Explaining torture and its reduction in a police department: a view from below

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EXPLAINING TORTURE AND ITS REDUCTION IN A POLICE DEPARTMENT: A VIEW FROM BELOW

by

Ahmet Guler

A Dissertation

Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York

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ABSTRACT

This is an ethnographic study of police deviance and police reform. This study investigates how organizational members rationalize the torture they perpetuated in the past, how they explain their sensemaking process and organizational identity change during the change process using empirical data from a counterterrorism division of the metropolitan police department (MPD) in a prospective member state of the EU.

In order to understand how MPD members explain the reasons for the improvements in human rights practices, the counterterrorism division of the MPD was selected as the focus of the ethnographic research. After completing the data collection process, the data were analyzed to find possible answers to the defined research questions. During this analysis, it became evident that the informants (police officers and managers) used several rationalization techniques to justify the torture practices they had used in the past. As the informants tried to explain why their division had used torture in the past, their explanations provided good examples of how deviant practices are normalized and rationalized among the police.

Furthermore, this study analyzes how CTD members explain the improvements in human rights practices that require major shifts in their cognitive understandings. This enabled us to explore police officers’ and managers’ sensemaking process within the change process as well as their perceptions about organizational identity change. In addition, while analyzing MPD members’ sensemaking process of change, this study explored MPD members’ reactions to the change initiated from above. While talking
about the practice of change, informants provided valuable information about their resistance to change, which mostly arose from their organizational identity.

As a result, the problem to be addressed in this project is how police officers rationalize the torture they perpetrated in the past and how they perceive their identity reconstruction process. Whereas analyzing the rationalization of torture contributes to the police deviance literature by providing empirical data on the rationalization techniques of torture by the police, examining the identity construction process adds new knowledge about organizational identity change as well as identity resistance to the police management literature.

**Keywords:** Torture; Rationalization; Police Deviance; Human Rights; Identity Change
DEDICATION

To my wife, Elif

To my daughters, Sila and Ela
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CHAPTER 1 –THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Introduction

Human rights are an important concern for states interested in joining the European Union (EU), which expects candidate states to meet standards for human rights as a requirement for entering the EU. One particular prospective member state has demonstrated tireless efforts to resolve its torture and maltreatment problems—most prevalent in police departments, especially in counterterrorism divisions. Its police departments have focused their efforts on eradicating torture and maltreatment practices, resulting in numerous structural and human rights policy changes in the metropolitan police department (MPD). The EU as well as other national and international organizations have recognized such change efforts and improvements in minimizing torture and maltreatment in the MPD. I will explain this case in detail below to give a general idea about the reform process and its results without citing references to protect the confidentiality of research.

The prospective member state has a long historical relationship with the EU to be a member of the Union which goes back to 1960s. The candidacy process and negotiations about full membership forced the prospective member state to complete many necessary tasks. The EU demanded lots of changes in the structure of the government and its policies. In this process, the EU has provided financial support to the prospective member state for the development in many policy areas such as education, governmental reform, and economic adjustment to meet the criteria of the EU
membership. However, human rights problems are among the main obstacles in joining the EU. The EU criticized the prospective member state for its human rights problems. After application for full membership at the end of 1980s, three main organizations of the EU played a significant role to improve human rights conditions in the prospective member state. These are the Commission of the European Communities, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).

First, the Commission of the European Communities has prepared Annual Progress Reports for the prospective member state to define its deficiencies and improvements in order to join the EU. In these reports, the EU has criticized the prospective member state about its human rights abuses. The prospective member state has been advised to correct its policies and practices against human rights, mainly for torture. However, in the latest progress report in 2006, the Commission appreciated improvements in the human rights policy of the prospective member state and the reforms done by the government related to human rights were regarded as positive actions toward joining the EU.

Second, the ECtHR was established to review cases about human rights abuses of the states which signed the European Convention on Human Rights and accepted the authority of the ECtHR. The prospective member state signed the Convention and accepted the authority of the ECtHR to review human rights complaints at the end of 1980s. Since then, the judgments of the ECtHR sanctioned the prospective member state to pay compensation to prosecutors because of human rights abuses. Up to now, many cases related to the prospective member state have been reviewed by the ECtHR and the decisions of this court have directly affected the prospective member state’s human rights
policy. According to a recent ECtHR report related to cases about the prospective member state, there are very few complaints related to torture in the police to the Court.

In addition, the prospective member state has accepted the authority of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) regarding its visits to governmental bodies related to criminal justice at the beginning of the 1990s. The CPT, founded in 1987, has a mission to fulfill the Article III of the European Convention on Human Rights which states “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The CPT visits countries to see the conditions of detainees and makes recommendations for improvements. The experts of the CPT consist of lawyers, medical doctors, and specialists on prisons and police departments. These experts are independent and impartial. The experts generally visit police stations, prisons and juvenile detention centers, holding centers for immigration detainees and psychiatric hospitals to see the conditions of detainees in these places (Kriebaum, 2002).

The CPT has carried out more than 20 visits to the prospective member state since 1990 to see whether human rights conditions in the country have advanced enough for fulfilling the requirement of the EU. At the end of each visit, the CPT prepared reports to indicate deficiencies of visited organizations related to human rights conditions. When we look at these reports, while earlier reports harshly criticize police departments because of torture and ill-treatments, later reports state that police departments have improved their human rights conditions. According to the 2006 CPT Report, human rights policy changes related to criminal justice area of the prospective member state have demonstrated “the desired impact on the ground.”
More specifically, CPT visited the CTD of the MPD nine times to assess the human rights conditions in the division since 1990. When we look at earlier reports, CPT delegations identified severe torture practices such as suspension by the arms, the application of electric shocks, squeezing of the testicles or stripping persons naked and hosing them with cold water occurred in the CTD. However, according to the report related to the last visit to the CTD in 2005, there had been significant improvements during their last visit and there was no torture case identified by them or reported to them by suspects, their lawyers, or other national human rights NGOs. Therefore, these improvements show that human rights conditions in police departments are changing in a positive way and the CTD has abandoned torture practices according to the CPT.

Besides EU human rights organizations, international human rights NGOs also paid attention to the human rights conditions in the prospective member state. In particular, two international human rights NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, prepared several reports, submitted press releases, and sent letters to the prospective member state’s government concerning human rights abuses. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both complained about a variety of human rights abuses committed by the police of the prospective member state in their annual human rights reports. Government officials in the prospective member state paid attention to these statements and activities of the international human rights NGOs. According to the latest reports published by Human Rights Watch, although implementing new legislative reforms concerning human rights safeguards in law enforcement agencies all across the country remains problematic, the prospective member state has made significant progress eradicating torture and ill-treatment by the police. Similarly, according to a latest report
by Amnesty International, although human rights violations continue to be inadequately investigated, there is significant reductions in the incidence of torture and ill-treatment by police while in custody, especially in the Counterterrorism Divisions of city police departments.

In order to improve its human rights conditions, there have been rigorous efforts in the MPD. First of all, to improve the educational awareness of police officers about human rights, human rights courses started to be taught at the Police Academy in 1991 and the Police Vocational Schools in 1992. Thus, police officers and police managers started to learn about human right issues before they begin their jobs. Moreover, the MPD arranged a lot of human rights drills for police officers and police managers especially in its counterterrorism division. Besides these educational efforts, the MPD prepared books and pamphlets about human rights to inform police officers and police managers. These educational efforts influenced the human rights practices of police officers.

In addition, there have been many adaptations of prospective members state’s law to European law for eliminating human rights abuses in police departments. These adaptations have radically affected policing practices. Police departments have changed their rules and standards according to the new laws. Significant changes are the strict implementation of exclusionary rule, the reduction of custody time in police stations, the right of informing relatives when a member of the family is under custody, the provision of a defense attorney for suspects who are under custody, and the increase of charges for human rights abuses. In addition, the conditions of jails in police stations and counterterrorism divisions improved to meet the requirements of the EU standards. All of
these improvements have changed the practice of policing and made the conditions of human rights better in the MPD.

