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Intra-sectoral diversity: a political economy of Thai private higher education

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INTRA-SECTORAL DIVERSITY:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THAI PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

By

Prachayani Praphamontripong

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
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INTRA-SECTORAL DIVERSITY:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THAI PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

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Prachayani Praphamontripong

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ABSTRACT

Private higher education (PHE) worldwide has been a rapid development in the last several decades. The private sector will continue to grow, diversify and undoubtedly play a significant role in the political economy of higher education. Nevertheless, systematically empirical studies on the trio relationships among PHE, institutional diversity and political economy are still miniscule, especially outside the U.S. In Thailand, studies on even public higher education utilizing international literature are rare, as is research with a macro-level empirical analysis of private-public comparison. Thus, this study focuses on the fundamental differences among Thai private higher education institutions (PHEIs) and between private and public ones and the extent to which political economy influences their shapes and differences. The study attempts to determine and demonstrate whether, how and how much the Thai case fits Levy’s (1986b) PHE pioneering concepts on types of PHE: religious-oriented, semi-elite, demand-absorbing.

The study employs combined methods of analysis: content analysis of 24 interviews of private university presidents and national policymakers and institutional data and legislative documentation, descriptive statistical analysis and Ragin’s (2000, 2008, 2009) Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The findings show clusters of characteristics on governance and finance in relation to different institutional types. Intra-sectorally, Thai PHEIs are different among themselves based on types of ownership and characteristics previously identified in the literature. Levy’s theory is vigorously applicable to the Thai context. Nonetheless, several deviations appear. The
findings introduce a new category, serious-demand-absorbing, which incorporates elements from other types. The findings also suggest that institutional isomorphism happens due to all PHE types tending to share comparable characteristics in both governance and finance and that institutional diversity becomes a matter of degrees. Institutional functions, e.g., size, age, mission, fields of study are catalysts in differentiation or isomorphism of different PHE types. Inter-sectorally, private and public higher education institutions are most different from one another in the law governing them, internal administration style, and government funding. Finally, political economic policies, e.g., quality assurance, the PHE Act, and student loans result in coercive isomorphism while aggressive market competition bolsters institutional diversity.
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Furthermore, I wish to thank Dr. Alan Wagner (Department Chair) and the Department of Educational Administration and Policy Studies for financial support during my doctoral studies. I also wish to thank Dr. Jason Lane for his critical reading on my dissertation proposal and his enthusiastic assistance with research methods. My genuine appreciation goes to Dr. Charles Ragin, the father of fsQCA, for his time and constructive suggestions.

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<td>APHEIT</td>
<td>Association of Private Higher Education Institutions of Thailand</td>
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<td>B.E.</td>
<td>Buddhist Era: the official Thai solar calendar which is 543 years greater than the Christian Era (AD)</td>
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<td>CHE</td>
<td>Commission on Higher Education</td>
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<td>fsQCA</td>
<td>Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<td>HEIs</td>
<td>Higher Education Institutions</td>
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<td>ICL</td>
<td>Income Contingent Loan</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MUA</td>
<td>Ministry of University Affairs (former CHE)</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Education Council</td>
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<td>NESDB</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation Development</td>
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<td>ONESQA</td>
<td>Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment</td>
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<td>PHE</td>
<td>Private Higher Education</td>
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<td>PHEIs</td>
<td>Private Higher Education Institutions</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>Sub-district Administration Organization</td>
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<td>SLF</td>
<td>Student Loans Fund</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“A diverse system, with a variety of institutions pursuing different goals and student audiences, is best able to serve individual and national goals. Recognizing the nature and legitimacy of this diversity helps ensure that there are fewer gaps in what the system can provide…”

(World Bank 2000)

This research seeks to determine institutional characteristics that show how private higher education institutions (PHEIs) in Thailand differ among themselves. Using Levy’s (1986b) private-public patterns and typology of private growth as a theoretical framework, the study attempts to confirm what the literature has said and to explore whether there will be any findings that challenge or deviate from the literature, thereby further suggesting a necessary modification. When researchers describe institutional diversity, as certainly in Levy’s case, the constructs commonly deal with major characteristics of higher education such as finance and governance. Additionally, a political economic perspective appears to be an important explanation to such differentiation. Therefore, this study has investigated whether these institutional characteristics hold in the Thai case.

1.1 Problem Statement and Hypotheses

1.1.1 Research Theme

Since the first enactment of the 1969 Private College Act, private higher education (PHE) in Thailand has progressively increased its role in the country’s higher
education development previously monopolized for over fifty years by public universities. As in most countries, the differences between private and public higher education institutions (HEIs) in Thailand depend largely on not only how they are founded and governed, but also how they are financed and functioned. The degree and shape of distinction, however, is linked to political economic forces imposed upon them. Such forces may refer to marked shifts from state- to market- ideology in privatization, marketization, quality and standards, state funding, private-public partnership, and so forth. In any case, international literature suggests that private-public distinction and institutional differentiation do matter in various important issues concerning higher education development for both scholarship and policy (Levy 1986b, 2007). As for Thailand, although much policy discourse has often mentioned such rapid PHE growth, Thai reality mostly illustrates only subjective policy claims and the lack of empirical studies on PHE and private-public comparison in the Thai higher education system as a whole. Hence, to address this research gap, this study posits its central research question as follows: How do Thai private higher education institutions (PHEIs) differ among themselves and from the public ones? Focusing on governance and finance—given their importance as recurring, important, and largely inclusive issues of higher education analysis—the study poses its main research question separately for each dimension. Nonetheless, the study banks upon a political economic explanation to a differentiation analysis of governance and finance.

1.1.2 Hypotheses

To help analyze these research questions, I have proposed several hypotheses. To begin with, I hypothesize that Levy’s (1986b) framework would be largely valid to the
Thai case, expecting that private and public HEIs in Thailand will differ from one another in common constructs dealing with governance and finance. Such characteristics can be observed through various dimensions like institutional size, administration and decision making as well as funding patterns. This is so because previous empirical cases in Asia, Latin America, and the United States, have confirmed the existence of institutional differentiation between private and public HEIs, especially in terms of governance and finance (Bernasconi 2006; Geiger 1986; Levy 1986c). Also, Levy’s framework is believed to be applicable to the Thai case, largely due to the fact that Asia and Latin America encompass comparable settings and hold similar characteristics. For instance, both Asia and Latin America once represented the “continental model” (Clark 1983) and the boom of private sector in such regions emerged as an unexpected phenomenon (Levy 2002).

Second, although there are significant differences of institutional characteristics between private and public HEIs, some private subsectors play significant roles in imitating other successful subsectors and so do public ones. For example, we see a non-coercive “domino effect” when private semi-elite universities voluntarily mimic some strategies of prestigious public universities in order to attract similar clienteles and to gain more legitimacy, and later on when demand-absorbing institutions emulate the private semi-elite ones (Praphamontripong 2005). Likewise, international literature suggests that many private demand absorbers are more dull emulators than dynamic competitors and that the most competitive oriented institutions are the semi-elite and the upper end of demand absorbers. In other words, within the private sector, non-elite demand absorbers likely imitate the latter two subsectors and even the public sector. The
likelihood of competition within the higher education market tends to occur among HEIs within the same sector (either private or public) and across the sector (both private and public) (Levy 1999; Silas Casillas 2005). Therefore, I have asserted that subsectors—different types of HEIs, specifically of the private ones (such as religious-oriented, semi-elite, demand-absorbing), be one of the crucial factors to illustrate diversification as well as to generate isomorphism of organizational characteristics in the Thai higher education system.

1.1.3 Attention to Private Higher Education

Despite ensuring an explicit inter-sectoral analysis of both private and public higher education sectors, this study dedicates most attention to the private sector and thus particularly lends itself to an application of the private higher education literature. Accordingly, the study’s unit of analysis will aim at PHEIs. This is so mainly because much of public higher education has already been known while little of PHE has been studied notwithstanding its fast growing role in higher education worldwide. The following subsections provide more justification.

1.2 Significance of the Study

The most significant implication of this proposed study is in the realm of scholarship. The study focuses on some important matters of academic interest: PHE mainly, dissection of a sector and private-public comparisons, privatization, higher education policy, and links between higher education and macro political economic policies. Furthermore, the Thai national case has made a great contribution into both
institutional differentiation literature as well as the international higher education literature—especially on political economic policy and PHE.

1.2.1 Private Higher Education

The research focuses on the private sector because PHE growth worldwide has been a fascinating phenomenon in the last several decades and yet there is still usually a lack of empirical research on PHE, particularly outside the U.S., either as a basic case analysis of national PHE or as a regional one. Even where there is research dealing with private-public differences in a given country—as in some Eastern European or African countries or India—it seems that very little such research is systemically using concepts and theory derived from the literature. Whereas an increasing number of studies deal with private-public differentiation, disaggregation of PHE remains rare—even though such intra-sectoral differences can be large. Few scholarly works have tackled PHE issues comparable to what I am attempting.

The most extensive analyses in the field of PHE and private-public distinction are Levy’s studies (1986b, 1992, 2002, 2006b, 2007). Based on the concepts of finance, governance, and function, Levy’s (1986b) pioneering study of private-public mixes and ideal types of PHE in different Latin American higher education systems is still contemporary and cited these days. Nevertheless, whereas Levy’s work included three case-studies, his subsequent work has been more general than nationally intensive, the major exception being India (Gupta, Levy, and Powar 2008) along with regional treatments for Africa (Mabizela, Levy, and Otieno 2007) and Eastern Europe (Slantcheva and Levy 2007).
Silas Casillas (2005) and Scheker (2007) apply Levy’s framework to the systems of Mexican PHE and the Dominican Republic K-12 education, respectively. Kent and Ramirez (1999) also explores institutional diversification in the Mexican PHE with some modifications from Levy’s typology. They all do so in article-length treatments. Also notable are several national case studies in Slantcheva and Levy (2007), Mabizela, Levy, and Otieno (2007) and Varghese (2004).

On the other hand, there are far more abundant studies on public higher education than on PHE. As Levy (1986b) accentuates, since one can rely on previous studies of public higher education more often than those of PHE, more effort must be dedicated to the study of PHE in order to gain a greater balance of understanding.

Ultimately, PHE research in Thailand is minimal in comparison to research on public higher education. Yet even fine studies on Thai public higher education, using international literature, are rare. Hence, this research is a pioneering study not only on PHE but also on private-public comparison in Thailand as well as in South-East Asia more generally. Its contribution deserves to be a major case study for the international higher education literature.

1.2.2 Institutional Diversity

As Rhoades (1992) asserts, an organizational perspective and its insights in the research areas of institutional differentiation through the division of labor and governance are particularly central to comparative higher education literature. Despite being accentuated in global higher education literature, institutional diversity on structural functionalism, referring to different fundamental dimensions of the division of labor, is seldom developed as empirical work, especially at the macro level. Most public higher
education scholars and some PHE scholars have studied such an issue but their focus is often on individual institutions. Research on interrelationships among different types of institutions and systems or the relationship between external environments on internal institutional characteristics is rather scarce. Thus, an attraction for a focus on differentiation and diversity is that it gives a broad view of the sector and contributes to the literature on institutional diversity. The study, therefore, fills such a research gap of PHE and institutional diversity literature.

Moreover, an analysis of private-public differentiation and a thorough investigation inside the private sector of the Thai higher education system are very important. Thai literature on institutional diversity is minimal and analyzed separately using either private or public sectors, as opposed to a holistic analysis that includes both sectors. At present, the only major literature on institutional differentiation is Sinlarat’s (2003) but it deals with only the public sector and provides only descriptive analysis through a historical approach on programmatic differentiation. Bovornsiri (2006), likewise, provides only a brief descriptive report on diversification of Thai higher education. A study of institutional diversity within the Thai private sector remains almost non-existent. Hence, this study is pioneering, expected to provide a better-informed methodology to help enhance an analysis of the Thai higher education, which will strengthen the Thai literature on institutional diversity of both private and public higher education.

1.2.3 Political Economy Approach

In the past, political economic inquiries related with HEIs were virtually unknown because higher education systems were often treated as if they were distinct from the
state and the markets. A paradoxical observation is apparent, seeing that the state in most
countries has been profoundly associated with the markets and the division of labor in
higher education—via labor force planning, for instance—while it has characterized the
markets as the separation of the state (Rhoades 1992). Nevertheless, Clark’s (1983)
classic trio model of higher education policy emphasizes the triangle of forces among
academic guild, state, and market. Through a political economic perspective, a
combination of state, market and academic guild signifies three different value systems
concerning the control of higher education (Kirby-Harris 2003). Decisions about
resources, inputs and outputs are often made at the system level. For example, not only
does the government typically set enrollments, allotting numbers of student places in
different fields, but it is also the prime subsidizer for public HEIs. As for the private
sector, generally the state gives very little or nothing financially to PHEIs, except for
those in the U.S. where indirect subsidy such as student grants and loans are pertinent to
private institutions. Indeed, the U.S. subsidies are more than pertinent; they are vital to
the existence of most private institutions, especially the demand-absorbing ones.
Therefore in recent decades, such significance of political economic realm has become
accepted more globally in the study of higher education and has increasingly oriented
international literature on higher education (Altbach 2005a; North 1990; Rhoads and
Torres 2006).

Furthermore, it is apparent for recent changes in Thailand that human resource
development has so much been linked to marketization based on the chief demand-supply
dynamic. Despite such significance, literature on a political economy of Thai politics is
abundant\(^1\) whereas both scholarly and empirical studies of Thai higher education drawn from political economic lens are still scarce. A contribution of this study has strengthened the linkage between higher education and political economy literature in Thailand. Indeed, it has contributed to each separately as well.

### 1.2.4 Linking Institutional Diversity and Political Economic Perspectives

The natural market pattern of higher education systems is identified as a pattern of increasing differentiation and complexity within the systems (Rhoades 1992). Such differentiation helps to enhance higher education’s level of performance (Birnbaum 1983; Carnegie Foundation 2005). It also signals an institutional response to the emergence of mass higher education in order that growing needs of the labor market for highly qualified manpower be met (Gellert and Rau 1992; Goedegebuure et al. 1996).

Policymakers in many countries often presume that a more differentiated system of higher education is required for the needs of a complex society, the growing labor market, and the rising heterogeneity of the student body alike (Huisman 1995). For instance, one of the UNESCO’s priorities is to enhance the equality of educational opportunities by promoting a more diversified system to public, private and nonprofit institutions (UNESCO 1998). The 2006 World University Presidents Summit hosted in Thailand centered its conference on the reflections of diversity and harmonization, asking what the best match for systems and governance structures is in a sector as diverse as higher education; and how diversity regarding provisions of the private-public, the traditional-technological and the local-global can assure both quality and the meeting of

\(^1\) Among leading scholars in the field of political economy of Thailand are Hewison (1997), Laothamatas (1988, 1992), and Phongpaichit and Baker (2002).
needs. Similarly, the OECD and international associations co-sponsored an international conference under the theme “diversity of missions” with a rationale that changing environments have challenged traditional academic cultures and brought increases of differentiation and diversity within and between HEIs. It is apparent that organizational and policy analysts pay ample attention to the influence of political economy on HEIs, questioning how and how much such environmental forces affect various dimensions of HEIs such as goals, size, structure, complexity, decision making, and the like (Rhoades 1992).

Institutional diversity and political economy are usually related in discourses of higher education and PHE in particular. Political economic forces (e.g., coercive regulations, normative pressures, etc.) help to explain institutional differentiation and isomorphism such as how different private and public HEIs are, how such different characteristics take place, and whether different HEIs take divergent or convergent forms. For instance, Varghese (2004) stated that most government’s policies specify a process of privatization that will blur the boundaries between private and public HEIs. Although some researchers have paid attention to organizational differentiation through the lens of political economy, their studies are often focused on either private (Kent and Ramirez 1999) or public sectors (Chaskes 1980). Furthermore, apparently no such study has been made in Thailand. Hence, this study has made a contribution to the literature on institutional diversity and a political economy of higher education in Thailand.

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1.3 Research Scope

The scope of this study is delimited in several ways. First, this research focuses on PHEIs in particular, under the supervision of the Commission on Higher Education (CHE), the Ministry of Education (MOE) in Thailand, leaving aside HEIs under other ministries. Rationales for this exclusion are mainly because HEIs under other ministries contribute less in mainstream undergraduate development and their data are unfeasible to collect. Second, this research’s focal point is on PHEIs, thereby omitting extensive data collection of public HEIs. Having said that, the study of PHE in Thailand is rather embryonic in comparison to that of public higher education, and thus the aim of this study in seeking to contribute to the literature of PHE justifies this delimited scope of study. Third, when referring to the public sector, this research includes neither public autonomous Buddhist universities nor community colleges. Justifications for such an omission stem from several aspects. Both subsectors hold a minimal share in university undergraduate development. They are not subject to most of ministerial regulations and policies that the majority is. The development history of the community college subsector is rather limited. And data on both subsectors are unfeasible to obtain. Since the study emphasizes institutional characteristics of both private and public HEIs in relation to market-oriented policies concerning mostly to the CHE which is the principal agency responsible for the Thai higher education development, this delimitation of the research scope is thus justified.
1.4 Research Background

1.4.1 The Growth of Private Higher Education Worldwide

International literature and reality has accentuated that private higher education has become the most strikingly expanding sector (Altbach 2005a; Levy 2006b). The private sector accommodates roughly 31.5 percent of the total global enrollment in higher education (Guruz 2004-2005). In some countries, PHE has emerged, re-emerged, or even dominated higher education industry while in others PHE is still embryonic or under an on-going policy debate of whether to allow PHE operation.

As often mentioned, countries with a relatively longstanding history of PHE genesis include the United States, Japan, and Latin American countries. In addition to such countries, private expansion has also been recently witnessed in countries with minimal history of private existence such as those in Eastern Europe (Slantcheva and Levy 2007). Particularly outside the Americas, major Asian countries such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea are among the principal private sectors, also later followed by India, Taiwan, and Turkey. Notwithstanding, many PHEIs in such countries are often perceived as concerning for quantity, serving mass student clientele with minimal academic standards (Altbach 2005a; Geiger 1986; Levy 1986b).

The growth of PHEIs in many countries is usually unanticipated and not mostly hatched by government policy (Levy 2002). In general, PHEIs offer “more,” “better,” or “different” alternatives than do the public ones (Geiger 1985). Once realized the private sector’s increasingly important size and role in higher education, governments in some countries have imposed policies and regulations that help to facilitate the private sector’s
expansion and simultaneously monitor its quality of educational provision. They thus contrast with the uncontrolled development reality of other countries.

In Asia, recently joined by Middle East, PHE is much more marked with a combination of government promotion and unanticipated emergence than in other regions. Mostly unplanned, PHEIs are often allowed more differentiation in their institutional missions and specializations than their public counterparts are. Even so, once it grasps the magnitude of the private expansion, the government commonly promulgates regulations, often aimed at facilitating such growth with ample controls. Funding patterns, quality assurance and standardization are typically the chosen instruments. Concisely put, governmental delayed regulations often follow such an expansion.

1.4.2 Private Higher Education Growth and Political Economic Forces: The Thai Context

Echoing the global reality where the role of private sector is becoming noteworthy due to a significant enrollment share (Altbach 2005b; Geiger 1986; Levy 2006b), Thai PHEIs have grown into one of the principal industries in producing manpower for the job markets in both domestic and international realms.

Private collaboration in Thailand has historically been rooted in the sectors of welfare and elementary-secondary education for centuries. As for higher education, private provision was much recognized via vocational education, given that only public universities were allowed at that time. It was not until 1960s that the Thai government started to pay serious attention to PHE since the demand for higher education had

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increased so critically that the existing public universities could not satisfy such a need. Consequently, The Thai Cabinet, in 1965, officially approved, in principle, to permit the private sector to conduct research and recognized them as institutions of higher learning. The 1969 Private College Act was thus promulgated, granting “college” status to the first six private institutions\(^5\)—previously started as vocational schools—with a restriction for the private colleges to offer only associates’ degrees, and shortly thereafter, extending permission (with rigid control measures)\(^6\) for them to offer bachelors’ degree programs (Boonprasert 2002; Kulachol 1995; Policy and Planning 2003; Watson 1991). Later, the 1979 Private Higher Education Institution Act was enacted. Meanwhile, the government agreed to grant first-time permission for private sectors to establish private universities and extend the instructional program level to the master’s degree. In 1984, the government, for the first time, uplifted the status of four private colleges to universities\(^7\) (Boonprasert 2002; Kulachol 1995; Policy and Planning 2003). Such government regulations imposed upon PHE in the Thai case reflect a global reality of PHE emergence as unanticipated growth to the government, and thus regulations are promulgated as a delayed process (Levy 2006b).

1.4.2.1 Thai Private-Public Differentiation in Emerging Roles

Thai private and public HEIs differ significantly in their geneses. The most important facets of public higher education emergence in Thailand have been political forces and perceived needs in higher education provision for manpower in order that

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5 The first six private institutions, all located in Bangkok, were Bangkok College, Pattana college, Dhurakijpundit College, Kirk College, Sripatum College (former Thai-Suriya College), and Thai Chamber of Commerce College.

6 Government’s rigid control measures for private higher education demonstrate typical Asian patterns.

7 The first four colleges to be granted “university” status were Bangkok University, Payap University, Dhurakijpundit University, and the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce.
graduates might serve as civil servants in different ministries (Policy and Planning 2003).
Indeed, this is a term long-associated with state bureaucracy more than the market.
Traditionally, Thai higher education system had long been immersed in the Continental Model—Burton Clark’s (1983) term—for its strong centralized bureaucratic system.
Only public universities were allowed in the beginning of the system development during the first half of the twentieth century. The state (via the CHE, formerly known as the Ministry of University Affairs) almost solely controlled the system’s governance, finance and function. For example, the country’s military-bureaucratic force was prominent, especially prior to 1973, where the military government led Thailand into political modernization with major support from the United States in order to increase both economic markets and technocratic training (Chaloemtiarana 1979; Darling 1962; Fineman 1997; Hussey 1993). Such a state-led force became one of associated factors that the establishment of public universities mushroomed and that many parts of the public sector got privatized.

Table 1: A Comparison of Private-Public Growth in Thai Higher Education\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of HEIs</th>
<th>Total Number of Public HEIs</th>
<th>Total Number of Private HEIs</th>
<th>Total Private HEIs %</th>
<th>Total Number of HE Enrollment</th>
<th>Total Enrollment in Public HEIs</th>
<th>Total Enrollment in Private HEIs</th>
<th>Total PHE Enrollment %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>67,848</td>
<td>63,823</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>175,418</td>
<td>161,363</td>
<td>14,055</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>670,829</td>
<td>639,798</td>
<td>31,031</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>728,615</td>
<td>675,480</td>
<td>53,135</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>629,498</td>
<td>518,956</td>
<td>110,542</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>904,636</td>
<td>730,876</td>
<td>173,760</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>1,179,569</td>
<td>955,759</td>
<td>223,810</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>2,106,869</td>
<td>1,830,146</td>
<td>276,723</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) The table represents higher education growth by number of institutions and enrollment share of Thai HEIs. Intervals of years are organized by the Commission on Higher Education (CHE) using the Thai B.E. year (starting from B.E. 2515). Data of public community colleges have been excluded in this table, given that the community college sector is relatively new to the Thai higher education system and beyond the scope of the study.

According to Table 1, in comparison to the longstanding public higher education sector, created in 1917\(^9\), private emergence in Thailand has also been growing during the entire period while holding slightly stagnant enrollment in the early decade of its genesis. Although the Private Higher Education Act was first promulgated in 1969 and the existing public universities could no longer suffice in the face of rising demand for higher education, governmental support for PHE was still minimal compared to that for such other public affairs as welfare and transportation. Regulations for private provision were so rigid and thus allowed less room for the private sector to penetrate into higher education provision at the moment (Kulachol 1995). Therefore, the legislative history tends to illustrate that the motivation for passing PHE laws was not the growing significance of PHEIs in the initial phase. In fact, it seems that PHE rapid proliferation in Thailand did not start occurring until the 1990s.

Furthermore, there had been a drastic diversification in the public sector between 2001 and 2006. All Rajabhat public institutes and Rajamangkla public institutes of technology were uplifted as universities and transferred to the CHE, leading to an enormous increase in both number of public HEIs and their enrollment shares. Such

\(^9\) The first public university in Thailand is Chulalongkorn University, founded in 1917 with a limited admissions policy originally aimed at reserving access for a certain class of people (normally, bureaucrats and royalists) in 4 different schools: medicine, public administration, engineering, and the arts and sciences. See Chulalongkorn University, *A Brief History of Chulalongkorn University* [on-line], available at http://www.chula.ac.th/chula/en/about/brief_en.html; Internet; accessed 23 April 2006.
political upgrades via diversification of the two public subsectors may explain, in part, the percentage stagnancy of private enrollments since 2003 onwards. The public sector, indeed, has been constantly holding roughly 80 percent of the total share of higher education enrollment. In short, Table 1 suggests a complicated model that reflects a multidimensional growth pattern, with a few new PHEIs founded early, then a huge expansion after legislative intervention, followed by a public sector reaction.

One possible explanation of a Thai PHE expansion, especially during late 1990s to early 2000s, may be based partially on the following political economic events. Military rule was perceived as a constraint to capital flows and trade relationships and the May 1992 political crisis almost dissolved the ruling military’s power. The 1995 election brought a reduced number of military senators, with most replacements coming from metropolitan and provincial businessmen. In 1997 the Asian economic crisis forced Thailand to open herself to trade and globalization under the conditions of the International Monetary Fund: IMF (Friedman 2000; Phongpaichit and Baker 2002). Also during 1997-2000 the Thai government, let by the Democrat party, enacted many laws and regulations concerning economic liberalization; among such laws was the 1998 Student Loans Act, allowing students from both private and public HEIs to apply for government loan. A window opportunity was thus opened to private providers, particularly those proprietary (but not legally for-profit) ones, as PHEIs in general rely heavily on student tuition and fees. Additionally, during 2001-2006 the Thai government led by the Thai-rak-Thai party with strong political economic networks, trade

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10 The Thai case thus typifies a global tendency marked in developing countries of recent decades wherein higher education overall expands, especially in PHE: the surge in the PHE share is pronounced in the institutional counts as public institution numbers either stagnate or rise more modestly than the private institution numbers do.
relationships and the business sector’s investments have been overwhelmingly encouraged in various national policies (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). Notably, the PHE Act was reauthorized in 2003 under this government, with less rigid regulations than the previous laws.

1.4.3 Summary of the Research Background

Thailand is among many countries where political economy is one of the most salient forces associated with higher education systems. Specifically, a sharp private-public differentiation in emerging roles in Thai higher education stems, in the main, from political forces as well as rising demands for higher education. While public genesis is abundantly a result of government initiatives—as also seen worldwide, private emergence is often followed by delayed government regulations. Moreover, despite the fact that public higher education has been constantly holding a majority share of Thai higher education enrollment, PHE has also been increasing its role in higher education provision, satisfying different types of niche markets. Through political economic lens, what different PHE brings to the Thai higher education system and how the private sector differs than the public counterpart can be explored via various significant institutional characteristics using an international framework of PHE typology.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation

This research encompasses seven chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the study and posed the research questions, providing the background of the study and the study’s contribution to the major literature of PHE, institutional diversity, and political economy. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature, covering two major strands of the study: political
economy of higher education as well as intra-sectoral diversity of PHEIs. Chapter 3 presents an operationalization of the study, laying out a research design, methodology, and research procedures. The main findings and analytical discussions are in the next three chapters. Chapter 4 mainly discusses inter-sectoral diversity of private and public HEIs, followed by an introduction of intra-sectoral diversity among PHEIs based on Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and traditional qualitative analysis. A thorough analysis of findings and discussions of intra-sectoral diversity of PHE are elaborated in Chapter 5 organized by types of PHE. Chapter 6 links institutional diversity of PHE to political economic forces, emphasizing the extent to which public policies and market mechanisms shape institutional characteristics and diversity of Thai PHEIs. Concluding thoughts and policy implications are provided in the final chapter, Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF GLOBAL LITERATURE ON PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

This chapter reviews major literature guiding the central research question: How do Thai private higher education institutions (PHEIs) differ among themselves and from the public ones? The research refers to two strands of relevant literature: political economy of higher education and intra-sectoral diversity of PHEIs. Derived from the international literature with a highlight on the Thai case, this chapter is organized into the following sections:

• The shift from state ideology to market ideology
• Political economic policies and higher education
• Institutional diversity (definitions of core conceptual constructs; intra-sectoral diversity of PHE)

At the end of the chapter, the synthesis is presented with a conceptual model concluding institutional diversity among different types of HEIs and an association between such differentiation and political economic policies. Both of the integration and the synthesis of the literature point out major variables for the study in exploring the Thai case.

2.1 The Shift from State Ideology to Market Ideology

At the beginning of the 21st century, the shift from state ideology to market ideology has been witnessed widely around the world via a trend toward increasing competition. Neo-liberal discourses on the state’s role in the national economy,
governmental cutbacks, deregulation and liberalization are generally the signals of supports for market-driven globalization. Reverberations are found in higher education. A growing belief that national higher education systems with extensive differentiation and competition prosper better than those that are non-competitive or less-differentiated makes the “time-honored systems” like Europe’s gravitate toward the American model (Clark 2004a). Likewise, Thailand, under the global economic forces and international financiers’ conditions, has shifted its preference from state-dominant to market-like characteristics for its national policies in various public affairs (Boramanunta 2005; Phongpaichit and Baker 2002).

Extending its power to higher education, market ideology increasingly penetrates the system with an entrepreneurial management approach, often in the public sector (Laurillard 2000; Shattock 2005; Waugh Jr. 2003). Both economic chaos and expectation of improving efficiency and competitiveness often associate the shift from state- to market- bases. Along the line, PHE has proliferated worldwide due partly to governmental deregulation and facilitation for the private sector11 as well as market mechanism of rising demands for higher education.

Unlike the Continental Model where the state is almost solely responsible for higher education provision with accountability and competition being almost non-existent (Clark 1983; Levy 1986b), the American model encourages market-based and status-drives that heftily conditions PHEIs and public HEIs in defining themselves, seeking external resources, and setting their conditions for research, teaching, and learning (Clark 2004a). Likewise, many OECD countries have attempted for their higher education

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systems to shift from state control to market-like discipline in order to create more diversified and adaptive higher education systems (Meek, Goedegebuure, and Huisman 2000). Indeed, for many countries’ recent higher education policy development, the fortification of HEIs into national drivers for efficiency and productivity via the adoption of market-like management models becomes paramount. According to Filbeck (2002), Thailand is among such countries where a failing economy and external pressure have partially shaped its higher education system toward market ideology, given the government’s claimed rationale that marketization helps to increase accountability, efficiency, flexibility, transparency, quality, and responsiveness to the society.

2.2 Political Economic Policies and Higher Education

Given the significance of national policies as one of the major environmental forces for shaping both private and public HEIs in Thailand, it is necessary that the study delineate the nature of political economic policy issues, as reviewed hereafter.

In Gornitzka’s (1999) study of governmental policies and organizational change, policy is defined as an object of political choice or a public goal statement with or without the instruments used to succeed it. When reinterpreted and implemented, policy is carried throughout an organization that conforms with different levels of its actors and their priorities (Kirby-Harris 2003). In succinct terms, policy signifies a public statement that is reinterpreted and implemented based on priorities of various actors at different organizational levels.

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12 For example, Australia, Chile, China, India, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, the United States, to name a few (Kamolmasratana 2002).
Political economic policies, accordingly, can be regarded as any public statements that contain market economic elements. Forces like globalization, privatization and isomorphism work to shape the transformation of PHE throughout the world (Fisher et al. 2004; Mei 2002; Ntshoe 2004). For example, in Japan, the government’s aspiration for Japanese universities to become world-class competitive results in “competition-based project funds” for public and private universities to compete over research funds and “The Toyama plan” introducing a competition principle via governmental financial allocation based on results from external evaluators (Yonezawa 2003). Isomorphism may thus happen when both Japanese private and public HEIs are under the same governmental requirements. Private universities may also mimic some features that their public counterparts do and succeed, in order to increase their global competitiveness. Likewise, the Japanese government’s policy on pay-by-performance may urge its public universities to adapt business-like management strategies often seen in the private sector so that they become less bureaucratic and more efficient.

Echoing the Japanese illustration, the Thai government aims at transforming all public universities into autonomous ones as part of its privatization policy (Bovornsiri 2006). It has amply claimed collaboration between private and public sectors in research and shared resources (Royal Thai Government 2001, 2005). Moreover, the 1998 Student Loans Act\textsuperscript{13} was first promulgated and perceived as one of the prime factors associated with the mushrooming of the private sector in the Thai higher education. The Private Higher Education Act has been recently reauthorized and the quality assurance policy has

\textsuperscript{13} The 1998 Student Loans Act allows students at the high school and higher education levels of both private and public institutions to apply for the government loans. The Act in Thai can be found at http://www.studentloan.or.th/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=131.
been promulgated for all private and public HEIs to be assessed and accredited.\textsuperscript{14} All these Thai government policy initiatives reflect political economic policies that tend to link to the roles of PHEIs as well as to those of their public counterparts.

Similar to the Thai example, realities in many countries show that while governments encourage some marketization, they are concerned about standards and quality. This concern has led to regulations often related to governmental funding and control particularly over PHEIs in their establishment, academic missions and functions (Kogan 1997; Levy 1992; Meek and O'Neill 1996).\textsuperscript{15} Kirby-Harris (2003) emphasizes that many governments in recent years have utilized several “policy levers” to stimulate changes in higher education arenas. Especially when the countries aim at global economic competitiveness, various political economic mechanisms are passed through HEIs as either trade-off resource conditions or coercive regulations or both. What form HEIs take and how such a form is actually different or similar among the private themselves and between private and public sectors become intriguing for both scholarship and policy discourses, which is the core of this study and thus requires further reviews on intra-sectoral diversity of PHEIs.

In order to analyze political economy of higher education, Rhoades (1992) accentuates that a resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) is applicable. Several reasons are that: 1) the analysis focuses on constraints and influences of the political marketplace; 2) the theory conceptualizes a relationship between an organization

\textsuperscript{14} The Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA), stipulated in the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999) and Amendments (Second National Education Act B.E. 2545 (2002)), is a public organization, “…responsible for development of criteria and methods of external evaluation, conducting evaluation of educational achievements in order to assess the quality of institutions…” (Education Council 2004). See ONESQA website for more information, [on-line] available at http://www.onesqa.or.th/th/home/index.php.

and its environment as the organization’s resource interdependency on other organizations; and 3) the emphasis is on political choices of institutional leaders when interacting with external entities.

Accompanying the resource dependence model, an institutional isomorphism approach (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) helps to explain what forms of political economic forces (e.g., coercive regulations, normative pressures, voluntarily emulation) have over organizational behaviors, how different they are in relation to political economic forces. One example is that organizations likely respond to coercive standardized regulations in similar ways, making themselves alike according to the standards in order to pass the requirements. However, political economic policies are not the only force for institutional similarity or differentiation. Institutional growth is also owing to the one chief market dynamic—that is a demand-supply mechanism. Many PHEIs are not dynamic competitors (Levy 1999). Most of non-elite demand absorbers likely mimic semi-elite or public institutions in the areas where they see a great deal of market demands. In contrast, some other serious non-elite and semi-elite ones tend to be more competitive or even innovative, for instance, in their marketing strategies. The point here has historically been raised in works on development more broadly (Levy 1999; Silas Casillas forthcoming).

2.3 Institutional Diversity

2.3.1 Definitions of Core Conceptual Constructs: Differentiation, Diversity, Diversification
To analyze in greater depth different forms of private and public HEIs, a definitional review of the three main constructs is necessary: differentiation, diversity and diversification (Praphamontripong 2008c). Differentiation signifies a process of increasing number, when different entities are emerging out of a formerly unified whole. Diversity represents characteristics of a community with different species, such as a variety of entities emerged across types. Diversification is a process of entities dispersed across types, an increasing number of types, or increasing differences between entities or types. More specifically, differentiation in higher education, as the status of becoming differentiated, refers to a process wherein new entities are dispersing in the system. Diversity in higher education thus conveys the existence of divergent forms of HEIs and groups of institutions that pursue different missions, produce graduates in different fields, employ different instructional styles, have different juridical strata, and receive funds from different sources. Concisely put, a differentiated system signals that there is a diversity of HEIs. Once the system is becoming differentiated, such a process signifies that there will be a new type of HEIs emerging (assuming that it is different than the existing ones). Therefore, as long as there is differentiation within the system, diversity seems to be a following default.

To elaborate more, for example, private emergences portray differentiation that occurs when PHEIs disperse within the system once dominated by the public sector. Private institutions are becoming differentiated from the public ones within the same system. Since private and public HEIs are different entities, such different sectors evidence institutional diversity. Diversification occurs when there is a new institution emerging across types, such as an institution partnering up with a foreign university.
Although differentiation and diversification are often used interchangeably as they both refer to a “process” of becoming differentiated, according to Huisman’s (1995) biological concept, differentiation signifies a process of new entities emerging out of a “formerly unified whole” whereas diversification refers to a process of increasing numbers of same entities or different entities or increasing differences between entities. Diversification also occurs in the higher education system when there are new kinds of HEIs emerging within each sector (public or private), such as different subsectors—religious, elite, community college, research universities, partnering universities, corporate universities (e.g., McDonalds University), or workforce development training outside of HEIs. Furthermore, when there are increasing differences in institutional characteristics within the same types of HEIs or across types, both differentiation and diversification are often mentioned. The differences are in terms of finance, governance, structure, size, mission, programs offered, and so forth. In short, both differentiation and diversification tend to be pretty close in their concepts.

To simplify the complexity of such definitions, this study favors the term “diversity” to represent an analysis here, given that it is a broader term that can be applied to different types of PHEIs. Nonetheless, throughout the research discussions, I have employed the term “diversification” when referring to a process of increasing differences between HEIs and increasing types of institutions over time. Likewise, when appropriate, the term “differentiation” has been used to mention how different various types of PHEIs are.
2.3.2 Intra-Sectoral Diversity of Private Higher Education

Interdependence between organizations and their environments has implications for various organizational dimensions, including governance, performed functions, and prestige (Rhoades 1992). Different organizational actors respond to external political economic demands variously depending upon organizational sectors, institutional types and local constraints (Clark 1998; Ntshoe 2004). In that sense, changed institutional characteristics illustrate a voluntary and/or involuntary alteration and transformation in any dimensions in order for an institution to better survive in the environment. Such changes range from minor variations to radical ones. For example, Barman (2002) stresses that in order to obtain donations in a competitive environment private nonprofit organizations differentiate themselves from others by asserting uniqueness based upon a specific criterion in which their rivals do not have. Accordingly, such asserted uniqueness will sharpen institutional differentiation.

On the contrary, critics argue that private-public distinction in a current entrepreneurial environment is becoming blurry by way of funding sources, governmental control, institutional management and governance, function and mission, autonomy and accountability, and so on (Landoni Couture 2005; Levy 1986c, 2004). While one institution differentiates itself from others by implementing a new management style or launching a new research project, for instance, other institutions may imitate such changes if they see any benefits gained. In this regard, although we see differentiation being made, we will likely witness mimicry among institutions throughout the institutional isomorphism process as well. Sharp institutional differentiation may be hindered by a degree of blurriness.
A selection of organizational variables, thus, becomes vital for thorough exploration of institutional differentiation and isomorphism among PHEIs and between private and public HEIs. Seeing that the Thai literature on private-public distinction and institutional diversity is almost absent, I, instead, have reviewed global literature covering numerous dimensions of institutional diversity deemed most related to the research questions.

Levy’s (1986b) study of private-public distinction in different Latin American higher education systems over the period of 1960-1980 employs three main concepts: finance, governance, and function. Birnbaum’s (1983) extensive analysis of institutional diversity in American higher education during the same period applies diversity matrix based on combinations of six variables: control, degree level, program type, enrollment size, student gender, and minority enrollment. Although less extensive, Chaskes’ (1980) empirical research concentrates on structural and size differentiation in relations to external environments of six U.S. state colleges. Derived from resource dependence and institutional isomorphism theories, a three-year comprehensive case study of 17 Australian universities by Marginson and Considine (2000) analyzes diversity in the “Enterprise University,” the new kind of recently emerging HEIs, based on governance, organizational cultures, executive leadership, research management, mission, size, and social status. Additionally, within the U.S. for-profit sector, Kinser (2006) specifies his research framework encompassing three main variables—locations, ownership, and highest degree awarded—to differentiate all degree-granting for-profit HEIs. In sum, through these analytical studies, common key variables recurrently mentioned can be grouped into three concepts: governance, finance, mission and function.
2.3.2.1 Levy’s (1986b) Analytical Framework of Private Growth

Zooming inside PHE, institutional diversity has been explored since the 1980s. The now classic trio of PHE types developed by Levy was leading and has been amply cited. Levy differentiates types of PHEIs in Latin American countries into three mostly sequential waves: Catholic, elite, and demand-absorbing. He stresses that in order to understand contemporary private-public patterns, an analysis through the relative juxtaposition of these sequential waves is necessary.

The rise of private Catholic universities emerged from changes of the State’s and Church’s roles, each itself resulting from dissatisfaction with the State’s role in higher education. Catholic universities early on principally aimed at religious service through disciplines such as theology and canonical law. Elite universities, in contrast, occurred as the formation of socially advantaged, secular and depoliticized universities which were distinct from or other than the Catholic ones in terms of particular programs offered in business-oriented fields and limited access originally involving only for the elites.

The remaining category, demand-absorbing, provides alternatives to religious study and mainly responds to the rising demand for higher education. Accordingly, demand-absorbing institutions are about quantity much more than quality. In succinct terms, the three basically chronological waves serve largely distinct purposes in satisfying demand on “better” (elite institutions), “different” (Catholic and cultural institutions), and “more” (demand-absorbing institutions) education (Pachuashvili 2006).

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16 As already elaborated in Chapter 1.
2.3.2.2 Key Concepts to Analyze Institutional Diversity

Governance

University governance is generally perceived through a concept of power and authority that come from internal and external agencies, both of which must be related in some ways and degrees. Also, different authorities, sometimes overlapping, exercise their responsibilities to the institutions for different functions. Such authorities include (but not restricted to) outside powers such as the legislature, the governor, the higher education council and the regents as well as inside authorities like the university administrators, the faculty, and the students (Epstein 1974).

