Protecting global cities: New York, London, and the internationalization of urban counterterrorism

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PROTECTING GLOBAL CITIES:
NEW YORK, LONDON, AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF URBAN COUNTERTERRORISM

By

Brian Nussbaum

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Rockefeller College of Public Affairs
Department of Political Science
2009
Protecting Global Cities:
New York, London, and the Internationalization of Urban Counterterrorism

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Abstract:

Cities have always been key strategic sites and were, for much of pre-Nation-State history, the major actors in international security. However, the recent state-centric literature of international politics has largely neglected cities, particularly in the realm of security studies. This neglect has come at the same time as a new age of transnational and international threats which are particularly salient for cities and those tasked with protecting them. This dissertation examines the phenomenon of increasingly internationally-oriented approaches to counterterrorism among local law enforcement in major cities. By looking extensively at New York and London, comparing the trajectories of their counterterrorism efforts, and contextualizing such efforts in the broader practitioner and scholarly environments, it hopes to provide a compelling explanation for why some cities internationalize their counterterrorism efforts, and how they accomplish such changes.
Acknowledgements

This process has been a long, and occasionally trying, one; and the fact that I finished it is more a tribute to the remarkable support network that I had than to anything I did. I had a host of supporters in my academic, research, work and personal orbits that enabled me to finish.

I could not have done any of this research, nor frankly just about anything in my professional life thus far, without the guidance and help of my committee chair Victor Asal. He has offered suggestions, support, encouragement and good-humored empathy; as well as an introduction into the personal and professional worlds of academia. He’s also offered an example of indefatigable work ethic, genuine concern about students learning and professional development, and perpetual helpfulness, that I hope I can emulate in some small way.

The other members of my dissertation committee each offered important insights, sounding boards, feedback and perspectives that made this possible as well. I thank them for their flexibility, responsiveness, engagement and ultimately their willingness to take time out of their already packed days. Rey Koslowski offered key theoretical insights and guidance that enabled me to situate this research in a broader discussion of governance and international relations. Rob Worden helped me wade into the criminal justice world, and offered invaluable insights into the practicalities of interviewing police officers and making this research work. Finally, Jim Steiner, who I had the pleasure to work with both academically and professionally, offered me great insights into the world of intelligence gained in multi-decade career as an intelligence analyst, and a friendly feedback loop about all aspects of my professional development.

In the research world, my association with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland has been the most productive research association of my professional life. Aside from funding this research, and providing remarkable outlets to share it, START has had a much broader impact on my thinking and research. The multi-disciplinary setting and exposure to such an impressive body of scholars made START a key part of my professional development. Gary LaFree, Kathie Smarick, Kate Worboys and Gary Ackerman were a few of the many START staff who directly supported and enabled this research. Rick Matthews from the National Center for the Security and Preparedness (NCSP) and Victor Asal, Karl Rethemeyer and Ian Anderson from the Project on Violent Conflict (PVC) at SUNY Albany also provided support and suggestions that were invaluable.

The New York State Office of Homeland Security, where I spent 4+ years working has played a major role in shaping this research as well. I owe everyone at OHS a great debt for the support and leeway they showed me as I pursued a dual track career in government and academia. My connections to OHS will hopefully remain strong, but a few individuals played a disproportionate role in shaping my research and career. Ann Marie Olson offered a young intern a chance to sink or swim, both of which I did often. Hopefully I swam more often than I sank. General F. David Sheppard and Colonel Chuck Phillips offered guidance, and professional opportunities that are more than I could have asked for. Meghan Dudley offered four years of empathy and support, for which I’m grateful. The OHS Intelligence Division team also offered unqualified support.
Terrie, Mike, Jaime, John, Adam, and Eileen were as good a team of intelligence analysts and friends as I could imagine exist anywhere. Along with Team Intel, the folks at the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) were amongst the brightest and most entertaining co-workers I could ever wish for. Others at OHS, including Paula Steigman, Ted Hallman, Jim Horton and Dennis McCarty have offered tremendous help in my professional development. More recently, Director Thomas Donlon and Chief of Staff James Sherry created an environment in which an analyst could pursue research and still feel part of the agency core. Deputy Chief of Staff Terry Hastings enabled me to see many aspects of the Homeland Security enterprise in a new way, and has become a good friend in the process.

Sadly, many of the people directly responsible for the success of this research are not people I can thank publicly because of the world they operate in. They are however some of the bravest and hardest working people that you can imagine. I feel better, and everyone else should too, knowing that they are the frontline of our defense against terrorism. My interviews and interactions with police officers, public officials and other security managers in New York and London are why this whole project took shape.

There are a few folks who deserve special recognition. Former-NYS OHS Deputy Director Frank Tabert provided introductions and access at Scotland Yard, without which this research could never have happened. At the Metropolitan Police Service, Andy was the best tour guide any security scholar could have asked for. Martin was a kindred spirit and conversationalist. Dave took a chance on allowing a graduate student into the new CTC for interviews, and I remain grateful. Many others who spoke to me, I wish to thank quietly.

In New York City there were also a small number of people I can thank directly for their help. Jeff Garafalo at the New York City Office of Management and Budget, I continue to owe you for your help. Without you, this would’ve been a different and weaker final product. Deputy Commissioner Falkenrath, I appreciate your taking the time to sit with researcher despite a hectic schedule that I can’t imagine. Elana, thank you for helping arrange meetings and other logistics without making my imposing seem like an imposition. Brandon, thanks for coming out to lunch. Numerous others who spoke to me about the Department and its programs, I appreciate all your time and input.

Finally I would like to thank my friends and family for their support (both moral and in the case of my folks, occasionally financial) over the past 6 years. You’ve all been very patient through graduate student poverty, long hours of reading and writing, and the seemingly non-existent forward movement of putting together a dissertation. You’ve all made this experience a great one, and I really appreciate everything.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

“The politically oriented castle, and the economically oriented market with the market area of the towns at times simultaneously serving both functions... often stand in plastic dualism beside one another...

...The relation between the garrison of the political fortress and the civil economic population is complicated but always decisively important for the composition of the city.”

- Max Weber, The City as the Fusion of Fortress and Market, 1905
Terrorism has become a touchstone security issue of the 21st century. The devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, while outliers in terms of scale and sophistication, are indicative of the broader trend of terrorism enabled by the globalization of travel, communications, technology and ideology. Robert Keohane has accurately described this new internationalized militancy as the “globalization of informal violence.”

Understanding why people resort to terrorism, how they undertake this violence, and how governments can respond to this transnational threat is a major undertaking, and one in its infancy. The empirical and theoretical literatures surrounding terrorism and terrorists have grown rapidly since 2001, but the literature characterizing and contextualizing counterterrorism efforts has been far less expansive and deep in its growth. Much of the literature that has developed has been almost atheoretical, often even eschewing existing theories of global politics and international relations.

Understanding counterterrorism efforts, how they change, and how they fit in a broader political context is an important project across all levels of governance. Almost all literature on counterterrorism is based on the national level of governance, with a small but emerging literature of international and transnational efforts to counter-terrorism. Sub-national efforts generally, and local efforts in particular, have been virtually ignored by political science, international relations, and other social science disciplines. While the criminal justice discipline has made some contribution to a nascent

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1 Defining the term terrorism is a notoriously hard proposition. For the purposes of this dissertation the working definition of terrorism will be “Politically motivated violence, targeting non-combatants, often using symbolism to increase the effect, done with the intention of intimidating an audience or pushing a political agenda.” There are literally dozens of definitions of terrorism; the best treatment of this subject is “Defining Terrorism” in Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. New York.
literature on police response to terrorism, it remains vastly understudied and almost completely un-theorized.

In an attempt to make a contribution to this serious lacunae in the understanding of counterterrorism, this dissertation examines how theories of international relations (theories of globalization and localization), organizational studies (organizational adaptation and learning), and newly emergent theories of networked threats and responses (like networked governance and Netwar) can help to understand innovation in the realm of policing terrorism, particularly policing terrorism in the new global metropolis. New York and London’s efforts to police terrorism are explored in great depth, however other cities are examined more briefly, and potential implications of the innovation in these two cities are analyzed as well.

New York and London’s police forces are amongst the largest and most respected in the world, however that alone is not sufficient to explain the kinds of changes and expansion of duties that they’ve undertaken. Rather, it is required to view these police forces in the context of the cities they serve, the national context they exist within, and the changing international system that has enabled their new practices and orientations. The globalization of local law enforcement is an important, if not yet pervasive phenomenon. The fact that this trend is not ubiquitous, at least on the scale that it exists in New York and London, does not mean that it is not meaningful or indicative of changes that will affect many smaller cities and their police.

Probably the most salient questions arising from the experiences of the NYPD and London Metropolitan Police recent experiences in policing terrorism are:
1) Are these new counterterrorism practices novel in terms of their orientation, scope and tactics?

2) Why were these cities able to internationalize their efforts when others either chose not to, or were constrained from doing so?

3) How do these changes, assuming that they’re meaningful, fit into existing understandings of governance and international relations?

Each of these questions requires serious inquiry, and offer different insights into the phenomena. The first is an empirical question about the scale and scope of these activities that requires a cataloguing of these counter terrorism efforts through a deep comparative look at the New York and London Metropolitan Police services and how they address terrorism. The second question also requires case studies of the departments, however with a focus not on “what they do,” but rather “how they got to where they are today.” The first question is answered by a comparison of the universe of counterterrorism activities, the second by a process-tracing story of how the current activities came to be; both are empirically described in the context of theories of policing and organizational change. Finally the third question is the one that is most explicitly theoretical. It is answered by comparing these policing phenomena to other globalized governance and security issues, to see whether these cases fit within our broader understanding of international security, or whether they must force us to re-examine some of the existing typologies and categorizations that we have.

It turns out these new counterterrorism strategies are in fact novel in terms of their orientation, scope and tactics. While not completely without precedent, they are substantially different than those earlier efforts with which they share some
characteristics. This dissertation will propose a model of why these cities were able to internationalize in this way. The model incorporates one main driver, the threat of international terrorism, as well as several important enabling structural factors (both environmental and organizational) that made such internationalization possible.

Finally, it turns out that these new practices do have some important implications for the study of international relations and politics. They enable the expansion of certain international relations theories that have largely ignored security issues to have new, and fruitful, areas of study. These changing approaches provide important insights into several theories of globalization (fragmegration, glocalization, Global City Theory), as well as other key theories of international relations (transnational relations, epistemic communities). Ultimately, the internationalization of local policing for terrorism is a theoretically fertile ground for the exploration of international politics.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

The basic structure of the dissertation will be to examine the broader theoretical perspectives surrounding the emergence of new urban counterterrorism models (chapters one and two), followed by a comprehensive examination of the internationalization of municipal counterterrorism efforts in New York City and London (chapters three and four), examining the increasing involvement in of these cities in the networking of international counter-terrorism and their emergence as actors in the international realm (chapter five) and finally examining the broader implications that this trend has for international relations, public administration and criminal justice. Chapter one will be an introductory chapter that frames the theoretical context in which the project fits, as well as outlining the goals, research questions, hypotheses and methodologies to be employed.
It will begin with an overview of the questions to be examined including whether or not there has been an internationalization of municipal policing, and whether such a trend has meaning for the examination of politics and policy.

Chapter one sets the theoretical framework for the coming discussions about globalization, localization, internationalization and policing. In order to understand the nature of this emerging police role, there are a number of existing literatures that require digestion. Exploring the literatures that have emerged in the fields of Urban Studies, Global Governance, Criminal Justice and Public Organization for Security will provide context. This will include the literature regarding cities and security, the overwhelmingly state-centric literature on international policing, intelligence and counterterrorism, and finally on the role of networking and organizational adaptation perspectives on counterterrorism. Ultimately chapter one sets the stage for the analysis in the subsequent chapters by outlining a series of questions, approaches and a theoretical background to underpin the further research.

Chapter two will include a survey of the existing literature related to theories of globalization and localization, and an analysis of how these theories relate to the emerging internationalization of local policing and counterterrorism. This literature is wide ranging and will include theories like “glocalization,” “fragmegration,” and Global and World City approaches. The Global City approach is particularly closely examined, because of some of the theoretical implications and insights it offers. “Global Cities” often face fundamentally different threats than their less globalized brethren, and thus have an impetus to react in ways that are fundamentally different than less global cities.
Chapters three and four will constitute two intensive case studies of the cities of New York and London, their municipal policing and security structures, and their changing and internationalizing counterterrorism efforts. In each case, the chapter will look at the historical factors that played into shaping the policing in the city, the cities experience with terrorism over time, the organizational characteristics, and numerous other factors that create the context for the city’s current efforts and structures. These chapters will draw heavily on interviews with police officials conducted in London and New York, open source reporting on police agencies, and the relatively meager amount of theoretical and academic work that addresses the trend of internationalization of municipal counterterrorism directly. Using the combined data from interviews and research, these chapters will engage in process tracing, particularly focusing on analytical explanation of how changing threat environments, political conditions, and resources (capital of both the traditional and human varieties) impact organizational change.

Chapter five will draw directly on some of the information stemming from chapters three and four (particularly how international liaisons and contacts are utilized by each city) to examine the international networking of the two cities and see how they have become important players in the international security realm. Drawing on two separate experiences, which are in many key ways different, it will look at how some very similar and some very disparate structures and patterns of international interaction have built up within the counterterrorism epistemic community.\(^8\) It will also offer some explanations of how and why some city police departments internationalize, by looking at similarities and differences.
One theoretical lens that will be particularly instructive is that of Global City (or World City) Theories. As a result of the economic centrality and autonomy of Global Cities in combination with the threat of International Terrorism, these cities have internationalized their policing functions in a way that is unique to these cities and this current era. (*Global City + International Terror = Internationalization of Policing*)

This internationalization has fostered the emergence of international security networks in which, for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, municipal law enforcement is in some ways on even footing with state-level security and intelligence services. (*Internationalization → Emergence of Cities as players in International Security*)

Stemming from the argument above about Global Cities (and their respective economic and political autonomy) the model of internationalization below will be elaborated on in this chapter.

Chapter 5 will also draw on work related to the networking of counterterrorism and security enterprises, 9 competitive adaptation for counterterrorism, 10 as well as work on
transnational and trans-governmental relations, this chapter will analyze the internationalization of municipal policing within the broader context of international security. It will also use social network analytic perspectives to examine whether or not there appears to be a meaningful change in the role that city police departments play vis a vis counterterrorism and international security.

Chapter six will serve as a conclusion, offering implications that stem from this trend, examining how the knowledge and tactics developed by these global city police forces have diffused outward to somewhat smaller less globally central cities, and outlining potential avenues for further research. The goal here is not just to recap the analysis in chapters two through five, but also rather to provide meaningful and useful theoretical (for further academic study) as well as pragmatic implications (for practitioners).

**Methodology**

Chapters three and four will be case studies, using information drawn primarily from three sources: academic and scholarly analysis, open source reporting and journalism and finally interviews with police officials and officers from New York City and London. By combining these three elements there will be a great advantage over any one or two of them individually; ultimately constituting a much more holistic (and hopefully accurate) picture of the international counterterrorism efforts in the respective cities. Each information source has its advantages and disadvantages; however the goal will be to maximize the positive effects and minimize the negative ones by allowing them to supplement and compliment each other.

Chapter five will be a combination of comparative analysis based on the case studies in chapters three and four, comparing the New York and London experiences on
the various elements that play into the emergence of new urban counterterrorism paradigms. There will also be analysis of the cities and their international counterterrorism liaisons and interactions within the context of networked approaches to counterterrorism. While a relatively young method, certainly younger than the ancient case study approach or even the behavioral regression analysis, social network analysis is ideal for the examination of certain socially constituted phenomena. Relational data will be drawn from interviews as well as from open source data; and using the social analytic perspective it will be possible to examine the changing nature of these counterterrorism networks. International counterterrorism cooperation and liaison work are ideally suited to social network analysis; because by their very nature they are an attempt to network an activity that already exists in an atomized form, and create or bring together an international community of practitioners.

Case Studies

There has been much consternation in Political Science over the methodological “debate” between those engaging in qualitative and quantitative work. It is however a false dichotomy that one of those approaches offers a “better” method for answering questions. They are well suited to answer different questions, and sometimes they are well suited to answer the same questions in different ways. Qualitative research, and case study approaches in particular, are excellent for theory generation, explaining outliers in large-N studies, examining sui generis phenomena, understanding historical and organizational processes, and numerous other important aspects of understanding the world both empirically and theoretically.
George and Bennett making a compelling argument that case studies are particularly useful for “deriving new hypotheses” and for “exploring causal mechanisms.” The second of those two is particularly well served by a case study method called “process tracing.”

“... Process tracing, which attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case... Process tracing can perform a heuristic function as well, generating new variables or hypotheses on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies.”

The case studies in this research are explicitly conceived of, and designed for, a process tracing approach to qualitative work. They examine the New York Police Department and London Metropolitan Police Service’ counterterrorism functions over time, and look at the numerous variables that impact the scale, scope and depth of those functions. By examining organizational structure and roles in various time periods, and doing both temporal and case comparison, it hopes to generate “new variables or hypotheses on the basis of the sequence of events observed inductively.”

Interviewing and Interview Data

Personal interviewing generally, and elite interviewing in particular, have a long history in the social sciences. Interviewing offers numerous advantages, including direct access to policymakers who might not be in a position to respond to a traditional survey instrument. In many cases there are more appropriate forms of eliciting data, like a
survey, however the universe of individuals involved in policing terrorism in large globalized cities is a fairly manageable one for traditional interviewing.

The technique also allows for both structured and unstructured interviews, which each offer distinct advantages. Structured interviews offer direct comparability across interview subjects, but are by their very nature static. Unstructured interviews on the other hand may not provide exact comparability, but allow for interview subjects to direct the conversation to places that the researcher may not have known to ask about in a more structured format. Sometimes this less structured approach is called a “focused interview.”¹⁸ To ensure that the positive effects of both approaches were available for this research, both structured question sets, and less structured conversational interview sessions were used.

The interviews used to collect data for these case studies offer several advantages beyond traditional sources of information like news coverage and policy and scholarly literatures. They provide insight into aspects of the urban counterterrorism programs that have not been covered in the press, and allowed for both leadership and “rank-and-file” perspectives on policing terrorism (the latter often being left out of news, and to a lesser extent, scholarly coverage). Access to both the leadership (managers) of these programs, as well as to the officers doing the day-to-day work provides a holistic picture of these innovative new approaches.

Finally it is worth noting that elite and personal interviewing on a topic as serious as counterterrorism inevitably results in the creation of some interview data that is sensitive in nature, and not appropriate for public release. This data includes identifying personal details, as well as programmatic and technical details that have implications for
public safety if released. In these few cases, there are small elements of the interview data that are omitted. This is in keeping with the spirit of Douglas Browne’s assertion that, in some cases, “...the Official Secrets Act blocks the curiosity of the historian – and no doubt rightly so.”

Why the City? The Missing Urban Level of Analysis in Security Studies

Cities as Actors in National and International Security

Cities, amongst all sub-national actors, are perhaps the most directly becoming involved in international security. While the security studies community has largely ignored the phenomena, a few dedicated scholars focused on the issue have emerged, as has a small literature stemming from the field of urban studies. It makes sense that those directly studying cities would look at them through the lens of security, what is less clear is why these urban approaches to security have had as little impact as they have on the community of scholars that study security. Increasingly both practitioners and some scholars are making compelling cases for the emergence of cities as a key landscape of modern (or post-modern) political violence.

Steve Simon, a National Security advisor to the Clinton Administration declared “The jihad that has evolved since September 11th has become a war of cities...” in testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee. Recognizing not just that Al Qaeda can exploit urban areas, as well as ungoverned wilderness, for anonymous cover, Simon also noted the fact that cities will continue to be the predominant target of such violence. “Cities are where their targets – both symbolic and of flesh-and-blood – are to be found in abundance and proximity.”

Global City Theory pioneer Saskia Sassen has recently begun to explore the
implications of new security threats for major global cities. “The new asymmetric wars have the effect of urbanizing war.” 22 However it is not just protracted conflicts, what we typically describe as war, which are affected. “The War on Terror shows us that cities become the theaters for asymmetric war...Think of the attacks in Madrid, London, Casablanca, Bali.” 23 In fact, Sassen even frames the same distinction between modern urban security and the problematic formulation of traditional “national” security.

“Today the search for national security may well become a source for urban insecurity... The traditional security paradigm based on national state security does not accommodate this...”24

Urban Terrorism

Terrorism is, and historically has been, largely an urban phenomenon. While there have of course been rural versions (particularly common at one point was the Maoist tack adopted by Sendero Luminoso and others), these have been the exception rather than the rule. When Willie Sutton was asked why he robbed banks, his answer was both pithy and logical, “Because that’s where the money is.”25 So too is the undeniable logic of urban terrorism: that is where the targets are. Institutions, Governments, Markets, Infrastructures, and People (to serve as both targets and audience) are concentrated and congregated in cities. The same density of humanity, and its constructions, that have made cities such a desirable social organization across time, make them desirable places to engage in symbolic political violence.

This fact has certainly been acknowledged amongst practitioners of this dastardly art. Carlos Marighella titled his key work The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla, specifically to differentiate this approach to Marxist revolution from the Maoist peasant
uprising model. However the acknowledgement of urbanity’s connection to terror far predates such explicit semantic embraces of it. Anarchist Mario Buda implicitly acknowledged the same intellectual framework when he wheeled his horse and cart, loaded with dynamite, up Wall Street and detonated it in front of the J.P. Morgan building in 1920. As far back as the Zealots Sicarii in the ancient Roman Empire, terrorists exploited crowded markets to turn murder and mayhem (violence) into theater (symbolic political action).

Al Qaeda has specifically discussed targeting cities and urban infrastructure.26 “Strikes inside cities are considered one type of military diplomacy, and this type of diplomacy is often written in blood, decorated with the remains of the dead and perfumed with the scent of gunpowder.” 27 Al Qaeda strategist Abu Hajir Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin goes further, discussing economic targets in cities, and the importance of targeting them. He lists several goals for such attack including “upset security and the air of stability necessary for growth in labor and speedy movement in the economy.” He also sees such attacks as having the potential to force “the withdrawal of foreign heads of finance from the local markets,” essentially attempting to reverse globalization.28

The Scholarly Literature on Cities and Terrorism

If the logic of terrorists targeting cities, and the anecdotal evidence of those engaging in terrorism both support the idea that terrorism has often been intimately linked to cities, it would be quite odd then if the study of cities and terrorists as political actors were to ignore such connections. However until fairly recently this has largely been the case. This oversight has not been without exceptions and, in the cases of scholars like H. V. Savitch and Jon Coaffee, very important exceptions at that. Still
outside of a very small group of scholars, the broader literature on cities (which extends back to ancient times) and the literature on terrorism (born in its current form in the 1970s, and growing exponentially since 2001) have largely overlooked this key dynamic.

The edited volume *Cities, War and Terrorism* is one of the first pieces to focus on cities as a security entities and a target set in the modern global system. This book takes a very theoretical (rather than comparative or analytical) approach to examining the “geopolitical tensions between cities as sites of violence and the information flows and networks that shape both contemporary urbanism and contemporary war.” While this approach sounds promising, it really dwells more in the realm of urban theorization than the analysis of political violence. One other important work that has addressed cities and their relation to terrorism is Jon Coaffee’s *Terrorism, Risk and the City*. While this book does discuss to some extent efforts that have been made to decrease or mitigate the effect of terrorism (specifically focusing on London’s “Ring of Steel” approach) it devotes most of its time to conceptions of changing urban space, and reaction to events rather than attempts to understand how and where they occur.

Some of the most interesting and important literature relating to cities and terrorism, particularly cities as targets for terrorism, is that provided by H.V. Savitch of the Urban Studies Institute in Louisville. Savitch examines the urban nature of terrorism, particularly the elements of cities that make them more likely to be targeted, and of more consequence when they are. His piece “Does Terrorism Have an Urban Future?” written before September 11th, is an important, if incomplete, examination of terrorism in 40 cities between 1993 and 2000. He discusses important findings and trends that indicate that cities should be worried about the trajectory of international terrorism. Perhaps the
most important finding in the context of this work is the fact that often terrorism can be
born in an area with high “resource mobilization” and “social breakdown” (often in a
weak or failing state), but can still be exported to other cities that lack those
characteristics but rather excel in a category he calls “target proneness.”

Savitch also attempted to interpret the September 11th attacks for the urban
scholarly community in his piece “Does 9-11 Portend a New Paradigm for Cities?” This
piece attempts to contextualize the attacks in terms of trends in terrorism (as evidenced in
his previous piece) as well as in terms of the kinds of economic and urban management
impacts that such attacks (and trends) could initiate. Clearly Savitch is one of the key
theorists attempting to understand what terrorism is doing to cities.

Further work relevant to the understanding of terrorism in cities has emerged from
the field of geography. Geographers have looked at various elements of urban readiness
and the geographical dispersion of risk and hazards. Some of these, like James Mitchell’s
analysis of Urban Vulnerability to Terrorism as Hazard, are directly applicable to cities
as targets of terrorism; whereas many others are useful in a general understanding of how
risk and hazards fit into a geographical conception of risk. It is worth noting however
that despite the relative dearth of meaningful study of terrorism from the urban
perspective, it is nothing in comparison to the virtual absence of similar studies from a
rural perspective.

Recent years have seen a massive growth in the literature on terrorism, and the
small literature on the urban nature of terrorism has also begun to expand. However like
much of the broader scholarly discussion related to terrorism, this literature has been
virtually devoid of empirical work that attempts to meaningfully test hypotheses in a
traditional social science context. While cross-national analyses of terrorism have begun to appear in recent years, “cross-municipal” analysis of the same systematic variety has simply been absent from the discussion. While there is no question that a problem of no consistent and widely recognized data on terrorism leads to problems in conducting quantitative analysis, this can only be part of the answer. Since such analysis has already been conducted cross-nationally, it clearly can be done (albeit requiring certain caveats related to data). Also, recent efforts to improve terrorism data consistency and availability (the Global Terrorism Database) have done much to mitigate, if not cure entirely, the previous problematic issues associated with terrorist attack data.

Beyond Savitch’s 2001 article, the only other major step toward embarking on a systematic empirical and quantitative understanding of the urban nature of terrorism was undertaken just recently with the 2008 publication of H.V. Savitch’s Cities in a Time of Terror: Space, Territory and Local Resilience. The first chapter of this work Sketching Urban Terrorism offers important descriptive statistics on terrorism in some large cities from the RAND Corporation/Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset of terrorist incidents.

What Kind of Terrorism Might Target What Kind of City?

It is important to recognize that not all terrorism is the same, from a theoretical perspective. The key distinction made here will be between international and domestic terrorism. This distinction is important theoretically because it may not only lead to different target sets, but also because it is one of the few distinctions that is well documented in the data of terrorism – and thus testable. The kinds of symbolic targets
chosen by terrorists fit well with understood dynamics of how terrorists behave. Symbolic politics are a key weapon in the terrorist political arsenal.\textsuperscript{35}

For example, international terrorism, the focus of this research, assumedly has a different set of goals in terms of the audience than domestic terrorism. Timothy McVeigh intended to coerce an American audience toward the political goals of limiting federal government involvement in the lives of what he and his ideological allies called “patriots.” In that context, targeting Oklahoma City made sense, as it easily fit into a symbolic metaphor of “every-city USA.” But if McVeigh had intended to sway a broad international audience, Oklahoma City would likely not have been a particularly useful target. At the international level, particular United States cities might have much more symbolic resonance - whether economically (New York, Chicago), culturally (Los Angeles, Las Vegas) or for particular geopolitical reasons (Washington – Political Importance, Houston – home to the Oil industry).

H.V. Savitch discusses this idea, although he conflates it with another, when he discusses the “\textit{target proneness}” of cities.\textsuperscript{36} Savitch says that “\textit{Targeted cities have a high value for terrorists; either because they are global centres, and the terrorists want to transmit a global message, or because they are proximate to a conflict (availability) and terrorists are more concerned about conveying a localized (i.e. national) message.}” (Savitch 2001) It is important to separate proximity to conflict from the ability to leverage urban violence for an international message. But Savitch’s recognition of this dynamic is important. A slightly more developed version of this idea was elaborated later, utilizing the idea of threats to Global Cities.\textsuperscript{37}
It may be possible that another subset of international terrorism, what Sageman has termed Salafi Jihadist terrorism may be even more distinct in its’ targeting. To them, particular cities may have even more significant political resonance. The jihadist desire to attack cities, as symbolic “military diplomacy” is exactly what Steven Simon argues is the desire of jihadist terrorists. He illustrates this combination of global symbolism and target rich environment in a description of the targeting of New York City.

“New York has already shown itself to be a crucial target for jihadists. This great city was construed by al-Qaeda to be the beating heart of America’s economy, which bin Laden believed he could cripple; the symbol of American arrogance as embodied by the “looming towers” of the World Trade Center; and the seat of Jewish power, which jihadists believe accounts for the global subordination of Muslim interests to America and Israel. It is also a teeming city, whose large and densely packed population promised the most efficient path to a successful mass attack that –from a jihadist viewpoint – might begin to even the score with the United States. There is no reason to think that this conviction has weakened. Furthermore, New York City proffers the same advantages to the attacker as do all large cities.

The array of targeting opportunities in New York is wide. Although we can be perversely certain that the attack, when it comes, will be the one we least expected, some preliminary judgments are possible. Mass transportation, which the jihadists have attacked elsewhere with some success, the financial district or banks, symbols of authority, and perhaps schools, given al Qaeda’s insistence on the need to avenge the tens of thousands of Muslim children it believes were deliberately killed by the U.S., either directly or through Israeli action thought to be sponsored by Washington.”

