening states supplying troops to one of the primary parties) do not lead to the formation of additional dyads (Harbom et al 2008, p. 5).

An example of an armed conflict with multiple dyads is in Myanmar, where the government battled seven different groups—the Karen National Union (KNU), God’s Army, the All-Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Rohingya Solidarity
Organization (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the Beik Mon Army (BMA). Past child soldier research usually takes armed conflict as the unit of analysis, but dyads are chosen here to account for possible variations amongst different groups. An armed conflict may have children on the battlefield, but to which group(s) they belong varies. The initial dyad sample, before coding for child soldiers and multiple independent variables, is 358.

The core hypothesis for the regression analysis is: If there is an increase in tactical need, then there is an increase in the likelihood of child soldier use. Tactical need is when an insurgency or a state is compelled to add onto its repertoire of fighting tactics. Tactical need is a concept that will be broken down into three separate independent variables. The dependent variable is child soldier use. It denotes one facet of the armed conflict process, which includes an agent (the child) and an historical event (use). The definition for child soldier use follows the guidelines laid out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Cape Town Principles. A child soldier is anyone fifteen years old or younger (United Nations 1989, Article 38), “who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms” (UNICEF 1997, p. 12). Even though most child soldier research chooses 18 years of age as the cut off point, a fifteen-years-of-age limit seems more appropriate given the potential for cultural variations in the childhood-to-adulthood transition (Archard 1993). Secondly, the international norm of 18 years of age is not solidified until 2000 with the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (United Nations 2000). Before the optional protocol a state, an insurgency or any other group might argue that a sixteen-year-old combatant, while not desirable in the eyes of the international community, might still fit within the guidelines laid out in 1989 in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.\footnote{The Convention declares: "States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest" (United Nations 1989, Art. 38, 3).} As for what children do in armed conflict, the broader Cape Town Principles capture the complexity of youth on the battlefield. It would be false to limit the definition adult soldiers to only those who carry guns, especially when “troops” includes cooks and logistical support. Hence the same framework should be applied to children as well. Also, child soldier researchers and advocacy groups following these guidelines when recording child soldier use.

The Variables

The child soldier use variable is approached in two ways.\footnote{See Appendix A for the Codebook listing detailed definitions and explanation for all of the variables assembled in the database.} It is converted into a dichotomous variable (0=no; 1=yes) and into a four-pronged categorical variable:

1 = Side A only (government only)
2 = Side B only
3 = Both Side A and Side B
4 = No child soldiers used in dyad

The dichotomous version is utilized in the initial regression analysis. Once the results of the model are established, the categorical variable is incorporated along with significant independent variables in order to uncover finer dynamics within the dyads.
The independent variable—tactical need—is divided into 3 dimensions: severity of the armed conflict, state militarization, and state terror. Three hypotheses are drawn from these dimensions.

H1: If an increase in the severity of the armed conflict, then an increase in the likelihood of child soldier use.

The severity hypothesis is based on the premise that the longer and bloodier the battle, the greater the resource exhaustion and the greater the need for more fighters and more ingenious methods for fighting. Child soldiers become a means for fulfilling that need. If the strategy of the opposition is protracted war, then child combatants might help extend the conflict. The severity of armed conflict variable is measured by intensity of the battle (Harbom et al 2008, p. 10), broken down into a dichotomous variable of Minor armed conflict (25-999 battle deaths per year) and War (1,000 or more battle deaths per year). Severity is also measured by duration of the armed conflict, translated into number of months that the fighting lasted. Even though we might assume that the longer the war (duration), the greater the number of total battle deaths, there is not necessarily a relationship between duration and intensity (See Lacina 2006), which is why both measures are incorporated into the model.

H2: If an increase in state militarization, then an increase in the likelihood of child soldier use.

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14 “State” represents Side A in the conflict. When two states are fighting, one state is labeled as Side A in the UCDP/PRIO dataset: “Side A is by definition always a primary party to the conflict. In internal conflicts, side A is always the government side, it is one of the sides in interstate conflicts and the colonial state in extrasystemic conflicts (Harbom et al 2008, p. 8).”
Militarization has four separate measures based on power, and the idea of a culture of violence. When an opposition group perceives the state as having the preponderance of might, it will respond by creating numerous alternate tactics to counter the imbalance of power. Sheer power is expressed in tanks, troops and military spending.\textsuperscript{15} States with superior war technology, lots of human resources and exorbitant war spending habits may be seen as unbeatable on their terms, in which case psychological approaches, such as child soldiers, become viable options. The tank is chosen a marker for war technology as Ripley (2003) remarks, in the 1940s, these armoured and armed vehicles “emerged as significant weapons in land warfare…Tank, along with aircraft, missiles and the atom bomb, symbolized a new era of mechanized and industrialized warfare, where a nation’s technological prowess and potential was now decisive” (pp. 7-8). The mobile weaponry is not only considered agile and deadly, but also extremely intimidating, “spreading terror and chaos in its wake” (p. 14). Unlike fighter jets, tanks would be the face-to-face foe that could easily trample an adult soldier. If children are placed in front of a tank, though, the strength of the weapons system might be diminished when confronted by a moral dilemma. For the regression, tanks is converted into a dichotomous measure expressed as either 10 or less tanks held by the state, or 11 or more tanks in their arsenal ($0 = \leq 10; 1= >10$). With more than ten tanks a state becomes a formidable force in land warfare.\textsuperscript{16} Troops represents the human resource potential for the state. More state manpower calls for, in the very least, a maximization of troops by the

\textsuperscript{15} Data for these measures is pulled from \textit{The Military Balance}, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985-2008).
\textsuperscript{16} Tanks will also be tested using a raw count for the number of tanks a state has to ensure that the dichotomous approach does not gloss over the potential effect.
opposition. The troops variable is the raw number of troops held by a state, converted by logarithmic transformation to account for potential skewing. Military expenditures expresses how much money a state spends on their armed forces and is another indication of the power the opposition must overcome. Finally, military expenditures as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) conveys to what degree a state invests its public goods in armed conflict. Military expenditures per GDP also provides a qualitative glimpse into the kind of society the state is producing. The idea here is that the greater the percentage of spending, the increase in the potential for a culture of violence within the state.

H$_3$: If an increase in state terror, then an increase in the likelihood of child soldier use.

State terror is the third dimension of tactical need. It is measured according to the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Wood & Cornet 2008), which gauges the amount of political violence and terror that occurs in a state in a year. The scale has five levels with “1” representing a state “under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.” At the other end, “5,” we see that “[T]error has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.” When examining child soldier use, the Political Terror Scale helps determine to what degree the state is steeped in violence, the degree to which it exercises its monopoly of coercion. The scale also helps delineate the moral boundaries of a state. If an insurgency or another state faces a government that is willing to resort to terror against its own citizens, it may make it more likely that terror, in the form of child
combatants, becomes a more acceptable fighting tactic. Possibly terror can only be defeated by terror; or, terror breeds terror.

Table 3: Dimensions of and Measures for the Tactical Need Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>Intensity (battle deaths; &gt; or &lt; 1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td>Tanks (number; &gt; or &lt; 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops (raw number; log trans.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Expenditures (raw number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Expenditure per GDP (percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terror</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale (1-5 degrees)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

Poverty is the most prevalent causal variable mentioned in child soldier research (See Woods 1993; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Brett McCallin and O’Shea 1996; Barnitz 1997; Twum-Danso 2003; Singer 2006; Singer 2007). However, only Achvarina, Vera, R. Nordås, G. Østby, and S. Rustad (2007) provide statistical support for the hypothesis that poverty might increase recruitment rates. They also find that in Africa, access to refugee camps has a stronger influence. They use infant mortality rates as a prime indicator of absolute poverty. Infant mortality rates (IMR) will also be used in this study as a control variable. IMR is defined as: “The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-
specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1,000 live births (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank & UNPD 2007, p. 10).” Two other measures will also be included—gross domestic product per capita (GDP pc) and the real gross domestic income (RGD Income). GDP pc data is drawn from the United Nations’ *National Accounts Main Aggregates Database* (2009), looking at the year prior to the onset of the armed conflict. The RGD Income data is extracted from the *Penn World Table, Version 6.3* (Heston, Summers and Aten (2009) and is defined as: “the 1996 international price value of domestic absorption of a country in a given year plus current exports minus current imports deflated by the deflator and the 1996 PPP of domestic absorption.” (Heston, Summers & Aten 2008, p. 20). Again, measure is chosen according to the year before onset of the armed conflict.\(^{17}\) In addition to their testing of absolute poverty, Achvarina, Vera, R. Nordås, G. Østby, and S. Rustad (2007) also provide measure for relative poverty, assuming that relative deprivation might boost child soldier recruitment in African countries. Gurr (1970) has argued that relative deprivation, or the “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” (p. 37), might be a precondition for political violence. Child soldier researchers (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994); Machel 1996; Singer 2007) have identified lack of educational opportunities as a potential motivator for child becoming soldiers. This conceptualization aligns with Gurr’s (1970) aspirational deprivation model, which proposes that people are not frustrated by a loss of what they have, rather “they are angered because they feel they have no means for attaining new or intensified

\(^{17}\) Note that for all of the following variables, the year prior to the start of the armed conflict was selected in order to capture the effect of pre-existing conditions and influences: Tanks, Troops, Military Expenditures, Military Expenditures per GDP, Political Terror, Infant Mortality, Education, GDP pc, RGD Income, Child Population, and Polity.
expectations” (p. 50). Education, says Gurr, can be one source that initiates these “rising expectations”:

The child of traditional society who invests his time and energy in formal education is assumed to be set in motion toward new goals, perhaps nebulous at first but increasingly distinct as education progresses. His level of expectations are likely to increase along with the salience of values he seeks. The notion that completion of elementary, or secondary, or higher education puts him close to his goals—of money, of status, of political participation—is also common. If he then finds jobs scarce, pay low, his kin hostile or parasitic, and his political capabilities low, disillusionment and anger are likely consequences (p. 95).

Children who feel deprived of education may then feel that political violence is one means of correcting a perceived injustice, and, consequently, they join an insurgent movement. Relative deprivation is controlled for in the regression analysis using UNESCO (2009b) statistics for school life expectancy for a given state.

Regime type is also incorporated into the control variable set to test the influence that democracy may or may not have on child soldier use. Pape (2005) finds that suicide bomber tend to target liberal democracies more often than other regimes. The same premise may or may not apply to child soldier use. The variable is measured by polity scores (Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers 2009a). The hypothesis that a youth bulge (Singer 2005), or child population increase, might lead to more child combatants is controlled for with a child population measure. Child population is measured as the percent of the population that is between the ages of 0-14. Finally, type of armed conflict is added to the regression to check for different effects, if any, caused by civil war or interstate war or extrasystemic war or internationalized internal conflict. It could be

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18 The Type of armed conflict variable is broken up into four parts according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset:

“1. Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.
posited that civil wars might have higher child soldier rates because insurgencies are less obligated to conform to international norms and laws. Whereas interstate wars are less likely to have child combatants because states are more obligated to follow international laws.

Two variables have not been included in the regression analysis—access to refugee/IDP camps, and small arms proliferation. In the most significant quantitative examinations of child soldier recruitment, Achvarina and Reich (2006) and Achvarina, Nordås, Østby & Rustad (2007) find a strong correlation between access to refugee/Internal Displacement (IDP) camps and child soldier recruitment. These studies focus on African states and African sub-national regions between the years of 1990-2004. The argument is that when refugee/IDP camps are less protected, they become more vulnerable to government and insurgency predation. The camps, in a sense, help pool human resources, which is essentially a boon for child soldier recruiters. The studies of Achvarina and Reich (2006) and Achvarina, Nordås, Østby & Rustad (2007) provide convincing statistical evidence of the effects of access to refugee/IDP camps on child soldier recruitment. Their regression analysis demonstrates that the variable is more influential than poverty (measured by infant mortality rates).

Their findings have two limitations, though: the results apply solely to Africa, and their models only explain recruitment that occurs during conflicts. Neither of these limitations is a flaw, as long as we do not expand their conclusions to include child

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2. Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.
3. Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.
4. Internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. (Harbom et al 2008, p. 10)."
soldier recruitment worldwide, and as long as we recognize that access to refugee/IDP camps is not a precondition for child soldier use. Using Africa as the scope of study is valid, and it would be worthwhile to broaden the sample to account for the variable globally. It could be incorporated into the regression analysis of the tactical need model. However it would not be internally logical to do so. Access to refugee/IDP camps only tells us what can happen once the armed conflict is underway, what choices may or may not occur regarding troop-building during the fight. Armed groups become rational actors when it comes to child soldier recruitment. Unprotected refugee/IDP camps appear to decrease costs and raise benefits for those who want to recruit children. (Granted, Achvarina and Reich (2006) clearly acknowledge that theirs is not a structural explanation.) Nevertheless, we still do not know what other variables might pressure groups to recruit children before the armed conflict occurs. What sets the stage for child soldier use? For the purposes of this study, the access to refugee/IDP camps variable is accepted as a plausible micro-dynamic of child soldier recruitment. However, the variable cannot be stretched out into the macro-realm of social forces, which is a concern of this study and which is why access to refugee/IDP camps is not controlled for. The variable is not a competing explanation, but rather a complementary explanation, one that reveals the intervening variable of refugee camps.

Another variable, the proliferation of small arms, is not included in the regression either. Both Rosen (2005) and Achvarina and Reich (2006) critique the causal logic of small arms equals more child soldiers. Rosen questions the lightweight premise and Achvarina and Reich challenge the ease-of-use assumption. Most importantly, Achvarina and Reich emphasis the difficulty of trying to operationalize small arms sales for a
regression analysis. They did search for data, but found that: “Figures on this trade are difficult to obtain and notoriously unreliable; they fail to take into account indirect transfers through neighboring countries by rebel force purchases, and tend to omit long-term transfers resulting from past proxy wars” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, p. 137).

I too find that assertions about the heavy flow of small arms causing child soldier use are difficult to prove, because of the lack of transparency of arms deals over the last 20 years. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Small Arms Survey and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, provide data that demonstrates that small arms flows to develop countries are heavy and contributing to bloody battles. And that children are indeed getting some of these weapons. However the mere presence of small arms in a country does not necessarily mean that children will be used to fight.

Looking at the 20 armed (1987-2007) conflicts that do not involve child soldiers, I find significant volumes of small arms imports into those states where the conflicts occurred. For example, South Africa has had a steady stream of small arms and ammunition supplied by states such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy (Norwegian Initiative 2009). By 2007, South Africa was ranked as having the 17th largest civilian firearms holding in the world (Small Arms Survey 2007, p. 47.). South Africa’s has also been the dominant arms producer in sub-Saharan Africa, an industry that was ramped up significantly in the 1970s and 1980s when the country was under a United Nations embargo (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 41). Despite the large stockpiles of small firearms and the production industry, neither the conflict with SWAPO (1966-1988), or with the ANC (1981-1988) involved child soldiers. Nigeria has also had large in-flows of small arms, and many anti-government fighters in the Niger Delta region
incorporate children into their troops (Florquin and Berman 2005). However, when Nigeria fought with Cameroon in 1996 (Cameroon is known to have imported more than a million of dollars small arms ammunition in 1995 and 1996 alone (Norwegian Initiative 2009), children were not pulled into the fight. Lastly, Mali has imported small arms and ammunition through the 1980s and into 2007, but conflicts with the Mouvement populaire de l'Azaouad/Azawad People's Movement (MPA), Front islamique arabe de l'Azaouad-Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA), and the Alliance démocratique pour le changement/Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC - B) do not appear to have recruited under-age combatants. These examples do not diminish the problems attached to heavy small arms flows. As the Small Arms Survey has shown, more guns translate into more crime and deadlier conflicts. The fact that the presence of numerous small arms might increase the intensity of conflict is important, but the small arms trade is neither a sufficient or necessary correlate for child soldier use.

**Analysis and Findings**

*Initial descriptions*

Summary statistics confirm that for all armed conflicts from 1987-2007, child soldier use is highly prevalent. Looking at the dichotomous coding of child soldier use, we see that 226 out of 258 dyads (87.6%) had at least one side using child soldiers.\(^{19}\) When broken down more specifically, according to which side has children in their ranks, we find that the government alone (Side A) uses children in war 8.8% of the time (20 out of 228 dyads), while the opposition alone (Side B) uses children in war 26.3% of the time (60 out of 228 dyads). In 50.9% of the dyads (116 out of 228), both the government and the

\(^{19}\) See Appendix D for a full list of the descriptive statistics examined.
opposition have child combatants at the same time (See Table 4). Overall, this means that governments are using children to help fight their battles in 59.7% of the dyads (136 out of 228), while the opposition uses child soldiers in 77.2% of the dyads (176 out of 228).

### Table 4: Child Soldier Use By Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Number of Dyads</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Only</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Group Only</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Government and Opposition</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we tabulate for regional differences, there seems to be some variations in likelihood of use. Within armed conflicts in the Americas, 70% of the dyads involved child soldiers (15 out of 21). This is the lowest regional percentage, which is then followed by Europe where child soldiers were included in 81% of the dyads (22 out of 27). Africa’s armed conflict dyads used child soldiers 88% of the time (106 out of 120), and in the Middle East it is 90% of the dyads. Finally, the highest percentage of child soldier use occurs in Asia—93% (57 out of 61). Table 5 shows the rankings by percentage. It could be that there is a development effect, with greater development translating into greater militarization and an ability to purchase more advanced military...

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20 Americas denotes North, Central and South America. Only one of the dyads occurs in North America and the remaining 20 are in Central and South America.
technology. Relative deprivation might be lower as well in the more industrialized nations. It is also possible that international norms might hold greater sway over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of Dyads with Child Soldiers</th>
<th>Child Soldier Dyads/Total Dyads*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>57/61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>26/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>106/120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>22/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>15/21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N=258

*Total = 256/259

the more developed states. The regional data is suggestive, but not definitive, and some of these hypotheses will be teased out more in the regression analysis. Suffice it to say that there are regional differences, however, the threshold is 70% and above for all areas, a notably high rate worldwide.

The figures for region, broken down by which side of the dyad is recruiting children, reveal several observations (See Table 6). Comparing all five regions, governments in the Middle East are most likely to have child soldiers when the opposition does not (19%), while governments in the Americas are least likely (7%). The
opposition forces in the Middle East are also most likely to have child combatants when
the government does not (46%), but Asia has a comparable rate of 43%. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Government Only</th>
<th>Opposition Only</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Child Soldier Use Dyad Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>19% (5)</td>
<td>46% (12)</td>
<td>35% (9)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>14.3% (3)</td>
<td>33.3% (7)</td>
<td>52.4% (11)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>8% (4)</td>
<td>43% (22)</td>
<td>49% (25)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8.3% (7)</td>
<td>20.3% (17)</td>
<td>71.4% (60)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>7% (1)</td>
<td>14% (2)</td>
<td>79% (11)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number in “( )” is dyads; N = 228. Total=196

Pearson chi2(15) = 30.64

Americas have the lowest percentage for opposition only, 14%. The dynamic flips,
though, when we examine child soldier use by both sides. The Americas become the
region most likely to have all parties of the armed conflict practicing child soldier
recruitment (79%), and the Middle East is the area least likely to have both sides with
child soldiers (35%). Africa has the second largest percentage with 71.4% for all dyads
having child combatants. The totals for government engagement (alone, 7%, or with the
opposition, 79%) ranks highest in the Americas at 86%. This means that if an armed
conflict in the Americas has child soldiers, there is an 86% chance that the government is
complicit. Conversely, governments in the Middle East participate the least in child soldier usage 44% (19% alone and 35% with the oppositions).

A brief study of the relationship between type of war and child soldier use demonstrates that regardless of whether the war is interstate, intrastate or an internationalized internal armed conflict, child soldiers are just as likely to be deployed. Even though intrastate conflict is the predominant type in the sample, 77% (199 out 258 dyads), the rates for child soldier use within each type of conflict are close to equal (See Table 7). Interstate equals 82%, Intrastate equals 86% and Internationalized internal armed conflict equals 94%. The data suggests that no matter what type of armed conflict child soldiers are most probably on the battlefield. In other words, state borders matter little. This finding will be further tested in the regression analysis.

Table 7: Percentage of Child Soldier Use for Each Type of Armed Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type†</th>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Total Dyads*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate</td>
<td>82% (9)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>86% (172)</td>
<td>14% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalized Internal</td>
<td>94% (45)</td>
<td>6% (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=258 (226 Child Soldier Use; 32 No Child Soldier Use.)
Pearson chi2 (2) = 2.2592
† There are no extrasystemic wars in the sample.
**Binary Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use and Tactical Need**

The tactical need hypothesis is tested first by running a binary logistic regression of child soldier use within dyads from armed conflicts occurring 1987-2007.\(^{21}\) Table 8 provides a summary of the results. Tactical need variables are pulled through multiple models, not only to account for the influence of control variables but also because many of the variables exhibited multicollinearity. For example, variables such as tanks\(^{22}\) cannot be included in models with troops (log) as the correlation between the two is .619 (See Appendix C for the correlation matrix of all variables). Model A reveals that several tactical need variables are significant: intensity (at the .01 level) and political terror (at the .05 level). Absolute poverty, as measured by infant mortality rates, is significant as well (at the .01 level). A measure of fit test\(^{23}\) for Model A shows a count $R^2$ of .874, or 87.4% correctly classified. Sensitivity equals 98.6% and specificity equals 9.68%.

Specificity is low, however, this aligns well with the model as only 13% of the dyads (N=246) have no child soldier use (See Appendix E for Sensitivity and Specificity scores for each model in the logit regression). In Model B, insignificant variables—duration, tanks, GDP per capita, polity and type—are dropped, and troops (log), military expenditures and education are introduced.\(^{24}\) These three variables have high percentages of multicollinearity with some of the variables in Model A. With Model B, once again,

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\(^{21}\) All regressions and subsequent calculations are performed with Stata Statistical Software 9.2 (StataCorp. 2005).

\(^{22}\) The tanks variable has two variations: dichotomous and raw number. Both variations were tested in the models but only the results for the dichotomous version are listed. Neither variation showed a significant influence.

\(^{23}\) The measure of fit software—“fitstat”—is from Long and Freese (2001).

\(^{24}\) A likelihood-ratio test is invalid when checking for Model B as nested model in Model A, because the number of observations differs, 246 to 247 (See Long and Freese 2006, pp. 102-103). Consequently, the validity of dropping the insignificant variables—duration, tanks, GDP per capita, polity and type—is tested by running a logit regression with these five variables and one of the most significant variables from Model A: intensity. In this test, only intensity appears significant, at the 1% level.
Table 8: Binary Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use, 1987-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Models</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.029**</td>
<td>2.548***</td>
<td>2.401**</td>
<td>2.143***</td>
<td>2.397**</td>
<td>2.447***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.793)</td>
<td>(.779)</td>
<td>(.759)</td>
<td>(.766)</td>
<td>(.760)</td>
<td>(.761)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>.113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.507)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.179)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Expend.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Expend per GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.151*</td>
<td>.144*</td>
<td>.173*</td>
<td>.160*</td>
<td>.163*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td></td>
<td>.704*</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.498*</td>
<td>.573*</td>
<td>.479*</td>
<td>.481*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.294)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td>(.250)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td>(.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td>.016**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGD Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.193*</td>
<td>- .162</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.066)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td></td>
<td>.016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
<td>.440</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.566)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.700***</td>
<td>-3.11</td>
<td>-4.425**</td>
<td>-2.800*</td>
<td>-3.950***</td>
<td>-2.691**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.279)</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(1.498)</td>
<td>(1.160)</td>
<td>(1.154)</td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyads (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly Classified</td>
<td></td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** = .05, .01, .001 levels of significance.
intensity is very significant (.001 level), military expenditures per GDP becomes significant (.05 level), political terror loses significance, and then education exhibits a level of significance (.05). Model C, sets aside education and incorporates child population. Child population correlates with education at -.787 which is why it is not included at the same time. Intensity, military expenditures per GDP and political terror are significant, while child population shows little influence on child soldier use. In Model D, education is reintroduced and real gross domestic income is added. Here again, intensity, military expenditure per GDP and political terror maintain significance (.001, .05 and .05). Model E brings infant mortality back into the analysis, but unlike in Model A, it is not significant when matched with intensity, military expenditure per GDP and political terror. A final logit analysis, Model F, tests the power of the significant tactical need variables with education. Pared down in this manner, education drops away from significance, leaving intensity (.001 level of significance), military expenditures per GDP (.05 level of significance) and political terror (.05 level of significance) as the most influential variables for child soldier use. Table 9 is a logit regression with the three significant tactical need variables, demonstrating their standalone explanatory power. The results of the binary logistic regression reveal that tactical need exerts a substantial influence on whether or not groups (government and insurgencies) will use children as combatants. Intensity carries the most weight, providing strong evidence in support of the severity hypothesis regarding tactical need. If we look at the cross tabs for intensity and

---

25 The coefficient for education is negative, indicating that the lower the school life expectancy, the greater the likelihood of child soldier use.
child soldier use, we find an important nuance.\textsuperscript{26} Child soldier use is highly prevalent in minor conflicts (25-999 battle/per year) as well as war (1,000+ battle deaths). The total for child soldier use is 226 dyads. Minor conflicts involve child soldiers in 106 dyads (47\% of 226) and wars have child soldiers in 120 dyads (53\% of 226). Meanwhile almost

Table 9: Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use and Intensity, Military Expenditures per GDP and Political Terror

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Tactical Need Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>2.432*** (.759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure per GDP</td>
<td>.141* (.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>.498* (.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.420*** (1.045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dyads Correctly Classified 247 87.5\%

Notes: *, **, ***: .05, .01, .001 levels of significance.

all non-child soldier use occurs in minor conflicts (30) and very little non-child soldier use happens in major wars (See Table 10). A Yule’s Q confirms the significance of the logit regression (Q = 89\%). As the data shows, there is about a 22\% chance that a minor

\textsuperscript{26} Crosstabs and graphical analysis are presented in order to clarify the relationships between independent and dependent variables, and to rule out the “garbage-can regression” effect as discussed by Achen (2005).
conflict will not have child combatants (30/136) and a 78% that it will (106/136). For war we discover that child soldier use is potentially inevitable—98% of all dyads from war

Table 10: Cross Tabulation of Intensity and Child Soldier Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Minor Conflict</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>N=258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have child soldiers (226/122). Only 2% of the dyads (2/122) in war do not have child combatants. So, while child soldier use is highly likely in armed conflict, lower battle death rates do matter, not because recruiting child soldiers increases the number of people killed, but because groups in minor armed conflict do not necessarily have to resort to a new tactic. But when war happens, the ethos appears to be, by any means necessary.

The militarization hypothesis is also supported by the .05 significance level of military expenditures per GDP. As states spend more and more of their budget on national defense, and potentially less on other public goods, we see an increase in the likelihood that during armed conflict, they will either use child soldiers or child soldiers will be used against them. A two-way area graph provides a clearer picture of this dynamic:
As displayed Graph 1, once a state spends close to 10% or more on its military, the propensity for child soldier recruitment rises well above the likelihood of not recruiting children.

The third significant variable—political terror level—supports the state terror hypothesis, and, when inspected more closely, offers more details about the interaction between the dependent and independent variable. A cross tab highlights two important points (See Table 11). First, states with high levels of political terror are more likely to be in armed conflict. We see a clear rise in the number of dyads from 2 at the lowest level of political terror to 54, 50 and 45 for levels 4-5. Second, the percent of child soldier use for each level of political terror increases as political violence by the state increases. For
Table 11: Child Soldier Use for Each Political Terror Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Terror Level</th>
<th>Number of Dyads†</th>
<th>Percent of Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Average per Three Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>96% (43)</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100% (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>93% (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73% (22)</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86% (31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>76% (16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59% (10)</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100% (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66% (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†N= 258
* ( ) = Number of dyads using child soldiers.

levels 1-2 it averages 63.6%, for 2.5-3.5 it averages 79.3%, and then for the most violent levels of 4-5, the average peaks at 96.0%. In other words, extreme acts of terror by the state before a conflict begins have a strong influence on groups, pushing them towards child soldier use. Graph 2 depicts the correlation in a linear regression.

27 The political terror scale defines the most violent two levels as (Gibney, Wood & Cornet 2008):

“Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.”
Overall, the binomial logistic regression provides evidence in support of all three dimensions of tactical need: severity, militarization and state terror. We are most likely to find child soldiers on the battlefield when the armed conflict involves highly militarized states and states that are brutal to their own civilian population. Minor conflicts and wars both have child combatants, but, if child soldiers are not present, it is most likely a minor armed conflict. This is the general picture that we can draw from the regression. Results from a multinomial logistic regression will give us more detailed rendering, one that shows us shades of difference between government only use, opposition only use and use by both sides.
Multinomial Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use and Tactical Need

The same dyads from the binomial regression of all armed conflicts from 1987-2007 are also coded for child soldier use, but greater specificity is added. As explained earlier, the dependent variable is broken up into four categories—child soldier use by the government only, by the opposition only, by both sides, and by neither side. The multinomial regression begins with the same basic model (A) first presented in the binomial logit regression. The base outcome for all of the models is “no child soldier use.” Each model is evaluated with the Hausman test of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and in every instance the assumption of IIA is accepted, indicating that the models are appropriate (See Freese and Long 2006, p. 243). One independent variable, military expenditures, is left out of the models for the multinomial logistic regression. When included it changed several other variable coefficients from positive to negative. A separate test was run to see if removing the military expenditure variable would corrupt the modeling. Results from a bivariate multinomial logistic regression of child soldier use and military expenditures provide little indication of a correlation between the two variables, and support the validity of removing the variable. Military expenditures for government use only, opposition use only and both sides using child soldiers is not significant at the .001, .01 or .05 level (N=220).

Table 12 summarizes the mlogit regression results for when the government is the only side of the dyad using child soldiers. Like the binomial logit regression, intensity stands out as very significant in all models (A-E) at the .001 level. A cross tab of intensity (for government only) with no child soldier use at all reveals that there are

---

28 H_0 Odds (Outcome-J vs. Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
29 Again, the motive is to avoid the “garbage-can regression” effect (Achen 2005; also see Ray 2005).
dyads in this category, and 17 (85%) are involved in war while only 3 (15%) are in minor conflicts.\textsuperscript{30} This indicates that the deadlier the battle, the greater the chance of child soldier use when only governments engage in the practice. Bloody wars might lessen the constraint of international norms on states. Military expenditures per GDP also correlates with child soldier use, a .01 level of significance in all the models (A-E). Here we find that the more militarized a state, the greater its propensity to militarize its child population. Borrowing Migdal’s (2001) concept of state and society relations, and the notion that each facet is transforming and/or constituting the other, it could be that the government only use of child soldiers indicates state domination over society. Defense of the state becomes more important than adhering to the cultural norms of its society.

Unlike the binomial logit regression, in the mlogit regression for government only use, political terror does not appear to matter. What surfaces as more influential is polity, which reaches the 5% level of significance in the final model (E). The coefficient is negative for polity indicating that the less democratic a state is, the more likely it is to use children in combat (when the state is the only side engaged in the practice). Schmid (1992) argues that for terrorism and democracies the struggle is over legitimacy and states that resort to terrorist tactics may lose some of their democratic legitimacy. This appears to be true for democracies and child soldier use. States that use child soldiers, especially as a stand-alone tactic that is not reciprocated by the opponent, are transgressing democratic norms that uphold the importance of civil society and the political power of civilians. Forcing children to fight takes away their democratic rights and strips them of their civilian status, which for children is most often considered a

\textsuperscript{30} A Yule’s Q calculation is –.98.
Table 12: Multinomial Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use, 1987-2007 (Government Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Models for Government Only Uses Child Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>3.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>- .033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Expend per GDP</td>
<td>.171*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGD Income</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Population</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>-.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyads (N)</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA (accept H_0?)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** = .05, .01, .001 levels of significance.
permanent role (unlike adults which can shift between civilian and military roles in a democracy). Hence, democracies and their institutions would prevent child soldier use in armed conflict. Once the polity threshold shifts away from democracies, though, states are more inclined to recruit children. A breakdown of polity and no child soldier use demonstrates this dynamic (See Table 13).

Table 13: Child Soldier Use Only by the Government Compared to Polity of the Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity Type</th>
<th>Dyads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracies</td>
<td>5% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracies</td>
<td>25% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracies</td>
<td>70% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (20)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The complete model for government only use of child soldiers is the triad of intensity, military expenditures per GDP, and polity. Evidence for the dimensions of severity and militarization are pronounced, but state terror is not an apparent factor. However, the state’s regime type is influential, which highlights the importance of the institutional structure of the state and its potential influence on child soldier recruitment. Because we are focusing on government use of child soldiers, the tactical need hypothesis

---

31 Democracies (“fully institutionalized”) range from 6 to 10 on the polity scale, anocracies (“mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes”) range from –5 to 5, and autocracies ( “fully institutionalized”) range from –4 to –10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009c).
becomes about the state extending its monopoly on the legitimate use of force deep into society. The practice signals the state’s willingness to deprive civil society of its claim on the individual. It is an aggressive form of social control exercised by the state, a process of redrawning and annunciating the boundary between state and society.  

We now turn to the other side of the dyad, analyzing what factors might lead to an opposition only use of child soldiers. Table 14 presents the results for this dependent variable category. Here again, we find that intensity matters, consistently significant for all five models (A-E). Evidence for militarization is apparent, however, troops is the influential variable rather than military expenditures per GDP. Number of troops is significant at the .001 level in the final model (E). Aligned together, these two variables support the tactical need hypothesis. A Yule’s Q calculation (79%) for cross tabs of child soldier use and intensity confirms that oppositions have a propensity for child soldier use in large-scale battles. More deaths may translate into a shortage of manpower. Similarly, the number of troops a state has before the conflict begins pushes the opposition closer to child soldier use. The appearance of a strong military prompts the adversary to find methods for bolstering their own forces. Recruiting children supplies fighters, and it also maximizes troop-building. And, in contrast to adults, children bring a psychological dimension to the battlefield.

---

32 See Mitchell (1991) regarding the state as a structural effect of processes continually creating and recreating the “line of difference” between state and society in order to capture power.
Table 14: Multinomial Logit Regression of Child Soldier, 1987-2007 (Opposition Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Models for Opposition Only Uses Child Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1.695*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>.328*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Expend per GDP</td>
<td>.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.00003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGD Income</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Population</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.522**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyads (N)</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA (accept H0?)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** = .001, .01, .05 levels of significance.
The third dependent variable category—both sides using child soldiers—sheds light on when child combatants become the all-pervasive norm on the battlefield. The findings parallel the binomial logit regression with intensity, military expenditures per GDP and political terror all exhibiting significance—intensity at the .001 level, and military expenditures and political terror at .05 (See Table 15). A fourth independent variable is also significant for the both sides using child soldiers category. Education is significant at the .05 level in the final model (H). Note that much of the interchanging of independent variables in Table 15 is due to issues of multicollinearity. Education, infant mortality and child population all are collinear with each other, which necessitates several iterations of the models to uncover which, if any, of the three are significant. In the final analysis, education remains more significant even when paired with child population.33

When all sides of the dyad use child soldiers, intensity matters. Throughout each and every logit and mlogit regression, we find that minor wars are less likely to promote child soldier use. The Yule’s Q calculation for both sides recruiting children versus no child soldier recruitment at all is .92. Suffice it to say that when it comes to child soldier use, battle deaths always matter. Militarization, as represented by military expenditures per GDP, is a consistently strong finding that demonstrates the influence of state behavior with regards to the use child soldiers and the interaction within the dyad. When governments recruit children for armed conflict and the opposition recruits children, each side is influenced by the state’s heavy investment in the military. In this relationship, the

33 Education and infant mortality are -.787. Education and child population are -.653. Child population and infant mortality are .657.
state appears to be exerting strong social control and the opposition group is countering with a retaliatory tactic—child soldier use. Adding even more pressure is the level of political terror that the state is willing to exercise. When the government and the opposition are both complicit, then 89% of the dyads have a political terror score of 3 or above, and 68% score from 4 to 5. The result: if a state is heavily militarized and imposes harsh sanctions, including executions, on its population for political participation, then notions of *jus ad bellum* disappear for children when armed conflict arises. The role of education and its relationship to child soldier use manifests in the data as a negative coefficient (-.182). This means that low levels of attainment, i.e. less opportunity for schooling, are an important factor in the child soldier use equation. Here, the state is turning its attention away from a public good (and more towards defense), and the opposition is responding, in many instances by allowing children to engage in armed conflict. The variable signals the presence of aspirational deprivation (Gurr 1970), an instance of frustration over broken expectations concerning education which leads to an increase in the probability of child soldier use during war. Perhaps the lack of investment by the state in the development of children creates a devaluation of childhood. This state action has been noted in the literature as a reason why children opt to join the fighting (See Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 199; Machel 1996; and Wessells 2002, 2006). However, the impetus to volunteer, based on education, is only significant for when both sides of the

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34 Three on the scale denotes: “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted” (Gibney, Wood & Cornet 2008); see footnote 24 for definitions of the most extreme levels of political violence, 4 and 5.
Table 15: Multinomial Logit Regression of Child Soldier Use, 1987-2007(Both Sides Use)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>2.150** (0.826)</td>
<td>2.674*** (0.792)</td>
<td>2.522*** (0.786)</td>
<td>2.659** (0.793)</td>
<td>2.579*** (0.775)</td>
<td>2.635*** (0.778)</td>
<td>2.709*** (0.786)</td>
<td>2.718*** (0.781)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>-0.226 (0.565)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>0.084 (0.163)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.170)</td>
<td>0.091 (0.168)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Expend per GDP</td>
<td>0.113 (0.079)</td>
<td>0.150* (0.077)</td>
<td>0.122 (0.076)</td>
<td>0.159* (0.077)</td>
<td>0.130* (0.071)</td>
<td>0.156* (0.075)</td>
<td>0.156* (0.074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>0.755** (0.304)</td>
<td>0.467 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.513 (0.290)</td>
<td>0.468 (0.314)</td>
<td>0.741** (0.240)</td>
<td>0.581* (0.253)</td>
<td>0.554* (0.256)</td>
<td>0.551* (0.254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>0.015 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.0002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGD Income</td>
<td>-0.0001 (0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.194* (0.082)</td>
<td>-0.161 (0.097)</td>
<td>-0.180 (0.109)</td>
<td>-0.182* (0.077)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Population</td>
<td>0.067 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.055* (0.032)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.040)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>0.131 (0.605)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.41** (2.323)</td>
<td>-3.89** (1.613)</td>
<td>-7.86** (2.613)</td>
<td>-3.97** (1.621)</td>
<td>-4.99*** (1.156)</td>
<td>-6.92*** (1.713)</td>
<td>-3.641 (2.574)</td>
<td>-3.477*** (1.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyads (N)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA (accept H0?)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** = .05, .01, .001 levels of significance.
dyad are using child soldiers. Table 16 shows expected levels of education for each child soldier use category, demonstrating that the category of both sides utilizing children in armed conflict has a distinctly different relationship with education. It is the lowest with a mean of 6.34 expected years of schooling. No child soldier use is higher with a mean of 7.85, but even higher is when the opposition only uses child soldiers, a mean of 8.78 years. The results indicate that it is an interaction effect between both sides of the dyad, one that only surfaces when intensity, military expenditures per GDP and political terror are significant as well. Ultimately, we see that tactical need (severity, militarization, and state terror) plus aspirational deprivation makes child soldier use the norm.

**Predicted Risk**

Using the findings from the logit and mlogit regression, we can develop several predictions regarding the percentage of risk involved for a number of the

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**Table 16: Average Expected Years of Schooling By Child Soldier Use Category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Average Expected Years of Schooling</th>
<th>Dyads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Only</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Only</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Sides</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total* 222
significant independent variables. Throughout each and every regression (logit and mlogit), intensity shows the strongest correlation to child soldier use. It is a dichotomous variable that signals a greater than or less than 999 battle deaths per year in an armed conflict. If we calculate a predicted risk in the shift from under 999 battle deaths to over 1,000 or more, we discover a 154% increase in risk for the use of child soldiers (See Table 17).