In terms of external control over PHEIs and public HEIs, Levy (1986b, 2007) explains that an institution is public if it is governed by state and it is private when governed by non-state personnel. Accordingly, external sources of control and authority over institutional autonomy of PHEIs and public HEIs are different; the state is the prime authority controlling the public sector while business and religious affiliations are the major sources of control over the private sector.

Internal university governance in both PHEIs and public HEIs may be identified in two broad administrative structural patterns: 1) decentralized academic guild in which power and influence are at the faculty level (bottom-up)—most likely representing traditional public HEIs, and 2) centralized entrepreneurialism in which institutions are influenced by the administrative level (top-down)—often in the private sector. Nevertheless, a very centralized university can at times be autonomous from the state (as in the case of PHEIs) whereas a more decentralized one (such as public HEIs) can be
rigidly controlled by the state. Therefore, it is crucial, as Epstein (1974) accentuates, to recognize a relationship of pluralistic authorities over the institutions.

Furthermore, Marginson and Considine (2000) define governance in broad terms as it involves power distribution within the institutions and their intersection with external stakeholders and environments. Governance determines various institutional affairs, including resource allocation, mission, patterns of hierarchy, and the like. Indeed, a traditional pattern of intra-institutional governance in the public sector has been transformed to or nearly to that in the private sector, particularly to strengthen university administration (Waugh Jr. 2003).

Inside the private sector, Levy explains that various types of PHEIs are governed by different non-state entities. PHEIs affiliated with churches or religious organizations likely have ministries on their boards of trustees, and decisions are often made by their religious sponsors. On the secular side, elite, semi-elite, or demand-absorbing PHEIs are owned and governed by individuals, families, or business corporations. Indeed, Kinser’s (2006) typology of for-profit HEIs in the U.S. employs legal ownership to differentiate how U.S. for-profit institutions are governed.

Finances

A basic distinction of private and public HEIs in terms of finance lies on what sources of income HEIs receive. An institution is public to the extent that it receives government funding while it is private to the extent that it banks upon non-government

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17 Private-public distinction in terms of finance tends to be less sharp than that in terms of governance and thus more difficult to give a clear-cut distinction. The governance distinction is a dichotomous one which has some legal designations. The finance model, in contrary, relies more on the “degree” of dependency: how much the institutions bank upon government- or non-government funding.
subsidy such as tuition and income from other private sources (Levy 1986b, 1992; Marginson 1997).

As we will see though, tuition and other private incomes are not the only sources for PHEIs; there are governmental student financial aid, research grants, and other public funds as well. Likewise, public HEIs collect other incomes from their market-like activities and receive research funds from corporations. The more HEIs rely on external financial sources, usually the higher level of external control and influence over the institutions.

In the United States, revenues of public HEIs are directly provided by state and local governments under at least two broad conditions that the institutions provide access and offer a broad range of programs, while those of PHEIs are heavily from student tuition and other sources irrelevant to enrollment (Geiger 1990). Concisely put, state-owned HEIs are thus more straightly controlled by the state due to state funding (Levy 2007; Marginson 2006). More perplexingly however, it is evident that the U.S. federal government has exercised its spending power through federal aid and grants in order to achieve its policy objectives by conditioning federal-aid recipients, both private and public alike, with abundant federal statutory and policy directives (Bok 1980; Gladieux and Wolanin 1978; Kaplin and Lee 1995). Accordingly, such standardized regulations imposed through funding often hinder sectoral diversity of private and public HEIs, particularly in their functions.

Partly similar to the American case, the Australian federal government can steer HEIs only via financial incentives rather than by forthright legislative control (Meek and O'Neill 1996). Indeed, the Australian government’s funding policy is a major political
instrument for the processes of institutional convergence and change because such a resource constraint would increase a level of dependency upon HEIs to their subsidizers. In that way, it is apparent that diversity and homogeneity among HEIs can be partly designed as a result of governmental funding conditions.

In particular, the financial diversity concepts suggest that there are variations across a scale of financial proportion from different sources such as a mixed private-public funding mechanism. PHEIs may receive public funding whereas public HEIs may be given non-state contributions. Levy’s analysis of Latin American cases theorizes three different patterns of private-public finance. A homogeneous pattern represented the Chilean case where the public sector relied directly on the state while initially the private sector sponsored itself but later banked greatly upon the state. On the contrary, a dichotomously distinctive pattern elucidates the Mexican and most of the Latin American cases in which the private sector depends almost exclusively on private income sources whereas the public one draws its revenues almost solely from state funds. Lastly, a qualified distinctive pattern portrays the Brazilian case where the state does not fund the private sector for its undergraduate education’s basic annual expenses but does so for graduate education, research, and facilities, particularly to Catholic universities. Concisely put, this Brazilian pattern implies a purposive selectivity of state financial support to PHEIs.

Furthermore, it is best to understand complex sources of incomes in the private sector by focusing separately on different subsectors. For example, within the Latin American Catholic subsector, state financial aid varies greatly. And most Catholic

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18 Other epitomes include Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
19 India, Japan, and the Philippines also fall in this pattern.
universities still depend largely on student fees, just as the other private subsectors. Elite universities, in contrast, rely overwhelmingly on foundation and corporate donations. Indeed, tuition fee is the prime source of income for almost all private subsectors and for non-elite PHEIs in developing nations in particular (Geiger 1986; Levy 1986b, 1992). There are a few that are entirely supported by foundation or endowment revenue and charge few, if any, student fees. Additionally, in developed nations government funds for PHEIs may depend on institution’s age, as seen in Japan (Levy 1992).

2.4 Synthesis of the Reviewed Literature

Institutional diversity and political economic forces are among recurring themes in global literature of PHE and organization. The literature stresses that a resource dependence mechanism within competitive market environments has greatly associated with government’s policies for the shift from state dominance toward market ideology. Often tied to financial incentives, political economic policies may refer to quality assurance, privatization, student loan act, the promotion of the private sector, and so forth. Apart from the demand-supply mechanism, such policies, to some extent, may shape institutional characteristics of both private and public HEIs.

To analyze institutional diversity, the literature utilizes different criteria. The most recurring ones include governance, size, finance, mission, and function. In fact, the presented data would be valuable if the variables are grouped altogether so that broader forms of HEIs can be reflected (Codling and Meek 2003). Despite the necessity of incorporating all important indicators to best convey differentiation and diversity among various types of PHEIs, individual researchers, in reality, may encounter so many various
constraints that including numerous variables in their studies becomes almost impossible. Ultimately, the Thai literature on institutional differentiation and diversity is rather limited. Therefore, I have chosen to particularly investigate the two variables, governance and finance, most mentioned in the international literature, in a fashion that best serves the Thai context, the purposes of this study and the research questions.

**Figure 1:** Conceptual Model of Inter- and Intra-Sectoral Diversity of Private and Public Higher Education Institutions in Relation to Political Economic Policies

Various dimensions of institutional characteristics for measuring inter- and intra-sectoral diversity of private and public HEIs are illustrated in Figure 1, a conceptual model for this research. Current studies fragmentarily deal with political economic forces and institutional diversity of private and public HEIs. Importantly, a number of them are not empirical studies. Mostly, the literature analyzes private and public HEIs separately. For instance, Marginson and Considine (2000) emphasize public universities with entrepreneurial elements whereas Kinser (2006) exclusively deals with private for-
profit institutions. Levy’s (1986b), as aforementioned, is the most extensive one that covers both private and public HEIs in various dimensions, and particularly goes inside the private sector.

Indeed, several features of Levy’s (1986b) work tend to align with the study’s aims, and thus primarily guide the research’s approach. Levy’s analysis draws largely from political economic notions in which power distribution and interrelationship among state, market/ the private sector, and institutions are core points of analysis. As we have said in Chapter 1, a political economic perspective is not only a mainstream issue concerned in higher education worldwide but also often linked to institutional differentiation. Since I am interested in exploring diversity of PHEIs through the lens of political economy, Levy’s framework is thus strikingly applicable.

Furthermore, Levy’s methods of data collection and analysis depict a traditional approach of conducting qualitative research of PHE where fruitful information is collected and analyzed in depth. To understand how and how much private and public HEIs in Latin America differ from one another, Levy employs extensive field research of longitudinal case studies with an ample qualitative orientation supplemented by a descriptive statistical analysis of archival data sources. In the similar vein, Marginson and Considine (2000) use extensive individual interviews supplemented by historical data, documentary reading, and an analysis of system-wide government statistical data. Their rationale is that information directly stemming from those involved in university governance would likely best reveal a social phenomenon of the higher education system. As Rhoades (1992) indicates, organizational theory can be applicable for case studies of a relationship between individuals and organizational structures as well as longitudinal
studies of individual institutions in a particular population. In trying to illuminate or understand similar social situations, it is apparent that qualitative researchers often take into account triangulation via the usage of different kinds of methods or data in order to maximize generalizability, consistency, and trustworthiness in their research results (Patton 2002). Such triangulation methods help strengthen the quality of the study, indeed. Given that the research aims at extracting the richness of collected data in order to best explain the sectoral diversity phenomenon of PHEIs, a triangulation qualitative approach through case studies accompanied by some archival data analyses is very useful.

Nonetheless, to extend to a new terrain of qualitative research in PHE, the study has also added in Ragin’s (2000, 2008, 2009) Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) that allows us to study clusters of categorical qualitative data in a range of degree through algebraic Boolean approach. Therefore, instead of analyzing variables as isolation, the fsQCA helps to look at variables as groups or patterns of variables. A combination of both traditional qualitative and fsQCA methods has powerfully captured diversity among subsectors/ institutional types. Successively, Chapter 3 details a research design and methodology for this research.
Chapter 3 presents the research design for this project. The chapter consecutively discusses research design, unit of analysis and sampling, instrument and data-gathering procedures, main constructs and variables, and data analyses.

3.1 Research Design

The main research question posed is: How do Thai private higher education institutions (PHEIs) differ among themselves and from the public ones? This study was designed, in the main, as a qualitative study, attempting to explore and understand the phenomenon of institutional diversity in the case of Thai PHE. Having said in Chapter 1, my research motivation lied largely in trying to understand Thailand’s higher education system and by the fact that PHE has been growing greatly worldwide. Levy’s (1986b) work is the primary source on such concepts, questions and research design, examining both inter-sectorally and intra-sectorally. Furthermore, a qualitative approach allowed me to fully explore and determine the differences of institutional characteristics of different types of Thai PHEIs, which has not extensively studied in the region. Also, I was able to determine whether the Thai case yields any international patterns previously identified in the research literature. At a fundamental stage of my research design, I was thus geared toward a theory-driven deductive approach. Nevertheless, an inductive approach was added later on after unexpected patterns of data were discovered.
Furthermore, according to the reviewed literature, quantitative and qualitative approaches complementarily help one another in tackling the issues of differences and similarities of higher education institutional characteristics. Most reviewed studies on differentiation often take one predominant methodological perspective and support their arguments with several methods of data collection and analyses. As Brewer and Hunter (1989) pointed out, social scientists usually combine multiple methods in order to maximize knowledge and understanding they seek. This research design, therefore, employed a combination of several methods of data collection, including interviews, document analysis, and archival data collection, with interviews being the primary method. Although such combined methods were time consuming, they provided a better understanding and comprehensive picture of a research problem (Creswell 2005). Indeed, a triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative elements could magnify validity of qualitative research (Patton 2002).

Aligned with the combined method of data collection, I put together several methods for my data analysis as well. First, I followed a traditional qualitative analysis like that in Levy’s work, which included content analysis of interview data and documents via Atlas.ti qualitative analysis software program as well as descriptive statistical analysis of archival data via SPSS quantitative analysis software program. Interview data were weighed as the prime data source and thus most important. Second, to widen a terrain of qualitative research in PHE, I applied Ragin’s (2000, 2009) Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to the categorization analysis of Thai PHEIs. fsQCA guided us in a cluster analysis of various degrees of categorical qualitative data using a truth table algorithm and Boolean algebraic approach. Instead of
analyzing variables as isolation, fsQCA aided me in examining variables as groups or patterns through different degrees of a variable. Also appropriate for a theoretical driven research, fsQCA allows researchers to test the theory their studies were based on. In this case, fsQCA helped me to find a connection between Levy’s framework and the Thai empirical evidence. A combination of traditional qualitative and fsQCA methods, supplementary by quantitative analysis of archival data, thus, better captures diversity among institutional types of Thai PHEIs.

3.2 Unit of Analysis

According to Rhoades (1992), cross-national research through organizational perspective often focuses on the organization rather than the individual as the principal units of analysis. Likewise, my unit of analysis was an institution but data were collected from individuals in the institution as well as external PHE experts. My justification was that university leaders of PHEIs in Thailand typically hold a great deal of authority and influence over policies and directions that determine institutional characteristics since they are top policymakers of the institution. As the PHE Act indicates, the president of PHEIs holds ultimate responsibility of all university affairs (Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon B.E. 2546 2003; Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon (Chababtee 2) B.E. 2550 2007). Similarly, PHE experts are able to provide an accurate macro-level analysis and discussion of PHE arena in Thailand.
3.3 Sampling

The number of cases to be observed depends greatly on the research design and what types of inference the researcher will attempt to make (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). For this study, the research was designed to observe variations in institutional characteristics of different types of PHEIs, using the case study of Thailand, while employing each of the PHEIs as a unit of analysis. A set of observations—PHEIs, in this case—helped me gather evidence to arrive at descriptive inferences in understanding the phenomenon of institutional diversity.

While the population of this study was PHEIs, it was impossible for an individual researcher to interview all or a majority of PHEIs in Thailand, given time and resource constraints. Accordingly, drawing from the population as large a sample as possible was a solution. Indeed, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) suggest some sample figures ranging from five to twenty observations for a typical qualitative study (p. 216).

Furthermore, in Marginson and Considine’s (2000) study, the authors selected half of Australian’s universities (17 cases) believed to represent the Australian university system and structured the sample of their cases to include several key characteristics such as age, size, and wealth of the institutions. Likewise, a priori knowledge suggests that Thai PHEIs with similar size and age tend to share some common defining institutional characteristics and that those outside the urbanized Bangkok and surrounding provinces tend to be comparable. Seeing that this research sought to present analytical summaries of the Thai PHEIs as a whole, rather than to discuss case after case, I particularly looked for prototypical cases of Thai PHEIs, thereby employing a stratified random sampling method based on sampling selection criteria in section 3.3.1. Using 2006 data with such
criteria as a sampling frame, I randomly selected a sample of 20 institutions, representing nearly one-third of the total 67 Thai PHEIs, in order to build a feasible sample, and to ensure that the cases represent the full range of variation covered in the study. In this manner, intentional selection of cases based on a priori knowledge of related variables (as presented in 3.3.1) helps to control potential bias in a case study sampling while stratified sampling helps to increase the research’s suitability for generalization. Indeed, with accurate stratum information of sampling selection criteria, representativeness of different strata or subpopulation within the sample is warranted (Neuman 2003).

3.3.1 Selection of PHEIs and Interviewees

To ensure representativeness and variations of the population of Thai PHEIs, selection criteria in sampling for the research’s case studies were designed. Based on previous knowledge of relevant variables, I used 2 main variables: geographic region (Bangkok/ others), and institutional size (large/ small) as selection criteria. According to the literature, institutional size is a nonjudgmental valid criterion leading to other important organizational characteristics (Chaskes 1980; Cohen 2003a) while geographic locations of different institutions, in general, vary greatly in resources, types of students, and program orientation (Gumport 1993).

Table 2: Intentional Sampling of PHEIs and Interviewees from PHEIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Number of PHEIs</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok-large</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok-small</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others-large</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others-small</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the 2006 data, there were 67 PHEIs in Thailand. Bangkok and central areas held roughly 60 percent of PHEIs, leaving the other 40 percent located outside the capital city areas (Appendix A). In Table 2, twenty PHEIs were selected from each group of conditions. Partly in line with Bernasconi (2006) and Cao (2007), I sampled the specific institutions based on the purposeful conditions upon a recommendation from Thai PHE scholars, government authorities, and fieldwork accessibility as well as my priori knowledge about the Thai PHE arena.

As to the operationalized definition of the selection criteria, the study signified large PHEIs as those having at least 7,000 full time equivalent students whereas small PHEIs enroll fewer than 7,000 students. Indeed, institutional size of PHEIs in Thailand ranges from fewer than 1,000 to over 20,000 students, with a majority of small and very small institutions at the bottom (Praphamontripong 2008b). PHEIs residing in “Bangkok” (Bangkok and central areas) included the following provinces: Ayutthaya, Bangkok, Kanchanaburi, Lopburi, Nakorn Nayok, Nakorn Pathom, Nakorn Sawan, Nontaburi, Pathumthani, Petchaburi, Ratchaburi, Samutprakarn, Samutsakorn, Saraburi, Supunburi, and Utaithani. The study defined “others” as any provinces excluded from the former group.

The university presidents or retired presidents of each institution were interviewed at each institutional setting. Despite including authoritative administrators such as university presidents as key informants is common in academic research in Thailand, selecting them as informants may have some limitations. To begin with, accessibility to the PHEIs’ authoritative figures is usually a major problem because they may not

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welcome the interview. However, the study used a representative sample of institutions whose university presidents agreed to cooperate, except one institution where the university president was traveling abroad during the entire data collection period (see Table 3 for a summary of sampled institutions). Furthermore, while it is doubtful whether such university presidents could provide as much information as other lower administrators could, the study valued the importance of data gathered from the university presidents. This was so because university presidents as the institutional authoritative figures speak for the institutions, and ultimate decision making often come from them, especially in the case of PHEIs. In contrast, lower administrators probably know much less about current decision-making processes. Since the purpose of the interview was to collect information on specific institutional characteristics and policies relevant to PHEIs, at least, the university presidents, given their official positions and authorities, could most likely guide what we explored. Otherwise, an alternative was to ask whether the university presidents could recommend the researcher with anyone having an insight of the institutions and being able to speak on their behalf. In this case, the presidents appointed their vice presidents to give an interview instead.
Table 3: A Cross Tabulation Summary of Sampling PHEIs by Size and Location

Case Processing Summary

<table>
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<th>Cases</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size * Location</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Size * Location Cross Tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Bangkok</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 represents a cross tabulation summary of the sampling PHEIs participated in the study. While initial sampling was to include 20 PHEIs, as specified in Table 2, the actual sampling included 19 PHEIs due to the fact that the president of one institution was abroad and could not participate in the interview, thereby omitted from the study. The distribution by size and location of the actual PHEIs participating in this study was comparable to the initial planning in Table 2. Proportionate to the 60:40 geographical location ratio previously mentioned, approximately 68 percent of selected institutions were in Bangkok while 32 percent were elsewhere. Likewise, as a majority of PHEIs is small, roughly 58 percent of participating institutions were small and about 42 percent were large, thereby covering a variation of PHEIs.

3.3.2 Selection of PHE Specialists

In addition to the interviews with the university presidents, five PHE specialists were purposively selected for an interview as well. According to Table 4, selected PHE
specialists included officials from the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Commission on Higher Education (CHE), the National Education Council (NEC), the Office for the National Education Standards and Quality Assurance (ONESQA) and a PHE expert outside the MOE who has been recognized among Thai higher education scholars.

Table 4: Intentional Sampling of PHE Specialists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officials from the Ministry of Education (MOE)/Commission on Higher Education (CHE)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official from the Bureau of Policy and Planning, National Education Council (NEC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official from the Office for the National Education Standards and Quality Assurance (ONESQA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHE Specialist outside the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My justification to include an interview with PHE specialists in this study was largely related to the nature of my research question and specific institutional characteristics that I investigated. It was important to gather information from the policy making authorities in the public sector because this study attempted to explore variations of institutional governance and finance among PHEIs and in relation to public HEIs. Outside PHEIs, such government officials and PHE specialists would be resourceful in providing information about external authority and control over PHEIs as well as any relevant policies imposed upon PHEIs. Indeed, all Thai PHEIs are under the supervision of the CHE, subject to the authority of the MOE. Likewise, the National Education Council is responsible for national policy formulation and thus coordinates directly with the CHE, again, under the MOE umbrella. The ONESQA is responsible for quality
assurance and accreditation of all HEIs, including private and public sectors. Hence, an inclusion of external informants for this study would contribute to a more fruitful analysis of findings.

**Table 5: A Cross Tabulation Summary of Total Participating Interviewees by Status, Position and Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Status * Position * Gender</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Interviewee Status Present</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Interviewee Status Retired</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Interviewee Status Present</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the selected 25 participants projected for an interview in this study, twenty-four responded and participated whereas the one missing was not available for the interview due to his travelling abroad. The remaining 24 participants allowed digital recording whereas 16.7 percent of them did not allow their names to be published and
29.2 percent did not allow their institutions’ names to be released. Table 5 depicts the roster of total 24 interviewees participating in this study, 5 of which were external specialists and government authorities while the rest were institutional top administrators such as presidents and vice presidents. A majority of male interviewees were presidents (62.5 percent), external specialists (25.0 percent) and vice presidents (12.5 percent), respectively. Also among the male interviewees, four were already retired. Indeed, gathering interview data from retirees helped to gain a more neutral perspective on the investigated institutional characteristics since they tended not to have any direct stake in the institutions any longer. Likewise, councils and PHE experts provided fruitful information, seeing that they tended to be skeptical about PHEIs and thus spoke more openly about PHE. As for female interviewees, a majority of them were presidents (62.5 percent), vice presidents (25.0 percent), and specialists (12.5 percent), respectively, with none of them being retired as of the interview periods. Additionally, female and male vice president interviewees were mostly positioned in university administration, strategic planning or academic affairs.

3.3.3 Selection of Official Documents and Archival Data

To ensure the quality of qualitative field research, triangulation such as employing different forms of data was considered (Bailey 2007). Henceforth, apart from interviews, miscellaneous available documents and statistical data concerning institutional governance and finance as well as several government policies related to PHEIs were purposefully gathered and analyzed. Primary documents included in this investigation were public policies, laws and regulations on PHE, quality assurance and accreditation, student loans as well as figures or percentages of any funding from the government and
other sources, tuition and fees and donations. Adding up information from other sources alongside interviews helped to enrich, verify, and triangulate the information obtained during interviews. Previous studies on PHE and institutional governance also take advantage of a variety of data sources (Bastiaens 2007; Bernasconi 2006; Cao 2007).

3.4 Instruments and Data Gatherings

The principal method for data collection was a semi-structured interview. The semi-structured interview provided flexibility in exploring key points via probing questions. The purpose of interviewing university presidents was to gather information about institutional characteristics and political economic policies involving the institutions. As in Bastiaens’ (2007) study, formal interviews with selected representatives allowed the researcher to test inferences via content analysis and analytical induction whereas informal consultations with other individuals and PHE experts through fieldworks enhanced the researcher’s perspective in understanding institutional diversity in governance and finance and how such concepts were defined by various kinds of informants. Furthermore, such information was used not only to reveal institutional diversity but also to interpret the quantitative data collected through the CHE’s archival statistical data.

Using an interview guideline with open-ended questions, I collected information via field interviews with private university presidents. The focus of field interviews was on the interviewee’s experiences and perspectives, thereby, encouraging the interviewer to ask a question in terms of situations and concrete examples (Neuman 2003). The interviews were conducted in Thailand over a two-month period in 2008. Each
interview, conducted in Thai language, ranged from 60 minutes minimum to 137 minutes maximum, with an average interview time of 92 minutes. In some cases, the interviews had to be shortened due to time constraints and thus a follow-up interview was conducted later on. Although specific contexts of different interviewees made the interviews loosen up from a standard protocol, still, general areas of interview questions were prepared and later adjusted before and during the interviews. Therefore, I initially designed two overlapping interview questions, one of which was for university presidents and another for external informants. The overlapping questions concerned overall issues of institutional governance, finance, differentiation and diversity, and relevant public policies in a macro level of PHE system in Thailand. Derived from the conceptual framework analyzed in the relevant literature, the interview guideline comprised two sections: institutional diversity in governance and institutional diversity in finance, both of which were being relevant to political economic policies and market mechanism for the Thai higher education (Appendix B-1, Appendix B-2). Specific questions regarding individual PHEIs were created and utilized spontaneously for university presidents and vice presidents depending on the interview flows. To avoid data omission due to limitations of semi-structured interviews, at the end of the interview, the interviewees were given an opportunity to freely express any important issues unaddressed during the interview which would help the researcher to discover any additional unidentified key points. If requested, a copy of the research objectives and interview guide with open-ended questions were sent to interviewees via fax or email prior to the scheduled interview date so that interviewees had enough time to understand the topic and the purpose of the interviews.
As the interview proceeded, a trusting and personal relationship between the interviewees and me as a researcher usually evolved. In most cases, the interviewees were willing to provide valuable documents for further analysis and a tour-visit of their institutions after the interview was finished. The interviewees proudly presented their institution’s highlights and facilities such as computer centers, indoor and outdoor gymnasiums, and dormitories and encouraged me to take as many photos as needed.

The other data gathering technique was content analysis of official documents for higher education and PHE in particular. Such documents were collected in either hard-copy or electronic formats directly from the CHE office, CHE website, ONESQA office and individual institution’s websites and publications. Primary documents included the Private Higher Education Acts, Student Loan Funds Act, CHE annual reports, CHE higher education development plans, ministerial regulations concerning PHEIs, CHE’s internal quality assurance manual, ONESQA’s external quality assurance manual, ONESQA’s external quality assurance report, statistical data of PHEIs such as student enrollments, and so forth.

3.5 Informed Consent

Following Flores’ (2006) study, I emphasized the importance of informed consent as a process. Throughout the research period, it was crucial to develop and carry on an understanding that this study was not to be an assessment of individual PHE university leaders or institutions but rather to be macro-level analysis of the whole PHE sector in Thailand. Thus, informed consent became an important process held throughout the interviews and not just as a formal ritual at the beginning of the research activities.
Accordingly, I designed the process of contacting the institutions and access into the setting was as follows. I submitted a letter to the CHE, requesting an official authorization for data collection in selected PHEIs under its supervision (Appendix C-1, Appendix C-2). A similar letter was sent to the Association of Private Higher Education Institutions of Thailand (APHEIT) in order to request its approval and cooperation with selected PHEIs (Appendix D). Once the official authorization from both organizations were granted,21 I sent a copy of the CHE’s approval letter and addressed it to the university president along with my research’s cover letter indicating an explanation of research objectives and a request for an interview at his or her convenience. After receiving an approval for an interview from the university president in the form of acceptance letters or phone call confirmations, I went to each institutional setting as scheduled, introducing myself to the university president or vice president appointed for the interview and explaining the research to him or her. The interviewee was encouraged to ask any questions he or she had before the interview started. Once he or she agreed to participate, I asked him or her to sign the informed consent (Appendix E-1, Appendix E-2). An equivalent “informed consent” procedure was employed to contact and to interview government authorities and PHE experts (Appendix E-3, Appendix E-4).

3.6 Constructs and Variables

To understand what the differences among PHEIs themselves were and how such differences occurred, I presented two major sets of measurable constructs in this study. First, Levy’s types of PHE (semi-elite, religious oriented, demand absorbing) were

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21 The CHE returned an official letter of research approval to me (Appendix C-1, Appendix C-2) whereas the APHEIT sent its request letter of cooperation to this study directly to each participating institution.
operationalized as in Table 6. Second, two broad theoretical components of divergent organizational forms (governance, finance) were operationalized as in Table 7. The first set was employed as an outcome of the combinational characteristics in the second set. In other words, the analysis was to investigate an association between the types of PHE and combinational configurations on governance and finance.

Table 6: Operationalization of Levy’s types of PHE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHE Types</th>
<th>Theoretical Definition</th>
<th>Criteria for Operationalization</th>
<th>Observable Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite/ Semi-elite</td>
<td>Socially advantaged, secular &amp; depoliticized universities</td>
<td>National reputation (top five among all PHEIs which had been discovered through this study)</td>
<td>Interviewee’s perception from interview data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selectivity &amp; limited access (originally reserved only for the elites)</td>
<td>Licensee type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reputable (nationally or internationally)</td>
<td>Student SES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious oriented</td>
<td>Founded/ sponsored by a religious organization/ church</td>
<td>Founded &amp; licensed by a religious organization</td>
<td>CHE document on licensee of PHEIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principally aiming at religious service through religious related disciplines (other non-religious fields may appear but initially religious-related fields are prominent.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interview data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand absorbing</td>
<td>Neither elite nor religious oriented</td>
<td>Neither elite/ semi-elite nor religious oriented limited national reputation</td>
<td>CHE document on licensee of PHEIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly responding to the rising demand for higher education</td>
<td>Founded &amp; licensed by seculars</td>
<td>Interview data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 6, the most straightforward type of PHE observed was the religious oriented institution. It could be classified unambiguously, based on its founder or licensee. Elite/ semi-elite institution was observed using interview data in which interviewees identified the name of top-five PHEIs. The most complicated and broadest category was demand-absorbing institution. In this study, PHEIs that were neither semi-elite nor religious-oriented were categorized as demand-absorbing ones.
Table 7: Summary of the Main Constructs and Variables of Institutional Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Components</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Constructs</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observable Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>External Control</td>
<td>Levels of control exerted by external agencies</td>
<td>- Policies, regulations, official documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Free from external control</td>
<td>- Institutional arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Controlled via incentives</td>
<td>- Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Closely tied to external control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sources of external control</td>
<td>- Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Religious/ Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Business corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Individuals/ Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Administration</td>
<td>President</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Locals are tied to the organization. They may be the owner or actual family members</td>
<td>- University appointment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cosmopolitans are tied to their professions.</td>
<td>- Organizational structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrators/ University Council members</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Locals are family members or owner’s representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cosmopolitans are professionals outside the owner’s family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision making power</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Top-down: Decision is made from the university president level.</td>
<td>- Institutional regulations (e.g., university appointment, procedural documents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Bottom-up: Decision is made from the faculty level.</td>
<td>- Organizational structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Finance</td>
<td>Sources of Income</td>
<td>Percentage of income sources</td>
<td>- Institutional arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of operation budget from the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of other funding from the government (e.g., research funds, soft loans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of income from tuition &amp; fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Percentage of other funding from other private sources (e.g., business, church donation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6.1 A Political Dimension Measured through Institutional Governance

The study operationalized a definition of institutional governance into two constructs: external authority and internal administration commonly used in the higher
education literature. *External authority* was defined as a level of control over an institution exerted by external agencies, including the government, religious organizations, foundations, business corporations, or individuals/families. The level of control was gauged in different degrees, ranging from “free from external control”, “controlled with positive/negative incentives”, to “closely tied to external control.” When external agencies did not have formal control over the institution’s affairs and the institution was not accountable to such agencies, the institution was considered “free from external control”. When external agencies had very little to some formal control over the institution, for example, through regulations or incentives, the external control over the institution was based upon how much strings attached to the institution. And thus the institution was considered being controlled under some conditions. Ultimately, when external agencies had some to a great deal of formal control that the institution needed to abide by regardless of whether or not the institution received any incentives, the institution was considered closely tied to external control. Succinctly put, autonomy was the classic term here. While there was not a meaning of absolute autonomy from external control, institutional autonomy should be tentatively regarded on a matter of degree (Bok 1980; Levy 1979, 1980)

To estimate various degrees of external control over the institution, several indicators were taken into account. First, I investigated relevant policies, regulations, and official documents to see what kinds of external policies and how such policies had been imposed upon the institution, for instance, government policy on quality assurance requirements or conditions/ incentives tied to corporate funding for the institution. Likewise, interviews on the same topics (policies, regulations) were taken into account in
order to see whether the institution had implemented such external policies and if so how much the implementation was in reality as well as how flexible it was for the institution.

Second, I explore institutional arrangements regarding personnel in order to see institutional power structure influenced by external agencies. Such a power structure was defined in terms of formal and informal networks via appointment from outside authorities or election from internal staff as well as by government authority or any other authorities of stakeholders and donors. While document investigation allowed me to cross-check interview data with facts, interviews gave insightful information on how external power was exerted upon the institution through the power arrangement mechanism of various political players of the institution.

In terms of power distribution within the institutions, *internal administration* was operationalized through decision making power and types of president and administrators/ university council members. Based on Gouldner (1957), types of president and administrators/ university council members signaled whether top administrators of the institution were insiders (locals) or outsiders (cosmopolitans). These variables were observed through interviews, organizational structure, and university appointments. To measure internal decision making, I specified two different power distribution streams: top-down and bottom-up powers. Top-down power appeared when top administrators of the institution (e.g., university presidents, vice presidents, university administration) were exclusively responsible for making a decision. The decision making process, thus, tended to be centralized, seeing that the decision came directly from the top and that it rarely involved faculty members at the bottom level of the institution. In contrast, bottom-up power happened when faculty members or
departmental staffs were the ones making a decision, which signified more decentralized internal decision making process. Concisely put, institutions oriented to top-down administration tended to have centralized decision making whereas those geared toward bottom-up management were perceived as decentralized institutions. To measure both power distribution concepts, I focused mainly on various institutional regulations relevant to university governance such as appointment and procedural documents as well as organizational structure. The procedure of how I integrated the various pieces of evidence is discussed in section 3.7.1.1 below.

### 3.6.2 An Economic Dimension Measured through Institutional Finance

Diversity in terms of institutional finance was measured through funding sources in which percentage of income sources was distributed. To measure how PHEIs differ from one another, I employed four different indicators: 1) percentage of operation budget from the government; 2) percentage of other funding from the government—such as government soft loans or research funds; 3) percentage of income from tuition and fees; and 4) percentage of other funding from other private sources—such as business and church donations. Furthermore, such indicators were used to measure financial autonomy. For instance, institutions receiving non-government funds obtained more autonomy from the government than those directly governmental subsidized yet this was not necessarily the case (Levy 1980). The four indicators allowed me to see financial patterns of different types of PHEIs in comparison to those of the public ones. Similar to the political dimension section, the procedure of how I integrated the various pieces of evidence is discussed in section 3.7.1.1.
3.7 Data Analyses

To analyze collected data, this study was designed as a two-step procedure. The first step was focused on a traditional content analysis of interview data and documents, complimented with descriptive statistical analysis of basic facts and figures representing institutional characteristics (e.g., student enrollment). The second step of data analysis emphasized a comparative perspective principle via a Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of interview records and published documents.

3.7.1 Content Analysis and Descriptive Statistical Analysis

Content analysis is generally utilized among social scientists to analyze qualitative information of a social phenomenon. When rich data were gathered via multiple sources, the researcher would develop a coding system, identifying clusters, patterns, or frequencies of such data relevant into emergent themes. Given that this study attempted to investigate whether the existing theories (such as Levy’s) would be transferable to the Thai PHE context, the analysis was geared toward deductive approaches on coding the qualitative data. The deductive approaches allowed the researcher to explicitly code themes and categories as guided by a theoretical framework right at the beginning of the coding process (Lewins and Silver 2007). Nevertheless, even if this study did not seek to develop a “grounded theory” (Glaser and Strauss 1999), some content analysis strategies of constant comparative method were favored, for example, comparing cases apropos of each category or combining categories with their properties. Like what Goetz and LeCompte (1981) accentuated, through a combination of category coding and simultaneous comparison across categories, new patterns or
relationships in institutional diversity and political economic policies were revealed, in addition to what the literature said.

### 3.7.1.1 Interview & Document Analyses

Through content analysis, institutional characteristics (both manifest and tacit) were coded and categorized into conceptual themes of governance and finance, and afterwards, specific elements were organized and labeled under each theme. As an integral part of content analysis, such a qualitative coding process enabled the researcher to organize the raw data into conceptual themes and categories guided by the research questions and later on moved the researcher toward data analysis and generalizations (Lewins and Silver 2007; Neuman 2003). Due to the purpose of this study that attempted to expand on existing theories of PHE and institutional diversity in terms of governance and finance, I designed a coding scheme derived from the theoretical framework and utilized it as an initial template for coding and categorization (Appendix F). Following King (1998)’s Template Analysis, I deductively used the coding scheme as a guide to identify and explain predictable data that fit or diverged from the established conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. Simultaneously, I inductively accommodated new information and themes arising from the texts that would require a theoretical expansion and modification. Despite consuming a great deal of efforts, this qualitative coding system allowed the researcher to reduce mountains of raw data, thematically managed the data, and identified relevant clusters and frequencies (Miles and Huberman 1994; Neuman 2003).

The interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed alongside note-taking during the interview process. Concurrent note-taking was useful particularly in a section
that helped the researcher to identify patterns and meanings of influence (Miles and Huberman 1994). In other words, detailed write-ups were prepared simultaneously with a minimum of inference that would also add up additional inquiries at the end. The full transcriptions of all 24 interviews were in Thai language while all codes and themes were conducted in English. A translation of all interview quotations was by the researcher.

All transcriptions were saved as Word Format file (.doc) for coding process using the “Atlas.ti” qualitative software application. Atlas.ti software systematically helped to support my initial development of qualitative codes and themes derived from the data as well as to see the networks and links between codes and within the texts. According to Lewins and Silver (2007), Atlast.ti provided the research users with an easy-friendly tool in making Code families and providing quick output for print-out, export, or editing. Its strength lied also on networking tool that allowed the users to see a linkage between codes within the actual texts. With this feature, especially, I was able to find a relationship between codes which afterwards allowed me to apply them as selected variables into the fsQCA analysis of combinational configurations in the second stage of data analysis.

Based on the theoretical framework comprising both major themes and sub-themes, interview data were initially coded and organized in a hierarchical order, using Atlas.it qualitative software program. Throughout the coding process, the coding scheme was revised and reorganized according to the available interview data (See Appendix F). The coding scheme was designed to cover four theoretical constructs (Code families): institutional diversity in governance, institutional diversity in finance, public policies, and market mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 2. Sub-themes under each code family were
both initially designed and emerged later. These four code families were nested within the theoretical framework of PHE types: semi-elite, religious-oriented, and demand-absorbing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC POLICY</th>
<th>MARKET MECHANISMS</th>
<th>Internal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claimed Support &amp; Similar Treatment</td>
<td>Market Competition</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Status Different Regulation</td>
<td>Social Perceptions</td>
<td>Decision-making Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Support but Strict in Practice</td>
<td>Marketization in Public University</td>
<td>Fast Decision-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claimed Tax Support</td>
<td>Unclear Policy</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Tax Law</td>
<td>Lack Control of Enrollment Number</td>
<td>Decision-making Bottom-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation Tax P-P Different</td>
<td>Lack Control of Institution Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Pays Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner as President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner Runs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax VAT</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner Holds Ultimate Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Policy &amp; Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Founder holds Ultimate Decision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Control</th>
<th>Institutional Diversity in Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Government Agencies</td>
<td>Controlled by Professional Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closely Tied to External &amp; Rigid Regulations</td>
<td>Controlled by Private Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled for quality</td>
<td>Controlled by Business Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional &amp; Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Controlled by Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Controlled by Outside Organizations</td>
<td>Controlled by Religious Foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Government Treatments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-Public HEIs Governed by Different Laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pow to University Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Professional Associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Private Entities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Business Corporations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Individual/ Families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Religious Foundations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance</th>
<th>MARKET MECHANISMS</th>
<th>Internal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Income General</td>
<td>Market Competition</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from Business sources</td>
<td>Social Perceptions</td>
<td>Decision-making Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from Donations</td>
<td>Marketization in Public University</td>
<td>Fast Decision-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from Individuals/ Families</td>
<td>Unclear Policy</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from Religion</td>
<td>Lack Control of Enrollment Number</td>
<td>Decision-making Bottom-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment Concern</td>
<td>Lack Control of Institution Number</td>
<td>Local President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from Tuition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner as President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy on Tuition No-Ceiling for PHEs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner Runs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Funding from Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner Holds Ultimate Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Operation budget from Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Founder holds Ultimate Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Soft Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td>University Council Members &amp; Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strategies to Get Student Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td>University Council Members are Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Student Loans and Institutional Diversity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Founder in Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Funds</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Founder Monitors Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td></td>
<td>University Council partly Sent by Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits Back to Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice President in Finance Sent by Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits Back to Owners</td>
<td></td>
<td>University Council partly Sent by Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Revised Coding Schemes Categorized by Four Theoretical Constructs**

Using the same coding schemes and categories from the interviews, a similar coding process of in-depth content analysis was applied to collected documents, including web-based ones. Particularly, rich descriptions and quotations about different institutional characteristics on governance and finance, were presented prior to data interpretation so that readers could have some room for their own judgment (Patton 2002). This document analysis enabled the researcher to confirm and triangulate findings that emerged from the interviews, particularly those relevant to a macro policy level in which individual’s perspectives might be limited.
3.7.1.2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis

Relevant statistical analysis was employed in the analysis of quantitative data such as basic statistical facts and figures of the institutions. Represented in a graphical and table fashions, descriptive statistics such as percentage, frequency distribution and mean were the key techniques. Findings from such statistical analysis were compared and complimented to those obtained from the qualitative descriptions in order to better represent a holistic context.

3.7.2 Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

In the second stage of data analysis, selected variables from qualitative codes and themes were employed for Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis: fsQCA (Ragin 2000, 2008, 2009). I used this approach particularly to examine types of PHEIs in Thailand, which are further discussed in Chapter 5. Given the nature of this research’s topic and question in which clusters and patterns of institutional characteristics of different PHEIs types were emphasized, fsQCA was strikingly suitable for data analysis. This was because fsQCA, by using Boolean algebra data simplification algorithms as superior analytical alternative to other forms of comparative analysis, enabled me to portray combinatorial and conjunctional variables of institutional characteristics in a manner of degree, which led to particular clusters and patterns of PHEIs. By using fsQCA, I was able to simplify sufficient conditions (combinational characteristics) for each type of PHEIs and draw a comparison to PHE types suggested in the theoretical framework, thereby being able to answer my main research question: How do Thai private higher education institutions (PHEIs) differ among themselves and from the public ones? While fsQCA provided rich analysis on types and differences within the
private sector, traditional qualitative analysis based on interview data via coding schemes enhanced the research answer to cover differentiation between private and public sectors. Therefore, both steps of data analysis complemented one another. Other quantitative analyses such as factor analysis might be equivalent methods; nonetheless, they were not appropriate for a qualitative case study.