Ultimately there is increasingly clear evidence that the city is fast becoming an important level of analysis in the study of security issues, despite the fact that it was long ignored. This insight is being expressed by practitioners like Steve Simon, scholars like Saskia Sassen, and perpetrators (or at least strategists) of urban violence like Abu Hajir Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. And yet somehow this chorus of voices has been ignored.

Globalization and Governance
Policing, Networks and Governance

Peter Gill has offered perhaps the most cogent and concise discussion of how the analytical framework of networks relates to policing.41 Beginning from the framework of examining the provision of public and private goods through markets, hierarchies and networks, Gill proceeds to describe how the network paradigm has (and in some cases has not) influenced the examination of policing. He argues that with the emergence of discussions of governance, and their decreasing emphasis on the state, policing has begun to be viewed as a particular case of national or international governance. This insight is important to any research into the importance of policing and international politics.

If policing is a form of governance, then it is contextualized within a broader discussion of international politics, which has largely left it out. There are some differences of course between traditional governance networks and law enforcement ones, but there are also some fundamental similarities. One difference is that, on the whole, there has historically tended to be less non-governmental representation in policing networks than in many traditional governance networks.42 That said, even differences like this have become less stark with the emergence of private sector police and security forces.

Using this framework of policing networks as part of governance in general allows for the examination of particular thematic police networks (for example those networks focused on information/intelligence sharing), as well as to examine the role in international networks of individual police departments and bureaucracies (like New York Police Department and the London Metropolitan Police Service). Aside from providing two different comparative approaches to analyzing police networks (thematic,
geographical), it also situates some networks in broader discussions of governance in international politics. Thus, this analytic framework offers a rich series of opportunities to cast new light on policing, international politics and how intertwined they are in a globalized world.

In fact, this sort of police networking fits well within traditional international relations understandings of transnational relations, and even more directly into the approach that has been termed “global governance.” “Global governance,” in contrast to “global government,” is a “much looser and less threatening concept of collective organization and regulation without coercion.” This governance is largely directed and achieved through “global policy networks.” These networks, of which policing networks are merely one variety, enable transnational cooperation on a host of different economic, social, and increasingly security issues.

Even here though, there are some new issues that challenge the current intellectual models of global governance. Slaughter recognizes two key types of networks that facilitate global governance: horizontal networks and vertical networks. Horizontal networks are those that develop amongst practitioners and officials, doing similar jobs across borders, for example the international networking of police officers. Vertical networks on the other hand are “those between national government officials and their supranational counterparts.”

Interestingly, the conception of vertical networks as being between national and supranational agencies and organizations glosses over an increasingly important role for sub-state actors. Even “global governance,” a paradigm based on the insufficiency of the
statist approach for modern international affairs appears to take a somewhat state-centric focus on international networking. There needs to be a full and fair evaluation of the increasingly important role that local actors are playing in global governance.

There is one more drawback to the current governance literature; particularly in as far as it pertains to law enforcement. There are some overly simplistic differentiations made, for example, between “information networks” and “enforcement networks.” While some networks do indeed exchange only information, and others do have slightly more “enforcement” roles, this distinction fades quickly in a world in which the difference between traditional policing and national security is becoming blurry.

This governance approach has been utilized extensively in studies of policing in Europe because of the transnational nature of so many political functions, including policing, in light of European integration. Anderson et al give one of the most comprehensive views of how policing has been theoretically examined in light of European integration in The Political Theory of European Police Cooperation. However the same theoretical and paradigmatic approaches to policing that are commonplace in the European context, have not yet made substantial in roads into the study of more local policing.

**Globalization and International Policing**

The literature surrounding international policing is eclectic, widespread and multi-disciplinary. It is however woefully incomplete. A small group of scholars including Ethan Nadelmann, Mathieu Deflem, and James Sheptycki have begun to situate the phenomenon in a series of disciplinary and theoretical frameworks. International

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2 For example the European Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) is a solely intelligence sharing enterprise, as such information transmitted within the network cannot be used in prosecutions. INTERPOL on the other hand has means to transmit information for use in criminal prosecutions.
Relations, Sociology, and Criminal Justice are just a few of the areas in which this complex issue has great implications.

Nadelmann’s work Cops Across Borders is considered to be one of the seminal works exploring international policing. That said, it focuses only on the internationalization of criminal law enforcement efforts by the United States. It takes a broad-brush look at US law enforcements, mainly although not entirely at the federal level, and with a particular focus on internationalization that resulted from counter-narcotics enforcement. Nadelmann explicitly framed the book as being at the intersection of “US foreign policy and criminal justice – that have little to do with each other.”

This intersection is important. He and coauthor Peter Andreas would go even further in their 2006 book Policing the Globe. The subtitle of this book, “Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations,” represents an acknowledgement of the increasing importance of globalization for international policing. This book offers an even more sweeping view of international policing, including introducing some key ideas into the study of international policing. Perhaps the most important of these is the distinction between “High Policing” and “Low Policing.” Drawing on the French conception of “Haute Police,” high policing is the political policing associated with national security and internal threats to stability. In contrast “low policing” is traditional uniformed or day-to-day crime control and public order policing. This distinction, best articulated by Jean Paul Brodeur, is an important one for any discussion of policing terrorism. Because high policing was usually conceived of as relating to national security and issues of domestic control, it was not well situated within the literature of international policing until Andreas and Nadelmann addressed it.
Interestingly, the contents of this volume closely parallel the existing literature on international policing. The areas of international policing that are fairly well examined are well encapsulated in this book, albeit the book does break some new ground. Sections with titles like “The European Origins of International Crime Control,” “The US Origins of Global Crime Control” (largely pulled from Nadelmann’s previous volume), and “International Crime Control after September 11” all speak to areas that have received attention (the former two), or are beginning to (the latter). The literature on international policing, like so many scholarly literatures, remains largely “Euro-centric,” or at least “Western-centric.”

Another key contributor to any understanding of international policing is the sociologist Mathieu Deflem. Very few scholars of international policing have the breadth and depth of scholarship that Deflem does. His work covers two of the three areas mentioned in Policing the Globe that are well studied – the European Origins of International Crime Control, and International Crime Control after September 11. In fact his work on international policing in Europe, and the international policing of terrorism are widely cited and amongst the most influential.

Deflem has published key works examining Interpol, Europol, historical international policing, as well as on particular international policing issues like money laundering, post-conflict policing, and internet crime amongst others. However Deflem has been most prolific in the area of international policing of terrorism. His articles have addressed such pressing issues as the role of Interpol and Europol in counterterrorism, border policing in relation to terrorism, and domestic surveillance. Any understanding
of international policing, particularly of how it relates to terrorism, must be informed by Deflem’s insights.

While scholars like Nadelmann and Deflem may constitute an intellectual core for the study of international policing, there are several others who play major roles in the field. James Sheptycki has made some major contributions to understandings of international policing, particularly in the realm of international policing’s implications for the modern state. He argues persuasively that such transnational efforts are an element in the creation of a “postmodern state.” Sheptycki has also offered important insight into issues like intelligence led policing, policing narcotics and policing and human rights.

The Impact of Terrorism on Policing

First Responder vs. First Preventers: Understanding the Role of Local Law Enforcement

Local law enforcement is a key front in the struggle to both prevent, as well as to minimize the impact of, terrorist attacks. In this case, local law enforcement is used to describe those agencies which are responsible for ensuring law, order and security at the sub-state level; including but not limited to regional, provincial, municipal, and tribal level agencies. There are several important reasons that these agencies are a natural and important piece of any comprehensive attempt to deal with the threat of terrorism. These agencies offer direct knowledge of the areas and targets that terrorists would operate in or attack. They also will in most cases be the first to react, responding and investigating in the early moments following any sort of terrorist incident. Depending on the set up within a given state, there are often times many more local law enforcement personnel
around the country than there are direct law enforcement agents of the federal authority; this difference in numbers results in a force that can act as a force multiplier in terms of intelligence collection, investigations and response. Finally, local law enforcement is increasingly broadening its mission to include counterterrorism as part of an international consensus amongst law enforcement practitioners, and the broader counterterrorism community can potentially leverage their devotion of resources to this goal.

The term First Responder has a long of use in the emergency management and response community. It is used in several ways, one very specific and another much more general. The first, specific way, is that it is a designation created by the United States Department of Transportation to describe someone who has completed a medical response course that falls between the low training level of the 8 hour First Aid course and the 120 hour Emergency Medical Technician course. This meaning however is not the way the term is typically used outside the emergency medical community. In the broader emergency response community, the term First Responder is used to refer to a much larger group of people who would likely be those who would respond to any major disaster, attack, outbreak or other catastrophic event. This includes emergency medical personnel, fire response, law enforcement, and is sometimes even expanded to include public works, or even private security personnel. Much of the time, money and energy that are expended in preparation for emergencies are used to train, equip, exercise and otherwise prepare this community to respond.

However in recent years, particularly since 2001 and the September 11th attacks, the law enforcement community has begun to take a more nuanced view of their role. While they often times continue to see themselves as first responders, the new term First
Preventers has become an equally common term. The change, while it seems minor, is in fact very important. Law Enforcement, in this case predominantly local law enforcement, has ceased to see it’s role in counterterrorism as a response (read: after the fact) role; rather it is increasingly common that law enforcement is incorporating active, and sometimes pro-active, counterterrorism as one of their core roles.

This changeover, of course, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; meaning that it is far more pronounced in New York City than in small, rural communities. However despite variations in the intensity of the First Preventer identification, it is not restricted to the largest and most vibrant cities and is increasingly becoming part of the national dialogue on countering terrorism.

This is also not a uniquely American change. While the terminology of “first responder” and “first preventer” may be largely American, evidence suggests that similar changes are happening to various degrees within numerous countries, often in response to their own experiences with international terrorism. A long experience with the Irish Republican Army and other groups has led London Police to see counter-terrorism as a key role. In response to attacks by Aum Shinrikyo, and the changing threats around the world, the Tokyo Police have incorporated counterterrorism as a key responsibility.60

**First Preventers, Law Enforcement and the Policing of Terrorism**

This conceptual change from first responders to first preventers is important in as far as it draws a community (local law enforcement) into a realm (counterterrorism) that had previously been solely the realm of “higher level,” in a federalism sense, agencies. However having local law enforcement think of themselves differently may not be enough, in and of itself, to affect any meaningful change in terms of their ability to
actually engage in counterterrorism. This re-conception of law enforcement’s role in counterterrorism has coincided with several other factors to result in a more serious change in their role.

This new perspective occurred at the same time, and largely as a result of, the political environment that followed the September 11th attacks. The September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the downed United Flight 93, because of their scale, casualty levels, cascading economic impact, and international profile, have increased the public awareness of terrorism threats, resulted in outcry over the inability of federal agencies to detect and foil terrorist plots, and made counterterrorism a salient political issue. They have also served to create a situation in which the political will to reign in local law enforcements attempts to expand their mission to include counterterrorism has been un-palatable in some places.

This change in political atmosphere has also occurred in the wake of a major change in policing strategy and tactics. Intelligence led-policing has been one of the key law enforcement models (along with community policing) that have characterized the recent technologically and methodologically savvy police force. The respect for the intelligence led policing approach, stemming largely from New York City’s experience with CompStat and subsequent experiences in other cities around the world, is widely lauded in the criminal justice literature.

**Incorporating Local Law Enforcement into “National Security**

The incorporation of local law enforcement in “high policing,” or that policing associated with internal political and security threats, is theoretically very important. The dissolving distinction between international and national security in light of transnational
threats means that as national security blends into international and local security, this national level coordination serves an important bridge in bringing locals toward a more even footing with “higher” level security agencies. However, the involvement of local law enforcement in national security is not the only way in which locals are insinuating themselves into international security coordination. Subsequent sections will elaborate on direct interaction between locals and international organizations, foreign agencies and the international scholarly and analytic community.

Several models have been adopted, in various countries, to incorporate local law enforcement into policing issues typically considered the realm of “national security.” Many of these reflect the particular institutional constructs of the nations in which they exist. Countries with strong national level law enforcement and security services have less need to create such mechanisms or organizations. However countries with relatively weak (or in this case small) centralized law enforcement, like the United States, or essentially no national centralized national law enforcement investigative body, like the United Kingdom, do have to find ways to encourage locals to interact with provincial/state, regional, national, and other security agencies. Two models of this incorporation worth considering in this vein are the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) model in the United States, and the Regional Intelligence Cell (RIC) model in the United Kingdom. These are examples of mechanisms that enable local law enforcement to concentrate on what has been termed “high policing” or securing the political arena, rather than securing general order and property rights from criminality.

**Internationalizing Municipal Policing**

Beyond its increasingly important role in “high policing,” local law enforcement is
also becoming more involved in the international counterterrorism community. This phenomenon should not be overstated; cities are not yet on a trajectory to replace states as the major providers of security and actors in international politics; however it should also not be downplayed. A number of cities, particularly large globalized cities, are increasingly being treated as peers by state level intelligence and security bureaucracies. These cities, like New York, London and Los Angeles, have high levels of threat, and an ability (or willingness) to confront them head on. Because of their financial and human resources, amplified threat levels and increasing political autonomy, these cities are increasingly taking on counterterrorism as a key municipal role.\textsuperscript{63} In doing so, they’ve increased the importance of access to counterterrorism intelligence; not just from their national level counterparts, but also from the broader international community.

There have thus been expansions and internationalizations of these police forces that have taken many forms. These changes have been relatively well covered by journalists, and to a lesser extent are beginning to be covered in the scholarly literature. These measures include city police officers sent overseas to work as intelligence liaisons, increased analytical interaction with the broader counterterrorism community, and direct interaction with Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs).

**Models of Policing and Intelligence**

There are numerous models of policing which have had various levels of success and acceptance over the past several decades. Community Oriented Policing, Problem Oriented Policing, The Compstat Model (sometimes discussed as an “accountability” based model), and Intelligence Led Policing, have all had much intellectual and scholarly
effort devoted to their study. Each model has proved successful in some senses, and had failures (or at least inconclusive results) in others. Each offers a particular set of tools and approaches that help to limit crime and at least elements of each has been applied to the contemporary issue of policing terrorism.

**Community Oriented Policing (COP)**

Community Oriented Policing (COP), which gained much favor in the 1990s, is a philosophical approach to policing that depends on Police interaction with, and connection to, the local community. Skogan calls COP “*An organizational strategy that leaves setting priorities and the means of achieving them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighborhoods.*”

Officer involvement in the community is designed to encourage increased community support to police from both individuals and local organizations: “*community institutions are the first line of defense against disorder and crime*” One important aspect of COP approaches is that officers spend time in the neighborhoods they patrol regularly, rather than rotating around from assignment to assignment.

This model of policing is amongst the most copied in the world, and has been spread so widely that virtually all police departments have policies that have been influenced by it. More recently, several scholars have adopted elements of community policing for counterterrorism purposes.

**Problem Oriented Policing (POP)**

Coming soon after the embrace of community policing, another model of policing that emerged was Problem Oriented Policing (POP). Based predominantly on the work of Herman Goldstein, POP argues that purpose of policing is mainly to solve problems.
It argues that much crime is the result of particular problems, which can be studied, and then have solutions devised, thus decreasing the level of crime. It calls for a feedback loop of analysis about particular issues that dominate the time and effort of police officers.

“The emphasis in problem-oriented policing is on directing attention to the broad range of problems the community expects the police to handle ... and on how police can be more effective in dealing with them. ... It recognizes that the ultimate goal of the police is not simply to enforce the law, but to deal with problems effectively – ideally, by preventing them from occurring in the first place.”

The acronym SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) is often used to describe the POP approach to policing, and this approach has incorporated many important insights from the academic study of crime. Some scholars of Intelligence Led Policing argue that ILP offers a way to improve POP, particularly by strengthening the analysis element of the SARA acronym.

**COMPSTAT and the Accountability Model**

The Compstat (for “Compare Statistics”) model of policing is one that focuses on concrete and measurable crime metrics, continuous oversight and the use of technology to monitor crime rates and deploy police resources. Using computerized mapping technology combined with systematic analysis and continuous progress reporting, Compstat has been hailed as one of the most important breakthroughs in policing in decades. Compstat provides chief officers with detailed mapping and monitoring of crime in particular areas, allowing them to hold
Initially instituted in New York City under Police Commissioner William Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Compstat and the accompanying drop in crime rates are seen as two of the biggest successes of the period. In fact, the success of the tactics (and the resulting media coverage of Chief Bratton) are often said to have played a role in his break with Giuliani, and ultimate move to the Los Angeles Police Department.

**Intelligence Led Policing**

While Intelligence Led Policing has emerged as one of the most important and most widely cited models of crime in recent years, it has had many definitional problems like those that have plagued Community Oriented Policing. Intelligence led policing is more a series of connected theoretical and practical approaches that put much emphasis on exploiting information to reduce crime. This information includes statistical crime data, informants, analysis, and other types of information that is compiled and utilized to help reduce crime.

These approaches gained much support following a series of reports in the mid to late 1990s, the most influential of which was a British report issued in 1997 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC) entitled Policing with Intelligence. The report illustrated some best practices and “a number of key factors considered crucial to the full implementation of intelligence-led policing, including an integrated intelligence structure, key performance indicators and collaboration with outside agencies.”

Jerry Ratcliffe, one of the most prominent scholars examining ILP defines it as “Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both
strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.”  

The potential application of intelligence led policing to terrorism has been widely discussed in practitioner circles, as well as examined theoretically in scholarly research. On the practitioner side, programs like the State and Local Anti Terrorism Training (SLATT) bring Intelligence Led Policing techniques to state and local law enforcement agencies around the country. On the academic side, McGarrell, Chermak and Freilich argue that "we believe there is great potential in using the ILP model to respond to terrorism. The arrests following the London subway and the Madrid train bombings, for instance, suggest that intelligence gathered from multiple sources, including surveillance cameras, community informants, and prison officials, was instrumental in postevent investigations. Recent arrests of suspected terrorists in the United States (Florida), Canada, and Britain suggest that intelligence may be able to identify terrorist groups and allow for intervention prior to an attack.”  

Government, Security Networks and Organizational Adaptation  

Another scholarly literature that contributes to any understanding of how the internationalization of municipal policing, is the one that has grown up around issues of networked responses to terrorism and governmental adaptation. The networked nature of modern terrorism, versus the supposed hierarchical nature of earlier terror organizations, has been amongst the most commented upon characteristics of the “new terrorism.” Many have argued this organizational feature of modern terrorism does much to constrain governments that are used to countering threats from much more traditional adversaries.  

Networking has been described as one of the three main organizational models for
organizing social and economic life, along with markets and hierarchies. Each of these three approaches offers particular advantages and disadvantages, with differences coming in terms of the level of flexibility, resiliency, span of control, and various other measures of organizational efficiency and utility. The networked, rather than hierarchical approach appears to have some key advantages for those engaged in terrorism, including resiliency and adaptive flexibility; however that can require tradeoffs with other advantageous traits like secrecy and control.

Several scholars and theorists have posited the need for governmental networks to oppose terror networks. Whether it’s allowing governments to wage Netwar, engaged in multi-lateral counterinsurgency, engage in organizational learning or any number of other conceptions, the end point in many of these approaches is the same. Governments must adapt and learn to fight mobile and transnational organizations and movements more effectively.

The US government recognized the need to reorient and reorganize to counter terrorism well before September of 2001. There were fits and starts at modifying then current security and intelligence arrangements, however, they were never centerpiece issues for most policymakers. Several terrorist attacks served as early focusing events, including the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and the 1995 Sarin Gas attack on the Tokyo underground system. The role of events, particularly disasters, spurring governmental and policy reform is fairly well documented.

However the study of the ways in which in governments respond to non-traditional (i.e. transnational, non-state, violent actors) enemies is still in its infancy. A
literature has begun to develop about policy and organizational changes in response to terrorism; however it has largely tended toward the atheoretical. There have however been some meaningful contributions to the broader contextual understanding governmental response, particularly those structural changes that have resulted from government bureaucracies having to react to more nimble and amorphous adversaries.

“Multilateral Counterinsurgency Networks” – A Framework

One of the most explicit calls for new, networked approaches to transnational threats comes from John Sullivan and Robert Bunker. Their understanding that previous jurisdictional, national and disciplinary boundaries which do not constrain hostile actors must be less of a constraint for law enforcement as well. The two argue that “traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels.”

Sullivan and Bunker’s call for relationships forming from traditional “national security” agencies to police and public safety organizations is fairly revolutionary. Historically the military and intelligence services have had minimal interaction with law enforcement beyond the national level (i.e. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, etc). The idea that state and local law enforcement have something important to contribute to national security is a fairly new one, or at least one that has been out of favor since the beginning of the Cold War. There are however several theoretical approaches to understanding security that provide meaningful insight into why this call for transnational and multi-jurisdictional approaches to the terrorist threat makes sense.

Netwar and Counter-Netwar: Fighting Networks with Networks
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, recognized quite early that new networked organizations, engaging in what they term “netwar,” posed distinct challenges to US security, and that the organizational structures of government agencies were ill equipped to respond to these challenges. Well before it was clear that terrorism would become the touchstone national security issue of the post-Cold War era, they clearly stated that hierarchies (then current US security bureaucracies) were not effective in countering networks, and that “counternetwar will require effective interagency mechanisms and operations.”

The main theoretical point underpinning the concept of netwar is that the new information environment changed the relative advantages of various kinds of actors, with good implications for transnational networks and unfortunate implications for large, static and geographically localized government bureaucracies. “The information revolution favors and strengthens networks, while it erodes hierarchies.”

“These adversaries who have advanced at networking (e.g. criminals, terrorists and activists) are enjoying a marked increase in their power relative to state agencies. While networking once allowed them to simply keep from being eradicated, it now allows them to compete on near equal terms with states and other hierarchically oriented adversaries.”

Using the theoretical attributes of netwar, case studies and analysis, the authors elaborated counter-netwar strategies designed to help minimize the structural hurdles to countering networked opponents. They illustrate that initial efforts to counter piracy in Southeast Asia failed largely because they were state-centered, and thus poorly able to deal with the regional reality of the actors involved in the criminal activity. It was not
until later attempts focused on transnational relations amongst law enforcement and cooperation that the phenomena began to be policed in meaningful way.  

The follow up to this 1996 introduction of Netwar, was a 2001 volume that applied and expanded upon the theory. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy offered an even broader series of applications of the theory to conflicts, political protest and criminal organizations. It examined protest movements and politically violent activity in Burma (democracy advocates), Seattle (the World Trade Organization protests), Mexico (the “Zapatistas”), the Middle East (HAMAS, Al Qaeda, etc), as well as numerous global networks of criminality (Russian organized crime) through the lens of netwar. However the most striking part of the follow up volume that Arquilla and Ronfeldt edited is its Afterword, written just after the September 11th attacks. It begins “Theory has struck home with a vengeance.”

While they admit that they had not appropriately amplified their suggestion of such a catastrophic approach to terrorism, they make a compelling case that their previous analysis offered much foreshadowing of the attacks on Washington and New York City. They compare the United States government and Al Qaeda’s strengths and weaknesses across several key characteristics including organizational, doctrinal, narrative, and technological capabilities. They dissect the ways in which countering such decentralized networks is very hard for entrenched government agencies with multiple bureaucratic, budgetary, cultural and other prerogatives. Tellingly, they equate the coming struggle with Al Qaeda to one of the United States’ most comparable experiences with transnational enemies, the targeting of drug cartels based in Colombia. And based on the experience with the Cali, Medellin and other cartels, they argue that many
advantages rest with the non-state challengers.

Another valuable theoretical approach to this dynamic is explicitly illustrated in the same terms; comparing drug smuggling networks to terrorist networks, as well as examining government responses to both. Michael Kenney approaches narco-networks and terror networks, and those that combat them, from the perspective of organizational learning and adaptation. Others have looked at terrorist organizations as learning entities, however there has been much less emphasis on how those agencies and organizations tasked with stopping terrorists learn and adapt.

**Organizational Learning and Competitive Adaptation in Counterterrorism**

"It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change" – Clarence Darrow

In countering new kinds of enemies and organizations, learning and adaptation are key attributes and abilities for any government to succeed. Unfortunately Kenney has a similar diagnosis to that of Arquilla and Ronfeldt: all too often government agencies are unable to respond as quickly and effectively as those they wish to police. Kenney gives impressive and comprehensive accounts of drug traffickers and terrorists using a combination of experience and trial-and-error to learn and adapt to law enforcement.

These topics have been addressed in various levels of detail elsewhere, but the biggest contribution of this research is to provide a similar look at the violator-enforcer feedback loop from the perspective of those doing counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism missions.

The parallels between narcotics trafficking and terrorism, from an enforcement perspective, are important. Both are transnational threats hard to counter
with traditional jurisdictional policing strategies, and as a result are often countered with task forces containing local, state, regional, national and sometimes international agencies represented. These task forces accomplish something that Kenney articulates, but could just as easily have been the prescription of Arquilla and Ronfeldt for countering networks with networks. Kenney argues these task forces constitute “small rapid reaction strike forces designed to mimic the stealth and mobility of their illicit adversaries.”

Both narco-trafficking and terrorism are also approached with a hybrid Law Enforcement, Military and Intelligence framework, as opposed to traditional crime that is usually pursued using solely law enforcement. This understanding that these problems, based in places like Afghanistan, Colombia and everywhere in between, require new tools or the novel use of existing tools, is important.

While many structural components of these two phenomena are similar (transnational, networked, flexible), there are elements that differentiate them in important ways. The difference between profit motive (in the drugs trade) and political motives (in terrorism) is a major one, which means that policies to address one of them need to be separated out from policies to address the other. The pre-conditions and “market demand” for drugs and violent political activism are very different, and conflating the two would be conceptually inaccurate. That said, there is increasing overlap between the two as terrorist organizations turn to the drug trade for funding (like FARC in Colombia) and to exploit the uncontrolled spaces and illicit logistical networks they facilitate (like Al Qaeda in the Afghan poppy-growing region)
Chapter 2: Theories of Globalization, Localization, and the Internationalization of Police Intelligence Sharing
Understanding changes in the international system is a key to formulating proper policy responses to the changing atmosphere. While much time and theoretical effort has been expended examining the changing nature of threats in order to formulate more appropriate responses; far fewer resources have been expended documenting these responses and attempting to integrate and coordinate them. Intelligence sharing is a fundamental piece of the response to numerous threats to international security, and proper coordination and integration requires a comprehensive and accurate picture of the various agencies and entities that are, and should be, involved. State level law enforcement and intelligence agencies are widely examined and studied across much of the world, and increasingly the international bodies and norms that enable these organizations to interact are also becoming well studied. Both “national security” agencies and increasingly the arrangements that allow for “international security” coordination are becoming increasingly well theorized and contextualized within the schools of thought in international politics. Unfortunately, a relatively small, but arguably quite important, piece of this security response has been wildly underdocumented and essentially un-theorized: local law enforcement and security integration.

In order to correct this oversight, several things are required. The first element that is key to understanding the dynamics of local law enforcements role in international intelligence sharing, is to empirically document that local law enforcement is indeed becoming an invaluable part of the broader international security constellation. This is a task that is just beginning to be undertaken in the scholarly realm. Perhaps equally important is the second step: situating this phenomenon within the theoretical context of
international politics. If the argument is that the increasing role of local law enforcement in international security is an important and meaningful change, then beyond empirical evidence, there exists a need to fit this new trend into existing understandings of international processes and global security cooperation. The goal of this research is to document the phenomena of internationalization of local law enforcement intelligence integration, and to contextualize it within a series of theoretical lenses that scholars use to conceptualize international relations: Fragmegration, Glocalisation and Global City theory.

**Threats and Responses – Globalization and Localization**

It has become widely accepted that, in the modern world, threats are no longer stationary, limited, provincial or discrete. Be it organized crime, trafficking in contraband, proliferation of weapons technology or terrorism, many of the current threats facing governments around the world are transnational, networked, diffuse and globalized. Therefore it makes sense that traditional responses, those in the vein of “national security” concerns, may be insufficient in dealing with these new threats. State level law enforcement is of course ill suited to deal with criminal or violent enterprises that act more like multi-national corporations than local small businesses. In response, law enforcement, intelligence and security services have begun responding by internationalizing their response efforts. From formal organizations like Interpol, to bilateral agreements, to much less entrenched information sharing accomplished through professional consideration, a wink, and a nod, internationalization is increasingly the accepted paradigm in countering transnational threats. This trend has actually been well
documented in the scholarly and policy literatures addressing both law enforcement, and to a somewhat lesser degree in intelligence sharing.

What has been explored far less, and to the detriment of a comprehensive understanding of these dynamics, is the extent to which the increased need for information sharing and coordination has not only shifted upward from the state level, but also downward. States are not only ill prepared to counter transnational networks, but often times they are ill prepared with the requisite local knowledge to counter even the nodes of those networks which do exist within their borders. Numerous structures have arisen to incorporate local law enforcement into these areas that now broadly constitute a newly conceived “national security.”

However this trend is also not the entire picture. Beyond the increasing importance of local law enforcement at the “national security” level, local agencies are increasingly playing a key role in the wider constellation of international security coordination. They are certainly not supplanting the state level organization or agency; however they are increasingly offering an important and nuanced supplement to the networking of international security. There are numerous reasons that this is occurring, including increased local recognition of international threats, a decreasing reliance on national level partners for information, and several local advantages in terms of competitive adaptation. This phenomena is not universal, rather it is limited to certain localities with particular characteristics be they demographic, economic, geographic, or geo-strategic.

