Promiscuous pioneers of morality: the code of ethics of a secret service functionary in communist Poland as set by law and practice, 1944-1989

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PROMISCUOUS PIONEERS OF MORALITY:
THE CODE OF ETHICS OF A SECRET SERVICE FUNCTIONARY IN COMMUNIST
POLAND
AS SET BY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1944-1989

by

L e s z e k   M u r a t

A Dissertation
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ABSTRACT

In recent years the historical literature on the communist system has grown to significant proportions, yet it has not made a comprehensive attempt to answer the empirical question of how successful communist regimes were in inculcating their moral principles into societies. But the empirical conflict between ethics and reality is crucial to understanding why communism eventually failed. My dissertation makes the first attempt to juxtapose the communist code of ethics, the morality it preached, and the ideal it championed, with ethical dilemmas, moral transgressions, and legal violations of the “purest of the pure” – communist security functionaries.

I pursue this theme by following the Polish security apparatus as the microcosm of an effort to transform it into an army of communist pioneers. Throughout this dissertation I have tried to identify key components of the communist ideal. Each chapter addresses one of its chief virtues: lawfulness, knowledge, secrecy, transparency, atheism, diligence, and sobriety. Although the structure of the code of ethics did not much differ from contemporary democratic canons, its implementation was often contradictory to ideals the officialdom preached.

Most historians explain this paradox as a deliberate policy. Nonetheless, in the course of my research I came across a large number of documents that prove the opposite. Without challenging the canonical conceptions of Marxist theory, I argue that in reference to the Polish security functionaries, even in Stalinist times, not everything promoting the system was considered acceptable and tolerated. The internal code of ethics of the security service was therefore not as instrumental as one would think. I conclude that the authorities were serious about implementing the code of ethics upon security cadres. Despite full-fledged campaigns of moral renovation, they were unable to exact moral responsibility for behavior of their subordinate officers. I argue that the moral crusade was from the start both the unsuccessful means and ends of a set of utopian moral transformations. As a result of this failure, security functionaries remained poorly equipped to meet the multifarious problems imposed upon them by the communist regime.
to my Father I dedicate this work
We are not afraid of the objective truth.

--- Józef Różański, Director of the MBP Investigative Department
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation reflects the generous support of several institutions, and collaboration with teachers, colleagues, and friends. The idea of writing about morality within the security apparatus came to me during my visits to the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), during which time I was provided with an excellent working environment. Completion of my dissertation would be unthinkable without the extremely friendly reception I received at the three field sites where the bulk of research was done: IPN in Łódź, IPN in Bydgoszcz, and IPN in Warsaw. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the employees at both locations, especially Marcin Sobczak, Katarzyna Berendt, and Katarzyna Adamow, for welcoming me into their ranks. Without their support this project would not have been possible.

I have benefited enormously from the encouragement granted to me by the members of the Department of History of the University at Albany. I would like to thank first and foremost Nadieszda Kizenko for her unwavering guidance, constructive criticism, and wonderful moral support. I could not have wished for better advisement throughout the project. I also appreciate the patience and criticism of Dan White, the second reader of the dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude to Richard Fogarty for his insightful reading of the entire manuscript. Finally, I owe many thanks to my colleagues, Anna Biel and Jonathan Coller, who spent time reviewing parts of my work.

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For spiritual inspiration for the study of history I would like to honor Paweł Jasienica – a deceased Polish medievalist, who was himself a victim of the security apparatus. I remain deeply impressed by his eloquence, wit, passion, and, foremost, by his sense of humor when writing about the past.

To thank Dagmara Glazik, my fiancée, would simply understate her influence: no single word of this dissertation would be possible without her personal encouragement.
## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Country/Context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Armia Krajowa, Home Army (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVH</td>
<td>Államvédelmi Hatóság, State Protection Authority, (Hungary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bezpieka</td>
<td>Security police (Poland)</td>
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<td>Cheka</td>
<td>Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya, Extraordinary Commission (USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPN</td>
<td>Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Institute of National Remembrance (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security (USSR)</td>
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<td>KOR</td>
<td>Komitet Obrony Robotników, Committee for Workers’ Defense (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBP</td>
<td>Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, Ministry of Public Security (Poland)</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Milicja Obywatelska, Citizen’s Militia (Poland)</td>
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<td>MSW</td>
<td>Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Poland)</td>
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<td>NKVD</td>
<td>Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, People's Commissars for Internal Affairs (USSR)</td>
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<td>PKP</td>
<td>Polskie Koleje Państwowe, Polish State Railroads</td>
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<td>PKWN</td>
<td>Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, Polish Committee of National Liberation</td>
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<td>PPR</td>
<td>Polska Partia Robotnicza, Polish Worker’s Party (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Polish Socialist Party (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPW</td>
<td>Pion Polityczno-Wychowawczy, Political-Educational Unit (Poland)</td>
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<td>PRL</td>
<td>Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, Polish People’s Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Polish Peasant’s Party</td>
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<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, Polish United Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Służba Bezpieczeństwa, Security Service (Poland)</td>
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Sigurnost, CSS: Komitet za Darzhavna Sigurnost, Committee for State Security
(Bulgaria)

STASI: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Ministry for State Security (East Germany)

StB: Státní Bezpečnost, State Security (Czechoslovakia)

TW: Tajny współpracownik, Secret collaborator (Poland)

UB: Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, Security Office (Poland)

ZOF: Zarząd Ochrony Funkcjonariuszy, Board for Functionaries’ Security (Poland)
INTRODUCTION

According to Marxist ideology the stage of full communism could be reached only if the people of a socialist society took the necessary steps to attain it. Though historians stress the importance of coercion, the communists also used other methods of social stimulation, including morality. The Marxists viewed morality as a useful tool to influence social transformations in a desired direction. Thus, one may not forget that the communist regimes had moral components and promulgated moral rules, such as the *Soviet Moral Code of the Builder of Communism* (see appendix 1) that provided the ethical incentive to become a perfect communist. These moral norms comprised a collection of desired virtues that every communist should possess. In the course of my dissertation, I would like to focus on the Polish communist regime and examine its attempts to shape the morals of Polish security functionaries, making them into ideal communists.

This dissertation focuses on the moral transformations of the Polish security apparatus as a microcosm of the communist security police. By choosing this geographical limitation, I do not wish to imply that the mechanisms described here did not exist in other communist countries. Quite the contrary, the Polish *Bezpieka*, the East German *Stasi*, the Romanian *Securitate*, the Czechoslovakian *Státní Bezpečnost*, the

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Hungarian Államvédelmi Hatóság, or the Bulgarian Sigurnost all originated from the same stem (NKVD-KGB) and shared many similarities. However, the majority of historical literature, especially in English, focuses on upper echelons of power and on secret operations, leaving problems of internal morality unexplored and inaccessible to scholars. Broader studies, especially in comparative perspective, would require separate dissertations. By providing the first comprehensive case study of one such national branch of the secret police, this dissertation seeks to provide the factual and interpretive foundation for subsequent comparative studies.

I propose to focus attention on a vital, yet unexplored by historians social group: security functionaries of low ranks. Many historians forget that the functionaries’ policing role was accompanied by the no less important function of social engineering. They were both its subjects and agents. Communist security functionaries had to participate in a more organized and systematic crusade of moral formation than were those in any country outside of the communist world. Communist authorities demanded a lot of their ‘soldiers’: they were supposed to be the moral backbone of the regime, to represent the ‘majesty of the Party,’ and to be immune to moral temptations of any kind. This type of communist ‘saint’ would be creative yet obedient, selfless and dedicated. In this dissertation, I would like to reconstruct the ideal functionary and to prove that these

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2 Security functionaries were expected to possess the following ideological and moral virtues: “(…) impeccable moral standing, civic and patriotic consciousness, high socialist ideological zeal, and other features that guarantee proper fulfillment of their duties to protect socialist state, citizens’ rights and public order, as well as the respect for the rule of law in their service”: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy służby bezpieczeństwa i milicji obywatelskiej PRL (Rules of Ethics and Customs for Security Service and Militia Functionaries in the Polish People’s Republic), IPN 01179/57, egz.1, 8.
desired values were seriously and genuinely considered, and were not merely conventional propaganda.

By analyzing numerous case studies based on heretofore unknown or neglected documents, I reconstruct a typical security officer for whom looking into the face of the Bezpieka socialist morality was sometimes not so much like looking into a mirror reflecting himself, but more like looking at an image of his own caricature. I pursue this theme by following a functionary’s daily work, his experiences of otherness, his expectations and hopes, his attitudes towards ideology, his understanding of Party orders, and his internal moral conflicts. The documents that spelled out communist qualities belonged to the secret part of the security apparatus’s functioning and were not meant for public consumption; they convey something of the real intent of the regime. That is what makes them unique, especially compared to other sources that produced compromised material for public dissemination.

My findings are in accord with the assertion that it is unlikely that the Polish communist regime survived on terror alone. It is beyond dispute that the Polish Communist Party exercised power by using the security service apparatus, often very brutally. It is also obvious that without a network of devoted security functionaries, the Party would not have been able to overcome numerous crises, both economic and political. My sources, however, indicate that the inventory of methods of influencing

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society was much broader than just terror. In this respect, the profession of a security officer cannot be explained by reference to coercion alone, since the archival documents reveal that being a secret service functionary was a much more complex profession (Solzhenitsyn began this process in the “Blue Caps” chapter of the *Gulag Archipelago*). I believe that it is impossible to work out the actual role of the secret service without a more concrete sense of who ‘they’ actually were, and who ‘they’ were meant to be. For that reason, I have to reject the totalitarian model of Sovietology because it distorts the reality as much as it neglects the “human side” of the secret service.

**METHODOLOGY**

My dissertation challenges perceptions of many contemporary historians of Poland, –most notably, Marek Chodakiewicz, Andrzej Paczkowski, and Piotr Kładoczny, and disputes the argument that the security apparatus paid no or minimal regard to morals. Andrzej Paczkowski, one of the most renown Polish historians, in the introduction to the collection of primacy sources that contains a great number of moral advices for the *Bezpieka*, only briefly mentions the existence of communist morality, but does not analyze it. Also Piotr Kładoczny in his extensive study of the communist law,

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Law as a Tool of Repression in People’s Poland, 1944-1956,\(^7\) neglects the complicated nature of communist morality outlined in various internal regulations, and claims only that security functionaries, “using elegant platitudes, implemented rules and values often contradictory to them [to moral values they preached].”\(^8\) Essentially the same point was made by Marek Chodakiewicz in his essay The Dialectics of Pain,\(^9\) and by Robert Spałek, who provided numerous examples of Bezpieka’s crimes. I argue, by contrast, that once historians break the ideological mold that stamps the security functionary as an anonymous criminal, then they can discover highly motivated, multifaceted, and contradictory individuals struggling to balance the high demands of socialist morality with effective work that often required moral compromises. Thus, my dissertation is one of the relatively few scholarly studies to penetrate the façade of the communist security apparatus. The contemporary literature related to communist morality behind the Iron Curtain is centered mostly around its philosophical aspects, not on its practical application.

In a general historiographical perspective, my research is at the main axis of historical controversy between the revisionist and the totalitarian models of Sovietology. Along with Sheila Fitzpatrick, one of the most prominent proponents of revisionism, I support the careful and dispassionate use of archives as a strategy for de-ideologizing this

\(^7\) Prawo jako narzędzie represji w Polsce Ludowej (1944-1956) (Law as a Tool of Repression in People’s Poland (1944-1956)) (Warszawa, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004).

\(^8\) “Dotyczy to także, a może zwłaszcza, systemu komunistycznego, którego funkcjonariusze, szermując szlachetnymi frazesami, wprowadzali zasady i wartości często zupełnie od nich odmienne”: Piotr Kładoczny, Prawo jako narzędzie represji w Polsce Ludowej (1944-1956) (Law as a Tool of Repression in People’s Poland (1944-1956)) (Warszawa, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004), 11.

Particularly, I admire revisionists’ attention to archival sources. Such a methodology for studying history places me alongside such attempts to revise Sovietology, but with one notable difference. For Fitzpatrick, good historical scholarship means rescuing history from the Cold War ‘iconodule’ bias. For me, it means rescuing history from the post-Cold War Central European patriotic ‘iconoclast’ bias. Moreover, like Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I re-open the possible paradox of Communist violence: a regime which acknowledges its violence might also contain some genuine humanity. My findings acknowledge the opposition between the communists’ political realism and their values, and allow me to portray the security apparatus in terms of the contrast between duplicity, dexterity, violent propaganda on one side, and respect for truth, law, and individual dignity on the other side. Although my study epitomizes Merleau-Ponty’s observation that purity of principles not only tolerates but even requires violence, some of my findings indicate that communist virtues were indeed based on rejection of violence. I attempt to explain this paradox not predicted by Merleau-Ponty, but observed by Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck.

Particularly relevant to my work is Halfin’s reconstruction of the Soviet moral system which, in his opinion, made it possible for its practitioners to resort to violence as

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10 Sheila Fitzpatrick was the leader of the second generation of "revisionist historians" working on Stalinism in the 1980s. For more details see: Sheila Fitzpatrick, "New Prospects on Stalinism," *The Russian Review*, vol. 45, October 1986, 358; “Revisionism in Retrospect: A Personal View,” *The Slavic Review*, vol. 67, no 3, 682-710. Other distinguished proponents of revisionism were Arch Getty, Robert Thurston, Lynne Viola, while Alfred Meyer, Geoff Ely, Richard Pipes, and Peter Kenez belonged to its most renowned critics.

11 For Fitzpatrick, who was accused of defending Stalinism and belonging to the “New Left,” the idea of revising Sovietology meant rescuing it from its Cold War bias by challenging popular belief, not recasting it to suit another political agenda, see: Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Retrospect…”, 685.


13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror...*, xiii.
morally defensible activity.\textsuperscript{14} My dissertation reinforces Halfin’s argument that Soviet crimes stemmed from communist moral convictions.\textsuperscript{15} Polish security functionaries, like Soviet party members analyzed by Halfin, had their minds structured by communist morality, embraced the violence inherent in it, and tried to resolve its contradictions. If we reject evaluation of communist morality in terms of being good or bad, and focus instead on its influence upon individuals, then we can discern sincere efforts to transform themselves into genuine followers of the Party. The death of the old individualist self and the birth of a new collective self, so diligently described by Halfin in his book \textit{Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial}, is even more dramatically exemplified in the souls of Polish security functionaries. Their cases reveal that the acceptance of communist values was sometimes thwarted by habits of ‘old morality,’ by which I mean independent acts of moral judgment based on universal, intuitive perception of good and evil. For example, deception is generally viewed as bad. Communist morality, however, valued deception as a virtue as long as it served the regime: officers were ordered to make friends in order to examine their inner identity. Many functionaries were torn between the desire to serve loyally the Party by identification with its moral guidance, and their habits of \textit{old morality} that made some of them to question it. Total internalization of communist virtues was a long and complicated process; both Polish security functionaries and Halfin’s autobiographers strove hard to close the gap between their own worldviews and the views of the regime. Their struggle shows many

\textsuperscript{15} Igal Halfin, \textit{Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 273.
similarities, and proves deep, sincere admiration of communist values on one hand, and difficulty in rejecting *old morality* on the other hand.

Archival documents teach us not to underestimate dynamism in the relationship between the Party and security functionaries. Surely, considering Bezpieka operatives as marionettes, absolutely dependent on their manipulators, is too simplistic because communist ideologists expected much more of security cadres than just passive acceptance of moral norms. Each officer had some freedom of action in view of his capabilities; in other words, he was expected correctly to adapt his communist convictions to particular circumstances. These individual expressions of communist morality deserve more attention than they have received so far. I also argue that communist morality had a productive influence on individuals (in this case Bezpieka functionaries). In this respect, the rationale for my dissertation comes directly from Jochen Hellbeck who believes that the whole moral crusade of the communist regimes was productive, not repressive.\(^{16}\) Moreover, I agree with his criticism of the Western imagination of the Stalinist regimes. For example, it is unjustified to claim that either Soviet citizens or Polish security functionaries were ever able to mitigate state pressure by “retreating into private spheres unaffected by ‘official’ ideology.” Both groups sincerely tried to internalize communist morality but at the same time they gave it their own form of expression thus making them unique. This “uniqueness” is the prime subject of my study.

Moreover, the community of Polish security functionaries, with its specific moral obligations and intensive attempts at personal transformations, serves as the

exemplification of a wider phenomenon called by Halfin “hermeneutics of the soul,” by which he means “a collection of enunciations and practices that came to distinguish those who should be admitted to the [Soviet] brotherhood.”¹⁷ Halfin examines hermeneutics of the soul in Soviet society at large, while my dissertation reveals the importance of the hermeneutical investigative practices within a specific group – the personnel of the Polish communist security apparatus. The Polish communist regime experienced the same problems inculcating morals as those identified by Halfin (for example, departure from loyalty to the Party, erratic attempts of self-control, difficulties in developing a sense of kinship). Polish hermeneutics of the soul in relation to security officers did not differ much from its Soviet prototype as portrayed by Halfin.

My dissertation not only acknowledges Halfin’s assertions, but also further develops some of his concepts, especially the paradox of the New Man. Halfin claims that the New Man could not have been an automaton without any spark of freedom, and at the same time he acknowledges that a communist man had to sacrifice his habits, inclinations, and mood to the Party as every aspect of everyday life was politicized.¹⁸ One’s transformation into the New Man was not easy, as this struggle, Hellbeck believes, was not only against the Other, but also against oneself. My dissertation further explores this paradox in relation to Polish security officers, such as Colonel Grzegorz Piotrowski who called himself “automaton” and “ingenious” at the same time (see Chapter Five).

In its methodological thrust, my dissertation is a response to the general lack of comprehensive evaluation of the degree to which communist morality actually influenced

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individuals. An exception is Jochen Hellbeck, who made an important contribution to methodological reflection concerning the historiographical use of autobiography as a source. In his book, *Revolution on My Mind*, Hellbeck portrays an individual’s exemplary struggle with one’s inner resistance during one’s conversion into a ‘Communist.’ Diaries are a particularly valuable sources of information because they most accurately reveal the degree of internalization of the communist ideology by their authors. But Polish security functionaries did not write diaries (the few available autobiographies that appeared after 1990 were written with intention of being published, which might have affected their credibility). I am aware that various types of documents produced by the Bezpieka’s bureaucratic machine may only partially substitute for the absence of personal diaries. Nonetheless, officers had, for example, to periodically write reports on their colleagues as well as on themselves. Their lives were under careful scrutiny to a greater extent than any other social group. A considerable volume of these reports of internal investigations, personal statements, and various evaluations are now available to historians. I am aware that these materials provide not internal, but mostly external perspectives, and thus have to be approached with caution. Nonetheless, despite different sources, Hellbeck and I come to the same conclusions. He contends, for example, that an individual and the political system cannot be viewed as two separate identities; I argue that this is especially applicable to Polish security functionaries. Just like Hellbeck’s diarists, most Polish security officers believed or wanted to believe that self-improvement and endurance were intrinsic to their success as communists. Also, both groups suffered an ever-widening divide between ideology and reality that made their struggle particularly difficult to

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internalize. Finally, I share Hellbeck’s and Halfin’s rejection of the hypothesis that Soviet citizens could rely on their own imaginations in designing their own selves. Rather, this process required the inspiration by the regime and “considerable intellectual effort” on their part.\textsuperscript{20}

A few words have to be said about semantics of becoming the ideal communist. Halfin claims that the ideal communist was a cultural artifact and calls him The New Man – an individual of either gender who applied to himself a modern notion of communist philosophy.\textsuperscript{21} Nonetheless, this is not the only description of a representative communist used by contemporary historians. Halfin himself provides a number of alternative names, such as “Apollo,” “Man-God,” and “Superman” (a term borrowed from Nikolay Gredeskul), while Hellbeck uses such terms as “Stalin-era heroes,” and “zealous Communists.”\textsuperscript{22} There also appeared \textit{homo sovieticus} (pl. \textit{homo sovietica}) – a critical and somewhat sarcastic reference to a category of communists who accepted everything that government imposed on them. \textit{Homo sovieticus} is especially popular among critics of communism, such as former Soviet sociologist Aleksandr Zinovyyev and Polish philosopher Józef Tischner: “\textit{Homo sovieticus} is a man running away from responsibility, opportunistic, aggressive towards the weakest and loyal towards the strongest, intellectually incapacitated, deprived of dignity and totally subjected to the Party.”\textsuperscript{23} I am aware that judging opportunism, lack of dignity, or intellectual capacity is subject to one’s system of values. In my dissertation I will use \textit{homo sovieticus} only as a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Igal Halfin (ed.), \textit{Language and Revolution...}, 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Igal Halfin (ed.), \textit{Language and Revolution...}, 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Igal Halfin (ed.), \textit{Language and Revolution...}, 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} For an extensive analysis of \textit{homo sovieticus}, see Józef Tischner, \textit{Etyka solidarności i Homo sovieticus (Solidarity Ethics and Homo Sovieticus)} (Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, 1992).
\end{itemize}
description of an individual who approximated an archetype of the New Soviet Man, as outlined in the *Soviet Moral Code of the Builder of Communism* from October 1961 (see appendix 1) and in its Polish version for the Bezpieka operatives, *Rules of Ethics and Customs for Security Service and Militia Functionaries in the Polish People’s Republic.*

This would be a man who 1) was totally devoted to the communist cause (as defined by the Party), 2) showed moral purity and unpretentiousness in social and private life, 3) had an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, and 4) developed admiration for collectivism and comradely mutual assistance.

There are also gender issues that need to be clarified. Though at first glance the Bezpieka – “the shield and sword of the Party,” may seem to be a place reserved solely for men of soldier-like qualities, I found no evidence that the regime discriminated against women when it came to serving in the security apparatus. The Bezpieka welcomed women into its ranks and offered them opportunities of promotion to the highest ranks. Female functionaries were in the minority, but this does not necessarily mean their role was marginalized.

The range of positions occupied by females ranged from secretaries to heads of ministerial departments. For example, between 1945 and 1956 one of the most powerful offices in the Ministry of Public Security was in the hands of Colonel Julia Brystiger (I discuss her role in the security apparatus in Chapter Five).

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24 Zasady etyki i obyczajów..., 31.
27 For a list of women in the Bezpieka, see the IPN internet catalogue: http://katalog.bip.ipn.gov.pl/main.do?katalogId=2&pageNo=1&.
This equality did not exist when it came to the Bezpieka’s internal language, however. Functionaries were generally addressed by the masculine funkcjonariusze, not by the feminine funkcjonariuszki (or by both). There is no evidence, however, that this habit had reasons other than just linguistic simplicity. For the same reason, I will refer to a functionary using the masculine pronouns him/his and the reflexive pronoun himself. It does not mean that I intend to exclude female functionaries from my study. Quite the contrary, I cite their cases if they seem relevant.

I believe that visual satire reveals more than any text can do, therefore, in the course of my dissertation I use satirical drawings of Andrzej Mleczko – one of the most famous Polish illustrators who committed part of his career to anti-communist activity.28 Mleczko skillfully satirized the omnipresent lies, exaggerated the regime’s deformities, and poked fun at the paradoxes of the communist system. His intelligent criticism of communist hypocrisy, especially his humorous depiction of opposed extremes, convinced me to include several of his drawings in my thesis.

Some words about what this dissertation will not cover are also necessary. I decided to omit details of security operations, as they have been well-studied by numerous contemporary historians.29 Neither will I accord primacy to the upper echelons of power, and to politics in general – they have also been thoroughly discussed, for example, in outstanding works of the ‘totalitarian’ school’s representatives: Merle Fainsod, Robert Conquest, Leonard Schapiro, Michel Tatu, Richard Pipes and Martin

28 Compare his website: mleczko.pl.
Malia. They focused on high politics but do not recognize autonomous spheres of social or political activity. Explanations proposed by the ‘totalitarian school’ are based on certain ideological presuppositions, such as viewing terror as an intentional systemic evil initiated by Stalin himself, that do not reveal the whole complexity of the communist reality. Contrary to what they claim, I argue that communist policies were often improvised and diverged from the regimes’ intentions. Also, terrorizing society was not the only function of the security apparatus; it had ambitious moral aspirations. The communist ideologists expected security functionaries to behave virtuously not because of rewards and punishments, but because they would value doing so. In attempting to shed light upon the ethical justification of the Bezpieka’s work, my dissertation is the missing component to provide a truly three-dimensional picture of the manner in which the communist system functioned.

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Until the mid-1980s, moral norms of conduct for the Polish security functionaries were articulated in various orders, internal regulations, and during secret briefings of security superiors. They also circulated in the form of instructions and pamphlets. In

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1985 the most important moral norms were compiled in a single book – *Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries.* For years, the study of the security apparatus has been hampered by the problems of getting access to the archives. These difficulties have eased during the last several years in many Central European states. Among the most important sources I use here are top-secret documents recently declassified and available to scholars at the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) in Poland. I visited several other Polish archives, such as those of the Polish National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa), and the Institute of History of the Polish Science Academy.

**CONTENT**

On the basis of my archival findings I organized communist moral norms into thematic branches and examined them in separate chapters.

By analyzing the virtue of socialist lawfulness (*praworządność socjalistyczna*), as outlined in Chapter One, I demonstrate that the regime ordered security functionaries to do the impossible – they had to fight the Party’s enemies and to obey the laws at the same time. It was the pressure of duty and the challenge of excellence as security officers functioned in the environment of exponentially growing duties and perfectionism. I argue that an exposure to this stress for too long led some of them to form a deep distaste for the whole concept of socialist lawfulness. My research unambiguously indicates that those functionaries who were unable to reconcile this contradiction had to be eliminated.

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31 *Zasady etyki i obyczajów...*
from the Bezpieka since in the security apparatus of Communist Poland there was no place for ‘degenerates’ — men unable to internalize double standards of morality.

Moral upbringing and intellectual development were also necessary components of a successful psychological transformation into an ideal communist. Pursuit of knowledge was defined by the Party ideologists as both legal and moral obligation. The regime had ambitious expectations for fostering this virtue, valuing knowledge as a means of personal salvation. As I show in Chapter Two, it sought to empower security functionaries intellectually and raise their moral qualifications. First and foremost, however, security schools were severely disciplinarian. But disciplining the security cadres was not enough to guarantee success in their education efforts. There were some other obstacles, too. I show that internal contradictions within the ideology and its inconsistency with reality thwarted the whole educational effort. Communist ideologists presupposed that security functionaries could not have acquired socialist virtues before entering the Bezpieka. The Party had to do a lot to bring officers around to “save them from themselves.” That is why, they put so much hope in proper education, as the crucial tool to create the New Man. Despite numerous attempts, however, the regime succeeded in forming obedient, but not necessarily enthusiastic, cadres. Partially contradictory to its expectations, the educational efforts produced intellectually handicapped and morally rigid men. As a result, security functionaries remained poorly equipped to meet the numerous problems imposed upon them by their Party.

Chapter Three points out that the regime’s perception of the ideal functionary included the glorification of secrecy. I argue that the Party adopted all kinds of restrictive

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32 In this respect, my findings acknowledge the assertions of Igal Halfin who was the proponent of the term “salvation through knowledge”: Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light..., 52-84.
measures to secure the confidentiality of the security service. One of the tools was the
promotion of a secretive ideal based on the ideological presumption that a security officer
must be totally transparent to the regime and totally obscure to everyone else. I
reconstruct a world of ubiquitous confidentiality which nurtured distrust even toward
colleagues. I argue that, despite numerous precautions, the Party was never wholly
successful in securing secrecy from among the security cadres. For example, the decision
to bureaucratize security work in order to make the apparatus internally secure resulted in
the growing stagnation of its cadres as they were more preoccupied with following
complicated procedures of internal security than with effective work. The people’s
natural propensity for communication proved stronger than either the law or the tight
control of their superiors. Nonetheless, secrecy was one of the most observed virtues,
partially because of the harsh consequences of disobedience, and partially because it
required passive, not active efforts on the part of functionaries.33

The successful transformation of functionaries into ideal communists depended
also on the effective inculcation of duplicity, explored in Chapter Four. Hidden behind
the masks of impenetrability, they were expected to work and to live in a state of constant
and perfect transparency with respect to the regime. All their behavior remained closely
related to the “interest of service” and thus was considered official.34 The officers lacked
a de facto private realm of family life immune from regular oversight by the security
apparatus. In 1949, the Party even resorted to eugenics to control every aspect of its

33 See, for example, Memo of Sergeant Major H. Ulicka from February 9, 1982, MSW S-0229/82,
IPN BU 01007/22, k.1, and the ministerial document about observing security rules in 1986: Wa-
1988/07/01 Nr AB-III-01297/88, IPN 01067/262, k. 6-8.
34 “A functionary’s behavior after work is not his private business, but is closely connected to the
interest of service” (“Postępowanie funkcjonariusza poza służbą nie jest wyłącznie jego prywatną
sprawą. Pozostaje ono w ścisłym związku z dobrem służby”): Zasady etyki i obyczajów..., 29.
solders’ lives. For example, each officer wishing to engage in a relationship had to ask for permission. The virtue of transparency was based on denunciation of oneself, often hard to make, and the functionaries obeyed it only as long as they trusted the regime or feared it.

In reference to the socialist virtue of atheism, in Chapter Five, I illustrate the hypothesis that the regime’s materialistic, atheistic, and explicitly anticlerical doctrine, which demanded the undivided loyalty of its cadres, was a kind of religion itself, but not attractive enough to become a sense of life for the security cadres (let alone of other citizens). I argue that the persistent religious activities of the security functionaries prompted serious concern on the part of the regime and were major impediments to transforming them into New Men. As I show, many officers consciously violated the order to stay atheist, instead continuing to secretly participate in religious rites and ceremonies. I also examine reasons for these acts of ‘unethical behavior,’ as well as forms of punishment of the ‘morally degenerate’ functionaries. My interest here may be divided into three major subsections. First are the ontological reasons for animosity between communism and religion. Second are the concrete methods the regime used to try to uproot religiosity from the security cadres, and the specific forms of constant

35 “Because of the specific conditions of the public security apparatus, in which it is unacceptable for functionaries to get married without permission, especially in the face of reported cases of marrying individuals from hostile political and class backgrounds, I order that: § 1. A security apparatus functionary intending to get married should turn to a proper superior for permission”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 7 z dnia 16 lutego 1949 (Ministerial Order No. 7 from February 16, 1949), IPN/ OBiAD/Lodz, sygn. 0050/26, t.1, k. 177.

36 Nathaniel Davis, for example, claims that communism shared with many religions the physical attributes of worship, including ceremonies, shrines, and rites. Lenin’s mausoleum and the Red Square parades are such an example: A Long Walk to Church (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), xxii; this belief is shared by John C. Bennett: Christianity and Communism (New York: Haden House Associated Press, 1948), 33-34, and Albert Boiter in Religion in the Soviet Union (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 10.
surveillance of the security personnel’s religious activity. The last are internal atheistic campaigns within the context of communist law, especially the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. My arguments are illustrated by a number of case studies of “degenerate functionaries,” revealing contradictions within socialist morality and disparity between ideal and practice.

In Chapter Six, I examine the virtue of diligence and the role of institutionalized relentlessness as a part of the socialist creed. Diligence was elevated to the top level of moral virtues because, in the eyes of the communist ideologists, the service was “the most prestigious, requiring perseverance and passion.” I demonstrate that the promotion of assiduousness among the security cadres had serious drawbacks such as the ubiquitous problems of idleness, lack of discipline, proper supervision, cheating, and general apathy. On the other hand, I also look closely at the “over-motivated” functionaries who vented their energy in abusive forms. I examine reasons for these extremes and conclude that they were dangerous not only for society, but especially for the security apparatus itself.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, I focus on the implementation of the virtue of sobriety. Teetotalism belonged to the core of communist morality and had itself become a primary symbol of one’s status as a communist within the security apparatus. The Party perceived sobriety both in the ideological and utilitarian sense and instituted the policy of close watch of drunk functionaries. Violations of sobriety served as a barometer of functionaries’ moral standing and their belief in the system. My dissertation suggests that despite a strict prohibitionist stance, the Bezpieca was never free from drunkenness, though the degree of drinking changed over time. The regime tried various techniques to

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37 Odprawa Departamentu III z dnia 13 sierpnia 1949 roku (Briefing of the Department III from August 13, 1949), CA MSW 17/IX/77, t.5, 198.
38 Compare Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 30.
discipline its cadres, all with only limited success. Ideological solutions such as reeducation by appealing to a functionary’s intellect and political awareness, were of limited effect. I conclude that the communist system itself, with its internal contradictions and tensions, was one of the reasons for the anti-alcohol campaigns’ limited success. The social acceptance of drinking as a cultural norm was yet another obstacle. Numerous harsh anti-liquor laws, punitive orders and regulations reminding officers to stay sober served as a desperate cry for discipline, but ideology alone was simply not enough to discourage many of the security functionaries from seeking consolation in alcohol.

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_The Bezpieka — “The Beating Heart of the Party”_

In order to make my work clear to the reader, I have simplified several issues that are not a primary subject of this study. I use the capitalized term “the Party” in reference to the Polish ruling political organization between 1944 and 1989, though officially there was no communist party in Poland throughout this time. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that Poland was in the hands of communists after World War II, regardless of how their affiliation was officially named. Initially active in two parties, in 1948 the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR) and the Lublin Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) merged and formed the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) that held power until 1989.³⁹

I also do not discuss the problem of which institution actually ruled over Poland – the Party, the Bezpieka, or the Soviet security apparatus (especially before 1956). Each time I use the term “regime,” I mean the communist system existing in Poland ruled by the communist “Party” – PPR/PPS or PZPR. The same concerns security. In communist Poland the security service, which I also call the security apparatus, the security police, or just the Bezpieka (from the Polish word “security,”) was a part of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, MBP), created in 1944 and renamed in 1954 the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, MSW). Specifically, the security apparatus was called the Security Office (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB) and after 1954 the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB). Throughout this time, the Bezpieka was controlled by the MBP/MSW ministers, employed thousands of officers with military ranks, and was divided into many operational divisions (see appendix 3). Since 1956, the core of the security service was composed of units dealing with foreign intelligence (Department I), counter-intelligence (Department II), combating anti-state activity (Department III), and surveillance of religious organizations (Department IV, created in 1962). In 1985, the Ministry of Internal affairs had nineteen divisions, most of which functioned also in the provincial headquarters of the Bezpieka (see appendix 4).

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From the very first moments of recapturing Poland from the Nazis in 1944, the Polish communists paid meticulous attention to giving their rules the appearance of

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legality by official acknowledgement of Poland’s pre-war legal heritage. However, the most important and visible tool in assuring power, *the Bezpieka*, worked without a constitutional basis for almost ten years. Though from a formal point of view the functioning of MBP was illegal, this was practically meaningless since there was no institution in Poland allowed to examine constitutional violations.\(^{41}\) The MBP’s supreme status was symptomatic of the new order: the regime operated according to a peculiar form of legality — hidden behind the façade of the rule of law, it kept imposing its own “law” that originated as a *de facto* power.

From the security apparatus’s inception it was obvious to communists that the *Bezpieka* was created not as a permanent institution: “We have to stress clearly that we are still the same military unit, and it will not change even when all bandits disappear.”\(^{42}\) Facing no parliamentary oversight, and no judicial control, the MBP organized its own structure in a remarkably short time. Surely, it would not have been done so smoothly if the Polish Communists had built the MBP spontaneously on their own. In fact, from the beginning, both the concept and its execution were modeled on the “already tested” Soviet security apparatus, mainly the NKVD.\(^ {43}\) With a virtually unlimited budget, technical means, and tens of thousands of functionaries supported by a dense network of

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\(^{41}\) A Formal, legalistic approach to the security apparatus calling it illegal is claimed especially by two distinguished Polish scholars — Antoni Dudek and Andrzej Paczkowski, *A Handbook of the Communist..., 221.

\(^{42}\) “Musimy wyraźnie powiedzieć, że tym zbrojnym oddziałem zostajemy nadal i pozostaniemy nim i wtedy, kiedy wcale ani jeden bandy zbrojnej w kraju nie będzie”: Referat ministra wygłoszony na kursie dla szefów PUBP, lipiec 1947r. (Speech of the Minister of Public Safety during Workshops for the Heads of the District Security Departments, July 1947), CA MSW, 17/IX/77, t. 2.

\(^{43}\) Between 1944 and 1949 the Polish security apparatus was auxiliary to the Soviet security services. In 1944 10,000 NKVD officers were stationed in Poland, which was ten times more than the emerging Polish internal troops. Soviet counter-intelligence, *Smersh*, had its own jails and between 1944 and 1946, the Soviets held in captivity almost 50,000 Poles. For details see: Antoni Dudek, Andrzej Paczkowski, *A Handbook of the Communist..., 7-10, 222.
secret collaborators, the MBP became “the shield and the sword” of the communists and the backbone of the new order. This special role was enhanced by various prerogatives. Thanks to their own hospitals, spa resorts, residential houses, shops, cafeterias, sports clubs, bakeries, and even kindergartens, security employees enjoyed life at least partially secluded from the grim reality of economic shortages and social tensions. Supported economically and protected by the Party, they quickly formed an elite class functioning as a “state within a state.” As one could anticipate, the majority of society lived in this deeply polarized public realm used to refer to security functionaries by using the third person plural pronoun “Them,” not the first person pronoun “We.” This was for the communists an embarrassing blatant exposure of deeply hidden animosities that were officially non-existent, but in practice impossible to contain.

Though never absolutely omnipotent, the nature of tasks entrusted to the Bezpieka called for its almost unlimited competency and, in consequence, vindicated the ubiquity of its interests. Unreserved and complete fulfillment of the Party’s orders was its primary mission, its standard of qualification and, most notably, its reason for existence. Throughout the communist era, this peculiar relationship was repeatedly and unequivocally stressed in numerous minutes and briefings. For instance, in a briefing on March 4, 1954, General Stanisław Radkiewicz, the Minister of MBP, furtively cautioned

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44 A detailed description of security functionaries’ privileges was provided by Colonel Józef Światło in Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło. Za kulisami bezpieki i partii 1940-1955 (Józef Światło Speaks. Inside the Security Apparatus and the Party 1940-1955) (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1988), 92-94. For a general overview, see Antoni Dudek, Andrzej Paczkowski, A Handbook of the Communist..., 223-225. For hospitals, see, for example Rozkaz Nr 83 (Order No. 83) from August 27, 1946, IPN 01225/46, k. 46.

45 See, for example, a cartoon by an anti-communist activist Andrzej Mleczko in Pożegnanie z Komuną (Farewell to Communism) where he exposed subtle linguistic alienation between the secret service and the society. Look also at the informative title of Teresa Torańska’s interviews with chief Polish Stalinists in Oni (Them) (Warszawa: Agencja Omnipress, 1990).
security functionaries that “every purpose of security services’ operation and every procedural detail must be conducted in concord with the Party and peoples’ power’s policy (…).”46 Since the Party “unquestioningly” focused its care on “a man and his material and spiritual needs over all other problems and social tasks,”47 the Bezpieka felt not only entitled, but also obligated, to spread its tentacles into private bedrooms, closets, basements, drawers, wardrobes, and bookcases. Omnipresence and omniscience, so intrinsic to the MBP’s functioning, were necessary to guarantee and control the “happiness of the masses,” vaguely defined by Radkiewicz as “comfortable and unrestrained usage of all benefits our system brings.”48 The imperative of socialist happiness, often blatantly irrelevant to actual social desires and remarkably impervious to social criticism, ultimately placed the Bezpieka in a vise between what was real and what was desired. Facing the chasm between the ideologically rigid Party and the fluctuating society, the security apparatus employed various means to harmonize the latter with the former. No matter whether society was stirred up or was pacified, in the Party’s view each of these circumstances might suddenly turn dangerous to the regime. Yet ot only outbursts of social spontaneity, but also signs of social apathy were alarming. In order to

47 “Wyższość systemu socjalistycznego (…) [polega na tym], że troskę o człowieka i jego potrzeby materialne i duchowe wysuwa na czoło wszystkich problemów i zadań społecznych”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 r., k. 1-42;
48 “(…) zapewnić im swobodne i pełne korzystanie z dobrodziejstw, jakie niesie nasz ustrój”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 r..., k. 1-42;
prevent and halt potentially lethal ideological numbness of society, the Party ordered the secret service to stay vigilant and, if facing signs of detachment, to redouble its efforts to “energize the inseparable bond between the masses and our Party (…)”. Considering socialism’s innate propensity to create social and economic tensions, the task of anticipating possible bursts of disloyalty, identifying threats, and destroying them in their embryonic phase made the existence of the security apparatus critical in all phases of the communist regime’s existence.

However, in Poland, filling vacancies with loyal and effective cadres became a troublesome issue, impossible to solve with mere administrative tools. The regime looked for men of certain qualities that were not easy to find, especially in the formative period of the security apparatus (1944-1950). As a matter of a paramount importance, the Party introduced a strict code of conduct — high standards of selection, strong emphasis on education, constant insistence on discipline, and special stress on secrecy — all to raise the purest “soldiers of the Party.”

Documents reveal that security functionaries were meant to be “fanatic” communists serving in the “spirit of devotion and fidelity to the Party.” Thus, men with a “high level of general knowledge,” “operationally experienced,” clever, intelligent, open, able to “recognize, approach and denounce the

49 “Mam na myśli problem wzmacniania łączności, wzmacniania nierozwalnej więzi z masami naszej partii (…)”: Przemówienie ministra Radkiewicza na odprawie w dniu [.] kwietnia 1953 r. (Minister Radkiewicz’s Speech during a Briefing in April, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10, k. 203-213.
50 A term “soldiers of the Party” (żołnierze partii) in reference to security officers was used by the Vice-minister of Public Security Jan Ptasiński in his secret Speech on September 3, 1953: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 r. na zakończenie kursu wychowawców zawodowych (Speech of Jan Ptasiński, the Vice-Minister of Public Security at the Conclusion of Professional Lecturer’s Training Course, September 3, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 22c, k.111-130.
51 This citation comes from Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 r. na zakończenie kursu wychowawców..., k.111-130.
enemy regardless of the foe’s education, knowledge, cunning, camouflage and slyness were always in high demand. The list of desired talents was much longer, and included such qualities as the capacity for thoughtful and effective “operational tactics” (kombinacja operacyjna), creative political ideas, flexibility of methods, and fondness for working with secret collaborators. Equally important, candidates should behave bravely enough to admit their failures, and to be exemplary in industriousness, sincerity, enthusiasm, and, especially, in unconditional loyalty.

![Image](image.png)

Figure 1. “We believe in you, dwarf!”: Satiric view of the communist labor ethos. Source: Andrzej Mleczko, Pożegnanie z Komuną (Farewell to Communism) (Fopress, 1990).

It is not hard to imagine that it was difficult to find candidates with all these capacities developed in at least rudimentary form. In the 1940s and early 1950s, only the Soviet security functionaries and a handful group of Polish communists trained in the

52 “Trzeba nam dziś ludzi o wysokim poziomie wiedzy ogólnej, zdolnych, inteligentnych, doświadczonych operacyjnie, ludzi z otwartą głową, myśliczych, umiejących rozpoznawać, podejść i demaskować wroga niezależnie od jego wykształcenia, wiedzy, chytrości, maskowania się i przebiegłości”: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 r. na zakończenie kursu wychowawców..., k.111-130.
53 Compare Zasady etyki i obyczajów...
USSR possessed a combination of these “virtues.” At that time, completion of the NKVD school guaranteed lightning-quick advancement. Immediately, the trainees formed the core of the Bezpieka, serving both as supervisors and tutors for their less experienced colleagues. Most of Bezpieka employees were recruited on the streets looking desperately for suitable candidates (see figure 1 for a satiric depiction of the communist work ethos). The results were not difficult to predict. Konrad Świetlik, the MBP Vice-Minister (1948-1953) bluntly admitted in a secret briefing, intuitiveness, practicality, amateurism, and plagiarism defined the MBP’s function in the early 1940s: “Don’t be discouraged by difficulties. There is nothing we can do about it — our service is difficult (...) and there is no academy that would teach us how to master our work. Our practice makes an academy itself (...). We use the experience of our Soviet comrades — this is our professional academy, this is our tempering. We strengthen ourselves by following the example of those who have already gone through a more difficult battery of tests.”

54 For example, supposed NKVD agents were Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski (the Head of the Commission of Public Security), Bolesław Bierut (President of Poland), Colonel Adam Gajewski (Director of Department I in the Ministry of Public Security), Mieczysław Mietkowski (second Vice-minister of the Ministry of Public Security), Roman Romkowski (first Vice-minister of the Ministry of Public Security), Artur Ritter-Jastrzębski (Director of Department I in the Ministry of Public Security), Julian Kole (Vice-minister in the Ministry of Finances), Bolesław Piasecki (leader of the PAX), General Mieczysław Moczar (the Head of the Ministry of Interior Affairs), et alia. For more details, see: Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło....
55 “At that time [1940s], men were recruited even on the streets (...)”: words of Samuel Sandler as interviewed by Teresa Torańska, “They Recruited on the Streets,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 6, 2010.
56 For a complete list of the Bezpieka’s nomenclatura, including profiles of the most prominent functionaries, see Mirosław Piotrowski, Ludzie Bezpieki w walce z Narodem i Kościołem (The Bezpieka’s Men in Fight against the Nation and the Church) (Lublin: Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej, 2000).
57 “Nie zrażać się trudnościami. Nie ma rady — służba nasza trudna, służba nasza trudna, [a] nie ma akademii, która by nas nauczyła, jak najdoskonalej pracować, akademię tworzymy w służbie, akademię tworzyli towarzysze, poczynając od Chełma. Korzystamy z ich doświadczenia, korzystamy z doświadczenia towarzyszy radzieckich, to jest nasza akademia w służbie, to jest nasz hart, hartujemy się na tych, którzy przeszli trudniejszy okres (...)” Przemówienie towarzysza wiceministra Świetlik na odprawie w dniu 15 kwietnia 1953 roku (Speech of the Comrade Vice-
In the same briefing, Świetlik lamented the unsatisfactory “moral level” of the security apparatus and in dramatic language demanded more intensified endeavors by the employees: “You must fight, dear comrades, for moral standards, for moral excellence!” Swietlik’s call symptomizes a permanent moralistic crusade within the Bezpieka — an integral part of a wider campaign to forge functionaries’ ideological mentality around the principle of noble service. Indeed, it is remarkable how much the Party cared for the morality of the Bezpieka and how much emphasis was put on law and order within its cadres. At one time, Minister Radkiewicz thundered against the apparatus’ “recklessness,” calling it a “perversion of ideological-moral ethics,” which was neither the first, nor the last such censure. The secrecy and the rhetoric of these speeches, as well as a number of detailed examples and disciplinary orders accompanying

minister of the Public Security, Świetlik, During a Briefing on April 15, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10, k. 215-223.

58 “Bić się, proszę towarzyszy, o morale, o poziom moralny.” This was a part of a long speech on corrections within the security apparatus, pointing especially at functionaries’ low self-esteem, illegal practices, and apathy: Przemówienie towarzysza wiceministra Świetlika na odprawie w dniu 15 kwietnia 1953..., k.215-223.

59 “Wszystko to tchnie łamaniem praworządności i więcej powiem: wszystko to tchnie...nie ci, którzy tolerują te rzeczy u siebie, tchnie moralnym wypaczeniem etyki moralno partyjnej tych ludzi, którzy to robią, tych naszych pracowników”: Przemówienie ministra Radkiewicza na odprawie w dniu 16 kwietnia 1953 roku (Speech of the Minister Radkiewicz During a Briefing on April 16, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10, k.203-213.

60 Compare, for instance, Zasady etyki i obyczajów...; Etyka zawodowa funkcjonariuszy służby bezpieczeństwa i milicji obywatelskiej (Warszawa: Zakład Pomocy Naukowych, Wydawnictw i Reprografii ASW, 1988), IPN 01179/49; Rozkaz nr 19 z dnia 15 maja 1945 roku (Order no 19 from May 15, 1945), IPN Ld 0050/21, t.II, k. 25; Rozkaz Nr 88 z 13 września 1946 roku (Order no 88 from September 12, 1946), Nr RR 15/46, IPN Ld 0050/22, t.II; Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...; Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego, Milicji Obywatelskiej, przewodniczących sądów wojewódzkich i prokuratorów wojewódzkich 7 lipca 1953 roku (Speech of the PRL’s Attorney General, Stefan Kalinowski, Raised during a Comprehensive Council of the Security Apparatus’ Functionaries, Functionaries of the Citizen’s Militia, Chiefs of the Regional Courts, and Regional Prosecutors, July 7, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.
them, indicate that this concern was not just internal propaganda. The moral crusade was not merely political rhetoric, but was often sincere, since it showed up in internal documents. Of course, it is undeniable that high-ranking security officers were also politicians and that a large portion of their activity was politically oriented. The political pragmatics of the Radkiewicz’s speech may explain its inner absurdity.

One cannot, however, forget that moralistic discourse was not a phenomenon circulating only in the isolation of ministerial rooms, but also dictated wider cultural trends that later dribbled down the steps of the Bezpieka’s long ladder of ranks. The lower in the apparatus, the less pragmatic and more fanatical these orders appeared to be. An ordinary functionary, unaware of the details of the intrigues at the top, had to make his own decision as to whether to treat new laws as nonsense that could be neglected (the regime usual doublespeak) or as a serious warning that should be strictly obeyed. For instance, how was one to understand a ministerial instruction demanding the “lack of tolerance even to the smallest trespasses, ideological distortions and moral perversions to every member of the Party, regardless of rank, including a minister,”\(^\text{61}\) if the minister who signed this order (Radkiewicz) was himself involved in every imaginable abuse?\(^\text{62}\) Facing this interpretative dilemma, the functionaries usually chose to remain extraordinarily cautious, since open expression of concerns to one’s superiors might be considered a manifestation of disloyalty. As is true of most bureaucratic structures,

\(^{61}\) “Najważniejsze i najgłówniejsze jest to, ażebyśmy zmobilizowali każdego członka partii i wychowali go w duchu nietolerowania najdrobniejszych przewinień, wykrzywień i wypaczeń moralno-politycznych każdego członka partii, bez względu na rangę — do ministra włącznie”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954..., k.1-12.

\(^{62}\) General Stanisław Radkiewicz was the first Stalinist Minister of the Public Security and served for nine years (1945-1954). He was a chief organizer of Stalinist terror. According to Józef Światło, Radkiewicz’s responsibility for terror was widely known in the apparatus, see Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło..., 43-44.
silence is less risky than rebellion. The famous Polish astronomer Aleksander Wolszczan, a long-term Bezpieka secret collaborator, lucidly described this bizarre reality, noting that in the communist regime “double life functioned as a civilizational norm.”

Nevertheless, the social schizophrenia, proportional to the regime’s hypocrisy, infected the security apparatus in a special way — the more scandalous revelations about the Party dignitaries surfaced in public, the more the ideological enthusiasm of the security cadres was lost. Needless to say, the security officers were relatively well informed and thus especially sensitive to corrupt examples. In these circumstances, a call to every employee to pull an emergency “moral brake” in case of the apparatus’s malfunction sounded like a parody. If the functionaries had literally obeyed the rule and “pulled the brake,” surely, the Bezpieka’s fast-speeding train towards the “communist paradise” would have derailed with catastrophic consequences to all its operators. No wonder that to many officers the moral crusade had only a symbolic meaning. Thus, in trying to decode a functionary’s life, one must be careful to approach the Bezpieka on its own baffling terms.

Typically, passionate devotion to Marxist-Leninist self-improvement and literal, yet spontaneous acceptance of the Party’s canons was not left unrewarded. Conferring upon an officer the “honor” of supervising agents and an expanding the network of

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63 The excerpt comes from the Aleksander Wolszczan’s statement in response to the accusation that he was a long-term secret collaborator of the Bezpieka. In the statement, Wolszczan admitted to the accusation, but noted that “in that time, a double life functioned as a civilizational norm” (“w tamtych czasach, podwójne życie funkcjonowało jako cywilizacyjna norma”): TVN, Fakty 7.30 PM, September 18, 2008.

64 Such an expression was used by the Minister of Public Security Stanisław Radkiewicz in his secret speech to the security executives: Przemówienie ministra Radkiewicza na odprawie w dniu 16 kwietnia 1953..., k. 203-213.

65 The term “paradise” in relation to communism I borrowed from Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind..., 5.
collaborators was, next to promotion, the most prestigious award. It was a *de facto* form of ceremonial initiation into the inner world of the Bezpieka’s “super-communists” and an authoritative attestation that a candidate had reached ideological maturity. It is noteworthy that the rulers saw that the ability to work with agents as absolutely critical to the Party because it had a dual barometric quality, it revealed the society’s actual mood (by having access to unsolicited opinions within certain groups) and an officer’s actual worth. Thus, usually the acknowledgement of a functionary’s talents and appreciation of his efforts was accompanied by an inflation of expectations: “The task of having a detailed knowledge of an agent, guiding his work, influencing his improvement and speeding up his ideological metamorphosis, requires that our operational employee [security functionary] be a psychologist, counselor, and counter-intelligence expert in one.”

Undoubtedly, coordinating the network of agents was a delicate, long-term task, and, as such, was often a source of frustration, especially for those functionaries who aspired to display the effects of their work in a short time. Ambition also had weaknesses. Pressed by news-hungry superiors and driven by the never-ending push for self-perfectionism, the “soldiers of the Party” were prone to abuses and mistakes. One of the most exemplary failures is the case of four officers, Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski, Colonel Leszek Pękala, Colonel Adam Pietruszka, and Colonel Waldemar Chmielewski, who in 1984, driven by ideological fanaticism and lust for prestige, kidnapped and

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66 “Dokładna znajomość agenta, nadawanie mu właściwego kierunku w jego pracy, oddziaływanie wychowawcze na przyspieszenie procesu jego przeobrażenia ideologicznego wymaga od naszego pracownika operacyjnego, aby był w jednej osobie psychologiem, kontrwywiadowcą i wychowawcą”: *Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na temat pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego 16 kwietnia 1953 roku* (Speech of the Vice-minister of the Public Security, Jan Ptasiński, Concerning Work in the National Economy, Presented During a Briefing to the Ministry of Public Security’s Executives, April 16, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 12, k. 1-26.
brutally murdered Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko — the chief chaplain of the Solidarity movement. To the disappointment of the security apparatus, the crime received enormous public attention and exposed many operational mechanisms. The communist apparatus also lost a number of valuable collaborators who were shocked by the murder. Such zeal did not always pay off.

Even more dangerous for the regime was a possible internal tension between a functionary’s two personae: private, dealing with his personal convictions, and public, dealing with his work obligations. The volume of declassified documents indicates that at least a part of the security cadres perceived their role as representatives to the masses of what the Party most cherished and idealized with some shades of indifference, reluctance, and even hostility. In short, the problem lay in the degree of the ideology’s internalization, or, putting it more colloquially, in the effectiveness of communist

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68 One of them was Rev. Michał Czajkowski, one of the most valuable secret collaborators among the Catholic clergy, who refused further cooperation with the Bezpieka after Rev. Popiełuszko’s murder: “Nie donosilem na Ks. Popiełuszkę” (“I Did Not Denounce Rev. Popiełuszko”), *Więź*, no. 7, 2009, 156-158.
brainwashing. Some functionaries rejected their identity of being “living emanations of the Party’s will” as embarrassing (possible but undesired) or too idealistic (desired but impossible). The central notion here is that functionaries were told to internalize two opposing sets of values. For example, they should be absolutely loyal to the superiors and at the same time to be deceitful to the secret collaborators whom they plumbed for information. In socialist morality this duplicity was the chief virtue and point of reference that defined the moral value of every act. For example, loyalty toward the Party would be considered positive, while loyalty to the Church was a serious flaw. Conversely, betrayal of the Party would meet with abhorrence, while betrayal of the Church brought admiration. In consequence, the redefinition of virtues in socialist morality provided fuel for internal tensions between the functionaries’ two personae, and, as some archives show, the two clashed almost as often as they complemented one another.

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The concept of morality played a large and important role in communist ideology. Though condemned by Marxist anti-moralism, the Soviet Union pioneered the promulgation of a moral code of “the builder of communism” by citing Marxist-Leninism as the ultimate arbiter of good and evil. Polish communists copied their Soviet instructors in this respect. Polish attempts at formulating communist ethics for the security apparatus date back to the late 1940s. In subsequent decades the number of internal references to morality increased, but only in 1985 was the ethical creed finally

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70 See appendix 1 for the text of the code.
compiled in one document, *Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries*,71 supplemented two years later by *Professional Ethics of the Security Service and Militia’s Functionaries*.72 This moral bible for communists was yet another means of inculcating ideology and championing the ideal functionary, who should be able to “strengthen his ideological and moral standing and develop (...) personality according to the Party’s program (...).”73 But it was not applicable only to work place; a security officer was to become a believer who “unites his purpose of life with his respect for work connected with personal well-being, polishing talents, and individual dignity.”74 Work for the Party and adherence to its ethics were supposed to guarantee one’s overall happiness and deep conviction of the right cause. In this sense, the Bezpieka was a well-organized communist quasi-religious order living in accordance and devotion to Marxism, in a rite proposed by Lenin and his followers. Both in Christian monasteries and communist security organizations, the path of virtue was a bitter and continuous struggle with rebellious tendencies, rather than a peaceful coordination of them into a well-ordered whole. The most perfect members of these communities were those who were formed through discipline, self-sacrifice, and struggle with one’s own egoism, just as advocated by St. Benedict of Nursia and Lenin.75 Also the ability to

71 *Zasady etyki i obyczajów...*
72 *Etyka zawodowa funkcjonariuszy...*
74 “(...) charakteryzuje się zespoleniem sensu życia z wartością pracy, z którą łączy się osobista pomyślność, rozwój uzdolnień i godność jednostki”: *Program PZPR..., 53.*
75 Compare the *Rule of Saint Benedict* in Richard W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1970). Lenin advocated raising “against egoists (...), against this mind and customs that call: ‘I care for my own business, all the rest does not matter to me’ “ as cited by Czesław Staszczak in *Materiały z konferencji naukowej w Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych i Milicji Obywatelskiej w dniu 21 października 1987 roku*
submit oneself to “social discipline” was required upon admittance both to Christian monastery as to a security apparatus.\textsuperscript{76}

It is the very nature of the moral ideal of every religion or ideology to call its followers out of their narrow selves and recognize larger values. The ascetic element of communist morality manifested itself in two forms: self-mastery and self-sacrifice. Self-mastery meant a proper decision-making process in case of value conflict. Self-sacrifice meant the sacrifice of a functionary’s well-being as a mere individual to a greater good – communism. His moral development was conditioned by an active opposition to tendencies of the nature of man, habits of his old morality and his inclinations. The dualism, called in Marxist discourse a “dialectical contradiction,” was based on false presumptions and forecasts, and remained beyond the possibility of an ultimate unity.\textsuperscript{77} This conflict could have been terminated either by the annihilation of a functionary’s independent thinking, or by the annihilation of communism itself.