My justification in using fsQCA in this study stemmed from the fact that fsQCA was a methodological approach appropriate for the comparison of qualitative data between small-N and the representative sample. Given that most of my data were qualitative in nature and that the sample size was rather small (N = 24), fsQCA was suitable. Also partially similar to Epstein *et al* (2008), fsQCA allowed me to analyze variables in a holistic manner instead of in isolation via the logic of variable-centered analyses as well as to provide a synthetic tool for clustering independent variables and examining relationships among variables and outcomes. Due to the fact that the nature of my research question dealt with categorization of PHEIs and that the research was qualitative oriented, fsQCA was especially appropriate.

fsQCA was designed for conditions that vary by degree, as often happened in many social science contexts. Derived from set-theory, fsQCA refers to the pseudo-continuous scale ranging from zero to one. Cases coded one signified “fully in” (full membership) a set while those coded zero signified “fully out” (non-membership) of the set. fsQCA was especially useful for this research as it allowed me to calibrate partial membership in sets using values along the continuum from zero to one. Table 8 shows a conversion of eight selected variables to Fuzzy-Set values.
Table 8: A Conversion of Eight Selected Variables to Fuzzy-Set Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables/ Categories</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Fuzzy Membership Scores</th>
<th>Explanations of Fuzzy Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Age  (INSTIAGE: A)</td>
<td>Years in service as PHEI</td>
<td>40 years or more = 1 30-39 years = 0.8 20-29 years = 0.6 10-19 years = 0.4 Less than 10 years = 0.2</td>
<td>A score of 1 (full membership) was assigned to PHEI establishing for 40 years or more, indicating its experience in the higher education market and with public policies. The ranges of years were determined according to the distribution of the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Size (INSTISIZE: Z)</td>
<td>Size of PHEI determined by total number of student enrollment</td>
<td>Large PHEI with 10,000 students or more = 1 Medium PHEI with 3,000 to less than 10,000 students = 0.67 Small PHEI with less than 3,000 students = 0.33</td>
<td>The full membership of 1 was designated to large PHEI with 10,000 or more students. Small PHEI with less than 3,000 students was assigned 0.33 degree of membership and medium PHEI having students from 3,000 to less than 10,000 was assigned 0.67 degree of membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President (PRESIDENT: P)</td>
<td>Key personnel in PHEI administration</td>
<td>Local (Owner/ family member as a president) = 1 Cosmopolitan (Outside professional, religious or secular, as a president) = 0</td>
<td>The full membership of 1 was assigned to local—PHEI whose owner or a family member was a president. Local indicated a full privateness of control in an institution. 0 was assigned to cosmopolitan—PHEI that brought religious or secular professionals from outside to be a president. Cosmopolitan signified a lack of local private control (owner’s) over institutional administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration (ADMIN: M)</td>
<td>Key Personnel in PHEI administration</td>
<td>Locals (Owner’s family members/ representatives in a university council or administration) = 1 Cosmopolitans (Outside professionals, no owner’s family members/ representatives, in a university council or administration) = 0</td>
<td>1 was assigned to PHEI having owner’s family members/ representatives in its university council or administration, indicating the full membership of privateness. PHEI having representatives from religious owner (organization) was also considered having a full membership as religious organization was considered a group of family members as well. 0 was assigned to PHEI managed by an outside professional, meaning that there was no owner’s family member or representative in the university council or administration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The full membership of 1 was assigned to PHEI reporting that its tuition & fee was 81-100% of its total income, indicating the high level of tuition dependency.

The ranges of scores were designed according to the distribution of the data. However, as stressed in the literature that PHEIs were highly tuition-dependent, the data in this study were also skewed toward the above end of the continuum. Therefore, memberships showing “fully out” (0) or nearly fully out were not found. The rationale to design these 6-scale fuzzy-set scores was to depict the fine degree of tuition dependency of each PHEI among 0.6 to 1.

1 was assigned to PHEI getting a donation of more than 10% of its total income, indicating the full membership of donation dependency.

0 was assigned to PHEI getting no donation, indicating the non-membership of donation dependency.

PHEI getting a donation between 5-10% of its total income was given 0.67 fuzzy-set score and PHEI getting a donation less than 5% was given 0.33 fuzzy-set score.

Crisp set scores was used for this government soft loans variable. The full membership of 1 was assigned to PHEI taking soft loans from the government whereas 0 was assigned to PHEI never taking any government soft loans, indicating the non-membership.

The full membership of 1 was assigned to PHEI where its owner took back 30% of its profits.

PHEI that owner took back less than 30% of its profits was assigned 0.6 fuzzy-set score, indicating the more fully in of the membership in being financially private.

0 was assigned to PHEI that owner did not take any profits back.
For each of the 19 prototypical cases, I recoded the data (mostly from interviews and individual institution’s websites) into fuzzy-set scores, based on the conversion portrayed in Table 8. Then, I ran the fsQCA analysis through “truth tables” in which every PHEI was laid out in the truth tables and each one of the eight dimensions was identified. Adopted from Ragin (1989) and several of his successors (Britt 1998; Flores 2006) that truth tables summarized possible patterns of outcomes relevant to configurations of conditions, I was able to find possible combinations of institutional characteristics, indicating whether a certain pattern of such traits existed and could be grouped as different types of PHEIs. To examine whether the Thai case matched Levy’s framework, I ran fsQCA analyses separately with two different sets of outcomes; one using the existing ownership typology categorized by the Thai CHE, and the other using Levy’s three-part category. The first set of outcomes, the Thai ownership typology, comprised FAMILY, RELIGFOUND, and BIZCORP. FAMILY signified a PHEI licensed by individual or family; RELIGFOUND signified a PHEI licensed by a religious organization or foundation; BIZCORP signified a PHEI licensed by a business company and corporation. As for the second set of outcomes, the Levy’s typology, there were SEMIELITE, DEMANDABSORB, RELIGIOUS, and I also included the emerging category, SERIOUSDA. In this way, I was able to find associations between Levy’s theory and the Thai empirical evidence through a comparison between the two sets of outcomes using fsQCA solutions and Boolean algebraic simplifications. In other words, combinational characteristics of each outcome provided by fsQCA solutions were

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22 Although the total of interviews was 24 cases, only 19 cases were applied to Fuzzy-Set analysis, given that they were all from the group of PHEIs. Thus, I left aside the interview data of 5 external informants in the Fuzzy-Set analysis of institutional type, while afterwards integrating them into the discussions and interpretations.
compared and interpreted whether the Thai findings followed Levy’s framework and how and how much they did so. This qualitative comparative approach, thus, permitted the qualitative analysis of social phenomena under the logic of experimental design, assisting us to simplify complexity in a theoretical guided fashion (Ragin 1989).

The next three chapters represent the main research findings and discussions, the heart of this dissertation. Chapter 4 focuses on inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral diversity of Thai higher education and Chapter 5 on types of PHE. Chapter 6 discusses the impacts of public policy and market on the shape of PHE.

Chapter 4 elaborates detail findings and analyses in two parts. The first part presents initial research findings and discussions of the traditional qualitative analysis and the second part bridges Levy’s typology to the Thai ownership categorization via fsQCA. Chapter 5 discusses the salient themes of institutional governance and finance emerged in the initial analysis to the categorization of PHE. As to Chapter 6, market mechanisms and public policies relevant to shape of PHE and extent of institutional diversity are considered.
CHAPTER 4
INTER-SECTORAL AND INTRA-SECTORAL DIVERSITY:
A CONFIGURATIONAL ANALYSIS USING fsQCA AND TRADITIONAL QUALITATIVE CODING SCHEMES

The major findings of this dissertation are presented in this chapter and the next two chapters. This Chapter 4 presents and discusses inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral diversity of Thai higher education, answering how Thai PHEIs differ among themselves and from the public ones, particularly in terms of institutional governance and finance. Chapter 5 discusses types of private higher education and Chapter 6 emphasizes the impacts of public policies and market mechanisms on Thai PHEIs. Qualitative data principally from face-to-face interviews, published and unpublished documents—including public policies, ministerial regulations, relevant publications and institutions’ websites—as well as statistical data, have led to major findings and analytical discussions to better understand the differences and similarities among PHEIs and between private and public HEIs. Especially, fsQCA analyses help a great deal for categorization of Thai PHEIs and to confirm the validity of the theoretical framework whereas traditional qualitative coding analysis helps to discuss differences between private and public sectors.

Such analytical categorization and interpretation also lead to an explanation of the two research hypotheses. The findings support my first hypothesis in that the Thai case fits Levy’s (1986b) framework on private-public distinctiveness in governance and finance and types of PHE, observed via internal administration and funding patterns. The findings also support my second hypothesis in that different types of PHEIs are key
factors illustrating diversity (with some isomorphism) in the Thai higher education system.

To elaborate my research analyses, I have organized Chapter 4 into 2 main sections: *Inter-Sectoral Dynamics* (discussing private-public distinctiveness), and *Intra-Sectoral Dynamics* (focusing on institutional diversity of PHE in overview). In the first section on inter-sectoral dynamics, I discuss private-public growth, private-public in governance, and private-public in finance. In the second section on intra-sectoral dynamics, I first discuss institutional diversity of PHEIs by age and size and then present the findings on types of PHE using fsQCA analyses. Afterwards, Chapter 5 presents major findings and thorough discussions of institutional diversity by types of PHE: *pluralizing religious- and cultural-oriented, semi-elite, demand-absorbing, and serious-demand-absorbing.*

### 4.1 Inter-Sectoral Dynamics: Private Alternatives and the Public Dominance

Private and public HEIs are the juxtapositional sectors functioning in a higher education system. The dynamics between private and public HEIs are often referred to and discussed in terms of how and how much each sector has developed. They are also analyzed in terms of how the two sectors are governed and financed, given that these variables are fundamental to higher education policy development. The following subsections discuss the three important issues to the “private-public difference” part of the research question: 1) private-public growth; 2) private-public difference in governance; and 3) private-public difference in finance.
4.1.1 Private versus Public Growth

In many developing countries the overall private-public dynamics in higher education is mostly known for the spectacular growth of the private sector. While the Thai higher education reality also follows this global tendency, PHE surge in Thailand does not seem to be as striking as other neighboring East Asian countries, according to Levy’s (2009b) UNESCO report. Even so, expansion of the Thai PHE sector in relation to that of the public one is important to both scholarship and policy as PHE providers keep emerging and diversified. The Thai reality portrays two overlapping pictures of private versus public growth in higher education system. First, the private sector, as an alternative to public higher education, has played a parallel or complementary role to the public predecessor (Umakoshi 2004) since the sector’s development. Second, both private and public expansions tend to anticipate demographics stagnancy or even decline in student enrollments, making the private-public dynamics become more intensified.23

The first finding confirms that the Thai PHE sector has continued to grow gradually in relation to its public counterpart even though it emerged 53 years later than the public one.24 While the public sector has always been dominating the Thai higher education system, the private sector—partly in line with Geiger (1986)—may be considered “parallel” to the public predecessor. It is parallel in the sense that different types of PHEIs have expanded particularly in absolute number and increasingly played an aggressive role in the marketplace. However, the Thai PHE sector has consistent minimum enrollment share in relation to the public one, though peaking at almost 20

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23 Chapter 6 elaborates in depth on the decline factor impacting Thai PHE.
24 As indicated in the section of Thai Private-Public Differentiation in Emerging Roles in Chapter 1, Thai public higher education sector was legally created in 1917 whereas the PHE sector was officially legalized in 1970 after the first PHE Act promulgation in 1969.
percent in 2002. The statistical data in Tables 9 and 10 capture the private-public growth in number of institutions and enrollment percentage by types of HEIs during the last 10 years.

**Table 9:** Types of Private-Public Growth by Number of Institutions in Thai Higher Education during 1998-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of HEIs</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private University</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private College</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Institute</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of PHEIs</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Admission University</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajabhat University</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajamangkla University of Technology</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous University</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Public HEIs</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of HEIs</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 9 illustrates that during the last 10 years the PHE sector had increased its institutional number from 42 to 70 institutions (roughly two-thirds of its size in 1998) while the public sector had expanded three times of its size in 1998, boosting up its institutional number from 24 to 78. It is necessary to note, however, that the public sector was indeed stagnant in its growth of institutional number when Rajabhat University subsector and Rajamangkla University of Technology subsector were excluded. These two types of public universities always exist yet they were not under the
CHE’s supervision prior to 2003, thereby being omitted from the CHE database and responsibility at the moment. Leaving aside these two public subsectors, it is apparent that for the last decade the public sector had grown from 24 to 29 institutions only (or approximately one-fifths of its total institutions in 1998). Indeed, as of 2007 the four dominating subsectors in Thai higher education in terms of institutional number are Rajabhat University subsector (N = 40), Private University subsector (N = 34), Private College subsector (N = 30), and Limited Admission University (N = 23), respectively.

Given this finding, the PHE sector seems to play a much more dynamic role than does the public sector, in planting its seeds into the Thai higher education industry. In this vein, PHE being dynamic transcends its parallel role to the public sector.

**Table 10: Types of Private-Public Growth by Percentage of Enrollment Share in Thai Higher Education during 1998-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of HEIs</th>
<th>Percentage of Higher Education Enrollment by Year</th>
<th>Mean of 2003-2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private University</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private College</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Institute</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrollment in PHEs</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajabhat University</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajamangkla University of Technology</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous University</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrollment in Public HEIs</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When analyzed in terms of private-public growth by enrollment share, Table 10 reveals that the Thai PHE sector tends to constantly have a small enrollment share in comparison to the public predecessor, especially in the Asian context. During 1998 to 2002 when Rajabhat University and Rajamangkla University of Technology subsectors were not yet transferred, the PHE sector had been holding its share of almost 20 percent of the total higher education enrollment. Within the public sector, the Open University subsector had held half of the total public higher education enrollment until after 2003 when its share was sliced up by the additional two public subsectors. Unlike the Open University subsector, the Limited Admission University and Autonomous University subsectors tended to be consistent in their enrollment shares, mostly, due to the government’s limited admission policy. When data of all subsectors were included (from 2003 to 2007), it is apparent that the four main subsectors preponderant to the Thai higher education system are the Open University subsector \((\bar{x} = 32.3\text{ percent})\), Rajabhat University subsector \((\bar{x} = 25.8\text{ percent})\), Limited Admission University subsector \((\bar{x} = 21.6\text{ percent})\), and the Private University subsector \((\bar{x} = 11.1\text{ percent})\), respectively.

PHE rapid growth in absolute numbers as opposed to enrollment share is a typical pattern in many countries, especially those with lasting public dominance, as a result of government deregulation for the private sector. The Thai finding echoes the global database, PROPHE’s,\(^{25}\) which reports that in most countries PHE grows by number of institutions rather than by its enrollment share.\(^{26}\) Such growth may be seen, indeed, as only infra-structure expansion but not necessary as academic popularity or recognition.

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\(^{25}\) For a complete PROPHE database, see *PROPHE International Databases*, available [online] at [http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/data/international.html](http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/data/international.html).

\(^{26}\) Exceptions include countries with a history of private parallel or preponderance such as Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan.
that results from increasing enrollment share. In this sense, the Thai case may be viewed in overall as quantity-focused. The fact that Thai private providers keep licensing a PHEI as an alternative to public universities despite a miniscule share in student enrollment may lead to an assumption on legitimacy or profit-making or both. This underlying intention—whether legitimacy or profit-seeking—exists in many countries (Slantcheva and Levy 2007).

Furthermore, the second finding signals a trend of stagnant growth of both private and public HEIs in Thailand. According to Table 10, none of the subsectors had shown a marked increase in student enrollment percentage during the past decade; on the contrary, a few subsectors had indicated a loss in their enrollment share. The Private University subsector, for instance, showed a drastic downfall in student enrollment share from 16.9 percent in 1998 to 8.5 percent in 2007. Public Open University subsector’s enrollment share also dropped massively in 2003 after the transfer of Rajabhat University and Rajamangkla University of Technology subsectors. Under the circumstances, the interview findings uncovered tensions among various higher education subsectors on declining student enrollment. Different institutions tended to take one another into account for the loss of their student enrollment. Simultaneously, some interviewees, such as Interviewee 23, tried to understand the decline from a student’s choice perspective:

“...Rajabhat universities have also declined in student enrollment. It is not true when other institutions blame that Rajabhat universities have taken over their students. In fact, high-school graduates prefer a famous public university. If they miss it, they likely choose a private university instead. Then, their third choice would be Rajabhat university…”

Although investigating the factors of student enrollment decline is beyond the research’s scope, this study offers one plausible explanation to the declining enrollment that is due
to decreasing population particularly in the youth-age cohort and dropping fertility rate. Later, Chapter 6 on the impacts of public policy and market economy elaborates the analysis in detail.

### 4.1.2 Private versus Public in Governance

Aside from analyzing the dynamics of private and public higher education sectors via their growth, governance is another key issue in the study on how the two sectors can differ from one another. According to Levy (1986b, 1992), private-public dichotomy in governance via juridical labels is consistent to empirical realities of privateness and publicness even if the level of private-public ambiguity may greater than that of finance. Based on the conceptual framework in Chapter 2 where external control and internal administration are the two key elements to examine institutional diversity in governance, the Thai findings reveal *some* differences in external control and *marked* differences in internal administration between private and public HEIs, as illustrated in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public HEIs</th>
<th>Private HEIs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>External Control</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Controlled by government agencies (CHE &amp; ONESQA)</td>
<td>• Controlled by government agencies (CHE &amp; ONESQA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Governed under their own statues</td>
<td>• Governed under PHE Act (one for all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Influenced by professional associations</td>
<td>• Influenced by professional associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Administration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal Administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Academic guild model, power at the faculty level.</td>
<td>• Administration power at the top administrative level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3:** Private-Public Differences in Governance in Thai higher Education System
In terms of external control, both private and public HEIs in Thailand are controlled by government agencies, mainly the CHE and ONESQA. However, they are governed under different laws and the public sector tends to receive more favorable treatments from the government. Aside from the CHE and ONESQA, professional associations also have certain influence on both private and public HEIs, especially toward standards of the programs offered and graduates’ qualifications. Additionally, PHEIs are also governed by other private entities who license them. Such private entities include business corporations, families or individuals, religious organizations, and foundations. As for internal administration, public HEIs tend to represent decentralized academic guild model of administration, giving overwhelming power to the faculty level. PHEIs, on the other hand, heftily hold administration power at the top administrative level.

4.1.2.1 External Control

Most importantly, the finding reveals certain tension between private and public sectors as a result of CHE’s supervision via different laws, sustaining the previous studies on Thai PHEIs (Boonprasert 2002; Kulachol 1995). Each public university has its own statute (such as Chulalongkorn University Act, Thammasat University Act, and so forth) while all of them have to abide by a few statues enforced in all ministries (such as Civil Service Act B.E. 2551). In contrast, all PHEIs follow the one and only law: the PHE Act, supplemented with tremendous ministerial regulations and procedures. Indeed, this Thai finding of one-size-fits-all law and heavy regulations is a solid parallel to the Latin American situation previously reported in Levy’s (1986b) work. Given the prestige of being the first-born child and the freedom to exercise their individual laws, public
universities tend to enjoy their institutional autonomy much more than do PHEIs. PHEIs, unlike the public predecessors, receive stricter control and treatment from the CHE. For that reason, a majority of interviewees pointed out inequality of state control over private and public HEIs, despite acknowledging that the government had attempted to treat the PHEIs better and to raise the status and autonomy of PHEIs to be equal to those of public universities. Interviewee 2, for example, praised such a governmental effort:

“The government’s attempt in trying to implement the National Education Act and the Private Higher Education Act is the force for the concept of equalizing the status of private universities and public universities. This attempt makes both types of HEIs equal.”

In reality, nevertheless, it is often skeptical how and how much the claimed policy has actually been implemented. As Friedman (2003) points out, written policies typically contain broad declared intentions of policymakers yet often fail to give lucid procedures for implementation. If the espoused policy and the assumptions of responsible agencies are divergent, ambiguity and discrepancy in carrying out the intended policy to actual implementation may likely evolve. This is mostly the case for Thailand. In spite of the claimed law on equal status and treatment for private and public HEIs, many interviewees stressed that discrepancy between the law and the actual implementation still appeared. Interviewee 6 gave an insightful example:

“Two years ago the CHE released ministerial standards on professoriate appointment—assistant professor, associate professor, professor—effective immediately for private universities. About one year after, the CHE announced that public universities must follow similar standards as a result of the Constitution 2540 that public and private [universities] must be equal. It seems that they [the CHE] gave a one-year extension to public universities... This is a crucial failure in education process. A bulk of faculty in public universities applied for professoriate appointment on September 30th [prior to the effective date]... Currently, there is huge discrepancy of faculty quality. This
incident reflects the [government's] attempt of equalizing policy while in reality the implementation is another story.”

Moreover, the finding shows that PHEIs are under the government’s both “process and product controls”—the terms Neave and van Vught (1991) explained in their analysis of government regulation of higher education in Western Europe. PHEIs receive process control via tremendous ministerial regulations on curriculum, finance, management and product control via the degree approval and qualifications of graduates as well as research publications (Legal Affairs 2007). Public universities, on the contrary, tend to enjoy their procedural autonomy more than PHEIs, seeing that the CHE’s process control over the public universities is flexible and relaxed. According to several interviewees, one can find in the CHE’s meeting referenda most of the agendas concerned with PHEIs while very few on public universities. Indeed, the latest 2008 CHE’s legal compilation of laws and regulations regarding HEIs contains over 60 percent of the document exclusively on PHEIs whereas the rest is on both private and public HEIs (Administration 2008).

Aside from government agencies, the finding detects another channel of external control similarly on both private and public HEIs. As important external influencers, professional associations set standards and requirements relevant to graduates’ and undergraduates’ qualifications. It is necessary for both private and public HEIs that offer professional fields to abide by the associations’ standards in order for their graduates to be issued a professional license and certified for the workplace, especially in the public sector. The most popular professional associations include Architect Council, Council of Engineers, Dental Council, Federal of Accounting Profession, Lawyers Council, the

27 This stronger control among aspects of curriculum for PHEIs is also seen in other parts of the world, such as in Brazil and Argentina (Levy 1986b).
Medical Council of Thailand, the Medical Technology Council, Thailand Nursing and Midwifery Council, the Pharmacy Council, Physical Therapy Council and Teachers Council, to name a few.

Nonetheless, the level of strictness varies depending on what kind of professional fields the institutions offer. The finding reports that among such various associations, Thailand Nursing and Midwifery Council seems to be one of the strictest associations. This association has an authority to temporarily suspend or even terminate any programs relevant to nursing profession if they do not meet the association’s standards even if they are already qualified for the CHE’s requirements. Yet, such an external control cannot affect an institution that does not offer nursing related programs. For example, public universities in the Rajabhat University and Rajamangkla University of Technology subsectors as well as small private colleges generally do not teach nursing programs, thereby unaffected by the association. On the other hand, public Limited Admission universities, comprehensive private universities, and religious-oriented private universities and colleges are concerned with the Nursing Council’s standards.

Inasmuch as all HEIs, regardless of whether they are private or public, have to follow similar standards and regulations from the associations, one may realize a coercive form of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) through a normative pressure from such professional associations, externally forcing both private and public HEIs to become more alike than diverse. Simultaneously, a counterargument might be that some variation still appears for different types of HEIs proceed to achieve the given standards differently.

28 Typically, Rajabhat universities are geared toward education and social science programs while Rajamangkla universities of technology are focused on engineering and technology related fields. Small private colleges tend to offer low-cost programs such as business administration, accounting, and law.

29 Intra-sectoral diversity of PHE regarding external control from the professional associations will be analyzed and discussed in the following sections.
based on their characteristics, backgrounds, and capacity. Longstanding public universities may find the standards easier to follow than small private colleges, for instance. This counterargument on different institutional types is valid and indeed a core of this research which is discussed fruitfully in the second half of this chapter. Anyhow, it is apparent that external control influenced by the professional associations does matter at certain degree for Thai private and public HEIs alike.

The last finding on external control of private-public sectors focuses particularly on the private side. In addition to government agencies and professional associations, Thai PHEIs are also governed by various kinds of non-state personnel, including individuals or families, business corporations, religious organizations and private foundations. Concisely put, CHE recognizes three types of private entities licensing PHEIs: 1) proprietary—individuals or families; 2) business companies and the Thai Chamber of Commerce; and 3) religious organizations and private foundations. Thus, the prime sources of control and authority over PHEIs are those licensing them. For that reason, what kind of control and how much such control is exerted upon PHEIs depend largely on types of legal ownerships a private institution has.

It is somewhat tricky to analyze external control over PHEIs based on their private providers (be it founders or licensees or owners) since they can be viewed from both external and internal perspectives. Such private providers can put forth their control and power internally and thoroughly over the institutions when they actually are the ones managing the institutions. Examples are clearly from many PHEIs licensed by individuals, seeing that the licensees mostly involve directly in the internal administration by holding a president position or appointing their family members as key institutional
administrators. Meanwhile, control from private providers can be considered as external control over PHEIs if the providers do not directly involve in the internal administration of the institutions. Religious-oriented PHEIs typically depict this external pattern well. In any case, the analysis includes private licensees as a valid source of external control over PHEIs.

4.1.2.2 Internal Administration

Private and public HEIs in Thailand are remarkably different when it comes to internal administration of the institutions. Although these findings are found in many countries and are not unusual to the literature on private-public comparisons, they deserve a fruitful analytical discussion for they add up another national case to the existing literature (Clark 1983; Geiger 1986; Levy 1986b). For this analysis, I employ two salient aspects: power distribution in decision making and management style, as portrayed in the conceptual framework in Chapter 2.

In Thai public universities, power is usually granted to the faculty at the departmental level, echoing Clark’s (1987a) model of academic guild. This form of decision making power is decentralized, concentrated at the bottom of the institutions. Individual faculty members, departments, or units are autonomous and often hold enough power and authority in matters relevant to them. According to the finding, a majority of the interviewees emphasized that public universities are more decentralized in their governance than private ones, as Interviewee 17 explained:

“Public universities typically decentralize their power to the unit level. For instance, each department has its own endowment. Decision making is finalized at the school or department levels. It also depends on the matter; for example, departments make decision on faculty hiring and fund-raising while the institutional level gives approval on curriculum-related matters. However, the most important level for decision making is
This academic guild tradition in Thai public higher education sector is parallel to the fact that the core of higher education learning mostly deals with academic matters and thus it should be given to the hands of academic constituencies like professors and faculty members. As Interviewee 14 pointed out, “public universities have faculty senate but we [PHEIs] do not grant much power to the faculty members.” In some countries, public university faculty members through a faculty union can demonstrate resistance or protest to a policy enforced by the university administration if they have opposing viewpoints. Examples include the U.S. and western countries where public university faculty stroke on negotiation and collective bargaining of wages (Annunziato 1994; Harrison and Tabory 1980). Furthermore, public higher education does not have any private ownership; it belongs to the state and taxpayers. Although the university president may hold ultimate decision making power due to line of authority, in practice, the university president and professors both are equally civil servants of the state. In the context of Thai public higher education, university administration and faculty members thus tend to reserve their power within their reach and employ collegial decision making in most university affairs.

The finding also reports that some interviewees who are former public university professors and administrators unanimously pointed out the slowness of decision making and university management in the public sector. They stressed that decision making in public universities takes some time to be finalized due mostly to bureaucratic procedures. Although individual departments have autonomy and authority to approve or disapprove a matter, they will have to submit written documents and follow tremendous protocols.
For that reason, it slows down the institutional management process. This slow bureaucratic feature is not common in the private sector.

On the contrary, the finding shows that in Thai PHEIs power is typically centralized and reserved at the top administration. This is particularly valid in most cases when the institutions have to deal with finance, regardless of what type the institutions are. A majority of the interviewees gave justifications variously. For instance, some interviewees emphasized that since they were privately run and money was limited they had to allocate it wisely; therefore, reserving the decision making power to the president was necessary. Others, in contrast, accentuated on how speedy centralization could offer when they had to make a decision involving a lump sum of money within a limited timeframe. Concisely put, PHEIs can make a decision much faster than public universities do, given that decision making often depends on the president or vice presidents responsible for a particular matter and that the procedure is not bureaucratic. Indeed, all interviewees echoed that it is much faster in the private sector than in the public one. Variation is found within the private sector regarding decision making process, however. In practice, some PHEIs form a committee to finalize the matter while for others the president holds ultimate say. Detailed analysis and discussion are presented in intra-sectoral dynamics section of this chapter and types of PHE in the next chapter.

4.1.3 Private versus Public in Finance

Fundamentally, the easiest criterion to identify and measure differences between private and public HEIs is through the financial dimension (Levy 1986b). Sources of revenues do matter as they influence HEIs’ performance and characteristics (Smith
Whereas public HEIs receive government funding, PHEIs rely heftily on private money. Indeed, the finding coincides with the PHE literature in that tuition and fees constitute the prime source of income for PHEIs. The finding also shows that while PHEIs do not receive any operational budget from the government, they do get government’s financial aid similar to public universities via student loans programs and research funds. Simultaneously, Thai public universities get funding from various private sources, just as PHEIs do. Such blurring financial characteristics of both private and public HEIs reiterate Levy’s (1992) point in that private and public HEIs do not always behave as they are called, thereby making the analysis of private-public distinctiveness more perplexing. In comparative perspective, the Thai case may be less unusual for the generalization than for the qualification. It is unusual still but far from unique. Figure 4 presents the main characteristics of private and public HEIs in Thailand in terms of institutional finance.

**Figure 4:** Private-Public Differences in Finance in Thai higher Education System
According to Figure 4, the finding indicates that the most significant income source that distinguishes PHEIs from public universities in Thailand is government funding as annual operation budget. PHEIs do not receive any direct annual operation budget from the government as this subsidy is granted to only public universities. Derived from the CHE’s report (Administration 2005), Figure 5 illustrates a pie chart of annual budget of CHE for different types of public HEIs in 2005.

![Annual Budget of CHE Fiscal Year 2005 (Baht)](image)

**Figure 5:** Annual Budget of Commission on Higher Education for Different Types of Public HEIs Fiscal Year 2005

Approximately 71 percent of the total CHE’s annual budget is allocated to public universities in the Limited Admission, Open University and Autonomous University subsectors. In contrast, Rajabhat and Rajamangkla University subsectors receive only nearly 10 percent each due to various reasons. Their unit costs are less than those of the former group. Rajabhat subsector is teaching-only and not research-oriented, thereby operating cost (e.g., for facility maintenance or faculty salary) is low. Rajamangkla does some research related to engineering and technology which needs certain budget for
facility and faculty but its size of both student enrollment and institutional number is very small. If considering the number of institutions and student enrollments of each public subsector in Tables 9 and 10, it is interesting that almost one-third of the government funding is given to only 30 public universities, mostly in the limited admission subsector where its enrollment size, alone, is comparable to that of Rajabhat. The majority of public universities, however, lie in the Rajabhat University subsector which only receives 8 percent of the CHE’s budget. The qualitative finding below coincides with the present quantitative data as well. Within the public sector, Interviewee 23 stressed that difference in government funding appears:

“Open university such as STOU\(^{30}\) receives from the government only 20% of its total annual budget and uses its own budget for the other 80%. Chula [Chulalongkorn University] which makes a lot of income from its Sam-Yan\(^{31}\) and all uses its own budget about 50% and receives another 50% from the government. As for Thammasat [university], I believe that it’s 70:30 [government’s budget to institution’s budget]... Therefore, there is discrepancy in government subsidy to public universities, depending on the nature of each type of institutions, whether it’s long-distance or classroom-setting, comprehensive or specialized, autonomous or traditional.”

After all, the Thai private-public distinctiveness in government operation budget is in line with Levy’s (1986a) private-public financial pattern of dual sectors where smaller sector is funded privately and larger sector funded publicly.\(^{32}\) In this pattern, public universities as a majority in the higher education system remain publicly funded and often charge only minimal tuition and fees. On the contrary, PHEIs usually account for 10 to 20

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\(^{30}\) STOU stands for Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University (public), available [online] at: www.stou.ac.th/eng/.

\(^{31}\) Chulalongkorn University owns the Sam-Yan area’s real estate property. The Sam-Yan neighborhood comprises many shop houses and famous restaurants.

\(^{32}\) This pattern is found in most of Latin American countries.
percent (but up to 50 percent) of the total higher education enrollment and draw their funds predominantly from private sources such as tuition and donations.

As stressed by Interviewee 23, a former government authority, all PHEIs are equally treated by the government as they receive zero financial support and have to fully invest on their own. Therefore, PHEIs are, in turn, allowed to charge *tuition and fees* without ceiling or any limitation from the government. This is so because higher education is considered non-compulsory education and the government does not provide any direct subsidy to PHEIs. The government needs to be assured that, once established, PHEIs are able to finance themselves and provide quality education. To that end, charging tuition and fees at the rate correspondent to the needs and characteristics of each individual private institution is necessary. Indeed, the finding reveals that tuition and fees in PHEIs are usually twice to three times more expensive than those in public universities.\(^{33}\) It is noted, however, that this comparison is based on regular undergraduate programs since public universities do charge a large amount of tuition and fees for executive and international programs which sometimes are even higher than those in private institutions.

Within the private sector, Thai PHEIs rely heftily on tuition and fees regardless of their types. It seems that demand-absorbing institutions bank upon tuition and fees the most (over 90% of their total incomes), followed by semi-elite universities (about 80-90%) and religious-oriented PHEIs (roughly 70%), respectively (See Table 19 in Chapter 6). Furthermore, semi-elite universities tend to charge high tuition and fees, seeing that they usually enroll students with high socio-economic status while demand-absorbing

\(^{33}\) Such tuition discrepancy between private and public HEIs are similarly found in many countries including France, Netherlands, and New Zealand (Jongbloed 2007) and the U.S. (Johnstone 2005).
ones emphasize affordable fees, thereby enrolling second-class students or those who otherwise cannot get into public universities or semi-elite private universities. Religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs are relatively comparable to demand-absorbing institutions in terms of tuition charged.

Aside from the no-ceiling policy on tuition and fees for PHEIs, the government gives “in kind” support to private institutions via 3 kinds of soft loans for infra-structure, faculty development, and laboratory equipment. PHEIs differ from public universities in this regard. Nevertheless, most PHEIs do not seem to take those opportunities because such government loans come with detailed regulations and conditions which they are not willing to deal with as they are already overwhelmed with other regulatory requirements. Through a political economic perspective, the mechanisms for government funding allocation typically encompass a number of regulations to ensure quality, efficiency, and equity, which in turn becomes an indirect tight attachment for higher education institutions’ autonomy and outcomes (Jongbloed 2007; Kaplin and Lee 1995). In this vein, it seems that most Thai PHEIs, regardless of their types, feel more comfortable depending on their own private funds (as they can enjoy more flexibility and autonomy) rather than on government money (as they are required to abide by subsequent conditions). Chapter 6 elaborates analysis and discussion on a relationship between PHEIs and government soft loans.

*Government student loans* and *research funds* are other income sources for both private and public HEIs. The finding is that while student loans seem to be one of the most significant income sources for PHEIs, research funds attract most leading public universities rather than PHEIs. To begin with, for both student loans schemes, SLF and
ICL\textsuperscript{34} (Prarachabunyat Kongtoon Haikooyuem Pur Kansuksa 1998), students who meet the specified conditions in private and public HEIs are qualified for the loans.\textsuperscript{35} It is apparent that government student loans have become a prime source of income for PHEIs because the loans are paid for the students as tuition and fees in which PHEIs rely on the most. Public universities also benefit from such loans but likely less so than private institutions, seeing that their tuition and fees are already at a subsidized rate and thus less expensive than those in PHEIs. Even so, the finding illustrates interesting reality where homogeneity in student-loans dependency occurs between private and public HEIs.

Demand-absorbing PHEIs bank upon student loans the most,\textsuperscript{36} and so do Rajabhat universities in the public sector.\textsuperscript{37} The top-tier institutions, semi-elite privates and leading limited-admission publics, depend on student loans the least. For other institutional types of each sector, student loans dependency varies based on offered fields of study and number of students as well as other sources of income the institutions may have.

As for research funds, among major sources of government research funds are the CHE and the National Research Council. The finding reveals that public universities usually receive government funding for research much more and easier than private

\textsuperscript{34} SLF stands for Student Loans Fund and ICL stands for Income Contingent Loan.

\textsuperscript{35} While Chapter 6 discusses fruitfully on a relationship between government student loans and different types of PHEIs, this chapter analyzes the difference between private and public HEIs in regards to their income sources from government student loans.

\textsuperscript{36} See Table 19 in Chapter 6 for sample of different types of Thai PHEIs receiving government student loans.

\textsuperscript{37} The Daily News Online newspaper (Karnsuksa: Narisara Jee Gor-Yor-Sor Jai Ngeun Yuam Rein 2009) reported that in addition to the assigned loans quotas, private and public HEIs further submitted student loans applications to the SLF office as follows: PHEIs 12,020 applications, Rajabhat public universities 11,720 applications, public universities (limited and autonomous) 8,848 applications, Rajamangkla public universities 3,068 applications, and Buddhist public universities 170 applications. Later on in Chapter 6, the study points that Rajabhat public university subsector indeed behaves like demand-absorbing private subsector.
institutions because there appears discrepancy in tapping government research funds between private and public HEIs, as Interviewee 1 and 9 pointed out:

Interviewee 1:

“Our income from research work is not much. We are doing research for both the government and the private sector. Generally, the government cannot pay the private institutions directly and thus we have to subcontract with public universities or partner with them.”

Interviewee 9:

“When the government agencies want to do research, they would hire public universities for that. They normally don’t hire private institutions. For example, if the mayor wants some research on governance, he would hire Rajabhat or other public universities in this province. He wouldn’t look at us.”

Not only do PHEIs need to subcontract with public universities but they also tend to be second choice for many government agencies when it comes to research grants as the government does not seem to be in favor of hiring PHEIs. Nevertheless, different types of institutions and researchers do matter, for both private and public HEIs, in respect to research. Within the public sector, leading universities and technology-oriented ones receive much more research grants than do Rajabhat universities (Administration 2005). Likewise, within the private sector, semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs seem more ambitious in or capable of securing research grants than small demand-absorbing colleges. Indeed, getting roughly 10 percent of the total income from research is extraordinary for PHEIs, and only several interviewees could speak about that with pride—Interviewee 6, for example:

“About 10 percent of our total income is from research and consultancy, mostly for the private sector and public enterprise. Our major clients are EGAT [Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand] and the Aviation Authority of Thailand… As for the private sector, we are doing research related to engines for the Thailand Automotive Institute.”
A majority of interviewees, mostly in demand-absorbing institutions, admitted that one of the features PHEIs need to improve is research and that they receive very miniscule amount of money from that area, likely less than 1-2 percent of the total income. The finding echoes a previous study on Thai PHEIs lacking research work (Chongwibul 2001). However, the study reveals inter-sectoral isomorphism between private and public higher education sectors in Thailand in regard to research funds. Different tiers—private or public—emphasize research work at different degrees, and thus income from research grants becomes varied.

Next is _self-generated income_—mostly referring to any incomes from marketization of the institutions. This source of income appears in both sectors of private and public higher education in Thailand and across different types of each sector, signifying institutional isomorphism rather than differentiation. Typical features of this type of income include dormitory rentals, publishing house, sport facilities rentals, cafeteria, sales of uniforms and stationary, and the like. The list is in line with the literature on how higher education becomes increasingly marketized (Kirp 2003; Newman, Couturier, and Scurry 2004). Variations in gaining this type of income occur, nonetheless, as Interviewee 7 indicated:

> “Other income sources are from selling uniforms and facility rentals but the percentage is very miniscule, less than 1 percent. We, private institutions, do not have a lot of assets like Chula [Chulalongkorn University, public] that also owns MBK shopping mall. We’ve just established and thus our assets are almost zero.”

Although income from marketization is common in the private and public sectors, it seems that the amount of money from this source of income varies greatly based on the capacity and development of the institutions.
The last two sources of income are especially highlighted in the private sector as opposed to the public one: 
**donation from private sources** and **other funding from the private sector**. Throughout the interviews, income from donation is repeatedly mentioned in that it is very minimal as donation is not common in the Thai culture. Interviewee 20, for instance, emphasized that donation for PHEIs is rare and even for leading public universities is almost impossible:

> “Donation for private institutions is very rare since it is not our culture. I wanted to adopt this culture into ours but it failed. In Thailand, we don’t give annual donation to the institutions unless there is a special occasion like the 40th anniversary of the institution that alumni or people may give out donations. Even Chula [Chulalongkorn University] or Thammasat [university] cannot do this… The government does not provide any incentive for the donors to give out their money to the private institutions either…”

Even so, the finding reveals the one and only exceptional case of PHEIs, YNU, where its ability to attract donations and fund-raising tends to be best outstanding among all and a majority of interviewees second that. Indeed, religious-oriented PHEIs tend to show this donation feature much more than other types of PHE. Chapter 5 elaborates in-depth in this regard.

Other funding from the private sector is the last (but not least) feature discovered from the findings. For public universities, usually this funding comes from research projects contracted with the non-government sector (Administration 2005). For PHEIs, conducting a research for the private sector is also mentioned as another source of income but the most important source is from the owners and licensees in the form of investment funds and endowment for the institutions. Particularly, semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing universities such as BU, DPU, SIU and PYU are concerned for institution’s
endowment, seeing that it is the criterion for the institution’s stability, as portrayed by
Interviewee 15:

“The vision of our owner is different. He wanted us to be international and research-oriented. To that end, he emphasized the financial support aspect. Almost 20 percent of our operation cost is allocated for student scholarships which resulted in qualified students enrolling in our institution, both domestic and international. We also financially support faculty for their research. Moreover, the owner put a lot of endowment into the university until we all feel secured and stable, seeing that our current asset ratio is around 4.”

Other PHEIs, especially small demand-absorbing ones, do not yet seem to take into account the concept of endowment as they operate in a much smaller scale and less expensive than those giant semi-elites or serious-demand-absorbing institutions. In this vein, even if they are less-well-endowed, they may prosper if having good management and low costs and seizing a particular market niches such as health-related professions and cultural-/religious- orientations (Johnstone 2005). After all, the concept of income from endowment in the Thai case is still developing while income from the owner’s investment funds is predominant.

4.2 Intra-Sectoral Dynamics: Institutional Diversity of Private Higher Education Sector

Intra-sectoral diversity of Thai PHE is the major analytical theme of this dissertation. When analyzing only within the private sector, I found interesting development patterns of Thai PHE varied by different types paralleled to Levy’s framework. Using Fuzzy-Set values (fsQCA), I start the section with the analysis of Thai PHE diversity by institutional age and size. Although Levy has often considered dimensions of age and size, his work on that has been ad hoc, never making a pointed
analysis of either dimension. The following subsection thus employs Fuzzy-Set values of institutional age and size converted from snapshot statistical data in order to present the existing scenario of Thai PHEIs in overall. Then, I explain how the Thai case fits Levy’s conceptual definitions by correlating the Thai Legal Ownership types with Levy’s PHE types, again, based on Fuzzy-Set values and through fsQCA analyses. In-depth analytical discussions of findings on each type of Thai PHEIs are presented afterwards.