These seemingly opposite trends, internationalization and localization, are in fact not nearly as different as might first be assumed. Rather, they represent two sides of a
single coin; the globalization of threats, and the globalization of responses to those threats. Globalization, a rather diffuse term, is often times interpreted to mean merely internationalization; however any look at the important theoretical examinations of the process show that it is a far more complicated phenomena.

In fact numerous theories and theorists of globalization, and its constituent ideas, fit quite well with the two pronged internationalization and localization perspective. James Rosenau’s conception of “fragmergration,” the simultaneous increase in fragmentation and integration, seems a natural fit for this dynamic. The widely cited idea of “glocalisation” is an explicit attempt to illustrate the dual nature of the globalization process by incorporating the word “local” into it. Finally, the Global City concept, discussed by many scholars, and probably illustrated most completely by Saskia Sassen, also seems to be a useful theoretical lens through which to view these developments. The increasing importance of local law enforcement in intelligence sharing in particular, and the networked future of tackling global threats more generally, is an important and meaningful key to a fuller understanding of security integration.

**Globalized Threats and International Terrorism**

The internationalization of threats to national and international security is well documented across any number of spectrums. In scholarly, policy, military, law enforcement and intelligence realms, it is no longer unorthodox to discuss transnational threats, globalization or international networks. While early advocates of these concepts may have faced inertia or even ridicule in their attempts to adjust people’s understandings of how the world functions, thankfully many of these obstacles have subsided. The challenge is now far less about suggesting or documenting that threats are transnational,
but rather about using that starting point to better understand them, craft responses, and tailor and coordinate those responses.

Global threats have been well examined in numerous forms. International organized crime has been a key facet that has received much attention. Smuggling of weapons, drugs, counterfeit goods, people and virtually any other illicit or unlicensed good are the lifeblood of international organized crime. These trades and the networks that enable them are fairly well documented.\textsuperscript{90} A very specific variation on this theme, and one with perhaps the potential for the most far-ranging outcome is the emergence of networks which have facilitated the proliferation of technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); most notably the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan which was responsible for proliferating both expertise and materiel associated with nuclear weapons production.

One of the key transnational threats that is currently being interpreted, analyzed and discussed in policy circles is international terrorism. The networking of terrorism across international borders is at least a century old\textsuperscript{91}, and modern syndicates of terror networks have direct organizational (if not ideological) antecedents in the recent past\textsuperscript{92}; however many have argued that several new features of these organizations\textsuperscript{93}, or new features of the modern world\textsuperscript{94}, have rendered this threat fundamentally more important and dangerous than it has been in the past.

This internationalization has been accomplished and facilitated in several important ways. More diffuse networked structures have done much to ease the organizational burdens of strictly hierarchical groups; these burdens include communication, command and control and vulnerability to the removal of leadership
figures. At the same time the cost (in both dollars and time) of communication has
declined rapidly. Information technology has enabled terrorist groups to coordinate their
activities across wide distances, and to virtually create “communities” which enable
indoctrination, training, and operational coordination. The increasing ease of
international travel, migration and diaspora communities (sometimes with elements
sympathetic to organizational causes) have also eased the internationalization of these
groups.

The focus of the discussion on international terrorism had been on what is often
termed Al Qaeda, but is probably more accurately described as the global Salafi Jihadist
movement. The term Al Qaeda (“The Base” in Arabic) is actually most useful in
describing the organization led by Osama Bin Laden in the Sudan and subsequently in
Afghanistan in the lead up to the September 11th attacks. Following 2001, the US
invasion of Afghanistan and the fracturing of Al Qaeda’s central command, the name has
often been applied to a much larger orbit of directly or even ideologically affiliated
groups and cells around the world. The threat posed by the global Salafi Jihad movement
is indeed a serious one; particularly in light of the US invasion of Iraq which has done
much to reinvigorate the movement, as outlined in the recent US National Intelligence
Estimate.

The transnational nature of the jihadi movement and the recognition that this creates problems for counterterrorism practitioners has been well documented by many
scholars and policymakers. Indeed, the need for an increase in international information
sharing and intelligence coordination in order to respond to it has also been widely
discussed in both academia as well as the policy sphere. However there remains one
aspect of this process of globalizing threats and a globalizing response that, while well noted in practitioner circles, has remained under theorized in scholarly and even policy circles: the importance of local law enforcement.

Part I: Local Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence: Changing Roles and Changing Needs – The Empirical Case

New York

New York City’s transformation of its police force, in response to terrorist threats, is perhaps the most extraordinary; as well as almost certainly the most heavily documented. The change in the New York Police Department’s structure and (NYPD) staffing has been profound. More than 1% of the Department's 40,000 officers now work full-time on counterterrorism initiatives. These officers include several hundred detectives and investigators focused on counterterrorism, as well as rotating groups of uniformed officers utilized in the swarming and inundation patrols associated with NYPD’s Operation Atlas counterterrorism program. The changes have also included the creation of a major terrorism related intelligence analysis program incorporating linguists, a cyber intelligence unit, as well as many analysts with prestigious academic pedigrees and federal analytic experience. These changes have been widely cited in the press, and have even begun to find their way into the academic literature.

The internationalization of New York’s policing for counterterrorism purposes has a few components; namely the use of international fact-finding and intelligence sharing trips, the permanent stationing of liaison officers abroad, direct interaction with IGOs and
the expanded intelligence analytic capability. Each of these contributes to the NYPD’s increasing international profile by establishing contacts and enhancing interaction with international partners. In this way the NYPD has established an international reputation and presence, and become one of the most respected local law enforcement agencies in the world.

Detectives and intelligence officers from NYPD’s counterterrorism and intelligence divisions have traveled extensively to gather information on recent and past terrorist attacks, threats and trends. These trips have included both formal and informal interaction with police and security agencies at the local, provincial/regional and national levels. The use of fact finding and intelligence sharing trips by the NYPD accomplishes several important ends. First it enables NYPD to quickly gather information without waiting for the same information to be collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated by federal law enforcement agencies in the US (this removing the proverbial “middle-man” is much of the reason for the expansion of NYPD’s intelligence capability). Secondly it more closely approximates access to raw intelligence data, because federal authorities do not filter the information. Thus NYPD officers can “ask the New York Question” as police commissioner Ray Kelly describes it; essentially asking whether there is any indication that international events or activity have a nexus to New York City. Finally, it provides NYPD with relationships and connections to colleagues in other countries that enable future collaboration. Fact-finding and intelligence sharing trips have included destinations like Madrid, Beslan, Mumbai, London, and Istanbul amongst many others.

NYPD’s liaison program was established shortly after September 11th, with the
stationing of an NYPD officer at the Metropolitan Police Service at New Scotland Yard in London. It quickly grew into a program with international reach, which fulfills many of the same functions as the intelligence and information sharing visits. These officers too are tasked with asking the New York question, however they do so on a much more consistent basis. Even more so than the short visits, the liaison officers focus on cultivating relationships with security and police agencies. These liaison officers have been stationed in relatively nearby locales like Montreal and Toronto, but also in places far further a field like Singapore, London, Tel Aviv, and Amman, Jordan. These postings, done despite objections of some federal authorities and largely with private funds, are perhaps the hallmark program of the NYPD’s counterterrorism push.

One of the most interesting postings for an NYPD liaison officer is Lyon, France. This officer is tasked with being NYPD’s representative at INTERPOL, the international policing agency. This direct interaction of a local law enforcement officer with an international organization, which is made up almost entirely of state-level law enforcement partners, is quite unique. It’s likely that much of NYPD’s interaction with INTERPOL is shaded by, or reflective of, police commissioner Ray Kelly’s historical association with INTERPOL. Kelly, following his first tenure as head of NYPD and some time working for the Treasury Department, served as President for the Americas at INTERPOL. Thus Kelly may be uniquely positioned to both enable local interaction with INTERPOL, but also to appreciate the resources that such a relationship would be able to offer.

In this way, Kelly illustrates an interesting point that appears common to the cases of New York and Los Angeles, the importance that particular leaders play in facilitating
internationalization. While there is an extent to which Scotland Yard’s program benefited from individual leadership, its internationalization was more a result of structural and institutional opportunities (a lack of national level law enforcement). The importance of individual leadership in facilitating this change is recognized at the highest level of the NYPD, in fact the kind of fundamental changes that internationalization entailed required leadership that was both “very aggressive” and featured considerable “vision.”

Finally, the increase in the focus of NYPD on intelligence analysis is unique; particularly original intelligence analysis that parallels similar work being conducted by federal authorities. The NYPD cyber intelligence unit is well regarded, and has in fact turned up information that was unfamiliar to federal partners who were eager to see it. The language capabilities of the 200+ “master linguists” at NYPD are also a resource that have been the envy of many other agencies, and actually in some cases have been borrowed by federal security agencies. However beyond the analytic capabilities, NYPD has also conducted extensive analytic outreach. Their analysts too have been traveling abroad and interacting with counterparts from around the world. Mitchell Silber, an NYPD intelligence analyst, described in detail how NYPD intelligence staff worked with colleagues in places like the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the production of the publicly released NYPD intelligence report Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. This analytical interaction is simply another level at which NYPD is breaking through traditional boundaries in police work.

London
Like New York, London has a long history with terrorism, and has been innovative and effective in its international response. There are some differences between New York and London, particularly in the political context surrounding new police initiatives. The main one is that law enforcement in the United Kingdom is structured differently than law enforcement in the United States; with no national level law enforcement agency equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The recently created Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) is supposed to move into that role, however it is unclear exactly the extent to which it will take over responsibility for terrorism, and that changeover has not yet been completed. The gathering of counterterrorism intelligence is the mandate of the domestic security service MI5, however most all operational response to terrorism (including much surveillance and analysis) is the role of local Police agencies Special Branch sections. These Special Branch units are modeled after the Special Branch unit in London, which is the political crimes and terrorism unit of the Metropolitan Police Service; and now part of the broader Counterterrorism Command (Special Operations 15, or S0-15).

Special Branch (formerly SO12) was combined with the Anti-Terrorist branch (SO13), the National Bomb Data Centre, the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit, and several other organizations to create the new Counterterrorism Command in 2006. Outside of London the local Special Branch units are supplemented by the Regional Intelligence Cells for analytic and operational support. The Metropolitan Police however do not need such assistance, as their huge numbers and vast resources have made them the natural leader of British law enforcement. In this role they sometimes occupy a rather strange dual-position as both the police force for the London
metropolitan area, as well as home to several national (or pseudo-national) elements of law enforcement. The Home Office or Foreign and Commonwealth Office often fund these bodies or positions.

The Metropolitan Police Services internationalization has also occurred along similar lines as New York City’s. There is an international liaison program, as well as links to international IGOs and NGOs. The liaison program in the Counterterrorism Command differs in one fundamental way from that of the NYPD, its liaison officers have official national status when abroad. Due to the lack of a national level law enforcement agency with as broad a mandate as the Federal Bureau of investigation, the officers from the Metropolitan Police serve as official representatives of the United Kingdom law enforcement community. The International Liaison Service (ILS) of the MPS born in the wake of Irish Republican Army attacks in continental Europe, and remained a small enterprise well into the 1990s. As recently as the late 1990s, the ILS’s future was uncertain and there were discussions of disbanding it. At the time there were liaisons assigned to Paris, France, Bonn Germany and one assigned to the BeNeLux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg).105

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, attacks in Madrid and London, and the rise of international terrorism as a high profile issue in international politics, the ILS has expanded greatly. There are now officers in more than 15 countries. Unlike previous incarnations of the ILS, and like the liaison officers from New York City, they now span the globe. Officers are stationed across Europe, in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt), the Middle East (Turkey), South Asia (Pakistan) Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia) and elsewhere (Australia).
The internationalization of the Metropolitan Police Service is not solely accomplished by the national liaison officers stationed to interact with local police and security services. It also occurs in an interesting way through Scotland Yard’s interaction with a number of important international and European entities like Europol and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT). Because of the United Kingdom’s role in Europe, there are a host of connections that are available to the MPS (acting on the UK’s behalf). These organizations and mechanisms vary in their formality, for example Europol is more formal than the PWGT. These organizations also vary in terms of how bureaucratic they are which some involved suggest is directly correlated to how formal they are. They also vary in the particular utility of each for various tasks. One illustration of this is that information shared within the PWGT is for intelligence purposes only, rather than for admission as evidence, and thus useful for preventive counterterrorism but not necessarily for prosecutions.

**Los Angeles**

An interesting case study, and perhaps one more indicative of most large city police forces than New York or London, is offered by Los Angeles. Los Angeles is clearly a large, globalized city with a serious threat of terrorism. However it is not quite as large or economically central as New York and London, and various political, geographical and resource constraints have made it impossible to undertake the same kind of ambitious expansion that NYPD has. That having been said, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and other local law enforcement (like the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department) have begun to internationalize their perspective. They do not have the same resources to devote, and are not as far along as New York; but it is quite clear that the
intentions exist, and the steps in that direction are beginning to bear fruit.

There is some evidence to believe that, like the case of New York City, much of Los Angeles disposition toward internationalization is personality based. Whereas the combination of Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seem largely responsible for New York’s trajectory; in Los Angeles, another former New York City police Commissioner seems to be leading the way: William Bratton. Bratton, the celebrated police commissioner under New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has done much to shape the current LAPD and its counterterrorism posture. For example, in terms of the LAPD's association with a think tank - the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Policing Terrorism - is a result of relationships that Bratton built there before leaving NYPD. Bratton has also been one of the driving forces in involving LAPD with police and security agencies around and perhaps more importantly, outside the United States.

Despite the major strides that the Los Angeles Police Department and associated local law enforcement have made, these changes do not yet compare to those made by New York or London. However for this reason, Los Angeles may be an even more instructive model in terms of what the broader effects of internationalization will be. New York and London are valuable examples because their order of magnitude and political autonomy are so high that they illustrate the possibilities for local interaction internationally; but Los Angeles, constrained by resource limitations and political hurdles, may indeed be a better example of how this trend is more likely to manifest itself across a wider swath of large urban areas. The Los Angeles example incorporates many of the same elements as New York and London (direct international interaction with foreign colleagues, potential use of liaison agents, connections to IGOs and NGOs,
analytic interaction) but in a smaller capacity as dictated by pragmatic requirements of staffing, funding and political realities.

The Los Angeles Police Department does indeed interact with police and security agencies and various NGOs both inside and outside the United States, but often in a somewhat more informal way than NYPD or Scotland Yard. One example of this is that the LAPD and Los Angeles Sheriffs Department have both sent officers to the United Kingdom for training.111 Also, the Police Executive Research Forum,112 an NGO that enables information and best practice sharing amongst police agencies (and which is currently headed by Mr. Bratton), recently held a conference in London in which William Bratton was able to spend time interacting with numerous members of the Metropolitan Police Service, particularly Commissioner Sir Ian Blair. Blair stated: that the conference would enable the Metropolitan police to build "...upon the continuing close liaison with law enforcement agencies in the US and countries worldwide."113 Bratton went further, contextualizing this meeting as the “latest” in a series of meetings between US and European police officials designed to foster improved information sharing.114

In the lead up to this conference, Bratton had stated that he was considering posting an officer full time in London to interact with the Metropolitan Police Service, in much the same way New York City did soon after the September 2001 attacks. His interest in doing this seems to have stemmed, in part at least, from the experience of his department following the attempted July 21, 2005 transit bombings in London. One of his officers was in London at the time to attend a briefing on the July 7, 2005 bombing which had occurred several weeks earlier. The LAPD officer was able to provide “real time information”115 ahead of even press coverage of the events. It is this kind of early
warning and quick intelligence transfer that liaison officers are often most useful for.

Beyond interaction through meetings, briefings, professional organizations, and potentially through liaison officers, LAPD (and the city of Los Angeles’ Law Enforcement Community more broadly) has also engaged numerous outside communities to help its analytic and strategic planning components. The Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning center is the official intelligence fusion center for the Los Angeles area. Formed in the mid 1990s, the TEW was one of the earliest models of a local fusion center designed to respond to Terrorist threats in the United States. Like many fusion centers the TEW combines local, county, state and federal agencies an “is designed to be an all source, all phase multi-agency, interdisciplinary, intelligence fusion center for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Area.” The TEW has gone further than many fusion centers in terms of its analytical outreach, involving the private sector, academia, and leveraging contacts in government and other sectors outside the United States. This change is perhaps best understood simply by examining a recent conference that the TEW hosted entitled “Terrorism, Global Security and the Law.” This conference featured speakers and presenters from a host of private companies, research centers and federal agencies; but what was equally striking was the international character of the participant list. It included speakers from:
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While Los Angeles has not begun to internationalize quite as much as New York and London, at least in terms of the stationing of officers overseas, it is clear that Los Angeles has certainly internationalized its perspective on terrorist threats. This changing approach, seeing transnational threats as requiring transnational responses, is not entirely new to law enforcement;\textsuperscript{119} it is however new in terms of the scale and frequency of interaction. The increasing involvement in international law enforcement and security, and the blending of threats between local, national and international levels, creates a new environment in which local actors are becoming a much more important piece of security networks and information sharing arrangements. The cases of New York, London and
Los Angeles provide sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that this shift is meaningful and occurring in various geographical, political and organizational contexts. What remains to be explored is, beyond the evidence of internationalization, what are the implications for international politics and security? How can these changes best be conceptualized and understood in the realm of international relations?

**Part II: Theoretical Lenses: Understanding New Security Roles for Local Law Enforcement in the Context of International Politics**

Assuming that the phenomena of local law enforcement becoming increasingly important to the network of international security practitioners is real, particularly in the realm of counterterrorism, what then are the implications of this trend for thinking about and understanding international politics and international security? The answer can be found by taking this phenomenon, and examining it through theoretical lenses that are commonly used to understand the world at large. There has been a proliferation of explanations for how and why governance and political processes have changed in our globalized world. Many are not applicable to this particular case, the globalization of local law enforcement, however some offer very valuable insights into what this trend means. These theories do several useful things in conjunction with the empirical evidence of internationalization:

- **They provide context:** They show that local law enforcement is only one of many types of local governance that is expanding and internationalizing
They illustrate dynamics of change: They explain how broad changes in international patterns result in the needs for differing models of governance.

They provide possible causal explanations as to why some agencies will take on global character and other will not: They provide insight into why certain types of local agencies, or agencies from certain types of localities, might be more or less likely to undertake international networking.

**Fragmentation, Integration and Rosenau’s “Fragmegration”**

James Rosenau understands globalization in a fundamentally different way than many who have chosen to address the topic. Rosenau has problems with the various activities that are all termed globalization; as well as the various parallel or similar phenomena that do not appear to have clear boundaries or differences. “World society, interdependence, centralizing tendencies, world system, globalism, universalism, internationalization, globality” are a few among many that Rosenau claims are often conflated with globalization. He claims that like globalization, these terms are used in an attempt to understand why today’s global affairs seem different from those in previous eras.

Rosenau defines globalization as a process of “boundary-broadening” that “allows people, goods, information, norms, practices, and institutions to move about oblivious to or despite boundaries.” He sees this in strong contrast to localization, in which boundaries are “heightened” rather than broadened. The implication of this is that localization is a process that inhibits the same movements across boundaries that
globalization enables. Not only are these two phenomena linked, but also Rosenau claims that they are “causally linked” meaning that increases in globalization result directly in parallel increases in localization impulses.122 Globalization is, in his mind, the more profound of these two forces: “globalization and localization will coexist, but the former will continue to set the context for the latter.”123

Rosenau goes on to define these two trends as broader impulses, encompassing numerous dynamics, which lead toward integration (globalization) and fragmentation (localization). By combining fragmentation and integration, Rosenau creates a word that he sees as more conceptually precise than globalization, “fragmegration.” This term offers a more nuanced understanding of what globalization is, by incorporating the two key aspects that Rosenau sees as underlying the buzzword. By explicitly recognizing that these two linked, yet conceptually opposite, processes fragmegration arguably provides a better analytical framework through which to examine the process.

Fragmegration also has implications for governance,124 which is the most important way in which it impacts issues of security. One of the key dynamics that results from fragmegration, is one of the key dynamics that are the focus of intelligence sharing and coordinating international security: networking.

“not only has the advent of network forms of organization undermined the authority of states, but in the context of our concern with the governance of fragmegration it has also had even more important consequences. Most notably, the networks have contributed to the disaggregation of authority as well as the formation of new collectivities not founded on hierarchical principles.”125

This dis-aggregation of authority is a key factor in the decreasing importance of
the traditional “national security” state in light of transnational threats. Governments at various levels, faced with threats that do not conform to traditional analytic perspectives are finding that new, less formal, ad hoc networked approaches to integration are the only way to keep pace with the hyper-adaptive networked threats posed by terrorists, smugglers, and other globalized malefactors.

Beyond networking, fragmegration offers another key implication for governance. Rosenau discusses “multi-level governance” a spreading of responsibility for managing public affairs away from a centralized (read: state level) government to a much more diverse group of actors which encompass a large multi level “ladder of governance.”

He sees fragmegration leading to an inevitable balkanization of public control: 
“...multilevel or comprehensive governance will be the dominant modes through which NGOs, communities, governments, regions, and the world attempt to exert a modicum of control over their affairs.”

Beyond fragmegrations impact on governance, Rosenau has indeed gone further and examined its impact on the security realm. Unlike, Glocalisation and Global City theory, which have both largely been discussed in economic terms, and virtually eschewed the discourse of changes in the security arena, fragmegration has been directly used to address such concerns. However Rosenau’s treatment of the impact of fragmegration on security is much more focused on a traditionally International Relations conception of security (i.e. related to interstate conflicts and the role of international institutions), rather than the kinds of transnational threats that constitute much of the current threat spectrum. While Rosenau does much to frame the impact of economic, social and political sources of fragmegration, and the subsequent impacts on international
security, he does far less to move from broad theoretical perspectives down to the pragmatic and realistic impact of fragmentation and integration dynamics on those agencies and governments tasked with ensuring security. A theoretical perspective with such potential to inform the intelligence and security coordination, has thus been sadly under-utilized in the attempt counter transnational threats.

Fragmegration offers a useful analytical tool for explaining the prominent features of how the security practitioner universe is changing: the devolution of some security tasks to local or regional bodies, the increasing turn to networking and networked information sharing, and the increased importance of multi level governance. In this framework, fragmegration accomplishes one of the most important tasks that can be expected from any theoretical framework, it proves fertile ground for explaining changes we see occurring in the real world.

Glocalisation

Glocalisation is an idea that has, more so than Rosenau’s work, largely been focused on the economic sphere, and to a slightly lesser extent how the political sphere reacts to the economic one.129 It is however quite applicable to various other policy areas, and noticeably in this case, security. Erik Swyngedouw rightfully describes glocalisation as an attempt to “recast” globalization in a different light; rather than traditional conceptions which have tended to view globalization as sort of international homogenization. “Internationalisation, mundialisation, delocalisation, international competitiveness, cultural hybridization and other more or less fashionable concepts”131 are not as conceptually useful in his mind.
The reason being that he defines glocalisation as two separate processes that in tandem form a more accurate picture of the way in which the process usually termed globalization works. The first of these processes he describes as one in which:

“economic activities and inter-firm networks are becoming simultaneously more localised/regionalised and transnational...”132 While here this process is based on economic activity and inter-firm networks, this process seems to represent what is occurring in terms of the increasingly transnational nature of threats. Intelligence and security services which were conceived and designed largely to counter state adversaries are less well prepared to deal with serious threats that move upward (transnationalization) and downward (localization). The second process, on the other hand, is characterized largely by the response to the first.

“...institutional/regulatory arrangements shift from the national scale both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or to local, urban or regional configurations...”133

By this he means that governance, in this case focused on economic issues, has to be increasingly coordinated across international borders, as well as in new ways at the local level. His argument is that viewing countries as having the ability to undertake these regulatory challenges at the national level in a networked world is not viable. Networks allow for broad international organization and coordination, as well as the coordination of small regional and local level nodes; thus states are ill suited to this kind of need. This dynamics is seen in the transformation of traditional ideas regarding “national security” taking on increasingly transnational/international components, as well as localized or regionalized components.
Some scholars have begun to see connections between the concept of
glocalisation and international security. Diez and Joenniemi presented a paper entitled
Security and Political Identity in a Glocalized Era,¹³⁴ which examined the importance of
glocalisation in international relations. It is an interesting exercise in examining some of
the theoretical implications of glocalisation, rather than making any attempt to document
any empirical evidence of “glocalising” security arrangements. Deiz and Joenniemi do
offer some interesting conceptual models illustrating the changing levels at which
“securitization” takes place¹³⁵; however these insights are arguably more useful to the
theorist of international politics than the practitioner of international security.

The element of glocalisation that may be most applicable to our understandings of
the incorporation of local law enforcement into the intelligence and counterterrorism
milieu is its emphasis on glocalisation as a result of “rescaling economic networks” and
as a result “rescaling territorialities of governance.”¹³⁶ This interaction between the
rescaling of economic networks and the response of rescaling governance is a direct
parallel to the kinds of “rescaling” that has occurred with international terrorism, and
governmental response. While terrorist networks have indeed become more
transnational, that overarching network still works to connect and influence small
localized operational cells. This combination of international logistics with localized
operators needs to be mirrored in government response (“scaled” in Swyngedouw’s
terms). The obvious way to do this is to allow international intelligence sharing
organizations and protocols to interact directly with local law enforcement. This would
be a classic example of Kenney’s competitive adaptation.
The Concept of Global Cities

In recent years, a growing literature in Geography and Urban Affairs has emerged focusing on Global Cities (sometimes termed World Cities). This literature explores cities that have disproportionate levels of economic, financial, telecommunication, media, and socio-cultural influence in the world system. These cities are not defined by population per se. For example, despite its size Mexico City is hardly ever considered a Global City. Instead, Global Cities are so designated based on their integration with global capital flows, telecommunications networks, and influential industries. It is a functional distinction rather than one based on some inherent quality like population or location. These cities are at once the result of and driver of the amorphous concept of Globalization.

Two of the most prominent Global Cities theorists are John Friedmann and Saskia Sassen. Friedmann describes a hierarchy of major cities that is based on each city’s role as a “control centre of capital.” This role was defined by a cities relative economic importance in terms of the number of firms and regional headquarters of multinational corporations the city hosted; the presence of international institutions and important business service and manufacturing centers; and how important the city was as a transportation node. On the other hand, Sassen is more associated with the more recent measures of Global Cities, which focus on the concentrations of several important financial and business service industries. In her 1991 book The Global City, she focuses specifically on accounting, advertising, banking, and law. Using measures of concentration in these functional areas, she declares New York, London and Tokyo to be “highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy.”
One of the key ways the cities have been defined is in terms of the presence of industries key to global finance (accounting, banking, etc), as well as the presence of numerous large multinational corporations. These cities, which include New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Paris, are what the *Economist* has termed “Capitals of Capital.”¹⁴⁰ Some industries are remarkably concentrated (like accounting) while others are more diffuse (advertising) and work less well to define Global Cities.¹⁴¹ Banking is another key industry that has been used to define what is and is not a Global City.

In the past few years, however, studies have emerged that have backed away from the financial service sector as the defining characteristic of Global Cities. Other services have been discussed as possible measures – for instance, legal services – and other measures, such as telecommunication centrality and the presence of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).¹⁴² Increasingly there is a consensus that while these definitions generate slightly different lists, there does exist a stratum of cities at the “top” of the global hierarchy that tend to combine intense internationalization in all of these categories. Termed by some scholars as “Alpha World Cities,” these cities compose a virtually undisputed subset of cities that are integral to the global economy and in many ways what may be termed an emerging global society.

In a survey of 29 articles related to World or Global City Theories, there is near unanimity that London, New York and Tokyo constitute a nexus of global capital that far exceeds their population or geographically expected proportion.¹⁴³ Most Global Cities scholars also included several other key nominees like Hong Kong, Paris, Singapore and Frankfurt. Some other cities also appeared often, but are often seen as “Beta” level...
global cities, including Madrid, Zurich, Sao Paulo, Moscow and Seoul. What is increasingly clear is that the Alpha echelon of Global Cities represents not only a key section of the global economy, but increasingly an interrelated and networked one.

The concept of a network of global cities is hardly new. Charles Tilly described how cities functioned as networked economic actors as far back as the 15th century.

“Urban networks... link higher level centers in separate regional systems, sometimes removed from each other by thousands of kilometers. Although timber, wheat, salt and wine traveled great distances in Europe well before 1500, urban networks long specialized in the exchange of light, expensive goods such as spices and silks.”

However the modern conception of economically networked cities, under globalization is arguably different. Peter Taylor, Richard Smith and Jonathan Beaverstock have written extensively about the ways in which these Global (or World) Cities are becoming less individual city-state-like actors, and more like an interdependent network which are so closely tied that minor fluctuations in the environment of one affects them all very deeply. These authors have looked at how economic interdependence, increased social interaction, communication flows, and shared civil society organizations are integrating these cities into the global economy, technical infrastructure, and civil society much more quickly than the nations of which they are a part.

Less effort has been put into examining how these cities might be integrating functionally in terms of regulation and law enforcement. Specifically, this is true in the realm of counterterrorism. This topic is not completely unexamined. The criminal justice
literature has indeed looked at cross-municipal enforcement.\textsuperscript{147} However, it has not been systematically approached in terms of the idea of Global Cities until very recently.\textsuperscript{148} While this distinction may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is in fact of real import. Global Cities arguably have a much different set of calculations to make in terms of both the threat of terrorism (London, New York, Paris and Tokyo have seen significant terrorism and Singapore has seen foiled plots), but also in terms of the resources and freedom they have to respond. New York City and Hong Kong not only have differing threat levels than many other cities (even of comparable size perhaps), but they also have a different level of independence from national and regional governance that may constrain some cities in their response.