The ideal of security functionary was composed of numerous norms developed throughout communist rule, and was finally brought together just a few years before its collapse. I would like quote in its original unabbreviated form what Czesław Staszczak, the chief communist ideologist, wrote in 1987. Functionaries should be trained to:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Presentations from the Scientific Conference In the Academy of Internal Affairs from October 21, 1987}, IPN 01179/49, 20.
\item \textit{Materiały z konferencji naukowej w Akademii Spraw…}, 20.
\item This term was provided by Stefan Staszewski, the first secretary of the Warsaw Communist Committee in the 1950s and the editor-in-chief of the Polish Press Agency, when he was asked a question “What is a communist?” For the entire interview with Staszewski and other Polish communists of the Stalinist era, see: Teresa Torańska, \textit{“Them…”}, esp. 128.
\end{itemize}
- deepen (...) ideological and social activity, patriotism, internationalism, and a sense of responsibility for the fate of the state and the nation;
- comprehensively develop personality – a multitude of interests, creative attitude, harmonically stimulated needs, as well as intellectual, material and cultural aspirations;
- strengthen political and psychic resistance to the destructive effects of anti-socialist propaganda and the negative influences of social pathologies;
- form functionaries’ conviction that service to the Party, state and nation are the goals and purpose of our work, and form a conviction that we gain social respect and admiration by solid fulfillment of our duties and by obeying proper ethical standards;
- strengthen a model of conscious and active attitude to work, party and social duties, propagate a model of an exemplary officer being a conscious member of the Party and an active social worker;
- uncompromisingly respect law at work according to a principle that each functionary of the Ministry of Interior Affairs shall guard the rule of law;
- deepen social, political, and professional knowledge, cultural interests, and formulate the materialist worldview;
- improve inter-personal relations in professional collectives, especially relations between superiors and subordinates, work for total integration of ministerial units, strengthen correctly understood comradeship, increase professional discipline;
- fight all harmful addictions and customs that affect work activity and family life, and with especial determination fight drinking alcohol on duty and after work;
- develop such features as willingness to sacrifice, diligence, availability, modesty, honor, dignity, cordiality, etc.;
- strengthen respect for the military uniform (...), personal aesthetics, and workplace order;
- practically implement the rules from the Ceremonials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, promote secular ceremonialism and lifestyle, create exemplary family relations.78

78 “Świadomi zagrożeń w sferze ideowo-moralnej, występujących w niektórych środowiskach resortu spraw wewnętrznych, powinniśmy podejmować bardziej ofensywnie i skuteczniejsze działania wychowawcze w celu: - pogłębiać-we wszystkich środowiskach resortu-ideowości i zaangażowania społecznego, patriotyzmu i internacjonalizmu oraz poczucia odpowiedzialności za losy państwa i narodu; - wszechstronnego rozwijania osobowości-bogatych zainteresowań, twórczych postaw i harmonijnie rozbudzonych potrzeb oraz aspiracji intelektualnych, materialnych i kulturalnych; - zwiększenia odporności politycznej i psychicznej na destrukcyjne działania antysocjalistycznej propagandy oraz negatywne wpływy zjawisk patologii społecznej; - kształtowania przekonań funkcjonariuszy o tym, iż celem i sensem naszej działalności jest служba partii, państwu i narodowi, oraz że społeczny szacunek i uznanie zyskujemy przez rzetelne wykonywanie swych obowiązków oraz prezentowanie właściwych postaw etycznych; - utrwalenie postaw świadomego i aktywnego stosunku do służby, obowiązków partyjnych i społecznych, upowszechniania modelu wzorowego funkcjonariusza, świadomego członka partii i zaangażowanego społecznika; - zapewnienie bezwzględnego przestrzegania prawa w realizacji zadań służbowych zgodnie z zasadą, iż każdy funkcjonariusz resortu spraw wewnętrznych stoi na straży praworządności; - pogłębiania wiedzy społeczno-politycznej i zawodowej, kształtowania materialistycznego światopoglądu oraz rozwijania zainteresowań kulturalnych; - doskonalenia stosunków międzyludzkich w kolektywach służbowych, zgłasza w relacji przełożony-podwładny, działania na rzecz pełnej integracji służb i środowisk resortowych, umacnianie właściwie pojmowanego koleżeństwa, podnoszenia na wyższy poziom dyscypliny służbowej; zwalczania wszelkich możliwych nalogów i przyzwyczajeń, które wpływają ujemnie na realizację zadań służbowych oraz życie rodzinne, zgłasza zaś w sposób zdecydowany konsekwentny – zjawiska spożywania alkoholu w czasie służby oraz nadużywania go po służbie; - rozwijania takich cech charakteru, jak: ofiarność, rzetelność, dyspozycyjność, skromność, honor i godność, życzliwość
But the communist ideologists were also aware that this ideal might be too illusionary to be realizable. Mieczysław Michalik, for example, warned against “sinning by having abstract attitude,” by which he meant adopting utopian standards that might lead to “promoting abstract patterns, [and] speculative, general, and moralizing presumption of ‘how it should be,’ ‘what kind of man a functionary should be,’ ‘what should he look like’ (...).”

Building on more pragmatic and historical reasons than his predecessors, Michalik characterized the desired communist morality as a system of rational standards, not unattainable values. This denouncer of idealism also called for a ‘more synthetic reflection of social experience’. In his view, such an attitude was to save the regime from extremes – utopian moral absolutism on the one hand, and axiological non-determinism and short-term solutions on the other hand.

In the Marxist axiology (theory of values), man and his life were the highest virtues. In communism, the definition of virtue obviously belonged to the rulers who conflated morality and submission to the Party, terming it “citizen’s morality.” This simple semantic operation changed the benevolent word morality into an ideological tool with the interests of the state, of the Party, of the nation, and of socialism as the ultimate criteria of good. By means of “citizen’s morality” the Party ideologists attempted in coercing the functionaries to accept the established order. It would manifest itself by their

80 Irena Aniserowicz, "Problemy moralnych wartości w Marksiźmie" ("Problems of Moral Values in Marxism"), IPN 01179/49, 256.
respect for common good, obeying social discipline, thinking in terms of the state, and paying respect to communist law.\textsuperscript{81} The Bezpieka, with its dogmatic teachers and ideological nourishment, its insular environment, and its work atmosphere, would become the center for the advancement and promulgation of the new morality and be the fittest environment for the growth of homo sovietica. The regime’s demands upon functionaries were as high as its ambitious expectations. Undoubtedly, use of morality was more prestigious and cheaper than coercion. The communist ideologists believed that the virtues cultivated by the security functionaries were also respected by society as the “highest social-moral values.”\textsuperscript{82} Nonetheless, the practical application of communist morality had to overcome serious obstacles. In theory, the officers should have generated spontaneous “ethical obligations” stemming from their moral convictions. Communist morality was supposed to supplement, and not copy legal regulations by deepening their motivation for sacrificial service. It was so difficult to implement, however, that moral norms had to be guarded by legal penalties anyway. But even this did not fundamentally alter the functionaries’ minds. For this reason, the socialist code of ethics of the security apparatus, though composed of great ideals and benevolent provisions, had to remain secretive. It was too distant from reality, and too embarrassing for the Bezpieka, to be widely publicized.

\textsuperscript{81} Irena Aniserowicz, ”Problemy moralnych...”, 265.
\textsuperscript{82} Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 14.
Chapter I

LAWFULNESS

Institutionalized Lawlessness

Lawfulness means to hit the enemy harder.

--- Józef Różański,
Head of the MBP investigative unit

1.1. Time of lawlessness

In communist Poland, as in other Soviet-controlled states, law had an instrumental role — it was valued if it reinforced the Party’s will and abused if it contradicted it. The introduction of communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s was accompanied by numerous blatant infringements of law enacted either before 1939 by the pre-war Polish government (but nonetheless partially upheld by communists), or after 1943 by the communists themselves. Paradoxically, during this “time of lawlessness,” the communists accentuated a general respect for law as essential for the state’s stability. Once they had removed the opposition as a political obstacle, they began to articulate the rule of law as a socialist virtue, not as an obstacle to socialism. Along with

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83 To contemporary historians, “the time of lawlessness” is the conventional expression for Stalinism in Poland (1944-1956): see, for example, Krzysztof Szwagrzyk, Prawnicy Czasu Bezprawia (Lawyers of Lawless Times) (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2005).

disciplining society, promoting legalism became particularly useful for stimulating and controlling the Bezpieka’s work. Well-funded,\textsuperscript{85} institutionally rich, and throbbing with ideological activity, in the early 1950s the security apparatus entered a period of major growth,\textsuperscript{86} which, if uncontrolled, could have placed it above all other institutions of the regime, including the Party.\textsuperscript{87} That is why on numerous occasions communist officials described\textit{ praworządność socjalistyczna} (socialist legality or socialist lawfulness)\textsuperscript{88} as the Bezpieka’s desired goal and its method of operation at the same time.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{85}See the budget of the MBP. Between April 1 and December 31, 1946, it reached almost 4 million zlotys — more than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Retrieved Lands, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Art combined: Andrzej K. Kunert, Rafał E. Stalarski (ed.),\textit{ Bija\c{e}ce serce Partii. Dzienniki personalne Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego} (The Beating Heart of the Party. The Personal Law Gazettes of the Ministry of Public Security), (Warszawa: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa & Oficyna Wydawnicza AUDITOR, 2001), vol. 1, 515.

\textsuperscript{86}Historians estimate that in 1946, the Ministry of Public Security supervised work of about 140,000 functionaries of all types. Between 1944 and 1956, over 8,000 oppositionists were killed in fighting the communists, 25,000 were sentenced to death and executed or died in prisons, 25,000 were killed in other ways, 50,000 were sent to the USSR and 240,000 were arrested: source:. Kunert, Stalarski (ed.),\textit{ Bija\c{e}ce serce Partii...}, vol. 1, 11.

\textsuperscript{87}For general information about communist law, see Piotr Kładoczny, \textit{Prawo jako narzędzie represji w Polsce Ludowej (1944-1956)} (Law as a Tool of Repression in People’s Poland (1944-1956)) (Warszawa, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004).

\textsuperscript{88}Its exact translation into English, is, however, hard to find. The feminine noun\textit{ praworządność} could be translated either as\textit{ law and order},\textit{ legality},\textit{ rule of law}, or\textit{ lawfulness},\textsuperscript{88} while the adjective\textit{ socjalistyczna} means\textit{ socialist}. Here, I will translate it either as\textit{ socialist lawfulness} or\textit{ socialist legality}, though no English expression reflects the neatness, buoyancy and resplendence with which this term is charged in Polish. This is the translation of one of the best Polish-English dictionaries, the\textit{ PWN-Oxford Polish-English Dictionary} (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005), 554

\textsuperscript{89}For example, in September 1953, the MBP vice-minister Jan Ptasiński delivered a secret speech in which he defined one of the reasons for which the Bezpieka was created: “the security apparatus is the apparatus made by the Party and government to watch the people’s law and order” (“Aparat b. p. jest aparatem, który przez partię został postawiony na straży ludowej praworządności”): \textit{Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych} (Speech of the MBP Vice-Minister, Ptasiński, for the End of the Workshops of the Professional Lecturers, September 3, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.
Though communist dignitaries frequently referred to socialist legality, the term never acquired a fixed meaning. Like many similar ideologically-rooted expressions, socialist legality was yet another example of the regime’s ‘newspeak,’ a classical illustration of Soviet-bloc ‘Aesopian’ language, which simultaneously conveyed the ostensible meaning to the public and a concealed meaning to the security apparatus. In an indirect sense, socialist lawfulness was an euphemism for the iron rule of the Party and a cover for various abuses of human rights, while officially it manifested the Party’s ostensible concern for justice. The official connotation of socialist lawfulness stemmed from the logic of the dictatorship of the proletariat: had the security apparatus, not at least officially, obeyed communist law, it would have ultimately meant that either these laws, or the Party, or both, were wrong. Such an alternative in Marxism was unacceptable and ideologically impossible (the Party, the highest power, was held to be infallible, so was its law, its will). Consequently, the security apparatus always had to obey Party orders, which, however, did not necessarily mean their obedience to official socialist legality as

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90 For example, sprawiedliwość ludowa (people’s justice), władza ludowa (people’s power), gospodarka socjalistyczna (socialist economy), świadomość klasowa (class consciousness).
91 Timothy Garton Ash discusses this issue while talking about Polish double life and attempts to regain at least the “private ownership of tongues”: The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). The ‘Aesopian’ communist language, a standard expression in Soviet-bloc countries, was also examined by Jadwiga Staniszkis in Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and by Lawrence Weschler in The Passion of Poland, from Solidarity through the State of War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 1.
92 Stefan Staszewski, the first secretary of the Warsaw Communist Committee in the 1950s and the editor-in-chief of the Polish Press Agency, defines a communist as a man who “has absolute faith in the Party, which means that his faith in it is uncritical at every stage, no matter what the Party is saying. It is a person with the ability to adapt his mentality and his conscience in such a way that he can unreservedly accept the dogma that the Party is never wrong, even though it is wrong all the time — something the Party itself actually admits with every new stage it enters (…). Whoever is able to reconcile that contradiction or, to put in Marxist terms, that dialectical process — the Party’s infallibility and its fallibility — is a communist.” For the entire interview with Staszewski and other Polish communists of the Stalinist era, see: Teresa Torańska, “Them” Stalin’s Polish Puppets (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), esp. 128.
such, since sometimes goals set by the Party would be impossible to achieve without compromising the rule of law.

The discrepancy between what was desired and what was needed to achieve it was a typical problem of totalitarian states struggling to reconcile their ultimate goals with limited means. In democracies legality is usually guarded by applying the same standards of the rule of law to all state institutions. Obviously, this model could not be accepted by any communist regime, which based its very existence on abusive practices such as arrests without legal basis, torturing detainees, and manipulating court proceedings. On the other hand, the regime’s effectiveness depended on public respect for its law. The communists managed to synthesize the two by altering the official meaning of lawfulness, so it could apply to unlawful regulations without having to change them. It was as if the authorities were trying to seduce society by the power of magic incantations, using such prefixes as socialist, revolutionary, or people’s for the appearance of civilizational superiority vis-à-vis their Western counterparts. The replacement of certain key words with neologisms was not only a Polish phenomenon – it occurred in other communist states, primarily in the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of substantive law, however, these prefixes indicated profound differences between western legal tradition and communist legal practice. As the term actually worked in Poland from 1944 to 1956, socialist legality meant the lack of an independent agency to examine the law from the perspective of its constitutionality, the protection of human rights only if they did not clash with the Party’s interests, the subordination of law to political aims, and the

creation of legal theory to justify unjust practices, to name a few. Obviously, these ‘differences’ were not constituent parts of lawfulness, as the regime claimed, but its opposite —lawlessness. The conceptual stretching of socialist legality thus led to the conceptual gutting of lawfulness to the point of its virtual negation.

Leaving aside how unlawful communist law really was, there is still the issue of how strictly it was obeyed by all the communist institutions, primarily the security apparatus. Was the regime determined to honor its own rules and thus to cultivate socialist legality? My research suggests that in Poland socialist lawfulness was reduced to legal obedience of all Polish citizens, including the Bezpieka operatives.

### 1.2. Lawfulness in lawless times

Socialist lawfulness carried a peculiar moral agency. Law was the most important mode of state coercion, but at the same time carried moral guidance. The security functionaries learned how to exploit law as a weapon and as an excuse for actions that in typical democratic systems would be considered immoral. The way the law was applied depended strictly on the security officers’ training, their power, and supervision over their work. In this respect, socialist lawfulness was *de facto* defined not only by the communist Parliament, but by the security apparatus itself. Ideally, each officer should have been able to work through available legal means. The reality was, however, more complicated as ‘soldiers of the Party’ had to “muck around with mud.”


“Babranie się w błocie”: a term used by the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz in Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 4 marca 1954 roku (Speech of the MBP Minister
only individuals with “strong Party character, of high endurance could act appropriately and remain clean.”

One may think that obedience to communist law was manifested by a merely passivity and purely receptive attitude on the part of all state institutions, including the security apparatus. In fact, socialist lawfulness was associated not only with restraint, but also with aggressiveness: “Lawfulness means to hit the enemy harder, lawfulness means not to be cheated by the enemy. Lawfulness means to expose the enemy fully, but lawfulness also means to let the honest people be unbothered (…)”. This pugnacious approach to socialist legality raised in 1953 by the MBP Investigative Department’s Chief, Józef Różański, partially explains the ubiquitous legal violations of the Stalinist era. Most importantly, the notion of lawfulness as simultaneously a procedure and a goal invested communist policies with a dynamic quality. The security functionaries were primarily charged with the duty of fighting the enemy — this was the central aim of lawfulness — thus efforts to strengthen the regime were lawful. But not all were and not
on every occasion. The Bezpieka cadres were supposed to filter out enemies and hit only
those guilty of anti-communist activity — a task difficult to implement without abuses in
a state where the Party arbitrarily dictated how many enemies were to be caught by the
security units.

One can recognize behind the distorted concept of social lawfulness a deliberate
pattern. In communist systems, especially during Stalinism, living strictly according to
law was virtually impossible. All people had, sooner or later, to collide with restrictive
rules: a worker had to falsify his efficiency statistics, otherwise he would not be able to
survive on his basic wages; a peasant had to cheat about his real harvests, otherwise he
would have to live on the edge of starvation; a security officer had to wangle food out of
ministerial magazines, otherwise he would have gone hungry. This behavior was for all
intents and purposes tolerated by the regime for latter punishment if need be. A fugitive
MBP official, Józef Światło, asserted that some lesser crimes of security functionaries
were purposely tolerated so that they might be used for blackmail in the future.99 For
example, blackmailed were the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz (who denounced
communism before World War II), the MBP Vice Minister Mieczysław Mietkowski (for
his financial swindles), and the Chief of the MBP Investigative Department, Józef
Rózański, (for his sexual deviations).100 Światło maintained that “the whole personal staff
of the security apparatus is primarily composed of Soviet officers and Soviet agents,
while the rest are looters, profitiers, deviants (…).”101 Such policy had a purpose. Before
1956, the regime reluctantly promoted in rank fanatical communists, preferring those

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100 Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło..., 76.
101 „(…) Cały skład personalny bezpieczeństwa to przede wszystkim oficerowie sowieccy i
agenci sowieckiego wywiadu, a potem szabrownicy, spekulanci, zboczeńcy (…)”: Zbigniew
Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło..., 61-62.
who had abused lawfulness and could therefore be kept in check. Such an officer was always threatened with degradation, and his constant fear guaranteed his political and bureaucratic loyalty. An officer had to live in a state of institutionalized hypocrisy – praising socialist lawfulness on one hand, and hiding his past on the other hand. But those who observed the rules of the game and knew the limits of what was permissible could feel relatively safe: they were protected by the network of collective accountability based on personal ties. That is why it is so difficult to assess the seriousness of certain types of transgressions and reasons for selective punishment. The archives of the IPN are filled with documents showing officers who committed grave crimes and got away with them, as well as those operatives who were severely punished for much lesser abuses. Surely, personal likes and dislikes, as well as cliques and cronyism, so difficult to track in official documents, played a role here.

Most historians agree that torture was an integral part of Poland’s totalitarian reality. They believe it was fully harmonized with the legal system and reflected in official propaganda.\textsuperscript{102} For example, Marek Chodakiewicz claims that although no law explicitly permitted torturing anyone, between 1944 and 1956, the laws and regulations commonly applied against political offenders were utterly dehumanizing and, hence, implicitly encouraged legal abuse, including torture.\textsuperscript{103} If this statement was true, then various secret instructions from within the Bezpieka apparatus should have encouraged functionaries to behave in an abusive way. However, numerous declassified documents


from before 1956 suggest the opposite: from the beginning the security chiefs were repeatedly ordered to punish the wrongdoers exemplarily. Thus, a quite different picture emerges if we look at the Bezpieka not from the standpoint of recent Polish historiography devoted to uncovering varieties of crimes, but from the perspective of the apparatus’s internal regulations. These documents of unusual importance are neglected by many historians who do not pay enough attention to the role of morality in the profession of security officers. A top-secret order of May 15, 1945, addressed to security functionaries may be a source of such confusion:

There are incidents when of public security and Militia functionaries commit illegal acts toward those who have been arrested. There was a case when functionaries of one of the Militia county units told detainees to lie down (…) and they were kicking them. Then they were told to stand up and shout loud (…). Security functionaries often apply unacceptable methods of beating and bullying while interrogating suspects. The aforementioned methods come from Hitlerites and fascists and are unworthy of a security functionary of a democratic state. A functionary should be merciless and resolute toward the enemy of the Nation and democratic state, but it does not mean it is acceptable to behave like fascists.104

The order proves that the regime at least discerned the problem. Its final instructions indicate that the abusive officers were not tolerated:

104 “Zdarzają się wypadki, że funkcjonariusze bezpieczeństwa publicznego i MO dopuszczają się czynów bezprawnych w stosunku do osób zatrzymanych. Zanotowany został wypadek, że funkcjonariusze jednej z powiatowych komend MO kazali grupie zatrzymanych położyć się na ziemię twarzą w dół, po czym kopali ich, następnie kazali powstać i wznosić chórem nakazane okrzyki (… ). Funkcjonariusze bezpieczeństwa publicznego podczas badań osób podejrzanych stosują niejednokrotnie niedopuszczalne metody bicia i znęcania się. Opisane metody przejęte od hitlerowców i faszystów niegodne są funkcjonariuszy bezpieczeństwa państwa demokratycznego. Funkcjonariusza bezpieczeństwa publicznego powinna cechować zdecydowanie i bezwzględność w stosunku do wroga Narodu i Państwa demokratycznego, nie znaczy to jednak, by dopuszczalne było postępowanie stosowane przez faszystów:” Rozkaz nr 19 z dnia 15 maja 1945 roku (Order No. 19 from May 15, 1945), IPN Ld 0050/21, t.II, k. 25.
To prevent similar accidents in the future, I order [functionaries to]:
1. bring those who are responsible for illegal behavior to justice
2. report immediately and in detail about each case and describe what kind of action has been taken toward the guilty ones
3. publicize this order among all units.\textsuperscript{105}

One may claim that the regime produced these kind of laws knowing that they would not be operative and that the communist dignitaries either did not have or did not want to use a reliable mechanism for coordinating discipline. In the light of later knowledge, it is tempting to develop, somewhat intuitively, the reasons for supposing that the Bezpieka would not have been able to cultivate moral righteousness. Contrary to this logic, however, the security apparatus did prosecute a wide range of legal offenses and, on occasion, did so mercilessly. In 1946, for example, two militiamen were sentenced to death for murder, cruelty, and moral corruption in the course of which they “forced prisoners to have intercourse with detained women to denigrate their human dignity. They later explained that their victims were of German descent and they did it for vengeance (…)”.\textsuperscript{106} The MBP Minister ordered each security functionary to be informed about these drastic violations and to be warned that breaking lawfulness would be severely penalized. But the pursuit of lawfulness included disapproval of lesser crimes as well. One may be surprised to learn that well before Stalin’s death the regime penalized

\textsuperscript{105} “Celem zapobieżenia podobnych wypadków na przyszłość rozkazuję: 1) w wypadku ujawnienia stosowania niedopuszczalnych środków wobec zatrzymanych – pociągnąć winnych do odpowiedzialności 2) w ujawnionych wypadkach bezwzględnie meldować ze szczegółowym spisem i podaniem jakie środki wobec winnego zostały podjęte 3) rozkaz ten podać do wiadomości wszystkich podległych organów:” Rozkaz nr 19 z dnia 15 maja 1945…, k. 25.
\textsuperscript{106} “(…) Zmuszano też więźniów do odbycia stosunków płciowych z zatrzymanymi kobietami w celu poniżenia ich godności ludzkiej. Tłumaczyli, że ofiary były narodowości niemieckiej i czynili to z zemsty (…). Rozkazuję a) podać ww do wiadomości wszystkim funkcjonariuszom SB i MO b) przypomnieć rozkaz Nr 19 z 15 maja 1945 roku i skutki niestosowania się do niego:” Rozkaz Nr 88 z 13 września 1946 roku (Order No. 88 from September 12, 1946), Nr RR 15/46, IPN Ld 0050/22, t.II.
those functionaries who entered ambulances without permission,\textsuperscript{107} who went fishing without permit,\textsuperscript{108} who did not recognize Catholic weddings as a legal bond,\textsuperscript{109} or who sent citizens notifications to pick up their identity cards in order to arrest them on this occasion.\textsuperscript{110} Polish society was also not as terrified of the Bezpiedka as one may suspect: people kept writing complaints about the security service’s work – a sign that they did not expect the regime’s retaliation. The authorities, after realizing that many of these complaints were badly handled by the Bezpiedka, ordered that all complaints should be examined “thoroughly, objectively, and quickly”: all accusations were to be investigated by commissions only and results sent directly to the Party.\textsuperscript{111}

In the face of the above examples, one must find an explanation for the Bezpiedka’s failures in combating lawlessness. Perhaps the most important was the fact that the morality of the newly admitted functionaries was often incompatible with a new system of Party discipline. Initially, the regime did not have many supporters in Poland and had to recruit security cadres from men of loose morals who soon brought the Party into disrepute.\textsuperscript{112} The authorities had to respect those who had decided to work in the

\textsuperscript{107} Okólnik Nr 10 z dnia 19 lutego 1946 roku (Circular Letter No 10 from February 19, 1946), 01914-46, IPN Ld 0050/21, t.II.
\textsuperscript{108} Pismo Okólne z dnia 27 lutego 1948 roku (Circular Letter from February 27, 1948), IPN Ld pf 13/II, t.1; Rozkaz (Order) Lp AB-6919/52, IPN Ld pf 13/II, t.2.
\textsuperscript{109} Pismo Okólne z dnia 9 lutego 1948 roku (Circular Letter from February 9, 1948), AF-197/48, IPN Ld pf 13/II, t.1.
\textsuperscript{110} Rozkaz z 21 lutego 1952 roku podpisany przez pułkownika Dudę (Order from February 21, 1952, signed by Colonel Duda), IPN, ld pf 13/1.
\textsuperscript{111} The same procedure concerned handling anonymous letters: Pismo Okólne Nr 092/55 (Circular Letter No 092/55) from September 10, 1955, SC-R-259/55, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. III.
\textsuperscript{112} One of the heads of the security schools, Antoni Lubliniecki, claimed that 98 percent of security cadres in Rzeszów district were unprepared for service: Sprawozdanie z pracy polityczno-wychowawczej w więzieniu w Rzeszowie za okres od 1 stycznia do 1 grudnia 1949 (Report on the political raising In Rzeszów prison between January 1 and December 1, 1949), IPN Rz 26, k. 37 as cited by Janusz Borowiec in “Nadużycia funkcjonariuszy więzienia w Rzeszowie w świetle raportu naczelnika Wydziału ds. Funkcjonariuszy WUBP w Rzeszowie z listopada 1949 roku” (Abuses of the Functionaries of the Rzeszów Prison In the Light of the
apparatus and closed their eyes to many of their flaws. Perhaps the regime did not have the means to punish all the wrongdoers at the time, especially when the circumstances of their work were conducive to spontaneous abuses. Maybe the problem lay in the training of intermediate superiors. As conduits of information from the localities to the center, and participants in the enforcing and interpreting law, they often failed to harmonize the Bezpieka’s disciplinary work. Finally, political rivals might contend for political superiority by damaging each other’s disciplinary efforts. Also, one should not forget the direct Soviet interference. Most probably, all these factors were at operative.

1.3 The scalpel of lawfulness

Although throughout communist rule the political structure of the regime retained its traditional underpinnings of coercion and propaganda, even in Stalinist times the Polish communists were aware that repression was not the only solution to all problems. For example, two years before Stalin’s death, the architect of terror, Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz, warned his party colleagues that repression was a “sharp and drastic political step” and as such should not be taken lightly.113 Personal and public freedom belonged to the core of valuable human rights, and each limitation of these rights, Radkiewicz reasoned, made society suspicious of the regime. Only “justified, politically accurate and correctly applied repression helps the state to meet its political targets, while

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113 Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat zadań aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w świetle uchwał VI Plenum KC PZPR (marzec 1951) (Speech of the MBP Minister Stanislaw Radkiewicz about the Tasks ahead of the Security Apparatus in the Light of the VI Meeting of the Central Committee of the PZPR, March 1951). Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t.7.
unjustified repression, accidental and incautious, hinders the Government from achieving political aims and is therefore very harmful.”\textsuperscript{114} Radkiewicz retained a concern about mass terror and criticized blind coercion based on the utilitarian argument that it thwarted the Party’s efforts to gain popularity among Poles. If not for the fact that the speech was given during the apex of Stalinism (1951), one might think that it reflected some of the most progressive voices of Polish communism: that of Władysław Gomułka, a proponent of a national road to communism with greater respect for human liberties,\textsuperscript{115} or that of Leszek Kołakowski, a proponent of building a bridge between Marxism and Catholicism.\textsuperscript{116} Inasmuch as Radkiewicz’s speech was not forced by any political changes nor as top secret could not have played any public role, the logical rationale is that the Minister viewed procedural socialist lawfulness at least partially as a desired standard for security operations. Therefore, one might be wrong to conclude that in Stalinist Poland effectiveness justified all abuses of socialist lawfulness committed by the Bezpieka.

Other secret speeches of security chiefs point toward a similar conclusion. Socialist lawfulness denoted elimination of enemies individually, but not mass repression based on

\textsuperscript{114} “Uzasadniona, trafna politycznie i słusznie zastosowana represja pomaga państwu w osiąganiu zamierzonych celów politycznych, nieuzasadnione zaś uderzenie represyjne, przypadkowe i nieprzemyślane, utrudnia Rządowi osiąganie postawionych zamierzeń politycznych i staje się przez to veryo szkodliwe”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat zadań..., t.7.


the ideological stance of the security cadres. In this respect, Polish Stalinism varied from its Soviet prototype, which had been based on almost unlimited terror. These facts justify a thesis proposed by Norman Davies and Zbigniew Brzeziński that Polish communism was different from that of other Eastern European states — never as cruel to opponents and as obedient to Moscow as were other Soviet-controlled regimes.

Though Polish Stalinist dignitaries spoke about communist enemies with utter contempt, they had never fully accepted the Soviet system of ethical values where a (Polish, sic!) ‘hangman and jailer’ [Dzerzhinsky] was a preeminent moral model. Polish communists may have copied their Soviet ‘brothers,’ the most experienced surgeons of the human soul, but they were not their clones and preferred less bloody ‘operations,’ giving priority to prevention over the ‘scalpel’ of lawfulness:

Repression — the arrest of a citizen — this is a brutal intervention into the social organism, similar to a surgical operation. A surgeon brutally penetrates the human organism and removes from it only a foreign body that spreads dangerous germs and microbes. The surgeon is a bother or even a wrongdoer if

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117 Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat zadań… t.7.
120 “But Dzerzhinsky, the new government’s premier executioner, fairly shone in all his blood-red, merciless glory. In the system of new ethical values, this chief hangman and jailer became the preeminent moral model (…). Thus Dzerzhinsky, in assuming the function of first executioner, became a holy martyr, the incarnation of virtue”: Andrei Sinyavsky, Soviet Civilization. A Cultural History (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1988), 125-126.
he decides to operate without a check-up and localization of germs, and when he cuts blindly and violates a healthy organism, if it is possible to cure the patient without a surgical operation, or if he decides for the operation too late, allowing germs to spread and consume the organism.121

The above statement of the chief “surgeon” of the regime, Minister Stanisław Rakiewicz, could have played on the imagination and the emotions of the security functionaries. In Radkiewicz’s perception, survival of the patient (society) was strictly dependent on the proper diagnosis of a surgeon (the Party), and precise usage of a scalpel (the Bezpieka). In this respect, a timely, comprehensive, and accurately conducted ‘operation’ constituted the fulfillment of socialist lawfulness while all unnecessary incisions would be lawless. The Party always had the right to act directly in the ‘patient’s favor.’ On the other hand, strictly pragmatic reasons compelled the ‘surgeon’ to limit his cuts to necessary ones making socialist lawfulness a self-imposed limitation. Radkiewicz was presumably aware that making the operation a mutilation might weaken the whole social body on which the surgeon works. Surely, his suggestions would have been impossible to enforce without independent institutions checking the Bezpieka’s power. Thus, the rule of law could not have been anything other than the regime’s gift to the society, a product of its benevolence, revocable and subject to flexible redefinitions.

121 “Represja—areszt obywatela—to brutalne wtargnięcie do organizmu społeczeństwa, podobne do zabiegu chirurgicznego. Chirurg, dokonując operacji, brutalnie wdziera się do organizmu człowieka i usuwa tylko ciała obce z organizmu, które roszczerza zarazki, bakcyle i zagraża organizmowi. Partaecz, jeśli nie szkodnik jest ten chirurg, jeśli decyduje się na operację bez dokładnego rozpoznania i umiejscowienia zarazków, jeśli tnie na oślep i narusza zdrowy organizm wtedy, kiedy można uleczyć pacjenta bez zabiegu chirurgicznego, albo jeśli spóźnia się z operacją i pozwala bakcylem rozrastać się i trawić organizm”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat zadań..., t.7.
In social context, communist ideologists perceived socialist lawfulness as a reciprocal relation between the security apparatus and the citizenry. This correlation was unbalanced: the Bezpieka’s respect for citizens’ rights could not have been verified, while citizens’ respect for the Party (and the Bezpieka) was arbitrarily evaluated by the security apparatus itself. The security functionaries were told that lawfulness consisted of giving oneself entirely to the service of the Party, moving beyond all bonds of personal and old morality in the name of duty. At the same time, they were warned that every citizen should be protected from abuses of all state institutions, including the Bezpieka. Many officers were therefore confused about the real intentions of the Party’s moralistic campaigns demanding respect for all laws.

1.3. The sanctuary of justice

Soon after Stalin’s death appeared voices among security chiefs calling for a redefinition of socialist lawfulness. Some of them favored a utopian version of absolute justice: “(…) lawfulness means fighting against all injustice, all immorality.” Others

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122 Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...
123 Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego, Milicji Obywatelskiej, przewodniczących sądów wojewódzkich i prokuratorów wojewódzkich 7 lipca 1953 roku (Speech of the PRL’s Attorney General, Stefan Kalinowski, Raised during a Comprehensive Council of the Security Apparatus’ Functionaries, Functionaries of the Citizen’s Militia, Chiefs of the Regional Courts, and Regional Prosecutors, July 7, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.
125 “Cały nasz aparat powinien zrozumieć, że praworządność to przecież walka z wszelką niesprawiedliwością, z wszelką nieprawością”: words of Colonel Humer: Stenogram z dyskusji na odprawie krajowej w dniu 4 III. 1954 r. (Stenographic Record during a National Briefing on March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14.
centered around more prosaic issues, such as paying respect to prison regulations. The end of Polish Stalinism in 1956 and the ascendance of the Gomułka group to power slightly reformed the concept of socialist lawfulness, putting on an exterior closer to Western standards of the rule of law. The terror of the early years receded, replaced by more ritualized forms of social control, though without a profoundly changing structure of power. Violence diminished mainly because the regime no longer needed it as long as it enjoyed a monopoly on power, mass media, and the school system. It encouraged some Stalinists to condemn previous distortions and demand respect for socialist lawfulness by the security apparatus:

As far as revolutionary lawfulness is concerned, we tend to distort it in various ways (...). First, we falsely think that circumventing or breaking laws established by the people’s government is helpful in fighting the enemy. This view is false and extremely harmful. The reality is exactly opposite. The laws enacted by the people’s government are aimed against all enemies and reactionary elements (...). Our laws are severe and ruthless toward the enemy (...). Breaking laws leads always to challenging the foundations of the people’s regime because it diminishes the people’s regime’s connections with the masses and the union between workers and peasants.

126 The problem of respect for the prison regulations by the security officers was raised by the MBP vice-minister Jan Ptasiński, *Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...*


128 “Na odcinku właściwego zrozumienia istoty rewolucyjnej praworządności istnieje u nas szereg wypaczeń (...). Po pierwsze uważa się w sposób fałszywy, że omijanie i łamanie praw ustanowionych przez władzę ludową pomaga w walce z wrogiem. Pogląd wręcz fałszywy i wybitnie szkodliwy. Sytuacja przedstawia się wręcz odwrotnie. Ustawy wydawane przez władzę ludową posiadają wyraźne ostrze klasowe skierowane przeciwko wszelkim wrogom i reakcyjnym elementom (...). Nasze ustawy w stosunku do wroga klasowego są ostre i bezwzględne (...). Wszelkie łamanie ustaw prowadzi zawsze do podważania postawy istnienia władzy ludowej, gdyż godzi w jej łączność z masami oraz sojusz robotniczo-chłopski”: *Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...*
The above reasoning seems logically justified and ideologically cohesive: the ideological commitment of the Vice Minister Ptasiński led him to the conclusion that it was people who failed, not laws. Surely, the legalistic approach of Ptasiński comes from his assertion of the Party’s infallibility and, consequently, his belief that communist laws — the proceedings of the Party could not be faulty. To suppose otherwise would be like assuming that the regime might be wrong which was impossible to admit even in a secret speech. Therefore, he emphasized instead the primacy of communist regulations over individual actions of some of the Bezpieka functionaries who broke the law in order to fight the enemy more effectively. For Ptasiński, such a goal could not have been an excuse since the communist statutes were repressive enough to fight the enemy without resorting to extralegal means. More importantly, abuses of law were lethal to communist rule because legal transgressions undermined the core of the regime’s existence — “the union between workers and peasants.” In other words, transgressions of law by the security apparatus undermined the fundamental trust between the masses and the Party, while the regime’s mission was to bring them closer. Furthermore, Ptasiński emphatically demanded that the Bezpieka’s educators (the training corps of the security cadres) take lawfulness very seriously because the security apparatus was “designed to obey laws.” Noteworthy but not surprising, the moralistic tone of this speech contradicted its author’s behavior. Not for the first time, a communist official responsible

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129 “Praworządność obowiązuje przede wszystkim aparat bezpieczeństwa, gdyż powinien on stać na jego straży”: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...

130 Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej (Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries) (Warszawa, 1985), IPN 01179/57, egz. 1, 15.

131 “Praworządność obowiązuje przede wszystkim aparat bezpieczeństwa, gdyż powinien on stać na jego straży”: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu wykładowców...
for crimes himself was particularly vocal in his condemnation of abusive practices vis-à-vis socialist lawfulness.\textsuperscript{132}

Attempts to redefine socialist lawfulness also came from lawyers associated with the security apparatus. In 1953 Attorney General, Stefan Kalinowski, met with chief functionaries of the Bezpieka and Militia and condemned their overall disrespect for law.\textsuperscript{133} After defining law in a strictly Marxist sense as “the expression of the Party’s and government’s policy and instructions mobilizing us to real actions,”\textsuperscript{134} he drew the conclusion that no public institution should stand above the law. With commendable clarity, the Attorney General provided numerous examples of the Bezpieka’s abuses, making clear that the whole structure of the security apparatus was involved in extralegal activities and needed deep reforms. His long speech resembled an indictment of distortions of socialist lawfulness: Kalinowski quoted numerous constitutional violations, mostly arrests without cause, improper sanitary conditions in prisons, faulty supervision of investigations, and excessive punishment.\textsuperscript{135} His speech set a new trend in the perception of law. This was a prelude to a more positive and ‘lawful’ concept of socialist lawfulness that developed in Polish communism after Stalin’s death. The legal system became an important channel for the dissemination of the “refurbished” political doctrine.

\textsuperscript{132} Jan Ptasiński was responsible for brutal treatment of the Polish underground fighters after WWII: Tadeusz M. Płużański, “Ostatni żyjący wiceminister bezpieczeństwa. Gdzie jest teraz Jan Ptasiński” (“The Last Living Vice-Minister of Security. Where is Jan Ptasiński Now”), Gazeta Polska, November 18, 2008, 28.

\textsuperscript{133} Stefan Kalinowski was a Polish Attorney General between September 1950 and April 1956. He was known for disrespect for law: Krzysztof Szwagrzyk, Prawniczy czasu bezprawia (Lawyers of Lawless Times) (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2005).

\textsuperscript{134} “W naszych prawach jest przecież wyrażona polityka partii rządu, nasze prawa stanowią instrukcje mobilizujące nas do praktycznego czynu”: Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego...

\textsuperscript{135} Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego...
In this respect, Polish attempts to redefine socialist lawfulness were not isolated phenomena, but reflected with cyclical trends observed, in among other places, the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, for example, the chief architect of the concept of *Soviet lawfulness*, Andrey Vyshinskii, demanded from procurators and other officials strict observance of the law.\textsuperscript{136} Such a Soviet crusade for rule of law was the reaction to the breakdown of legal norms during the early days of collectivization.\textsuperscript{137} A historian of Stalinism, Peter Solomon, claims that promoting the observance of law had a minimal effect upon Soviet legal practice;\textsuperscript{138} in Poland, however, stricter supervision and more rigid disciplinary sanctions did not allow lawlessness to develop to Soviet dimensions.

The reader of these sorts of documents might gain the impression that the *Bezpieka* in the 1950s was a sanctuary of justice. However, apart from the difficulty of determining how sincere secret statements actually were, sadistic inclinations spontaneously appear in all closed communities which are insular, stratified, and powerful.\textsuperscript{139} Without a comprehensive system of investigation and punishment, transgressions are impossible to contain. Considering the abusive practices of the communist regime, the reader may find himself muddled by the fact that the *Bezpieka* apparatus was equipped with a preventive tool from its inception: the Department of

\textsuperscript{139} Sadistic inclinations were present, for example, in Catholic monasteries, disciplined and with vast power over their inmates. See, for example, the most recent case concerning the Congregation of Christian Brothers in Ireland: Katarzyna Surmak-Dormańska, “Bierz cukierek i milcz” (“Take a candy and stay silent”), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Semptember 13, 2009.
Functionaries’ Affairs.\textsuperscript{140} In theory, the Department was supposed to set an example of the rule of law of the security personnel, but, as the MBP Vice Minister Konrad Świetlik complained in April 1953, it permitted itself to “grossly violate lawfulness.”\textsuperscript{141} Just one month after Stalin’s death, Świetlik called these abuses “incomprehensible,” though for five years as a Vice Minister he had not been so outspoken.\textsuperscript{142} Obviously, the Minister neglected to indicate that his sudden insight was part of mainly his own struggle for power as he was fighting not for order and lawfulness as such, but for his own head. Świetlik’s hypocritical reasoning is, however, an interesting illustration of contradictory thinking based on the assumption that one may glamorize constitutional freedoms and at the same time something as unglamorous as Dzerzhinsky’s methods of their ‘implementation.’\textsuperscript{143} To security functionaries who carefully listened to their superiors’ legalistic sermons, socialist lawfulness must have meant cynicism or the redefinition of law. Historians may disagree to what extent those numerous calls for “guarding people’s

\textsuperscript{140} The Department (Bureau) of Functionaries’ Affairs (Biuro do spraw Funkcjonariuszy) was created in August of 1949. To its duties belonged internal investigation of the Bezpieka cadres: Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), Aparat bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1953-1954..., 90.

\textsuperscript{141} “Wydziały do spraw funkcjonariuszy pozwalają sobie w gruby, paskudny sposób narusza praworządność (...):” 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika na temat „pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej” wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (April 16, 1953. Speech of the MBP Vice-Minister Konrad Świetlik during the Briefing for the MBP Chiefs about the Work in the National Economy), AIPN, MBP, 10.

\textsuperscript{142} Konrad Świetlik was the Vice-Minister of Public Security from August 1, 1948 to November 30, 1954.

\textsuperscript{143} In the same secret speech, Świetlik called for the respect of the Constitution, especially protection from false arrest, and for Bolshevik fervency: “Let’s hit exactly as great revolutionaries teach us by their example. Let’s hit them as Felix Dzerzhinsky used to do” (“Bić tak, jak uczą nas wielcy rewolucjoniści swoim własnym przykładem. Bić tak, jak bił ich Feliks Dzierżyński”: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika na temat „pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej...”
lawfulness against all arbitrariness and abuses”\textsuperscript{144} were really meant to change the Bezpieka’s abusive practices of operation, but it is beyond dispute that the Bezpieka’s internal structure and goals alone would have placed the apparatus on a collision course with commonsense justice. In fact, for the security apparatus, it was essential to operate in an atmosphere of uncertainty of law in a sort of all-enveloping fog through which loyalty might be easily ascertained. At the same time, however, the officers were constantly reminded that “it is every communist’s obligation (…) regardless of his rank, to obey party and state discipline as closely as possible.”\textsuperscript{145} Clearly, for the security personnel the biggest risk lay not in breaking socialist law but in losing their sense of proportion about what they could and could not get away with. Usually, only the officers who grossly violated the written and unwritten rules of behavior and bureaucratic ethics would suffer serious disciplinary sanctions. Indeed, so-called socialist lawfulness might beguile a functionary with its generosity, bewitch him with its high-mindedness, and sadden him with its incongruity. For a Marxist, however, reconciling dialectical contradictions of this kind was nothing unusual. Depending on current limits of the permissible set by the Party, the security worker deftly deflated lawfulness into something more manageable, but not necessarily more lawful.

After 1956, the quest for lawfulness did not change in form, but rather intensified. The security cadres were partially refreshed, especially supervisory cadres. Also, some internal laws were further amended to prevent abuses, such as a regulation from 1969 that required the security superiors to prepare yearly reports on their subordinates’ behavior

\textsuperscript{144} See, the secret speech of Attorney General Stefan Kalinowski: Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego…

\textsuperscript{145} Referat prokuratora generalnego PRL Stefana Kalinowskiego wygłoszony na wspólnej naradzie pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego…
towards citizens, and all major violations of discipline, professional ethics and morality.\textsuperscript{146} In fact, however, the substantive law did not evolve that much – for the entire forty-five years of the Bezpieka’s existence, each case of a functionary’s gun usage, stealing, or serious car accident had to be reported in detail.\textsuperscript{147} Many of these reports are available in archives and show how seriously the regime regarded the wrongdoers.\textsuperscript{148} The perception of legalism increased over time. For example, though every foreigner coming to Poland was treated with suspicion, the overzealous functionaries who arrested foreign tourists or confiscated their possessions just for photographing objects of no security value were secretly warned in 1974 that this practice was unlawful and should be stopped.\textsuperscript{149} The regime eased surveillance of visitors as it strove for normalcy in foreign relations and for better respect of socialist lawfulness on the part of its cadres.

\textbf{1.4. The rules of the game}

Socialist lawfulness had its own distinct meaning within the world of the security apparatus. The work of the Bezpieka operatives was precisely regulated by a system of various legal rules designed to control, stimulate, discipline, encourage, punish, or reward officers depending on the need. At this point, I would like to analyze some of the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{146} Zarządzenie 08/69 Ministra Spraw wewnętrznych z dnia 13 stycznia 1969r. (Regulation 08/69 of the Internal Affairs Minister from January 13, 1969). See also a regulation signed by Colonel St. Mrożek on November 29, 1973 (Ldz KS 02666/73), IPN Ld pf 13/369.
\item\textsuperscript{147} IPN Ld pf 13/40.
\item\textsuperscript{148} Look for example, at the information about the discipline in the Wieruszów security unit. In 1973, there was one reported incident of disciplinary violation: a functionary used a car for personal business. He was punished for that as law prescribed: \textit{Informacja z dnia 8 stycznia 1974 roku} (Information from January 8, 1974), P-025/74, IPN Ld pf 13/369. See also Report on discipline in Warsaw, AJ-45 BJ 31, February 24, 1959, Ldz AB-530/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I.; Zarządzenie nr 29/60 (Regulation No 29/60), A-0750/60, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I, k. 162; Pismo Okólnie Nr 02/62 z dnia 14 marca 1962 roku (Circular Letter No 02/62 from March 14, 1962), K-02190/62, IPN LdIPN Ld pf 13/387 unifying disciplinary procedure in all security units.
\item\textsuperscript{149} Order from June 30, 1974, IPN Ld pf 13/408, t.II, k. 72.
\end{itemize}
different types of regulations and their influence on the security cadres. I will skip a detailed evaluation of their context since this issue, large enough to constitute a separate thesis, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is also a subject of interest to numerous historians studying the repressiveness of communist law.\textsuperscript{150}

The functions of the security apparatus were regulated by two kinds of laws — \textit{overt} (known to the general public) and \textit{secret} (known only to the security functionaries). This dichotomy comes from the two types of promulgation — overt and secret.\textsuperscript{151} The Constitution of 1952, most statutes (\textit{ustawy}), and many ministerial regulations (\textit{rozporządzenia}) were overt. Though none of the communist overt laws permitted abuses, including torture,\textsuperscript{152} their language was often aggressive, and penalties were severe.\textsuperscript{153} It was a duplicitous tactic; officially, communist law did not criminalize Polish independent formations (such as the Home Army: \textit{“Armia Krajowa”} AK, or the National Military Units: \textit{“Narodowe Siły Zbrojne”} NSZ) but only the fascists and their ‘Polish


\textsuperscript{151}\textit{Dziennik Ustaw Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej} (Record of Statutes of the Polish People’s Republic) was the most important promulgatory journal in the Communist Poland between 1952 and 1989. The supplementary was \textit{Monitor Polski}: Eugeniousz Ochendowski, \textit{Prawo Administracyjne} (Administrative Law) (Toruń: TNOiK, 1999), 134-135. For the role of the Dziennik Ustaw in contemporary Poland, see Sławomira Wrókowska, \textit{Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa} (The Basic Terms of Law and Legal Science) (Poznań: Ars Boni At Aequi, 2005), 132.


\textsuperscript{153}The Stalinist legal system in Poland was analyzed by Zdzisław Albin Zièba in \textit{Prawo przeciw społeczeństwu} (Law Against Society) (Warszawa: Katedra Socjologii Moralności i Oksjologii Ogólnej, Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych, 1997).
The Party, however, did exploit the anti-fascist decree against numerous anti-fascist fighters. Thousands of the AK or NSZ members, who had risked their lives fighting the Nazis, were arrested under the false pretext of collaborating with the Germans. The Bezpieka’s role was here absolutely critical: it fell to them to reveal the alleged correlation between the Nazis and the Polish anti-Nazi underground units, an accusation difficult to prove even with the aid of sophisticated forgery. To meet these Party expectations, the security apparatus had to break the law by the application of torture. The security cadres were to find the evidence against the “traitors,” “fascists,” or “anti-Semites,” and only then hand them over to the courts, which usually sentenced the “Polish Hitlerites” to death or many years in prison. The decree of August 31, 1944 was a prelude to the enactment of other penal regulations. In January 1946 the regime enacted a retroactive statute against those responsible for “the September 1939 calamity and fascization of state life,” aiming to crush the remains of the pre-war Polish government. Two months earlier the law had appeared regulating crimes “especially dangerous in the phase of the state rebuilding” that together

154 Decree of August 31, 1944, against “The Fascist-Hitlerite Criminals and Traitors of the Polish Nation.” It was a decree of the Polish Committee of the National Liberation (PKWN), established by Joseph Stalin and recognized by the USSR only. Dziennik Ustaw, no. 4, poz. 16 (1944); in Dziennik Ustaw, no. 69, poz. 377 (1946).
155 Zbigniew Bażyński, Mówi Jozef Światło...
157 Dekret z dnia 22 stycznia 1946 roku o odpowiedzialności za klęskę wrześniową i faszyzację życia państwowego, DzU 1946, nr 5, poz. 46.
158 Dekret z dnia 16 listopada 1945 roku o przestępstwach szczególnie niebezpiecznych w okresie odbudowy Państwa, DzU 1945, nr 53, poz. 300.
with the statute “excluding antagonistic elements from Polish society”\textsuperscript{159} constituted an overture to communist rule in Poland.

Archival documents reveal that security officers were supposed to know these laws. The Bezpieka organized periodical exams checking the legal knowledge and the ideological correctness of its cadres. On each such occasions, the Party tried to pursue two goals simultaneously: to direct the focus of service to law, and to increase indoctrination by explaining the ‘proper’ interpretation of statutes. For example, before the new communist constitution was enacted (nicknamed the \textit{Stalinist Constitution of 1952}),\textsuperscript{160} the Party organized obligatory workshops about “constitutional rules” in all of the Bezpieka provincial and county posts.\textsuperscript{161} Their goal was to scrutinize functionaries’ “understanding of revolutionary lawfulness and ability to illustrate constitutional provisions with examples coming from their own work.”\textsuperscript{162} The officers were expected to know Polish citizens’ constitutional rights and duties, though the profile of exams does not leave any doubt about their ideological charge. To pass the exam, for example, the security employees had to speak clearly about the “cultural and economic achievements of peasants and workers vis-à-vis pre-1939 Poland,” to explain the meaning of the

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Ustawa z dnia 6 maja 1945 roku o wyłączeniu ze społeczeństwa polskiego wrogich elementów}, DzU 1945, nr 17, poz. 96.
\textsuperscript{160} Enacted on July 22, 1952: \textit{Dz. U. 1952, nr 33, poz. 232.}
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Instrukcja z dnia 13 lutego 1952 roku o przeprowadzeniu egzaminów z zasad konstytucji dla pracowników WUBP i PUBP} (Instruction from February 13, 1952, about the Examination Concerning Constitutional Rules of the WUBP and PUBP Employees), Nr Ac-131/52, IPN Ld pf 13/II t.2.
\textsuperscript{162} “Zadaniem jest ocenić czy zdający rozumie zagadnienie rewolucyjnej praworządności i ilustrować zasady konstytucyjne przykładami ze swojego odcinka pracy”: \textit{Instrukcja z dnia 13 lutego 1952 roku o przeprowadzeniu egzaminów z zasad konstytucji dla pracowników WUBP i PUBP} (Instruction from February 13, 1952, about the Examination Concerning Constitutional Rules of the WUBP and PUBP Employees), Nr Ac-131/52, IPN Ld pf 13/II t.2.
“peasants-workers union,” and that of the guiding role of the Party. They were infused with the perception of socialist lawfulness as a tool, not as a standard, of their work.

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Ministerial rules were often supplemented by secret instructions (instrukcje) — documents with detailed descriptions of duties, operational advice, and interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. The instructions were highly-valued sources of law, and, in addition to statutes, established the legal framework for the security apparatus’s work. The declassified archives show that ministers frequently used the instructions as the most direct and comprehensive legal tool regulating the Bezpieka’s work.

Published in a rigid, standardized legal format, including catalogue codes, statutory references, and ministerial stamp seals, all to stress their seriousness, the instructions provided the most down-to-earth ex cathedra pronouncements of how to achieve the regime’s goals.

Though predominantly pragmatic in subject, sometimes, to cajole the addressees, the instructions were reinforced by grandiose preambles:

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163 The Instruction contained 29 issues to discuss and examine. Most of them concerned ideology. Instrukcja z dnia 13 lutego 1952 roku o przeprowadzeniu egzaminów z zasad konstytucji...

164 The Institute of National Memory’s archives contain a great number of the Bezpieka’s instructions, see for example the following volumes: IPN Ld 0050/36 t.1; IPN Ld 0050/23 t.2; IPN Ld 0050/23 t.1; IPN Ld 0050/27 t.1; IPN Ld 0050/27 t.2; IPN Ld pf 13/7 t.1; IPN Ld pf 13/401 cz.1; IPN Ld pf 13/401 cz.2; IPN Ld pf 13, 402.

165 Typically, each instruction contained the following formal features: 1 name of the act (for example, „Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych oraz w jednostkach Milicji Obywatelskiej z wyjątkiem jednostek administracyjnych i usługowych” – „The Instruction about securing national and departmental secrets in the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ and the MO security units with exception of administrative and logistic units”) (IPN Ld pf 13/403, k.230), 2. legal basis (for example, „załącznik do rozkazu MBP Nr 037/53 z dnia 10 sierpnia 1953 roku” – „The suplement to the MBP Order Nr 037/53 from August 10, 1953”) (IPN Ld 0050/27 t. I, k. 54), 3. date of enactment, 4. the author of the instruction (for example, the Ministry of Public Security), 5. ministerial stamp and code (for example, Nr. AC-R-1280/53) (IPN Ld 0050/27 t. I, k. 54), 6. note of secrecy (for example, “Ściśłe tajne” – “Top secret,” or “Tajne specjalnego znaczenia”- “Secret, of special value”) (IPN Ld pf 13/402, k. 230), 7. name of the person in charge.
The institutions of public security functioning within the limitations of the people’s law, continue their indomitable fight against imperialism’s agents, spies, saboteurs, and all other activity of the class enemy aimed against the implementation of socialism in our state (...). A deep understanding and internalization of the following Instruction, based on the experience that comes from fighting the enemy, will allow us to master the basics of counter-intelligence work and to fulfill the fundamental duties of the operational functionaries.  

All-embracing in scope, yet particularized in each subject, the instructions are an attractive object of study for historians; strictly pragmatic reasons for their enactment made them, unlike other normative acts, relatively free from propaganda. The instructions reveal the most authentic tactics of the Bezpieka, as well as traces of adaptation to changing reality, and – most importantly — actual relations of power among the security operatives. Particularly interesting here is the connection between the apparatus’s internal laws and their implementation. Not coincidentally, the security functionaries were obliged to read the instructions, to discuss them in groups, and even to sign rosters entitled “I have read and understood the Instruction Number...” Undoubtedly, the instructions were laws in action, since they contained provisions warning about serious
disciplinary sanctions if disobeyed. Together with disciplinary orders, they compose incontrovertible evidence of the functionaries’ actual power within the security apparatus.

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As is typical in other militarized institutions, operations of the Bezpieka were stimulated by orders. The orders provided bore a striking resemblance to those of the army. Their specific content and commanding tone, however, were differentiated from instructions and regulations — they were relatively more general in subject and more moderate in language. Indeed, if rules and instructions composed the law, orders were forms of their implementation. The archives reveal three categories of the Bezpieka’s orders: punitive orders (rozkazy karne), awarding orders (rozkazy wyróżniające), and general orders (rozkazy ogólne, rozkazy).

The punitive orders revealed and condemned functionaries’ abuses of law, and inflicted specific disciplinary sanctions for each transgression. As one may imagine, the repertoire of the punitive orders’ themes was wide, stretching from sleeping at work to sexual harassment of subordinates: “On December 14, 1959, Officer M. Sypniewski committed a moral transgression by groping a subordinate and proposing intercourse, by which he abused his power and brought shame to himself before other subordinate

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168 For example, “Funkcjonariusz winny naruszenia niniejszej Instrukcji podlega surowej odpowiedzialności” („The functionary guilty of infringement of his Instruction is subject to severe penalty.”) Instrukcja o użyciu broni palnej przez funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa z dnia 10 sierpnia 1953 roku AC-R-1280/53, punkt 10 (Instruction Concerning use of Shooting Weaponry by the Functionaries of the Security Apparatus, August 10, 1953, AC-R-1280/53, point 10), IPN Ld 0050/27 t. I, k. 56.

169 Called sometimes „special orders” (rozkazy specjalne), see for example, the Special Order issued by Major Roszkowski, penalizing for a functionary for insufficient secrecy, Ab-479/57, IPN Ld pf 13/336 t.1
functionaries. “

To the greater embarrassment of wrongdoers and the larger discouragement of those who would think about emulating them, the details of the compromising content of the punitive orders were often revealed to all security personnel during briefings, and then discussed. Such a proceeding was both a show of the Bezpieka’s supremacy and a product of ideological exigency. First and foremost, the ceremonial degradation of a functionary via a punitive order surely had preventive aims. Moreover, discrediting a functionary in front of his co-workers by the institutionalized divestiture of the aura of his inviolability, in which many of these officers functioned, aimed at subordinating habitual impudence to ministerial rules through means of shame and disgrace. The seriousness of the penalty accompanying ceremonial humbling, varying from a mere warning to arrest, usually depended on the intent and the degree of violation, and was often reduced if preceded by sincere self-criticism. Usually, for lesser transgressions, doing a prescribed ‘penance’ together with an act of ‘contrition’ was satisfactory enough to retain the duties of a security functionary. Full ‘absolution’ could be granted by the means of an awarding order in which institutionalized forgiveness vindicated disciplinary sanctions as reward for some excellent work achieved

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171 Many punitive orders included a provision that their contents were open within the security, such as quoted Special Order from January 13 1959, IPN Ld pf 13/336 t. 1.

by an ambitious functionary seeking rehabilitation. In many aspects this resembled religious confession. This phenomenon is particularly well studied by Igal Halfin, who discerns numerous similarities between Christianity and Marxism because the Soviet “ritualized confession borrowed from Orthodoxy and became a key part of Bolshevik discourse.” Halfin notes that some categories of crimes were redeemable through contrition as a means of mass surrender to the will of the state. Christian and communist confessions, both in the Soviet Union and in Poland, shared similar structures, agents and metaphors.

* *

Unlike the punitive orders used for preventive purposes, the awarding orders stimulated security personnel through motivation. The Bezpieka chiefs did not hesitate to identify achievements of their subordinates and used them as examples to other functionaries. The content of awarding orders was publicized among the cadres, partially to demonstrate the exact expectations of the regime, and partially to prove that these expectations were possible to realize. No wonder that especially praised were successes in “difficult areas,” known to be onerous and fatiguing, where results came after years of Herculean efforts. Undoubtedly, surveillance of the Catholic Church belonged to this category. It required great delicacy and no less deviousness, so that a positive outcome of

173 For an example of such an order, see Rozkaz specjalny nr 40 z dnia 21 listopada 1960 roku o zatarciu kar dyscyplinarnych (Special Order nr 40 dated on November 21, 1960, Vindicating Disciplinary Sanctions), Ab-0778/60, IPN Ld pf 13/336 t. I.
176 See also Igal Halfin, Stalinist Confessions. Messianism and Terror at the Leningrad Communist University (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).
the operational work met with the superior’s applause. For one such exemplary action, in the course of which two secret collaborators had been recruited within the Catholic seminary, Lieutenant Sławomir Janiszewski was granted an official commendation and a 600-zloty-bonus. Moreover, the relentlessness of Janiszewski in his continuing surveillance of the clergy won him another precious award just five months later — this time annulling a reprimand he had received via a punitive order. The Bezpieka also praised an exemplary attitude to work: Second Lieutenant Michalik received an award of 400 zlotys for maintaining operational contacts with secret collaborators even though he was on leave, and for recruiting two new collaborators at that time. Such rewards suggest that superiors admired a propensity for carrying over professional diligence and personal dedication into private life.