4.2.1 Institutional Diversity of Private Higher Education Institutions by Age and Size

Although largely echoing the PHE literature, with needed adaptation as noted, the Thai findings in Figure 6 show some specific deviation from Levy’s framework when it comes to institutional age and size. Levy asserted that religious-oriented type tended to come first, followed by elite/semi-elite and then demand-absorbing. I found that for Thai PHE, semi-elite emerged first, followed by religious-oriented and demand-absorbing. The bulk of Thai PHEIs is small in size and less than 10 years old, seeing that they score at the bottom left of Figure 6; this finding coincides with the PHE literature. But semi-elite universities are rather old and large when compared with other types. The fact that Thai semi-elites are large may be deviant from the PHE literature for typical semi-elite universities tend to be small due to their high selectivity and limited access.
Figure 6: A Distribution of Thai PHEIs by Institutional Age and Size Year 2006 Based on Fuzzy Set Values

In Figure 6, INSTISIZE_fs axis shows Fuzzy-Set values of size of PHEIs, ranging from small PHEI with less than 3,000 students (0.33), medium PHEI with 3,000 to less than 10,000 students (0.67), to large PHEI with 10,000 students or more (1.00). INSTIAEGE_fs axis represents Fuzzy-Set values of age of PHEIs, ranging from less than 10 years old (0.20), between 10 to 19 years old (0.40), between 20-29 years old (0.60), between 30-39 years old (0.80), to 40 years or more (1.00).38 Apparently, old and large PHEIs in Thailand are rare, seeing that there are only a few of them at the top-right corner (e.g., AU, BU, DPU, SPU, UTCC). These universities are the oldest of PHEIs—almost 40 years of establishment, as well as the largest—almost 20,000 students or over.

38 A complete explanation of variable conversions is discussed in Chapter 3 Table 8.
Most of them also fit semi-elitist’s characteristics (Praphamontripong 2008d), which is discussed further in the chapter. At the bottom-left corner, on the contrary, contains a cluster of PHEIs with only less than 10 years of age and below 3,000 students enrolling. This group largely refers to demand-absorbing category in the following subsections. Another interesting finding is at the bottom-right and near bottom-right corner of Figure 5 where most institutions are Catholic and Christian (e.g., SAENGTHAM, MC, SLC and CTU). These religious-oriented institutions are old or even as old as semi-elites yet small in their institutional size. This finding partly echoes the PHE literature where religious-oriented subsector via missionary education typically emerges long before other subsectors (Collier 2008; Levy 1986b).

The qualitative interview finding confirms the quantitative statistics analyzed above as well. For instance, Interviewee 21 pointed out that institutional age is a crucial factor for diversity in PHE:

“Within the private sector, there is a difference. Don’t forget that a university has its own life cycle. Whichever was founded for a long time would be well established and very financially secured. Meanwhile, a university recently created would just start learning and its life cycle would not be fully developed yet. Therefore, the difference lies in years developed whether they are long or short. Institutional age is an important factor but not the sole factor because some universities when founded can develop very fast, RSU, for example. They [RSU] develop much faster than their peers…”

Conjointly, several interviewees emphasized that institutional size did factor in the differences among Thai PHEIs. Interviewee 4 comparatively gave a thorough analysis:

“Within the private sector, institutional diversity is apparent, based on size. There are about 5 giant institutions, followed by another 5 institutions with around 10,000 students. The latter has comparable resources to the former, approximately 600-700 million baht. With sufficient resources, both groups can run their institutions to achieve the purpose of higher education. Apart from that, there are around 10
institutions with 5,000-9,000 students that have 300-400 million baht revenue, which can still survive as higher education institutions. Among 65 PHEIs, that is about it. The rest are those with early 1,000 students, which can still manage and cover their expenses but they can’t grow much. Those below 1,000 students rarely have profits and thus can’t develop much. Their incentive and survival are due to the fact that they run their institutions in a vocational education mode.”

Accordingly, one can infer that there are at least three relevant issues influencing how PHEI differ from one another: size, finance and management. Elite and semi-elite private universities have abundant resources and revenue that help facilitate their institutions in obtaining and sustaining academic excellence and quality research. Although typical wealthy elite and semi-elite PHEIs worldwide tend to be small because of their high selectivity, exceptions appear, for instance, Waseda University in Japan (over 50,000 students), Yonsei University in Korea (almost 30,000 students), the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo in Brazil (34,000 students) and the Universidade de São Paulo in Brazil (over 30,500 students) (Levy 1986b; Schwartzman 2007).

Apparently, the large size factor can be well associated with the longstanding age of an institution, both of which result in seasoned experiences in institutional administration and academic quality as well as financial stability. In contrast, recent PHEIs with minimum student enrollment tend to have limited funding; institutional management and development may likely be constrained accordingly. Within an increasingly competitive higher education market, various PHEIs (or even public ones) are aggressively trying to differentiate themselves from others so they can sustain their enrollment shares and be alive.

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4.2.2 Types of Private Higher Education: Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Thai Ownership Typology and Levy’s Analytical Framework

Institutional diversity and differentiation thus become a crucial factor for PHEIs because different types of PHEIs usually portray different characteristics that lead to certain roles and survival outcomes in the higher education arenas. In this subsection, I discuss findings on institutional diversity of PHE by types. For categorization analysis, I have selected mostly mentioned sub-themes discovered from the research findings to be analyzed via Fuzzy-Set QCA (fsQCA). As mentioned in Chapter 3, Fuzzy-Set would allow me to see differences of each PHE type through a combination of institutional characteristics by degree. Figure 7 illustrates eight characteristics variables employed in the following fsQCA analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Characteristics:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGE (A) signifies age of an institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTISIZE (Z) signifies size of an institution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Characteristics:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENT (P) signifies type of the institution’s president (cosmopolitan or local).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN (M) signifies type of the institution’s administration and university council personnel (cosmopolitan or local).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance Characteristics:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUITION (T) signifies the dependency of an institution on tuition &amp; fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONATION (D) signifies the dependency of an institution on donation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFTLOAN (L) signifies the dependency of an institution on government soft loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFIT (F) signifies whether or not the institution’s licensee takes back the profits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7:** Selected Eight Characteristics Variables for fsQCA Analyses

The finding reveals eight characteristics variables of PHEIs commonly referred to by all interviewees, which is also complementary to the conceptual framework in Chapter 2. In Figure 7, I categorize the eight characteristics into three dimensions, systematically corresponding to the research question. The first dimension, general characteristics, is
composed of institutional age and size of PHEIs. This dimension is to give an overview analysis of institutional diversity among Thai PHEIs. More specifically, the second dimension deals with governance characteristics, including institutional president and administration. It is noted that both president and administration variables represent internal administration aspect of institutional governance while external control aspect has been omitted from fsQCA. This is because the finding reveals that Thai PHEIs are under similar external control agencies discussed earlier in the chapter; henceforth, only variables to examine internal administration are employed here. The third dimension is finance, focusing on the dependency of PHEIs on tuition and fee, donation, government soft loans as well as profit-seeking action of the licensees.40 Major findings of PHE types in Thailand using fsQCA analysis are respectively presented in the following three subsections: Thai ownership typology, Levy’s typology and cross tabulation of Thai ownership type and Levy’s typology. Afterwards, analytical discussions of the findings are presented in another four subsections based on PHE types: pluralizing religious-cultural-oriented, semi-elite, demand-absorbing, and serious-demand-absorbing.

4.2.2.1 fsQCA of the Thai Ownership Typology

Institutional diversity of PHEIs in Thailand can be explored in terms of their legal ownership aside from level of degree offered (university, college, institute) stipulated in the PHE Act. All Thai PHEIs, legalized as “not-for-profit” institutions,41 are registered

40 Although government research fund was mentioned in the interview findings, it is neither prominent nor feasible for data accessibility when compared to the other chosen variables. Additionally, Thai PHEIs do not commonly focus on research and thus barely bank upon government research fund.

41 According to the Supreme Administrative Court Case Number 880/2549, PHEIs are considered, by law, “not-for-profit” educational institutions that represent the state in providing educational services. Although the term “for-profit” is not legally applicable, they are allowed to have profits but at least 70% of such profits must be, first, given back to the institutions for further development. Licensees may be given 30% of the profits as the maximum if there are profits left after being allocated to the institutions.
as one of these 3 ownership types based on their licensee designation: 1) proprietary—family or individual; 2) company and the Chamber of Commerce; and 3) religious organization and foundation (APHEIT 2003). Figure 8 reports a pie chart, depicting the percentage of different Thai PHE ownership types represented in the sample.

![Pie Chart](image)

**Figure 8:** Pie Chart Portraying the Percentage of PHEIs by Different Thai Ownership Types Year 2006

Echoing the global trend where most PHEIs are family owned (Altbach 2005c; Kinser 2006), the finding shows that over 40 percent of the sampled institutions are licensed and owned by proprietors including families and individuals whereas the rest is a mix between company and religious organization types. This distribution is comparable to the overall existing population (Thai PHEIs) despite the increasing trend of PHEIs licensed by a company or foundation in recent years. When applied all 19 institutions in these 3 ownership types to the 8 selected characteristics variables for fsQCA, Tables 11, 12, 13 illustrate some possible configurations (combinational characteristics) representing

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(Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon B.E. 2546 2003; Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon (Chababtee 2) B.E. 2550 2007).

42 Unlike in the U.S. where the terms “proprietary” and “for-profit” are used interchangeably, the word “for-profit” is not legally applicable to the Thai PHE sector. Therefore, even a PHEI licensed by a proprietor, its legal standing is still considered “not-for-profit” under the Thai context.
proprietary type, company type, and religious organization type, respectively (for the full truth table analyses, see Appendix G).

It is noted that the frequency cutoff point of 1.000000 is employed in all fsQCA analyses because this study has a small sample size (N = 19), and according to Ragin (Ragin 2000, 2008) the frequency cutoff of 1.000000 is appropriate. Configurations that fail to meet this frequency cutoff of at least 1 case are not included. Those configurations are logical remainders available to be employed as counterfactual cases for further logical simplification of the truth table analysis (Ragin 2009). Also, the recommended consistency cutoff is 0.750000 (Ragin 2008); henceforth, all fsQCA analyses in this study employ the consistency cutoff point of 0.750000 or higher. Furthermore, all the 19 cases have been used for all the fsQCA truth table analyses hereafter and the parsimonious solution has been chosen for the analyses instead of the complex solution. This is so because the study attempts to test the theory and parsimonious solution is suitable for that, given that it is useful in the cases where the researcher has some knowledge of the simplicity of the subject being examined (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). According to Ragin (2009), a parsimonious solution “allows the incorporation of logical remainders, without evaluating their plausibility, into the solution,” (p. 114). Whether they are empirically plausible or not, logical remainders are potentially beneficial for future research (De Meur, Rihoux, and Yamasaki 2009).
Table 11: Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Proprietary Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS*PROFITBACKFS+</td>
<td>0.300000</td>
<td>0.075000</td>
<td>0.666667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>softloanfs<em>profitbackfs</em>PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.125000</td>
<td>0.041250</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS<em>softloanfs</em>PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.125000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.833333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTISIZEFS<em>softloanfs</em>PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.166250</td>
<td>0.032500</td>
<td>0.801205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTISIZEFS<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>PROFITBACKFS</td>
<td>0.200000</td>
<td>0.025000</td>
<td>0.829016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.482500
solution consistency: 0.725564

Table 11 shows 5 possible configurations of Thai PHEIs licensed by proprietary, portrayed as the following formula:

\[ AF + lfp + AlP + ZIP + ZLF \rightarrow FAMILYFS \]

The set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.725; its coverage of the outcome (proprietary owned) is 0.482. According to Ragin (2008), consistency evaluations need substantial number of cases as perfect consistency may not warrant the existence of meaningful set-theoretic connection. In this case, both outcome consistency and coverage are high, thereby suggesting sufficiency in this solution. The results indicate that PHEIs licensed by proprietary including families or individuals demonstrate either one of these 5 combinational characteristics, with the IfP combination being the strongest as its consistency is 1.000000. The Ifp combination means that PHEIs licensed by proprietary do not take government soft loans (I); their licensees do not take profits (f); and their presidents are locals (P). This combination is plausible and evident in reality.
because typical family-owned private institutions have either the owner or family
members as a president. The reason that they take neither government soft loans nor
profits back may stem from the fact that the owner is already wealthy and devoted to
academic provision instead of profit-making. Taking government soft loans may be
much more burdensome than investing on their own. The second combination is AIP,
meaning that PHEIs owned by proprietary are old (A); they do not take government soft
loans (I); and their presidents are locals (P). Along the same continuum, the third
combination is ZIP, signifying that they are large (Z); they do not take government soft
loans (I); and their presidents are locals (P). For these two configurations, family-owned
PHEIs are also family-run, having a local president. They are either old or large but they
do not take any government soft loans. PHEIs that are old and run by wealthy families or
individuals tend to be well-established in certain level and may not need to apply for any
soft loans from the government. Likewise, PHEIs that are large and run by the wealthy
owners may not need government soft loans as they are self-sufficient via their tuition &
fees income from their large size of students enrolling. Interestingly enough, the last two
configurations, ZLF and AF match Levy’s semi-elite category to be discussed in section
4.2.2.3, despite the fact that both configurations do not have consistency as strong as the
first configuration, IfP. ZLF means that proprietary owned PHEIs are large (Z); they take
government soft loans (L); and their licensees take profits (F). AF signifies the
combination of being old (A) and taking profits (F). These two configurations are
plausible and evident as well, given that old or large private universities would have
taken government soft loans at the early stage of their development and once they are
well established (older and larger) their licensees then may have taken some profits back to themselves.

Perplexingly further, the **company** type of Thai PHEIs shows more diversity among institutions licensed by business corporations than in the proprietary type. Table 12 details the possible 8 configurations of institutional characteristics of Thai PHEIs licensed by a company.

**Table 12: Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Company Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adminfs+</td>
<td>0.166667</td>
<td>0.100000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFTLOANFS*PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.166667</td>
<td>0.100000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instiagefs<em>donationfs</em>SOFTLOANFS+</td>
<td>0.200000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instisizefs<em>PROFITBACKFS</em>presidentfs+</td>
<td>0.221667</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.801205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instisizefs<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>PROFITBACKFS+</td>
<td>0.111667</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instiagefs<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>PROFITBACKFS+</td>
<td>0.133333</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.666667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTISIZEFS<em>softloansfs</em>profitbackfs*presidentfs+</td>
<td>0.288333</td>
<td>0.055000</td>
<td>0.839806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS<em>INSTISIZEFS</em>softloansfs*presidentfs</td>
<td>0.300000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.659341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.755000
solution consistency: 0.680180

The findings can be read in an fsQCA formula as follows:

\[ m + LP + adL + zFp + zLF + aLF + Zlfp + AZlp \rightarrow BIZCORPFS \]

Based on 19 cases, the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.680; its coverage of the outcome (company) is 0.755, signifying that both outcome consistency and coverage are acceptable. The solution displays that there are 8 possible configurations that show
combinational characteristics of Thai PHEIs licensed by a company, with three configurations being the strongest: m, LP, and zLF, given their consistency of 1.000000. However, out of the three, only the configuration “m” is found to match Levy’s serious-demand-absorbing configuration and “LP” with semi-elite configuration. The configuration “m” indicates that members of university administration and university council are cosmopolitans (m). This is typically the case of business corporations’ governance structure where there is no one dominant family but instead professionals.

The second configuration, LP, indicates that the institutions owned by company take government soft loans (L) and their presidents are locals (P). This pattern is plausible as the owner of PHEIs may register the institutions in a company type but actually run the institutions in the family local mode where the owner may as well be the president.

The next two configurations, adL and aLF, may not show consistency as strong as the first three configurations but they happen to match Levy’s demand-absorbing configuration. The configuration adL signifies that the company-owned institutions are recently established or new (a); they do not have donations (d); they do take government soft loans (L). One possible reason that these three characteristics are represented together in this configuration may be that a lot of demand-absorbing PHEIs are recent and there is a trend for them to be licensed as a company (due to a legitimacy reason). The donation aspect contrasts with the business nature, thereby being absent. Since they are recently founded and may not have enough investment fund, PHEIs may apply for the government soft loans for their infra-structure development. Along the same continuum, the configuration aLF means that PHEIs licensed by a company are recently established or new (a); they take government soft loans (L); their licensees take profits (F). This
pattern obviously indicates a profit-making intention due to the business nature the institutions may have.

Other configurations are not as salient as the abovementioned ones. They are zFp, zLF, Zlfp, and AZlp. The configuration zFp signifies that they are small (z); their licensees take profits (F); their presidents are cosmopolitans (p). The configuration zLF means that they are small (z); they take government soft loans (L); their licensees take profits (F). The configuration Zlfp indicates that they are large (Z); they do not take government soft loans (l); their licensees do not take profits (f); their presidents are cosmopolitans (p). Lastly, the configuration AZlp means that they are old (A) and large (Z); they do not take government soft loans (l) and their presidents are cosmopolitans (p). It is apparent that the fsQCA truth table solutions for this company type represent many results, signaling great variations across the PHEIs in the company type.

Unlike the proprietary and company types where institutional diversity is apparent in terms of governance and finance, religious organization and foundation type illustrates a relatively limited diversity, as reported in Table 13.

**Table 13:** Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Religious Organization Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>donationfs<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>profitbackfs*presidentfs+</td>
<td>0.402000</td>
<td>0.014000</td>
<td>0.834025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>profitbackfs*presidentfs</td>
<td>0.440000</td>
<td>0.052000</td>
<td>0.733333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.454000  
solution consistency: 0.739414
According to Table 13, only 2 possible configurations of Thai PHEIs licensed by religious organizations or foundations are found.

\[
\text{dLfp + ALfp} \rightarrow \text{RELIGFOUNDFS } (\text{original}) \\
\text{Lfp (d + A)} \rightarrow \text{RELIGFOUNDFS } (\text{simplified})
\]

Based on 19 cases, the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.739; its coverage of the outcome (religious foundation) is 0.454, signifying that both outcome consistency and coverage are high. The solution suggests that Thai PHEIs licensed by religious organizations or foundations have three common combinational characteristics: Lfp, meaning that 1) they take government soft loans (L); 2) their licensees do not take profits (f); and 3) their presidents are cosmopolitans (p). Additionally, they do not have donations (d) or members of their university administration and university council are locals (A). It is intriguing that these solutions, Lfp (d + A), exactly fit the solutions of Levy’s religious-oriented category. PHEIs licensed by religious organizations or private foundations are usually not profit-oriented as they are not proprietary owned. Seeing that they are not family-owned their presidents generally come from the search process (even if they are required to have similar faith as the licensing organizations). Members of university council and administration, however, may come directly from the church organizations as they need to be certain that the institutional policy and implementation are aligned with their faith. The donation aspect of the Thai case may be deviant from the PHE literature in which religious-oriented PHEIs generally receive donations as another income source. Although some interviewees mentioned about receiving donations, the donation variable is not significantly correlated enough when run through fsQCA.
In sum, fsQCA analyses of the Thai ownership types illustrates certain levels of intra-sectoral institutional diversity among PHEIs in which PHEIs licensed by business companies and corporations are the most diverse while those licensed by religious organizations and foundations are the least. PHEIs licensed by proprietary significantly show a characteristic of having local presidents whereas those licensed by company exclusively hire cosmopolitan presidents. The substantive importance of the actual combinations from the Thai ownership types are discussed after cross tabulated with Levy’s typology in Chapter 5.

4.2.2.2 fsQCA of Levy’s Typology

Levy’s PHE classification comprises 3 chronological types: religious-/ cultural-oriented, elite/s-elite, and demand-absorbing/non-elite. Levy’s typology complements the preceding fsQCA analyses of Thai ownership types, seeing that there are some matches of fsQCA configurations between the two typologies. The cross tabulation section further discusses such a relationship.

Levy’s analytical typology holds valid in the Thai case for the most part but requires multiple and significant adaptation. That is, the salient national typology does not conform one-to-one to Levy’s. It overlaps it and ultimately does not contradict it yet requires careful linking and attention to overlap and the complexity of this national case. Chapter 5 further elaborates this regard.

Similarly using 8 chosen variable characteristics and all 19 institutional cases, the findings represent how and how much Thai PHEIs fit Levy’s typology via fsQCA analyses. Based on Table 6 (operationalization of Levy’s PHE types) in Chapter 3, the 19 sampling PHEIs have been assigned exclusively into each one of the four PHE types:
religious-/cultural-oriented, semi-elite, demand-absorbing, and serious-demand-absorbing. The last category, serious-demand-absorbing, has been added to Levy’s original framework as a part of theoretical modification discovered from the findings. Figure 9 presents a pie chart, depicting the percentage of Thai PHEIs by Levy’s different PHE types represented in the sample. Afterwards, Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17 report the truth table analyses of fsQCA by Levy’s PHE types.

**Figure 9:** Pie Chart Depicting the Percentage of Thai PHEIs by Levy’s PHE Types Year 2006

To assign Thai PHEIs into Levy’s category, the study purposively relies on the fundamental definition and criteria of operationalization of each PHE type presented in Table 6 Chapter 3. According to Figure 9, Thai PHEIs fall most into the demand-absorbing category, representing 8 out of 19 PHEIs (48 percent of the total sample), followed by semi-elite (26 percent), serious-demand-absorbing (21 percent), and religious-oriented (11 percent), respectively. Particularly, it is noted that the finding reports only 2 PHEIs in religious-oriented category (11 percent). Although Figure 8 shows 5 PHEIs actually licensed by religious organizations and foundations, when categorized by Levy’s typology, only two of them are counted as religious-oriented. This
is so because the study defines only an institution showing salient religious characteristics such as one founded by a religious order and does not show any strong characteristics of other types. Furthermore, three institutions are counted as semi-elite, serious-demand-absorbing, and demand-absorbing ones. The religious-licensed ones in semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing categories show most appealing characteristics that fit in such categories according to perceived perceptions of the interviewees, thereby excluded from the religious-oriented counts. Likewise, the one in demand-absorbing category is licensed by a foundation and shows most characteristics of demand-absorbing category. It is neither religious nor cultural. Indeed, it is owned by a family that registered the foundation. Therefore, it was excluded in the religious-oriented count. Detailed analyses are further discussed in the subsections on each PHE type.

Using fsQCA truth table analyses, possible configurations of PHEIs based on Levy’s typology are presented in Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17.

**Table 14:** Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Religious-Oriented Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>donationfs<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>profitbackfs*presidentfs+</td>
<td>0.502500</td>
<td>0.017500</td>
<td>0.834025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>profitbackfs*presidentfs</td>
<td>0.530000</td>
<td>0.065000</td>
<td>0.733333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 shows two possible configurations of **religious-oriented** PHEIs, read as the following formula:
Based on 19 cases, the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.739; its coverage of the outcome (religious) is 0.567, signifying that both outcome consistency and coverage are high. This solution is the most perfect match of all between Levy’s typology and the Thai ownership typology. As previously discussed, religious- and cultural-oriented institutions are licensed by religious organizations or private foundations. They commonly have three combinational characteristics that they take government soft loans (L); that their licensees do not take profits (f); and that their presidents are cosmopolitans (p). In addition to those, they do not receive donations (d) or members of their university administration and university council are locals (A).

Unlike the religious-oriented PHEIs where profits aspect is absent, semi-elite PHEIs show a strong present of profit-pursuing characteristic. Table 15 reports the finding of fsQCA truth table analysis of semi-elite category.

**Table 15: Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Semi-Elite Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOFTLOANFS*PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.200000</td>
<td>0.200000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIAGEFS*PROFITBACKFS+</td>
<td>0.280000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.388889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTISIZEFS<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>PROFITBACKFS</td>
<td>0.320000</td>
<td>0.040000</td>
<td>0.829016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.520000
solution consistency: 0.527383
Based on 19 cases, the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.527; its coverage of the outcome (semi-elite) is 0.520, signifying that both outcome consistency and coverage are acceptable. The solution suggests that there are 3 possible configurations of Thai PHEIs in the semi-elite category, as portrayed in the formula:

\[ \text{LP + AF + ZLF} \rightarrow \text{SEMIELITEFS} \]

While the first configuration, LP, exactly matches the Thai company type’s configuration, the other two configurations, AF and ZLF, also echo the Thai family type’s configurations. In this semi-elite solution, however, the LP configuration is the strongest, seeing that its consistency is 1.000000. The LP configuration signifies that Thai semi-elite PHEIs owned by a company take government soft loans (L) and their presidents are locals (P). The second configuration, AF, suggests that semi-elite PHEIs licensed by family or individual are old institutions (A) and their licensees do take profits (F). The third configuration, ZLF, means that semi-elite PHEIs licensed by family or individual are large in size (Z); they take government soft loans (L); and their licensees take profits (F).

Contrasting to those in the semi-elite category, demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand are small and recent in their establishment yet the profit-pursuing characteristic is present, just as similar as that of the semi-elite type.
Table 16: Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Demand-Absorbing Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>softloanfs*PRESIDENTFS+</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
<td>0.248750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instisizefs*PROFITBACKFS+</td>
<td>0.376250</td>
<td>0.041250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instiagefs<em>donationfs</em>SOFTLOANFS+</td>
<td>0.100000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instiagefs<em>SOFTLOANFS</em>PROFITBACKFS</td>
<td>0.100000</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on 19 cases, Table 16 presents that the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 0.694; its coverage of the outcome (demand-absorbing) is 0.641, signifying that both outcome consistency and coverage are acceptable. The solution suggests 4 possible configurations of demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand, as shown in the next formula:

\[ IP + zF + \text{adL} + \text{aLF} \rightarrow \text{DEMANDABSORBFS} \]

Out of the four possible configurations, there are only two configurations of Levy’s demand-absorbing type that perfectly match the Thai company type: adL and aLF. To begin with, the configuration adL suggests that demand-absorbing PHEIs owned by a company if taking government soft loans (L), they would normally be new institutions (a) without receiving any donations (d). Indeed, donation is not part of the Thai culture, especially not for the business company sector. Secondly, the configuration aLF signifies that demand-absorbing PHEIs owned by a company if taking government soft loans (L) and being new (a), their licensees would take profits back (F). Nevertheless, these two
configurations are not strong, seeing that their consistencies are low when compared to the configurations IP and zF. The configuration IP means that demand-absorbing PHEIs in general do not take government soft loans (l) and their presidents are locals (P). The configuration zF simply means that demand-absorbing PHEIs in general are small in size (z) and their licensees do take profits (F). These last two configurations seem very plausible and possible if analyzed with more cases because both configurations are salient features of demand-absorbing PHEIs suggested in the PHE literature.

Extended from the original demand-absorbing category, the embryonic serious-

demand-absorbing category may be potentially included as a modification of Levy’s classic PHE trio. Although there appears only 1 possible configuration of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs using the Thai samples, as represented in Table 17, the finding is worth discussing and exploring further.

Table 17: Truth Table Analysis Showing Parsimonious Solution of Serious-Demand-Absorbing Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>adminfs</th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on 19 cases, the set-theoretic consistency of this solution is 1.000000; its coverage of the outcome (serious-demand-absorbing) is 0.250, signifying that both outcome
consistency and coverage are high. The solution in Table 17 suggests the following formula:

\[ m \rightarrow \text{SERIOUSDAFS} \]

At least, one can be certain that one of the salient characteristics of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs is cosmopolitan university administration and university council (m). In other words, the finding stresses that members of university administration and university council of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are cosmopolitans (m) who professionally come from outside the institutions. This configuration matches the Thai company type’s configuration as previously discussed.

4.2.2.3 Cross Tabulation of the Thai Ownership Typology and Levy’s Typology

After presenting the fsQCA findings of both the Thai ownership typology and Levy’s typology, this subsection displays a cross tabulation of the findings of both typologies in order to see a relation between the two. According to Table 18, the most obvious match between Levy’s PHE types and the Thai listed types is religious-oriented institutions. Their only licensees are religious organizations or foundations, thereby easiest for categorization. Semi-elites’ licensees are mixed between proprietary and business company types, partly echoing Levy’s definition in that semi-elite PHEIs are often founded by wealthy philanthropists or elitists. They are top private universities and hold the highest national reputation among PHEIs. As the PHE literature stressed, the finding shows that demand-absorbing PHEIs are significantly family owned and licensed by proprietors (Altbach 2005c; Kinser 2006). A majority of PHEIs in Thailand are in this category.
Table 18: Cross Tabulation of the Thai Ownership Typology and Levy’s PHE Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similar fsQCA Configurations (Numbers of PHEIs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thai Ownership Typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIZCORP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGFOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the following subsections elaborate detailed analyses and discussions by PHE types derived from Table 18, summary of the findings is provided here. Table 18 represents the association between the Thai PHE ownership typology and Levy’s framework of PHE types, based on fsQCA truth table parsimonious solutions. While religious-oriented institutions are typically licensed by religious organizations or private foundations, semi-elite institutions can be licensed by any types—proprietary, business company, or even religious organization. Although demand-absorbing and serious-demand-absorbing institutions can as well be licensed by any types, the finding shows that demand-absorbing institutions are overwhelmingly licensed by family or individual whereas serious-demand-absorbing ones are primarily licensed by a business company, a major finding, fitting our largely assumed notions.

When further considering the possible configurations of institutional characteristics in terms of governance and finance, the most perfect match is RILIGIOUS and RELIGFOUND, both of which are comprised of exact combinational characteristics:
Lfp (d + A). The interpretation is that religious institutions are licensed by religious organization/foundation that do not take back any profits. They tend to take soft loans from the government and their presidents are cosmopolitans from outside an institution. In addition to these three common factors, religious-oriented institutions are considerably old or they do not receive donations (or perhaps have very minimum donations).

The second match is SEMIELITE and FAMILY, both of which show similar two possible configurations of institutional characteristics: AF + ZLF. The finding reads that semi-elite institutions licensed by proprietary have one characteristic in common; that is their licensees take back profits. Coping with the profit factor, they have either one of the two combinational characteristics: 1) they are old; or 2) they are large and they take soft loans from the government.

Furthermore, the analysis shows another possible match between SEMIELITE and BIZCORP, having one possible combination of characteristics: LP. This means that semi-elite institutions licensed by a business company take soft loans from the government and have a local president sent by the owners. Likewise, SERIOUSDA and BIZCORP similarly have one possible configuration of institutional characteristics in common: m. It is apparent that serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs licensed by a business company have members of university administration and university council that come from outside the institutions—cosmopolitans, in technical term.

Lastly, the findings also report several matches between DEMANDABSORB and BIZCORP while showing various patterns between DEMANDABSORB and FAMILY. Demand-absorbing institutions licensed by a business company have 2 possible configurations of characteristics in common: adL + aLF. The first combination is that
they are recently established yet without receiving any donations but they do take
government soft loans. The second possible combination is that they are recently
established and they do take government soft loans while their licensees take back profits.
Unlike those licensed by business corporations, demand-absorbing PHEIs licensed by
proprietary demonstrate various patterns of institutional characteristics. Possible
configurations of DEMANDABSORB and FAMILY are not matched one-on-one.
Nevertheless, when considered each of the characteristics separately, two salient
characteristics are repeatedly found in the fsQCA solutions; they are profit (F) and
president (P) factors. Concisely put, licensees of proprietary demand-absorbing PHEIs
tend to take back profits and presidents of these institutions are locals (e.g., family
members).

Analytical discussions of these abovementioned findings are elaborated in the
following Chapter 5, Types of Private Higher Education.
CHAPTER 5
TYPES OF PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Chapter 5 elaborates empirical findings and discussions on types of PHE in Thailand. As an elaboration of a qualitative analysis derived from fsQCA results and traditional coding schemes presented in the 4.2 section on intra-sectoral dynamics in Chapter 4, this chapter analytically discusses findings in 4 main sections organized by types of PHE: 1) Pluralizing Religious- and Cultural-Oriented; 2) Semi-Elite; 3) Demand-Absorbing; and 4) Serious-Demand-Absorbing. Within each section, the chapter gives an overview of the type and then focuses on 2 political economic dimensions relevant to institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs, governance and finance, followed by a concluding section.

5.1 Pluralizing Religious- and Cultural-Oriented

5.1.1 Overview

Religion and culture have been among the fundamental cores of the Thai society since the ancient era, seeing that Thai people started learning basic literacy, arithmetic, and Buddhism from the Buddhist temples (Policy and Planning 2003). Buddhism being the national religion, Buddhist education has always been in the hands of the public sector\(^43\) until 1999 where the Buddhist Foundation was granted a license to operate the first private International Buddhist College. Aside from Buddhism, the Thai government welcomes other religions to be practiced in the country as well (Bovornsiri 1998). This is

\(^{43}\) Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University and Mahamakut Buddhist University.
apparent in the case of Christianity which has rooted in Thailand since 1567 and has played a significant role in Western medical provision and elementary-secondary private education (Matawatsarapak 2001). However, the Christian role at a higher education level was legally recognized after the first PHE Act promulgation in 1969. Likewise, Islam has been practiced widely by people in southern Thailand but Islamic education provided at the higher education level just came to light in the late 1990s. Such an increasing role of religious organizations and cultural foundations in Thai higher education provision owe mostly to the government deregulation on PHE; this is a typical pattern influencing PHE growth throughout Asia (Levy 2002).

The various religious roles and affiliations with different religious orders and cultural foundations also make religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs sharply distinct from other types of PHEIs. Their licensees could be Catholic (e.g., Roman Archdiocese of Bangkok), Christian (e.g., Church of Christ, Christian Medical Foundation of Seventh-day Adventist), Islamic, Buddhist, Thai arts foundation, and Thai-Japanese foundation. Concisely put, licensees of religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs in Thailand, so far, are either religious orders or cultural foundations; they can never be business corporations or proprietors.

Within the ample diversity of licensees, the Thai findings show certain degrees of isomorphism among religious-oriented PHEIs by ways of institutional age. All Catholic and Christian PHEIs are comparatively old, emerged during 1970s-1980s. Islamic, Buddhist, and cultural institutions are relatively new, established after late 1990s.44 This

44 Refer to Figure 6 in Chapter 4 on institutional diversity by age and size.
Thai context reflects global reality where earlier Catholic or Christian PHEIs are likely followed by Islamic or Pentecostal initiatives (Levy 2008a).

Furthermore, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs function differently when compared to other types of PHEIs. In the U.S., Europe, Latin America, and neighboring Asian countries, most Catholic universities were created as religious alternatives to the secular public universities in order to provide religious service via theology, philosophy, and canonical law (Levy 1986b, 1992). In Central Europe, some Catholic universities only aim at training prospective priests or fellows of their religious orders (Sunjic 2005) while Catholic colleges in the U.S. have a long tradition to serve the church and its certain members—mostly the wealthiest males (Altbach 2005b; Collier 2008). Beyond the religious identities, cultural identities have been bolstered as well. Central and Eastern Europe has portrayed illustrations of such PHEIs with multi-ethnic and multi-lingual dimensions whereas Asia and the U.S. have been known for women’s colleges (Levy 2009b; Purcell, Helms, and Rumbley 2005). Therefore, the religious and cultural characteristics are the highlights of this type for other PHE types less likely set their missions and roles toward faith-based and cultural orientations.

Echoing the global realities, the Thai religious-oriented PHEIs mostly aim at religious values alongside health sciences education. Saengtham College (SC) and International Buddhist College (IBC) exclusively focus on training priests and monks.45 Yala Islamic University (YIU) hones in on Shariah (Islamic law), Usuluddin (Islamic principles), Islamic studies, history and Islamic civilization, and Arabic and Malay

languages. Saint Louis Nursing College (SLC), Mission College (MC), and Christian University (CTU) emphasize nursing sciences and Christian values. As Interviewee 3 stressed, “we are niche market, focusing on human and health-related. Everything we offer involves health sciences—such as nursing informatics, health and logistics management. This is due to the mission of our Christian church.” Indeed, students in such institutions are required to participate in Christian activities (e.g., attending mass) and all activities relevant to religion have to be Christian but nothing else. According to Interviewee 12, “activities related to Buddhist or Islamic have to be done outside the campus. The students are not forbidden; however, this is our territory, so we have to lift up the rights on our faith.” Likewise, cultural-oriented PHEIs shape their functions to only specific missions; Arsom Silp Institute of the Arts (ARSOMSILP) aims at whole language education and architecture for community and environment while Thai-Nichi Institute of Technology (TNI) focuses on engineering, information technology, business administration—industrial management and Japanese. It is apparent that within the Thai religious-oriented PHE subsector, diversity appears depending upon various religious faith-based or cultural orientations whereas isomorphism arises due to similar normative missions of nourishing institution’s values and activities (Catholic, Christian, Buddhist, Islamic, Arts, or Japanese culture and language) as well as promoting health sciences education (especially among Christian institutions).

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46 For more information, see Curriculum, Yala Islamic University, available [online] at: http://www.yiu.ac.th/new/index.php/องค์ประกอบ/การจัดการการศึกษาระดับปริญญาตรี.html.
47 For more information, see Curriculum, Arsom Silp Institute of the Arts, available [online] at: http://www.arsomsilp.ac.th/?page_id=3.
Moreover, with such narrow foci and specializations, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs tend to be small in their institutional size, manifesting another dimension of indistinctiveness as opposed to diversity within the religious subsector. The Thai finding reveals that most institutions in this type enroll less than 1,000 students and only a few have a couple of thousand students.\(^{49}\) Religious-oriented PHEIs with larger size tend to be more comprehensive in their programs offered while those with smaller size concentrate on only either theology or health sciences. Anyhow, the fact that religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs are rather small and narrow in their foci is prominently repeated in international PHE literature (Collier 2008; Sunjic 2005).

5.1.2 Governance

Institutional diversity in terms of governance of religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs is discussed in two dimensions: external control and internal administration. Figure 10 summarizes key characteristics in governance of PHEIs in this type.

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**Figure 10:** Key Characteristics in Institutional Governance of Religious- and Cultural-Oriented PHEIs

\footnote{\(^{49}\) Refer to Figure 6 in the section of Institutional Diversity by Age and Size in Chapter 4.}
5.1.2.1 External Control

Like other types of PHEIs, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs in Thailand are closely tied to external control, mainly CHE. As discussed in the inter-sectoral diversity section in Chapter 4, the CHE has a great deal of formal control that all PHEIs need to abide by regardless of whether they receive any incentives since the CHE is the government agency directly supervising them. Aside from being under the CHE and ONESQA, religious-oriented PHEIs are especially influenced by the Nursing and Midwifery Council because most of them (religious-oriented) focus on health and nursing sciences. They, indeed, tend to be affected by the requirements and standards of the Council the most when compared to other types of PHEIs as others generally emphasize on business administration as opposed to nursing. Also, some religious-oriented institutions that are comprehensive may be subject to several other professional councils related to their programs offered such as the Federal of Accounting Profession and Council of Engineers. This comprehensive dimension repeats the history of Latin American’s Catholic universities where multiple motivation (specifically in business-related courses) instead of Catholic alone had been highlighted (Levy 1986b). Nevertheless, the level of control from such professional associations for religious-oriented type is as tight as that of other types which have already discussed earlier in the previous chapter.

Furthermore, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs are also controlled directly by their religious organizations or private foundations licensing them. Interestingly, the strong attachment coming from such organizations to the institutions is strictly bound, perhaps, as close as that from business companies. For instance, Interviewee 3
accentuated the strong relationship between a licensing religious organization and a private institution:

“…Once established, a private university is legally recognized as a juridical person. The Church of Christ is also a juridical person but we are related via monitoring policy such as quality policy… We have to promote Christian values and follow particular Christian activities. If we don’t do those we will be evoked from the affiliation.”

Although the PHE literature stresses that institutional attachments to the national churches and the Vatican have weakened and institutional personnel such as administrators and professors are not priestly anymore (Levy 1986b), Thai PHEIs with Christian faith-based seem to continue a tight string with their Christian licensing organizations not only by ways of Christian values promotion but also via personnel appointment and finance.

5.1.2.2 Internal Administration

Religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs in Thailand portray some characteristics similar to those of other types of PHEIs yet still preserving several distinctive highlights in their internal administration. As in other PHE types, decision making power and administration in religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs is concentrated at the top level of the institutions. While commonly practiced within the private sector, this feature is sharply different from the bottom-up academic guild model in the public sector often mentioned in the literature (Clark 1987a).

Within the religious-oriented subsector, nonetheless, there appear variations of top-down administration and decision making. The finding reveals that several large comprehensive Christian-oriented universities are centralized as the university president holds ultimate decision making especially on finance and personnel. Interviewee 1 gave
a lucid example: “Considering the personnel hiring, the HR [human resource]
department continues doing its job but the final say depends on me [the president].”
Likewise, Interviewee 3 stressed, “especially we are small in scale with the budget about
200 million Baht per annum, we are centralized in finance while decentralized in
paperwork or academic.” On the contrary, small religious colleges bank upon their
college’s boards for all decisions to be made. This is surprising since one would expect a
large comprehensive religious institution to involve more key administrators as opposed
to the president alone in decision making and to be more decentralized in institutional
management. Through a political economic perspective, the interviewees justify their
being top-down and centralized by reasoning that any matters involving a lump sum of
money and faculty appointment are at a very high stake. Since they are private with
limited funding, they have to be effective and wise in managing both dimensions.
Therefore, the presidents’ judgment and approval are necessary. Small colleges’ leaders
are also concerned about the financial factor, expressing that the funding is so limited that
they have to involve the colleges’ boards and key administrators for all decisions and
responsibilities in case of any mistakes to be happened. Although it seems awkward to
associate the money factor with the religious characteristic, religious-oriented
institutions, apparently, are very cautious about their funding and how to manage it
efficiently. Important institutional affairs such as finance and personnel do get finalized
at the top administrative level, be it the president or the institutional board or both.

Furthermore, the findings are that presidents of religious- and cultural-oriented
PHEIs are cosmopolitans—Gouldner’s term (1957) to refer to institutional leaders who
are professional and come from outside the organizations, as explained in Chapter 3.
Inasmuch as religious-oriented institutions are owned by the churches or cultural-oriented institutions belong to private foundations, the presidents of the institutions often come through the search process which is starkly different from demand-absorbing family-owned colleges where their presidents are mostly family members. Even so, there is a strict requisite for the presidents of PHEIs in the religious-oriented subsector: their presidents must hold similar faith-base as that of the religious organizations. Some churches even require that the presidents be priests or nuns. Indeed, most Christian PHEIs have priests or nuns as their presidents and so does Buddhist. Exception appears in the Islamic subsector where neither the president nor administrative personnel is “imam”. These findings are largely consistent with Levy’s (1986b) findings on Latin America even though they were already slipping notably by that point.