In fact, the exclusionary rule decision of the United States (US) Supreme Court as a result of the Mapp v. Ohio (1961) case has similarities with the MPD case explained above. The result of the Mapp v. Ohio (1961) was that evidence obtained while using illegal techniques by the police could not be used in a criminal prosecution. This decision had a major effect on the crime investigation procedures of American police departments (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). In order to ensure compliance with the US Supreme Court decision regarding exclusionary rule, American police departments underwent significant efforts, such as improving their recruitment and education standards, providing in-service training, adjusting court decisions, and changing the department’s standard operating procedure (Walker, 2005). According to the research findings concerning compliance with the exclusionary rule in police departments, some police departments resisted the new rule at the beginning, but later studies showed that the police now all generally comply with the court order (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

The MPD case provides an important topic for study because torture is an endemic problem for countries that are threatened by terrorism. Wars against terrorism bring forth issues of torture and maltreatment not only in developing countries, but also in developed countries. Ethical standards and human rights obligations are disregarded to get crucial information from terror suspects, thereby ensuring national security. Consequently, people debate how to balance the urgent needs of national security and the requirements of human rights. As a result, the problem of terrorism affects not only economic, political, and security issues, but also civil rights issues within the country.
A thin line exists between protecting a country against terrorist attacks and ensuring human rights. When governments formally or informally authorize law enforcement agencies to use coercive interrogation techniques, they start down a slippery slope that often ends in torture. Law enforcement units become increasingly aggressive against suspects of terrorism and sometimes use illegal and unethical techniques to investigate terrorist activities. In the process, democratic values are damaged and human rights abuses ignored for the sake of combating terrorism.

Moreover, when these practices become institutionalized in law enforcement agencies, the eradication of such inappropriate techniques from organizational memory and routine becomes more difficult. Ashforth and Anand (2003) provided an effective model for explaining how corrupted behaviors are normalized within organizations. Their model helps explain how torture practices are normalized within law enforcement agencies. The model includes three pillars that provide a suitable environment for torture practices to be normalized: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Although leaders and organizational culture play key roles in institutionalizing torture practices, rationalization techniques provide justifications and excuses for law enforcement officers to mitigate the negative effects of carrying out torture. Moreover, new officers are gradually introduced to torture practices by seasoned officers during their socialization process. When all these factors come into play in an organization, torture becomes a common practice for a law enforcement agency during interrogation, making its elimination difficult.

In fact, organizational change in police departments is presented as a challenging task in the literature. Police culture in particular is depicted as resistant to change (Chan,
and generally associated with police officers’ negative behaviors (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). However, the prospective member state examined herein seems to have brought about a successful change in the police in regards to improvements its human rights practices and this practice change has been appreciated by the European Union (Commission of the European Communities, 2006 & 2007).

In order to understand how MPD members explain the reasons for the improvements in human rights practices, the counterterrorism division of the MPD was selected as the focus of the ethnographic research. After completing the data collection process, the data were analyzed to find possible answers to the defined research questions. During this analysis, it became evident that the informants (police officers and managers) used several rationalization techniques to justify the torture practices they had used in the past. As the informants tried to explain why their division had used torture in the past, their explanations provided good examples of how deviant practices are normalized and rationalized among the police. Thus, analyzing the rationalization techniques of torture in the MPD provides necessary insights about how deviant practices are justified by the police and what factors play roles in this rationalization process.

Given that the current literature lacks sufficient empirical research on police deviance (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004) and that rationalization techniques of deviant practices have not received enough attention from researchers (see Hunt & Manning, 1991; Kappeler et al., 1998), these areas warrant further research (Chan, 1999).

The first part of this dissertation research focused on counterterrorism officers’ rationalization techniques, thereby contributing to the counterterrorism literature by
providing in-depth analyses about the normalization techniques of torture in the counterterrorism context. Moreover, this analysis makes meaningful contributions to practical knowledge. Understanding the rationalization techniques of torture and analyzing this process provides police reformers and administrators information about the underlying causes of torture and its perpetuation.

Furthermore, this study analyzed how CTD members explain the improvements in human rights practices that require major shifts in their cognitive understandings. This enabled us to explore police officers’ and managers’ sensemaking process within the change process as well as their perceptions about organizational identity change. The police management literature approaches organizational change from the managerial perspective, disregarding police officers’ experiences as participants in the change process. Several researchers (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003; Ericson, 2001; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Isabella, 1990; Weick, 1995) have demonstrated that sensemaking is an important process for understanding how organizational members perceive change efforts in an organization. Organizational change serves as a catalyst for organizational members because it brings new ways of working into the organizational life (Apker, 2004; Maitlis, 2005). Organizational members engage in sensemaking, which is grounded in identity construction (Weick, 1995), to adapt changes into their identity. In particular, some researchers (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Reger, Gustafson, DeMarie, and Mullane, 1994a) have stated that major changes in organizations require cognitive reorientation of organizational members, which is directly related to organizational identity. In order to see a change in organizational identity, organizational members need to consider a change initiative as
necessary and achievable according to their collective organizational identity (Reger, Mullane, Gustafson, & DeMarie, 1994b). However, according to the current examination of police management literature, no study has analyzed organizational identity change in the police. Therefore, in order to fill the gap in the literature, this study examined CTD members’ explanations about their organizational identity change to understand how they reconstructed their organizational identity in order to meet the demands of human rights improvements mandated from above.

In addition, while analyzing MPD members’ sensemaking process of change, this study explored MPD members’ reactions to the change initiated from above. While talking about the practice of change, informants provide valuable information about their resistance to change, which mostly arises from their organizational identity. Most previous studies have approached resistance to change from a managerial perspective, offering several strategies to overcome resistance (Allen, 1997; Dantzker, 1999; More, Wegener, Vito, & Walsh, 2006). However, some organizational scholars (Gravenhorst, 2003; Kegan & Lahey, 2001; Lawrence, 1968; Perren & Megginson, 1996) have argued that resistance to change is a normal reaction that comes from organizational members seeking to protect the organization from inappropriate actions.

Moreover, Bartunek et al. (2006) argued that organizational change studies perceive change recipients as passive actors, approaching the experience of change recipients as resistance. In fact, change recipients’ sensemaking process of change and their adjustments to new changes may take some time, which can frustrate change agents (George & Jones, 2001). According to Reger et al. (1994b), organizational members engage in two kinds of resistance in order to protect their organizational identity: active
and passive resistance. While resistance occurs due to organizational members’ inability to fit a change initiative into their organizational identity, active resistance stems from cognitive opposition, which arises from the conflict between a proposed change and current organizational identity. If a top management initiates a change without providing connections to organizational identity, organizational members will show passive resistance such as apathy or anxiety against the change initiative. Thus, this research adds new insights about resistance to change in the police and how this resistance can be understood from the perspective of organizational identity, to which police scholars have not yet paid much attention. This analysis makes up the second part of the current research.

The current study investigated how organizational members rationalize the torture they perpetuated in the past, how they explain their sensemaking process and organizational identity change during the change process using empirical data from the counterterrorism division of the MPD in a prospective member state of the EU. Within the context of police deviance and police reform, the present study seek to address the following research questions:

1. How do police officers rationalize torture when explaining their previously used practices?

2. How do police officers manage their identity during a change initiated from above?

These research questions were answered from the perspective of MPD members using the ethnographic method to reflect native perspectives. It is necessary and appropriate to use the ethnographic method in this kind of research because it provides a
researcher to get “thick description” of the research context (Geertz, 1973). In addition, the ethnographic method also provides important advantages of studying sensitive topics such as deviance in my case because an ethnographer spends good amount of time with his/her research informants in order to get rich explanations about his/her research topic. Thus, this approach also makes an important contribution to the police deviance and the police management literature, which need further empirical research on police deviance (Chan, 1999; Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004) and police reform (Chan, 1997).

As a result, the problem to be addressed in this project is how police officers rationalize the torture they perpetrated in the past and how they perceive their identity reconstruction process. Whereas analyzing the rationalization of torture contributes to the police deviance literature by providing empirical data on the rationalization techniques of torture by the police, examining the identity construction process adds new knowledge about organizational identity change as well as identity resistance to the police management literature. Therefore, this study fills in the gaps in existent literature on police deviance and police reform.

**Organization of the Text**

This dissertation project comprises six chapters. Chapter I introduces the statement of the problem and research questions. Chapter II reviews the relevant literature to understand the research context and previous research related to the dissertation topic. Chapter III explains the data and the methodology of the dissertation project. Chapter IV analyzes how police officers in the MPD counterterrorism division under study rationalize their deviant practices of the past. Chapter V investigates MPD
members’ sensemaking process of the change initiative in this division to understand how
MPD members explain their organizational identity change as well as the MPD members’
responses to the change initiative from the perspective of MPD members. Finally,
Chapter VI discusses the contributions of this dissertation project pertinent to the
literature and practitioners.
CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This literature review consists of two sections. In the first section, explanations about torture and police deviance will be examined. In the second section of this literature review, organizational change and resistance to change in the police will be analyzed from a sensemaking perspective.