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General orders comprised yet another form regulating the Bezpieka’s personnel’s work. Using a sternly prescriptive, military tone, the security superiors forbade or ordered certain types of behavior, usually referring to the most recent cases of abuse or neglect. Sometimes, general orders resembled punitive orders, but they contained a preamble with specific examples, such as one from March 21, 1952, where the exhaustive introduction commented on numerous occurrences of drunkenness of the security personnel:

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177 Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 7 z dnia 18 lutego 1960 roku (Special Order No. 7 dated on February 18, 1960), IPN Ld pf 13/336 t. I.
178 Rozkaz Specjalny Ab-460/60 z dnia 1 lipca 1960 roku (Special Order Ab-460/60 dated on July 1, 1960), IPN Ld pf 13/336 t. I.
179 Rozkaz Nr 25/56 z dnia 14 września 1956 roku A-1377 (Order Nr 25/56 dated on September 14, 1956, A-1377), IPN Ld 13/7, t. III.
180 Another such an example is an award for the Lieutenant Bogdan Mirk for “impeccable everyday personal life” (“nienaganne zachowanie się w codziennym życiu osobistym”), IPN Ld pf 13/336 t.I, k. 109.
Particularly recently, there were cases of drunkenness that resulted in serious losses, for example: 1. (…), 2. (…), 3. On December 3, 1951, three functionaries of the Warsaw District, Warrant Officer Stanisław Ciesielski, Warrant Officer Eugeniusz Lato, and Corporal Henryk Skłucki, consumed a large dose of alcohol and afterwards had a row with randomly met citizen, who happened to be a Party member and a labor champion (…). While trying to run away, he was mortally wounded by a bullet from their gun. The above-mentioned functionaries were disciplinarily expelled from the security apparatus, arrested and put at the Prosecutor’s Office’ disposal.\textsuperscript{181}

The order was aimed against superiors accused of neglecting their paramount professional duty — “proper training of subordinate functionaries.”\textsuperscript{182} To prevent future violations, the commanding officers of all the Bezpieka branches were obliged to instruct their subordinates about uncompromising rules concerning alcohol consumption, counteract abuses by frequent control, to severely penalize the wrongdoers, and to report on each case of the order’s violation.\textsuperscript{183} This order reveals the backstage of the internal efforts to keep the security employees well-disciplined and motivated, and, together with many other similar orders,\textsuperscript{184} indicates a full-fledged trend to clean undesirable elements


\textsuperscript{182} “In the case of transgression of law under influence of alcohol, usually only the guilty functionary is brought to justice, not his superior, who allowed for such a transgression by tolerating drunkenness and neglecting a paramount duty of due rising subordinate functionaries” (“W razie popełnienia wykroczenia po pijanemu do odpowiedzialności pociąga się z reguły tylko winnego pracownika, nie zwracając uwagi, iż odpowiedzialnym jest również jego przełożony, który dopuścił do zaistnienia takiego wypadku przez tolerowanie pijanactwa i niewykonanie swego podstawowego obowiązku służbowego jakim jest należyte wychowanie podległych mu funkcjonariuszy”: Rozkaz Nr 08/52 z dnia 31 marca 1952..., k. 32.

\textsuperscript{183} For the whole list of obligations, see, Rozkaz Nr 08/52 z dnia 31 marca 1952..., k. 33.

\textsuperscript{184} For instance, the order sanctioning unjustified arrest: Rozkaz Nr 0114/55, AC-R-314/55 (Order No. 0114/55, AC-R-314/55), IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. III, k. 208; the order prohibiting use of the Security’s motor vehicles for private purposes: Rozkaz Nr 39, AC-2134/49 (Order No. 39, AC-
out of the Bezpieka cadres. Moreover, other general orders reveal in their quantity that campaigns against various pathologies were uncompromising \textit{de jure} and genuine \textit{de facto}. Though their actual implementation varied in orthodoxy, the mere fact of questioning the moral and political capabilities of the Bezpieka chiefs in the presence of all the security personnel was already a dramatic gesture. Such undermining of the authority of the superiors was in itself an almost suicidal attack on the buttress of the entire security structure — unconditional loyalty. If the regime decided to take the risk of compromising loyalty, it means that there were other paramount values at stake.

Drunkenness is such an example — if left uncontrolled, it would diminish not only internal discipline, but also public trust in the security service stemming from its supposed credibility, accountability, and predictability. The general orders served an indispensable stimulating function. One cannot, however, conclude that the general and

\textit{\underline{2134/49}}, IPN Ld pf 13/11, t. I; the order prohibiting use of physical coercion: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 04/60, AB-0108/60 (Order No. 04/60, AB-0108/60)}, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. II; the order concerning functionaries disciplinarily fired from work: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 21, AC-508-48 (Order No. 21, AC-508-48)}, IPN Ld 0050/22, t. II; the order prohibiting fascist-like methods of interrogation: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 19 z dnia 15 maja 1945 roku (Order No. 19 dated on May 15, 1945)}, IPN Ld pf 0050/21, t. II, k. 25; the order regulating disciplinary investigations: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 010/TW/67 (The Order No. 010/TW/67)}, IPN Ld pf 13/21; the order sanctioning arrest for over 48 hours without prosecutor’s knowledge: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 16/53, Sg 1963/53 (Order No. Nr 16/53, Sg 1963/53)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order concerning improper use of weaponry: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 8/53 na podstawie rozkazu ministra MBP Nr 018/52 (Order No. 8/53 based on the MBP Order No. 018/52)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order concerning telephone communication and its secrecy: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 33/53, Sg 2718/53 (The Order No. 33/53, Sg 2718/53)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order concerning exposure of the network of collaborators: \textit{Rozkaz Nr. 37/57, Sg 2756/53 (Order No. 37/57, Sg 2756/53)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order concerning using his rank within the Bezpieka to solve personal disputes: \textit{Rozkaz Nr. 41/53, SS-502/53 (Order No. 41/53, SS-502-53)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order penalizing poaching: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 18/54, SS-259/54 (Order No. 18/54, SS-259/54)}, IPN Ld pf 13/1; the order penalizing stealing valuables belonged to the detained individuals: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 62a, Nr 05867/46 (Order No. 62a, Nr 05867/46)}, IPN Ld pf 0050/21, t. I, k. 39; the order prohibiting detention of the KRN’s deputies, judges and foreign diplomats without a special warrant: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 56, Nr. 04866/46 (Order No. 56, Nr. 04866/46)}, IPN Ld pf 0050/21, t. II, k. 89-90; the order penalizing excessive drinking of alcohol: \textit{Rozkaz Nr. 08/52 (Order No. 08/52)}, IPN Ld pf 0050/26, t. I, k. 175; the order regulating relations with fired functionaries: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 21, AC-508/48 (Order No. 21, AC-508/48)}, IPN Ld pf 0050/22, t. II, k. 162.
punitive orders substituted for the statutory responsibility of the security cadres. Although they composed the most basic and most frequent form of discipline, the most grievous crimes subject to the sanction of imprisonment or death penalty were in the hands of military courts.

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The Personal Law Gazette (Dziennik Personalny) — a promulgatory journal issued periodically by the Ministry of the Public Security, promoting the Bezpieka’s officers in rank — was also secret. Each of the issues was signed by the Minister of Public Security himself, contained the specific legal basis for promotion 185 and identified each promoted functionary by his/her full name and rank. 186 The Gazette also posted decisions concerning decorations in its special section “Decisions about Decoration” (Postanowienie o odznaczeniu). The secrecy of the Gazette seems to be justified; one can imagine that release of names of the most trusted functionaries could endanger them in public, and, what was equally important, reveal the numerical strengths of the Bezpieka, as well as its structure. The decisions granting promotions and decorations were not, however, secret for the apparatus itself. The regime wanted a certain level of

185 For example, “On the basis of the regulation of the Head of the State National Council on December 27, 1944, the following functionaries of the Public Security Service have been promoted” (“Na podstawie zarządzenia Przewodniczącego Krajowej Rady Narodowej z dniem 27 grudnia 1944r. niżej wymienionym funkcjonariuszom Służby Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego nadano stopień oficerski:”) Dziennik Personalny Nr 1, Rok 1, Rzeczpospolita Polska, Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego. Source: Andrzej K. Kunert, Rafał E. Stalarski (ed.), Bĳące serce Partii. Dzienniki personalne Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (The Beating Heart of the Party. The Personal Law Gazettes of the Ministry of Public Security), (Warszawa: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa & Oficyna Wydawnicza AUDITOR, 2001), vol. 1, 12-162.

186 For the complete list of the Personal Law Gazettes between 1945 and 1947, see Andrzej K. Kunert, Rafał E. Stalarski (ed.), Bĳące serce Partii..., 12-162.
transparency within its structure and therefore decided to publish decisions among the
circle of security employees. Undoubtedly, granting a medal or promoting a particular
individual could be seen as a manifestation of the regime’s arbitrariness so, to make an
appearance of legality and equality before law, each decision was supported by a
meticulous citation of its legal basis. Sometimes, in laudatory and even poetic language
were detailed reasons for an award published in ministerial bulletins, such as “On the
Watch of Democracy” (“Na Straży Demokracji”) — an internal newspaper edited for its
employees by the Central Headquarters of the Militia. In addition to being
informative, all of these efforts also served a stimulating purpose: since part of every
decorative honor is to give one the privilege of boasting before one’s peers, the applause
or the envy it caused could motivate other functionaries to harder work.

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Not surprisingly, the secularization of the society from predominantly Catholic
traditions stemmed from the Bezpieka itself. As history has repeatedly witnessed, one of
the best ways to eradicate old beliefs is to replace them with new ones. Nothing
demonstrates this more clearly than the establishment of certain memorial days

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187 Each decision about decoration was numbered, dated and provided with legal basis, for
instance: “Decision about decoration R. 872/47 on July 22, 1947 (based on the State Council’s
Resolution from March 27, 1947)” (“Postanowienie o odznaczeniu R. 872/47 z dnia 22 lipca
1947 roku (Na podstawie Uchwały Rady Państwa z dnia 27 marca 1947 r.).” For more examples,
188 See, for example, an article „When do we promote and award” (“Kiedy awansujemy i
odznaczamy”) in the Na Straży Demokracji (On the Watch of Democracy), Nr 8 (23) Rok II, 4.
Look also for other internal newspapers, especially the biweekly Ormowiec (The ORMO-man) for
the functionaries of the Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens’ Militia (ORMO), Z Kraju i ze Świata
(News from the Country and the World), and a supplement to the Na Straży Demokracji, Na
Straży (On the Watch) – a military periodical for the Corps of the Internal Security.
commemorating important communist achievements for the security cadres. As a part of such new rituals, ministerial dignitaries prepared occasional orders (rozkazy okolicznościowe) to remind functionaries of the basics of the communist creed. Infused with ideological hostility, these ‘occasional orders’ quickly became an intrinsic part of the new communist liturgy saturated with ideological pomposity and grandiloquent wishes. As the Chief Commander of the Citizens’ Militia put it on July 22, 1946:

On the day of the Great Feast of Poland’s Rebirth, we join the whole courageous nation standing around heroic and victorious banners of the people’s democracy. We swear to the nation to stay faithfully at our responsible posts to protect the order and security of our liberated Homeland. With an iron broom, we swear to sweep our cadres of all the Błachuta and Mazur-types — the degenerate servants of fascism, who tried to apply their mole tactics among us. We will not allow them to sully the good name of the Militia. We will jerk out the weed of anti-Semitism together with its roots, and with a sharp eye we will watch for the ideological purity of our cadres. Long live Free, Democratic Poland!

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189 The Polish communists celebrated the following holidays: January 1 (New Year), March 8 (International Women’s Day), May 1 (Labor Day), May 9 (Victory over Fascism), July 22 (Proclamation of the PKWN Manifesto), and November 7 (October Revolution). Particular professions had also their own feasts: for example, functionaries of the militia celebrated their day on October 7.

190 “Walka jeszcze trwa. Reakcja jeszcze nie jest doszczętnie rozbita. Jeszcze strzelają bandyci zza węgla, jeszcze burzą spokój robotnika i chłopa, jeszcze porywają się na zdobycze ludu. W niedalekiej przyszłości czeka nas nowa wielka bitwa o utrwalenie Demokracji (…) (“The fight is still on. The reaction is not yet totally destroyed. Bandits still shoot from behind piles of coal, still disturb workers’ and peasants’ peaceful life, still attack on the achievements of the People. In the nearest future, we will face a fierce battle to stabilize Democracy (…).”), Rozkaz Nr 95 Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego na dzień 7 października 1946 roku (Order No. 95 of the Minister of Public Security from October 7, 1946), published in Na Straży Demokracji (On the Watch of Democracy), nr 25.


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Depending on the occasion, the pledge could vary in length and fervor — from just a few formal words of good wishes for the New Year\textsuperscript{192} to the comprehensive profession of a creed:

\textit{(…)} I order you to increase vigilance and military alert, to stifle reactionary troublemaking in its initial phase, to serve as a model for each citizen, and to honor democratic legal order, to allow each worker and peasant to express their will during elections, to increase discipline and operational effectiveness, to expand professional qualifications and manners, to clean the Militia cadres out of elements hostile to the Peoples’ interests, and to unite in close cooperation with other branches of public security, which also fight against reaction and in defense of Democracy.\textsuperscript{193}

Exhausted by an orgy of ideological furor (which was a kind of moral prostitution for those who secretly did not accept the regime), the security functionaries were usually allowed a couple of \textit{Bruderschafts} to cement friendships and create family-like bonds. The communist ideologists purposely encouraged for cultivation of these kinds of customs. Celebrating promotions in rank, anniversaries, or fallen comrades had a number of positive consequences; primarily it helped to strengthen the apparatus’s identity by forming a “socialist character of impersonal relations.”\textsuperscript{194} By participating in ceremonial activities, the functionaries created and revived shared feelings of union and commitment

\textsuperscript{192} “Z okazji Nowego Roku przesyłam serdeczne życzenia powodzenia w pracy wszystkim Funkcjonariuszom Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, Milicji Obywatelskiej, Korpusu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego i Więziennictwa” (“As of the New Year, I wish all the Functionaries of the Public Security, Citizen’s Militia, Corps of Internal Security and Prison Guards good luck in their work”) Rozkaz Nr 100 z dnia 31 grudnia 1946 roku (Order No. 100 from December 31, 1946) published in the \textit{Na Straży Demokracji (On the Watch of Democracy)}, rok III, nr 2 (47), 1.

\textsuperscript{193} “(…) Rozkazuję Wam: wzmocnić czujność i gotowość bojową, w zarodku dławić każdą próbę wichrzenia reakcji, być wzorem dla każdego obywatela i stać na straży prawodawstwa demokratycznego, stać na straży, by w czasie wyborów każdy robotnik i chłop (...) mógł swobodnie wyrazić swą wolę, wzmocnić dyscyplinę służbową i sprawność operacyjną, podnieść poziom kwalifikacji zawodowej i kultury ogólnej, oczyścić szeregi Milicji z elementów obcych interesom Ludu, ciasniej zewrzeć szeregi i ściślej współpracować z innymi organami bezpieczeństwa w walce z reakcją i w obronie Demokracji”: Rozkaz Nr 95 Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego na dzień 7 października 1946 roku (Order nr 95 of the Minister of Public Security from October 7, 1946), published in \textit{Na Straży Demokracji (On the Watch of Democracy)}, nr 25.

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy…}, 27.
to the Party. Communist rituals were also valuable because they substituted for the religious needs of many officers. Thus, the security chiefs were “morally obliged” to organize secular celebrations of a functionary’s wedding or the name-giving of his child. These systematically cultivated rituals were supposed to separate the functionaries and their families from the influence of the Catholic Church and calm down their feelings of social estrangement.

1.5. Conclusion

The fact that the communist regime was responsible for many crimes does not necessarily mean that it desired to neglect lawfulness. Socialist legality was very similar to the concept of the rule of law in the West and belonged to the core of socialist virtues. The overall respect for law was strictly correlated with the degree of socialist morality’s internalization by security cadres. Most of their violations were caused not by the Bezpieka’s deliberate policy of disrespect for law, but by functionaries’ inability to achieve successful work results within limits of the existing law. Official morality regarding respect for law promoted by the communist ideologists tended to be more ideal than the choices made by particular officers, especially before 1956. The IPN archives reveal that the Bezpieka superiors devoted much of their energy to fighting legal violations within the security apparatus, but at the same time they often defended them, as did Minister Radkiewicz who once admitted that “We used to beat, we beat now, and we will beat. And prosecutor has nothing to do with it. It is our own business.” Such an

195 Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 28.
incongruity between the ideology and practice was not unusual, but deliberate policy of communist regimes.

Socialist lawfulness was a combination of morality of duty and morality of aspirations. Being both minimalist and maximalist called security functionaries to perfection and to obeying laws at the same time. It was a pressure of duty and a challenge of excellence as security officers functioned in the environment of exponentially growing duty and perfectionism. Exposure to this stress for too long led some of them to a distaste for the whole concept of socialist lawfulness. Functioning between extremes of love and hatred may seem unusual but was typical of totalitarian states, where barbarity toward the enemy was justified in the name of building a new, “better” civilization. In this particular respect, Różański’s speech is no different than Heinrich Himmler's address to the SS-men in Poznań in 1943. The functionaries’ admiration of the Communist Party was an excuse for mass repression of the communists’ true and imaginary enemies, just as SS-men’s admiration for the German

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199 “(…) Jeżeli my podniesiemy poziom polityczny aparatu śledczego, wtedy my wykonamy te zadania, które przed nami stawia kierownictwo partii i ministerstwa” (“If we raise the political level of the investigative apparatus, then we will fulfill the tasks given to us by the Party and ministerial chiefs”): Przemówienie dyrektora Departamentu Śledczego Józefa Różańskiego na temat "pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej...”
volk had been an excuse for the mass extermination of the Jews ten years before. Both Himmler and Różański perceived lawfulness in an aggressive sense as the struggle against foes, —and also in a passive sense as a virtue of unblemished service to the regime in the spirit of decency or honesty. Those functionaries who were unable to combine cruelty with decency had to be eliminated from service, since in the security apparatus of the Nazi Germany and Communist Poland there was no place for “degenerates” — men unable to internalize double standards of morality.

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200 “Wir haben diese schwerste Aufgabe in Liebe zu unserem Volk getan. Und wir haben keinen Schaden in unserem Innern, in unserer Seele, in unserem Charakter daran genommen” (“We have carried out this most difficult task for the love of our people. And we have taken on no defect within us, in our soul, or in our character”): Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/HimmlerPosen.

201 “Und dies durchgehalten zu haben, und dabei -- abgesehen von menschlichen Ausnahmeschwächen -- anständig geblieben zu sein, hat uns hart gemacht und ist ein niemals genanntes und niemals zu nennendes Ruhmesblatt” (“And to have seen this through, and -- with the exception of human weaknesses -- to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us so hard. This a page of glory in our history which has never been written and will never bewritten”): Roger Manvell, Heinrich Fraenkel, Himmler (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1965), 136.


203 “Eine Anzahl SS-Männer haben sich dagegen verfehlt. Es sind nicht sehr viele, und sie werden des Todes sein - GNADENLOS!” (“A number of SS men have offended against this order [stealing]. There are not very many, and they will be dead men - WITHOUT MERCY!”): Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/HimmlerPosen.

Disciplinary penalties of the Bezpieka functionaries were discussed by the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiwicz in the Paper of the Minister of Public Security for the National Council of the Security Apparatus’ Chiefs, March 4, 1954 (Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego na krajową radę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa, 4 marzec 1954 rok), AIPN, MBP, 14.
Chapter II

Knowledge

Institutionalized Brainwashing

By order, we must force functionaries to study.204
--- Major Czesław Borecki, Chief of the Bezpieka in Kielce

2.1. Introduction

The Polish communist security police created a peculiar environment wherein its members acted under constant pressure to make moral improvements: “Joining the Bezpieka is a voluntary political and moral choice meaning the acceptance of specific duties and willingness to make personal sacrifices.”205 Moral education and intellectual development – chief moral obligations – were necessary components of functionaries’ successful psychological transformation into iconic communists. These virtues were defined as legal and moral obligations,206 and demanded much more than a typical employer usually expects from his workers. Security cadres were the apple of the regime’s eye, and the standards for their ideological and moral transformation were set

204 "Należy zobowiązać ludzi rozkazem do uczenia się”: words of Major Czesław Borecki in reference to security functionaries spoken on June 9, 1950, Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t.6, 23.
206 Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 18.
higher than for other state employees, as Antoni Parzyszek, chief ideologist, noted in the manual for security cadres, *Rules and Methods of Security Functionaries’ Moral Formation.*\(^{207}\) The officers were supposed to establish a quasi-mystical relationship with the Party and deepen it with their ongoing efforts of intellectual self-improvement. Mere acceptance of an applicant to the service did not mean that he was a confirmed mature communist. Communist morality did not appear spontaneously in humans, but had to be taught. Therefore, hiring even the most enthusiastic candidate was rather an investment and a beginning of a long, painful journey of inculcating communist morals. It was explicitly outlined, for example, by Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz in 1954, when he advocated merciless treatment of all resistance to the campaign of moral improvement within the *Bezpieka.*\(^{208}\) Any remaining bourgeois instincts of functionaries had to be broken, brought to subjection, given the right direction, and confirmed in that state, all through proper and continuous formation.

The *Bezpieka*’s schooling was first and foremost missionary, in the literal sense of establishing discipleship, of making “followers.” It was also selective, thus making these followers exceptional. The regime resorted to training programs that could turn security officers into sturdy communists equipped with a firm philosophical base, enthusiastic for the Party no matter what. The final success of the system lay in the mass production of

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\(^{207}\) “Należy jednak podkreślić fakt, że przed funkcjonariuszami resortu spraw wewnętrznych stawia się wyższe wymagania ideowo-moralne niż przed urzędnikami państwowymi (...)” (“It has to be stressed, however, that there are higher moral and ideological expectations for the security functionaries than for state employees”: Antoni Parzyszek, “Zasady i metody wychowania moralnego funkcjonariuszy resortu spraw wewnętrznych” (“Rules and Methods of Security Functionaries’ Moral Formation”), IPN 01179/49, 190.

\(^{208}\) Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 r. (Speech of Stanisław Radkiewicz, the Minister of Public Security to the National Executive Committee of the Security Apparatus, March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14, k. 42.
such communist models. The methods of educating security employees belonged to a rich repertoire of manipulative instruments with the ministerial schools playing a key role in forming the character of their soldiers. But how was this target to be achieved? Was the Party successful in meeting this ambitious goal? The answers to these questions may explain how close the communists moved toward their ideal and why they ultimately failed.

The pedagogical language of the Bezpieka chiefs presents a challenge for translation into English. They frequently used a verb, *wychowywać*, which means more than the verb *to educate* in English. It embraces the whole process of molding individuals in accordance with certain norms and teaching elementary things, just as parents do with their children. Therefore, it is closer to *upbringing* or *raising*. The Polish communist educators used this verb for the same purpose as their Soviet masters employed *vospitanie*, or Rousseau’s use of *education* in French. Both denote the process of coming to maturity, the formation of a worldview, the development of character and the internalization of customs. The two regimes not only wanted to teach officers the technical craft of security, but aspired to transform their whole being through *wychowanie komunistyczne* or *kommunisticheskoe vospitanie* (*communist upbringing*).

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209 See, for example, *Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza w sprawie zadań dla aparatu bezpieczeństwa na odcinku kadr w związku z IV Plenum KC PZPR, wygłoszony na naradzie w dniu 26 maja 1950 roku* (Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz Concerning Goals of the Security Apparatus Related to Cadres, in *Conjunction to the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, May 26, 1950*), Archiwum MSWiA, syg. 17/IX/77, t. 6.

210 *Wychowanie* has in Polish language two meanings: 1. to secure psychic and physical development of an individual under age, and 2. educate somebody in a certain direction, or form someone’s mind in respect to something; Mieczysław Szymczak (ed), *Słownik języka polskiego* (Dictionary of Polish Language), volume III (Warsaw: PWN, 1985), 785-786.

This similarity was the result of the paternal relations between the Party and its soldiers existing in the Soviet prototype and in its Polish copy. Unfortunately, wychowywać does not have a satisfactory English equivalent, and so to try to reproduce it results in an awkward, artificial language. Depending on context, I will use the verbs to raise, to educate, to cultivate and the noun upbringing.

2.2. An academy of hatred

In the 1940s the lack of basic cadres directly affected the Bezpieka’s creation and functioning. The first Polish homo sovietica were trained by the NKVD in a Special School (Szkoła Specjalna) in Kuybyshev, the Soviet reserve capital during World War II. Called by the native Poles “Kuybyshevers” (kujbyszewiacy), they composed the backbone of the newly created MBP. At this formative time, functionaries were often “recruited on the streets,” while a diploma from the Soviet secret security school opened doors to a career in all countries east of the Elbe. In the late 1940s, the Polish local security education expanded, and the influence of the Soviet masters slowly decreased. Toward the end of the decade, Polish Stalinists created three major security

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213 “At that time [1940s], men were recruited even on the streets (…)”: words of Samuel Sandler as interviewed by Teresa Torańska, “They Recruited on the Streets,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 6, 2010.

But it took time to educate cadres. In the meantime, deficiencies in elementary school education were offset by \textit{ad hoc} supplementary education. Before 1955, short-term courses providing remedial information, practical advice, and basic familiarity with communist morality were the most widespread means of security cadres’ training. Many employees raised their level of competence by enrolling in these various short-term workshops, organized in all local \textit{Bezpieka} units. Despite these efforts on the part of the regime, voluntary education was not popular: by 1950 only forty percent of the security superiors decided to participate in some kind of training.\footnote{"(…) zamiast stu słuchaczy mamy 50-70" ("(…) instead of one hundred listeners, we have 50-70"): words of Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz in reference to district schools (szkoły wojewódzkie): Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza w sprawie zadań dla aparatu bezpieczeństwa na odcinku kadtr..., t. 6.} Teachers were mostly recruited from among senior security officers who served as a good example to follow but often lacked pedagogic skills. Altogether, poor planning, low quality instructors, and class rules of admittance (the preference given candidates classified as peasants and workers) all contributed to the overall poor quality of education, especially if compared with public high schools and colleges.\footnote{Roman Tomaszewski, "Tendencje autokratyczne lub integracyjne szkolnictwa resortowego na przykładzie MON" ("Authocratic or Integrational Tendencies in the Ministry of Defense’ Schooling"), Pomorska Akademia Ekonomiczna w Słupsku, 112-113.}

Training courses were simplified versions of courses taught in public schools. It was partially caused by the regime that regarded its soldiers as intellectually primitive because they came from the least educated segment of society, as Minister Radkiewicz
put it somewhat cynically in his report: “[our] men are inexperienced and losers, they need experience and upbringing. We have 76 percent workers, 16 percent peasants, 10 percent working intelligence (…). Only 38 percent (800 men) completed elementary school; 43 chiefs of our apparatus reached only seventh grade. In respect to overall education, our cadres look very lamentable.”

One may think that these defects were the result of the Bezpieka’s ad hoc formation and that the situation could only improve in the following years. Admittance requirements were indeed raised in the next decades, but the overall level of intellectual maturity of the security cadres was still far from ideal five years after Radkiewicz’s complaint. For example, in 1955 the internal investigation of the Brzeziny Unit revealed a low level of political knowledge: shocked inspectors found out, among others errors, that one of the employees had classified Belgium as a communist state and Bulgaria as capitalist. Such discoveries were numerous.

The subject matter for studying was mostly ideological, based on the works of Marx, Lenin and, particularly, Felix Dzerzhinsky – a Polish Communist revolutionary, famous as the founder of the Cheka – who was presented as “an example of a zealous

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217 “Ludzie są niedoświadczeni, życiowo mało wychowani, wymagają doświadczenia i wychowania. Robotników mamy 76 procent, chłopów 16 procent, inteligencji pracującej 10 procent (…). Ze szkołą powszechną mamy 38 procent (800 osób); 43 ludzi na kierowniczych stanowiskach naszego aparatu w całym kierownictwie ma zaledwie 7 kl. wykształcenia. Pod względem wykształcenia ogólnego kadra nasza przedstawia się bardzo opłakanie”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza w sprawie zadań dla aparatu bezpieczeństwa na odcinku kadr..., t. 6.


219 Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza w sprawie zadań dla aparatu bezpieczeństwa na odcinku kadr..., t. 6.
communist fighting for communist ideas.”\textsuperscript{220} The end of Polish Stalinism in 1956 did not change the curriculum. The functionaries were still educated in the cult of the first Polish communists who founded “the moral backbone for the security apparatus.”\textsuperscript{221} The need for continuity, so crucial in building group morale, took precedence over a comprehensive critical approach towards numerous abuses in the past. However, preoccupation with the past and glorification of the traditional institution, without substantial critical evaluations, might have been interpreted by some students as a signal that they were absolved in advance from any responsibility for crimes, just as were their Stalinist predecessors. Indeed, the Party was firmly impaled on a two-horned dilemma. On one hand, it was important to assure the officers that they would not be punished for following even wrong orders; on the other hand, it was necessary to put an end to abuses of law. Consequently, education of the \textit{Bezpieka} employees was to some extent separated from practice, a situation which might have reduced its overall prestige. At school functionaries were taught to observe socialist morality, while at work they were sometimes rewarded for its violations.\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{220} ”Stanowi on dla nas wzór żarliwego komunisty walczącego o ideały komunizmu”: \textit{Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy}..., 12.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy}..., 12-13.
\textsuperscript{222} See, for example, the letter of Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski as cited by Tadeusz Fredro-Boniecki in \textit{Wychodzenie z piekła. Dalszy ciąg zwycięstwa ks. Jerzego (Leaving Hell. Continuation of the Victory of Rev. Jerzy)} (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 1991), 22-23.
The shortages in education of the security cadres could not be solved without a comprehensive approach; it took a number of years to consolidate the educational ladder. To improve quality, the Party raised minimal training duration from four to six months, and significantly expanded education opportunities by the Training Department of the MBP (Departament Szkolenia MBP). The emergence of these educational endeavors was an additional tool of moral inculcation to supplement training through service. The Bezpieka chiefs scheduled obligatory workshops concerning a vast array of socio-political subjects. The organizers structured their workshops around ideologically meaningful issues and along conventional lines. For example, in the early 1970s, “(…) to understand mechanism of class struggle and political rationale of the Bezpieka’s functioning as a collective unit as well as its employees individually,” all security

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functionaries underwent an obligatory two-hundred-hour training course deepening their “political-ideological knowledge.” Among other things, it consisted of ideological indoctrination, the basics of psychological manipulation and fighting techniques:


The regime hoped to increase the number of qualified security functionaries by expanding opportunities, offering incentives, and imposing sanctions for educational negligence. In 1962, the MSW Minister announced desired qualifications for the Bezpieka employees that were reasonably reachable:

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225 Tabela stanowisk i kwalifikacji funkcjonariuszy MO zatrudnionych w SB KWMO I KPMO (Table of Positions and Qualifications of Militia Functionaries Employed in the Security Service in District and County Militia Headquarters), Zarządzenie Nr 0168/62 z 5 listopada 1962 roku (Regulation No. 0168/62 from November 5, 1962), AB-0482/110/62, IPN Ld pf 13/387.
Position

Security Vice-Chief (z-ca komendanta ds bezpieczeññta)
Senior Operational Officer (Starszy Oficer Operacyjny)
Operational Officer (Oficer Operacyjny)
Senior Officer -Sector III (Starszy Oficer Pion III)
Senior Officer -Sector IV (Starszy Oficer Pion IV)
Intern (Praktykant)

Requirements

Higher or secondary education; ability to work in a team; knowledge of the locality for operational purposes 226
Secondary education; ability to recruit secret collaborators and work with them; knowledge of investigative principles
Secondary education; completed operational school [the Bezpieka school]; knowledge of recent international, Polish and economic situation
Secondary education; knowledge of the penal code and forensic science
Secondary education, knowledge of religious issues 227
Secondary education


Furthermore, to encourage those functionaries who already possessed a college diploma to further study, Brigadier General Franciszek Szlachcic offered them extramural studies in the newly-developed concentration: security. Completion of the evening class program was the equivalent of the professional school for officers’ diploma. 228 After that, to be fully educated and to reach their full potential for a great career, functionaries needed only training in the Soviet Union, which some of them pursued. 229

226 Operational purposes mean all goals related to identification and destruction of the enemy, as well as preventive surveillance and recruitment of secret collaborators.
227 Sector IV was responsible for fighting religious organizations, primarily the Catholic Church.
228 Zarządzenie 0135/63 z 10 sierpnia 1963 roku (Regulation 0135/63 from August 10, 1963), AB-0388/110/63, IPN Ld pf 13/387.
229 See, for example, dossier of security ministers: Franciszek Szlachic (1971) was trained in a special KGB school between 1954 and 1955: IPN BU 0604/1633 (MSW 22820/V), Mirosław Milewski (1980-81) – in 1970: IPN BU 0604/1629 (22810/V); Czesław Kiszczak (1981-1990) – in 1975: Karta E-14:"ZS 3745/723/K. I have not found any document that explicitly stated that the Soviet training was absolutely necessary for the highest ranks. Nonetheless, considering the
The 1970s saw other important improvements in both the level and the significance of functionaries’ training. In 1972, the regime created the Academy of Internal Affairs (Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, ASW). Soon, stringent rules of admittance and rigid discipline made it an elite security school. Along with age restrictions (applicants had to be under thirty-five years of age), good health, and impeccable ideological standing, candidates had to pass entry exams in written and oral form (in penal law and forensic science, foreign language, and socio-political issues).

The enrollees were trained by thirty-nine “outstanding” full time professors and sixty six assistant professors committed to increasing candidates’ deep understanding of socialist morality, especially the communist concept of the rule of law. In the same year, the Dzerzhinsky Higher School for Officers (Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska im. Dzierżyńskiego, WSO) also opened. Named after Felix Dzerzhinsky, WSO pedantically fostered his virtues, mostly zeal and anticlericalism (in 1989 it merged with the ASW). Armed with the conviction that their philosophy was superior to Christianity and capitalism and that history was on their side, the ASW and WSO faculty organized lectures, debates, forums, and discussions to foster love toward the Party and hatred toward the Party’s enemies. In December 1983, for instance, young officers found out from their teachers about ideological threats from the Catholic Church, and “crimes” of priests like Rev. Jerzy

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230 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów (Decree of Ministerial Council), Dz.U.72 nr.34 poz.233.
231 Zarządzenie Nr 82/72 z dnia 11 sierpnia 1972 roku (Regulation No. 82/72 from August 11, 1972), Ldz. AC-577/72, IPN LD pf 13/401, cz. 1, k. 4 -11.
Ten months later, Rev. Popiełuszko was brutally murdered by four officers of the Bezpieka apparatus. Only one of them had not completed his security college education.\footnote{Janusz Kotański, “Męczeństwo ks. Jerzego Popiełuszki” (“Martyrdom of Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko”), \\textit{Nasz Dziennik}, 30 December, 2006.}

The Bezpieka schools attempted to form the moral and political character of students – this was their primary goal, not the dissemination of scientific knowledge.\footnote{Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski, Lieutenant Leszek Pękala, Colonel Adam Pietruszka graduated At the WSO: IPN BU 0604/905 (18867/V), IPN BU 0242/54711 (19835/V), IPN BU 0604/903 (188865/V).}

The aim of the process of self-liberation was to create the spiritual ideal. It confirms Igal Halfin’s observation that communism acted as a messianic movement guided by Marxist theory which elevated “the knowledge of man to the status of the vehicle of salvation.”\footnote{Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953 (Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanislaw Radkiewicz about Educating Security Functionaries in Ministerial Schools, Raised at the Conclusion of the Workshop for Professional Lecturers, September 3, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.}

Also Polish communists elevated knowledge to a supreme position believing that conscious man is able to better control himself. Facing multiple threats of political apathy of security cadres, it became increasingly apparent that communist education must be more intensive and effective, especially within the Bezpieka. Until the early 1980s moral schooling was in the hands of specially trained officers supported by internal Party organizations. In 1980, however, the Bezpieka faced something of an earthquake caused by the Solidarity movement, and some of its “mentally weaker” functionaries showed signs of ideological wobbling. However, these mostly young officers were not necessarily lost if treated appropriately: “They needed attentive, ideological, and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Igal Halfin, \textit{From Darkness ...}, 53, 82.}
\end{footnotes}
educational help and care that restored their faith in our socialist principles and
strengthened their moral standing based on the socialist hierarchy of values, by providing
them with a wise and true interpretation of facts.”237 The regime’s ambition of moral
crusade culminated in a movement establishing the Political-Educational Unit (Pion
Polityczno-Wychowawczy, PPW).238 With the goal of preparing a breeding ground for
security youngsters, PPW was expert in disciplining, but contributed little to the
restoration of faith in communism. Mere hard work, obedience, promptness, and
persistance, so fervently advocated by PPW, did not produce enough heat to hatch *homo
sovietica* in large numbers. Facing this reality, the *Bezpieka* educators began to feel
powerless and frustrated, as Colonel Eligiusz Kotoń put it: “After a four-month-training
program, students are not able to write a report (…). Security chiefs and their
subordinates are committed, but the exam (…) revealed that they [security chiefs] do not
know how to register a case in Department II, cannot write a case analysis and a plan of
surveillance. They sat there for four-five days and did nothing without help.”239 But

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237 “Wymagali jednak troskliwej, ideowo-wychowawczej pomocy i opieki, która m.in. przez
modrą i właściwą interpretację zdarzeń, przywróciłaby im wiarę w nasze socjalistyczne pryncypia
oraz umocniła postawy ideowe oparte na socjalistycznej hierarchii wartości”: Czesław Staszczak,
"Zadania przełożonych, aparatu polityczno-wychowawczego oraz organizacji partyjnych i
społecznych w dalszym kształtowaniu właściwych postaw ideowo-moralnych funkcjonariuszy,
żołnierzy i pracowników resortu spraw wewnętrznych” ("Duties of Superiors, Political-
Educational Apparatus, and Party and Social Organizations in Further Formation of the Correct
Ideological and Moral Standing of the Functionaries, Soldiers, and Employees of Security
Sernice"), Materiały z konferencji naukowej w Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych i Milicji
Obywatelskiej w dniu 21 października 1987 roku (Presentations from the Scientific Conference In
the Academy of Internal Affairs from October 21, 1987), IPN 01179/49, 15.
238 For the analysis of the Political-Educational Unit, see: Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział
general Kiszczak (What General Kiszczak Did Not Reveal) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna
Wydawnicza, 1992), 147-150.
239 “(…) po 4-miesięcznym szkoleniu uczeń nie umie napisać raportu (…). Szefowie i ich zastępcy
to ludzie oddani, ale gdy się ich sprawdziło na miesięczne szkolenie do WUBP, okazało się, że
szef nie wie, jak zarejestrować sprawę w II Wydziale, nie umiał napisać analizy sprawy, planu
rozpracowania, siedział 4-5 dni i bez pomocy nie zrobił”: words of Colonel Eligiusz Kotoń, chief
of the Szczecin District Unit, Protokół odprawy szefów WUBP w dniu 9 czerwca 1950 roku
problems of this sort were relatively easy to solve; inculcating morals was far more complex. As Party ideologist Czesław Staszczak noted: “Soon, in the course of everyday work, it became obvious that it is easier to form young functionaries’ political conscience rather than their morality.” Such impressions are confirmed by archival documents. A large volume of disciplinary actions (over 10,000) suggests that despite continuous indoctrination many functionaries did not understand that “serving the Party, the state, and the nation is the reason of our service, and that we can win social respect through our (…) ethical behavior.” For Czesław Staszczak and other proponents of the more intensified education, the effectiveness of moral campaigns depended on intellectual stimulation by peers, agitations, and more professional training.

2.3. Puritan schools

The Marxist educators could make significant advances only after they clarified their assumption about the nature of man. Their attempt to organize all the pieces of knowledge about human growth and development was a prelude to making education into a science. This was, in turn, a prerequisite to the completion of the communist revolution in the Bezpieka. The source of problems lay in their perception of man, which rejected any spiritual sphere and promoted a strictly materialistic point of view. Their denial of spirituality led to the assumption that science could eventually reduce all phenomena,

(Report from the Briefing of the District Security Chiefs In June 9, 1950), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t. 6, 22.

240 “Niebawem w toku codziennej pracy okazało się, że łatwiej jest kształtować w świadomości młodych funkcjonariuszy pryncypia polityczno-ustrojowe niż zasady etyczno-moralne”: Materiały z konferencji naukowej w Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych..., 16.

241 ”(…) celem i sensem naszej działalności jest służba partii, państwu i narodowi oraz że społeczny szacunek i uznanie zyskujemy przez rzetelne wykonywanie swych obowiązków oraz prezentowanie właściwych postaw etycznych”: Etyka zawodowa funkcjonariuszy..., 24.

242 Etyka zawodowa funkcjonariuszy..., 27.
including religion, to the natural laws of opposites, negation and transformation.\textsuperscript{243} In order to be faithful to this basic operating assumption about the nature of man and his needs, the regime developed values to substitute for spiritual ones – knowledge and loyalty.

Despite many efforts, the regime was not able to change the nature of functionaries’ emotions to a desired degree. The disparity between intellectual convictions and emotional attitude resulted in growing frustration, as was the case of Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski who was looking for “a sense of life” in the Bezpieka.\textsuperscript{244} Though he achieved excellent work results for which he was amply rewarded, Captain Piotrowski described his real mental state as “hibernated,” with his mind “totally frozen,” which ultimately led him to commit brutal murder.\textsuperscript{245} This example validates Herman Kahn’s\textsuperscript{246} prediction that if spiritual needs of people are not met, we can expect them to sink into the “Late Sensate State” described as “(…) depraved, faddish, violently novel, exhibitionist, debased, vulgar, ugly, debunking, nihilistic, pornographic, sarcastic or sadistic.”\textsuperscript{247} Kahn, an American strategist who represented an anti-communist point of view, described a phenomenon which unknown to him found application in the communist security service. But the regime spotted the same danger. The Party, in its

\textsuperscript{243}  
\textit{Dialekticheskii materialism (Dialectical Materialism)}, by A. Aizenberg, K. Egorova, M. Zhiv, K. Sedikov, G. Tymianskii, and R. Iankovskii, under the general editorship of A. Aizenberg, G. Tymianskii, and N. Shirokov (Leningrad: ORGIZ-Privoi, 1931).

\textsuperscript{244}  
Tadeusz Fredro-Boniecki, \textit{Wychodzenie z piekła. Dalszy ciąg zwycięstwa…}, 120.

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\textsuperscript{246}  
Herman Kahn (February 15, 1922 – July 7, 1983) was a founder of the Hudson Institute and originally came to prominence as a military strategist and systems theorist while employed at RAND Corporation, USA. For more information about his career, see Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, \textit{The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War} (Harvard University Press, 2005).

\textsuperscript{247}  
own words, aspired to fill the religious vacuum and defined “spiritual needs of the people,” and even “functioned like a church with its own ideology.” It could be successful if the regime had to offer society really attractive ideology. However, frequently a person loses control when his state does not serve him but only defines his needs and satisfactions. In respect to communism, the abdication of responsibility was costly in every sense. Trained in absolute obedience, the Bezpieka employees became less independent and less tolerant, and less fully human as well. Though it was a goal of the regime and part of the homo sovieticus transformation, it was also a source of frustration to the Party chiefs who expected much more than just blind loyalty:

We need men of high general knowledge, clever, intelligent, experienced. We need men with open minds, thinking, being able to recognize, approach and expose the enemy regardless of his education, knowledge, cunning, masking abilities and slyness. We need men of high political and professional level, those who can bring to work (…) creative political thinking (…)..

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248 “Superiority of the socialist system (…) [means that] material and spiritual needs of a man are over all other social problems” (“Wyższość systemu socjalistycznego (…) [polega na tym], że troskę o człowieka i jego potrzeby materialne i duchowe wysuwa na czoło wszystkich problemów i zadań społecznych”): Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954…, k. 1-42.

249 “(…) Partia też się swoiste kształciła jako kościół ze swoją ideologią”: words of General Wojciech Jaruzelski interviewed by Monika Olejnik in a TV program Kropka nad i, TVN, 12 November 2009.

250 “Trzeba nam ludzi o wysokim poziomie wiedzy ogólnej, zdolnych, inteligentnych, doświadczonych, ludzi z otwartą głową, myślących, umiejętnościach rozpoznac, podejść i zdemaskować wroga niezależnie od jego wykształcenia, wiedzy, chytrości, maskowania się i przebiegłości. Trzeba nam ludzi o wysokim poziomie polityczno-zawodowym, takich, którzy potrafią do każdego rozpracowania wnieść (…) twórczą myśl polityczną (…)”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953…
Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz, the author of the above invitation, believed in the attractiveness of communism and its superiority over all other socio-political systems and religions. For him — a communist trained to reconcile dialectical contradictions – it was possible, and even natural, to be at the same time creative and passive, to think independently, and to believe in the Party without any doubt. He expected the same of his subordinates whom he viewed as capable of similar transformation. His long speech about educating functionaries is a fascinating compendium of ideological assertions and a brilliant articulation of problems to be faced and issues to be resolved. In the first such extensive discussion of education of security cadres in MBP history, Radkiewicz expressed optimism in Marxism as an ideology, yet repeatedly confessed how inappropriately it had been inculcated into functionaries’ heads and hearts. If one substitutes Party for God and communism for Christianity, the speech would look like the curriculum of a Puritan school based on the doctrine of the natural depravity of children: “Comrades, you have to (…) use the whole repertoire of methods to raise a man who comes to school as a tabula rasa, with harmful habits and influences.”

With their natural human nature assumed to be wicked, functionaries could not have been trusted to make important decisions about their own learning; they had to allow themselves to be passively driven into the Bezpieka schooling system. The Party’s perception of an inherently corrupt nature later evolved together with Polish communism to become more optimistic. From the 1960s onward, the regime accepted to the Bezpieka only men of

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251 “Muscie, towarzysze, skończyć ze szkolarstwem, musicie stosować gamę środków wychowania człowieka, który przychodzi do szkoły surowy, ze szkodliwymi nawykami i należalościami”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...
“flawless ideological and political standing,” which suggests either that communism was at that time mature enough to produce such virtuous candidates—or their own standards had become more lax or more tolerant.

2.4. The smell of moral decay

In the Bezpieka world, students associated with others like themselves, so the mental, moral, and social attitudes they formed were reinforced by their peers. The regime consciously exploited peer pressure to control party ethics, and it skillfully designed reinforcement for groups contingent upon the desired behavior of each of its members. The aim was to create groups that would be based on mutual control and education, and to reduce individual variations, making the security cadres as homogenous as possible. The trend of fraternal closeness among the security officers came from the Soviet Union where it was used for decades to practice such virtues as decency, individual worth, and cooperation. Polish functionaries quickly learned to observe their masters.

The principle of collectivity worked well. In 1950, one of the pioneers of peer learning in Poland, Major Borecki (the head of the Bezpieka Unit in Kielce), advised colleagues to try his own method of schooling:

252 Zarządzenie Nr 82/72 z dnia 11 sierpnia 1972 roku (Ruling No. 82/72 from August 11, 1972), Ldz. AC-577/72, IPN LD pf 13/401, cz. 1, k.4; see also Zarządzenie Nr 0168/62 z dnia 5 listopada 1962 (Ruling No. 0168/62 from November 5, 1962), AB-0482/110/62, IPN Ld pf 13/387.
253 “Communist principles, taken in elementary form, are the principles of highly educated, honest, advanced people; they are love for one’s socialist motherland, friendship, comradeship, humanity, honesty, love for socialist labor, and a great many other universally understood lofty qualities”: Mikhail I. Kalinin, On Communist Education (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 99.
(…) once a week group members are released from their afternoon professional tasks to study the material until late night. Once a week there are seminars. This has shown results. Moreover, the weaker functionaries have been assigned to work with the stronger ones. The younger, weaker officer carefully watches his stronger partner (…), and the stronger officer has to keep an eye on him. After four months this method has shown good results.  

The internal debate about education of the security cadres revealed a good deal about how educators evaluated the progress of a large-scale educational mission. Some of them were, however, less optimistic that Borecki. The most vocal participant at the conference for security superiors in May 1950, Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz, expressed his indignation toward the schoolmasters’ lack of flexibility which thwarted the overall moral crusade, “We will declare war on all kinds of routine and ossification, both in the themes and the methods of scientific work.” The logic of internal debate was based largely on the exaggerated vision of human nature, and sometimes on analogies of a war-like and ‘hygienic’ language, “(…) We have to reveal all that stinks, all that reeks of

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254 “(…) raz w tygodniu zwalnia się członków grup popołudniowych zajęć zawodowych i do późna w nocy obowiązani są oni do przerabiania objętego programem materiału. Jeden raz w tygodniu są seminaria. To dało wyniki. Ponadto przydzielono słabszych do mocniejszych. Młody, słabszy pracownik przygląda się wszystkiemu, co robi mocniejszy (…), a starszy, mocniejszy, do którego jest przydzielony, musi go egzaminować. Po czterech miesiącach metoda ta dała b. dobre rezultaty”: speech of Major Czesław Borecki at the briefing of the security chiefs, Protokół odprawy szefów WUBP w dniu 9 czerwca 1950 roku (Report from the Briefing of the District Security Chiefs In June 9, 1950), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t.6, 23.

255 “Będziemy wypowiadać zdecydowaną walkę wszelkiego rodzaju rutyniarstwie, skostnieniu, zarówno w tematyce, jak i w metodach pracy naukowej”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza w sprawie zadań dla aparatu bezpieczeństwa na odcinku kadr..., t. 6.

256 See, for example, words of Jan Ptasiński: “Stąd wypływa pierwsze i podstawowe zadanie (…) wychować pracownika aparatu bezpieczeństwa duchu ofiarności i wierności dla partii, aby zrozumieli, iż na każdym odcinku, gdziekolwiek znajdują się, są tylko żołnierzami partii(…)” (“There comes the first and foremost duty (…) to raise security functionaries in the spirit of sacrifices and loyalty toward the Party so they may understand that whenever they are and whatever they do, they are only soldiers of the Party (…)”: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu...
This language was not a Polish invention but echoed Lenin’s own bellicose convictions that a school should be “a weapon of the proletarian dictatorship, which not only leads communist principles, but also serves as a guiding ideal.” This language also contained many pedagogical truths. Lenin’s chief epigone in Stalinist Poland, Radkiewicz declared that “Summaries, theses, reports, and lectures are not enough because education is a problem of pedagogical approach, of applied methodology, and of its own system. It requires a special attention and a special format.” Radkiewicz might indeed be blamed for putting too much confidence in the power of communist education and laying too much emphasis on method and system, with too little on their feasibility. Yet he deserves remembrance as the person who left the Bezpieka a comprehensive system of pedagogy. If Lenin, as the greatest universal ‘apostle of the new learning,’ proclaimed the gospel of knowledge, Radkiewicz, as the greatest Polish apostle of the new education, proclaimed the gospel of a new school. He believed that socialist morality – an attribute required of Party guardians, and Party piety – an attribute reserved for the Party members, made obligatory ideals for every functionary, as this profession called for moral perfectionism. As a summary of this whole pedagogy nothing better can be offered than one sentence from Radkiewicz’s secret speech that reflects the characteristics of his

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257 “(...) trzeba obowiązkowo wyciągać to, co cuchnie, to, co zgnilizn a czuć”: Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika na temat „pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej” wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego 15 kwietnia 1953 roku (April 15, 1953. Speech of the MBP Vice-Minister Konrad Świetlik during the Briefing for the MBP Chiefs about the Work in the National Economy), AIPN, MBP, 10.
258 Leninski Sbornik, XIII, 80, as cited by Maurice J. Shore, Soviet Education. Its Psychology and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 141.
259 “Nie wystarczą konspekty, tezy, referaty i wykłady, gdyż wychowanie jest również wielkim problemem pedagogiki, odrębnej metodyki, odrębnego systemu problem wychowania wymaga specjalnego opracowania i ujęcia w określoną formę”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu...
convictions and that of the age: “Surely, school is a place for polishing [students’
characters] that shall produce a battle-hardened, impeccable member of the Party; a
worthy employee of the security apparatus conscious of his role and tasks.”  In other
words, schools were to be factories mass producing homo sovietica – “biorobots”
programmed to think in communist terms of subservience and undivided loyalty, yet
clever enough to fight the enemy – even if it was an enemy they themselves created.

2.5. An incubator of virtues

Surely, there were officers who realized they idolized a false god. In 1987
Antoni Parzyszek, one of the chief specialists in communist indoctrination of security
cadres, outlined a detailed plan to counteract this danger. He assumed that proper
formation of honesty, justice, or bravery could not be achieved without first saturating
functionaries’ minds with knowledge about politics, history, economy, and pedagogy.
Parzyszek advocated embracing many aspects of training. The key to success was
ideological zeal (ideowość). Functionaries’ enthusiasm and their understanding of their
goals, as well as their internalization of socialist ethics, constituted the absolute
minimum.  But how could students be invigorated in their pursuit of knowledge?

Speaking as someone who remained himself profoundly committed to teaching,

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260 “Szkoła jest nieuctwliwie szlifiernią, która winna dać zahartowanego, skrystalizowanego
członka partii, świadomego swojej roli i zadań, godnego pracownika aparatu bezpieczeństwa”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...
261 Communist ideologist Czesław Staszczyk claimed that there were groups of functionaries who violated discipline: Materiały z konferencji naukowej w Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych..., 17.
Parzyszek stressed the special role of teachers, called for their initiative and zeal, and emphasized cultivating the Bezpieka’s tradition as a methodology. This conception of the relationship between past, present, and future drove the quest of reconstructing the history of the Bezpieka and impelled the retrieval of the struggles and experiences of one such communist hero, Felix Dzerzhinsky. The peculiar educational paradigm of the security apparatus was organized on certain ideological premises, lies, and distortions. True, Dzerzhinsky personified the virtues of bravery and zeal, but surely not those of justice and honesty as perceived by the average man. Thus, one of the characteristics of this logic was the apparent conflict between morals and the reluctance to admit what these morals actually meant in the secret police. Not only was the Bezpieka’s world hypocritical, but so was its language. The communist educators knew that an intellectual understanding of issues, while important, was not in itself a sufficient basis for good morals. They attempted to develop positive (adoration) and negative (hatred) emotional attitudes in their students. Here, the example of Dzerzhinsky played a crucial role because he epitomized core virtues of the Bezpieka’s morality, and his life was a source of plentiful illustrations of righteous communist behavior because “By nature he was a very attractive, charming man with a tender, proud and pure soul” – wrote once his Bolshevik friend Vyacheslav Menzhinsky. A communist biographer of Dzerzhinsky noted that he “set high standards for the work of each Communist and demanded

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264 The crucial role of teachers was stressed by other communist dignitaries as well. See, for example, speeches of the Bezpieka district chiefs in 1950 about internal education: Protokół odprawy szefów WUBP w dniu 9 czerwca 1950 roku (Report from the Briefing of the District Security Chiefs In June 9, 1950), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t.6, 21-23.
unswerving loyalty to the Party duty.” These virtues were especially applicable to the security apparatus.

Another foundation of communist schooling was training in emulation, called in the security jargon copying activity (aktywność kopiująca). The communists were interested primarily in training officers to copy their superiors. This meant that the success of transforming the Bezpieka into a gigantic copying machine depended primarily on the quality of available templates, not only on the technology of duplication. Communist morality had its weaknesses, and the temple was often guarded by those who were unworthy. On occasion, there appeared indications that the Bezpieka school system was too automatic and detached from individual students:

Lecturers should not be separated from the collective and act as machines giving lectures and conducting exercises. If we needed only machines in our training efforts, then we would play gramophone records with lectures (…).  

To say that communists called for some creativity is not to suggest that they advocated free-thinking. On the contrary, spontaneity was regarded as a tool with which instructors could win the friendship of students to find out what they really thought and how they

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267 Felix Dzerzhinsky..., 220.
268 “Nas interesuje ten typ aktywności, który ma wpływ na kształtowanie postaw moralnych funkcjonariuszy. W związku z tym należy zwrócić uwagę na aktywność tzw. kopującą lub naśladowczą” (“We are interested in the kind of activity that influences functionaries’ moral level. That is why we hale to turn our attention to the so called copying or mimicking activity”): Antoni Parzyszek, “Zasady i metody wychowania moralnego funkcjonariuszy…”, 181.
269 “Wykładowcom nie wolno odebrać się od kolektywu, zamieniać się w automat wygłaszający wykłady i prowadzący ćwiczenia. Gdyby nam w pracy szkoleniowej miały wystarczyć automaty, to można by było nakręcać płyty gramofonowe, na których nagranie byłyby wykłady”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...
might react in various circumstances.\textsuperscript{270} Given the reality of such little ‘tests,’ it seems that the scene from the film “The Lives of Others” showing a young Stasi officer provoked by his superior to crack an anti-communist joke was not pure fiction.\textsuperscript{271} To be sure, the regime did not favor its soldiers’ creativity in a political sense, but rather let them select a method for a task; for example, choosing the right tactics to recruit a secret collaborator.

But the Party’s general pursuit of conformity and institutionalized dependency that took precedence over promoting individual initiative was conducive to functionaries’ apathy. Failure to commit an officer to certain communist values through education resulted in his growing alienation from the regime and his confusion of values. This induced what Herbert Read, an anarchist poet, once called “the atrophy of sensibility” – moral anesthesia.\textsuperscript{272} When one lost his faith in the system, his impetus for growth waned, his vitality was replaced by apathy, and a state of alienation followed. Well-known cases of Captain Piotrowski and Colonel Adam Pietrusza may serve here as examples.

Other cardinal principles of the security education, by which educational offerings were to be judged, were called by the Party ideologists collectivity (\emph{zasada zespołowości}), systematic learning (\emph{zasada systematyczności}), and durability (\emph{zasada

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{270} “Z tego względu każdy wykładowca powinien (…) obserwować go, aby móc przewidzieć, jak on się zachowa w różnych sytuacjach” ("Because of his, each lecturer shall (…) observe him [student] to foresee how he may react In various situations"): \textit{Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953…}

\textsuperscript{271} \textit{The Lives of Others} is a German film about monitoring of the cultural scene of East Berlin by agents of the Stasi. The film was shot in 2006 by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck and won several awards.

The functionaries had to implement their knowledge in practice (rule of practicability), as Lenin had been the first to advocate. Sincere desire was not enough. Communist ideals had to be supported by the sterner stuff of socialist values and active will. Functionaries had to undergo every possible effort to make the ideals real.

The application of such a rule required systematic training of the security corps. As I already noted, no man was a paragon of virtue when he entered the service; he could approach this ideal only by a long and sustained program of development under the strict and continuous supervision of specialists. “Systematic educational efforts are the opposite of (...) a random approach. They have a special role in maintaining the high level of the security and militia functionaries’ morals. These efforts guarantee not only good work results, but also form a certain style of work.” The Party advocated making a systematic approach the basis of the practice of education, probably being aware that without constant indoctrination the functionaries might lose their ideological zeal. The more the economic gap between the West and East expanded, the more regularly such ideological training took place. It is hard to assess what played the more important role – indoctrination or discipline. Acts of open betrayal were, however, rare.

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273 Antoni Parzyszek, “Zasady i metody wychowania moralnego funkcjonariuszy…”, 185-186.
276 See, for example, the escape of a ZOMO functionary who hijacked a commercial plane in 1980: Izabela Jopkiewicz, "Polska leci na Tempelhof,” Gazeta.pl, October 18, 2004.
2.6. The temple of knowledge

Once revolution had been carried out in the late 1940s, a new responsibility rested on the communist educators. Their educational objectives had to be adapted to a transformed environment. In the 1950s, with the communist system secure, the Party could employ a battery of new stimuli. Along with direct forms of education, the regime influenced security cadres by a whole repertoire of indirect methods developed in the course of the decade. They included ceremonies, the cultivating of professional traditions, and indoctrination by government-controlled mass media.\textsuperscript{277} The Party also saw the integrative force of nationalism and its potential for the forging of security officers from various backgrounds into a single political unit. Polish communist education, just like its Soviet prototype,\textsuperscript{278} was based on strong patriotic sentiments aimed at developing an identity that would assure the functionaries’ support of nation-state policies, as can be seen in the 1987 summary of communist rules and ethics of security apparatus, “The ideological basis for this profession is deep patriotism (…)\textsuperscript{279}”

The regime’s ideologists viewed patriotism as a tool to secure an attachment to the communist political community and to unite the functionaries in patriotic allegiance to a single national identity centered around the Party. Nationalism was used to develop common hatred of an enemy, real or imaginary: “We need men with deep hatred toward the class enemy, with absolute devotion and loyalty to the Party, aggressive, [willing to

\textsuperscript{277} For a complete list of direct and indirect methods of indoctrination, see Antoni Parzyszek, “Zasady i metody wychowania moralnego funkcjonariuszy…”, 190-191.
\textsuperscript{278} For details about Soviet patriotism, see Maurice J. Shore, Soviet Education. Its Psychology and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), especially charter 15.
\textsuperscript{279} “Podstawą ideową tej służby jest głęboki patrotyzm (…)”: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 14.
make] sacrifices, and [having] high ideological purity." The Bezpieka educators viewed ardent patriotism as a desirable attitude at a time of world conflict, when it seemed capitalist-communist competition might be settled through deadly wars, one of which might escalate into a worldwide holocaust. Thus, soldiers of the Party had to be always on the alert, mentally and physically ready for sacrifice. They were encouraged to exercise systematically, and to participate also in sports activities organized by the security apparatus. The Party, with its ambitious goals, expected functionaries to impose on themselves strict moral discipline, to develop a kind of conscience similar to a religious one. In other words, they would become their own guardians in thoughts and in deeds.

The communist nation-state held the same sacrosanct position as the pre-Reformation Roman Catholic Church had held in the educational system of its era, with the substitution of the word “treason” for “heresy.” The communist nation-state also suffered from the same ailment of nepotism that had affected the Church. Training a functionary in the spirit of elitism and superiority widened, not lessened, the gulf between society and the security cadres, eroding their mutual understanding. Many security officers and their families who enjoyed privileges closed themselves off from society and lived in ghettos. Colonel Grzegorz Piotrowski claimed that it was both a reason and a

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280 “Trzeba nam ludzi, którzy palą głęboką nienawiścią do wroga klasowego, których cechuje całkowite oddanie i wierność partii, bojowość, poświęcenie i wysoka ideowość”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładów zawodowych, 3 września 1953..., k. 74.