The utility of the Global City theory framework for examining the increased importance of local law enforcement involvement in international security is that it shows a very particular case of fragmegration or glocalisation, resulting in a unique variation on multi-level governance. This particular dynamic of cities that play an important role as an engine in globalization provides a much needed example and explanation of the increasing importance of local level governance in international political phenomena. The idea that cities are, in this increasingly globalized age, becoming less “national” and more globalized fits very well with the conception that local level regulatory and governing agencies (in this case law enforcement) have a growing need to be viewed as legitimate international actors, and require not just recognition, but integration opportunities.

Global city theory also provides a strong explanatory variable that might suggest why certain local law enforcement actors would be important and viable members of
international practitioner communities, while others will not. By arguing that cities (local entities) with particular economic and political characteristics are integrating into the global system (internationalization) in different ways, there exists a framework to draw on for translating a similar dynamic to security integration. Concentrations of resources (both traditional capital, as well as human capital), political autonomy and higher threat levels all appear to explain why cities like New York and London have local law enforcement that would need to become important nodes in international intelligence sharing and security arenas, while other less globalized cities might not.\textsuperscript{149}

Next Steps

Clearly each of these theoretical lenses offers a useful perspective in examining at least some facet of the internationalization and localization processes that are becoming increasingly well documented. The next step is not just documenting the phenomena empirically, nor presenting theoretical perspectives that offer potential insight into understanding and contextualizing them; the next step in this nascent research program
will be to systematically utilize the theories of international politics, which seem at first

glance helpful in improving our understanding, to see whether the realities of

internationalization match the expected outcomes associated with the theories. Is

increased involvement of local law enforcement in international intelligence sharing a

result of broad geo-political trends like globalization, glocalisation, and the like? It

seems likely that it is, if not a direct result of such trends, at least strongly encouraged by

such changes.

However there are alternative explanations that also need to be examined. It is

clear from the cases of New York and Los Angeles, and in a more nuanced way also true

of London, that individual political leadership and will at the executive level play a very

important role in fostering internationalization. Networks of personal contacts in foreign

intelligence and police agencies are also a major factor in enabling locals to interact

across international borders. Interestingly it may be the case that these alternative

explanations are indeed the main aspects that enable internationalization, but that they do

so within the context of the broader trends. Regardless of leadership and political will,

and regardless of the networks of personal contacts abroad, it can be argued that without

the proliferation of globalized threats (and dramatic manifestations of these, like the

Khan Network and the September 11th attacks) these resources would be wasted. It

appears largely to be the case that globalization, and the constituent theories that create

its milieu, create the political opportunity for local law enforcement to use those

resources that they have internationally.
“For many generations New York had taken no heed of war, save as a thing that happened far away, that affected prices and supplied the newspapers with exciting headlines and pictures. The New Yorkers felt that war in their own land was an impossible thing...

...And then suddenly, into world peacefully busied for the most part upon armaments and the perfection of explosives, war came... The immediate effect on New York... was merely to intensify her normal vehemence...

...As the airships sailed along they smashed up the city as a child will shatter its cities of brick and card. Below they left ruins and blazing conflagrations and heaped and scattered men, women and children mixed together...

...Lower Manhattan was soon a furnace of crimson flames, from which there was no escape. Cars, railways, ferries, all had ceased, and never a light lit the way of the distracted fugitives in that dusky confusion but the light of burning...”

H.G. Wells, The War in the Air - 1908
New York City is one of the most diverse and dynamic cities on earth. Its police force is a reflection of that vibrancy, and is one of the most storied and well-respected “brands” in law enforcement. Its long history is not without scandal and error; however those remain exceptions rather than the rule. The New York Police Department’s history has been told well by historians, former officers, and documented in the criminal justice literature. However there are elements of its history that remain under-examined.

One of these lacunae is the dearth of meaningful examination of the role that NYPD has played, and continues to play, in both international and “high” policing. Historically, most histories of municipal police agencies have not focused on these two elements as, at least in the United States case, cities have not played a large role in international or “high” policing. Both of these areas are predominantly the responsibility of federal agencies in the United States; however the NYPD is unique both in the scope and the scale of its historical involvement in both.

There is indeed some documented history of city police involvement in international policing in the United States; however it is not a well-developed literature by any stretch of the imagination. What emerges is a picture of occasional and ad hoc deployment of officers abroad (usually to neighboring countries), with some more extensive involvement in the era before federal law enforcement agencies developed extensive investigative abilities. This literature has also not kept pace with some rapid changes in the post September 11th era.

Outlined by Jean Paul Brodeur, the term “high policing” is based on the traditional French conception of “haute police,” which encompassed those policing activities focused on political activities (as opposed to the merely criminal) and those
issues traditionally associated with “national security.” Low policing, on the other hand is conceived of as traditional crime control policing, as carried out by most uniformed police agencies.

Like international policing, “high policing” is generally considered the responsibility of federal law enforcement and intelligence services, largely because of its concern with “national security.” However “national security” is not today, nor arguably was it in the past, truly just a national concern. During the Cold War the main security threat came directly from the Soviet Union, and thus national security was coordinated at the national level. However “non-traditional” and post-Cold War threats like terrorism are not so easily conceived of and countered solely at the national level.152

One commentator, discussing the threat of international terrorism, described the reality as “In the end, all terrorism is local.”153 Since 2001 the NYPD has, in the face of the terror threat, undertaken a massive refocusing on both international and “high” policing activities. Interestingly while this shift is revolutionary in scale and scope, it is not necessarily revolutionary in orientation. The extent of the internationalization and securitization may be novel, but a look back at the pre-Cold War NYPD shows that New York City police officers have a long history of international policing, and protecting US “national security.”

The New York City Police Department

The New York City Police Department, the biggest in the United States, is also one of the largest police forces in the world. With 37,000 officers and another 15,000 support staff, the New York Police Department is about twice the size of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In fact the New York Police Department is larger than the
standing armies of dozens of countries around the world, giving it the ability to specialize in ways many other forces cannot imagine. NYPD officers patrol 76 city neighborhoods that encompass every conceivable race, ethnicity, religion and creed: “We police the most diverse city, probably in the world.”

The modern NYPD did not come into existence until the mid 19th century. Before this, the policing of New York City fell to numerous ward and neighborhood level police agencies that did not have any standardized training, oversight, equipment or even uniforms. These organizations largely reported to local level politicians like aldermen and ward leaders. They varied in their levels of effectiveness, corruption, and even whether they patrolled at night. This patchwork approach was often criticized from above (the Mayor and Common Council) and from below (the people of New York) but reorganization plans were fraught with political hurdles. However, a series of political and ethnic riots and omni-present violent crime created the political opportunity to restructure.

In 1856 the recently elected Governor John King, backed by public opinion fed up with Police inconsistency, created a Metropolitan Police District that included Manhattan, Brooklyn, Westchester and Staten Island. The existing policing bureaucracy and the newly proposed one squared off, and for several weeks competing Police forces patrolled New York. Soon though, the courts intervened and ruled in favor of the Albany created new police force. This institutionalized the modern NYPD Precinct scheme, and managed to overcome the inertia and chaos of policing in New York City.

Since then, the New York Police Department has grown with the city, developing into one of the most recognizable law enforcement “brands” in the world. While there
have been numerous problems and scandals in the department over the decades, the
NYPD has come to be seen as one of the pre-eminent law enforcement institutions in the
world. Today it is an organization that has changed greatly in its focus and operations,
although there have been numerous organizational and cultural themes which have
remained consistent or reemerged over time.

**EARLY TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: 1900-1945**

**New York’s Early Experience with Policing National Security**

New York City and the New York Police Department are not entirely new to the
world of “high” policing. Rather, before the Cold War era, NYPD was in fact deeply
involved in policing various violent political activities. The earliest high policing in New
York was a result of an influx of largely foreign anarchists and other radicals around the
turn of the 20th century. There were, however, “homegrown” anarchist radicals born in
the United States as well, although often to immigrant parents. One of these US born
radicals, Leon Czsologosz, would eventually assassinate President McKinley. In New
York, the movement was closely associated with a wave of European immigration that
included some political radicals from Italy (like many members of what would become
the Brescia Group), Germany (like Johann Most) and elsewhere on the continent. This
wave of terrorism has been well documented, and is one of the closest parallels to modern
day Islamist terrorism in terms of its global nature, revolutionary ideological
underpinnings, and the challenges posed to traditional law enforcement and security
arrangements.

One of the best known of these anarchist incidents was the 1920 bombing of the J.
P. Morgan headquarters on Wall Street by anarchist Mario Buda. Buda brought a horse
drawn cart packed with explosives to Wall Street, and detonated it, leaving scars in the J. P. Morgan Building that can still be seen today. The event, considered by some the first “car-bomb,” was a formative one in New York’s understanding of terrorism.

“The horse and wagon were blown to bits. Glass showered down from office windows, and awnings twelve stories above the streets burst into flames. People fled in terror as a great cloud of dust enveloped the area. In Morgan’s office Thomas Joyce of the securities department fell dead on his desk… Outside scores of bodies littered the streets. Blood was everywhere.”

The NYPD is also not new to the need for international policing and cooperation to counter international threats and challenges. The transnational threat of anarchist terrorism, as well as the threat of organized crime groups like the Sicilian Mafia, was problems that NYPD had to confront in the near absence of federal law enforcement presence. The US Secret Service played some role in these issues, but was small and comparatively short of resources. The nascent Federal Bureau of Investigation, founded in 1908 but not a potent law enforcement agency until decades later, could not sufficiently address these issues either. Thus, in that vacuum, the NYPD naturally assumed much more expansive responsibility for crimes that were of national and even international significance.

**Figure 1 - Early National Security/Political Crimes in New York City**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Organizational/State Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1914</td>
<td>Explosives Manufacture, Conspiracy, etc</td>
<td>The “Brescia Group”*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1914</td>
<td>Bombings at St. Patrick Cathedral, the New York Archdiocese and St. Alphonsus Church</td>
<td>Anarchists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1915</td>
<td>Attempted Bombing at St. Patrick's Cathedral</td>
<td>Anarchists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1916</td>
<td>Bombings of Allied Ships with devices manufactured in New York City Harbor</td>
<td>German agents created the bombs, and worked with Irish-American Dock Workers to place them on ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 1916</td>
<td>Black Tom Island Sabotage** – 2 Million pounds of munitions for the Allied Forces destroyed</td>
<td>Assumed German Agents/Saboteurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Numerous Arrests under the Sedition Act</td>
<td>Anarchists, Russian Revolutionaries, Draft Protestors and Various other “Radicals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1919</td>
<td>Mail Bombings Targeting High Profile Business Leaders (J. P. Morgan, John Rockefeller, etc)</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 1920</td>
<td>Wall Street Wagon Bombing – 39 Killed and almost 400 wounded</td>
<td>Italian Anarchist Mario Buda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Named after Gaetano Brescia, the anarchist who assassinated the King of Italy. The Brescia Group had 600+ members. Three members were killed on July 4, 1914 when the bomb they were manufacturing to target the Rockefeller Family exploded.

** While technically in New Jersey (what is now Liberty Park, NJ) NYPD investigated because of its resources and the minimal capabilities of New Jersey and Federal Law Enforcement at the time.

NYPD’s experience with high policing was not limited solely to transnational threats such as terrorism and traditional law enforcement. In fact, in the run up to World War I the NYPD was closely intertwined with the national security establishment in the United States. Long before the United States decided to end their neutrality in the “Great War,” the NYPD (or at least substantial elements of it) had chosen to side with the Allies and begun working toward that goal in earnest.
The New York City Bomb Squad, one of the elements of the Department most involved in “high policing” at the time had made contacts in the intelligence services of various Allied countries long before the United States entered the war. Under Special Deputy Commissioner Nicholas Biddle, the NYPD coordinated its search for the German saboteurs with Allied intelligence personnel. Later, during the war, Biddle would be made a Colonel and run both US military and New York City Police intelligence operations out of the same office at 302 Broadway. In fact the military, intelligence and police functions became so intertwined during World War I that they were often hard to separate. The “intelligence police” Biddle oversaw were New York Police Detectives given a military rank of sergeant; an interesting precursor of the Joint Terrorism Task Force model, which would later deputize NYPD officers as special Marshals with federal arrest powers.

**New York’s Early Experience with International Policing**

Along with responsibility for policing violent political activity, the NYPD also came early to policing internationally. As a result of anarchist terrorism and Italian organized crime, the NYPD took on international roles early and continued them until the new Federal Bureau of Investigation began to really supplant it as the flagship national law enforcement agency.

New York had numerous interactions and relations with European police services, many of which shaped the way the department developed. Arthur Woods, who largely created the NYPD’s detective bureau, did so after touring Europe to study various policing and investigation agencies and units. This led to the adoption of a hybrid of
models from around the continent, including the creation of functional units focusing on specific crimes like homicide, robbery, and street crime.

In 1904 the NYPD sent Detective Sergeant Joseph Faurot to Scotland Yard to study their use of fingerprinting.\(^{160}\) Fingerprints taken in New York City and sent to London for comparison with those of recorded thieves actually identified someone involved in a robbery at the Waldorf Astoria hotel. In fact by 1908, Detective Faurot had solved a murder using fingerprinting. By 1914 NYPD was hosting international policing conferences and utilizing both European academics and investigators to train and educate its detectives. NYPD’s international policing efforts were not however confined to learning and education. In fact, they engaged in real international policing and investigations because of the lack of federal law enforcement and the reserves of officers and expertise they had.

The clearest example of the international role of NYPD came in its response not to policing political activities, but rather to traditional organized crime, in the form of the Sicilian Mafia. Joe Petrosino, the NYPD’s first Italian-American police detective, is a near mythical figure in the department’s history. Initially, because of ethnic prejudices, many officers in the department dismissed him; but he would grow to become a decorated and widely respected example of what an NYPD detective could be. Killed in the line of duties overseas, he was also an archetypical example of the NYPD’s early internationalization.\(^{161}\)

Petrosino was sent to Italy in February of 1909 to work with Italian police and to investigate the Italian records of 2,000 suspect Italian immigrants. The mission was supposed to be a secret one, however attempts by some police officials to garner positive
publicity by discussing the efforts hamstrung Petrosino’s clandestine endeavors.
Petrosino, an effective but ultimately street level detective, was out of his element interacting with Police Chiefs and government officials. The police liaison role often requires the skills of a diplomat, skills that Petrosino either didn’t have or chose not to exercise. Thus his trip was fraught with trouble. While in Palermo, Sicily Petrosino met with numerous informants in an attempt to gather intelligence about the Mafia and political extremists in New York City. On March 12, 1909 while waiting for a trolley in Palermo, Joe Petrosino was shot. There is still debate about whether he was killed by hired gunmen or by the mafia figure (and fugitive from New York City) Don Vito Cascio Ferro. Either way, his death marked the end of a remarkable chapter in the history of the NYPD.

An early example of New York and its police department utilizing the broad diversity of its citizens to provide cultural and linguistic understanding to criminals and extremists in insular immigrant communities, Petrosino was the first NYPD detective to be effective in gathering intelligence about criminals and radicals in the Italian immigrant community. He worked on organized crime and anarchist issues, and eventually went on to head the “Italian Squad” which looked at both issues in the Italian neighborhoods across New York City. This utilization of New York’s natural diversity of human resources is a major theme that re-emerges in more recent “high policing” efforts.

**The Cold War Period**

The growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the middle of the century, the political realities of the Cold War coming to dominate the arena of “national security,” and several other factors conspired to limit the involvement of the New York
Police Department in international and high policing between 1945 and 2001. While some terrorism indeed struck New York City during this period (Puerto Rican Nationalists and Radical Leftists in the 1970s and 1980s were amongst several groups that routinely targeted the city), on the whole it was not an issue that the department devoted large amounts of time and effort to.

There was a Bureau of Special Services and Information (BOSSI), sometimes termed “the Red Squad” that operated during this period within the Department. While the BOSSI did engage in some intelligence gathering, and even did some work on issues of “subversion,” it tended to focus almost completely on domestic issues like labor strikes, civil rights and student protestors, and domestic terrorism groups like Puerto Rican nationalists or violent Black nationalists. There were a number of cases of abuse of powers, civil liberty violations and major surveillance operations of a questionable nature. These abuses ended up resulting in the Handschu Guidelines that dictated NYPD surveillance limitations until after September 11th. Ultimately though, in few cases was BOSSI involved in the kinds of international operations that the departments personnel were in the Pre and Post-Cold War eras.

While the consequences of terrorism were indeed local, the prevention of terrorism was seen as a “national” responsibility. The FBI controlled and oversaw terrorism investigations, and there were at best a couple of dozen NYPD officers working on the Joint Terrorism Task Force with the FBI. While the JTTF model originated in the New York City field office of the FBI during this period, and is by most accounts a fairly successful model, counterterrorism simply was not a Departmental priority for much of this period. There are numerous accounts of terrorism investigations in which the NYPD
was either pushed out, or largely left out. It was seen in many cases either as someone else’s problem (the FBI)\(^3\) or something interesting that most officers were not allowed to be involved in (because of classified information and differences between the goals of the intelligence community and law enforcement). However that logic was damaged in 1993, and came crashing down in September of 2001.

**TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: 2001-PRESENT**

New York City’s Recent Experience with International Terrorism

The New York City Police Department has completely overhauled its structure and mission in light of the threat of international terrorism. The post-September 11\(^{th}\) NYPD, while perhaps echoing some of the “high policing” experiences of the past, is a fundamentally different enterprise both culturally and organizationally. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center by a group of Egyptian Militants associated with Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (“the Blind Sheikh”) ushered in a new era in terms of how New York viewed terrorism as a threat to the city. Ramzi Youseff, the person who constructed the massive truck bomb that detonated in the parking garage below one of the World Trade Center towers, admitted that he had envisioned collapsing one tower on to the other; an outcome that could have resulted in a carnage that didn’t seem conceivable until 2001.

While the first World Trade Center attack killed several people and injured many more, it did not accomplish the large scale murder Youseff envisioned. That tragedy would not occur until the second attack on the Trade Center eight years later. It is cliché

\(^3\) There are many anecdotes that illustrate this feeling, but indicative of this is the following quote from Katz 2005 (page 61): “Detectives working the squads in the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-eighth precincts (heavily Arab areas in Brooklyn) used to joke that they could always tell when something blew up in the Middle East, even before it would reach the news or the papers, because an FBI surveillance van, usually masquerading as a cable TV repair truck would be parked outside one of the many social clubs in the area.”
to suggest that the September 11th attacks changed everything. However the death of 2,973 people in those attacks did forever change the New York City Police Department.

**Counterterrorism as a role for the NYPD**

Until the mid 1990s the New York Police Department, like most modern city police forces, focused largely on traditional crime reduction. Tools like Compstat (a computer program for monitoring and tracking crime), supported the “Broken Windows” philosophy approach to fighting crime while the city was helmed by Rudy Giuliani and the department was headed by William Bratton. Terrorism and political violence were still issues in the city and were investigated in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This relationship with the FBI was sometimes contentious; however the Joint Terrorism Task Force model had helped to improve coordination. After the 1993 attack and subsequent Landmarks plot (in which Sheik Abdel Rahman and some of his supporters were arrested), terrorism became a more serious priority. Terrorism remained though a secondary or even tertiary concern.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 led not just to a reprioritization in which counterterrorism has become viewed more as a core function of the department, but also to a major restructuring of large parts of the force. According to Ray Kelly, Police Commissioner and architect of the new NYPD structure, the police department is now concerned with the “Three Cs” which stands for “Conventional crime reduction, Counterterrorism and Community Relations.” Making the terrorism threat a key priority of the department is a major shift in focus, and has been followed up with adjustments in resources and manpower, much of this as a result of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s support of Kelly’s new approach. The New York Police Department
spends “around 200 million” dollars per year on its counterterrorism efforts according to Commissioner Kelly. Previously the Department had only a small number of officers working full-time on terrorism issues, post-September 11th however there are currently approximately 1,000 officers working full-time in counterterrorism. This new priority and the organizational changes it has engendered have reshaped the department drastically. Kelly created a new Counterterrorism Bureau from the ground up, and overhauled and reoriented the existing Intelligence division.

These organizations and their taskings represent a major change in the priorities of the New York Police Department. These divisions have largely been taken over by administrators recruited from very high-ranking federal service in national security. David Cohen, the former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Operations, now heads the Intelligence Division where he oversaw the National Clandestine Service (the United States’ network of human intelligence collectors). The Counter Terrorism Bureau, on the other hand, is currently headed by former White House Homeland Security Advisor Richard Falkenrath. These two “hires” are indicative of a broader trend of recruiting former federal government officials, and other with impressive security credentials, as well as the NYPD general trend of responding to terrorism, and issue usually considered to be “national security.”

**The Counterterrorism Bureau**

The Counterterrorism Bureau is an entirely new section in the department, and one that is unique in NYPD’s storied history. It has a large number of very specialized personnel, conducts department-wide terrorism training, and oversees Operation ATLAS – a major critical infrastructure and counterterrorism operations program. Operation
ATLAS includes paramilitary swarms and surges of officers around critical infrastructure and high profile targets, increased transit security, and inundation of patrols in high risk areas like lower Manhattan. The Counterterrorism Bureau is also home to the detectives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), who are deputized as special federal marshals and thus serve a hybrid local-national law enforcement function. Finally the Counterterrorism Bureau houses the Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, its own internal intelligence analysis unit.

Initially, the Counterterrorism Bureau was overseen by Lieutenant General Frank Libutti; who left in 2003 to take a Presidential appointment at the federal Department of Homeland Security. He was succeeded as Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism by Ambassador Michael Sheehan, a former Special Forces soldier who had spent time as the State Department’s Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism during the Clinton Administration. Finally, the Bureau has most recently been overseen by Deputy Commissioner Richard Falkenrath who had previously served as special advisor to President George W. Bush for Homeland Security.

The Counterterrorism Bureau employs 250 officers full-time, 130 of who are part of the New York JTTF with the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies. Before the creation of the Counterterrorism Bureau there were only seventeen NYPD officers on the JTTF, a change that represents the scale of change in the department’s prioritization. These officers are given federal security clearances, and thus have access to classified terrorism information.

Beyond the large number of personnel devoted specifically to counterterrorism investigations, others are focused on training the departments thousands of rank and file
officers, analyzing threats from abroad, as well as numerous emergency response units
that deploy on behalf of or in coordination with the Counterterrorism Bureau.

The training that the CT Bureau oversees and conducts is targeted to the
approximately 36,000 officers who are not devoted full-time to terrorism issues, in order
that they are able to recognize indicators and suspicious behavior. This training varies by
rank, ranging from “awareness level” introductions to advanced tactical training, and
includes instruction in the use of personal protective equipment designed to protect
officers from CBRN threats (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear). Officers at
all levels also receive training in “trends in target selection and attack methodologies.”

The analytic unit at the Counterterrorism Bureau puts out numerous intelligence
products for the law enforcement and security community, as well as products that go to
the private sector as part of NYPD SHIELD, the department’s private sector partnership.
There are “about a dozen” analysts in the Bureau who have both functional (CBRN,
Cyber threats) as well as geographic areas (South Asia, the Levant and Iraq, etc) of
responsibility. Due to the prestige of the department, and the cutting edge nature of the
work, the unit has drawn many talented analysts who would otherwise likely have ended
up in the federal intelligence community.

The Bureau also includes “Counterterrorism Inspectors,” more than a dozen
“high-ranking” field officers who report back to a Chief in the Bureau, these officers
oversee Atlas deployments and play a coordinating role across the department. Atlas is
probably the most high profile and visible aspect of the Counterterrorism Bureau’s new
approach. It is the department’s sweeping new counterterrorism plan, characterized by
the massive deployments of heavily-armed, paramilitary-style units at potential targets around the city.

Designed to disrupt terrorist surveillance, planning and potentially even terrorist operations; these surges have been somewhat controversial. Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) surges and “Hercules Team” operations both feature high profile appearances of large numbers of heavily armed paramilitary officers and vehicles inundating potential terrorist targets and critical infrastructure sites. Department administrators stress that these movements are “intelligence driven”; and there are indeed some anecdotal indications that they have been effective. The most widely cited of these “successes” is the case of an Al Qaeda operative who was being monitored by authorities told a handler in Pakistan that a planned attack on the Brooklyn Bridge was not going to be possible because “the weather is too hot.” Many cite this as a case in which a potential attack was called off when the operative was deterred by the heavy paramilitary swarms he had seen when conducting pre-operational surveillance of the bridge.173

The Emergency Service Unit (ESU)

The Emergency Service Unit is the section of NYPD that responds to catastrophic events of all stripes, be they “deliberate disasters” (historical NYPD speak for terrorism events), criminal undertakings (like hostage situations), or accidents (like building collapses). In the post-9/11 era, the ESU is perhaps best known in the context of being NYPD’s CBRN-response unit. This WMD response capability is unrivaled in any police department in the United States. The ESU is an elite unit composed of some of the NYPD’s most impressive and effective police officers.
The ESU grew out of a unit created in 1925 designed to engage in Urban Search and Rescue, which counted amongst its ranks officers with skills in carpentry, welding, and rigging, as well as electricians. They traveled in fire trucks modified for NYPD’s Urban Response mission. This unit later also featured one of the nation’s first tactical response teams (often called SWAT Teams for Special Weapons and Tactics). This tactical team was heavily armed and earned the nickname “The Machine Gun Squad.” There were even rumors that this unit engaged in some “high policing” in World War II, stationing snipers on NYC area waterways and bridges to patrol for German and Italian miniature submersibles.

The ESU has changed a bit since 2001, although it’s CBRNE and Urban Search and Rescue response capabilities predate the attacks of that year. However there has been a further increase in the resources and training of the ESU since then, including a serious refocusing on the Radiological/Nuclear response capabilities. ESU has always served a hazardous material response function, but much of that was focused on accidental or industrial threats. In the wake of some key events (the 1995 Tokyo Sarin attack, September 11th, and the Anthrax attack) the focus on the threat of WMD terrorism has been increased greatly.

**The Intelligence Division**

The Intelligence Division is not a new organization like the Counterterrorism Bureau, however its structure and role have changed in major ways since 2001. The major shift is its move away from focusing on diplomatic protection and criminal intelligence and toward counterterrorism intelligence. Most striking perhaps is the Division’s increasingly international character. More so than perhaps any other
municipal police intelligence unit in the world (excepting perhaps London’s former Special Branch SO12, now part of the Counter Terrorism Command SO15) the New York City Police Department Intelligence Division takes a truly global view of the threats facing their city.

New York City, and particularly Commissioner Kelly, have overseen the fundamental change of the Intelligence Division from a small boutique operation that had a very narrow role into an expansive global intelligence operation unrivaled at the municipal level almost anywhere in the world. By bringing in several high profile security experts with experience and expertise in the national and international intelligence and counterterrorism communities, by channeling existing resources that had not previously been utilized, and by expanding overseas, the Department created an intelligence unit that rivals the security services of many small countries in scope if not necessarily in scale.

The reinvention of the Intelligence Division began at the leadership level with Ray Kelly’s recruitment of David Cohen as Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence. Cohen, a veteran intelligence official, has held many of the top posts at the Central Intelligence Agency; including Deputy Director for Intelligence (head of the Agency analytical division) and Deputy Director for Operations (head of the clandestine service and covert operations). While this hire was indeed a coup and defining maneuver for the Intelligence Division, the hiring of the hyper-qualified has not occurred only at the top. The Division has also hired a cadre of “young” and devoted security and terrorism analysts whose academic pedigrees Kelly has touted as including places like Harvard Law School, the Kennedy School of Government, the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at
Tufts and Columbia’s International Studies programs. This analytic unit contains “about a dozen” civilian analysts focused on terrorism issues, who work with and support investigators and detectives in the Intelligence Division.

Deputy Commissioner Falkenrath has said that under Cohen, “By combining select elements of CIA tradecraft with tried-and-true law enforcement techniques…the intelligence program has produced remarkable results.” One commonly cited instance of this is the Intelligence Division’s use of an undercover agent as well as an informant cultivated within the community that ultimately led to the foiling of a plot to bomb the Herald Square Subway Station in Manhattan.

Another factor in the Intelligence Division’s ability to analyze intelligence and take an international perspective is its exploitation of pre-existing, though previously un-leveraged, capability: critical language skills. Due to New York City’s amazing diversity, the Department has long been a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic organization. After 2001, many officers who had been serving in various roles across the department and had skills in national security relevant foreign languages (often they were native speakers who had emigrated to New York) were subsequently drafted into the Intelligence Division to help with counterterrorism analysis. The NYPD has 275 certified interpreters, who can work in 45 different languages. These languages are a clear necessity in order to police a city as diverse as New York City.

This unique resource is a result of the department’s long time embrace of New York’s amazingly diverse immigrant community. “Police work had always been an entry level job for immigrants. The badge, the uniform, the authority carried a sense of
belonging, as well as prestige, in a new country. The Irish, the Germans, the Italians had all joined the ranks in their first generation.”

These interpreters, according to Ray Kelly, include more sworn Arabic linguists than any other law enforcement agency in the United States. The Department also has numerous officers fluent in other critical languages including Pashto, Urdu and Farsi. The Department has loaned these linguists out to federal agencies who lack these necessary language capabilities. Some of these linguists and interpreters search jihadist and extremist websites and chatrooms, often with a level of success their federal counterparts are impressed by; for example the Central Intelligence Agency sent representatives to an NYPD facility in order to ascertain how an NYPD analyst had found intelligence online that the Agency had not seen before. This use of the NYPD’s cultural diversity as an asset to help protect New Yorkers is a direct parallel to the “Italian Squad” in the previous era.