Explanations of Torture Behavior

According to the Article I of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, torture means “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Although the CPT refers to the definition of torture issued by the UN in its official documents, there is no explicit definition of torture used by the CPT. ECtHR decisions related to torture cases issued guidance to the CPT to define torture in each case (Morgan & Evans, 2001). In its reports, the CPT uses three different terms to classify physical ill-treatment: ill-treatment, severe ill-treatment, and torture (Morgan & Evans, 2001). According to this tripartite
classification, the CPT approaches torture as the most serious form of ill-treatment and can be defined as “specialized, or exotic, forms of violence purposefully employed to gain a confession or information, or generally intended to intimidate or humiliate” (Morgan & Evans, 2001, p.60). Both of these definitions of torture will be used to define torture in this study.

According to Miller (1999), two different theoretical perspectives in the literature explain why people do harm to others: dispositional and situational perspectives. Proponents of the dispositional perspective argue that psychological factors and personality orientations are the main causes of inhumane behavior, suggesting that people who do harm other people are abnormal individuals. Meanwhile, the situational perspective states that environmental factors are the primary determinants of destructive behavior. Proponents of this perspective say that destructive behaviors evolve over time; although individuals are inexperienced when they join a new social setting, they socialize and engage in harmful behavior as a result of forcing conditions.

As pioneers in the study of the dispositional perspective, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) started a project after World War II to investigate the root causes of anti-semitism that was later turned to the study of ethnocentrism. They developed the theory of authoritarian personality which was inspired by the psychodynamic theory of Sigmund Freud (Feldman, 2003). They believed that inhumane behavior and mass killings were done by Nazis because of dispositional factors. Thus, they proposed a cluster of authoritarian personality traits that come from early childhood experiences of individuals. They also designed the F-scale, which includes nine traits --conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression,
anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and "toughness," destructiveness and
cynicism, projectivity, and sex (Adorno et al., 1950, p.228)-- to measure authoritarian
personality. Even though the study of authoritarian personality and the F-scale received
methodological criticism, the theory of the authoritarian personality led to prolific
discussions in the literature on the causes of authoritarian behavior (Kreml, 1977).

However, Zimbardo (2005) criticizes the study of authoritarian personality
because it gives too much importance on internal dispositional factors while ignoring
situational factors. Zimbardo states that this bias of overemphasizing internal factors and
underemphasizing external factors, which was defined as the fundamental attribution
error by Lei Ross (1977), causes inaccurate explanations of the source of inhumane
behavior. He also says that the dispositional perspective, which is based on individualistic
values rather than collectivist values, provides a simplistic analysis of evil in the world
consisting of good and bad people.

Tsang (2002) states that while earlier studies on deviant behavior explained the
origin of immoral behavior from the dispositional approach, later studies have argued that
deviant behavior occurs because of a combination of situational and psychological
factors. According to the social psychological explanations, normal individuals have
potential to deviate from norms in suitable circumstances. In order to understand the role
of situational factors in engaging inhumane behavior, several experiments have been
conducted. Researchers have especially analyzed under what conditions people obey
authority, even disregarding ethical principles. Milgram (1974) conducted a series of
social psychological experiments to measure the willingness of people to obey authority.
Although Milgram started his first experiment in 1963, his most famous experiment
occurred in 1974. In this later experiment, 40 participants were recruited to participate in the experiment as a teacher. Two other roles—an experimenter and a learner—were carried out by associates of the researcher who were aware of the goal of the experiment.

The participants who were not informed of the experiment’s purposes were responsible for imposing electric shocks to the learner for each wrong answer in an experimental setting in which the learner was strapped to a chair and wired with electrodes. The participants, who sat in front of an electric shock generator, were instructed to increase the electric shock gradually, from 15 to 450 volts using 15-volt increments, for each wrong answer. Although the learner did not actually receive any shock, he/she pretended to feel pain and yelled to be released after every increased shock. The experimenter persuaded the participant to administer the shocks using verbal commands, starting with less authoritative and increasing to compelling orders.

After completing the experiment, the results indicated that 65 percent of the uninformed participants completed the experiment, applying the highest level of shock (450 volts) to the learner (Burger, 2009). According to Milgram (1974), this experiment demonstrates that participants were motivated to reach the highest level of shock not because of their sadistic personality, but due to their sense of obligation, which forced them to achieve the task at hand. In other words, this experiment shows that situational factors rather than dispositional factors define people’s behavior.

In addition, Zimbardo (1973) conducted an experiment known as the Stanford prison experiment in 1971 to determine the effects of being a “prisoner” or “guard” in a mock prison setting at Stanford University. Two dozen male college students were
chosen from among a large group of potential participants in order to create a homogenous, normal, and healthy pool of recruits for the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to their roles either as a prisoner or a guard. In an environment that very closely simulated an authentic prison setting, all the participants quickly adapted to their new roles; guards started to show aggressive behaviors while prisoners adopted more passive responses. Although the experiment was designed to end in two weeks, it had to be stopped on the sixth day due to pathological results experienced by the participants. Prisoner participants indicated severe depression; meanwhile, guard participants enjoyed having extreme power and control over prisoners. The results of this study refute the role of dispositional factors in shaping behavior and underscore the powerful role of situational factors (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973).

Recently, Burger (2009) replicated Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiment to determine whether the results would still be valid today. Although Burger only partially replicated the Milgram experiment due to ethical concerns, he says that he tried to mimic the experiment setting as much as possible. According to his results, the participants responded almost identically as they did in Milgram’s experiment. Burger states that, although changes have emerged in society, the situational factors that influenced the original participants remain valid today.

In addition, several studies have investigated why people commit inhumane behavior in real-life settings. For example, Arendt (1994) analyzed Adolf Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust under the Nazi regime. Arendt (1994) states that, although Eichmann supervised atrocious killings, he did his duty according to the characteristics of a perfect bureaucrat. Eichmann was a law-abiding citizen who obeyed the orders handed
down from his superiors. Arendt coined the term *banality of evil*, which refers to the idea that ordinary people are responsible for mass killings and genocides, such as Holocaust, rather than people who have sadistic and fascist personality characteristics.

However, Cesarani (2006) criticized Arendt’s presentation of Eichmann as a small cog in the Nazi system who merely did his duty in killing millions of Jewish people. Cesarani asserted that Arendt’s presentation of Eichmann stems from her predetermined and ideological background based on the theory of totalitarianism. For Cesarani, other factors emerge from social, psychological, political, and ideological dynamics to help explain how Eichmann evolved into such a horrendous murderer.

Tsang (2002) also analyzed why Nazis carried out such a dreadful massacre on the Jewish people. She believes that, rather than dispositional factors, a combination of situational and psychological factors were the main components driving the outcomes of the Holocaust. In her analysis, Tsang also explored how Nazis rationalized their atrocious practices during the Holocaust, stating that Nazis used several moral rationalization techniques to help them believe that their deviant behavior did not violate their moral standards. She believes that values, perceptions, and motivations play important roles in engaging in moral rationalization. Values are necessary in moral rationalization as people have to believe in moral standards to feel the need for rationalizing their immoral behavior. Moreover, perceptions are crucial elements for interpreting situational factors. Finally, individual motivations also play a role in moral rationalization because individual motivations generally compete with moral motivations; this conflict creates a need for moral rationalization.
Furthermore, according to Tsang (2002), several situational factors contribute to the moral rationalization process, including obedience to authority, roles, deindividuation, routinization, depersonalization, others’ inaction, and evil organizations. First, obedience to authority allows an immoral individual to justify his/her inhumane action by claiming that he/she just follows the orders to carry out his/her duty. Second, roles also play a role in the moral rationalization by giving an opportunity for an immoral individual to focus on the role, while disregarding its unethical consequences. Third, deindividuation also facilitates immoral behavior because perpetrators can engage in brutal actions more easily if they feel anonymous in an immoral situation. Thus, they avoid both social evaluation and self-evaluation which may cause the feeling of guilt. Moreover, routinization helps immoral individuals to see themselves as small cogs in the machine rather than active agents and to focus on the detail of the task they perform rather than the results of their tasks. The other situational factor, depersonalization, helps individuals to get rid of self-blame by desensitizing their actions by seeing themselves as a part of a big political movement. Also, not seeing any reaction from victims, bystanders, and other perpetrators to their immoral behavior encourages immoral individuals to continue their inhumane action. Finally, Tsang (2002) says that all these situational factors can be found in evil organizations, which provide a suitable environment for inhumane actions.