281 See, for example, a plan of sport events for security functionaries for 1974, IPN Ld pf 13/394, k. 74.

282 According to Stanislav Levchenko, former KGB officer, nepotism begun at the lowest level of one’s career: Uri Raanan and Igor Lukes, Inside the Apparat: Perspectives on the Soviet System From Former Functionaries (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1990), 2. For description of nepotism in the Polish security apparatus, see Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 166-167.
result of their social alienation and described the peculiar nature of these closed communities with their own customs and values: “Estrangement of the Bezpieka from society pushed it into a mafia-like organization. At various meetings I used to raise an opinion that when others reject us or want to divide us, then we have to stick together.”  

Samuel Sandler, a Polish communist, linked this phenomenon to Soviet practice: “They [Polish communists who came from the Soviet Union] realized in the U.S.S.R. that being a member of a gang was a matter of survival.”  

Jan Widacki, the MSW Minister, made a similar observation in respect to the whole apparatus.

But estrangement was in fact an escape from the bitter reality of economic shortages and the social apathy which conflicted with the optimistic predictions of communist theoreticians. Since an officer was committed to a profession that was inevitably linked with ambivalence and contradictions, his emotional life was full of stress and frustration. According to historian Jerzy Eisler, a typical Polish communist was a man of contradictions, truly believing in his cause, thinking of himself in terms of his superiority over all the others, including Soviet communists (sic!). He had a tendency to separate himself from almost anybody but his immediate colleagues, and stigmatize all outsiders by using the pronoun “them.” Hence, his characteristics had to be in some respect ironic, even funny:

285 Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 166.
An officer could not function as a communist unless he could live happily with contradictions and without feeling obligated to resolve them. In case of conflict, his survival depended upon his ability to choose the Party, not society, and hide in a ghetto together with men like him. The ability to learn this skill was the mark of a mature communist; indeed, it was the mark of communist life. It is not surprising that the pressures from unmet expectations and the anxiety produced by alienation motivated a desperate search for something that either filled those needs or provided some kind of escape from anxiety. Ghettos served that purpose. Despite the vigorous efforts of security educators, it proved to be impossible to build solid pride on the quicksand of wishes, anger, hatred – no matter how justifiable by Marxist logic. The transformation of society into the communist ideal (which at the same time would mean bringing it closer to

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287 Practicing morals was based on utmost loyalty and discipline. Compare Kazimierz Gładowski’s internal report on discipline: “Refleksje nad etycznymi aspektami regulaminu dyscyplinarnego funkcjonariuszy resortu spraw wewnętrznych” (“Thought about Ethical Aspects of Disciplinary Rules for the Internal Ministry’s Functionaries”), Etyka zawodowa funkcjonariuszy..., 283-295.
security officers) was impossible so long as the Party and nation were at odds, not in alliance. Because of ontological animosities between rulers and ruled, functionaries had to demonstrate their communist maturity and choose “wisely.” Most stayed loyal to the Party, while only a few rejected communism. Those who could not make up their minds usually turned to alcohol and lies.

2.7. Conclusion

Though education is usually associated with reason, enlightenment, and free-thinking, to communists it meant the instilling of an intolerant ideology to subjugate security officers intellectually and to commit them to a strictly doctrinal perception of the world. The regime always viewed education in terms of weaponry transforming functionaries into an internally and an externally disciplined army. It was both a legal and moral obligation to study and improve. But internal contradictions within the ideology and its inconsistency with reality served the opposite purpose, as shows a satiric cartoon of Andrzej Mleczko (figure 2). Facing this dilemma, security officers came to recognize the delicate balance between what was expected, what was possible, and what had to be invented. Thus, virtues promoted by the Bezpieka schools could not have been regarded literally, but only as a metaphor. This concerned, for example, respect for law. Though officially functionaries were educated in strict legal obedience, they were sometimes encouraged to violate it by their superiors.288

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288 As was the case of informal “Group D” created in 1973 mainly to fight the Catholic Church: Jan M. Rokita and Antoni Dudek, Raport Rokity: sprawozdanie Sejmowej Komisji Nadzwyczajnej
Such conflicts and tensions underlay all aspects of the socio-cultural transformations in communism. Bezpieka education is a particularly good example of how assumptions about authority, opportunity, and ideology permeated the lives of targeted listeners. The most pivotal aspect of the process of schooling was the unconditional recognition of loyalty, both collective and individual. Cadre loyalty was a deliberate goal of the regime as it tested its power in a prelude to a broader moral crusade. But the holy war by which Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz endeavored to establish his methodology seems strikingly medieval. The Minister tried to fight the Church, or what he called “the bastion of superstition,” by creating close-minded and superstitious fanatics like the twelfth century inquisitors of Konrad von Marburg’s type. Such men were able to harass society, but not to convince it to socialist ideas. After Radkiewicz’s removal from office in 1954 for his mismanagement of the MBP, his legacy was taken over by successors, who attempted to follow in the educational footsteps of Polish Stalinists. The individual educators changed, but the education remained the same. Numerous attempts to intensify training and indoctrination succeeded in forming obedient, but not necessarily enthusiastic, cadres. They loyally served the Party, but it was at the expense of social trust. Their alienation from the majority of Poles thwarted plans to infuse society with communist morality. Thus, the Bezpieka’s educational discourse was from the start both the unsuccessful means and the end of a set of utopian moral transformations. Socialist

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289 “Ciemnogród i zabobonność” — in his memoirs, Jan Widacki recollects numerous nicknames for the Church used by the regime, for example: “agents,” “imperial emissaries” (“emisariusze imperializmu”), “warmongers” (“podżegacze wojenni”): Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 87-88.
education was utterly inappropriate to the political and social situation, especially in the 1980s.
Chapter III

SECRECY

Institutionalized Confidentiality

Only a man totally devoted to the Party may properly protect and manage a state secret.

--- Stanisław Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security

3.1. A watchful state

In all states law enforcement requires a certain amount of confidentiality. The Polish communist regime, however, just like its Soviet prototype, centered its very existence around ubiquitous secrecy, often developed to the point of absurdity. Unlike democratic countries, a watchful communist state depended on the confidentiality of gathered information to proceed with full-scale manipulation. Though everybody was expected to follow the rules, the idealization of secrecy as virtuous benefited only the

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291 There are numerous books written about propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, such as Ilya Zemstov, Encyclopedia of Soviet Life (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991); John Wesley Joung, Totalitarian Language: Orwell’s Newspeak and Its Nazi and Communist Antecedents (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991). For propaganda in Communist Poland, see, for example, Piotr Semkow, Propaganda PRL (Propaganda in Polish People’s Republic) (Gdańsk: Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 2004).
communist Party elite which had access to information about the country’s overall internal and external situation. It very often conflicted with expectations based on ideological assumptions, such as ideal and real economic prospects. The legitimization of the regime facing expanding cognitive dissonance of social consciousness called for application of a whole repertoire of manipulative techniques. Institutionalized confidentiality was a part of a socio-cultural aspect of Marxist-Leninism which included knowledge, beliefs, values and practices of Polish society, particularly as they related to the Party. Secretiveness of all domains was a sine qua non for the hermeticism of the regime, and it persisted at all levels of the public realm, including the echelons of power. For example, contrary to official propaganda, the PZPR was not monolithic but internally divided. Stealth was necessary to camouflage divergences on the ideological level as well as the inconsistency between the ideal and actual methods the regime used to

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293 This is a term I borrowed from Jadwiga Koralewicz, for whom it means discrepancy between what is observed and what is desired. In a typical communist system, it leads to “psychotic impotence” and to “dimorphism of social life”: Jadwiga Koralewicz (ed.), Crisis and Transition: Polish Society in the 1980s (Oxford, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); for more information about a double life in the communist system, see Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution. Solidarity 1980-1981 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

294 For details about the PZPR and internal tensions within it, see, for example: Paul G. Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland, 1975-1986 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); see also memoirs of communist dignitaries, especially Stanisław Kania, Zatrzymać konfrontację (To Stop the Confrontation) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991); Mieczysław F. Rakowski, Jak to się stało (How Did It Happen) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991); Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego (Martial Status, Why) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992).
transform Poland into a communist paradise.\textsuperscript{295} These were the primary constituents of the “culture of secrecy”\textsuperscript{296} — an integral part of communist civilization.

The Party had a supremely collective concept of secrecy, making all citizens responsible for keeping state secrets. Universal confidentiality had been legally institutionalized in 1949 by a decree that categorized secrets into two groups: state secrets (\textit{tajemnica państwowa}) and confidential information (\textit{tajemnica służbowa}).\textsuperscript{297} The first embraced “all information, documents, and other things that, due to (…) the vital interest of Poland or its allies can be revealed only to authorized individuals.”\textsuperscript{298} Allowing for the fact that all aspects of life were in the state’s interest, the decree was applicable to all knowledge and virtually to everyone. Not surprisingly, “a universal obligation of

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{296} I am referring to a term used by Sergo A. Mikoyan in his article “Culture of Secrecy: Western Winds Behind Kremlin Walls,” adapted from a paper that the author prepared for the symposium at Princeton University titled “CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991.” The symposium, held in March 2001, was sponsored by the Center of International Studies at Princeton and the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. For details, see https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence as accessed on May 3, 2009.
  \item \textsuperscript{297} Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej z dnia 26 października 1949 roku, (Decree about Protection of State Secrets and Confidential Information from October 26, 1949), Dz.U.R.P. Nr 55, poz. 437. For more information about the decree, see Bartłomiej Kozłowski, “Uchwalenie małego kodeksu karnego” (“Enactment of the Small Penal Code”) in Polska.pl, 2004: http://wiadomosci.polska.pl/kalendarz/kalendarium/article.htm?id=109994 as accessed on May 4, 2009. In my work, I will be using a term “state secret” also in reference to confidential information.
  \item \textsuperscript{298} “Art.1.1. Tajemnicę państwową stanowią wszelkie wiadomości, dokumenty lub inne przedmioty, które ze względu na obronę, bezpieczeństwo lub ważne interesy gospodarcze bądź polityczne Państwa Polskiego albo państw zaprzyjaźnionych mogą być udostępnione wyłącznie osobom do tego uprawnionym”: Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej z dnia 26 października...
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vigilance on the part of all citizens” was particularly addressed to security officers who, due to the furtive nature of their profession, often had knowledge of closely-guarded secrets. Furthermore, the cult of the Party posited them in an intimate relationship in which they were bound to the regime by ties of responsibility, involvement, and secretiveness. It was not a coincidence that the Minister of Public Security stressed functionaries’ “special duty of increased vigilance, caution, and discipline” while talking about maintaining secrecy; an intimate tie with the Party entailed moral responsibilities of confidentiality.

3.2. Secret police

Within this larger ideological context, the Bezpieka was central to the practices of institutionalizing confidentiality — similar to other security organs in the Eastern Bloc whose function was securing secrecy. The Bezpieka, however, was more than just a

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299 “Powszechny nakaz czujności ze strony wszystkich obywateli”: a term used by Minister of Public Security, Stanisław Radkiewicz, in his order from July 17, 1950, Rozkaz Ministra Nr 027/50 (Ministerial Order No. 027/50), IPN/OBUiAD/Łódź, sygn. 0050/26 t.1, k.173.

300 “Art.2. Confidential information are all information, documents and things that for the sake of duty can be revealed only to entitled individuals.” (“Art.2. Tajemnice służbową stanowią wiadomości, dokumenty lub inne przedmioty, które ze względu na dobro służby mogą być udostępnione wyłącznie osobom do tego uprawnionym”), Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej z dnia 26 października 1949...

301 “(...) nakłada na funkcjonariuszy służby bezpieczeństwa szczególny obowiązek wzmożonej czujności, ostrożności i dyscypliny”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 027/50 ..., k.173.

guardian of confidentiality; it was meant to be the most perfect embodiment of secretiveness itself. Operating in an environment of external surreptitiousness and internal furtiveness, the Bezpieka was supposed to be the secretive ideal—totally transparent to the Party and completely obscure to everyone else, including its own cadres. To accomplish this, the Bezpieka turned to secretive practices borrowed directly from the NKVD/KGB: investigating, apprehending, and sometimes even judging suspects clandestinely. With authority superior to other law-enforcement agencies, its functioning was kept secret not only from the population but also, especially before 1956, from a large number of the Party members. As such, the Bezpieka was ontologically clandestine—its very nature depended on pervasive secrecy. Calling it the secret police or secret service is therefore justified short description.

The secretive life of the security functionaries was regarded as the closest implementation of the communist virtues. In the eyes of ideologists, for each officer aspiring to perfection confidentiality was an indispensable ability flowing from unconditional trust in the regime. The integration of loyalty and secrecy composed the core of socialist morality and dictated each functionary’s usefulness, as “only a man


totally devoted to the Party may properly protect and manage a state secret.”

Conversely, in order to secure the secretiveness of the Bezpieka cadres, the regime requested functionaries to “constantly raise [their] unconditional dedication to the Party.” Loyalty and secrecy were therefore both sides of the same coin. In theory, given a desired passionate devotion to the Party and literal acceptance of communist canons, it was highly unlikely that functionaries would willingly transgress rules of secrecy. However, to assure obedience and minimize legal violations, each candidate for Bezpieka operative had carefully to read rules of confidentiality before being admitted to the apparatus. Signed certifications of acknowledgment were then put into personal files and stored for the duration of his career. This was a copy of the Soviet procedure, which required each employee to sign an undertaking not to reveal anything about work in the KGB in any form.

The Party, however, still fearful of possible exposure of secrets, adopted yet another measure that would ultimately ascertain loyalty; each functionary was sworn to secrecy during his official oath ceremony which ultimately married him to the regime:

“(…) I solemnly swear to guard and protect confidential information, accurately carry out

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304 “Tylko człowiek bezgranicznie oddany partii może właściwie ją [tajemnicę państwową] chronić i dysponować”: Referat Ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 4 marca 1954…
305 “Dlatego też stale musimy podnosić u nas bezgraniczne oddanie partii”: Referat Ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 4 marca 1954 roku…
306 Admittance to the Bezpieka vis-a-vis secrecy was regulated by the paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Instruction: Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych oraz w jednostkach Milicji Obywatelskiej z wyjątkiem jednostek administracyjnych i usługowych (Instruction about Protection of State Secrets and Confidential Information in the Security Units of MSW and Citizen’s Militia, with Exception of Administrative and Servicing Units), IPN/OBUiAD/Lódź, syg. IPN Ld pf 13/402, k. 231.
superiors’ orders, and eagerly perform duties (…).” One can see this as a vow of obedience similar to the one made to the Catholic Church by a monk, but such ceremony had its purpose. The initiation of a functionary as *homo sovieticus* was at the same time an invitation into mysterious world of security police. It had been standard practice to regard all Bezpieca functions as confidential (and always implying the promise of secrecy), such as a clergyman hearing confession. Consequently, a talkative officer brought shame on himself in the eyes of his colleagues and superiors. Violation of these rules was considered a blatant betrayal of the intimate relation between him and the Party, and would place him immediately in a category of the worst degenerates since assault on the Party’s trust was the most heinous of all crimes.309

3.3. The Party exposed

Unsurprisingly, virtually everything connected to the secret police was secret: “all documents, information and things directly or indirectly concerned with the function of security units (…) are state secrets or confidential information.”310 The most closely guarded secrets were those about organization and methods of operation, the personal data of Bezpieca employees and secret collaborators, and documents related to

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308 “Ślubuję uroczyście strzec i dochować tajemnicy służbowej, rozkazy przełożonych wykonywać wiernie i obowiązki moje wypełniać gorliwie i sumiennie”: Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział…, 154.
309 A detailed classification of trespasses of security officers was presented by Stanisław Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security to security chiefs, in March 1954: *Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954…*, k.1-42.
310 “Tajemnicę państwową lub służbową w jednostkach bezpieczeństwa MSW i jednostkach operacyjnych MO stanowią wszystkie dokumenty, wiadomości i przedmioty związane (bezpośrednio lub pośrednio) z organizacją i działalności tych jednostek (…)”: *Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych…*, k. 231.
cooperation with the intelligence services of Polish allies.\textsuperscript{311} Contacts with press and organizations not directly affiliated with communist administration were prohibited.\textsuperscript{312} Anything not categorized as “secret,” yet somehow related to \textit{Bezpieka}, such as scrap paper, orders of food supply, or energy bills, was also secret. Carbon paper, for example, had to be destroyed in a manner prescribed by law,\textsuperscript{313} while paper forms were printed solely in printing shops operated by the Ministry of Public Security.\textsuperscript{314} Moreover, the security officers were strictly instructed how to communicate by phone,\textsuperscript{315} how to address letters properly,\textsuperscript{316} and how to show their identity cards without revealing too many details.\textsuperscript{317}

The \textit{Bezpieka} had a great deal to hide and was aware of the danger of uncontrolled exposure. This fear was not unjustified. In 1953, one of the top MBP dignitaries, Colonel Józef Światło, escaped to the West and soon began revealing vital

\textsuperscript{311} For detailed, ten-point enumeration of the most secret information, see paragraph 13 of the Instruction: \textit{Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych...}, k. 231.
\textsuperscript{312} “Units of public security (UB and MO) must not give opinions and correspond (…) with any institutions with exception of security apparatus” (“Organa służby bezpieczeństwa UBP i MO nie udzielają odpowiedzi ani też nie prowadzą żadnej korespondencji w sprawach opinii (sprawdzeń, ustaleń, wywiadów) o poszczególnych osobach z żadnymi urzędami lub instytucjami z poza aparatu bezpieczeństwa), \textit{Przepisy o Udzielaniu Opinii (Provisions About Providing Opinions)}, Nr AC-R-186/53, IPN/Obiad/Łódź, sygn. 0050/27 t.2, k.120-121.
\textsuperscript{313} \textit{Zarządzenie Nr 27 z dnia 2 maja 1949 roku} (Regulation No. 27 from May 2, 1949), AC-1464/49, IPN Ld pf 13/11, t.1.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{Rozkaz Nr 33 z dnia 1 czerwca 1948 roku} (Order No. 33 from June 1, 1948), AC-951/48, IPN Ld pf 13/11, t.1.
\textsuperscript{315} Talks on the phone must not concerned secret matters, but only arranged a face to face meetings between functionaries: \textit{Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych...}, k. 231. For cases of the rule’s violation, see, for example, \textit{Rozkaz Nr 33/53} (Order No. 33/53), Sg 2718/53, IPN Ld pf 13/1.
\textsuperscript{316} For letters circulating within the security units, see \textit{Pismo Okólne Nr 11/62 z dnia 7 grudnia 1962 roku} (Circular Letter No. 11/62 from December 7, 1962), IPN Ld pf 13/393.
\textsuperscript{317} According to law, security functionaries were supposed to show identity cards from a distance, not hand them over: \textit{Instrukcja z 25 czerwca 1952 roku} (Instruction from June 25, 1952), AC-1037/52, IPN Ld 0050/23, t. 2.
secrets via Radio Free Europe. Broadcasts of his memoirs played a pivotal role in de-Stalinization in Poland, causing real panic within the security apparatus: “Glued to their radios, feverishly and with beating heart, the Comrades kept listening about others and waited for their own turn to come in Świtło’s revelations.” The regime, facing devastating exposure, reacted with confusion. Though thousands of Poles listened to Radio Free Europe, Bezpieka’s tapes of the broadcast were classified “top-secret” and kept in sealed envelopes. That the Party had a tough philosophy of punishment for security violations cannot be surprising. That this position came to play a dominant role in the treatment of security cadres is perhaps more so. Silence had to be so pervasively enjoined on functionaries precisely because their knowledge was so powerful and threatening. Świtło’s case indicates that this fear was basically justified: during the time of their function, communist security police experienced a steady stream of defections: Nikolai Kholkov (1953), Reino Häyhänen (1957), Anatoliy Golitsyn (1961), Oleg Lyalin (1971), Ion Pacepa (1978), Matei Haiducu (1978), Stanislav Levchenko (1979), Vladimir Kuzichkin (1982), Vitaly Yurchenko (1985), and Oleg Gordievsky (1985), to name a few. Some of them publically revealed state secrets.

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318 The reactions of the general public to Świtło's radio broadcasts have been examined by A. Sobor-Świderska, in “Józef Świtło – Myth and Reality,” Studia Historyczne (Historical Studies), 2006, vol. 49, no. 1, 41-63.
320 Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Świtło.... 256.
321 Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Świtło.... 256.
322 Kholkov was a KGB officer who defected to the United States in 1953: Ben Macintyre, “The Spy Poisoned by the KGB – But Who Lived to Tell the Tale,” The Times, December 1, 2006; Reino Häyhänen was an NKVD officer who defected to the United States in 1957: “Rudolph Ivanovich Abel” on the FBI website: http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/abel/abel.htm; Anatoliy Golitsyn was a KGB officer who defected to the Unites States in 1961: Anatoliy
3.4. Secret bonds

Life according to the virtue of secrecy was challenging. The regime expected each functionary’s personal and official lives to merge, claiming that confidentiality depended on constant vigilance whether on duty or in private. A ministerial instruction from 1958 is an example how secrecy became a conduit of ideological imposition generally, and an agent of the construction of an isolated life specifically. Functionaries were strictly prohibited from revealing work-related information to their families. In the eyes of law, family members were categorized as aliens: “the order to keep secrets by the security employees from aliens applies to also their family members who, in this respect, shall be treated as aliens.” In reality, however, it was not that simple; the quasi-mystical bond of an officer with the Party produced special ties between his relatives and the regime.

Aware of the impossibility of keeping all secrets from family members, such as

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323 See, for example, Stanislav Levchenko, On the Wrong Side...; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: the Inside Story... See also Sprawozdanie w 1980 roku (Report from 1980), January 2, 1981, 028-Ldz S-5/pf/81, IPN BU 01368/43.

324 “Wymieniony obowiązek zachowania tajemnicy przez pracowników bezpieczeństwa wobec osób obcych istnieje w tym samym stopniu wobec członków rodzin, którzy, o ile chodzi o sprawy służby, winni być traktowani na równi z osobami obcymi”: Wyciąg z Instrukcji Dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Nr 04/59 z dnia 17 lipca 1950 roku (Excerpt from the Instruction of the Director of Minister’s Office No. 04/50 dated on July 17, 1950), IPN/OBUiD/Lódź, sygn. 0050/26 t.1, k. 174.
disappearance for several days, the regime extended the obligation of confidentiality also to them.\(^\text{325}\) In this respect, they were treated as security employees.

For some officers it must have been hard to live in a state of dual loyalty to the regime and to family, especially if one had moral doubts related to his profession. Work in the \textit{Bezpieka} made a functionary’s life essentially duplicitous. This is a typical dilemma of a secret agent regardless of what political system he serves. The inability of attaining complete mental unity with immediate relatives based on truth and transparency could lead to growing tensions and social estrangement. Nevertheless, for every officer who wished to serve the system, living a double life was a matter of pragmatic necessity. The communist regime viewed it as the central indicator of loyalty. In the secretive world of the \textit{Bezpieka}, duplicity gained the rank of a civilizational norm:\(^\text{326}\) family had to be sacrificed, and a functionary was to keep silent at all cost.

Despite restrictive measures, some functionaries opened their mouths. A comprehensive investigation of security offices in Łódź district alone revealed cases of numerous secrecy violations which caused the apparatus “great losses.”\(^\text{327}\) For example, Corporal Kazimierz Józefacki informed his wife and other relatives about methods of \textit{Bezpieka} operation, cases under investigation, code names of collaborators, objects under surveillance, and other vital secrets.\(^\text{328}\) Scarcity of archival documents does not us allow

\(^{325}\) ”(…) It is a responsibility of family members to keep secret information about the planned trip, and even a mere fact of departure” (“(…) obowiązkiem członków rodziny jest zachowanie w tajemnicy wiadomości o zamierzonym wyjeździe względnie samego faktu wyjazdu”), Wyciąg z Instrukcji Dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Nr 04/59…, k. 174.

\(^{326}\) The term “dupliciti as a civilizational norm” (“podwójne życie jako norma cywilizacyjna”) was used by Aleksander Wolszczan, Polish astronomer accused of secret collaboration with the communist regime: \textit{TVN, Fakty}, September 18, 2008, 19.00.

\(^{327}\) ”(…) Łamanie Rozkazu Ministra 027/50 przyniosło ogromne szkody”: Rozkaz Nr 20/52 z dnia 10 września 1952 roku (Order No. 20/52 from September 10, 1952), IPN Ld pf 13/1.

\(^{328}\) Rozkaz Nr 20/52...
to determine Józefacki’s motives, but it seems excessive talkativeness, not spying, was the reason. In any case, his loquacity cost him dearly — he was fired from work and arrested together with his wife. Soon after the incident, all security operatives were reminded about strict rules concerning secrecy and ordered to report on how they had executed the law to date. They were alerted that a functionary’s sense of loyalty to family had to yield to his absolute loyalty to the Party. The regime did not expect Bezpieka cadres to live in celibacy, but their families had to be totally transparent and obedient. In case of any suspicion, they could be immediately put under strict surveillance and prosecuted. Aware that talkativeness is a human weakness difficult to uproot, the Party advocated harsh treatment of wrongdoers but with limited success. Józefacki’s exemplary punishment did not deter his colleagues from whispering secrets to their relatives; six years later, two other officers disclosed secrets to their families and did not admit it in reports. Both were lowered in rank and exposed to shame within the Bezpieka community.

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329 “Józefacki został zwolniony dyscyplinarnie i aresztowany wraz z żoną”: Rozkaz Nr 20/52...
330 Secrecy was at that time regulated by three legal acts: Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej z dnia 26 października 1949 Dz.U.R.P. Nr 55, poz. 437, Rozkaz Ministra z dnia 027/50 (Minister’s Order 027/50)..., and Instrukcja 04/50 (Instruction 04/50).
331 For information about communist eugenics, see chapter IV.
332 As it was in respect to families of SB functionaries who killed Reverend Jerzy Popiełuszko, chaplain of Solidarity. Between 1985 and 1990 Colonel Adam Pietruszka’s family surveillance by the Bezpieka (the operation’s codename: “Teresa”) was aimed at solving all the circumstances of Rev. Popiełuszko’s death. See, Paweł Tomaski, “Adam Pietruszka (ur. 1938), zastępca dyrektora Departamentu IV MSW” (“Adam Pietruszka (Born in 1938), the Vice-Director of the MSW Departament IV) in Bogdan Strycharz (ed.), Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989 (The Apparatus of Oppression in the People’s Poland, 1944-1989) (Rzeszów: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 1/5/2007), 528.
333 Exposure happened in 1958 by Second Lieutenants Stanisław Szymczak and Stanisław Rybus, Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 49 (Special Order No. 49), A-838/58, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 148.
3.5. *The Secret Garden*

To minimize possible devastation by disloyal officers, the regime implemented internal rules of secrecy within the *Bezpieka* apparatus itself. It was supposed to make it internally hermetic, comprised of units with limited knowledge of one another, and of functionaries unaware of their colleagues’ duties. The *Instruction* from 1958 unambiguously prohibited security operatives from sharing knowledge with their co-workers without their superior’s consent.\(^{334}\) The instruction, however, brought nothing new to security work because from its very inception the *Bezpieka* functioned, at least in theory, according to the same rigid procedure:

> All information, documents and other materials concerning operation of a given unit are internal secrets of the unit and must not be revealed to employees of any other units (even to functionaries of different sections of the same department) without their superior’s permission. This order concerns also comrades of the same unit who do not work on the case. Secrecy applies both to current cases and those that have been closed in previous years.\(^{335}\)

Nonetheless, talkativeness within the security apparatus remained one of the most pervasive ailments, reaching “plague” proportions:

> Especially striking is the plague of talkativeness. It has been proven on numerous occasions that many operational and non-operational functionaries disregarded basic rules of vigilance and discussed secret matters during lunches in cafeterias, in mess-halls, in after-work clubs, and in cinemas run by the security apparatus. They did so in the presence of

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\(^{334}\) *Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych...,* k. 230.

\(^{335}\) “Wszystkie wiadomości, dokumenty i inne materiały, dotyczące pracy danej jednostki organizacyjnej, stanowią wewnętrzną tajemnicę tej jednostki i nie wolno ujawniać ich wobec pracowników innych jednostek (nawet pracownikom innej sekcji tego samego wydziału) bez zezwolenia przełożonego. Zachowanie tajemnicy obowiązuje również wobec towarzyszy pracy z tej samej jednostki, którzy nie biorą udziału w załatwieniu danej sprawy. Obowiązek zachowania tajemnicy odnosi się zarówno do spraw bieżących jak i już ukończonych w latach ubiegłych”: *Wyciąg z Instrukcji Dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Nr 04/59...,* k. 174.
employees of other units, family members of other functionaries, cafeteria’s staff, etc. (...) 336

How justified these observations were shows the example of Colonel Adam Hodysz — a mole in the Bezpieka Gdańsk unit who for almost three years (1980-1983) actively spied for Solidarity. Hodysz skillfully exploited the talkativeness of his co-workers to gather valuable information as well as to camouflage himself from the “mole hunters.” It was relatively easy because security functionaries often bragged to their colleagues about their secret agents and achievements. Boosting one’s image by compromising confidentiality was often in Bezpieka. 337 Peer pressure and a desire to raise one’s status prevailed not only over the virtue of humility but also over basic instinct of loyalty to the Party. Officially, each functionary witnessing exposure of secrets was legally obligated to stop the conversation immediately and to report the event to his superiors. Moreover, failure to do so made such an officer automatically guilty of hiding a crime. 338 Despite such rigid rules and penalties, peer boasting flourished. This was an indication both of the lack of efficient supervisory mechanisms on the part of the Party and the extent to which personal attitudes and egoistic habits continued to shape the definition of secrecy away from the one promoted by the regime. The Bezpieka’s world was full of gossips – a phenomenon typical of institutions where secrecy does not allow for free exchange of

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336 "Szczególnie rażąca jest plaga gadulstwa. Stwierdzono niejednokrotnie, iż wielu pracowników operacyjnych i nieoperacyjnych lekceważąc podstawowe zasady czujności, omawia sprawy służbowe w czasie posiłków w stołówkach i kasynach oraz w świetlicach i kinach organów bezpieczeństwa, w otoczeniu pracowników innych jednostek, członków rodzin funkcjonariuszy, obsługi stołówek itp. (…)": Wyciąg z Instrukcji Dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Nr 04/59..., k. 175.
338 Rozkaz Ministra Nr. 027/50..., k. 173. See also Zbiór ważniejszych przepisów o zachowaniu się funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego (Collection of Major Rules Concerning Behavior of Functionaries of Public Security Apparatus), IPN/OBUiD/Łódź, sygn. 0050/26 t.1, k. 175.
news. It also made moles more difficult to catch. Colonel Hadysz, for example, would have been pinned down much sooner if he had passed on only those secrets known to him due to his ascribed functions. But the much wider extent of his leaks misled investigative officers for some time. Obviously unaware of how much security officers admired showing off, the officers suspected that entire Gdańsk security apparatus was “packed with Solidarity agents.” This particular account shows the obvious difficulty the Bezpieka authorities continued to encounter in seeking to check and channel forms of functionaries’ improper behavior triggered by ambition and egoism.

3.6. Panzer cabinets

Next to talkativeness, heedlessness constituted another important category of confidentiality violation, caused by laziness and carelessness. Though mostly unintentional and thus pardonable, it could potentially expose the Bezpieka to the same danger as talkativeness or spying. Between 1958 and 1961 in Łódź district, at least thirteen individual penal orders were issued against officers compromising rules of documents’ secrecy. For example, Lieutenant Korbownicka was reprimanded for storing documents with codenames in an unlocked file-cabinet. One of her colleagues was penalized for leaving secret materials on a desk in an unsupervised room. Also, it was not unusual to see a functionary admitting to losing keys to safe cabinets and office

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340 Cezary Gmyz, “Hodysz – Wallendrod z Bezpieki...”.
341 Rozkaz specjalny z dnia 7 grudnia 1957 roku (Special Order from December 7, 1957), Ldz Ab-479/57, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. I, k. 12.
desks, or to witness him opening locks with substitute tools. Other problems were more serious. Lieutenant Zaorski, for example, lost a top secret document that, to his surprise, was later found in front of the security office building. Major Biliński could not return all materials that were once given to him, and telegraph operator Stanisława Nagielska stole confidential data. According to a ministerial warning in 1954, each year fifty security functionaries lost their identity cards, making it easier for the enemy to produce fake ones. There are also indications that rules of confidentiality had not been wholly respected or efficiently enforced by Bezpieka supervisors themselves. A directive from 1950 that rebuked chiefs for showing secret documents to unauthorized functionaries is such a proof. With all this, there is no wonder that functionaries were repeatedly reminded about secrecy rules and penalties. The procedural regulations further complicated their work, making clerical duties in the security apparatus tiresome and monotonous:

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344 Rozkaz Nr 9 z dnia 9 września 1959 roku (Order No. 9 from September 9, 1959), Ab-492/59, IPN Ld pf 13/335, t. I, k. 23.
345 Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 7 z dnia 5 sierpnia 1959 roku (Special Order No. 7 from August 5, 1959), Ab-449/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. I.
346 The reasons for her stealing documents are not known. Nagana dla Stanisławy Nagielskiej, telegrafistki samodzielnnej sekcji „A” (Admonition for Stanisława Nagielska, a telegraf operator of the independent section “A”), Ab-081/P/61, June 27, 1961, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t. I, k. 110.
347 Komunikat Nr 15 z dnia 1 kwietnia 1954 roku (Announcement No. 15 from April 1, 1954), IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. I. See also announcement from June 13, 1950, about fake stamps used by anti-communist underground, AC-2263/50, IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. I, k. 319. For sample disciplinary sanctions, see: Sprawozdanie o stanie dyscypliny pracy w Biurze „A” MSW za okres od 1.1.1978 do 1.12.1978 (Report on Discipline in MSW Bureau “A” from January 1, 1978 to December 1, 1979), January 24, 1979, 028 Ldz S-0171/79, IPN BU 01368/43.
348 Zarządzenie Nr 7 z dnia 18 marca 1950 roku (Directive No. 7 from March 18, 1950), Sg 1405/50, IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. I, k. 143.
Strict discipline accompanied by rigid procedural regulations, applied to various forms of misbehavior but lacked a parallel positive mechanism for promoting ingenuity: along with its benefits, bureaucratization had its costs. First was routine — excessive formality reduced the Bezpieka’s responsiveness so critical in security matters. A second problem was the partial paralysis of the decision-making process that in some units reached dimensions of institutional inertia. Fearing the consequences of mistakes, many functionaries categorized a priori all documents as secret even though they contained no operational value whatsoever. The Bezpieka could choke from the habit of excessive secrecy, but not much could have been done to prevent it. The regime kept warning the security cadres against irresponsible secretiveness but it was still safer for officers to be admonished for showing too much care than be punished for carelessness in security matters. The other alternative for the regime — loosening procedural rules — might dangerously compromise confidentiality and was therefore unacceptable to the Bezpieka chiefs.


350 “Many times, functionaries are afraid and categorize not secret documents as secret, for example an order for paper supply (…). Documents shall be categorized according to their content (…)” (“Często jest tak, że funkcjonariusze boją się i kwalifikują dokumenty jako tajne a one tajnymi nie są, na przykład zamówienie na materiały biurowe (…). Stąd nakazuje się, aby kwalifikować dokumenty według treści (…)”: Pismo Okólne Nr 07/62 z 12 czerwca 1962 roku (Circular Letter No. 07/62 from June 12, 1962), Ab-0290/110/62, IPN Ld pf 13/387.
The silence and obscurity that enfolded the Bezpieka structure had a distinct consequences however. Constantly watched functionaries showed lower self-esteem and reduced eagerness to feel “above the law.” Secondly, the lower a functionary was in rank, the more impenetrable the Bezpieka seemed to be for him. As such, security functionaries might have overestimated its powers, been more fearful, and for this reason increasingly loyal to the regime. Silence is usually associated with mystery and, for this reason, it was not a coincidence that the cult of secrecy was a component of communist religion.

3.7. Secret collaborators

The procedure of dealing with secret collaborators (TW, tajny współpracownik) was yet another important category of secrecy in the Bezpieka. Directing of a secret collaborator who was usually hidden in his community required caution and talent. It was not an easy task since one false move could result in accidental exposure. Work with secret collaborators belonged to the most difficult duties (impossible without employing secret measures): “Strict secrecy is the primary factor guaranteeing success in operational activities, especially in work with secret network.”

Obviously, success depended on the mutual respect of secrecy. Therefore, just like every security officer, TWs had to sign at the beginning and at the end of their service pledge to keep secret “the conversations and activities performed for the security organs.”

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351 “Podstawowym czynnikiem gwarantującym osiągnięcia w pracy operacyjnej, a szczególnie w pracy z siecią jest właśnie przestrzeganie konspiracji”: Rozkaz Nr 37/57 z dnia 13 października 1953 roku (Order No. 37/57 from October 13, 1953), Sg 2756/53, IPN Ld pf 13/1.

352 The full text of obligations is following: “In compliance with a discussion with the representative public security, I promise to keep as secret the conversations and activities performed for the security organs. The obligation of keeping secrets concerns also the information of not my direct interest, but received as a result of my co-operation with security organs. I hereby testify that I have been warned that for revealing secrets to others I will be
collaborators were tied to the Bezpieka with a vow of loyalty and secrecy. Although further analysis of this bond is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it merits further investigation.

3.8. *The Wizard of Oz*

Throughout the communist era the majority of security functionaries scrupulously respected their obligation to observe confidentiality. Conscious acts of disobedience were rare, and, unlike drunkenness, no one was excluded from persecution. More pervasive was the problem of breaking secrecy by mistake or simple carelessness. Though all Bezpieka operatives were reminded to observe furtiveness strictly, several cases show how easily one could involuntarily expose state secrets. It might begin innocently enough. Given that an average functionary had many clerical duties and access to classified materials, cases of mishandling of documents were not isolated. The Party seemed to be aware that in any given instance there would always be some careless operatives compromising diligence. To minimize leaks, the entire Bezpieka apparatus had to undertake procedural countermeasures, such as rules for the circulation of documents. The category of secrecy became the primary indicator of how to handle a given document. Most materials were stamped “secret” or “top secret” and accessible only to a

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criminally prosecuted to the extent of Polish law” (“Zgodnie z rozmową przeprowadzoną z przedstawicielem organów bezpieczeństwa publicznego zobowiązuję się do ścisłego przestrzegania tajemnicy z przeprowadzonych rozmów i czynności wykonywanych dla potrzeb organów bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Zachowanie tajemnicy obowiązuje mnie również w sprawach w których nie będę bezpośrednio zainteresowany, a które dojdą do mojej wiadomości z uwagi na kontakt z organami bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Stwierdzam, że zostałem uprzedzony, iż za zdradę tajemnicy wobec osób trzecich zostanę pociągnięty do odpowiedzialności karnej zgodnie z prawodawstwem PRL”): IPN LD pf 13/336, t. 2, k. 10. For the procedure at the end of a TW’s service, see, for example, *Raport z dnia 23 marca 1956 roku* (Report from March 23, 1956), IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. 3.
limited group of entitled functionaries. Ascribing a correct classification to a document was a matter of its author’s individual responsibility and was constantly supervised.\textsuperscript{353} Changes in the category of document’s secrecy were also defined procedurally: it could have been done only by the author or by a functionary superior in rank, and necessarily signed.\textsuperscript{354} If individual liability of this sort did not guarantee absolutely responsible care, nonetheless, it decreased the probability of incidental exposure. Much more difficult was teaching functionaries how to work with secret documents. The law unambiguously stated that:

During work, only documents related to a reviewed case can be placed on a desk. All other documents must be put away. All file cabinets and desks shall be kept locked, even if an employee is present in a room.\textsuperscript{355}

At the end of a day, functionaries had to secure documents in safe cabinets, lock and seal them.\textsuperscript{356} The instruction made it clear that the primary reason for these diligent measures was not so much exposure to individuals from outside of the security apparatus but protection from other employees. “Documents shall be kept in such a way to prevent other functionaries, who are not related to the case, from seizing them, even if they are employed in the same unit.”\textsuperscript{357} Usually, in the peculiar environment of the secret police,
institutionalized secrecy was correlated with institutionalized distrust. In the world of the Bezpieka, secrecy and distrust were elevated to a level of virtue and justified not only as morally acceptable but as morally desirable. It was a part of the regime’s hallucinatory tactics: to secure submission of employees, the security apparatus had to operate in a cloud of mystery, secrecy, and uncertainty. The Bezpieka served as an agent of fear equally towards society and towards its own cadres, and the mechanism of secrecy made it difficult to be penetrated by its own employees. This created an illusion of omnipotence and omniscience. Moreover, the regimes’ hunger for fanatical service necessitated the institutionalized estrangement of security functionaries. Ultimately, it generated the impression that the regime knew everything and exacerbated the belief that it may discipline everyone. One may say that the Bezpieka tried to secure loyalty relying on the technique of the Wizard of Oz — they could be successful as long as they operated in secrecy, as long as no one looked behind the curtain.

należeli oni do tego samego ogniwa”: Wyciąg z Instrukcji Dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Nr 04/59..., k. 174.
Figure 5. “IDIOTS RULE! Should we arrest him for insult or the disclosure of a state secret”? Source: Pożegnanie z Komuną (Farewell to Communism) (Fopress, 1990).

3.9. Saul from the Bezpieka

Some functionaries who should naturally have turned to the Party for moral guidance might have sometimes sought such direction elsewhere. Party ideologists believed that if security cadres were educated properly in communism, bourgeois culture would be less attractive to them. That position was optimistic; as long as alternatives were suppressed it was believed the danger of divided loyalty would be diminished. A change came with Solidarity. Philosophically at the opposite side of the regime, the free trade movement attracted not only workers, but all segments of society, from peasants to college professors. Whereas the common security apparatus might have

358 For extensive comparison of communism, Christianity, and the Solidarity movement, see the numerous works of Józef Tishner, such as Filozofia chrześcijańska w dialogu z marxizmem (Christian Philosophy in a Dialogue with Marxism) (Kraków: Instytut Filozofii przy Papieskim Wydziale Teologicznym: Instytut Teologiczny Księży Misjonarzy, 1979); Myślenie według wartości (Thinking in Terms of Values) (Kraków: Józef Tischner Institute, 2005), Etyka solidarności oraz homo sovieticus (Solidarity’s Ethics and Homo Sovieticus) (Kraków: Znak, 2005); Spirit of Solidarity (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984).

been a collective of unspoiled virtues, some functionaries became infected with the same moral dilemma as Solidarity sympathizers. In a sense, security officers were subject to the worst temptations: access to the Western press and more accurate information about the real state of communism’s progress, strictly classified to most other people, informed them of significant obstacles standing in the way of an ideal communist society.  

Again, the problem lay in the discrepancy between ideals and reality. Some functionaries, like Capitain Adam Hodysz – called in 2005 “Saul from the Bezpieka,” being unable to reconcile the anxiety about the immoral elements in communist morality, broke their previous vows and aligned with Solidarity. In these cases, secretive service to the Party turned into secretive betrayal of all the Party represented. Hodysz, for instance, “officially remained the Bezpieka investigative officer, but unofficially accepted the role of a secretive guardian angel of the underground in Gdańsk.” Without his “protection” it would have been impossible for Solidarity to exist for so long in Gdańsk. He was not the only Bezpieka functionary consciously exposing secrets to enemies; in the Wrocław area alone there were at least ten officers who gathered around Captain Marian Charukiewicz. For over a decade (from 1972 to 1983), the informal “Charukiewicz

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360 Cezary Gmyz, “Hodysz – Wallendrod z Bezpieki”....
361 Colonel Adam Hodysz was the Bezpieka functionary between 1964 and 1984 in Gdansk district. He worked in counterintelligence and investigative Units of the security apparatus. For more information, see Jarosław Kurski, ”Adam Hodysz,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 lipca 2005. See also Hodysz’s biographical note in Encyklopedia Solidarności (Solidarity’s Encyclopedia), http://www.encyklopedia-solidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=Adam_Hodysz. A term “Saul from the Bezpieka” was proposed by Jarosław Kurski in his article “Sawel z SB,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 23/24, 2005.
363 Hodysz warned the Solidarity that “the company [Bezpieka] works at full speed” and provided details planned operations: Cezary Gmyz, “Hodysz – Wallendrod z Bezpieki”...
group” warned local priests about Bezpieka’s operations against them. A similar episode involved Kazimierz Sulka, the Bezpieka Lieutenant from Sucha Beskidzka. Nonetheless, the extent of secrecy violations has not yet been comprehensively studied by historians and it is hard to speculate over their actual influence on the Bezpieka’s functioning.

3.10. Operation Abscess

Given the regime’s sensitivity over secrecy, there is nothing surprising that the penalty for a talkative officer was harsh. Besides living with the very real consequences of his assault on the Party, a perpetrator had to cope with a whole repertoire of elaborate paralegal actions of retaliatory character, stretching from social degradation to moral humiliation. It appears, however, that institutionalized vengeance was not blind but selective: the Party created a special category for unintentional offenders who, in some cases, could even be pardoned. Nonetheless, each act of violated confidentiality was carefully examined for the damage it caused the regime. Sometimes, the suspicious activity of one officer might lead to “an earthquake” in a unit, shaken down by thorough inspections by special security groups.

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364 Charukiewicz group existed between 1972 and 1983. It was composed of Bezpieka officers from various sections and it constantly grew in members. By 1983, most of its sympathizers were either expelled from work or abandoned their service: Piotr Pytlakowski, “Esbecy w niebie”.... 365 Lieutenant Kazimierz Sulka disobeyed an order to harass a local priest, for which he was fired from work and arrested (on the basis of provocation). From arrest and prison, Sulka was sending warnings to the priest, informing him about Bezpieka’s plans to assault him: Piotr Pytlakowski, “Esbecy w niebie”.... 366 The security investigators were expected to take into consideration the officer’s violation in its full context, especially “its character, results, reasons, circumstances,” and also “the degree of his evil intent (…)”: Zarządzenie Nr 61/87 (Directive No. 61/87) from October 31, 1987, Ldz. KG-176/2/87, IPN 01225/247, 25. 367 Jan Widacki, former Minister of Interior Affairs, provides in his memoirs a detailed picture of two groups designed to check their colleagues for political correctness, Zarząd Ochrony
Functionaries who revealed secrets deserved proper retaliation. Penalties for offenders depended on the degree of their degeneration, measured by intentionality, seriousness, and circumstances of disobedience. Intentional revelation of state secrets could cost the offender up to ten years in prison; if he acted unintentionally, up to three years.\footnote{Article 3 of the Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej z dnia 26 października 1949 roku, (Decree about Protection of State Secrets and Confidential Information from October 26, 1949), Dz.U.R.P. Nr 55, poz. 437.} The law prescribed the same penalty for officers who lost confidential documents.\footnote{Article 7 of the Dekret o ochronie tajemnicy państwowej...} However, retaliation could be reduced and even abandoned in cases of “lesser importance,” where the Bezpieka’s vital interests were not harmed. In such situations, a functionary was subjected to disciplinary proceedings ranging from admonition to expulsion from work.\footnote{Rozkaz Ministra Nr. 027/50., k. 173.} The law guaranteed the officers some rights in this respect, for example, each functionary could appeal the decision of his superior and the penalty was postponed until his appeal was listened.\footnote{Zarządzenie Nr 61/87 (Directive No. 61/87) from October 31, 1987, Ldz. KG-176/2/87, IPN 01225/247, 25.} Though law allowed for flexibility, the regime preferred harsh treatment of offenders. Those who could not keep secrets were seen as lacking the necessary features of a good communist: party discipline, sincerity, vigilance, and ideological purity.\footnote{Compare Referat Ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 4 marca 1954...}

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offenders and their lenient superiors.\textsuperscript{373} The degenerates could not count on the regime’s mercy.

For careless functionaries, the most typical penalty was admonition;\textsuperscript{374} while for windbags — degradation in rank.\textsuperscript{375} Finally, those who consciously exposed secrets to regimes’ enemies often faced prison terms and all kinds of harassment. Investigation was usually long and painful. For instance, Piotr Siedliński, an officer accused of working for Solidarity, broke his silence when he heard the ultimatum: “you will either tell everything, or tomorrow you will be notified that your son had a car accident and died.”\textsuperscript{376} In addition, the regime used to retaliate for its disgrace by humiliating a functionary. For example, Colonel Adma Hodysz was confined in prison together with Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski. His colleague, Piotr Siedliński, was kept with Lieutenant Waldemar Chmielewski, while another Solidarity spy — Kazimierz Sulka, with Colonel Adam Pietruszka. Noteworthy, Piotrowski, Chmielewski, and Pietruszka were all infamous murderers of Solidarity’s chaplain Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko.\textsuperscript{377} It was an old communist torture to keep two enemies in one cell: in this case, Solidarity sympathizers

\textsuperscript{373} Zbiór ważniejszych przepisów o zachowaniu się funkcjonariuszy..., k. 175.
\textsuperscript{374} As it was in case of Lieutenant Korbownicka who kept secret documents in unlocked cabinet: \textit{Rozkaz Specjalny z dnia 7 grudnia 1957 roku} (Special Order from December 7, 1957), Ldz Ab-479/57, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I; Major Bilski who lost secret documents: \textit{Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 7 z dnia 5 sierpnia 1959 roku} (Special Order No. 7 from August 5, 1959), Ab-449/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I; Lieutenant Zaorski who lost a secret document in front of the security office building: \textit{Rozkaz Nr 9 z dnia 9 listopada 1959 roku} (Order No. 9 from October 9, 1959), Ab-492/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I, k. 23.
\textsuperscript{375} For example, Second Lieutenant Szymczak, who exposed a secret agent in front of his family was reduced in rank: \textit{Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 49} (Special Order No. 49), A-838/58, from June 14, 1958, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.I, k. 148.
\textsuperscript{376} ”(...) albo powiesz, albo jutro się dowiesz, że twojego syna potrącił samochód i nie żyje”: Piotr Pytlakowski, “Esbecy w niebiece....”
\textsuperscript{377} Cezary Gmyz, “Hodysz – Wallendrod z Bezpieki...”
with criminals hating Solidarity to the point of heinous murder. Nonetheless, harsh retaliation did not guarantee that a talkative operative would not reveal secrets after completing his time in jail. Sometimes, to secure their loyalty, violators were put on trial not for exposing secrets, but for other crimes. Colonel Hodysz, for example, was sentenced for bribery while officer Kazimierz Sulka for stealing. The Bezpieka organized ingenious provocations to show offenders that they were totally at the regimes’ will.

One would be mistaken to think that termination of service in the security apparatus automatically ended service to the Party. In fact, the vow of loyalty to the Party existed even after ties with the Bezpieka were cut. Each functionary was notified that the bond of secrecy could not be broken in any circumstances, even by expulsion from the service: “The obligation of keeping secrets concerns those who work and those who no longer work [in the Bezpieka].” Thus, even though at the margin of the security community, fired functionaries remained in the Bezpieka’s scope of interest for a long time. Because they knew well “methods of (…) work, (…) structure, and the attitude (…) to certain problems, especially (…) the relations with various political, social, and market institutions,” former security employees posed a huge danger, especially if they were

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378 One of the most infamous such an example was locking Kazimierz Moczarski — an officer of the Polish Home Army who fought against Nazis, together with Jurgen Stroop, the Nazi war criminal responsible for pacification of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising: Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Oskarżony Kazimierz Moczarski (Defendant Kazimierz Moczarski) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Iskry, 2006). See also Moczarski’s memoirs from prison: Rozmowy z katem (Conversations with an Executioner) (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1978).

379 Piotr Pytlakowski, “Esbecy w niebycie…”

380 “Zachowanie tajemnicy obowiązuje zarówno w czasie trwania stosunku służbowego, jak i po jego rozwiązaniu”: “), Instrukcja w sprawie zabezpieczenia tajemnicy państwowej i służbowej w jednostkach służby bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych..., k. 230.

381 ”Z organów bezpieczeństwa publicznego zwolniono tysiące pracowników, którzy poznali metody naszej pracy, naszą strukturę oraz podejście do wielu zagadnień, zgłasza jeśli chodzi o stosunki wzajemne z różnymi instytucjami tak politycznymi, jak społecznymi i gospodarczymi”:
caught revealing secrets. For this reason, it was in the Bezpieka’s vital interest to maintain contacts with former functionaries and control their subsequent activities. Already in 1948, the Minister of Public Security ordered security chiefs to show their interest in the fate of fired subordinates, particularly in their place of living and employment plans. The rule, not publicized among the large security community but only among the chiefs, provided legal basis for “operational protection by security units” (operacyjna opieka organów bezpieczeństwa), which in practice meant comprehensive surveillance of former colleagues. Since the order institutionalized peer spying, its execution was vested in hands of the most talented officers whose fanatical loyalty to the Party was beyond dispute. They put, among others, former officer Kazimierz Sulka on strict surveillance in an operation with the telling codename Abscess (Ropiel). This case revealed that fanatic functionaries were not socially acceptable to the Bezpieka community. For example, Major Maciej Roplewski, who exposed Colonel Hodysz, complained about painful estrangement as his colleagues treated him “unkindly,” with a malicious attitude long after the incident. This suggests that professional solidarity of security officers was sometimes stronger than their loyalty to the Party.

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Rozkaz Nr 21 o postępowaniu ze zwolnionymi pracownikami (Order No. 21 Regulating the Procedure Concerning Expelled Employees), AC-508/48, IPB/obiad/Lódź, sygn. 0050/22, t.2, k. 162.
382 Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę kierownictwa aparatu bezpieczeństwa, 4 marca 1954...
383 Rozkaz Nr 21 o postępowaniu ze zwolnionymi pracownikami (Order No. 21 Regulating the Procedure Concerning Expelled Employees), AC-508/48, IPB/obiad/Lódź, sygn. 0050/22, t.2, k. 162.
384 For more detaills, see point 4 of the Rozkaz Nr 21 o postępowaniu..., k. 162.
385 Piotr Pytlakowski, “Esbecy w niebycie”...
386 Cezary Gmyz, “Hodysz – Wallendrod z Bezpieki”...
The emphasis on the secrecy and loyalty is not something strange in states all over the world. Behind the Iron Curtain, however, the confidentiality was rigidly institutionalized, and formed an intrinsic part of the culture. In Poland, guardianship of universal secrecy was in the hands of the Bezpieka and required its own structure to be secure from internal and external leaks. The Party adopted all kinds of restrictive measures to secure the confidentiality of the Bezpieka indicating that public security was regarded as an important consideration for the survival of the regime. One of the tools was the promotion of a secretive ideal based on the ideological presumption that a security officer — the perfect communist — must be totally transparent to the regime and totally obscure to all others. The Bezpieka functionaries were held to the jealous Party by a mysterious bond of obedience, and any act of violation constituted the highest of crimes. In a personal sense, secrecy was a sacrifice. It grew directly from the virtue of loyalty, and, as such, constituted the duplicitous vision of a functionary’s life — loyal to the Party and disloyal even to his own family. Estranged from the outside world, security cadres lived in a mysterious world of ubiquitous confidentiality, with nurtured distrust even toward their colleagues. It was a part of the regime’s tactics of keeping them subordinate.

Despite numerous precautions, the Party was never wholly successful in securing secrets among the Bezpieka cadres. While institutionalized confidentiality represented the official desire of the regime, some functionaries, mainly because of their carelessness, disobeyed the rules. It suggests that the Party did not change the security functionaries’ habits as much as it might have liked. The decision to bureaucratize security work and
penalize abusers in order to make the apparatus internally more secure came to mean in practice the growing inertia of its cadres. Sometimes, their natural propensity for talking proved stronger than either the law or superiors’ tight control. Nonetheless, secrecy was one of the most observed virtues, partially because of harsh consequences of disobedience, and partially because it required passive, not active efforts on functionaries’ part. To be virtuous, an officer did not have to make an effort, as was in the case of the virtue of diligence or lawfulness.
4.1. The pyramid of conspiracy

The communist conception of the world included the belief in the existence of great webs of secret actions, perpetrated by larger or smaller groups of conspirators, supposedly threatening revolutionaries’ lives and their socio-political goals. Copying the Moscow model of paranoiac conspiracy, the regimes behind the Iron Curtain both invented and fought against a single, indivisible, and pervasive enemy. The idea of general conspiracy resonated frequently in the communist perception of reality. As Pavel Sudoplatov, Soviet officer for special operations, once put it: “We believed that every

--- Józef Różański, Director of the MBP Investigative Department

Western country hated us and wished our doom.” Initially, for the Polish communists, the most important factor in intensifying convictions of conspiracy was the actual existence of organized opposition: the London Government, the Catholic Church, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and members of the Freedom and Independence organization (WiN), to name the most important ones. Fears generated by encounters with these groups in the late 1940s were later augmented by the defections of several prominent communists, including Bezpieka officers, the election of Karol Wojtyła to the papal throne, and, finally, the birth of the Solidarity movement.

Installed as it had been in Poland through coercive means, the communist regime needed the constant protection of the Bezpieka, and thus had to pay meticulous attention

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to the ideological purity of the security cadres. The chief ideologists knew that the political degeneration of the security apparatus could be lethal to the whole system and regarded the virtue of transparency as a promising preventive mechanism of control. As perfect representatives of homo sovieticus, the Bezpieka officers were not supposed to hide anything from the Party but instead be totally sincere and obedient. The goal was to build a self-monitoring and self-denunciating society loyal only to the Party. The valorization of truthfulness (called also honesty, sincerity, openness, and transparency)\textsuperscript{392} was, however, much more contradictory because the nature of functionaries’ duties, based as they were on spying, denouncing, and plotting, required them to be at the same time essentially deceitful.\textsuperscript{393} In fact, the security apparatus became a laboratory of the regime’s reexamination of values, with the officers participating in a full-scale experiment of socializing institutionalized duplicity: they had to reconcile Machiavellian talents with the virtue of absolute sincerity.

\textbf{4.2. Institutionalized hypocrisy}

The chief ideologists believed that transparency was not a given, but rather the product of a long political hardening. The impulse to educate future security operatives in the spirit of “sincerity and loyalty toward the Party”\textsuperscript{394} came from the conviction that

\textsuperscript{392} Compare Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej (Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries) (Warszawa, 1985), IPN 01179/57, egz. 1.
\textsuperscript{393} A historian Maurice Merleau-Ponty believes that in the Soviet Union cunning, deception and bloodshed were part of normality: “Within the U.S.S.R. violence and deception have official status while humanity is to be found in daily life”: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 180.
\textsuperscript{394} Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953 roku (Speech of the Vice-Minister of Public
without proper schooling, the “moral and political face of a functionary” might not be shaped properly.\textsuperscript{395} It was not enough simply to give the functionaries advice and warnings; sincerity had to be permanently instilled into their minds, as Jan Ptasiński, the Vice-Minister of Public Security, put it in 1953 at a speech to the Bezp\textit{ieka} instructors: “We have to find methods and ways to inculcate and reinforce a participant’s sincerity and loyalty to the Party, to his superiors, and to his colleagues at work.”\textsuperscript{396} Clearly, the regime perceived transparency as something more than a product of blind loyalty – it was also supposed to be a result of a functionary’s own convictions flowing from his thorough political indoctrination.\textsuperscript{397} The emphasis on the voluntary aspects of transparency was particularly important. It is an old truth that an employee who is self-motivated and genuinely devoted usually works more efficiently than an employee who is driven by fear and compulsion. In this spirit, Jan Ptasiński, expressed concerns for the educational needs of the security apparatus. He optimistically advocated an ambitious pedagogical program for young officers, centered around strengthening their truthfulness and sincerity towards the Party:

\textit{Security, Jan Ptasiński, at the End of the Workshop for Professional Educators, September 3, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.}

\textsuperscript{395} “School’s mission is to find new methods of shaping and hardening the moral and political standing of a participant” (“Szkoła jest do tego powołana, aby szukać form i metod, które kształtują i hartują moralno-polityczne oblicze danego słuchacza”): \textit{Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...}

\textsuperscript{396} “Trzeba znaleźć sposoby, formy, ażeby zaszczyścić i ugruntować wobec słuchacza szczerość i uczciwość wobec partii, wobec przełożonych i towarzyszy pracy”: \textit{Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych...}

\textsuperscript{397} "Powinności etyczne są wypełniane ze względu na akceptowane wartości, wewnętrzne przekonania moralne, nakaz sumienia” ("Ethical obligations are enforced by accepted values, internal moral convictions, and by moral imperative": \textit{Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy...}, 8.)
Sincerity and honesty of security cadres have a special role because functionaries have contacts with people, with the nation. It is critical to teach our employees to avoid discrepancy between what they do and what they write in their reports. This very important problem shall be addressed as the first in our educational work.  

But even the best indoctrination would not have been successful in the atmosphere of omnipresent distrust and rivalry. Indeed, transparency was a challenge – sometimes fear of shame, or simply lack of trust, made the officers shrink from frankness. The more mendacious the Bezpieka was, the more often tireless communist ideologists warned against “hypocrisy of internal relations.” Ideally, a security officer should be totally frank to his superiors and totally obscure to society. Especially in the years of Stalin, this dualism led them to the rejection of the objective truth as something defunct and to the blind acceptance of arbitrary violence, in spite of the socialist creed that called it immoral. Practically, socialist morality was therefore different from its literal meaning.