### Table 17: Predicted Risk of Child Soldier Use When Intensity of Armed Conflict Changes To Over 999 Battle Deaths Per Year*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>.3356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0→1</td>
<td>154%</td>
<td>.8520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From the Logit Model, where intensity, military expenditures per GDP and political terror were significant. Military expenditures per GDP and political terror variables were held at the means.

The results clearly demonstrate the need to emphasize swift action when any conflict erupts in order to prevent escalation. Otherwise, child soldier use becomes less of a hypothesis and more of a certainty.

Militarization, as measured by military expenditures per GDP, is also a notable variable in the logit and mlogit regressions. If we examine the logit model, where intensity, military expenditures per GDP and political terror are the key independent
variables, we see a predicted risk for military spending that steadily increases with any shift from a lower percentage of military spending to a higher percentage (See Table 18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>.7357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>.7869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→5</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>.8304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→7</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>.8665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→9</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>.8959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→11</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>.9195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→13</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>.9380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δ = Percentage of military expenditures per GDP.

*From the logit model when intensity, military expenditures per GDP, and political terror are significant; Intensity held at “1”, or more than 999 battle deaths per year; Political terror is held at the mean. (Military expenditures per GDP mean = 6.07, min = .4, max = 35.5)

The effect of military spending on child soldier use is not as dramatic as the effect of intensity of armed conflict, but the predicted risk does express how policies that curtail excessive military spending can be a deterrent to child soldier use.

The third variable from the logit regression that warrants consideration for risk is political terror. If we look at political terror measures for a state before an armed conflict, we might gain a better insight into the potential for child soldier use. Any state that uses some degree of violence against its citizens who voice dissent is more likely to use child soldiers in war. At the far end of the scale (5), in which executions and murder
are common practice, the predicted risk is 54% more likely to use child soldiers when compared to the much more open state that scores a 1 on the scale (See Table 19).

Table 19: Predicted Risk of Child Soldier Use When Political Terror Increases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>.5936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→2</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>.7062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→3</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>.7983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→4</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>.8669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1→5</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>.9147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δ = Political Terror scale, 1-5, with 1 = no political terror, 5 = extreme terror.

*From the logit model when intensity, military expenditures per GDP, and political terror are significant; Intensity held at “1”, or more than 999 battle deaths per year; military expenditures per GDP is held at the mean.

The data for predicted risk on political terror indicates that the variable might serve as an early warning sign for potential child soldier use. Examining the political terror measures for any state that shows stirrings of civil war would be a valid method for IGOs and NGOs who want to forecast when they need to prepare for the advent of child soldier use.

Three additional variables from the mlogit regression bear notable results from predicted risk analyses: polity, troop size and education. Polity becomes significant when only governments use child soldiers. The findings from the government only regression reveal large degrees of risk in any shift away from democracy and towards autocracy (See Table 20).
Table 20: Predicted Risk of Child Soldier Use Only By the Government When Polity Decreases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10→6</td>
<td>108%</td>
<td>.0079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6→2</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>.0156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2→-2</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>.0296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2→-6</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>.0537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-6→-10</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>.0930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δ = Polity score; Democracy 10 to 6; Anocracy 5 to -5; Autocracy -6 to -10.

*From the mlogit model when only governments use child soldiers; Intensity held at “1”, or more than 999 battle deaths per year; Polity and military expenditures per GDP held at means.

Even within the range of democracy there is a sizable increase in risk (108%) in a move from 10 to 6. All the other polity shifts exhibit high degrees of predicted risk as well, and at the bottom end of the scale where autocracy is situated, we still find a 73% predicted risk within the range (-6 to -10). Similar to predicted risks for political terror, predicted risks for polity can be seen as early warning clues to future child soldier use.

When insurgents are the only side using child soldiers, government troop size appears significant, and assessing the predicted risk provides insight into just how influential troop increases can be (See Table 21). An increase from 2,000 troops to about 10,900 troops raises the risk of potential child soldier use by 115%. Moving from 10,900 to 64,800 troops raises the risk to 100%. Each of the shifts outlined in Table 21 indicate that not only does government troop size matter before the conflict begins, but also during the conflict. Bringing in more troops can tip the insurgents cost/benefit analysis.
Table 21: Predicted Risk of Child Soldier Use Only By Insurgents When Government Troop Size Increases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000→10,900</td>
<td>115%</td>
<td>.1480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,900→64,800</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>.2962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64,800→186,000</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>.3916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186,000→704,500</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>.4912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δ = Approximate number of government troops.

*From the mlogit model when only insurgents use child soldiers; Intensity is held at “1”, or more than 999 battle deaths per year; Polity is held at the mean. Troop size mean equals 257,690.

towards greater benefits for using children in combat. The growing risk that bringing in more troops produces is another condition that states and military planners should consider, as adding more troops might raise the level of force but it might also have unintended adverse consequences for children in war zones.

The final predicted risk calculation is for education, an independent variable that correlates with child soldier use when both sides of a dyad recruit children. Findings from the predicted risk calculations demonstrate the need to bolster education (See Table 22). Any decrease in years of schooling increases the risk of child soldier use, especially in the higher levels of education such as 16 to 14 years (50%), 14 to 11 years (71%) and 11 to 8 years (55%). The broader view of a shift from strong state (16 years of education) to weak and/or failed state (2 years of education) results in a 575% predicted risk of child
Table 22: Predicted Risk of Child Soldier Use by Both Sides When Level of Education Decreases.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Pr(value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16→14</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>.1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14→11</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>.2773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11→8</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>.4290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8→5</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>.5909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5→2</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>.7309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 → 2</td>
<td>575%</td>
<td>.7309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δ = years of schooling

*From the mlogit model for when both sides use child soldiers; Intensity held at “1”, or more than 999 battle deaths per year; Military Expenditures per GDP and Political Terror held at means. Education: Min = 1.7 years of schooling; Max = 15.9 years of schooling; Mean = 7.12.

soldier use. With respect to child solider use, the policy implication is straightforward: if you want to decrease the risk of child soldier use, practice prevention and increase educational levels.

Conclusion

Results from the regression analyses provide viable evidence in support of the tactical need hypothesis. The wider scope of the binomial logistic regression reveals the
influence that severity of conflict (battle deaths), militarization (military expenditures per GDP) and state terror (political terror scale) have on child soldier use. The image depicted by the data is that of a brutish state versus an adaptive opponent. And child soldier use is the adaptation intended to weaken a state by alternative means. It is, however, a very general picture and provides very little detail about child soldier use dynamics within the dyad. With the multinomial logistic regression we get a much finer-grained picture. Severity of conflict, militarization (as either military expenditures per GDP or troops) and political terror remain, but regime type (polity) and aspirational deprivation (education) also enter the frame.\textsuperscript{35} If only one side is using child combatants, severity and militarization matter, and so does democracy. This is a new finding in child soldier research, one that needs to be explored more. Finally, the last mlogit model explains why all fighting factions would resort to child soldier use: tactical need and frustrations resulting from a state that is not providing basic social goods (education) to its youth.

Structural constraints and social forces matter with regards to the child soldier phenomenon. But the tactical need model does not tell us how the tactic develops nor how it becomes the norm in armed conflict. The next chapter will trace the evolution of child soldier use as a tactic, explaining its diffusion through insurgency networks. The story begins, though, before Vietnam and before World War II, with the empowerment of youth at the start of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This movement, combined with an increasing disregard for civilian life and advances in war technology, facilitates the necessary cultural shift that makes child soldier use acceptable and innovative inside the theater of war.

\textsuperscript{35} See Appendix E for results of a Wald test that supports the correlations from the mlogit regression.
Chapter 4: A Shifting Norm

In the preceding chapter we examined why children are being used in armed conflict. But, given the apparent contemporary international prohibition against the practice, we still have not explored why a moral boundary could be so readily crossed by insurgencies and governments. Even if the intensity of a conflict, militarization and political terror are the preconditions and/or existing conditions that increase the likelihood that youth will be pulled into conflict, it does not explain why widespread cultural norms are ignored. Rosen (2005) inverts the problem and argues that the current anti-child soldier use norm is actually the new phenomenon, that today’s child soldier “crisis” is a post-colonial construct that begins with the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Rosen says making child soldiers illegal is an extension of the development of the war-as-a-criminal-act international norm; and that the international spotlight on the phenomenon is more about the “competing political agendas of humanitarian groups, sovereign states, and the United Nations” (p. 10), than a horror unique to today’s wars.

Rosen’s thesis provides a much more nuanced view of child soldier use, bringing in the notion of the “politics of age” (p. 132). With the rise of the anti-child soldier use norm we see a struggle for who will define and potentially capture the symbolic power of children and childhood. Sociologist Pat Lauderdale claims that the whole notion of deviance is socially constructed and “created, maintained, and changed through political processes” (p. 36). So, if we ignore the political struggle inherent in the act of naming behavior deviant, we will never understand the nature of deviance, that of process, or the power dynamics inherent in the social construction of “bad.” Child soldier use is one
such example of behavior caught in a deviance naming battle. This does not diminish the severity of the practice, but points to where the moral boundaries of international society are today regarding the issue. The formation of anti-child-soldier-use NGOs, the ratification of treaties, and the trials of war criminals are moments when global civil society draws a line:

   Each time the community moves to censure some act of deviation...and convenes a formal ceremony to deal with the responsible offender, it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and restates where the boundaries of the group are located” (Erikson 1966, pp. 12-13).

The redefined moral boundaries, therefore, are not necessarily markers for a new phenomenon, but rather new lines.

   Although Rosen does not refer to it, parts of his argument parallel Scott’s (1999) in *Seeing Like A State*. Scott details how the state’s rationalizing process has a detrimental (rather than positive) effect when applied to human development projects. The state ends up ignoring civil society and the local in its effort to control/improve human lives. With Rosen’s work, we find states and global civil society struggling together to control/improve human lives and at the same time ignoring how global history has helped shape the problem. Granted, humanitarian NGOs are not directly exacerbating the child soldier problem, however, their work, which many times focuses heavily on naming and shaming, can over-simplify a complex social dynamic.\(^{36}\) The result is a push for policies grounded more on ethos rather than comprehensive evidence.

   Also important in both Rosen’s (and Scott’s) text is the introduction of ideology as a key variable. Bringing ideology into the child soldier phenomenon is an important

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\(^{36}\) Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that naming and shaming governments for human rights abuses does not necessarily decrease violations and in some cases even induces more human rights violations.
addition to child soldier research. Rosen however does not provide a deep analysis of why ideology becomes an issue, other than the rise of competing interests and the political power that might be gained from defining who can and cannot fight in war. I agree with Rosen in that ideology does become much more salient in the post-colonial era, but I will move the discussion further in this chapter, outlining why a “politics of age” might come about from child soldier use. Unlike Rosen, I see more than a new social construct, i.e. the child soldier “crisis”. After World War II, there is a shift that occurs on the battle field in armed conflict. Child soldiers move from being a means of troop fortification to a socio-psychological weapon of war. If new norms are being created at the international level prohibiting child soldier use, new norms are also being created at the ground level—a shift towards the tactical.

The norm shift at both levels is the result of much broader historical processes—structural changes that create new social dynamics, which in turn produce child soldier use. The two most important processes begin around the turn of the twentieth century. First, we see a rise in political engagement on behalf of, and by, youth. Both the state and society have fostered this growth in child empowerment. We also see ambiguity regarding the sanctity of civilian life in armed conflict. As a result of these two phenomena, we find that the moral boundary between children and political violence has become much more permeable. Second, in addition to the transmogrification of norms, advances in war technology have increased the need for tactical innovations by insurgents. Following the strategies set forth by Mao Tse-tung concerning protracted war, insurgencies (and eventually states) have turned to child soldier use as a tactic to counter big guns and big bombs. (Technological advances have also increased the number of
A third contributing component is the rise of a global terrorist network. The development of organizational links since World War II between numerous groups and states in the world has produced multiple learning centers that facilitate the transmission of knowledge of guerrilla warfare. These nodes have been the points of contact for terrorist and insurgency groups. They are the places and spaces were tactical innovations are exchanged. Child soldier use is one of those tactical innovations diffused through parts of the network.

The dialectic of these three social forces culminates in the advent of a child-soldier-use-as-tactic norm following World War II. Children become increasingly more useful as combatants in war, from Korea in the 1950s, to Vietnam in the 1960s, to Sri Lanka in 2000. Youth empowerment and war technology foster this usefulness. The co-mingling of social forces produces a tactical innovation that diffuses through social networks built from terrorist training camps and practices, and the outcome is 10-11 year old boys dressed in black carrying AK-47s training in Iraq for Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia in 2008 (Rubin 2008).

Uncovering the movement from child as troop fortifier to child as tactical weapon requires both historical analysis and social network analysis. Even though child soldier use is very apparent in contemporary armed conflict, the social processes involved are what Pierson (2003) might define as “slow moving, and… invisible” (p. 177). The shift from child as troop fortifier to child as a tactic is cumulative, meaning that “change in… [the] variable is continuous but extremely gradual” (p. 181), which is why a broader historical perspective is essential for understanding why a shift in norms occurs.\footnote{Note that the history outlined is not meant to be a sketch of a causal pathway. The goal is to illustrate the changing context of children’s political power—a change that is not straightforward. As children become...}
Adding social network analysis (Chapter 5) helps trace the flow of communication between groups involved in armed conflict, thereby providing insight into how the child soldier use norm is learned and diffused among multiple actors. As Mitchell (1969) observes, the flow of communication through a network is the site where norms are transmitted, disputed, transformed or discarded. By delineating the network of actors involved in the formation of the tactic, we should be able to see that child soldier use has become a norm for insurgencies and opposition groups even though the international community views it as deviant. This chapter will outline the history of youth empowerment, the sanctity civilian life (or lack thereof) and the role of advances in war technology armed conflict. Chapter 5 will continue the discussion, explaining the origins of the child soldier use tactic and how the knowledge is dispersed through multiple social networks.

**Youth empowerment**

In 1683, nine year old Claude de Bonneval went to study at a Jesuit college in France. Two years later, “[H]e left…to sign on as a marine in the King’s Navy. At the age of thirteen he was a sub-lieutenant” (Ariès 1962, p. 193). His path was similar to other servicemen, who joined the military in an apprenticeship system that would prepare them for war. The transition also made them adults. The military apprenticeship system, however, dwindled significantly in Europe by the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, as formal education had taken greater precedence in the lives of the upper class (Ariès 1962). Consequently,

more empowered, gaining more self-determination in the international arena, they also become more protected and as a consequence strongly entrenched subjects under the ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971). It is an ambiguous, liminal, position for children that social forces produce, and it is what makes the anti-child soldier use norm so porous.
according to Ariès, eleven and twelve year olds in Europe were much less likely to be found training as soldiers and more likely to be sitting in schools. Education took over as the institutional site where children matured. The push was led by “moralists” who saw education as having a “moral and spiritual function” which prepared the raw child for adulthood: “it was recognized that the child was not ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to a special treatment, a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join the adults” (p. 412). The transition out of soldiering, out of adult society and into schools, marks a loss of power for children—no longer imbued with the state’s legitimate use of force, children switched over to being controlled, dominated, “quarantined”. 38 The move away from socialized soldier to socially controlled youth is not the final loss of power for children, though. It is but one of many up and down fluctuations in the historical progression of youth empowerment. The following cases demonstrate the many peaks and valleys, rises and falls for youth as political beings.

**Child Rights in the US and UK**

As education changed the construct of childhood in Europe in the 1700s for the upper class, industrialization “redefined” the concept of childhood for the working class in the United States in the 1800s (Hindman 2002, p. 21).39 The post-Civil War industrial boom increased the need for labor and resulted in more and more women and children leaving their homes to work in factories. In the 1870s, 5.92% of the workforce in the U.S.

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38 Similarly, in colonial America, children were viewed as a potential danger, born in sin so that they had to be reborn again to become a more pure adult. And it was not until the 19th century that education played a significant role for American children as reformers viewed schools as a place to “solve the ills of society” (Hawes 1991, p. 14).

39 The history of child empowerment described herein focuses on the United States, Europe, Russia and China as they had the most salient global influence on international norms concerning youth empowerment, an influence that becomes apparent in many independence movements in developing countries.
consisted of children, ages 10-14. By the 1900s, 6.02% of the workforce was made up of children. This was only a slight percentage increase, however. In the last 30 years of the 19th century the number of 10-14 year old workers had more than doubled, going from 765 to 1,750 (p. 31).\(^40\) Children were increasingly part of a new social phenomenon.

Industrialization changed the site of work (no longer the home) and the family dynamics: “As industrialization progressed, households finally become disaggregated individual employees” (p. 24). And children, even though under the control of the company, gained some independence and agency.

As factory-based labor grew, so did political empowerment for children. Even though work conditions were harsh and wages were low,\(^41\) children acquired more voice in society. As early as 1828 children organized a strike at a cotton mill in Paterson, New Jersey to protest a change in meal times and the length of the work day. They persuaded management to rescind the rescheduling of lunch, but they were unable to make the company shorten the day shift from thirteen and a half hours down to ten hours (Bartoletti 1999). In 1834, a group of girls working in a cotton mill in Lowell, Massachusetts went on strike after management announced a cut in their wages. Other notable labor actions for children include the newsboy strike of 1899 in New York City (Bartoletti 1999) and the Mother Jones-led strikes in Carbondale and Scranton, Pennsylvania, on behalf of and with young girls, many between the ages of 12-16, who worked in the textile mills (Steppenoff 1997). Similar advances for children were also

\(^{40}\) According to Hindman (2002), the rise of child labor was not particular to the U.S., but was a phase that all industrialized states went through.

\(^{41}\) For example, the match making industry in Britain, especially from the 1840s-1860s, was considered quite brutal Marx (1976[1867]), introducing diseases such as tetanus to the child workers, half were under 18 and many those were under 13 years old. States Marx, “With a working day ranging from 12 to 14 to 15 hours, night-labour, irregular meal-times, and meals mostly taken in the workrooms themselves, pestilent with phosphorous, Dante would have found the worst horrors in the Inferno surpassed in the industry” (p. 356.)
happening in Europe. The Factory Acts of 1833 and 1844 in the United Kingdom set a minimum age for workers at 8-9 years old and work day length (9 and 7 hours), and included requirements for schooling, several hours per day (Kirby 2003). Meanwhile, boy-tailors led a strike in France in 1840 (Marxist Internet Archive 2010). And by the late 1880s, women and teenage girls in a match factory in London were in the streets protesting 14 hour work days and hazardous health conditions (Raw 2009). Despite industry’s ruthless treatment of children in the workplace, the process of industrialization gave young laborers political power.\footnote{Marx (1976[1867]) posits that the British Factory Acts of the 1800s, and subsequent labor laws regulating work conditions for children and adults as well as modifications to the length of the working day, were the logical outcomes of capitalism: “They developed gradually out of the circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode of production. Their formulation, official recognition and proclamation by the state were the result of a long class struggle” (pp. 394-395). While capitalism may be the ultimate social force that results in child empowerment, this thesis is too grand to be sufficiently explored herein and hence is assumed to be integral to the process.}

The growth of the children’s rights movement in the U.S. and the U.K. was in a large part due to the labor movement, as well as to humanitarian groups and government legislation. In 1796, English philosopher Thomas Spence argued in *The Rights of Infants* that children had natural rights, a right to live and eat, the moment that they entered the world (Spence 1797). Spence thereby extended conceptions of natural rights as developed by John Locke and Thomas Paine. In 1802 the U.K. Parliament passed the Factory Health and Morals Act, which attempted to regulate working conditions for child apprentices (Lavalette 1999). In the 19th century, reformers became important to the children’s rights movement viewing the child “as both needing redemption and being capable of redeeming society” (Hawes 1991, p. 11). Social reformer Mary Carpenter advocated on behalf of children who had broken the law. In her book, *Juvenile Delinquents, their Condition and Treatment*, (Carpenter 1853), she asserted that juvenile delinquency was
more the fault of the parent than the child’s and the penal system should treat children differently than adults. Children gained more security in education with the Elementary Education Act of 1870. The English law required school boards to provide schools for children, ages 5 to 12, and attendance was mandatory (Stephens 1998). At the beginning of the 20th century, English law proscribed punishments for child abuse and “the removal to a place of safety (usually a workhouse) of children found ill-treated, or begging in the streets” (Bigger 2009, p. 62). These protections set forth in the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of 1904 were articulated further in the UK Children Act of 1908.

The United States also produced several important legal moves forward for children’s rights and protections in the 19th Century. Massachusetts passed the first state laws regulating child labor in 1836 and added to those laws in 1842, reducing the workday down to 10 hours (University of Iowa Labor 2010). In 1869, Samuel Fletcher and his wife, Ledicia, were found guilty of abusing their blind son, Samuel Fletcher, Jr., locking him “in a cold, damp cellar without fire, during several days of midwinter” (Cooley 1913, p. 181). The Supreme Court of Illinois fined each parent $300 for the offence: “the court held the parents subject to indictment, because, in chastising their child, they had exceeded the bounds of reason, and inflicted a barbarous punishment” (p. 182). The case was an early example of the parental authority meeting the boundary of the natural rights of the child. Six years later, the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC) was founded in reaction to another child abuse case involving an eight year old girl, Mary Ellen Wilson. Ironically, it was a lawyer for the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in New York (ASPCA) who
took the case to court as the NYSPCC had not been established yet (New York Society 2010; Hawes 1991).

Labor and reform groups in the U.S. continued to play a role in pushing for child rights via protections in the workplace from the late 1800s and into the 20th century. In 1876 the Working Men’s Party, a labor organization, called for laws setting the minimum work age at 14, a proposal which was later endorsed by the American Federation of Labor (Commons and Andrews 1920). Union leader Samuel Gomper fought to stop the use of children in cigar factories in 1883 (Samuel Gompers 2010), and went on to push for a constitutional amendment that would abolish child labor altogether (Organizes for Law 1922). In 1902, a group of workers in New York created the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) to advocate for the abolishment of child labor. The NCLC helped in the campaign to institute a federal U.S. Children’s Bureau in 1912 (Samuel Gompers 2010). The Children’s Bureau became the first federal agency charged with administering child welfare programs. The Bureau’s mission was “to investigate and report on infant mortality, birth rates, orphanages, juvenile courts, and other social issues of that time” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2010).

The drive for federal laws giving children more and more rights continued on into 20th century in both the United States and Britain. In 1919, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson presented a list of child welfare standards the most essential of which were “inalienable rights,” and “an extension of democracy to children” that knew “no boundaries” (Marshall 2008, p. 353). The drive for stronger rights for children was also motivated by a humanitarian advocate for the American Child Health Association (ACHA) and then a U.S. President: Herbert Hoover wrote several charters concerning the
welfare of children and once in office as president, convened a third White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. The result was a 19 article list of rights for children (Marshall 2008). It was with the help of non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children Fund in England and Swedish Radda Barnen, created in 1919, that moved the issue into the international community. The NGOs formed in reaction to the plight of three million children who were victims of a trade embargo by England and its allies after World War I (Save the Children Sweden 2010). Founding member of the Save the Children Fund, Eglantyne Jebb, contributed to one of the earliest international statements about child rights, the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the League of Nations in 1924 (Mahood 2009). The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was formed following World War II to help countries and their children that were affected by famine. The creation of UNICEF in 1946 marked a significant move by the United Nations, an intergovernmental organization, to provide aid to, to promote human rights for, children (UNICEF 2010). By 1959, with the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, children had become integral to the international human rights regime.

The movement for more and more rights for children was not a one-dimensional affair as it was also coupled with a growing list of protections for children. While labor and labor laws may have been politically empowering the child, and social reformers and humanitarian charters may have been pushing for more self-determination for the young, at the same time children were becoming more like victims. Historian Dominique Marshall (2008) argues that today’s debates about child entitlements are influenced by early work by Herbert Hoover and other humanitarian advocates, which pacify the power
of children. Marshall classifies some of the contemporary rhetoric about child rights and welfare as: “children as bodies to be fed and cured, as emotional beings to be loved, as politically neutral citizens, and as future citizens” (p. 351). These classifications are useful for a discussion on child soldiers because they highlight the framing of a child as needing help, and as not quite politically individuated. If we contrast this “not fully developed” image of the child with the concurrent history of youth movements in the world, we find that youth empowerment is a dialectical process, both giving the child agency and at the same time taking it away. The result is that children enter into a liminal social space, an in-betweeness that creates even greater ambiguity regarding norms about how they should exist in the global social sphere. A brief overview of youth movements in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, Germany, and China, reveals more of this socio-political complexity.43

**Youth Movements in the US**

The process of youth empowerment was not quick to occur in America nor was it readily embraced by society. In 1907, psychoanalyst, G. Stanley Hall published a book in the U.S. titled, *Adolescence*. In the book, Hall described adolescence as a chaotic phase of life, characterized by “hyperactivity and inertia, social sensitivity and egocentrism, heightened intuition and infantile disordered state” (Passerini 1997, p. 317). Hall suggested that the way to approach youth chaos was not to push the child into immediate

43 The focus is on youth movements and nation-state’s as these countries had a large impact on the construction of international norms that exist today concerning children. This is not to say that other non-state aligned youth movements did not occur. The Jewish diaspora developed a significant youth movement starting in the early 1900s with groups such as Blau-Weiss (Germany), Gordonia (Poland), Hamahanot (Palestine), Poalei Zion (Russia), Betar (Latvia) and Habonim (United Kingdom) and Young Judaea (United States). The unifying principle was the development of Zionist consciousness (Israeli Ministry 1998).
adulthood, but to let the child experience adolescence as it unfolded. He “considered military training to be the best means for realizing the potential of this age and for respecting its specificity” (p. 317). The military did not however become the main U.S. institution where children were meant to mature. For the most part that was left up to the educational system. According to Altbach (1974) and Brax (1981), in the early 1900s American universities held the role of in loco parentis. This relationship extended the relationship established by earlier years of schooling and implied that students became adults only after graduating. As a consequence, student activism was not generally considered legitimate by the public or the government. And from 1900 to 1917, there was only “modest growth in campus political action” and “very little generational conflict” (Altbach 1974, p. 18).

It was not until the 1930s that student political activism became noteworthy. Except for some abolitionist student groups on college campuses in the 1830s, most of the 19th century protest movements were not ideologically-based, and it was not until the 1930s that the first nationally organized political student movement came about (Brax 1981).\textsuperscript{44} The movement was “ignited by two radical youth groups, working separately—one, Socialist; the other Communist” (p. 20). In 1931, the communist group, New York Student League, formed and soon renamed itself as the National Student League (NSL). The following year, 1932, the NSL sent students to Harlan County, Kentucky to join in the coal miners’ strike. NSL members were confronted by the County Sherriff and local citizens and told to leave, which they did but they continued on in their protest, traveling to Washington, D.C. to petition the federal government to help the miners. The protest

\textsuperscript{44} While only a small percentage of the U.S. population attended college, 9% in 1929 (compared to 5% in 1999), that small fraction did become influential in the political sphere for youths nationwide (U.S. Census Bureau 2000, 2003).
received national attention. In the same year, the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) was created as an outgrowth of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society founded by writers Jack London and Upton Sinclair and lawyer Clarence Darrow (Brax 1981).

Student activism continued after the Harlan County protests. Students staged free speech rallies and strikes at colleges and universities such as Columbia and City College of New York. The demonstrations were over the suspensions of a student newspaper editor and a teacher because of their political views. The indications of a potential war also motivated students across the country to mobilize. The Student Anti-War League formed at the University of California, Berkeley and the Student Congress Against War held a convention in Chicago, Illinois. The anti-war push gained momentum in 1934 with the SLID and the NSL initiating two student-led strikes against the war on campuses including Hunter College, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, UC Berkeley, San Jose State College and Ohio State. The two protest involved over 150,000 undergraduates leaving class, and a third protest, staged in 1936 had at least 350,000 student participants (Brax 1981).

While students were rallying against overseas engagement, another, more broad-based group, the American Youth Congress (AYC) formed in 1934. Its goal was “to protect the mass of American youth from the menace of unemployment, war and Fascism” (p. 68). According to Brax (1981), the AYC was the only student organization that worked with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration (with the help of Eleanor Roosevelt). The AYC worked the institutional facet of change, lobbying the federal government for legislation concerning peace, minority rights, academic freedom and
child labor. One result was the formation of the National Youth Administration (NYA) in 1935, which developed federal aid work study programs for youth (Brax 1981).

As World War II approached, nationalism captured the energy of the students who for the most part moved toward aligning with the country’s political agenda. Isolationists sentiments grew after the 1939 signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact polarized political action, said Brax, making it a choice between peace or “the horrors of Nazis” (p. 91). Combined with Eleanor Roosevelt’s deeper engagement with youth issues, student energies were effectively captured by the state. During the war, the focus on campus was dominated by a support for the military (Altbach 1974). And, “by the end of the war,” states Altbach, “most of the roots of the prewar student movement had been destroyed and political activity, by and large, had to start anew” (p. 111).

In the 1950s American society once again grew apprehensive about youth, envisioning adolescence as potentially detrimental to the nation and making it “a legal and social status that had to be disciplined, protected and given its own institutions” (Passerini 1997, p. 318). Fears of juveniles on the rampage blossomed, and the perception that youth power needed to be contained increased. The federal government responded with the creation of a Youth Correction Division (1951), a Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency (1953) and a Division of Juvenile Delinquency (1954) (Passerini 1997, p. 318). Authors Grace and Fred Hechinger labeled the phenomenon as “teen-age tyranny” in 1962, declaring that America was being taken over by an “adolescent subculture” that was “tribal like and characterized by many aberrations” (p. 323). Youth gangs were seen as the outgrowth of this new tyranny, but they were a social ill rather than a political force.
On college campuses, there was renewed dissatisfaction by students with the direction that society had taken, however the repressive atmosphere effectively suppressed large-scale political movements. (Altbach 1974). Anti-communist McCarthyism contributed to the squashing of professor and student political activities. By the end of the 1950s, more organized efforts at a youth movement coalesced, though. The formation of the Student Peace Union (SPU) in 1959 and the rise of the peace and civil rights movements re-ignited political activism for youths. Examples of a resurgence of youth empowerment include youth marches in Washington D.C. in 1957 and 1958 advocating for the integration of schools, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) mobilization of youth to picket Woolworth’s for not serving Blacks at the lunch counters (p. 198). According to Altbach, the fifties may have been “silent” in terms of the youth movement, but they did produce “the vociferous and militant student movement of the sixties” (p. 203).

It was in the 1960s that we see the peak of the youth movement in the U.S., a time when the young in American society appeared to hold their greatest level of power. The decade is much too complex and beyond the scope of this historical argument to explore herein. A general observation is necessary though. The peace movement against the war in Vietnam and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the continuing civil rights movement and the growing cultural revolt (supported by an ideology of “intense generational resentments and demands for sexual freedom”) (Foss and Larkin 1976, p. 47), empowered a wide age range. And, as a consequence expanded the norm for at what

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45 Children, as young as ten years old, also participated in the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama in 1965. Civil rights organizers saw the utility of children in their movement, not only for populating marches but also for helping to overfill the jails when activists were arrested (Partridge 2009).
age a person could be legitimately political. Even though in subsequent decades, this norm may have somewhat receded, the possibility for where the boundaries could exist remained. The modern archetype of child-as-rebel in American culture has not disappeared. It is the ever-present political potential.

Youth Movements in the United Kingdom

From the 1880s to the late twentieth century, British youth movements followed two modes of empowerment. The first was power garnered from nationalism, the second, which began after World War II, was power gained through consumerism. The earlier mode was not about rebellious British youth lashing out at the state, but rather about “a far more complex and subtle inter-generational dialectic of pressure, response, leadership, and collaboration” (Wilkinson 1969, p. 4). The latter mode was however steeped in anti-establishment posturing and anti-generational distancing. Both pathways enlarged the possibilities for what youth could do in British society while at the same time reinforcing the legitimacy of the social structure that they were working within.

Early British youth movements spanning from the 1880s to the 1940s were, according to Springhall (1977), partly a reaction to urbanization and the rise of leisure time for working class adolescents. More and more youths were clustered together in the cities and, when not working, had time to idle about. Youth organizations arose as a place where these youths could make constructive use of their free time. Youth organizations “evolved at a time when they appeared to offer an antidote to what could be seen…as increasing signs of juvenile restlessness” (p. 15). As a consequence, the overarching youth movement became complicit in the social control of youth and helped feed the
need to solidify national unity in Britain, to protect the Empire. Springhall states that up
until the 1920s, the movements were mostly militaristic and imperialistic in nature, but
after the 1920s and up until WWII alternate ideologies emerged. Three major groups
dominated the British youth movement up until World War II: the Boys Brigades, the
Boy Scouts, and the Cadets. All three were aimed at boys, and were designed to induce
conformity and maturation.

The Boys Brigade was founded in 1883 in Glasgow, Scotland by William
Alexander Smith (Springhall 1977). Smith wanted to revive support for the North
Woodside Mission Sunday School from working-class boys, by developing a Brigade
that would instill Christian values, self-respect and “manliness.” “This was to be done by
using military discipline, organization, uniform, and symbolism in boys over twelve,”
stated Wilkinson (1969, p. 5). According to one of the early Boys Brigade members, the
organization filled the gap for those who had outgrown regular church Sunday school, but
who could not yet join the YMCA, which accepted boys 17 years and older (Springhall
Brigade engaged in weekly drill parades (they wore military-like clothing and carried
fake guns) and was given Bible instruction as well. What started as a small company with
30 members in Scotland expanded to over 300 companies and more than 14,000 members
in Scotland, England and Wales in six years. By 1900, the UK had almost 45,000 Boys
Brigade members and the organization “had spread to Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, West Indies, India, and Ceylon” (p. 6). The Boys Brigade’s stature was
eventually overshadowed by the rise of the Boy Scouts in 1907 and the movement waned
further when its founder Smith died in 1914. The Brigade tried to remain distinct from
the Boy Scouts, though, clinging to its religious ideology and resisting “deep links with the military machine of Britain” (Springhall 1977, p. 30). Members of the Brigade did join British forces during World War I however.

The Boy Scouts may have eclipsed the Boys Brigade as a dominant youth movement in the United Kingdom, but they also owed their existence to their precursor, (Wilkinson 1969). Founded in 1907 by former British soldier Robert Baden-Powell, the Boy Scouts were based on the notion on developing good citizens and reconnecting with nature (Springhall 1977). Nature was seen as a pathway to purity for boys, and the movement itself was “one of the most obvious twentieth-century products of a general tendency in English life to reject disdainfully the unhealthy vulgarity of capitalist urban-industrial values” (p. 54). The Boy Scout movement was aimed at boys ages 11-15. Troops would venture out on camping expedition and put to practice many of the ideas set forth in Powell’s manual, *Scouting for Boys*. The guide presented information such as how to track animals, how to tie knots and how to be physically fit. *Scouting for Boys* also laid out the ideological foundation of the movement, that of fortifying the British empire. As stated in the original Scouting manual: “The main cause of the downfall of Rome is similar to that which resulted in the downfall of other great empires and that cause may be summed up in each case as the decline of good citizenship and the want of energetic patriotism” (quoted in Wilkinson 1969, p. 10). Camping expeditions were one of the means for transforming boys into strong and dutiful British subjects.

Powell’s first Brownsea Island Experiment Camp was so successful that after one year, numerous troops had formed spontaneously across England, which further necessitated adult leaders, advisory committees and standardization of scouting practices.
The boys movement quickly grew into a nationwide organization and by 1910 had over 100,000 official members in Britain and a total of 250,000 when including scouts in the United States, Chile and Argentine (p. 14). When World War I arrived, the Boy Scouts furthered their allegiance to citizenship, assisting “in the defense and effective maintenance of the British empire (Springhall 1977, p. 61). Scouts signaled air raid warnings, helped with food harvests, acted as messengers, guarded reservoirs, and helped boost morale of the newly enlisted. Powell also created a special sub-unit, the Scouts Defense Corps, to defend the country more as soldiers than as civilians (Springhall 1977). The militarization of boys was by no means a new facet of Baden-Powell’s original vision, though. In the first edition of Scouting for Boys (1908) one of the primary laws of scouting was to: “Be prepared to fight in defence of England” (Rosenthal 1984, p. 121). Separate from the law, Baden Powell was once asked about the “Be Prepared” motto that every scout had to recite: “What should a boy scout be prepared for?” Baden-Powell replied, “Frankly, War.” (MacDonald 1993, p. 179). After WWI, the Scouts’ focus shifted to concentrate less on soldiering and more on “family, on class harmony, national unity and peaceful reconstruction” (Springhall 1977, p. 63). The shift aligned with the national movements toward internationalism. The Boy Scouts continued to grow and by 1930s membership was over 400,000 (p. 64).

Today, the Scouts are a worldwide movement with over 26 million members in 160 countries (World Organization of the Scout Movement 2010). They have maintained their citizenship and nature principles as well as their uniforms with neck bandanas and merit bandages. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) have also kept the tie to soldiering. The Explorers program of the BSA trains teenage boys and girls to fight terrorism and
enforce homeland security. In California, youth as young as 14 participate in simulations that “can involve chasing down illegal border crosses as well as more dangerous situations that include facing down terrorists and taking out ‘active shooters’ like those who bring gunfire and death to college campuses” (Steinhauer 2009, p. A1). Clearly the youth movement that began in Britain over 100 years ago has not lost its capacity to empower the young in a significant way.

The third facet of the British youth movement that deserves attention is the Cadets. These groups first appeared in Britain in the mid-19th century during the time of Napoleon III’s threat of invasion. The first official groups formed in public schools in the 1870s (Springhall 1977). Again, the idea of unruly youths who needed to be socially controlled was the main driving force behind the creation of the Cadets. Groups such as the East London Cadet Corp and the Southwark Cadet Corps, were taking working class youths and using the rigors of military discipline to instill the virtues of: physical exercise, discipline and “reverence for law and order” (p. 72). Unlike the Boy Scouts, the Cadets were a direct appendage of the British military with possibly 1,000 Cadets entering World War I for Britain (Springhall 1977, p. 78). After the war, the Cadets waned as a youth movement, which was in conjunction with the general anti-war sentiment in Britain. However, as World War II approached the Cadet recruitment rates rose once again. The Cadet Corps still exist in Britain’s military branches such as the Army and the Navy. Youth must be between the ages of 12-18 to qualify for membership (Army Cadet Force 2010).

Because the Boys Brigade, Boy Scouts, and the Cadets, were all grounded, at least in part, on military principles, there was a fourth facet to Britain’s early youth
movements that merits attention for its anti-military approach. The Woodcraft groups of
the early 1900s were founded on more utopian principles of socialism and evolutionary
theory (Springhall 1977). The idea was that discipline and marching were not the way to
maturation but rather that the child must evolve, “must live through all the stages of
mankind” (p. 111) before he could become an adult. Groups such as the Order of
Woodcraft Chivalry, the Kibbo Kift Kindred and the Woodcraft Folk created rituals,
ceremonies and various woodcrafting skills meant to help the young find “individual
freedom through the open-air life poetry, adventure and play” (p. 112). Like the Boys
Brigade, the Woodcraft groups were reacting to urbanization and industrialization,
however, their utopian ideals kept them, according to Springhall (1977), on the periphery
of the youth movement. The goal of changing British society was noteworthy as another
mode for empowering youth, but it was short-lived.