While presidents of religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs come from outside the university or college, members of university administration and university council of such institutions are locals—another term of Gouldner (1957), referring to institutional leaders who come from inside the institutions and are tied to the organizations such as family members. This feature is salient in both the religious-oriented and cultural-oriented subsectors as well as in the demand-absorbing subsector to be described afterwards. Applying analogy, one could easily see that the church organization is comparable to the family and that the church organization appointing its members to take care of its private institutions is similar to the father appointing his son or daughter to be the president or vice president. In some Christian institutions, the president of the foundation concurrently holds the position of the university council’s president. Also, there are priests, nuns, or monks as members of the university council of religious-

50 “Imam” refers to the person who leads Islamic prayer.
oriented PHEIs. They are mostly appointed by the licensing church organization, as seen in SLC and CTU. At least several top administrators of religious-oriented PHEIs are priests, nuns, and monks as well; SC, SLC, and IBC are good examples. On the cultural side, ARSOMSILP similarly has some key members from the foundation who simultaneously hold a seat in its university council as well as university administration. In this sense, religious-oriented PHEIs only deviate from other types of PHEIs in their priestly status while cultural-oriented ones may not be dissimilar to others at all.

5.1.3 Finance

Diversity in terms of finance between religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs and other PHEIs in Thailand are rather limited. Their sources of income appear to follow the generic list found in the PHE literature. That is, the most important source of income for PHEIs worldwide is tuition and fees while other income sources may include marketization, research fund from the government and private industry, and donations (Geiger 1986; Levy 1992). Figure 11 illustrates key characteristics of institutional finance in religious- and cultural-oriented type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pluralizing Religious- and Cultural-Oriented PHEIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Depend on tuition &amp; fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Depend on government soft loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Receive minimum donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Licensees do not take profits back.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Key Characteristics in Institutional Finance of Religious- and Cultural-Oriented PHEIs
According to Figure 11, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs in Thailand do bank upon tuition and fees the most, as is the case for other private institutions. In fact, approximately 70-90 percent of their total income is from tuition and fees. Since PHEIs heftily depend on tuition and fees, number of students enrolling in their institutions becomes crucial. In small Christian colleges, a majority of income from tuition and fees paid by their nursing students goes to faculty salary and the rest is barely enough for such other academic expenses as internship and training in a hospital. This situation actually occurs across most PHEIs—the small private colleges that enroll only few hundred students.

Aside from tuition and fees, religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs do take government soft loans. Generally, such soft loans help the institutions in infra-structure constructions, faculty development and equipment purchase. Some religious-oriented institutions, however, do not prefer taking such government soft loans as they feel the loan process is too selective that new institutions cannot compete with old institutions. Religious-oriented institutions do not differ from demand-absorbing ones in this respect for they both feel troublesome by the loan application process and via competition with semi-elite universities.

Moreover, while the PHE literature regards donation as a common income source for religious-oriented institutions even though donation for overall PHEIs is rare (Collier 2008), the Thai finding is mostly in line in that donation is found in religious-oriented PHEIs but does not seem to be the significant source of income for them at all when compared to other institutional characteristics. Although some interviewees perceive religious-oriented PHEIs as donation receivers and often assume their accessibility to
donation and financial support from their churches or religious foundations, a majority of 
interviewees of religious-oriented type argued that such assumptions are usually untrue. 
The tradition of donation for the private sector is never encouraged in the Thai culture in 
comparison to that for the public counterpart and the government regulation to support 
such a matter seems doubtful. Indeed, the law tends to be rigid on a matter of donation to 
HEIs licensed by private providers. PHEIs must be approved by the CHE if they are to 
receive a certain amount of donations specified in the PHE Act. The CHE’s approval 
must be obtained also should the private institutions accept financial support from any 
foreign organizations (Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon B.E. 2546 2003). 
Nonetheless, variations on donation receiving do appear across religious-oriented 
subsector. Large comprehensive Christian universities, IBC, and YIC tend to receive 
some donations from their international religious affiliations. Small Christian colleges 
bank amply upon their domestic licensing organizations. Above all, they all reported that 
the total donation percentage is only less than 5 percent of their total income (mostly, it is 
about 1 percent). An exception is Yonok University, where donations account for more 
than 10 percent of its total income.51 Instead of banking upon religious donations, some 
religious-oriented universities (mostly large comprehensive ones) pay attention to 
donations from other sources such as alumni and project-based fund-raising, just as 
similar as what semi-elite private universities do. Apparently, one can see voluntary 
emulation from these religious-oriented universities looking up to the longstanding semi-

51 Yonok University is always regarded as the best practice in obtaining foreign donations and 
fund-raising. It receives funding from USAID and American-Thai Foundation. As a Christian-oriented 
institution, Yonok was founded by a Christian individual and licensed under the Yonok Foundation. In 
2006, Yonok’s licensee was transferred from Yonok Foundation to a secular proprietary. Therefore, in the 
fsQCA analysis, Yonok University was included in the demand-absorbing category while its history 
information was helpful for the discussion of religious-oriented category.
elite counterparts. This voluntary form of isomorphism is also found in many parts of the world (Levy 2006a).

The last and, perhaps, most quintessential characteristic of religious-oriented PHEIs is the fact that their licensees do not take back any money from the institutions’ annual net profits. Although the institutions donate certain percentage of the profits (never beyond 30 percent as stipulated in the PHE Act) to their licensing foundations or churches, the foundations always donate back that same amount or even more to the institutions. Thus, since their foundations are religious without any for-profit intention, all the money typically goes back to the institutions for development and improvement. This principle is dubious, however, in the case of cultural-oriented institutions as their licensees are private foundations which can be registered by any types of individuals or stakeholders. This cultural-oriented subsector is still amorphous in the PHE literature and thus further investigation is necessary. Anyhow, the not-for-profit intention is a highlight of PHEIs in this religious-oriented type and sharply different from other types of PHEIs.

5.2 Semi-Elite

5.2.1 Overview

Unlike religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs in which religious traits and nonprofit-intention particularly characterize their prime identifications, “elite” PHEIs worldwide portray a combination of academic excellence, admission selectivity, high profile students and faculty members as well as business orientation and elite networking (Levy 1986b, 1992). As reviewed in Chapter 2, Levy (1986b)’s original term of PHEIs
in this type is “elite,” mostly referring to world-class leading Ivy League private universities and colleges within the U.S. Nevertheless, elite PHEIs outside the U.S. are sporadic, only found in Japan, South Korea, several Latin American and Western European countries (Levy 2008c). In most countries across the world, national elites are overwhelmingly public. Although recent attempts to imitate world-class elite private universities with lump-sum philanthropic sponsors have been witnessed (e.g., Chile, Germany, India and Iraq), one may detect gaps between aspiration and reality of such attempts. These aspiring PHEIs are certainly not “elite” institutions in the American vista. Possibly still, they can be considered as “semi-elites.”

According to the emerging semi-elite PHE literature (Demurat 2008; Levy 2008b; Praphamontripong 2008d; Silas Casillas 2008a), semi-elite PHEIs are defined in the simplest term as those “between elite and non-elite.” Mostly founded by business elites, they are often leading PHEIs in their own countries for their multiple significant distinctions. To begin with, semi-elite PHEIs have comparable reputation to most good public universities and usually enroll students with high socio-economic status. They compete against second-tier public universities, given that most students who fail to enter the top national public universities usually consider semi-elite PHEIs alongside second-tier public ones (Demurat 2008). They also focus extensively on teaching and hands-on

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training, thereby making their academic programs up-to-date with their market niches. Since typical semi-elite PHEIs are market-oriented and professionally run, they are well-connected to their market employers and very aggressive in the market competition (Clark 1998). Additionally, semi-elite PHEIs are ambitious to become excellent and widely recognized in various dimensions including academic legitimacy. Insofar as legitimacy is a conferred status provided and controlled by societal norms outside the institutions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Slantcheva and Levy 2007), semi-elite PHEIs search for accreditation at both national and international levels as a clear signal. To that end, they pay serious attention to internationalization, institutional rankings as well as domestic and international partnerships.

Reflecting the postulated global semi-elite characteristics, the Thai findings display comparable characteristics of top Thai private universities and those identified in the international examples. The study reveals 6 leading Thai private universities. A majority of the interviewees unanimously identified BU and AU as the top two private universities, followed closely by UTCC and DPU. After that, the ranking becomes divergent. RSU and SPU were respectively named next as well as SIAM, PYU, and MUT. Even so, the second group (SIAM, PYU, and MUT) has been excluded from this semi-elite category because less than one-thirds of the interviewees nominated them. Although RSU and SPU received close counts (63 percent and 58 percent of the total interviewees, respectively), SPU is complicated for this study’s categorization since it tends to best fit demand-absorbing characteristics while minimally showing certain important features of semi-elites in academic legitimacy and entrepreneurism. Indeed, “SPU is perceived as easy to graduate and easy to get admitted,” said Interviewee 4.
With minimal selectivity, SPU is known for mass production, as speculated by Interviewee 3: “SIAM and SPU tend to concern for quantity but not outstanding. I think they are geared toward mass products as they target low-cost market.” Accordingly, SPU was dropped from this semi-elite category due to its equivocal characteristics.\(^{53}\)

Among the five semi-elite private universities, diversity in their legal ownership statuses is salient. Thai semi-elite private universities are licensed by any types of private entities: proprietary, business company and religious foundation. Despite the fact that elite or semi-elite PHEIs are often created by secular elites, most elite traits can be found in several Catholic universities, especially in Latin America and the U.S. (Levy 1986b).\(^{54}\) Parallel to the literature, AU is Catholic-oriented, founded and licensed by the Saint Gabriel Foundation of Thailand. BU was created by business elite, a former minister of several ministries; DPU was established by revered wealthy scholars. UTCC was founded and licensed by the Thai Chamber of Commerce while RSU was licensed by a company of an elite politician who was the President of the Parliament and former minister of several ministries. This phenomenon of PHEIs’ early development involving people from the public sector is also apparent in China, India, and elsewhere (Gnanam 2002; Ping 2002).

In terms of diversity by institutional age and size, the finding shows that most semi-elite private universities are among the oldest and largest PHEIs in Thailand. The semi-elite subsector is almost 40 years old, having enrolled roughly 40 percent of the

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53 One possible reason that SPU was mentioned as leading private universities may stem from the fact that SPU was among the first legalized private universities in Thailand and has been expanding since 1970. The old and large factors are crucial values for the Thai context since they represent continuous development and seasoned experiences of the institution. Concisely put, the institution’s credentials are partly perceived via its institutional age and size.

54 In the U.S., University of Notre Dame, Georgetown University and Boston College may well represent the mix of religious-elite trait and thus they are not reflective of the majority of religious-oriented PHEIs (Collier 2008).
total PHE enrollment for the last 10 years (Praphamontripong 2010). The fsQCA solution confirms that semi-elites licensed under the proprietary type (BU and DPU) are significantly old and large. Indeed, a positive link between institutional age and prestige in the Thai case may stem from the societal norms. The Thai market and society seem to recognize graduates from longstanding semi-elite private universities much more so than those from recent demand-absorbing or public second-tier ones. This huge size and old age characteristics are unusual for the semi-elite phenomenon in other countries and further investigation on more national cases is necessary.

With such longstanding history and large size, Thai semi-elites are comprehensive in missions and programs offered even though their initial missions are geared toward business administration. Limited diversity within the semi-elite subsector is thus found in their functions and what they do. All of them, alike, claim academic distinction via a combination of both theoretical and hands-on experiences such as internship and practicum training with their business networks. Conducting more research is almost a requisite for them to claim up the academic legitimacy. Illustrations are lucid especially in the case of DPU and UTCC which tend to outshine others in boosting their research performance in the last 5 years. Extensive hands-on experiences compliment the theoretical research practice as well. To that end, BU and RSU endowed a great deal of money on their most advanced multi-media studios for the school of communication arts and journalism; AU launched the state-of-the-art information technology center covering the entire building space; UTCC supported its faculty and student research with the

55 Similar to Thailand, Chile is another reflection where prestige comes partly with institutional age as graduates from oldest private universities perform closer to their peers from the public ones See Andres Bernasconi (2005), “New Data Shows No Difference in Earnings of Graduates of Some Chilean Private Universities Compared to Graduates of Older Universities,” in PROPE Global News Reports, available [online] at: http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/publication/News/SummaryChile6.html.
University of Chicago-UTCC Research Center—the acclaimed largest data archive center of the country; DPU built a 4-star hotel on campus to provide a hands-on training to students in the hospitality and tourism majors.

Furthermore, semi-elites often claim quality in regard to their faculty members and guest speakers. The finding reports that BU is the pioneer in sponsoring its faculty to study abroad and UTCC, DPU and AU have recently been aggressive in giving out faculty scholarships as well. RSU, in contrast, overwhelmingly hires retired reputable deans and professors from public universities. In other words, the Thai case shows the features of the private institutions training and investing on their own insiders as well as those drawing human resource personnel from outside. The features of PHEIs hiring retired (or actives) professors from the public universities or public university professors teaching part-time in PHEIs are also applied elsewhere.

The pursuit of academic legitimacy through partnerships and linkages with both domestic and international reputable institutions is other feature semi-elite private universities are very aggressive about (Slantcheva and Levy 2007), clearly much more than other PHE types are. Indeed, many interviewees repeat that AU is much more advanced in internationalization than its public counterparts. Signing a memorandum of understanding with internationally recognized universities from abroad is necessary for all the five, especially UTCC and AU. Partnership with domestic prestigious public universities seems to be an alternative and less desirable.

5.2.2 Governance

Focusing on difference in institutional governance, the semi-elite type displays outstanding key characteristics dissimilar to other PHE types. Within the semi-elite
subsector, both variation and homogeneity appear in institutional characteristics. Similar to the previous section, the study discusses diversity in institutional governance of semi-elite private universities via external control and internal administration. Figure 12 illustrates key governance characteristics of Thai semi-elite private universities.

**Figure 12: Key Characteristics in Institutional Governance of Semi-Elite PHEIs**

### 5.2.2.1 External Control

In general, Thai semi-elite private universities are closely tied to the CHE because by law they are directly under the CHE’s supervision, just as with other PHE types. Even so, often there are mechanisms for PHEIs to earn autonomy, akin to what Bernasconi (forthcoming) finds in Latin America. Thai semi-elites, when compared to other PHEIs, tend to have some discretion with respect to the CHE control especially in the last decade. This is due possibly to the fact that semi-elite universities have proven their credentials academic-wise and that their top administrators and key professors have been appointed in various subcommittees of the national boards (Kulachol 1995), as Interviewee 4 described:
“We help ONESQA or professional associations as we have a lot of researchers and professors who are committee members of the ONESQA, National Research Institute, National Education Council, Soft Loan Funds Committee, and so on… This gives a great deal of indirect influence to the government and public policies. For instance, we can influence how much money the SLF Committee should allocate to private universities and colleges in comparison to public universities.”

As a result, the feature of reference power allows semi-elite institutions certain informal influence over the government. It is apparent that the professorial model—often seen in leading public universities—also symbolizes a key governance characteristic of semi-elite and elite PHEIs.

In addition to the CHE, semi-elites are subject to the ONESQA’s external quality assessment and accreditation. This regulation is similar to all higher education institutions regardless of types and evaluation criteria are undifferentiated for all institutions. Nevertheless, the finding reports that semi-elite private universities and leading public universities seem to have more competitive advantages than the small demand-absorbing or religious-oriented PHEIs when it comes to the criteria on research and publications. Semi-elites often claim academic excellence and being distinctive from others by way of famous professors, seasoned experiences and wealth of resources—all of which are integral factors to strengthen their capacity in research production and securing research fund. On the contrary, small demand-absorbing PHEIs are most comfortable with teaching and training only since their concerns lie in fast transition of their students into the job markets. A number of interviewees confessed that research and publications are very minimal and often neglected in the private sector. This finding well repeats the previous studies in Thailand (Chongwibul 2001; Dulayakasem 2002).
Professional associations are other external controllers for all higher education institutions including the semi-elite privates. Being comprehensive universities, all of Thai semi-elite privates offer a variety of professional fields such as architecture, engineering, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, nursing, law and accounting. As in other PHE types, the external bond between professional associations and these semi-elite institutions lies on professional license for employment. Upon graduation, students of semi-elite private universities—just as those of other types—need to pass an examination given by the association related to their fields so that they could obtain a professional license, particularly if they are to work for the public sector. Although this protocol is similarly applied to all types of higher education institutions, semi-elite private universities seem to be affected a great deal in relation to other PHE types as a result of their comprehensiveness. Instead of needing to abide by only a couple of associations, they have to follow all requirements and standards of 7-8 associations, for example. On the contrary, small religious-oriented colleges or demand-absorbing institutions are likely involved with only a few associations, mostly related to nursing, law, and accounting fields.

Lastly, semi-elite private universities are externally controlled by whatever types of the private entities licensing them—proprietary, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and religious foundation. Having discussed earlier that licensees may be considered as internal sources of control, the external control aspect is still worth the analysis of Thai semi-elite private universities. To begin with, the Saint Gabriel Foundation of Thailand and AU are legally acknowledged as two separate entities yet attached to one another. The finding shows that the foundation has a strong control over AU because the president
of the foundation automatically holds a position of the university council’s president and
the foundation directly appoints faculty and staff personnel to work in the university.
Likewise, while the Thai Chamber of Commerce appoints some of its members to be
university council’s committee members at UTCC, owners of BU and DPU also send
some of their family members to seat in the university councils and administration.
Ultimately, the licensee of RSU is actually the president of the university himself.
Regardless of what licensee type semi-elite universities have, they receive certain control
and influence from their owners both directly and latently.

5.2.2.2 Internal Administration

Semi-elite private universities in Thailand illustrate a number of similarities in
internal administration characteristics among themselves while representing a stark
difference from other PHE types via a business-oriented model. First, decision making
power and administration in semi-elite institutions is held at the top level of the
institutions, just as other PHE types. Centralization is especially employed in matters
concerning finance and personnel. As Interviewee 1 pointed out, “in most matters we
give abundant autonomy to our faculty and staff except issues on finance and faculty
recruitment. Since we have limited budget we need to be centralized.” In most cases,
day-to-day decision making and operation in semi-elite universities stem from line of
authority in an organization; however, anything ad hoc or directive would come from the
university president. Team-based decision making among top administrators is
occasionally mentioned. As a result, since centralization and top-down decision making
are heftily exercised, semi-elite private universities claim that they are speedy in decision
making and implementation, especially much more than the public universities are.
Next, diversity appears within the semi-elite subsector when it comes to the university president variable. The Thai semi-elites portray a mix between local and cosmopolitan presidents. While it is expected that semi-elites owned by individual proprietors would have local presidents as the university presidents (just as a majority of PHEIs licensed by proprietary do), the finding depicts reversing reality in that these semi-elites hire outside professionals to run their universities. Furthermore, semi-elites owned by business companies have local presidents as opposed to cosmopolitan ones. For instance, the company’s CEO licensing RSU is the university president himself while UTCC’s president is a member of the Thai Chamber of Commerce. AU’s president can be considered local as well, given that he, as a priest and member of the church foundation, was appointed directly from the foundation. The Thai findings, hence, tend to deviate from the PHE literature in which elite and semi-elite PHEIs is professionally run and less family-involved, in general (Slantcheva and Levy 2007).

The most contrasting feature between semi-elites and other types of PHEIs is their informal administrative structure called “executive group” or “executive committee.” An executive committee typically comprises owners and family members, president, vice presidents, and, possibly, assistants to the president, in order to handle serious or ad hoc matters. As Interviewee 2 put, “we have a committee sent by the owners, which is called executive committee. This is one major force in strategic planning or anything the owners are concerned about.” Since most semi-elite private universities were founded by business elites, this executive committee model tends to align a great deal with that of the business corporations. Typical demand-absorbing institutions do not have this feature or at least they do not officially claim to have one.
This is so because demand-absorbing PHEIs are overwhelmingly family-run with very few professionals involved and thus most decisions are informally made straight away by the owner or among the family members. Semi-elites, in contrast, strive themselves to become professional and academically excellent. Having the executive committee ensures the transparency and efficiency of their operational systems.

Aside from executive committee, university council is another crucial constituency in university governance. Semi-elite universities are not that different than other types of PHEIs in this respect. Their university council members are mixed among locals and cosmopolitans: 1) those sent by owners; 2) those sent by the CHE as stipulated in the law; and 3) those from outside, not related to the owners. This formula is typical in any university council in Thailand. The difference, thus, stems from the proportion of each even if a majority of the members is generally drawn from outside scholars and professionals. For example, in AU’s university council, out of 17 members there are 4 reverences sent from the church foundation; there are 3 people sent by the owners in DPU’s university council. Indeed, owners’ representatives in the university council are usually members in the executive committee as well. In this way, the owners can be assured that the institutions will be operated in a desirable direction as opposed to the conflicting one.

The owners can further ensure the delivery of their visions and directions in university administration when they put their family members or representatives in the university administration positions. The Thai findings show that semi-elite private universities are not dissimilar to other types in this regard. At least someone from the owners secures one of the administration seats, usually any positions involving finance
and strategic planning, e.g., vice president in finance. It is apparent that despite disclaiming their professionalism, institutional governance and administration of semi-elite private universities in Thailand are still influenced a great deal by the owners or licensees.

5.2.3 Finance

Echoing the PHE literature where PHEIs heavily depend upon tuition and fees as the prime income source (Geiger 1986; Levy 2006b; Silas Casillas 2008b), Figure 13 shows that Thai semi-elite private universities are similar to other PHE types in their dependency on tuition and fees. However, unlike demand-absorbing PHEIs whose income from tuition and fees is as high as almost 100 percent, semi-elites represent a slightly lower figure, such as UTCC, 87-90 percent, and DPU, 90 percent. It is also apparent that semi-elites are perceived to charge high tuition and fees in relation to other PHE types; henceforth, socio-economic status of their students is typically middle and upper classes. The Thai finding reports that except DPU where a majority of its students are from middle and lower class families, all other semi-elites enroll approximately 60-70 percent of students coming from middle and upper classes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semi-Elite PHEIs</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Depend on tuition &amp; fees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Depend on government soft loans (proprietary &amp; business company types).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Licensees take profits back (proprietary type).</td>
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**Figure 13:** Key Characteristics in Institutional Finance of Semi-Elite PHEIs
Furthermore, PHEIs sometimes receive other funding from the government directly or indirectly (Guruz 2008; Levy 1992). In this regard, Thai semi-elite private universities are akin to other PHE types in terms of operation budget from the government for they do not receive any direct government subsidy. Several semi-elites do take government soft loans for faculty professional development, equipment purchasing, and university construction and development, especially those licensed by proprietary and business company. Nevertheless, their perceptions toward the government loan application process are unenthusiastic since they feel that the regulations and conditions are overwhelming and the amount of money is too minimal. Indeed, most of them only took the loans at the first stage of their development. This fact could be consistent with the notion of semi-elite as keen on institutional autonomy, particularly when they have become so well-endowed and well-recognized.

After all, semi-elite private universities do attract more government funding through research funds. This feature is sharply different from that of small demand-absorbing or religious-oriented PHEIs which do not have capacity or desire for. Although research funds from various government agencies are available upon applications and projects, the percentage of research funds from the government to the total income of semi-elite private universities are very miniscule (less than 5 percent) despite their disclaimer for academic distinction. This point coincides with the PHE literature where PHEIs in general do not conduct research or even when they do, mostly it is applied research (Chongwibul 2001).

Diversity in finance between semi-elite private universities and other PHE types lies on government student loan schemes as well. While there are currently two
important financial policies: Student Loans Fund (SLF) and Income Contingent Loans (ICL) available to students in both PHEIs and public universities, semi-elite private universities tend to rely on these two loans much less than small religious-oriented and demand-absorbing PHEIs or even second tier public universities. Indeed, the finding reports that students receiving SLF and ICL in each of the semi-elite universities in year 2007-2008 are approximately as follows: AU, 7 percent of the total student enrollment; BU, 13 percent; RSU, 30 percent; UTCC, 30-35 percent; and DPU, 60 percent, respectively. It is noted that the big discrepancy in students taking both student loans among the five semi-elite universities may partly stem from the socio-economic status of students. Intriguingly, the church-related AU banking upon government funding the least is contrary to church-affiliated private universities in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, seeing that their government funding represents more than 50 percent of their core revenue (Guruz 2008). For the Thai context, semi-elites tend to possess more autonomy and distinctiveness than other PHEIs. Institutions receiving more non-government funds are likely expected to obtain more autonomy from the government than those directly governmental subsidized. Still, this is not necessarily the case. Succinctly put, without the two government student loans schemes, most semi-elites may still financially survive while other small demand-absorbing PHEIs may encounter a major financial crash.

Lastly, financial diversity regarding profit intention occurs within the semi-elite subsector. The finding shows that semi-elite private universities licensed by proprietary do take back money from the institutions’ annual net profits. In other words, up to 30 percent of the net profits are returned to the owners—in this case, families or individuals.
Licensees of other semi-elites (either religious or business) give the 30 percent net profits back to the universities for further development.

5.3 Demand-Absorbing

5.3.1 Overview

Demand-absorbing PHEIs worldwide are largely non-elite and demand-absorbing by nature and thus institutional diversity within the demand-absorbing subsector is enormous. Demand-absorbing PHEIs are defined as non-elite institutions created to absorb exceeding demand for higher education that the public sector cannot accommodate (Levy 1992; Obasi 2006; Silas Casillas 2005). Due to its tremendous variations in multi-dimensions, this type of PHE has often been perceived as questionable in quality and profit-making intention. For that matter, demand-absorbing PHEIs may be further categorized into two different types: 1) serious job-oriented institutions; and 2) profit-making garage institutions whose academic quality is highly problematic (Levy 2007, 2009b; Silas Casillas forthcoming). The first type is discussed in next section as the fourth possible PHE type modified from Levy’s (1986b) originals. After all, this demand-absorbing subsector tends to be the largest and fastest growing private subsector among others across the world (Levy 2009b).

Reflecting the global trends, a majority of Thai PHEIs fall into this demand-absorbing category as they are neither religious- and cultural-oriented nor semi-elite institutions and due to the fact that they tend to focus on quantity and low-cost budget. Even so, the finding fails to reveal any acknowledgment of the term “demand-absorbing” from the interviewees. Particularly, interviewees from those small institutions do not call
themselves “demand-absorbing” but rather “small private institutions.” They gave positive answers to their institutions, saying that they help educating second-class or poor students who cannot otherwise get into well-established PHEIs or public universities. Their strengths stem from good caring and close relationship between faculty and students, and so on.

Within the demand-absorbing subsector, systemic diversity via different legal ownership is apparent, much more so than in other PHE types. Aligning with the PHE literature where demand-absorbing PHEIs are initially initiated by family-owned businesses and enterprises (Altbach 2005c; Kinser 2006; Levy 1986b), Thai demand-absorbing institutions are overwhelmingly licensed by proprietary, business company, and private foundation, respectively (Praphamontripong 2008c). Most of Thai demand-absorbing PHEIs are in Bangkok, central area and highly developed provinces of each region, echoing the global trends where demand-absorbing and other PHEIs are often located in the big cities (Levy 1986b). On this subject, nonetheless, demand-absorbing PHEIs are akin to other PHE types as they all tend to locate themselves in wherever developed and industrialized, and accordingly Bangkok and the central area are the prime markets. In fact, the finding reports that several demand-absorbing institutions have expanded their branch campuses to other locations where there is a possibility to attract a mass volume of local and provincial students.

Furthermore, demand-absorbing PHEIs differ sharply from other PHE types (especially semi-elites and Christians) in their institutional age for their emergence is much recent. In particular, the fsQCA result confirms that demand-absorbing PHEIs licensed by business companies are rather new. Having discussed earlier in the section of

56 Chiang-Mai in the north and Ubon-Ratchathani in the northeast, for example.
diversity in institutional age and size in Chapter 4, demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand have mushroomed particularly after 1991 whereas semi-elite universities have officially emerged since 1970. Exceptions appear in several cases where demand-absorbing universities licensed by families or individuals have been founded as almost early as semi-elite ones. Conjointly, demand-absorbing institutions are typically small in size—sometimes enrolling only a few hundred students. A majority of the interviewees repeated that small and recent demand-absorbing PHEIs differ from large and longstanding semi-elite universities since the former have more disadvantages in competing with the latter. This is so because large and well-established semi-elites are stable and offer many fields of study with a lot of students enrolling while demand-absorbing ones are small and offer very few programs despite being abundant in number and widespread across the country. On top of that, similar to many interviewees, Interviewee 11 raised the issue of the Thai mindset that gives preference to large and longstanding institutions:

“PHEIs surely differ from one another. The country’s culture is important because this cultural value is rooted in the Thai mindset that reputable universities with long-lasting history are likely recognized by both parents and future employers. They believe large universities are more capable in producing graduates with better quality. However, this is not the case in reality if we [small PHEIs] really take good care of the students. Who will have better standards?”

Institutional missions and functions also manifest differences in institutional size of Thai demand-absorbing PHEIs as well as institutions in other PHE types. The Thai finding indicates that demand-absorbing PHEIs claim to provide academic and technical trainings in the high-demand fields corresponding to the market and societal needs. As Chongwibul (2001) and Dulayakasem (2002) assert, most Thai PHEIs rarely conduct
research but rather heftily emphasize job trainings in mainstream low-cost fields such as business administration, communication arts, fine arts & humanities, computer science and information technology. Such characteristics reflect those in the for-profit sector in terms of fundamental vocational and technical characteristics (Kinser 2006) as well as those in the PHE sector in general (Levy 1986b, 1992).

5.3.2 Governance

Institutional governance of demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand is largely homogeneous in terms of external control while portraying various patterns in internal administration. It is noted that the cross tabulation (Table 18) in Chapter 4 fails to find compatible combinations of governance characteristics between demand-absorbing type and any of the Thai ownership types, thereby yielding inconclusive patterns. The reason lies mostly on the fact that the demand-absorbing subsector is large in absolute number and owned by all kinds of licensees. Different types of owners often have diverse approaches in institutional administration and management. They may have different visions and seek different kinds of staff personnel—more locals and less cosmopolitans or vice versa. Accordingly, to find common combinational characteristics across the demand-absorbing subsector may become challenging. Even so, the qualitative interview findings help to determine possible features in institutional governance that have also been identified in the PHE literature, as represented in Figure 14.
### External Control
- Controlled by government agencies (CHE & ONESQA).
- Governed under PHE Act.
- Influenced by professional associations (e.g., accounting, law).
- Governed by proprietary, business company, or private foundation (proprietary dominant).

### Internal Administration
- Administration power at the top administrative level—Centralized in finance.
- Presidents are locals.

#### Figure 14: Key Characteristics in Institutional Governance of Demand-Absorbing PHEIs

#### 5.3.2.1 External Control

Thai demand-absorbing PHEIs are mostly similar to other types of PHEIs in terms of external control. Governed under the PHE Act, they are subject to the CHE’s supervision and ONESQA’s quality assessment and accreditation—just the same as other PHE types. Slight difference appears, however. While semi-elite private universities seem to be given certain autonomy from the government, some interviewees believed that a number of small demand-absorbing private colleges, particularly those recently established, need close monitoring from the CHE and ONESQA in order for the government to prevent diploma mills and corruption and as a sign of consumer protection. This is also the case found in salient global examples where the governments tightly overhaul PHEIs for quality control and financial transparency with the belief and intention to preserve academic standards and prevent profit-making behaviors of the
private institutions. To that end, Interviewee 17 suggested how and how much the
government should control PHEIs based on various categorizations:

“At the end, we may need to categorize PHEIs into 3 groups, like A, B, C. Supposedly for PHEIs in Group A, we give certain autonomy to
them and just regulate and facilitate them in terms of policy alongside
some monitoring and post-audit in curriculum and credentials. This
group can proceed to self-accrediting mode, only submitting a summary
report every 5 years to the government. Group B, in contrast, the
government needs to set up a site-visit and monitor them more closely
while Group C the government may need to monitor it every morning and
evening since it is not trustworthy. Institutions in this Group are those
‘fully paid, easy graduated.’ Currently, there appear only 20 percent of
PHEIs in Group A while 80 percent are in Group B and C.”

It is often presumably that a majority of PHEIs are in the demand-absorbing
category, deemed appropriate to be subject to the government’s control much more so
than other types. As Levy (2007, 2009b) points out, the demand-absorbing subsector is
heterogeneous, comprising both serious job-oriented and problematic ones. Many
interviewees reported that while most Thai PHEIs are similarly concerned in enrolling a
mass volume of students via popular high-demand fields, a few are very serious in job-
orientation and networking with the market industry whereas a bulk are suspicious in
their academic quality. Therefore, it is rightly so that the government lends its hands in
ensuring quality of higher education in which the market forces may not be reliable in
(e.g., allowing low-quality providers) and that the government knows what is happening
in the private sector for public policy formulation and implementation (Fielden and
Varghese 2009).

Apart from the government agencies, demand-absorbing PHEIs are influenced by
professional associations as akin to other PHE types. Nevertheless, it is obvious that

57 Like in Bangladesh, Belarus, India, Malaysia Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania,
South Korea, Uganda, Yemen, and so forth (Neelakantan 2008; Program for Research on Private Higher
Education 2002).
there are a couple of associations where demand-absorbing PHEIs need to abide by; such associations include accounting and law councils. This is so because demand-absorbing institutions are generally specialized, focusing on only a few inexpensive fields. Religious- and cultural-oriented PHEIs are also influenced by a few associations; nonetheless, they mostly are nursing and religious-/cultural-related. On the contrary, semi-elite private universities have to abide by standards and regulations of many professional associations due to their comprehensiveness. Again, while standards are applied similarly across the board, demand-absorbing PHEIs may find it challenging in fulfilling the requirements much more so than semi-elite ones as a result of limited resources, experiences, and capacities.

Diversity in governance by ways of licensees and owners is found as well. Inasmuch as the demand-absorbing subsector is similar to the semi-elite one in which they are licensed by all three kinds of licensees—proprietary, company and private foundation, demand-absorbing institutions are overwhelmingly owned by proprietary. It is perplexing to make a clear-cut on external control of the demand-absorbing subsector in this sense because most family-owned institutions are likely family-run by nature, thereby exercising a power transition from external control to internal administration and management. Henceforth, the feature of owners playing both external and internal governing roles of demand-absorbing PHEIs is much more apparent when compared to that of other PHE types.

5.3.2.2 Internal Administration

Demand-absorbing PHEIs show comparable characteristics of decision making and institutional administration to other types of PHEIs, signaling more isomorphism
than diversity among various types of the PHE sector. Regardless of what type their licensees are, decisions are mostly made at the top administrative level of the institutions. Faculty and unit levels at the bottom of the organizations are rarely given a chance to participate, as Interviewee 12 suspected:

“In provincial areas, private institutions are mostly family-owned. Being a family-owned, their management will be sharply different than ours in that they can say yes or no right away in every matter. Then can make a decision immediately. If asked whether faculty can participate [in the decision making], the answer is no.”

It is common, especially, that demand-absorbing institutions licensed by a family or individual would be amply influenced by the owners in most of their decision makings which are quite steady, much more so than those licensed by shareholders, private foundations or public universities. Interviewee 13 emphasized the steadiness advantage of an institution being a family-owned as opposed to corporation-owned:

“If they [PHEIs] are owned by business shareholders, it is different. If there are many shareholders, when it comes to budget approval, it will take time. But we are family-owned, centralized; therefore, we don’t need to ask for shareholders’ approval. We can make a decision right away.”

In the demand-absorbing subsector, decision makings relevant to finance are mostly centralized, coming straight from the owners. This centralized finance is salient across the board of PHE. Generally, PHEIs are very cautious in terms of budget allocation and financial investment insofar as they are heftily private-funded. Mismanagement or failure in decision making relevant to financial matters may result in loosing profits, bankruptcy or legal investigation. The nature of owners making a financial decision on their own thus provides the financial secured feeling to them since it is their money and their judgment after all.
Moreover, in some demand-absorbing PHEIs, the licensee has more power than the university council or the president in finalizing a matter, as Interviewee 9 explained:

“Licensees have tremendous influence. They are like the company’s CEOs. Although the president has already made a decision or the university council has already approved such a decision, the licensees can overrule the decision and put the matter on hold… Departmental chairs and faculty members participate in the meeting but do not have any power to make a decision. The university council decides and approves the matter but, again, final say depends on the licensees.”

The owners, eventually, are critical influencers in institutional governance of most demand-absorbing PHEIs regardless of licensee types. This characteristic is comparable to that of other PHE types; nevertheless, it seems most apparent in the demand-absorbing subsector given that the subsector is dominated by family-run as opposed to professional-run. Indeed, some interviewees commented that PHEIs owned by proprietary are acceptable and admirable as long as the owners concern for academic quality and public good instead of aggressive profit-making. Concisely put, institutional accountability and financial transparency of family-owned demand-absorbing PHEIs are often questionable in the public’s eyes.

Furthermore, the finding emphasizes that the presidents of demand-absorbing PHEIs are mostly locals. In most proprietary-licensed demand-absorbing institutions, it is typical that the licensee holds the president position of an institution himself/herself. Or a family member of the licensee holds the president position while the licensee holds the university council’s president position. In company-owned and foundation-owned institutions, on the other hand, the president may be considered cosmopolitan as he/she likely comes from outside the institutions, mostly from the public sector. Although in this sense the demand-absorbing subsector depicts some variations of the presidential
model, this feature is ambiguous for the analysis inasmuch as the cosmopolitan president is often the person whom the owners have an influence on. For example, if the institution is licensed by shareholders (the business company type), the president would likely be a retired president or vice president of a public university who is a close friend of the shareholders. This illustration is plausible in most cases. This becomes a selling-point of many demand-absorbing institutions as students may enroll in their institutions based on the reputation of the retired public university president (Praphamontripong 2008c).

The demand-absorbing subsector also demonstrates a mix of local and cosmopolitan models in university council and institutional administration. Regardless of what licensee type demand-absorbing institutions are, there are always the owner’s family members or company members in the university council and administration board. In this case, isomorphism appears across the PHE sector and within the demand-absorbing subsector. Even so, the demand-absorbing subsector tends to have a higher degree of being local than being cosmopolitan. For instance, at Institution P, the owner is the university council’s president; the daughter is the president; the mother is the vice president in finance. Likewise, in some institutions at least 3-4 family members are on the university council and simultaneously hold top administrative positions such as vice president in finance, strategic planning and academic. Interviewee 13 explained that family members sent by the licensee follow a protocol as akin to other non-family member vice presidents and that they had been prepared long before coming to work for the institution:

“In other institutions, family members may dominate an administration procedure and decision making but here it is certainly not. The four siblings are in different fields: law, accounting, higher education, and education and policy. The licensees had already planned earlier on
Indeed, the finding reveals that most demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand follow this local model of institutional administration. With this much of the family-oriented degree in administration and governance, it is often skeptical in the public’s views that demand-absorbing PHEIs may indeed pursue another goal besides promoting public good. As Levy (2009b) puts it, some family-owned demand-absorbing institutions are highly questionable in academic quality and effort for their business plans and management are geared toward non-transparency and shallowness. Private gain is likely a key intention. This point is particularly plausible in the for-profit demand-absorbing subsector in the U.S. and Latin America (Kinser 2006; Silas Casillas forthcoming).

5.3.3 Finance

Diversity in institutional finance of demand-absorbing PHEIs is strikingly restricted within the demand-absorbing subsector whereas there are sharp deviations from religious-oriented subsector. The key research question is how PHEIs differ among themselves and this section examines how the demand-absorbing subsector is different from or is similar to other PHE types in terms of institutional finance. Figure 15 illustrates key characteristics in institutional finance of this type.
Akin to other PHE types, demand-absorbing PHEIs are heavily dependent on tuition and fees as their prime income source. Despite the fact that PHEIs worldwide often bank upon tuition and fees the most (Geiger 1986; Levy 1992), the degree of tuition dependency of demand-absorbing subsector is extreme, approximately 95-99 percent of the total income in the case of Thailand. Semi-elite and religious-oriented subsectors, in contrast, may depend on tuition and fees but the degree of dependency tend to be less than that of demand-absorbing one for they have other major sources of income such as research fund, self-generated income, endowment and donation.

Furthermore, the fsQCA finding shows that demand-absorbing institutions licensed by a company do take government soft loans while proprietary and private foundation institutions do not. In fact, the institutions that do take government soft loans are likely the ones that have cosmopolitan president and administrators who usually come from the public sector. As Interviewee 18 pointed out, he is familiar with the government’s protocol since he comes from a public university where this kind of detailed procedures is always enforced. Other private institutions that have pure-blood administrators from the private sector may find the government’s protocol very
bureaucratic or even troublesome. Despite the government proclaimed effort to encourage small demand-absorbing PHEIs to take advantage on government soft loans, demand-absorbing institutions—proprietary in particular—do not seem to bother with such. Most interviewees repeated that they are not interested in applying for any soft loans from the government since the available amount of loans is very minimal while there are a number of regulations and conditions attached to the loans. Applying for the loans from any banks would give similar amount of loans or even more and they do not have to worry about such overwhelming conditions. They also feel that the loans are too restricted to only large and old private universities that they do not seem to be able to penetrate into the pool. On the other hand, demand-absorbing PHEIs are very enthusiastic on government student loans: SLF and ICL. Some institutions put forth aggressive marketing strategies to attract a mass volume of students from across the country just to secure such student loans. Seeing that demand-absorbing PHEIs rely on tuition and fees almost 99 percent of their total income, securing government student loans certainly becomes critical for demand-absorbing institution’s survivals.

Lastly, the fsQCA solution does not indicate any significant statistical findings on whether demand-absorbing PHEIs do return profits back to the licensees or not. This may due to the fact that fsQCA method analyzes different variables simultaneously as a combination; therefore, the “profit” variable alone would not yield any statistical significance. Even so, the interview findings confirm that a majority of demand-absorbing PHEIs do return 30 percent of their annual net profits back to their licensees, especially the company and proprietary types. More specifically, those institutions are mostly small and recent with a local president. This finding emphasizes the PHE
literature where legally non-profit institutions are actually functioning as for-profit ones (Levy 2009b; Weisbrod 1988).