After Stalin’s death, voices of change appeared, criticizing the internal situation of the Bezpieka saturated with widespread lying. In 1954, Józef Dziemidok, the Vice-Director of the MBP Department XI, expressed his anxiety concerning the erosion of

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398 “Uczciwość i szczerość u pracowników aparatu bezpieczeństwa ma szczególne znaczenie – ponieważ spotykają się oni z ludźmi, narodem. Jest rzeczą nieodzowną nauczyć naszych pracowników, by nie postępowali inaczej w życiu, a inaczej pisali w raportach. Ten tak ważny problem winien się znaleźć na pierwszym planie naszej pracy wychowawczej”: Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...


400 I thoroughly discussed obscurity as a socialist virtue in the chapter “Secrecy.”

401 Department XI was responsible for fighting religious organizations, mainly the Catholic Church: Mirosław Piotrowski, Ludzie Bezpieki w walce z Narodem i Kościołem (The Bezpieka’s Men Fighting Against the Nation and the Church) (Lublin: Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej, 2000), 54.
functionaries’ sincerity toward the regime. He pointed out personal vengeance as the cause of widespread sanctimoniousness: “The system of internal relations is based on hypocrisy. There is fear of telling the truth. An employee is afraid that by revealing truth which is unpleasant to his superiors, they may punish him.” Dziemidok identified a serious problem that made the security apparatus murky, thus difficult to control by superiors. He blamed Stalinist terror for these distortions that forced even a man like him to violate the virtue of frankness:

For example, one of our employees was arrested and put on trial. All believed that it was groundless. I also thought that way, but I was afraid to say this because I might have been accused of lack of vigilance, of defending the enemy, etc. Directors are afraid to tell the truth to the minister, superiors are afraid of directors. For instance, when a certain chief of a section—Opara—complained to his superior, they searched his unit and showed him that he worked poorly and was therefore wrong.

Dziemidok’s goal of restoring truth might seem to be a positive attempt at reform, though it could have been disastrous to the security apparatus if implemented rigidly. The vision of substantial “refreshment” (hiring new cadres) of the Bezpieka personnel scared Stalinist Politburo members from undertaking any bolder reforms.

The real political earthquake came in October 1956 when the highly publicized defection of Colonel Józef Światło and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party led to considerable transformations. As a consequence of the removal of the leading

\footnote{“Systemem stosunków wewnętrznych jest zakłamanie. Lęk mówienia prawdy. Pracownik boi się, że jak powie prawdę nieprzyjemną dla przełożonych, mogą stosować wobec niego represje”: Protokół z partyjno-служbowej narady aktywu..., 1630/12.}

\footnote{“Na przykład jedną pracownicę aresztowano i oddano sprawę do sądu. Wszyscy uważali, że to niesłusznie. Ja też tak uważałem, ale bałem się powiedzieć, żeby się nie spotkać z zarzutami, że wykazuję brak czujności, że bronię wroga, itp. Dyrektorzy boją się mówić prawdę ministrowi, a naczelnicy boją się dyrektorów, np. jeden kierownik sekcji, Opara, zaś il się na naczelnika wydziału, to zrobili u niego kontrolę w sekcji wykazali mu, że źle pracuje i że wobec tego nie ma racji”: Protokół z partyjno-служbowej narady aktywu..., 1630/12.}
Stalinists, the Bezpieka was weakened – the number of its employees was cut by over one third in central headquarters and by half in local affiliates. The huge network of secret informers was also substantially reduced, and the most implicated functionaries were arrested. Later, however, the security apparatus was gradually strengthened and continued to serve the role of a backbone for the refurbished regime until 1989.

Dziemidok’s example reveals the dramatic battle between a functionary’s natural instinct of self-preservation through hiding, and an ingrained feeling of obligation to remain honest toward the regime at all costs. To understand the drama of these tensions, one must bear in mind the mentality of a typical security officer, for whom the Party was infallible and held supreme authority in all respects, including morals. Unless all relations within the Bezpieka were accurately supervised, the danger of personal retaliation must have acted as a serious deterrent to staying transparent. Whereas a newly hired functionary might have been a ‘sanctuary’ of unspoiled virtue of honesty at the beginning of his service, soon after admittance he had to face the same malaise as his

404 For a more detailed analysis of the Bezpieka’s transformations in 1956, see Krzysztof Persak and Łukasz Kamiński, A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944-1989 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), esp. 239, 244.
405 A Communist is a man who “has absolute faith in the Party, which means that his faith in it is uncritical at every stage, no matter what the Party is saying. He is a person with the ability to adapt his mentality and his conscience in such a way that he can unreservedly accept the dogma that the Party is never wrong, even though it is wrong all the time — something the Party itself actually admits with every new stage it enters (…). Whoever is able to reconcile that contradiction or, to put in Marxist terms, that dialectical process — the Party’s infallibility and its fallibility — is a communist”: this definition was provided by Stefan Staszewski, the first secretary of the Warsaw Communist Committee in the 1950s and the editor-in-chief of the Polish Press Agency, when he was asked a question “What is a communist?” For the entire interview with Staszewski and other Polish communists of the Stalinist era, see: Teresa Torańska, “Them” Stalin’s Polish Puppets (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), esp. 128.
more experienced colleagues who already learned how to lie in the course of service, “mucking around in the mud” for years.

4.3. Champions of the objective truth

Not only were the authorities hungry to know everything about security cadres; they were also confident they could exact transparency through proper education. In 1953, facing growing criticism by the Party officials who were concerned about the Bezpieka’s impenetrability, its chief, Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz, tried to calm them by assuring them that teaching functionaries “truthfulness and sincerity toward the Party is an attainable and a serious task,” and that this problem “should be at the forefront of (...) educational work.” For each communist it was necessary to strive and morally regenerate oneself again and again. Since Radkiewicz and many of his colleagues repeatedly argued for these endeavors, they must have believed that the apparatus was able to become transparent in its future functioning. Nonetheless, it was not only the security police, but the communist system that was ontologically based on lies and was thus unable to legitimize itself without resorting to distortions of truth. In Stalinism, power relations reduced the virtue of truthfulness to mere obsequiousness, while the

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406 “Babranie się w błocie”: a term used by the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz in Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 4 marca 1954 roku (Speech of the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz for the National Council of the Security Chiefs, March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14.

407 “Nauczyć prawdomówności i szczerości wobec partii jest rzeczą poważną i w pełni osiągalną (...)”. Ten tak ważny problem winien się znaleźć na pierwszym planie w naszej pracy wychowawczej” Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953 (Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz about Educating Security Functionaries in Ministerial Schools, Raised at the Conclusion of the Workshop for Professional Lecturers, September 3, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 10.
moral acquittal of security methods nourished institutionalized cynicism which separated political action from private morals. The ministerial council meeting held in November 1954, just three days after the arrest of Józef Różański, one of the architects of terror who ironically claimed not to be afraid of “objective truth,”\textsuperscript{408} was much more condemnatory of omnipresent lies than previous meetings.\textsuperscript{409} After Stalin’s death the political atmosphere began to change: fear lost its paralyzing influence on internal discussions. Happy that for the first time they finally might speak frankly,\textsuperscript{410} and after hearing the self-criticism of several participants (Adam Humer, Józef Czaplicki, Józef Karkoszka, Konrad Świetlik), the council condemned numerous distortions of socialist morality in a way unknown until then. The comrades criticized the miasma of confusion and lies that surrounded the whole security apparatus and admitted that “hypocrisy – measuring ourselves and society by different yardsticks – is also a part of our conduct.”\textsuperscript{411}

Admittedly, one might expect conference participants to exploit the fact of insincerity of lower-rank security functionaries to cover their own abuses, just as the Nazi officials in Nuremberg, claiming that they did not know about their subordinates’ actions.

This excuse was not offered, however. Instead, they regretted that the lack of openness caused several losses for the apparatus, mostly defections of its functionaries abroad, that could otherwise have been prevented. This example offers a structural

\textsuperscript{408} “Obawa przed prawdą jest obawa nam obca”: Przemówienie Dyrektora Departamentu Śledczego Józefa Różańskiego na temat pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej...
\textsuperscript{409} The council meeting was opened on November 11, 1954, while Józef Różański was arrested on November 8: Andrzej Paczkowski, Aparat bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1953-1954. Taktyka, strategia, metody (The Security Apparatus in Poland Between 1953-1954. Tactics, Strategy, Methods) (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004), 401.
\textsuperscript{410} “Dobrze, że po dziesięciu latach zaczęliśmy mówić innym, szczerym językiem” (“It is good that after ten years we begun taking in a new, sincere way”), words of Konrad Świetlik, the vice-Minister of Public Security: Protokół partyjno-służbowej narady aktywu..., 1630/12.
\textsuperscript{411} Words of Zbigniew Paszkowski, the Head of Rural Inspectorate of the MBP: Protokół partyjno-służbowej narady aktywu..., 1630/12.
explanation for the duality in the Bezpieka chiefs’ perception of truthfulness. Their pragmatic attitude is yet another indicator that the regime viewed the virtue of transparency primarily in an instrumental way, with a real meaning hidden behind the façade of idealism. Sincerity had to be implemented in order to strengthen the security apparatus, for it would provide early warnings of functionaries’ political degeneration, such as Józef Światło’s plans to escape to the US, because “if there were this vent, Światło would not be now on the West but in Rakowiecka [prison].” The concept of transparency was quite clearly brought about not by the philosophers under the pressure of theory, but by the regime under the pressure of practice. In this respect it did not differ from its Soviet prototype. Vigilance in indentifying and exposing enemies (see figure 6) –Sheila Fitzpatrick notes - was one of the cardinal virtues in the Soviet Union where revolutionary militants were “obsessed with authenticity and transparency.” Unmasking was an everyday practice in Stalin’s Russia mainly because virtually everybody had something to hide. Fitzpatrick links this phenomenon to the nature of communism itself, claiming that “all identity projects require impersonation” and sometimes even imposture. It could not have been different when it came to the community of the Bezpieka considering the fact that it was engaged in a transformation project of Soviet proportions. Individual practices of impersonation were thus unavoidable, so were the regime’s efforts to discover wolves in sheep’s clothing.

412 “Gdyby stworzono ten wentyl, to Światło byłby nie na Zachodzie, a na Rakowieckiej”; words of Zygmunt Okręt, the Director of the MBP Central Archive: Protokół partyjno-służbowej narady aktywu..., 1630/12.
415 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks..., 18.
This situation did not change in the following decades. In 1985, the regime published a compilation of socialist morals which summed up the “achievements of the socialist ethics” of the Polish security apparatus since its inception.416 In a secret instruction, *Principles and Methods of the Ministry of Interior Affairs Functionaries Moral Molding,* 417 a leading moralist of the regime in the 1980s, Antoni Parzyszek, stressed that the main purpose of moral upbringing was to evoke and consolidate psychic transformations in a functionary’s personality,418 and that next to fostering such virtues as courage, dignity, and bravery, honesty was an integral part of the socialist morality. His

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416 *Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy*....
417 The instruction was a part of a conference organized by the Academy of Internal Affairs, held on October 21, 1987, and later published in a book format.
party comrade, Kaziemierz Głodowski, shared this opinion and classified honesty and truthfulness as “the most important moral principles of functionaries.”

Both engineers of souls advocated a comprehensive inculcation of these socialist morals to the point of their total internalization. Parzyszek expected security cadres to accept socialist values deeply, which would be manifested in their professional knowledge, proper emotional attitude, and willingness to act in the defense of these values. This ambitious outcome was to be achieved through three types of incentives: legal regulations, moral rules, and customs. Obviously, the actions of the authorities aimed at a socialist ideal – the acceptance of these socialist principles to the point of development of spontaneous adherence, where disciplinary sanction was no longer needed, either as a deterrent or an incentive. However, it is easy to disprove their presumption that the character of a functionary, the mechanisms of the Bezpieka functioning, and the expectations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, all fostered institutionalized sincerity. Perfect transparency vis-à-vis the Party could be achieved only if an officer was free from making mistakes or loyal to the regime to the point of breaking his inborn instinct of self-preservation. Yes, if for a functionary the Party was indeed infallible and the supreme authority, he would be less hesitant to admit to his

420 In his proposed methodology, Parzyszek relied on science by quoting numerous works pertaining to psychology. In this particular respect, he referred to a book Psychologia jako nauka o człowieku (Psychology As Science About Man) by M. Maruszewski, J. Reykowski, and T. Tomaszewski (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1966), 270.
failures. But sometimes fear and shame made them shrink from openness, and sometimes
the mistakes of the Party itself caused some functionaries to lose faith in the system. The
socialist code of ethics provided the ideal, while reality, as the Party itself secretly
admitted, was much different.\footnote{Dokumenty te przecież prezentują idealny wzorzec, w życiu natomiast – jak wiemy – może być [i często bywa] inaczej" ("These documents present the ideal, but, as we all know, real life may be [and often is] different than that") Kazimierz Głoński, “Refleksje nad etycznymi aspektami….”, 289.}

4.4. Communist eugenics

The imminent danger of betrayal drove the Party into a constant search for
treachery within the security cadres. The degree of penetration into their lives was
proportional to the regime’s aspirations. Every officer was supposed to practice socialist
virtues in private as much as at work. More precisely, in the scope of socialist ethics, all
their behavior remained closely related to the “interest of service”\footnote{"A functionary’s behavior after work is not his private business, but is closely connected to the interest of service” (“Postępowanie funkcjonariusza poza służbą nie jest wyłącznie jego prywatną sprawą. Pozostaje ono w ścisłym związku z dobrem służby”): Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 29.} and thus was
considered official. The officers lacked a \textit{de facto} private realm of family life immune
from regular oversight by the security apparatus. The authorities put the operatives under
extensive supervision, monitoring how they promoted socialist values within their
families, particularly whether they raised their children as “righteous people conscious of
their civic duties towards the Polish People’s Republic.”\footnote{"Jego szczególną powinnością jest dbałość o wychowanie dzieci na prawych i świadomych swych obowiązków obywateli PRL”: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 30.} Failure to prepare relatives to
lead the state’s notion of a moral life could trigger state intervention through disciplinary
sanctions. Families did not enjoy autonomy in their political and moral standing,\(^{426}\) which in practice meant extension of the virtue of transparency to the most intimate spheres of a functionary’s life.\(^{427}\) The totalitarian regime wanted to know with whom its soldiers talked, slept, or went fishing (compare figures 7 and 8).\(^{428}\)

The primary source of this information was self-denunciation institutionalized by numerous regulations. For example, a *Ministerial Order* of March 23, 1950, reminded all functionaries of their obligation to: “report to their superiors about all major events and changes in personal lives, as well as in lives of their families.”\(^{429}\) Functionaries were to report immediately in detail about births, weddings, divorces, deaths, relocations, foreign trips, political affiliations, legal violations, and places where they lived.\(^{430}\)

\(^{426}\) “As all security functionaries’ wives, also I was under obligation to participate in periodical political training. My reluctance to do so caused irritation of the security chiefs. On several occasions I was called to the local security office and warned about possible consequences of my political apathy”: words of Elżbieta Murat-Pietrzykowska, a wife of a former security officer, interviewed by the author on July 20, 2009.

\(^{427}\) “Functionaries’ social life is not neutral from the perspective of the service’s interests”: *Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy…*, 30.

\(^{428}\) Compare *Przepisy łowieckie obowiązujące funkcjonariuszy zajmujących się myślistwem (Hunting Regulations Concerning Functionaries)*, January 2, 1953, IPN/OBiAD/Łódź, sygn. 0050/26, t.1, k. 179.

\(^{429}\) “Rozkazuję wszystkim funkcjonariuszom służby bezpieczeństwa publicznego meldować specjany raportem swym przełożonym o wszelkich ważniejszych wydarzeniach i zmianach zachodzących w ich życiu osobistym i życiu członków i ich rodzin”: *Rozkaz Ministra Nr 013/50 z dnia 23 marca 1950 r. (Ministerial Order No. 013/50 from March 23, 1950)*, IPN/ OBiAD/Lodz, sygn. 0050/26, t.1, k. 177.

\(^{430}\) See points 1- 6 of the *Rozkaz Ministra Nr 013/50…*, k. 177.
In addition to screening existing families, the regime attempted to raise homo sovietica through means of selective breeding. Communist eugenics was introduced in the Bezpieka as early as 1949 by a detailed order signed by the MBP Vice-Minister Mieczysław Mietkowski:

Because of the specific conditions of the public security apparatus, in which it is unacceptable for functionaries to get married without permission, especially in the face of reported cases of marrying individuals from hostile political and class backgrounds, I order that: § 1. A security apparatus functionary intending to get married should turn to a proper superior for permission.431

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431 "Z uwagi na specyficzne warunki służby bezpieczeństwa publicznego, w której niedopuszczalne jest, aby funkcjonariusze zawierali związek małżeński bez zezwolenia władzy, w szczególności wobec stwierdzonych wypadków wiązania się z osobami ze środowisk obcych politycznie i klasowo, rozkazuję § 1. Funkcjonariusz służby bezpieczeństwa publicznego zamierzający zawrzeć związek małżeński, winien zwrócić się do właściwej władzy przełożonej o uzyskanie zezwolenia na zawarcie tego związku.” The enumeration of circumstances when a functionary had to report was open: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 7 z dnia 16 lutego 1949 (Ministerial Order No. 7 from February 16, 1949), IPN/ OBiAD/Lodz, sygn. 0050/26, t.1, k. 177.
Each officer wishing to be exempted from celibacy had to prepare a special plea, supplemented with his/her fiancée/fiancé’s extensive resume and a picture, plus a deposition about sources of income and wealth of the lover as well as his/her parents. The permission was necessary even if both of them worked in the security apparatus. One may think that those who were for various reasons reluctant to reveal such information might have turned to cohabitation as the optimal solution. This, however, was not the case. The jealous eye of the Party also saw beneath the bedcovers of its ‘priests.’""432 The all-anticipating law obligated functionaries to report their non-martial relationships, including the planned ones: “functionaries who are or will live in a factual marital relationship [live together] without legalized marriage, are required to report this to a superior providing documents about the person with whom they developed a relationship (…)” 433 Legitimate sexual relations were limited to ‘licensed’ partners, and sexual practices were judged according to whether they occurred within confines of the communist eugenics. The communist moral rules governing appropriate relations ensured that functionaries’ loyalty to the regime was not compromised by their love affairs.

Beneath the general level of agreement that the sexual relations between an officer and a prostitute were immoral, there were a range of other situations deemed wrong. 434 For example, because professional relations within the security apparatus were based on

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432 Krzysztof Kąkolewski called security functionaries “priests of the Marxist doctrine” (“kapłani doktryny marksistowskiej”) in one of his books: Ksiądz Jerzy w rękach oprawców (Father Jerzy In Hands of Abusers) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Von Borowiecky, 2004).

433 “§11. Funkcjonariusze, którzy znajdują się – lub znajdą się w faktycznej wspólnocie małżeńskiej [wspólnym zamieszkaniu] bez zalegalizowanego związku małżeńskiego, obowiązanie są zawiadomić o tym władzę przełożoną, załączając dokumenty osoby z którą współżyją (…)”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 7 z dnia 16 lutego 1949....

434 I have not found in the IPN rules comprehensively regulating sexual morality of the Bezpieka cadres, but the regime was prolific in issuing ad hoc individual punitive orders pertaining to sexuality. Based on these documents, it is possible to reconstruct the communist moral code in respect to sexuality of security functionaries.
limited trust, sexual practices between a superior and subordinate and between an officer and a secret collaborator were prohibited. This kind of "in-house" philandering jeopardized the paternal role of the senior officer and could damage the internal structure of the Bezpieka. What made this behavior unacceptable was not so much the emotional compulsion and the power imbalance of those involved as it was the possible consequence of establishing too close an emotional relationship outside of the security apparatus. The risk of impaired effectiveness of work was the primary reason for condemning such acts, as was seen in the case of Captain Proszowski who engaged in a relationship with his informer, “which lowered level of his operational work [effectiveness].”

Surely, the acquisition of the virtue of transparency in such intimate matters was conducive to complete servility, and frequently developed into a quasi-religious, quasi-incestuous relationship between the institution and its servant. Years of enforced obedience bred a deep respect for the authorities to the point of exhibitionism. The soldiers of the Party, who seemed so impenetrable to others, were at the same time stripping off personal autonomy in the presence of the regime’ highest authority. The socialist virtue of transparency was intentionally designed to guarantee their constant moral nakedness, partially to secure control over them, and partially to let them know that without the Party they meant nothing.

435 “(…) to obniżyło poziom pracy operacyjnej”: Rozkaz Karny Nr 074/55 (Punitive Order No. 074/55) from August 9, 1955, AC-R-229/55, IPN 01225/230, k. 43.
Virtuous security officers also had to be financially transparent. Taking loans or accepting material aid in any form was prohibited because it could change relations of servitude. From 1948, the regime begun to conduct a persistent campaign against officers hungry for material gain. Greed for money is as old as humanity, and nothing expresses the communist rationale better than a passage from the Gospel (Mt 6: 25, 15): “No one can serve two masters. He will either hate one and love the other, or be devoted to one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.” In the spirit of these ethics, both Christian and Soviet, in 1950, Second-Lieutenant Drzewiecki warned all security officers about financial depravity and strictly forbade doing anything that would engage them in extra-Party relationships. In theory, the obligation concerned all

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437 Richard T. George claims that there is nothing incongruous in that because Soviet ethics was in many ways similar to Christianity: Soviet Ethics..., 13.
438 “Przepisy o zaciąganiu pożyczek, przyjmowaniu podarków przez funkcjonariuszy bezpieczeństwa publicznego” (“Rules Prohibiting Taking Loans and Gifts by the Public Service Functionaries”), Zbiór Ważniejszych przepisów o zachowaniu się aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego (Collection of Major Regulations Concerning Behavior of Functionaries of the
communists, including the echelons of power. In reality, the financial transparency was applied with selective severity: the higher in rank, the looser standards for its adherence. Much damage in this respect was done by fugitive Colonel Józef Światło, whose revelations were broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe. By revealing immorality of the leadership --their verbosity, bombast, and financial swindles-- the Colonel mercilessly exposed the double standards of socialist morality. 439 Those functionaries who heard him on the radio must have understood that the universal call for equality was a fiction, and particularly the call for internal transparency was just a tool to manipulate them.

4.5. The act of contrition

Deceitfulness toward the Party was suicidal socially, if not physically. One could imagine the anger with which the regime reacted to each act of insincerity. To those who withdrew to “their tight shell where they ossified” 440 and felt safe, the Minister of Public Security promised to “mercilessly break all their resistance, whether they like it or not.” 441 The inevitable moral “ossification” usually happened when an officer lost contact with the ‘pulsating beacon of truth’ – the Party – and with ‘life-giving water’ –

440 “Są i tacy, którzy (…) zasklepiając się we własnej ciasnej skorupie, i dobrze się czują” (“There are also those who (…) ossified in their tight shell, and feel well with it”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu…, 14. By “ossification,” Minister Radkiewicz most probably meant becoming withdrawn from the Party influence.
441 “Czas najwyższy radykalnie ten stan zmienić, a opory bezlitośnie łamać, przewyciężać, bez względu na to, czy się to komuś podoba, czy nie”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu…
communism. In this situation, the regime offered “help” which was impossible to reject. As true communists, all officers had to accept that they would not grow to be independent moral agents and that they would never reach the stage of moral maturity when they could be free to decide on their own. Rather, they established a relationship with the Bezpieca similar to that of a child and his parent – one open to guidance, corrections, and training. Given the fact that the goals of the Party and the goals of society were often contradictory, every security functionary who was honest to the regime had to be deceitful toward society. Hiding real intentions was, for example, critical to recruit secret collaborators or effectively to monitor people for anti-communist activism. Thus, the same duplicity could be virtuous or reprehensible, depending on its relation to the Party: duplicity in relations to the regime constituted heinous moral degeneration, while transparency towards the regime absolved the immorality of duplicity in all other contexts. In other words, duplicity was moral as long as it served the Party and immoral if it undermined it.\footnote{There are many documents revealing the regime’s numerous campaigns against duplicity. See, for example, speech of Colonel Jerzy Siedlecki, the Director of the Functionaries’ Personnel’s Bureau discussing influence of the Church on the Bezpieca, Briefing from November 21, 1949, CA MSW 17/IX/77, t. 5.}

The regime’s strategy oscillated between two extremes: continuous demands to maintain high levels of secrecy (for the sake of impenetrability to the enemy), and continuous demands to maintain high levels of transparency (for the sake of demonstrating loyalty to the Party). This dual task involved constant vigilance, utmost sacrifice, and twenty-four-hour availability. Under such circumstances, high and noble virtues soon died out (if there were any at the beginning of service), and frustration reigned supreme. Particularly vulnerable was the virtue of transparency because it
required continuous effort on the functionaries’ part. The regime was not omnipresent, so it could not see everything. Its ability to react depended on the effectiveness of the digestive system of its internal bureaucratic machinery. As a rule, the Party never trusted its soldiers and found frequent random investigations helpful in securing “party honesty.” This was of paramount importance since insincerity was the consequence of and prelude to other moral violations – it signaled that a functionary’s “political conscience was clouded”:

(...) all tricks, hiding, or blurring facts, for example, by various fictitious reports, constitute a serious party and professional crime. It is bad when they act improperly, but is even worse when (...) they lack wholehearted and sacrificial sincerity toward the Party and superiors. Unfortunately, trespasses and hypocrisy appear together, and come from the same source – clouding of political conscience.”

Practicing transparency was a difficulty complicated by the lack of moral uniformity and frequent conflicts with other communist ideas. Particularly challenging was the cultivation of friendliness – “the basic element of the moral atmosphere in the functionaries’ collectives.” The regime advocated loyalty and honesty between colleagues primarily because the overall effectiveness of service depended on the smooth co-operation of its members. This “professional solidarity” helped to foster consciousness of shared identity that further particularized and solidified the group. As the Soviet-era

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443 Referat Ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu...
444 (...) wszelkie kanty, ukrywanie i zamazywanie faktycznego stanu rzeczy, np. przez różne falszywe tzw. notatki urzędowe itp., to poważne przestępstwo służbowe i partyjne. Niedobrze jest gdy się postępuje niewłaściwie, źle, gorzej jeszcze, gdy (...) brak całkowitej i bez reszty szczerości wobec partii i przełożonych. Tak jest jednak niestety, gdyż wyrastają z jednego pnia, jednego źródła zaćmienia sumienia partyjnego”: Stenogram z dyskusji na odprawie krajowej w dniu 4 marca 1954 roku (Minute from the Discussion at the National Briefing on March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14.
445 ”Elementarnym składnikiem właściwego klimatu moralnego w kolektywach funkcjonariuszy jest koleńskość”: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy..., 24.
historian Richard T. George once put it, “The result might be the development of a society of moral conformity greater than that ever previously achieved in human history.”

But this experiment also evoked a continuous conflict with the obligation to denounce oneself and one’s colleagues: as frequently as the Bezpieka officers rediscovered their coherent identity, transparency tested their cohesiveness. Though the communist morality treated denunciation as a virtue, its immoral character, especially in respect to friendship, was too obvious to go unnoticed. What the regime saw as utmost virtue was simply cultivation of morality through immoral means. True, in all institutions loyalty is the highest good, and sometimes friendship has to be sacrificed, but in the communist reality frequent denunciations of oneself and one’s colleagues were elevated to the level of everyday practice. But at least there was an element of diabolical honesty in it: the functionaries must have been aware that all of them reported on one another.

There is no doubt that by choosing to work in the security apparatus they \textit{a priori} accepted duplicity as their own norm, which was typical of all security officers behind the Iron Curtain.

Obviously, high standards of ethics forced many to hide the fact that their actual morality differed from the one championed by the regime. Hypocrisy was widespread and concerned all segments of the security apparatus. The Bezpieka chiefs, who were hardly paragons of communist morality themselves, reacted to it with frustration and even surprise. They could not explain the rejection of transparency in terms other than

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\item[446] Richard T. De George, \textit{Soviet Ethics...}, 125.
\item[447] Zbigniew Błażyński, \textit{Mówi Józef Światło...}, 208.
\item[448] For example, historians of the Soviet security police, Uri Raánan and Igor Lukes claim that working in the KGB meant to distrust and to be distrusted: \textit{Inside the Apparat. Perspectives on the Soviet System From Former Functionaries} (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1990), 101.
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\end{footnotesize}
But in security work occasions to lose political virginity were numerous, and the “sickness” rapidly became a plague. Functionaries cheated on their contacts with secret collaborators, and even invented secret collaborators; they accepted gifts, they hunted animals without permission, they failed to report the locations of their vacations, and they did not inform superiors about deaths they caused – to name only a few infractions. Ideally, the functionaries’ proletarian conscience should have forced them to report their immoral behavior to a superior who, to some extent, acted as a priest hearing a confession. But reality was a good deal less idyllic than that. Massive indoctrinations were only partially successful. More effective was fear of exposure or forced “confessions” after a violation had already been discovered. The regime developed a complicated system of internal institutions, such as the Political-Educational Unit (Pion

449 See, for example, speech of Stanisław Radkiewicz, the Minister of MBP: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953...
452 Okólnik Nr 11 z dnia 3 marca 1948 roku (Circular Letter No. 11 from March 3, 1948), AC-51/48, IPN LD pf 13/11, t.I, k. 91. For law regulating acceptance of money from charity organizations, see: Okólnik Nr 5 z dnia 1 czerwca 1948 roku (Circular Letter No. 33 from June 1, 1948), AC-951/48, IPN Ld pf 13/11, t.I, k. 85.
454 Pismo Okólne Nr 01/52 z dnia 21 stycznia 1952 roku (Circular Letter No. 01/52 from January 21, 1952), AC-28/52, IPN Ld 0050/23, t.II.
455 Rozkaz Nr 19 z dnia 15 maja 1945 roku (Order No. 19 from May 15, 1945), IPN LD pf 0050/21, t.II.
456 “It is very frequent in our apparatus that men cheat their superiors” (“W naszym aparacie są bardzo częste wypadki, że ludzie wprowadzają w błąd przełożonych”), Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat wychowania funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w szkołach resortowych wygłoszone na zakończenie kursu wykładowców zawodowych, 3 września 1953..., 10.
457 I discuss various kinds of functionaries’ indoctrination in the chapter “Knowledge.”
Polityczno-Wychowawczy, PPW)\textsuperscript{458} and the Board for Functionaries’ Security (Zarząd Ochrony Funkcjonariuszy, ZOF),\textsuperscript{459} whose role was to search for duplicitous officers who had lost faith or otherwise betrayed the system (I discuss their functions and methods of work in Chapter Five).

An exemplary case of forced confession concerns Captain Jan Baran, an accomplished functionary of the Bezpieka, who between 1965 and 1969 systematically embezzled security funds and falsified numerous documents to cover up his swindles.\textsuperscript{460} Exposure of Baran was the result of his superiors’ vigilance and preventive investigations. “As an experienced employee of the security apparatus having a satisfactory level of intellect, he is fully responsible for his actions” – wrote Major Zdzisław Józefkowicz who supervised the investigation, and bitterly concluded that – “he turned out to be dishonest.”\textsuperscript{461} Before being fired from work, however, Baran was forced to confess everything intelligibly and precisely: “Hereby I testify that (…) there were cases where I illegally falsified certain documents. As far as reasons for this improper and disgraceful behavior are concerned, I will explain them in a separate document.”\textsuperscript{462}

\textsuperscript{458} Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział...., 149.
\textsuperscript{459} “Zarząd Ochrony Funkcjonariuszy was created by General Kiszczak’s regulation in the last days of December 1984.
\textsuperscript{461} “Kapitan Jan Baran jako długoletni pracownik organów Służby Bezpieczeństwa, reprezentujący odpowiedni poziom intelektualny, jest w pełni odpowiedzialny za swoje czyny. Swym postępowaniem skompromitował dobre imię funkcjonariusza organów Służby Bezpieczeństwa, okazał się człowiekiem nieuczciwym,” Sprawozdanie z postępowania dyscyplinarne wobec kapitana Jana Barana obwinionego o fałszowanie dokumentacji i przywłaszczanie pieniędzy z funduszu ‘O’ (Report on Disciplinary Proceedings Concerning Captain Jan Baran Accused of Documents’ Falsification and Embezzlement of Money form the Fund ‘O’), AIPN Sz, 0065/1400, k. 83.
\textsuperscript{462} “Oświadczam, że w okresie pełnienia obowiązków z kta ds. bezpieczeństwa były wypadki, że kilka razy w sposób sprzeczny z obowiązującymi przepisami odnose się gospodarki funduszem ‘O’
clarified the repentant Baran. For the disgraced authorities, it was not enough; the
Captain had to make a full act of contrition:

(…) It is also true that in the last time of my operational work I fell into a stressful
collection that I could not overcome. It was caused by my objective failures at work
(weak cadres, no results), and partially because of my difficult family situation (…). I
fully understand that I behaved against the dignity of a security functionary, but now
I can only regret it. Once again I testify with full responsibility that I gained nothing
out of this money. Through my recklessness I lost all my possessions, I hurt my
family and undermined the good name of myself and the security apparatus’. I know
for sure that I will never act so inappropriately again (…). I am financially ruined and
I am leaving my fate in the hands of the security chiefdom. I would like to ask to take
my explanation under consideration, save my already impaired health, and I will try
to rehabilitate myself wherever I work.463

Exposed and humiliated, Baran put himself at the mercy of his superiors, begging for
consideration and forbearance. It was, however, too late.

Before his inevitable expulsion a degenerate functionary had to be fully stripped
of all his secrets, and stand transparent in the light of the Party’s majesty to feel ashamed.
The drama in this ritual had its purpose. A wretched officer was to be stigmatized with an
inferiority complex that hopefully never left him. His personal dignity was broken so that

463 "Faktem jest również, że w ostatnim okresie mojej pracy na skutek obiektywnie istniejących
niepowodzeń w pracy operacyjnej (słabe kadry, brak wyników), częściowo trudnej sytuacji
rodzinnej popadłem w jakiś stan stresowy, którego nie mogłem pokonać (…). Ja zdaję sobie
sprawę z tego, że postąpiłem w sposób sprzeczny z godnościa pracownika SB, ale cóż, mogę
teraz tylko tego żałować. Oświadczam jeszcze raz z pełną odpowiedzialnością, że ja z tej gotówki
w zasadzie nic nie miałem. Jedynie przez swoją lekkomyślność straciłem cały dorobek mego dość
krótkiego na ogół życia, skrzywdziłem rodzinę i poderwałem opinię nie tylko siebie, ale i
organom SB. Wiem na pewno, że już nigdy tak niewłaściwe nie postąpię (…). Jestem finansowo
zrujnowany i dalszy swój los pozostawiam kierownictwu SB. Prosiłbym zatem, aby to moje
wyjaśnienie wziąć pod uwagę, oszczędzić mi już i tak nadszarpniętego zdrowia, a ja na każdym
odcinku, na którym będę pracował, postaram się zrehabilitować": Oświadczenie kapitana Jana
Barana w sprawie fałszowania…, k. 78-79.
the Party’s dignity might flourish; he had to humble himself so that the regime could
triumph.

One may doubt the healing abilities of such a practice. It was too artificial and too
coercive in character to bring moral catharsis. Rather, this display of transparency only
frightened an officer and taught him a primitive respect through fear. Forced self-
criticism, however, if only because of its fragmentary, artificial, and coercive character,
could not be regarded as a satisfactory mode of self-revelation for those in trouble. In
fact, it manifested not only a failure in respect to the wrongdoer, but also failure of the
ideology that hoped to turn functionaries into the pre-eminent group of fully mature
(unconditionally loyal) communists. Each dishonest act slowed the regime’s pilgrimage
toward the communist paradise.

It is hard to assess how many security functionaries violated transparency. The
Bezpieka chiefs tended to exaggerate the problem in their internal discussions but failed
to provide an exact numbers. Recent historical studies may provide an answer to this
question. For example, out of nine superiors of the Tarnów County Unit between 1945-
1956, one resigned because of his mental breakdown, another one was removed for
stealing, and two others were expelled for their insincerity. It is hard to assess how many security functionaries violated transparency. The Bezpieka chiefs tended to exaggerate the problem in their internal discussions but failed to provide an exact numbers. Recent historical studies may provide an answer to this question. For example, out of nine superiors of the Tarnów County Unit between 1945-1956, one resigned because of his mental breakdown, another one was removed for stealing, and two others were expelled for their insincerity.464 During these tumultuous times, for the adventuresome the security apparatus was a place where they could give

464 A Tarnow Bezpieka Chief, Ludwik Wojtasow, hid his membership in the AK (Home Army), AIPN Kr 0149/153; Leon Podworski was fired for stealing a detainee’s property, AIPN Kr 057/1324; Stanisaw Strzaka hid that he signed a declaration of loyalty to Poland in the 1930s and that he was arrested by NKVD, AIPN Kr 0/149/113; Stefan Stawarczyk had nervous impairment, AIPN Kr 057/1520. For more general information about Tarnow County Security Unit, see Michał Wenklar, ”Szefowie Powiatowego Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego/Powiatowego Urzędu ds. Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Tarnowie w latach 1945-1956” (“Chiefs of the Tarnow County Security Unit Between 1945 and 1956”), Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej, 1944-1989 (Apparatus of Repression in People’s Poland, 1944-1989), 2/4/2006 (Rzeszów: IPN, 2006), 150.
almost unlimited vent to their zeal. After 1956, however, the Bezpieka solidified institutionally and became more internally vigilant.

4.6. Conclusion

The successful development of a society of moral conformity depended on the effectiveness of efforts to inculcate duplicity in the security cadres. The goal was ambitious and required splitting functionaries’ minds into two parts. Hidden behind the masks of impenetrability and appearances of trustworthiness, they had to work and live in a state of constant and perfect exposure toward the regime. Their inner alter ego was to be totally receptive to the socialist ethics. Here, transparency was based on a functionary’s instinctive force to report on his own failures to observe it. The communist ideologists, however, distorted the concept of sincerity – something usually associated with honor, honesty, and trust – into an institutionalized denunciation rooted in its opposite: dishonor, betrayal, and distrust. Reporting on oneself and on colleagues led to frustrations, especially when the expectations of the regime were difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to meet. As a result, the communist virtue of transparency helped to create psychopathic men prone to give vent to their inferiority complex in an abusive way.\footnote{Compare statement of Antoni Mężydło, a member of the anti-communist opposition, interviewed by Piotr Gursztyn, “SB-Tajna Policja Psychopatów” (“SB – Secret Police of Psychopaths”), Dziennik.pl, September 25, 2008.} Some of them closed themselves off in their own world of impenetrability and became immune to the conventions of socialist ethics. This is one of the reasons why the code of functionaries’ ethics, so pompous and benevolent, was classified and never publicized outside of the apparatus.
The regime’s ideologists overestimated the cohesiveness of Marxism-Leninism: the moral reconciliation of Machiavellian talents with the virtue of absolute sincerity was simply impossible. Despite numerous attempts of intensive education and indoctrination, transparency was enforced mainly through fear. There could be no sorting out of these problems without disassembling of the communist system itself. As the fugitive security officer Józef Światło once stated, “The communist system itself is responsible. Removal of individuals does not change anything, it does not help. The real change may be brought only through the liquidation of the communist system.”

Chapter V

ATHEISM

Institutionalized Religiosity

I will be devoted to service with my body and soul.

--- General Jerzy Gruba,
Commander of the Security Office in Cracow

5.1. The Catholic Church — lethal enemy of the communist regime

The complete annihilation of the military and political opposition to the communist regime in the late 1940s made the Catholic Church the communists’ main target as the only meaningful independent institution still functioning in communist Poland. The Polish Catholic church was in a unique position: other religious institutions within the Soviet Bloc were either destroyed or controlled by the communist regimes. According to a historian Hanna Diskin, the Polish Church was “the main force behind the opposition movement in Poland and Eastern Europe, and despite suffering a series of serious blows and retreats, the opposition movement increased its power over the decades until its dramatic victory in 1989 (…).”467 Ironically, the Catholic Church in Poland survived because of Stalin who decided to spare it for the time being despite numerous

pleas of zealous Polish communists asking for permission to attack and destroy it.⁴⁶⁸ For Stalin, the Catholic clergy was necessary to legitimatize the new Polish regime, encourage the fearful Poles to populate vast territories annexed from Germany,⁴⁶⁹ and stay neutral in a ferocious campaign against non-communist organizations.⁴⁷⁰ Of course, it was not a genuine gesture of acceptance but the Bolshevik tactic of concentrated efforts on one enemy at a time.⁴⁷¹ As early as 1949, the communists’ swift success in monopolizing power placed the Church in the precarious position of being the only 

⁴⁶⁸ Andrzej Paczkowski notes that the PPR (Polish Worker’s Party) did not launch an open war against the Church, as advised by Stalin and some radicals within it: Andrzej Paczkowski, Stanisław Mikołajczyk czyli klęska realisty (Stanisław Mikołajczyk - Failure of the Realist) (Warszawa: Agencja Omnipress, 1991), 160. For example, in 1944, the communist government of Poland pushed for an agrarian reform of real estate exceeding certain limits. Wanda Wasilewska, the deputy chief of the PKWN, testified in her memoir that the decision not to include church lands in the agrarian reform was taken by Stalin himself: see Secretariat General du Gouvernement, 1959, 9 as cited in Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph. Church and State in Gomułka’s Poland, 54, 266. Hanna Diskin in her book about Polish Communist regime and the Catholic Church calls the USSR’s postponement of confrontation with the Church “remarkable if we consider the deep doctrinal and practical antagonism between the sides, Soviet experience during and after the Bolshevik revolution, and the Soviet tendency, at the time, to convert the church in Eastern Europe to a national institution administratively subservient to state authority”: The Seeds of Triumph. Church and State in Gomułka’s Poland, 33.

⁴⁶⁹ This was the response to the widespread reluctance to settle in the Western Territories (“The Retrieved Lands”), if the government failed to organize religious services for newcomers: Tygodnik Warszawski, no. 29, 1947, and Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph..., 65; see also Ronald C. Monticone, The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945-1985 (New York: East European Monographs, 1986), 18-20.

⁴⁷⁰ The most important political opponent of the communists was PSL (The Polish People’s Party) — a non-communist party allowed by Stalin to function in Poland for appearances of democracy. Its leader, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, facing arrest, decided to go on exile in 1947. WiN (Wolność i Niezawisłość: Freedom and Independence) was the anti-communist organization established in 1945. For details of the annihilation of the WiN and PSL, see: Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948; Andrzej Paczkowski, Zdobycie Władzy (Seizing of Power) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993); Maciej Korkuć, “Moje bezpieczniackie wojsko. Początki władzy komunistycznej w oczach płk. UB Józefa Jurkowskiego” (“My Security Army. The Beginnings of the Communist Rule in the Eyes of the UB Colonel Jozef Jurkowski ”), Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej, 459-488.

⁴⁷¹ In the chapter devoted to the first period of the Gomułka’s rule versus the Church, Hanna Diskin notes that “in the light of the main objectives which Stalin considered critical, and in the face of the difficulties of which he was highly aware, the Soviet Union adopted, as part of its (stage-by-stage) tactics, a policy of postponing and disguising its ideological objectives, which had exceptional significance in terms of agriculture as well as religion and the church in Poland”: The Seeds of Triumph..., 32-33.
autonomous actor on the socio-political stage in Poland. Since the early 1950s, the regime perceived the Church as its main internal enemy, but despite numerous assiduous campaigns to mitigate its position, this classification did not change for the next four decades (with the exception of the Solidarity movement in the early 1980s). Throughout that time, the Catholic Church was continuously exposed to the brunt of the regime’s vicious endeavors to extirpate the clergy by complete penetration from within\(^{472}\) and unending siege from without. These tasks were, however, not easy and therefore vested upon the shoulders of the elite “soldiers of the Party” — the most fanatic and trusted functionaries of the security apparatus — the Bezpieka.

The communists’ vehement hostility toward the Catholic Church resulted not only from the Church’s institutionalized independence, but was also exacerbated by its unflagging teachings from the pulpit. The Church’s strong standing in key socio-religious

\(^{472}\) The Catholic Church was constantly under the strict Bezpieka surveillance. The primary control was exercised by the network of secret collaborators. For an extensive analysis of the clergy under communist surveillance, see Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Księża wobec Bezpieki (Priests Towards the Bezpieka) (Wydawnictwo Znak, 2007). For details concerning surveillance of Karol Wojtyła, the future pope, see: Marek Lasota and Marek Zając, Donos na Wojtyłę (Denunciation of Wojtyła) (Wydawnictwo Znak, 2006). For a general overview of repressions of the Church, see: J. Myszor (ed.), Leksykon duchowieństwa represjonowanego w PRL w latach 1945-1989 (The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Repressed Clergy in the Polish People’s Republic, 1945-1989) (Warszawa, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006), volumes I, II, III. Particularly interesting is a note of the Colonel Goroński about internal rifts within the Church and the possibility of exploitation of the animosities between Karol Wojtyła and Stefan Wyszyński (the Primate): Notatka majora katowickiej SB Zygmunta Nikla z wykładu wicedyrektora Departamentu IV MSW plk Zenona Gorońskiego na kursokonferencji dla pracowników jednostek terenowych pionu IV SB zorganizowanej na początku Kwieta 1969 r. w Wiśle (Minute Made by Major Zygmunt Nikiel from the Katowice SB, Based on the Lecture of Colonel Zenon Goroński, Vice-Director of the MSW, Department IV during the Conference for the Functionaries of District Units of SB, Department IV. Early April, 1969), AIPN Ka, WUSW w Katowicach, 056/59, t. 2. See also monographs in English: Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph: Church and State in Gomułka's Poland (New York: Central European University Press, 2001); Michel Patrick, Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe: Catholicism in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (Oxford: Polity, 1991); Norbert Zmijewski, The Catholic-Marxist Ideological Dialogue in Poland, 1945-1980 (Brookfield, VT: Gower Pub. Co., 1991) Vladimir Gsovski (ed.), Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, with an Introduction on the Soviet Union (New York, Published for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee by Praeger, 1955).
matters, not always anti-communist but simply different, provided an alternative to the propaganda of socialist morality. Regardless of how attractive the Catholic doctrine might actually have been to the average Pole, the mere fact of its availability reduced the effectiveness of communist social engineering. The Stalinist regime was frustrated because its lack of monopoly on teaching complicated its plan for imposing the communist way of life upon the entire society. Notably, the alternative between the contrasting beliefs of Marxism and Catholicism was the product of ontological differences between the Party and the Church, which were possible to placate temporarily but impossible to reconcile permanently. Thus, only the destruction of the Church would have satisfied the communists.

Jan Widacki, the former minister of internal affairs (MSW) and a vehement critic of the regime, acknowledged this grievous doctrinal polarity by noting that it existed on three levels: philosophical, ideological, and psychological. In the philosophical sense, the Church propagated its own values and vision of humanity which were very different from those of Marxist ideology. Ideologically, the Church managed to maintain its political independence and institutional integrity, and, in spite of many communists’ efforts, remained largely uncontrollable, albeit relatively predictable. Finally, in a psychological sense, growing social respect for the clergy exasperated many ambitious security functionaries, sometimes to the point of murderous infuriation. In 1969, another MSW minister, Franciszek Szlachcic, explained reasons for the confrontation, blaming the other side for their bellicose attitude: “We need to distinguish between politics and

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473 For a detailed analysis of the antagonism between the Catholic faith and communist doctrine, see Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph..., 13-14.  
ideology. Détente from time to time is possible, as we have now. But the ideological fight is still on and intensifies. The ideological activity of the clergy is a part of their ideological sabotage. For the vice-minister, the religious activity of the Church was intrinsically ideological and thus unacceptable to the regime. The only acceptable modus vivendi would be by its total control. For these reasons, the regime was unwilling to tolerate the strong position of the Church in the mode of “peaceful co-existence.” The government’s attack on the Church was inevitable.

The Party’s full-fledged crusade against the Church and religiosity in general began in 1949 and employed the whole battery of state institutions — a secular school system, ferocious propaganda, derisive media and ubiquitous censorship. Undoubtedly, the Bezpieka played a critical role in organizing and supervising relentless anticlerical campaigns. Its methods of operation varied from the clandestine harassment of village priests to the preparation of a public trial of a bishop. After the Polish October (1956)

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475 “Trzeba rozróżnić politykę od ideologii. W polityce są możliwe okresowe odprężenia, jak obecnie. Ale w ideologii walka trwa i nasila się. Ideologiczne działania kleru stanowią część dywersji ideologicznej”: Notatka z narady w Departamencie IV MSW sporządzona przez naczelnika Wydziału IV KWMO w Katowicach 4 lutego 1969 roku (Minute from the Meeting in Departament IV of the MSW Made by the Director of the Departament IV of the KWMO in Katowice on February 4, 1969), as cited in Adam Dziurok (ed.), Metody pracy operacyjnej...

476 For a thorough analysis of the ideological duel between the Party and the Church, see Norbert A. Zmijewski in The Catholic-Marxist Ideological Dialogue in Poland, 1945-1980 (Dartmouth: Billing & Sons Ltd.,1991). Zmijewski discusses such problems as dispute between Karol Wojtyła and Leszek Kołakowski, the pursuit of power by the PAX organization, and Thomism versus Marxism debate.

477 Many of these actions were orchestrated by an independent Group “D” operating within the Department IV of the MSW. For example, they supervised publishing harmful articles in various periodicals such as Ancora, Samoobrona Wiary (Self–Defense of Faith) and Nowa Droga (The Road). Other methods were based on sending harassing letters, spreading false rumors and blackmailing based on denunciations from secret collaborators. For more information, see Krzysztof Persak and Łukasz Kamiński, A Handbook of the Communist Security..., 268.

478 According to historians Antoni Dudek and Andrzej Paczkowski, the Bezpieka’s activity slowly moved up the ladder of the Catholic hierarchy, beginning from propaganda assaults through summoning hierarchs to interrogation to arrest. The first was the bishop of Kielce, Czesław
which marked the end of Stalinism (The Polish Stalinists were removed from government by the nationalist-communists led by Władysław Gomułka), the security apparatus began tackling the Church mainly with administrative tools: instituting a military draft, the rejection of church construction permits, and rationing fuel for winter. Although varying in spitefulness, all these methods served the same purpose — to break as many clergy as possible to the point of numbness and threaten the most stubborn of them to the point of heart attack.

5.2. The religious masquerade of the regime: prelude to attack

Ironically, in the late 1940s, many Communist Party dignitaries were involved in a campaign designed to show their supposedly tolerant standing toward the Catholic Church. To win the support of Catholic Poles, the regime tried to exploit the mistakes of the main opposition leader, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who antagonized the Church through numerous polemics with the Catholic press, breaking off the concordat, supporting amendments to the family law (such as separation of civil and religious marriage) and

Kaczmarek, arrested in 1951; for more details see, Krzysztof Persak and Łukasz Kamiński, A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus..., 267-269.


480 For a detailed repertoire of the Bezpieka’s methods used against the Church, see Bogdan Szajkowski, Next to God...Poland. Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1983), 9-24.

481 For example, the functionaries of the Bezpieka who murdered Rev. Popiełuszko employed various methods to break him psychologically, see Krystyna Daszkiewicz, Uprowadzenie i morderstwo Ks. Jerzego Popiełuszki (Kidnaping and Murdering Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko) (Poznań: Kantor Wydawniczy SAWW, 1990), 276.

482 During the meeting of the functionaries of the Department IV of the SB between September 15 and 19, 1984, Colonel Adam Pietruszka argued: “That is the end of the game with Rev. Popiełuszko and Rev. Małkowski. We move to more vigorous actions. We need to shake them to the edge of heart attack” (“Dosyć tej zabawy z Popiełuszką i Małkowskiim, podejmujemy zdecydowane działania. Trzeba nimi tak wstrząsnąć, żeby to było na granicy zawału serca”): Krystyna Daszkiewicz, Uprowadzenie i morderstwo..., 303.
with the neo-pagan radical agrarianism of his party colleague Józef Niečko.\textsuperscript{483} Until the destruction of its political opposition and the anti-communist military units accomplished by 1950, the regime covered its atheistic face with a religious mask, as its hunger for power was larger than its ideological anticlericalism. The most visible ‘convert’ from atheism to ostensible Catholicism was Boleslaw Bierut, the leader of the Polish Communist Party, who went far beyond tolerant phrases, and on several occasions, with folded hands, made pilgrimages to the “bastion of superstition and reaction,” as the Catholic Church was called during secret briefings.\textsuperscript{484} In a climactic gesture, on February 5, 1947, he even swore a presidential oath, ending it with an exclamation “So help me God!” Surely, this declaration was not driven by emotions but by cold political calculation and indicated a temporary armistice in the state-church war. In the meantime, the Catholic Church quickly regained its strength after being debilitated by five years of brutal Nazi rule. Nevertheless, after 1945, Poland was a unique case of all states behind the Iron Curtain: for while religious groups of all kinds were under a fierce communist attack, in Hungary, Lithuania or Czechoslovakia the Polish Catholic Church enjoyed relative growth. As the Polish church historian, Hanna Diskin, noted in reference to the late 1940s, “Church baptism and a Catholic education of Communist Party members, including senior party members, had (…) bore witness to the extraordinary influence of the Polish Church.”\textsuperscript{485} Indeed, for the Polish communists of the late 1940s, there was nothing incongruous about participating in religious parades, baptisms, religious funerals.

\textsuperscript{483} Andrzej Paczkowski notes that relations between the Mikołajczyk’s party, PSL, and the Catholic Church were never straightforward, Stanisław Mikołajczyk czyli klęska realisty (Stanislaw Mikołajczyk - Failure of the Realist), 160-161.

\textsuperscript{484} “Ciemnogród i zabobonność” — in his memoirs, Jan Widacki recollects numerous nicknames for the Church used by the regime, for example: “agents,” “imperial emissaries” (“emisariusze imperializmu”), “warmongers” (“podżegacze wojenni”): Czego nie powiedział..., 87-88.

\textsuperscript{485} Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph..., 52.
and church weddings, especially if their leader did such things publicly.\textsuperscript{486} At the same time, however, the security functionaries put the clergy and the religious communists under strict surveillance, gathering evidence for future trials, which confirmed one defected high ranking security officer’s eloquent point that “for the regime there was no holiness whatsoever (see a cartoon below for satirical depiction).”\textsuperscript{487}

![Figure 9. A satirical depiction of the communist regime fighting religion. Source: Andrzej Mleczko, \textit{Pożegnanie z Komuną} (Farewell to Communism) (Fopress, 1990).](image)

Presumably, the Church’s fine liturgy and splendid ceremonials did not impress Bolesław Bierut, since in 1949 he threw off the mask of mildness and showed, from the Church’s perspective, a particularly diabolical face. The \textit{Bezpieka}’s machinery began to accelerate its ferocious anticlerical campaign — spying, arresting, misinforming,

\textsuperscript{486} Hanna Diskin, \textit{The Seeds of Triumph...}, 52.  
\textsuperscript{487} Words of Józef Swiatło, one of the the \textit{Bezpieka} chiefs, as cited by Zbigniew Błażyński in \textit{Mówi Józef Światło (Jozef Światlo Speaks)} (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1988), 45.
blackmailing and bribing the clergy.\textsuperscript{488} The attacks were so intense that on July 13, 1949, Pope Pius XII excommunicated Bierut and his communist colleagues. This was not the first time a formerly devoted ruler had met with a papal damnation, and paradoxically, this might have been a good moment to follow Henry VIII’s example of creating a new, state-friendly church. The efforts to do so using the PAX\textsuperscript{489} and “Patriotic Priests”\textsuperscript{490} were, however, unsuccessful. Ultimately, it was not the papal excommunication, but Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchëv’s anti-Stalinist speech that scared Bolesław Bierut to death: he died of a heart attack in Moscow, days after the 20\textsuperscript{th} Soviet Communist Party Congress turbulently deposed his mummified god, Joseph Stalin, from his exalted pedestal.\textsuperscript{491}

\textbf{5.3. The security functionary as homo sovieticus}

The regime’s materialistic, atheistic, and explicitly anticlerical doctrine, demanding undivided loyalty, was in fact a kind of religion itself.\textsuperscript{492} The uncritical belief

\textsuperscript{488} For more details and case studies, see: Filip Musiał and Jarosław Szarka (ed.), \textit{Operacja zniszczyć Kościół (Operation: To Destroy the Church)} (Kraków: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2007), as well as: Bogdan Szajkowski, \textit{Next to God} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 9-28.

\textsuperscript{489} PAX Association (\textit{Stowarzyszenie PAX}) was a pro-communist secular religious organization created to undermine grassroot support for the Polish Catholic Church: Normän Davies, \textit{God’s Playground} (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1998), 626-627.

\textsuperscript{490} According to Józef Światło, a special role in subjugating the Church was played by Bolesław Piasecki and his organization PAX. This organization was supported by the regime in order to weaken the Church. Światło also reveals the role of the “patriotic priests” used by the communists to destroy the Church from within. For more information, see: Zbigniew Błażyński, \textit{Mówi Józef Światło…}, 174-189. For other Soviet bloc countries, see: G. Gorman (ed.), \textit{Church and State in Postwar Eastern Europe: a Bibliographical Survey} (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Robert Goeckel, \textit{The Lutheran Church and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change Under Ulbricht and Honecker} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

\textsuperscript{491} The reasons for Bierut’s death were examined by Sławomir Stępień in \textit{Reakcje bezpieki na śmierć Tow. “Tomasza” (The Bezpieka’s Reactions to Comrade ‘Tomasz’ Death)} (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2005).

\textsuperscript{492} Historians debate whether communism was a substitute for religion. Nathaniel Davis claims that communism shared with many religions the physical attributes of worship, including
in the Communist Party served as an absolute precondition for working in the security apparatus. There is nothing strange in this fact since each security functionary had to be an exemplary communist who:

has absolute faith in the Party, which means that his faith in it is uncritical at every stage, no matter what the Party is saying. It is a person with the ability to adapt his mentality and his conscience in such a way that he can unreservedly accept the dogma that the Party is never wrong, even though it is wrong all the time — something the Party itself actually admits with every new stage it enters (...). Whoever is able to reconcile that contradiction or, to put in Marxist terms, that dialectical process — the Party’s infallibility and its fallibility — is a communist.493

The above definition of a communist provided by the Stalinist editor-in-chief of the Polish Press Agency unabashedly reveals the essentials of the functionaries’ creed. Ironically, the dogma of the Party’s infallibility was strikingly similar to the dogma of papal infallibility: it was supposed to be unquestioned and essential for personal survival, while the latter was unquestioned and essential for personal salvation.494 The assertion of “an absolute faith in the Party” embellished the regime with an aura of secular divinity based on “scientific historical determinism.”495 Surely, the faith in the Party — a

ceremonies, shrines, and rites. Lenin’s mausoleum and the Red Square parades are such an example: A Long Walk to Church (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), xxii; this belief is shared by John C. Bennett: Christianity and Communism (New York: Haden House Associated Press, 1948), 33-34, and Albert Boiter in Religion in the Soviet Union (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 10. This notion is opposed by, for example, Paul Gaber who thinks that atheism does not require an act of faith, but rather it is the negation of faith: And God Created Lenin (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 22.

493 This definition was provided by Stefan Staszewski, the first secretary of the Warsaw Communist Party Committee in the 1950s and the editor-in-chief of the Polish Press Agency, when he was asked a question “Who is a communist?” For the entire interview with Staszewski and other Polish communists of the Stalinist era, see: Teresa Torańska, “Them…”, esp. 128.

494 The dogma of papal infallibility was declared in 1870 in a Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Pastor Aeternus promulgated by Pope Pius IX. For more information about the dogma, see: Francis Sullivan, Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium (New York: Paulist, 1996).

495 This is the Marxist-Leninist stance that events are historically predetermined and justify leading role of the communist parties.
substitute for the old God, required a high level of devoutness, and many times sacrifice
to the point of “martyrdom.” Indubitable and wholehearted service to the regime
regardless of anything (sometimes, regardless of everything) must have been
accompanied by a large dose of fanaticism, dexterity, or both. Functioning in constant
dialectical fusions of extremes trained the security officers to the point of spiritual
numbness, mental stillness and ideological ossification. These were, however, the
essentials for becoming a new kind of man, fitting well into the definition of homo
sovieticus\textsuperscript{496} as provided by the Polish priest and philosopher Józef Tischner. For
Tischner, homo sovieticus is a man who is running away from responsibility,
opportunistic, aggressive towards the weakest and loyal towards the strongest,
intellectually incapacitated, deprived of dignity and totally subjected to the Party.\textsuperscript{497} In
other words, nothing more than an automaton, or, in other words, a “biorobot” of the
regime.

The Party was well aware that only officers free from religious ‘flaws’ could
evolve into homo sovieticus. In order to prevent functionaries from flirting with
religiosity, the regime organized internal anti-clerical campaigns, fervently ridiculing the
Church as bankrupt: denigrating the clergy as hypocrites; and poured scorn on the
religious ceremonialism as completely benighted. In this respect, the security personnel
were strictly instructed to represent the “materialistic worldview” (światopogląd
materialistyczny) as the only acceptable one, because it had been scientifically proven.