The most innovative of the NYPD’s recent counterterrorism efforts, its placement of liaison officers overseas, actually harkens back to its early experiences with officers like Joe Petrosino. It is however different in some fundamental ways. The Department has, with Commissioner Kelly’s initiative, begun “permanently” stationing officers abroad in order to liaise with foreign police, security and intelligence services. The purpose of this is several fold, however several commentators agree that the main purpose is to supplement (or arguably to circumvent) what is seen as the slow and constrained “national security” bureaucracy. The obvious target of much of this frustration is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the official law enforcement body tasked with domestic counterterrorism. Initially after September 11th, relations between
the FBI and the NYPD were strained, with New York feeling that they had not been given access and information in a timely manner or on equal terms. Thus there was a feeling that they could no longer rely on the FBI.

This feeling was perhaps most clearly felt after the October of 2001 incident (just one month after a catastrophic attack) in which the Central Intelligence Agency received intelligence that there might be a nuclear device in New York City, a threat that was shared with the White House, but not with then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.\textsuperscript{185} It was in this context then, that the New York Police Department undertook what would become one of the most ambitious plans in the history of municipal “high” policing.

The New York Police Department’s Internationalization for Counterterrorism

The Internationalization of the NYPD’s intelligence efforts, and to a lesser extent their investigative, capabilities has occurred in two arenas. The first is that officers have traveled extensively abroad on short-term discrete assignments including information gathering, actual investigations, intelligence exchanges and occasionally participating in interrogations overseas. This is not entirely unique to the New York Police Department, however the scale (in terms of the number of such trips), the scope of the countries visited (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.) and the level of access they’ve been granted (i.e. to detainees at Guantanamo Bay) are certainly unique to NYPD. Some of these officers have gone on intelligence gathering trips in the wake of attacks in Madrid, Beslan, Mumbai, Bali and other cities that have suffered from terrorism. Officers working as part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force have also been directly involved in terrorism investigations all over the world. The Department has also had several officers who have been involved in the interrogations of terrorist suspects in
South Asia, the Middle East and Guantanamo Bay. In fact, in recognition of this new international orientation, Commissioner Kelly has described the department as “a Council on Foreign Relations with guns.”186

Figure 2– NYPD Officers Stationed Abroad for Various Duties187

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo Bay, Cuba</td>
<td>Interrogations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Interrogations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>JTTF Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali, Indonesia</td>
<td>JTTF Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>JTTF Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>JTTF Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>JTTF Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>“Investigations” or “Interrogations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>“Investigations” or “Interrogations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>“Investigations” or “Interrogations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai, India</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(July 2006, December 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London, London</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(July 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beslan, Russia</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(September 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(March 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(February 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manila, Philippines</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(February 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(November 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12 + Suicide Bombings)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second, and most unique, facet of the department’s is the stationing of liaison officers around the globe on a semi-permanent basis. These officers work on the department to liaise with local police and security services, share intelligence, conduct
briefings and trainings and mainly to, in Ray Kelly’s words, “ask the New York question” – to see how their knowledge and experiences might affect New York City. These liaisons, dispatched over initial objections from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are unique in the history of American law enforcement. Officers working on specific cases or investigations (like Joe Petrosino), or dispatched to a nearby regional city facing similar threats (as has occurred sometimes in relation to large drug investigations), are not uncommon historically; but nothing like the global scope that New York has embraced has been done before by municipal law enforcement. From France to Singapore to Abu Dhabi, officers from the Department’s Intelligence Division are serving as local (and often regional) liaisons between the City and a variety of security and police services of numerous varieties. These liaison activities include expected functions such as information exchange and intelligence sharing, but have also included the liaisons conducting training for police and security forces in host countries. Interactions are common with other municipal agencies, national level agencies, and even international policing agencies (NYPD is represented at INTERPOL headquarters in Lyons, France).

NYPD Liaison
This liaison program is unique in a host of ways. One key way in which the program differs from the only comparable undertaking (the International Liaison Service of London’s Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command) is in terms of how it is funded. While the liaisons from London are paid for by the national government (the Home Office), the expenses of the NYPD’s intelligence liaison officers’ are financed by the private not-for-profit Police Foundation of New York. This novel approach to funding an innovative international police program is not terribly surprising in light of the well publicized criticisms that New York City has expressed regarding what it sees as insufficient and poorly targeted federal Homeland Security funding to fulfill its needs.

Aside from how the liaison program is funded, there is another part of this initiative that has been well documented in the press: the political and turf struggles between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NYPD over whether New York should be conducting this kind of international work. Although relations that were initially rocky following NYPD’s expanded operations have improved in recent years. Commissioner Kelly’s attitude has been that New York “can’t afford to wait months, or even years, to get information…” In fact, following the March 11th, 2004 bombing in Madrid, Spain; the NYPD sent an intelligence liaison team to Spain without first consulting with the FBI. The FBI maintains its own international liaisons, commonly called “Legats” (for Legal Attaches). A FBI official described the NYPD response to the Madrid attack as a serious “stumble” in an otherwise relatively positive relationship. These concerns over turf and who has the right to be doing this work, particularly in light

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4 For more details about the London Metropolitan Police Service’s International Liaison Service, see Nussbaum 2007.
of September 11th, have been problematic. The FBI and federal law enforcement more generally, have not been in a political position to deny the NYPD the right to send such officers; and thus there is a growing acceptance of the practice. There has been, at least anecdotally, an improvement in the relationship between the NYPD and the FBI since 2002-3.

“High Policing” in New York City: The History and the Future

High policing clearly has a long history in the New York Police department. It has however changed drastically since September 11th 2001. Interestingly the recent post-2001 period of high policing activity is much more similar to the activities NYPD undertook in the first half of the twentieth century, rather than those that characterized the fifty years in between. Similarities in the activities that threatened New York City, the steps taken to mitigate those threats, and the dynamics that underlie these processes are often quite similar across time. There are however some major differences, the most obvious being the place of the NYPD in the constellation of US law enforcement agencies.

The early period of high policing by the NYPD (roughly from the turn of the century through the end of World War II) was characterized by the many threats that the United States (and New York City more particularly) faced. This included transnational threats, like anarchist terrorism, as well as unconventional state threats, like German saboteurs. NYPD reacted by engaging in high policing to protect the city, and because there was no national level law enforcement (or weak nascent agencies) capable of fulfilling such a role. This vacuum of law enforcement at the national level is very
similar to the political environment in which the London Metropolitan Police Service came to engage in high policing, almost as a default.

The next period was characterized by two factors that conspired to minimize the NYPD’s role in high policing. At the same time that the major threat to US interests became a more “traditional” state adversary (the Soviet Union in the Cold War), national level law enforcement expanded both its capabilities and size. Thus high policing became predominantly the realm of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Pre-World War II the FBI was a small and not yet fully developed organization, and other federal agencies like the Secret Service were too small and under-resourced to be effective “national” policing agencies. In this period the NYPD’s involvement in High Policing became largely a support role to these national agencies, and confined largely to visits by foreign dignitaries and support to a few national security investigations.

In the post 2001 era the New York Police Department has again become a major force in high policing developing not just a regional or even national footprint, but rather internationalizing even more so than they had at the height of the previous historical episodes in which the policed political and security issues.

There are some clear commonalities that appear in both the early episodes of NYPD’s high policing, and the more recent post-2001 efforts. The use of international liaisons, the leveraging of departmental diversity, and the importance of individual leadership are all clear threads that connect the two experiences.

Figure 4 - Similarities in High Policing by NYPD (1900-1945 and 2001-Present)
In both time periods, the feeling that the national level law enforcement could not protect New York City (early on because of lack of capacity, and in 2001 because of a perceived lack of willingness to treat the NYPD as an equal partner) lead the city to take its security on as its own responsibility. The sending or stationing of officers overseas, with or without federal approval, was also characteristic of both periods, as NYPD officers were dispatched abroad as both emissaries of the city, and its protective vanguard in distant lands.

In both the early twentieth century and early twenty-first century periods the NYPD drew on the incredible diversity of New York City (and thus its police department) to gain deep insights to the threats facing the people of New York. Whether it was Italian officers infiltrating anarchist discussion circles in the 1920s, or Egyptian...
and Bangladeshi immigrant officers infiltrating Jihadist chat-rooms in 2004, the idea of deriving strength from a diverse workforce is nowhere better encapsulated than in the NYPD.

Finally in both the early NYPD and in more recent experiences, the role of individuals and individual leadership has proven paramount in shaping the high policing function. It is likely that this is true of policing bureaucracies generally (the literature of police leadership debates this point) however in the historical cases of NYPD’s high policing, this is a particularly salient issue. In the first episode high-level officials like Deputy Commissioner (and later Commissioner) Arthur Woods’s interaction with continental police agencies in Europe did much to shape the nascent Detective Bureau and to give it an international flavor. Special Deputy Commissioner Biddle, in conjunction with Woods and at the urging of Mayor John Purloin Mitchel, did much to involve NYPD in the pre-war and wartime intelligence activities of the allies. Lower level officers like Joe Petrosino also did much to change not just the face of the department, but to change its trajectory.

Today this dynamic takes its clearest form in the cases of Commissioner Ray Kelly who remade the department in the image of a local police force that would have global reach. Kelly was committed to pursuing this model to protect New Yorkers, and Mayor Michael Bloomberg supported him; without that support, changes like those undertaken by Kelly would not have stood a chance of being successful. A step down the organizational hierarchy, the same individual-driven change is apparent in Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence David Cohen, who brought CIA style organization and tradecraft to a municipal police department. This reliance on person (or persona) driven
change is not limited to these highest levels though. Interviews with NYPD officers and counterterrorism officials also indicate that personal initiative and leadership by some lower level officials also shapes outcomes in today’s NYPD as much as bureaucratic imperatives do.195

In the end, the story of the NYPD’s involvement in high policing offers several interesting temporal episodes that enable comparative study. These episodes are interesting in as far as they share many similar elements, some that differ, and wildly divergent outcomes. The policing of political and national security crime is newly relevant because of changes in the landscape of threats facing the United States in the post-Cold War world, and it makes sense that one of the key places to look for insights into this change is in one of the most respected law enforcement agencies and “brands” in the world: The New York Police Department.
CHAPTER 4: Policing Terrorism in London

“Keep Calm, and Carry On”¹⁹⁶

– WWII era Motivational Poster in the United Kingdom
The London Metropolitan Police Service

The London Metropolitan Police Service (often known as Scotland Yard after the building they were once headquartered in) is one of the best-known and most prestigious police organizations in the world. Responsible for policing “greater London,” the service was founded in 1829 with about 1,000 officers responsible for policing a population of two million. The MPS has subsequently grown to a force of over 31,000 officers, with 15,000+ supporting staff, and is now responsible for policing over seven million people. Beneath the Commissioner (currently Sir Ian Blair), there are ten large divisions, which are subsequently divided into dozens of smaller organizations.

The MPS came into being in 1829 with the passage of the Police Act proposed by Robert Peel. It was with this act that the modern policing of London began. However, it was preceded by several previous variations. It followed about 30 years of a slightly less formalized policing arrangement in which Justices of the Peace (JP), a title originally stemming from an act passed in 1361, policed the city under the leadership of Patrick Colquhoun. Before the establishment of this JP schema in 1800, policing was accomplished largely by constables and JPs, but the responsibility for order and crime control rested firmly with the collective in each individual township. This “old policing” approach existed for approximately 600 years until the 19th century reforms which led to the creation of the Metropolitan Police Service.

The City of London Police

There is also a unique police force, the City of London Police, tasked with protecting the area of central London called “the Square Mile.” The Square Mile is London’s financial district, similar to the Wall Street area of Lower Manhattan.
City of London has fewer than 9,000 residents, however that number grows to more than 350,000 everyday as the commuters who work in the financial industry enter the city.\textsuperscript{197}

The City of London Police also plays a role in counterterrorism, however their activities tend to be on the anti-terrorism side (mitigation and general prevention) rather than the proactive intelligence-gathering side of counterterrorism. They work with businesses in the Square Mile to share information, help with physical security anti-terrorism measures, work to ensure preparedness, and exercising terrorism responses.

Formally established in 1839, but existing in various forms since Roman times, the City of London Police initially had about 500 officers. This number peaked at approximately 1200 officers in 1910.\textsuperscript{198} There are about 1200 employees at the City of London Police today, however about 400 are civilian employees.\textsuperscript{199} This police force is unique in the world of policing major urban centers, because of its small size and small remit.

Since the City of London Police doesn’t do the same kinds of proactive terrorism intelligence gathering investigations as the Metropolitan Police Service, and since they are responsible for a tiny sliver of the city (albeit an important one), they do not play the same role that the Metropolitan Police do in the counterterrorism efforts of the City. That said, they do fulfill some key roles, and have even begun some level of internationalization that will be discussed later in the context of London’s counterterrorism efforts.

\textbf{London’s Experience with International Terrorism}

Few Western cities have a longer or more varied history of political violence than London. Dating back to the mid-to-late 19\textsuperscript{th} century London faced a near constant threat
of terrorist attack from Irish Republican organizations that embraced militancy as a tactic to achieve independence. Even with the independence of most of Ireland in the 1920s, following the partition of the northern six counties as British controlled Northern Ireland; Republican violence did not abate. In fact, beginning in the 1960s a new period of increased violence labeled “the Troubles” began. Eventually the Troubles would kill around three thousand people in Northern Ireland, England, and in terrorist attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army around continental Europe.

Particularly after a series of massive car bombings in the 1980s and early 1990s, and numerous attacks on British targets in Europe, the IRA led to major changes in the way in which London Policed terror. Institutions like Special Branch’s nascent International Liaison Service, and tactics like the “Ring of Steel” (circling inner London in checkpoints, roadblocks and closed circuit television cameras), were the innovative responses to IRA terrorism. The IRA dominated the way in which London (and as such the London Metropolitan Police Service) conceptualized terrorism for most of its existence. It offered the operational and ambient risk levels that contextualized decisions about how the department addressed terrorism. Despite being “international” in the technical sense, it was still a relatively local (at best regional) threat.

In the 1980s and 1990s the United Kingdom’s relatively liberal immigration and asylum policies attracted numerous refugees of both economic and political varieties. Much of the economically induced immigration came from South Asia, an area that because of the colonial experience of the Raj was already well culturally and economically connected to the United Kingdom.
Many of the political migrants came from North African and Middle Eastern countries where they had been involved in groups opposing the autocratic regimes in their home states. Often these organizations were Islamist organizations, some of the only groups that offered meaningful alternative political spaces in places like Algeria (the FIS and subsequently GIA), Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood, Gamaa Islamiyya or Egyptian Islamic Jihad, or Syria (Muslim Brotherhood). This accepting attitude to individuals seeking asylum who had often been involved in militancy at home, combined with the UK’s refusal to extradite those who might be tortured or executed, led to some political and diplomatic problems as the United Kingdom (and particularly London) gained a reputation as a home for Islamic militancy. It got so bad that by the mid 1990s, after a campaign of bombings by Algerian militants who had received logistical support from London, French and Middle Eastern intelligence sources were sarcastically referring to London by the sobriquet “Londonistan.”

There appeared to be a somewhat uneasy truce between the militants agitating overseas from London, and security authorities. The unspoken deal was that these individuals would be allowed to go about with their activities (or at least not deported home) assuming the violence that they advocated stayed outside the United Kingdom. After September 11th, with the sea change in sentiment regarding the potential for mass casualty Islamist terrorism; the Metropolitan Police Service and the Security Service (MI5) attempted to update their capabilities for monitoring and detaining the militants within their midst. There are however those who argue that it was already too late at that point. On July 7, 2005 four suicide bombers detonated themselves on trains and a bus killing 52 commuters and injuring about 700. After the “7/7” bombings and a failed
attempt two weeks later on July 21st, there was another major shift sentiment and
approach to counterterrorism.

**Policing Terrorism in London and the United Kingdom**

The structure of “high” policing in the United Kingdom differs greatly from the
structure in the United States. There is very little federal law enforcement in the United
Kingdom\(^5\), and the policing of terrorism has long been primarily the responsibility of the
Special Branch unit at the Metropolitan Police Service and its cognate bureaus in local
police jurisdictions around the United Kingdom. Domestic surveillance and monitoring
is a dual responsibility for the Special Branch officers and the civil servants of the
Security Service (MI5), although the officers from the MPS are the only ones with arrest
powers.

What used to be the Special Branch (SO12) of the London Metropolitan Police
Service, has recently been absorbed into the new Counterterrorism Command (CTC or
SO15). The CT Command is an amalgamation of the Special Branch, the Anti-Terrorism
Branch (SO13- which is responsible for terror attack response and investigation), and
several other smaller units and functions associated with terrorism and terror
investigations. There are, beyond these major players, a series of arrangements and
organizations of varying levels of formality that further coordinate the policing of
terrorism.\(^{201}\)

Perhaps the most important formal arrangement is the subset of the Association of
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) that has as its remit to deal with terrorism. The
Association of Chief Police Officers committee on Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO-

\(^5\) There are exceptions to this in functional areas like customs and immigration control, and the newly
formed Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA)
TAM) is the key body that addresses counter-terrorism policing strategy, leveraging as it does the knowledge of high ranking officers from the 44 regional police forces across Britain, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This group, in conjunction with the Home Office and several national coordinators located within the Metropolitan Police (focused of the coordination of Special Branches and Terrorism Investigations) are the key policy drivers in terms of the policing of terrorism.

On the operational side, a similar patchwork of individuals, agencies and committees are involved in any given terrorism investigation. The Chief Constable, incident or investigation commander, and Special Branch unit in the geographical region in which the investigation is occurring coordinate with several national level bodies and individuals including national security coordinating COBRA group (for Cabinet Officer Briefing Room A). It is customary, although not officially required that the regional commander invite the National Coordinator of Terrorism Investigations, who is currently the head of the Metropolitan Police Counterterrorism Command (SO15), to take part in the investigation.

These investigations are also supported by a series of Regional Intelligence Cells (RICs) that are spread around the country. While each local police force has its own Special Branch, they vary greatly in their resourcing and capacity to conduct effective investigations and surveillance. The Regional Intelligence Cells are an attempt to leverage national resources (from the Home Office) in coordination with the local police Special Branches to create regionalized surveillance and investigation capabilities that are beyond the scope of those that could be expected from some of the smaller or more rural police forces in the United Kingdom. This program, begun in 2004, provides RICs that
on average support 6-8 local or regional police forces. There was some resistance to this increased coordination amongst local Special Branches from MI5, which had been functioning as a coordinating agent between local Special Branches.

All of these arrangements indicate that increasingly there is diffusion out of London in terms of the capability to investigate terrorism and terrorists. However this diffusion is fairly recent, and has gathered a bit more momentum since the 7/7 attacks of 2005. While the United Kingdom has no national law enforcement in the sense of having a Federal Bureau of Investigation-like agency, the previous model of ad hoc cooperation with an intellectual and resource center of gravity in London is increasingly seen as unsustainable. In the end, the Counterterrorism Command at Scotland Yard is, while not a national investigatory unit a national resource that is often times called upon to offer intelligence, investigatory and analytic support to investigations around the country.

“The Special Branch... is primarily an intelligence department. Its business is to keep a watch on any body of people, of whatever political complexion, whose activities seem likely to result sooner or later in open acts of sedition or disorder.”

- Sir H. Scott in Scotland Yard (1957)

**The Special Branch: 1880-1945**

The “Special Branch” is the section of the Metropolitan Police Service tasked with policing and surveilling political crime, terrorism and subversion. It is the “high” policing branch of the London Metropolitan Police, particularly the side of high policing that involves intelligence gathering and proactive counterterrorism. Initially it grew out of the British experience with Irish republican terrorism; however it has subsequently dealt with anarchists, ethno-nationalists, radical environmentalists, jihadists, and myriad other threats to public safety and order. Formed in the 1880s, the Special Branch (SO12)
has long been situated within the Specialist Operations section of the MPS which also housed the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13 - housing the bomb squad and terror investigation capability), the Diplomatic Protection unit, and similarly unique other functions. Recently, as part of a post July 2005 attack reorganization, SO12 and SO13 were combined with several other small units to create the new SO15 Counter Terrorism Command (CTC). Special Branch has a long and storied history, and has always been the front line of defending one of the most targeted cities in the history of terrorism.

The Special Irish Branch was formed in 1883 in response to a campaign of Irish republican (or “Fenian”) bombing that began in March of that year, continuing through early 1885. The political surveillance function did pre-exist the Special Branch’s official formation, however it was more of an ad hoc function run largely on two parallel tracks, from within the Metropolitan Police Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and out of the Home Office. Special Branch grew out of this function within the CID, and was initially situated within this division. Following a slow down in Irish republican attacks, it quickly became clear that other threats also required Special Branch’s focus and surveillance.

Anarchists, many of whom had taken refuge in London from their home countries on the continent, were operating widely in the city during this time period. Anarchist luminaries like Peter Kropotkin and Johann Most were amongst the many that operated in London during this period. A series of dynamite attacks, along with the international wave of anarchists assassinating heads of state, made this a pressing problem around the turn of the century. That having been established, Special Branch was still quite a small organization at this point. “Fifteen to twenty officers” constituted the main force of the
Special Branch at that point, with much of the remaining high policing left to the Criminal Investigative Divisions (CIDs) of local forces that had preceded the Branch.210 Within a decade, the Special Branch had grown to house about 50 full time officers, and its activities spanned numerous political areas including anarchism, the suffrage movement, Indian activists, as well as the Irish republicans that lead to its birth.

By the time World War I began, there were 100 members of Special Branch, within the 700 members of the broader Criminal Investigative Division. From the very beginning of the War, Special Branch coordinated and worked closely with the newly formed Security Service (MI5) on issues related to espionage and “aiding the enemy.” During this period, surveillance expanded beyond those involved in violence, to include many groups that were merely politically active in liberal causes like labor unions and pacifism. Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, socialist movements around Europe (and in London) became more active and hopeful. Many of the groups associated with Soviet Bolshevism were also intertwined with strikes and unions in London, and thus the Special Branch devoted time and resources to monitoring these groups as well.

It was in this period that the struggle between MI5 and the Special Branch related to their overlapping remits came to a boil. Ultimately, its increased level of secrecy and some bureaucratic and political support led to MI5 expanding its role beyond counterintelligence to include counter-subversion more generally. Thus MI5 took on a broader role in monitoring political dissent that was more than traditional state sponsored cloak-and-dagger spying.

The 1920s and 1930s brought an increase in Irish Republican activity, particularly following seminal events like the Easter Rising (1919) and the independence of the 26
counties of Ireland (1922). The Branch now served less of a role in counter-espionage, acting as the operational arm of MI5 (i.e. conducting arrests of suspects surveilled by the Security Service). The Branch, in its recent more focused role contracted; shrinking from a peak of 150 officers (in 1920) down to about 120 for the ensuing two decades.²¹¹ World War II did not result in a major expansion, as espionage was now the responsibility of MI5. However IRA bombing campaigns in the same period led to some legislative changes that increased their powers.

**The Cold War Special Branch**

The Cold War era Special Branch did not experience fundamental changes in operations or functions the way the New York Police Department did. It did not experience the same changing political context in which national level law enforcement emerged as the arbiter of high policing. On the other hand, it is inaccurate to suggest that the Cold War did not lead to any changes in the roles and activities of the Branch.

After World War II, several communist and leftist groups lodged complaints with the new Labor government about the Special Branch placing infiltrators and agents within their organizations. The Home Secretary in the new government, finding such tactics “un-British” ordered an end to the program. This almost eliminated the Branch’s intelligence gathering capabilities in such organizations, leading to a massive intelligence failure in 1947. When thousands of “squatters” from East London occupied empty houses and apartments in the center of London, the Home Office realized it had eliminated an important capability to be aware of such movements, and removed the ban on Special Branch infiltration of leftist groups.
The Cold War, and the connected concerns about Soviet and Communist espionage, led to closer interaction and cooperation between the Special Branch and MI5. One example of this was that Special Branch served to collate the lists of suspected Communist Party members and registered aliens compiled by the chief constables of all the police forces across the United Kingdom, and share this information with MI5. This period also increased surveillance of a number of other political movements including the anti-Nuclear movement and anti-Apartheid movements.

A series of minor crises and a period of political introspection led to reorganization of the Special Branch in the mid 1960s. The 1963 scandal involving the leaking of classified information in a pamphlet entitled “Spies for Peace” led the Special Branch and the intelligence services on a major search for leakers, none of which was ultimately successful. Along with the Radcliffe Inquiry, a government investigation of the effectiveness of security services, this lead Special Branch to reinvestigate its priorities and its internal organization. The resulting changes were amongst the most profound since the Branch’s founding.

The largest change was to establish Special Branches across the country, rather than having the capability only in the Metropolitan Police. Interestingly, each of these Special Branches, while technically reporting to the Chief Constable of their regional police force, reported informally to the Special Branch in London. Therefore “the Branch at the Yard and the Home Office could request information of the regional squads without going through the usual channels” albeit informally. This nationwide network of local Special Branches can reasonably seen as the precursor of some of the newer counterterrorism efforts of the Counterterrorism Command, like Regional Intelligence
Cells. This change also raised the number of officers involved in Special Branch duties from about 200-250 to over 400 across the country. Ultimately, by the mid 1970s Special Branch had grown to 550 officers, a direct reaction to the Irish “Troubles” beginning in 1969.213

Special Branch and the Ticking Time-Bomb of Londonistan

Beginning in the 1980s, and reaching critical mass in the 1990s, the British Government’s immigration and human rights policies began to be abused by militants around the world who were seeking to escape persecution or arrest in their homelands. Militants from the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere took refuge in the United Kingdom, and mostly in London. The city’s long reputation as a place where political dissidents could find freedom dated at least back to the Anarchist and Bolshevik periods, and the British authorities were understandably proud of their reputation for liberalism. However the influx of militants that began in the 1980s was longer and broader than previous periods of similar immigration. It occurred largely in the wake of the end of the Afghan Jihad and the collapse of Islamist revolutionary movements in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere; all of which created a large transnational class of professional jihadist revolutionaries.6

The arrival of these activists in London was initially seen as a minor problem; however Special Branch and MI5 both paid some attention to it. Unfortunately at this same time, a flare up in Irish Republican violence dominated much of the time and effort of Special Branch, leaving militant Islam under-examined. As London-based militants began to play a larger role in terrorism in France, North Africa and the Middle East, the

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6 For a clear examination of this milieu, see Brynjar Lia’s biography of Abu Musab Al Suri “Architect of Global Jihad” Al Suri, Abu Qatada, and others were amongst the vanguard of this activist class in London.
term Londonistan emerged as a sobriquet for London. The term conflated London with Afghanistan, which during the Afghan Jihad had been the place where Islamist revolutionaries from around the world massed to fight the Soviets and plot attacks on their home governments. Continental European Security Services and those in the Arab world referred to Londonistan as they became more frustrated with British indifference to its citizens and immigrants exporting Jihad to their homelands.

Special Branch and the Security Service routinely interviewed Islamist militants; particularly those accused of crimes elsewhere, but almost never worked with immigration authorities to extradite them. This resulted from two different impulses, one was to preserve London’s role as a home for political dissent, but also there was a very real sense that on human rights grounds such extraditions were not possible. Many of the governments to which the United Kingdom could have extradited these militants were notorious for the use of torture and the death penalty, activities that offended British sensibilities.

A final, and not often discussed component of British reluctance to see such militants as a problem was a sense that there was an implicit “contract” between militants and the security services that Islamic terrorists would use London as a based, and in return agree not to target the UK for attack. Such agreements have precedent in the interpretation of Islamic law offered by jihadist clerics, and such have a theoretical underpinning that supports their existence. There are debates about whether such agreements were ever made explicit; however there is much evidence that the 2005 London attacks shocked many in the police and intelligence communities, who had
seriously believed that such implicit agreements would protect Britain from the transnational jihad.

7/7, Reorganization, and the Counter Terrorism Command

2006 saw a massive reorganization within the Specialist Operations section of the Metropolitan Police Service, with the Anti-terrorism branch (Specialist Operations 13 or SO13) and Special Branch (SO12) being agglomerated with several key national units in a broad Counter-Terrorism Command. The Metropolitan Police describes its new organization as “a new bespoke, multi-faceted, single counter-terrorism command - not restricted in design or look by existing structures, with a better capability and capacity to meet ongoing and future threats.”

The new entity, the Counterterrorism Command (SO15), contains units that were formerly responsible for terror investigations and forensics (SO13), those responsible for counterterrorism intelligence gathering (SO12), tracking suspect financial transactions (the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit or NTFIU) and the National Bomb Data Centre amongst others. This new command includes “intelligence analysis and development, with investigations and operational support.”