5.4 **Serious-Demand-Absorbing**

5.4.1 **Overview**

The serious-demand-absorbing type is rather embryonic in the PHE literature, the emergence of which may owe in part to the gigantic size of the demand-absorbing subsector as well as the diversity the demand-absorbing subsector. Subsequently, PHE scholars have started to explore a possibility to differentiate PHEIs within the demand-absorbing subsector into those perceived as having problematic characteristics and those performing seriousness in job trainings and access (Levy 2009b; Praphamontripong 2008a; Silas Casillas forthcoming). This new category is therefore a modification of Levy’s (1986b) original three-part typology of PHE.

The serious-demand-absorbing subsector emerged from the demand-absorbing subsector reflects a lucid example of institutional diversification—a process in which there is a new kind of institutions emerging across types or within each type (Huisman 1995). According to Levy (2009b), serious-demand-absorbing institutions are spontaneous in responding to emerging needs in the workforce marketplace in order to differentiate themselves from typical demand-absorbing PHEIs. They are not only job-oriented but also innovative, targeting non-traditional student population and distance learning. Besides, they likely show certain characteristics akin to some semi-elite PHEIs, including academic excellence, effective management and entrepreneurialism, internationalization and legitimacy pursuit. In this sense, one may as well realize
voluntarily isomorphic behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) between serious-demand-absorbing and semi-elite institutions. While institutional diversification is apparent when the serious-demand-absorbing subsector emerges from the demand-absorbing subsector, institutional isomorphism also occurs when the serious-demand-absorbing subsector imitates certain characteristics of the semi-elite subsector. Such overlapping characteristics make it difficult for the clear-cut categorization of PHE; henceforth, institutional diversity among various PHE types depends largely on a matter of degree of difference and similarity.

Reflecting the global attempts to explore serious-demand-absorbing institutions, the Thai finding shows a glimpse of such institutions as well. There are several demand-absorbing PHEIs demonstrating some degrees of national reputation but not as high as semi-elite’s and being niche focused and well connected to a particular marketplace. They are, indeed, mentioned unanimously by a majority of the interviewees as the fast-growing and successful specialized institutions. In this sense, they may fit the serious-demand-absorbing concept.

Most serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand are owned and licensed by business companies. An exception appears when one Christian university also falls into this serious-demand-absorbing category. Being associated with either private companies or religious foundations, serious-demand-absorbing institutions demonstrate one common trait—a clear access function linked directly to particular niche channels, be it a certain private industry or a specific religious denomination. Such a trio strong connection among the institutions, the licensees and the niche markets influences a great deal on the institutions’ characteristics. Lucid examples include DTC and MUT. DTC licensed by
the Royal Princess (Public) Co., Ltd. (Dusit Hotels & Resorts and Princess Hotels) aims at professional trainings in the fields of hotel management and catering in order to serve its parent company and the hotel industry both domestic and international. Likewise, MUT is owned by a group of former eminent professors of a prestigious public university specialized in engineering and information technology. MUT has been seriously focusing on specialized professional trainings and research in both undergraduate and graduate levels in engineering, veterinary medicine, science and informational technology. Ranked number 36 in Asia Week 2000 and number 1 in ONESQA’s recent ranking, MUT—with strong licensees’ backgrounds and networks—positions itself heftily into the engineering and computer technology industries.

Apart from being niche-oriented and determined in job trainings, serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are generally medium to small in their institutional size and recent in their years of establishment. The size factor is largely associated with the specialized and niche-oriented factor. This feature contrasts sharply to the comprehensiveness of large semi-elite universities. Likewise, the limited years of development of the serious-demand-absorbing subsector contradict the longstanding histories of the semi-elite subsector.

58 For more information, see “Dusit Thani College History,” available [online] at http://www.dtc.ac.th/Info/history.html.

5.4.2 Governance

Institutional governance in both dimensions of external control and internal administration is very heterogeneous between serious-demand-absorbing and demand-absorbing subsectors while being homogeneous between serious-demand-absorbing and semi-elite subsectors. Figure 16 summarizes key characteristics in institutional governance of serious-demand-absorbing institutions.

**Serious-Demand-Absorbing PHEIs**

**External Control**
- Controlled by government agencies (CHE & ONESQA).
- Governed under PHE Act.
- Influenced by professional associations.
- Governed by business company and religious foundation.

**Internal Administration**
- Administration power at the top administrative level—Centralized in finance.
- Presidents are cosmopolitans.
- Members of University Council and university administration are cosmopolitans.
- Informal structure called “executive committee”.

**Figure 16:** Key Characteristics in Institutional Governance of Serious-Demand-Absorbing PHEIs

5.4.2.1 External Control

Serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs in Thailand are under the CHE’s supervision as akin to other PHE types. They are also subject to the ONESQA’s quality assessment and accreditation like every institution. Although the relationship between government control and serious-demand-absorbing institutions is closely tied, there seem to be variations within the serious-demand-absorbing subsector. Despite being licensed similarly by private companies, various serious-demand-absorbing institutions experience different kinds of control from the CHE, mostly related to financial matters as opposed to
academic ones. The finding reveals that institutions with total private traits (e.g., owned and run by professional corporations) are likely monitored closely on how the institution’s net profits are allocated and how the licensees are taxed from such profits. This is so because the licensees of such institutions simultaneously own other kinds of business which the CHE may assume that their institutions are likely oriented to profit-making. Other type of serious-demand-absorbing institutions owned and run by academics are monitored closely by the CHE on the matters related to taxations from research projects. Intriguingly, the CHE’s notion of PHEIs intending to make profits often supersedes other existing good characteristics (e.g., academic excellence, seriousness in job-trainings). Consequently, tight control is a common approach for the government to ensure academic quality and consumer protection, regardless of how serious academically the private institutions are.

Moreover, serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are influenced by professional associations, just as akin to other PHE types. Similar to demand-absorbing institutions, serious-demand-absorbing ones are typically subject to only several associations relevant to their programs offered. Nonetheless, while accounting and law councils are the major professional associations influencing the demand-absorbing subsector, engineering and veterinary medical councils alongside accounting council are among the crucial associations for serious-demand-absorbing institutions.

Degree of professional association’s influence appears as well. Similar to semi-elite universities, serious-demand-absorbing institutions have key professors and administrators in the boards of various professional associations, thereby providing some advantages to the serious-demand-absorbing institutions. Increased recognitions and
credentials are evident. For instance, Interviewee 6 stated, “I am the chairman of the examination for computer subject and this subject is required as a foundation subject for all engineers who apply for the professional license examination... This is a matter of credentials.”

Lastly, serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are influenced by private entities licensing them, mostly business corporations. Christian foundation licensee is seen as exceptional in the serious-demand-absorbing case. The private licensees, as external controllers, have certain influence over serious-demand-absorbing institutions. The common areas that the licensees usually concern for include finance and personnel, which the institutions have to submit a report to their parent organizations periodically. In some cases, the licensees also send key personnel to hold important positions in the institutions in order to ensure that their visions are carried out in the desirable ways, aligned with the parent organizations. These features are often seen across the private sector.

5.4.2.2 Internal Administration

The Thai finding reveals that the only governance characteristic in internal administration similarly displayed across the PHE types is top-down decision making and administration. This feature is prominent in the PHE literature and not unusual for the study of private-public differentiation (Geiger 1986). Serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs, as an emerging subsector, does follow such a feature. For instance, Interviewee 6 provided an example of how effective and top-down a decision was made in his institution:

“Last year, we built new laboratory which was the only laboratory in Thailand that could handle a very high frequency. We invested over 20
million Baht. We only took half-and-hour to make a decision. Policy-wise, I have full authority in making the decision to purchase laboratory equipments and afterwards report to the owners and board to get official approval according to the university protocol. Anyhow, almost 100 percent of my decisions have rarely been disapproved.”

Along the same political economic continuum, Interviewee 15 pointed out a relationship between decision making and institutional finance in which top administrators have to be responsible for any decisions and management specifically relevant to finance:

“President delegates the decision making power and management authority to a chairman of each program. Then, it depends on the president’s management style. If the chairman fails to manage the budget, we all have to take full responsibility of that. We are different than other institutions. There are 4 levels of administrators who need to be responsible for any financial failures. The project manager pays 4 times; the department chair pays 3 times; the vice president overseeing that project pays 2 times; the president pays 1 time. As a president, I had to pay almost all the time since I was the one who selected the people. If they failed, it meant that my judgment was wrong…”

It is apparent that decision making in regard to financial matters is crucially centralized at the top level of the institutions. Serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are indifferent to other PHE types in this respect.

When considering the president and administrative key personnel variables, diversity in internal administration of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs is more comparable to semi-elite private universities than to demand-absorbing ones. To begin with, similar to semi-elite and religious-oriented PHEIs, serious-demand-absorbing institutions tend to seek their presidents from cosmopolitans, outside professionals. However, this feature may not always be the case, given that DTC’s president was appointed directly from the parent organization to become the college president. Since she is one of the administrators in the parent organization, she may be considered a local president as opposed to cosmopolitan one. Likewise, PYU’s president was a PYU
alumnus, reverence and member of the Church of Christ, appointed by the foundation via the search process; he may be considered a local president as well. Anyhow, whether the presidents are cosmopolitans or locals, they mostly come through the search process akin to that in the semi-elite subsector, not just by convenience or closeness factors like what we often see in the demand-absorbing one.

Next, serious-demand-absorbing institutions usually have an “executive committee” as another internal board in addition to the university council, which is sharply different from the demand-absorbing’s governance pattern. Akin to that in the semi-elite subsector, executive committee of serious-demand-absorbing institutions comprises some representatives of the licensees or parent organizations as well as top administrators of the institutions. Any ad hoc and serious matters such as financial ones need an approval from this board. In some institutions, executive committee tends to have more power than university council, as Interviewee 5 described: “If it involves a lump sum of money, despite being approved by the university council, we have to get an approval from the executive committee as a final…” By far, only serious-demand-absorbing and semi-elite subsectors apply this business model of executive committee. It is plausible for both subsectors to include this model in their internal administration as they are rooted by the business sector.

Unlike executive committee where its members are significantly locals, the fsQCA analysis confirms that a majority of university council members and university administrators of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs are cosmopolitans. Even so, it is inevitable that few people in the two groups must be the owners’ representatives, particularly more so in the university council than in the university administration. It is
possible that, being a business company by nature, serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs try to maintain a professional business model throughout their internal administration and management while reserving power in policy formulation and strategic planning at the university council level where the licensees are actually in the board themselves.

5.4.3 Finance

Institutional finance of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs is comparable to that of PHEIs in general. The fsQCA analysis does not show any significant variables on finance for this type of institutions except the profit characteristic.

Figure 17: Key Characteristics in Institutional Finance of Serious-Demand-Absorbing PHEIs

According to Figure 17, the findings only reveal two major characteristics on finance of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs. First, serious-demand-absorbing institutions bank upon tuition and fees like other types of PHE. The degree of tuition dependency varies within the serious-demand-absorbing subsector in the Thai case. Most institutions in this type rely on tuition and fees as high as 80-90 percent of the total income. When compared to demand-absorbing PHEIs, nonetheless, such percentages are much lower. Other income sources of serious-demand-absorbing institutions stem from
various sources—mostly private, depending on which niche market the institutions are in. Some obtain funding from research projects while others from church donations as well as via executive training courses and consultancy. The exception is SIU where income from tuition and fees is approximately less than 50 percent of its total income, seeing that a majority of its income is from its licensees and that most students are awarded tuition scholarships throughout their studies.

Second, the fsQCA analysis confirms that licensees of serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs do take annual net profits from the institutions as per the PHE law. Some institutions give maximum 30 percent of net profits to their licensees while others give less or sometimes even none. This is so because their parent organizations are business corporations where a formal structure of shareholders and profit sharing are key signatures. Even the church-related one does donate back to its licensee, the church foundation. The institution does not return 30 percent of its net profits to the church but it does so for 2 percent of its total budget. Precisely, the church-related institution does portray a business trait. Weisbrod’s (1988) term, “non-profits in disguise,” may fit well in this case.

5.5 Summary

For the most part, the Thai case fits Levy’s conceptual framework and PHE literature on both private-public dynamics and types of PHE but institutional age and size are significant factors in differentiating types of Thai PHE, particularly for the semi-elite versus demand-absorbing ones. The Thai findings echo the PHE literature where demand-absorbing institutions are mostly small and recent but deviate from the literature
where semi-elites are rather old and large. Culture and societal value may explain the Thai reality in this regard. Thais feel that large and longstanding well-developed institutions are credible and trustworthy for they have proven their reputation through numerous customers and seasoned experiences.

Another major highlight is that among the 3 types, demand-absorbing PHEIs fit the PHE literature the most, given that they markedly portray significant characteristics in governance and finance as well as institutional age and size paralleled to the key literature. Being new and small, demand-absorbing PHEIs are overwhelmingly owned by family or individual whereas other types of PHEIs may owned by religious organization or corporation. While other types of PHE seek a president from outside professionals, demand-absorbing institutions tend to rely on their own representatives or family members. Family members also get involved in institutional administration and decision making particularly on issues related to finance. This characteristic is also seen in semi-elite and religious-oriented PHEIs but less strikingly than in demand-absorbing ones.

In terms of finance, demand-absorbing institutions depend on tuition and fees the most, though a majority of them are government-dependent via student loan programs. Unlike semi-elites (where income sources also stem from research fund, endowment, and self-generated income from marketization) and religious-oriented institutions (where income source may come from donation), demand-absorbing PHEIs have only government student loan programs and owner’s investment as their two prime income sources. They do not do much research and donation is not usual for family-owned
institutions. Besides, their owners do take profit back whereas owners of most semi-elite and religious-oriented PHEIs do not.
CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL ECONOMIC FORCES SHAPING
PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

Chapter 6 illustrates findings and analyses on key public policy realities and market mechanisms relevant to institutional characteristics of Thai PHEIs, strengthening the analyses in Chapter 4 and 5 to answer the research questions on how Thai PHEIs differ among themselves and from the public ones. Through a political economic perspective, this chapter particularly attempts to conceptualize the roles of public policies and market forces on the PHE shape and the extent to which PHEIs become differentiated. Presented via the findings of interviews, regulatory documents, policies and statutes, Chapter 6 comprises two major themes: public policies and market mechanisms, both of which are found to be influential in sustaining a great deal of institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs.

6.1 Public Policies

In most parts of the world, public policies influence many aspects of public and private higher educations’ institutional characteristics, management and operation. As Neave and van Vught (1994) emphasize, government regulations in both developing and developed countries have become an increasingly crucial issue for higher education and the private sector regulation is among one of the government’s major foci. While government subsidized public universities are subject to government policies and regulations, PHEIs whether financially sponsored by the government or not, are as well
under government control and regulations—even more so than their public counterparts in some countries. This is so mostly because private emergence often comes through initiative outside the government and largely as a surprise. Indeed, PHEIs outside the United States emerge much later than public universities and the government often reacts with delayed and rigid regulations (Levy 2006b, forthcoming). Apparently, PHE’s existence and growth in the higher education marketplace are so phenomenal and diversified that the government is inevitably urged to pay serious attention to, often in the form of various policy initiatives and enforcement. For instance, Otieno (2007) noted that African PHEIs are strictly regulated by the government on direction, type and level of their services and that such rigid regulations are seen in the private sector rather than in the public one. Given that the PHE sector is strikingly diversified in multi-dimensions, different public policies may be formulated and applied to different types of PHEIs; simultaneously, such government policies may influence how PHEIs characterize themselves, thereby making the higher education system more heterogeneous or vice versa.

Thailand is no exception. As found by Kulachol (1995), the finding reveals that Thai PHEIs are subject to rigid government regulations and policies under the CHE’s supervision, seemingly much more so than public universities are. This finding contrasts with the U.S. reality and what the World Bank (2000) reported that government regulations affect PHEIs while concurrently giving them greater autonomy than public universities. Indeed, different types of Thai PHEIs tend to experience government policies differently and even starkly differ from their public counterparts despite the fact

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60 Such as Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Georgia, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine (Levy 2006b).
that a government’s stated goal has claimed to increase the autonomy of PHEIs in order to equalize governmental treatment and standards between private and public sectors (Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon (Chababtee 2) B.E. 2550 2007). On top of that, PHE leaders often discuss the general instability of the government and the unstable public policies toward PHE, making it difficult for them to position themselves in the higher education marketplace. Their perceptions toward public policies affecting PHEIs are a mixture of satisfaction and complaints. Among quintessential public policies and regulations concerning Thai PHEIs include the PHE Act and ministerial regulations, quality assurance, tax laws, government soft loans for institutions and government student loans. These are largely market-oriented and influential to various types of PHEIs in different degrees. The following subsections analytically detail each policy reality influencing institutional diversity of PHEIs in Thailand.

6.1.1 Private Higher Education Act and Ministerial Regulations

As discussed in Chapter 4, private and public HEIs in Thailand are governed under different laws. While each public university has its own statute, all PHEIs are regulated by the same laws: “Private Higher Education Act B.E. 2546,” enacted in 2003 and “Second Private Higher Education Act B.E. 2550,” enacted in 2007 (Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon B.E. 2546 2003; Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon (Chababtee 2) B.E. 2550 2007). This policy reality of statutory difference fundamentally creates sharp distinction of external government control between private and public HEIs yet coercively forming isomorphism within the private sector.

To begin with, the finding discloses that there appears some disparity in CHE’s treatments between private and public HEIs as a result of different governing laws. That
is, most PHEIs tend to feel disfavored by the CHE’s treatments as they perceive the statutory difference as double standards. Interviewee 20, for instance, expressed about the policy reality on private-public discrepancy by the CHE’s control:

“The CHE oversees both private and public HEIs. However, in reality the CHE can’t control anyone except private institutions since public universities have their own statutes and are subject to their own university councils. The CHE can’t interfere… Therefore, the CHE can only control private institutions. Take a look at the CHE’s meeting referenda, almost 90 percent of their agendas concern PHEIs.”

The fact that most of the CHE’s agendas involve matters of PHEIs is widely mentioned throughout the field research. Indeed, a majority of interviewees unanimously stated that Thai PHEIs have almost always received stricter government control than public universities. As Interviewee 10, 17 and 22 confirmed, prior to Act 2550, most of the PHEIs’ academic affairs—such as launching a new curriculum, changing the course numbers, approving degrees—had to be approved by the CHE. In contrast, Interviewee 21 pointed that public universities are automatically accredited and their academic affairs are only subject to an approval of their university councils. The CHE generally does not interfere with any of those issues in public universities. These findings bolster leading literature on Thai PHE (Boonprasert 2002; Kulachol 1995).

Precisely, debates on favoritism and dissimilar treatment of the government toward PHEIs and public universities are lucid while private sector’s expansion becomes remarkable due to drastically increased demand in higher education. To uplift the status of PHE and facilitate the private sector’s growth, the Thai government has reauthorized the PHE Act several times, as described in the research background section in Chapter 1. The latest laws governing all PHEIs are Act 2546 and Act 2550; these laws are perceived, by far, as the most liberal ones for PHEIs. Act 2546 imposes the establishment of the
ONESQA and quality assurance to be assessed similarly in both public and private HEIs. Along the same continuum, in order to equalize government treatment between public universities and PHEIs, Act 2550 required that private and public HEIs implement similar standards and monitoring. The university council of PHEIs, under the CHE’s acknowledgement, has power to approve curriculum and graduation, as well as power in the administration of various university affairs, just as similar to that of the public universities. Together with other interviewee, Interviewee 4 felt the positive trend from this major change:

“The government has given the authority to the university council for student graduation approval, but the university must appoint an academic council to handle this. Also, the committee on professoriate appointment consisting of external scholars is the university’s matter. CHE does not nominate its people into these 2 boards, but it does send 3 people to sit on the university council... This means that the CHE has given much more autonomy to the privates than in the past...”

In spite of the fact that private and public HEIs are fundamentally different because of the statutory discrepancy, the Thai reality signals what DiMaggio and Powell (1991) called “coercive isomorphism” in which HEIs are becoming homogeneous due to the coercive force of public policy similarly imposed upon HEIs. In this vein, the government proclaims that PHEIs, just as similar as public universities, can enjoy freedom and flexibility in their administration and management with the CHE only being a post auditor. This is the most significant claim enforced by Act 2550. Such a deregulation trend seems certain as well in many countries where the governments are loosening up their control over the operation and establishment of PHEIs (World Bank 2000).

Notwithstanding this reality, under the coercive isomorphism, institutional differentiation and diversity emerge. While both Act 2546 and Act 2550 govern all
PHEIs similarly regardless of their various institutional characteristics (university vs. college; proprietary-owned vs. foundation-owned, for example), the laws tend to shape each type of PHEIs differently. Importantly, Interviewee 23 gave a thorough analysis of how PHEIs differ from one another under the same laws:

“Private higher education institutions are similar in two ways. The government doesn’t give any in cash support to them and they are subject to similar quality standards and control. The difference among private institutions is that, under these similarities, private institutions that are well-established, comprehensive, and large in size will be more advantaged than small institutions mostly located in rural areas… Neither does the government treat any institutions differently nor does the government choose to control them purposively. As a result, under this non-selective policy, private institutions are affected differently due to their background and capacity.”

It can be inferred that since the laws contain high standards, longstanding semi-elite private universities and several serious-demand-absorbing ones that are replete with high capacity and resources may fulfill such legal requirements much easier than small proprietary-owned demand-absorbing colleges that have limited resources and funding. In other words, one may witness differentiation as an effect of coercive isomorphism where various types of PHEIs respond to the same standards differently. In this vein, differences among PHEIs do not come from different public policies but rather the market and their own dynamics.

Aside from these two major laws, PHEIs are also subject to over 20 ministerial regulations.61 Such detailed regulations cover various procedural issues such as specification of lands, conditions for institutional establishment, institutional accreditation, procedures on declaring institutional property and donation, curricula and programs, degree conferral, faculty appointment, faculty standards, employee benefits.

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61 For more information on laws and regulations related to higher education, see [http://www.mua.go.th/law.html](http://www.mua.go.th/law.html).
and fringes, design of identification card for employees, faculty/employee/student databases, changes of institutional status\textsuperscript{62} or name, branch campus and center, accounting and annual financial report, advertisement procedures, annual report (Legal Affairs 2007). With this enormous amount of procedural regulations, Interviewee 3 particularly felt the tighter control from the government as opposed to the looser one that the government claimed:

“For the matter of curriculum accreditation, in Act 2550, instead of directly stating that private institutions follow a similar procedure that public universities have, it was written that the university council has a power to approve curriculum and accredit the curriculum’s standards. However, this academic process must follow the CHE’s procedures which are supplementing laws and ministerial regulations… Previously, if we updated a little bit of the curriculum, we didn’t have to report to the CHE. Now, only adjusting a course description or course number, we have to submit a report to the CHE every semester… Therefore, in the main law, it sounds nice, giving the university council’s power to approve things but whatever we do the CHE strictly monitors us.”

Even with the Act 2550 and its subsequent freedoms, it seems that PHEIs still fight the enduring government’s tight control via overwhelming ministerial regulations.

In sum, PHE Acts and ministerial regulations tend to shape PHEIs to become alike under the similar regulatory framework. Although the Act 2546 classified PHEIs into 3 different types: university, college and institute, similar procedures and regulations for institutional management and operation were applied to all PHEIs. This is clearly the government’s intention to treat all PHEIs in a standardized way. Only the requirements for initial establishment of an institution are slightly different; for example, to be licensed as a university, requirements and standards are higher than as a college. Other procedural

\textsuperscript{62} A lot of PHEIs started with a “college” status as establishment requirements are more manageable to achieve while requirements are stricter if registering as a university. Nevertheless, they are likely to apply for a status upgrade for more legitimacy.
regulations are mostly alike. In this vein, institutional isomorphism within the PHE sector becomes a consequence of the coercive public policy.

### 6.1.2 Quality Assurance

Institutional characteristics of Thai PHEIs are partially shaped by the government’s quality assurance policy as well. This is so because the government pays serious attention to the expansion of higher education and its quality in order to ensure high standards of human resource preparation and the development of internationalization (Chandarasorn 2002). In 1996 the Ministry of the University Affairs promulgated a policy and procedure for the quality assurance of higher education, as an effort to raise the standard and meet international criteria. This new policy was a response to the 8th national economic development plan (1997-2001) for producing a workforce in global market competition (Standards and Evaluation 2008). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the National Education Act of B.E. 2542 (1999) enforced educational standards and quality assurance of both internally and externally to be assessed at all educational institutions across the country (Education Council 2004). As a result of this Act, the government has inaugurated the office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA) and has endowed it with responsibility for overseeing the external quality assurance of all Thai education institutions.

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63 Due to the administrative organization of the Ministry of Education Act of B.E. 2546 (2003) which amalgamated the Ministry of the University Affairs (MUA) and the Ministry of Education (MOE) in 2003, the MUA was renamed the Commission on Higher Education (CHE), one of the five major offices of the Ministry of Education. The CHE is responsible for private and public higher education provisions in regards to policy proposals; plans and standards development; human resources development; establishment, amalgamation, and improvement of higher education institutions; quality assurance; and accreditation (Education Council 2004).

64 The Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA), stipulated in the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999) and Amendments (Second National Education Act B.E. 2545 (2002)), is a public organization responsible for developing criteria and procedures of external evaluation.
These quality assurance policies and procedures are applied to both private and public HEIs. The CHE is responsible for assessing the International Quality Assurance (IQA) every year, whereas the ONESQA assesses and accredits the External Quality Assurance (EQA) every 5 years. Law requires the publication of these IQA and EQA reports for all Thai institutions. The finding reports that both IQA and EQA standards and indicators are relatively comparable so that HEIs can easily develop their own quality assurance systems in order to meet both the CHE’s and ONESQA’s standards. Even so, the interviewees’ reactions on the effects of the standards and assessment processes between IQA and EQA seem controversial.

To begin with, under the IQA process—which requires quality control, audit and assessment—HEIS must submit an annual self-assessment report that addresses 9 aspects of quality standards. Both private and public HEIs are free to apply any quality assurance system or strategy suitable to their own institutions, as long as they address these 9 issues (Standards and Evaluation 2008). Rather than hinder PHEIs, the IQA standards tend to facilitate institutional planning and administration. Among others, Interviewees 3 and 19 shared their appreciation for the standards.

Interviewee 3:

“It is apparent that the government has made an effort to enhance educational standards by creating performance indicators for both private and public universities... This is a good effort. I think this policy helps us see our direction clearer, how to meet the national standards as it reflects the government’s needs toward higher education administration.”

65 IQA standards are composed of 3 dimensions: 1) quality of graduates; 2) higher education administration and 3) development of knowledge and learning society. Under these 3 dimensions, there are 9 aspects of quality standards to be assessed: 1) philosophy, mission & objective, and an implementation plan; 2) instruction; 3) student development activities; 3) research; 5) academic service to the community; 6) art and culture preservation; 7) administration and management; 8) finance and budgeting and 9) a quality assurance system (Standards and Evaluation 2008).

and conduction evaluation of the quality and performance of educational institutions (Education Council 2004).
Interviewee 19:

“It is good since it makes my job easier, meaning that I can easily control the academic quality of our service if we can meet the standards. I don’t have to worry, but rather I’m happy. It helps our administration.”

Even with such freedom, the finding signals coercive isomorphism where PHEIs tend to have comparable characteristics for following the IQA process as a result of the CHE’s only set of indicators. The distinction among PHEIs thus depends on how well they perform on each indicator. In this vein, institutional differentiation among various types of PHEIs appears only as a matter of degree. For instance, semi-elite universities emphasizing on research are likely to score better in that regard than small cultural-oriented colleges where research is less focused than cultural preservation. Anyhow, both types of institutions do portray similar characteristics—research and culture preservation, making institutional diversity rather limited.

Partly in line with the IQA, EQA evaluation covering both institutional and departmental levels is based on institutional missions. Both private and public HEIs are required to choose among 4 missions as priorities: research, academic service to the community, culture preservation, and teaching. HEIs will be evaluated using the required common indicators as well as the indicators specific to the mission they chose. At the end, HEIs will be accredited with any of the 3 conditions: 1) accredited according to the

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66 The ONESQA is on the second round of its EQA and accreditation. The second EQA, during 2006-2010, is different from the first round in 3 aspects: 1) coverage of both institutional and departmental levels; 2) declaration of institutional mission; and 3) accreditation of both institutional and departmental levels. In contrast, the first EQA was processed from 2001 to 2005 using 8 higher education standards: 1) quality of graduates; 2) student learning; 3) learning support; 4) research; 5) academic service; 6) culture preservation; 7) management; 8) international quality assurance. Performance indicators for evaluation were similar for all HEIs, regardless of whether they are private or public. Assessing only at the institutional level, the first evaluation gave HEIs an idea of how well they performed as a pre-cursory to further accreditation (National Education Standards and Quality Assessment 2007).
quality standards; 2) accredited with conditions; and 3) non-accredited (National Education Standards and Quality Assessment 2004; Standards and Evaluation 2008).

According to the ONESQA, its classification by missions allows HEIs to assess themselves and see which type of missions would best fit their organizational natures and behaviors. Theoretically, both private and public HEIs would benefit from this division of goals as they are different entities sometimes pursuing different missions and have different operational strategies. Assessing them based on their distinct natures would yield more effective and realistic results. As Interviewee 23 echoed, diversity of PHEIs particularly in this sense stems from non-coercive force since private institutions have a chance in positioning themselves based on their strengths and preferences:

“ONESQA evaluates all institutions every 5 years by using similar standards and indicators. However, if they are large institutions, they may focus on research and teaching more than the small ones, which may be only teaching-oriented… Therefore, the 4 missions are variables. In the second evaluation, ONESQA requires institutions to declare how they weigh each mission… Most institutions do not give a lot of weight to research; they emphasize teaching, academic service or cultural preservation. MUT may focus on research, but others are likely not. This is a variable that makes PHEIs different. Nonetheless, it is not imposed differentiation but rather volunteered differentiation because institutions choose to position themselves…”

While institutional diversity is imposed through non-coercive form of EQA policy, the finding reveals certain institutional stratification between private and public sectors and within the private sector as an impact of the policy indicators. Some PHEIs felt that the ONESQA’s indicators tend to favor public universities and large semi-elite private universities as opposed to equalizing opportunity to all kinds of HEIs. Along with other interviewees, Interviewee 7, for example, complained that the EQA standards cause different types of HEIs to score or gain advantages differently:
It is common that public universities are perceived as institutions receiving resources and support the most from the government whereas PHEIs gain much less government financial support than the public ones. Within the private sector, the finding shows that large semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing universities tend to be wealthier and better established than small demand-absorbing colleges. Various intertwined reasons are that semi-elites operate in a larger scale with more students resulting in more incomes from tuition, more faculty members to do research work, more self-generated incomes via their marketization activities such as publishing house, cafeteria, dormitories, and renting-out their facilities. Here, the Thai reality illustrates the “Matthew Effect” Trow (1987) pointed out. It seems that with all those advantages, public universities and large semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing private universities have all the capacities to meet or even exceed the EQA’s criteria much easier than small demand-absorbing or religious-oriented private colleges. Concisely put, for the Thai reality, the IQA seems to create coercive isomorphism with limited institutional diversity among HEIs due to the one and only set of indicators while different ability to do well on the EQA is the result of different quality.

6.1.3 Tax laws

Another public policy influencing on differences of Thai PHEIs’ operation is tax-related policy. Tax exemption for Thai PHEIs is believed to be a major support from the government, as stipulated in the sixth chapter of the PHE Act of 2003 (ACT 2546) that the government will subsidize PHEIs by exempting them from the import tax for goods
and equipments related to academia and research (Prarachabanyat Sathabun Udomsuksa Akachon B.E. 2546 2003). Aside from the import tax, licensees of PHEIs and donors are exempted from income tax, specific business tax\(^67\) and stamp duty\(^68\) for any land transfers and donations of non-movable property to PHEIs (Praratchakridsadeeka Awktamkwannai Pramuanrachadakorn Waduy Garnyokwen Ratsadakorn (Chababtee 427) B.E. 2548 2005).

Although PHEIs receive government financial incentives via tax exemptions, they still have to abide by tax-related obligations, including annual property tax and donation. The finding reveals that these tax-related obligations have become a burden for some PHEIs, particularly large universities. In this regard, Interviewee 21 pointed out conflicting regulations between various government agencies involving property tax:

“…we [PHEIs] have to pay property tax. The CHE enacted the regulation, requiring that we must have plenty of land while the SAO\(^69\) is the one collecting tax. And these agencies are two separate government entities which do not cooperate with one another... They do not support us, but rather collect tax from us... The more space you have, the higher the tax.”

Given that the CHE’s ministerial regulations indicate a specific amount of lands for an establishment of university, college and institute differently,\(^70\) some large private

\(^67\) Specific Business Tax (SBT) is indirect tax in which certain businesses exempted from Value Added Tax (VAT) are subject to. For more information, see Specific Business Tax, in Tax Structures, available [online] at: The Revenue Department, http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6042.0.html.

\(^68\) Stamp duties are taxes on instruments which are signified as any document chargeable with duty according to the Revenue Code. For more information, see Stamp Duty, in Tax Structures, available [online] at The Revenue Department, http://www.rd.go.th/publish/21986.0.html.

\(^69\) SAO stands for Sub-district Administration Organization.

\(^70\) According to section 9 of PHE Act 2546, there are 3 types of PHEIs: 1) university; 2) institute; and 3) college. University signifies an institution offering various fields of study, holding degree-granting power for all levels, and aiming at instructional provision and research. Institute signifies an institution offering specialized fields of study, holding degree-granting power for all levels and primarily providing instruction and research. College signifies an institution offering particular fields of study, holding degree-granting power for only levels under master’s degree and mainly providing teaching with research being an optional. In order to receive approval for establishment of a private higher education institution, land given
universities have to pay an enormous amount of property tax because of their large campuses. In this vein, it seems that all private universities, regardless of PHE types, are affected by this property tax the most when compared to colleges and institutes. Indeed, the finding reveals that one of the semi-elite universities paid roughly 15 million Baht in 2008 for property tax alone. Likewise, Interviewee 1 complained that, “we even built a church within our university and we had to pay property tax.” Interviewee 12 shared the same property tax burden and requested for electricity and water exemptions:

“...we have to pay for property tax, which is collected differently depending on each SAO... we do not receive any exemptions even for the buildings used for educational purposes. Neither are Electricity and water exemptions. For instance, the electric rate will be cheaper at night but we have to operate in the day time. It seems that they are supporting nightclubs and bars instead of educational institutions. Our electricity bill is very expensive; each month is about 1-2 million Baht...”

Along with property tax which affects all types of Thai PHEIs in different degree, donation is another tax-related concern for private institutions. The finding shows that private universities affiliated with religious foundations especially raise concerns about donation tax. Donation for PHEIs is still not common in Thailand and many other places outside the United States. Even so, Levy (2007) found some increasing large-scale philanthropic movements for private universities around the world, including Italy and Germany. In Thailand, large-scale donations for PHEIs can be given only under the government’s approval via some procedural regulations. For example, PHEIs must be granted an approval from the CHE if they are to receive more than 10 million Baht in donation (Legal Affairs 2007). Interviewee 24 pointed out the different governmental supports on donation taxes between Thailand and abroad:

of 100 rais (approximately 39.5 acres) must be available for the university type, and 10 rais (approximately 4 acres) for the types of institute and college (Legal Affairs 2007).
“Even the taxation issue, I don’t think it’s clear… There is a ceiling on donation to an institution. Donation to a foundation in Thailand is also problematic because such a foundation has to be announced in the Government Gazette. And there are a lot of conditions that some foundations cannot follow. We are also a private foundation, as the money we have raised has been used to support education within our institution. We help donate to Rotary and Lions Club, but still not qualified according to the law. Therefore, people who donate to our foundation will not be tax exempt… Compare this to other countries: I registered the American-Thai foundation and whoever makes a donation to this foundation will be tax exempt.”

It seems that even though the government theoretically supports PHEIs with tax exemptions, much of its intention is lost in the practical application of the laws and PHEIs still struggle against the regulation. Religious-oriented PHEIs tend to be affected the most by this donation tax constraint whereas demand-absorbing and semi-elite ones do not, given that they are overwhelmingly proprietary sponsored.

6.1.4 Government Soft Loans

Institutional characteristics of different PHE types in Thailand also involve government soft loans. While this public policy does not seem pertinent to institutional diversity of PHEIs like the PHE Act and quality assurance policy, this government soft loan helps characterize some PHEIs as another funding source for them.

Having discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, government soft loans are given by the Thai government as “in kind” support to PHEIs, seeing that government’s direct support to PHEIs is absent. PHEIs can use these loans as development funds in 3 areas: 1) faculty; 2) infra-structure; and 3) laboratory equipment. PHEIs must apply for these loans on a project basis, with a four percent interest rate, which is generally lower than the bank’s. Nevertheless, infra-structure and laboratory equipment loans are given in the form of
matching grants; PHEIs are approved only half of the proposed loan and will have to show their financial affordability for the other half.

Interviewee 10 reported that PHEIs applying to these loans are mostly medium to large institutions, as most small demand-absorbing institutions are not financially capable. As the PHE literature notes, most small PHEIs are family-run, focused hefty on teaching and training, and usually offered inexpensive fields that do not require a large investment (Altbach 2005c; Geiger 1986); this holds true for the case of Thai demand-absorbing institutions as well. Given such characteristics, small demand-absorbing PHEIs may not have any need for such government loans. Furthermore, according to the finding, small demand-absorbing private colleges feel that dealing with conditions and regulations throughout the loan application process is cumbersome for they are just too regulated to be of any use to them, as Interviewee 7 reflected:

“... in practice, only few private institutions apply for such loans because conditions and requirements are obstacles... Since the conditions are so detailed and enormous, even if the interest rate is low, there are not many private institutions applying.”

In contrast, medium-sized private universities—mostly non-family-run or managed by a retired public university president—often take advantage of such government soft loans. Among them, Interviewee 24 commented:

“The faculty development loan is helpful and so is the infrastructure loan. We used to apply with long-term low interest rates. The loan for faculty studying abroad is beneficial. We took advantage of this loan twice, and the regulations and procedures are not complicated. We also applied for matching funds for construction and equipment purchasing. They all are fine.”

One explanation for such diverse viewpoints is that PHEIs influenced by religious foundations or run by former public university personnel are familiar with detailed
regulations and procedures as well as the transparency in financial management. Family-run demand-absorbing institutions are mostly centralized, dependent on only the owners and have a difficult time handling detailed regulations in their operations. They generally prefer flexibility and less bureaucratic procedures in their management, especially in finance. When they justify that the amount of loans is not large enough, they would rather not go through all the burdens. In this way, conditions from the government soft loans become construed by the smaller family-run demand-absorbing colleges as a tight string attachment whereas their students take loans more than semi-elite students do.

6.1.5 Government Student Loans

Similar to previously discussed major public policies, government student loans policy helps to shape different types of PHE characteristics. Due to excess demand in higher education and government budget cutbacks, government loan schemes have become one of the most attractive public policies, seeing that over 50 countries have introduced student loans schemes at the higher education level (Ziderman 2004). Likewise, Thailand issued the Student Loans Fund (SLF)\(^71\) policy in 1998 to ensure access for needy students via student loans under excessively favorable repayment conditions (Prarachabunyat Kongtoon Haikooyuem Pur Kansuksa 1998; Ziderman 2003). This government policy inauguration was a part of Thailand’s economic liberalization commitment to the IMF since the economic crisis in 1997. Successively, another type of student loans titled, Income Contingent Loan (ICL) modeled after the successful Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) was implemented in 2006 alongside the existing SLF (Chapman 2005; Ziderman 2006). Students who meet

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specified requirements in both private and public HEIs are eligible for the loans. It is apparent that both SLF and ICL have become a prime income source for PHEIs, in particular, via the form of tuition and fees. Even so, the degree of government-financial dependency of PHEIs via student loan schemes varies among PHE types, and these student loan programs facilitate different types of PHE expansion.

With an SLF policy (Prarachabunyat Kongtoon Haikooyuem Pur Kansuksa 1998), students from any HEI can apply for the loan. Nonetheless, there are certain restrictions for the government’s budget is limited.\textsuperscript{72} This SLF loan, while helpful to most, limits its pool of applicants and may be unfair in its dispersal of funds. The loan allocation to HEIs is based on number of students. More importantly, this loan scheme has expanded very quickly, resulting in budgetary cutbacks. Eventually, each individual institution receives a minimum amount of loan that is below recommended levels (Ziderman 2003).

The ICL, in contrast, is based on cost-sharing platform, moving beyond the previous state-subsidized social platform of SLF. This ICL loan scheme is limited to only baccalaureate and undergraduate students of certain majors according to the government’s needs. The amount of loans per annum awarded varies upon fields.\textsuperscript{73} While the payback procedure is relatively similar to SLF’s, under this ICL format, the tax authorities are responsible for repayment collection (Ziderman 2006). It seems that this

\textsuperscript{72} The loan is need-based, limited to high-school students applying to an HEI, vocational education students, and baccalaureate and undergraduate students whose family annual income does not exceed 200,000 Baht (approximately 5,714 USD). The amount given to each student varies by the student’s field of study, ranging from 84,000 Baht (2,400 USD) for social science and architecture to 174,000 Baht (4,971 USD) for medicine, veterinary medicine, and dentistry. Two years after graduating, students must start paying back the loan with 1 percent interest rate for a maximum of 15 years.

\textsuperscript{73} Social science and architecture (60,000 Baht; 1,714 USD); engineering, science, technology and agriculture (70,000 Baht; 2,000 USD); public health, nursing and pharmacy (80,000 Baht; 2,285 USD); and medicine, veterinary medicine, dentistry (150,000 Baht; 4,285 USD). For more information, see Student Loan Funds, available [online] at http://www.studentloan.or.th/loan.php.
ICL loan is even more selective, as it can fluctuate depending on the government’s needs and the coverage specified at the moment may change based on the market demands.

While SLF and ICL are available for both private and public HEIs, the finding reports that the loans tend to help lessen the financial burden of PHEIs more than they help the public universities.\textsuperscript{74} For instance, Interviewee 23 reasoned that government student loans help a great deal in facilitating the growth of PHE:

\begin{quote}
Since there have been government student loans, existing [private] institutions have increased their enrollment and new [private] institutions have emerged. This is very beneficial for the development of PHEIs, given their rapid jump. It is not that beneficial for public universities, as they cannot accommodate all students due to the limited public university admission policy… Now there are such loans and students do not have to tie themselves to only public universities; they can choose reputable private universities instead because they can pay tuition and fees with their government loans…”
\end{quote}

PHEIs typically receive government subsidies by enrolling students whose tuition is paid by the government (World Bank 2000). In this vein, students who cannot afford higher education on their own can have money through the loans to pay tuition and fees at a PHEI.