\textsuperscript{496} This term was initially introduced by the Soviet sociologist Aleksandr Zinoviev with
pejorative connotations to the concept of the “New Soviet Man” postulated by the Soviet
Communist Party. For details, see: Aleksandr Zinoviev, Homo Sovieticus (Boston: Atlantic

\textsuperscript{497} For an extensive analysis of homo sovieticus, see Józef Tischner, Etyka solidarności i Homo
sovieticus (Solidarity Ethics and Homo Sovieticus) (Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy
Although the regime claimed it cared for both “material and spiritual needs over all other social problems,” the materialistic approach it propagated substantially simplified human nature by neglecting eschatology, transcendence and spirituality. Jan Widacki observed that the security functionaries were not allowed to engage in ontological disputes, but told to accept the spiritless, ephemeral vision of humanity as dogma. More so, the Bezpieka elevated atheism to the rank of a moral virtue and condemned each act of religious activism as a serious infringement on the socialist “rule of ethics.”

Archival documents reveal that the regime considered the Church as an arrogant enemy. The institutionalized atheism among its security cadres was a preventative measure to make the Bezpieka immune to the potential infiltration of its cadres by the clergy: “We have to hit the enemy — the clergy. We deal with an extremely devious foe that knows very well how to use intrigue and other methods associated with the term >Jesuits<.” Moreover, aware of a possible influence by the functionaries’ Catholic relatives, the regime demanded that their wives also be nonbelievers: “an operational

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498 “Wyższość systemu socjalistycznego (…) [pola na tym], że troskę o człowieka i jego potrzeby materialne i duchowe wysuwa na czoło wszystkich problemów i zadań społecznych”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 r. (Speech of Stanisław Radkiewicz, the Minister of Public Security, to the National Executive Committee of the Security Apparatus, March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14, k. 1-42;
500 Jan Widacki, the former Vice-Minister of the MSW, writes about a militia functionary who was fired for organizing a religious funeral for his wife. In an explanatory document, the functionary was accused of “ethical rules’ violation”: Czego nie powiedział…, 78.
functionary cannot be a believer, as well as his wife. It especially concerns employees of Department V [responsible for fighting the church].\footnote{502} Very often, a wife tries to exercise an influence on her husband and the clergy uses family as a means to get to us.\footnote{503}

Moreover, to protect the security body from religious “infection,” all candidates for the ‘soldiers of the Party’ were questioned about their faith. In addition to submitting a detailed resume, each applicant had to fill out a form asking, among other questions, about religious attitudes. The former communist, Jan Widacki, notes that although he examined hundreds of personal files, he never saw the entry “Roman Catholic” or any other religion without a note “non-practicing.” Most applicants, however, claimed themselves to be either “non-believers” or “athiests”\footnote{504} — exactly what the regime looked for. In this vein, zealous to the point of absurdity was the application of Jerzy Gruba, future Commandant of the Bezpieka in Katowice, who assured on his questionnaire in 1953 that he would be devoted to service “with body and soul.”\footnote{505} He got the job.

\footnote{502} Department V of the Ministry of Public Security was responsible for preventing the hostile penetration, fighting political parties and church influence. For details on the MBP structure and evolution, see: Mirosław Piotrowski, \textit{Ludzie Bezpieki w walce z Narodem i Kościołem (The Bezpieka’s Men Fighting Against the Nation and the Church)} (Lublin: Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej, 2000).
\footnote{503} “Operacyjny pracownik nie może być człowiekiem wierzącym, jak również jego żona, szczególnie dotyczy to pracowników po linii V Departamentu. Żona bardzo często stara się wywierać wpływ na męża, kier usiłuje poprzez rodzinę dotrzeć do nas”: Speech of the Minister Radkiewicz recorded in \textit{Materiały narady aktywu MBP w dniach 23-25 marca...}
\footnote{504} “I had in my hands hundreds of personal files of the MO and SB functionaries. I saw hundreds of personal queries. I have never seen in any of them the entry ‘Roman-Catholic’ or any other without a note ‘non-practicing.’ Most of them, however, wrote ‘nonbeliever’ or “atheist’”\textquotedblright; \footnote{505} Jan Widacki, \textit{Czego nie powiedział...,} 151.
\footnote{505} Jan Widacki, \textit{Czego nie powiedział...,} 173.
The above preventive measures were accompanied by intellectual brainwashing. Ironically, the Communist Party leadership launched internal campaigns against religiosity borrowing words of religious connotation to refer to the regime itself. In this semantic mishmash, materialistically senseless words, such as “soul,” received new, “rationalized” meanings: “(...) care for party vigilance, party attitude, for ‘party soul,’ and for party raising should become the continuous responsibility of us all, our everyday effort.” This was not the only spiritually charged statement of Stanisław Radkiewicz, the Minister of Public Security (1944-1954), who had a general fondness for using pious expressions in his secret speeches. Once, he called the security apparatus “devoted and saturated with the party’s spirit,” on a different occasion, he criticized “functionaries with sins of crimes,” at another time, he urged their “growing in the spirit of frankness.” The Minister’s ethereal language became popular and keenly copied by other dignitaries. For example, one of the vice-directors of Public Security sanctified the Bezpieka’s vigilance as being “the most holy duty,” while his colleague, Colonel

506 “(...) troska o czujność partyjną, postawę partyjną, o ‘duszę partyjną,’ o wychowanie partyjne winna być stałym obowiązkiem nas wszystkich i wysiłkiem na co dzień”: Referat Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954...
507 “Ofiarny i przeniknięty partyjnym duchem aparat MBP (...)”: Rezolucja Sekretariatu KC PZPR w sprawie pracy organów bezpieczeństwa, przyjęta na posiedzeniu w dniu 24 lutego 1949 roku (Resolution of the PZPR Central Committee Concerning Work of the Security Apparatus, Enacted on February 24, 1949), AAN, KC PZPR, t. 2.
508 “Nie zaśmiecajmy aparatu państwowego przez ludzi, którzy nam bardzo często dają, a którzy mają sami grzechy przestępstwa i popełniają dalej przestępstwa”: Stanisław Radkiewicz’s speech in the Materiały odprawy szefów WUBP z 10 czerwca 1948 (Documents Concerning the Briefing for the District Offices of the Public Security Executives, June 10, 1948), CA MSW, 17/x/77, t. 4.
509 “Wychowanie w duchu szczerości”: Referat Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954...
510 “Nasz najświętszy obowiązek”: speech of the director Henryk Chmielewski (Vice-Director of the Department V of the MBP) during the MBP council held between March 23 and 25, 1949, AAN, KC PZPR, Papiery B. Bieruta 11/68.
Humer, lamented over functionaries who were “soulless and lacking party conscience.”

Edward Ochab, the first secretary of the Communist Party, called the Bezpieka a “devilish mill functioning without control,” and Franciszek Szlachcic, the MSW minister (February – December, 1971), pointed at “the security apparatus’s venial original sin” (ciężki grzech pierworodny). The most awkward and humorous was Edward Gierek’s reaction to Karol Wojtyła’s papal election in 1978. According to one of his aids, when Gierek was greeted with the surprising news, the First Secretary of the Party painfully exclaimed: “Oh, for God’s sake!”

The secrecy of these comments, with the exception of Szlachcic’s, precludes the possibility of such religious rhetoric being used for some kind of propaganda. The semantic syncretism of the Bezpieka’s newspeak can be explained in two other ways. First and foremost, it might have been force of habit since many functionaries were raised as Catholics and were used to expressing their feelings by words of religious

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511 “Bezdusznosc i brak sumienia partyjnego u niektórych pracowników aparatu śledczego”: the words of the Colonel Humer spoken during the Briefing for the National Council of the Security Apparatus’ Management, March 4, 1954 (Stenogram dyskusji na krajowej naradzie aktywu aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 r.), AIPN, MBP, 14.

512 “Organy bezpieczeństwa wyniosły się ponad partię, téz diabelski młyn działa bez kontroli”: Speech of Edward Ochab to the communist echelons in Katowice, April 1956, as cited by Franciszek Szlachcic, the MSW Minister, in his memoirs, Gorzki Smak Władzy (Bitter Taste of Power) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1992), 13.

513 In 1990, minister Franciszek Szlachcic interviewed by Jerzy Sławomir Mac said the following: “from the beginning the security apparatus had a venial original sin. The apparatus had in-born defects that were the result of the style of rules, servicing just one ideology and one Party” (“Aparat bezpieczeństwa obciążony był od początku ciężkim grzechem pierworodnym. Miał wady wrodzone, które wynikały z systemu rządzenia, służenia jednej ideologii i jednej partii”): Jerzy S. Mac, Przesłuchanie Supergliny (Interrogation of the SuperCap), 52.


515 The MBP vice-Minister Ptasiński was well aware of this fact and even warned that “many of our employees have been raised in religious manners since the cradle” (“Trzeba się liczyć z faktem, iż szereg naszych pracowników wychowywanych było od małego dziecka w duchu religijnym”): Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na
connotation. Jerzy Eisler, the Polish historian of communism, notes that all of them had been altar boys, and that at one occasion they even bragged to themselves about it.\(^{516}\) Moreover, many of them were barely educated and therefore unable to communicate in a more refined and less religious vocabulary.\(^{517}\) Secondly, the Marxist language itself might have been too narrow to express all thoughts, such as *party spirit* — understandable yet indefinable. In any event, the religious jargon of the *Bezpieka* was the farce of atheism as long as the security dignitaries were unable to free themselves from the influence of religious semantics.

### 5.4. The Inquisition within the Bezpieka

Despite anti-clerical campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s, the Catholic Church remained independent and hugely popular. The Communist Party was aware of its potential influence on all the sections of society, including the security functionaries. Although the *Bezpieka*’s Department of Human Resources was flooded with assurances of religious contempt, the Bolshevik rule of limited trust called for constant monitoring of the cadres. Between 1944 and 1981, the “spiritual care” over security functionaries was in the hands of party organizations operating at every level of the *Bezpieka*’s convoluted structure. In 1981, the internal inquisition had been institutionalized in the form of the Political-Educational Unit (Pion Polityczno-Wychowawczy, PPW) — a copy of a similar


\(^{517}\) The MBP’s vice-Minister Ptasiński was also aware of the functionaries’ educational lacks, see: *Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953...*, k. 308-319.
unit existing in the Ministry of National Defense since 1943. Militaristic in discipline and fanatical in attitude, the PPW pedantically and scrupulously combed through the background of security personnel looking for proselytes. The hunt for ideological infidels quickly won for the PPW infamy as the government’s most hated investigative unit.

However, for the last chief of the PPW, it was a cause for pride:

> We did not make a mistake by laying a special stress on the forming and the uninterrupted developing of the functionaries’ moral and ideological values. We always cared that the superiors raised their subordinates (...). Those functionaries who, for better results, violated the rule of law or collided, even slightly, with the ethics or law, were met with general condemnation and severity.

Indeed, the six hundred employees of the PPW unrelentingly stalked their colleagues, ensuring that they did not lose sight of the “pulsating beacon of Marxist-Leninism.” If they caught a functionary breaking the socialist rules of ethics, for example by baptizing a child, this “ideological conflict” (konflikt ideowy) would have been automatically reported to the superiors together with a plea for dismissal. It is no wonder that the PPW’s zeal scared the security personnel into more cautious service, which the chief of the PPW proudly admitted: “soon after, the life confirmed that the decision to set up the PPW was right. Immediately, this new unit began intensive influence on the

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519 Jan Widacki claims that PPW “was a unit particularly hated by majority of functionaries” (“Była to formacja szczególnie znienawidzona przez ógół funkcjonariuszy”): Jan Widacki, *Czego nie powiedział…*, 149.

520 “Stawiając już od pierwszych chwil istnienia naszych organów na kształtowanie i konsekwentne rozwijanie wartości ideowo-moralnych funkcjonariuszy, nie popełniliśmy błędu. Dbaliśmy zawsze o to, by przelożeni wychowywali podwładnych (...). Z ogólnym potępieniem i surowością spotykali się nieodmiennie ci funkcjonariusze, którzy zabiegając o wyniki pracy stosowali metody naruszające praworządność lub kolidujące — nawet w niewielkim stopniu — z etyką i prawem”: Referat wiceministra MSW Czesława Staszczaka wygłoszony w Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych w Warszawie w 1987 roku (Speech of the MSW Vice-Minister Czesław Staszczak Presented in the Academy of Internal Affairs in Warsaw, 1987).
functionaries’ actions. It encouraged the superiors to take more attentive care to the moral and political state of their subordinates and to consider ‘upbringing function’ as primary.”\textsuperscript{521}

Figure 10. On the left: “The reaction is overcome”: a communist propagandist drawing praising “the soldier of the Party” by Kazimierz Grusa; source: “Szpilki,” July 17, 1945, no 20. On the right: Archangel Michael defeating the devil, source: www.ilianrachov.com

After the scandalous murder of Rev. Popiełuszko by four functionaries from the echelons of the MSW (October 1984), the Minister of Internal Affairs demilitarized the PPW by granting its oversight to a civilian with a rank of MSW vice-minister. It was a smart move aimed to increase the PPW’s prestige but to not fundamentally change its formula at the same time. The PPW’s first civilian director put much stress on indoctrination of the cadres through various non-disciplinary means, mainly speeches and publications.

\textsuperscript{521} “Już wkrótce życie potwierdziło słuszność decyzji o powołaniu Służby Polityczno-Wychowawczej w resorcie spraw wewnętrznych. Nowo utworzony aparat zaczął intensywnie oddziaływać na postawy funkcjonariuszy, dopinając przełożonych do poświęcania zagadnieniom stanu moralno-politycznego podwładnych więcej uwagi, do traktowania funkcji wychowawczej jako nadrzędnej”: Referat wiceministra MSW Czesława Staszcaka...
The PPW prepared periodicals, such as the Biuletyn (Bulletin), to educate the functionaries about the clandestine activity of the enemies. However, these periodicals contained no sophisticated methods for fighting the Church. The articles raised the security personnel’s intellects to the mere level of a popular encyclopedia: from one issue of the Biuletyn, for example, readers could find out that the Vatican is the name for one of the hills in Rome, and this name derives from Latin viticino meaning “forecast” or “prediction.” Much more sophisticated was “Ancora,” which printed a new issue each month between 1976-1983. Officially published by the Polish Center for the Second Vatican Council Renewal (Polski Ośrodek Odnowy Soborowej), it was in fact prepared by the Bezpieka specialists to divide the Church from within. In the communist plans, the journal was addressed to the clergy to supposedly create an impression that there is a strong dissident movement against Primate Stefan Wyszyński and the Polish Episcopate. The “Ancora” (printed in a primitive manner for better credibility) contained translations and reprints of Western theologians and Catholic dissidents, such as Hans Küng, as well as articles written by professors at the Academy of Catholic

522 Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 148.
523 Its editor-in-chief was Colonel Konrad Straszewski, the chief of the Department IV responsible for fighting the Church. He was also a member of the infamous group “D” established for “special operations.” See for details, Jan M. Rokita and Antoni Dudek, Raport Rokita: sprawozdanie Sejmowej Komisji Nadzwyczajnej do Zbadania Działalności MSW (The Rokita Report: The Report of the Special Parliamentary Commission for the Examination of the MSW Work) (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2005).
525 Reverend Father Hans Küng is a controversial Swiss Catholic theologian who rejected the doctrine of papal infallibility and criticized Pope John Paul II for restoration of the pre-Vatican II status quo. See, for example: Hans Küng, Infallible? An Inquiry; Papal Ministry in the Church (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983).
Theology (Akademia Teologii Katolickiej) secretly recruited to work for the *Bezpieka.*

The journal did not break the Church, but the attempt shows how the security functionaries were ingenious when it came to fighting it. Next to terror and primitive propaganda, the security apparatus also employed sophisticated tactics that relied on the highest theological quality.

In addition to this inquisitorial hunts and educational efforts, the PPW also specialized in ideological resurrections. The unit took special care of the “mentally weakest” functionaries, usually the youngest in service — those who often were “politically unstable” (rozchwiani politycznie). These functionaries were not always considered lost, but needed “caring ideological and educational help (...) that would restore their *faith* in (...) socialist rules and strengthen ideological attitude based on the socialist hierarchy of values.” This ambitious goal was carried out by breathing a new “socialist spirit” into insentient officers. For the PPW, the revival of faith in socialism was just a matter of competent indoctrination based on “wise and true interpretation of facts.” Obviously, the goal of indoctrination in the Marxist spirit was to convince doubtful officers that the Party was always right, and that all failures are temporary or

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526 “Esbeckie ministerium…” The article was also published at http://medeksza.blogspot.com on August 8, 2008.

527 For more information about the *Ancora,* see the article in the *Biuletyn IPN,* nr 1/2003, M. Lasota, “O raporcie sejmowej komisji poświęconym samodzielnej grupie „D” w MSW” ("About the Parliamentary Commission’s Report on the Separate Group “D” in the MSW") *Biuletyn IPN,* nr 1/2003, 35.

528 The PPW director, Czesław Staszczak, warned in one of his secret speeches against some “mentally weakest functionaries susceptible to political wobbling”: *Referat wiceministra MSW Czesława Staszczaka…*

529 “Funkcjonariusze ci, przeważnie bardzo młodzi, nie byli dla resortu straceni. Wymagali jednak troskliwej ideowo-wychowaczej pomocy i opieki, która między innymi przez mądrą i prawdziwą interpretację zdarzeń przywróciłaby im wiarę w nasze socjalistyczne pryncypia oraz umocniła postawy ideowe oparte na socjalistycznej hierarchii wartości”: *Referat wiceministra MSW Czesława Staszczaka…*

530 “Mądra i właściwa interpretacja zdarzeń”: *Referat wiceministra MSW Czesława Staszczaka...*
necessary to reach more advanced stages of socialist development during the long pilgrimage towards the communist paradise. Thus, to keep the socialistic pilgrimage moving at all cost, the PPW tried to restore functionaries’ sense of duty and hope in socialism, actualizing the spiteful aphorism that socialism without hope is like church without faith.  

The PPW’s Marxist sorceries were, however, only partially successful: once its chief bemoaned that young officers were more receptive to ideological rather than moral transformations. The Party decided to try to counteract this. Created by one signature of the security minister, the Board for Functionaries’ Security (Zarząd Ochrony Funkcjonariuszy, ZOF) became yet another remedy for moral perversions and legal transgressions. Called by officers “security within security,” the ZOF’s role — exactly as its name indicates — was to protect the “security functionaries from themselves.” One can see in the ZOF a desperate effort to prevent the officers from seeing hopelessly catastrophic economic reality by keeping them “mentally incapacitated.” This two-hundred-headed Leviathan living parasitically inside the Bezpieka’s body was a pacemaker for the slacking “heart of the Party” — as the security apparatus was often

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531 This observation is supposedly Willy Brand’s, though I was unable to confirm that in my research.

532 “Soon later our daily work revealed that it is easier to infuse the young functionaries’ consciousness with the political and ideological rules than with the ethical and moral principles” (“Niebawem w toku codziennej pracy okazało się jednak, że łatwiej jest kształtować w świadomości młodych funkcjonariuszy pryncypia polityczno-ustrojowe niż zasady etyczno-moralne”): Referat wicem ministra MSW Czesława S. Staszczaka...

533 Zarząd Ochrony Funkcjonariuszy was created by General Kiszczak’s regulation (Zarządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych) in the last days of December 1984.

534 Paweł Piotrowski claims that ZOF was disliked by the functionaries because over 90 percent of its investigations concerned financial or criminal offences: “Przemiany MSW w latach 1989-1990” (“Changes in the Ministry of Interior Affairs between 1989 and 1990”), Bulletin of the Institute of National Remembrance, issue no. 4, 2004, 47.

metaphorically called.\textsuperscript{536} If the Party’s role was to inspire, the ZOF and PPW were to examine who became inspired.\textsuperscript{537} To fulfill this paramount duty, the ZOF did not hesitate to refer to paralegal means. Each entry into correspondence and each bug planting — the ZOF’s favorite tactics — violated the statute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Office which prohibited spying within the MSW.\textsuperscript{538} These were, however, “meaningless details” if the protection of ideological purity was at stake.

![Figure 11. “Search, Search!” The security officers were often pejoratively called “the dogs” (see, for example, the film “Psy” by Władysław Pasikowski).\textsuperscript{539} This is a drawing by the anti-communist artist Andrzej Mleczko, source: www.mleczko.pl](image)

In exceptional cases, the ZOF was allowed to recruit secret collaborators among the security personnel. But in order not to endanger the solidarity between the officers —

\textsuperscript{536} See, for example, Andrzej K. Kunert (ed.), \textit{Bijące serce Partii (Beating Hart of the Party)} (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ADIUTOR, 2001).
\textsuperscript{537} See, for example, \textit{Poradnik w sprawie poznawania i kształtowania stanu moralno-politycznego i nastrojów w resorcie spraw wewnętrznych}.\textsuperscript{538} \textit{Ustawa o Urzędzie Spraw Wewnętrznych}, Dz.U. 12, poz. 10. 432.
\textsuperscript{539} Władysław Pasikowski, \textit{Psy}, (Juliusz Machulski Production, 1992). The film is about former security functionaries who had been positively verified and allowed to work for the Police. The film became controversial for portraying the security functionaries vulgar language and brutal methods of work.
essential for coordinated teamwork — each secret collaborator was traditionally dismissed after the particular investigation had been closed. In any case, the scope of the ZOF interest was virtually unlimited as its curiosity was not satisfied by studying officers’ potentially harmful behavior. The ZOF were also interested in the officers’ attitude which justified interventions in every possible sphere of a functionary’s life, including the intimate (compare figure 11). The eyes of the Bezpieka’s Leviathan tended to squint convergently into functionaries personae, as well as divergently — onto functionaries’ surroundings. It is applied to former officers. Since work in the security apparatus was more than profession – it was a life-long vocation, nobody could simply left the Bezpieka without consequences.\footnote{540} In one such example, the ZOF kept complete surveillance on the families of former Bezpieka operatives: Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski and Colonel Adam Pietruszka — the infamous murderers of Rev. Popiełuszko, chaplain of ‘Solidarity.’ The bugs were active for five years, until the ZOF’s demise in 1989.\footnote{541}

5.5. Degenerate functionaries

In spite of all these endeavors, many security functionaries were still unable to “unchain their minds” from the Catholic devoutness and participated more or less regularly, yet clandestinely, in religious ceremonies. The idea of raising a functionary in the spirit of duplicity — a clever tactic to deceive the regime’s enemy, in numerous cases

\footnote{\textit{540} Krzysztof Kąkolewski, \textit{Ksiądz Jerzy...}, 26.}
\footnote{\textit{541} For example, between 1985 and 1990 Colonel Adam Pietruszka’s family surveillance by the Bezpieka (operation’s codename: “Teresa”) was aimed at solving all the circumstances of Rev. Popiełuszko’s death. See, Paweł Tomaski, “Adam Pietruszka (ur. 1938), zastępca dyrektora Departamentu IV MSW” (“Adam Pietruszka (born in 1938), the Vice-Director of the MSW Departament IV) in Bogdan Strycharz (ed.), \textit{Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989 (The Apparatus of Oppression In the People’s Poland, 1944-1989)} (Rzeszów: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 1/5/2007), 528.}
turned against the regime itself. If a functionary’s duplicity accidentally reversed polarity, the double-edged sword of slyness could become dangerous for the sheath of the security apparatus. Numerous sources indicate that the religiosity of the Bezpieka personnel did not concern only isolated cases. The defected Lieutenant Colonel Józef Światło publicly admitted that “security functionaries, even if they do not participate in weekly religious activities, still try to get married in the Church. Many times, they travel to distant locations for the wedding (…). I know that these cases were numerous.” The security minister discussing problems of the Bezpieka with its executives during a secret conference in 1954, made a similar observation: “There are still cases of religious devoutness, petit bourgeois mentality, bossiness, drunkenness and hooliganism.” The most striking seems to be, however, the secret discussion between the security dignitaries held during one of the most tumultuous times in the Bezpieka’s history (December 1984). Exactly at the moment when Rev. Popiełuszko’s murder received world press coverage forcing the security apparatus to retreat, the minister furtively discussed ways to uproot religious devoutness out of the security cadres: “the problem of religious devoutness has reached a level, from which we cannot escape. So far, we had been reacting to it in

542 “Funkcjonariusze UB nawet jeżeli nie uczęszczają do kościoła, to mimo to na ogół starają się brać śluby w kościele. Jadą nieraz do odległych miejscowości na ślub (…). Wiem, że takich spraw było dużo”: Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło..., 184.
543 “Występują jeszcze przejawy religianctwo, obyczajowości drobnomieszczańskiej, dygnitarstwo, pijaństwo i chuligaństwo”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu kierowniczego...
various ways, but we need unified tactics, regulations, and methodology.\textsuperscript{545} The
Minister’s idea of setting strict rules against religiously devout and ideologically devious
functionaries was enthusiastically supported by all the conference participants as a useful
“step ahead” — a step toward institutionalized atheism.\textsuperscript{546}

It would be naïve, however, to think that the Party leaders trivialized religiosity as
something that may disappear if the functionaries cut themselves physically from the
Church. As early as 1953, one of the security vice-ministers warned his Party comrades
that:

Overcoming religious superstitions is not easy and simple. In many cases, we
consider the employee a nonbeliever because he does not go to church and
does not participate in religious ceremonies. It is an unrealistic and
superfluous judgment. The reality is different. In practice, people dither for a
long time, and it may last forever if they are left without political and
ideological help of the party organizations and all the active communists.
Often we are caught by surprise: one hid his religiosity, the other baptized his
child in the village church, another secretly traveled the country to get married
in church.\textsuperscript{547}

For this apparatchik, the roots of the problem laid in the \textit{Bezpieka} recruitment
procedure favoring candidates of a peasant or proletarian pedigree, which in fact worked

\textsuperscript{545} “Narósł u nas problem religianctwa od którego nie możemy uciec. Różnie
podchodzimy do
przypadków religianctwa i konieczne są w tym zakresie jednolita polityka, zasady i praktyka”: General Czesław Kiszczak’s speech during the MSW executives conference held on December 5, 1984.
\textsuperscript{546} Other participants were: General Jedynak, General Pożoga, General Beim, General Czubiński and General Zaczkowski.
\textsuperscript{547} “Przezwyciężenie przesądów religijnych nie jest rzeczą taką łatwą i prostą. My w szeregu
wypadków sugerujemy się tym, że pracownik nie chodzi do kościoła, nie odbywa praktyk
religijnych i uważamy, iż stał się niewierzącym. Jest to bardzo powierzchowny i nie
odpowiadający rzeczywistości sąd. W praktyce jest inaczej, w praktyce ludzie okres wahania
przechodzą dość długo i jeśli w tym okresie nie ma dostatecznie rozbudowanej pracy polityczno-
ideologicznej ze strony organizacji partyjnych i całego naszego aktywu, to może się on
przeciągać w nieskończoność. Ileż zaskakuje nas faktów: a ten ukrył swoją religijność, a ten w
skrytości gdzieś na wieś wywiódł dziecko, aby je ochrzcić, inny znów w skrytości wyjechał na
drugi koniec kraju i wziął ślub kościelny”: Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3
września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu...
in favor of the Church, not the regime. Despite constant application filtering, the Bezpieka accepted many peasants and workers who had been raised in the Catholic faith since the cradle, so it would be “naïve to think” — the vice-minister alerted — “that such an employee could cut off his religious ties within a year or two (...).”

This strikingly pragmatic assessment of the situation called for the redefinition of a nonbeliever. To the vice-minister, mere physical withdrawal from the church did not alone constitute an atheist — it must be accompanied by an internal transformation in the “spirit of the materialistic outlook.” The regime saw this realized through the substitution of the cult of Yahweh by the cult of the Party (compare figure 12). To achieve this goal, brainwashing focused on denigrating religiosity to the level of socially accepted pathologies — drunkenness and hooliganism. Thus, given its re-definition as morally deprived, devoutness was clearly not considered an element of socialist ethics, but rather its grievous violation.

In the 1980s, it became customary for “morally degenerate functionaries” who blemished the code of socialist ethics by dipping their fingers into holy water to be “amputated” as the atrophied members of the security apparatus. Catching an officer inhaling incense was proof that he already incensed a dangerous dose of the Catholic spirit and therefore betrayed the regime. “The Militia had trust in you, and you betrayed

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548 “Zresztą naiwnym byłoby, gdybyśmy liczyli, że przychodząc do nas, pracownik w ciągu roku czy dwóch potrafi zerwać praktykę religijną (...): Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu...

549 “Therefore, the cadres of teachers and all the educational workers are to fight the religiousness in the spirit of the materialistic outlook on the world” (“Dlatego przed kadrą wykładowców i całym aparatem szkolenia zawodowego stoi sprawa walki z naciskiem religianctwa, wychowania kadr pracowników w duchu materialistycznego poglądu na świat”): Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 roku na zakończenie kursu...

550 “Występują jeszcze przejawy religianctwa, obyczajowości drobnomieszczańskiej, dygnitarstwa, pijaństwo i chuligaństwo”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową naradę aktywu...
them by having a relationship with the clergy!” — Sergeant Tadeusz Milczewski heard these words accompanied by a dismissal order signed by the security minister himself.\footnote{The order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czesław Kiszczak, no. 01294. The details of the Milczewski’s case were explored by the press, see for example: “Rozkaz Kiszczaka. Zwalnict za ślub” (“The Kiszczak’s Order: Firing for the Wedding”), \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, September 16, 2008.}

Sergeant Milczewski “betrayed” the Party by having a religious wedding with a woman with three priests in her family and for not reporting this “outrageous” fact to his superiors.\footnote{This information were revealed during Kiszczak’s trial launched in September 2008. Kiszczak was accused by Milczewski of violating law, for details, see: “Rozkaz Kiszczaka. Zwalnict za ślub” (“The Kiszczak’s Order: Firing for the Wedding”), \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, September 16, 2008.} These kinds of cases were numerous and concerned even less grievous acts.\footnote{“Rozkaz Kiszczaka. Zwalnict za ślub” (“The Kiszczak’s Order: Firing for the Wedding”), \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, September 16, 2008.} The MSW minister, Czesław Kiszczak, for example, did not hesitate to dismiss an officer for merely allowing his daughter to participate in the First Communion ceremony.\footnote{“Były Naczelnik z MSW. Z MO nie zwalniano za praktyki religijne” (“The Former MSW Director: The Militia Did Not Dismiss for Participation in Religious Ceremonies”): \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, September 16, 2008.}

![Figure 12. A cartoon by the anti-communist artist Andrzej Mleczko. Source: Andrzej Mleczko, \textit{Pożegnanie z Komuną (Farewell to Communism)} (Fopress, 1990).](image)
Exemplary is the story of Colonel Tadeusz R., unidentified by last name, who worked in the security apparatus for forty years with an ideal communist’s attitude. In 1985, his name was even put into the Honorary Book of the SB and MO Functionaries of Merit, and his chest glistened with medals of all colors, including two of the brightest: the Poland’s Rebirth Veterans’ Cross and the Poland’s Rebirth Officers’ Cross. The ever-suspicious PPW did not, however, lose the distinguished functionary from their sight. The death of the Colonel’s wife (February, 1987) was yet another occasion to check his loyalty. This time, the PPW’s limited trust proved to be rewarding: soon after the surveillance had been launched, the vice-director of the PPW found on his desk an interesting note:

According to the order, on February 2, 1987 at 2 PM, I went to Colonel R.’s home in order to find out the date and the character of the funeral of his wife, who deceased on February 1. During the discussion, after extending condolences, I have established that the funeral is scheduled on February 4 at 12 PM (Thursday) in the Catholic rite. I submit this note for operational usage.⁵⁵⁵

The next day, the widower was visited by two lieutenant-colonels who expressed their sorrow for his wife’s death. One would be mistaken to think, however, that consolation was a part of the Bezpieka’s statutory mission: “then, we got to the point and notified him about the MSW dissatisfaction with his agreement for the wife’s Catholic

⁵⁵⁵ “Zgodnie z poleceniem w dniu 2 II 1987 r. o godz. 14.00 udałem się do mieszkania płk. R. w celu ustalenia daty i charakteru pogrzebu zmarłej w dniu 1 II br. żony. Po złożeniu kondolencji w czasie prowadzonej rozmowy ustaliłem, że w dniu 4 II o godz. 12 (czwartek) odbędzie się pogrzeb żony z obrządkiem katolickim. Powyższą notatkę przedkładam w celu wykorzystania służbowego”: Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 80.
The officers did not forget to remind the Colonel how much he owed to the regime, but this only irritated the widower who replied that the religious character of the funeral was the decision of his daughter, over whom he had no influence. Unable to break his stubbornness, the officers left the Colonel after posing the rhetorical question of whether he was aware of the consequences of his decision. The Colonel was unmoved as much as the PPW. Several days after his wife’s coffin had been sprinkled by holy water and buried, he was called by superiors and pressed to sign a plea for his own dismissal. A month later, he met with the Party lambaste, and in April was dismissed from service by the ministerial order no 0904, which wholeheartedly approved the PPW’s motion:

(...) In February 1987, Colonel R. organized a religious funeral of his wife and, in spite of a warning discussion, did not change his mind. This event met with criticism of the functionaries and senior citizens. Colonel R. not only compromised himself as a Party member, but also undermined the security apparatus’s authority. Leaving him active in service would violate the rules of ethics and customs of the MO [militia] and SB [secret security] functionaries.

Before dismissal from the Bezpieka, the superiors usually tried to break the proselytes mentally by giving them glimmers of hope for institutionalized forgiveness if they showed enough remorse. The forms varied: while Colonel R. was asked to sign a plea for his dismissal another member of the Party, Sergeant Milczewski was encouraged

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556 “(…) wyraziwszy słowa współczucia z powodu śmierci żony, przystąpiliśmy do meritum sprawy, wyrażając dezaprobatę Kierownictwa Resortu MSW z faktu godzenia się go na obrządkowość katolicką pogrzebu żony”: Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 80.

557 “(…) W miesiącu lutym 1987 r. po śmierci żony zorganizował jej pogrzeb z obrzędem kościenym i mimo przeprowadzonej z nim rozmowy nie odstąpił od tego zamieru. Fakt ten w miejscowym środowisku oraz wśród funkcjonariuszy, emerytów i rencistów jest negatywnie komentowany. Płk R. swoim zachowanie skompromitował się nie tylko jako członek PZPR, ale również podważał autorytet naszym organom. Pozostawienie wymienionego w dalszej służbie byłoby sprzeczne z zasadami etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy MO i SB”: The motion had been signed by the Chief of the WUSW (District Office of the Internal Affairs) and his subordinate responsible for the PPW, as cited in Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 81.
to sign a derogatory statement denouncing his beliefs and family: “I broke with my in-laws [because of their religiosity] and moved with my wife and child to a rented room. I did not baptize the child. I am against Christianity.” 558 Self criticism, regardless how sincere, was usually in vain because final decisions, made in the 1980s by the MSW minister himself, were predominantly negative. 559 Presumably, the dialectics of “a functionary publicly fighting against the Church and privately attending religious ceremonies with a wife” 560 was impossible to reconcile. The Party wanted both its soldiers’ bodies and souls; any compromise was ruled out.

5.6. “My soul rejoices” 561

If there was no evidence of other subversive activity, religious functionaries were usually expelled from service, which meant financial and social denigration but at least no criminal repercussions. Many of the dismissed officers were later accepted into the reformed post-communist police force in 1990. The recruitment procedure revealed an interesting case: on one occasion, the police accepted a functionary previously dismissed for religious activity, but the commission soon later revealed that this functionary used to ruthlessly dismiss his colleagues for the same “moral violations.” 562 This was a typical example of moral schizophrenia nurtured for years in the communist environment. The regime elevated hypocrisy to a moral virtue, hiding its inner immorality behind the façade

558 Tadeusz Milezewski’s statement as read by the Judge Ewa Kopacz, “Rozkaz Kiszczaka…”.
559 “Rozkaz Kiszczaka…”.
560 Such an expression was used by Colonel Jerzy Siedlecki, the Director of the Functionaries’ Personnel’s Bureau discussing influence of the Church on the Bezpieka, The Briefing on November 21, 1949, CA MSW 17/IX/77, t. 5.
561 Words of Minister Kiszczak in reaction to the Bezpieka’s subversive activity against Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko: Fredro-Boniecki Tadeusz, Zwycięstwo księdza..., 39.
562 Jan Widacki’s memoire, Czego nie powiedział..., 151.
of a peculiar word with presumably positive charge: “the ostensible activity” (działania pozorne). For example, Minister Kiszczak relied on a group of people in the MSW who used to prepare anniversary cards for the hated clergy. “Personally, I am very happy that His Holiness, John Paul II, vested upon you such an honorable dignity, you — whom I honor with deepest respect and trust” — with these lofty words, the MSW minister greeted Alojzy Orszulik as a new bishop. The “card unit” must have lacked the necessary panache, however, since these warm wishes were composed by the minister himself in the form of a correction to the unit’s proposal in a more reserved form. Notably, a copy of such cards had been sent via administrative channel to the director of the MSW department responsible for fighting the Church. This paradoxical procedure was nothing less than a microcosm of the socialist morality: the minister sent cards with grandiloquent wishes to a bishop, while his subordinates sent criminals to burn the bishop’s car. In the regime’s masquerade, everyone played their assigned roles: some were to be ostensibly friendly, others — realistically ruthless.

Undoubtedly, being involved in anti-church activities brought some of the functionaries into the Church’s sphere of influence. Spying on nuns, eavesdropping on priests, or recording sermons must have exposed security personnel to a condensed dose of theoretical and practical Catholicism. Some officers became closer to the altar than many of the most devout non-police Catholics could dream. The regime did not hesitate

563 “Osobiście bardzo się cieszę, że tą wysoką godnością Jego Świętobliwość Jan Paweł II obdarzył kapłana, którego darzę najwyższym szacunkiem i zaufaniem”: General Kiszczak’s wishes as remembered by Jan Widacki, 91.
564 Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 91.
565 See, for example, the case of Captain Stanisław Proszowski, the Head of the WUSB Department IV in Poznań, who violated rules of working with secret collaborators by establishing too friendly relations with local priests: Rozkaz Karny Nr 074/55 (Punitive Order No. 074/55) from August 9, 1955, AC-R-229/55, IPN 01225/230, k. 43.
to exploit this opportunity and trained several officers to celebrate Holy Mass; some of them even managed to sneak into confessional to hear sins. Particularly interesting is the MSW project of examining all sermons for their anti-regime content. During one Sunday, the many sections of the security apparatus recorded several thousand sermons throughout Polish churches. The material was later re-heard and re-examined by church specialists. This the most complex exegesis of sermons in the history of the world homiletics revealed that over ninety percent of them did not have any ideological connotations whatsoever. Did they bring the officers closer to Christianity? The archives do not contain an answer for this question.

Each act of dismissal from service was a dramatic gesture of the ideologically moribund regime, less effective and more discouraged with every decade, yet still unable to saturate Polish society with an attractive substitute for Catholicism. The really dramatic convulsions came after the ascendance of Karol Wojtyła to the papal throne in 1978. Jan Widacki notes that John Paul II was the reason why “the Bezpieka went absolutely crazy over the Church.” In an institutional sense, “craziness” was manifested in the increased surveillance of the clergy. In the colloquial sense, many functionaries went crazy about the Pope, admiring him as a person. Aware of that danger, the 67,000 functionaries participating in the operation “Summer-79” (protecting a papal visit to Poland in June 1979) were given strict orders not to show spontaneous

566 Kąkolewski Krzysztof, Ksiądz Jerzy..., 295-296.
567 “Po wyborze Jana Pawła II esbeja na punkcie Kościoła dosłownie oszalała”: Jan Widacki’s memoire, Czego nie powiedział..., 89.
568 The operation „Summer-79” employed 67,391 functionaries, out of which 49,353 were in military uniforms. The security officers used two camcorders, 21 cameras and 37 voice recorders. This army had 5,769 cars and 5,286 radio stations. In reserves, there were almost 5,000 ORMO men. For more details about the pilgrimage logistics, see: Filip Musiał and Jarosław Szarka (ed.), Operacja..., 157.
welcome to the Pontiff, but rather to behave “according to the secular character of the People’s Poland.” Several officers, however, ignored this directive and kissed the Pope’s hand, and even knelt in front of him. These cases were later scrutinized by the Bezpieka investigative unit. Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, some officers were seen expressing their respect to Primate Stefan Wyszyński by saluting him — a phenomenon widespread among the majority of the security personnel. The regime tried to counteract this by imposing strict disciplinary rules and tough sanctions, but all with limited success.

5.7. The Catholic Church on the offensive

There is evidence that the regime’s perception of the Church as an arrogant enemy was partially justified. Virtually every member of the Party, regardless of rank and experience, could become a target for evangelization. The striking case of conversion concerned Colonel Julia Brystygier — one of the most fervent anti-clerical Stalinists from the echelons of the communist government. Her nickname “Bloody Luna” and description of “a criminal beast which surpassed in cruelty German she-wards from concentration camps” is telling. Luna’s fanatic pro-Soviet attitude and exceptional intelligence (She was a doctor of philosophy who had attended the Sorbonne) widely opened doors to her career in the security apparatus. Between 1950 and 1954 Colonel

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569 This issue is briefly discussed by Marek Lasota in Filip Musiał and Jarosław Szarka (ed.), Operacja..., 157.
570 The Bezpieka scrutinized, for example, Sergeant Kazimierz Aleksandrek for his knowledge about an officer who knelt in front of the Pontiff and kissed his hand. Aleksandrek claimed it was not true, but a historian Marek Lasota claims that this most probably happened, see: Filip Musiał and Jarosław Szarka (ed.), Operacja..., 157.
571 This statement is based on the MSW minister Franciszek Szlachcic’s memoir, Gorzki Smak..., 79.
Brystygier was a director of the MBP Department V responsible for fighting the Church. Next to preparing long term anti-clerical strategies, she personally enjoyed sexual torturing — her most favorite one was interrogating naked priests, hitting their genitals with a whip and squeezing them in a wardrobe.\(^5^7^3\)

On occasion, Bloody Luna was exposed to dare attempts to convert her into Catholicism. Once, for example, an interrogated nun, Maria Okońska,\(^5^7^4\) tried to exploit suspiciously kind attitude of Luna and boldly questioned her about faith. This trivial conversation had an unexpected outcome. Maria Okońska promised the Colonel to pray for her by thinking of her in “the most beautiful way a man can think about another man.”\(^5^7^5\) This attempt of evangelization, ending with a cordial hug between a victim and the oppressor, within a week won freedom for the nun and only encouraged her to even more intense prayer for the “poor communist.” A year later, Maria Okońska was on the full offensive, voluntarily visiting Colonel Brystygier with a New Testament — a gift offered to Luna by the Primate Wyszyński himself.\(^5^7^6\) For the time being it was fruitless: a few years later Wyszyński was arrested and anti-church campaign intensified. In 1956, however, “Bloody Luna” lost her job in the public security and for a long time lived on

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\(^5^7^4\) Maria Okońska was the most important figure of the Primate’s Institute (Instytut Prymasowski), and a close assistant of Primate Stefan Wyszyński, for more details, see her memoire: *Przez Maryję wszystko dla Boga. Wspomnienia 1920-1948* (Through Mary Everything for God. Memoire 1920-1948) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo im. Stefana Kardynała Wyszyńskiego SOLI DEO, 2008).


\(^5^7^6\) Jan Grzegorczyk, “Wielki Piątek...”. See also: J. Góra and J. Grzegorczyk, *Skrawek nieba albo o Ojcu i Królu (Piece of Heaven or abort the Father and the King)* (Poznań, 2001).
bread and water. Her frequently visits of a friend in a Catholic House for the Blind in Laski exposed the former Colonel to the Catholic way of life and finally made her to convert to Catholicism and ask for baptism (being Jewish by origin she was not baptized in childhood). By the end of her life, she used to take Communion every day, prayed a lot, gave large sums of money to the blind children and, finally, “died completely reconciled with God…” Some people were suspicious of the authenticity of her conversion, but her new friend, Reverend Antoni Marylski, was sure that Luna underwent a real conversion because “she realized how much evil and unhappiness was caused by her actions and now she tries to fix a lot by her new Christian life.”

The regime viewed Luna’s conversion in Laski as an example of the Church’s dangerous power. Many members of the Party, communist intelligentsia, and the security officers including those who fought against the Church visited the House in Laski looking for spiritual help. The House was visited by atheist Jews as well as by former Catholics who previously abandoned their faith for the carrier in the state apparatus. Secret baptisms of communists and their children (sometimes adults) became a norm. Not surprisingly, the regime put the House on strict surveillance and penetrated the personnel in several operations, one of them code-named “Cobra.”

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577 AIPN, 01178/591, k. 281.
578 “Umarła całkowicie pojednana z Bogiem…”: Stefan Budzyński, Między wiarą a zwątpieniem (Between Faith and Despondency) (Warszawa: Adam, 2001).
579 “Ona teraz uświadomiła sobie, ile zła i nieszczęścia wielu ludziom swym nieludzkim postępowaniem sprawiła i stara się obecnie nowym chrześcijańskim życiem jeszcze wiele naprawić”: words of Rev. Marylski as recorded by the secret collaborator ”Rawski” in 1969: AIPN, 01178/591, k. 190.
581 Based on archival documents pertaining to the House in Laski surveillance, AIPN, 01178/591.
582 For a detailed analysis of the operation “Kobra,” see: Jan Żaryn, ‘’Córka marnotrawna…’’.
agents\textsuperscript{583} spied on the repentant communists coming from all sections of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{584}

In Catholicism converting the enemies of the Church seems to be one of the signs of holiness.\textsuperscript{585} Typically, the acceleration of popular veneration happens in places where the Church enemy antagonizes both the saintly candidate and the majority of the population. This was the case of Karol Wojtyła who was especially talented at impressing, if not converting, many communists. Although later as Pope John Paul II he had never expressed this openly in public, communism was his most lethal opponent and he ultimately helped to bring it down. The time of Wojtyła’s election (1978) marked the apex of Soviet strength, where almost nobody expected it to disintegrate in the near future, nor to do this peacefully.\textsuperscript{586} In this situation, even a small change brought by Wojtyła could be considered a miracle. Millions of Poles and many others who lived under Soviet dominance waited for decades for any sign of such change. Indeed, John Paul II, when invited to Poland, gave his communist hosts an unpleasant alternative. They could refuse to participate in religious ceremonies he performed, and, as a result, risk a loss of monopoly on the media for the duration of the broadcast. Or, they could participate, but this would indirectly express their submission to the Pontiff. In either case, many people would regard the result as miraculous. The authorities were afraid that

\textsuperscript{583} Some of the codenames of the secret collaborators were: “Rawski,” “Jasiński,” “Mariusz,” “Alfa,” “Stefan”: 8 AIPN, 01178/591, k.67.

\textsuperscript{584} Jan Żaryn, “Córka marnotrawna…”.

\textsuperscript{585} For the fortitude of the saints, see: Thomas V. Moore, \textit{Heroic Sanctity and Insanity} (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1959), 73-88.

Wojtyła’s appearances on Polish state TV would not only give him access to people’s souls but spark a counter-revolution. In this respect, the Bezpieka played a crucial role to avert possible calamity. Operation “Summer-79” (Lato-79) was a full-scale endeavor, embracing all possible aspects of the papal visit to Poland in 1979. The security apparatus activated its network of secret collaborators, intensified surveillance of the Church, and increased vigilance for anti-regime provocations to a scale unparalleled in decades. Separately from state television, the Bezpieka secretly broadcasted the visit using its own recording equipment. In Cracow alone, security functionaries were eavesdropping 80 telephone lines, not counting bugs installed in other places. All of these ingenious efforts to minimize John Paul’s influence on society were repeated during each of his pilgrimages to Poland, but, as history showed, the security apparatus was unable to succeed. The powerful and ubiquitous secret service was effective in denigrating other complex socio-political doctrines, but proved to be defenseless when it came to a simple message of hope and love delivered by the Pope. To thousands of security functionaries thought to perceive the world in pragmatic terms, comprehending of the papal phenomenon was beyond their abilities.

5.8. Law and religious freedom

So help me God.
--- Boleslaw Bierut, Communist President of Poland, 1947.

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Filip Musiał and Jarosław Szarka (ed.), Operacja...
One would be mistaken to think that being a Catholic functionary in communist Poland constituted a crime *ex lege*. The Constitution of 1952 (called ‘the Stalinist Constitution’), explicitly guaranteed freedom of religion to *all* citizens:

**Art. 70. 1.** The Polish People’s Republic guarantees its citizens freedom of consciousness and religion. The Church and other religious groups can freely conduct their religious functions. No one can force citizens not to participate in religious duties and ceremonies. Also, no one can force anybody to participate in religious duties and ceremonies.\(^{588}\)

The benevolence of article 70 point 1 seems to be suspicious considering the actual communist attitude toward religion. If freedom of “consciousness and religion” concerned all citizens, it must have included security functionaries as well. Usually in these kinds of disputes, the main problem lies in legal interpretation. Although communist Poland officially honored religious freedom, practically speaking, the regime abused it on the pretext of state and church separation, as expressed in point 2 of article 70: “The Church is separated from the state. The relation between the state and church, as well as legal and financial status of religious denominations will be regulated in statutes.”\(^{589}\) Point 2 of the Stalinist Constitution indirectly legalized purging the *Bezpieka* of religion: the security apparatus — the state institution to the core — was designed to be free from the church. The institutional separation of the *Bezpieka* does not mean, however, that their employees’ personal beliefs had to be scrutinized as well. Article 70 point 1 unambiguously prohibited anyone forcing citizens not to participate in religious

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duties and ceremonies. The Party’s instructions penalizing the security personnel for private religious activism were therefore blatantly unconstitutional. Strikingly, throughout thirty-six years of the Stalinist Constitution, the regime did not make even an effort to legitimize the PPW’s and ZOF’s inquisitorial hunts by means of a statutory regulation. For the communists, point 3 of the article 70 provided enough protection: “Abuses of freedom of consciousness and religion against the interests of the Polish People’s Republic are penalized.”\textsuperscript{590} Certainly, the Party had the unchallenged monopoly of defining state interests and, if the prescribed penalty was to be only administrative (such as dismissal from service), it did not have to be put into statutory law. Most probably, the infringement on the “ethical rules” of institutionalized atheism was purposely an undefined statutory violation, so a “daring” functionary’s complaint for the dismissing order could be contained in safe wardrobes of the Bezpieka dignitaries. In my archival research, documents have not revealed cases of officers disputing with their superiors on paper — a sign that the personnel was well aware that a legal duel with the regime would be as suicidal as valorous.

Strikingly, in the scope of the communist penal law, the Bezpieka’s inquisitors were more than constitutional assaulters — they were criminals. The penal code from 1969 provided for up to five years in prison to anyone, who “limits a citizen’s rights in regards to his/her religious affiliation or the lack of such” (article 192).\textsuperscript{591} Moreover, article 196 prescribed the same penalty for a person forcing anyone not to participate in a religious

\textsuperscript{590} "Artykuł 70. 3. Nadużywanie wolności sumienia i wyznania dla celów godzących w interesy Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej jest karane": Dziennik Ustaw, 1952, nr 33, poz. 232.

\textsuperscript{591} "Art. 192. Kto ogranicza obywatela w jego prawach ze względu na jego bezwyznaniowość lub przynależność wyznaniową, podlega karze pozbawienia wolności do lat 5": Kodeks Karny z dnia 14 maja 1969 roku (The Penal Code from May 14, 1969): Dziennik Ustaw z dnia 14 maja 1969 roku, nr 13, poz. 94.
activity or ceremony. These crimes did not have any exceptions. Ironically, the communists were powerful enough to legitimate the Bezpieka’s internal anticlerical watch, it was severely penalized ex lege. Surely, it must have been a confusing signal for the security employees, especially those with legalistic attitudes, allowing for the fact that the security officers were obligated to know the provisions of all laws applicable to their service. The practice of keeping articles 192 and 196 inactive was an ominous sign for the functionaries that they worked in a lawless environment. In this tenebrous “state within a state,” actual rules were dictated ad hoc by the Bezpieka dignitaries. To survive in the jungle of the Bezpieka, the officers by all means had to obey law — law of the strongest, not necessarily law of the statutes. Internalization of this reality was broad. For instance, during his trial, Lieutenant Waldemar Chmielewski testified that his superior assured him about their impunity: “no one will be allowed to interrogate us, take our fingerprints, or cross-examine us.” Chmielewski was very unlucky — called by General Wojciech Jaruzelski (leader of the Communist Party in the 1980s) “the rotten cell in the entrails of the security body.” he had been “amputated with exemplary

592 “Art. 196. Kto zmusza inną osobę do podjęcia czynności religijnej lub do udziału w obrzędzie religijnym albo do powstrzymania się od takiej czynności lub obrzędu, podlega karze pozbawienia wolności do lat 5” (“Art. 196. Whoever forces another person to participate in a religious activity or to participate in a religious ceremony, as well as not to participate in the religious activity or ceremony, is subject to the penalty of up to five years in prison”): Kodeks Karny z dnia 14 maja 1969 roku (The Penal Code from May 14, 1969): Dziennik Ustaw z dnia 14 maja 1969 roku, nr 13, poz. 94
593 Orders, rules, instructions, guidelines and ministerial regulations were scrupulously recorded by the Bezpieka units. According to the Instruction Og P-3, every functionary must have read new laws and acknowledged this by signing a special roster. See also, the Instrukcja nr 01/60 z 20 kwietnia 1960 roku w sprawie trybu wydawania i prowadzenia ewidencji przepisów służby bezpieczeństwa (Instruction No. 01/60 Concerning Publication and Recording of the Security Service’s Rules from April 20, 1960), Nr A2 935/60, IPN Ld pf. 13/387, k. 137.
594 “Nikt nie pozwoli na to, żebyśmy byli przesłuchiwani, aby pobierano odciski palców, żeby nas komuś okazywano”: testimony of Lieutenant Waldemar Chmielewski as cited by Krystyna Daszkiewicz in Uprowadzenie i morderstwo..., 147-148.
openness.”595 With a dose of reluctance, but to save the prestige of the security apparatus facing total public ignominy, the regime sacrificed a few of its members by turning the inactive law into a sharp scalpel suitable for “amputations.” If the regime had been a consistent surgeon, the society would have witnessed the Bezpieka’s total mutilation. As usual, the dogma of the Party’s infallibility took the priority.

5.9. Conclusion

Ironically, for the regime “every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, [was] unutterable vileness, vileness of the most dangerous kind, contagion of the most abominable kind,”596 the security officers were under compulsion to become fanatical believers: unconditionally devoted to communism and uncritically accepting the Party’s infallibility. They were meant to be the apostles of the new religion of Marxist-atheism, as it developed many of the external trappings of religion: rites, ceremonies, language, and worship of its leaders. There was, however, one paramount difference concerning Poland. Unlike in other Central-Eastern European states, where communists twisted atheist materialism to fill the vacuum left by the loss of religion deliberately destroyed in the course of their accession to power,597 there was no religious void in Poland as Catholicism remained a dominant religion. Here, the scientific historical determinism had to compete against Catholicism. Thus, the antagonisms between these two systems of beliefs were ontological and ultimately irreconcilable; at least one of them had to eventually perish. Such a polarized view on religious reality

595 These were General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s words during a press conference in Jabłonna concerning the Rev. Popiełuszko’s murder, as cited in Krystyna Daszkiewicz, Ibid, 423.
597 Paul Gaber, And God Created..., 22.
forced the communist regime to dramatically promote its own vision of humanity and the world — it was a matter of survival.

To destroy the Church, the regime created an entire structure of its own morals, where institutionalized atheism was elevated to the highest virtue, and religiosity was denigrated to the level of socially accepted pathologies — alongside drunkenness and hooliganism. In this respect, the security apparatus was both an agent of broad atheist change of Polish society and a laboratory of atheist transformation of the security community. The Party cared a lot for the “purity” of the Bezpieka’s cadres since the security officers were to be the first solely atheist segment of the Polish society radiating to others with socialist optimism and ideological expertise. To have the Bezpieka entirely atheist, the regime established strict rules of admission, trying to filter out the candidates inclined to Catholicism. Those accepted to service were under constant surveillance as the internal inquisitorial units ceaselessly searched for degenerate functionaries — religiously devout and ideologically devious. Tolerating Catholic officers was impossible: in the Party’s eyes, those functionaries who participated in religious ceremonies were unwilling and unable to transform into homo sovieticus and thus had to be eliminated from the security apparatus before infecting their colleagues with “intellectual deprivation.”

Despite full-fledged efforts to extirpate religiosity, the Marxist-atheist religion did not prove to be attractive enough to substitute for Catholicism. Service in constant dialectical fusions of extremes demanded that the security officers be spiritually numb, mentally still and ideologically ossified. Many officers opposed and remained, at least

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secretly, religious. In addition, the regime’s policy was confusing: the communist dignitaries used to officially participate in religious ceremonies and borrow words of religious connotation to describe the secular world. Also communist law — “the emanation of Party’s will,” unambiguously honored religious freedom. These confusing signals were falsely recognized by some functionaries as institutionalized acceptance of Catholicism. Considering the actual bellicose attitude to the Church, working in the Bezpieka required duplicity — another chief socialist virtue. Yet those officers who kept intellectual and emotional distance from the Party had to realize that dialectic materialism was in fact an incurable moral schizophrenia. Mainly for these reasons, the regime’s goal to promote a new, Marxist-atheist outlook on life through the security functionaries proved to be a failure.
Chapter VI

DILIGENCE

Institutionalized Relentlessness

We need to have a warm heart but cold mind.
--- Hilary Minc, one of the Polish Stalinists

6.1. The pendulum of diligence

The Polish communist security apparatus existed for two main reasons — to eliminate the regimes’ enemies, real and imaginary, and to insert its armed tentacles deeply into the society’s body in a comprehensive and permanent embrace: “We have to stress clearly that we are still the same military unit, and it will not change even when all bandits disappear.” In this chapter I would like to examine the virtue of diligence of the Polish security apparatus and the role of institutionalized relentlessness as a part of socialist morality. An unexplored but vital topic is the successful fulfillment of the Bezpieka’s mission of preventing all that was unexpected, controlling all that was suspicious, and destroying all that was dangerous required. This would not have been achieved without a disciplined army of functionaries working relentlessly for the Party’s

599 For extensive analysis of the Bezpieka’s influence on the Polish society, see: Mirosław Piotrowski, Ludzie Bezpieki w walce z Narodem i Kościołem (The Bezpieka’s Men Fighting Against the Nation and the Church) (Lublin, Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej, 2000).

600 “Musimy wyraźnie powiedzieć, że tym zbrojnym oddziałem zostajemy nadal i pozostaniemy nim i wtedy, kiedy wcale ani jeden bandy zbrojnej w kraju nie będzie”: Referat ministra wygłoszony na kursie dla szefów PUBP, lipiec 1947r. (Speech of the Minister of Public Safety during Workshop for the Heads of the District Security Departments, July 1947), CA MSW, 17/IX/77, t. 2.
glory in the spirit of unconditional sacrifice and incessant eagerness. The profession of a secret functionary was the intersection of stubbornness and patience, thus combining the qualities of a soldier and a craftsman. The delicate nature of the tasks of the security officers called them to be more like teachers than butchers. 601 Successful results, such as recruitment of valuable secret collaborators, depended on dynamism and charisma as much as on slynys and bribery. Officially, there was no place in the Bezpieka for any routine or indolence as contradictory to the general assumption that the security profession was “the most prestigious, requiring perseverance and passion.” 602 I will show that in the communist code of values, diligence was elevated to the top level of moral virtues, combining morality of duty and morality of aspiration. However, the propagandist promotion of the assiduousness among the Bezpieka’s cadres had its drawbacks. Sometimes it “over-motivated” the functionaries, who gave vent to their energy in abusive forms, and sometimes the opposite — it had a minimal stimulative influence on the cadres of the ossifying Bezpieka’s bureaucracy. These extremes proved to be dangerous not only for the Polish society, but also for the security apparatus itself.

6.2. Diligence as a socialist virtue

Diligence enjoyed the favorite position in the pantheon of socialist values, more highly regarded than functionaries’ education and brilliance. Industriousness belonged to the core of socialist morality and could compensate for intellectual shortcomings and transgressions of common morality, such as hooliganism. Particularly exemplary is the

601 The role of the security functionaries gradually evolved from direct coercion to preventive operations, Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział general Kiszczak (What General Kiszczak Did Not Reveal) (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1992), 174.

602 Odprawa Departamentu III z dnia 13 sierpnia 1949 roku (Briefing of the Department III from August 13, 1949), CA MSW 17/IX/77, t.5, 198.
vita of Major Edmund Perek, the Bezpieka functionary, who put the clergy in Katowice under strict surveillance for four decades. His example shows that the lack of basic education was not necessarily an impediment to a career in the public security; Perek had only six years of elementary school. At the age of thirty five, after a series of arguments with his superiors, he completed high school, and soon thereafter, with an even greater dose of reluctance, attended the communist university, but never received a college diploma. Nevertheless, his avidity compensated for his lack of education; each promotion in rank (in 1949, 1953, 1961, 1977, 1982, 1987) cited Perek’s zeal and passion as a substantive argument for the award. The archives reveal that his “initiative and engagement” won him numerous financial benefits and considerable prestige among colleagues. “By diligence and conscientiousness, he built a good standing among co-workers who respect and like him for that reason.” Moreover, Perek’s case shows that the virtue of diligence had the power to mitigate a criminal record (Perek was several times arrested for harassing a fisherman) as well as to bend legal rules: in 1987, against the statutory requirement of having a college diploma, the MSW minister, General

603 In 1957, Perek was pressed by his superiors to get a high school diploma. His rejection almost cost him a dismissal form the service. Nevertheless, in 1959, he finally received a high school diploma (Industrial-Pedagogical Technical High School), and between 1960 and 1962 he was a part time student at the University of Social Sciences (Wieczorowy Uniwersytet Nauk Społecznych) operating under the auspice of the Communist Party in Katowice. A detailed biography of Edmund Perek is provided by Łucja Marek based on Perek’s personal files: AIPN Ka, WUSW Katowice, 0231/287, and published in Bogdan Strycharz (ed.), Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej, 1944-1989 (The Apparatus of Repression in People’s Poland) (Rzeszów: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006), 2/4/2006, 439-445.