The new Command has an interesting duality of roles that combines national level tasks with the traditional London focused security concerns. This combination can get murky at times, as debate sometimes breaks out in the press or even within the leadership over the correct balance between focusing on London (their primary charge) and some national level tasks (which they’ve inherited in many ways because the United Kingdom lacks a national law enforcement agency on the model of the Federal Bureau of Investigation). There is a new national level law enforcement organization, the Serious
and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), that will in some ways take over certain national
law enforcement tasks; however because it is a relatively new amalgamation of several
agencies it is not yet in a position to take on all national responsibilities, nor was it
designed to.\textsuperscript{217}

The distinction between national and local roles in the new Counter Terrorism
Command is spelled out fairly well in the Metropolitan Police’s own agency literature.\textsuperscript{218}

The Command’s roles are described as:

- To bring to justice those engaged in terrorist, domestic extremist and related
  offences
- To provide a proactive and reactive response to terrorist, domestic extremist and
  related offences, including the prevention and disruption of terrorist activity
- \textit{Support the National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations outside London}
- To gather and exploit intelligence on terrorism and extremism in London
- To assess, analyse and develop intelligence to drive operational activity
- To engage in partnership with London’s communities in order to understand their
  concerns and to provide reassurance and support where needed
- To provide specialist security advice and services internally and externally
- To provide an explosive ordnance disposal and CBRN capability in London
- \textit{To assist the British Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service in
  fulfilling their statutory roles}
- \textit{To be the police single point of contact for international partners in counter-
  terrorism matters}
- \textit{Assisting in the protection of British interests overseas and the investigation of
  attacks against those interests}

**** Those roles in bold italics are arguably “national” level roles

\textbf{Scotland Yard’s Internationalization of Counterterrorism}

The London Metropolitan Police Service has been policing terrorism for well over
a century, and certainly policing against modern international terrorism since it’s
emergence in the 1970s. The Irish Republican Army had wide and deep ties to various
terrorist organizations and revolutionary movements across Europe, the Middle East, and
even further a field. However the major internal piece (as opposed to membership or
affiliation with external organizations like Interpol or Europol) of their international counterterrorism strategy, the International Liaison Service within Special Branch, was a relatively limited endeavor in the Pre-September 11th era.

While international liaison work was nothing new to the MPS Special Branch, the formation of a standing and permanent liaison service was quite novel. The International Liaison Service was formalized under the leadership of Special Branch head Brian Hayes. Hayes’ new organization featured three officers who spoke nine languages when it began. The International Liaison Service found its home naturally within the Special Branch, largely for reasons of human resources. Due to the organizations involvement in “high policing” and the monitoring of foreign subversives, it was a natural repository within the Metropolitan Police Service for those officers with foreign language skills.

The International Liaison Service within Special Branch got its start after a series of attacks on British Soldiers and targets in continental Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Not surprisingly Special Branch sent it’s liaisons to places where there were deemed to be threats to British interests, mainly Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; with the latter three referred to in the aggregate as the BeNeLux countries. In Germany British Military installations had been targeted, and in the BeNeLux countries the IRA had cells that had targeted British Soldiers, and eventually mistakenly shot two Australian nationals mistaking them for soldiers from the United Kingdom. So for most of the International Liaison Service’s life it was a relatively small organization with three officers placed abroad; one in France, one in Germany and one assigned to the BeNeLux countries. It remained this way throughout the 1990s, and
at one point late in that decade it was seriously discussed disbanding the International Liaison Service.

London Pre 2000

London 2001-2002
London 2003-2004

London 2004-2005
London 2007

Since September 11th there has been a massive refocusing on terrorism within the Metropolitan Police Service, moving the overall focus away from Irish Republican threats (which have in most ways been mollified by the peace process). The new twin focuses of Special Branch, and in it’s newer incarnation the Counterterrorism Command, have been the existing store of militants who have taken asylum and refuge in the United Kingdom, and the relatively newer threat of homegrown extremism of the type epitomized by the 7/7 bombers. In light of this changing threat, the International Liaison Service too has changed drastically. While combating the Irish Republican Army, sending liaisons to nearby continental Europe was sufficient to ensure a proper
flow of intelligence. However in working against the networked world of Islamist terrorism with training camps in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mindanao, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere; the International Liaison Service has had to live up to it’s name. No longer a regional liaison service, the ILS has indeed stationed officers around the world in an expansion that is actually even wider than that of the NYPD. With 17 officers stationed in 16 countries, the International Liaison Service truly spans the globe. The Officers are assigned responsibility for countries regionally, so for example the officer stationed in Driebergen, Netherlands is in fact responsible for the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. In this manner the officers of the International Liaison Service are tasked with keeping the Counterterrorism Command in contact with a remarkable 60 countries as well as several international organizations.

The Internationalization of the City of London Police?

There is at least some reason to believe that the internationalization of municipal policing has moved even beyond the larger Metropolitan Police Force, and down to the much smaller (and more narrowly focused) City of London Police. The City of London Police clearly takes terrorism very seriously, having one of its five directorates devoted to terrorism and serious crime. However because much of their counterterrorism effort is devoted to a small area, and largely to a specific industry, it would be possible to imagine a way in which they could avoid the same kinds of international orientation that the larger city-wide force adopted.

Many of the tactics adopted by the broader London and New York City departments are used, in smaller scales, by the City of London. Threat briefings to constituent businesses, exercises of terrorism response activities, and major public
awareness campaigns are all part of the City of London Police toolkit for countering terrorism. Examples of best practices include Project Griffin and Project ARGUS. Project Griffin was launched in 2004, and is a public-private preparedness and prevention partnership in which police, emergency services and private sector security managers coordinate resources and efforts. ARGUS is an acronym for Area Reinforcement Gained Using Scenarios and is organized by the National Counterterrorism Security Office (NaCTSO – a national level coordinating body). Its focus is on providing information and simulations of terror attacks and other disruptions to private sector partners across numerous industries, and helping them plan for response and continuity of operations. These programs however are not terribly international in nature, except to the extent that they recognize international threats, and affect international industries like banking and finance.

There is evidence though, to suggest that the new, networked international approach has touched the City Police as well. The department trumpets its information sharing initiatives “Members of the Counter Terrorism team have traveled to Israel and the USA to learn more about these new methods and to share their expertise as leaders in counter-terrorism.” In fact, they specifically point out their international networking with New York City “The Force is also able to host visitors from other agencies from across the world including New York City Police’s Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism.” While it is impossible to conclude from these connections that the City of London Police is undergoing a major shift in focus, it does show that a small and narrowly focused (both in terms of geography and mission) department can internationalize to a smaller extent, particularly when facing similar transnational threats.
CHAPTER 5: Comparing New York and London
The cases of internationalization and reorientation in New York and London share many similarities, as well as having many differences. However they both fit within the broader theoretical framework proposed to explain internationalization. (See diagram)

The geo-political, political/institutional, economic, organizational and other contexts in which these processes have been undertaken are different, however many of the outcomes are similar. Geo-politically the context that impacts these cities, and their response, is the threat level they face. Politically and institutionally, the existence or absence of parallel bureaucracies with similar roles creates different political incentives for city’s to do what these two have done. The availability of funds, and the autonomy to spend them as they see fit, create differing levels of flexibility that can underpin such expansion and innovation. Finally, the organizational aspects of these police departments, including leadership, human resources, and structure, all create situations that encourage or discourage particular kinds of organizational change.
This process, through which these various aspects impact organizational behavior and change, is one that is very unique; but has implications for many other organizations changing to catch up with globalization. Understanding these changes from an organizational perspective is pressing, because municipal police departments are actually much like many other organizations (business firms, national governments, non-governmental organizations) that have been forced to react to the decreasingly territorialized nature of globalization, and as a result have had to wade into geographical and subject areas that used to be far beyond their typical purview.

**Geopolitical Context**

The geo-political context under which these organizations reoriented their traditional policing roles has of course been very important. Both cities initially engaged in some reorientation in the early 20th century in response to early transnational threats like anarchist terrorism. These early, and somewhat parallel changes, both reflected one of the earliest truly global security threats. Enabled by changes in international travel, communication, immigration, and a revolutionary political ideology, international anarchism was responsible for the deaths of heads of state in the United States, Russia, France, Italy and elsewhere.

As the geopolitical context changed so to did the operations and orientation of these police forces, although not in exactly the same way. During the Cold War period, the New York Police Department decreased its high and international policing efforts to near nothing. There were some minor exceptions, and following the creation of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in the 1980s it ticked up slightly, but it remained outside the mainstream of anything the department was doing. The Metropolitan Police Service also
changed its approach somewhat in the Cold War years, particularly since the responsibility for much of the counter-subversion part of its previous role was adopted by MI5. While it maintained countering Irish Republican terrorism as a primarily police (rather than MI5) function until the 1990s, it largely decreased its previous counter-intelligence and other counter-subversion efforts. However with the emergence of new threats in the post-Cold War era, the discussion about the respective roles between MI5 and the MPS would need to be revisited.

Finally, in the post-2001 threat environment, the need for organizational change and adaptation seemed pressing. This suddenly acute need for police departments that were better equipped to deal with changing threats became clear in New York after September 2001. Arguably it became clearer in London at the same time; however the fundamental restructuring of the Special Operations section of the MPS would not occur until after the July 2005 transit bombings in London. Either way, the reactive nature of these organizational shifts is important. These departments were suddenly thrust into a new era, that of global networks pursuing mass casualty terrorism, without the proper organizational structures and tools to respond. To their credits, both organizations immediately realized their need to adapt.

How they assessed their shortcomings and planned for change is interesting as well. For example, the NYPD brought in the famed management consultancy McKinsey and Partners to evaluate their responses to September 11th, as well as their general emergency response and preparedness.230

**Institutional Context**
The institutional context in which these two departments pursued their new orientations, and particularly their international efforts, was vastly different. The institutional context in this sense is the environment in which the departments expanded, in terms of what agencies and institutions were in competition for the same roles and jurisdictions. While the NYPD internationalized over strident objections by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (as well as ruffling some feathers in neighboring communities and states), the Metropolitan Police has long fallen into some de facto national roles because of the lack of a unified national law enforcement structure in the United Kingdom. The London Metropolitan Police is not new to the counter-terrorism and intelligence world, although the focus may be on a new adversary; rather the department had the national remit for counterterrorism intelligence gathering until MI5 took that remit over in 1992.

Initially, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reacted quite negatively to the NYPD’s deployment of officers overseas. While that has changed over the past several years, largely as a result of a transition at the top of the FBI’s New York Field Office, the reality remains that the Department expanded with the political backing of the city’s leadership, despite serious pressure from agencies with competing responsibilities for coordinating international counterterrorism efforts. Regardless of the objections of the Bureau, the NYPD was in an interesting position of political autonomy as a result of the massive impact of the September 2001 attacks and the loss the city suffered. While there are ongoing debates about the responsibility for the intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks, New York City (and particularly Commissioner Kelly) have made a vocal case that they were failed by the national intelligence and law enforcement powers
establishment. Thus far, neither federal nor New York State political authorities have
been willing to put sufficient pressure on the department (politically or fiscally) to rein in
such overseas assignments.

Similar issues have resulted from a series of undercover operations that NYPD
has pursued in neighboring communities in New York State, and in neighboring states.
These operations, including buying fertilizer and bomb components to show the ease of
constructing vehicle bombs as well as purchasing toxic chemicals like chlorine, have led
to public flaps and jurisdictional fights. That said, New York is unapologetic about its
use of such operations outside its jurisdiction.

“We do it!” says Deputy Commissioner for Counter-terrorism Richard Falkenrath,
citing the likelihood that an attack on New York could easily be staged from upstate New
York or New Jersey. Falkenrath claims that there are simply not enough federally
mandated “tripwires” to ensure that people aren’t engaged in nefarious activity related to
the purchase of dangerous materials like ammonium nitrate and chlorine. “If the feds
won’t require due diligence, we will go out and check on it ourselves.”231 This attitude,
while indicative of NYPD’s determination to protect its citizens, can at times cause
friction with neighbors and federal agencies.

The institutional context in which Scotland Yard’s counterterrorism efforts
expanded was significantly different. Not only did the Metropolitan Police not face
challenges from national level law enforcement (although there were some problems with
MI5), they also did not face the same kinds of problems with local Special Branches with
whom they worked extensively. The occasional competition with the Security Service
changed quickly after September 11th, 2001. Following a meeting at 10 Downing street
in which the Prime Minister instructed security officials (both law enforcement and intelligence) that there “was not to be a 9/11 in the United Kingdom”\textsuperscript{232}, the services began to work together in earnest. While it was not an instant fix, CTC officials now describe the relationship as “a very healthy and constructive marriage… at all levels.”\textsuperscript{233}

In fact, there have been cases of cooperation between MI\textsubscript{5} and Special Branch (now CTC) that enabled them to construct an operational picture based on disparate information acquired from allied security, intelligence and police forces in allied European countries, where that information was not shared within the original country. The result being that the British had a better sense of threats in an allied country than the country did itself, because of failed domestic information sharing.\textsuperscript{234}

This good working relationship also stems from the fundamental difference between the FBI and MI\textsubscript{5}, the Security Service has no arrest powers, and thus has always relied on Special Branch (and now the CTC) to function as its executive arm. For example “\textsuperscript{5 (MI\textsubscript{5}) applies for a phone intercept warrant, and the Met does it.”\textsuperscript{235} In that sense, the institutional context is different not just in terms of attitudes, but is structurally different in terms of the organizational roles and expectations between agencies.

The institutional context was not only different, and less adversarial, with national competitors. Regional and neighboring police forces also have had a somewhat less tendentious interaction with the Metropolitan Police on counter-terrorism issues. This has been in part at least because the Met Special Branch has often provided supplementary investigative and analytic capacity to the smaller Special Branches located outside of London. This dynamic has recently become less salient, as the Regional Intelligence Cell model is beginning to provide for that support, however the historical
circumstances led to somewhat less tension in relations between the Met Special Branch and its counterparts in other Police forces.

**Economic Context**

The Economic context of internationalization is closely related to the geo-political and Political/Institutional contexts as well. In fact, in some ways it is an extension of those two. The funding of the departments differs greatly, however they both operate with a patchwork of municipal funds, as well as a series of federal funds provided for specific national security taskings and functions. Often these funds come with substantial strings attached, including requirements for spending, reporting, and collaboration. (see DHS/FEMA Grant Guidance for the UASI program as an example).

In New York, the Federal funds have predominantly come as part of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program, with some other funds coming from other Homeland Security Grant Programs like Secure the Cities (STC), the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP).²³⁶ These funding streams supplement the NYPD’s already massive budget, which totals about 4+ Billion dollars per year.²³⁷

That said, at the behest of Mayor Bloomberg’s office and overseen by Commissioner Kelly, New York City has devoted much of its own funding to counter-terrorism efforts. It is important that while much of the funding for counterterrorism efforts comes from federal sources, that New York has both its own resources and much autonomy over directing its federal grant funds. It has even leveraged private funds in novel and innovative ways; like those provided by the Police Foundation of New York, and attempting to incorporate private security officers into a community of information
sharing (through the SHIELD program). These three sources of funds (federal, municipal, and increasingly some private resources) enable New York to be much more flexible in pursuing innovative counterterrorism strategies than many other cities.

London has a similar patchwork of funding for its counterterrorism efforts, much of which are funded through municipal sources, however with important aspects funded by the national government. There is some use of private resources through outreach programs, but there is not the same kind of direct funding of police programs from private sources that exists with the Police Foundation and the liaison program in New York.

Much of the Metropolitan Police Service’s counterterrorism work is funded through municipal moneys administered by the Metropolitan Police Authority. However particular aspects are funded with money from the Home Office (the CTC’s Bomb Data Centre, most of the International Liaison Service) as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (some of the International Liaison Service, capacity building and training for European allies).²³⁸ Interestingly there are separate funding streams for “domestic extremism” (including animal rights/environmental extremism, etc) and “counter-terrorism” (threats seen as international terrorism related).²³⁹

Organizational Context

While the organizational context in which these changes took place are arguably quite different (the departments have differing histories, cultures, differing mechanisms of reporting to city leaders), the organizational resources that allowed them to internationalize were in many cases similar. These included city leadership that was amenable to such expansions (Mayor Bloomberg’s Office in the case of New York City,
and the Metropolitan Police Authority in the case of London), departmental leadership that was willing to make serious structural changes to reorganize and reorient, and human resources (both existing and newly hired) that enabled them to take a global approach. In conjunction, these organizational characteristics provided abilities that would not exist in many other cities.

City/Municipal Leadership and Acceptance

The role of the city leadership is important because, while departmental reorganization has been largely directed and conceptualized from within, it would not be possible without the approval of the offices or institutional bodies that oversee the departments. Mayor Bloomberg’s office enabled Commissioner Ray Kelly’s ambitious overhaul of the department by giving them both economic backing, as well as the political cover needed to weather complaints from Federal agencies about jurisdictional expansion. In London, the Metropolitan Police Authority has provided much of the same backing, although it requires somewhat less direct confrontation with national level authorities as they provide some of the funds to bankroll the international programs, as well as providing official sanction to such activities. That said, the Metropolitan Police Authority could well have taken a much more “London-centric” view and approach, questioning expenditures and operations that do not directly benefit the city. Instead, they both understood and embraced the broader view the department has taken.

Organizational Leadership

Once the city leadership embraced, or at least understood, the international approach, the question of how to turn that approach into a concrete program of structural changes and organizational refocusing. These structural changes, initiated by
departmental leadership, and vastly expanding the national security role of what were initially local policing agencies, are similar in some ways, and different in others. However in both cases, the changes were top down decisions, which were likely aided in transition by the hierarchical and paramilitary nature of policing organizations. The creation of a Counterterrorism Bureau in the NYPD and the refocusing of its Intelligence Division were major changes that created (or recreated) a national security policing function that had shriveled to a dozen or so JTTF officers who were largely outside the Departments mainstream. However in the wake of the September 11th attacks, such organizational re-design was, if not inevitable, largely seen as necessary. The feedback loop in which organizations respond to environmental changes is clearly illustrated in this adjustment.  

**Human Resources**

Human resources, both resources that existed within the departments before internationalization and those brought in subsequent to the changes, have been a factor enabling both departments to do the kind of international work that is required in light of new counterterrorism efforts. These resources include diverse human capital in areas like language and cultural background, as well as increasingly calling upon people with the kinds of analytical talents that previously might not have been attracted to police work or a police administration. It is well accepted in the business and organizational studies literatures that in order to run an effective global enterprise, it requires staffing that if not directly reflective of diverse cultures, then at least aware of the importance of such perspectives.
The pre-existing language capabilities in both departments played an important role in allowing for the quick transition to internationalization. In the NYPD, the department reflected much of the diversity of New York City, and as such contained individuals from many countries and linguistic traditions that helped to speed the department’s ability to deal with international terrorism issues based in the Middle East and South Asia. This was an advantage that the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department amongst others did not have, and their subsequent attempts to correct their language skills shortcomings have been problematic and slow to improve. In the case of the Metropolitan Police, the language skills had largely already migrated to Special Branch as it had always selected for those skill sets that improved effectiveness at high policing, languages being a key factor. The creation of the International Liaison Service under Brian Hayes was an extension of this existing tendency, composed as it was of 3 individuals who collectively spoke 9 languages.

In terms of analytical human resources required to conduct this kind of internationally oriented counterterrorism program, both departments had to refocus their traditional crime investigation and analysis functions, as well as to create geo-political assessment functions which are certainly not typical of municipal police departments. In the case of New York, there was a dual pronged recruitment approach, involving both bringing in former federal intelligence officials (from CIA, FBI, etc), as well as recruiting new analysts from the kinds of internationally focused programs that traditionally supply such analysts to the national intelligence community (including the Kennedy School at Harvard and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins amongst others). Some of New York’s building of analytic capabilities directly overlapped with its
utilizing officers language skills. For example several of the officers that staff NYPD’s Cyber unit, which monitors and analyzes jihadist chat forums, are of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent; so they cannot merely read the words of the posters to these forums, but can analyze them in terms of their culture references and context.

In the case of the Metropolitan Police, intelligence analysis also takes a key role in terms of human resources. However in this case, it is at least as much about investing in human resources as it is taking advantage of existing ones. For example, Metropolitan Police intelligence analysts all undergo a multi-month training program to equip them with the analytical skills required to support police operations. The analysts, who staff both the Metropolitan Intelligence Bureau (MIB - a department-wide intelligence unit) as well as the Counter Terrorism Command’s own intelligence unit. The CTC intelligence unit is linked with the Confidential Unit of the MIB, which houses the secure information environment for data storage and analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internationalization of Municipal Policing</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>London</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorist Threat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Political Autonomy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Economic Autonomy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Human Capital</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department and Urban Leadership</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NYPD in the Theoretical Model

Main Driver | Enabling Factors
---|---
Transnational Threats (Terrorism) | Internationalization of NYPD
  - Expansion over others objections
  - UAS Funding
    - Mayoral Support
    - Private Support
  - Language Capabilities
    - Analysts
  - Bloomberg
    - Kelly
    - Cohen/Palmerath

London Metropolitan Police in the Theoretical Model

Main Driver | Enabling Factors
---|---
Transnational Threats (Terrorism) | Internationalization of London Metropolitan Police
  - Expansion in light of National LE vacuum
  - Home Office
    - FCO Office
  - Language Capabilities
    - Analysts
  - Brian Hayes - ILS
International Liaison Officers: Similarities, Differences and Implications

When examining the two cases of New York and London, there are some striking parallels, some very obvious divergences, and any number of potential future ramifications that stem from this phenomenon. The similarities in many ways stem from similar understandings of the threat, and from similarities in the situation of the cities vis-à-vis their national government and the globalizing international system. The differences appear to stem largely from different domestic organizations of law enforcement, historical and experiential differences, as well as some larger geopolitical differences (like the United Kingdom being part of the European Union).

The two biggest similarities, which seem to set apart the London Metropolitan Police and the New York Police Department, from their counterparts in many other cities, are their international expansion, as well as the global scope with which that has occurred. Before September 11th their had been relatively low level expansion of policing, with Scotland Yard certainly further along in the process as a result of it’s experience with the Irish Republican Army. The NYPD had less experience with expansion both because it had less experience with and threat from terrorism, as well as fewer nearby nations from which threats could emanate. They had some experience working with Canadian officials on issues like drug trafficking, but not the kind of permanently stationed officers that the Metropolitan Police did.

Importantly, this is expansion was, in both cases, a reaction to international terrorism. The London Metropolitan Police expanded first in response to international activity by Irish republican terrorists, and later expanded further to combat the jihadist terrorist threat. The New York Police Department on the other hand did not have the
steady exposure to an international threat that London did, and thus it was not until the catastrophic attack of 2001 that the city expanded overseas. However beyond being generally reactive to a change in the international threat situation, at least in the case of the London Metropolitan Police, it appears to have been somewhat directly reactive to changing events. It is possible to correlate some of the expansion of the ILS to concrete events that seemed to have slightly preceded the organizational changes.

Beyond merely expanding, both organizations chose to expand to areas (geographically speaking) that show a remarkably similar understanding of the threat they’re facing. Particularly in the Post-September 11th context, the main threat facing both cities is Salafi Jihadism, which is often referred to somewhat inaccurately as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, both the organization and the ideology it has engendered are, in a very real sense, global threats. Global cities, like New York and London, have realized that countering global threats requires a global reach and response.

Both have stationed officers in areas of the world where even United States federal law enforcement have had relatively minimal presences. Southeast Asia is a major theatre of jihadist operations, if not for Al Qaeda’s central organizational command, then certainly for affiliated networks like Jemaa Islamiyya (in Indonesia and Malaysia) and Abu Sayyaf (in the Philippines). Both departments have responded by stationing officers in this area. The Middle East is also a key area in which Al Qaeda and its affiliates have operated, and also found much logistical and financial support. New York and London have responded to this by having officers assigned to cover this area. (Note: the Metropolitan Police Officer assigned to Athens, Greece has responsibility for the Middle East)²⁴⁶
The differences between the two cities International Liaison programs are at least equally striking, if not more so. The key differences are how the programs came to be, how they are run, funded and administered, and finally what responsibilities they have beyond the municipality they serve. The first, and probably most interesting difference is that the two cities ended up with very similar International Liaison programs resulting from very different stories and causal processes.

While there is no question that both departments formed International Liaison services in a reactive way, they did so in very different political and organizational contexts. The London Metropolitan Police Service, particularly its Special Branch and Counterterrorism elements, expanded overseas because there was no overarching centralized national law enforcement agency to take responsibility for international counterterrorism. With the most training, most experience, most resources and most international exposure, the Metropolitan Police moved in to satisfy a need for international networking. There is some evidence that with the emergence of agencies like the Serious Organized Crime Agency emerging nationally, that particularly in international arenas like Europol the nascent Counterterrorism Command’s International Liaison Service will play a somewhat decreased role.

New York City on the other hand expanded not as a result of a vacuum at the federal level, but rather despite the existence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Expanding over the objections of a national law enforcement agency is a very different approach to simply expanding in light of a need that no organization currently fills. As such there has been much debate over the legitimacy of what the New York Police Department have done, that has not been mirrored by coverage of the Metropolitan
Police’s international activities. This political dynamic would indicate that the kind of economic and political autonomy required for a city to undertake international expansion, that was discussed earlier, would likely be even more applicable to the New York case.

The funding issue may seem insignificant, but is in fact closely tied to the previous one. New York City has funded its international expansion through the New York City Police Foundation, a non-profit organization, rather than through the use of Federal Homeland Security funding for which the program would not qualify. On the other hand the legitimacy that the Metropolitan Police Service’s liaisons have by way of their national sanction is quite different. They are in fact funded largely by money given to the Metropolitan Police Service by the Home and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. In conjunction with this funding from the national government for such programs, there comes an expectation that the International Liaison Service within the Metropolitan Police will also facilitate inquiries between other local police agencies (and their individual Special Branches) and the enforcement agencies in the countries to which they are assigned.

It’s not clear that the differences in funding (and as a potential extension, legitimacy) are well publicized or recognized by the agencies with whom these officers liaise. These are however important distinctions that have potential impacts on how these programs function and how successful they are. For example, one European police official makes clear that the liaison from the New York Police Department is a very important component of transatlantic police cooperation; but despite this, it is secondary because they could not afford to jeopardize their relationship with the FBI.247
Liaison Experiences: Similarities and Differences

Beyond the structural underpinnings and institutional contexts, there are however some interesting parallels between the two cities liaison services, in terms of the roles that liaison officers have to play. There is often a tension for police liaisons who fulfill numerous roles including police officer, national diplomat, departmental ambassador, intelligence officer, information conduit, as well as others. This is further complicated when, as in the case of New York City’s liaisons, they are there without national sanction. The sometimes conflicting roles of these liaisons make for complicated situations as well as requiring a delicate balancing act. Several key dichotomies that can cause problems for the liaisons are the National-Municipal divide and the intelligence-law enforcement cultural divide. On the other hand, a sort of international law enforcement culture can make these liaisons easier, and interestingly the national-municipal divide can in some cases offer benefits even as it presents problems.

The divide between liaisons serving as representatives and those serving as representatives of a city (or other sub-national police agency) can be real or conceptual, but have real impacts on police work. For example, an NYPD Liaison who served for almost two years as the department’s representative in a Middle Eastern country was surprised to find that not many people were shocked that the city had police officers abroad. In fact, many accepted it easily because “New York City is a city with great threats…” and there is a “perception of great resources.” While many of these people were not necessarily surprised to meet a New York police officer assigned to their country, there were real hurdles in some of his interactions with police agencies in the
countries that he spent time in. One was a conceptual hurdle, namely that in countries that only had national level law enforcement, the role and meaning of a city police force (particularly one on the scale of New York’s) was not easily understood. These issues of differing scopes of operation and scales of jurisdiction lead to a complicated networking effect in which the NYPD (a city police force) may liaise with either another city police force, a regional/provincial force, national law enforcement, or even other national security institutions like intelligence agencies or the military. This at the same time that the FBI Legal Attaché (“Legat”), State Department Regional Security Officer (RSO), Military Attaches, Central Intelligence Agency personnel, and countless others are likely doing the same.

The divide between the intelligence culture or mindset and the law enforcement culture or mindset is well articulated elsewhere. On the other hand, some practitioners make the case that the mindset problem is less pronounced than it once was. “…that can still be the case, and certainly that would have been true some 5-10 years ago. However, the situation has changed greatly over the recent past and police and intelligence services work together extremely closely in the UK and there is very good communication and information sharing.”

That said the fundamental differences in goals in intelligence (information collection, analysis and dissemination) and law enforcement (crime investigation and prosecution), while sometimes bridgeable, can create real problems. One of the most concrete illustrations of this problem is how it impacts police officers that are involved in intelligence work. While the two cultures are often melded together, they do have limitations and create friction at times.
These are likely not unique only to municipal liaison officers, some of the issues associated with this have been examined in looking at national level liaison officers.\textsuperscript{252} Liaison officers, are one of the main planks of the edifice of transnational police relations. Didier Bigo acknowledges this, going so far as calling liaison officers in Europe “new transnational agents.”\textsuperscript{253}

Interestingly, Bigo offers a very illustrative term “Police Archipelagos” to describe the increasing prevalence of specialized police units and functions (i.e. narcotics, counterterrorism, border, etc focused units). These units are no longer “local police stations doing local police work”\textsuperscript{254} but rather semi-autonomous units that may have more in common (structurally and culturally) with similar functional units in other nations than with those police within their own departments who fulfill more traditional roles. Certainly counter-terrorism policing fits this mold. What is interesting though is that these functional divides are, in Bigo’s discussion, about units operating in the same geographic area, but separated by purpose. Increasingly, while Bigo’s neo-functionalist reading continues to seem relevant, the idea of geography constraining these functional policing units (even local law enforcement) seems to be eroding.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Liaison Program</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>London</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Liaison Program</td>
<td>Immediately Global</td>
<td>Initially regional, later global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Environment/Context</td>
<td>Despite national law enforcement - Expansion over objections of the FBI</td>
<td>Vacuum of national law enforcement – because there was no national LE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Officer Status</td>
<td>Department representative – no national standing</td>
<td>Department representative – some national standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Private – New York Police Foundation</td>
<td>Public – Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organizational Theory

Understanding the environmental, institutional and organizational contexts in which these different processes unfolded is important. However equally important, and heretofore unexamined is how these changes fit within existing theoretical frameworks for understanding organizational change, and how organizations (particularly security bureaucracies) respond to environmental changes like globalization. There has in recent years been a growth in the literature of organizational adaptation and response to transnational threats, and on the whole it has been well applied to understand the successes and failures of both national level and international level responses to terrorism. This literature has essentially ignored the organizational response of sub-national security actors to these same forces. This is in large part because until recently (at least since the beginning of the Cold War) this has not been a major role for sub-national security actors. They largely protected their regional/municipal/private geographical area and left “national security” (high policing) to the national level authorities (at least where such national level authorities existed). However, since the end of the Cold War, a new dynamic has begun to change the relative role of sub-national actors in “national security.” This change is well suited to analysis using paradigms of thought that are already well accepted in the security literature, but have not yet been used to shed light on it.