If the British youth movements of the early to mid-20th century were about
becoming a member of the adult class, the post-World War II movements were about
youth creating new roles in society for youth. The former movements were, according to
Wilkinson (1969), “carefully designed attempts to respond to their [the young] needs and
demands, to harness their energies for great causes approved by their adult leaders—
imperial defence, national defence, international co-operation, national efficiency, and so
on” (p. 22). The goal was to empower youth by socializing them into the confines of the
state, to make them politically strong according to the rules of the state. Personal
empowerment did occur, as one youth said: “I’m not a ‘know-nothing’ that nobody wants
to know. Now—I’m a somebody” (Springhall 1977, p. 121). Here youth was “given” the
freedom to move out of childhood and into adulthood after following the pathway of
military discipline and nature communion. But after World War II, this pathway from child to man/woman drastically changed. Neither adults nor the state guided youth. Youth did.

Following WWII, British youth became “a distinct cultural entity as never before” (Osgerby 1998, p. 17). They were, in a sense, on their own. The state and society were both threatened by this shift in power and at the same time saw it as potentially fruitful. Youth were “vilified as the most deplorable evidence of cultural bankruptcy, and…celebrated as the exciting precursor to a prosperous future” (p. 14). The English state tried to institutionalize and contain the new youth power through the educational system, youth community service projects, and mandatory military registration. Clearly delineated age categories were also constructed by the state, defining youth as between the ages of 14-21 (Osgerby 1998). But the most worrisome time frame became the ages of 15-18. These were the ages when youth could be out of school but did not have to be in the military service, yet. It was “a period which came to be regarded as an unknown and troublesome hiatus” (p. 20).

Youth power during the teen years came mainly from one source: economics. Osgerby stated that from the 1940s to the 1960s, “earning power”, especially for working class youth continually increased, providing them with more disposable income and more “economic muscle” (p. 24). This power was seen as somewhat ambiguous, though, and youth became “the shorthand signifier for unbridled pleasure in what seemed to be a new age of hedonistic consumption”; at the same time youth also embodied “all that the
consumer dream stood for” (p. 33). Teenagers were the center of this new age set class, buying their identities and forms of power.  

Having more and more leisure time, and money, helped spawn British youth subcultures. In the 1950s, Teddy Boys began appearing on urban streets. Dressed in the style of Edwardian dandies, these teens put their money towards fashion and American rock and roll music. Their growing rebel-like attitude transmogrified into more subcultural groupings in the 1960s, most notably the “modernist” or “mods” and the “rockers.” The “mods” were youth with a “neat image of cool sophistication…emblematic of a working class in transition” (Osgerby 1998, p. 42). Similar to the Teddy Boys, they wore tailored suits, kept a sharp appearance and rose motor scooters. Contrastingly, the “rockers” drove motorcycles, wore leather coats and boots and blue jeans. According to Osgerby (1998), “rockers...rejected the ‘effeminacy’ of conspicuous consumption and instead cultivated an image of sturdy masculinity” (p. 42).

The differences between “mods” and “rockers” played out in clashes on the streets of England.  

Gangs from both subcultures would fight and the media would publish the events. The result was a rise in fear over the subcultures’ apparent disregard for civility. Moral panics developed about the youths and their potential threat to English society’s norms and values. The two groups dissipated by the late 1960s, but the societal unease about youth continued as more counter-cultures developed in the next decades.

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46 According to Osgerby (1998), the term “teenager” was coined by American market researchers in the 1940s. The term marked a group “distinguished not simply by their youth but by a particular style of conspicuous, leisure-oriented consumption” (p. 35).

47 The battle between “mods” and “rockers” and the view from British teenagers in the 1960s is succinctly explored in the 1973 album, “Quadrophenia” by The Who, and the subsequent 1979 film based on the rock opera.
including “hippies” “skinheads” and “ punks” (Osgerby 1998). While the British youth movements may not have manifested as direct political action such as the French student occupation of Sorbonne University in May of 1968, the iconic figures of Sid Vicious and John Lennon, Mohawks and shaved heads, have become enduring emblems of youth empowerment that had developed in post-World War II Britain. Although seen mostly as fashion statements today, these semiotic markers still retain the notion that youths always hold the potential to subvert the society within which they live.

Youth Movements in Fascist Italy

At times, youth movements in the U.S. and the U.K. pushed against the state, but mostly their power went through a domestication process whereby youth, even when rebellious, fell in line with national ideology. Luzzato (1997) comments that this was a common characteristic of collective action by youth that began in the 19th century: “aiming to serve the interests of the nation, rather than yearning for a revolutionary transformation of society” (p. 176). In the cases of the U.S. and the U.K, the 1960s displayed signs of rebellion however the end result was cooptation. With Fascist Italy in the early 20th century, the Hitler Jugend of Germany in the 1930s, and the Communist Youth Leagues of China, we find a different pathway. Unlike in the U.S. and the U.K, these states took a much more aggressive role, institutionalizing youth power for use in nation-building. These states harnessed the burgeoning power of children.

Youth movements had a significant role to play in Italian politics at the beginning of the 20th century. Post-World War I Italy endured enormous economic hardship and saw high unemployment rates. Student groups, such as the Avanguardie studentsche dei
Fasci Italliani di Combattimento, formed from 1919-1921 partly in reaction to the harsh fiscal conditions (Passerini 1997; Paluello 1946). In 1921, these associations organized under the name, Avanguardie Giovani Fasciste, and accepted students from all areas of life. That same year, the Balila groups were formed to incorporate children 14 years of age and younger (Paluello 1946). The Partito Nazionale Fascista, or National Fascist Party, PNF, gained more and more control over the youth movement and when it merged with the state under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, the youth movement ultimate goal became the creation of the “new Fascist citizen” (Koon 1985, p. 90). In fact, for fascist Italy, the young were, according to Malvano (1997), “the touchstone of its activities, the key to its own organizational system” (p. 233).

Fascist Italy was obsessed with youth, moving the concept into the realm of myth. The young, says Passerini (1997), were “both a metaphor for fascism and its tool, since it enabled the fascist regime to present an image of strength and power, of historical determination, of destiny” (p. 315). Youth became synonymous with Fascism, attempting to extend of the ideology into eternity (Malvano 1997). The idea of youth was integrated into anthems and slogans. One Fascist saying hoisted leader Benitio Mussolini to the top of the youth iconography: “The Duce is the youngest of us all. What wonderful youthfulness is his!” (p. 250). Another slogan made the older generation an out-group: “by the age of thirty a man is worthless” (Passerini 1997, p. 294). The mystification of youth, theoretical, flipped the generational hierarchy upside down. To be young was to be powerful.

A major component of the “Fascistization” of Italy from the 1920s to the 1940s involved a two-pronged approach: the development of youth groups and the
transformation of the educational system (Koon 1985). The goal was to indoctrinate the body and mind children with fascist ideology and eventually to channel the new political being into the state apparatus. Educational institutions became an “agency of military regimentation” and the paramilitary youth groups were used to “compliment the political work of the schools” (p. 63). Every phase of education, from elementary school and up into the universities, every facet of the curriculum, was infused with fascist ideals.

Learning the alphabet, understanding math, and singing all involved fascist signs and symbols. Grade school textbooks on writing initiated the process. “The letter F, for example, was illustrated with a picture of the fasces; the first word to be pronounced after learning the vowels was eia, a Fascist war cry” (p. 78). And when children were present in the texts, they wore Fascist uniforms, marched in line, and carried play rifles; all in order to become a soldier in the Fascist army (Koon 1985).

In 1926, the Italian state attempted to centralize the network of Avanguardia youth groups by creating the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). The state-run ONB was meant to supplement the school-time indoctrination. Children (boys, mostly) under 18 years old were given “leisure-time activities as well as sports and military training” (Koon 1985, p. 91). The ONB was composed of students and urban youths, so in 1930 another youth group, the Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento, was set up to incorporate non-students and working class rural youths. The Fasci, which was controlled by the PNF, focused on shaping the minds and bodies of 18-21 year olds. According to Koon (1985), there was some “friction” between the groups, so another, umbrella group, the Gioventù Italiana del Littoria (GIL), was created by Mussolini in 1937 to bring in all youth, ages 6-21, into the Fascist state fold (p. 91). Beginning at the age of eight, the
GIL\textsuperscript{48} prepared the child for the military; they “learned to use rifles, machine guns, tanks, and other modern weapons” (p. 149). From the instituting of the ONB and then on to the creation of the GIL, the direction of youth groups and the youth movement maintained one overriding function: “to create ‘Fascists, Fascists without spot…Fascist soldiers’ who would be ‘consentors of national values…[and] the secure military garrison of the new Italy’” (p. 94).

Even though the GIL pulled the youth groups all into one fold, it did not evoke greater allegiance. According to Koon (1985), the fascist power over youth waned in the 1930s. Many children were in the groups for conformity’s sake, others became apathetic and dropped out, and a notable portion move toward antifascist activities. A 1937 PNF report on youth groups in Turin stated: “The Young Fascists are deserting the meetings…Only the books are full of members, but the truth is that the young no longer go to the groups” (p. 114). Anti-Fascist youth movements, such as Giustizia e Liberta, the Giovane Italia, the Alleanza Nazionale per Libertà, and the Movimento di Unità Proletaria (MUP), grew in strength as the the country moved closer and closer to World War II. When youth realized that the Fascist movement would not fulfill its ideological promises for the future, they became either more complacent or more rebellious. The reality that Italy was not ready for WWII and that Nazi Germany was not an acceptable partner finalized the disillusionment: “The regime could enroll millions of young men and women in youth groups, it could bombard them with propaganda, it could make them march and carry rifles, but it could not make most of them accept a war for which their nation was unprepared and an alliance they scorned” (p. 247).

\textsuperscript{48} The GIL also focused on shaping children into clean and upstanding citizens. Koon (1985) remarks that the GIL’s training manuals for squad leaders set forth rules of conduct much like those found in Boy Scout manuals (p. 152).
Despite the Fascist party’s and eventually the state’s efforts to capitalize on the power of the youth, the youth did not fully succumb. The Italian case demonstrates that, first of all, political movements and the state recognize the power potential of children and are more than willing to incorporate them deeply into the military. At the same time, it is clear that youth are not entirely complacent and are quite capable of recapturing their own agency even after years of indoctrination. The history of youth groups in Fascist Italy also shows that norms concerning children and militarization are extremely malleable, especially when the role of the child is being completely dictated by the state. Nazi Germany exhibits a similar empowerment dynamic for youth, one that is also diffused by World War II, but nevertheless contributes to the historical shaping of norms about child soldiers.

**Hitler Jugend as Youth Movement**

The early 20th century marked a major change in the role of children in Germany. The youth movement went from an outdoor, nature-based enrichment idea to an authoritarian state divide and conquer apparatus. The Hitler Jugend (HJ), or Hitler Youth, was the latter, a culmination of several decades of youth movement development, which ultimately transmogrified the child from social subject into political being. As historian H.W. Koch (2000) observed, “never before or since in German history did youth occupy such positions of power” (p. 131). The formation of the HJ was an intentional move by the Third Reich, aimed at dissolving social ties. The process removed youth from the authority of the family, church and schools and supplied them with a commanding agency above most adults (Kater 2004; Michaud 1997). Youth gained “an incomparable
sense of authority over average German citizens of any age, even when they were Nazis, and nearly absolute power over those who were not” (Kater 2004, p. 3). The access to political power was appealing to many for power’s sake alone, but it also provided grounding in an especially chaotic post-World War I Germany (Kater 2004).

The German youth movement began before the devastations of World War I. It was both a new style of collective action, and a hitherto unrealized way to view children and adolescents. “Youth” was not even a commonly recognized social grouping in Germany until the end of the 19th century (Koch 2000; Kater 2004). The movement began in 1901 in Berlin with the creation of the Wandervögel, or “hiking birds.” The youth group was a reaction to the alienating effects of industrialization and the “materialism and bourgeois complacency” of the times (Kater 2004, p. 7). The Wandervögel was not political, though. It was more of a free spirit group, following the philosophical writings of authors such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The boys “roamed the countryside, following their own rules of simplicity and honesty, dressed in makeshift garb, singing rediscovered folksongs, eating simple food by the campfire, and espousing a sexually clean life (Kater 2004, p. 7-8). The organizing principle, one that would carry through many youth groups in Germany, including the HJ, was: “youth should lead youth” (Koch 2000, p. 26). And the Wandervögel did just that up until World War I, out in the fields and woods of Germany.

When World War I arrived, Wandervögel boys did not stay out in the wilds of nature, though. Thousands volunteered to fight against the British. However they were ill-prepared for battle and by the end of the war, the majority of Wandervögel who had joined the army, were dead. According to Kater (2004), the German youth movement was
affected by the deaths, and sought answers for why members of the Wandervögel fared so poorly. In reaction, the next wave of youth groups became “increasingly martial, hierarchical, attached to discipline, uniforms, racist, and suspicious of girls in the midst” (p. 9). After the Wandervögel, many Bünde, or leagues, developed, grew, and disbanded. These included the less political Catholic and Protestant groups, and the overtly political Antifascistische Junge Garde (Antifa), the youth wing of the Rotfrontkämpferband (communist) and the Jungnationaler Bund (Lutheran and conservative), as well as the Youth League of the National Socialist Workers’ Party (a youth group within Hitler’s party) (Koch 200; Kater 2004). Most of the youth groups were anti-democratic, and disillusioned with the Weimar Republic, which was not giving them the future they had hoped for. As a consequence, youth “increasingly looked to radical alternatives” (Kater 2004, p. 6).

Even if the “soldier” had become “the yardstick of German post-war youth movements,” Adolf Hitler was not a big enthusiast of incorporating children and adolescents into the ranks of his party initially (Koch 2000, p. 119). He was more concerned with mobilizing Germans who could vote for him. Once he realized that teenagers would help with strong arm politics, however, he endorsed the development of a youth group. The National Socialist Youth Movement was the first youth movement to set up within Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (NSDAP). Created in 1922, the NSDAP’s Youth League was composed of youths, ages 14-18. But Hitler’s arrest after the Munich Beer Hall putsch of 1923, effectively ended the activities of the Youth League. It was not until 1926 that the group re-emerged under the soldified name of the Hitler-Jugend, Bund der deutschen Arbeiterjugend (Kater 2004). Seen as an
extension of Hitler’s rising power, the Hitler-Jugend was not readily embraced by the state. The youth group’s political activities were increasingly viewed as a threat and the HJ was banned several times. The group gained momentum in the late 1920s and by the early 1930s had incorporated many other youth groups into its organization. By 1933, when Hitler became chancellor, the HJ had over 2 million members; by 1936, that number had more than doubled to 5.4 million youth (Kater, p. 19).

The goal of the HJ was to educate the youth and prepare them to become Sturmabteilungen (“stormtroopers”), a.k.a. Brown Shirts. The organization divided boys into two groups: the Jungvolk, ages 10-14, and the Hitlerjugend, ages 14-18 (Koch 2000). Girls had their own division, the Bund Deutscher Mädchen (BDM). Training for boys was pre-military and included camping, hiking, map study, marching drills, drills in camouflage, and large martial competitions (Michaud 1997). The HJ was a socializing force, much like the Wandervögel, however the goal was not a return to nature. The HJ was aimed at militarizing the youth and preparing them for “a war of territorial expansion and…the neutralization of Europe’s Jews” (Kater 2004, pp. 28-29). Training was harsh, having a strong element of sadism. Many Jungvolk (ages 10-14) had to pass a “courage test” which “could take the form of having to jump in full battle-dress and boots from the window of the first floor of a block of flats” (Koch 2000, p. 193). Strong bodies were essential, and physical education was more highly valued than intellectual development. School curriculums were also incorporated into the Nazi agenda. History, geography and biology were infused with racism, and the school day was modified to focus mostly on physical education—five hours a day (Kater 2004). By 1939, thanks to the Youth

49 Girls were an integral part of the HJ, but they were not for the most part molded into soldiers. Instead they were to be the mothers who would breed the pure German race (Kater 2000).
Ordinance (a decree that made membership in the HJ mandatory for anyone between the ages of 10 and 18) every youth in German society was being pushed towards militarism.

Despite the HJ’s attempt to instill their ethos into the young, there was a youth resistance movement against the Nazi group. These included: the Turnverein Mariendorf, the Rote Jungpioniere, the Rote Pfadfinder, the Schwarze Schar, Christopher, the d.j.1.11, and the Roman Catholic group, Graue Order. Many of the youth became saboteurs while others became “paracriminal juveniles” (Kater 2004, p. 115) The most famous youth group was the Weisse Rose, or White Rose, whose leaders were former members of the HJ. The youth group printed anti-Nazi leaflets and wrote graffiti in the streets saying “Down with Hitler” and “Hitler mass murderer” (p. 129). Even though, by the start of World War II, the HJ was devoted to Hitler and the mission of the Aryan race, at the same time there was a backlash proliferation of anti-Hitler youth groups. The phenomenon indicated that “Hitler’s ‘vision’ had failed to be fully realized” (Michaud 1997, p. 279). In addition to politically motivated youth, there were also numerous gangs and cliques forming all over Germany leading up to WWII. There was the Blasen, or “Bubbles”, the “Jumbo Band”, “Violet Blue”, the Al Capone Gang”, the Edelweissenpiraten (“Edelweisspirates”), the Meuten, and the Swing Youth. These youths either participated in street violence, or crime, or were anti-Nazi by being dedicated to the bourgeois life of American Swing and Dixieland Jazz and “trendy fashion, and the consumption of refined liquors” (Kater 2004, p. 140).

The Nazi regime clamped down on the resistance groups. After 1933, dissent within the HJ was seen as treason against the state, and a few years later this applied to all youth group dissent (Koch 2000). Agitators were arrested and eventually the Nazis
created a special Jugendschutzlager, or “youth protection camp” (Kater 2004, p. 157). The young resisters were framed as criminal and/or biological deviants, who needed to be removed from society. Some members of the Edelweiss Pirates and Swings were sent off to camps in Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Neuengamme. Some Swings ended up in the Moringen camp where they were “subjects for eugenic-experimental scrutiny” (Kater 2004, p. 164). Meanwhile, White Rose leaders Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christop Probst were captured in 1943 and decapitated. Whether a youth was engaged in overt political violence or casual aesthetic difference, this did not matter to the Nazi regime as it was all against the state and hence necessitated abolishment.

With World War II, the Hitler Jugend played an active role in homeland support and physical fighting. HJ units helped with disaster relief when German cities were bombed and assisted the soldiers who returned from battle. Other HJ members went directly into the battlefield. When the war started in 1939, only youth 16 years or older were pulled into the fighting, but that age lowered as the war progressed. After 1943, 15 year old boys were being called up (Kater 2004). It is estimated that there were about 200,000 teenage canoneers, or Flakhelfers, in 1943. The “Flak helpers” would haul ammunition, load weapons and fire at enemy aircraft (p. 199). The Nazis also formed an HJ panzer division. The young tank crews were anywhere from 16-18 years old, and, tellingly, “the panzer recruits did not receive cigarettes like mature soldiers, but candy” (p. 213). Nevertheless, HJ members who had risen to the fighting ranks under the direction of the Wehrmacht, saw themselves as having grown up. They even rejected the HJ label as “it stood for infancy and immaturity” (p. 203). The Nazis also used HJ youth in suicide missions. Against the British, the youths had been seen lying down and letting
tanks drive over them as they detonated grenades underneath the vehicles (p. 214). The “Werewolves” were youths who were dropped behind enemy lines to carry out suicide sabotage missions. HJ members, some as young as fourteen year olds were forced to commit war crimes as well, executing deserters from their own divisions and burying Jews who were still alive (p. 226). By the end of the war, the age for battle had lowered even further, and children as young as 12 and 13 were seen on the Eastern front. An artillery units with 12 year olds was noted as having some of the most ruthless fighters: “Rather than surrender, the boys fought until killed” (Koch 2000, p. 249).

As the can be seen from the German case, from the turn of the 19th century to World War II, society and the state bestowed much power on youth. The Wandervögel youth took it upon themselves to claim their own agency in German society. Other youths moved into more political organizations, and the Nazi party was there to capitalize on the power potential that youths could supply. However, not all youth were willing to give up their own free will to serve the state’s racist agenda. (The White Rose leaders gave their heads to defy Hitler.) And even when they did commit to the HJ and Hitler’s war, firing artillery at the allied forces, they still retained their own agency. Twelve year-olds fighting to their death was a sign of dedication to a cause, and possibly of deeply entrenched indoctrination, but it was also an assertion of self. Nazi Germany stretched many moral boundaries concerning youth and war, but it certainly could not usurp the individual child.

*The Soviet Komsomol as Youth Movement*
While the Nazi state was attempting to dominate every aspect of the child, the Russia state was inculcating communism into its youth. Russia and Germany were similar in that both states were tapping into the power of the youth and redirecting it into the nationalist agenda—to transform society. Nazi Germany was expansionist, and strove for a pure Aryan race. Youth were to be used for their might and for their breeding potential. In post-October Revolution Russia, youth were to be the transformers, the ones who helped with the development of society into a collectivist socialist body. Pilkington (1994) argues that the Soviet youth movement was not a case of simple indoctrination and control, though. Contrary to Kassoff (1965), Pilkington claims that the creation and maintenance of the Communist youth league, known as Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodyozhi, or Komsomol, was a part of a dialectical process to move Soviet society into the ideal world envisioned by Marx and then acted upon by Lenin. Youth would embody the new ideals, and progress would be perpetuated through “social inheritance” of the socialist ideology (pp. 50-51). Kassoff (1965) agrees that the Komsomol youth program was about transforming society, but he says that social control by the elites took greater precedence over communist utopia. “The Soviet leadership,” states Kassoff, “regards the possibility of spontaneous unguided change from generation to generation as subversive to its ambitious plans for the society as well as to its own political hegemony” (p. 4). Even though Pilkington and Kassoff offer different readings of the history of youth movements in the Soviet Union, they both concur that the Komsomol was “a powerful institution of the emergent socialist state” (Pilkington 1994, p. 53).

Before and during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Bolsheviks paid scant attention to youth. At the 1903 Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party, Vladimir Lenin had mentioned the importance of youth forming study groups to learn about Marxism, but little action was taken by the Party (Lenin 1903; Fainsod 1951). Many youth groups formed after the 1917 March Revolution, but they were not under the auspices of the Bolshevik Party. One such youth organization was known as Work and Light (Fainsod 1951). Led by P. Shevtov, an “idealistic young student”, the group of factory workers “repudiated class struggle and called upon youth ‘to join no party, but to work together ourselves according to the precepts of brotherly feeling’” (p. 20). The Bolsheviks viewed the group as a threat and usurped its power by attacking the ideals of Work and Light and offering a more concrete political and economic agenda. Work and Light ended in August 1917 (Fainsod 1951). The Bolshevik Party captured several other youth movements in similar fashion, appealing to working-class grievances, “calling for such popular reforms as the outlaw of child labor, the six hour working day for young workers, the establishment of minimum wages” and so forth (p. 21). One year later, in late October/early November of 1918, the Komsomol, or Communist Association of Youth, was founded, states Fainsod, with a membership of just over 22,000.

When the Russian Civil War started, Komsomol youth engaged. The Bolsheviks depended on the youth league as part of its military force against the White Army (Kassof 1965). According to Fainsod (1951), members of the Komsomol “were rushed to the front in successive mobilizations where they functioned as agitators, commissars, and shock troops (p. 21). As the Bolsheviks gained more ground on the Whites, more youth joined the Komsomol. Military success was a boon to the youth organization, boosting membership significantly, but once the Civil War was over, the Komsomol shifted more
towards an educational focus. The goal of youth and the Komsomol, following Lenin’s urging, was to learn, and to transform: “You must train yourself to be Communists…[and] The entire purpose of training, educating and teaching the youth of today should be to imbue them with communist ethics” (Lenin 1920).\textsuperscript{50} The effect was to move youth away from the role of “military enthusiast” and towards the role of educated “new engineer” of Soviet society (Gorsuch 2000, pp. 19-20).

In 1922, the Bolshevik party expanded its reach, creating another division of its youth league—the Young Pioneers. The move was an attempt to increase its mostly working class ranks by incorporating children, ages 10-16 into the party. Members of the Young Pioneers would eventually move on to the ranks of the Komsomol, which organized and trained youths 14-23. According to Chamberlin (1930), the Young Pioneers did many of the same activities as the Boy Scouts, such as woodworking and physical exercise, “with the difference…that they are crammed with Communist doctrine (p. 328). Later, the Bolsheviks instituted an even younger branch of the youth league called the Octobrists, ages 8-10. Collectively, the three divisions tried to shape the life of a youth from age 8 to at least age 23. The idea was that children were raw and unformed, so they needed to be streamlined into a system that would mold them into the “new citizen,” a Soviet adult (Kassof 1965, p. 27).

While some Komsomol members felt coerced or peer-pressured into joining, many saw the organization as a means of self-empowerment. The league taught proletariat youth how to read, an opportunity that they had not had before joining. It also offered social activities, such as drama groups, choral societies and sports groups, which

\textsuperscript{50} Ethics involved a dialectical battle. It was “the struggle to build communist morality…accompanied by a struggle against bourgeois immorality” (Pilkington 1994, p. 54).
gave many urban youth a “community of peers” (Gorsuch 2000, p. 42). One Komosol member said that he joined the group because he was “eager to become part of the ‘struggle’ for a bright future…realizing the people’s eternal dream of a free and prosperous life” (Pilkington 1994, p. 53). Another member was so dedicated to the group that he said he was “ready to die in the struggle with the enemies of the workers and the peasants” (Gorsuch 2000, p. 45). The Komsomol empowered an economic class that had meant little to the Russia that existed before the revolution. Initially, only proletarian youth were allowed to enter the group, and the more well-off had to apply and be approved by Communist officials. Eventually, in an effort to expand the ranks of the Komsomol, other classes were readily accepted into the organization.

While the Komsomol was turning the individual youth into a “new Soviet”, it also was fulfilling Lenin’s charge to engage in “socialist construction” (Pilkington 1994). Komosol youth participated in the collectivization process, building tractor factories and electric plants, laboring in coal mines, and helping in the dekulakization process. They were organizing sports competitions, dances, and literary talks to educate society (Fainsod 1951). The movement was an all-out assault on the past history of Russia. They spoke out against religion and “declared war on illiteracy, drunkenness and filth and sent out 100,000 ‘cultural soldiers’ to carry through this task” (Pilkington 1994, p. 60). The Komsomol was instilling Soviet morality which asked them to suppress their individual ego and join the collective. The collectivist mentality went so far as to make some youth members dedicate themselves to the cause over and above their own families. A 12 year-

51 The Komsomol was not entirely good-willed, though, pushing other clubs out of society, including the Boy Scouts, in order to solidify allegiance. (Gorsuch 2000).
52 In addition to the social and cultural activities, the Komsomol was, according to Kassof (1965), a paramilitary organization that trained youth physically for battle, taught them how to use weapons, and socialized them into a military way of being.
old boy, Pavlik Morozov, reported his father’s anti-state activities to the Party. The father was executed thereafter. Outraged at the Party’s use of the boy for surveillance, local community members killed Pavlik. The state responded by mythologizing the boy, making him a hero in children’s books (Kassoff 1965, p. 37).

The Komsomol was an all-encompassing youth organization that attempted to drawn in as many children as possible for building the new state, but not every Soviet youth was enthralled with the promise of a “new” and “bright” future. When Lenin put forth his New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, some of the more militant youth became disillusioned with the Komsomol and the Communist party, claiming that the NEP weakened the Marxist vision for an end to class struggle. The NEP, a mix of private market and command economy strategies, was not Communist enough for these youth (Gorsuch 2000). Other youths were apathetic about and bored by the Komsomol. For them, there was too much suppression of the individual. As a result, these youth rejected the “production ethic” and became apathetic towards the movement as a whole (Kassof 1965, p. 144). Another, more overt form of rebellion against the Komsomol manifested as the stilyagi. These were the youth who did not embrace the proletariat ethos, but rather went running towards the bourgeois life. They were “devoted to the quest for pleasure” and tried to “get away with the minimum amount of work while enjoying themselves as much as possible” (Kassof 1965, p. 154). The stilyagi appropriated Western symbols of leisure—fashion, “jazz, dance fads, the cocktail hour” (p. 154). Yet another, anti-Komsomol stance was taken by groups of youth known as the Crown Princes. These were young, underground, capitalist, entrepreneurs, buying and selling consumer goods, “currency and foreign commodities” (p. 156). Whenever the Communist party was faced
with dissenting youth and youth organizations, it responded with denouncements and/or repression. For example, the All-Russian Society of Educational-Production Associations of Youth in Pre-Conscription Military Training, or VTOPAS, was a group that tried to help street teenagers become more integrated into Soviet society. Even though VTOPAS was not against the Komsomol, it was seen as a threat, encroaching on the state’s territory of social control for youth. The Komsomol attacked VTOPAS as “youth syndicalism” and forced the group to disband (Pilkington 1994, p. 56). After World War II, the state also set up “special locations” to send youth who displayed anti-social behavior (Kassof 1965, p. 168). In the eyes of the state, the Komsomol, and its precursor divisions of Young Pioneers and Octobrists, was the only legitimate youth movement.

Even though the Komsomol had its dissenters, it did have enough dedicated followers during World War II. These youths supported war-time production of goods, assisted with reconstruction of spaces bombed by the enemy, aided soldiers returning from battle, and fought on the front lines as well. Pilkington (1994) states that there were over 10 million Komsomol engaged in World War II activities, and 3,000 Komsomol organizations contributing to the partisan resistance against the Nazis (p. 65). The Russian guerilla forces were a mix of the young, the old, labor, technicians, and members of the Red Army. The resisters included lawyers, bank employees, fishermen, lumberjacks, female teachers, mechanics, and so forth (Soviet War News 1942, p. 8). Both women and children were very active in the partisan groups. Women acted as fighters, scouts, messengers, intelligence gatherers, cooks and nurses. One girl, Anna Shubyonik, who was a secretary of her local Komsomol group, fought with her guerilla

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53 The Soviet Union has conscripted males since 1918, and the Komsomol has a long history of working within the military. Recruitment age has been set traditionally around 18 years of age (Jones and Grupp 1982; Soviet War News 1942).
detachment, and, “during one engagement she crept up to an enemy petrol depot under heavy fire and, although wounded, threw her hand-grenades and blew up the fuel” (p. 28). Boys, the ages of 14 and 12, were known to have attacked Nazi staff cars, and to have blown up bridges. One Young Pioneer, age 10, set fire to a tank in a partisan ambush (p. 29). The pre-military training of the Komsomol served many of the Soviet resistance movements well during the war.

As can be seen from this brief history of the Komsomol, the youth organization was empowering and ultra-controlling. The Communist Party tried to make all organized activity for children pass through the state. The Soviet Youth movement was a thoroughly structured and institutionalized affair. Kassof (1965) argues that the Soviet state, through the Komsomol, sought the “superbureaucratization of childhood” (p. 74). Although the attempted dominance of youth paralleled the Nazi institution of the Hitler Jugend, the Soviets were not focused solely on the building of a physical übermensch. Rather, the Soviet youth project included a “concern with knowledge, a respect for science, education, [and] competence” (Kassof 1965, p. 181). This balance of physical and philosophical education was heavily doused with Soviet ideology, nevertheless, Soviet youth were not always subjects of the state. The Komsomol history displays how youth were empowered and, yet again, imbued with agency, despite the state’s efforts to own them under the moral guise of collectivism.

*China’s Youth Movements, the Kuomintang, and Mao*

The last case presented is that of youth empowerment in China. According to Israel (1966), the modern Chinese youth/student movement began on May 4, 1891 with
protests against the “pro-Japanese warlords and politicians” (p.3). Held in Beijing, the demonstrations sparked many more years of rising Chinese nationalism and a turning away from the old order. The May Fourth generation were youth in “revolt against all authority: family, school and state alike seemed decadent, venal, and hopelessly encrusted with worn out ways of thought” (p. 3-4). The uprising signaled a major break away from traditional Chinese childhood socialization, which laid out clearly defined norms and values as transmitted and exemplified by an authority figure. The ingrained rule was: “As long as the leader’s behavior is correct, followers owe him strict loyalty and must model themselves upon him” (Richard and Wilson 1970, p. 93). With the end of dynastic rule, Chinese citizens, including its youth, were less likely to acquiesce if the leaders were not fulfilling expectations. After World War I, many Chinese viewed its government’s inability to refute the Treaty of Versailles as conceding to imperialism. The China’s youth wanted strong leaders and the May Fourth Movement was about forcing its leaders to stand strong, especially against the Japanese. The subsequent decades of political participation by youth became a discourse that targeted “oppressors from abroad and those who practice inept government at home” (p. 98).

The May Fourth Movement was a boon for many socialist groups, boosting youth participation in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the Young China Party (Chauvinists). The new recruits were not merely additions to the ranks, though. The fight for full control of Chinese politics would be partly determined by how the dominant political parties dealt with the eager and motivated youth. Initially, in the late 1920s, the Kuomintang was reluctant to back any student movement as it viewed youth as a potential threat to leadership. Consequently the KMT urged students to
turn away from political activity to return to education. Meanwhile the CCP was doing little to take advantage of the power potential of youth activism as the party was facing strong opposition from the KMT-controlled government. Over time, the KMT and CCP developed two different approaches to dealing with youth empowerment—the KMT tried to oppress and/or control while the CCP tried to incorporate, harness and then unleash youth. KMT leader Chiang Kai-Shek’s solution was not about enlisting the students but rather about “‘sitting’ on them” (Israel 1966, p. 46). Mao Tse-tung inverted the KMT approach buy creating an army of youth willing to “sit” on any opponent of communism. In the end, it was Mao’s strategy that capitalized on the intrinsic power of Chinese youth.

The Kuomintang were not always averse to recruiting youth for direct action. In 1926, the KMT “mobilized China’s students in a nationwide crusade” to try and unite the nation (Israel 1966, p. 11). Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, students of the Whampoa Military Academy marched in the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). From 1926-1928, the NRA fought against warlords in the Northern Expedition. But warlords were not the only victims of Chiang Kai-shek’s campaigns. The Northern Expedition also involved the killing of communists, and in 1927 the KMT initiated the Party Purification Movement to further rid the party of communist influence. According to Israel (1966), many of China’s youth were not supportive of the purification movement and viewed Chiang Kai-shek as corrupt and in collusion with wealthy landlords. By 1928, the KMT had abolished its own Youth Bureau, deeming the “student political movement a “grievous mistake”” (p. 17). When Japanese troops moved into eastern China in that same year, the KMT responded with protests and a “universal program of anti-Japanese education” (p. 21).
Even though youth were willing to speak out and mobilize against what they saw as imperialism, the KMT was reluctant to utilize student movements. Israel (1966) notes that the Kuomintang perceived youths as potential threats to leadership within the party. Instead of a call to action, the KMT maintained a message of education over political activity as the best route for youth engagement in nation-building. Even as the Japanese were moving more and more into China and as the students were presenting the Chinese government with petitions calling for war against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek constantly tried to keep students under his control. He vacillated, though, encouraging students to enlist in the military for a potential war and at the same time, placating the youth movement. He said: “You students can fulfill your duties as citizens by calmly studying and supporting the government” (p. 63). Such pronouncements only frustrated youth even more.

In 1935, youth frustration reached its peak. Fed up with the encroaching Japanese and a complacent KMT government, students in Peiping organized a large-scale demonstration. Known as the December Ninth Movement, the Peiping Student Union voiced its disapproval of the Japanese actions and demanded that the government stop arbitrary arrests of students, stop the Chinese Civil war, and allow freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization (Israel 1966, p. 119). The government replied by having police spray protestors with fire hoses, by beating them and by arresting them. The repressive actions worked against the KMT. Instead of extinguishing the movement, its actions on December 9th set off a wave of support for the youth and the anti-Japanese agenda. The Communist Youth League (YCL) also supported the December 9ers, which boosted the legitimacy of the CCP as a viable option to the KMT.
Following the demonstrations of December 9th, many of the students moved out into the rural areas to continue their cause. Some of these youth formed their own group known as the National Liberation Vanguards of China, or NLVC (Israel and Klein 1976). The NLVC was a more militaristic organization compared to previous youth collectives. Considered a “front organization” for the YCL (p. 102), in 1936 the NLVC instituted guerilla training “to prepare students for resistance against the invader” (p. 115). As war with Japan drew closer, both the CCP and the NLVC urged all of China’s youth to join military forces. When the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 commenced, many youth groups were ready to fight, or lend support for troops and war refugees (p. 167).

The next major step for youth empowerment came under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the CCP. Originally Mao was uninterested in mobilizing youth and was skeptical of the value of students. He viewed them as members of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois classes (Israel and Klein 1976). They were important for the revolution “but play no decisive role,” he said, “only the proletariat and peasant play this role” (p. 187). Ironically, according to Averill (2006), youth helped introduce the revolution into the rural areas, regions such as Jinggangshan where Mao began his guerilla war campaigns to convert China to communism in the late 1920s. When the CCP set up the first Red state in Jiangxi, Mao acted as “president” and “prime minister” but it was Party boss Chou En-lai who organized the population and set up a bureaucracy (Chang and Halliday 2006). Chou En-lai’s vision of developing a communist state started with the youth: “People first got enmeshed in an organization from the age of six, when they had to join the Children’s Corps. At the age of fifteen they were automatically enrolled in the Youth Brigade” (p. 102). Eventually, the indoctrinated youth would be
used as brute enforcers of the communist agenda. Children were placed in “harassment squads, called “humiliation teams,”’ charged with pressuring others to join the Red Amy; and “teenagers were sometimes encouraged to serve as executioners of ‘class enemies’” (p. 105). The practice of utilizing children to enforce the communist ideology would be repeated again and again in the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution. While Mao may not have created the organizational structure that streamlined youth into the service of the CCP, he was more than willing to take advantage of the political power that it provided in years to come. Radical youth under party control fit well with his fascination with “violence that smashed the social order” (p. 41).

Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP sought control over “every facet of the national life”, in part through its New Democratic Youth League\(^5\) (Funnel 1970, p. 107). The purpose of the Youth League was to organize and educate new members for the party, and to help with consolidation of the party. The League was also essential to building up the armed forces. In the rural areas, Youth League members were tasked with reforming the countryside populace, including the creation of co-operatives, and the expulsion of anti-communists. According to one Chinese observer from the era, thousands of youths were mobilized “to prosecute numerous counter-revolutionary elements guilty of heinous crimes and to denounce the criminal acts of corrupt elements and law-breaking capitalists” (p. 114). The youth were fulfilling Mao’s edict (1967) of 1939 in which he declared that young intellectuals and students were an army whose task was “to destroy imperialism and feudalism, change

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\(^5\) The New Democratic Youth League was a renaming of the CCP’s Communist Youth League (CYL), which had been in existence since 1925. The CYL was originally known as the Socialist Youth League of China (Israel 1966).
China’s present semi-colonial and semi-feudal status, and establish a people’s democracy. That is what the youth of the whole country must strive for” (p. 243).

Membership in the New Democratic Youth League grew from a half million members in 1949 to 25 million by 1959 (Leader 1974). The organization returned to its former name, the Communist Youth League (YCL), in 1957. The group included Chinese citizens between the age of 15 and 25. The CCP also had a branch for even younger children known as the Young Pioneers. The Young Pioneers encompassed youth between the ages of 9 and 15 (Israel 1967, p. 2).\(^{55}\) The primary functions of the YCL were to indoctrination and political mobilization of the youth, which including activities such as Mao study classes, physical training, revolutionary theater, and work on the communes and in the factories (Leader 1974, p. 713). The YCL was tied to the military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and during the Korean war the Young Pioneers even readied themselves to become soldiers, drilling “with wooden guns and grenades” (Funnell 1970, p. 126). On one 1965 Chinese radio program it was stated that “every basic militia platoon now has three to five children attached to it. These children will pass on to others the ability to kill the enemy” (p. 126).