Within the private sector, different types of PHEIs seem to take advantage of the government student loans variously. Table 19 shows that Thai demand-absorbing PHEIs tend to bank upon such student loans the most whereas a majority of semi-elite private universities rely on student loans the least. Some serious-demand-absorbing institutions rely heftily on ICL as most of their students are qualified for the fields particularly promoted (e.g., engineering). Other serious-demand-absorbing ones intentionally receive fewer loans because they already provide their own institutional scholarships. Semi-elite

\footnote{74 Public universities already charge tuition and fees at a subsidized rate.}
private universities also have other income sources aside from student loans, thereby taking fewer loans.

**Table 19: Sample of Different Types of Thai PHEIs Receiving Government Student Loans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHEIs</th>
<th>Students Receiving Student Loans</th>
<th>% of Total Income from Tuition &amp; Fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-Elite</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution A</td>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>About 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution B</td>
<td>Less than 15%</td>
<td>About 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution L</td>
<td>About 30%</td>
<td>About 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Q</td>
<td>About 30%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution D</td>
<td>About 60%</td>
<td>About 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serious-Demand-Absorbing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution M</td>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>About 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution J</td>
<td>About 30%</td>
<td>About 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution E</td>
<td>About 60%</td>
<td>About 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution F</td>
<td>About 80%</td>
<td>About 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious-Oriented</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution N</td>
<td>About 60%</td>
<td>About 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand-Absorbing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution R</td>
<td>About 60%</td>
<td>About 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution P</td>
<td>About 70%</td>
<td>About 98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution K</td>
<td>More than 80%</td>
<td>About 90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table illustrates different 13 PHEIs within 4 institutional types that receive either SLF or ICL or both. The percentages here are estimate figures given by interviewees of each institution. Sources are from interview data.

The finding reveals some institutional discrepancies as a result of the government student loans, as Interviewee 7 pointed out:

"Although the government leans its support towards [us], it is still not enough. When it comes to funding allocation, its support is geared toward public universities or large private universities more than to small private colleges. In practice, there are still some surpluses and deficits."

It is believed that in being considered for the loans, small demand-absorbing private colleges are treated less favorably than public universities and large semi-elite private universities even if the latter ones do not necessary desire for the loans as much as the former. This has become problematic for the higher education system as a whole. A
majority of interviewees repeated that some institutions—both private and public—heftily recruit students eligible for the loans via aggressive advertisement strategies which sometimes result in scandals. This creates misunderstandings and conflicts among different sectors of higher education. Therefore, to ameliorate a rivalry, Ziderman (2003) suggested that any loans scheme needs simultaneous consideration on the issues of planning, monitoring, execution, evaluation, and organizational structure of both the macro-level system and institutional system.

6.1.6 Instability of the Policies and the Government

As shown through the complex web of laws, tax exemptions and government loans, politics and public policies have always been major influencers on Thai PHE development. Thai political stability is thus a key factor for sustainability and diversification of all PHE types. Although leading global discourses accentuate that higher education systems would be efficacious and autonomous only when shielded from the enduring influence of governments, political parties and any short-term political incidents relevant to education (Bok 1980; World Bank 2000), it is inevitable for Thailand and many other countries to be able to mute politics from higher education simply because politics is rooted fundamentally everywhere in the societies either in the form of regulations and policies or as government intervention or both75. Indeed, one may witness an increasing role of the governments and politics in private and public higher education worldwide (Bok 1980; Kaplin and Lee 1995; Levy and Zumeta forthcoming).

75 Examples of government policies, regulations, and interventions on PHEIs can be found in PROPHE Global News Reports, available [online] at http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/publication/NewsArticle.html.
Inasmuch as the national government and its policies have abundant influence on Thai PHEIs, it is unfortunate that the Thai political system has rarely been stable and the turnover rate of each government and minister has been remarkable (Phongpaichit and Baker 2002). Indeed, as Interviewee 10 noted, in the past the Minister of Education was changed every 3 months, amounting to roughly 5 ministers within 1 year. Such a rapid turnover rate tends to create an ambiguous direction for HEIs as it affects continuity of the policy implementation. Similar to the public sector, PHEIs cannot escape the impact of such instability on their institutional planning and operation. The impact seems severe when it comes to planning and finance in particular. Interviewee 3 found it hard to characterize her institution’s coping method with the government policy as the government keeps changing:

“After the coup d’état [in 2006], it has been unpredictable. Due to the instability of the government, we survive yet without any directions. I’d like to emphasize this. Because of the government’s instability, the Minister of Education cannot issue any policy and we cannot foresee any directions for our higher education development. No one really takes responsibility: neither the MOE nor the NESDB\textsuperscript{76} does… As a result, private institutions have to adapt a short-term vision and planning from the government. When it comes to management survival strategy, we have to constantly change our planning and it is not healthy…”

As the government and its ministers keep rotating, policies slip by and terminate eventually. According to Phongpaichit and Baker (2002), the Thai political power for complex legislation reforms lies heavily in the hands of the conservative senior bureaucracy whereas individual ministers designated by their political parties may succeed certain policy changes via personal networks. In this vein, short-term policy initiatives come and go with individual ministers, depending mostly on how stable each

\textsuperscript{76} NESDB stands for the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board. For more information, see \textit{NESDB}, available [online] at \url{http://www.nesdb.go.th/}. 
government is. The finding reveals that inconsistent government financial supports for faculty development, research, and student loans are a repeatedly big problem for the interviewees, regardless of their institutional types. Indeed, Interviewee 2 pointed out that research and faculty development funding were unpredictable at the time when the MOE’s administrative structure was changed in 2003:

“The government improved its administration by transferring the MUA into the CHE, under the MOE. We used to receive research and faculty development funds but once the MUA was transferred, other institutions applied but couldn’t get such funds as [the funds] were terminated. Sometimes changes of policy and government cause changes in budgeting and funding… This reflects inconsistent support.”

Likewise, uncertainty of government student loans causes difficulties for students in PHEIs, as reflected by Interviewee 5:

“Sometimes we are tired of this student loans policy. Originally there was only SLF and our students were not qualified… but when there was ICL more students applied to our institution since the hotel management fields were in demand and they could apply for the ICL. Once they enrolled, the ICL was terminated, and only SLF remained. This sudden policy change brought about a lot of burdens for students and the private sector.”

Political commitment is crucial for higher education development and sustainability, and Thai PHEIs struggle with the policy and funding changes. Chapman (2005) highlights that the higher education systems in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United Kingdom were weakened at some points without funding reforms and committed governmental support. For Thailand, it has become clear that PHEIs are government-dependent, particularly because student loans are their chief source of income. In this sense, demand-absorbing subsector banks upon government student loans the most and it is the largest subsector by absolute institutional number and total student enrollment among the 4 PHE types. Through a political economic view, government funding
relevant to management and operations of PHEIs are often put into question as the government fluctuates. Although the Thai PHE sector is private-funded and market-oriented by nature, government funding and regulations become strong catalysts for the sector’s diversification and survival in the higher education marketplace.

### 6.2 Market Mechanisms

Alongside the public policy force, the recent Thai PHEIs are heavily concerned with the force of market mechanisms as experienced by most PHEIs across the world. This is so because PHEIs, in order to survive, need to constantly adjust their institutional characteristics to a changing status of domestic—sometimes even international—market economy. Through the resource dependence perspective, the ability both to compete in the marketplace and to correctly forecast the supply-demand dynamics, thus, becomes crucial to their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Most importantly, different types of PHE may respond to the influence of market mechanisms variously and simultaneously market mechanisms may drive intra-sectoral differentiation and diversity of the PHE sector, which reflects the core of this research. The following subsections analytically discussed 4 major findings on market mechanisms and institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs: 1) market competition; 2) declining population; 3) increasing intra-sectoral diversity and 4) internationalization, information technology and partnership. Afterwards, the concluding section accentuates the relationship between political economic forces and institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs.
6.2.1 Market Competition: Aggressive Public Universities, Aggressive Government and Private Concerns

![Diagram showing market competition and private-public stratification of Thai Higher Education]

**Figure 18:** Market Competition and Private-Public Stratification of Thai Higher Education

When considering market competition, the findings reveal 3 overlapping issues that influence institutional diversity and diversification of all types of Thai PHEIs, as portrayed in Figure 18. They are public expansion and marketization, public privatization and stratification between private and public HEIs. According to Figure 18, PHE came to light as a parallel sector to the public higher education. Throughout the political economic processes of public expansion and marketization as well as privatization, both private and public higher education sectors have become diversified in not only institutional types but also institutional numbers as well as student enrollment. As a result of the institutional diversification process, the Thai higher education system in the modern days depicts a great deal of institutional diversity and market competition.

6.2.1.1 Public Expansion and Marketization

Higher education expansion and marketization of the public sector are crucial threats for the shape and growth of PHE, given that a competition for survival in the higher education marketplace becomes tense when populations (private and public HEIs, in this case) keep rising. The finding reveals that although the Thai government has
proclaimed several policy initiatives emphasizing more assistance for PHEIs and less support for the expansion of public universities (General Administration 2008), PHEIs continue to feel that the government does not have any concrete policies on standards and trends of the public sector expansion. Noted indeed, PHEIs are concerned a great deal in competing with public universities, seeing that different types of public universities have been diversified through rising numbers of branch campuses and increased seats in the public university admission policy.

To begin with, branch campuses have been a popular trend for Thai HEIs, particularly the public ones. Leaders of PHEIs and PHE experts fear that competition between private and public universities will be strikingly volatile and aggressive, given such public infinite expansion. Along with other interviewees, Interviewee 12 pointed out that various types of public universities whose main campuses are in Bangkok have opened a branch campus in other parts of Thailand:

“In order to provide quality education, we have to compete with public universities. Take a look at this policy. Is it necessary for [Public HEIs Sector B] to open a branch campus in the countryside? For example, in Chiang Mai, there are many universities already. [Public HEIs Sector B], [Public HEIs Sector D] all go. Why do they have to go? It is not necessary. Where will they find qualified faculty? For twenty-to-thirty thousand students, how will they find time to take care of the students due to their heavy teaching loads for both full-time and part-time programs? How will they find time to do research and prepare for teaching?”

Public university branch campuses typically offer full-time and part-time programs with a tremendous number of part-time faculty members. Interviewee 19 stressed that some

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77 In the 2008 CHE Annual Report, several policy initiatives emphasized that the government should not support the expansion of public universities any longer but rather increase their quality of education, research and development, as well as academic service to community. The government should also support and facilitate the private sector in higher education provision, particularly in the fields in which the private sector was specialized. Simultaneously, the government should encourage public universities to focus on the fields that required high investment and were in demand of the nation’s development in order to avoid duplication of fields offered between private and public HEIs.
public universities operate small centers in a secondary school or a shopping mall and
offer similar programs that are already offered by PHEIs in a similar location:

“… for example, [Public HEIs Sector B] opening their centers in a secondary school have only classrooms… not only in southern Thailand, but elsewhere… And other types of public universities have also started; for instance, [Public HEIs Sector D] has opened many centers, offering Master’s programs. Public universities do not take into account the existing mapping—who has already offered what? We have already offered Master of Law, [Public HEIs Sector D] should not have similarly offered Master of Law degree…”

It is striking that most features of public expansion here echo institutional characteristics of demand-absorbing PHEIs: branch campus, part-time programs, part-time faculty members, operating in a shopping mall and offering high-demand programs. In this vein, one may apply “demand-absorbing” title to these public institutions as well, except that, according to Interviewees 12 and 19, there seems to be neither new nor burgeoning demand for the public sector to absorb. For that reason, public expansion tends to pull away existing demands from PHEIs.

Alongside the public expansion, public universities have become increasingly marketized, just as similar as their private counterparts. The fundamental assumptions of the public sector believing in marketization are that the private sector approach is relatively superior to traditional bureaucratic approaches and thus adopting strategies and practices of the private sector in its operation is advantageous (Mok 2000). Through a pluralistic competition lens, Interviewee 24 complimented the public sector for being entrepreneurial:

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78 Branch campuses being established abroad have expanded in the last decade in many countries such as Australia, Qatar, Singapore, South Africa, the U.S. and Vietnam (Altbach 2005a).
“Self-generated income via training courses is another way to service the society and gain income but most universities do not pursue this feature seriously. I think the serious one is [a leading university of Public HEIs Sector B]. It is the only university that is good at this. It is an entrepreneur that can make a lump sum of money through its training courses, continuing education, part-time degree programs, and so forth. This is good for fund raising and as faculty extra incomes. However, we only doubt about the quality if the university overdoes it. The university has opened in many provinces…”

As a result, the phenomenon of public expansion and marketization has worried many PHEIs. Previously, PHEIs were not allowed to open branch campuses or centers. While Act 2550 has deregulated this policy, PHEIs that are willing to expand their campuses are still encumbered by supplementing regulations. They must abide by all detailed ministerial procedures and are usually monitored closely for sufficiency of branch campus space, number of full-time faculty, campus facilities, and so forth (Legal Affairs 2007). Because of these limitations, there are only a few private universities exercising this opportunity; most PHEIs are not willing to deal with the regulations.

Notwithstanding, it is stressed that most demand-absorbing PHEIs have been operating in a low-cost convenient mode and have been long a growth dynamic for PHE.

Consequently, the public action on expansion and marketization seems to greatly threaten the largest subsector of the PHE, the demand-absorbing institutions.

Furthermore, the finding reports that PHEIs feel unstable as well when the Vocational Education Act was reauthorized in 2008. This law grants public vocational schools the power to offer bachelor’s degrees (Prarachabanyat Karn Aachiwasuksa B.E. 2551 2008). Likely stemming from the politician’s force, this policy push-through is perceived as another government attempt to promote public higher education accessibility and expansion. PHEIs, especially small family-run demand-absorbing colleges that also
own a private vocational school offering a transfer for their students with associate
degrees from another vocational school, are threatened by this policy because they fear
that they will lose their feeders to the public sector. Anew, it seems that the public sector
expansion may carve up existing student enrollment share from the private sector—the
demand-absorbing subsector in particular. Eventually, as Marginson (2007) emphasizes,
market forces such as marketization can intensify rivalry and exclusion between the
private and public sectors.

Apart from rising branch campuses of public universities and Vocational
Education Act reauthorization, the current policy to increase seats in the public university
admission system is another public expansion challenge to PHEIs. Indeed, it is common
elsewhere that the governments steer the higher education systems on the matters of
higher education expansion, budget and enrollment policies (Neave and van Vught 1994).
Although Thailand’s increased public university admission policy neither have a purpose
regarding PHEIs nor try to diminish them, they seem to unintentionally have impacts on
the PHE sector.

A majority of interviewees believed that increased admission of public
universities is one of the reasons that PHEIs lose their enrollment shares in these last few
years as most public universities do not limit their admissions to only one round, but have
prolonged their admissions process by accepting applications in further subsequent
rounds. Interviewee 20 observed that students often choose a public university and that
universities in the Public HEIs Sector B have opened their branches everywhere. Similar
to others, Interviewee 13 expressed the burden of competing with the public sector in
recruiting prospective students:
“Look at the [public university] admission policy. Students had applied and taken the exam. Whoever passed the exam would get in. While the result of the first round was released, they [public universities] continued for the second round. [Public HEIs Sector B] also took students for the fifth round. Then, where can private institutions find the students? Nowadays we have to twist the ground to find a student. We finally have to take students who did not pass the admission exam.”

Interviewees 17, a quality assurance public agent, pointed out that in the next 10 years, if public universities expanded indefinitely, PHEIs would suffer. Regardless of their types, PHEIs eventually feel the inevitable public threat. The Thai finding is partly in line with the Mexican case where the overwhelming public expansion wound up leading to private consequences. In that case, however, the public expansion fueled the rise of elite private universities (Levy 1986b) whereas in the Thai case, an impact tends to be PHE decline in overall and the surge of institutional distinctiveness in individual cases.79

6.2.1.2 Public Privatization

Public expansion in the form of privatization of public HEIs is another challenge for the shape and growth of PHEIs. In some of the developing countries, the governments have adopted various approaches in order to shift from the total state funding to other reliance sources, thereby privatizing public HEIs and treating them as semi-independent corporations (Marginson 2007; Varghese 2004). Considering China, for instance, all public HEIs are expected to generate income from various kinds of commercial activities for their state appropriation amounts to only roughly 20-30 percent of institutional incomes (Cheng 2009). Similarly in Thailand, privatization of limited-

79 Examples could be PHEIs in the serious-demand-absorbing and cultural-oriented subsectors. Those institutions have well-defined missions and goals that are geared toward a particular niche. They are not the mainstream ones and thus they tend to do well in the competitive higher education marketplace as long as they find their specific niches.
admission public universities as autonomous universities reflects such a global
tendency. 80

As mentioned in Chapter 4, all public universities are fully subsidized by the
government for their operations. Their faculty and staff are considered civil servants
under the government laws—similar to civil servants under other ministries. The finding
reports that by transferring to autonomous universities, public universities still receive
government budgets, but are not regulated under the bureaucratic procedures and laws.
The government offers a block grant and the autonomous universities are able to manage
their financial allocation and operation without interference. A majority of interviewees
believed that because of the financial gain (subsidies) paired with the freedom, public
autonomous universities are at an advantage in the market competition. Interviewee 13,
18, 20, for instance, accentuated that although PHEIs are flexible, efficient and speedy in
their management compared to traditional public universities, once become autonomous,
public universities will have both government subsidies and a flexible management style.
PHEIs do not get any direct funding from the government for their operations. In the
near future, Interviewee 20 feared that the market competition between PHEIs and public
universities will become even more volatile once all public universities turn into
autonomous ones.

On the contrary, leaders of some private institutions such as Interviewee 6 do not
seem to be bothered by the transformation of public universities into autonomous

80 As of July 2008, there were 13 public autonomous universities: 1) Burapha University, 2)
Chiang Mai University, 3) Chulalongkorn University, 4) King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology
Ladkrabang, 5) King Mongkut’s University of Technology North Bangkok, 6) King Mongkut’s University
of Technology Thonburi, 7) Mahamakut Buddhist University, 8) Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya
University, 9) Mahidol University, 10) Mae Fah Luang University, 11) Suranaree University of
Technology, 12) Thaksin University and 13) Walailak University (List of Higher Education Institutions
under the Commission on Higher Education 2009).
institutions as long as the government enforces similar standards to both private and public sectors:

“I don’t mind public universities that have been transformed into autonomous ones; I indeed encourage them to. Only one thing I want is that we must compete under similar rules despite all the assets and buildings they have already had. Once they become autonomous, will they dare enough to stop being subsidized by the government? Private universities have to do everything by themselves to survive and are still monitored and controlled.”

Likewise, Interviewee 23, a former government authority, argued that PHEIs push public universities to become autonomous, in order to compete with the flexibility and effectiveness of the private sector:

“…since the private sector’s emergence, it is obvious that being privates make the institutional development move forward so quickly due to privateness and flexibility. Simultaneously, the private sector has become a force for public universities not to be stagnant. In the past, public universities had never thought about competing with the privates but nowadays they cannot as the privates have developed so fast. It is great that this competition has occurred and resulted in public universities transferring themselves to become autonomous…”

As Varghese (2004) points out, public universities have become more autonomous from the government by adopting the private sector’s managerial and entrepreneurial styles. In this vein, both private and public HEIs in Thailand have turned into each other’s catalyst in pursuit of competitiveness in the higher education marketplace, reiterating the global realities of private-public dynamics (Demurat 2008; Otieno and Levy 2007; Pachuashvili 2008).

6.2.1.3 Private-Public Stratification in the Higher Education Marketplace

As mentioned in Chapter 1, higher education in Thailand has been dominated by the public sector, akin to higher education systems in many countries outside the United States. In recent years, some PHEIs have received worldwide attention because of their
aggressive competition with public universities (Mabizela, Levy, and Otieno 2007). Likewise, Figure 18 in the opening section of market competition illustrates the Thai findings that reveal a sensitive economic tension in the market competition between private and public HEIs and among private PHEIs themselves.

Due to sharp competition and heavily regulated public policy, Thai higher education institutions become further differentiated and stratified. According to Figure 18, at the apex of the higher education pyramid, top institutions include the oldest five public universities.\textsuperscript{81} As the interviewees mentioned, these longstanding public universities are typically the first choice of high school graduates across the country, and most of them who get into such universities have excellent academic records and middle-to-upper socioeconomic status.\textsuperscript{82} If students fail to get into the top public universities, semi-elite private universities located in Bangkok are usually the alternative, instead of public regional and provincial universities. Rajabhat and Rajamangkla public universities and other types of PHEIs make up the lower tiers of the Thai higher education marketplace. Indeed, many interviewees reported that within the Rajabhat university subsector, the discrepancy of quality and size between the universities in Bangkok and regional institutions is remarkable.

Moreover, our Thai finding suggests that higher education market competition in overall tends to be much more aggressive between private and public HEIs rather than among PHEIs themselves. Nevertheless, within the private sector, semi-elite universities compete compellingly against one another in addition to battling fiercely with some top

\textsuperscript{81} Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Mahidol University, Silpakorn University, and Kasetsart University.

\textsuperscript{82} As they likely can afford to pay for extra tutoring classes for the national university entrance examination.
public universities and regional ones. Serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs have started entering the top league in recent years, leaving behind small demand-absorbing and religious-oriented institutions in the lower tiers with provincial Rajabhat and Rajamangkla public universities.

For Thai PHEIs, competition with public universities tends to be a stumbling block that disadvantages their operation and development as discussed in the previous subsections. De facto, competing for student enrollments and social recognition with the public sector has become a challenging priority for PHEIs, not only in Thailand. Demurat (2008) notes that in Poland, pinnacle students by-and-large aspire for top public universities, leaving PHEIs to recruit near-pinnacle students instead. If the public universities sit at the top of the market, the private-public mix in the second tier is highly competitive (Levy 2008b). Coinciding with Demurat’s study, the Thai case illustrates fierce competition for the near-pinnacle students among top private universities and leading and regional public counterparts via aggressive marketing campaigns and public relation strategies.

Echoing Trow’s (1987) “Analysis of Status,” the Thai case illustrates the institutional stratification of both sectors of higher education (private vs. public) and institutions within sectors (large vs. small). Trow explains that the leading universities retain an advantage in the market competition whereas new institutions tend not to be attractive enough for prospective students and are unlikely to compete effectively with the traditional leading universities. Partly in line with Trow, Altbach (2004) notes that

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83 Popular student recruitment strategies include granting various kinds of scholarships, giving away free laptops and using celebrity to attract prospective students and to raise their institutional profiles.  
84 Ibid. For instance, new students in some semi-elite private universities or even demand-absorbing ones receive a free laptop on the day of enrollment and payment.
the bulk of PHEIs in Asia, including Thailand, are generally found at the bottom of this prestige hierarchy. Even so, one often finds demand-absorbing-like public universities toward the bottom hierarchy as well; the Thai case portrays a perfect illustration.

### 6.2.2 Declining Population

Alongside the public expansion force, declining population is reported as one of the significant factors constraining the growth of PHEIs in Thailand. By nature, PHEIs are heftily driven by the market demands. The finding suggests that PHEIs’ concerns about the supply-demand dynamic mainly involve the declining population of high school graduates and employers’ expectations. PHEIs need high school graduates as their major feeders to be transformed via the university process to become qualified products for the consumers—the future employers in the marketplace. If the feeders are dropping and the consumers are not satisfied with the products, PHEIs will be in a difficult situation for the market competition.

Similar to some other Asian countries—such as China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and so forth—Thailand has shown a glimpse of population declining phase since the last decade, given that elderly population have been increasing while youth population have been declining (Francese and Kinsella 1992; Hirschman 2001; Skeldon 1999). Recently, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) conducted a 30-year population projection and revealed that the fertility rate had dropped from 1.81 in 2000 to 1.60 in 2006. It will drop to 1.35 in 2030. Accordingly, newborn children will decrease whereas life expectancy will increase, resulting in increasing elderly population (The National Economic and Social Development Board 2007). In particular, the Thai statistics projects a drop of
youth ages 10-24 from 16,100,000 in 2006 to 14,500,000 in 2025 (Thailand Statistics 2009). This declining population tendency is so crucial that PHE leaders, researchers, and policy makers pay attention to and not be surprised by.

Seeing that fertility decline has become an increasingly salient theme in Asia and the public higher education expansion keeps moving forward, some PHEIs, such as Institution N, have decided to position themselves more carefully in the market. Institution N’s founder, a superior reverence, postulated that in the near future youth population would decrease and the retiree population would increase. By keeping his institution as a small religious-oriented college and not expanding its status to a university like others, he eases the competition between his institution and other private and public new institutions as well as expanding existing ones. Similar to several interviewees, Interviewee 12 stressed that the decline in birth rate affects the numbers of students going into the higher education system, which further fortifies the competition:

“The number of students going into the traditional education system is decreasing as a result of declining birth rate... At the higher education level competition is very aggressive and thus most PHEIs are unable to meet their recruitment targets.”

According to Interviewee 17, a quality assurance expert, a number of PHEIs—most likely small demand-absorbing colleges that enroll under 4,000 students—will have to merge or close in the near future because they will neither be able to survive the decreased enrollment and rising expenditure and investment nor cope up with the rising public expansion. Furthermore, Interviewee 6 speculated that private institutions offering social science programs will be in a similar situation since the country’s need for social scientists is declining. Indeed, Interviewee 3 suspected a merger trend in the private sector in which a small demand-absorbing private college in a northern province merges
with a large private university in Bangkok. It is apparent that the Thai case recaps Levy’s argument where declining population becomes a risk and prospect for small PHEIs as seen in other countries (Levy 2009a).

6.2.3 Increasing Intra-Sectoral Diversity: How PHEIs Respond to the Rising Public Challenge & Decreasing Demand

The fact that decreasing population will be affecting the decline of traditional students going into the higher education system while public expansion keeps rising is sooner or later inevitable for PHEIs regardless of their types. As a way to respond to such market mechanisms and government policy influences, PHEIs thus gear themselves more cautiously than they used to toward what the prospective consumers and employers want. As portrayed in Figure 19, two major trends of PHE’s responses are increasing diversification of fields of study and internationalization.

![Figure 19: Thai Private Higher Education's Responses to the Rising Public Challenge & Decreasing Demand](image)

6.2.3.1 Increasing Diversification of Fields of Study

Fields of study offered by HEIs are a significant discriminatory variable in investigating institutional diversity and diversification (Huisman 2007). Typically, PHEIs are long known for being alternatives to their public counterparts; henceforth,
being distinctive and innovative in fields of study and sub-fields instead of holding on to traditional fields like the public universities do is an acclaimed PHE contribution (Levy 1992). Along the similar continuum, Interviewee 10 and 23, both former government authorities, accentuated that Thai PHEIs differ among themselves depending on the programs and curricula they offer. Some institutions develop much faster than others as they keep updating their programs and contents in order to meet the latest employers’ specifications.

The Thai finding shows that as a response to the public expansion and population challenges, PHEIs pay closer attention to specific fields and programs than they used to as they follow the changing market demands. MUT, for instance, initially considered whether it would offer new fields of study that targeted the changing market trends in Thailand but finally decided not to at that moment. Fields such as law—not conventional law, but technology law, patent law, and commerce law—have recently emerged in the Thai higher education market, and although MUT focuses on technology, it still lacks faculty specialized in law. Even so, MUT plans to offer law programs designed to train in less conventional law such as patent law and commerce law. Likewise, some private colleges gear themselves toward computer information technology, as it is a major demand in the current worldwide market. Many students are interested in this field, and PHEIs like NBC or PTU advertise their strength in this field. Additionally, institutions offering international programs and English language courses attract more students; one reason being that parents want to find business partners through their children’s schools. Rather than over-diversifying their curriculum, some small demand-absorbing institutions distinguish themselves by concentrating on the quality of the popular fields, such as

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85 Some private colleges started as computer training schools or are affiliated with such schools.
business administration and communication arts. The Thai finding coincides with the Argentine case where increasingly diversified higher education system appears with a rising number of PHEIs focusing in the social sciences rather than in the medical sciences (Cohen 2003b). By so doing, it seems that PHEIs have turned the market demands into their strengths and produce particular graduates that meet the market’s needs. Although this market-driven approach in offered fields is fundamental in PHE expansion and consistent with the PHE literature on PHE’s choice of fields, the Thai findings assert that this approach has become one of the core motifs of PHE’s responses to new realities of intensified market competition.

Furthermore, the finding discloses that PHEIs use various bridging strategies to support the relationship between offered fields of study and employers’ demands. Some institutions, such as PYU—a Christian serious-demand-absorbing university—implemented a “cooperative education” model to pair up with various industries in both the private and public sector in order to keep up with the market demands. PYU requires senior undergraduate students to work in their fields of study for the academic year prior to graduation. CTU, another Christian-oriented institution, started a “community based curriculum,” in which all students have to interact with the local community and are required to work with local businesses related to their fields of study. Similarly, students of DTC—also serious-demand-absorbing—have to practice field training with the college’s hotel network as partial fulfillment of their degrees. Relatively, these features may be found at public universities and semi-elite private universities as well as large demand-absorbing PHEIs. The findings fit Levy (2007)’s argument that PHEIs could aggressively compete with public universities for average students and status recognition.
in the market. In doing so, PHEIs offer special programs that cater to fields and trainings linked directly to the job market.

Lastly, the finding suggests that PHEIs gain both students’ and employers’ trust by closely following the changing market demands. Leaders of PHEIs claim that their credentials in the marketplace are acceptable. According to the findings, for example, DTC claims that its employers welcome student trainees and graduates from DTC because DTC students are better trained and more specialized than students from other institutions. DTC also has extensive experience in hotel management-related fields due to support from its founding hotel corporations, experience which gives the university trustworthiness among its employers and networks. In like manner, BU and RSU—both semi-elite—advertise their success putting their graduates into the marketplace:

“Employers have trust in graduates of Bangkok University and offer a salary scale similar to that offered to graduates from public universities”; “employers see graduates of Rangsit University as qualified ones. This can also be counted as another certification of our success.”

Following the U.S. system in which competitive conditions encourage a number of HEIs to build “institutional willpower” (Clark 2004b)—the strength of will to carry out the institution’s plans, leaders of Thai PHEIs realize the importance of intrinsic motivation toward identifying their own uniqueness and boosting the quality of their institutions. In short, a competitive status hierarchy in the higher education marketplace has helped HEIs define themselves, differentiate their curricula from each other and seek resources and funding.
6.2.3.2 Internationalization, Information Technology and Partnership

Together with increasing diversification of fields of study, becoming competitive and legitimised via internationalization, information technology and partnership helps PHEIs to defeat the rising public challenge. It has become a common practice for both private and public HEIs worldwide to offer international programs, enroll foreign students with domestic ones, meet information technology benchmark, partner with foreign institutions for study abroad programs, or exchange faculty members for short-course teaching and research (Newman, Couturier, and Scurry 2004). Albeit typical practices in the globalization era, these listed features are indeed major motifs of PHEIs in responding to the rising intensified global market competition.

Participating in the global trend, a great number of private and public HEIs in Thailand progressively offer programs/activities concerned with internationalization and information technology. The levels of internationalization vary (with some overlapping) among different types of PHEIs, ranging from full international universities (AU and SIU) and international colleges within the universities (BU, DPU, UTCC), to only a few international programs commonly offered in many PHEIs. The first two levels are usually seen in semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing institutions while the last one is found in typical religious- and cultural-oriented as well as demand-absorbing PHEIs. Several institutions, including CTU and RSU, have gone so far in the effort to globalize their institutions that they are in the process of transforming their medium of instruction from Thai into English. Furthermore, most interviewees reported that the market prefers graduates fluent in English and versed in other language communications as well as information technology. For example, Interviewee 15 saw a benefit of being
international oriented: “… the fact that we are international and English language-oriented makes neighboring countries send their children to our institution in order to find business partners…” Likewise, Interviewee 7 proudly mentioned that being familiar with the market trend on information technology gave his institution a boost in market competition:

“In the era of internet information technology and globalization, most people pay attention to information technology which increases the market demand on such fields. It is also our strength in these fields that make students interested in enrolling into our institutions…. If we were not oriented in information technology, gearing toward humanities instead, we would not have had that many students enrolling.”

Apparently, many PHEIs regardless of their types claim that information technology and English language foci are among their strengths—especially demand-absorbing institutions whose owners also run vocational or language schools at the baccalaureate levels or non-formal education.

The finding also reveals that semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing institutions modeling from university abroad perceive themselves as more competitive in the market than other types of PHEIs and public universities because of their internationalization and international recognition. According to the interviewees, BU used Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey as a model academic structure, given their similar characteristic as a private urban university. CTU, which has been in the process of transforming to a full-fledged international university, is modeled after International Christian University in Japan. DTC was originally supported by SHATEC—the Singapore International Hotel & Tourism College—for its curriculum design and management. YNU was fundamentally influenced by Baylor University and Stanford University. Founded with the hope of becoming the Stanford University of Thailand, SIU applied some of the evaluation
indicators from Imperial College London. Indeed, all of them have been partnering with such foreign institutions in one form or another. It is sensible that the key link for such partnerships between these Thai PHEIs and institutions abroad stems from the private institutions’ founders who are either alumni or networks of the partnering foreign institutions. The underlying motif of those founders, mostly business elites or reverent scholars, is likely to strive for distinctiveness and legitimacy. For that reason, the Thai finding largely recapitulates the global realities where partnership and international recognition are PHE’s crucial strategies in the pursuit of legitimacy (Levy 2009b; Slantcheva and Levy 2007).

6.3 Conclusion

Throughout Chapter 6, the findings and discussions emphasize two major factors of political economic forces bolstering institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs: public policies and market mechanisms. The chapter asserts that both political economic forces influence a great deal how PHEIs shape their institutional characteristics. Different types of PHEIs, indeed, tend to respond to such forces variously, thereby reflecting institutional diversity within the PHE sector as well as between private and public sectors. It is not just random by PHEI but rather that the chapter has repeatedly found intra-sectoral patterns very much along the lines of Levy’s (1986b) PHE typology, especially of semi-elite versus demand-absorbing (and serious-demand-absorbing) subsectors. Even so, some features of public policies and market mechanisms may create coercive isomorphism or volunteered emulation or both between private and public HEIs as well as among PHEIs.
Themselves overwhelmingly market-oriented in nature, public policies shaping various types of Thai PHEIs include PHE Act and ministerial regulations, quality assurance, tax laws and government loans for institutions and students. Most significantly, Thai PHEIS are governed under different laws than public universities. This policy reality of statutory difference fundamentally creates sharp distinctions of external government control between private and public HEIs, seeing that PHEIs are mostly disfavored by the CHE’s rigid regulations and treatments. Moreover, although various major public policies are enforce similarly to all types of PHEIs—reiterating the coercive isomorphism process, policy realities tend to show different scenarios by different PHE types. Given their ideal characteristics (e.g., wealthy, well-recognized, large & longstanding, academic-excellent, etc.), semi-elite private universities seem to cope with the coercive public policies, especially the PHE Act, ministerial regulations and quality assurance, the best, followed by serious-demand-absorbing institutions. Likewise, different types of PHEIs take advantage of government student loans variously. Demand-absorbing PHEIs bank upon such student loans the most while semi-elite universities depend on such loans the least. Given such a complex web of laws, tax exemptions and government loans, the political stability is a key factor for sustainability and diversification of all PHE types. Still, the Thai political system has rarely been stable, often resulting in inconsistency of public policies enforced in PHEIs, especially in regard to planning and finance. The instability of the government and unstable policies make it hard for PHEIs to position themselves in the higher education marketplace. In this vein, demand-absorbing PHEIs tend to be at risk the most among other PHE types because of they rely on the government financial support the most.
Together with public policies, market mechanisms play important roles in shaping different types of Thai PHEIs as well. Higher education expansion and marketization of the public sector are perceived as crucial threats for the shape and growth of PHE. Public expansion via increasing branch campuses and adding seats in the public university admission system as well as the reauthorization of the Vocational Education Act worries most PHEIs, particularly small demand-absorbing ones. De facto, demand-absorbing-like public universities appear because many public universities imitate the private sector’s characteristics, thereby becoming more marketized and entrepreneurial. While public privatization through a transformation from traditional limited admission universities to autonomous ones helps enhancing the public sector with efficacy and flexibility, it seriously hinders the private sector’s expansion. Apparently, public expansion and privatization tend to pull away existing student demands from the private sector instead of absorbing new or large demands.

The higher education market competition becomes tenser and more stratified when Thailand shows a glimpse of declining high-school graduate population in addition to seemingly infinite public expansion. Although the overall competition tends to be much more aggressive between private and public HEIs than among PHEIs themselves, semi-elites compete fiercely among each other and with some top and regional public universities. Serious-demand-absorbing institutions start competing with semi-elites and some regional public ones. Small demand-absorbing and religious-oriented institutions compete among themselves and with provincial Rajabhat and Rajamangkla public universities. Eventually, various types of PHEIs have become more aware of their
distinctiveness from other institutions as a way to strive and survive in the highly competitive market.

As a way to respond to the external political economic forces, PHEIs have diversified within themselves via broadening their offerings. Being in-tune with informational technology and seeking for legitimacy via internationalization and partnership are also increasingly highlighted. In this vein, serious-demand-absorbing and cultural-oriented PHEIs shine the most as new alternatives to the existing three fundamental private subsectors. While it is salient that political economic forces help to increase institutional diversity of the PHE sector, a paradoxical reality appears when the internal diversification of PHEIs may narrow differences among themselves (Kogan 1997). Ultimately, the Thai case helps to strengthen the validity and relationship of existing global literature on PHE, institutional differentiation, institutional isomorphism as well as political economy.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The private sector of higher education is complex and has diversified worldwide. Due to its greater significance, PHE will continue to increasingly influence the political economy of higher education (Altbach 2005a). Simultaneously as one societal sector, the higher education system and its parts (PHE, in this case) are fundamentally driven by the powerful political economy with varying degree of dependence on politics and markets (Clark 1987b). While the two tides naturally stimulate one another in the form of continuously cyclical dynamics, the heart of this research remains focused on the latter tide—the fundamental difference among Thai PHEIs and the extent to which political economy influences their shapes and differences.

7.1 Synthesis of the Analysis and Findings

“How do Thai private higher education institutions differ among themselves and from the public ones, particularly in terms of governance and finance?”

This research question has been investigated via a systematic and thorough analysis of intra-sectoral institutional diversity of PHEIs in Thailand based on a political economic perspective, summarized as follows. As Chapter 1 introduces the research theme involving a trio-relationship among institutional diversity, private higher education, and political economy as well as significance of the three, Chapter 2 reviews previous studies and leading literature, specifically focusing on Levy’s (1986b) typology
of PHE. The study is theory-driven and qualitative-oriented in nature. Depicted in Chapter 3, the main purpose is to determine and demonstrate whether, how, and how much the Thai case fits Levy’s (1986b) pioneering concepts of PHE typology or vice versa. Based on in-depth interviews as a prime source of data, supplementary with relevant documents and statistical data, this research encompasses a combination of traditional qualitative content analysis and Ragin’s (1989, 2000, 2008, 2009) Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). In this way, the analytical findings best reveal salient institutional characteristics in governance and finance of different types of Thai PHEIs in relation to those of the public counterparts. As traditional content analysis helps to discover initial important themes and subthemes, fsQCA instills such findings in a vigorously quantitative-like manner, allowing the researcher to assess the institutional diversity of PHE phenomenon empirically and systematically.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 manifest major findings and analytical discussions to the central research question. Inter-sectoral diversity between private and public HEIs is discussed in Chapter 4 whereas Chapter 5 exclusively analyzes intra-sectoral diversity of PHEIs. Then, Chapter 6 incorporates institutional diversity of PHE with political economic forces, reasoning the possible impacts of public policies and market mechanisms toward the shape of different PHE types. Ultimately, this chapter concludes the study with a research model synthesized from major findings, illustrated in Figure 20, and policy implications as well as recommendations for future research.
Figure 20: A Research Model of Inter- and Intra-Sectoral Diversity of Private and Public Higher Education Institutions in Relation to Political Economic Forces

**Inter-sectorally**, private and public HEIs are most different from one another in 3 regards: 1) the law governing them; 2) internal administration style; and 3) government funding as annual operation budget. The fact that all PHEIs are governed under the same PHE Act while each public university has its own statute is an integral factor influencing how different the CHE treats private and public HEIs. In this vein, the Thai case portrays a “difference by design” pattern in which institutional differentiation between private and public sectors come directly from the CHE as a chief architect of the Thai higher education system.
Private-public difference in internal administration fundamentally stems from who sets up the sector and how it is set up. PHEIs are owned by private entities, be it proprietary, company, or religious organization; public universities are owned by the state. Public universities do not have the one and only owner whose interest dominates the institutional characteristics like the private counterparts do. Decision making and administration are decentralized and thus concentrated at the faculty level, given that public higher education depends on numerous constituencies and is believed to be for the public good. Private institutions, on the contrary, are influenced heavily, or sometimes solely, by their owners, thereby centralizing their internal administration and decision making process at the top administrative level in order to reassure the owners’ interests and goals. Since PHEIs do not receive any government operation budget—the third aspect—AS the public universities do, this difference coping with the private nature urges PHEIs to be efficient, flexible, and managerial in managing institutional finance for every Thai Baht is out of their own pockets.

**Intra-sectorally**, Thai PHEIs are different among themselves based on types of ownerships and characteristics previously studied in the PHE literature. The fsQCA analysis is particularly beneficial in linking the existing Thai ownership types with Levy’s PHE types. The fsQCA cross tabulation shown in Table 18 Chapter 4 confirms that Levy’s theory is vigorously applicable to the Thai context even if several deviations appear and subsequent modification is necessary. Different configurations stemming from 8 selected characteristics variables are subsets of different outcomes (in this case, different PHE types), signifying what the salient characteristics of each PHE type are.
Derived from the fsQCA analysis formulas in Table 18, Figure 20 illustrates a qualitative interpretation, indicating major characteristics of 4 PHE types in the case of Thailand.

Special attention is given to the new category, serious-demand-absorbing. While unspecified in Levy’s original categorization, the serious-demand-absorbing subsector in the Thai case depicts outstanding (yet still far from unique) characteristics, some of which overlap those of semi-elite, religious-oriented and demand-absorbing subsectors. In other words, serious-demand-absorbing subsector incorporates a bit of everything from other subsectors, thereby making the analysis of institutional diversity even more complex. Even so, this research is in favor of labeling serious-demand-absorbing as a new subsector of PHE due to the above justification. Yet, more national cases are necessary to be empirically tested for further development of such PHE categorization.