Netwar

As a framework for understanding organizational change in response to terrorism, Arquilla and Ronfeldts conception of Netwar is a powerful tool. One of the
defining aspects of netwar is that its networked nature makes it a challenge to counter using traditional governmental security bureaucracies. This need for new organizational architectures and orientations is a result of organizational constraints on such bureaucracies in reacting to smaller, quicker, more maneuverable and adaptable networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt laid out this problem as far back as the 1990s:

“It takes networks to fight networks. Governments that would defend against netwar will, increasingly, have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries. This does not mean mirroring the adversary, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles that he has already learned about the rise of network forms in the Information Age. These principles depend to some extent upon technological innovation, but mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for inter-agency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation”\textsuperscript{255}

The counter-netwar paradigm, as articulated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt calls for both organizational and doctrinal innovation. These two elements correlate to two dynamics that are clearly illustrated in the cases of the internationalization of policing in London and New York: structural reorganization (organizational) and the international reorientation of the department’s perspective (doctrinal). Arquilla and Ronfeldt make a compelling case that without both organizational change and doctrinal change, security agencies will be unable to respond effectively to new varieties of conflict like networked terrorism. They also suggest that both these changes will have to be in the service of increased \textit{“inter-agency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation.”}\textsuperscript{256} Internationalization, particularly the use of liaison officers, directly addresses these two requirements.
Organizational innovation in response to international terrorism is clear in both the London and New York City cases. London’s decision to combine Special Branch (SO12), the Anti-Terrorism Branch (SO13), and numerous other organizations and functions dedicated to terrorism into the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) represented the Metropolitan Police Service’s biggest organizational overhaul related to terrorism issues since the creation of Special Branch. While it is early in the process to judge the CTC’s effectiveness, vis a vis the earlier model, it is certainly accepted wisdom that the coordination or fusion of disparate organizations doing the same mission can result in the leveraging resources and decreased duplication of effort. In New York City, the organizational changes, including standing up a Counter Terrorism Division and creating large analytical units focused on terror threats, are clear examples of innovation designed to structurally prepare the department to deal more effectively with terrorist threats. The creation (in New York) and massive expansion (in London) of international liaison programs is also an obvious example of such organizational change, and one that explicitly targets the need for increased inter-agency coordination; as well as being very obviously multi-jurisdictional (and in fact transnational).

Doctrinal innovation too is a key factor to enabling these departments to begin to respond to the threats they face today. The change in perspective from “first responders” to “first preventers” is one example of this re-conception of the role of local law enforcement. Another example, and a related one, is the massive increase in terrorism awareness and indicator training, in both London and New York City. This training, indicates how seriously these departments take terrorism, incorporating what used to be a secondary or tertiary concern (as well a segmented responsibility for a small subgroup).
into the mainstream curriculum that all officers are exposed to. It really is indicative of a major re-prioritization, one in which high policing is beginning to again play a major role in the day-to-day operations of a local law enforcement organization.

It is important to realize that these changes are in no way absolute, agency-wide, nor irreversible. This counter-netwar approach is should not be interpreted as the complete networking of local police agencies, or the removal of hierarchies from these bureaucracies. Such drastic changes would neither be advisable according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, nor would they likely be sustainable based on the understandings of why bureaucracies develop and how they behave, put forth by scholars like Max Weber\textsuperscript{257} and James Q. Wilson.\textsuperscript{258} Rather, these approaches are designed to create hybrid organizations that capture some of the advantages of networked organization, mitigate some of the constraints of traditional bureaucracies, and create structures and policies that allow police officers to effectively and efficiently protect the people of their jurisdiction.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt offer a description of this balancing act:

"It is not necessary, desirable, or even possible to replace all hierarchies with networks in governments. Rather, where relevant, the challenge will be to blend these two forms skillfully, while retaining enough core authority to encourage and enforce adherence to networked processes. By creating effective hybrids, governments may become better prepared to confront the new threats and challenges emerging in the Information Age..."\textsuperscript{259}

Both the international liaison efforts, and broader reorganizations, of the NYPD and the MPS in London are designed to create internal capacities to engage in networked behavior and to circumvent some of the hurdles that bureaucracies present. At the same
time, these multi-disciplinary units (like the NYPD’s CT Bureau and the Metropolitan Police’s new CT Command) are unique in terms of the breadth of individuals involved but also situated within the existing departmental bureaucracies. In large part, this model achieves much of what Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue is required, “skillfully blending” such organizational models.

**Multilateral Counterinsurgency Networks: What Are They and How Do They Apply?**

Another theoretical approach to organizing to counter networked threats, while related to netwar and counter-netwar, goes a bit further by defining what types of partnerships would be required to effectively counter such threats. Sullivan and Bunker put forth the concept of “multilateral counterinsurgency networks” as the way for governments to respond to non-state threats. “The globalization of justice and security is in its early stages... A global counter-insurgency network (or networks) are necessary to preserve both national and global security...”

The model Sullivan and Bunker propose draws heavily on the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model pioneered in Los Angeles, and subsequently copied elsewhere. Sullivan, an official with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LACSD), was intimately involved in the creation and direction of the first TEW. The TEW was an “all source” (classified, sensitive but unclassified, and open source) and “all phase” (pre, trans and post incident) intelligence fusion cell, that crossed levels of government and disciplines.

The TEW however was more a conceptual model than a working model for the networks Sullivan and Bunker propose as their end-goal. The TEW offered a microcosm
snapshot of what such a multilateral network could look like, but was not sufficiently internationalized to be a real working model. There were also some technical and procedural problems about how information could and could not be shared; in one case resulting in charges that two Marines inappropriately shared classified information with TEW staff. 262

The model they propose acknowledges needs for coordination across borders as well as across all levels of government (and to an extent in the private sector). One of the clearest examples of this is the way in which they define government information needs in order to react to international terrorism “Both prevention and response are influenced by local and global factors, with local and global information requirements…” 263 This explicit acknowledgement of the local and global facets of the problem and the needs for response lead Sullivan and Bunker to suggest that numerous elements of national governments that have never connected directly with local governments will need to do so.

“Preserving global and national security requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national) level to effectively counter these threats.” 264

This sort of networking sounds very much like what New York and London have been trying to accomplish quietly and without much fanfare. While they certainly never refer to it as building “multilateral counterinsurgency networks,” it seems like that has largely been what they are doing.

Interestingly, the varying levels of formality and official sanction for liaison activities actually make sense in light of this theoretical approach. While there are very entrenched and official channels (like INTERPOL), there are less formal bodies like the
Police Working Group on Terrorism, and even more individual and personality driven networks that cross borders and levels of government. This fits well with the supposition that Sullivan and Bunker make about how “investigative cooperation” is often “dependent upon an informal “sneaker net” of magistrates, prosecutors, police and intelligence officers.” These informal networks tend to take over when the formalized and traditional networks do not offer the timeliness, candor or fluidity required to deal with challenges that are in a state of flux.

**Competitive Adaptation and Organizational Learning**

In an attempt to use the substantial social science literature on organizational learning and bureaucratic adaptation to examine how law enforcement and security agencies respond to drug smugglers and terrorists, Michael Kenney offers a major competing theoretical framework in which to examine the new internationalized character of municipal policing. He focuses on national level agencies responding to such threats, but many of the insights he offers translate quite directly to the cases of the New York Police Department and the London Metropolitan Police. While Kenney acknowledges the importance of the networked responses that Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Bunker and Sullivan (amongst others) call for to respond to terrorism, he offers a parallel way to understand changes beyond outreach, liaison work and other types of changes that clearly fit the “networking” mold. In fact he eventually compares its utility for examining changing bureaucracies directly to “Counter-Netwar” going so far as to characterize the discussion as “the fallacy of counter-netwar.”
While much of Kenney’s discussion focuses on the use of inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional task forces, and so even he acknowledges that much of his analysis supports elements of the counter-netwar perspective. However Kenney sees those advocating counter-netwar as a bit too optimistic about the novelty and utility of such networks. He argues that such networks have existed since the 1980s at least, and while there have been successes, there have also been failures of such approaches. He also cites examples of how these interagency networks (particularly the Joint Terrorism Task Forces – JTTFs) have failed to overcome the bureaucratic and other hurdles to information sharing, despite their goal of doing just that. Finally, because these governmental networks still require bureaucratic, legal and financial oversight, they will continue to lag behind their “dark” counterparts according to Kenney. Therefore, Kenney does not dismiss the power of networks to help law enforcement counter such approaches, rather he contextualizes this networking as one of many tools that agencies can use and adapt through a feedback loop of organizational learning. He situates them not as a panacea, but as one of a host of options that organizations can learn to use effectively through trial and error, formal experimentation and informal means of organizational change.

For Kenney, both illicit actors and governments experiment and learn in “complex adaptive systems.” Both sides have advantages and disadvantages in these systems. While the government agencies are often better off in terms of the scale of the resources available to them (with terrorists, not always with narco-traffickers), they suffer with complex and entrenched bureaucracies that do not respond quickly to changing environments. The networks on the other hand often have limited resources and are limited to operating largely clandestinely, however they have organizational flexibility
and flat command and control structures. Kenney argues that a combination of intuitive learning (metis) and formal learning (techne) allows each side to use those advantages it has more effectively, improve those areas where they have disadvantages, and learn over time to better counter their enemy. The fact that both sides are doing this is what makes it a dynamic, complex, and competitive adaptive system.

As an example Kenney cites changes in US anti-drug operations that fully utilized those resources and advantages that the government bureaucracies had. The major resources they had (particularly technological resources – i.e. electronic surveillance) were very influential in improving counter-drug operations. One area in which the governments were at a disadvantage was in information and the diffusion of intelligence. Numerous attempts at interagency working groups and task forces were designed to clear that hurdle. Another area they were disadvantaged in was with a lack of organizational knowledge of their opponent (whereas government bureaucracies tend to be more transparent). Here the government relied on increased intelligence analysis for “sensemaking,” devoting more time to understanding the enemy. The agencies also innovated in their undercover operations, trying numerous approaches to gain “best practices” over time. All of these same approaches to organizational learning are in evidence in the cases of the New York Police Department and London Metropolitan Police.

*Leveraging the Resource Advantage*

Clearly both cities police forces made major investments of resources in countering terrorism. This includes financial resources, human resources and technological resources. Terrorist operations tend to cost very little, and even then many
terrorist networks have trouble funding their operations. These police departments on the other hand have access to vast resources from their own coffers, as well as specialized counterterrorism funding from their respective national governments (UASI funding in the case of New York, and funding from the Home Office and FCO in the case of London).

Beyond just channeling funds to their counterterrorism, these departments have also invested in innovative technologies, in much the same way that Kenney describes improved use of technology in counter-drug operations. London first created its “Ring of Steel” model of protecting its central financial district using CCTV, license plate readers (LPRs), and traffic management to create a secure zone. New York is creating a similar system in its new Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI), and weighing creating a similar zone in Midtown Manhattan, a Mid-Town Security Initiative (MTSI). Other technological improvements are also well documented. These include New York’s extensive use of radiation and biological agent detection, and London’s impressive use of geographical information systems (GIS) to map suspicious activity and potential terrorism pre-cursor crimes.

Interagency Work Groups to Overcome the Information Disadvantage

Kenney’s dismissal of counter-netwar is not as sweeping as it may initially seem. He argues that these networks are inherent “sovereignty-bound” and limited by their need for legal and financial accountability, and thus are not a panacea that will enable governments to network together and defeat either traffickers or terrorists. That said, he does recognize, albeit with skepticism, that these task forces can sometimes be useful in improving information sharing and improving the agility of bureaucracies. In New York
City these networks include working with state and federal partners (including the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the UASI Urban Area Working Group), working with the private sector (Operation Nexus and NYPD Shield) and working with international partners (through the international liaison program) amongst many others. In London these networks include the same set of partners. Connections between the Counterterrorism Command and Special Branches around the country exist independently, as well as through governing networks like the Association of Chief Police Officers committee for Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO TAM). The CTC is also connected to the private sector through its outreach programs. Finally the Metropolitan Police are connected to international partners through their International Liaison Service (ILS), as well as networks like Interpol, Europol, and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT).

What is important about Kenney’s approach to these interagency groups and taskforces is that they constitute a component, and a rather small one at that, of a broader portfolio of innovations and experimentations that enable organizational learning. Kenney supports a feedback loop in which organizational structures (be they hierarchies, networks, cellular structures, etc) are experimented with and tested for their utility. Along with organizational structures, processes, technologies, and other aspects of government operations must all be open to evaluation and adaptation.

*Improving Understanding of the Adversary – the Importance of Intelligence Analysis*

Kenney makes the case that early on, one of the major sources of failure in counter-narcotics operations was a lack of understanding of the traffickers networks, organizations, business models and incentive structures. This lack of understanding of
the drivers and channels that enable drug trafficking led to unrealistic or inaccurate expectations about how to disrupt the networks. One of the major ways that Kenney claims these operations can become more effective is through the incorporation of this kind of organizational knowledge. He makes a case that the usage of intelligence analysis and increased understanding of the adversary was a boon to the counter-narcotics operations.

This incorporation of intelligence analysis and adversary understanding is a clear priority for both police forces. At NYPD both the Intelligence Division and the Counter Terrorism Divisions each have a separate intelligence analysis capability. These two analytic groups focus on tactical and strategic intelligence respectively. The Intelligence Divisions analysis focuses on information and leads collected by investigators and officers across the entire departmental spectrum, and they have access to essentially all ongoing cases and investigations. In the Counter Terrorism Division, the Terrorist Threat Analysis Group (TTAG) does strategic level analysis of geopolitics, terrorist networks, trends in tactics and targeting, and other non-case specific intelligence analysis. A sampling of titles of the weekly intelligence products that TTAG produces shows the breadth of their analytic work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NYPD CT Bureau TTAG Weekly Products</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBRN Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber and Finance Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism Policy Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism News Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jihadist World Weekly</td>
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<td>Europe Weekly</td>
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<td>Western Hemisphere Weekly</td>
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<td>Iran Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq and Levant Weekly</td>
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<td>Africa Weekly</td>
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There have been similarly impressive advancements in intelligence analysis at the MPS. Rather than differentiating between strategic and tactical intelligence in the collection phase, all terrorism related intelligence at MPS passes through a single point of entry (SPOE) within a unit called Development and Tasking (DAT). Within DAT there are three main units that focus respectively on international terrorism (including Islamic extremist terrorism), Irish terrorism issues (of both the republican and loyalist variety) and a domestic extremism unit (including left and right wing extremism and environmental extremism). At DAT this intelligence is sorted and directed to various places. It can go to an intelligence development team that can use further collection and analysis to follow up on and expand the inquiry. It can also go to operational or investigative teams that have their own embedded analysts to support investigations.

This counter-terrorism process is related to the larger criminal analysis capability housed in the Metropolitan Intelligence Bureau (MIB), however for reasons of secrecy and national security it is often times de facto separated from MIB even though it is notionally part of the same process.

**Innovation in undercover/enforcement actions**

It of course goes without saying that undercover police operations are amongst the least discussed operations, and details surrounding them tend to be hard to acquire. Despite this, between interviews with officials and recent news coverage there appears to be ample evidence that the scope and scale of the undercover operations undertaken by these municipal police agencies have changed meaningfully as terrorism has become a core mission.
In New York these operations have ranged from red teaming activities to infiltrations of the milieus in which radicalization can take hold. Red Teaming (simulating adversary planning and operations in order to find and judge weaknesses) efforts have included attempts to collect dangerous or toxic materials like chlorine and ammonium nitrate. For example, following several 2007 Improvised Explosive Device attacks that included chlorine canisters in Iraq, Deputy Commissioner Falkenrath tasked the Counterterrorism Division with conducting “Operation Green Cloud” in which they purchased chlorine gas and IED components.275

Perhaps most importantly, some of these red teaming exercises have been conducted outside of New York City, occasionally leading to tensions with neighboring jurisdictions and states. One example was an attempt to follow up on some intelligence regarding Al Qaeda attempts to use scuba divers for attacks. When the NYPD began using undercover officers to attempt to suspiciously purchase dive equipment in nearby New Jersey, tensions flared between NYPD and the New Jersey authorities.276

These operations also included undercover infiltrations of “informal groups of youths and men who shared extremist views…”277 A striking example of this innovation is the case of a young Bangladeshi Muslim police officer who spent four years working undercover in Mosques, social clubs, engaged in martial arts training and other activities with young men involved in the radicalization process. Details of this particular operation became public when the officer testified at the trial of men charged with plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station.278

These infiltrations of extremist networks and organizations have raised some serious questions and problems for the NYPD. In the run up to the 2004 Republican
National Convention in New York, the NYPD conducted major surveillance and infiltration operations of many groups in the city, some in other states, and officers even traveled to Canada and Europe as part of these activities. This wholesale “observation” of groups planning to protest at the New York convention sparked major debates about whether or not police agencies had the right to do such surveillance on protest groups that show no indications of being involved in illegal activities. The New York Civil Liberties Union has subsequently lobbied for and gotten many of the NYPD’s documents from this effort released through Freedom of Information Act requests. Regardless of whether these actions are constitutional, appropriate, or even practical, many have taken notice of them. Following news coverage of the extent of such undercover operations, discussions of such tactics were undertaken at police departments across the United States.
Chapter 6 – Conclusion
Globalization: Transnational Threats, Transnational Responses

“The horizon has been defeated, by the pirates of the new age…”
-Jack Johnson, The Horizon Has Been Defeated. 2003

Globalization has presented many positives for humanity including access to ideas, goods, cultural artifacts and various other attributes of societies across the vastness of space. It has also had some negative impacts, as the same logistical and communication networks that facilitate trade, travel and interaction have been used for devious, and sometimes violent, ends. Suddenly, the virtual dissolution of distance became a real threat as well as a force for good.

In January of 2008 Spanish authorities arrested a number of men plotting to conduct suicide bombings on the Barcelona Metro, essentially attempting to recreate the July 7, 2005 London Transit bombings in Spain. This plot had direct ties to the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands, one of the most violent ungoverned spaces in the modern world. The emergence of such threats, originating in tribal badlands thousands of miles away but threatening a modern Western metropolis and its citizens, are no longer outliers in the world of security analysis.

In the new world of global threats, and with the need for global reaction, there is little doubt that governmental response must be flexible and adaptable. It is also increasingly clear that rigid state-level response to globalized non-state actors often proves insufficient. While there is beginning to be some real steps taken to internationalize the response to globalized threats, it’s almost all at the supra-national or national level.
The messy work of transnational relations, particularly sub-national relations, in security remains a project very much in flux. Largely because of its novelty, and the inherent secrecy of matters related to security and intelligence, this emerging global reality, and practitioner community, have remained under-reported in the press, and virtually unanalyzed in the world of scholarship. Yet, these new practices and practitioners are illustrative of theories that have been gaining ground in some places and present problems for other approaches that have long been accepted as orthodoxy.

**The Level of Analysis Problem in Security Studies**

The dominant, though certainly not only, approach to security studies is a statist one; although this orthodoxy is slowing being challenged. The vast literature of security studies tends to focus on both state threats, and state responses to state and non-state threats. However in light of the increasingly global nature of the threat, there is an increasing consensus in the field that the strictly statist approach is insufficient. Thus there’s been a growth in the study of globally conceived threats, and also globally conceived security measures and efforts.

Much of the most interesting work on such issues comes out of the Global Governance school. The emergence of the “disaggregated state” is an important development. The government networks at the center of global governance are an important, but not sufficient, step toward the new more nuanced view of how security is becoming a more diffused responsibility. When looking at law enforcement networking, Global Governance scholars tend to look exclusively at the horizontal networks and vertical networks that incorporate national level officers, their counterparts, and supranational international organizations.
While emerging international and even transnational responses have begun to be studied in earnest, there are still several elements of this new constellation that remain, if not totally ignored, under-examined and definitely under-theorized. The importance of private actors (from private military contractors, to corporate security, to NGOs) has not been adequately examined – in the scholarly rather than journalistic or polemic approach - with a few key exceptions.\textsuperscript{283} Similarly, there has not been sufficient examination of the sub-national actors tasked with “national security” variety responsibilities.

This includes police, security, intelligence and other functions occurring at the regional, provincial, state, municipal, tribal and other local levels. The analysis and theorization of these actors role in security studies is in its infancy. While it is beginning to expand slowly, it has not come close to keeping pace with the rapid expansion of its relevance and the massive shift that it has caused in the day-to-day operations of these agencies and organizations. These groups have been adapting absent the kinds of policy guidance that the security studies field can offer, largely because they’ve not been taken seriously in the field where the default is a state-centric approach.

One of the most important things that these new security practices and practitioners have the potential to do is to better inform our understanding of the changing face of governance in the globalized world. It can do this in several key ways. It can provide some nuance to the expanded and globalized vision of security studies, illustrating that while the nation is indeed an insufficient level of analysis, so to are merely the national and supranational. By forcing the recognition that security spans all levels of governance, the practices should lead to a better holistic understanding of security. These new practices can also incorporating security into a number of international political
theories that have already acknowledged the importance of both globalization and localization, but that have largely ignored the implications of such for security. In both these major streams of study, the new realities on the ground (namely internationalized municipal counterterrorism efforts) have not percolated in any meaningful way into the scholarly dialogue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which levels of analysis have relevant sub-fields of international politics recognized and devoted discussion and research to?</th>
<th>Security Studies</th>
<th>Globalization/Localization Theories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International/Global Level</td>
<td>Increasingly recognized</td>
<td>Recognized importance – w/ some recognition of security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/Statist Level</td>
<td>Dominant Approach - Longtime Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Argued decreasing importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Level</td>
<td>Not yet meaningfully incorporated</td>
<td>Recognized importance – w/ almost no connection to security</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Security Studies here is taken to mean the general field of international politics that concerns itself primarily with “High Politics,” war and the control of violent coercion.
** Globalization Theories here refer to those theories discussed earlier including Fragmegration, Glocalization and Global City Theory amongst others.

**Who Does Recognize Sub-State Actors?**

It is not the case that all of international studies has taken the approach that security studies have. In fact many approaches to global politics have indeed acknowledged the importance of sub-state actors, and even embraced them as their unit of analysis. Transnational relations, functionalism and neo-functionalism, and numerous theories of globalization all explicitly accept sub-national actors as meaningful and consequential. Transnational relations argued that elements of governments and societies interacting across numerous issues, including security, are important to how we understand international politics. Functionalism and neo-functionalist approaches made similar
arguments about the common worldviews and experiences of those who fulfill particular roles in society, and how they lead to communities of thought and practice based on common orientations rather than geographic borders. Theories of globalization like Rosenau’s “fragmegration,” “Glocalization,” and Global City approaches, all provide insights into how and why the changes in the international system which characterize so much of current discussions in the field have not lead solely to internationalization or global homogenization, but also to an increasing interconnection of local politics and local governance across vast global distances.

These approaches however have not had the same impact on issues of “high politics” (security and war) as they have had on “low politics” (economics, culture, etc.). This makes sense in context that providing for security is considered by many the raison d’être of the state, and thus the tight grip on the statist approach in the security studies field makes sense. That said, while these theories acknowledging “non-traditional” actors in international politics make inroads in the study of economics and culture, there is reason to believe that they need to be better incorporated into the security field.

One of the key goals of this dissertation has been to explore empirically and theoretically a series of security practices and security practitioners that have been largely ignored because they do not fit into many of the mainstream statist theories that dominate modern security studies. Another key goal has been to take these new security dynamics and begin to explain how they emerged; looking at both environmental and internal/organizational factors that have played a role in their rise. Finally the third major goal has been to explore what the implications of these changes are for the field of international studies.
In the world of Globalization theory, particularly those aspects that have already adopted the understanding that local and sub-national levels of analysis are important, there has still not been any systematic attempt to incorporate security issues into these perspectives. Glocalization and Global City approaches have been primarily focused on economic issues, and have subsequently spread somewhat to incorporate cultural issues, and to a somewhat lesser extent issues of governance. Fragmegration on the other hand has always focused mostly on governance issues, and then implications have also been drawn for economic and cultural parallels. Even fragmegration, while indeed focused on governance, has tended to be discussed in terms of economic governance.

| Have Globalization Theories incorporated security into their discourse on the importance of sub-national actors and forces in the following spheres? |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                                 | Economic       | Cultural       | Governance     |
| Fragmegration                   | Yes            | Somewhat       | Dominant       |
| Glocalization                   | Dominant       | Yes            | Somewhat       |
| Global City Theory             | Dominant       | Somewhat       | Somewhat       |
|                                 |                |                | Security (as separate from Governance) |
|                                 |                |                | NO             |
|                                 |                |                | NO             |
|                                 |                |                | NO             |

*The use of NO here is slightly simplistic, and should be read to mean that these approaches have not incorporated security in any meaningful way into the discourse of the sub-field as it relates to local actors. There have, in some cases, been several small scale or non-scholarly attempts to address these issues.

New Practices in Security:  
The Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counterterrorism

There have been numerous changes in policing in recent decades. The emergence of new frameworks for policing has created serious shifts in how police behave and conceive of themselves. Data-driven policing approaches like COMPSTAT have revolutionized the deployment of resources and accountability expectations in policing. The Intelligence-Led Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing paradigms have changed
the underlying drivers of police activities. However few changes in policing have as drastically expanded the purview of policing as the incorporation of the counter-terrorism role into many police departments. The emergence of a “first preventer” rather traditional “first responder” conception of police officers has added another plank to the already overwhelming series of roles that police officers are expected to play. The incorporation of this new role has ranged from minor levels of increased awareness in some departments (or a rhetorical nod in that direction with no meaningful change), to wholesale reorientations and restructuring of major departments. While these changes vary greatly, terrorism and homeland security issues have been responsible for one of the largest expansions of the role of police in the modern era.

There is evidence to suggest that municipal police forces in New York and London are now on a trajectory to begin playing a role in international security that has not seen any meaningful equivalent in a century, and perhaps not even then. At the turn of the 20th century, the international anarchist threat had both New York and London responding to international terrorism within the context of the need for international law enforcement cooperation. However since then, there has been not just a decline, but also a virtual absence of municipal policing in a global context. There have been some minor example of municipal police involved in regional or cross-border international policing, but that has been the exception rather than the rule. It was also almost always temporary and case specific, rather than part of a large concerted effort to engage international partners in ongoing dialogue, intelligence sharing and coordination. Therefore, what has happened in New York City and London since 2001 is in many ways not just new, but revolutionary.
**Internationalizing: How and Why?**

While police around the world have been transformed by the emergence of terrorism as a touchstone security issue for the new era, very few local police have, thus far, done much more than conduct the occasional terrorism awareness course or interact a bit more with federal/national level law enforcement. A few however, namely those in several key, large, global cities have massively expanded and reoriented their departments to make countering terrorism one of their core missions. In doing so, and particularly in expanding it beyond both municipal and even national boundaries, they have embarked on a historically unparalleled trajectory.

Intelligence collection and sharing, officer exchanges and liaisons, virtual and cyber connections, and analytic outreach and collaboration are just some of the mechanisms through which some cities (typically global cities, or cities with particular socio-cultural or economic links to the globalized world – like Las Vegas for example) have begun to embrace an international approach to law enforcement and security. In a world of fluid transnational threats that can quickly originate at one point on the globe and arrive at the opposite end almost immediately, traditional localized conceptions of security quickly become insufficient.

**New York City – Pioneering Globalized Municipal Counterterrorism**

In New York City the quite brutal and literal arrival of international mass-casualty terrorism in 2001 fundamentally changed the political and law enforcement landscapes as much as it altered the iconic skyline. The leadership of the city of New York, feeling failed by federal law enforcement and intelligence services, decided to create their own parallel information gathering and sharing mechanisms, often using techniques and talent
from those federal agencies. This was a major moment in United States law enforcement, in as far as a city began exercising something not unlike sovereignty in the one realm in which it was believed that the state was the ultimate arbiter: “high politics.” With security issues joining economic, social and other issues as a decreasingly state-centric patchwork in the new globalized world, New York had done something revolutionary.

The creation of a Counter-Terrorism Bureau with hundreds of officers and personnel working full-time on the terrorism issue, New York took on a host of tasks that were previously thought beyond the scope of a “local” police department. Critical infrastructure protection, anti-terrorism training, strategic geo-political analysis, paramilitary protection surges, and massive commitments of officers to Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are all at least major leaps forward in scale, and in many cases the creation of entirely novel roles for a municipal police department.