Mao maximized the political violence potential of youth during the Cultural Revolution, a period in Chinese history known for the bloody purging of Chinese citizens perceived as antithetical to the ideology of a proletarian state. The Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966-1976, but youth mobilization began in 1965. Paramilitary organizations under the auspices of the YCL were created and violence was acknowledged as a legitimate political tool. The youth organizations were being encouraged by Mao and

\(^{55}\) In 1965, the Young Pioneers extended its age limit to include children over 7 years old. According to Funnell (1970), the Young Pioneers organization was designed to prepare children for the YCL, teaching them the “revolutionary virtues” (p. 124).
General Lin Piao to root out and expel the bourgeois elements from the educational system. In September of 1965, Mao gave secret orders to Peking University students to assault the president of the university (Israel 1967; Richard and Wilson 1970). This was the beginning of the Red Guard, a youth movement that lasted from 1966-1968.

Numerous student groups formed in 1966 rallying under a common cause: disillusionment with the educational system and the ineffectiveness of the YCL. According to Israel (1967), proletarian youth were realizing that even though they might pass through middle school and university, the system benefited children of the bourgeoisie. Consequently, for the proletariat youth school became a place of “academic and social humiliation at the hands of the middle class” (p. 5). Many of these frustrated youths joined the Red Guard movement, stated Richard and Wilson (1970), because it gave them “a sense of power and purpose and a heightened feeling of acceptance by other involved peers,” and a chance at leadership (p. 90). This empowerment manifested as mass mobilization and violence. In less than a year, the Red Guard had held numerous rallies across the country, “physically clashed with government, Party and school authorities, workers, soldiers and other students,” destroyed shops, “assailed citizens and compelled them to change hairdos, dress and shoes,” destroyed art and other religious and cultural monuments, and “entered private homes to destroy family alters and furniture” (Israel 1967, p. 12). Teachers were abused in front of spectators: “dragged in front of crowds and manhandled, their faces blackened, and dunces’ hats put on their heads. They were forced to kneel, some were beaten up, and women were sexually assaulted (Chang and Halliday 2006, p. 504).” Numerous acts of torture occurred across
the country. Mao encouraged school girls to “Be Violent” and they were. At a Peking girls’ school, “the headmaster…was kicked and trampled…boiling waters was poured over her…she was thrashed with leather army belts with brass buckles, and with wooden sticks studded with nails. She soon collapsed and died” (Chang and Halliday 2006, p. 506).

The Red Guard’s purge lasted for almost two years, but the movement could not sustain itself beyond 1968. Even though they were willing to go to the extremes, the Red Guard lacked organizational cohesion. Different factions within the movement vied for command and eventually “[T]he political elite among them…failed to coalesce and was preoccupied with internal bickering (Israel 1967, p. 24). The decentralized nature of the Red Guard coupled with its chaotic violence drained the power from the movement, and caused it to outlive its usefulness for Mao. In July of 1968 he called Red Guard leaders before him and told them “(with tears in his eyes, it was reported) that the time had come for the Red Guards to pass from the historical scene” (Meisner 1977, p. 345). Not all Red Guard groups heeded Mao’s request, though, and the PLA had to be called upon to crush those Red Guard factions that would not relinquish. Many break away Red Guard members were executed. As Meisner (1977), remarked: “The death of the Red Guard movement thus came at the hands of the force that had assisted its birth” (p. 345).

Youth empowerment in China offered enormous political leverage when enacted. Sparked by the May 4th movement in 1891, Chinese youth were more than willing to participate in nation-building, both internally, with new ideologies such as communism, and externally, against imperialistic moves by Japan. When the KMT tried to mollify

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56 The Red Guard also had the support of the police and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA provided “military and political training” (Israel 1967; Nelsen 1972, p. 449).
youth frustrations by telling them to be calm and learn, youth became disenchanted by the government and looked elsewhere to fulfill its needs. The December Ninth Movement marked the shift away from the KMT and towards the CCP. But youth, especially the proletariat, were not convinced that the party and its Communist Youth League were faithful to the vision of a society without classes. The result was the rise of the Red Guards. Chairman Mao, as political entrepreneur, seized this violent power of youth and used it to strengthen his own position of power. In the end, a youth movement that stove to create a new nation was finally captured by the state.

The history of youth empowerment in these six cases—the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Russia and China—exemplifies the growth of child/adolescent/youth/student politicization from the late 1800s up to the 1960s. The range of what youth have done, from mass protests to national defense, to mass torture, has greatly widened the global cultural norm for what their role in politics is and should be. The battle for moral boundaries regarding children has not been about just what happens at the street-level, though. There also appears to be a dialectic between state and society, both of which are trying to capitalize on the power of youth. This dialectic is in accord with Migdal’s (2001) theory of state in society, which highlights the symbiotic struggle between the state and society over principles and values. It is an interplay of institutions and cultures. As he states: “Through their practices, states lay claim to the collective consciousness of their population. Institutions and symbols have been at the core of the continuing reinvention of society. But tremendous contestation prevails over who—the state as a whole, parts of the state, other social organizations—defines and taps
into the forms of collective consciousness in society” (pp. 37-38). In the last 100 years, the role of the child has ceased to become the dominion of the family, and has shifted into an agon between state and society. The result is a greatly expanded social construct for what children can and cannot do in global civil society.

**Civilians as Precious, Civilians as Prey**

Even though the contemporary discourse about the role of civilians in war frames them as sacrosanct, thousands of years of armed conflict reflect a different image. According to historian Caleb Carr (2003), since antiquity civilians have often been the intended targets of military campaigns. Today, states Carr, we call this strategy “terrorism,” but “from the time of the Roman republic to the late eighteenth century…the phrase that was most often used was destructive war” (p. 32). Forces from the Roman empire were, says Carr, “astoundingly savage” (p. 35); the tactics used were meant to instill deep fear in the opposition. Plunder and rape also helped remunerate poorly paid troops. The result, according to Carr, was the eradication of any distinction between noncombatant and warrior. All were legitimate targets.

It was not until after the tenth century that a significant attempt to redraw the line between civilians and soldiers occurred. The Pax Dei (“Peace of God”) movement within the Christian church, says Carr, was an outgrowth of the idea that civilians were not fair game in warfare. Then came the Treuga Dei (“Truce of God”) initiative of 1027 which called for limiting of war to Monday through Friday and a ban on Christians killing Christians. Carr notes that these attempts to control warfare provided hope for the church and peasants, but the reality was that the nobles and knights disregarded the edicts and
“went on warring, raiding, and burning as before” (p. 53). And even though initially it was the church that attempted to set moral boundaries, religion itself was not above ground-level acts of terror. During the Crusades (11th-13th centuries), both Christians and Muslims killed civilians, “reports became routine of the extermination of entire cities. The intention on both sides was, as usual, to terrify and impress the enemy that he would abandon his allegiance to his leader and his cause” (p. 58).

It was not until the 15th century that, according to Carr, another attempt to curb indiscriminate killings during war occurred, however, the motive was less about morals and more about military effectiveness. In 1435, Sir John Fastolf, an advisor to King Henry VI of England, suggested that brutal attacks on French citizenry was counterproductive, both costly and creating more hatred and impetus to fight longer. “Actually combat, he declared, should occur only ‘betwixt men of were and men of were’” (p. 63). The idea of excluding civilians from the battle would develop even further over the next 200 years, and in 1625, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius would codify rules of war, *jus in bello*, setting guidelines such as how prisoners of war and noncombatants should be treated. These guidelines were furthered reinforced by the push for greater discipline within the ranks of armies built up by France’s King Louis XIV and Frederick II, King of Prussia, so that by the 18th century the battlefield was a placed to be occupied by uniformed troops who were fighting uniformed troops (Ahlström 1991). Civilians were less likely to be targeted and “they could even maintain business relations with other civilians in enemy territory” (p. 6).

Civilians continued to be slaughtered in war, from Napoleon’s campaigns to the French Revolution to the American Civil war. However, the global impetus to separate
civilians from soldiers remained, as demonstrated by the First Geneva Convention of 1864. The treaty called for the neutrality of doctors and nurses on the battlefield and advocated care for the wounded and sick, no matter which nation they belonged to (Ahlström 1991). The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 followed, the first of which articulated restraints on weapons that caused unnecessary suffering such as dum-dum bullets and “asphyxiating or deleterious gases” (p. 29). The second conference produced a definition for who qualified as a combatant and how civilians should be treated. During World War I (WWI), many of the Hague guidelines were violated: “from poison gas to mass murder on the high seas, Europeans and Americans broke nearly every code of wartime conduct they had previously established for themselves” (pp. 177-178). The international community responded post-WWI by drafting more agreements concerning the rules of war. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 provided a more detailed prohibition of poisonous gases and biological warfare, and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 outlined how prisoners of war should be treated (Ahlström 1991). During World War II, however, civilians fared poorly as witnessed by the German bombings of British cities, the mass extermination of Jews, the US incendiary bombing of Japan as led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, as well as by Major General Curtis LeMay, and finally the dropping of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Carr 2003).

Following World War II, civilians were afforded even more international attention and protection, in part as a reaction to the civilian casualties that occurred during the war. The 1948 United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide called for the protection of civilians and a prohibition against the extermination
of groups of people. The 1949 Geneva Conventions focused heavily on the treatment of civilians in war. Article 3 of Convention V prohibits:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples (Geneva Conventions 1949).

The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expanded these pronouncements to include both international and internal armed conflicts and the use of civilian targeting as a tactic” attacks against civilians, as well as threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population” (Ahlström 1991, p. 32).

In the twentieth century, international law became increasingly more focused on separating civilians from combatants, but, as Ahlström’s (1991) study showed, civilians were still getting pulled into the battle arena. Alhstrom found that when comparing civilian casualties from 1816-1945 to those between 1945-1990, the latter had significantly more. In WWII, he calculated that 67% of all deaths were civilians. When examining armed conflicts from 1988-1989, Alhstrom observed that 5,000,000 people were killed during this time frame and “nine out of ten of all victims (dead and uprooted)” were civilians (p. 19). He concluded that contemporary wars involved much more targeting of noncombatants. A more recent study by Hicks et al (2009) showed that the trend of civilian casualties has not subsided. Hicks et al counted 60,481 civilian casualties occurring from 2003-2008 during fighting in Iraq (p. 1586). Methods of killing included executions, small-arms gunfire, suicide, roadside and car bombings and air
attacks. From the data of civilians killed where sex and age are known, Hicks et al (2009) calculated that about 20% were women and children.

The history of warfare, including into the 21st century, exhibits an up and down respect for civilian life. It has only been for about the last 300 years that a discourse regarding the protection of civilians has evolved, but at the same time that discourse has been negated with the killings of millions of noncombatants. Although the modern global civil society has established a strong norm against armies inadvertently and/or intentionally targeting civilians, the practice is prevalent. In Afghanistan in 2009, American military commanders are attempting to “cut Afghan civilian deaths,” which shows that the global norm does have some effect; however, the killing of civilians is so commonly accepted as part of war that ending it would necessitate a “cultural shift” within U.S. forces (Burch 2009).

The deeply embedded cultural fact of civilian expendability establishes an environment wherein noncombatants are not exceptional beings. The contemporary international norm may try to sanctify noncombatants, but there is a long history of armed conflict realities that continue to undermine the moral framework of treaties and protocols such as the Geneva Conventions. The result is a blurred global conception of the role of civilians in war. This haziness also affects how the roles of children are socially constructed during war. Children can be seen as precious, productive, mercenary, or even prey in armed conflicts. The perception is quite malleable, thanks partly to how civilians have been treated during war for the last 2,000 years or so.
War Technology Supersedes

Advancements in war technology, especially in the last 100 years, have pushed state and insurgency forces to search for counter-tactics that can meet the power of new weaponry. The logit regression results presented in Chapter 3 (p. 76) demonstrate that the amount that a state spends on its military in proportion to its GDP matters as far as whether or not child soldiers will be used by either side in armed conflict. More military spending translates into more soldiers and weaponry. And here, states hold the preponderance of might as compared to insurgencies—buying, investing in, and developing war technology, and building up large troops. The U.S. National Defense Budget for 2008 is over $500 billion, the highest it has been since 1946. Several billion dollars of these funds have been dedicated to new war technology research such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program (Singer 2009, p. 61). This is just one of the more significant investments that states are making in advanced war technology. The ever-increasing sophistication of weaponry raises the costs of fighting against the state and, in response, opposition forces search for new methods that will raise the costs for states.

Guerilla forces understand the weaponry gap that exists between state forces and insurgencies. In Brazilian guerilla leader Carlos Marighella’s *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla* (2003 [1969]), he emphasizes that even though the urban guerilla has inferior weapons, he can defeat the opposition, if he thinks creatively.\(^{57}\) This means not only relying on light weaponry such as the submachine gun, which is “efficient and easy to shoot” (p. 9), but also shifting the battlefield to include psychological terrains. The fighter should develop tactics that “wear out, demoralize and distract the enemy” (p. 13). War

\(^{57}\) Marighella’s manual, printed in 1969, has been distributed throughout Latin America and Europe and has become a guide for many terrorist groups on both continents (Forest 2006a).
historian Van Creveld (1989) notes that this approach is what has helped guerillas and terrorists win conflicts. He states, “Victory, if and when it came, was usually the result not of outright military superiority on their side but of a crisis of confidence which caused the opponent’s will and/or forces to melt away” (p. 300).

Child soldier use is one tactic that attempts to counter inventions such as the tank, the jet fighter and possibly unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs). The tactic is an attempt to decrease the leverage of money-fortified warfare by shifting the battle into a social-psychological arena. The increasing mechanization and roboticization of war has pulled the soldier’s body, his/her corporal presence, away from the battlefield. Child soldiers are a tactic that brings flesh back into the arena, if not physically, at a minimum, mentally. When children engage in armed conflict, when they enter the theater of war, soldiers who oppose them have a much more difficult time retreating back into mechanized warfare. This can potentially defuse what was a technological advancement in weaponry. The incongruity of a tank rolling up to face a child is not the same as a tank

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58 The term tactic is used following the Clausewitzian (1968 [1832]) notion that strategy is the assemblage of battles in war that seek to serve a political goal, and tactics are how those battles are fought. Manual De Landa (1991) adds further detail pertinent to the idea of war technology and soldiers, stating that “tactics seek to integrate men and weapons in order to win single battles” (p. 83).

59 This is not to say that insurgencies do not have access to, and utilize, advanced war technology. The incorporation of the AK-47 into guerilla movements has certainly raised the costs for government troops, who have had to faced much deadly force, thanks to the profusion of assault rifles globally (Stohl, Schroeder and Smith 2007). Also, the Mujahedeen turned the tide of war against the Soviets in 1986, when they procured over 500 FIM-92 Stinger missiles from the U.S Central Intelligence Agency. The highly advanced Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPAD) technology helped the rebels shoot down aircraft that had been devastating Mujahedeen fighters for years (Crile 2003; Coll 2004).

60 Similarly, Weinstein (2007) argues that resource availability affects how rebel groups utilize violence. He finds that “movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence selectively and strategically” (p. 7). Meanwhile, movements that have greater endowments before the conflict starts are more likely to commit indiscriminate acts of violence. So, the greater the gap between state resources and opposition resources, the greater the likelihood that violence becomes a much more precise instrument of war. I extend this line of reasoning, adding child soldier use as one of these precise instruments of violence.
confronting an adult insurgent, and this is one of the reasons why child soldiers can be effective: they create discord in the mind of the opponent.

Early in the 20th century, British army officer and military strategist J.F.C. Fuller foresaw the importance of war technology, how it could tip the advantage towards the army that incorporated new weaponry. He also emphasized the continual countering of technology with new technology. In his *On Future Warfare* (1928) he traced the evolution of increasing mechanization, beginning with advances in the crafting of bullets (from 1800-1905) and the invention of the Maxim gun. Firing 500 rounds per minute, the Maxim gun was key in the overwhelming defeat and colonization of much of Africa and Asia (Boot 2006). It was iconic war technology, revealing the disparity in killing power between the developed and developing world. In World War I, however, the bullet and gun were soon replaced by tanks and gas as the dominate technologies, and, according to Fuller (1928), these technologies and accompanying tactics pushed combatants and states deeper into the moral universe of war. There was a greater tendency to “strike the moral rather than at the muscle of the enemy” (pp. 179-180), he said. And gas was “par excellence the weapon of demoralization…it can terrorize without necessarily killing…it can enforce economically the policy of one nation or another” (p. 176).

The Industrial Revolution shifted the scale of death and destruction in war as well. Inventions such as the telegraph and the development of railways made mobilization of troops much easier. Technology was a boon to troops: “armies came to be counted in the millions, not in miserly hundreds of thousands as had been the case during the nineteenth century” (Van Creveld 1989, p. 161). World War I was “shorter” than previous world wars because of technology, but it was also “far more catastrophic” with over eight
million people killed (Boot 2006, p. 198). The force ratio of a single soldier had dramatically changed: “A single machine gunner or artillery man in 1914 could rain down more death than an entire regiment a hundred years before” (p. 198). The price of warring had risen with this plethora of technology. Military expenditures for Britain, France and Germany increased by 2,000 percent from 1913-1918 (p. 199). War technology “had turned war into a question of economic and industrial mobilization” rather than face-to-face combat skill (Van Creveld 1989, p. 163).

Numerous non-technology tactics developed to counter the massive “storm of steel” feel of war (Van Creveld, p. 171). Entrenchment, camouflage, and dispersion on the battlefield (instead of line and wedge formations) were used to minimize the high volumes of firepower. But technology again was the main method for answering those tactics. Flamethrowers and tanks came along in World War I—tanks carrying both shell power and the power of fear. According to Van Crevald, for decades the armoured division was “one of the most potent symbols of military power” (p. 179). It was, as Fuller stated, a “wonder weapon,” a technology that plowed through armor and into the minds of soldiers. It was a demoralizing tool that provided a huge advantage, allowing you “to attack the nerves of an army, and through its nerves the will of its commander, [which] is more profitable than battering to pieces the bodies of men” (Fuller, as quoted in Boot 2006, p. 217).

From 1911-1945, advances in airpower changed again the strategies and tactics necessary to win. According to Van Creveld (1989) the development of the long range airfighter was a major technological contribution to air warfare in World War II (p. 190). Airplanes ignored the obstacles that hindered tanks and moved easily back and forth over
enemy lines. The threat from tanks on the ground was coupled with the fear in the sky. This powerful combination was exemplified by Germany’s blitzkrieg strategy, “which consisted of terrorizing a potential target through air raids and propaganda and then breaking up its [the enemy’s] will to resist through a series of armored attacks” (DeLanda 1991, p. 75). Air technology not only changed the ability to destroy an enemy, but also the norms of how to kill. Airpower helped produce “the obliteration of the distinction between the front and rear, combatants and noncombatants…The outcome was a crisis in the law of war, and a process of barbarization,” stated Van Creveld 1989, p. 196). The terror of airbombing peaked in World War II with U.S. Major General Curtis J. LeMay’s decision to firebomb Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Kobe in 1945. A switch in airbomb technology—moving from shells filled high explosives to ones filled with “a new jellied gasoline mixture”—resulted in the deaths of almost 84,000 people and injured nearly 50,000 people in Tokyo (Boot 2006, p. 289). The LeMay bombings “set a horrific new standard of destruction” impacting both civilians and soldiers:

The firestorm became so intense that the B-29s were buffeted like ping-pong balls by turbulence from rising thermal up drafts, and their fuselages were blackened by soot. The crewmen were sickened by the smell of roasting human flesh that reached their cabins thousands of feet above the burning city (p. 290).

The Japanese did not surrender after the bombings, though, and the United States pushed on with an even greater leap in war technology—the atomic bomb.

The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki mark a technological peak in state warcraft. The ability to kill tens of thousands of people and to destroy vast metropolitan areas was unprecedented and, once the bombs were dropped, impossible for

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61 The chemicals in the bombs, now commonly known as napalm, were used previously in World War I in flamethrowers, and incendiary weaponry had already been used on buildings. The tactical/technological innovation initiated by LeMay was indiscriminate firebombing over a civilian-steeped area (Boot 2006).
an enemy to defend. No steel plate could protect those being struck. Also, the organizational complexity behind the construction of nuclear weapons was exponential.\textsuperscript{62} The magnitude of investment needed for research and development of nuclear weapons—finances and personnel—could only be made by an organization at the state level or above. Even today, the resources needed to process radioactive materials extend well-beyond the capabilities of rebel groups and most less industrially developed nations. More than 60 years after the first use of nuclear bombs in war, there are still only eight states that have nuclear weapons—Russia, United States, China, France, United Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Israel (Cirincione, Wolfstohl and Rajkumar 2005). While policymakers and military planners expound the dangers of rogue nations and/or terrorist groups developing or stealing nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{63} illegal warheads have yet to be used. Instead, the counter to nuclear weapon superiority has become ground-level tactics.

“Nuclear weapons,” says Mahnken (2008), forces “armies to achieve greater dispersion, security, and deception in order to survive on the battlefield” (p. 52). This shift towards greater deception, a point that Marighella (2003\[1969\]) stresses in his urban guerilla guide, has continued as super powers, such as the U.S., have continued to develop even more sophisticated weaponry.

The 21\textsuperscript{st} century battlefield now includes robotics—unmanned planes, helicopters, submarines, and land vehicles that serve as spies, bomb squads and soldiers. The Raven drone has been used by the U.S. for aerial surveillance in Iraq. The Predator drone plane

\textsuperscript{62} Ironically, Lord Ernest Rutherford, the British/New Zealand chemist and physicist who discovered radioactivity, had declared in 1933 that anyone proclaiming that they could produce energy from atoms in high, industrial-size volumes “was talking moonshine” (Rhodes 1988, p. 27).

\textsuperscript{63} In U.S. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy he stated: “The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology -- when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons” (Bush, 2002, p. 13).
has killed thousands of Iraq insurgents. The Fire Scout helicopter is being developed to fire missiles on terrorists, insurgents and/or drug traffickers. Unmanned submarines are being utilized for minesweeping and close-to-shore patrols. The Warrior robot has worked for the U.S. military as a member of its bomb squads in Iraq and Afghanistan. And REDOWL “uses lasers and sound detection equipment to find any sniper who dares shoot at the robot or accompanying troops, then instantly targets them with an infrared laser beam” (Singer 2009, p. 111). The point of robotic war technology is to keep the soldier as far away from fighting as possible. Frustrated by the ever-shifting tactics of insurgencies, state militaries are turning to people-less conflict. As U.S. Navy researcher, Bart Everett, says: “To me, the robot is our answer to the suicide bomber” (p. 62).

However, the advanced weaponry is still not foolproof. Having fought in Iraq, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Lance L. Smith expresses frustration even though his forces have the preponderance of might and sophisticated weaponry: “We have [made] huge leaps in technology…but we’re still getting guys killed by idiotic technology—a 155mm shell with a wire strung out” (Boot 2006, p. 388). Robotics may lessen the risk for some fighters, but it does not remove the fact that armed conflict necessitates injury and death, and as long as harm is present, so too are morals. Israel’s use of UAVs against Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon in 2006 has not produced reverential insurgents—fighters who give up in the face of advanced robot weaponry, according to an editor from the Beirut-based Daily Star newspaper. He says that those who utilize robot war machines appear as “cowards because they send out machines to fight us…They don’t want to fight us like real men, but are afraid to fight. So we just have to kill a few of their soldiers to defeat them (Singer 2009, p. 308). Despite the billions of dollars spent on fighting
machines by state armies, small insurgencies remain formidable foes, because they continually transform their tactics. The use of child soldiers is just one of many approaches to the opposition’s emphasis on advanced war technology. Since 2007, the Taliban have been using children as suicide bombers in Afghanistan. A six year-old boy was discovered wearing an explosive vest in June of that year. He was approaching a check point run by international coalition forces. Soldiers defused the bomb, and the boy was made safe. The incident points out how insurgents will use alternate means to counter armed forces that have drone airplanes and robotic bomb squads at their disposal. Using a child as a suicide bomber removes the ability to use robotics and forces the coalition forces to re-insert their bodies into the battlefield in a much more vulnerable fashion. One Lieutenant Colonel spoke to this shift in dynamics that results from switching the age of the bomber: "What we do if we identify the fact that an adult is wearing a suicide vest is we use whatever force we deem necessary to protect the lives of our soldiers and any civilians. Of course it makes it more difficult - it's a six year-old child" (O’Shea 2007).

**Conclusion**

The brief histories of youth empowerment, of norms regarding civilians and war, and of the continual push for newer, better, stronger weapons presented above are not meant to be treatises on the direct causes of child soldier use. However, they should give a clearer indication of the ‘big, slow-moving and invisible’ processes (Pierson 2003, p. 177) that have blurred the norms surrounding the legitimacy of child soldier use. Over the past century, children have been given more and more agency, and at the same time have
been cast as needing protection. Civilians have not been exempt from armed conflict, and, in fact, are often used/kill by states and insurgents in order to weaken the enemy.

Finally, war technology is an ever-evolving tactic that begets counter-tactics, most often approaches that sidestep physical might and necessitate psychological force. These three historical dynamics have created the social space wherein child soldier use as a tactic becomes a possibility. The next chapter will show the post-World War II beginnings of the practice, and will examine the social networks of learning that the tactics have diffused across.
Chapter 5: The Spread of a Tactic

Unconventional warfare is not new to the 20th century. The French are said to have used night ambushes against the English in the Hundred Year’s War (1337-1453); irregular fighting occurred during the American colonial expansion (by both settlers and Indians); the Spanish developed guerilla tactics64 when Napoleon invaded and occupied the country (1808-1814); and T.E. Lawrence, who was one of the first “to reduce guerilla warfare to a set of rules,” waged irregular war during his campaigns in Arabia (1916-1918) (Wilkins 1962, p. 5). In other words, there is a lineage for unconventional tactics that extends back well before today’s armed conflicts. When looking at child soldier use as a complex tactic (not just as a troop builder), however, the origins begin with Mao Tse-tung and his theories on guerilla warfare and protracted war.

In 1937, the Japanese invaded China with superior force, which, according to Mao, precluded a “quick victory” for the Chinese, as Japan’s imperialist stature provided her with “great military, economic and political organizational power” (Tse-Tung 2001, p. 13). Despite the overwhelming might of the Japanese, Mao did not consider them unbeatable. “The danger of subjugation is there,” he said, “But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have advantages” (p. 31). It was the shortcomings and advantages that Mao focused on in his analysis of irregular war in a pamphlet—On Guerilla Warfare (Tse-tung 2005)—and in a series of lectures outlining his theory of protracted war (Tse-tung 2001). In order to overcome the imbalance of force, Mao realized that the resource-laden enemy had to be slowed down so that the weaker

64 The Spanish called their small, but psychologically taxing, style of fighting, “guerilla”, which meant “little war” (Wilkins 1962, p. 5).
opposition could build up its force and reverse the momentum of the conflict. The key was to turn the fighting into a protracted war, a drawn out conflict that produced a shift from the strong enemy versus the weaker opponent, to a balance of power between the two sides (a “strategic stalemate” p. 36), to a flip in power wherein the weaker opponent assumed a “strategic counter-offensive and [produced] the enemy’s strategic retreat” (p. 34).

One essential component of this flip in power was the inclusion of psychological force. Mao acknowledged that the weaker side would eventually have to build up its material strength, but the path to power for a guerilla faction was through the mind: “Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is the people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale” (p. 44). Guerilla warfare was “ruthless in nature,” said Mao (p. 40), and depended on the efficient use of concentrated force. In order to access “human power” Mao advocated the creation of a united front, which included the mobilization of peasants as fighters. Civilians could and should be militarized. “Without question,” said Mao, “the fountainhead of guerilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerilla units directly from themselves” (Tse-tung 2005, p. 73).

Mao’s theory of protracted war helped him win control of China from Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang in 1949, thereby confirming the effectiveness of his battle philosophies. The global communist movement helped spread Mao’s strategies in the 1940s to insurgents in regions such as the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya (Wilkins 1962). His theories were the foundation upon which insurgents in Burma (1949-1955),
Algeria (1954-1962), and Rhodesia (1972-1980) based their battle strategies (Beckett 2001), and Iraqis and Afghan fighters utilize Mao-like tactics as well in 2010. The tactical use of children as soldiers evolved from Maoist roots. As will be shown, the modern use of child soldiers followed a developmental pathway through the First Indochina War, the Korean War, and then the war in Vietnam, winding its way through insurgencies and becoming a staple for future rebel movements.\footnote{Although civilians and children have been involved in armed conflicts during and before World War II, they have not been engaged in warfare as a tactical choice that leveraged international humanitarian norms (See Singer 2006 re: the child soldier doctrine, pp. 53-56). Mao’s protracted war tactics initiate the shift by devising methods that could weaken an opponent with far greater strength, which included a greater focus on the psychology of the enemy (See Tse-tung 2001 and 2005).} Child soldier use became a learned practice and these wars were the laboratories where the knowledge was developed.

**Civilians, Mixed Tactics, and then, Children**

*The First Indochina War*

The Japanese took control of Indochina from the French towards the end of World War II, but after losing the war had to relinquish the territory.\footnote{Rebellion in Indochina was not new after World War II. There had been several rebellions against the French in Indochina in the 19th century, but it was not until the First Indochina War that Mao’s theories were implemented (Lam 1967).} An agreement made during the Potsdam Conference split Indochina into north and south at the 16th parallel. Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang would control the north and the British would oversee the south. (This despite the fact that the Vietminh had already set up a government run by Vietnamese.) The French were left out of the Potsdam conference negotiations, nevertheless they re-asserted their legacy in Indochina and entered Saigon in 1945 “in order to re-establish ‘law and order’” (Fall 1962). The French and Vietminh co-existed
for awhile, but in 1946 tensions peaked. The Vietminh created roadblocks, the French bulldozed them down. The Vietminh reciprocated with attacks on the French to which the French responded by shelling the Vietnamese city of Haiphong. Then, the Vietminh increased attacks against French bases throughout the region and war ensued (Fall 1962).

The Vietminh forces were led by Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap. Both had lived in China and studied Mao’s doctrines. Ho Chi Minh had written his own articles about guerilla warfare and had translated other works on guerilla warfare in Russian and Chinese, and Giap developed, and wrote about, his own version of Maoist guerilla war, which contributed to his formulation of a Viet Doctrine on guerilla war (Beckett 2001; Tanham 1961). The Vietminh forces followed the Viet Doctrine, fighting a protracted war which “was essentially one of attrition, in the sense that all efforts, military and nonmilitary, were aimed at wearing down the French” (Tanham 1961, p. 14).

Some of the tactics used paralleled and extended Maoist guerilla warfare, including engaging the civilian population and attacking the mind of the opponent. General Giap sought popular support for the Vietminh so as to gain “such positive contributions as food, shelter, intelligence, and transport,” and to win the confidence of locals so that they might hide guerilla who were being pursued (Tanham 1961, p. 23). At the start of the war, Ho Chi Minh made an appeal “for women with hoes and children with pickaxes to fight alongside adult males” (Woodside 1976, p. 242). These calls for total engagement by civilians were taken up. The Vietminh organized and utilized men and women from villages into popular troops for the tasks of infiltration, propagandizing, “sabotaging, harassing, ambushing and attacking” (p. 25). According to French Lt. Col. Marc E. Geneste (1962), who fought in the First Indochina War, Giap changed the rules
of war. Fighters no longer wore uniforms, which effectively blurred the lines between who should be fired at and who should be protected. Civilians were pulled deep into the battle theater, “willingly or not, everyone has a role. Even children bring messages or weapons” (p. 266). The Vietminh style, said Geneste, was disorienting:

> French soldiers know that the enemy is here. In the mornings we find our friends killed, their homes burned. Ambushes destroy convoys, soldiers are shot in the back, mines are placed on the roads and bombs blow up here and there killing women and children. Every time we arrive the enemy has vanished in the jungle or is mixed in with the population” (pp. 264-265).

General Giap made it the job of the guerilla fighter “to strike, to harass, confuse and demoralize” (Jonas and Tanham 1962, p. 287). According to Trinquier (2006), terrorism was the Vietminh’s weapon. It was one of the core principles of Giap’s tactics—to ruthlessly “undermine enemy morale in every way possible” (Tanham 1961, p. 75). The extensive use of civilians pushed the notion of partisan fighters beyond its World War II position, and the use of terrorism, sometimes even against the Vietminh’s own popular support, became the new tactic in guerilla warfare, a step beyond the tactics outlined in Maoist doctrine (Johnson 1968).

*Korean War*

North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June of 1950. The armed conflict lasted three years (1950-1953), pitting the North Koreans (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) against the South Koreans (Republic of Korea). But both sides had international backing: the North was supported by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union, and the South was aided by the United Nations and the United
States (Kaufman 1986). The North Korean forces, known as the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), had far greater strength at the start of the conflict:

Supplied generously by the Soviet Union, North Korea had 150 medium-sized tanks and a small tactical air force; South Korea had no tanks and virtually no military aircraft. North Korea had a three-to-one numerical advantage in divisional artillery, and its best guns far outranged those of South Korea (Steuck 1995, p. 11).

Troop size was about equal, but the NKPA had many more soldiers who had fought in the Chinese civil war. They were hardened, experienced war veterans (Steuck 1995). As international players such as the UN, the US, the PRC and the Soviet Union provided more and more physical and material support, the conflict took on a back and forth conventional war struggle for territory, and the initial advantage held by the NKPA disappeared.

Even though both sides of the conflict were steeped in conventional war strategies and able to access significant artillery and airpower, the war was not solely a conventional affair. The NKPA was well-endowed with arms and soldiers, but it utilized mixed tactics against the U.S. army (Minnich 2005). The NKPA “practiced conventional combined-arms warfare, tactics that combined infantry, artillery, and tanks. Unlike the U.S. Army, the NKPA also relied heavily on infiltration tactics, the practice of slipping groups of soldiers through enemy lines to gather intelligence, to attack artillery positions and supply points, and to block roads” (US Department of the Army 2001, p. 30). The infiltration tactic consisted of using the civilian role to their advantage. Members of the NKPA would seek out civilian sympathizers, would disguise themselves as civilians, and would “use civilian refugees as cover” (p. 30).
Many of the NKPA soldiers were well-versed in guerilla tactics, having fought with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria as part of the Anti-Japanese Guerilla Army in the 1930s. According to Minnich’s research (2005), “guerilla combat techniques were the forte” of these anti-Japanese forces (p. 16), and North Korea's first leader, Kim Il-Sung, became famous for his efforts in Maoist-style insurgency battles against the Japanese. In the early 1940s, many of the anti-Japanese soldiers, including Kim Il-Sung, fled to the Soviet Union where they then took up military training, education, indoctrination according to Soviet models of warfare. When the NKPA readied itself for the invasion of South Korea, it was a combination of the Soviet military system of war strategizing and discipline and Maoist protracted war philosophies and practices (Minnich 2005).

The mixed tactics—conventional warfighting plus guerilla warfare—of the NKPA would prove problematic for U.S. forces during the Korean War, and, as the incident at No Gun Ri highlights, would prove psychologically disruptive to American soldiers. In July of 1950, an undetermined number of civilians were killed by U.S. soldiers in the South Korean village of No Gun Ri. The accidental killings were, according to a U.S. Army (2001) investigation, a result of the NKPA guerilla tactics of the “exploitation of civilians” (p. 33). The NKPA’s ability to wage conventional and guerilla war at the same time dissolved the notion of front lines and “challenged the soldiers’ ability to distinguish

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67 By the mid-1940s, North Korea had set up military training centers in former Japanese bases on the peninsula. Some recruits also went to the Soviet Union for training: “in 1946, at least ten thousand North Korean youth were sent to Siberia for specialized military-training in avionics, tank gunnery, communications, and motor mechanics” (Minnich 2005, p. 31).

68 The number of civilians killed is much disputed. An *Associated Press* story from 1999 reported that several hundred refugees were massacred, while research by an Army major Robert Bateman contested the number of killings (he claims around 35 people) and the veracity of the report (Hanley and Mendoza 2006; Greer 2002). A U.S. Army Department investigation in 2001 could not verify the number killed. Civilians were killed, states the report, but it was not a “deliberate” attempt to kill innocent people by U.S. soldiers (US Dept. Army 2001, p. xv).
friend from foe” (p. 103). NKPA soldiers would infiltrate and take “pot shots”; would “pose as peasant refugees” while carrying concealed firearms; would disguise themselves “as farmers whose dress is predominately white”, pass U.S. troops then fire upon them from the flank; women were also found to be concealing handgrenades (pp. 33-35). Confronted by such psychological dissonance on the battlefield, U.S. soldiers at No Gun Ri were not able to distinguish who was the threat and who was an innocent fleeing the fighting.

The Korean War did not yield a conventional win for either side (Kaufman 1986), however, an evolution in tactics did occur. The NKPA demonstrated that guerilla warfare was not solely the provenance of the insurgent or under-fortified army. Protracted war practices could be integrated into conventional war strategies and could produce unsettling results on the enemy. Even though the U.S had nuclear capabilities, it could not help South Korea decisively beat the North Koreans. The exploitation of civilians was not the decisive factor, but it was essential to North Korea’s and the NKPA’s successes. The mixed tactics approach was the next advance in guerilla war strategy pertinent to child soldier use after the First Indochina War.

The Vietnam War

The tactics used in the Korean War involving women and children can be characterized as camouflaging: NKPA soldiers were either using civilians as physical shields (a method of hiding from the enemy’s bullet), or the NKPA were donning the clothes of civilians, wearing them like costumes. During the Vietnam War, or Second
Indochina War (1955-1975), we see a more active engagement by civilians and the pulling of children into more soldier-like roles. Psychological warfare was the dominate approach to battle for the Vietcong. They depended on “selective terrorism,” or repeated acts of focused violence that had no apparent connection (Johnson 1968, p. 445). “They came, fought, and ran,” stated one farmer living near Saigon (Pohle 1969, p. 9). At times the targets appeared logical, such as South Vietnamese soldiers or the police, but other times attacks seemed more random: “American employees and aides…journalists, priests, teachers, and other local leaders, and young men of draft age” (p. 11). The Vietcong were, according to Johnson (1968), creating the alternative to a purely military approach against the South Vietnamese Saigon government, attempting “to isolate it politically and demoralize or win over its army without actually being forced to reverse the rebel-government military imbalance” (p. 445). The objective was to persuade/dissaude the South Vietnamese people through fear; terrorism used to atomize the populace and force them “to make individual calculations of the relative costs and benefits in the short run of particular courses of behavior” (p. 445). Once alienated the populace would then see the North Vietnamese cause as more promising and stable. It was, says Johnson (1968), an evolution in guerilla warfare, and the Vietcong were relentless about it.

In 1954, Vietnam was split into the north and the south along the 17th parallel according to an agreement outlined in the Geneva Accords. The division was an effort to bring about peace between the Ho Chi Minh-led North/Vietminh and the French-aligned Bao Dai government of the South. The Geneva agreement also “called for reunification of the country through nationwide elections in 1956” (Lawrence 2008, p. 50). The south,

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69 This follows Vietnam historian Robert K. Brigham’s timeframe for the war (2006).
or Republic of Vietnam, refused to sign the accord and to hold elections. Prime minister and subsequent President Ngo Dinh Diem opted instead for a non-communist, separate state that looked to the U.S. for support, rather than to the French, Chinese or Soviets. Diem’s regime was repressive, and nation-building was feeble. Many people living in the south were pro-communist and anti-West, having fought for the Vietminh during the First Indochina War. Diem’s harsh crack down on these devotees of the North—arrests of “some twenty-five thousand suspected subversives” who were then placed in detention camps, some tortured, some killed—further ignited the northern-aligned southerners (Lawrence 2008, p. 53). Communist fighters, later to be called “Viet Cong,” began to retaliate against Diem’s state, staging “small-scale raids against government strongholds” (p. 63).