Smeulers (2004) also states that ordinary people transform into human rights violators in extraordinary circumstances. She analyzed the transformation process of ordinary people into cruel perpetrators, identifying five phases in the process: the preparation phase, the initiation phase, the first time, habituation and routinization, and
the turning point and exit. In the preparation phase, recruits are socialized and trained to follow orders strictly and obey authority in hierarchical organizations such as the military, police, secret service, or prisons. In the initiation phase, these recruits are slowly acclimated to inhumane practices. Although initially they simply observe torture, they gradually become involved in the application of different torture practices. In the third phase, recruits commit torture for first time, crossing the line between being an ordinary person and an evil person. As a reaction to this first crime, the perpetrator can refuse to continue, although this is very unlikely due to the social pressure and earlier training process; rather, the perpetrator is more likely to try to justify the torture. In the fourth phase, perpetrators start to see themselves as a cog in a machine; they believe that they cannot change the system even if they refuse to engage in such inhumane behaviors. Thus, they routinize their cruel habits with the assistance of rationalization techniques, minimizing their roles in torture, blaming and dehumanizing victims, and delineating their organizational life from their normal life in order to reduce any guilt or shame. In the final phase, although less likely to occur, perpetrators can decide to quit for several reasons. First, they may think that they cannot endure any more horrific practices, leading them to quit. They may also individualize the victim from prior experiences or close relationships. Lastly, perpetrators may not be able to manage the doubling strategy (Lifton, 1993), which helps them separate their organizational life from their social life. Such factors assist perpetrators in escaping the need to commit inhumane practices, although exiting is hard and rare.

Smeulers (2004) further examined how perpetrators explain their cruel practices of the past. Differences exist from individual to individual. Some perpetrators believe that
they tortured and killed people to protect their country; they seek refuge in their ideologies to justify their cruel behavior. Other perpetrators refuse the idea that they did any wrong in the past and fail to accept their responsibility by blaming other factors. Still others try to escape facing their old memories; they do not talk about them. Some individuals in this last group feel strong guilt and repentance, which can lead to psychological trauma and suicides.

In addition, De Zulueta (1996) reviewed the extant literature to analyze why people become torturers. She referred to the experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, stating that they demonstrated that—under suitable conditions—certain people can become torturers in order to obey authority. De Zulueta further claimed that personality factors formed in childhood also affect individuals’ chance of becoming torturers. She referred to cultural spillover theory, which proposes that cultural forms of upbringing influence individuals’ propensity to violence, to explain how childhood background provides a source for potential torturers. De Zulueta ultimately argued that states play a crucial role in institutionalizing torture by using torture as the government’s security strategy, whether formally or informally. Thus, individuals think that they are sanctioned by the state even when their act is immoral and falls outside the law.

Kelman (1989) also argued that mass killings of defenseless civilians cannot be explained using only psychological factors as, under certain conditions, moral principles are weakened by three social processes—namely, authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. Through authorization, people not only find justifications for their inhumane behavior, but also satisfy their feelings by obeying authority. After authorizing
inhumane behavior, people no longer question the rightness of their behavior; they become part of a larger system. Routinization helps people to avoid questioning their decision before carrying out an action, focusing only on the details of the job rather than the results of the action. The last step, dehumanization, helps people to avoid feelings of moral responsibility for victims by transforming the victims into non-human objects. These three social processes create suitable conditions for violent behavior by weakening moral obligations of individuals and groups.

In analyzing former Greek torturers, Haritos-Fatouros (2003) stated that individual traits and dispositions were not significant factors in the creation of torturers. He stated that, although certain developmental hardships existed in the past life of torturers, officers who showed psychopathology were sorted out by their organization during selection and recruitment processes. According to the results of the analysis, situational factors—rather than dispositional factors—played a major role in the creation of torturers in the Greek Military Police. In order to increase obedience to authority, Greek torturers were subjected to group pressure, harassment, compliance, and conformity by their supervisors and peers. In addition, to reduce the strain associated with carrying out inhumane behavior, several strategies were utilized, such as deindividuation of the victimizer within the group, dehumanization of the victim, blaming and devaluing the victim by portraying him/her as either being less than human or a threat to society, belief in a higher cause, social modeling, reinforcement of obedient behavior, and trivialization of evil. For Haritos-Fatouros (2003), these situational factors and cognitive processes not only permitted, but also routinized, torture in the Greek Military Police.
In a related study, Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo (2002) studied police violence in Brazil during the country’s military period, from 1964 to 1985, to understand how ordinary men became state torturers. The authors interviewed police officers who had carried out horrible atrocities on criminals. According to the authors, personality factors were not primary factors in transforming these men into torturers; rather, historical, political, sociological, organizational, and social-psychological factors were the main causes, changing ordinary members of the Brazilian Police into torturers. Whereas historical and political factors are related to the country’s military regime and its long history of torture, sociological and organizational factors are the results of socialization processes, police culture, and formal and informal training in the police organization. Meanwhile, social-psychological factors come into play when several mechanisms help individuals rationalize their inhumane behavior. These mechanisms include moral transformation, blind obedience, dehumanization of victims, neutralization of accountability, and moral disengagement. According to the authors, all these factors contribute to transforming a good man into an evil creature.

In conclusion, there is an extensive literature in social psychology indicating that social, psychological, political, and ideological factors rather than dispositional factors play role in the occurrence of torture. Although there is a large amount of research about how social, psychological, political, and ideological factors take roles in torture in general, there is little research about what kinds of rationalization techniques are used by individual torturers to justify torture and mitigate strain that comes from moral conflicts.
Police Deviance

In order to understand police torture, it is necessary to look at explanations of police deviance in the literature. In the earlier research, scholars discussed the determinants of police deviance in order to see whether personal traits are the source of police misbehavior, or if sociological pressures explain the root of police misbehavior (Niederhoffer, 1967). Later studies in police deviance have added new dimensions to explain it better. In the recent literature, while Worden (1996) reviews sociological, psychological, and organizational theories in order to explain the causes of police violence, Kappeler et al. (1998) state that psychological, sociological, and anthropological approaches explain the development of police character and police deviance. Kappeler et al. (1998) also say that rationalization techniques as cognitive factors are important for learning and justifying police deviance. Therefore, this section will review personality, sociological, organizational, anthropological, and cognitive explanations of police deviance and explore a synthesis model developed by Ashforth and Anand (2003) to provide a comprehensive model of normalizing police deviance.

Personality Approach

Researchers who approach police deviance from a personality perspective state that the personality of a police officer determines his/her behavior. Police officers behave according to their personal dispositions in their job. For the proponents of this approach, policing as a masculine occupation attracts certain types of people such as authoritarian individuals (Rapaport, Schafer, & Gill, 1945). This approach suggests that in order to minimize police deviance, police departments should carefully examine the
characteristics of police officers in their recruitment process. Thus, the police department should reduce the possibility of hiring a problem police officer (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1998). For instance, according to the Christopher Commission Report (1991), a small number of police officers in the Los Angeles Police Department frequently use excessive force against citizens and they disregard the guidelines of their department. The commission blames the management because of failing to pay attention to these problem officers. However, the commission also accepts the limited ability of the prescreening test to solve the police brutality problem because of occupational pressures on police behavior. In fact, the personality approach has been mostly discredited. Studies about police personality show that police candidates and recruits do not have different personal traits from the larger society regarding their authoritarian personalities (Crank, 1998; Niederhoffer, 1967; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Moreover, the typology studies of police officers’ personalities indicate that rather than only one big group in police departments, there are at least five different types of police officers (professional, tough-cop, clean-beat crime fighter, problem-solver, and avoider) (Broderick, 1977; Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977; Worden, 1995). Therefore, personality explanations became insufficient to explain police deviance and researchers started to examine other factors as explained below.

**Sociological Approach**

Some researchers who argue the role of social dynamics as a determinant of police behavior oppose the dispositional explanation. They state that police misbehavior is defined by situational factors rather than the personality of a police officer (Worden, 1996). The research on situational factors demonstrates that when police officers encounter a violation in the society, they make their decisions according to the
importance of the violation, the characteristics of the offender and the victim, and their relationship with each other (Worden, 1989). Particularly, in police brutality cases, police officers behave more aggressively to minorities, the poor, and low status people of the society (Benson, 2001; Worden 1996). Therefore, this approach sees social forces and dynamics as the main causes of police misbehavior.