604 In 1977, he was granted a valuable watch, in 1979 and 1981 financial rewards, regularly he received additional benefits (dodatki operacyjne). Perek was also rewarded with numerous medals. For details, see Łucja Marek, “Edmund Perek (1927-1992), zastępca naczelnika Wydziału IV KW MO/WUSW w Katowicach” (“Edmund Perek (1927-1992), the Vice-Head of the Departament IV of the District Military Headquarters in Katowice”) in Bogdan Strycharz (ed.), Aparat Represji..., 444-445.
Czesław Kiszczak, promoted Perek to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as “the extraordinary honor for his sacrificial service.”

Perek exemplifies the regime’s overall policy to reward hard-working functionaries; assiduousness was one of the most visible signs of loyalty and a test of a functionary’s belief in the Party. The more passive the security cadres tended to be, the more actively the regime encouraged commitment to service, viewing it as a healthy and beneficial input of their ideological optimism. Diligence also had a special quality making it useful for the Bezpieka’s overall periodical appraisals. It was an active virtue requiring constant vim and vigor and thus was easier to discern than other, more subtle and passive socialist virtues, such as loyalty or atheism: to be virtuous, the functionaries had just to refrain from cheating their co-workers and from participating in religious practices. Assiduousness or laziness were comparatively easier to discern and more suitable for examination by statistical approach — a method every bureaucracy uses the most. For these reasons, diligence was a primary thermometer of the functionaries’ mood and a barometer of the Bezpieka’s overall effectiveness.

Periodically, each functionary was evaluated by superiors in the report (sometimes called “certificates of morality”) attached to his personal file. The archives

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607 For instructions how to write certificates of morality see Świadectwa Moralności - zasady wydawania (Rules for Issuing Certificates of Morality), IPN BU MSW I 380, IPN 01225/46.
reveal that diligence stood out as the most prevalent characteristics of the security personnel. “Diligent, responsible, politically conscious and stable functionary, blindly devoted to the people’s democracy” — appraisals of this kind guaranteed promotion and untroubled service. Aware that industriousness paid off, many functionaries decided to stay active after hours and increased their work efficiency. The regime welcomed such endeavors with joy, sometimes even with official commendation. For example, Sergeant Urszula Gremplewska, one of the Bezpieka’s interpreters, was praised by a prestigious special order for assiduous work for the MSW coping with an enormous amount of documents written in German. In a similar manner, the regime recognized Second Lieutenant Michalik for maintaining contacts with secret collaborators during vacation. One of the most enviable was the fast-forward career of Colonel Adam Pietruszka, who within just twenty years (1961-1981) climbed to the position of the Vice-Director of the MSW Department IV (responsible for fighting the Church). His biographer, Paweł Tomasik, argues that Pietruszka owed this to his ambitiousness, self-discipline and after-work activity, and, unlike Edmund Perek, to his assiduous pursuit of education.

6.3. Ostensible diligence

The pursuit of rewards made many security functionaries keep up appearances of effectiveness — an “ostensible activity” (feinted) typical of heavily bureaucratized

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609 Rozkaz Specjalny numer 25 (Special Order No. 25), IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 61.
610 Rozkaz numer 25/56 (Order no. 25/56), A-1377, IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. III.
611 Paweł Tomasik, “Adam Pietruszka (ur. 1938), zastępca dyrektora Departamentu IV MSW” (“Adam Pietruszka (born 1938), the Vice-Director of the MSW Departament IV”) published in Bogdan Strycharz (ed.), Aparat Represji..., 523-530.
organizations where faulty supervision leads to slow, but difficult to reverse, structural decomposition. In the 1980s, the ostensible activity of the security personnel reached gigantic proportions, seriously weakening the Bezpieka’s sense of orientation. Many functionaries mastered “creative bureaucracy” to perfection, flooding their superiors’ desks with detailed plans and reports of no operational value. Their superiors, on the other hand, used to “organize unproductive meetings, conferences and teleconferences, where tons of paper were consumed, lots of ink was spilled, and many hours were lost,” all with minimal effectiveness. This pyramid of pretended diligence placed the security apparatus in a kind of illusionary world. The most tempting was the mock recruitment of secret collaborators, considered by the regime a barometer of effectiveness. Always hungry for information, the Bezpieka dignitaries motivated their subordinates to fill file cabinets with interesting reports, seducing them with financial and honorary praises for the “especially sacrificial and fruitful work with agents.” In particularly high demand were officers able to combine diligence with effectiveness, as both quality and quantity of gathered material comprised the test of a functionary’s worth. The fate of the functionaries who failed to build a network of secret

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612 This statement is based on Jan Widacki’s observation coming from his memoirs, Czego nie powiedział..., 90.
613 “[Zaczyna się] opracowywać dziesiątki drobiazgowych planów, sprawozdań, itp. Organizować kolejne bezproduktywne narady, konferencje i telekonferencje. Zapisuje się wtedy i zużywa tony papieru, wylewa morze atramentu, marnuje godziny...” – this opinion about bureaucratic inefficiency of the Bezpieka was proclaimed by Jan Widacki, the former MSW minister in his memoirs: Czego nie powiedział..., 90.
614 “Za szczególnie ofiarną i owocną pracę z agenturą należy przedstawić do nagrody”: Briefing of the Department III on August 13, 1949 (Odprawa Departamentu III z dnia 13 sierpnia 1949 roku), CA MSW 17/X/77, t.5.
615 “The workers of the third department will be tested based on the quality and quantity of captured material (from the official and unofficial sources, or agents) (...)(“Pracownicy trzeciej linii winni w codziennej pracy za sprawdzian swych osiągnięć przyjąć ilość i jakość zdobytego materiału (zarówno drogą agenturalną jaki i półoficjalną i oficjalną (...))”:words of an unknown
collaborators was also institutionally defined, initially by Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz who in 1949 said that: “those who avoid working with agents shall be downgraded, punished, and if it does not produce any effect — dismissed from important posts.”

To Radkiewicz, an officer without a network of secret collaborators was like a branch without leaves — withered and unproductive, better to be cut off.

6.4. Raising “dead souls”

The feinted activity of the Bezpieka’s personnel was a potentially harmful disease hampering the security apparatus from its inception. One would be wrong to think that the regime neglected the problem. For example, in 1954, Capitan Roman Kamiński complained that “numerous recruitments among teachers are made without any purpose or justification, only for recruitment itself. Recruitment for the sake of recruiting. These incautious recruitments only add to the mass of unnecessary working. We lose much time to work with such collaborators, achieving no results.” In some cases, the desire to


meet unrealistic norms led to absurd situations: “Your Reverence, please provide me with
some kind of denunciation, because my superior is pressing me”\(^\text{619}\) — this joke widely
circulating among security personnel, surely was not laughable to the Bezpieka’s bosses.
They were well aware that the bugs of routine and monotony found the Bezpieka’s body
well suited to parasitize, slowly changing its glorious mission into a farce, like a termite
slowly changes beams into dust. Sadly for them, the virtue of diligence, so actively
promoted by the Party, degenerated into a race for “creative recruitment.” On one
occasion, the MBP Vice-Minister Jan Ptasiński complained that many meetings with
secret collaborators resembled “a relay race with a report,”\(^\text{620}\) with no time for their
ideological or psychological stimulation by security officer.

The security personnel, whose ambitiousness exceeded effectiveness, regularly
fed their superiors illusionary news they wanted to hear. The pyramid of lies evolved into
a structural schizophrenia — the security apparatus was losing horizontal contact with an
outside world as much as vertical contact between cadres. Franciszek Szlachcic, the
MSW minister, openly described the seriousness of this problem when asked by an
interviewer in 1990:

\[
\text{JM: I guess, this gave an opportunity for abuses, fiction, and creating “death} \\
\text{souls” [?]}
\]

\[
\text{FS: Frauds were numerous. The security functionaries created a mechanism of} \\
\text{the apparatus’s deception. They falsified lists of informers and used to write} \\
\text{reports for fictitious agents, signed by their colleagues, sister, brother in law}
\]

\(\text{619}\) “Niestety znana jest anegdotka > niech ksiądz da doniesienie, bo szef mnie morduje<”; this
joke was quoted by Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz during a meeting with the MBP chiefs:
Materiały narady aktywu MBP w dniach 23-25 marca 1949...
\(\text{620}\) “Spotkanie na wolnym powietrzu przypomina >biegnącą sztafetę z meldunkiem<”;
16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego
na temat ”pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej” wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu
kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (April 16, 1953. Speech of the MBP
Vice-Minister Jan Ptasiński during the Briefing for the MBP Chiefs about Working in the
National Economy), AIPN, MBP, 12.
— the whole mechanism of fraud. I estimate that more than one third of the secret collaborators did not exist at all. In 1956, when I was in Katowice, we received an order to destroy all unnecessary documents. We looked through the records of the secret collaborators and destroyed approximately twenty thousand files (...). Later, in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, as I was told, the tendency of extensive recruitment reappeared.621

Surely, cheating the Bezpieka was a dramatic decision indicating lack of faith in their mission and a grievous distortion of the socialist code of ethics centered around loyalty toward the Party. Why did officers resort to it? The reasons for falsifying lists of informers varied from hiding professional failures to cold, pragmatic calculations aimed solely at financial rewards. Most probably, however, functionaries considered the regime’s insistence on the “work norm” excessive, and creative recruitment was a matter of necessity. This argument seems to be justified, taking into consideration Jan Widacki’s assertion that an average functionary was expected to guide twelve secret collaborators, three times more than advised by the criminal tactic textbooks at that time.622 The archives confirm Widacki’s observation. For instance, the report on discipline in the Brzeziny Security County Office reveals a variety of mistakes. The investigators

621 “To dawało chyba okazję do nadużyć, do fikcji, do wpisywania >martwych dusz<. Oszustw było co niemiara. Stworzył się cały mechanizm oszukiwania res ortu przez samych jego pracowników. Falszowali spisy informatorów, sami pisali informacje od fikcyjnych agentów, podpisywali im koledzy, siostra, szwagier — powstał cały mechanizm oszustwa. Sądzę, że więcej niż jedna trzecia informatorów to była lipa. Kiedy w 1956r., gdy byłem w Katowicach, przyszła decyzja, by zniszczyć wszystko, co niepotrzebne, przejrzeliśmy teczki tajnych współpracowników i zniszczyliśmy chyba 20 tysięcy teczek. Potem te werbunki były już rzadsze, mniej werbowano, ale bardziej pewniaków, po czym w latach siedemdziesiątych, a zwłaszcza osiemdziesiątych, jak mi mówiono, znów nastąpiła tendencja do poszerzania werbunków”.
Franciszek Szlachcic as interviewed by Jerzy Sławomir Mac in Przesłuchanie Supergliny (The Supercap’s Interrogation) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo FAKT, 1990), 35.

622 “Criminal tactic’s textbooks suggest that an operational functionary working in the police should not have more than 4-5 informers. In the 1980s, the Bezpieka demanded that functionaries guide 12 secret collaborators” (“Podręczniki taktyki kryminalnej podają, że w policji kryminalnej pracownik operacyjny nie powinien pracować z więcej niż 4-5 konfidentami. W SB w latach osiemdziesiątych żądano od funkcjonariuszy, by mieli po 12 swoich t.w.”): Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział..., 124. Criminal tactics means here law enforcement, see for example, Brunon Hołysz (ed.), Kryminologia w krajach socjalistycznych: wybór artykułów (Criminal Studies in Socialist States, Selected Articles) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1976).
complained that some officers had “only” four informers, and they used to write
denunciations instead of secret collaborators themselves, which made it possible that
some of reports had been “embellished.”
Many secret collaborators were
recommended for removal from records as valueless. The report did not accuse any
officer of creating *dead souls*, though it contained evidence of numerous fake meetings
with informers. Investigations of this practice were frequent and usually revealed the
same practices.

It seems that the former security officers talk about falsification of agents with
reluctance, though unofficially admitted that such practices were common. One such
statement came in October 2008 and concerned Archbishop Henryk Muszyński, accused
of being a secret collaborator in the late 1980s. The retired security functionary, whose
name is unknown, provided the Archbishop with explanatory testimony stating that “the
entry >secret collaborator< in the Archbishop’s record was put there without his consent,
knowledge and will.”
It is possible, but not proven, that the scale of falsification
reached almost 80 percent of all the informers in the late 1980s.

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623 *Raport Kontrolny organizacji pracy w powiatowym urzędzie ds. bezpieczeństwa w Brzezinach
w 1956 roku (Report on Work Organization in the County Security Office in Brzeziny in 1956),
IPN Ld pf 13/7, t. III, k.187-203.*
624 Jan Widacki, *Czego nie powiedział…*, 124.
625 “Wpis dokonany w karcie ewidencyjnej ks. prof. dziś arcybiskupa Henryka Muszyńskiego (t.
w. - tajny współpracownik) został dokonany bez jego zgody i wiedzy oraz wbrew jego woli”: Katarzyna Wiśniewska, “Esbecy spreparowali sobie agenta” (“The SB-men Falsified an Agent”),
*Gazeta Wyborcza*, October 14, 2008. The Archbishop Muszyński was registered as a secret
collaborator in 1984 and remained as such until 1989. In an interview for the Katholic Press
Agency, the Archbishop claimed that he had never agreed to any collaboration. On several
occasions, he had contact with the *Bezpieka*, especially when he applied for a passport. Several
times, he was visited by the security functionaries at home. His entry into the SB files as a secret
collaborator, Archbishop Muszyński explains in the following way: “most probably I was a
candidate for too much time, so there was a need to >move me up<, most probably someone
wanted to use it for his benefit” (“Tłumaczę to w ten sposób, że pewnie zbyt długo byłem
>kandydatem «, trzeba więc było w jakimś sensie mnie »awansować «, a być może ktoś chciał na
6.5. Distorting the reality

*If no one finds the body, I will be amply rewarded.*

--- Lieutenant Leszek Pękala

The miracle of raising dead souls, no matter how brilliantly incarnated in the files, had to be accompanied by some real achievements to be credible. One must not forget that the Bezpieka’s personnel was comprised numerous passionate, ideologically devoted functionaries, for whom cheating was immoral and thus unacceptable. But those who genuinely internalized the dogma of the Party’s infallibility were prone to various other abuses. In their case, the mechanism of deception was replaced by the mechanism of distorting reality, also based on fraud. This phenomenon had several variations. The most pathological form occurred in the late 1940s, when many officers were forced to fulfill unrealistic demands for catching a certain number of communist foes and simply generated them *ex nihilo*. Franciszek Szlachcic, who was actively involved in the hunts, honestly admitted that although there were virtually no opponents of the regime in his district, “They had to be produced. In 1945, we worked down there in the local terrain and produced a lot of enemies.”627 The idea was strikingly simple: to catch someone who did not enthusiastically support the communists and force him, via interrogation, to admit to anti-communist sentiments. Since the Stalinist regime nurtured loyalty of the security apparatus, the Party’s demand would immediately meet with the Bezpieka’s supply.

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Consequently, when the Party told the functionaries to find and fight enemies, the Bezpieka soon brought an avalanche of hostile elements, real and imaginary. The scale of the operation was impressive: Franciszek Szlachcic estimates that half of the detainees were not involved in any kind of subversive activity.\textsuperscript{628} It did not matter, however — the Bezpieka had to obey orders. Thus, with “Bolshevik relentlessness,”\textsuperscript{629} the security officers stigmatized innocent men and women and terrorized all of Polish society in paranoiac campaigns.

Andrzej Paczkowski, a historian of Polish communism, claims that the concept of “internal enemy” was imported to Poland and other Eastern European states directly from the Soviet Union. Paczkowski points at a coup in Prague in 1948 as an impulse to begin purges of Josip Tito types in all Moscow-controlled regimes.\textsuperscript{630} But hunting for imagined enemies had a long tradition before that. It stems from Stalin’s thesis of the sharpening of the class struggle with the advance of socialist construction. There are countless historical works analyzing Stalin’s fixation with Trotskyites or saboteurs in the 1930s. Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, for instance, that the Great Purges were about fighting a new kind of enemy, without specific attributes. To her, randomness of terror and its arbitrariness make it a social pathology.\textsuperscript{631} The mechanism was simple: arresting a given number of people and forcing them to admit to specific crimes, regardless of their actual guilt.

\textsuperscript{628} Jerzy S. Mac, \textit{Przesłuchanie…}, 14.
\textsuperscript{629} “Bolszewicki upór”: a term used in the reference to the flaws in interrogations by Colonel Julian Konar, the Head of the section in the MBP Department I, \textit{Odprawa z dnia 21 listopada 1949 roku (Briefing from November 21, 1949)}, CA MSW 17/IX/77, t. 5.
Jochen Hellbeck’s example of Alexander Afinogenov, the Soviet poet who was falsely arrested and forced to self-denunciation, is just one of thousands of similar cases.\textsuperscript{632}

Polish communism, however, differed from the Soviet model; it was less cruel and more limited. Yes, the Bezpieka, just like NKVD, arrested innocent people and extracted false testimonies by force, but the scale of repression was low comparing to neighboring states.\textsuperscript{633} It is not the place to examine reasons for this dissimilarity, though it is worth mentioning that it might have been caused by a combination of Stalin’s tactics of fighting one enemy at a time, the nationalism of Polish communists, the international situation, and the shortage of devoted security cadres.

The communist regime tried to calm down the hunts by reminding the security personnel to save their strength for the future. In Poland, Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz self-critically admonished these nit-picking campaigns as irrational: “There is leftism among us — we give the security apparatus and agents unrealistic goals. We cannot see spies everywhere because it only stupefies and confuses.”\textsuperscript{634} But Radkiewicz was not brave enough to attack openly the Party for faulty guidelines. Surely, for the co-author of the mass terror,\textsuperscript{635} such a censure would have meant his self-destruction. Naturally, he


\textsuperscript{633} “Nonetheless, Stalinism in Poland was never as cruel as in other states of the bloc”: Norman Davies, \textit{God’s Playground} (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1998), vol. II, 628-629.

\textsuperscript{634} “U nas jest takie lewactwo — stawianie nierealnych zadań aparatowi i agenturze. Nie można wszędzie doszukiwać się szpiegów, bo to tylko ogłupia i dezorientuje”: \textit{Przemówienie końcowe ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na naradzie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, dnia 19 sierpnia 1953 r. (Conclusive Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz during the Meeting with the Chief sof the MBP, August 19, 1953)}, AIPN, MBP, 22a.

\textsuperscript{635} Radkiewicz was one of architects of the apparatus of terror in Poland. Before World War II, Radkiewicz denounced communism, for which he was later blackmailed. For more details, see: Zbigniew Błażyński, \textit{Mówia Józef Światło. Za kulisami bezpieki i partii 1940-1955} (Józef Światło Speaks. Inside the Security Apparatus and the Party 1940-1955) (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1988), 43-44; for the Bezpieka in general, see: Ryszard Terlecki, \textit{Miecz i tarcza}
and other Stalinists looked for scapegoats within the security apparatus itself, this time pointing at the functionaries’ apathy and indolence: “The reason for the rule of law’s violations (…) is also pathological laziness that invites the functionaries to take the easy way out, and to simplify complicated investigative problems by a hasty arrest, blatant fraud or hitting a detainee in the face instead of diligent, preventive and arduous work.”636 In short, the ministerial dignitaries considered lack of diligence in implementing their orders, not the orders themselves, as the primary flaw. To some extent, they were right. The average investigation was boring, without spectacular findings and sensational conclusions. The chance of catching a real spy or saboteur was minimal and “warming up” (manufacturing) the case was a way to break the boredom.

6.6. Pathological ambition

Next to apathy, the Bezpieka was consumed by the opposite, yet no less lethal disease: excessive ambition. Encouraged to show initiative and passion, some functionaries took their mission literally, determined to succeed at all costs. The Bezpieka’s rules of the game were simple: one served devoutly, one was rewarded more handsomely for one’s efforts, and one would likely be offered promotion and financial

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636 “Źródłem naruszeń praworządności jest (…) też chorobliwe nieróbstwo, które pcha na łatwiznę, na upraszczanie sobie rozwiązań trudnych, skomplikowanych nieraz problemów operacyjnych i śledczych przez pochopny areszt, ordynarne fałszerstwo lub walnięcie w twarz aresztowanego w miejsce wytężonej, zapobiegłwej i uciążliwej pracy”: words of Colonel Humer during the secret discussion among the MBP chiefs, Stenogram dyskusji na krajowej naradzie aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954 roku (Stenographic Record of the Discussion During the National Council of the MBP Chiefs, March 4, 1954), AIPN, MBP, 14.
benefits afterwards.\textsuperscript{637} There were officers who grew obsessive for rewards — new medals and badges became their addiction. The temptations of a career on the rise were often difficult to resist.

Undoubtedly, the unlimited lust for prestige led to the most scandalous murder in the regime’s history — the assassination of Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko by four high-ranking security officers in 1984.\textsuperscript{638} For years these high ranking officers worked to silence the priest using all kinds of legal and illegal methods. Finally, they kidnapped him, brutally tortured him for a long time, and then threw his body into the Vistula River. To their surprise, however, several days later they were apprehended, put on public trial and sentenced to many years in prison. The trial in 1985 was orchestrated by the regime and many still doubt whether all circumstances of Popieluszko’s murder were revealed.\textsuperscript{639} Nonetheless, in the course of the judicial proceedings it was revealed that Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski, the chief murderer, suffered from strong, excessive ambition.\textsuperscript{640} Unlike his colleagues who concentrated on raising dead souls, Piotrowski believed that a functionary had to be a militant in seeking to silence the stubborn clergy. He found his

\textsuperscript{637} “Promotions in rank and awarding with medals and money influenced [increased] the discipline”: Sprawozdanie o stanie dyscypliny pracy w Wydziale Inspekcji Biura “A” MSW w roku 1977 (Report on Discipline in MSW Bureau “A”, Investigative, Department, in 1977), 054 Ldz. S-pfu-64/WI/78, IPN BU 01368/43, k. 10.


\textsuperscript{639} Some historians suspect that Rev. Popełuszko was murdered six days later than officially proclaimed, in different manner and killed by different men: “IPN: KGB kontra Popieluszko?” (“IPN: KGB v. Popełuszko?”), Wprost, nr 42/2006.

own work style, preferring “direct activity” over clerical work, meaning in practice ruthless careerism through immoral, illegal, and even criminal means. His superior, Colonel Adam Pietruszka, showed a similar attitude to service; he encouraged the abduction because such a “success” would open doors in his career. Particularly interesting is Pietruszka’s reaction to his subordinates’ questions about the legality of the operation. His relation with the ministerial dignitaries was so intimate that he had no hesitation in enlisting them to his side. Thus, when his direct subordinate, Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski, asked him what might have happened if the priest had really had a heart attack, Pietruszka replied confidently and without remorse: “It would be his bad luck to have a weak heart.” Also their colleague Lieutenant Leszek Pękala was similarly sure of his reward: “If no one finds the body, I will be amply rewarded” — he later openly admitted in court. In the explanation of the verdict sentencing the officers to many years in prison, the court stressed the role of the “professional frustration” of the murderers, whose ambitious plans for the clergy’s pacification were

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645 Krystyna Daszkiewicz, Uprowadzenie..., 334.
thwarted by Rev. Popiełuszko alone. Their continual frustration led to murderous aggression, as “silencing” the priest became the *condicio sine qua non* for their careers: Colonel Pietruszka testified that his further promotion would not have been possible without “limiting Rev. Popiełuszko’s activity.” Additionally, their frustration was augmented by a sudden halt in their lightning promotions. For instance, at the age of 31, Captain Grzegorz Piotrowski supervised work of many functionaries more advanced in rank, experience and age. His unsatisfied ambition, however, exceeded even this rank. Piotrowski’s case shows that on occasion, rewards proved to be dangerously addictive. Sometimes, the price the regime paid for the officers’ relentlessness was high — in 1984, the *Bezpieka* lost the rest of its prestige in the fire of social shock and indignation, and some Party dignitaries almost lost their posts.

**6.7. The war against routine**

The Polish semantics was a part of a larger linguistic transformation that originated in the Soviet Union during its first Five-Year Plan (1928-1932). Soviet society underwent a substantial socio-economic change, and labor ideology was a catalyst of

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646 Maria Bielska (ed.), Iwona Kowalska (ed.), *Proces o...*, 286.
648 “(…) This, doubtless, was an anomaly but Piotrowski, it seems, was a rising star with a background considered to be highly desirable (…). After only nine years in the SB – six in Lodz and three in Warsaw – he was already head of a Department Four section with more than one officer of higher rank under his command”: Kevin Ruane, *To Kill A Priest* (London: Gibson Square, 2004), 155.
649 Jerzy Urban, the regime’s spokesman, claims that the MSW Kiszczak told him that Rev. Popiełuszko’s murder was a part of a larger plot designed to remove some of the Party members from power: Witold Bereś, Jerzy Skoczylas, *General Kiszczak mówi (General Kiszczak Speaks)* (Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991), 242-243. For details of the regime’s efforts to save the MSW prestige, see Zbigniew Branach, *Piętno księżobójcy (The Priestkiller’s Stigma)* (Bydgoszcz: Agencja Reporterska CENTRA, 2007), 69.
these reforms. The security cades, as the elite, were all called for making efforts of the Soviet Stakhanovites dimensions. In other words, they were called to be different, more perfect, pure, and elitist, just like Stakhanovites who were publicly “portrayed as experiencing life differently from ordinary mortals: more fully, intensely, and authentically.” Observations of Jochen Hellebeck partially explains Radkiewicz’s optimism in his moral crusade. The security functionaries carried the potential total personality within them, they just had to shape it by heroism and incessant multifold activity. Apathy was not an option, “the new man had to logically excel as a hero or a social leader in order to be truly himself.” Work had a transformative experience because, as Sheila Fitzpatrick put it, “it was collective and imbued with a sense of purpose.” This purpose was the belief in the ultimate triumph of communism. The labor ideology was for this reason ontologically bellicose.

The Party stressed charismatic diligence in warlike language, placing the functionaries in a paranoiac battlefield where they had to fight themselves as the enemy. Minister Stanisław Rakiewicz, the chief illusionist of the regime, demanded that his direct subordinates generate in the functionaries’ minds an obsessive lust for perfectionism: “We need to create an atmosphere among our employees (…) that the better Party man is the one who learns, that the better worker and the better Party man is...

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650 For more information about language and communist Russia, see Igal Halfin’s chapter “Intimacy in an Ideological Key: The Communist Case of the 1920s and 1930s” in Language and Revolution. Making Modern Political Identities (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002).
652 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind..., 256.
654 For more information about labor ideology in general, see Bobo Lo, Soviet Ideology and the Collapse of the State (New York, McMillan Press, 2000).
the one who listens and accepts all of his superiors’ remarks aimed at elevating his practical and professional skills. We will solve this issue quickly, if we create an atmosphere of fighting for high standards, fighting for skills, fighting for knowledge.”

The emphasis on warlike propaganda had a sound purpose. It also served as a means of transforming the security apparatus into a gigantic, well-organized anthill of terror. Diligence and relentlessness were the prerequisites for victory. This argument resonates in recent works of Polish historians. Andrzej Paczkowski, for example, believes that hard work was necessary for elevating massive but selective terror to a universal terror — limitless and ubiquitous. Considering the Bezpieka’s growing strength, Paczkowski concludes that “the security functionaries were not idle, but worked ‘hard’: day and night, in offices or interrogation rooms, rummaging around apartments or running to meet secret collaborators, always submissive to superiors, obedient to the Party, faithful to ideology.”

To cope with exponentially growing duties, the Bezpieka preferred not to produce new tentacles, but rather to branch off the existing units into more specialized sections,

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657 “Jak z tego wynika, funkcjonariusze UB nie lenili się, lecz ciężko ‘pracowali’: w dzień i w nocy, w biurach i w pokojach przesłuchań, buszując po cudzych mieszkaniach czy spiesząc się na spotkania z tajnymi współpracownikami. Dyspozycyjni wobec szefów, posłusznii wobec partii, wierni ideologii”: Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), Aparat Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1950-1952, 15.
like surveillance of the railway workers, or each individual village. Their numbers proliferated proportionally to the expansion of the regime’s interests. The specialization gave diligence a new meaning: chained to a particular section of work, the functionaries gained additional enemies — routine and boredom. To many “soldiers of the Party,” fighting humdrum was harder than squeezing testimonies of collaboration with the Gestap out of the most stubborn anti-Nazi detainees. To prevent apathy from spreading, the regime swiftly launched an internal campaign against formality and routine: “we need to stress more clearly the necessity to fight formalism (…). We need to fight the bureaucratic attitude (…)” In the regime’s language, the noun bureaucrat became synonymous with traitor, and soon the anti-bureaucratic crusaders called for the bureaucrats’ expulsion behind the sinking ship of the Bezpieka: “We have to get rid of the

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658 The Bezpieka, surveilled, among others, political organizations, the KOR (The Committe of Worker’s Self-Defense), Solidarity members, the Catholic Church and other religious denominations (like Jehovah Witnesses), scientists, journalists, artists, students, teachers, workers, tourists, foreign diplomats, tour guides, and lawyers. For examples of specialization, see Protokół krajowej odprawy naczelników Wydziału X WUBP oraz naczelników wydziałów i kierowników sekcji Departamentu X MBP w dniach 17-18 marca 1952 roku (Report from the National Briefing of the Department X’s Directors and Chiefs of Sections Held Between March 17 and 18, 1952), Archiwum Akt Nowych, Zespół KC PZPR, sygn. 509/37. See also: Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), Aparat Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1950-1952, 15.

659 It became a norm that the former AK fighters were accused by the communists for collaborating with the Nazis. Lieutenant-Colonel Józef Światło estimated that during interrogations the Bezpieka broke approximately 60 percent of the detainees: Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło (Jozef Światło Speaks) (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1988), 221.

660 “Trzeba to, bardziej jeszcze w tym miejscu podkreślić konieczność walki z formalizmem (…). No, nie możemy tak. Trzeba walczyć z takim biurokratycznym podejściem (…)”; 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława..., 10. Routine was also attacked by other Party dignitaries, for example, by Julia Brystygier on March 28, 1948: Materiały odprawy kierowników i zastępców kierowników WUBP oraz przedstawicieli wydziałów V w dniu 28 marca 1948 r. (Documents from Briefing of the WUBP Chiefs and Vice-Chiefs, and the Sections V Representatives, March 28, 1948), CA MSW 17/IX/77, t. 3; General Roman Romkowski on March 28, 1948: Materiały odprawy kierowników i zastępców kierowników WUBP oraz przedstawicieli wydziałów V w dniu 28 marca 1948 r. (Documents from Briefing of the WUBP Chiefs and Vice-Chiefs, and the Sections V Representatives, March 28, 1948), CA MSW 17/IX/77, t. 3; MBP Vice-Minister Jan Ptasinski on April 16, 1953: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasinkiego na temat „pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej...”. 
burden. We tend to be too heavy, a little bossy, bureaucratized. We need to mobilize the apparatus, move more vigorously.”

In general, behind the Iron Curtain many police officials feigned great zeal. This attitude originated in the Soviet Union where Lenin was fond of Taylorism (introducing machinelike routine to increase productivity in factories) and Stalin often exhorted his subjects to work harder. The Soviets were initially great boosters of "praktiki," perhaps because people such as Ezhov, Kaganovich or Voroshilov really had little or no formal education, and still had risen to the very top of the system.

As Siegelbaum and other historians have pointed out, however, reality did not add up to hard work ("we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us"). It would be naive to think that the mere speeches condemning habits of routine, conventionality and primitivism, though frequent and clamorous, could have alone reversed a general tendency of the growth of apathy. The moral crusade proved more difficult than anticipated. For all the ambitious intentions, the regime ran into structural resistance, finding itself dramatically involved in a kind of a Catch-22. There is nothing surprising in this, since the ministerial dignitaries demanded the impossible: to find proofs of the Party’s a priori assertions (such as existence of enemies in society) without cheating.

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662 "Catch up and overtake capitalism," shock workers, Stakhanovites; there is still a "Shosse Entusiastov" in Moscow today.

663 Lewis H. Siegelbaum claims that “(...) Stakhanovism undermined its own effectiveness. To the extent that it gave workers incentives to raise their productivity, it presupposed that conditions outside the control of workers would be satisfied so that they could concentrate on achieving and overfilling their norms. Yet by increasing the likelihood of distortions and bottlenecks and in other ways intensifying competition among workers for favorable conditions, it may well have sapped the enthusiasm that it initially inspired: Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 302. For more critical approaches to Stakhanovism, see Solomon Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union (New York, Praeger, 1952); Mark Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938-1945 (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
one’s superiors or distorting reality. Idealistically enough, diligence and restlessness were supposed to be the antidote for all problems. However, the regime’s hope that freeing personnel from administrative tasks might further activate them was naive because the secret service’s bureaucratization was impossible to lessen without endangering the regime itself. Consequently, the more bureaucratized the security apparatus became, the more routine it generated. When it came to particular orders from Party leaders, however, the Bezpieka reacted erratically, blindly arresting lots of people — desperately trying to solve problems by the force of its own momentum.\textsuperscript{664}

6.8. Institutionalized lynching

Apathy was a contagious violation of the fanatic character of a security profession, and the Party demanded the guilty ones be exemplarily punished in a manner that would meet with the applause of medieval inquisitors: “They must be brought to the whipping post. We must create such a climate that no one would even dare to tolerate these kinds of men among the people’s apparatus. We must react with disdain toward (...) the loafers, the slobs, the idlers.”\textsuperscript{665} In his exhaustive diagnosis of the Bezpieka’s ailments, Minister Radkiewicz argued with Dominican fervency for burning laziness in the “fire of activism,” and suggested frequent use of the ideological flagellations of the

\textsuperscript{664} The MBP Vice-Minister Jan Ptasiński complained in 1953 that the security apparatus is nervous and in emergency situations it arrests and interrogates lots of people: Protokół z odprawy kierownictwa ministerstwa z dnia 6 II 1953r. w sprawie ochrony gospodarki narodowej i walki z wywiadem (Report on the Protection of the National Economy and Fighting the Espionage from the Briefing of the Ministerial Chiefs Held on February 2, 1953), AIPN, MBP, 9.

\textsuperscript{665} “Trzeba [ich] postawić pod pręgierz ogólny. Musimy wytworzyć taką atmosferę u nas wewnętrz, taki klimat, aby nikt nie osmaił się nawet tolerować tych ludzi w gronie naszego ludowego aparatu (...). Trzeba wytworzyć pogardę dla (...) nierobów, dla niechlujów, pogardę dla leni”. Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza, wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO w dniu 11 maja 1951 roku (Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz Raised During the Briefing for the Militia Functionaries, May 11, 1951), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t. 8.
“whipping post.” The remedy proposed by Radkiewicz was a combination of a public confession and a public condemnation executed in a form of institutionalized lynching:

Not individual talks but (…) a collective opinion. We must bring to the light these things, the most detailed things we must bring to the surface and discuss them. We must condemn them, we must create an atmosphere of disdain for trespasses of all kinds (…). We must strive for collective opinions of all the personnel, because in this way we can nurture the men and clarify their opinions. We need bold, collective criticism (…).”

Minister Radkiewicz’s hysterical cry for activism had a diagnostic purpose. For the ministerial dignitaries, the silence of subordinates gathered around their colleague at the “whipping post” would be a symptom of emotional weakness, if not an ideological cancer. Radkiewicz regarded collective criticism as a sign of the personnel’s strength and loyalty. It signaled that bonds of solidarity between the security officers were weaker than the bond of loyalty between each of them and the Party. The officers’ opprobrious reaction would be a kind of a renewal of vows, periodically necessary for ideological catharses: “We must demand that every participant of the meeting behaves actively, actively criticizes all trespasses, and not just listens passively. This is not the Party language! This is not a proper meeting (…). Whoever is silent should be asked: what do you think?”

Presumably, Minister Radkiewicz had on his mind a supremely collective, almost sacramental concept of forgiveness that was practiced already in the Soviet

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667 “Musimy domagać się od każdego uczestnika zebrania aktywnego udziału, aktywnej krytyki wszelkich przestępstw, nie biernego słuchania (…). Nie taki jest język partyjny! Nie takie jest zebranie. Tam powinien być ogień aktywności, ustosunkowania się, a kto milczy — wywołać: a ty jak myślisz?”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza, wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO..., t. 8.
Two ideas impelled Radkiewicz’s call: that of officiating forgiveness in institutional form, and that of breaking the wrongdoers mentally. Although that is how forgiveness was supposed to operate, in practice it had come to mean an embarrassment, not a sacrament: few functionaries would voluntarily bring themselves to the whipping post. Most functionaries had become resigned to this reluctance and tended to avoid criticism unless forced, as Radkiewicz complained in the secret *Briefing for the Militia Functionaries*: “We lack zealousness (…) which surely means that the waves of degeneration are strong. It is because we are not accustomed to fight for that, practice that.”

Self-denunciation, a substitute for a confession practiced for centuries in the Catholic Church, was surrounded by the aura of compassion and mercy. Communism—in Igal Halfin’s words “a messianic movement guided by Marxist theory,” seemingly oscillated between extremes of faith and its lack. To meet the expectations of the rulers, many people developed a double life, nourished two personae: “an invented public self and a real private self.” Sheila Fitzpatrick observes that those who concealed their sins were considered “masked” and the regime had an ambition to reveal their true identity. If this practice could concern painters, teachers, or poets, it must have also referred to the security cadres, but surely in a more rigid form. In one of the most

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669 “Tego zacięcia u nas nie ma (…) na pewno powoduje to, że fale rozkładu nie maleją. Dlatego, że nie ma u nas tego zwyczaju, że tego nie robimy, o to się nie bijemy”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza, wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO.
670 Igal Halfin wrote that „communism could (…) be seen as a messianic movement guided by Marxist theory, which provided the disciples with an elaborate hermeneutics of signs to interpret the distance from the present historical station to full human emancipation and the End of History”: *From Darkness to Light…*, 82.
fascinating studies of personal narratives in the Stalinist Russia, *Revolution on My Mind*, Jochen Hellbeck reveals how deeply the Soviet system of morality pervaded individual’s personal domain. Confessing sins was a step toward self-purification. “In the Soviet context,” Hellebeck observes, “rebirth was frequently used to describe the inner transformation of a person who joined the Communist party.” Conversion through self denunciation was the purifying experience for a communist, unifying him with the regime. Undoubtedly, self-condemnation of violations one did not commit in reality was the most valuable. It manifested utmost loyalty and affirmation of the Party’s infallibility to the point of self-denial. Alexander Afinogenov’s story of agonizing “self-purification” is a quintessence of this mechanism:

> I killed the self inside me – and then a miracle happened: no longer hoping for anything and having already prepared myself for this death, I understood and suddenly saw the beginning of something altogether new, a new “self,” far removed from previous troubles and vanity, a “self” that arouse out of the mist of all the best that had ever been in me and that had faded, vanished, evaporated.

A poet Afinogenov killed his dignity, truth, and friendship, in order to show deep communist transformation and save his biological life. His offer was accepted. Not all, however, were that lucky. Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov, the formidable NKVD chiefs whose acts of contrition are legendary, were not pardoned. It indicates that successful transformation was not the only condition for survival in Stalinism.

Though it may seem contradictory to what was said above, the regime preferred sinful individuals over the impeccable ones because they were much easier to manipulate (especially for the high ranks). Stanisław Radkiewicz, for instance, met this criterion. As

a betrayer of communism in the late 1930s, he lived in constant fear of exposure, and by his fanatical service he wanted to postpone the moment of arrest. Diligence, so critical in security work, was in his case spurred by fear. Colonel Józef Światło, his immediate subordinate who escaped to the West, remembered Radkiewicz’s confession as a dramatic gesture:

Radkiewicz testified [in a letter to the Party chief Władysław Gomułka] that he can no longer hide from the Party his crime which he committed when he was a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Association in the 1930s (...). Radkiewicz (...) disavowed the Communist Party and promised not to engage himself into any political activity. Radkiewicz ended his letter with expression of sorrow (...). I understood at this moment why Radkiewicz, so merciless toward his subordinates and inhumane toward the Bezpieka’s victims, is so docile and meek toward his Party superiors. 675

Minister Radkiewicz, guilty of the worst of all crimes, sought to emphasize among the security cadres what he was only partially able to do: perfect self-purification:

“We are capable of doing that, but there is one condition — we must internally, not formally, agree with the Party, we must fight against our own liberal mood (...) I speak about a breakthrough, a deep breakthrough concerning each of us.” 676

This moralistic advice, undoubtedly idealistic and sound, became increasingly strained when it collided with the corrupt structure of power the regime was based on. The development of...

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675 “Radkiewicz oświadczył w nim, że nie może dłużej ukrywać przed partią przestępstwa, które swego czasu popełnił, kiedy był sekretarzem Komitetu Centralnego komunistycznego Związku Młodzieży w latach trzydziestych (...). Złożył wówczas pisemne oświadczenie, że wyrzeka się partii komunistycznej i zobowiązuje się zaniechać wszelkiej działalności politycznej (...). Zrozumiałem przede wszystkim dlaczego Radkiewicz, tak bezwzględny w stosunku do podwładnych i nieludzki w stosunkach do ofiar bezpieki, jest tak potulny i pokorny w stosunku do swoich przełożonych w partii”: Zbigniew Błażyński, Mówi Józef Światło..., 43.

676 “Mnie się wydaje, że nas stać na to, żeby to zrobić pod jednym warunkiem, że sami wewnętrznie, nie formalnie będziemy się zgadzali z linią Partii, że sami będziemy zwalczali u siebie niektóre liberalistyczne nastroje, które się przedostały (...). Dlatego mówię o przełomie, głębokim przełomie, jaki musimy dokonać, sięgającym każdego z nas”: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza, wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO...
functionaries’ severe and energetic attachment depended on the regime’s ability to overcome their resistance from entrenched dignity and shyness. The campaign of the institutionalized confession oscillated between functionaries’ natural lassitude and the regimes’ artificial enthusiasm, and as such was a constant struggle against human nature that the regime could not win.

6.9. Functionaries under the X-ray

For ideological and pragmatic reasons, the regime could not have tolerated abuses of diligence compromising the discipline of the security apparatus. Aware that the suppression of laziness and routine via a moralistic campaign alone would not work, the ministerial dignitaries resorted to frequent controls. Investigation was one of the three pills comprising the antidote to the disease of apathy, as advised by Minister Radkiewicz: “Insightfulness (…), prudence (…) and control. These elements are necessary to prevent us from distorting our methods of struggle against the enemy (…).” Radkiewicz’s efforts to return fugitives from discipline to their ideological home concentrated on the imposition of penalties. The regime stripped away much of the complexity that it had known in pre-war Poland and thereby made the machinery for finding offenders simpler and quicker. The simplification of the procedure (i.e. no possibility of appeal) brought

677 “Wnikiowość (…), rozważność (…) i wreszcie kontrola wykonania. Te elementy są niezbędnym środkiem, który może nas, i powinien, uchronić przed wypaczeniem metod walki z wrogiem, które ułatwiają i zbliżają nas do głównego wroga i ułatwiają z nim walkę”: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na temat ”pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej”…, 10. Control was also advised by the MBP Vice-Minister Jan Ptasiński: “In reference to this, check and control the work of each individual functionary having contact with secret collaborators”: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Jana Ptasińskiego na temat ”pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej…”. 
many benefits. With practically no access to independent courts, delinquents could not escape their penalty by invoking the judiciary against the security secret regulations.

The regime tried to tighten discipline by a two-fold tactic: 1) creating the General Inspectorate (Główny Inspektorat Ministra) and 2) ordering chiefs of the local Bezpieca’s units to report periodically on the discipline of their subordinates. The General Inspectorate (GI) was a big X-ray machine looking at the security personnel through the scope of comprehensive control. The archival documents reveal that the GI hunted primarily for the “dead souls” and those who used to raise them in their filing cabinets. The GI’s statutorily defined mission does not leave any doubt about it. According to a work plan set for the General Inspectorate, its goal was to evaluate the operational activity of the security officers, the circumstances of secret collaborators’ recruitment, and the value of their reports. Additionally, upon closer inspection, the controllers checked carefully several randomly chosen files for their credibility. Encouraged by the GI’s effectiveness, in 1958, the regime created yet an additional structure — the Security Inspectorate (Inspektorat d/s Bezpieczeństwa), focusing solely on the local security units in each of Poland’s 200 counties. Though inspectors were few compared to the overall number of the security personnel, they were recruited from the oldest officers, politically and professionally experienced, which partially compensated for their numerical weakness.

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678 Plan zadań Głównego Inspektoratu Ministra z dnia 9 kwietnia 1959 roku (Plan of Work for the General Inspectorate from April 9, 1959), IPN pf 13, 402, k. 158-161.
679 These goals were outlined in the Plan zadań Głównego Inspektoratu..., k. 158-161.
680 The Security Inspectorate was created in 1958 by the ministerial Organizational Regulation Nr 0132 (Zarządzenie Organizacyjne No. 0132), IPN Ld pf 13, 402, k. 166.
The punitive aspect of control was one of several other potential benefits. In a polemical report about the inspectorate cadres, Lieutenant-Colonel Lech suggested looking beyond the scope of punishment: “the inspector should rather try to cooperate with the security functionaries, because hunting for mistakes can only thwart sincerity (…). One should not approach apodictically but pedagogically.” The inspection philosophy of Lieutenant-Colonel Lech centered around the assumption that the security personnel was mostly healthy, and that pathologies were caused by the Bezpieka’s structural setting. The inspectors’ role was to guide or drive functionaries to moral regeneration. Secondly, the inspectors were supposed to present the Party with an accurate picture of the secret service’s overall activity and with suggestions of what, if anything, should be amended. To Lech, not the quantity, but quality of control mattered the most. Such an approach was, however, much too idealistic, as it did not fully consider the degree of the functionaries’ professional degeneration.

The results of inspections of the Bezpieka’s local units brought the Party many reasons for concern. Though the archival material concerning internal control has not yet been classified and digested by historians in its entirety, the available documents suggest that reports fit into a pessimistic picture of the security force as remembered by two former MSW ministers: Franciszek Szlachcic and Jan Widacki. The Brzeziny Security County Office in 1956 was a striking case. The inspectors thundered:

684 Jan Widacki, Czego nie powiedział...
The work organization at the Brzeziny Security County Office is fatal. Three functionaries have nothing to do, the rest do not prepare daily plans for work. There is no improvement since the last check-up. Discipline slackens. Michalak, Kowalski and Pietrzak guide only four informers. Kowalski’s work attitude changed only because he got married to a ZMP activist. (...) The others are better, but they also lack discipline. No one worked on the “Cwaniak” case for three years! The Chief of the Office was not aware of the situation! (…) Most acts of surveillance were baseless. The reason for this is a lack of control and activity planning (…). Many secret collaborators do not prepare denunciations themselves, but the security functionaries do that for them. This may lead to embellishments and falsifications (such cases have been proven) (...).  685

The report revealed ubiquitous problems: idleness, lack of discipline, improper supervision, cheating, feinted activity, and general apathy. Already in 1949 Minister Radkiewicz complained that security employees avoided writing documents and reporting to superiors. Subsequently, not much improvement had been achieved.  686 What was even worse, these pathologies were so deeply rooted that even previous investigations did not change the situation. This indicates that Lieutenant-Colonel Lech’s inspection philosophy missed the reality that the stubbornness of the personnel was more powerful than their ideological enthusiasm. Spectacular dismissals from service, as tat one of Major Siemiewski from Białystok,  687 were only short-term solutions.


687 Major Siemiański was dismissed on May 4, 1953, for having no discipline on his subordinates: Rozkaz Nr 014/53 (Order No. 014/53), IPN Ld 0050/23, t. II.
The reports on discipline prepared by the chiefs of the Bezpieka county units were not more helpful. According to a secret statewide regulation from 1973, each of them had to present yearly reports on discipline, including all major cases of disciplinary violations. Moreover, the regulation reminded Bezpieka workers that discipline was equal to operational work and that violations were to be examined along with party organizations and discussed in briefings. Thus, by ministerial regulation, discipline was elevated to a legal obligation. In practice, however, it only added more clerical work but did not change people’s habits. Not surprisingly, the reports sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs were brief and lacked deep self-criticism. They were good sources of statistical data for the ministry, nothing more. Notably, from an ideological perspective, withholding abuses and distortions from superiors was worse than a criminal activity — it was tantamount to the abuse of the Party itself. The functionaries were institutionally obligated to denounce all violations regardless who committed them. Surely, the

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688 Signed by Colonel St. Mrożek on November 29, 1973 (Ldz Ks 02666/73), IPN Ld pf 13/369.
689 “The work discipline should be treated equally to the operational activity (…). Violations should be examined together with the party organizations and discussed during briefings” (“Dyscyplina służbowa winna być traktowana na równi z merytoryczną działalnością (…). Przewinienia winny być rozpatrywane przy udziale organizacji partyjnych i omawiane na naradach służbowych”): Zarządzenie z dnia 29 XI 1973 r. (Directive from November 29, 1973), 1973 (Ldz Ks 02666/73), IPN Ld pf 13/369.
691 See, for example, report on discipline in Wieruszów unit prepared by Major Szczepanik on January 8, 1974, P-025/74, IPN Ld pf 13/369.
692 Institutional denunciation was regulated by numerous secret speeches of the MBP chiefs. One of the most direct was Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz argument raised in April 1951: “We have to disarm and destroy silent conspiracies, keeping the Party chiefs uninformed about various abuses and distortions…even at the level of county. These plots are anti-Party. The functionaries of the secret service are supposed to react immediately to every crime and inform their superiors about every crime regardless of who is the perpetrator” (“Musimy rozbrajać i rozbić do końca te spiski milczenia, zatajania przed kierownictwem partyjnym różnych nadjwu, wypaczeń…nawet na szczeblu kierownictwa powiatowego. Są to spiski antypartyjne, spiski przeciwko Partii. Zadaniem pracowników bezpieczeństwa publicznego jest natychmiast reagować na każdy fakt przestępstwa, o każdym fakcie przestępstwa meldować władom przełożonym, niezależnie od
controls provided little maneuvering room for functionaries trying to deflect discipline. However, as the reality showed, neither the repression nor the reports themselves were powerful enough to discipline the security personnel to a satisfying way. Perhaps the attitude of the functionaries and their supervision was incompatible with a system of socialist discipline that simply lacked realism.

6.10. Conclusion

The virtue of diligence was a part of the communist drive for labor productivity that originated in the Soviet Union in the 1930s as Stakhanovism. The Party attempted to accelerate the efforts of workers by promoting diligent application of socialist moral code. For the security apparatus, however, commitment meant much more than it did for the rest of society. Naked coercion was a partially accepted method of ensuring loyalty of masses but it could not be the sole driving force. Frequent investigations and penalties could be only a short-term antidote to the disease of apathy. The success of communism depended, first, on enthusiastic service of its soldiers, secondly, on an enthusiastic commitment of society in response to the Bezpieka’s stimulation.

Assiduousness, the most visible sign of loyalty and a test for a functionary’s belief in the Party, was at the center of the security profession’s ethos. The obligation to stay active derived logically from the linkage between work performance and the success of communism.693 The profession of a secret functionary was a blend of stubbornness and
tego, kto to bezprawie popełnia”): Przemówienie końcowe ministra BP Stanisława Radkiewicza, wygłoszone na odprawie w dniu 23 kwietnia 1951 r. (Conclusive Speech of the MBP Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz on April 23, 1951), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t. 8.
693 Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej (Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries) (Warsaw, 1985), IPN 01179/57, egz. 1, 15. 25.
patience, combining the qualities of a soldier and a craftsman. But the propagandist promotion of the assiduousness in war-like terms had its drawbacks; it increased the likelihood of distortions and legal violations. However enthusiastically functionaries assumed their tasks, the Party did not wish to leave them uncontrolled. Despite this bureaucratic effort, tensions persisted. Sometimes the moralist propaganda “over-motivated” the functionaries, who gave vent to their energy in abusive forms, and sometimes it had a minimal influence on the ossifying Bezpieka’s cadres. That these problems were not peculiar to the formation period of the apparatus, laziness and overzealousness continued to plague the Bezpieka even in its putatively mature stage.

The fact that apathy led to subsequent moral degeneration, such as drunkenness and general slackness of the job, inspired periodic attempts at reform. As described earlier most drastic remedy proposed by Minister Radkiewicz was a combination of a public confession and a public condemnation. The highly promoted virtue of diligence was exploited to facilitate and stimulate subsequent moral regeneration. As the reality showed, however, motivation and skill, even if sincere, did not in themselves guarantee effectiveness. Demands of the regime were incompatible with a system of socialist discipline that simply lacked realism.
Chapter VII
Sobriety
Institutionalized Teetotalism

Comrades, we must show a collective contempt for drunkards.
--- Stanisław Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security.\textsuperscript{694}

7.1. Drunk Peoples’ Republic

In many communist states, drinking alcohol was a pivotal element of socialist culture and an important feature in the production and reproduction of ethnic, national, class, gender, and local community identities. Alcohol consumption was a largely male activity, stimulated by the persuasion of companions or relatives for whom intoxication was a refuge from the tensions so frequent in communist socio-economic systems.\textsuperscript{695} In this respect, Polish society was not different: alcohol (especially vodka) both catalyzed social life and served as a trade commodity functioning much like currency.\textsuperscript{696}

\textsuperscript{694} “Trzeba, towarzysze, wywołać zbiorową pogardę dla pijaków”: Przemówienie końcowe ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO w dniu 11 maja 1951 roku (Speech of the Public Security Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz During a Briefing for the Militia Functionaries, May 11, 1951), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t. 8.


Though drinking was an ubiquitous habit, socially appreciated and culturally accepted,\(^697\) communist ideologists fulminated against alcohol overindulgence as something unworthy of a devoted communist, arguing that “Soviet man, the builder of a new communist society (...) does not need drunkenness.”\(^698\) Communist propaganda promoted the qualities of the new “Soviet man” — sober, methodical and industrious — for whom alcohol would be non-essential, since participation in building of the new system should consume all his efforts and fulfill all his dreams. Similarly, in a particularly nationalist Poland, sobriety, or at least moderate drinking, was a standard claim repeatedly made by propagandists, who perceived it as a “sine qua non of the moral and material wealth of the nation.”\(^699\) Nevertheless, despite numerous efforts, Polish anti-alcohol campaigns resembled those of the Soviet Union, with a gap between official attitudes towards drinking and popular opinion favoring alcohol consumption.\(^700\) A typical Polish abstinent officer often found himself at odds with the rest of his co-workers, for whom alcohol was a kind of easy accessible anesthetic for all the pains associated with the communist system.

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\(^697\) Among the most interesting documents about the role of alcohol in Polish society are comedies, for example Miś (Teddy Bear) by Stanisław Bareja (Zespół Filmowy Perspektywa, 1980), and Co mi zrobiš jak mnie złapiesz? (What Will You Do if You Catch Me?) also by Stanisław Bareja (1978).


Though no social group, including the Bezpieka operatives, was free from widespread drunkenness, the Party guarded the sobriety of the security apparatus with special attention and punished drunk functionaries with unparalleled severity. Teetotalism and loyalty were raised to nearly equal status, changing the perception of sobriety from being an essentially private matter to that of being an essential attribute of homo sovieticus. An ideal security functionary was loyal, atheistic, intelligent, diligent, and sober. But while diligence was an indicator of an officer’s operational value, abstinence from alcohol was an absolute precondition for being an “emanation of the Party’s will” — a title reserved only to clear-headed functionaries capable of controlling themselves in all situations. The Party could not tolerate drunk security officers since intoxication blatantly contradicted all that the new system officially represented: heroism, not faint-heartedness; pragmatism, not delusion; perseverance, not moral degeneration.

701 A detailed picture of a state functionary as an emanation of the Party and Communist regime was portrayed by President Bolesław Bierut in 1951: Przemówienie prezydenta Bolesława Bieruta wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO w dniu 10 maja 1951 roku (Speech of the President Bolesław Bierut to the Militia Functionaries, May 10, 1951), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn. 17/IX/77, t.8. See also Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz’s speech on May 11, 1950: Przemówienie końcowe ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO w dniu 11 maja 1951 roku (Speech of the Minister of Public Security Stanisław Radkiewicz to the Militia Functionaries, May 11, 1951), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn.17/IX/77, t. 8.

702 Cowardice was denounced by Minister Radkiewicz on September 5, 1950, during his speech for the chiefs of the Public Security Districts: Przemówienie ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza wygłoszone na odprawie szefów WUBP w dniu 5 września 1950 roku (Speech of Minister of Public Security Stanisław Radkiewicz During Briefing of the Chiefs of the Provincial Units of the Public Security, September 5, 1950), Archiwum MSWiA, sygn.17/IX/77, t.6.

703 See, for example, speech of the MBP Director of the Investigative Unit in 1953: Przemówienie dyrektora Departamentu Śledczego Józefa Różańskiego na temat >pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej< wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Speech of Józef Różański, the Director’s of the Investigative Unit of the MBP, to the Chiefs of the Ministry of Public Security about Working in National Economy), AIPN, MBP, 10. See also Przemówienie wiceministra Ptasińskiego z dnia 3 września 1953 r. na zakończenie kursu wychowawców zawodowych (Speech of Jan Ptasiński, the Vice-Minister of Public Security at the
The regime is like a drunk slut riding a red dragon.

Rev. Stanisław Małkowski⁷⁰⁵

7.2. Sobriety as a virtue

The primary way in which the Party related to abstinence concerned the “dignity of a security functionary.” Abstention from alcohol as a matter of moral value called for the vocal and adamant denunciation of alcohol as an evil potentially harmful to the communist system in general and especially to its core — the security apparatus. Alcohol addiction constituted infidelity to the regime, for its very existence indicated the divided allegiance. The most explicit statement of an essentially anti-alcohol mentality came in March 1952 from Waclaw Lewikowski, the MBP Vice-Minister,⁷⁰⁶ who signed a comprehensive order concerning the problem of alcohol consumption by security functionaries.⁷⁰⁷ The order bemoaned the Bezpieka officers’ unawareness of the fact that alcohol overuse not only might result in mistakes, but “the mere act of showing oneself while intoxicated damages the dignity of a security functionary.”⁷⁰⁸ The wording and

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⁷⁰⁴ The moral degeneration of security functionaries in respect to alcoholism was condemned by President Bolesław Bierut: Przemówienie prezydenta Bolesława Bieruta wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO...


⁷⁰⁶ For more information about Waclaw Lewikowski, see Henryk Piecuch, Spotkania z Fejginem: Zza kulis bezpieki (Meetings with Fejgin, From the Backstage of Bezpieka) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Story, 1996), 143.

⁷⁰⁷ Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52 z dnia 31 marca 1952 roku o zwalczaniu przypadków nadużywania alkoholu (Ministerial Order No. 08/52 dated on March 31, 1952, about Fighting Alcohol Overdose), IPN/ OBUiAD /Łódź, Sygn. 0050/23, t.1., k. 32-38.

⁷⁰⁸ “Już samo nadużycie alkoholu, choćby nie pociągało za sobą żadnych wykroczeń po wybiciu, sam fakt pokazania się w stanie nietrzeźwym hańbi godność funkcjonariusza służby bezpieczeństwa”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52 z dnia 31 marca 1952 roku o zwalczaniu przypadków
composition of the order’s preamble indicates that the regime perceived sobriety in both an ideological and a utilitarian sense. The order referred to the relationship between alcohol consumption and work results, and stressed the close correlation between abstinence and other virtues of communist morality, such as responsibility (odpowiedzialność), education (wychowanie), and dignity (godność).

The Party’s conception of the ideal functionary included sobriety and loyalty along with day-to-day work responsibilities. These qualities were the logical extension and expression of communist ideology, and contributed to the regime’s official image of itself as a clear-headed, serious-minded agent of socio-political progress. Not surprisingly, teetotalism and intemperance were discussed in personnel files and affected functionaries’ “operational abilities.” To understand the importance of sobriety, one must be aware that in the scope of the ideology each Bezpieca operative, like any other public officer of Communist Poland, was more than a representative of the Party — he was the “personification of the new regime.” President Bierut’s numerous secret addresses to the security functionaries are examples of how drunkenness was labeled sinful and considered something to be cured by ideological means. Bierut routinely asked for help battling the intemperance, linking “a functionary’s dignity” with dignity of the nation: “It is a great and honorable duty to be the nation’s servant, its defendant and

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709 For more information about communist education, see chapter II.
710 An example of this belief is General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s speech on March 16, 1984 during the National Conference of the Polish United Worker’s Party’s Delegates: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Przemówienia...
711 See, for instance, Charakterystyka Józefa Kuryły (Characteristics of Józef Kuryła), AIPN Rz, 54/343, k.60.
712 “(…) Jest uosobieniem nowego ustrój”: Przemówienie prezydenta Bolesława Bieruta wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO...
executioner of its will, an exponent of its progressive desires, a representative of its
dignity, its state power and might, its majesty.” President Bierut was obviously playing
on the emotions of the Bezpieka functionaries.