Two other highlights from these PHE typology findings are that all PHE types tend to share comparable characteristics in both governance and finance, suggesting institutional isomorphism as opposed to differentiation, and that institutional diversity of different types of PHEIs becomes a matter of degrees. In like manner, institutional functions—such as age, size, mission, offered fields of study, comprehensiveness, etc.—factor in, as a catalyst in differentiation or homogenization on governance and finance of different PHE types. For instance, all PHE types are influenced by professional associations but varied by degree of how comprehensive or specialized they are. Semi-elite universities involve a lot of professional associations for they are comprehensive, offering many professional schools. Other types are less comprehensive and thus influenced by fewer numbers of associations. Even so, which association influences
them depends on what field of study they offer. Likewise, all PHE types bank upon
tuition and fees as their prime income source but the degree of such dependency varies.

Moreover, political economic forces such as public policies and market
mechanisms affect institutional diversity and isomorphism of different types of Thai
PHEIs. On one hand, such policies as quality assurance, PHE Act and student loans
influence how PHEIs characterize themselves under the similar standards, which often
results in coercive isomorphism. On the other hand, aggressive market competition alerts
PHEIs for responsiveness and even distinctiveness, bolstering institutional diversity of
the higher education system as a whole. Both factors dynamically complement one
another and are essential for the analysis of PHE institutional diversity.

To sum up, Thai PHEIs are different from, as well as similar to one another based
on Levy’s PHE types. Yet, to what extent they are different from one another depends
not only on the degree of difference but also political economic forces surrounding and
interacting with them. The analysis of PHE categorization is important and it is vital to
have a category for both scholarship and policy reasons.

7.2 Policy Implications

At a macro level, sectoral differentiation confirms both overlapping and
contrasting explanations to major inquiries in social, economic, and political realms
(Levy 1986b). Although its main purpose and contribution is scholarship, this
scholarship should have policy payoffs as well. It should be ultimately of value to inform
national and international policymakers in further adjusting certain public policies and
agendas on PHE mainly, quality assurance and accreditation, privatization, institutional
classification, financing patterns, and private-public partnership in the higher education systems, and in Thailand, especially. Since different types of HEIs pursue divergent as well as convergent institutional characteristics when reacting to political economic forces, the research findings, particularly in Chapter 6, can enhance the formulation of government policy that may better suit different types of Thai HEIs within various subsectors. Partly in line with Cao (2007), institutional diversity of Thai PHEIs warrants differential treatment in PHE policy formulation. To hold PHEIs accountable, policymakers may consider different monitoring policies for different PHE types, as discussed throughout Chapter 5 and 6. For example, semi-elite and serious-demand-absorbing PHEIs deserve more flexibility, self-monitoring, and favorable treatment from the government, while demand-absorbing PHEIs with less transparent financial system and low academic outcomes need close government’s monitoring and supervision.

Nonetheless, as the World Bank (2000) suggested, the government should only act when it has a clear understanding of the problem and be able to apply the suggested solution efficiently. To this end, findings of research of this kind become valuable and practical to the government due to the rigor of research analyses, empirical evidences, and ample comparisons drawn from the global literature. Additionally, analysis of institutional diversity and differentiation may help guide somewhat parallel studies in other countries as well.

At an institutional level, the research findings particularly on inter-sectoral diversity in Chapter 4 and types of PHE in Chapter 5 can inform various relevant institutional decision-makers, such as university presidents and administrators alike, of what the differences and similarities among various types of HEIs are. Findings on
political economic forces toward the shape of PHEIs in Chapter 6 are especially useful for PHEI leaders in regard to institutional responses to political economic forces of public policies and market mechanisms. Such information can be beneficial feedback mostly for PHEIs in their further strategic planning in reshaping or altering their institutional characteristics so that they can better respond to the government policies and competently survive in a highly competitive market environment. This study similarly provides Thai policymakers and scholars ample international contextualization.

With the knowledge concerning featured characteristics other PHEIs may have, those who have not had similar features and thought of advantages of such may review and rejuvenate their institutional characteristics to become similar to their benchmarks. Beyond the provided research findings, institutional leaders may seek more information about relevant practices in their interested types of institutions based on the presented research concepts and benchmark and sometimes adapt their own institutional characteristics to match those aspired ones. In contrast, similar knowledge is of importance should the PHEI leaders choose to become more distinctive or innovative from others. Seeing that, in the next decade, the major challenge focalizes how HEIs position themselves and shape their relationships with the government and the society (Chapman and Austin 2002), this research provides extensive information on institutional diversity linked with political economy that is beneficial for policy implications.
7.3 Limitations of the Research

Beyond the limitations in the research scope presented in Chapter 1, several other limitations pose challenges to the generalization of findings and the conclusions of this research to the broader contexts.

First, due to resource and other constraints, the study’s samples are exclusively leaders in the PHE sector and comprise only one-third of PHEIs of all 4 types. Although the research is heavily focused on the private sector and some of the PHEI leaders are actually former professors or leaders in the public sector, an inclusion of public university leaders would strengthen the generalization of the findings particularly in the areas of private-public dynamics and political economic forces shaping PHE. Likewise, the generalization of the research findings may be limited due to the sample size even though the study aims at analytical summaries of the Thai PHEIs as a whole and thus employs a purposive sampling method in order to look for a prototypical case of Thai PHEIs. If given enough time and resource as well as accessibility, an analysis of the whole PHEI population may enhance the research ability in generalizing the findings and conclusions.

Second, major limitations stem from the lack of good guidance from prior studies, especially on how to assess institutional diversity of PHE empirically and systematically via fsQCA. Although the study is theory-driven, the lack of well-developed research designs and operationalization of the theoretical concepts as guidance to develop this research makes it challenging to justify whether the investigation is effectively carried out and how convincing the discussions are. This research, thus, had to originally design how to test the theoretical concepts of PHE types to the Thai context in a systematic way.
In this vein, this limitation has become an opportunity for the research to make a contribution to strengthen the methodology in examining PHE phenomena.

7.4 Recommendations for Future Studies

Conceptually, this study has mapped institutional diversity among PHEIs and between private and public HEIs to the Thai political economic contexts. Levy’s (1986b) theoretical concepts of PHE types and private-public distinctiveness in governance, finance and function, have proven to be largely valid for the Thai case even if some deviations appear. Given that this study focalizes the political economic dimensions—governance and finance, further studies may incorporate the function dimension, seeing that the findings reveal that how the institutions behave matters to institutional diversity. Interesting function variables found from the study include: fields of study (inexpensive/ expensive); comprehensiveness; partnership (government agency, military, public university, association, business & private sector, international organization—both religious and secular). Therefore, future studies may include the suggested variables in the function dimension to assess how various PHE types differ in relation to political economic forces.

The findings also point out importance of various actors in different types of HEIs: leaders/ administrators (secular owners/ religious & priests/ outside professionals); university council (family/ religious/ business corporation/ academic); faculty (new & young blood receiving institution’s scholarship/ retired from public university); students (SES—high/low; geography—in BKK/ outside BKK); future employers (private sector/
public sector/ international/ own networks/ all). All of this may warrant further empirical investigation.

Methodologically, the approaches employed in this research have proven to be suitable mechanisms in examining institutional diversity of PHEIs. Such different methods of content analysis of qualitative coding schemes, Fuzzy-Set analysis, and descriptive statistical analysis show convergent findings that are in line with the literature. As a result, this triangulation has increased the reliability and validity of the research results in overall. Especially, my application of Ragin’s Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is appropriate for systematically synthesizing the research findings. fsQCA helps to extract the richness of the qualitative data that vary in degree into plentiful meanings on how and how much various types of PHEIs differ from one another. As the findings represent, institutional diversity of different types of PHEIs varies based on degree of each institutional characteristic, fsQCA is best suitable in this regard. Given that this research is pioneering in its attempt to apply fsQCA to the study of PHE typology and differentiation, the study applies only necessary analysis procedures deemed appropriate and sufficient for the exploration. Future studies may also apply the calibration procedure when assigning a fuzzy-set score as well as to select different sets of characteristics variables for the testing. fsQCA is recommended for future analysis of different PHE types or even in the public sector. Above all, this research hopes that presented findings and drawbacks may offer insights to relevant future research.
APPENDIX A: Distribution of Private Higher Education Institutions in Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total PHEIs</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok-large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3+4+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathumthani</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0+1+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samutprakarn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0+0+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok-small</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayutthaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1+0+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanchanaburi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakorn Pathom</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0+0+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakorn Nayok</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakorn Sawan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nontaburi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathumthani</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petchaburi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others -large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khonkaen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others -small</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiangmai</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0+0+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiangrai</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonburi</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khonkaen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhon Ratchasrima</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakorn Si Thammarat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1+0+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitsanulok</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayong</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songkhla</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srisakate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surat Thani</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tak</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubon Ratchathani</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udon Thani</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Raw data on institutional size and location year 2007 were obtained from the Commission on Higher Education Website [on-line] available at http://www.mua.go.th. Data on year established were retrieved from individual institutions’ websites.
APPENDIX B-1: Interview Guide with Open-Ended Questions for Institutional Leaders
(with Thai translation)

INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
(INSTITUTIONAL LEADERS)
แนวค่าแอมตอยซ์วิทยี (ผู้นำของกิจกรรม)

Section I: Political Economic Policies and Private Higher Education Institutions
ส่วนที่ I: นโยบายการศึกษาและระบบการเงินและการทุนที่สำคัญ

1. In your view, which government policy facilitates or instead hinders your institution or other private institutions the most? Please describe how.
1. ในความคิดเห็นของคุณ นโยบายการศึกษาที่มีผลบวกหรือที่มีผลเสียต่อการดำเนินงานของสถาบัน และอินิเรียตังอื่น ๆ ที่ส่งผลกระทบต่อ หรือ
นโยบายที่มีผลบวกหรือที่มีผลเสีย โปรดอธิบาย

2. How would such policy make your institution different or similar to other institutions?
2. นโยบายดังกล่าวมีผลทำให้สถาบันของคุณแตกต่างจากสถาบันอื่น ๆ อย่างไร

Section II: Intra-Sectoral Diversity
ส่วนที่ 2: ความหลากหลายในภาค

3. Which are the institutional characteristics that make your institution differ from others? Could you give an example?
3. คุณเห็นว่าคุณมีที่แตกต่างจากสถาบันอื่น ๆ อย่างไร

4. Could you describe if there are any external factors associated with such differences among institutions?
4. คุณสามารถอธิบายได้ว่ามีปัจจัยภายนอกที่เกี่ยวข้องกับความแตกต่างระหว่างสถาบันหรือไม่

Section II-A: Intra-Sectoral Diversity in Institutional Governance
ส่วนที่ 2อา: ความหลากหลายในภาคการบริหารจัดการ

5. Could you describe which sources of external control over your institution are and in what form? If your institution is under various external constituencies, which group has the most direct control over your institution?
5. คุณสามารถอธิบายได้ว่ามีปัจจัยภายนอกที่ควบคุมที่สำคัญที่ส่งไปยังสถาบันของคุณเป็นอย่างไร

6. Could you explain if there are any incentives or penalties tied to such control of the external authorities over your institution? Would you care to share any example?
6. คุณสามารถอธิบายได้ว่ามีอิทธิพลหรือผลกระทบจากการควบคุมจากที่มีอยู่ในสถาบันของคุณเป็นอย่างไร
7. In terms of internal administration, could you please describe how your institution is structured and how decision is made within your institution?

8. In your view, how does the decision making process of your institution differ from or is similar to other private institutions and the public universities?

Section II.B: Intra Sectoral Diversity in Institutional Finance

9. Which is the income source that your institution banks upon the most? Can you also talk about other private institutions whether they would rely on such similar sources as yours or different ones?

10. Could you describe if there are any conditions tied to the funds you receive from any income sources that you have to abide by and in which form they are?

11. Can you think about any government policies that has either positive or negative relation with financial management of your institution? Please explain how.

12. In the similar vein, what do you think about whether other private institutions would have similar or different experiences than your institution?

Section III: Other

13. Before we end this interview, are there any other thoughts about your institutional characteristics you would like to talk about? Or if there is anything other differences and similarities among private higher education institutions not mentioned?

14. 閃亮的問題是：知識的來源是什麼？可以談談其他私營機構是否會依賴相同的來源，或者不同的來源？

15. 可以描述一下你在什麼條件下收到的資金，以及這些條件是以什麼形式存在的？

16. 你認為政府的哪些政策對機構的財務管理有正面或負面的影響？請解釋為什麼。

17. 在類似的背景下，你認為其他私營機構會有相同的經歷，還是不同的經歷？

Section III: 他者

18. 在我們結束這場訪談之前，你有關於機構特徵的其他想法嗎？如果有的話，請告訴我們這些私營機構和其他機構之間的差異和相似性。
APPENDIX B-2: Interview Guide with Open-Ended Questions for Specialists & Government Authorities (with Thai translation)

INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
(SPECIALISTS & GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES)

Section I: Political Economic Policies and Private Higher Education Institutions

1. In your view, which government policy facilitates or instead hinders private higher education institutions the most? Please explain how.
2. Can you think of any government policies that make private higher education institutions different or similar among themselves? Please describe.

Section II: Intra-Sectoral Diversity

3. Which are the institutional characteristics that make private higher education institutions different from one another?
4. Could you describe if there are any external factors associated with such differences or similarities among private higher education institutions?

Section II-A: Intra-Sectoral Diversity in Institutional Governance

5. Could you describe which sources of external control over private higher education institutions are and in what form? Do you see any differences or similarities in how they are externally controlled among private higher education institutions?
6. Could you explain if there are any incentives or penalties tied to such control of the external authorities over private higher education institutions?
7. In terms of internal administration, could you please explain how private higher education institutions are typically structured and how decisions are made within an institution?

8. In your view, how does the decision making process of private higher education institutions differ from or is similar to one another? And how so when compared to public universities?

Section II.B: Intra Sectoral Diversity in Institutional Finance

9. Which is the income source that private higher education institutions typically bank upon the most? Do you see any differences or similarities across the private sector?

10. Could you describe if there are any conditions tied to the funds private higher education institutions receive from any income sources that they have to abide by and in which form such conditions are?

11. Can you think about any government policies that have either positive or negative relation with financial management of private higher education institutions? What do you think about whether such private institutions would have different or similar experiences across their sector?

Section III: Other

12. Before we end this interview, are there any other thoughts about institutional characteristics of private higher education institutions you would like to talk about? Or if there is anything about other differences and similarities among private higher education institutions not mentioned?
APPENDIX C-1: Research Approval Letter to the Commission on Higher Education

22 กุมภาพันธ์ 2551

เรื่อง ขออนุญาตทำการวิจัยในสถาบันอุดมศึกษาเอกชนในลักษณะของคณะกรรมการอุดมศึกษา
เรียน สำนักงานคณะกรรมการอุดมศึกษา กระทรวงศึกษาธิการ

ดิฉัน นางสาวประชญาณี ประกาศนียบัตรศิษย์จบ นักเรียนวิทยาลัย และวิทยาศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต สาขาวิชาบริหารการศึกษา จาก University of Wisconsin-Madison ขออนุญาตทำการวิจัยเรื่องคุณวุฒิพิเศษสำหรับการศึกษาในสถาบันอุดมศึกษาจึงเรียนยัง University at Albany, State University of New York

ดิฉันได้รับทุนจากมหาวิทยาลัยให้เป็นผู้ช่วยอาจารย์ของศาสตราจารย์ดร. เดนนิส ลี (SUNY Distinguished Professor Daniel C. Levy) ซึ่งเป็นผู้ช่วยทางด้านวิจัยเกี่ยวกับนโยบายสาธารณะและการอุดมศึกษาเอกชนและผู้อานวยการโครงการวิจัยการอุดมศึกษาเอกชนทั่วโลก (Program for Research on Private Higher Education: PROPHE; http://www.albany.edu/dept/caps/proph/) ซึ่งได้รับทุนสนับสนุนจากฟอร์ดฟอนด์ (Ford Foundation, U.S.) ขอบคุณพนักงานของดิฉันรวมถึงอาจารย์และผู้ช่วยอาจารย์ในการรวบรวมข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการอุดมศึกษาเอกชนทั่วโลก นโยบาย และกฎหมายที่เกี่ยวข้อง การวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลต่าง ๆ การรายงานข่าวต่าง ๆ ก็ยิ่งกว่านี้ นโยบาย กฎหมาย และการอุดมศึกษาเอกชน ตลอดจนการเขียนบทความและความจำเป็นที่ต้องการแนะแนวต่าง ๆ

ในขณะเดียวกัน ดิฉันได้ผ่านการสอบ proposal defense สำหรับการทำการวิจัยนี้ซึ่งดูเหมือนใน
หัวข้อเกี่ยวกับความแตกต่างขององค์กรในการดำเนินการปกครองและบริหารงานระหว่างสถาบันอุดมศึกษาของเอกชนและรัฐที่อยู่ข้างกันเป็นนโยบายของวิจัยที่มีบทบาทสำคัญของการศึกษาและการพิจารณาความพยายามของ
สถาบันอุดมศึกษา โดยการวิเคราะห์จะเน้นสถาบันอุดมศึกษาเอกชนเป็นหลัก วิทยานิพนธ์ของดิฉันจะเข้า
เดินทางร่วมกับการวิจัยที่มีความแตกต่างระหว่างองค์กร เศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง และการอุดมศึกษาเอกชน
ทั้งของประเทศและนานาชาติ ข้อเสนอแนะจากงานวิจัยของดิฉันจะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อการ
พัฒนานโยบายของรัฐที่มีต่อสถาบันอุดมศึกษา โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งต่อสถาบันอุดมศึกษาเอกชน และต่อ
ผู้บริหารสถาบันอุดมศึกษาทั่วทั้งของรัฐและเอกชนในการที่จะพัฒนาองค์กรของตนให้มีศักยภาพอยู่ใน
สิ่งแวดล้อมที่เปลี่ยนไปด้วยการเจริญขึ้น

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ในช่วงที่คืนหน้านี้ขาดหายอยู่ถึงคืนและทำร้ายคดีในโอกาสที่ห้ามข้อใด คืนนี้ได้รับการสนับสนุนเป็นอย่างดีและยินดีมอบจากสถานศึกษา สำนักงานคณะกรรมการการอุดมศึกษา และอีกทั้งยังจะได้รับการสนับสนุนจากคู่คิดของบางมหาวิทยาลัยที่สิ้นรู้จัก ในกรณี คืนนี้โควิดของอนุญาตให้มีการกระทบกระทั่งที่นี้ที่ทำให้การวิจัยช่วยอยู่และสัมภาษณ์ผู้บริหารระดับสูงของสถาบันอุดมศึกษาเอกชน (กลุ่มตัวอย่าง) ซึ่งอยู่ภายใต้การสังกัดกระทรวง

ทั้งนี้ คืนนี้หวังเป็นอย่างยิ่งว่าคณะกรรมการการอุดมศึกษาจะพิจารณาอนุญาตให้คืนนี้เข้าทำวิจัยในสถาบันอุดมศึกษาเอกชนในสังกัดของท่านที่งานวิทยานิพนธ์นี้ คืนนี้ขอขอบคุณนายกองค์ในความยุติธรรมของท่านมาว่างหน้า

ด้วยความเคารพยิ่งสูง

[ลายมือ]

ประกาศนีย ประจำกรมพิพิธศึกษา

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U.S.
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[ลายมือ]

(นายสุนทร แย้มผู่)
เลขานุการคณะกรรมการการอุดมศึกษา
27 ก.ย.2551

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APPENDIX C-2: Research Approval Letter to the Commission on Higher Education  
(English Translation)

22 February 2008

Subject: Approval request for research to be conducted in Thai private higher education  
institutions under the supervision of the Commission on Higher Education

To: Secretary-General, Commission on Higher Education, Ministry of Education

I, Prachayani Praphamontripong, received a B.Ed. 1st class honor from Chulalongkorn University  
and an M.S. Educational Administration from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am  
currently pursuing my doctoral study at the University at Albany, State University of New York  
(SUNY).

I have been awarded a research assistantship, under the supervision of Dr. Daniel C. Levy, SUNY  
Distinguished Professor and director of the world’s major center on the study of private higher  
education (Program for Research on Private Higher Education: PROPHE;  
http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/), funded by Ford Foundation, U.S. The scope of my  
assistantship includes data gathering on private higher education worldwide and policies and  
regulations related to private higher education, data analysis, news report, and working papers.

Meanwhile, I have successfully defended my dissertation research proposal on the topic of  
institutional diversity regarding governance and finance of private higher education institutions in  
relation to political economic policies. Findings of this research are hoped to produce a great  
contribution to literature on institutional differentiation, political economy, and private higher  
education in Thailand and international contexts. Also, the research findings will be beneficial to  
the formulation and development of government policies regarding Thai private higher education  
as well as to the institutional leaders in strengthening their institutional competencies for the  
competitive environment.

During my feasibility study and decision making for this research topic, several government  
authorities of the National Education Council and the Commission on Higher Education as well  
as the private university president have been constantly lending their supports to me. Therefore, I  
would like to ask for your approval on my dissertation research to be conducted in the private  
higher education institutions under your supervision via interview and document data collection  
procedures.

Lastly, I am looking forward to your approval. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Prachayani Praphamontripong

APPROVED

(SUMATE YAMNOON)

SECRETARY-GENERAL, COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION

27 FEBRUARY 2008

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APPENDIX D: Research Approval Letter to the Association of Private Higher Education Institutions in Thailand

...
Contact Info:

U.S.
Prachayani Praphamontripong
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APPENDIX E-1: Inform Consent for PHE Institutional Leaders

In the discussions among stakeholders regarding the research, it was decided that the Institutional Leaders would be informed about the research activities and be asked to consent to the participation of participants in the study. The Institutional Leaders were informed of the purpose of the research and the potential benefits and risks to the participants. They were also informed of their right to withdraw from the research at any time without any consequences. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were also informed that the results of the research would be used to improve the effectiveness of the program and that the data would be kept confidential. They were informed that the data would be used for research and educational purposes only and that the Institutional Leaders would not be identified in any reports or publications. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the use of the data and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were informed that the research would be conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the research institute and that the Institutional Leaders would be notified of any changes to the research protocol. They were informed that the Institutional Leaders would be given the opportunity to review the research findings and to provide feedback. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were also informed that the research would be conducted in a manner that would not cause harm to the participants. They were informed that the Institutional Leaders would be given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any time without any consequences. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were informed that the research would be conducted in a manner that would not cause harm to the research staff. They were informed that the Institutional Leaders would be given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any time without any consequences. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were informed that the research would be conducted in a manner that would not cause harm to the participants. They were informed that the Institutional Leaders would be given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any time without any consequences. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.

The Institutional Leaders were informed that the research would be conducted in a manner that would not cause harm to the research staff. They were informed that the Institutional Leaders would be given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any time without any consequences. The Institutional Leaders agreed to the research and signed the consent forms.
โดยสภาพจิตวิทยาสร้างความสุขของมนุษย์อย่างต่าง ๆ ทำให้เรารู้วา นักศึกษานั้น การวิจัยและพัฒนาจะมีการเปลี่ยนแปลง

จิตวิทยาเริ่มจะเห็นส่วนหนึ่งของวิทยาการของทิศทางด้านการวิจัยและเรียนรู้ทางวิทยาการที่เหลื่อม

นักศึกษาของทางวิจัยและศึกษาและทำการประชุมที่จะถูกจัดการในที่ตั้งที่จะจัดการในที่สุดก่อนที่จะจัดการ

นอกจากนี้เราสามารถจัดการในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนา

หากต้องการทราบข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับวิธีนั้น ๆ สามารถเพิ่มเติมได้ที่เว็บไซน์ของทางวิทยาการ นักศึกษา

ที่มีการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนาในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนา

ขอขอบคุณ

ประสมภูมิ ประธานเครือข่าย

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[ ] จัดการช่วยสอนให้สมทบในการวิจัยและพัฒนา[ ] จัดการในสถานที่ที่เราได้รับการพัฒนา

[ ] จัดการช่วยสอนให้กับนักศึกษาในระดับของขั้นตอน

[ ] จัดการช่วยสอนให้กับนักศึกษาในระดับของขั้นตอน

ในการบรรยายนั้น จัดการช่วยสอนเข้าใจในงานวิจัยพัฒนา

รอง

------------------------------ ริม

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Esteemed reader:

I, Prachayani Praphamontripong, received a B.Ed. 1st class honor from Chulalongkorn University and an M.S. Educational Administration from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am currently pursuing my doctoral study at the University at Albany, State University of New York (SUNY), under the supervision of Dr. Daniel C. Levy, SUNY Distinguished Professor and director of the world’s major center on the study of private higher education (Program for Research on Private Higher Education: PROPHE; http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/).

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral program in the department of Educational Administration and Policy Studies, the University at Albany, SUNY, I am working on my dissertation research titled “Intra-Sectoral Diversity: A Political Economy of Thai Private Higher Education.” Conducted by myself, this qualitative research explores institutional characteristics, asking how Thai private higher education institutions differ among themselves in terms of institutional governance and finance. The research’s aim is to determine whether the Thai case yields any international patterns previously identified and whether there will be any findings that deviate from the literature, thereby suggesting further modification. Findings of this research are hoped to produce a great contribution to literature on private higher education and private-public comparison in Thailand and international higher education. It is also expected to enhance research and knowledge on institutional diversity of private higher education. Ultimately, the proposed study will strengthen the linkage between private higher education and political economy literature in Thailand as well as in South East Asia region.

Being in a special position to provide relevant information and opinions as someone who has insightful knowledge about this institution, you are invited to participate in this research project. Your institution has been selected among the over 67 Thai private higher education institutions and thus all information provided by you will be crucially important. Through the interview process (45-75 minutes), you will be asked about your institution’s characteristics in relation to government policies (e.g., how your institution is governed, what external authorities controlling the institution may include, how decisions are made within the institution, how your institution is financed, and so forth). Additionally, your candid comments that indicate any institutional shortcomings (including those at other institutions) are welcome.

To assure confidentiality, I affirm that there is no any anticipated risk in your participation other than you may feel uncomfortable in answering some detailed questions. I also assure that the interview contents will be stored as electronic files with password in my personal laptop. I will neither identify your institution’s name nor reveal your individual name in any of my publications or public statements unless permission is granted. I will omit all personal identifying indicators (such as gender, age, or race) and will instead use a pseudo name when mentioning an institution and a person. Unless disclosure is mandated by law, all information extracted from the interview is strictly confidential and will be employed for this research only. However, the Institutional
Review Board and the University at Albany responsible for monitoring this research may inspect the information.

Your participation is voluntary. As a participant, you do not have to answer any question(s) you do not want. Even already agreeing to participate in this research or signing the informed consent document, you may decide to withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits you may otherwise have been entitled. If you agree, the interview will be digitally recorded to help facilitate further analysis. All the interview audio files will be destroyed immediately after transcription is completed. As participant, you agree or not in being digitally recorded and in being identified.

The findings from this research will be parts of my doctoral dissertation to be submitted to SUNY and research papers to be submitted to academic journals and conferences. Your institution will benefit from this research through my dissertation report. Such information can be beneficial feedback particularly for your further strategic planning in reshaping or altering your institutional characteristics so that you can better respond to the government policies and competently survive in a highly competitive market environment. Also, related benefit can come from knowing more about other private higher education institutions. This research will similarly give you international contextualization.

If you would like further information regarding this research project, you may contact me at 001.518.364.7229 or pp791842@albany.edu. If you have any other inquiries concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office of Research Compliance at 001.518.437.4569 or orc@uamail.albany.edu. Please sign the consent form below and keep one copy of this form for your record. Another copy of this consent form will be secured together with the research records of this study.

Lastly, I appreciate your time and collaboration. I hope that you will choose to participate in this research.

Sincerely,

Prachayani Praphamontripong

******************************************************************************

The following signature represents that I, __________________________________ (print your name), have read, or been informed of, the information about this study entitled: “Intra-Sectoral Diversity: A Political Economy of Thai Private Higher Education,” conducted by Prachayani Praphamontripong.

[ ] I agree to digital-record the interview. [ ] I do not agree to digital-record the interview.

[ ] I grant permission for this research to publicly identify my name.
[ ] I grant permission for this research to publicly identify my institution’s name.

By signing my name, I hereby consent to participate in this research project.

Signature____________________________________ Date_____/_____/________
โดยประกาศการปรับปรุงฐานข้อมูลประวัติศาสตร์โครงการที่ดำเนินการ นักวิทยาศาสตร์ นักวิจัยที่มีความรู้ความเข้าใจในการวิทยาศาสตร์ข้อมูลและระบบสารสนเทศ ซึ่งมีประสบการณ์ในการจัดการข้อมูลขั้นตอนรายละเอียด ส่วนใหญ่จะมีคุณสมบัติที่เหมาะสมกับงานวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ ทั้งนี้ ทั้งนี้จึงให้ข้อมูลทางวิจัยที่มีความสำคัญในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการและให้ข้อมูลที่เกี่ยวข้อง

ข้อมูลทั้งหมดการวิจัยจะเก็บรวบรวมในสารสนเทศจัดเก็บข้อมูลในการจัดการข้อมูลและอุปกรณ์ดิจิตอล ที่เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในสารสนเทศจัดเก็บข้อมูลได้รับการพิจารณาจากทั้งหมดที่เกี่ยวข้องในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ

นักวิจัยที่มีความรู้ทำให้เกิดการตรวจสอบข้อมูลในการจัดการข้อมูลและอุปกรณ์ดิจิตอล ได้รับการพิจารณาจากทั้งหมดที่เกี่ยวข้องเป็นประชากรที่จะดำเนินการและให้ข้อมูลที่เกี่ยวข้องในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ

ข้อมูลทั้งหมดการวิจัยที่จะเก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการจัดการข้อมูลและอุปกรณ์ดิจิตอล ที่เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ

ข้อมูลทั้งหมดการวิจัยที่จะเก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการจัดการข้อมูลและอุปกรณ์ดิจิตอล ที่เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ

ข้อมูลทั้งหมดการวิจัยที่จะเก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการจัดการข้อมูลและอุปกรณ์ดิจิตอล ที่เก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลในการวิจัยที่จะดำเนินการ
Esteemed reader:

I, Prachayani Praphamontripong, received a B.Ed. 1st class honor from Chulalongkorn University and an M.S. Educational Administration from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am currently pursuing my doctoral study at the University at Albany, State University of New York (SUNY), under the supervision of Dr. Daniel C. Levy, SUNY Distinguished Professor and director of the world’s major center on the study of private higher education (Program for Research on Private Higher Education: PROPHE; http://www.albany.edu/dept/eaps/prophe/).

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral program in the department of Educational Administration and Policy Studies, the University at Albany, SUNY, I am working on my dissertation research titled “Intra-Sectoral Diversity: A Political Economy of Thai Private Higher Education.” Conducted by myself, this qualitative research explores institutional characteristics, asking how Thai private higher education institutions differ among themselves in terms of institutional governance and finance. The research’s aim is to determine whether the Thai case yields any international patterns previously identified and whether there will be any findings that deviate from the literature, thereby suggesting further modification. Findings of this research are hoped to produce a great contribution to literature on private higher education and private-public comparison in Thailand and international higher education. It is also expected to enhance research and knowledge on institutional diversity of private higher education. Ultimately, the proposed study will strengthen the linkage between private higher education and political economy literature in Thailand as well as in South East Asia region.

Being in a special position to provide relevant information and opinions as someone whose expertise is Thai private higher education or someone whose authority and responsibility involve Thai private higher education institutions, you are invited to participate in this research project. Through the interview process (45-75 minutes), you will be asked about institutional characteristics of private higher education institutions in Thailand in relation to government policies (e.g., how they are governed, what external authorities controlling the institutions may include, how decisions are made within the institutions, how they are financed, and so forth). Additionally, your candid comments that indicate any institutional shortcomings are welcome.

To assure confidentiality, I affirm that there is no any anticipated risk in your participation other than you may feel uncomfortable in answering some detailed questions. I also assure that the interview contents will be stored as electronic files with password in my personal laptop. I will neither identify your organization’s name nor reveal your individual name in any of my publications or public statements unless permission is granted. I will omit all personal identifying indicators (such as gender, age, or race) and will instead use a pseudo name when mentioning an institution and a person. Unless disclosure is mandated by law, all information extracted from the interview is strictly confidential and will be employed for this research only. However, the
Institutional Review Board and the University at Albany responsible for monitoring this research may inspect the information.

Your participation is voluntary. As a participant, you do not have to answer any question(s) you do not want. Even already agreeing to participate in this research or signing the informed consent document, you may decide to withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits you may otherwise have been entitled. If you agree, the interview will be digitally recorded to help facilitate further analysis and all the interview audio files will be destroyed immediately after transcription is completed. As participant, you agree or not in being digitally recorded and in being identified.

The findings from this research will be parts of my doctoral dissertation to be submitted to SUNY and research papers to be submitted to academic journals and conferences. You will benefit from this research through my dissertation report. Such information help to inform you in further recommendation on certain policies and agendas such as private higher education, mainly, institutional diversity and differentiation, quality assurance, financial patterns, and private-public partnership in the Thai higher education system. This research will similarly give you international contextualization.

If you would like further information regarding this research project, you may contact me at 001.518.364.7229 or pp791842@albany.edu. If you have any other inquiries concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office of Research Compliance at 001.518.437.4569 or orc@uamail.albany.edu. Please sign the consent form below and keep one copy of this form for your record. Another copy of this consent form will be secured together with the research records of this study.

Lastly, I appreciate your time and collaboration. I hope that you will choose to participate in this research.

Sincerely,

Prachayani Praphamontripong

******************************************************************************

The following signature represents that I, _____________________________ (print your name), have read, or been informed of, the information about this study entitled: “Intra-Sectoral Diversity: A Political Economy of Thai Private Higher Education,” conducted by Prachayani Praphamontripong.

[ ] I agree to digital-record the interview. [ ] I do not agree to digital-record the interview.

[ ] I grant permission for this research to publicly identify my name.  [ ] I grant permission for this research to publicly identify my organization’s name.

By signing my name, I hereby consent to participate in this research project.

Signature____________________________________ Date_____/______/_______
### APPENDIX F: Initial and Revised Coding Schemes

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<tr>
<th>Initial Coding Schemes</th>
<th>Revised Coding Schemes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POL: PUBLIC POLICY</strong></td>
<td><strong>PUBLIC POLICY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POL-CSST: Claimed Support &amp; Similar Treatment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Claimed Support &amp; Similar Treatment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Different Status Different Regulation</td>
<td>- Different Status Different Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Policy Support but Strict in Practice</td>
<td>- Policy Support but Strict in Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Support PHE</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Support Standards &amp; Indicators</td>
<td><strong>Claimed Tax Support</strong></td>
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<td>- Unclear Policy</td>
<td>- Strict Tax Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Less Support for Research</td>
<td>- Donation Tax P-P Different</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack Control of Enrollment Number</td>
<td>- Owner Pays Income Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack Control of Institution Number</td>
<td>- Other Taxes</td>
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<td>- Similar Effect for PHE</td>
<td>- Property Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tax VAT</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POL-CTS: Claimed Tax Support</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unstable Policy &amp; Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strict Tax Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Donation Tax P-P Different</td>
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<tr>
<th>Initial Coding Schemes</th>
<th>Revised Coding Schemes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EF: EXTERNAL FORCES</strong></td>
<td><strong>MARKET MECHANISMS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EF-MC: Market Competition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Market Competition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Social Perceptions</td>
<td>- Social Perceptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Thai Culture</td>
<td>- Marketization in Public University</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Employers Trust</td>
<td>- Unclear Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Faculty &amp; Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Marketization in Public University</td>
<td>- Lack Control of Enrollment Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack Control of Institution Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EF-MD: Market Demand</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Market Economy</td>
<td>- Declining Population</td>
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<td>- High School Graduates Number Drop</td>
<td>- High School Graduates Number Drop</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Country’s Needs</td>
<td>- Country’s Needs</td>
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<td><strong>EF-UPG: Unstable Policy &amp; Government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Internationalization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EF-I: Internationalization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Information Technology</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EF-IT: Information Technology</strong></td>
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<td>Initial Coding Schemes</td>
<td>Revised Coding Schemes</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO: EXTERNAL CONTROL</td>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO-GA: Controlled by Government Agencies</td>
<td>EXTERNAL CONTROL</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Closely Tied to External</td>
<td>Closely Tied to External &amp; Rigid Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Control via Penalties</td>
<td>Controlled for quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Traditional &amp; Bureaucratic Mindset of Government</td>
<td>Traditional &amp; Bureaucracy</td>
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<td>- Rigid Regulations</td>
<td>Quality Controlled by Outside Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO-DGT: Different Government Treatments</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Private-Public HEIs Governed by Different Laws</td>
<td>Different Government Treatments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Power to University Council</td>
<td>Private-Public HEIs Governed by Different Laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Unqualified Government Auditors</td>
<td>Power to University Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO-QG: Controlled for Quality by Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Government Standards Interfere with Administration</td>
<td>Controlled by Professional Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unqualified Government Auditors</td>
<td>Controlled by Private Entities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO-EA: exerted by External Agency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Controlled by Business Corporations</td>
<td>Controlled by Business Corporations</td>
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<td>- Controlled by Foundation</td>
<td>Controlled by Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Controlled by Individuals/ Families</td>
<td>Controlled by Individuals/ Families</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Controlled by Religious Foundations</td>
<td>Controlled by Religious Foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Controlled by Professional Associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quality Controlled by Outside Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Institution Age &amp; Generation of Owners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Coding Schemes</td>
<td>Revised Coding Schemes</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IA: INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION</strong></td>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IA-DG: Decision-making General</strong></td>
<td>INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decision Making Line of Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IA-C: Centralization</strong></td>
<td>Fast Decision-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decision-making Top-Down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fast Decision-Making</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making Bottom-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IA-D: Decentralization</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decision-making Bottom-Up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Academic Focus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decision-making Team Based</td>
<td>Local President</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner as President</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IA-L: Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Owners Run</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Owner as President</td>
<td>Owner Holds Ultimate Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Owners Run</td>
<td>Priest as President</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Owner's Family Members in Admin</td>
<td>Religious Founder holds Ultimate Decision</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Owner Holds Ultimate Decision</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Vice Present in Finance Sent by Owner</td>
<td>University Council Members &amp; Administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>University Council Members are Religious</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Priest as President</td>
<td>Religious Founder in Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Priests in Governance</td>
<td>Religious Founder Monitor Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Religious Founder in Governance</td>
<td>University Council partly Sent by Founder</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Religious Founder Monitor Finance</td>
<td>Vice Present in Finance Sent by Owner</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Religious Founder holds Ultimate Decision</td>
<td>University Council partly Sent by Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Executive Committee</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Like Business Corporation</td>
<td>Like Business Corporation</td>
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<td>- Outside Professionals</td>
<td>Outside Professionals</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Profit Making Focus</td>
<td>Profit Making Focus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IA-QUCM: Quality of University Council Members</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- University Council Academic Leaders</td>
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<td>- University Council Members are Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>- University Council as Rubber Stamp</td>
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<tr>
<td>- University Council partly Sent by Founder</td>
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<tr>
<td>- University Council partly Sent by Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial Coding Schemes</td>
<td>Revised Coding Schemes</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FIN: FINANCE</strong></td>
<td><strong>FINANCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FIN-SIG: Sources of Income General</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sources of Income General</strong></td>
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<td>- Funding from Business sources</td>
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<td>- Funding from Donations</td>
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<td>- Funding from Individuals/ Families</td>
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<td>- Donation Not Thai Culture</td>
<td>Endowment Concern</td>
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<td>- Donation Tax Exempt</td>
<td><strong>Income from Tuition</strong></td>
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<td>- Endowment Concern</td>
<td>Policy on Tuition No Ceiling for PHEIs</td>
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<td><strong>FIN-OFG: Other Funding from Government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other Funding from Government</strong></td>
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<td>- No Operation budget from Government</td>
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<td>- Government Fund Publics</td>
<td>Government Soft Loans</td>
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<td>- Indirect Government Subsidy</td>
<td>Student Loans</td>
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<td>- Strategies to Get Student Loans</td>
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<td>- Student Loans</td>
<td>- Student Loans and Institutional Diversity</td>
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<td>Research Funds</td>
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<td>- Research Funds</td>
<td><strong>Profit</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FIN-InT: Income from Tuition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Profits Back to Institution</strong></td>
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<td>- Policy on Tuition No Ceiling for PHEIs</td>
<td>Profits Back to Owners</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Owner Pays Income Tax</td>
<td>- Other Taxes</td>
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<td>- Property Tax</td>
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<td>- Property Tax</td>
<td>- Tax VAT</td>
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<td>- Conditions from Funders</td>
<td>- Profits Back to Institution</td>
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<td>- Faculty Scholarships</td>
<td>- Profits Back to Owners</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Institution give Student Scholarships</td>
<td>- Profits Less Allocated to Research</td>
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<td>Initial Coding Schemes (General)</td>
<td>Initial Coding Schemes (General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIV: DIVERSITY</td>
<td>PHE: PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Emphasis &amp; Programs Offered</td>
<td>- Claimed Leader in Region</td>
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<td>- Facilities</td>
<td>- Catalyst for Public</td>
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<td>- Financial Management and Audit</td>
<td>- Concern for Quality</td>
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<td>- Geography and Region</td>
<td>- Concern for Quantity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Institutional Age</td>
<td>- Increased by Vocational as Feeders</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Investment Fund</td>
<td>- Not-For-Profit Intention</td>
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<td>- Diversity Institutional Stratification</td>
<td>- Not-For-Profit Status</td>
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<td>- Institutional Size</td>
<td>- Weak in Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Management System</td>
<td>- Sense of Belonging</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Diversity within PHE</td>
<td>- No Difference in Organizational Structure</td>
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<td>- Politics involved in diversity</td>
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<td>- Quality of Graduates</td>
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<td>- Types of Founders</td>
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<td>- University Council Committee</td>
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### APPENDIX G: fsQCA Truth Table Analyses

#### FAMILYFS

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<tr>
<th>instiagefs</th>
<th>instisizefs</th>
<th>tuitionfs</th>
<th>donationsfs</th>
<th>softloansfs</th>
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<th>presidentfs</th>
<th>number</th>
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