In 1960, the communist fighters formalized their political and military position, forming under the name of the National Liberation Front (NLF). “Modeled on the Vietminh” (p. 64) the NLF fighters, a.k.a. the Viet Cong, entered the Second Indochina War with a firm Maoist/General Giap grounding (Beckett 2001). By 1961, the Viet Cong were waging a full-scale guerilla war against the South Vietnamese government. But both sides were not going it alone. The Viet Cong were bolstered by the North Vietnamese government and the Soviets,70 while the South Vietnamese government was tied to the United States. The U.S. supplied military advisors, then armored vehicles, and then troops. Despite the pairing with superpowers, the South Vietnamese government had overwhelming might on its side, thanks to the Americans. In fact, by 1966, the U.S. dropped more bombs on North Vietnam and Laos each week than they had dropped “at

70 The Soviets offered large amounts of supports, including sending items such as food, fuel, generators, and antiaircraft weapons (Lawrence 2008).
the peak of World War II against the Germans” (Kakin and Lewis 1967, p. 186). The Viet Cong, however, did not whither against the force. Instead it retaliated with more intense terror tactics: “when the heavy influx of new weapons, especially the armed helicopters, caused communist deaths to soar in 1962, the Vietcong loosed a wave of assassinations and kidnappings, presumably to offset the effect of its staggering losses” (p. 138). And it was the combination of terror and infiltration that staved off the American forces for two decades.

The Viet Cong were amplifying and extending tactics practiced in the First Indochina War, most importantly the militarization of civilians and an “opportunistic readiness to exploit any social ‘contradiction’ in order to bring about the violent defeat of the enemy” (Johnson 1968, p. 447). The Viet Cong would attack quickly and then withdraw without trying to win the battle. They would ambush American soldiers from behind; they would blend in with civilians; they would target civilians. Schools were bombed, health centers were bombed. A teenager was used to throw a grenade into a holiday crowd in downtown Saigon, killing six persons, including two children, and injuring 38 persons” (Pike 1970 p. 96). Any method that could pull the enemy off balance was used. The disappearance of front lines and a clearly identifiable enemy was disorienting. It induced fear and paranoia: “Frustrated and frightened, U.S. soldiers tended to view all Vietnamese with distrust” (Lawrence 2008, p. 107). This distrust weakened the morale of American troops and lowered their respect for Vietnamese life. The tactics, in effect, weakened the soldiers’ attachment to laws of war and rules of engagement, making the destruction of homes and private property and the abuse of civilians much more palatable. As one American soldier commented, “Children were
suspect, women were suspect…It’s very easy to slip into a primitive state of mind” (p. 108).

The massacre at My Lai hamlet is a clear example of how American troops were affected by Viet Cong terror tactics. From March 16th to March 19th of 1968, U.S. soldiers led a raid on Son My village in South Vietnam. The objective was to root out Viet Cong who were thought to be using the village as a staging area. Estimates vary, but the Peer Commission report stated that at least 175-200 Vietnamese men, women and children were killed (Goldstein, Marshall and Schwartz 1976, p. 45). These were not insurgents, but rather civilians, “only 3 or 4 were confirmed as Viet Cong” (p. 46). U.S. soldiers had not only massacred noncombatants, they had also acted well-beyond the constraints of laws of war and rules of engagement. Crimes committed “included individual and group acts of murder, rape, sodomy, [and] maiming” (p. 315); and, “in one case the rapist is reported to have shoved the muzzle of his M-16 rifle into the vagina of the victim and pulled the trigger” (Peers 1979, p. 175). Here, in Son My village, the roles had reversed and conventional war soldiers from the U.S. were exhibiting extreme terror tactics.

A U.S. investigation of the massacre, the Peer Commission, cited multiple reasons why the soldiers had broken away from their military code. These included: lack of proper training about the laws of war set forth by the Hague and Geneva Conventions; lack of strong leadership; organizational problems; and, a low regard for the Vietnamese, and other psychological factors (Peer 1979). The soldiers were in a war where roles and rules were blurred, and this created contempt and fear. Some members of Charlie Company derided all Vietnamese people (North and South) as being “subhuman, on the

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71 Son My was a village composed of several hamlets. My Lai was one of those hamlets.
level of dogs” (p. 230). This distrust of the Vietnamese, whether they were fighting against you or with you, emanated from the lack of a distinction between combatant and noncombatant—male, female, young, or old could all be potentially dangerous. As stated in the Peer Commission report, everyone was a threat: “…a war replete with instances of VC women bearing arms and killing U.S. soldiers and children of VC serving as boobytrap specialists and would-be assassins” (Goldstein, Marshall and Schwartz 1976, pp. 198-199). Gender and age were no longer markers for civilian status. And the tactic worked, acting on the psyche of the opponent which then helped to break down order in the troops. The My Lai event laid bare the power of Viet Cong guerilla tactics.

The Viet Cong used children specifically as spies (Peer 1970), suicide bombers and in sapper cells. Recruiters preferred the young for sapper cells “because they are more easily influenced in their thinking, are willing to run risks, physically are better able to carry out their assignments, are less likely to question the arrangements for an operation, and are less apt to become double agents” (Pike 1970, pp. 74-75). Some youths were volunteers while many others were forcibly recruited (Goure 1965). The lowest age for recruitment into formal Viet Cong forces was 17, and boys 15-16 years old were eligible for “youth duties” in local hamlet militia (Donnell 1967, p. 8-11). However, even younger children were utilized for special operations. Fourteen year olds were known to have worked for demolition units laying land mines (Elliot and Elliot 1969), and to have thrown bombs into police headquarters. A twelve year old was coerced into throwing a grenade into a village. A Viet Cong fighter was known to have given a small school girl an unpinned hand grenade and then told her to take it to her teacher: “At the classroom door the child drops the grenade, killing herself and injuring nine children” (Pike 1970, p.
The tactic leveraged the principle that the younger the child, the greater the psychological force.

As discussed in Chapter 4, children in combat are not a new phenomenon, but, in the case of the Vietnam War, it is clear that this is a new use of the child—as a tactical innovation. The Viet Cong had ventured much further than their Viet Minh and North Korean predecessors by making the child a resource for their guerilla war. Children were creating moral dilemmas for the U.S. soldiers, forcing them to choose between killing a culturally deemed innocent, or being killed (Tynes 2008). It was a no-win situation, one that was deleterious to American soldier and their ability to wage war.

The international community recognized the severity of tactics that instrumentalized civilians and children in the Vietnam War. The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions addressed guerilla warfare directly, prohibiting “attacks against civilians, as well as threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population” (Ahlström 1991, p. 32). The Protocols also introduced into international law protection for children against recruitment. According to Bothe, Partsch and Solf (1982), these and other provisions in the Protocols were contentious as they struck at the core power dynamics between rich countries and poor countries engaged in war. The concern was that “a specific rule might give an advantage to the technically advanced country or to the poor country relying on

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72 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not address civilians in combat directly. In 1934, the International Conferences of the Red Cross meeting in Tokyo produced a series of articles that would incorporate civilian protections into the Geneva Conventions. But, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a conference in which the articles were to be reviewed in 1940 was cancelled due to the outbreak of World War II. Consequently civilian protection was not re-introduced until after the war (ICRC 2005).
methods like guerilla warfare” (p. 7).\textsuperscript{73} The issues of combatants versus noncombatants, acceptable methods for fighting and type of weapons used, and the rules regarding protecting or not protecting civilians created a divide between states of the global North and states of the global South at the conference. It was “at the root of the difficulties in the negotiations” and it all stemmed from the “Vietnam syndrome” (p. 9). Policymakers realized the power of the tactics developed by the Viet Cong and the issue became how to control it.

The modern history of guerilla warfare reveals an origins pathway of child soldier use that begins with the protracted war theory of Mao Tse-tung; flows into General Giap’s and the Viet Minh’s utilization of terrorism and the tapping into the role of civilians; is followed by the NKPA’s mixed tactics approach; and then is activated by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. As stated previously, child soldiers have engaged in armed conflict before the Vietnam War. What marks the difference is the Vietcong’s transformation of a practice that was about increasing troop numbers into a tactic designed to disorient and unnerve the enemy.

Diagram 2 depicts the initial origins pathway. Note that in addition to the core structure (Mao to Vietcong), several other branches have been delineated. According to Beckett (2001) and Papagos (1962), the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), the People’s Anti-Japanese Army (HUK/Philippines), the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party of

\textsuperscript{73} In addition to states, 11 liberation movements, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), attend the conference. The groups could give input about the draft provision, however they could not vote on the final provisions (Bothe, Partsch and Solf 1982).
Malaya (MCP) all incorporated Mao’s guerilla warfare theories into their insurgencies in the mid-1940s to late 1950’s. These insurgencies represent how Mao’s ideas spread. However the tactics were not developed further, that is to the degree to which the Viet Minh transmogrified them. The next outcropping of insurgencies stems from the Viet Minh. Fidel Castro’s and Che Guevara’s 26th of July Movement, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Thai Communist Party (CPT) studied and implemented Viet Minh-style tactics and fighting (late 1950s and into the 1960s) (Beckett 2001). These groups exemplify the evolution of protracted war theory, but not in the direction of child soldier use as a psychological tactic. Guevara (2006) did build on and advance Mao’s ideas. The direction of his guerilla warfare doctrine steered away from using children as weapons, though, and codified proper recruitment ages as 16 or older. He stated that anyone younger than this did not have the physical and mental fortitude needed for guerilla warfare. He said the best age for insurgents is between 25 and 35 years old:

An individual who sets out at that age, abandoning their home, children, and entire world, must have thought through their responsibility and made a firm decision not to retreat a step. There are extraordinary cases of children who have reached the highest ranks of our Rebel Army as combatants, but this is not common. For every one of them who displayed great fighting qualities, there were dozens who should have been returned to their homes and who frequently became a dangerous burden for the guerilla band (p. 56).

Clearly, Guevara is advocating against using children in armed conflict.

Like the 26th of July Movement, the FLN and the CPT, the NKPA are attached to the Viet Minh as well. Their development of mixed tactics is what makes them feed into the Viet Cong on the diagram. NKPA’s approach, which involves being fortified with large supplies of military resources and yet still waging guerilla-style warfare, becomes important in the further evolution of child soldier use by governments. For example, the
Guatemalan government has conscripted many children—“boys as young as thirteen or fourteen”—since the 1980s for their Civil Defence Patrols, not only to defend against insurgents but also to act “as repressive instruments to exercise control over the indigenous population” (Woods 1993, pp. 22-23). The fighting in Liberia from 1987 on also includes children waging battles for both the government and the rebels (Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996). The more extreme cases of government use of children in war can be traced back in part to the precedent set by the NKPA.

The Vietcong occupy the final, and central spot on Diagram 2 as they are the group responsible for producing the tactical innovation of child soldier use. Attached below the Viet Cong are the Khmer Rouge of Kampuchea/Cambodia, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) of Mozambique, and the Shining Path of Peru. These three cases are emblematic of how fighting groups have taken the Vietcong development and put it into working order for their armed conflicts. The Khmer Rouge relied on children both when the group was an insurgency and when it was in power as the government; some of the forced conscripts were “as young as seven” (Woods 1993, p. 20). Despite their anti-Marxist stance, RENAMO fighters incorporated children into their battles against the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in the civil war from 1975-1992. This case demonstrates how the communist ideology was no longer essential to the tactic. The Shining Path, an ardent Maoist movement, was known for its terror tactics and sacrificing of children in armed conflict. Women and girls comprised close to 40 percent of the Shining Path force and created such fear in Peru that the Lima police were told to fire unquestioningly upon females if attacked (Woods 1993).
Diagram 2: Origins of Child Soldier Use as a Tactic
The use of child soldiers as a tactic, post-Vietcong, has become an icon of armed conflict in the world today. It is a common practice,\textsuperscript{74} one that has adapted to a wide range of battle scenarios and cultural differences. The practice has become fine-tuned:

…to take deliberate advantage of the moral and operational dilemmas that result. In a number of cases, including Columbia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, the youngest units (known as “small boy units”) are used as the spearhead of assaults. Often, the children are sent forward naked, to create further sympathy and confusion among their opponents. Naked children are also believed to be imbued with magical powers in certain tribal cultures, adding to the disruptive effect (Singer 2006, p. 86).

Through historical analysis, we can see how the tactic first arose. Through further historical analysis and the application of basic social network analysis, we can begin to visualize how the tactic is being transmitted to fighting groups globally.

Diffusion of an Innovation

Why do we see the Taliban and the Khmer Rouge using the same indoctrination techniques for training child fighters?\textsuperscript{75} Why are child soldiers in Columbia utilized in the same manner as in the Democratic Republic of Congo? Are these coincidences, or is there a connection? Is there a line of communication between these groups that allows for the exchange of information about tactics? In this section, I propose that insurgencies have multiple linking communication pathways, and that the child soldier use tactic is sometimes conveyed across these pathways. These communication lines are what facilitate the diffusion of the tactical innovation. The Viet Cong may have created the tactical innovation of child soldier use, but there was no guarantee that it would diffuse to

\textsuperscript{74} For the 107 armed conflicts that occurred between 1987-2007, 78% (83) involved child soldiers. Governments used child soldiers in almost 49% (53) of the conflicts and the opposition used child soldiers in about 67% (72) of the conflicts.

\textsuperscript{75} Information provided by U.S. soldier in a confidential interview, 2009.
other insurgencies. However, it has. The Maoist Lal Sena fighters of Nepal are known to have received “advice and training from Peru’s Shining Path and Indian militant communist groups,” and close to half of the Lal Sena insurgents are teenagers (Spillius 2000). Singer (2006) proposes that this is an indication “that there are teaching pathways by which the child soldier doctrine has been spread” (p. 33).

Heyman and Mickolus (1981) show how another form of political violence, transnational terrorism, has diffused through the international system. They propose several possible explanations for how this might have happened. First, terrorism could be a product of spontaneous generation, meaning that there were no connections between groups and that terrorism occurring all over the world was a self-contained phenomenon, the result of “indigenous factors” (p. 183). Spontaneous generation would mean that, in fact, diffusion did not occur. Second, terrorism diffusion might evolve out of cooperation between groups that are participating in the “free exchange of ideas, information, and assistance” (p. 183). This interaction takes place at training centers, conferences/meetings, and umbrella organizations, such as the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta which joined the Argentinian Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), the Chilean Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) and the Uruguayan Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement/MLN) under one coordinating organization. Third, diffusion can occur by “actual transport”, when a group relocates to a new territory terrorism travels with them (p. 183). The Palestinians are an example of this mode of diffusion. Fourth, and last, is when terrorism is spread through contagion, or, what Heyman and Mickolus (1981) call “influence and imitation” (p. 138). This occurs when a group witnesses or reads about or views through
mass media terrorism and then imitates the actions. Using social network analysis (constructing adjacency maps and producing Markov chains), Heyman and Mickolus (1981) show that spontaneous generation does not explain transnational terrorism; overall it is not a random phenomenon. Rather, diffusion occurs, because of cooperation between groups, by actual transport of groups, and by influence and imitation.

I argue that the child soldier use tactic is diffused in a parallel fashion to transnational terrorism. If we examine insurgencies, regardless of child soldier use, we see that they have cooperated with one another. For example, in the 1950s, Thai fighters were training in China, North Vietnam and Laos (Marks 1996). The Great Lakes region of Africa has seen numerous guerilla factions displaying actual transport in states such as Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Insurgencies in these states have relocated themselves quite often, carrying their causes and fighting methods with them. Insurgencies have also exhibited influence and imitation. In the early 1960s, groups of university students sought out methods for toppling the Shah. They turned to studying the writings of Mao, Guevara and Frantz Fanon as well as analyzing the insurgencies in China, Vietnam and Cuba. This, according to Abrahamian (1980), is the origins of the guerilla movement in Iran. With these three modes of diffusion, insurgencies have transmitted and learned many different tactics, including the child soldier tactic. Some have adopted the latter while others have not.

As demonstrated by the regression analysis in Chapter 3, structural variables such as intensity of the battle, militarization of the state, political terror and polity, have an effect

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76 Learning, as defined by Levy (1994), is “the development of new beliefs, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience skills” (p. 283).

77 Evidence of all three channels—cooperation, actual transport, and influence and imitation—is provided to demonstrate that all three are operative. The degree to which each one occurs is not explored, but it is worthy of much more extensive research.
on the likelihood of adoption by insurgencies and governments. These factors increase
the likelihood of adoption of the tactic. However, this does not insure diffusion.

In order for diffusion of innovation to occur, several factors must coalesce: There
must be “(1) an innovation (2) [that] is communicated through certain channels (3) over
time (4) among members of a social system” (Rogers 2003, p. 11). As demonstrated, the
use of children in armed conflict switched during the Vietnam War from being a means
of boosting troop numbers to a tactical innovation aimed at disrupting the enemy’s force
potential through socio-psychological means. Since then, there have been many different
channels that the tactical innovation could have been passed along—through
interpersonal (face-to-face) contact, and/or through mass media. Forest (2006b) argues
that, for terrorists, motivational knowledge (ideology) is “typically disseminated in oral,
print, and online formats, and largely deals with the realms of psychological, social,
cultural, intellectual, and emotional development” (p.4). Motivational learning, states
Forest, is about increasing the “will to kill” in an individual; whereas, operational
knowledge, or the “skill to kill,” he says, is more likely to occur in training camps and
other centers of learning in which terrorist gather for face-to-face contact (p. 4). Forest
points out that the internet has facilitated the transfer of more and more operational
knowledge then was previously possible. Nevertheless, the “skill to kill” is primarily
being transmitted through the interpersonal channels of conferences, meetings and
terrorist training bases. Child soldier use falls under the “skill to kill” category.

I propose that the development of terrorist training centers in places such as
Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria, and Lebanon has contributed to the diffusion process of
the tactic, by fostering the creation of a social system, or network. If, as Radcliffe-Brown
(1940) states, a social phenomenon is “not the immediate result of the nature of individual human beings” but rather is “the result of the social structure” created by the people who engage in the practice (p. 3); then terrorist training centers are prime places for groups of people to come together, build, reinforce and empower the social network.78 The result is the advent of an international social phenomenon, and the structure through which the diffusion of tactical innovations can occur. The social network is essential for the innovation to spread and endure. Without a network, knowledge dies.

So, the final contributing component to the child soldiers tactic is the rise of a global terrorist network. The development of organizational links since World War II between numerous groups and states in the world has produced multiple learning centers that facilitate the transmission of knowledge of guerilla warfare. The global terrorist network has been developing since the 1960s. Knowledge sharing, and the sharing of norms for how to wage war, has occurred through mass media, such as books and television, and through interpersonal contact, including conferences and training camps (Forest 2006a). Cuba, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Sudan have all hosted terrorist groups either at conferences or training facilities (Bodansky 1993; Sterling 1981; Smith 1995; Marks 1996). These nodes have been the points of contact for terrorist and insurgency groups—points of contact that have helped institute and maintain a terrorist social structure. The network has become an environment where tactics can be discussed, fine-tuned, and made to flourish. Given the fertile space that the terrorist network is for

78A social network is also a structure in which behavior that is viewed by the in-group (sovereign states) as deviant, becomes acceptable and legitimate for the out-group (terrorists). This follows Mitchell’s (1969) observations that social networks are the structures where norms are created, maintained, contested and dissolved.
insurgency war tactics, it is feasible that child soldier use would be included and could be transmitted through the terrorist network. Hence, we can hypothesize:

H: If there is an increase in a terrorist network, then there is an increase in the likelihood that a tactical innovation, such as child soldier use, could utilize the network for diffusion.

Social Network Analysis

To test the hypothesis that terrorist networks increase the likelihood of diffusion of the child soldier use tactic, I utilized social network analysis (SNA) reasoning and methods. SNA uncovers what Wellman (1983) calls “deep structures—regular network patterns beneath the often complex surface of social systems” (p. 157). The method provides sociological insight into the “structure of social action” (Scott 1991). By using SNA, we should be able to reveal the flow of communication between groups involved, thereby providing insight into how the child soldier use norm is learned and diffused among multiple actors. The first step involved a sampling of sites/locations where significant terrorist conferences and/or training occurred was selected, beginning with the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Cuba and spanning to 2007. Cuba, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Sudan were the most prominent locales for the exchange of terrorist knowledge during this timeframe. A database listing all the terrorist groups reported to have attended these main sites was developed. The pairing of

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79 Researchers have used diffusion of innovations theory and social network analysis to study military technology and power, insurgency, terrorism and suicide bombing (e.g. Goldman and Eliason 2003; Horowitz 2010a; Reed 2007; Sageman 2004; Horowitz 2010b), but these concepts and techniques have yet to be applied to child soldier use.

80 Terrorism data was drawn from the following sources: Bodansky 1993; Sterling 1981; Smith 1995; Marks 1996; Forest 2006c, Forest 2006d; U.S Congress 1986; Segal 1986; Cooley 1987; Abdullah and Muana 1998; Clapham 1998.

81 Other locations, such as Uzbekistan, did involve terrorists and training, and was included in the initial sampling. However, after refining the data, these sites fell out of the core structure.
actors with events created a two-mode, affiliation network.\textsuperscript{82} A link or relational tie was established between groups if they visited the same training sites or conferences. They did not however have to be at the same training site at the same time. The rationale was that the location marked where knowledge was held and shared via trainers, hence groups were exposed to the same teachers and basic teachings even if they were not at the center of learning at the same time.\textsuperscript{83} The network was drawn using NodeXL software (Smith et al 2010), a Microsoft Excel-based program that provides a visualization of relational ties and nodes in the network being analyzed. Once the terrorist network was constructed, terrorist and insurgency groups that did not use child soldiers were removed from the dataset. The result produced a skeletal structure of groups that passed through the training centers, conferences or meetings, and that did use child soldiers. This was the child soldier tactic network that had been embedded in the global terrorist network (See Graph 1).

\textsuperscript{82} An affiliation network is “when one set of actors is measured with respect to attendance at, or affiliation with, a set of events or activities” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 30). For this study, actors were either terrorist groups or insurgencies. An event is defined as an appearance at training camps, learning centers, conferences, as well as activity at a home location. For instance, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) is an actor, and Sri Lanka, Israel, Malaysia are some of the events connected to the actor.

\textsuperscript{83} The same logic applies to learning at universities or colleges. For example, one group of students may study at a university with Michel Foucault and then leave after four years. A new group arrives after the former group leaves. The new group studies with Foucault, but has no contact with the first group. Nevertheless, both groups leave the university with a similar body of knowledge.
The most significant finding is that **Libya** is the major hub in the network.

Numerous groups have passed through the Libyan training camps, representing Africa.
the Middle East, South America and Europe. Except for the absence of Asia, this correlates with the regional spread of child soldier using groups in armed conflicts from 1987-2007. For the 83 conflicts that have child soldiers, Africa contains 26 (31.3%), Asia has 26 (31.3%), Europe’s share is 11 (13.3%), the Middle East has 11 (13.3%) and North and South America make up the remaining 9 (10.8%). Terrorist/Insurgent groups include: the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), Sudanese rebels, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Sandinistas, Guatemalan insurgents, Basque insurgents (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Fatah. The second major hub for the network is Nicaragua. Here we find South American groups (M-19, the Sandinistas and the Uruguayan Tupamaros) and Europeans (the ETA and the IRA). It is important to notice that numerous trainers from North Korea, Vietnam, East Germany, Bulgaria, Libya, Palestine and Cuba have passed through Nicaragua. These trainers link Nicaragua with Iran as well. Sudan and Palestine are notable for their generation of a sizable portion of the network in the Middle East (Hamas, Hezbollah, Fatah, the PLO, the PFLP, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Sudanese rebels and Al Qaeda). Syria and Lebanon contribute links to the PLO, Hezbollah, the PIJ, Fatah, the PFLP, and the ETA and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), and Afghanistan is built upon the Taliban, Al Qaeda and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA). Two groups, rather than places, exhibit strong connections: the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and Al Qaeda. Their presence further indicates that interpersonal communication is strong in the child soldier tactic network.
Statistical analysis of the network provides further reinforcement of the general structure discussed above. The graph created is undirected, has 83 vertices and 117 total edges. Libya is the central most powerful node as demonstrated by findings for degree centrality (15), betweenness centrality (1), closeness centrality (2.463) and eigenvector centrality (.421), which put Libya at the top for all four measures. Nicaragua also ranks high for all four measures, except for closeness centrality (3.573). Nicaragua is 34th out of 117 for closeness, which is probably due to the geographical distance of South America, as compared to Libya’s more central location in North Africa. Tables 19 & 20 list the most prominent actors/events and their scores for degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. These are the more frequently used measures for centrality, and indicate roughly the “actor’s prominence in a network (Valente et al 2008, p. 17; Wasserman & Faust 1994). Even though degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector are closely correlated, Valente et al (2008) show that “these measures are distinct, yet conceptually related” and therefore taken together are useful for general analysis of the network structure (p. 19).

In Table 19, we see the general importance or power of Libya, Nicaragua, the Tamil Tigers, Al Qaeda and Sudan in the network. (The table is a ranked presentation for the statistics, except for the switch of Nicaragua and the Tamil Tigers in the Eigenvector column.) In Table 20, we find a few slight differences. Libya, the Tamil Tigers, Nicaragua and Al Qaeda all exhibit the greatest betweenness for the network, suggesting

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84 Degree centrality is the number of ties to other vertices in the network. It is a simple measure of the centrality of the node and its “power potential” (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, p. 147). Betweenness centrality shows to what degree the actor/event lies between the others. The greater the betweenness, the more power over the flow of information in the network. Closeness centrality measures how close the actor/event is to others, implying that the closer one is to another, the more direct contact and influence that actor/event has in the network. Finally, the eigenvector centrality measure describes which event is most central “in terms of the ‘global’ or ‘overall’ structure of the network” (p. 157).
that they all have the strongest power over the flow of information through the network.

For Closeness, there is a slight variation, with Nicaragua dropping away and Fatah and Lebanon ranking 4th and 5th for this measure. These two actors/events, together with Libya, Tamil Tigers and Al Qaeda, have the most direct contact and influence in the child soldier use tactic network.

Table 23: Degree and Eigenvector Centrality for the Most Prominent Positions in the Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor/Event</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Tigers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: Betweenness and Closeness Centrality for the Most Prominent Positions in the Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor/Event</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Tigers</td>
<td>.884</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>2.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measures of centrality provide an overall indication of the key actors/events in the structure. For diffusion to occur, though, it is also essential that the network have weak ties, especially if the innovation sits outside, or at the edge, of social norms (Granovetter 1973). Strong ties are built upon the amount of time actors are together, as well as “the emotional intensity, the intimacy” and the reciprocation of the relationship (p. 1361). The greater the amount time, the greater the emotional intensity, the greater the intimacy and the greater the reciprocity, the stronger the tie. When these dimensions are sparse, the weaker the tie. Weak tie relationships tend to be more in the realm of acquaintances. The logic is that close friends and colleagues have similar knowledge bases, and tend to create insular networks that re-circulate the same basic information. It takes the appearance an acquaintance to introduce innovations. In other words, “information must flow into such an interlocking network from outside to provide energy for further information exchange” (Rogers 2003, p. 341). Fine and Kleinman (1979) explain how the norms and practices of youth subculture—drug use, fashion, music choice, etc.—are diffused, in part, via weak ties. In the child soldier tactic network, there are numerous weak ties, which also enable diffusion. Foday Sankoh and the RUF of Sierra Leone had a longstanding relationship with Charles Taylor and the NPFL of Liberia. The two groups fought together in Liberia and Sierra Leone and members from both guerilla groups had trained together in Libya (Ellis 1998; Abdullah and Muana 1998). The relationship between the two groups would be characterized as a strong tie. Conversely, the IRA and the RUF trained in Libya guerilla camps, but not together. Hence, their relationship would be characterized as a weak tie. The same weak tie relationship also exists between the Basque ETA and the RUF for their appearances in Libya. And the Tamil Tigers and
the PKK have appeared in Syria for terrorist training, but the relationship between the two groups is also weak. These are only a few of the examples of weak ties in the network, but they help demonstrate that there are viable weak tie “bridges” (Granovetter 1973) in the network for the tactical innovation to diffuse across.

*Examples of Terrorists and Insurgencies Training Together*

Two cases from the child soldier tactic network highlight the intermingling of terrorist training and the child soldier tactic network—Libya and Nicaragua. Libya entered the international terrorism network in the early 1970s, with Colonel Muammar Qaddafi providing money, arms and training for the Palestinian terrorist attack during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich (Sterling 1981). According to one U.S. state department official, Qaddafi helped “virtually every group in the world with revolutionary credentials” (p. 260). His mission was to spread Islam and destroy Western imperialism (Bodansky 1993). Groups that Libya supported included Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, the IRA Provisionals, Malaysian insurgents, the Polisario Front, the Basque ETA, the Italian Red Army Brigade, Sudanese and Chadian guerillas and the PLO (Sterling 1981).

The training system developed by Qaddafi was highly institutionalized. There were over 40 different guerilla learning centers established throughout the country (US Senate 1986, p. 87). Upon arrival, “all guerrilla trainees from abroad were checked in and out of the Libyan capital by computer…[and when finished] A golden handshake after graduation included false passports, pocket money for the trip home, and a weapon or two” (Sterling 1981, p. 264). The instruction was extensive and
participants could acquire skills such as desert warfare, proficiency with small arms/explosives/anti-aircraft missiles, and naval capabilities. Additionally, “after six-months of basic training, terrorists are capable of forging documents, sabotage, kidnapping, hijacking and assassination” (US Senate 1986, p. 91). Tens of thousands of trainees passed through the camps, arriving from Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Algeria, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Mauritania, Cameroon, Benin, Niger, Ivory Coast, Japan, Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Venezuela, Argentina, France, Spain, Ireland and Italy (Sterling 1981; US Senate 1986). The instructors were from Russia, Cuba, East Germany, Syria, Palestine, and Libya. Trainees travelled from camp to camp, learning different terrorism skills, spending weeks or months honing their abilities. Members of the Polisario Front even had their children with them and the Libyans provided “hostels for the youth (ages 9-18) to live in while their parents learned tactics” (Sterling 1981, p. 263).

While there is no direct evidence (codified in writing or eyewitness reports) of the teaching of a child soldier use tactic, the Libyan state did promote the use of youth in combat, and many of the insurgents who passed through the training camps used child soldiers in their campaigns. Defense of the nation is considered a duty of all Libyan citizens and everyone, men and women, are trained in military skills. The official age of conscription is 18-15, but children are given “preliminary military training from the age of 14 onwards. Between 15 and 18, school children (boys and girls) are trained twice a week in the use of hand-weapons” (War Resister’s 1998). In the late 1980s, Libyan militia units recruited boys as young as 14 and a Libyan prisoner of war in Chad was said to be 11 years old (War Resister’s 1998). Clearly
the Libyan state has not been against the militarization of the young. Within the Libyan guerilla training camps, there were numerous insurgencies that either used child soldiers at the time or would go on to utilize them in their battles against governments. The AFDL of Congo-Zaire, the Basques (ETA), Fatah, Guatemalan insurgents, the IRA, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, Columbia’s M-19, Liberia’s NPFL, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Uganda, Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, Sudanese rebels, and UNITA of Angola all received instruction in the Libyan training camps. Whether or not they learned the efficacy of child soldier use cannot be determined beyond a doubt, however, it is plausible that the tactic of using underage fighters was discussed in the guerilla training centers. In the very least, enough groups that used child soldiers passed through Libya and made it possible for the innovation to diffuse.  

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Cubans “established a center of international terrorism: in the 1980s (Bodansky 1993, p. 298). The Latin American training grounds were incorporated into a Cuban and Soviet vision of defeating the west that was formalized with the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana Cuba (Sterling 1981). Over 500 delegates attended the conference, representing insurgencies from the former Belgian Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa, South-West Africa, the Yemens, Palestine, Laos, Cambodia, South Korea, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, 

85 Note the geographical range of the participants: Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. Also note that the use of child soldiers as a social/political phenomenon was not widely reported in the media or well-documented in books until the 1990s, so that mass media could not have been the key, initial transmitter of the innovation.
Columbia, Cyprus, Panama, and Indonesia (p. 14). The purpose of the meeting was “to devise ‘a global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism’” (p. 14). Guerilla training centers were first set up in Cuba, and the Sandinistas would learn guerilla tactics there as well as in Lebanon and Libya (Sterling 1981; Ashby 1986).

When the Sandinistas took control of the Nicaraguan government in 1979, they continued the Cuban and Soviet vision established at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference. According to Ashby (1986), “within weeks of taking power in Managua, the Sandinistas began turning Nicaragua into an operational center for revolutionary internationalism” (p. 3). With Cuban and Soviet help, the Sandinistas fortified more than 20 different garrisons and training centers in order to prepare rebels and terrorists for their battles abroad (CIA 1985, p. 11). Trainers and trainees came from Palestine (PLO), North Korea, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Spain (Basque ETA), Italy (Red Brigade), Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Ireland (IRA), Argentina, Uruguay (Tupamaros), West Germany, Honduras, Costa Rica, Columbia (M-19), and El Salvador (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front/FLMN) (Bodansky 1993; Moore 1985; CIA 1985; Ashby 1986). As of 1985, over 3000 military and security personnel from foreign countries had provided instruction in the Nicaraguan camps (CIA 1985, p. 9). The training was in security, intelligence, weapons instruction, pilot instruction, “tactics, politics, and engineering” (CIA 1985, p. 10). Four training camps were set up to teach guerilla skills to the FMLN in order to prepare for attacks in El Salvador (Moore 1985, p. 82), and the PLO entrenched
themselves in Nicaragua,\textsuperscript{86} using it as “a formal base from which to launch terrorist operations in the Western hemisphere” (Bodansky 1993, p. 299).

As with the Libyan case, there are no explicit documents describing the development or practice of child soldier use as a tactic. But many of the insurgents and terrorists that were in Nicaragua did use, or went on to use, children as combatants. The Basque ETA, Iranians, Iraqis, IRA, Libyans, M-19, PLO, Sandinistas and Vietnamese all incorporated children into their troops. These groups all co-mingled in training camps in Nicaragua in which the sole purpose was to learn skills and tactics to defeat opposition governments. Whether or not the groups picked up the child soldier tactic directly from their experiences in Nicaragua, the environment was primed for the exchange of such a tactic. Like teachers who exchange pedagogical insights in university meetings and hallways, and students who trade study tips, insurgent and terrorist organization in centers of learning pass their battle insights and experiences amongst one another. Nicaragua in the 1980s was a likely locale for transmission of this type of knowledge. In the very least, the social norm against child soldier use did not exist in the training camps.

As the Sandinista-controlled government came to an end in 1990, the “terrorist supporting infrastructure quietly collapsed” (Bodansky 1993, p. 299). The child soldier network in Latin American did not fizzle, though. In Columbia, thousands of child soldiers have worked for the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (Coalition to Stop 2004). Twelve year olds have been part of self-defense militias in Peru, and children were used as fighters by the Shining Path guerillas (Coalition to Stop 2004;\textsuperscript{86} A PLO “embassy” was also set up in Managua (Ashby 1986, p. 4).
Brett, McCallin and O’Shea 1996). The Nicaraguan flow of insurgents and terrorists through the Nicaraguan training camps in the 1980s probably assisted the diffusion of the child soldier tactic to these Latin American groups.

Conclusion

In Chapter 4, we considered how socio-historical forces have shifted the norms regarding children and civilians over the last century and half, and how exponential advances in war technology have produced a never-ending need for new tactics. In this Chapter we began with the notion that Mao’s guerilla fighting style and theories initiated the process of problem-solving, i.e. how to defeat an enemy who had the preponderance of force. By tracing the evolution of tactics from the Viet Minh to the Viet Cong we see how one new technique to counter a powerful American military was developed—child soldier use. But the tactic did not end with the Vietnam War. The creation of a terrorist network provided a structure for the diffusion of this tactic by numerous adopters. Terrorist training camps and interpersonal contact helped weaken the moral boundary prohibiting child soldier use and increased the ease with which fighting groups could learn the practice. This is how the child soldier tactic network was finally created.87

The development of the child soldier use norm is similar to the norm “life cycle” as outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 895). Their life cycle has three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. Norm emergence involves norm entrepreneurs who attempt to persuade “a critical mass” to adopt a new norm. Norm

87 Again, the depiction of the child soldier tactic network is not meant as evidence to support a causal argument that training camps and learning centers caused child soldiering. Rather the aim of the social network analysis is to reveal pathways that the tactic could have been communicated and diffused. The network does not cause, it facilitates.
cascading is when others begin to adopt the norm, and acceptance (if the norm catches on) rolls through social groups as a cascading phenomenon. Finally, norm internalization is when “norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (p. 895). What Chapters 4 and 5 have attempted to show is that using child soldiers is a norm and that it has a clear life cycle. Military strategists, such as General Giap, were norm entrepreneurs with regards to battlefield tactics. They pushed the edges of acceptable fighting practices. After Vietnam, norm cascading occurred and was facilitated by the creation of a child soldier use network. Finally, child soldier use became socially internalized. In Chapter 3, the quantitative data showed that the majority or armed conflicts from 1987-2007 involved children in combat. In other words, contrary to the position of the global community of the 21st century, child soldier use became a norm for rebels and government armies—a legitimate tactic for use in battle.
Chapter 6: Ground-level Dynamics and the Case of Sierra Leone

“...they took a stone and hit the face of my father and then he was killed and they removed his blood and put it in a cup and said ‘drink this blood or else we will kill you’; so I have no alternative but to drink the blood…”

-testimony of a child to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The overarching argument—that child soldier use offers a tactical advantage—has been explored and elaborated on at two levels. The quantitative analysis approached the problem on the state level, considering factors such as military expenditures, polity, political terror and so forth. The argument then shifted towards the international level, looking at historical social forces and the diffusion of the practice through a globally situated network. What has been missing, though, is a consideration of the local, ground-level dynamics of child soldier use as a tactic. In essence, what has been left out is the core reality: what happens on the battlefield where use occurs. Revealing the state and the international level manifestations of child soldier use is important, but it has the potential to gloss over the individual, sociological/ontological dynamics. Child soldier use is a rational action which is steeped in the visceral reaction that the practice evokes. It takes place in a brutal arena, but it is a calculated endeavor that capitalizes on generational social divisions and flesh. International and state level analyses provide the frames through which we can begin to see what is happening, but these frames cannot capture clearly how youth, guns and blood combine to create a daunting tactic. The following discussion will provide a finer-grained analysis by presenting findings from a single case study of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.

In *Case Studies and Theory Development*, George and Bennett (2005) detail how case studies complement and bolster arguments made from macrolevel analyses. One of the main premises of microlevel analysis is “that individuals must have been capable of behaving, and motivated to behave as the macrolevel theory states, and that they did in fact behave the way they did because of the explicit or implicit microlevel assumptions embedded in macrolevel theory” (p. 142). Case studies can provide the thread that ties the micro- to the macro- theory, and they can also highlight where the theory breaks down or over-extends, e.g. when examining outlier cases. With a single-case study of Sierra Leone presented in this chapter, the point is to leverage the strengths of case study approaches, such as increasing conceptual validity and refinement, revealing other variables that might be at play, exploring casual mechanisms in more depth, and developing a more complex child soldier use model (p. 19).

The armed conflict in Sierra Leone is an extreme case. It is an instance where the class of events is in “full play”. Almost all parties involved used child soldiers. A plethora of moral boundaries were shattered. Children were utilized and abused in multiple ways. Forces inside and outside the state contributed to the phenomenon, and little-to-no effort was made by the international community to stop the practice. Because the Sierra Leone case is saturated with the phenomenon under consideration, one might deem it an instance of selection bias, that is, choosing a case that only supports the theory being tested, thereby not truly testing the theory (a.k.a. leveraging the zero degrees of freedom state of affairs). This would be a valid criticism if the Sierra Leone case was meant to be an inductive pathway to theory-building. This, however, is not why the

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89 Following George and Bennett (2005), a case is “an instance of a class of events” (p. 17), with the class of events equaling child soldier use during armed conflict.
armed conflict in Sierra Leone was chosen. It is not an attempt at testing the tactical innovation thesis. Rather, the point is to elaborate on the thesis, to uncover the complexity of child soldier use when it is thoroughly engaged, and to explore motivations more deeply. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone is also valuable because it is a recent case and still quite present in the collective memory of those involved. As will be seen from the data presented—from interviews, historical documents and ethnographic observations—we can develop an intricate picture in a large part due to the fact that the armed conflict is a contemporary case.