7.3. Relaxation under control

The Party’s disgust with drunkenness was, however, more a necessity than a
moral judgment, more a reaction to real danger than a blanket condemnation of the act.
An intoxicated security functionary could pose a whole spectrum of possible hazards. Out
of the dismal list of drinking’s negative outcomes, relaxation of vigilance posed the
biggest danger. Aware that alcohol could slacken one’s sense of alertness and reveal
one’s inner identity, the Party interpreted the uncontrolled relaxation of its soldiers as a
more likely source of troubles than simply the slothful and demoralizing manifestation of
intemperance. If one also takes into consideration the omnipresent secrecy and ubiquitous
camouflage of the Bezpieka’s dual world, it is not hard to imagine that a drunk
functionary’s excessive openness could easily turn out to be a Pandora’s box. This
attitude became increasingly strained when it concerned regular drinking: “Investigate
systematically intoxicated functionaries for the enemy’s possible influence and
incitement” – demanded the MBP Minister in 1952. Irresponsible drinking, which, in

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713 “Jest to wielka i zaszczytna funkcja być sługą narodu, obrońcą i wykonawcą jego potrzeb,
wyrazicielem jego dążeń rozwojowych, reprezentantem jego godności, jego państwowej woli i
mocy, jego majestatu”: Przemówienie prezydenta Bolesława Bieruta wygłoszone na odprawie
funkcjonalariuszy MO...
714 “Śledztwo w stosunku do systematycznie upijających się funkcjonariuszy służby
bezpieczeństwa przeprowadzać pod kątem widzenia wpływów wroga i jego inspiracji.” ‘Enemy’
means here an abstract, imaginary foe, not a specific person or institution: Rozkaz Ministra Nr
08/52..., k. 33.
reality meant drinking without the Party’s control, was, in the eyes of the ideology, yet another form of the enemy attack:

(…) The sharp class struggle in the state caused, among other things, the class enemy’s increased stress on the moral standing of secret service functionaries. Getting a functionary drunk is one of the enemy’s methods of demoralizing the security apparatus. This leads to a functionary’s inability to fulfilling his work duties correctly, and to other serious consequences.715

The above element of warlike ideology should not be underestimated. The regime was absolutely serious when it came to situations typical of alcoholic officers — unauthorized work absence, revealing secrets, inadequate storage of secret documents, or loss of documents.716 The Party expressed its dismay that alcohol played a large part in these kinds of infractions.717 Those who lost the “battle with the bottle” were to be permanently excluded from the security cadres. The law demanded that an officer responsible for the grave consequences of his intemperance be expelled from the apparatus, and his addiction be known in all places he would like to work, in order to prevent him from taking important positions.718


716 For example, Lieutenant Karbownicka was warned for keeping top secret documents in an unsecured cabinet, Rozkaz Specjalny Ldz Ab-479/57 (Special Order Ldz Ab-479/57), IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1. See also a similar case when an officer left secret documents unattended on his desk Rozkaz Karny nr 17/59 Ab-662-rq (Punitive Order nr 17/59 Ab-662-rq), IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1. See, for example, the Punitive Order AB-449/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, RS nr 7; and Order Nr 9, Ab-492/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 23. For absence, see Report on Discipline in the Bezpieka, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 159. For loosing documents, see, for example, the Punitive Order AB-449/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, RS nr 7; and Order Nr 9, Ab-492/59, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 23. For absence, see Report on Discipline in the Bezpieka, IPN Ld pf 13/336, t.1, k. 159.

717 Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52…, k. 32.

718 Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52…, k. 33.
7.4. Baptists

In principle, the security officers had to renounce drinking; and, at least officially, sobriety itself became a primary symbol of one’s status as a communist. However, in a society where drinking was customary, it could be considered a slight if one declined the offer to drink. Despite anti-alcohol crusades, drinking in the Bezpieka was common (especially in the 1940s and 1950s), and the refusal to do so erected a barrier between unshakable officers and the rest who did not share such prohibitionist views. In May 1951 Minister Radkiewicz lamented a widespread conviction among the security officers that clashed with the sacred motives of teetotalism promoted by the Party: “in your units, they [drunkards] are called heroes. ‘I got drunk today, I went out partying today’ — these are heroes. They walk jauntily as if they have a halo.”

The tone of the criticism and the time of its occurrence suggest that it touched a real nerve in the Bezpieka. Radkiewicz’s examples indicate that a pro-alcohol mood acceptance had gained ascendancy especially in less supervised local units alienating the abstainers from the community of security officers. Many of those who accepted the austere standards of temperance exposed themselves to the hostility of their companions.

719 “A oni przecież u Was w terenie uchodzą za bohaterów — ja dziś wypiłem, ja dziś się zabawiłem, to bohaterowie, aureola ich jest, gieroje”: Przemówienie końcowe ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy MO...

720 This is parallel to the argument of a historian Janusz Borowiec who specializes in security officers’ abuses in Rzeszów province: Janusz Borowiec, “Nadużycia funkcjonariuszy więzienia w Rzeszowie w świetle raportu naczelnika Wydziału ds. Funkcjonariuszy WUBP w Rzeszowie z listopada 1949 roku” (“Abuses of the Functionaries of the Rzeszów Prison in the Light of the Report made by the Chief of the Unit Responsible for Provincial Functionaries, Prepared in November of 1949), Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej (Apparatus of Repression in People’s Poland), (Rzeszów: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2007), 1/5/2007, 277-278.
who sardonically called them “baptists” (baptyści). The term, however, had deeper connotations than the simple linkage of baptists and sobriety. It referred specifically to those Polish communists who came from the Soviet Union and drank less than local Poles. The nickname manifested both contempt for abstainers and distaste for the “Moscow Poles,” who enjoyed a privileged position in the state. Strikingly, being called a Baptist, did not necessarily mean alcohol had never touched one’s lips; rather, it referred to how much alcohol one consumed. Thus, the logic distinguishing baptists and non-baptists is questionable if only alcohol consumption is taken into consideration.

One of the first who called the abstainers “baptists” was General Grzegorz Korczyński, the Vice Minister of Public Security between 1946 and 1948. In 1950 he was arrested and sentenced to life in prison: Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), Aparat bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1950-1952 (The Security Apparatus in Poland Between 1950 and 1952) (Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, 2000), 117.


So far, I came across only a few documents related to baptists, so it is hard to evaluate how widely this term was used.
Minister Radkiewicz’s censure of alcohol consumption not only echoed the Party’s repugnance for drunkenness, but stemmed from his own convictions typical of a Moscow-Pole. He grew particularly strident when he realized that sober functionaries were outcasts and that teetotalism was viewed as an obsolescent concept. The two complementary solutions for alcoholic woes he proposed — a collective contempt for drunkards and promotion of abstinence — were based on the presumption that the security functionaries’ moral standing and ideological sensitivity had not yet been totally consumed by alcoholic intemperance. Radkiewicz placed most hope of moral renaissance in the baptists: “We must promote them as models of those who actively fight this depravity: those who cannot stand it, whose morality and political conscience cannot approve it.” Radkiewicz’s insistence is understandable, for the baptists’ messianic role, supported by the institutional repression of drunkards, might have indeed had the desired effect. Nevertheless, the Baptists’ crusade achieved only limited success. Three years later, in 1954, Minister Radkiewicz still complained about it, equating the sin of alcoholic intemperance with such grave violations as religiosity and capitalist sentiments: “there

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725 Stanisław Radkiewicz was a Soviet citizen. For more details, see Ryszard Terlecki, Miecz i tarcza komunizmu. Historia aparatu bezpieczeństwa w Polsce 1944-1990 (Sword and Shield of Communism. History of the Security Apparatus in Poland between 1944 and 1990) (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2007).
726 “Trzeba za wzór stawiać i pokazywać za przykład tych, którzy walczą aktywnie z tą zgnilizną. Którzy nie mogą ściepnieć, których morale, sumienie ich partyjne nie znosi tego”: Przemówienie końcowe ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy...
are still cases of religious devoutness, petit bourgeois mentality, bossiness, drunkenness and hooliganism.”

7.5. Re-education

Given how alcohol impairs the will, it is not surprising that drinking, like other forms of moral depravity, was perceived and explained in ideological terms. Apparently, in the pantheon of communist values, sobriety had a special role, though it does not mean that alcohol overuse was treated with the same disdain as were functionaries’ disloyalty or religious activity. Total prohibition for the nation was never a part of the communist creed, and restrictions on drinking were merely situational. Drunkenness in the security apparatus was particularly unacceptable, but the Party would turn a blind eye to occasional drinking. Casual intoxication was viewed as a sign of private rather than ideological troubles and therefore worried the Party mostly when a functionary lost control over his life.

Tight control of oneself and others, political discipline, and ideological vigilance combined with frequent acts of self-criticism, were supposed to detoxify the security body from alcoholic inclinations. Its power of intervention gave the Party a tool and a forum by which the regime expressed its concern in a structured format and signaled the importance of sobriety. Despite apparent failures in fighting drunkenness, Minister Radkiewicz argued for educational over repressive solutions for strictly pragmatic
reasons: disciplinary actions alone did not work. A similar approach came from President Bolesław Bierut who, in his typically bellicose language, attempted to encourage functionaries in the struggle against drinking. In short, the problem was in the discrepancy between pragmatic and ideological diagnosis of alcohol overuse. For the Party, moral standing and drunkenness were all of a piece, and ideological education that was expected to make a difference:

In order to fight drunkenness (…), you should frequently use such methods as organizing individual talks, influencing family members, examining these cases during party meetings and imposing sanctions. While resolving the cases, the Party organizations should act uncompromisingly.

The regime naively trusted that Party organizations, which existed alongside each major security unit providing moral support and intellectual guidance, would be able to influence the moral and ideological standing of each functionary regardless of rank, whether on duty or not. Here, the key word for the Party’s notion of the loyalty of the security functionary was “to denounce” (donosić, sygnaлизować). The officer could not close his eyes to the drunkenness — or to erring colleagues — he saw around him, but

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729 Przemówienie Prezydenta Bolesława Bieruta wygłoszone na odprawie funkcjonariuszy..., t.8.

730 “W walce z pijanistwem (…) stosować metody oddziaływania poprzez rozmowy indywidualne, wpływanie na członków rodzin, omawianie tych spraw na zebraniach partyjnych aż do stosowania sankcji partyjnych włącznie. Przy omawianiu wykroczeń podst. org. part. winny wykazać pełną pryncypialność”: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową radę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca...

731 This was ascertained by Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz in his long speech about various abuses in the security apparatus in 1954: Referat ministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Stanisława Radkiewicza na krajową radę aktywu kierowniczego aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego 4 marca 1954..., 14, point c.
was expected to denounce them without hesitation. This insistence is understandable, for the private and public lives of the soldiers of the Party no longer belonged to them, but to the regime.

7.6. Boozers

The archives are full of references to disciplinary actions taken against drunk Bezpieka operatives. One example concerns Captain Teofil Paulch, a functionary of the public security unit in Rzeszów. Paluch, who bravely took part in several spectacular actions against the regime’s enemies and showed himself to be a “brave operational functionary,” had to leave the family of security officers after a drunken incident, when he “publicly battered a militiaman, harassed him verbally, pulled him out of the car and finally kicked him out for farewell.” The drunken Paluch was probably unaware that

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734 Teofil Paluch was a functionary of the 3rd Unit of the Provincial Security Office in Rzeszów and Białystok (Wydział III WUBP ) between 1944 and 1953. For more details about his career in the security apparatus, see Zbigniew Nawrocki, Zamiast wolności. UB na Rzeszowszczyźnie 1944-1949 (Instead of Freedom. Security Apparatus in Rzeszów District 1944-1949) (Rzeszów: Instytut Europejskich Studiów Społecznych, 1998), 106.
735 “(…) publicznie pobił milicjanta, nawymyślał mu od blacharzy, potem go wypchnął z samochodu i kopnął go na pożegnanie jeszcze”: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika na temat „pracy na odcinku gospodarki narodowej” wygłoszone na odprawie aktywu kierowniczego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (April 16, 1953. Speech of the MBP Vice-Minister Konrad Świetlik during the Briefing for the MBP Chiefs about the Work in the National Economy), AIPN, MBP, 10.
this time his victim was not a partisan, but a public functionary. The disciplinary action for the incident was, however, neither swift nor unequivocal. Initially, Paluch met compassion and forgiveness from his superiors, who violated the ministerial order requiring supervising officers to “ruthlessly fight drinking.” Paluch’s example proves that many superiors accepted a recidivist drunkard’s acts with failure to assign blame for them. It can be explained either by their unawareness of the Bezpieka internal anti-alcohol regulations, or by their acceptance of habitual drinking. The first argument seems to be weak, since the functionaries repeatedly had to take part in briefings and in-service training sessions devoted to work discipline, of which sobriety was an integral part.

Legal ignorance was not an excuse because the internal instructions required each functionary to be introduced to all rules and regulations concerning his work, and even to sign a special form (OgP-3) attesting that he had read and understood them. According to the regulation, drinking constituted nothing else than a conscious violation of the Bezpieka’s principles and a possible prelude to other forms of disloyalty.

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736 Teofil Paluch participated in actions disbanding partisan units, for example unit “Huzara” commanded by Kazimierz Kamienieński and unit “Wiarus” commanded by Stanisław Grabowski: Zbigniew Nawrocki, Zamiast wolności..., 106.
737 Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/... k. 175.
738 The Ministry of Internal Affairs organized occasional training of the public functionaries. For example, between 1971 and 1974 all the Bezpieka functionaries had to participate in an in-service training program concerning such issues as “professional manners” (kultura pracy), “principles of personal refinement” (kultura osobista), and “solving problems” (rozwiązywanie problemów), Decyzja podpułkownika M. Winczorka z dnia 27 Lipca 1971 roku (Decision of Lieutenant-Colonel M. Winczorek dated on July 27, 1971), IPN Ld pf 13/369. In addition, all the accepted public functionaries were under legal obligation to read necessary rules and regulations concerning their service: Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1959 roku o służbie funkcjonariuszy MO (The Statute about the Service of the Militia Functionary from January 31, 1959), Dz.U. Nr 23, 11.06.1973.
739 See, for example, Instrukcja Nr 01/60 z dnia 20 czerwca 1960 roku w sprawie trybu wydawania i prowadzenia ewidencji przepisów służby bezpieczeństwa Nr A2 935/60 (Instruction No. 01/60 from June 20, 1960 about Enactment and Registration of Security Rule, No. A2 935/60), IPN Ld pf 13/387, k. 137.
The Paluch case was a major blow to those idealists who believed that drinking was a habit one might escape through mere strength of will. Since the appeals to a functionary’s intellect and political awareness were of minimal effect, the concept of trusting the shaky officers gave way to guarding them more closely. Already in the early 1950s it seemed that the Party must bear some responsibility for promoting teetotalism and should assist officers in their struggle with liquor. One such proponent was the MBP Vice-Minister Konrad Świetlik, who praised the growing power of the political authorities in respect to ‘boozers’: 740

There is no other choice, comrades. If someone is a booser, he must be given a stronger companion, someone who is be able to set him free from boozing, raise him, make him a good man. We cannot expect that a booser suddenly, without our help, might become a decent man. The example of Captain Paluch states the contrary. 741

Such a request, emphasizing individual mentoring and a comprehensive approach to alcoholism, had a chance of being effective. Świetlik’s suggestion aimed at breaking down the tendency of demoralization provided by the alcohol-addicted functionaries and reverse it by moralizing example and close control by the baptists. The duty to raise their colleagues from the moral “mud” was almost unrealistic; the Party seemed to think that by a baptist’s close supervision, the regime could bully all functionaries into better

740 Konrad Świetlik used a Polish word “lump” which may be translated as “layabout” or “bum”: Słownik polsko-angielski (Polish-English Dictionary) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005), 295. “Lump,” however, has a broader meaning — a person without moral values, someone who is idle and behaves in a socially unacceptable manner: Słownik języka polskiego (Dictionary of Polish Language) (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984), vol II, 60. The context of Konrad Świetlik’s speech indicates that he referred to a drunkard: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika...

741 “Nie ma rady, proszę towarzyszy, jeśli ktoś ma w sobie coś z lumpa, to trzeba dać mu towarzysza mocnego, który go potrafi z tego lumpostwa wyzwolić, wychować, zrobić z niego dobrego człowieka, ale liczyć na to, że lump sam ni z tego, ni z owego, bez naszej pomocy, stanie się porządnym człowiekiem. To przykład kapitana Palucha zaprzeczył.” The Vice-Minister Świetlik was obviously unsatisfied with Paluch’s progress, who despite many chances failed to correct himself: 16 Kwiecień 1953 roku. Przemówienie wiceministra bezpieczeństwa publicznego Konrada Świetlika...
behavior. In fact, “guardian angels” did not work miracles. The problem of liquor within the Bezpieka bedeviled it throughout its existence. In 1969, for instance, the Minister of Internal Affairs repeated previous orders prohibiting excessive drinking, and in 1973 Colonel Mrożek reminded his subordinates that “alcohol overuse in our profession is not only an offense in itself, but also a factor loosening discipline.” From 1981 on, moral supervision took on a more organized form. Among the institutions suitable for anti-alcohol crusades, prominence of place belonged to the Political-Educational Unit (Pion Polityczno-Wychowawczy, PPW). Militaristic in discipline and fanatical in attitude, the PPW pedantically and scrupulously combed through the security personnel looking for “drunk degenerates.” In addition, the regime repeatedly promulgated new laws, punitive orders, and regulations reminding officers of the necessity of remaining sober.

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742 In Rzeszów district, for example, drunkenness was the second cause of disciplinary expulsions in the late 1940s: Janusz Borowiec, “Nadużyća funkcjonariuszy więzienia w Rzeszowie w świetle raportu naczelnika Wydziału ds. Funkcjonariuszy WUBP w Rzeszowie z listopada 1949 roku” (Abuses of the Functionaries of the Rzeszów Prison in the Light of the Report made by the Chief of the Unit Responsible for Provincial Functionaries, Prepared in November of 1949), Aparat Represji..., 287.
744 “Nadużywanie alkoholu w naszej służbie jest nie tylko przewinieniem samym w sobie ale stanowi podłoże dla rozluźnienia dyscypliny w ogóle”: Zarządzenie pułkownika St. Mrożka z dnia 29 listopada 1973 roku (Directive of Colonel St. Mrożek dated on November 29, 1973), Ldz. ks 02666/73.
746 In Rzeszów Province alone, there were several anti-liquor laws enacted in the 1940s: Rozkaz Nr 3 kierownika Resortu BP PKWN z dnia 24 października 1944 r. (Order No. 3 of the Public Security Chief of the Polish Committee of National Liberation from October 24, 1944), AAN 295/VII-252; Rozkaz Nr 3 kierownika WUBP Rzeszów z dnia 6 stycznia 1945 roku (Order No. 3 of the Provincial Public Security Chief from January 1, 1945), AIPN Rz, 04/325, k.1; Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 044 z dnia 13 września 1946 roku (Special Order No. 044 from September 13, 1946), AIPN Rz, 118/175, k. 63. For a detailed picture of drunkenness in Rzeszów Province, see Janusz Borowiec, “Nadużyća funkcjonariuszy więzienia w Rzeszowie w świetle raportu naczelnika Wydziału ds. Funkcjonariuszy WUBP w Rzeszowie z listopada 1949 roku” (“Abuses of the Functionaries of the Rzeszów Prison In the Light of the Report made by the Chief of the Unit Responsible for Provincial Functionaries, prepared in November 1949), Aparat Represji w
The culmination of the anti-alcohol campaign took place in 1985, when sobriety was identified as a vital part of the new moral code, warning that “yielding to addictions affecting self-control, physical and intellectual fitness, is at odds with a functionary’s dignity and honor.”

7.7. Inebriated guardian-angels

The language of internal discussions indicates that excessive use of alcohol was widespread. However, the perception of drinking as an assault on the nation’s dignity must have increased functionaries’ vigilance, especially among the supervising officers who were institutionally obliged to watch for dipsomaniac subordinates. The regime believed that the problem of inebriated cadres could not exist if the units had proper supervision: “There is no doubt that acts of drinking among the security functionaries may occur and actually occur in those units where chiefs have a casual attitude to their supervisory duties (…)”. For that particular reason, the regime saw alcoholism as a barometer of institutional superintendence’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its ideological guardianship. Not surprisingly, the mobilization of the Bezpieka bosses for correction and rehabilitation of alcohol-abusers presented a real challenge, and complaints about their apathy were more frequent than was praise for their duty-inspired efforts in intervening with drinking. To change this, the order strongly declared that “a

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747 “Uleganie nałogom obniżającym samokontrolę, sprawność intelektualną i fizyczną nie licuje z godnością i honorem funkcjonariusza”: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej (Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries) (Warszawa, 1985), IPN 01179/57, egz. 1, 30.
748 “Nie ulega żadnej wątpliwości, że fakty pijaniaństwa wśród funkcjonariuszy organów bezpieczeństwa publicznego mogą mieć i mają miejsce w tych jednostkach, których kierownicy odnoszą się beztrosko do swych obowiązków dowódcy (…)”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/…, k. 32.
superior officer is also responsible, who allowed it to happen by tolerating drunkenness and by his failure to execute his fundamental duty of the proper upbringing of subordinate functionaries.” 749 The law drew lines more clearly under what was appropriate alcohol consumption and what was not. In fact, the division of a functionary’s public and private lives was impossible, as the security chiefs had to exercise unlimited control over drinking habits. The regime wanted the virtue of sobriety to encompass the whole life of a soldier of the Party, and, additionally, to be controlled by an “guardian angel.” Thus, security chiefs were expected not only to watch their subordinates on duty, but also in their private lives. The law demanded that all functionaries ask for permission to go to public feasts, and gun-possessing officers were under a total alcohol prohibition. 750 Moreover, the regime tried to discipline the cadres by swift and severe punishment of those Bezpieka superiors “who did not react at all, or reacted inadequately to the drunkenness of their subordinates.” 751

On occasion, the Party elite received signals that its enhancement of agitation and rigor had only limited success. The policy of being less trusting and more disciplinary towards drunkards proved unrealizable despite repeated efforts of ideological indoctrination and re-education. The case of Lieutenant Łoszczak — the chief of the County Bezpieka Unit (Powiatowy Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) in Zamość, belongs to the most drastic violations of sobriety norms. Lieutenant Łoszczak, who was supposed to

749 “(…) odpowiedzialnym jest również jego przełożony, który dopuścił do zaistnienia takiego przypadku przez tolerowanie pijania i niewykonanie swego podstawowego obowiązku służbowego jakim jest należyte wychowanie podległych mu funkcjonariuszy”: Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52…, k. 32.
750 Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/…, k. 33.
751 “Wyciągnąć surowe wnioski dyscyplinarne wobec przełożonych, którzy nie reagują lub niedostatecznie reagują na uprawianie pijania przez swych podwładnych”: Zbiór ważniejszych przepisów…, k. 175.
embody an ascetic ideal to his subordinates, taught them instead how to drink alcohol to the point of vomiting it. He also took an “indifferent stance toward subordinate cadres, and was disinterested in organizing political and job trainings for months.” The price he paid for his imprudent behavior — disciplinary expulsion from work trial before the Military Court, and infamy among the security officers (the order was publicized among the entire Bezpieka apparatus), seems to be high but within limits of the existing law. This is not surprising. If a subordinate functionary violated liquor rules, it was harmful for him and the secret collaborators he guided, but if a superior broke the law, it was harmful for all security officers of the unit. This logic stems from an almost apostolic notion of the mission of the security chiefs, whose guidance and control were essential for the Bezpieka’s proper function. Reproofs were meant to contribute to their awareness. It may be asked how true these ideological claims were. It may be asked if the Party itself was observant of its own anti-alcohol norms. Though the Party is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is commonly understood that the Party elite’s drinking was well known to the Bezpieka officers, which surely did not help to discipline low-ranking cadres. Jerzy Eisler, the Polish historian of communism, claims that drinking was a hidden problem of the Party itself which reveals double morality of the Party members.

752 This case was discussed in a punitive order: Rozkaz Karny z dnia 24 marca 1952 roku AC-453/52 (Punitive Order from March 24, 1952, AC-453/52) signed by the Public Security Vice-Minister Wacław Lewikowski, IPN Ld pf 13/II, t.2.
753 “Był on bezdusznie ustosunkowany do wychowania podległych sobie kadr, nie interesował się tym, że od kilku miesięcy zabrakło w urzędzie szkolenia politycznego i zawodowego”: Rozkaz Karny z dnia 24 marca 1952 roku AC-453/52 (Punitive Order from March 24, 1952, AC-453/52), IPN Ld pf 13/II, t.2.
754 Rozkaz Karny z dnia 24 marca 1952 ....
755 Some of the Bezpieka functionaries believed that their units were “drunk not less than the Party”: Archiwum Państwowe w Rzeszowie, Komitet Wojewódzki PPR w Rzeszowie, 9, Sprawozdanie z działalności KW PPR w Rzeszowie za lipiec 1946 roku, 14 VIII 1946, k. 32.
Arguably, the dichotomy between reality and expectations contributed to the limited success of the anti-liquor campaigns. In this respect, Poland was similar to the Soviet Union and other communist states, such as Yugoslavia.757

7.8. Disciplinary actions

The stories of functionaries who had lost their career through drink were numerous. The alcoholics’ cases followed the same pattern: a functionary who was a privileged member of the communist elite began to lead a dissipated life in the bars and at parties. Initially, his behavior met with superiors’ leniency, so he became more brazen. He gradually broke rules more boldly, gets drunk in private, and eventually brought this habit to work. Ultimately, he sunk so low that he can no longer control himself. If he became a public figure, drinking posed a potential public, as well as private threat. Moral downfall was conducive to subsequent abuses for many security officers had guns at their disposal. Stories of rivalries with a drunk secret functionary shooting at random, family disputes where a wife used her husband’s gun,758 affairs with prostitutes,759 stealing,760 or unauthorized drinking with secret collaborators761 were not infrequent. Obviously, the Party was especially concerned when a uniformed officer got drunk publicly. A


758 See examples in the Rozkaz Ministra Nr 08/52..., k. 32.


760 See, for example, case of Sergeant Pawłowski who was disciplinarily fired for drunkenness and stealing: Rozkaz Specjalny Nr 12/59 Ldz A-0209/59 (Special Order No. 12/59 Ldz A-0209/59), IPN Ldz pf 13/336, t.1, k. 12.

761 Rozkaz Karny z dnia 20 sierpnia 1960 roku (Punitive Order from August 20, 1960), IPN Ldz pf 13/336, t.1, k. 72.
uniformed functionary represented the honor and dignity of the Bezpiewka and the Party; consequently, appearing drunk constituted an official humiliation of the regime. For these reasons, the security chiefs could not tolerate the behavior of one officer who, in full uniform and armed, visited two renowned night clubs, got drunk, then fell under the table and slept there for the rest of the night, thus “becoming the laughing-stock of the club’s clients.” The officer was arrested, and his example was used to signal the security cadres that the regime would not tolerate scandalous violations of sobriety.

These accounts convey the difficulty the Party continued to encounter in seeking to suppress all forms of alcoholic intemperance. While there was a developed negative system of discipline to apply to various forms of misbehavior, including imprisonment, there was also a comprehensive positive mechanism of promoting sobriety. Indeed, the officers were frequently briefed about the virtue of sobriety and its role in communist morality. Occasionally, they were warned that drunkenness was a method used by the enemy to “weaken the security apparatus in the ongoing fight” and that serious, war-like disciplinary consequences would follow the lack of compliance. Notably, part of a secret officer’s duty was guarding the sobriety of other public functionaries. Even

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762 “(…) spadł pod stół i leżał do rana, stając się pośmiewiskiem dla publiczności tego lokalu.” It is the case of the Warrant Officer Henryk Hebda, the investigative officer of the Bezpiewka: Rozkaz Karny z dnia 27 lutego 1953 roku (Punitive Order from February 27, 1953), Ldz Mg-175/53, IPN Ld pf 13/1.

763 For example, the law from February 27, 1953, required security chiefs to organize frequent briefings bringing sobriety to attention of all the security officers: Rozkaz Karny z dnia 27 lutego 1953....


765 In 1952 alone the security officers reported on 334 drunk military functionaries of the Polish State Railways (PKP): Instrukcja Nr 03/52 z dnia 19 maja 1952 (Instruction No. 03/52), AC-812/52, IPN Ld 0050/23, t.II.
drunkards with excellent work results in fighting alcoholism of others could not count for help, liquour discipline was treated as seriously as their own achievements.  

“An award for impeccable behavior in every-day personal life” was yet another form of positive stimulation. An officer whose private life complied with communist virtues could count on salary increases and more frequent promotions. The content of the awarding orders was usually publicized among the cadres, partially to demonstrate the exact expectations of the regime, and partially to prove that these expectations were possible to realize. Especially praised were successes in “difficult areas,” known as onerous and fatiguing, where results often came after years of Herculean efforts. Undoubtedly, sobriety belonged to this category.

The third method of positive motivation centered around substitute forms of entertainment. Surely, work stress and private issues were for many officers difficult to handle without resorting to liquor. Alcohol problems could be a warning sign of elevated work stress that, if left unattended, could lead to bigger problems. The task of alcohol prevention was on the shoulders of chiefs of the Party organizations (sekretarze organizacji partyjnych) tied to every Bezpieka section by an ideological umbilical cord. Initial penalties were moderate — individual talks and warnings — but they increased in

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766 “Dyscyplina służbowa winna być traktowana na równi z merytoryczną działalnością” (‘‘Work discipline should be treated equally to work results’’), Zarządzenie pułkownika St. Mrożka z dnia 29 listopada 1973 roku (Directive of Colonel St. Mrożek from November 29, 1973), Ldz ks 02666/73, IPN Ld pf 13/369. See also Rozkaz Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych Nr 04/60 z dnia 7 kwietnia 1960 roku (Order of the Minister of Interior Affairs No. 04/60 from April 7, 1960), AB-0108/60, IPN, Ld pf 13/336, t.II.


768 Łukasz Kamiński, a professional historian from the Wrocław University claims that drunkeness was one of the most characteristic features of security functionaries, along with family problems: “Koniec Świata Esbeków” (“End of the World of Secret Functionaries”), Gazeta Wyborcza Opole, 06/03/2005.
severity in proportion to the duration and extent of one’s drinking. Also, the Party tried to prevent accidental stress-out activities by having its own entertainments, allowing functionaries to relax in a controlled manner. The regime placed hope in its therapeutic function of “drawing functionaries’ attention away from drinking inclination.” Despite these efforts, drunkenness remained one of the major problems plaguing the *Bezpieka*.

### 7.9. Conclusion

The Party’s perception of the ideal functionary included the glorification of sobriety. The virtue of teetotalism belonged to the core of communist morality and had itself become a primary symbol of one’s status as a communist within the *Bezpieka* apparatus. Drinking was considered infidelity to the Party, and the very existence of addiction signified divided allegiance — a situation impossible to tolerate within a totalitarian state demanding absolute loyalty. Moreover, liquor intemperance among security operatives was dangerous to the regime in the most direct sense: drunk security officers were a public threat and potential victims of the communists’ enemies. Sobriety violations served as a barometer of functionaries’ moral standing and belief in the system.

The Party understood that an addicted officer could seriously debilitate the regime’s strength, and that this was exactly what various anti-communist forces desired: an officer addicted to alcohol became subordinate to it in every aspect of his existence — including security work — to an enemy’s manipulation. He might even sacrifice loyalty to the Party just to fulfill his ongoing need for intoxication. The Party interpreted

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769 “Należy wytworzyć taką atmosferę partyjną i organizować takie kulturalne rozrywki, które odciągałyby ludzi od pociągu do picia wódki”: *Zbiór ważniejszych przepisów…*, k. 175.

intemperance in a polarized way, warning that one cannot serve two masters, as
“drinking, even if not directly incited by the enemy, works for him because it weakens
the security apparatus in the ongoing fight.”\textsuperscript{771} Truly, considering the fact that alcohol has
an ability to alter human consciousness and that the addict’s mind is no longer his
own,\textsuperscript{772} the regime’s primary concern for sobriety seems justified. At the extreme limit
of the addictive process, the functionary usually became a pitiful slave of the addiction
and was prone to relinquish socialist values to his absolute ruler — alcohol.

Despite its strict prohibitionist stance, the \textit{Bezpieka} was never free from
drunkenness, though its degree changed over time. In 1987, for example, alcohol overuse
constituted forty percent of all violations of the security apparatus.\textsuperscript{773} One of the
consequences of sobriety’s perception, both in the ideological and a utilitarian sense, was
the policy of close watch of drunk functionaries — an attitude that became increasingly
strained when it came to liquor recidivists. The regime tried various techniques to
discipline its cadres, all with limited success. For example, the policy of being less
trusting and more disciplinary towards the drunkards proved unrealizable despite
repeated efforts of indoctrination. Minister Kiszczak, for example, issued several orders
to “eliminate” functionaries who had problems with alcohol, all with limited result.\textsuperscript{774}

\textsuperscript{771} “(…) bo pijaństwo choćby nawet nie inspirowane bezpośrednio przez wroga, idzie na rękę
\textsuperscript{772} For the holistic approach toward alcoholism and alcohol’s influence on human mind, see Mac
\textsuperscript{773} \textit{Report} prepared by Colonel Lechosław Stemplewski on August 21, 1987, Ldz Kg 1593-87,
IPN BU 01368/43, k. 41.
\textsuperscript{774} “Despite these precautions, violations related to alcohol overuse are at high level, being
responsible for 40 percent of all trespasses committed by security officers (…). [Minister
Kiszczak] unambiguously and decisively expressed his attitude to this [problem] by issuing a
Ideological solutions, such as reeducation appealing to a functionary’s intellect and political awareness, were of limited effect. The communist system itself, with its internal contradictions and tensions, was one of the reasons for the anti-alcohol campaign’s limited success. The social convention of drinking as a cultural norm was yet another obstacle. The general attitude toward the *baptists* suggests that sober functionaries were sometimes outcasts within the security cadres, marginalized and even harassed. It also indicates that not all security officers accepted the benefits of the virtue of sobriety.

The regime, aware that its very existence was dependent on the temperance of its security cadres, went to great effort to promote teetotalism. A drunk *Bezpieca* would not have been able to control Polish society, and even more, it could become dangerous to the Party itself. Therefore, harsh anti-liquor laws, punitive orders and regulations reminding officers to stay sober served as a desperate cry for discipline. Ideology alone was simply not enough to discourage many of the security functionaries from seeking consolation in vodka.

special order no. 1 on May 27, 1987*: *Report* prepared by Colonel Lechosław Stemplewski on August 21, 1987, Ldz Kg 1593-87, IPN BU 01368/43, k. 41.
CONCLUSION

The multifaceted reasons for the Bezpieka’s existence determined its recruiting policy that favored men of a certain character. Among their various functions, the security operatives were charged with the goal of controlling society and exposing anti-communist activities. It was, however, in their role as mentors of social moral renovation that they were supposed to reflect the code of communist values. Ideally the officer would transform others by setting an example of communist virtue. The security cadres played a vital moral role and their success depended on their abilities of moral self-transformations. Just like the autobiographers described by Jochen Hellebeck, security officers were supposed to be flexible enough to accept new morals and firm enough to reject temptations of the old morality.

The Party played a predominant role in establishing new morals: it set the conditions for truth, it had the authority to lay down the rules of moral conduct, and was the judge of moral violations. This role was reflected in the Party’s pattern of repeated moral crusades that encouraged security cadres to struggle ever harder with their inner selves. However rigorously communist ideologists continued to issue ex cathedra legal and moral pronouncements, their application into practice was always far from ideal. That failure had consequences: most of society looked at security cadres not with admiration for their virtues but with suspicion, sometimes even with hostility. The reasons for the suspicion had to do primarily with the Bezpieka’s public role the as enforcer of communism, but often times the personal flaws of the security cadres further antagonized society.
As they faced this continual problem, Party ideologists drew the conclusion that they needed to reinforce long-term ideological training as well as short-term coercive methods with a more comprehensive system of guidance. They drew on a full repertoire of methods including harassment and blackmail. But because communist morality constantly reiterated the negative notions of order and discipline, it failed to enlist the enthusiasm of the security cadres. The conflicting concepts of socialist morality promoting both voluntarism and coercion, fanaticism and pragmatism, and fear and hope, produced a mixture of contradictory values difficult to internalize.

This difficulty does not mean, however, that security officers did not undergo internal transformations. Bezpieka operatives did internalized communist morality to a degree but at the same time gave it their own corrupt form of expression. In this respect they actively co-formulated the regime’s moral policy. As this dissertation has shown, seemingly righteous, or at least reasonable, principles of communist morality were deformed by functionaries’ own flaws: laziness, lack of skills, lust for money, addictions, and habits of personal morality. Party leaders understood that they could combat these human shortcomings only through having their functionaries internalize the party’s requisite values. They even tried to penetrate most intimate spheres of functionaries’ lives, consuming a large portion of their time and energy watching their colleagues for moral corruption. Instead of raising standards of morality, however, the Bezpieka environment served to nurture distrust, cronyism, apathy, anger. Ultimately the work environment contributed to the failure to convert security functionaries into perfect communists.
The aim of creating the ‘new man’ was not solely a Polish phenomenon. It came to Poland from the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. It is, therefore, not surprising that Soviet and Polish attempts at moral transformations shared many similarities. That is why my findings in relation to Polish security functionaries confirm the observations of Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin with respect to Soviet society at large. Yet in their extensive research of Soviet experiences, these scholars considered the NKVD mostly as an agent of social control rather than a source of virtue and a model for others. Many historians do not take the moralistic language of the security apparatus seriously and consider it to be empty jargon. However, I have argued here that conceiving of the Bezpieka’s internal communist morality in these terms makes a large part of its activity irrational. It is impossible to understand security functionaries without considering their incessant moral hermeneutics. A historian should never forget the role of communist metamorphosis and all tensions that were related to approaching an ideal type. Being a security officer was more than a profession; it was also a vocation. With its own philosophy, justification of goals, moral norms, habits, and rituals, the Bezpieka gave many individuals a belief system and a way of life. It would be shortsighted to consider a security officer’s mentality without taking into consideration his moral aspirations. I have attempted a more synoptic view, recognizing that much of the Bezpieka’s activity was prompted by a complicated moral and ideological cocoon. This dissertation provides another dimension to the functioning of the communist security apparatus and indicates that some of its actions that might have seemed senseless before are now given rational explanation. I discovered that socialist morality was more complex than formerly portrayed. Far from being merely a device of propaganda, it was
an amalgam of principles and practices that contained both benevolent and cruel elements. By no means does this combination make socialist morality more ‘human.’ It makes it more rational and explains why so many people either hate it or admire it upon their experiences.

This dissertation is relevant to the recent discussion of the role of security in democratic states facing terrorist threats. Though it is focused on the time of the Cold War, it concerns mechanisms that continue to exist in the contemporary world and will likely persist. In the United States, for example, the security dilemma is at the heart of controversy over constitutionality of the Patriot Act and Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003. My work hopes to be a part of this debate: studies of security officers’ violations of legal and moral norms, and possible ways of disciplining security cadres, may strengthen arguments of the proponents of cautious enlargement of security service. I argue that the moralizing campaigns of security functionaries, no matter the country and political system, may achieve little success if an officer’s personal morality is in conflict with the code of ethics of an institution he serves. In particular, I show the conditions in which secret operatives are prone to various abuses: for example, unlimited power, undefined relations between subordinates and superiors, fanaticism, unrestrained ambition, biased education, personal problems, and addictions. The Communist example I present here may serve as a warning to all democratic states: mere acceptance of a code of ethics, regardless how genuine, may not be sufficient to develop the morality of security employees. The more we know about totalitarianism’s modus operandi, the more we can do to prevent the world from facing this threat again.
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APPENDIX 1

Soviet Moral Code of the Builder of Communism, October 1961

“The Party holds that the moral code of the builder of communism should comprise the following principles:

1. devotion to the communist cause; love of the socialist motherland and of the other socialist countries;
2. conscientious labor for the good of society – he who does not work, neither should he eat;
3. concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public wealth;
4. a high sense of public duty; intolerance of actions harmful to the public interest;
5. collectivism and comradely mutual assistance; one for all and all for one;
6. humane relations and mutual respect between individuals – man is to man a friend, comrade, and brother;
7. honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty, and unpretentiousness in social and private life;
8. mutual respect in the family, and concern for the upbringing of children;
9. an uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism, and money-grubbing;
10. friendship and brotherhood among all people of the USSR; intolerance of national and racial hatred;
11. an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, peace, and the freedom of nations;
12. fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all peoples.”

APPENDIX 2

Zasady Etyki i Obyczajów Funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej PRL

Służba Bezpieczeństwa i Milicja Obywatelska pełnią doniosłe funkcje w państwie i społeczeństwie. Strzegą bezpieczeństwa państwa i porządku publicznego, chronią życie i zdrowie ludzkie oraz własność społeczną i mienie obywateli – działają w kręgu najwyższych wartości społecznych. Te trudne i odpowiedzialne zadania wymagają nie tylko odpowiednich sprawności intelektualnych i fizycznych, lecz także wysokich walorów ideowo-moralnych.

Pojęcie służby w organach powołanych do ochrony porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego jest obywatelską deklaracją działania w interesie socjalistycznego państwa i jego obywateli. Wstąpienie do służby jest dobrowolnym wyborem politycznym i moralnym oznaczającym akceptację szczególnych powinności i gotowość do wielu osobistych wyrzeczeń.

Zgodnie z ustawą o służbie funkcjonariuszy SB i MO PRL z dnia 31 lipca 1985 roku od kandydatów do służby w resorcie spraw wewnętrznych wymaga się następujących walorów ideowo-moralnych: nieskazitelnej postawy moralnej, obywatelskiej i patriotycznej świadomości, wysokiej socjalistycznej ideowości oraz innych cech, dających rękomię należytego wykonywania obowiązków ochrony socjalistycznego państwa, praw obywateli i porządku publicznego, a także przestrzegania praworządności w wykonywaniu obowiązków służbowych.

Postępowanie funkcjonariuszy regulują przepisy prawne, zasady etyki zawodowej i normy obyczajowe ukształtowane

Principles of Ethics and Customs of the SB and Citizen’s Militia’s Functionaries

The security Service and Citizen’s Militia serve important functions in the state and in society. They guard state security and public order and they protect human life and health, as well as public and private property all in the spirit of highest social values. These difficult and responsible goals require not only proper intellectual and physical fitness, but also high ideological and moral qualifications.

Employment in the services created for protection of order and public security is one’s a declaration of willingness to act in the interest of the socialist state and its citizens. Enrollment in the service is a voluntary political and moral choice that means acceptance of special obligations and readiness to many personal sacrifices.

According to a statute about the SB and MO functionaries from July 31, 1985, candidates for work in the internal affairs’ apparatus are expected to possess the following ideological and moral virtues: impeccable moral standing, civic and patriotic consciousness, high socialist & ideological zeal, and other features that guarantee proper fulfillment of officers’ duties to protect socialist state, citizens’ rights and public order, as well as the respect for the rule of law in functionaries’ work.

Functionaries’ behavior is regulated by legal provisions, rules of professional ethics and customs formed
towane w resorcie spraw wewnętrznych. Przepisy prawne określają obowiązki słužbowe egzekwowane w trybie administracyjno-partyjnym i dyscyplinarnym. Powinności etyczne są wypełnione ze względu na akceptowane wartości, wewnętrzne przekonania moralne, nakaz sumienia. Normy etyki zawodowej uzupełniają prawną regulację postępowania funkcjonariusza, wzmacniają nakazy i zakazy prawne, wzbogacają moralne treści działań słužbowych, pogłębiają motywację do ofiarnego służyby. Obyczaje, regulując zewnętrzne formy zachowania się funkcjonariuszy w różnych sytuacjach słužbowych i prywatnych, nawiązując do najlepszych tradycji dobrego wychowania, dopełniają i konkretyzują zasady etyki zawodowej.

Usystematyzowany i spisany zbiór podstawowych wartości oraz norm etyki zawodowej i obyczajów powinien sprzyjać umacnianiu poczucia godności zawodowej funkcjonariuszy SB i MO, rozbudzaniu ich wrażliwości moralnej w kontaktach z obywatelami, pobudzaniu mechanizmów samokontroli, przeciwdziałających ewentualnym nadużyciom w służybie, harmonizowaniu współżycia w kolektywach pracowniczych oraz integrowaniu funkcjonariuszy różnych pionów słužbowych w macierzystych jednostkach organizacyjnych i całym resorcie spraw wewnętrznych. Dokument ten powinien pomagać w procesie wychowawczym realizowanym przez przełożonych, organizacje partyjne, aparat polityczno-wychowawczy, szkoły resortowe, itp. oraz w samowychowaniu; przyjętym do służyby powinien ułatwiać adaptację społechno-zawodową, sądom honorowym – służyć za podstawę ich orzeczeń i działalności profilaktyczno-wychowawczej; przełożonym –

in the ministry of interior affairs. Legal provisions regulate professional duties that are enforced through party-administrative and disciplinary means. Ethical duties are enforced because one internalizes values, moral convictions, and because his conscience dictates so. Norms of professional ethics supplement legal regulations of functionaries’ behavior. They also strengthen legal provisions, enrich moral aspects of professional work, and deepen motivation to sacrificial service. Customs fulfill and specify professional ethics by regulating formal aspects of behavior in various private and official situations. Customs refer to the best tradition of good training.

A systematized and compiled code of basic values, norms of professional ethics, and customs should strengthen a sense of the MO and SB functionaries’ professional dignity. It should also foster their moral sensitivity in contacts with citizens, stimulate mechanisms of self-control, counteract against eventual abuses, harmonize coexistence in professional collectives and integrate functionaries from various units of the entire ministry of internal affairs. This document should help in the effort to train functionaries by superiors, party organizations, political-educational apparatus, ministerial schools, etc (…). It should also make their social-professional adaptation easier (…). It should provide superiors with judgmental criteria for their in-service evaluations.
I. Moralny sens służby w organach służby bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej

1. Termin „służba” oznacza działanie w imię wyższych, ogólnospołecznych celów i zadań. Służba funkcjonariuszy SB i MO jest pracą wykonywaną w interesie społeczeństwa polskiego i pomyślnego rozwoju socjalistycznej Ojczyzny. Ideę tę dobitnie wyraża rota ślubowania funkcjonariuszy.

2. Służba narodowi polega głównie na umacnianiu jego socjalistycznej państwowości przez zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego.

3. Podstawą ideową tej służby jest głęboki patriotyzm, organicznie związany z proletariackim internacjona-

II. Morality in the Service in the Security Apparatus and in the Citizen’s Militia

1. The term “service” means work in the name of higher, socially recognized aims and tasks. Service of the SB and MO functionaries is conducted in the interest of the Polish society and to secure prosperous development of [our] socialist Fatherland. This idea is amply stressed in the functionaries’ form of an oath.

2. Service to the nation means strengthening its socialist statehood by maintaining security and public order.

3. Patriotism is the ideological basis of this service, organically connected to proletarian internationalism, loyalty to the agenda of the Polish United Workers
lizmem, wierność programowi Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej i konstytucyjnym zasadom ustrojowym, troska o siłę, stabilność i autorytet socjalistycznego państwa.

4. Służba dla społeczeństwa i socjalistycznego państwa wymaga szczególnego zaangażowania ideowo-politycznego. Nie można bowiem skutecznie strzec interesów państwa bez znajomości i afirmacji jego założeń ustrojowych, których polityczną podstawą jest markizm-leninizm i program budowy socjalizmu zawarty w uchwałach centralnych organów PZPR.

5. Moralny sens służby w organach SB i MO znajduje szczególny wyraz w tym, iż wartości chronione przez funkcjonariuszy stanowią fundament ładu społecznego i są cenione przez społeczeństwo jako najwyższe wartości społeczno-moralne.

6. Organom spraw wewnętrznych zostały powierzone zadania, których wykonanie w dużej mierze zależy od współpracy ze społeczeństwem. Więź funkcjonariuszy ze społeczeństwem jest fundamentalną zasadą realizacji przez resort spraw wewnętrznych swych funkcji i zadań w państwie socjalistycznym oraz stanowi przesłankę sprawności działania organów SB i MO. Istotnym czynnikiem pozyskiwania społecznego wsparcia jest działalność funkcjonariuszy w organizacjach społeczno-politycznych i organach samorządowych. Aby funkcjonariusz miał moralne prawo oczekiwać uznania i pomocy obywatele, winien przede wszystkim swą postawą i prawidłowym działaniem zawodowym i społecznym jak najlepiej służyć narodowi.

7. Służba funkcjonariuszy SB i MO wymaga – z natury rzeczy – poświęceń, w tym także narażania zdrowia a nawet Party, constitutional rules, and care for strong, stable and the prestige of [our] socialist state.

4. Serving society and the socialist state requires lots of ideological and political involvement. One cannot successfully protect state interests without knowledge and affirmation of its policy based on Marxism-Leninism and main resolutions of the PZPR.

5. The moral significance of working in the SB or MO flows from the fact that the values protected by the functionaries are considered the highest social and moral virtues by society.

6. The fulfillment of the tasks by the units of the ministry of internal affairs is to a large extent dependent on cooperation with society. The tie between a functionary and society belongs to the basic requirements of [successful] functioning in the socialist state. It indicates the effectiveness of the SB and MO units. The functionaries’ participation in social, political and local organizations gains social support [for the MSW]. A functionary does not have the moral right to expect respect and help from the citizens without first serving the nation properly, both in his professional and social life.

7. The SB and MO profession requires, by its nature, sacrifices, including risking one’s health and life.
życia. Dopóki będą istnieć wrogowie Polski socjalistycznej oraz osoby naruszające porządek prawny, dopóty służba funkcjonariusza będzie się wiązała z ryzykiem narażania własnego życia lub zdrowia.

8. W istocie służby zawarta jest dyspozycyjność funkcjonariuszy, tzn. ich stała gotowość do wykonywania określonych zadań wynikających z poleceni służbowych oraz z obiektowych sytuacji, z którymi się stykają i na które powinni reagować zgodnie z przepisami prawa, zasadami współżycia społecznego i w poczuciu osobistej odpowiedzialności za przestrzeganie tych przepisów i zasad.


10. Przestrzeganie moralnych powinności jest źródłem i wyrazem godności oraz honoru funkcjonariusza.

II. Zasada praworządności

11. Istota praworządności w organach powołanych do ochrony porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego wynika z Konstytucji PRL i polega na organizowaniu i wykonywaniu służby zgodnie z przepisami prawa.

12. Konsekwentne przestrzeganie prawa przez funkcjonariuszy SB i MO jest podstawową zasadą moralną regulującą ich działania. Postępowanie zgodne z prawem leży zarówno w interesie

Risking loss of health and death will be there as long as there exist enemies of the socialist Poland and men violating the law.

8. Functionaries’ availability belongs to the essence of their service. It means their continuous readiness to execute orders, their proper reactions in various circumstances, their acting in accordance to basic rules of social life, and their awareness of their personal responsibility for obeying these rules.

9. The profession is also connected with the obligation to obey discipline of work. It especially means accurate reactions to superiors’ orders and respect for the internal rules of work. The ministry of internal affairs is modeled on the military, -- its effectiveness comes from centralization, hierarchy and giving orders.

10. Obeying moral duties is a source and an expression of a functionary’s dignity and honor.

II. The rule of lawfulness

11. In respect to institutions called for protection of order and public security, lawfulness flows from the PRL’s Constitution and means service in accordance with the law.

12. Consistent respect for the law by the SB and MO functionaries is the basic moral rule regulating their work. It is in the interest of the state, society, SB and MO units, and a functionary himself to obey the law.
państwa, społeczeństwa, organów SB i MO, jak i samego funkcjonariusza.

13. Naruszenie norm prawnych w związku ze ściganiem sprawcy przestępstwa lub innymi działaniami służbowymi czyni z obrońcy sprawcę naruszenia porządku prawnego. Działanie wbrew obowiązującemu prawu, niezależnie od motywów, jest łamaniem prawa i zawsze godzi w interesy socjalistycznego państwa.

14. Przestrzeganie zasady praworządności przez funkcjonariuszy wyraża się także w sposobie wykonywania uprawnień służbowych. Każde nadużycie uprawnień podważa autorytet organów SB i MO, a w konsekwencji godzi w autorytet władzy ludowej i państwa socjalistycznego. Niewykorzystanie uprawnień w sytuacjach, w których prawo nakazuje podjęcie określonych działań, jest naruszeniem zasady praworządności.

15. Obowiązkiem moralnym funkcjonariusza jest dbałość o podnoszenie społecznej rangi prawa i autorytetu organów stosujących oraz upowszechnianie kultury prawnjej w społeczeństwie.

16. Konsekwentne przestrzeganie przepisów prawa nie może przekształcić się jednak w biurokratyczną rutynę i bezduszną.

17. Warunkiem umacniania praworządności przez funkcjonariuszy jest znajomość obowiązującego prawa. Wiedza prawnicza sprzyja skuteczności działań funkcjonariuszy oraz podnosi kulturę pełnionej przez nich służby. służbowych powierzonych funkcjonariuszowi do stałej realizacji.
19. Powinnością ustawową i moralną funkcjonariusza jest stałe podnoszenie wiedzy ogólnej, społeczno-politycznej i zawodowej.

III. Ogólne zasady moralne w postępowaniu służbowym z obywatelami

20. W świetle założeń socjalistycznego humanizmu każdemu człowiekowi, niezależnie od jego postępowania, przysługuje elementarny szacunek. Zasada ta jest integralną częścią socjalistycznego systemu prawa. Przestrzeganie prawa przez funkcjonariusza, niezależnie od stopnia jego rygoru, stanowi więc podstawową gwarancję poszanowania godności ludzkiej. We wszelkich kontaktach służbowych z obywatelami powinna się przejawiać wysoka kultura osobista funkcjonariusza.

21. Wykonując obowiązki służbowe, funkcjonariusz powinien postępować w ten sposób, aby swoim przykładem wyzwalać, rozwijać i umacniać u innych poczucie godności narodowej, osobistej i zawodowej.

22. W kontaktach z obywatelami funkcjonariusz powinien przejawiać wrażliwość na krzywdę ludzką. Zaprzeczeniem tej postawy jest niechęć zbijania się niedbalym, opieszalym i lekceważącym podejściem do obowiązków służbowych. Źródłem bezdusznego i lekceważącego traktowania spraw ludzkich bywa na ogół biurokratyzm polegający na bezosobowym, zrutynizowanym działaniu, w którym nie dostrzega się poszczególnych ludzi i ich spraw.

23. Z wrażliwością na krzywdę ludzką wiąże się postawa opiekuńczości. Funkcjonariusz, posiadając odpowiednie przygotowanie zawodowe, niezbędne...
instrumenty działania i zagwarantowaną szczególną ochronę prawną, powinien umacniać swą postawę poczucie bezpieczeństwa obywateli.

Opiekuńczość funkcjonariusza ma dwojaki wymiar – ogólny i indywidualny. Pierwszy wyraża się w obronie dóbr ogólnospołecznych, zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa obywatelom, utrzymaniu porządku publicznego; -- drugi zaś w niesieniu bezpośredniej pomocy osobom poszkodowanym, ostrzeganiu ludzi przed groźącym im niebezpieczeństwem ze strony innych osób lub z powodu własnej lekkomyślności, kompetentnych poradach, sygnalizowaniu trudnych ludzkich spraw wyspecjalizowanym instytucjom opieki społecznej.

Szczególnym rodzajem opiekuńczości jest niesienie natychmiastowej pomocy ofiarom klęsk żywiołowych.

24. Ochrona ładu społecznego, przeciwdziałanie przestępczym zagrożeniom, działanie w sytuacjach trudnych i niebezpiecznych wymagają ofiarności, odwagi, a nawet męstwa. Tchórzliwe zachowanie poniża godność zawodową funkcjonariusza.

V. Moralne zasady postępowania w kolektywie, obyczaje w służbie

32. Funkcjonariusz powinien dbać o dobre imię służby, strzec godności i honoru swego zawodu. Należy pamiętać, że zachowanie konkretnego funkcjonariusza oceniane jest przez społeczeństwo nie tylko jako postawa określonej jednostki, stanowi ono przesłankę oceny całego resortu spraw wewnętrznych.

33. Właściwe stosunki międzyludzkie w środowisku funkcjonariuszy są

tection of the law, shall commit himself to strengthen citizens’ sense of security.

A functionary’s protectiveness has two meanings – universal and individual. The first one means protection of socially recognized values, security of citizens, and maintaining public order. The second one means delivering help to the injured, giving warnings about dangers (...), and informing institutions of social care about persons in need.

Helping victims of natural disasters is a special type of protectiveness.

24. Protecting social order, counteracting crimes, and reacting in difficult and dangerous situations requires sacrifice, bravery, and valour. Cowardice decreases a functionary’s professional dignity.

V. Moral rules of work in the community, customs of the service

32. A functionary shall care for prestige of his service, and protect the dignity and honor of his profession. One must remember that behavior of a functionary is subject to social judgment, which affects not only him but also the whole ministry of internal affairs.

33. Proper interpersonal relations between functionaries are especially
szczególnie ważnym elementem spoistości resortu spraw wewnętrznych i efektywności realizowanych przez nie zadań, a ponadto sprawiają poszczególnym funkcjonariuszom satysfakcję z pełnionej służby.

34. Elementarnym składnikiem właściwego klimatu moralnego w kolektywach funkcjonariuszy jest koleżeńskość. Być koleżeńskim, tzn. być uczynnym, życzliwym, dzielić się z innymi swą wiedzą i doświadczeniem zawodowym, pomagać współtowarzyszom w realizacji ich zadań, a także – w razie potrzeby – szczerze wskazywać na czyjeś wady i uchybienia.

Trwały stosunek koleżeństwa ma tendencję do przekształcania się w wyższą formę więzi osobowej – w przyjaźń. Stosunki koleżeńskie sprzyjają umacnianiu się solidarności zawodowej.

35. Solidarność zawodowa polega na poczuciu społeczności zawodowej i zespołowym wysiłku wszystkich funkcjonariuszy w celu zapewnienia realizacji celów ustawowych. W postawie tej zawiera się pełna identyfikacja z celami i zadaniami organów bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego oraz z troską o godność służby. Solidarność zawodowa funkcjonariuszy nie może mieć nic wspólnego z elitarnością, z wynoszeniem środowiskowych interesów zawodowych na interes społeczny. Wyrazem solidarności zawodowej jest również aktywna współpraca i współdziałanie różnych pionów i komórek służbowych. Dowodem trwałości solidarności zawodowej jest stałe podtrzymywanie więzi z weteranami służby – zapraszanie na uroczystości w jednostce, odwiedzanie byłych funkcjonariuszy w dniach dla nich uroczystych,
36. Each functionary is expected to be loyal, honest and fair to his superiors and colleagues.

41. A good superior is careful and nice to his subordinates, but at the same time he is demanding and consistently uses his investigative and disciplinary powers. To expect others [to be virtuous], he should behave in a way to set an example of socialist zeal, discipline, commitment, responsibility, conscientiousness, good manners, etc.

VI. Moral rules and customs for after work

51. A functionary’s behavior after work is not his private business. It remains in close relation to the interest of the service.

52. In his private life, a functionary should follow universal moral norms. His behavior should be well-mannered and modest.

54. In his family life, a functionary should provide his family with satisfactory living conditions and should care for the proper atmosphere of family life.
55. Ze względu na dobro służby nie są obojętne kontakty osobiste funkcjonariusza (...).
56. Uleganie nałogom obniżającym samokontrolę, sprawność intelektualną i fizyczną nie licuje z godnością i honorem funkcjonariusza.
(...)
58. (...). Nie może zatem zapominać, że funkcjonariusz jest przedstawicielem środowiska, którego tradycyjnie ukształtowana obyczajowość ma świecki charakter.
59. W życie rodzinne i towarzyskie funkcjonariusz powinien wносzyć wartości kultury socjalistycznej.
60. Warunki służby w organach SB i MO nie są pozbawione sytuacji konfliktowych, które często wymagają indywidualnych rozstrzygnięć moralnych (...). Trafność podejmowanych rozstrzygnięć jest wyrazem wysokiej kultury etycznej funkcjonariusza.

55. A functionary’s social life is not indifferent [to the Ministry of Internal Affairs] due to the nature of the service.
56. All addictions that affect self-control as well as intellectual and physical fitness violate a functionary’s dignity and honor.
58. One must not forget that a functionary represents a circle that has been formed by the secular tradition.
59. A functionary should bring values of socialist culture into his family and his social life.
60. The conditions of work in the SB and MO units are not free from conflicts, which require individual moral adjudications (...). Proper decision-making manifests a high ethical standing on the part of a functionary.
Source: Zasady etyki i obyczajów funkcjonariuszy Służby Bezpieczeństwa i Milicji Obywatelskiej (Principles of Ethics and Customs of the Security Apparatus and Militia Functionaries) (Warszawa, 1985), IPN 01179/57, egz. 1
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