Moreover, scholars using a sociological approach argue that police misbehavior is influenced by group socialization and professionalization (Kappeler et al., 1998). Socialization is an important factor in explaining corruption in police organizations. The socialization process of the police has been studied in the literature to understand how new officers learn shared understandings in the police. Police culture is learned from the early stage of training at the police academy and it is reinforced with the formal and informal instruction of experienced police officers during field training and early period of the job (Drummond, 1976; Van Maanen, 1974, 1975). When there is a discrepancy between formal education in the police academy and applications in the field, the latter will change the attitudes of police officers and the impact of education will be weak (Haarr, 2001). Although formal education will facilitate the socialization process of new police officers, the working environment will be a key determinant of attitudes and behaviors of police officers. If a new police officer wants to get accepted into the world of experienced officers, he/she has to learn the rules of police culture and behave according to these rules. Whereas this socialization process teaches new police officers common sense approaches and experiences of experienced police officers about policing, it also forces new officers to bow to the expectations of this culture (Van Maanen, 1974). In this process, new officers are exposed to not only positive traits of police culture but
also to the dark side of police culture that includes deviant practices. Therefore, although
the socialization process facilitates new officers’ integration into a police department, it
also teaches new officers how to deviate from societal norms to meet the expectation of
police culture.

Organizational Approach

Some research about police deviance indicates that a police organization is the
major factor in determining the police officer’s misbehavior. According to this approach,
police officers follow the rules and regulations of their department, and they carefully
watch their chiefs’ preferences (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Wilson’s (1968) pioneer study
about the types of the police organizations (legalistic, watchman, and service types)
illustrates the importance of the organization’s influence on the behavior of police
officers. According to Wilson, these differences among police departments happen
because of the legal and organizational constraints on police behavior. In particular, the
community’s preferences about policing style send a signal to the police chief about how
to organize the police department. In addition, the style of the police chief will have a
direct impact on police officers’ preferences when performing their duty. For instance,
Skolnick (1994) argues that police administrators’ constant pressure on police officers to
be efficient undermines the rule of law. Police chiefs, who are responsible for taking
precautions against police brutality and misconduct, usually do not take responsibility for
police officers’ wrongdoings (HRW, 1998), and they generally use the “rotten apple”
rhetoric to acquit themselves (Kappeler et al., 1998). In fact, the problem may not be a
few rotten apples but the barrel (Swope, 2001).
Moreover, the organizational structure of police departments provides opportunities for police deviance (Kappeler et al., 1998). Establishing special units to fight crime more efficiently fosters police deviance by providing autonomy and secrecy to these units. In addition, the competition among these elite units induces police officers to behave above the law (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Police officers in specialized units develop special unit solidarity and they deviate from the norms of the police department. The supervision and accountability of these special units becomes more difficult; hence, police chiefs lose their control over these units. In addition, the career system of police departments creates a tolerable environment for deviant behaviors because police chiefs advance to their position from the lowest rank of the police department (Alpert & Dunham, 1988). Therefore, they already have exposed the deviant behavior of police officers and they tolerate or disregard police deviance in their departments.

Anthropological Approach

The anthropological approach states that police culture is the source of police deviance and provides a supportive environment for police deviance (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Dixon, 1999; Kappeler et al., 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Police culture is defined as “a set of widely shared outlooks that are formed as adaptations to a working environment characterized by uncertainty, danger, and coercive authority and that serves to manage the strains that originate in this work environment” (Skogan & Frydl, 2004, p. 131). Police culture consists of the everyday work, the common knowledge in the organization, and the shared beliefs and understandings among police officers. Police culture is directly impacted by its organizational environment due to the reciprocal relationship between police officers and their related groups. This relationship shapes
Police culture in its everyday actions (Crank, 1998). Police officers develop different strategies to cope with organizational and environmental pressures.

Police culture has been a topic of study in the United States since the 1970s. Early studies focused on the work of patrol officers; police culture was seen as the culture of patrol officers. Researchers studied different aspects of police culture to understand police behavior and made suggestions for improving the way of policing. Earlier police culture studies see police culture as a monolithic occupational culture (Crank, 1998). Some scholars even argue that police culture is the same everywhere in the world and police forces in different countries have similar cultural understandings (Crank, 1998; Skolnick, 1994; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). These studies tried to identify common features of police culture and the reasons for shared cultural understanding among police officers.

Paoline (2003) analyzed the literature on police culture to develop a model to capture all aspects of the traditional police culture (see Figure 1). His model outlines causes, prescriptions and outcomes of traditional police culture. According to the model, components of police culture come from occupational and organizational environments of police culture. Because the dangerous characteristic of policing makes police officers suspicious of citizens, coercive authority is wielded for maintaining the edge during interactions with citizens. In addition to these occupational coping mechanisms, police officers use other coping mechanisms in dealing with their hostile organizational environment—namely, the laying low strategy and crime fighter orientation. With the laying low strategy, police officers avoid unnecessary administrative scrutiny by refraining from trouble. Meanwhile, a strict adherence to the crime fighter orientation, which focuses exclusively on solving crimes, assists police officers in determining their
role in society. Police officers as crime fighters easily fulfill their goals by arresting criminals. However, their other roles—such as maintaining order or doing social work—are ambiguous and subjective. Thus, police officers emphasize their crime fighter roles by setting objective outcomes for their job. As a result, police officers’ occupational and organizational environments as well as their coping mechanisms for dealing with problems in these environments result in social isolation and group loyalty.

While the first studies defined the basic components of monolithic police culture, later studies argued that instead of a monolithic police culture, police forces have several subcultures (Brown, 1988; Chan, 1997; Foster, 2003; Garcia, 2003, 2005; Manning, 2006; Paoline, 2001; Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000; Punch, 1983; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Sheptycki, 1998; Waddington, 1999; Wood, Davis, & Rouse, 2004). These studies argue that the idea of a singular police culture cannot explain the differences within and between police departments. Although there are some similarities among police officers, there are significant differences in the police culture. Thus, the definition of police
culture should include these differences in police forces and should be open to the explanations of multiple cultures.

Moreover, Foster (2003) argues that studies of police culture are not conclusive enough to illustrate the dominant culture in police organizations. These studies have discussed some aspects of real police work as the common culture of all police departments but failed to demonstrate how widespread these features of police culture are among police departments and their subunits. In addition, Waddington (1999) states that police culture is not homogeneous; there are organizational, hierarchical, and divisional subcultures. Subcultural differences among police units are important to examine because the different roles and ranks in police departments have different work priorities. They also have different environments that have an important impact on the police culture. Therefore, research has to take into consideration the crucial differences that shape police culture.

In order to understand the dark side of police culture (Kappeler et al., 1998), we should extend the traditional model of police culture (see Figure 1) by adding the effects of police culture on officers’ outlook and the effects on police practice into the model as depicted in the Figure 2 below. According to the police deviance literature, police culture is the main source of deviant behaviors in police forces (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Dixon, 1999; Kappeler et al., 1998; Mink, Dietz, & Mink, 2000; Ross, 2001; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). However, police deviance has been studied as police corruption and other types of police deviance have received less attention from scholars. While the police become corrupt in order to benefit financially, other types of deviance such as police brutality, abuse of authority, fabrication of evidence, and wiretapping are generally used to fight
crime (Shearing, 1981). Some scholars define these actions, done for the sake of public safety, as “noble cause corruption” (Kleinig, 2002). The reason for noble cause corruption is the moral commitment of a police officer to fight injustice. The noble cause is the heart of police culture. Police culture supports unethical and illegal behaviors of police officers in exchange for good results. When performing their jobs, police officers have to determine if the ends justify the means (Crank & Caldero, 2000; Kleinig, 2002).

Similarly, Barker and Carter (1994) identify two types in police deviance: occupational deviance and abuse of authority. Occupational deviance consists of police corruption and police misconduct—forms related to the police officers’ role as a public employee rather than their actual practice as a police officer. In contrast, abuse of authority consists of the physical, psychological, and legal abuses that are related directly to actual policing practices. While occupational deviance has an internal locus, abuse of authority has an external locus. Thus, whereas occupational deviance is related to improper officers’ behavior as organizational members, abuse of authority consists of unlawful police practices that are committed against citizens while discharging police duties. To explain the culture of police violence, the model below deals only with abuse of authority as an occupational deviance.
As illustrated in the model, although isolation from society creates a “we-they” feeling and a sense of machismo among police officers, loyalty causes a code of silence and cover-up mentality, which prevent the investigation of potential abuses of authority. Police officers become isolated from their civilian friends, their community, and even their relatives and families. They isolate themselves from society due to their need to separate real and perceived dangers, cope with the loss of autonomy in their jobs, and handle social reaction (Paoline, 2003). Isolation and other reasons such as danger in job situations and hostility toward police officers create a sense of camaraderie with their co-workers (Harrison, 1995). Crank (1998) argued that the “us vs. them” mentality in police culture has been promoted by a militaristic perception. The sense of “us vs. them” develops among police officers in order to protect their colleagues against the public and their superiors. Police officers think that they cannot trust anybody except other police officers—a feeling defined using different terms in the literature: us-them attitude, siege mentality, camaraderie, brotherhood, and esprit de corps. Moreover, social isolation and the we-they feeling among police officers creates a sense of machismo in policing.