In Chapter One, a causal hypothesis is presented that outlines a rational actor perspective for why individuals and insurgencies would use child soldiers. It is argued that child soldier use increases political opportunities, making it a valuable tool in armed conflict. The causal pathway is presented again in Diagram 3 below.

**Diagram 1: Causal Relationship of Child Soldier Use to Political Opportunities**

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Moral dilemmas

Use of child soldiers (+) Troop fortification (+) \rightarrow Political opportunities

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Relocation of fear
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90 Recall that political opportunities are events or social process that “undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (McAdam 1982, p. 41).
If an insurgency has the tactical need, as is demonstrated by the regression analysis in Chapter 3 for armed conflicts from 1987-2007, then child soldier use is a tool that might be chosen. There are, however, obstacles to this choice. Utilizing children in combat pushes moral boundaries observed by most cultures throughout the world. When a fighting force crosses over this moral boundary, they are breaking through a social control mechanism. Hence, the moral boundary is a cost that the insurgency/government force must consider. But the tactic can also produce benefits. If a group is willing to transgress the moral boundary, it gains access to new forms of power, which can tip the cost/benefit balance towards benefits. The broader hypothesis is: If there is an increase in tactical need, then there is an increase in the likelihood of child soldier use, and then there is an increase in the likelihood of political opportunities. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone will shed light on the tail end of this hypothesis, examining each of the three dimensions—troop fortification, moral dilemmas, and relocation of fear. The case study also reveals the dynamic of tactical interaction, or the reciprocation of child soldier use by the opposition in order to counter the power of the tactic. Finally, the war in Sierra Leone exposes a deeper dynamic, that of social disruption or the intentional attempt to tear apart pre-existing social structures. The Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) battle strategy deliberately placed children in the center of the conflict. The result was an upending of pre-existing patrimonial structures of social control. The point became to obliterate any and all forms of political power containers, from the top (central government), through the middle (local government), through the family and into the child.
A Brief History of the War in Sierra Leone, 1991-2002

On March 23, 1991, an insurgent force of about 100 fighters crossed over the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone and lay siege to two towns in the southeast district of Kailahun.91 The group was a mix of Sierra Leoneans, Liberians, and mercenaries from Burkino Faso (“Burkinabes”). The attack was relatively short: “The rebels killed one Sierra Leone army major, one lieutenant and eleven civilians, looted the towns and withdrew into Liberia” (p. 59, Gberie 2005). This assault, however, initiated the ten year-long civil war in Sierra Leone, which resulted in an estimated 20-50,000 casualties, the loss of limb through intentional amputation for 30,000 people and the violent sexual assaults of over 200,000 women (Ploughshares 2011).

Although the first attacks consisted of a number of different groups—Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya, lumpen youth and criminals recruited from Liberia, and members of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) specials forces—the insurgency would become known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone (Abdullah 2004). The RUF was formulated by Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray after their return from guerilla military training in Libya in 1988. Sankoh and his cohort organized for the conflict while in Sierra Leone, and then during stays in Liberia. Liberian Charles Taylor and the NPFL offered support (arms and troops) for the RUF in exchange for help with the NPFL insurgency, which had been staging its own rebellion in Liberia (Abdullah 2004). Sankoh started recruiting for the RUF in 1990 in detention centers in Liberia, where Sierra Leoneans where being held. At Camp Namma, a training base for the NPFL, he developed the seeds of the RUF insurgency, what would become the trademark of the rebel fighting force. According to the Sierra

91 See Appendix F for a map of Sierra Leone.
Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission (2004b), “the base provided the training
ground for a unique and vicious breed of fighters, many of them child combatants” (p. 101). These recruits would become the vanguard force for the RUF:

- a disparate collection…included among their number both men and women; Sierra Leoneans of most of the major ethnic groups in the country, including large numbers of Mendes and Temnes; boys as young as 11 years of age, ‘senior citizens’; illiterate labourers and secondary-school drop-outs through to a highly educated professionals in diverse fields (p. 105).

Within the vanguard was a group of about five children who “formed the RUF’s first contingent of ‘small boys’” (p. 107). Testimony given by one of the vanguards stated that these children (between the ages of 10-14) did not train with the adults, but they were given weapons and named ‘bodyguards’ or ‘small soldiers’; these young recruits were noted as being ‘fierce fighters’ during the war and a few of them became members and commanders of the RUF’s Small Boys’ Unit, or SBU (p. 107). Even before the war started, Sankoh and his forces considered children as integral to battle.

According to Abdullah (2004), the RUF was less about an intellectual movement overthrowing the government, and more about disgruntled lumpen youths and individual citizens turning towards more self-serving violence in response to years of government corruption. President Joseph Momoh was in power when the RUF conducted its initial raids. Momoh was the “handpicked successor” of Siaka Stevens, the first, post-independence President of Sierra Leone (Gberie 2004, p. 34). Stevens’ presidency, which began in 1971, was known for its ever-increasing corruption, moving a state premised on democracy towards patrimonialism, one party elitism (the All People’s Congress/APC), and poverty. During Stevens’ reign, Sierra Leone went from being a state potentially rich from diamonds and agricultural goods, to one bankrupt and severely lacking in basic

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92 This is contrary to Paul Richards’ (1996) claim that that the RUF was a groups of excluded intellectuals.
social services such as healthcare and education. It was not all Stevens doing, though, as he did not inherit a perfectly blank, pure democratic state, but rather entered into, and readily coopted, a colonial state system that was “illegitimate and exploitive” well before independence (Gberie 2005, p. 29). When Stevens retired and Momoh took over, citizens looked for positive change and significant reforms. President Momoh seemed to hear the call for reform, but he was, in reality, “a benign figure, if a thoroughly incompetent one” (p. 37). It was in this environment, a state willing to prey on its own citizens, that the RUF took up arms in what would be less about a revolutionary transformation and more about a Hobbesian, self-serving reaction to a nasty and brutish government.

As the RUF continued its incursions across the eastern part of Sierra Leone, Momoh responded by sending troops from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) to fight off the insurgency. However, the SLA was small and ill-equipped. In 1990, the army consisted of a little over 3000 members (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1991). Under President Stevens rule, the military was kept weak in order to prevent any military resistance to presidential power. As a consequence, Momoh turned to Guinea and Nigeria to help fortify his army; he also recruited a rag-tag number of Freetown “vagrants” to raise the SLA troop level to about 6,000 (Gberie 2005, p. 64). Despite the increase in Momoh’s army, they could only attain a “stalemate” against the RUF in early 1992. Meanwhile, Sierra Leonean citizens were calling for more and more political reforms back in the Western capital of Freetown, pressuring Momoh to return the state to a multiparty constitution. Momoh’s government was being confronted on both electoral and military fronts. And then, on April 29, 1992, members of an unpaid and disgruntled
army staged a coup and ousted Momoh from power. The new junta, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, named itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and promised to defeat the RUF and bring Sierra Leone back to the people (Gberie 2005).

Despite the promise of stability, the NPRC and the country descended deeper into the war and more troubles. The RUF’s takeover of the southern and eastern provinces severely harmed the food supply as these provinces were key agricultural regions, and the fighting forced over 100,000 Sierra Leoneans to take refuge in Guinea. The RUF did not control the entire country, but their brutal tactics were having an effect on citizens everywhere, on and off the battlefield. The “hacking off of hands and limbs, rape, all forms of torture, and the destruction of schools and the violent recruitment of schoolchildren…were causing deep demoralization in the nation’s population” (p. 71).

The NPRC’s Captain Strasser derided Momoh’s regime both for its corruption and its ineffective Sierra Leone Army. Strasser claimed that the RUF could be defeated and the NPRC began building up his forces—troops, including unemployed youths, and more “sophisticated weaponry and communications equipment from Belgium and Romania” (p. 74). According to an Amnesty International report (1993), “by 1993 over 1,000 boys under 15 years of age, some as young as seven, were reported to have been enlisted into the army” (p. 1). In the years to come, the NPRC would also hire British-based Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) and the South African mercenary company, Executive Outcomes (EO) to help with the conflict (Gberie 2005).

The NPRC regime increased its military prowess as soldiers from the SLA moved in and captured territory from the RUF, including the diamond mines. But the glory of the victory was quickly eroded as many members of the SLA looted villages and mined
the diamonds for themselves. Soldiers would pretend to be RUF rebels on their rampages, thereby earning the name, “sobels”, a.k.a. “soldiers by day, rebels at night”, for their duplicitous actions (p. 106, Abraham 2004a). Despite the corruption on the battlefield, the NPRC junta did move closer to civilian rule. In 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP)93 was elected president.

During its term of rule (1992-1996), the NPRC gained some ground against the RUF, but its efforts alone were not enough to stop the rebel atrocities. The NPRC’s self-serving sobel troops further diminished the sense of trust in the state. As a consequence, local militias formed to fend off the RUF. Collectively these militia became known as the Civil Defense Force, or CDF. One of the earliest militias was a Tamaboro battalion, organized in late 1992 “under the patronage of a senior NPRC officer” (Gberie 2005, p. 82). Tamaboros were traditional hunters who worked as scouts and as combatants. They were revered for their keen awareness of the bush terrain and a deep knowledge of the occult world. According to Gberie (2005), they were a “witchcraft battalion” (p. 82), an important physical and spiritual counter to the RUF’s socially disruptive ways of waging war. The Tamaboros were one of four main civil defense groups; the others were the Kapras, the Donsos, and the Kamajoi (Mustapha 2006, p. 45).

The Kamajoi became the most notable “face” of the CDF in Sierra Leone, and Chief Hinga Norman was their most prominent military head. Like the Tamaboros, the Kamajoi were revered for their “magical powers” and bush knowledge (Muana 1997, p. 84). These were men steeped in the Mende hunter guild tradition and Poro secret

93 The SLPP was the rival party to Stevens APC.
The Kamajoi forces were effective against the RUF because they had, in addition to their skill as warriors, psychological power on the battlefield. As Muana (1997) notes the Kamajoi exemplified how many African wars were fought not just on the corporeal level, but also on the psychological level “through traditional magic and assistance of the spiritual world” (p. 85). The mythic quality of the Kamajoi was essential to their counterinsurgency, because it confronted the terror that the RUF tried to generate. Some RUF combatants said they were easily defeated by the Kamajoi because they feared their “supernatural powers” (p. 94). The Kamajoi were also able to recruit many volunteers into their ranks as they carried moral legitimacy in the community—they reinforced pre-existing social norms rather than destroyed them (as the RUF would do).

This reinforcement of social norms was apparent in how the Kamjoi incorporated children into their troops. According to Mustapha (2006), the Kamajoi did not force children to fight. They “mainly used propaganda and heroic praises” for recruitment (p. 48). Youths would join in order to exact revenge, protect their village or to become a hero. If children wanted to volunteer, they had to be accepted into the Kamajoi and then undergo Poro and Kamajoi initiation (Muana 1997; Mustapha 2006). The process adhered to pre-existing cultural rites of passage, changing them from children into adults, making them legitimate men and warriors in the society. This approach was the opposite of how the RUF used children. Under the RUF, children were forced to fight or act as sex slaves, and to be subservient to their commanders, who were to be seen as their new fathers, or Pa’s.

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94 Poro is a West African secret association of the Mende that “serves as the primary religious and political entity at the local level” (p. 8, Bellman 1984). The society is also responsible for initiating boys into manhood, and for teaching youth proper conduct in society. Those who do not pass through Poro are not considered adults, and are not allowed to fight in war or even act as spies (Confidential Interview, 2009).
The CDF\textsuperscript{95} was extremely important in subduing the RUF in Mende Chiefdoms, and the militias were credited with helping to pressure the RUF to sign the Abidjan Peace Accord on November 30, 1996 (Gberie 2005, p. 86). But the ceasefire, and subsequent election of President Kabbah, did not end the war. In May of 1997, another coup occurred, led by sobel members of the Sierra Leone Army. During the overthrow of the government, they freed a former SLA major from prison—Johnny Paul Koroma—who would then become their new leader. President Kabbah fled Sierra Leone, as Koroma took control of the government under the name of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Koroma invited Foday Sankoh and the RUF to join forces with the AFRC. Members of RUF flooded into the capital of Freetown and with the AFRC instigated waves of looting and brutalization, which they nicknamed “Operation Pay Yourself.” According to Gberie (2005), the coup led to the complete “collapse of formal state institutions and emergence of criminal gangsterism to replace them” (p. 96).

The AFRC coup was “condemned universally” by the international community (Gberie 2004, p. 154). The regional coalition’s military force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), battled the junta and effectively pushed the AFRC/RUF to negotiate a cease fire with the Conkary Peace Plan of 1997. But the junta leaders were evasive when it came to implementing the agreement and eventually ECOMOG troops and the CDF executed a coordinated, countrywide assault on the AFRC/RUF. By April of 1998, “90 percent of Sierra Leonean territory, including the diamond mining districts” had been made safe, thanks to ECOMOG and the CDF (p. 116, Gberie 2005). AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma and his troops retreated

\textsuperscript{95} “CDF” will, from this point on in the discussion, designate all of the civil militia collectively, but with the recognition that Chief Hinga Norman’s Kamajoi forces were the most prominent and documented group.
from Freetown and President Kabbah returned to assume his elected position as head of state.

The RUF was beaten back into the countryside, however, their insurgency re-ignited. RUF commander Sam “Maskita” Bockarie proclaimed on BBC radio that the rebels would “kill everyone in the country ‘to the last chicken’” and then initiated the next wave of destruction, known as Operation No Living Thing (p. 120). In the months that followed, the rebels regained possession of the diamond mining region, wrested control of key towns in the north, and in January of 1999 returned to invade Freetown. Two weeks of “horror” ensued with rebels digging in, battling ECOMOG forces, ransacking civilian homes, and killing indiscriminately (pp. 126). The rebels utilized:

...thousands of teenage RUF fighters, almost all of them wearing bandages on the side of the head where incisions had been made to pack crack cocaine under their skin. They seemed completely insane or delirious. They rounded up whole neighborhoods, forcing frightened civilians to state a demonstration of welcome for them. Those not showing enough enthusiasm were gunned down immediately. Hundreds were killed in this way (p. 127).

Complete terror enveloped the capital city. Mass amputations, rape and slaughter prevailed.

After three weeks of fighting, ECOMOG was able to fend off the RUF and regain control of Freetown. The Kabbah government was not assured that it could hold off the RUF forever, though, and agreed to negotiate an end to the war. In July 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF finalized the Lomé Peace Accord. The agreement called for a cease-fire, and amnesty for all involved in the fighting. It also gave RUF leader Foday Sankoh Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources and National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and made him the vice president (Sierra Leone Web 1996-2010). Giving the
RUF leader positions of power in the government was highly criticized (see for example Abraham 2004b\textsuperscript{96}), and led many to doubt the validity and efficacy of the Accord. The agreement did seem to hold the state together, though, and for the next year disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts slowly brought stability back, albeit with numerous instances of rogue-like skirmishes occurring in various parts of the country.\textsuperscript{97} The armed conflict “formally ended on 11 January 2002, with the symbolic ceremonial closure of the last disarmament centre in Kailahun district, where the war had begun in March 1991” (Gberie 2005, p. 2).

**Roots of Child Soldier Use in the Sierra Leone Civil War**

Children were included in the ranks of the RUF\textsuperscript{98} from the very start of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and the idea to use them in battle germinated during events occurring in Libya and Liberia years before the war. The network analysis in Chapter 5 revealed that Libya was a central node in the web of rebel groups that were connected by their practice of child soldier use. Numerous insurgencies, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Basque separatists (ETA), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

\textsuperscript{96}Abraham (2004b) states bluntly, “a democratically elected government was forced to share power with a terrorist organization” (p. 214).

\textsuperscript{97} The RUF held “political prisoners, abductees, and child soldiers” throughout the DDR process (Abraham 2004b, p. 215), and bandit-type groups such as the West Side Boys maintained control of small enclaves from which they would stage violent rampages (Gberie 2005).

\textsuperscript{98} The RUF were the first armed group to use child soldiers in the armed conflict. The politicization of youth however started well before the war. Rashid (2004) and Abdullah & Muana (1998) detail how the Sierra Leonean radical student movement of the 1970s and 1980s converged with discontented urban youth to produce a politically charged lumpenproletariat. And it was this young class of discontents that the RUF and the NPRC were able to mobilize. The idea of youth speaking and acting out against their Pa’s was no longer a taboo, but rather a necessity against the corruption perpetuated by the Stevens and Momoh administrations.
trained in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s guerilla camps. Qaddafi’s assistance extended to Sierra Leoneans as early as the 1970s (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a; Rashid 2004). Student groups formed at Fourah Bay College (FBC) of the University of Sierra Leone in order to study the Green Book. The Green Book was Qaddafi’s political philosophy treatise outlining how a people’s state could be formed. Libya also provided “financial assistance to Sierra Leone Muslims in the late 1970s in order to perform the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca (p. 58).

The key moment of Libyan support came in the mid-1980s after three lecturers and 41 students were expelled from FBC in response to student protests against the APC government (p. 59). A small group of these protesters, including the FBC student union leader Alie Kabbah, left the country to continue their studies at the University of Ghana, thanks to the Libyan government, which paid for their school fees. Some of these students then went on to Libya to participate in seminars and conferences, receiving ideological training, from 1987-1988. The Sierra Leonean trainees were concerned with how to turn their corrupted state into a viable, just nation. However, a split occurred in the group regarding how that process should take place. Alie Kabbah’s faction sought a well-structured revolution based on principles. The opposing faction, however, was less-concerned with ideology and principles and pushed for a purely militaristic overthrow of the Sierra Leonean government. The military group advocated for a joint effort, teaming up with the Liberian insurgents, the NPFL, to stage a violent insurrection. It was the latter group that Libya chose to bolster (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a; Rashid 2004).

The NPFL was training in Libya at the same time as the Sierra Leoneans, and their leader, Charles Taylor saw an opportunity. According to interviews with the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, Taylor “was quick to take advantage of the split in the ranks of the Sierra Leoneans by aligning with Foday Sankoh, a former corporeal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), who emerged as the leader of the more militant faction” (p. 60). Alie Kabbah and members of his group left Libya after the split, but Foday Sankoh stayed and, with several others, went on to engage in military training from 1988-1989. According to a witness at the trial of Charles Taylor in the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the Liberians trained with Sankoh and about 10-15 Sierra Leoneans at first (Open Society Justice Initiative 2008a). Sierra Leoneans also mingled with fighters from Gambia, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Congo, Philippines and Indonesia, but it is was the NPFL that they would most closely align with—the future RUF members helping with the insurgency in Liberia and the NPFL helping with the armed conflict in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone TRC 2004b).

Guerrilla training in the Libya camps was extremely rigorous. In addition to courses on how to use AK-47s and ground-to-air missile launchers, trainees also participated in brutal drills. The point of these harsh exercises was to “remove the civilian blood from inside” the trainees (p. 528, fn 130). Some of the drills that the trainees underwent were the “halaba” and the “black hole;” they also had to master the practice of ripping the heads off of live chickens or frogs using only their teeth. The halaba drill is significant as it became an exercise utilized by vanguard members of the RUF when they went to train recruits back home. The exercise basically consisted of running through the desert carrying heavy loads while other trainees beat you. Recruits would run their feet raw from the hard desert ground. If they fell during the ordeal, they were “mercilessly flogged using sticks and other implements, including the butts of guns” (p. 528, fn 131).
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated that when the halaba was incorporated into the RUF training regiment during the Sierra Leone war, it created a greater propensity for some rebels “to exercise their own reigns of terror over conscripts…especially child recruits” (p. 109).

Youths were a part of the core group of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters, who trained in Libya. Benjamin Yeaten was a 14-15 year old boy who impressed Taylor with his hard work in the guerilla training. “He was very aggressive in training and won a lot of prizes,” said one witness who was with Yeaten in the Libyan camps (Open Society Justice Initiative 2008b). Yeaten fought as a child soldier for the NPFL during the Liberian civil war, and went on to become Taylor’s bodyguard and the Director of Special Security Services (SSS) for the Liberian state. Rashid Mansaray was a teenager when he went through commando training with the first group of Sierra Leoneans at a base in Benghazi, Libya (Sierra Leone TRC 2004b). He was seen as a “teenage revolutionary with a much respected commitment to the cause and intellectual energy” (p. 93). Mansaray was part of the triumvirate heads of the RUF that included Foday Sankoh and Abu Kanu. Mansaray was the RUF’s first Battalion Commander, fighting for the NPFL in Liberia and for the rebels in Sierra Leone (Abdullah 2004).

Rashid (2004) states that Foday Sankoh assessed the power of youth years earlier, when he sat in on meetings of radical student groups in Sierra Leone. It was there that he had “witnessed first hand the potential of youth militancy” (p. 84). With models such as Yeaten and Mansaray, Sankoh was shown how potential could turn into action. The training camps in Libya created brutal fighters and leaders for the RUF, and provided a solid grounding for guerilla war: “the logistics behind the actions that made hacking of
limbs, creation of child soldiers and killing of over fifty-thousand countrymen and countrywomen in Sierra Leone possible” (Kabba 2007). After training in Libya, the core members of the RUF went off to Liberia to fight for the NPFL and to recruit troops for their future invasion into Sierra Leone.

The war in Liberia was, to some, a contagion, a nasty conflict that infected the nation of Sierra Leone. The “spillover effect” manifested as extreme acts of terror, the strategic abuse of civilians and the inclusion of child soldiers (Sesay and Ismail 2003, p. 161). By looking at events from the Liberian war, we see another stop on the pathway—from Libya to Liberia to Sierra Leone—of war as obliteration, that is, the complete annihilation of political institutions and societal cohesion. The events in and insurgents from Liberia were not solely responsible for what the RUF and subsequent Sierra Leonean fighting groups did during the armed conflict. As noted earlier, the early formulations of the revolution in Sierra Leone included actors, such as Alie Kabbah, who were more concerned with the long-term well-being of the citizenry and were not interested in terrorizing the country. And even after the conflict started in Sierra Leone, there were RUF leaders who did not agree with the indiscriminate killing. Both Rashid Mansaray and Abu Kanu thought that the RUF should not use random violence as a tactic, and because of their beliefs, Foday Sankoh incriminated them both. One year into the war, he had them executed (Abdullah 2004, p. 61). So, in addition to the contagion that Liberia created, it was also necessary to have political entrepreneurs/violent specialists (Tilly 2003, pp. 34-35), such as guerilla trainers in Libya, Charles Taylor, and Foday Sankoh, who would push the insurgency beyond the extreme.
Although it preceded the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, the NPFL insurgency in Liberia grew out of the same ground—Libya; and the Liberian armed conflict remained deeply intertwined with the fight in Sierra Leone. Taylor’s initial NPFL fighters completed their guerilla training in Libya in 1989, after which Taylor went to Sierra Leone and asked President Momoh if his forces could use the country “as a launch pad for his revolution in Liberia” (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a, p. 60). President Momoh refused to help the NPFL as it would violate a regional agreement between West African states. Momoh then proceeded to put Taylor in jail. Meanwhile, Taylor’s NPFL set up camps in Cote d’Ivoire near the northern Liberian border. Ivorian President Felix Houpouhet-Boigny not only provided the NPFL with a safe haven, but he also supplied military intelligence and medical care for the wounded, facilitated the smuggling of diamonds to fund the insurgency, and helped with the transfer of arms (Advocates for Human Rights 2009, p. 268). The training camps in Cote d’Ivoire included Liberians, fighters from Burkino Faso (known as Burkinabes), and Sierra Leoneans. Eventually Taylor was released from prison in Sierra Leone, after which he traveled to Cote d’Ivoire to join up with his NPFL troops prepare for the insurgency.

Liberia’s civil war began in December of 1989 when Taylor’s NPFL invaded into Liberia’s northern Nimba County. The goal was make their way to the capital, Monrovia, and overthrow the president, Samuel Doe. The NPFL insurgency utilized extreme violence from the first invasion onwards. There were innumerable acts of terror that targeted civilians, and there was a continuous, deliberate use of children as soldiers as a tactic (Republic of Liberia 2009a). One civilian stated: “A group took my father and said..."

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99 Some Burkinabes had trained in Libya and in Burkino Faso. These were mostly “disaffected youth” who had become alienated during the economic crises in the 1980s (Advocates for Human Rights 2009, pp. 267-268)
he was a Doe supporter, and he was beheaded with a power saw and I was stabbed in my stomach with a bayonet from the back. They burnt my brother with plastic and my sister’s fingers were broken” (pp. 137-138, Advocates for Human Rights 2009). Children from 6-18 years of age were forcibly recruited, and made:

…to kill friends and family members including their parents, rape and be raped, serve as sexual slaves and prostitutes, labor, take drugs, engage in cannibalism, torture and pillage communities. Many were forced to be ‘juju' controllers, ammunition carriers, spies, armed guards, ambushers and so on (Republic of Liberia 2009b, p. 44).

Children intentionally were placed in the dead center of the battle theater. The NPFL’s terror tactics were meant to create an environment of complete uncertainty, to obliterate all forms of trust in the society (Advocates for Human Rights 2009). This attempt at social disruption was about usurping leaders at the national level and about challenging and appropriating deeper levels of political authority at the local level, specifically the power of the secret society, Poro, and the family. The child became one locus of this struggle.

In The Mask of Anarchy, Africanist Stephen Ellis (2007) details how the war in Liberia was fought on the ground and in the Liberian cosmology. The acts of brutality were not random, but rather highly signified acts meant to wrestle power from the reigning political authority of Poro. The Poro notion that power is gained through sacrifice and eating (“Poro business if eating business,” p. 223), was transformed into weaponry and commodities. The monopoly of the legitimate use of force was extracted from the institution of Poro, and coopted by political entrepreneurs/violent specialists

100 Poro is a political institution in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, that socializes children “to the norms and values” of the culture and enables “them to be productive citizens of that community as they grow up in society” (Republic of Liberia 2009c, p. 21). Poro is the secret society for men and Sande is the secret society for women. For boys, the initiation ritual is, in part, teaching a “proper understanding of the power of manhood, including one of its immanent features, violence” (Ellis 1995, p. 188). Poro is only discussed herein as the struggle for power over secret societies was more about the authority of men and male leaders. This is not is suggest, however, that the power of Sande is any less important. It was merely less salient in the war.
(Tilly 2003), and anyone else who wanted to empower themselves. During the war, “the practice of human sacrifice was taken out of the bounds of officials of traditional secret societies and used by heartmen, independent commercial entrepreneurs who obtained human organs and sold them for monetary gain to those who believed that they could acquire wealth and power by their ritual use and even consumption, In fact, it was privatized” (pp. 266-267).

Children, who are traditionally seen as belonging to the family and the jurisdiction of secret societies, were also to be eaten, both metaphorically and literally, in order to access their potential power. Anthropologist Mariane Ferme (2001) explains how in West Africa societies with Poro associations, children are not viewed as innocents in need of coddling. Children, according to Ferme, carry tremendous potential and chaotic power. Infants can “endanger their own mothers’ lives by harboring witch spirits who complicate pregnancy, labor and delivery” (p. 199). Children exist in an ambiguous social space, sometimes they are “real persons” but they are also deemed to be like animals, “unable to control their behaviors” (p. 200). This marginality makes children “potentially dangerous” (p. 217). One function of Poro is to tame the child and convert them into an adult that conforms to social norms, thereby decreasing their potential danger to the community. 101 As combatants, children were threatening because they were chaotic power with a gun. As one United Nations observer said, “they can cut off someone’s head without thinking” (Ellis 1998, p. 168). By turning them into child soldiers, the NPFL had metaphorical eaten their power. But the rebels would go even further to access the latent power in a child:

101 Ferme (2001) notes that the Mende word for uninitiated child is kpowanga (pl.), which “also means ‘mad’ and ‘mentally deficient’, and Poro training provides knowledge as a remedy for this “madness”.(p. 200).
...commanders organized cooking feasts and served children’s body parts, including their intestines and hearts. The blood of children was collected and cooked into soups into which hearts were served as choice meats for cannibalistic commanders. In other instances, children’s body parts were sold in open markets (Advocates for Human Rights 2009, p. 44).

These practices in the Liberian war were “the politics of the belly” (Bayart 2009) heightened to its most extreme state.

The NPFL was the lead force when it came to child soldier use, but throughout the first, and then second, civil war, multiple factions had child combatants: the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), the Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). It was estimated that there were between 15 and 20 thousand child soldiers involved in the two civil wars in Liberia, 1989-1997 and 1999-2003 (Advocates for Human Rights 2009, p. 204). Nevertheless, it was the NPFL that initiated and institutionalized the practice. In addition to gathering boys and girls up for their ranks as they conquered villages and towns, the NPFL also had special Small Boy Units. These were the “first generation of child soldiers” some of whom were as young as 13, and they very aggressive (Ellis 1998, p. 168; Open Society Justice Initiative 2008a).

It was within the Liberian milieu that Sierra Leonian Foday Sankoh formulated his war strategies and gathered his troops. In October 1990, Sankoh, as a member of the NPFL, visited numerous detention centers in Liberia where Sierra Leoneans were being held captive. These centers were to be Sankoh’s recruiting stations for a vanguard force, a place where the rebel leader would pick out who he thought would be a good fighter. The Sierra Leonean detainees were enlisted under duress. Sankoh manipulated their fears, telling them that they would probably be killed if they remained in the detention centers.
They would have a chance, however, if they became fighters for an insurgency in Sierra Leone: “effectively, he blackmailed them into becoming members of the RUF” (Sierra Leone TRC 2004b, p. 103). The chosen detainees were eventually driven to a training base, Camp Namma, where they would join with others, including Liberian fighters, Burkinabes and “a core group of seven young men” (Sierra Leoneans) who had undergone military training in Cote d’Ivoire (p. 105). In March of 1991, this collection of vanguard fighters invaded Sierra Leone. This was the RUF, with Foday Sankoh and his experiences in Liberia to lead them.

**Child Soldiers in the Sierra Leone War**

Somewhere between 6-10,000 child soldiers participated in the decade-long armed conflict in Sierra Leone, and “more than 6,774 entered the DDR programme” after the war had finished (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a, p. 235). All sides—the government, the RUF, the NPRC, the AFRC and the CDF—had children in their ranks. The regression analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that when both sides used children as soldiers the most significant independent variables were: intensity, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, political terror and years of education. If we look at these statistics the year before the war started (1990), we find that the independent variables for the armed conflict in Sierra Leone’s do not align exactly with the large-N findings. The military expenditures are very low (0.4%), which is outside the model, and the political terror scale number (2) is also outside the model (“2” would be relatively low political repression, marked by limited amounts of imprisonment for political views). Education, however, fits well
within the range of significance (4.1 years of schooling).\textsuperscript{102} The last most significant variable is intensity of the armed conflict, which is high as expected by the regression analysis. These are the statistical findings that set the scene for when the RUF invaded Sierra Leone.

While the variables to not conform entirely to the statistical model, there is evidence that the concepts still apply. The militarization of the Sierra Leonean state was not apparent in the government budget, but it was very salient on the ground, especially under President Siaka Stevens rule. Stevens helped cultivate a militaristic approach to politics. During his rule, and into President Momoh’s before the war, the military was intentionally kept weak, minimally fortified. This was so that it would not pose a threat to those in power (Gberie 2005). At the same time, Stevens was bolstering his power with a private force. He created his own protective “shadow army” known as the Internal Security Unit (ISU) to act as bodyguards and as a thuggery device that would attack any political opposition to the APC (p. 29). According to former principal of Fourah Bay College, Professor Cyril Foray, Stevens fostered the idealization of violence; he and “his political cohorts produced a belief among a whole generation of young Sierra Leoneans…that violence pays, that it is or can be a way of life, and that it is the shortest and most effective route to achievement and success” (Keen 2005, p. 18). The RUF manifesto, “Footpaths to Democracy” cites militarization of the state as one of the reasons for the insurgency: “We continue to fight because we are tired of being perpetual victims of state sponsored poverty and human degradation visited on us by years of

\textsuperscript{102} The findings from Chapter 3 demonstrate that as years of education decrease, the likelihood of child soldier use increases.
autocratic rule and militarism‖ (Revolutionary United Front 1995). Even though military spending was low, militarization of the state was quite high.

Actual political terror was also higher than the Political Terror scale indicates for the Sierra Leonean case. Stevens was known for his use of violence against political dissent and his use of youths to enact it (Keen 2005). The reduction of the state to one party rule by the APC, and the ever-growing web of cronyism and patrimonialism made Sierra Leone a repressive, exclusionary state (Abdullah 2004). From 1968-1992, APC presidents Stevens and Momoh consistently tried to squash any and all dissenting voices: University students who organized protests faced stiff resistance from security agents and sometimes appeared on campuses with a show of force, violently chasing students and closing the university. For example, following student uprising at the 1977 Annual University Convocation, security forces brutalized students and damaged campus property. Armed units of the Cuban-trained para-military International Security Unit...joined the operation arresting several lecturers and several student leaders...Similarly, in 1981, when the Sierra Leone Labour Congress (SLLC) struck for better wages and working conditions, government security effectively broke the strike by physically intimidating their leadership. An anti-government newspaper, the Tablet, had its printing facilities raided and destroyed by APC thugs (pp. 92-93, Kpundeh 2004).

According to Wright (1997), these “dictatorial tendencies” were to become “a harbinger of civil chaos” (p. 18). Another important feature to recognize is that President Momoh surrounded himself with members of “a parasitic cabal known locally as the Binkolo Mafia” (Kandeh 1999, p. 352). The group belonged to a Limba tribal organization known as Ekutay, a secretive in-group that heightened ethnic difference to a degree unknown before in the West African state: “For the first time in the history of Sierra Leone, a sitting government institutionalized a tribal organization” (Tiyaama 2007). The Ekutay inner circle that surrounded and essentially controlled the government under President Momoh increased Stevens predatory style of rule. The cabal was alleged to have

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103 The RUF manifesto has been seen as an empty document, written for the RUF once the war had already begun. Despite the apparent bogus promises made in the manifesto, it does tap into the most salient problems of the state: education, corruption and violence. Hence, the claims made in the document are valid. The RUF solutions, however, were not backed up with legitimate actions.
“murdered their political opponents” (Brima 2010). A significant degree of political terror was present in Sierra Leone before the war, but it is not necessarily being captured by the Political Terror scale rating that was given. In the very least, the legacy of Stevens rule, which was full of threat and violent retribution, had an impact on those who would later go to war.

Unlike militarization and political terror, the significance of education is apparent in the regression analysis and in qualitative data. In fact, the low level of education was an enduring legacy of the Sierra Leonean state since independence. In the 1970s, less than 15% of 5-11 year olds were in school, and only 5% of 12-16 year olds attended secondary school (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a, p. 238). The TRC stated that the low rate was due to poor state funding of schools and a preference for educating the children of elites. This trend continued well into the early 1990s. Wright (1997) claims that the issue of “education in Sierra Leone has been an accomplice in creating the climate of rebellion which culminated in civil war” (p. 20). In the RUF “Footpaths to Democracy”, the deteriorated and preferential state of education was a major grievance. “It has become a common dictum,” stated the manifesto, “of the APC ruling class that education is a privilege and not a right,” and it was this right of education that the RUF claimed to be fighting to regain (RUF 2005). Several of the former child soldiers that I interviewed in Sierra Leone confidentially voiced the same grievance. Peters and Richards (1998) found that education was also a reason that some joined to fight against the RUF. One 16 year-old boy said he enlisted with the Kamajoi “because his schooling had been halted by

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104 The Political Terror Scale using ratings formulated by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department and looks at how the government responds to political dissent. Imprisonment, torture and murder are used to assess the degree to which political terror is present. The influence of a secretive tribal organization could easily be missed by outside observers.
RUF attacks on Kono” and while fighting he always dreamed of going back to school (p. 195). For many Sierra Leoneans, education was a grievance, one that transcended political factions and fighting forces.

Intensity of the armed conflict is the fourth significant independent variable. For Sierra Leone, intensity of the war was high—over 1,000 battle-deaths or more in a year. Beyond the casualty rate figures, we also find that the conflict was vicious. The Sierra Leone TRC (2004c) found evidence for 40,242 human rights violations during the war, 60.5% of which were perpetrated by the RUF.\textsuperscript{105} The AFRC was responsible for 9.8%, the SLA 6.8% and the CDF 1.5% (p. 38). Human rights abuses included rape, sexual slavery, amputations, forced cannibalism, drugging, torture and killing. The young were not spared these acts. For those who were forced to fight, 50% of them were 14 years or younger, and 25% were 11 or younger. Twenty-five (25%) of rape victims were 13 years or younger, and 50% of the sexual slaves were 15 years old or younger (Sierra Leone TRC 2009d). These underlying human rights abuse statistics further support the general coding of the armed conflict as high in intensity.

The armed conflict had four main fighting groups: the SLA (the government), the RUF, the AFRC, and the Kamajoi. Towards the end of the war, another, spin-off group, the West Side Boys, arose. The West Side boys were a “splinter group” of the AFRC that emerged in 1999 and lasted until 2000 (Utas and Jörgel 2008, p. 488). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset used in the regression analysis breaks the Sierra Leone conflict into 5 dyadic interactions: government vs. the RUF (1991-2000), government vs. AFRC (1997-2000), government vs. the Kamajoi (1997-1998, the government and the United

\textsuperscript{105} The TRC document over 40,000 human rights violations, but assumes that more occurred. These were only cases that were reported.
Kingdom vs. the RUF (2001), and the government vs. the West Side Boys (2001). The interactions between the government and the RUF, the government and the AFRC and the government and the Kamajoi all involve child soldier use on both sides. However, when the United Kingdom (UK) joins with the government against the RUF and against the West Side Boys, child soldier use only occurs on the side of the rebel groups. It appears that the presence of the United Kingdom deterred child soldier use by the Sierra Leonean government. It could be that because the U.K. is deeply entrenched in the international community, and therefore subject to greater scrutiny for violating international norms such as anti-child soldier use, the cost of breaking the norm for the U.K. or even allying with a state that did is much higher. Hence, the U.K. would not provide troops to a government that did have child combatants. It is impossible to determine what the catalyst is based solely on the Sierra Leone case study, but it would be worth exploring with further research.

In order to examine the tactical dynamics of child soldier use on the ground, I conducted fieldwork in Sierra Leone in 2008 and 2010. Data was gathered through interviews, ethnography and historical analysis. Discussions with informants were based on open-ended questions and recorded as handwritten notes. These were snowball interviews with each interviewee making suggestions to others in the community to participate. About 35 respondents were involved in the study. The range included civilian mothers and fathers, former child soldiers, former members of the SLA, the AFRC, members of ECOMOG troops, local and national government officials, and several former university students who participated in the radical student movement of the 1980s. These discussions were analyzed after the interviews had taken place, looking for

106 All interviews were confidential.
evidence to support or refute the micro-level theory that child soldier use increases political opportunities. Especially important was the appearance, or lack thereof, of the dimensions of troop fortification, moral dilemmas and the relocation of fear.