The massive augmentation of the existing Intelligence Bureau was also a major step for the department’s internationalization of its orientation. A division that had long focused on crime statistics and occasional diplomat protection was turned, with the leadership of a man who had run the CIA’s analytic and clandestine collection sections, into a world-class intelligence collection and analysis organization. The hiring of civilian analysts of the highest caliber, the leveraging of existing diverse human capital in the department, the consistent international outreach, and ultimately the stationing of NYPD officers abroad combined to create the pre-eminent law enforcement intelligence organization in the United States.

Through these, and other efforts, the New York Police Department has in recent years created what journalist Christopher Dickey has called “America’s best counterterrorism
and what the Economist has called “an alternative to the highly militarized war on terror.” Former NYPD analyst and current researcher at the Council of Foreign Relations Lydia Khalil has called NYPD efforts: “Part think tank, part detective agency, part paramilitary organization, the New York Police Department's (NYPD) counterterrorism program has become one of the most sophisticated in the world.”

The kinds of praise the NYPD approach have received does not mean that there are not critics. Early resistance from federal authorities, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has been tempered in recent years. There are however other criticisms levied about the organizations operations, tendency to secrecy, and some questions about the tradeoffs of focusing resources on terrorism rather than traditional crime. These discussions continue, but there is little question that in a federal system that Louis Brandeis referred to (albeit referencing states) as the “laboratory of democracy,” the NYPD has created some novel experiments.

London – Evolving Municipal Counterterrorism: From Local, to Regional, to Global

While New York transitioned quickly from a limited counterterrorism role to a global one (at least in the modern, post-Cold War era), London developed a global counterterrorism approach over decades. While London’s earliest counterterrorism efforts occurred almost a century ago, it wasn’t until the modern “Troubles” with Ireland that the efforts internationalized outside Britain and Ireland. In the 1980s, as the Irish Republican Army had spread both its logistical and operational tentacles across continental Europe, the international threat was countered with an international municipal response. The emergence of the International Liaison Service (ILS) signaled a realization
that even “local” law enforcement had to take at least a regional international approach to transnational threats. Throughout much of the 1990s, it was unclear that the ILS would remain as a distinct unit, particularly following the late 1990s détente between the British authorities and the Irish Republican Army. Like in New York, it was not until after September 11th, 2001 that the need for a more permanent and widespread global police liaison function became clear, or justifiable.

That there is some hybrid national standing as a result of the United Kingdom’s lack of national law enforcement, does change the meaning of the ILS a bit, but such structural and institutional differences are inevitable in the comparative context. Interestingly, this is quite parallel to the role that the NYPD played during the Anarchist outrages over one hundred years ago, before the United States had any strong and meaningful national level law enforcement. In that sense there are structural similarities between the turn of the 20th century NYPD and the turn of the 21st century London Metropolitan Police in terms of their international activities. With the mid-1990s transfer of the remit for terrorism intelligence collection to MI5, and the recent birth of the national Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), it is of course possible that the United Kingdom is moving in the institutional direction that the United States did, however the creation of the Counterterrorism Command in the Special Operations Division of the Metropolitan Police makes it appear more as if the United Kingdom is moving toward a hybrid model: arguably an even more fully developed national-local cooperation than exists in the United States.
NyLon – Cities as “International Financial Critical Infrastructure?”

“Cities shape the destinies of states chiefly by serving as containers and distribution points for capital.” – Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States. 1990

Numerous scholars and journalists have argued that there is something fundamentally unique about the role New York and London play in the world, with some of the more creative ones going so far as to assign the name NyLon to the duo.288 Connected to their unique role in the world of finance and the global economy, the cities have an equally unique role in terms of their law enforcement. These new tactics and approaches were not brought about solely because the cities wanted them, or even solely to protect human life for its own sake, rather they have been judged important to the cities continued competitiveness, prosperity and functionality. One of the reasons that New York and London are as important as they are to the world economy is that they are seen as safe places to transact business, both in the regulatory and physical senses of safety.

The investments in security these cities have made, particularly for the financial districts in both cities, are clearly an important part of maintaining their respective comparative advantages as financial hubs. Threats, like the IRA’s targeting of the “City of London” and the Al Qaeda attacks on Lower Manhattan, have targeted not just innocent people in these cities, but have attempted to damage their ability to serve as focal points for networks of capital, ideas, goods, and services. The “Ring of Steel” in London and the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI) in New York are direct attempts to ensure the physical security that must surround the secure regulatory environment in order to maintain the cities roles as key nodes in the international
economy. The cities are, in a very real way, the “critical infrastructure” of the global economy.

The use of surveillance technology, physical security measures and targeted police deployments in heavy concentrations characterize both cities financial district security schemes. Closed circuit television (CCTV), license plate readers (LPRs), bollards and closed streets, and officers deployed to protect critical facilities are just part of large coordinated plans designed to ensure that NyLon remains two of the safest places to do business in the global economy.

Implications for Other Jurisdictions: Large Cities, Small Cities and the Emerging Urban Security Region

Implications for Other Large and “Global” Cities

Few cities will have the threat levels, economic resources, political autonomy, numerous other factors that conspired to create the counterterrorism programs in New York and London; or at least will have them in the scale the New York and London do. Many cities will have at least some of these aspects of their urban environment, in varying degrees. Some cities have major threat levels despite being smaller and less globalized. Some cities are comparatively affluent, but lack the threat levels or political autonomy that would make such programs feasible.

A natural place to look for cities that could have similar prospects for developing counterterrorism responses and solutions that would incorporate aspects of these programs are other large global cities. The Global Cities literature posits numerous thresholds and typologies for dividing up cities into tiers or levels of globalization. However, unsurprisingly, some come up more than others. Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Madrid, Mumbai, Dubai, Chicago and others have similar economic
characteristics to New York and London. Other cities are mentioned as being globalized along other parameters - particular industries (Houston – for petroleum), cultural centrality (Rome, Los Angeles, Las Vegas), centers of governance (Washington, Brussels) and other facets of modern urban dynamics all play into the new globalized city.

These cities that have particular cultural or political resonance beyond their mere population and size are an interesting group. Whether it is because they are home to a modern international culture industry like gaming (Las Vegas, Macau) or media production (for example Los Angeles and Mumbai, for Hollywood and Bollywood respectively), or longstanding cultural importance like Rome, the connections that these culture industries create can globalize these cities in a meaningful way. For example, in a study of security efforts in Rome, Maria Grazia Galantino very accurately described Rome as “a middle city with Mega-fears.” The connections emerging from these cultural centers, both tangible (international flights, telecommunication infrastructure, etc) and intangible (connections based on the importance of the cultural products), serve to connect these cities to international globalization in a way that a similarly sized city without such industries simply is not.

Arguably these places, both moderately large globalized cities and those with global cultural linkages, share some structural similarities and global networking that might mirror New York and London, and could thus benefit from the cities experience in protecting itself from globalized threats. How might these cities adopt, adapt and utilize strategies that New York and London pioneered to improve their own preparedness?
This answer reflects a broader version of what New York and London have done through their own interaction, both bilaterally and more broadly. The sharing of best practices and diffusion of tactics, and the creation of networks of urban security practitioners are key. Both sharing approaches to urban counterterrorism and creating transnational relationships with fellow practitioners are arguably reaching their apex in New York and London, but in both cases this change is indicative of a broader trend. This trend of internationalized urban counter-terror measures and perspectives has been adopted at the city level outside these two global metropoles (albeit in smaller scale).

The sharing of tactics and practices can be seen in many aspects of what the cities do, however the clearest example may be in the adoption by New York of London’s famed Ring of Steel to protect its financial center. The creation of heavily “fortified” and monitored areas to protect urban centers and key strategic industries is one that has spread outward in a somewhat less systematic and obvious way. The use of street closings, closed circuit television cameras (CCTV), license plate readers (LPRs) and other technology and techniques enables the city authorities to have greater situational awareness and control over areas deemed critical. New York is in the process of adapting this model for the financial district of lower Manhattan in the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI), and to a lesser extent in a planned Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative. Examples also exist of the “ring of steel” approach being adopted in Baghdad, Iraq, and rhetorically (if not literally) being adopted in Mumbai, India following the terrorists attacks in 2008.

Larger global cities are also adopting some of the police liaison approaches that NYPD and the London Metropolitan Police have pioneered. In the same way that New
York and London, and their respective police forces exchange information (and sometimes personnel), police forces more widely have begun to exchange officers for terrorism liaison and intelligence purposes. This is almost always on short, temporary assignments, and thus differs from the NY and London programs. That said though, while the medium is different (short temporary duty assignments vs. permanent liaison stations) the content is often similar. The transmission of best practices, recent intelligence and innovative tactics amongst “urban security practitioners” is an increasingly common and important part of police operations.

**Los Angeles: A Model of Mid-Level Internationalization?**

>“These contacts, these cop-to-cop connections, are vital in our pursuit of solutions to both homeland security and crime problems.” - Police Chief William Bratton, LAPD

One need look no further than Los Angeles to see a lower level version of these same types of officer and information exchanges. While Los Angeles is not as globalized as New York or London, and while it has the structural limitations discussed earlier, the department has adopted versions of many of these same programs. The Los Angeles Police Department has seconded an officer to the London Metropolitan Police for intelligence sharing purposes, and following the Mumbai attacks deployed officers in the same manner New York has often done. In fact the Chief of the LAPD, William Bratton, has explicitly lauded the creation of international liaisons and networking as a key facet of his cities counterterrorism efforts.

>“One of the great developments of the past few years has been the dramatic expansion of the law enforcement network internationally... based in part on the necessity of immediate and actionable intelligence after the attacks of 11th September and 7th July, local police have realized that their federal governments lack the ability to provide a meaningful and timely link, a cop-to-cop link between police agencies across the globe.”
The LAPD team heading to Mumbai took advantage of the same internal human capital in the LAPD that the NYPD programs had. Using officers of diverse backgrounds, particularly first and second-generation immigrants, has proven a very valuable tool in dealing with international issues at the local level.

“We have got a good team assembled --myself and SWAT members, and an intelligence lieutenant and a detective working in robbery/homicide department who hails from Mumbai, has a family here and knows the language and the lay of the land.”

The team’s goals sound very familiar when compared with the NYPD and Metropolitan Police terrorism liaisons: “’to learn, observe, and bring back best practices to LAPD...’ but may go even further recognizing the emergence of a city network that benefits from such liaisons. One of the teams stated goals, is to take any gathered information and “to disseminate to other major cities to help guard against Mumbai-like terrorist attacks on American soft targets.”

**Smaller Cities: Tactical Diffusion, Reorientation and Differences of Scale**

Smaller cities too are likely see implications spreading out from these new approaches to policing, and the integration of “national security” into local concerns. A shift in small Police Departments’ orientations, toward including terrorism as a major concern, is a noted (if not yet fully understood) phenomena. This change is of course not as extreme as the shift in orientation undertaken by high profile targets like New York and London, but as two of the largest and most recognized “brands” in law enforcement, they inevitably provide a model for smaller police departments despite differences in resources and threat levels.
There is an understanding amongst smaller cities that many of the same capabilities and orientations adopted by major global cities are required, in some capacity. While they have the neither the resources (financial or human), nor the political freedom to pursue massive internationalized terrorism programs, some of the same kinds of approaches are diffusing outward from larger cities. Large cities like Chicago and Los Angeles have visited NYPD’s terrorism operations to learn, but so have smaller (and decidedly less “global”) cities like Phoenix, AZ. The new Regional Intelligence Cell (RIC) structure - creating surveillance, intelligence collection and intelligence analysis capabilities for deployment regionally - in the United Kingdom has grown out of a recognition that smaller police agencies require support to conduct “national security” investigations they would otherwise be ill equipped for.

This “large city-to-small city” diffusion is not a new phenomenon. For example the first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), combining local and federal officers, was formed in New York City in the 1980s. This model however spread quickly. In fact, today, according to the FBI these task forces now exist “In 100 cities nationwide, including at least one in each of our 56 field offices. Sixty-five of these JTTFs were created after 9/11/01.” While this model moved as a result of the FBI spreading it from the top down, it is indicative of a fact that a need that was pressing in a large city (New York City) was seen to have an analog at the level of smaller cities.

Another example of this diffusion is the ACAMS program. The Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) is a computer program designed to catalogue and analyze critical infrastructure in a given jurisdiction, which was developed by the Los Angeles Police Department in conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security. In this case, a model developed largely by a city police department, albeit with federal support, has diffused not just to other smaller cities, but also to many states around the United States.

Another interesting way in which police tactics, related to terrorism and more generally, can spread is through the dispersal of people from a particular department. The NYPD for example has seemed to act as a “feeder” department minting out police executives who have gone on to lead departments across the United States, both in large cities and smaller ones. Heather MacDonald has studied what she has termed “the NYPD diaspora.” She outlines how former high-level NYPD personnel have gone on, in recent years, to take the reins of departments in large cities like Miami, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, but also in smaller cities like Newton, MA, East Orange, NJ and Hartford, CT. MacDonald focuses on the diffusion of the COMPSTAT model of policing from the mid 1990s until about 2005, but includes discussion of how other aspects of the NYPD experience also translate down to smaller jurisdictions. Often times these new chiefs have to adjust to differing levels of resources both human (number of officers, language skills and cultural understandings, level of specialization, etc) and financial (small cities lack the budgetary flexibility of New York). It seems likely that a similar kind of diffusion could follow in the post-2001 era, with new NYPD understandings of counterterrorism roles moving out to smaller municipal departments with similar resource constraints.
Implications for the Study of Security

Implications for the Study of International Security - Globalization

The implications of these new police practices for theoretical studies of globalization are clear. These expanded, internationalized municipal police forces help to incorporate security into areas of study that for far too long looked mainly at economic and socio-cultural issues, while largely ignoring “high politics.” That high politics continued to be, or at least to appear, state-centric is probably a large part of why they were under-theorized. What these new practices do is add a new dimension to the increasing realization that theories of globalization are also relevant to issues of security. While perhaps less transnational than economic relations, the expansion of security to a supranational issue is becoming more and more accepted. There however has been virtually no recognition of sub-state actors in international security, and it is here that theories of globalization offer important insights into transnational relations that apply across economic, social and security issues. This dissertation is one of numerous ongoing attempts to better integrate theories of globalization into security studies, hoping to ensure that the field keeps pace with the rapidly changing international environment.

Implications for the Study of International Security – Organizational Studies

Increasing amounts of time and effort have been used to begin examining, analyzing and hopefully understanding the organizational characteristics of adversaries and groups that pose security threats in the globalized world. Terrorist groups have been analyzed as learning organizations, transnational advocacy groups, multi-national corporations, and a host of other lenses.
It was not really until several years ago that a similar focus on how government agencies and bureaucracies are responding to these new organizations really began to take hold. Looking at law enforcement, intelligence and security networks is still in its infancy. This dissertation makes an effort to document newly arising security networks, understand their formation and mechanics, and analyze where they fit in the broader discussion of international security.

**Implications for the Study of International Security – International Politics**

One of the major arguments presented here is that these new practices and networks are novel, constituting a meaningful shift in international politics. That said, there are existing theories of international politics that can be used to analyze these issues in ways that offer important insights. Functionalism and neo-functionalism, Transnational Relations, Epistemic Communities, Global Governance, and other mainstream elements of international politics relate clearly to the emergence of transnational law enforcement communities and networks.

Interestingly, those studying international politics and security often tend to avoid discussions of crime and law enforcement, dismissing them in favor of a focus on “security” issues which are seen as more consequential. However the blending of crime and security, and the fact that many new threats are countered as much by law enforcement as the military is making that a less and less tenable position. Conversely, many studying crime tend to downplay international politics and security issues seeing them as part of a different discipline. This too is becoming harder to sustain intellectually. Not only do international politics provide the context in which much crime now takes place, but also increasingly, the fates of international criminals, international
law enforcement and states are becoming intertwined. From terrorism, to corruption, to
narco-insurgency, and in countless other ways, states are becoming defined and
sometimes destroyed by international criminal activity.
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/CCJG/reviews/CampbellSystematicReviewOnTerrorism02062006FINAL_REVISED.pdf
6 - Koschade, Stuart. 2006. A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence.  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.  29.  559-575
8 - Friedmann, J. 1995
17 See
33 The only meaningful exception is in the literature on Agroterrorism, one example is Butler Harrington, L. 2003 Bioweaponry and Agroterrorism in Cutter, S. Richardson, B. and Wilbanks, T. 2003. The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism.
54 Deflem publications are all cited at http://www.cas.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcvpubl.html
60 See Tokyo Metropolitan Police website http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/foreign/gaiyo2/kouan1.htm
61 See discussion in McGarrell, Edmund. And Joshua Friedlich and Steve Chermak. Intelligence-Led Policing as a Framework for Responding to Terrorism. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. 23(2) pg 143-144
63 For further explanation of the dynamics that enable these expansions see: Nussbaum, Brian. (2007) Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counterterrorism. Global Crime. 8 (3)
68 Ratcliffe, J. 2009. 'Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating risk and influencing action', in Marilyn B. Peterson, MB, Bob Morehouse and Richard Wright (Eds) INTELLIGENCE 2010: Revising the Basic Elements, IALEIA.


see for example National Commission on Terrorism 2000


Arquilla, J. and D. Ronfeldt. 1996. The Advent of Netwar. RAND: Santa Monica, CA.

Arquilla, J. and D. Ronfeldt. 1996. The Advent of Netwar. RAND: Santa Monica, CA.

Arquilla, J. and D. Ronfeldt. 1996. The Advent of Netwar. RAND: Santa Monica, CA.

Arquilla, J. and D. Ronfeldt. 1996. The Advent of Netwar. RAND: Santa Monica, CA.


See

For a comprehensive discussion of the structural changes to NYPD for counterterrorism, and the internationalization of its policing, see the article Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counterterrorism in the November 2007 issue of the journal Global Crime.


Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate’, 9 December 2006.


105 Information regarding the International Liaison Service of the Metropolitan Police Service comes from a series of Interviews with Metropolitan Police Officials, and documents accessed by the author in February 2007 at New Scotland Yard, London, United Kingdom.


111 See:

112 http://www.policeforum.org/


Examples include:


Eddy, RP. 2005. In the End, All Terrorism is Local. *Times Online*. July 8. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article541530.ece


All incidents are described in Lardner and Reppetto 2000


207 CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.
208 CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.


Metropolitan Police 2009 Available at http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

Metropolitan Police 2009 Available at http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm

SOCA Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author in London.

Metropolitan Police 2009 Available at http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

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City of London Police. 2009. Project ARGUS. http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/CityPolice/CT/ProjectArgus/


Authors Collection.


CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

CTC Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

Details of federal homeland security grant programs can be found at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_programs.htm


CTC Command Officials. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard. 1/30/07, 2/1/07

CTC Command Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard. 2/4/07


CTC Command Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard. 1/30/07

CTC Command Email Follow Up 6/20/07

CTC Command Email Follow Up 6/20/07

CT Command Official. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.


NYPD Liaison Officer. 2008. Interview conducted by author in New York City.

NYPD Liaison Officer. 2008. Interview conducted by author in New York City.

CTC Command Email Follow Up 6/20/07


CTC Command Officials. 2007. Interview conducted by author at New Scotland Yard.

1/30/07

All NYPD intelligence products discussed are in authors collection.


See for example the American Enterprise Institute discussion at http://www.aei.org/outlook/12743


See details of the LAPD “Operation Archangel” Critical infrastructure protection program, as well as info on ACAMS at http://www.lapdonline.org/emergency_services_division/content_basic_view/33044


Two key examples are:


Appendix 1 – Interview Data

The interviews conducted for this dissertation included conversations, structured and unstructured, with officials and officers across several agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities. They were conducted by the author, in person, in both New York and London between January 2007 and Spring of 2008. There were also several email exchanges between the author and interviewees, and where these emails were the source of information, they are cited as such.

During my London trip I interviewed at least a dozen individuals who worked within the Counterterrorism Command, several more in other areas of the Metropolitan Police, and several officials who worked in other agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities who worked with the Metropolitan Police.

In New York I had the good fortune to interview several high ranking officials within the department, including the Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism Richard Falkenrath. I also individually spoke to several officers who served as liaisons overseas for the NYPD Intelligence division. Finally, I spoke to several other officers at NYPD in both “on the record” and “off the record” capacities.
Appendix II - Regionalizing Urban Security?

Luton, Leeds and 7/7 – Is There an Emerging Metropolitan Security Region?

The July 7, 2005 London Transit bombings were indicative of an important aspect of terrorism: namely that plots are often hatched nearby but outside the area in which they ultimately occur. Police investigations quickly showed that the bombs were assembled in a Leeds apartment, and several of the bombers were living or spending time in the Luton area before using the London suburb as a launching point for the United Kingdom’s deadliest terrorist bombing ever.\textsuperscript{309} Luton is 32 miles north of London, and Leeds is about 180 miles away. (Comparable distances from Manhattan would be cities like White Plains, NY – about 30 miles away – and Albany, NY – about 140 miles away)

The realization that terrorists can and have often targeted cities from surrounding areas has the potential to have to create a new conception of geographic security. Urban security could be expanded to view the urban region as the key way of looking at how to protect a city. This regional approach to global cities, and their surrounding areas, has already gained a hold in the urban studies world,\textsuperscript{310} but has not yet been discussed in explicitly security relevant terms.

There is some evidence that this is the case. The UASI and Secure the Cities programs from the US Department of Homeland Security take explicitly urban-region based approaches to distributing homeland security funds and measuring security capabilities. Outreach programs by both the NYPD and the London Metropolitan Police also take explicitly regional approaches, attempting to work with communities neighboring the cities to ensure security for their citizens.
There is also the realization that often times, cities rely on infrastructure and security efforts that exist outside their municipal boundaries. New York City, for example receives its drinking water from a vast series of reservoirs and infrastructure that is in counties and cities upstate, and outside municipal boundaries.\(^{311}\) The New York City regional transit systems connect with New Jersey and Connecticut as well, and as such both rail and ferry security are directly connected with those efforts conducted not just by other cities, but other states.\(^{312}\) These ever increasing levels of interconnection and interdependence mean that cities are no longer islands, but rather are enmeshed in a networked world, with all the implications that has for security.

While this may or may not be indicative of a meaningful expansion of urban centers, viewed from a security perspective, it is an area that requires further study. There are numerous examples of security efforts that are designed to protect urban areas that move beyond directly local efforts (like police deployments) to incorporate regional partners. Intelligence “fusion” (i.e. the collection, sharing, and cooperative analysis of intelligence across disciplines and geographic areas) remains a focus of counter-terrorism responses, and it is this kind of deliberately multi-jurisdictional approach that would naturally fit in a regional context.

**The Joint Terrorism Task Force Model – The United States**

The Joint Terrorism Task Force Model (JTTF) is an attempt by the FBI to accommodate numerous needs of their own, those of local law enforcement, and to more effectively counter a threat that does not respect jurisdictional lines: terrorism. JTTFs, 65 of them in cities around the country (including 1 in each of the 56 Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Offices),\(^{313}\) are organizations led by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and designed to allow greater coordination between national level law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement. The members of JTTFs, overseen by a Supervisory Special Agent, work together to coordinate resources (workspace, technical equipment, vehicles, manpower), conduct inquiries (including surveillance and electronic monitoring), and to investigate crimes associated with terrorism.

Based on an ad hoc model developed at the New York City field office in 1979 to deal with bank robberies, the task force model was soon adopted to deal with terrorist threats. Originally a small group of 11 NYPD Detectives and 11 FBI Field Agents, the New York City JTTF has grown substantially, especially after September 2001. Today there are more than one hundred and twenty officers from the NYPD seconded to the New York City JTTF. However the growth of the New York JTTF is only part of a much larger growth of the JTTF program. Over the past several decades, the JTTF model has spread to cities around the country and has become one way, if not the key way, which local law enforcement has been incorporated into “national security.” Overseen by the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) in Washington, the JTTF has become the hallmark domestic counterterrorism program. The NJTTF can be directly contacted by any local law enforcement in the United States, however the local JTTFs provided a natural avenue of contact and a country-wide network of multi-agency nodes.

The JTTF has two purposes, one reactive and one proactive. The reactive purpose is to investigate acts of terrorism, suspicious activity that could indicate potential terrorism, and to investigate any criminal activity with a terrorist nexus. The proactive purpose is to “investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals targeting or operating within the … metropolitan area for the purpose of detecting,
preventing, and prosecuting their criminal activity.” 317 Before the September 11th attacks there were 35 established JTTFs around the United States, however following the attacks Director Robert Mueller mandated the creation of JTTFs at every field office around the country. 318

JTTFs consist of personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, other federal agencies (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Intelligence Community Partners, etc), State Level Law Enforcement and local county or municipal police agencies. Each of the local officers assigned to the JTTF are given federal security clearances so that they have access to national security sensitive information. 319 Interestingly in an attempt to overcome some of the bureaucratic and organizational tendencies of interagency hurdles and loyalties, each JTTF is encouraged to “create their own seals, patches, and jackets.” 320

The Regional Intelligence Cell Model – The United Kingdom

Unlike the JTTF model in the United States, the Regional Intelligence Cell model in the United Kingdom is a bit narrower than the JTTF. Largely as a function of institutional differences (mainly the lack of a strong centralized national law enforcement body) the Regional Intelligence Cells (RICs) are not run by supervisory federal agents, but they serve much the same purpose: supplying local law enforcement with intelligence, expertise and analytic and surveillance capabilities for counterterrorism. Coordinated between Special Branches in the Metropolitan Police Service and local Special Branches, the Regional intelligence Cells are designed to:

“support the co-ordination of activity on a regional basis in accordance with the principles of the National Intelligence Model, which supports the identification and
prioritisation of business. Working through Regional Special Branch tasking and co-ordination groups and other fora they provide regional strategic assessments of terrorism and other threats and develop regional responses to these issues in conjunction with police colleagues and partner agencies.”

The structural differences between the United States and United Kingdom law enforcement landscapes play a key role in understanding the different arrangements that arise to accomplish similar goals. There is a national level information sharing structure in the Joint Terrorism Assessment Centre (JTAC) over seen by the British domestic intelligence agency MI5, however the RIC structure accomplishes numerous similar activities in parallel (albeit at a lower level). By pooling resources, and with coordinating some national level help, the regional Special Branches around the United Kingdom are able to utilize these regional cells to maintain capabilities that would be beyond the resources and specialization of all but the largest jurisdictions.

Because the cells view local law enforcement as their primary customer, rather than junior level partners, the dynamics between locals and RICs are slightly different. Local agencies contribute officers and resources to the Regional Intelligence Cells for use on both local and regional projects and investigations. For example, the following passage is from a report by the Gwent Police District:

“The force Special Branch has supported the work of the regional intelligence cell (RIC) and has been involved in joint intelligence-gathering operations. It has also utilised the services of the analyst at the RIC on purely Gwent-based intelligence-gathering operations.”
Regional Enforcement Resources to Support Local Operations

Both of these arrangements take an explicitly regional approach, with the JTTF regions defined by law enforcement jurisdictions – with the FBI using its Field Offices and the Regional Intelligence Cells based on several police districts. While FBI Field Offices are by their nature tied to particular urban areas, a case could be made that the Regional Intelligence Cells are less tied to urban areas per se. While that is true, a series of terrorism arrests in smaller cities outside the London area made clear that such areas had serious threats despite lacking a police force with sufficient specialization to ensure surveillance and analysis capabilities. While they differ in several key aspects, particularly the extent to which they are guided and run from the national level, both approaches seem to recognize the increasingly regional nature of threats to cities.

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311 See the New York City Department of Environmental Protection for details: http://nyc.gov/html/dep/html/drinking_water/maplevels_wide.shtml
312 For details see the websites of the Metropolitan Transit Authority http://www.mta.info/ and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey http://www.panynj.gov/
316 The Anti-Defamation League. The History of the JTTF. Available at: http://www.adl.org/learn/jttf/history_JTTF.asp
317 The Anti-Defamation League. The History of the JTTF. Available at: http://www.adl.org/learn/jttf/history_JTTF.asp
321 The Home Office. Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom.
Appendix III - City Under Siege: The November 2008 Attack on Mumbai, India

In light of November 2008 Terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, there has been a flurry of discussion about urban terrorism and guerilla warfare, since it became horrifically clear that a small number of armed terrorists could seize key portions of a major international city. This discussion, largely in policy and media rather than scholarly circles, has focused in large part on the ability of cities to respond to such “fedayeen” style armed assaults. Beyond the discussions of counter-assault teams and the like though, there has also been some signs of an emerging recognition of the practical and the symbolic importance of cities in the global world. While the practical aspect (with cities housing concentrations of people, industry, infrastructure and other social capital) should come as no surprise, the symbolic aspects are equally important when discussing terrorist targeting.

It is well established that terrorist attacks, and their targeting, are often imbued with important symbolic meaning, few have expressed this idea as clearly as Christopher Hitchens did after the attacks on Mumbai and the Islamabad Marriott Hotel the same year.

“...the whole concept of a cosmopolitan city open to its own citizens and to the world—a city on the model of Sarajevo or London or Beirut or Manhattan. There is, of course, a reason they attract the ire and loathing of the religious fanatics. To the pure and godly, the very existence of such places is a profanity. In a smaller way, the same is true of the Islamabad Marriott hotel, where I also used to stay. It was a meeting point and crossroads for foreigners. It had a bar where the Pakistani prohibition rules did not apply. Its dining rooms and public spaces featured stylish Asian women who showed their faces. And so it had to be immolated, like any other Sodom or Gomorrah.”

More and more cities are being recognized by practitioners, policymakers, reporters, and now finally scholars as well, as one of the key geographic and political
features of international security. This recognition, stemming largely from international
terrorist threats and the response to them, has many implications for the study of
international security.

http://www.slate.com/id/2205710/