*Figure 2: Police violence culture (Expanded on Paoline, 2003)*
(Benson, 2001). Benson (2001, p. 682) defines machismo as “a value system that celebrates male physical strength, aggression, violence, competition, and dominance.” By giving high esteem to physical strength and power, police officers become more likely to use excessive or unnecessary force in their job.

Isolation from society and group solidarity foster loyalty among police officers. Since police officers rely on this loyalty for protection against outsiders, they rarely cooperate with administrative and judicial bodies to give information about their colleagues’ misconduct (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Crank, 1998; Klockars, Ivkovic, & Haberfeld, 2004). The code of silence has been cited as the most important barrier against investigations of police corruption and misconduct by independent commissions such as the Christopher Commission and the Mollen Commission (HRW, 1998). According to Skolnick and Fyfe (1993), the code of silence is a normal reaction of every group; however, police officers—as a closed occupational group—promote an extreme version. They never think about talking against their fellow officers, which is defined as betrayal. If any police officer breaks the code of silence and cooperates with authorities, he or she will be stigmatized by his or her colleagues (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993) with ostracism and no cover in the field (Cancino & Enriguez, 2004). The code of silence, also known as the blue wall (Skolnick, 2002), prevents police officers from blowing the whistle; thus, deviant behaviors in police departments find an environment in which to flourish.

In the extreme form of loyalty, police officers commit unethical and illegal acts to protect their colleagues. These efforts prevent investigations of abuse of authority. According to Sayed and Bruce (1998), these cover-up activities may not be done only for personal gain but also for collective ones. Police officers may want to protect their
colleagues to keep secrets about their activities or to protect the image of their department.

All of the cultural explanations above indicate that police culture provides and supports values and beliefs that facilitate deviance (Dixon, 1999; Kappeler et al., 1998). Therefore, although police culture provides a common framework for police officers (Crank, 1998; Chan, 1997; Harrison, 1995), it also consists of negative shared understandings that cause deviation. These negative shared understandings allow police officers to actualize their unethical and illegal practices.

**Cognitive Approach**

Other police deviance researchers state that cognitive explanations are better for understanding police deviance. Individual rationalization techniques help police officers to rationalize, excuse, and justify their deviant behavior in their eyes as well as in the public eyes (Kappeler et al., 1998). They say that police officers use several self-defense mechanisms to justify their deviant behavior. Thus, police deviance perpetuates in police departments because of rationalization techniques used by police officers to normalize their improper behaviors.

Kappeler et al. (1998) state that it is necessary to know the difference between motive and motivation in order to understand the relationship between police deviance and rationalization process. Motivation is “an inner drive or impulse that causes a person to act in a particular way, but motive is a device used to bring structure, organization, and meaning to behavior” (Kappeler et al., p.111). Thus, motive explains the acts that give social meanings to behaviors. Motive can arise before, during, or after performing an
act. Before the act, people can explain their motives to locate their act in the normative system of society. Motives can also be expressed during the acts which derive from people’s past frames and experiences. Finally, motives can be explained after the behavior and these explanations give a better idea of the social construction of the behavior than does motive before and during the act. According to Kappeler et al. (1998, p.112), in motive after the fact, people use “excuses, mitigations and justifications” to locate their acts in social context. Motives after the fact not only provide a framework within which people can interpret their actions, but also present behaviors as socially acceptable. All these explanations help people to believe that their deviant behavior is normal.

The normalization of deviant behavior helps police officers to justify their deviant behavior before and after the fact. In order to explain the techniques used by the police for neutralizing deviance, Kappeler et al. (1998) use the techniques of neutralization that were identified by Sykes and Matza (1957). These techniques and their application to police deviance are depicted in the table below.
Police Techniques of Neutralizing Deviance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sykes and Matza's Neutralization Technique</th>
<th>Verbalization</th>
<th>Techniques in the Police Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Denial of Responsibility</td>
<td>&quot;They made me do it.&quot;</td>
<td>Police use of excessive force in arresting a citizen who challenges police authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Denial of Injury</td>
<td>&quot;No innocent got hurt.&quot;</td>
<td>Police use of perjury to justify an illegal search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Denial of Victim</td>
<td>&quot;They deserved it.&quot;</td>
<td>Failure of police to uncover drugs during an illegal search of a &quot;known&quot; drug dealer is rationalized because he didn't have drugs &quot;this&quot; time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Condemning the Condemners</td>
<td>&quot;They don't know anything.&quot;</td>
<td>Police rejection of legal and department control and sanction of deviant behavior.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Police techniques of neutralizing deviance (Kappeler et al., 1998, p.114)

Moreover, Albert Bandura (1990) developed the cognitive theory of selective moral disengagement which defines several moral disengagement techniques for avoiding self-sanctions as depicted in the figure below (see Figure 3). According to Bandura, individuals who engage in inhumane behavior use different moral disengagement techniques at different points in the self-regulatory process in order to disengage moral sanctions. These techniques are moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and attribution of blame. While moral justification, advantageous comparison, and euphemistic language are used for redefining reprehensible conduct as moral conduct, diffusion and
displacement of responsibility assist individuals to minimize their role in causing harm and misrepresent detrimental effects of their inhumane conduct. In addition, individuals apply dehumanization and attribution of blame as psychosocial mechanisms to shift the blame on victims.

According to Bandura (2004), these mechanisms of moral disengagement can be used in terrorism as well as in counterterrorism contexts to understand how people legitimize their immoral actions. He states that both the members of terrorist organizations and members of security forces in counterterrorism may apply these mechanisms of moral disengagement to legitimize their actions. The members of security forces justify their reprehensible conduct against terrorists by portraying their actions as socially worthy and necessary for their society. Moral justifications are used to redefine moral standards in the minds of people. Counterterrorism officials can use advantageous
comparison as a mechanism of moral disengagement by comparing their retaliatory violence with atrocious terrorist activities. Thus, they try to justify their violent responses with arguing its effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks in the future. In addition, violent counterterrorism activities can be presented as less harmful than they are with using euphemistic language. All these three mechanisms of moral disengagement are used to get rid of moral control in counterterrorism by providing moral justifications, doing social comparisons, and labeling euphemistically.

Moreover, Bandura (2004) states that individuals can see their actions as following the wills and commands of authorities rather than seeing themselves as responsible. Thus, they obscure or minimize their role in inhumane behavior and they shift responsibility by redefining their role from being an active agent to being a passive adherent. In order to avoid self-sanctions, the responsibility of harmful actions can be diffused among people. Division of labor and group decision making are tools that enable the diffusion of responsibility and make individuals feel less guilty of inhumane conduct. In addition, the disregarding or distortion of harmful consequences lessen the effect of moral self-sanctions. If people do not see the harmful consequence of their conduct, they feel less guilt. However, if they have to see the detrimental effects, they try to ignore, minimize or distort them in order to avoid self-censure. By using these mechanisms, individuals try to avoid moral sanctions by misconstruing the detrimental consequences of inhumane conduct.

Finally, counterterrorism officials can use attribution of blame and dehumanization as psychosocial mechanisms to justify their reprehensible conduct. They can blame their opponents or forceful situations in order to represent themselves as
faultless in conducting inhumane acts. Counterterrorism officials can also dehumanize terrorists by portraying them as subhuman creatures. Thus, they get rid of empathetic feelings toward other human beings and they become insensitive to their harmful effects.

Maruna and Copes (2004) also criticize Bandura’s moral disengagement techniques because they say that Bandura did not take into consideration the techniques of neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza (1957). In fact, when we compare the moral disengagement techniques with the techniques of neutralization, we can see several similarities. First, the first technique of neutralization, “denial of responsibility,” has similarities with two moral disengagement techniques, displacement of responsibility and diffusion of responsibility. Moreover, the third technique of neutralization, “denial of victim,” encompasses attribution of blame and dehumanization techniques of moral disengagement. Therefore, when we present the rationalization techniques of police officers in our case, we will consider the similarities in different theories of rationalizing deviance.