One general pattern and discourse emerged from all of the interviews. The meetings began with a detailing of personal histories during the civil war and then led into discussions about why the interviewees thought children were enlisted to fight. Initial responses often consisted of immediate, utilitarian rationales, such as children were a cheap way to build an army, and children were easily managed and manipulated. However, as the discussions carried on, talk of a moral breakdown in the social structure emerged. Even though Sierra Leonean culture has a staunch taboo against forcing children to fight in adult wars, political entrepreneurs were able to tap into communal weaknesses brought on by economic hardships and government failures. Individualism and selfishness (traits not worthy of praise in West African society) were heightened. This increased sense of “every man and woman for him or herself” seems to have weakened the usually tight, moral fabric. And one consequence of this weakening was that people became much less concerned with upholding the norm of protecting children. One woman related how, during the war, she witnessed a mother abandoning her healthy, crying baby in the bush. When asked, “Why would a mother do that? What would drive her to readily give up her child?” The interviewee responded: “The woman was so scared. She thought the crying baby would give her hiding place away and the rebels would find

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107 A 2007 interview with a former child soldier from Cote d’Ivoire revealed a similar phenomenon. The male respondent said that after the economic downturn in Cote d’Ivoire, due to falling cocoa prices and corruption in the government, citizens became much more selfish and cynical. “Nobody cares anymore,” he said, “everyone just looks out for himself. They don’t care if kids fight in wars.” The former child soldier was very negative about the situation in his country, promising never to return to such a selfish environment. “They can all go to hell for what they did to me.”
her. The baby was crying because it was hungry and the woman had no food to feed the child, so she got rid of it, so she wouldn't get killed." This story highlights the environment of anomie that was created by the government under Stevens and Momoh and then leveraged by groups such as the RUF. The use of child soldiers further heightened the social disruption that took place.

The micro-level theory being examined with the Sierra Leone case, that child soldier use increases political opportunities, is premised on rational choice deliberations. The practice is a result of the weighing of costs and benefits with the aim of maximizing utility. In armed conflict, government and rebel behavior is similar to that of competing firms (Coase 1937). Armed conflict can be seen as an organizational contest between large firms (governments) and small firms (rebel groups). The relationship compels both sides to formulate strategies and adjust tactics according to costs and benefits. This approach is an extension of the theories set forth by Lichbach (1998) in The Rebel’s Dilemma. When rebels and governments clash they fight for a share of the market for social order. One side’s gain results in the other side’s loss: “Social order in a state results from social disorder in dissident groups. Social disorder in a state results from social order in dissident groups” (p. xii). Governments usually have a monopoly on the market, and a strong hold on the goods needed to maintain social order. Additionally, unlike rebel groups (small firms), the costs of organizing and marketing for governments (large firms) are much lower (Coase 1937). Rebel groups want at least a share of the market for

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108 Confidential interview, 2008.
109 A firm is “the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase 1937, p. 393). The point of the firm is to focus resources and decrease marketing costs.
110 This state of affairs, however, is not static. As Metz (2007-2008) asserts, in today’s armed conflicts “[I]t is nearly impossible for a single entity, whether the state or a nonstate player, to monopolize power. Market domination and share are constantly shifting” (p. 23).
social order, if not a monopoly, but they have much higher marketing costs. So, the goal of rebel groups becomes to lower their costs by increasing marketing costs for governments. An increase in marketing costs for governments translates into an increase in political opportunities for rebels. When marketing costs become too great for the government, it either collapses or relinquishes a share of the social order. Then, a rebel group captures its desired share of the market of social order and claims success.

In order to break into the market and compete with governments, rebel groups must be like all small entrepreneurs, that is, innovative. They must “invent new technologies of collective dissent” (Lichbach 1998, p. 51). This has been the case even before T.E. Lawrence of Arabia switched his fighting style from attacking troops to attacking materials (Wilkins 1962); before General Giap pushed the Vietminh towards terrorism (Jonas and Tanham 1962; Trinquier 2006); and before the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) of Sri Lanka began activating numerous suicide bombers as a new tactic (Horowitz 2010). The reality of insurgencies is that if rebels want to compete with governments, the conflict process demands that they seek out radical new ways to fight. But each armed conflict carries a different demand equation. As Lichbach (1998) states, rebels “looking to employ effective tactics must discover their group’s demand functions for various tactics, including relative costs and benefits...[They] discover these demand functions by experimentation and adapt their tactics accordingly” (p. 54). Child soldier use is a one rebel rational choice experiment that became a battlefield norm in Sierra Leone.111

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111 As the Sierra Leone TRC report (2004c) declared, turning children into soldiers was a “deliberate strategy on the part of the RUF leadership” (p. 97). And it was a practice that all other fighting groups adopted as well.
The first dimension on the causal pathway from child soldier use to political opportunities\textsuperscript{112} is troop fortification. Troop fortification is the increase in troop size and/or troop capability. Size is simply gaining more bodies. Capability is about increasing the power of the fighters either through training or tactical use. The latter becomes important especially for small groups/insurgencies that seek to maximize their power against larger state forces. British engineer and aerial warfare theorist F.W. Lanchester (1916) developed differential equations that emphasize the importance of troop size and concentration for fighting groups of unequal strength. His n-square law provided a mathematical model for calculating fighting strength, which included not only resources but also tactics. Lanchester demonstrated that how an army uses their troops is important and can increase significantly increase the force ratio. Deitchman (1962), Schaffer (1967), and Intiligator and Brito (1988) apply Lanchester’s models to guerilla warfare, highlighting the interactive dynamics of manipulating force ratios, of force depletion and of government and guerilla recruitment. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the RUF or other groups were making mathematical calculations on the battlefield. Rather, the process of leveraging troop strength was an inherent part of guerilla tactics, one that Lanchester’s mathematical models confirm as effective.

The RUF entered the Kailahun district in March 1991, starting a war with approximately 100 fighters several hundred miles away from the capital city of Freetown (Gberie 2005). The rebels invaded a rural region in which the SLA had few troops. Four days later the RUF attacked another village with 300 troops this time. Both invasions involved looting, destruction of property and the killing of civilians (p. 59). The rebels

\textsuperscript{112} Political opportunities, as previously defined in Chapter 1, is when an event or social process “serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (McAdam 1982, p. 41). In the Sierra Leonean case the political establishment is the government and its military arm.
were quick to build their troops through forced recruitment as the SLA was soon to bring part of its 3,000 troop force to fight them (p. 60). The government forces would need more troops as well. Abdullah and Rashid (2004) state that children became the answer to shortages for both sides. There was a “shortage of able-bodied males to fight for the RUF and the RSLMF. The high death toll, the wretched conditions of service, the meager salary…the summary executions, and above all, the senselessness of the war, discouraged responsible adults from enlisting on either side” (p. 242). The RUF also had to overcome the unpopularity of their insurgency: their failure to win “the sympathy of the very people they claim to be fighting for compelled them to recruit their army from lumpens and juveniles” (p. 63, Abdullah 2004). One former radical university student said simply, “Children were used out of necessity and expediency”.113 The practice immediately boosted troop numbers and troop concentrations. A former SLA soldier, who fought with the British late in the war, said he observed that the RUF recruited more children whenever manpower dipped. He remarked that adding children to their ranks was different than adding adult soldiers, because children were more difficult to confront. “They would send the children to the front lines and the leaders would follow,” he said. “It made it much harder to fight them, having to face off first against children.”114 Other interviewees commented on the impulsiveness of some child soldiers, many of whom were drugged with cocaine or marijuana. It was harder to fight or contain the youths because they were the most unpredictable of enemies. By boosting troop numbers and troop concentration, the RUF, and subsequent factions, gained political-military opportunities that often gave them an edge on the battlefield.

113 Confidential interview, 2008.
114 Confidential interview, 2008.
The second dimension leading to political opportunities is moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma is an event in which an individual has to choose between two or more options, none of which, when picked, maximizes utility. Furthermore, the choice of action carries with it a positive and a negative implication. When confronted by a child on the battlefield, socio-cultural values enter the rational choice equation. A soldier can defend him/herself by shooting the child holding the weapon. Preservation of life is the positive outcome. The negative, dilemma-inducing result is that the soldier has killed a child, which crosses socio-cultural norms and carries social and personal sanctions. If the soldier is a parent, the costs of killing a child often increase, which deepens the dilemma.

Moral dilemmas occur as a tear in the structure of the social system. The underlying theory is premised on the idea that the social system structure is where ethics are developed, generated and maintained (Tynes and Speed 2009). Within the structure, a rationality is created and reinforced, but when another social system structure challenges that rationality, a tear can manifest. The event is can be better understood by looking at the structural layout of social systems: rules, roles, and institutions (See Diagram 4).

**Diagram 4: The Structure of a Social System**

![Diagram of a Social System](attachment:Diagram_4.png)

*Rules are “the set of instructions for creating an action situation in a particular...*
Especially important is the “set of instructions” aspect—these are the guidelines, the more concretized explanations for behavior. They can be written, such as law or rules for a game, or oral pronouncements, such as obeying your parents, or ritualized gestures, such as passing the palm wine cup with your right hand. Even though rules can be written down, Ostrom notes that it is not fully a rule unless “most people whose strategies are affected by it know of its existence and expect others to monitor behavior and sanction nonconformance” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 51). Rules necessitate social group awareness and reinforcement.

Roles are a “collection of norms delimited by what a single actor may be expected to perform” (Scott 1971, p. 85). So, in a social system, the actor may have multiple facets of who they are and what they can do, but in any given sub-system, i.e. the local arena, an actor is constrained/more precisely defined by a particular role. Hence, “the actor does not participate as a total entity, but only by virtue of a given differentiated ‘sector’ of his total action” (Parsons 1964, p. 230). For example, your role in the local arena may be “military official” (even though you may be a mom or a dad) and hence you will be expected to behave as a military official in that arena and not as a mother or a father. Furthermore, if you were to pop on a red nose, paint your face white and make balloon animals on the battlefield, you would be noticed for acting outside of your role.

Institutions are “patterns governing behavior and social relationships which have become interwoven with a system of common moral sentiments which in turn define what one has a ‘right to expect’ of a person in a certain position” (Parsons 1964, p. 143). Here it is important to note that “a right to expect” denotes a constraint on behavior, a narrowing of possible options for behavior before it occurs. Examples of institutions
include the family, religion, government, the military, and West African secret societies.

Institutions help locate the actors in the social system and more precisely define what their roles are through rules.\textsuperscript{115}

What we are concerned with for child soldier use is when two local social systems meet (the rebel forces and society; or the rebel forces and the state/military) and how social systems are disrupted or the structure is torn. Diagram 5 shows society (A) colliding with rebel forces that use child soldiers (B). When two social systems meet, a tear does not necessarily have to happen. The meeting can result in simple disorientation for the individual, such as when someone from a politically conservative party interacts with an anarchist with multiple face piercings. In this instance, the two social system structures probably will not suffer breaches of their moral boundaries. However, when the social system of a non-child soldier using faction is confronted by a child soldiers using faction, the decision-making process for the non-child combatant system is forced to either reject or accept the

\textbf{Diagram 5: The Meeting of Two Conflicting Social Systems}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (A) at (0,0) {A};
\node (B) at (3,0) {B};
\node (RulesA) at (-1,3) {Rules};
\node (RulesB) at (2,3) {Rules};
\node (RolesA) at (-1,1) {Roles};
\node (RolesB) at (2,1) {Roles};
\node (InstitutionsA) at (-1,-1) {Institutions};
\node (InstitutionsB) at (2,-1) {Institutions};
\draw (A) -- (RulesA);
\draw (A) -- (RolesA);
\draw (A) -- (InstitutionsA);
\draw (B) -- (RulesB);
\draw (B) -- (RolesB);
\draw (B) -- (InstitutionsB);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, the interaction of rules, roles and institutions is interdependent. There is no causal mechanism. We cannot find a beginning or an end, nor can we tell which part leads. Rather, it is a reciprocating system.
other social system into its structure, and this is the moral dilemma event.

Two examples from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight how non-child soldier social systems clashing with child soldier social systems can invoke uncertainty or even moral dilemmas. An interview with a member of the U.S. Army who was on tour of duty in Iraq in 2004 revealed the confusion that can result when children enter the theater of war.\textsuperscript{116} The soldier stated that it was common to see children in the war zone. Most of them were playing and walking about. One time a child came up to him and tried to cajole him into giving him candy. Then the boy wanted the soldier to play. The U.S. soldier did not give the boy candy, nor did he play with him. Nevertheless, the boy moved closer and closer to the soldier. Eventually the child touched the soldier’s rifle and tried to grab it to play with. At that point the soldier pushed the boy to the ground. When I interviewed the soldier, I asked him if the child’s actions surprised him. He said “No, it was no big deal.” I then asked him would he let an adult man touch his gun. The soldier replied, “An adult would never have gotten within ten yards of me.” The story demonstrates the disorienting effects when two apparently disparate social systems meet. The soldier was constrained by his role as a fighter, but when the child entered the arena, the soldier’s role softened to include a more neutral, less aggressive adult. The child remained a child until he touched the gun. At that point the boy’s role shifted to become a potential threat, possibly even a child soldier. Child soldier use keys into this malleability in, or weakness of, social systems that place children in roles of innocent.

Another interview with a soldier who was working in Afghanistan in 2008 exemplifies how moral dilemmas can manifest when an insurgency maximizes the weak spots of a social system. The U.S. soldier specialized in the cultural aspects of the war in

\textsuperscript{116} Confidential interview, 2008.
Afghanistan. She said that children had been used by insurgents in Afghanistan as fighters and as suicide bombers. She recalled one mission that she was called in on in which a small child was loaded with a bomb. The little boy had been told to push the trigger when he reached a group of soldiers so that flowers would be released into the air. The U.S. soldier worked with the child and other military personnel to defuse the bomb. The soldier was in a quandary though. She was compelled to save the child, and did. But she also knew that once she saved the child, the Taliban would kill the child and the child’s family for failing the mission. The soldier had to rescue the child, especially because he/she was so young. The soldier recognized as well that it was the age of the suicide bomber that allowed the little boy to get so close to the group of soldiers and that had the bomber been an adult the moral dilemma would have been less dire. The use of the child as a suicide bomber was highly effective at creating political opportunities for the Taliban.

In the Liberian war, the NPFL put children on the front lines in order to induce moral dilemmas in ECOMOG fighters:

They were the first in a wave of troops, and the older fighters were behind them. At first the ECOMOG troops didn’t want to shoot at the kids…they were shocked to see such small kids fighting. But when the kids began shooting at them they had no alternative, so they began shooting and killing kids (Human Rights Watch 1994).

The “shock of the soldiers” is the tear in the social system that occurs when two contrary structures collide. In the Sierra Leone armed conflict, we find the same tactics, child soldier use preying on social systems that have strong norms of protecting children. Keen (2005) found that children were sometimes “used as ‘bait’ to encourage an attack that could be ambushed” (p. 97). One of Keen’s informants told him of the rebel “practice of sending drugged-up boys as shields in attacks to test the strength of the government
forces: “When the government says, “We have killed 40 rebels,” a lot of these will be young boys”’ (p. 85). The “strength” of the government was a reference to moral fortitude. Would the government soldiers be able to kill boys, knowing that they might face social retribution? The “test” was the moral dilemma.

A former SLA soldier that I interviewed said it was very hard seeing children on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{117} He said he was trained by the British military in how to deal with a very young enemy. Even with the training, he said, it was very very hard. “When you go against an enemy who is an adult, you need courage,” he said. “But when you face a child, it’s no longer about courage. It’s a burden.” The “burden” is part of the reason why the opposition would use child soldiers. The psychological weight that the practice added to fighting can slow the soldier down and make him/her much more vulnerable. Child soldiers create a gap in standard operating procedures, which provides an opportunity for the enemy. A former member of the AFRC told me he did not like children in war.\textsuperscript{118} “It makes for more problems,” he said, “more problems on the battlefield.”

The third dimension that leads to an increase in political opportunities is the relocation of fear. This is when an insurgency or any fighting group pushes beyond the boundaries of just war and attempt to usurp the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Merari (1993) discusses how terrorism is used by insurgents as a strategic device, “to impose their will on the general population and channel its behavior by sowing fear” (p. 225). Terrorism as a strategy is about exerting social control, through psychological means, stealing away the state’s authority over civilians. This is Lacqueur’s (1998) point when he states that guerilla factions use terror to “demoralize the government by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{117} Confidential interview, 2008.
\item\textsuperscript{118} Confidential interview, 2008.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
disrupting control‖ (p. 401). In Vinci’s (2005) study of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, he argues that the LRA challenges the state with its use of fear in the battlefield. Fear, for the LRA, is a force multiplier, a method for maximizing “its perceived threat” (p. 369). The LRA were brutal, cutting off lips and ears of civilians, cutting off legs so that they could not ride bicycles. Child soldiers were also utilized by the LRA because they could “inflict fear on their adversaries due to their own fearlessness in combat and complete disregard for human life” (p. 371).

The NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone both instrumentalized terror as a tactic for relocating fear (making the insurgencies the holders of supreme threat). The outcome in these armed conflict was a demobilized, controlled population (Advocates for Human Rights 2009; Richards et al 1996; McIntyre et al 2002). Child soldiers donned the terror role in armed conflict in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. One witness in Liberia said that “child soldiers killed people for ‘fun’, further underscoring the incendiary and terrifying combination of an armed child vested with absolute authority over others” (p. 217, Advocates for Human Rights 2009). According to Human Rights Watch (1998), the RUF and AFRC placed children at the front lines and forced them “to commit atrocities against their own communities” (p. 10). Child soldiers were often used a rebel checkpoints because they invoked more fear in civilians as compared to adult guards at checkpoints (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a). The RUF solidified the power of children by instituting a Small Boys Unit (SBU). Child commanders of the SBUs were considered

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119 Trinqué (2006) details a similar dynamic in the Vietminh insurgency against the French. One goal of the insurgency was to control the civilians “and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lies continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety” (p. 15).
“ruthless…or in the jargon of the RUF ‘a wild boy or hard boy’” (p. 294). The RUF also attempted to wrest the political authority of the Poro, developing initiation rites of their own, complete with naming practices and tattooing (Denov 2010).

Interviews\textsuperscript{120} with Sierra Leonean civilians related the all-pervasive fear that child soldier use could produce. One mother said that acts of amputations, especially by child soldiers, were meant to break up the community and push out all previous power holders. “They made us scared,” she said. Another Sierra Leonean said because so many child soldiers were drugged, they were seen as “crazy” and unpredictable. This unpredictability induced fear and paranoia in civilians, paranoia and distrust that continued well after the war was over. A father stated that child soldiers that returned to his village after the conflict had to be moved elsewhere, because no one trusted them. “If they came back, they would be too much trouble,” he said. Many interviewees stated that by taking children and turning them into soldiers, the rebels had undermined all sense of authority, removing it from the government and the family.\textsuperscript{121} Adults no longer had control, which for many civilians, was the last vestige of power they had. By demobilizing civilians, rebels were able to inhibit the behavior of civilians. They were less likely to fight back, which opened up a political opportunity of greater social control for the rebels.

Demobilization of civilians and other groups was not complete, though. There were ways that the government and other factions could counter the tactical innovation of child soldier use. One method was to use child soldiers. According to McAdam (1983), tactical innovations often lead to rebuttals by the opposition. This dynamic becomes a

\textsuperscript{120} Confidential interviews, 2008 and 2010.
\textsuperscript{121} During World War II, the German military used a similar approach to control its own civilians. The young corp of Hitler Jugend preyed upon the internal tensions of the family. It “often pitted son against father or daughter against mother as a matter of tactics…in order to keep adults in check” (Kater 2004, p. 39).
tactical interaction—the process of each side trying to regain power from the other.  

During the First War in IndoChina, the Vietminh continually engaged in a back and forth assessment and adjustment process on the battlefield. “Each devised new tactics and strategies and the other attempted to foil them,” states Tanham (1961, p. 110).

Once again, we find that a tactical dynamic, in this case tactical interaction, develops in the Liberian war and then also manifests in the Sierra Leone conflict. Richards (1996) states: “The practice of recruiting war orphans as under-age ‘shock troops’ was introduced by the NPFL, but later became general among all factions in Liberia, and among parties to the dispute in Sierra Leone, not excepting the Sierra Leone army, where under-age ‘vigilantes’ were selected and trained by battle-front commanders to ‘fight fire with fire’” (p. 88). The SLA government army recruited youths to take away potential soldiers from the RUF, to decrease the pool of available conscripts, and to gain the socio-psychological advantage that child soldiers afforded. The government army recruited “from among border-zone youth, teaching them guerilla tactics as deployed by both the NPFL and the RUF” (p. 180). One of the earliest civil defense militias formed (in 1991) was led by Captain Prince Benjamin Hirsch. Hirsch intentionally recruited from the same region as the rebels. “In this way he was able to deny the RUF its potential support from the youth of the diamond minds” (Gberie 2005, p. 76). Hirsch also incorporated Poro notions of “hindo-hindo (the mobilsation of village young men for community defence)” (Peters and Richards 1998, p. 189). By including Poro ideas and

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122 This process of counter-tactics is supported on a social-psychological level by the theory of symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969/1998), which states that “social interaction is a process that forms human conduct instead of merely being a means or setting for the expression or release of human conduct. Put simply, human beings in interacting with one another have to take into account of what each other is doing or is about to do; they are forced to direct their own conduct or handle their situations in terms of what they take into account…One has to fit one’s own line of activity in some manner to the actions of the other” (p. 8).
practices, Hirsch’s militia and the CDF groups that followed were able to gain legitimacy. The CDF provided a process for including youth that aligned with traditional values, which was unlike the RUF (Muana 1997). Legitimacy was also an underlying reason why youth volunteered for the CDF and as a consequence the CDF did not have to use forced recruitment. Youth joined groups such as the Kamajor for revenge and/or to be seen as heroes (Mustapha 2006). This was not the case with the RUF.

Conclusion

This single case study of Sierra Leone has hopefully provided a much more nuanced view of how child soldier use works as a tactic. By delving deeper into the ground-level dynamics we can make a stronger connection between the macro- and micro-levels of theory. There is a thread of tactics that runs through all levels. Militarization, political terror, education and intensity of armed conflict connect with troop fortification, morals dilemmas and relocation of fear in a society. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone has also uncovered several variables that deserve greater attention in future comparative studies. Political entrepreneurs/violent specialists such as Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor were very influential in the dissolution of moral boundaries and the instituting of human rights abuses in their armed conflicts. Child soldier use was a primary tool for them. Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda plays a similar role and is heavily dependent upon child soldier use. These Sankoh, Taylor and Kony demonstrate how the environment may be primed for child soldier use, but the practice only occurs when certain leaders push their forces over the tipping point. Can the practice occur without political entrepreneurs/violent specialists?
Kaufman’s (2001) theory regarding ethnic conflict shows how mobilization for political violence sometimes involves political entrepreneurs (elites or guerilla leaders) or and sometimes it does not. The absence of political entrepreneurs is a mass-led mobilization, a more crowd-like dynamic. Is this possible with child soldier use? Can it be more of a crowd-induced phenomenon? Other cases should be examined to test these questions.

The contagion effect is a second variable that needs further exploring. If we look at the wars in central and east Africa—the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda—we might find that one of the reasons why child soldiers are used in all of these states is because they are neighbors. If this is the case, then much more analysis is needed to understand how the contagion process works for child soldier use. A third variable that deserves more attention is the effects of allies, especially states that are major actors in the international arena, (e.g. the United Kingdom). In the Sierra Leone armed conflict it appears that the introduction of British troops at the end of the war decreased the likelihood of child soldier use by the SLA. If allies do have a constraining effect, then having major international actors intervene in civil wars might might be a method for decreasing child soldier use.

A final concept that warrants greater attention is social disrupture. This is an effect of child soldier use. Social disrupture is an outcome of the relocation of fear—the intentional attempt to tear apart pre-existing social structures. Kabia (2010b) states that fighting factions “often deliberately target civil society as a way of undermining and weakening its resolve to act as a check on predatory elites. These terror tactics are meant to destroy the social capital and the moral economy that underpin civil society” (p. 20). With the RUF, placing children in the center of the battle arena was clearly an attempt at
annihilating social capital and the moral economy\textsuperscript{123} in order to weaken any resistance movement from civilians. Even the training and indoctrination of child soldiers was an attack of social capital, wrenching any connection that the child may have had with civil society and the moral economy. The RUF was trying to strip a “forced recruit of all grounding in the society to which he or she previously belonged (including by subverting the moral and socio-cultural norms of that society) and then compelling (corrupting) the recruits to adopt a new, fundamentally warped set of standards and guiding principles” (Sierra Leone TRC 2004b, p. 530).

The new principles that children acquired maximized their potential for violence for the duration of the armed conflict, and created long-term social disruption. Such brutal destruction of the pre-existing social system was part of the goal of groups such as the RUF, to “create legacies of embitterment and suspicion that are the opposite of the relationships of trust and confidence vital to social capital” (Harvey 1997, p. 17). Children were taught and forced to “carrying out the killings, amputations and rape of loved ones, community members, relatives, and peers” (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a, p. 263). By committing atrocities against family and village, child soldiers were thrust out of their former social system. It was an “irrevocable break between conscripts and their communities” (Richards 1995, p. 158). The result was that after the war was over, child soldiers could not go home. Many civilians that I interviewed stated that when former child combatants returned to their village or town, they were feared and ostracized.

\textsuperscript{123} Moral economy is defined as “the range of distributive processes which occur within communities” (Swift 1989, p. 9). This range adheres to rules as proscribed by the social system within which it operates. Or, as Sayer (2000) defines it: “moral economy embodies norms and sentiments regarding the responsibilities and rights of individuals and institutions with respect to others. These norms and sentiments go beyond matters of justice and equality to conceptions of the good” (p. 79). Different social systems may overlap in their moral economies or may be completely separate.
Consequently they would leave, and re-situate themselves in communities where they were unknown, or they would move to the capital of Freetown. Once in Freetown many would become alienated youth. The social disruption effect was not limited to child soldiers, though. A government official that I interviewed echoed a wide-spread sentiment that the war and the use of child soldiers had eroded traditional generational constraints.\textsuperscript{124} “Before the war, pikin would always listen,” he said, “But now, after the war, less children listen to their elders.”

How to mend or transcend social disruption becomes the role of communities, government and global civil society. It is an enduring task, one that has not yet occurred in numerous states where children were turned into combatants. Considering the depth of brutality and social schism, is it possible? Returning to the quote that opened the chapter:

\ldots they took a stone and hit the face of my father and then he was killed and they removed his blood and put it in a cup and said ‘drink this blood or else we will kill you’; so I have no alternative but to drink the blood… (Sierra Leone TRC 2004a, p. 276)

If children were forced to eat their fathers, can they ever re-enter the social system that they once inhabited?

\textsuperscript{124} Confidential interview, 2008.
Chapter 7: Strategies of Prevention, Compellence and Protection

There are only two powers in the world, the sword and the mind ... In the long run the sword is always vanquished by the mind.

-Napoleon Bonaparte-¹²⁵

The main argument throughout this project has been that child soldier use is a tactical innovation. It is a tool that fighting factions utilize in order to gain an advantage on the battlefield. This study has approached the problem on multiple levels of analysis—the international level, the state level, the community level and the level of the individual. It has also tested the notion of tactical innovation from three theoretical frameworks: structure, culture and rational choice. The findings from the study show that the phenomenon of child soldier use is a global and a local issue, and that the problem results from a combination of structural, cultural and rational action forces. Hence, in order to end the practice, a holistic strategy must be developed. Global and national policies of prevention are important because they consider the structural elements, and place broad constraints on actors. However, because the phenomenon is extremely dependent upon interpersonal and small group interactions amongst civilians and combatants, real time strategies that consider the day-to-day battle realities, cultural norms, and rational choice considerations must be developed as well. Strategies of compellence and protection become useful as they can connect the global and the local arenas, and the structural, cultural and rational choice dynamics.

Child soldiers have witnessed and experienced a wide range of atrocities. Whether as a porter or a cook or as an executioner, the young in armed conflict inhabit a brutal

¹²⁵ The quote is from page 96 of Koren (1905).
world. The degree of violence is extreme in the Sierra Leonian case. Nevertheless, the problem, of deterring child soldier use, is approachable. Findings from this study will hopefully guide policymakers and activists towards more solutions. The regression analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that multiple structural factors influence whether or not a government or an insurgency will place children in combat. Depending on the dyadic relationship, intensity of the armed conflict, militarization of the government, troop size, degree of political terror, polity, and education all appear to matter. These variables reflect a tactical trend in armed conflict over a 20 year time frame (1987-2007). Chapter 4 addressed the historical context that facilitated the transformation of children into much more politically empowered entities. The last two centuries prepared the way for children to enter new roles as soldiers and as tactical devices. In Chapter 5, the emphasis was on the evolution of a norm, of how child soldier use could become acceptable within certain social systems. The network analysis depicted the flow of new practices and values—child soldier use as developed within a culture of violence. Finally, the case study of Sierra Leone in Chapter 6 zoomed in on the tactical dimensions as enacted within the conflict: the advantage gained on the ground.

The majority of the literature on child soldiers has focused on grievances, such as poverty and education, and the structural influence of weak states. Other enabling factors, including the small arms trade and refugee camps, have also been examined. These variables are valuable because they readily translate into policy prescriptions that IGOs, NGOs and states can institute. There are international treaties, national laws and relief efforts that attend to the problem of child soldier use as it occurs today. However, as this study has tried to demonstrate, the problem must be confronted not just at the
international level and the national level, amongst elites, but also down on the ground during the battle. The argument in Chapter 6 is underpinned by rational choice dynamics. The tactic of child soldier use is chosen when governments and/or insurgencies assess that the benefits outweigh the costs. Child fighters are an expression of maximizing utility in armed conflict. In *Complex Emergencies*, political scientist David Keen (2008) proposes that if policymakers and humanitarian aid workers want to reduce the brutalities of armed conflict and move closer to lasting peace, then they should focus on “how to manipulate the incentives of violence” (p. 174). He too sees a rational choice dynamic in armed conflict, and consequently the only way to minimize what happens in war is to strategize with the same assumptions. Policymakers and humanitarian aid workers should “try to map the benefits and costs of violence for a variety of parties and to seek to influence the calculations they make” (p. 208). After locating the actors involved, and exploring what their incentives are, they should consider what tools are available for manipulating those incentives. Furthermore, they must also devise new tools, especially with regards to child soldier use. Having found that the practice is an innovation, minimizing the incentives requires that everyone involved in the issue finds innovative responses to the dominant fact of contemporary wars: child soldier use is beneficial.

Even though each analysis—regression, historical, network, and case study—has tried to provide deeper insights about the phenomenon, much more digging still needs to be done. Further research on the ground-level dynamics of troop fortification, moral dilemmas and the relocation of fear is needed, expanding the focus to a larger comparative analysis of several cases. A deeper look into the role of political entrepreneurs/violent specialists in multiple cases would also be beneficial, especially
with regards to isolating those who exacerbate the problem. As CETO (2002) has suggested if a military knows who is instigating the practice, then capturing the political entrepreneur/violent specialist might decrease child soldier use. Another area of research that deserves more attention is the aspect of social disruption. If rebels use child soldiers in order to tear holes in the social fabric, then understanding how individuals experience these tears and how they reframe them with memory becomes essential to repairing the damage done. Truth and reconciliation commissions touch on this, but mostly from the angle of accusation and confession. It remains to be seen whether or not the work of truth and reconciliation commissions mends the holes caused by social disruption, which is why it is a topic worthy of more detailed attention. A final area of research that should be explored is how tactical information about child soldier use is exchanged. The network analysis showed the pathways along which the information possibly travelled, but it did not tell us what and how tactics are traded. Interviews with rebels who intentionally recruited and trained children might provide greater insight.

No study provides a complete picture of any socio-political behavior, but this project has built a multi-dimensional model of child soldier use that has not been developed before. Nevertheless, it did fall short with its modeling of the diffusion of a norm. The social network analysis in Chapter 5 depicted the pathways and nodes that the child soldier use tactic could most readily traverse. It became clear with the analysis that a network was in place and that Libya could be central to the transmission of the practice. However, the final piece of the causal pathway was not presented. There has yet to be found overt evidence of guerilla trainers in Libya instructing their trainees in the art of child soldier use. Many insurgencies went to the camps, intermingled, traded strategies,
and then returned to their countries to perpetrate similar acts in battle. There was also
evidence showing that child soldiers, such as Benjamin Yeaten of Liberia, trained at the
camps. And many children lived in the Libyan facilities as well. However, there has yet
to be found training manuals or eyewitness testimony explicitly stating that using
children in battle is a viable tactical choice for insurgents. Hence, the inferential gap
between Libyan guerrilla training camps and child soldier use must remain somewhat
open until further research produces evidence to bridge that gap.

**The Unintended Consequences of Benefits: Two Examples**

Before tackling the issue of strategies and tools, it is worth examining the
potential for unintended consequences of benefits from child soldier use. While the
international norm may forbid child soldier use, there are still numerous the gains that
actors on all levels can accrue as spill off from the practice. Polman (2010) argues that a
large-scale aid industry has cropped up around contemporary humanitarian crises.
Numerous international and local actors have developed a marketplace that benefits from
helping victims of armed conflict and other complex emergencies. She states, “The ICRC
[International Committee of the Red Cross] reckons that every major disaster attracts,
again on average, about a thousand national and international aid organizations. The
presence of twice that number, as in Afghanistan in 2004, no longer surprises anyone.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that the total number of
INGOs exceeds thirty-seven thousand” (p. 10). Clearly there is a large community that
has formed to help with complex emergencies, and the issue of child soldiers is no
exception. Some of the international IGOs and NGOs that work on the problem include:
the United Nations, UNICEF, the World Bank, the ICRC, the International Labor Organization, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Terre des Hommes International Federation, Save the Children Alliance, Invisible Children, and War Child. These organizations all contribute to the reinforcement of the anti-child soldier use norm. But, according to Polman (2010), they are also wrapped up in the aid industry which has access to a large pool of money:

For developmental cooperation in general, donor governments that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) make a total of $120 billion available annually...Campaigns by churches, businesses, and clubs, plus door-to-door collections and all kinds of heartwarming local initiatives, add hundreds of millions of dollars to this total every year (p. 10).

Whether they are huge operations, such as the United Nations, or smaller, non-profit church groups, money flows through these organizations. And, as Polman points out, that money can enter the hands of local actors, and oftentimes rebels. “From the proceeds of their negotiations with INGOs, warring factions feed and arm themselves and buy support,” she says (p. 97).

In Sierra Leone, the trickle down of international funds was most apparent during the DDR process at the end of the armed conflict. When observing Sierra Leoneans passing through the Bo disarmament center in 2001, anthropologist Daniel Hoffman (2003) found that children were often encouraged to pass themselves off as adults, and willing did so because “while child ex-combatants received rehabilitation, adults received direct material rewards. Children who could be snuck through brought benefits to their parent or patron, the latter often the commander in whose care a child was placed in by family or community” (p. 300). Here, in the disarmament process, the role of child soldier was being maximized through disguise, and as a consequence, the child did not
receive the benefit intended. In fact, they lost out on rehabilitation, and in the end only the international community and the government army or rebel commander benefited.

The cost-benefit chain that extends from IGO to child is complex, as the previous example demonstrates. And the problem of money ending up in the hands of the unintended must be resolved. Otherwise donors end up promoting the behavior that they hope to deter. Polman (2010) also found that the RUF ramped up their levels of violence, especially amputations, when the world turned its attention away from Sierra Leone. “Without the amputee factor, you people wouldn’t have come,” said RUF rebel Mike Lamin (p. 168). There is a dependency that can develop between the international community and groups that use child soldiers. The key then is to leverage that dependency.

The second example of unintended consequences that occur when trying to deter child soldier use involves state-to-state interactions and the benefits of domestic law. For several years, a group of NGOs lobbied the United States government to put more pressure on states that used child soldiers. Partly grounded on work conducted by the Center for Defense Information (CDI), organizations such as CDI, Human Rights Watch, World Vision and Amnesty International USA tried to exploit a link between U.S. military aid and countries with underage fighters (World Vision 2009). Looking at U.S. Department of State Human Rights reports and statistics for foreign military aid, the CDI found that the 2006 Human Rights report cited 25 countries with a past or current history of child soldier use. In 13 of these states, children were forcibly recruited, and “since 2001, the U.S. government has supplied 11 of these 13 countries with military assistance” (CDI 2007). NGOs saw this connection as beneficial to child soldier deterrence. After all,
would a country such as the U.S. want to be seen as an enabler for child soldier use? To be depicted as the state that gave the guns to the children? Instead, why not reverse the picture to become the state that rewarded governments that do not use child soldiers? This was the logic of the law that became the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008.

The law was strong, benefitting the U.S. with a good guy image and benefitting those states that refrained from child soldier use by continuing their military aid. If states broke the norm against child recruitment, then it would cost them their guns and military training. The law appeared as a positive for all, until, that is, it was tested. In October of 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama waived the law for four countries that were known to have child soldiers in their ranks: Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Yemen (Obama 2010a). His rationale for the waiver was that it was in the national interest to continue to supply military aid to these states, a loophole that the law itself provided for. The U.S. president said that these four states were important partners in the fight against terrorism in north and central Africa (Obama 2010b) and military aid would decrease the likelihood of terrorism in those regions. What had happened was the benefit of military aid to non-child soldier states had shifted to military aid to non-terrorist states. The cost-benefit equation had been recalculated: state security had trumped international norms.\(^{126}\) Now, instead of capitalizing on a link between military aid and child soldier use, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 provided a means for the United States government to maximize its benefits. The U.S. could be good for denying child soldier norm-breakers, that did not pose a national security threat, their military aid, and the U.S. could be good for insuring that there would be less terrorists

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\(^{126}\) The United States, along with 138 other states, are party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which prohibits the recruitment of youth under 18 years of age (United Nations 2011).
being made. Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Yemen also benefitted. These states could keep their child soldiers and their guns. Children, however, gained nothing.

What Tools Can We Use?

The two examples above do not encapsulate all of the complexities surrounding prevention, compellence and protection with regards to child soldier use. The cases of humanitarian crises and the aid industry, and of the U.S. Child Soldier Act of 2008 should, instead, be held as reminders that any policy formulation or strategy that aims to end child soldier use is fraught with multiple, shifting calculations. With this in mind, the discussion now turns to some of the tools that currently exist to address child soldier use, as well as some tools that have yet to be developed.

The most visible approach to preventing child soldier use takes place at the international and national levels. International humanitarian law has developed very exacting rules for who qualifies as a valid soldier and who is too young to be recruited and to fight. The lineage of treaties (Harvey 2003) extends from the Geneva Conventions of 1949, especially Geneva Convention IV, which pertains to the treatment and the protection of civilians during armed conflict, and through the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention (1977). Protocols I & II afford special protection for children in war and set 15 years old as the age limit for recruitment. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child continues the progression, obliging states to protect children from human rights abuses during war and to maintain the recruitment threshold at 15. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is a treaty created specifically for the young.
Finally, the treaties culminate with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2000. The Optional Protocol raises “the minimum age for direct participation to 18 for State forces (Article 1)” and disallows “the compulsory recruitment of under-18s into national armed forces (Article 2)” (p. 7). The Optional Protocol also prohibits all non-state, fighting forces from using children under 18 years of age in armed conflict. According to Harvey (2003), the collection of international laws aimed at protecting children in war is in general a “strong legal framework”, however “the application of these laws and standards in reality is limited, leaving children vulnerable to abuse” (p. 5). For example, the Optional Protocol “requires States to take ‘all feasible measures’” to keep children out of the battle theater (p. 7). The lack of precision in the wording, i.e. ‘feasible’, creates an opening for states, allowing them to hide behind the notion of self-defined capabilities. A state that violates the treaty can plead, “We tried our best.” The wording weakens state obligations, says Harvey.