**Synthesis Model of Police Deviance**

In order to understand how deviant behavior occurs and perpetuates in the police, we considered personality, sociological, organizational, cultural and cognitive explanations. We found that the personality approach had been largely discredited. Similar to the explanations of torture behavior as discussed in the first part of this literature review, although earlier studies used personality explanations to understand police deviance, these explanations became insufficient to explain police deviance later. Rather than dispositional factors, sociological, organizational, anthropological and
cognitive factors have become dominant explanations of police deviance in the literature. As mentioned above, sociological, organizational, cultural and cognitive perspectives provide useful insights to understand how police deviance is normalized by the police. Whereas the sociological perspective provides explanations about how situational factors affect torture and socialization processes facilitate the learning of torture, the organizational perspective indicates the role of a leader and organizational design in police deviance. Moreover, while cognitive perspectives provides ideas about how police officers rationalize their deviant behavior to get rid of self-blame or guilt, the cultural perspective explains why police deviance is permitted in the police and how it is institutionalized in police departments. Ashforth and Anand (2003) suggest a framework that synthesizes these four perspectives as depicted in the figure below (see Figure 4).

Ashforth and Anand’s framework of normalized corruption explains how corruption becomes a natural part of organizational life and how it flourishes. According to the framework below, three pillars come into play to normalize corruption in organizations: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Whereas institutionalization of corruption explains how corrupted behaviors become a property of organizational life, rationalization illuminates how organizational members use rationalization techniques to justify their corrupted behavior and reflect these practices as normal and acceptable. Moreover, the third pillar, socialization, explains how newcomers are socialized into corrupt practices. This normalized corruption framework explains not only why deviance occurs in policing but also what factors allow it to perpetuate and become routinized. I will describe each pillar in detail below in order to explain how
police deviance is institutionalized and rationalized in police departments as well as how new officers are socialized into deviant culture.

According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), there are three phases in institutionalizing corruption as illustrated in the Figure 5 below: 1) Initial corrupt decision or act, 2) Embedding corruption in structures and processes, 3) Routinizing corruption. In the first phase, if organizational climate is permissive of unethical behaviors, corrupt behaviors find a suitable environment to prosper. In addition, organizational climate and culture cause deviant behavior to be generated if they provide a base for unethical practices. Leaders also play a critical role in institutionalizing corruption by not controlling their subordinates’ behaviors as well as not being a good role model for their employees. Leaders can also be passive and incapable of investigating corrupt behavior; thus, corrupt behavior can be actualized without leaders’ awareness. Even worse, leaders can engage in corrupt behavior by providing support for or leading unethical practices. In the second phase of institutionalizing corruption, corrupt decisions and acts become part of organizational memory because organizational members see these decisions and acts as successful methods due to their positive outcome.
for the organization. When these acts become embedded in organizational culture, corrupt acts are normalized thorough rationalization techniques. In the last phase, when corrupt acts become institutionalized into organizational practices, they become routinized and accepted as the usual way of doing business in organizations.

The second pillar of the normalized corruption framework, “rationalization,” provides justification of corrupt behaviors for organizational members. Rationalization assists organizational members to get rid of guilt or self-blame for their corrupt behaviors by legitimizing their illegal acts among their group as well as in society. Human beings tend to protect their self-image and self-respect by providing logical explanations and reasonable excuses for failures or undesirable acts. People use defense mechanisms to protect themselves from disorganization and pain (Fehr, 2003). In order to avoid the feeling of guilt, individuals rationalize their improper acts by using plausible
justifications and socially acceptable excuses (Clark, 1998). Although individuals are not much aware of using rationalization as a defense mechanism, it helps them to get rid of the anxiety that comes from moral conflicts (Milliken & Honeycutt, 2004).

Clark (1998) states that the term rationalization first appeared in psychology literature at the First Psychoanalytic Conference when Ernest Jones delivered the paper titled “Rationalisation in Every-day Life” in 1908 in Salzburg, Austria. Jones defined rationalization as a way of justifying unacceptable behavior by using plausible explanations without being conscious of doing it (Clark, 1998). In addition, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychology, mentioned rationalization in his studies but scholars are not sure whether he considered rationalization as a defense mechanism. According to psychoanalytical theory developed by Sigmund Freud, the personality of an individual consists of three aspects, which are the id, the ego, and the superego. Freud states that the ego deals with neurotic, real, and moral anxieties that emerge from the id and superego. In order to struggle with painful and stressful ideas, the ego uses several defense mechanisms to reduce conflict between the ego, the id and the superego. Anna Freud (1946) defined ten defense mechanisms that were derived from Sigmund Freud’s writings about psychoanalysis. These are regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal, and sublimation. Even though A. Freud did not mention rationalization as a defense mechanism in her book, she used this term in her later studies (Clark, 1998).

Tsang (2002) reviewed theories to determine why people need to rationalize their deviant behaviors. According to Tsang, moral disengagement, cognitive dissonance, and self-affirmation explain different aspects of the need to rationalize deviant behavior.
According to moral disengagement, which was developed by Bandura (1990), individuals rationalize their immoral behavior in order to avoid self-blame or guilt. Thus, people use different moral disengagement techniques to rid them of their self-sanctions as a result of a discrepancy between their moral principles and immoral behavior.

Moreover, according to the theory of cognitive dissonance developed by Festinger (1962), when a divergence exists between cognitive elements and reality, individuals experience dissonance. In order to reduce or eliminate dissonance, people try to change either their behavioral cognitive element or environmental cognitive element. However, changing the behavioral cognitive element is easier than changing environmental elements as people have more control over their behaviors than their environments. Thus, people use rationalization techniques to alter the meaning of their immoral behavior and eliminate cognitive dissonance. Finally, the theory of self-affirmation states that—when individuals experience cognitive dissonance—they try to reduce or eliminate dissonance to maintain their self-integrity rather than self-consistency. Therefore, individuals need to rationalize their deviant behavior in order to protect their positive self-concept (Tsang, 2002).

Ashforth and Anand (2003) define eight types of rationalization five of which were proposed by Sykes and Matza (1957) as techniques of neutralization. These are legality, denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, social weighting, appeal to higher loyalties, metaphor of the ledger, and refocusing attention. The first rationalization technique, “legality”, occurs due to the lack of legal rules regulating some unethical behaviors, which provides an excuse for organizational members to argue that their practices are not illegal. The second technique, “denial of responsibility,” happens
when actors claim that circumstances are forced on them and they have no choice. In “denial of injury,” actors believe that nobody was actually harmed because of their unethical practice. When organizational members use “denial of victim” as rationalization of their deviant behavior, they claim that the victim of their act had deserved punishment. In social weighting, organizational members use two strategies to alleviate the blame of their deviant behavior. The first one is “condemning the condemnner” that is used for challenging the morality of an accuser to lessen the wrongfulness of their own behavior. The other social weighting strategy is “selective social comparison” that is used for ameliorating the negative image of deviant behavior by directing focus at more corrupt groups and practices. Using “appeal to higher loyalties,” organizational actors prioritize their group-based norms rather than considering broader society norms. Thus, they prefer particularistic norms rather than universalistic norms. In “metaphor of the ledger,” organizational actors rationalize their improper acts by thinking that they can be tolerated due to their past credits and positive contributions to the organization. In the last type of rationalization, “refocusing attention,” organizational actors try to shift attention from negative parts of their work to positive parts to justify their dirty work.

Socialization as the third pillar of the normalized corruption framework explains how newcomers are introduced to corruption in organizations. Ashforth and Anand (2003) say that corruption is a shared practice of a group among organizational members. Groups create a “social cocoon” that fosters corrupt behaviors in organizations. A social cocoon is a micro culture of a group that is created for finding solutions to idiosyncratic problems. Thus, people can safely actualize their deviant behaviors by gaining support
and justification from their intimate group’s social cocoon. Ashforth and Anand (2003) state that socialization into corruption follows one of two routes: cognition → behavior and behavior → cognition. In the cognition → behavior route, newcomers are aware of values, beliefs, and prescriptions of their roles. Thus, newcomers act according to predispositions of their role to actualize the congruity between their cognition and behavior. In the behavior → cognition route, newcomers are directly exposed to behavior and they have to justify their roles by finding their positive features. When we look at the socialization processes in the model below, while cooptation fits in the cognition → behavior route, incrementalism and compromise follow the behavior → cognition route.