At the national level, the global push to protect children from war has resulted in domestic laws which set the recruitment age (both voluntary and compulsory) at 18. According to Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2008), “almost two thirds” of the 120 states that have ratified the Optional Protocol have “committed themselves in their declarations” to institute this minimum age” (p. 19). Some of the more recent states to follow suit include Chile, Italy, Jordan, the Maldives, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and South Korea. But this progress has been coupled with regressive acts by other states, which have held fast to reducing the recruitment age in order to remedy troop shortages. The drive to prohibit the recruitment of 16 and 17 year olds has been “resisted by armed
forces in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, on the grounds that it would adversely affect the availability of recruits. In the U.S.A, following a dramatic fall in the number of under-18s joining the military and general recruitment shortfalls, increased enlistment bonuses were introduced and minimum educational standards for recruits were lowered” (p. 19). In developing and war-torn states, the issue of recruitment age is complicated even further by the lack of paperwork and procedures to verify the correct age of a child. Ragged or non-existent birth certificates make compliance with law difficult.

In addition to recruitment age, some states have drafted separate domestic laws to facilitate prevention, compellence and protection. Sweden has made it a war crime for any armed group to use children under 15 years of age in combat. Sierra Leone passed the Child Rights Act in 2007 which accepted the definition of child as anyone under 18 years old, and made it illegal to use “land mines and other weapons declared by international instruments to be adverse to children” (p. 297). As mentioned earlier, the United States passed a law (the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008) that bans the transfer of military aid to states that use child soldiers. These are notable, national level steps forward. However, they are the exceptions. Very few states have institutionalized the international anti-child soldier use norm in this manner; and even with the bridges that have been made between international and domestic law “the gap between what governments say and what they do remains wide” (p. 17). The U.S. decision to waiver domestic law and allow military aid to Yemen, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudan highlights this gap.
Several judicial instruments have been utilized to punish offenders of international law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) convened its first case against an individual accused of child soldier use on January 29, 2009. Congolese leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) “is accused of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate in hostilities, from September 2002 to August 2003” (Coalition for the International Criminal Court 2010). Dyilo could face life imprisonment if he is found guilty. The case has not been decided and is on hold as of February 2011 due to a stay of proceedings order and a subsequent reversal by the ICC Appeals Chamber.

The first convictions for child soldier use pre-date the ICC trial. In 2003, the Special Court for Sierra Leone indicted members from several different armed groups from the civil war. In 2007, the Court found three fighters from the AFRC “guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the recruitment and use of child soldiers. All three received prison sentences of more than 45 years” (Coalition to Stop 2007b). CDF militia member Allieu Kondewa was convicted as well, found guilty of breaking several international humanitarian laws (war crimes, crimes against humanity, child soldier use). He was sentenced to eight years in prison. The indictments and convictions of leaders from the

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127 The Rome Statute, which is the basis for the creation of the ICC, gives the Court jurisdiction over the prosecution of child soldier use. Article 8, 2b, xxvi, states that it is a war crime to conscript or enlist “children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities” (UN 1999).
128 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was formed as a joint project of the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone.
129 The men charged were Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu. RUF Foday Sankoh was also indicted by the court but died while in custody.
130 CDF leader Chief Hinga Norman was indicted for child soldier use, but died while in custody of the court.
various armed groups (the AFRC, the RUF, and the CDF) demonstrated the resolve of the international and national community to reaffirm the legitimacy of justice even during war. No group was pardoned for breaking global norms against child soldier use, even if the group, such as the CDF, was seen as a saving grace during the armed conflict. The result of the verdicts did not, however, provide closure for many Sierra Leoneans. In fact, the indictment of Chief Hinga Norman is still viewed by many as bogus and illegitimate, and has created skepticism regarding international proscriptions of local conflicts. This is not to say that some Sierra Leoneans condone child soldier use. Instead, those who are disgruntled by the international framing of how the war was fought, point to the Kamajoi’s legitimate use of traditional methods to incorporate children into their force, especially since it entailed an initiation process that conferred adulthood.

International law and judicial instruments are the main tools used to address the violating of the rights of children in armed conflict. Another overlooked tool that could be of value is economics, both sanctions and rewards. David Keen (2008) suggests that economic sanctioning of human rights abusers, and those connected to groups who violate humanitarian law, can be an effective method for compellence. Placing restrictions on the illegal trade of goods in West Africa has changed the behavior of some states. In 2001, the UN sanctioned the Liberian government for its support of the RUF and rebels in Guinea. “These sanctions included banning Liberian diamond exports, strengthening an existing arms embargo, grounding Liberian-registered aircraft and banning international travel by senior Liberian officials” (p. 174). Liberia responded to the restrictions by relinquishing some of its ties to the RUF, which helped with the progress towards peace. Directly “freezing or confiscating the foreign assets of a
particular warring party or of particular individuals” was useful in pressuring elites in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for their stance on Kosovo (p. 176). The strategy was also used against the FARC insurgents in Columbia and the UNITA rebels in Angola. Keen (2008) further suggests attacking the arms trade as a means to weaken human rights violators. All of these economic sanctions—trade bans, freezing assets, and blocking the arms trade—have yet to be implemented against groups that use child soldiers, though. Economic punishment could be a viable method for decreasing the benefits of child soldiers, and of compelling rebels and governments to stop recruiting.

Economic rewards confronts the same issue, but from the vantage of raising the benefits for not engaging in human rights abuses. Keen (2008) states that post-conflict DDR programs, if well-funded and well-executed, can compel and deter. “A good DDR programme can lure soldiers away from loyalty to leaders who often have a particularly vested interest in continuing conflict and avoiding the accountability and punishment that peace might bring” (p. 179). Keen is fully aware of the problems that occurred during the DDR process in Sierra Leone, which is why he stresses the importance of not short shrifting combatants and soldiers. A “good DDR programme” is one that ensures that aid is distributed to those in need and recognizes that soldiers must be taken care of. If soldiers see that their livelihoods will be diminished or abolished, that they will not get paid for serving after the conflict, then they have little incentive to accept peace. They might, instead, return to the battle and the use of child soldiers. Overall, economic reward does have the potential to change preferences and allegiances, but as a strategy of compellence, it can be manipulated away from the intended goal of stopping the conflict and pulling children off the battlefield.
The problem of taking policy and making it “work” appears especially difficult when trying to implement international norms into local realities. De Berry (2001) argues that the Convention on the Rights of the Child exemplifies the “gulf” between international standards against child soldier use and the realities of protecting children during war (p. 93). She, like others, advocates for a closer examination of the international complexities of child soldier use—“the global arms trade, international interventions and noninterventions, and the portrayal of the effects of conflict in the media”—and the ground-level, “local social relationships that will influence the life of a child during a conflict” (p. 103). The Convention on the Rights of the Child will continue to fall short if the global and the local are not attend to at the same time, she says. If we consider the argument presented throughout this project, that child soldier use is tactical event that transpires in the local arena, then strategies of prevention, compellence and protection must work through international law and pertain to local interactions. Otherwise the de Berry’s “gap” will remain, and the practice will continue.

**Ground-level tools**

Two ground-level groups which are essential to diminishing the effectiveness of child soldier use are the community and the military. In the *Field Guide to Child Soldier Programs in Emergencies*, Lorey (2001) outlines several strategies for preventing recruitment and rescuing children from battle. Some of the programming options for humanitarian workers include mapping areas of risk, developing education and awareness-raising campaigns, helping former child soldier re-unite with family, and working with communities and their leaders “to identify and reinforce traditional
mechanisms for protection of children” (p. 20). From my fieldwork in Sierra Leone, I found Lorey’s last option to be relevant to the country’s armed conflict and to the survival of children. Human rights expert Ramcharan (2010) stresses the importance of education and communities, especially teaching human rights. “This is essential for the deepening of a national culture of human rights,” he says, “which, in turn, is crucial for the promotion of values of tolerance and respect and, in the final analysis, for the prevention of human rights violations” (p. 54). A Sierra Leonean secondary school teacher that I interviewed felt, like Ramcharan, that education is a primary tool for deterring armed conflict and the use of child soldiers. Part of his curriculum involves mentoring students, speaking to them about the problems of war and the need to uphold human rights even in terrible times. Understanding that a major grievance of the war was education, he tells his class that knowledge is of great value in life and cannot be gained on the battlefield. “Education no kam from di gun,’ he said.\textsuperscript{131} It was the gun that divided us, he said.

Community-strength, how tight the bonds are between members, is exactly what the RUF rebels attacked, which is why any work before or during armed conflict to reinforce communal ties is worthwhile. A mother of four children who fled from the rebels for miles through the bush said that she saw many abandoned people, the elderly and children.\textsuperscript{132} Her and her husband proceeded to gather all those they met along their path to form a close-knit group. The mother said that her group’s survival depended upon the sharing of food rations, and the constant discussions about, and reinforcement of, community ideals. At night, when the group rested, adults discussed, and children

\textsuperscript{131} Confidential interview, 2010.
\textsuperscript{132} Confidential interview, 2008 & 2010.
learned, how the war was about selfishness and short-term gains. This strengthening of communal ties was what helped the group reach safety, she said, and fend off the fear that the RUF had generated.

A father of two children and former SLA member also emphasized the value of building strong family and community ties. He said he often teaches his own children about the war and the worthlessness of killing each other. “It was not worth it,” he said, “We gained nothing.” On the practical level, the father also developed a plan of action how to deal with armed conflict should it arise again. He instructed his children on where and how to hide, and how to interact with authority (rebels) should they be captured. When I asked him where did he get his sense of community and why did some Sierra Leoneans revert to selfishness and fear while others sought out stronger communal ties, he said it was a combination of “family and Gbangbani.” Gbangbani is a male secret society, similar to Poro, but its range of membership is based in the northern part of Sierra Leone. He said the training from Gbangbani always kept him thinking about the group over the individual. Further discussions with other members of Gbangbani in neighboring villages reiterated the power of the secret society, especially with respect to communal ties. One older Pa said that the Gbangbani’s emphasis on sympathy was what helped his village maintain social cohesion when the RUF passed through during the war.134

The power of social cohesion became all-important and necessary for several children who were recruited by the RUF. In three separate interviews with former child soldiers, I heard how young combatants strategized how to protect other children from

133 Confidential interview, 2010.
134 Confidential interview, 2010.
their RUF commanders. One boy, who was ten years old when captured, said his older brother joined the RUF once he saw that his sibling was recruited. He said that his brother protected many families and child soldiers while a part of the RUF. “When commanders were extra-rough on children,” he said, “my brother would step in and say ‘don’t worry, I’ll take of it.’” The older brother would then pull the child away to safety. The older brother would also provide opportunities for children to escape. When the RUF would travel through the bush, the older brother spread his group thin so that the children at the tail end of the line could duck out. In an interview with another former child combatant, I heard how he and other RUF child soldiers created a network of support for each other in order to resist the RUF brutality. The network acted as a safe haven within a world of rebels who looted, raped and killed. The interviewee joined the RUF when the rebels swept through his town. When I asked why he joined, he said “to protect others.” When I asked how he resist the RUF’s coercion, he stated that he had sympathy in his heart. “Pikin without sympathy were the ones most likely to engage in atrocities,” he said. The third interviewee also played a role of protector of children within the ranks. He was 15 when the RUF forced him to join. He said he travelled across the country with the rebels and was finally able to leave, ending up in the town where he now lived. I asked him why he had not gone back to his family on the other side of the country and he said that they were all dead, killed by the RUF. “There is nothing to go back to,” he said. “How has the town here accepted you,” I asked, “Do they ever worry about you once being with the RUF?” “No,” he replied, “Not at all. They think of me as part hero, because I helped protect their children when the RUF grabbed them.”

135 Confidential interview, 2008.
136 Confidential interview, 2010.
137 Confidential interviews, 2008 & 2010.
With all three cases, we find that family and community ties grounded the child soldiers and made them resisters. Strong sibling bonds and the ability to sympathize were two of the tools that these child soldiers engaged to fend off the RUF’s coercion. Especially important was the development of a resistance network within the insurgent network. This tactic was what Scott (1985) might call a “weapon of the weak”, the ability to fight back in subtle and practical ways even when in an extremely repressive environment. It was a guerilla tactic being used against a guerilla force. The protector role also had long-term repercussions. The third interviewee was able to reintegrate into the society, because he resisted and protected. His story highlighted how child soldier prevention programs that emphasis work with the community and on community strengthening are useful before, during, and after the war. This entails not only engaging families and villages, but also approaching male and female secret societies.¹³⁸ Like the Gbangbani members interviewed, the third child soldier interviewee attributed sympathy as a source of strength during the war.¹³⁹

The second ground-level group that should be incorporated into strategies of prevention, compellence and protection is the military. Save the Children Sweden (2009) is an NGO that has worked with militaries in Africa since 1998, teaching them basic child rights, according to international law, and mechanisms and strategies to protect and rescue children during armed conflict. Some of the positive findings from their efforts include making soldiers aware of how “to incorporate child rights and protection into

¹³⁸ Because I am male, I was not privy to the role that female secret societies, such as Sande or Bundo, played in the war. They are just as influential as Poro and Gbangbani, though, and must be included in any child soldier prevention programs.
¹³⁹ Because he was from the southern part of the country, he had not passed through Gbangbani, but had been initiated into Poro.
their work…to minimize exploitation and abuse of children perpetrated by the military themselves…[and] to establish and strengthen child protection mechanisms within the military structures such as Child Protection Units (CPUs)” (p. 1). A significant result of the training has been a shift in how children in war zones are perceived by the military. The goal has been “to instill in the military the reflex to protect children” even when the child is a soldier with a gun (p. 33). Child soldiers pose a challenging problem for soldiers who are highly-disciplined and skilled in combat. Nevertheless, the child rights training urges utmost constraint. As one trainer from the Cote D’Ivoire Navy states, “We explain that children as combatants must be neutralized but not killed” (p. 41).

A real-life scenario in Uganda against LRA leader Joseph Kony and his troops demonstrated how the training can be put into practice. In one confrontation, Kony surrounded himself with 200 child combatants to act as a shield against opposition forces. In order to protect and rescue the children, the commander of the opposing army intentionally maintained minimum force throughout the skirmish because so many children were involved: “…he ordered the soldiers to fire in the air upon which all the children lay down. The military then advanced and saved over one hundred children” (p. 42). The commander’s restraint neutralized the tactic of child soldier use, thereby decreasing the benefits for Kony and the LRA. Moral dilemma had been eradicated because the commander maintained the psychological schema that framed children as in need of protection.

The complexities of interacting with children on the battlefield is the most difficult problem that soldiers will face. The educating and training suggestions offered by Save the Children Sweden should be the primary tools used to untangle the problem.
The United States Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) has developed some valuable guidelines for soldiers in battle as well. When faced against troops that have child combatants, soldiers can utilize strategies such as firing for “shock effect”, creating opportunities for children to escape, and targeting key adults who appear as leaders over the child soldiers (p. 26, CETO 2002). Firing for shock effect can involve firing over the opposition’s heads or displaying degree of force by bringing in helicopters and bombing in the distance. According to CETO, because many child soldiers are forced recruits, they are often looking for avenues of escape. Hence, militaries should facilitate those escapes by increased intelligence of the opposition and by providing safe havens once the children flee. Finally, militaries can decrease child soldier use by concentrating on the elimination of those leaders who are perpetrating the practice. This tactic also necessitates increased intelligence.

I found evidence from the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia to support the dire need to work with the military on preventing and ending child soldier use. A former member of the SLA who went to Liberia as part of the ECOMOG force there voiced dismay about how the military did not deal with the child soldier issue. He witnessed child soldiers as young as 12 years old fighting for both sides of the armed conflict—government and insurgency. He said that he wanted to prevent it and protect the children, but there was nothing he could do. “The rules of war had been broken he said,” he said, “but our hands were tied because we had an ECOMOG mandate to protect refugees. That was out mandate. No more than that.”

Because ECOMOG did not have a plan of action for child soldiers in this case, nothing could be done. Conversely, a former SLA soldier who fought late in the Sierra Leone conflict said that his training in child soldier

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140 Confidential interview, 2010.
awareness was very useful for rescuing children. He said that the British army had taught his troop how to create escape opportunities and how to keep the former combatants safe while the battle was still being fought. Another interview with a current member of the Royal Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) revealed another asset that the military can provide: mentoring. The soldier had returned from Sudan as a member of the African Union peacekeeping force. His troop’s job was to act as an escort for food relief. He said he experienced kids throwing rocks at him and he saw 10 year old boys with machine guns. At one point, he grew so disenchanted with the situation that he decided to strike up a conversation with a child commander. The RSLAF soldier said that he tried to persuade the boy to put down his gun, that it wasn’t worth it, that he should instead turn to education. The soldier told the boy that he had given up his education to become a soldier and now he regrets it. Now he is stuck as a soldier, he said, stuck with “little pay, and little future.”\textsuperscript{141} The RSLAF soldier told me that he does not know if his words would have an effect, nevertheless he had to say something. This example of mentoring is an untapped resource in child soldier prevention and compellence, one that needs more development by the military.

One other component of military training that deserves much more attention is the psychological effects that can result from soldiers interacting with child combatants. Hughes (2008) warns that there is a serious lack of research by the U.S. military regarding engaging and/or killing child soldiers. We do not know the extent of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that might be occurring in U.S. troops, she says. This is a blindspot in military assessment especially because “populations other than just our combat troops may need to be prepared to interface with this growing threat because

\textsuperscript{141} Confidential interview, 2010.
more of these children may be treated by our forward-deployed medical troops, processed through detainee operations centers, or become part of media stories that may influence larger audiences than just our military public-affairs personnel” (p. 63). Soldiers might be able to block out moral dilemmas that arise on the battlefield when they confront a 10 year old with a gun, however, they may not be able to eradicate long-term consequences, such as PTSD. And the consequence of mentally wounded soldiers extends beyond the individual and into troop morale. Public morale could also be influenced.

For example, in 2010 Wikileaks released a video taken from the aerial perch of an U.S. Apache helicopter in New Baghdad, Iraq. The video showed the U.S. engaged in an airstrike against insurgents and others on the ground. Eighteen or more people were killed including civilians. The audio transcript (Wikileaks 2010) detailed the conversation between the U.S. pilot and military coordinators on the ground.¹⁴²

13:22  What’s that?
13:23  Got that big pile of bodies to the right, on the corner?
13:24  Yeah, right here.
13:25  We got a dismounted infantry and vehicles, over.
13:30  Again, roger.
13:31  And clear.
13:48  There’s the Bradley right there.
13:51  Got ‘em.
14:00  Hotel two-six; are you uh at this grid over?
14:05  Yeah I wanted to get you around so you didn’t just get that one dude to scare them all the away. It worked out pretty good.
14:11  I didn’t want those fuckers to run away and scatter.
14:12  Yeah.

Soon after the strike, the conversation shifted to details about who was hurt:

16:36  Target Twenty
16:36  Roger
16:40  You want me to take over talking to them?
16:42  S’Alright.
16:46  Seven-Six Romeo Over.
16:49  Roger, I’ve got eleven Iraqi KIAs [Killed in Action]. One small child wounded. Over.

¹⁴² Numbers on the left denote the time elapsed on the video in minutes and seconds.
Roger, we need to evac [evacuate] this child. Ah, she’s got a uh, she’s got a wound to the belly.

I can’t do anything here. She needs to get evaced. Over.

Bushmaster Seven, Bushmaster Seven; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo.

We need your location over.

Roger, we’re at the location where Crazyhorse engaged the RPG fire break.

Grid five-four-five-eight.

Well it’s their fault for bringing their kids into a battle.

That’s right.

Got uh, eleven.

Yeah uh, roger. We’re monitoring [observing].

Sorry.

Further on in the conversation the pilot learns that two other civilian children were hit and died. It is unknown whether or not the children were meant to be in the battle zone as fighters and/or deterrents, or were merely innocents caught in the middle of a cross-fire. Given the initial reaction of the fighter, that of pilot blaming adults on the ground, it can be inferred that the U.S soldier was not aware that children might be in the battle zone, nor that children needed protection. Psychologically, the soldier will have to process the event and his own responsibility. Because the event was made public via Wikileaks, it impacted the U.S. public as well. It is these types of issues that result when children and child soldiers are involved in war, and it is the military that should prepare for such outcomes.

The community and the military must enter into the child soldier prevention, compellence, and protection equation if they want to lessen the effectiveness of the tactic for insurgencies. These groups should not be entirely separate entities, though. Ideally, the community and the military, as well as humanitarian aid organizations and security forces (local police) should combine efforts, coordinate with, and reinforce, one another. The goal would be to create a comprehensive “child protection community” (p. 5, Dempsey 2007), which would bring the norms down from the level of international law
and into practical realities. All of the policy suggestions presented in this chapter align with the notion that strategies to end child soldier use must end up on the ground-level. The practice of putting children into combat happens in the field of war, face-to-face, and that is where the practice will end, too.

The Reality

For now, though, the problem of recruiting children into combat has not ended. Armed conflict may wax and wane, but child soldier use has not; and when wars have ended, the potential for reoccurrence remains. Sierra Leone’s history of political transactions being “centered on using the young as tools of violence” rather than “positive political participation”, i.e. democratic engagement, has not been resolved (p. 66, Mustapha 2006). The international community and the Sierra Leonean state have been lackluster in providing jobs and education, which could contribute to future unrest. In Freetown, some youths have formed gangs and staged riots. On December 12, 2010, the Freetown streets were “flooded with youths armed with cutlasses, stones, knives, bottles and other dangerous weapons. They were using these weapons to indiscriminately attack people and business house” (Kabia 2010a). Riots are not the norm in Freetown, and this incident evoked worry among some Sierra Leoneans that the same discontent seen before the war was emerging once again. A report by the Africa Economic Development Institute (AEDI) (2010) stated that a broader trend might also be occurring:

The return of politicized youth gangs, such as the non-aligned All People’s Congress Party and the southern-aligned Sierra Leone’s People’s Party (SLPP), are evidence of the role that identity has in politics in Sierra Leone. The return of the two parties means that young adults are increasingly drawing political and ethnic lines....The divide, according to a UN official, is said to be promoted by government youth program that seeks favor with chiefdoms in power.
According to the AEDI, the willingness of youth to participate in such gangs is in part due to deteriorating socio-economic factors including unemployment and a high cost of living.

In the southern region of the country, youth are being mobilized by a former SLA then AFRC officer. Adamu Eze is known to have been involved in the slaughter of civilians and SLPP supporters while in the town of Kono (Gberie 2010). Eze was known to be a “brutal enforcer” during the war. After the war ended, Eze returned to Kono to become a diamond miner, and a Chief Security officer at one of the mining sites. While in Kono he has mobilized youths to act as mine monitors, and to join the paramilitary police force in area. Journalist Lans Gberie (2010) is leery of Eze’s role as mentor, whom he interviewed while in Kono:

…it occurred to me, listening to his deranged locution, in an impoverished city blighted and war-scarred, a place with so many layers of dereliction and decrepitude, it occurred to me that this may well be a dress-rehearsal for something more sinister, something that ought now to be halted in its track. [Said Eze] “The APC is giving more to the youths now. The SLPP was all for chiefs; they were in complete control. But here in Kono, we the youths are in control, we are in power.”

Eze might signal the return of the political entrepreneur/violent specialist, ready to ignite violence with youths on his front lines.

The negative evolution of former child soldiers is exemplified by the actions of NPFL General Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten is the child soldier who impressed Charles Taylor while training in the Libyan guerrilla camps. After the Liberian war ended, General Yeaten continued to work for Charles Taylor, but now that Taylor is on trial in the Hague for war crimes, Yeaten has turned elsewhere for employment. In January 2011, Yeaten was reported to have moved into the southeastern part of Cote D’Ivoire (Global
Network News 2011). Yeaten is rumored to be making his way to help incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo in his resistance against Alassane Ouattara. (Ouattara officially won the last presidential election, but Gbagbo refused to step down.) Yeaten and many other ex-Liberian fighters are said to be looking for work as mercenaries. Because Yeaten has been a fighter since about the age of 14, it is not surprising that he would continue on and become a soldier for hire. Armed conflict is his world. It is what he was taught to do since boyhood. Unfortunately, Yeaten’s case is not an anomaly. It is an example of why child soldier use should not be ignored.
APPENDIX A: Codebook

Conflict Count

This number denotes armed conflict. Several dyads may be included in one armed conflict. Armed conflict is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset of armed conflicts.

ID/Tynes

This number denotes each dyad. One number per conflict dyad. A conflict can have more than one dyad, but the dyad will always include the grounding state (see UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, example Russia, #11, 12 & 13). This follows the definition from the UCDP/PRIO codebook:

*Dyad:* A dyad consists of two conflicting primary parties. At least one of the primary parties must be the government of a state. In interstate conflicts, both primary parties are state governments. In intrastate and extrasystemic conflicts, the non-governmental primary party includes one or more opposition organization(s). A conflict can include more than one dyad. If e.g. a government is opposed by three rebel groups over the same incompatibility, the conflict is made up of three dyads. Note that secondary parties (i.e. intervening states supplying troops to one of the primary parties) do not lead to the formation of additional dyads (Harbom et al 2008, p. 5).

ID/PRIO

This number denotes each dyad according the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset numbering system.

Location

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

The name(s) of the country/countries whose government(s) have a primary claim to the issue in dispute...Location is defined as the government side of a conflict...For internal and internationalized internal conflicts (see Section 3.12 for definition), only one country name is listed. This is the country whose government or territory is disputed.

For interstate conflict, both primary parties are listed in the Location field. Even if several governments are involved in the conflict, only countries that fulfill the inclusion criteria
for primary actors are listed here. This normally means that two countries are listed, but there are three notable exceptions: In the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49 as well as the Suez war of 1956 and the war in Iraq in 2003, there are more than two primary parties to the conflict.

For extrasystemic conflicts, Location is set to be the disputed area, not the government of the colonial power. Since the Location field in these conflicts by default does not indicate members of the international system, it constitutes an exception from the definition presented in Section 2. Location is a string variable, listing the names of the countries involved. These might be fighting together or against each other (Harbom et al 2008, p. 8)."

**Side A**

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

“Side A is by definition always a primary party to the conflict. In internal conflicts, side A is always the government side, it is one of the sides in interstate conflicts and the colonial state in extrasystemic conflicts (Harbom et al 2008, p. 8).”

**Side B**

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

“Like Side A, Side B is by definition a primary party to the conflict. Side B is the opposition side of all internal and extrasystemic conflicts and the second side in an interstate conflict. Thus, Side B can include both states and non-governmental opposition groups, depending on the type of conflict. (Harbom et al 2008, p. 9).”

**Year**

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

“The year(s) of observation” (Harbom et al 2008, p. 10).

The range for this study is from 1987-2007. Conflicts may start earlier than 1987, though. These conflicts are included as long as they end in or continue through 1987.
Duration

Based on the Year(s) from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, this variable denotes the entire length of the conflict, listed in number of months.

Incompatibility

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

“As described in Section 2.1, UCDP collects information on conflicts where the incompatibility, i.e. the general incompatible positions, concerns either government, territory or both…Conflicts that concerned both territory and government were assigned to their primary incompatibility. From Version 4-2007 the incompatibility is coded in three categories:

1. Territory
2. Government
3. Government and Territory

Note that the incompatibility expressed in terms of government or a specific territory is crude in the sense that possible underlying incompatibilities are not considered. In other words, the stated incompatibility is what the parties are (or claim to be) fighting over, but it says nothing about why the parties are fighting. While a state can only experience one intrastate conflict over government in a given year, that same state can simultaneously be a primary party to one or more interstate conflicts over government and/or territory. In the case of intrastate territorial conflicts, multiple conflicts can be recorded over different territories in a state in a given year (Harbom et al 2008, p. 9).”

Intensity

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:

“1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year.
2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. (Harbom et al 2008, p. 10).”

Type of Conflict

This is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, defined in the codebook as:
“1. Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.

2. Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.

3. Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.

4. Internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. (Harbom et al 2008, p. 10)”

**Region**

Region of Location. This variable groups the various conflicts into six geographical categories, based on coding for the Location of the conflict.

1. Europe
2. Middle East
3. Asia
4. Africa
5. South America
6. North America

**Child Soldier Use A**

Child soldier use is coded for each side in a dyad, but only one score is given per dyad. Following the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), a child soldier is anyone fifteen years old or younger. A child soldier is anyone “who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms” (United Nations 1997)

1=Side A only (government only)
2=Side B only
3=Both Side A and Side B
4=No child soldiers used in dyad
5=No data to confirm
Child Soldier Use B

A dichotomous variable that states simply whether or not child soldiers appear in the dyad.

1=Yes
0=No

GDP per capita

GDP per capita is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. Any conflict that begins before 1987, is coded for GDP per capita in 1986. Hence the range for GDP per capita is within 1986-2007. (Tracking and labeling child soldier use did not begin until the late 1980s, so using GDP per capita data from 1986 on most closely aligns with the child soldier data.) In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), GDP per capita is listed for both states. Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

GDP per capita B

This is GDP per capita for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Education

Education is based on Location, looking at the year closest to the conflict start date. UNESCO statistics are posted in five year intervals; for this study’s range the pertinent years are 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. The variable is measured as school life expectancy, which is defined as:

“The total number of years of schooling which a child of a certain age can expect to receive in the future, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular age is equal to the current enrolment ratio for that age (UNESCO 2009b).”

Many of the conflicts begin before 1987, however child soldier information is only reliable starting in 1987. Hence, when coding for year prior to start of conflict, 1986 is used as the earliest year prior in order to be consistent with the available information for child soldier use.
**Education B**

This is Education for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

**Infant Mortality**

Infant Mortality is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Infant mortality is listed for both states. Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory. (from UN Demographic Yearbook, except for Israel/Palestine; http://www.childmortality.org/)

Infant mortality is defined as: “The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1,000 live births (p. 10, UNICEF, WHO, World Bank & UNPD 2007).”

**Infant Mortality B**

This is Education for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

**Child Population**

Child population is based on Location, looking at the year closest to the conflict start date. United Nations population statistics are posted in five year intervals; for this study’s range the pertinent years are 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Child population is defined as: “De facto population as 1 July of the year indicated and in the age group indicated and the percentage it represents with respect to the total population” (United Nations Population Division 2009b). It encompasses ages 0-14. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Child population is listed for both states. Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

**Child Population B**

This is Child Population for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.
Military Expenditures

Military expenditures is listed in millions of U.S. dollars. It is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Military expenditures is listed for both states.

Military Expenditures B

This is Military Expenditures for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Military Expenditures as Percent of GDP

Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP is a percentage of the GDP. It is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Military expenditures as percent of GDP is listed for both states.

Military Expenditures as Percent of GDP B

This is Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Tanks

Tank is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not the state has more than 10 tanks in its military. It is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Tank is listed for both states.

1=Yes
0=No

Tanks B

This is Tanks for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Troops

Troops is based on Location, looking at the number of troops held by the state for the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Troops is listed for both states.
Troops B

This is Troops for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Polity

Scores are pulled from the Polity scale. The polity scale is a range gauging how democratic or authoritarian the regime is: +10 (strongly democratic) to −10 (strongly autocratic). The regime is based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Polity is listed for both regimes.

The Polity 2 score is used from the Polity dataset: “This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses” (p. 15, Marshall and Jaggers 2009b)

Polity B

This is Polity for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Political Terror

Scores are pulled from the Political Terror Scale. They are based on Location, looking at the year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), the Political Terror scale is listed for both states. The Occupied Territories of Israel levels are used when coding for Israel.

From Gibney, Wood & Cornet (2008):

“The PTS measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its...
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

*Political Terror Scale, 1976-2007, averages of all available scores from Amnesty International and US state department reports."

Political Terror B

This is Political Terror for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.

Real Gross Domestic Income per capita

Real Gross Domestic Income per capita is based on Location, looking at year prior to the start of the conflict. In interstate conflicts (for example, India vs. Pakistan), Real Gross Domestic Income per capita is listed for both states. Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Real Gross Domestic Income (RGDPL adjusted for Terms of Trade changes) is in constant U.S. dollars.

"The RGDPTT variable is Gross Domestic Income and follows the recommended method in the UN System of National Accounts. This revised procedure is also consistent with the current and past treatment of the net foreign balance in PWT. RGDPTT is the 1996 international price value of domestic absorption of a country in a given year plus current exports minus current imports deflated by the deflator and the 1996 PPP of domestic absorption." (Heston, Summers & Aten 2008, p. 20).

Real Gross Domestic Income per capita B

This is Real Gross Domestic Income per capita for when it is an interstate conflict, in which case statistics for both states are listed.
APPENDIX B: Notes on Coding and Sources

Timeframe 1987-2007:

Friends World Committee for Consultation has campaigned internationally against child soldier use since 1979. The Quaker organization began sending reports about child soldier use to the United Nations in 1985. [Child Soldiers, Woods] The data appears to be more thorough and comprehensive beginning around 1987.

Conflict Count

Sources =


ID/PRIO

ID/PRIO 103:

Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge and Cambodia and Vietnam vs. Khmer Rouge is coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Cambodia vs. FUNCINPEC and Cambodia and Vietnam vs. FUNCINPEC are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Cambodia vs. KPNLF and Cambodia and Vietnam vs. KPNLF are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.
ID/PRIO 113:

Sudan vs. SPLM/A and Sudan and Chad vs. SPLM/A are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Sudan vs. JEM and Sudan and Chad vs. JEM are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Sudan vs. SLM/A and Sudan and Chad vs. SLM/A were coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 118:

Uganda vs. UDCA/LRA and Uganda and Sudan vs. UDCA/LRA are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables were coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 131:

Angola v. UNITA and Angola and Cuba vs. UNITA and Angola and Namibia vs. UNITA are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 137:

Afghanistan vs. Multinational Coalition (2001) is coded using independent variables from the United States as it was the lead opponent.

ID/PRIO 176:

Iraq vs. Multinational coalition is coded using independent variables from the United States as it was the lead opponent.

ID/PRIO 179:
Rwanda vs. FPR and Rwanda and Republic of Congo vs. FPR are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 191:

Algeria vs. GSPC and Algeria, Chad, Mali and Niger v. GSPC are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 200:

Tajikistan vs. UTO and Tajikistan and Soviet Union vs. UTO are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 214:

Congo vs. Ninjas and Congo, Angola and Chad vs. Ninjas are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Congo vs. Ntsiloulous and Congo, Angola and Chad vs. Ntsiloulous are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

ID/PRIO 218:

Serbia vs. NATO is coded using independent variables from the United States as it was the lead opponent.
ID/PRIO 224:

US et al vs. al-Qaida is condensed into one conflict even though the coalition members slightly alter from year to year.

ID/PRIO 91 & PRIO 166:

Chad and France vs. Libya and Chad vs. Libya are coded as one long conflict as child soldier use could not be discerned from one phase to the next.

Other variables are coded dependent upon how the entire conflict began, i.e. if it began as a single state vs. a single group, then the entire conflict is coded according to how the conflict was initiated even though multiple states may have entered later on.

Sources =


Location

Sources =


Side A

Sources =


Side B

Sources =

Same as Side A.

Year

Sources =


Duration

Sources =


**Incomaptability**

Sources =


**Type of Conflict**

Sources =


**Region**

Sources =


Child Soldier Use A

Sources =


Hunter, Catherine (2006). "Occupied Territories, Palestinian Children and Hamas." Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Forum on Armed Groups and the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland, 4 to 7 July 2006.


**Child Soldier Use B**

Sources =

Same as for Child Soldier Use A.

**GDP per capita**

Source =


**GDP per capita B**

Source =

Same as for GDP per capita A.

**Education**


Source =


Education B

Source = Same as for Education A.

Infant Mortality

Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Data for Serbia before 1997 uses the Bosnia rate it is comparable to Serbian rate from 1997 on (approximately +/- 3).

Source =


Infant Mortality B

Source =

Same as for Infant Mortality A

Child Population

Data for Israel is drawn from statistics for the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Sources =

Revision, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp

Child Population B

Sources =

Same for Child Population A.

Military Expenditures

Sources =


Military Expenditures B
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Military Expenditures as Percent of GDP
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Military Expenditures as Percent of GDP B
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Tanks
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Tanks B
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Troops
Sources =
Same as for Military Expenditures A.
Troops B

Sources =

Same as for Military Expenditures A.

Polity

Sources =


Polity B

Sources =

Same as for Polity A.

Political Terror

Source =


Real Gross Domestic Income per capita

RGDI was not available for Myanmar and Palestine, so the GNI figure was used from United Nations (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp) multiplied by inflation adjustment made for RGDI for India and Israel. Inflation adjustment = RGDI for India divided by GNI for India x GNI for Burma; RGDI for Israel = GNI for Israel x GNI for Palestine. (both of these are modest adjustment; Burma and Palestine are probably poorer). RGDI for Russia 1989 (and before) not available so 1990 figured was used. Georgia 1992 and before not available so 1993 figure was used. For any coding of Serbia,
used Inflation adjustment for Serbia = RGDI for Bosnia divided by GNI for Bosnia x GNI for Serbia. For Azerbaijan and Armenia before 1993, the 1993 statistic was used. For Georgia pre-1993, the 1993 statistic was used. For Moldova pre-1992, the 1992 statistic was used. For Tajikistan pre-1993, the 1993 statistic was used.

**Sources =**


**Real Gross Domestic Income per capita B**

**Source =**

Same as for Real Gross Domestic Income per capita A.
APPENDIX C: Correlation Matrix for Logit Regression

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<td>.619</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.268</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
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<td>.259</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>-.218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>-.210</td>
<td>-.380</td>
<td>-.227</td>
<td>.194</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Infant Mortality</td>
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<td>.112</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.341</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>-.167</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>-.054</td>
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<td>.195</td>
<td>.787</td>
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<td>.395</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.299</td>
<td>.694</td>
<td>-.305</td>
<td>-.586</td>
<td>-.550</td>
<td>.894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Gross Domestic Income</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>-.356</td>
<td>-.319</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td>-.653</td>
<td>-.514</td>
<td>-.622</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Population</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.160</td>
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<td>.100</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure Per GDP</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>-.253</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td>-.306</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.215</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.071</td>
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*Red font denotes correlation.*
### APPENDIX D: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Regression Analyses

#### a. Child Soldier Use (Dichotomous)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Number of Dyads</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### b. Child Soldier Use (Categorical)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child Soldier Use</th>
<th>Number of Dyads</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Only</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Group Only</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Government and Opposition</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>50.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
c. Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>N (Dyads)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Need</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>637</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>257690</td>
<td>568015.8</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5096000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Exp. (mill./US$)</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>4902.6</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>304136</td>
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<td>Mil. Exp. Per GDP</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (per 1K)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>173.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1104.5</td>
<td>2662.5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>34280</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGD Income (US$)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>3051.1</td>
<td>3744.2</td>
<td>306.3</td>
<td>39376.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Pop. (% of pop.)</td>
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<td>40.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>49.7</td>
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Independent Variables (cont.)

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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Need</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-999 Battle Deaths</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 999 Battle Deaths</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>44.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n=283)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt; 10</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>≥ 10</td>
<td>211</td>
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<td>(n=273)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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## Independent Variable (cont.)

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<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-9</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>-5</td>
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<td>-4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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APPENDIX E: Tests for Fit of Models

a. Sensitivity and Specificity Percentages for Binary Logistic Regression

<table>
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<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity</td>
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<td>97.2%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>98.15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specificity</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyads Correctly Classified</td>
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<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Wald Test for Multinomial Logistic Regression Variables

1. Government Only Uses Child Soldiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Chi²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>P &gt; Chi²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>21.313</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures per GDP</td>
<td>7.877</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>19.633</td>
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<td>.049</td>
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</table>

N = 219 dyads

2. Opposition Only Uses Child Soldiers

<table>
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<th>df</th>
<th>P &gt; Chi²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16.308</td>
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<td>Polity</td>
<td>15.778</td>
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</table>

N = 219 dyads
3. Both Sides Use Child Soldier

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Chi²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>P &gt; Chi²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>19.634</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures per GDP</td>
<td>11.930</td>
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<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror</td>
<td>4.759</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18.094</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N = 219 dyads*
APPENDIX F: Map of Sierra Leone

(Map from Central Intelligence Agency, United States Government)

144 Courtesy of University of Pennsylvania, African Studies Center. Available at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/CIA_Maps/menu_CIA.html
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