In cooptation process, rewards are used to induce newcomers to engage in corrupt behavior. In the incrementalism route, newcomers are incrementally led to engage in corrupt behaviors in order to create a conflict between their attitude and behavior by their colleagues. In the third route to corruption, newcomers try to solve their ethical dilemmas by finding a compromise between two unethical situations. As depicted in the model below, cooptation, incrementalism, and compromise reinforce each other. When newcomers are subject to these processes of socialization, they most probably accept their new roles and they will incrementally become identical to their counterparts in the social cocoon.
The normalized corruption framework provides a good model for understanding how police deviance is normalized and what mechanisms are in play to create and perpetuate a favorable environment for unethical and illegal behaviors. Whereas institutionalization explains the role of police culture in routinizing deviant practices, rationalization indicates how police culture provides excuses and justifications by which police officers normalize their improper actions. Moreover, socialization mechanisms show how deviant culture of policing is transferred to new officers.

In conclusion, the review of extant deviance literature suggests that torture can be explained by sociological, organizational, cultural and cognitive explanations as depicted in the normalized corruption framework of Ashforth and Anand (2003). However, although there are some theoretical explanations about police deviance in the literature, there is not enough empirical research on police deviance (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004). Because police organizations do not generally welcome research on police deviance in
their departments, even if a researcher is able to get permission to do research on deviance, resistance from police culture prevents in-depth research and police members try to conceal their deviant practices (Punch, 1989). In addition, rationalization techniques of deviant practices in the police agencies have not received enough attention from researchers (see Hunt & Manning, 1991; James, 2006; Kappeler et al., 1998); thus, this topic needs further research (Chan, 1999). Therefore, how torture is normalized in police agencies and what kinds of rationalization techniques are used by the police to justify torture will be the first part of my dissertation project to fill the gap in the literature.

**Explaining Organizational Change from Below**

This section reviews the literature about organizational change to understand the experience of change in police organizations. The first part of the review analyzes two different approaches to organizational change and provides explanations about how organizational members make sense of change in organizations. It then explains how a change affects organizational identity as well as the possibility of resistance that arises from organizational identity. This section concludes with a review of organizational change studies in the police management literature to identify gaps in this literature, thereby offering research questions for the current study.

According to Bryman (2004), two different ontological paradigms exist for understanding the nature of social entities in social research: objectivism and constructivism. The objectivist paradigm sees social entities as objective entities beyond the influence of social actors. From this perspective, social entities can be understood as
external factors that exist without any relationship with social actors. However, the constructivist paradigm opposes the idea of objective reality and instead proposes that social reality is continuously created through social interactions. Social actors attribute meanings to social phenomena and construct social reality. Whereas quantitative research follows the objectivist paradigm to investigate reality in social life, qualitative research approaches reality from the perspective of the constructivist paradigm (Brower, Abolafia, & Carr, 2000).

Watzlawick’s (1976) definition of reality can be used to understand the root causes of differences between objectivism and constructivism. Watzlawick asserts that two different aspects of reality exist: first order reality and second order reality. First order reality is the objective, scientific, and verifiable part of reality, while second order reality is related to the attribution of meaning and value to the objective part of reality. People readily agree on first order realities; however, second order realities remain open to debate due to subjective interpretations. Second order realities are created when people attribute, interpret, and give significance to a first order reality (Ford, 1999). Watzlawick (1976) further argued that individuals are generally not aware of the existence of two realities or they forget the distinction between them. Thus, human beings start to see reality as one objective truth that comes from our understanding of the world. However, our realities are the results of current and historical stories, narratives, and discourses acquired through social communication. Thus, our reality is shaped by other people’s judgments and interpretations through socialization (Ford, 1999). The discussion of how we as human beings define what is real can be helpful for understanding change in organizations. From the perspective of constructivism, approaching organizational
change as a first order reality and disregarding the second order reality leads to a poor understanding of change.

Similarly, Ford (1999) stated that studies in the organizational change literature approach change either from a structural-functionalist view or a constructivist view. Although the structural-functionalist view perceives organizational change as an objective reality, the constructivist view sees it as a socially constructed reality. From the perspective of the structural-functionalist view, change agents’ role in achieving a successful change is to align organizations to an objective reality by making appropriate interventions according to the goal of the change initiative. Thus, change agents need to apply strategies and tactics consistent with objective reality. However, benefiting from Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) definition of reality as a socially constructed phenomenon, Brown and Humpherys (2003, p. 123) stated that “organizational realities are enacted or socially constructed.” Organizational members construct their own subjective reality rather than try to find some existing reality (Choo, 1996). According to proponents of the constructivist view, change agents’ perspectives may not reflect the true reality because realities in organizational life are constructed through the sensemaking process. Organizational members try to interpret and make sense of change initiatives using their cognitive schemas and social discourses. While structural-functionalists argue that organizational change can be achieved by intentional and planned actions, constructivists say that organizational change can be accomplished by shifting individuals’ frameworks of understanding and changing organizational members’ interpretation process in regards to organizational events. The constructivist perspective approaches organizational change from a cognitive perspective, which supports the idea
that—in order to understand organizational change—researchers need to focus on
organizational members’ interpretation and sensemaking process of change (Weber &
Manning, 2001). Therefore, according to proponents of constructivist approach,
organizational change should be treated as the constructed reality rather than as the
objective reality in order to understand and manage organizational change.

Weick (1979) coined the term organizing in order to pay attention to the social
process of interpretation in organizations. He defined organizing “as a consensually
validated grammar for reducing equivocality by means of sensible interlocked behaviors.
To organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent actions into sensible sequences that
generate sensible outcomes” (Weick, 1979, p. 3). According to Weick, organizational
members spend a good amount of their time to reconstruct plausible histories in order to
explain their current situations despite the fact that their constructed histories have not
actually created their present situations. In order to explain the elements of organizing
and their relationships with each other, Weick and his colleagues (2005) proposed the
process of organizing model. This model outlines four elements of organizing: ecological
change, enactment, selection, and retention. Organizational members pay attention to
their environment when there is a change. Ecological change provides raw materials for
organizational members to make sense of their environment. Enactment involves
organizational members playing key roles to create the environments imposed on them.
They selectively focus on certain changes in their environment, and their actions
influence ecological change. In the activity of selection, organizational members choose
schemes of interpretation to provide cause maps for reducing ambiguity in their
environment. To ensure future use, organizational members select cause maps that help
reduce equivocality and eliminate ineffective cause maps to decrease confusion. In the retention phase, organizational members retain successful sensemaking outputs, which serve as products for organizing. Moreover, organizational members store cause maps that consist of variables for explaining causal relationships. Thus, organizational members intentionally select changes in their environment and make sense of their environment by engaging in the activities of enactment, selection, and retention, as depicted in the following model.

![Diagram of the relationship among enactment, organizing, and sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005, p.414)](image)

Figure 7. The relationship among enactment, organizing, and sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005, p.414)

According to Weick (1995), the sensemaking process requires three elements to start: a frame, a cue, and a connection. Frames consist of past moments of socialization whereas cues are present moments of experience. Individuals’ efforts to create a relation between frames and cues create connection. In order to make sense of the present situation (cue), individuals search meaning to create a connection from a past moment (frame). Weick (1995) further asserted that sensemaking involves seven characteristics: 1) grounded in identity construction, 2) retrospective, 3) enactive of sensible environment, 4) social, 5) ongoing, 6) focused on and by extracted cues, and 7) driven by
plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick, 1995, p. 17). People—as both sense-makers and sense-givers—construct their identity by interacting with other people and seeing themselves from other people’s perspectives. As it is retrospective, sensemaking occurs after an action occurs, as people construct the meaning after the event. Enactive of sensible environment refers to the idea that people are part of the environment in which they are trying to make sense. Thus, they create some part of the environment in which they live. Sensemaking also occurs in social contexts as people do not live in an isolated world. Although they may be alone, they take into consideration what other people think about themselves and their ideas. Sensemaking is an ongoing activity that never stops; individuals are constantly in the middle of this process, constantly making sense of their surroundings according to sensible cues. In addition, as human beings, we try to make sense of everything using available cues. We try to extract meaning from the context using various mental activities, such as filtering, classifying, and comparing available information. Yet ultimately, sensemaking depends on plausible explanations rather than accurate facts. In order to act swiftly, people tend to simplify the situation rather than thinking comprehensively.

Weick (1995) also argued that sensemaking is not only a cognitive, but also a social process. Organizational members try to make sense of what is going on in their environment, benefiting from not only their interpretive schemes shaped by their past experience and socialization but also from social discourses with their colleagues (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). This sociocognitive process helps individuals form ongoing events in a sensible structure. Individuals interact with other people by sharing stories, gossip, jokes, ideas, and experiences about organizational change, thereby creating
sensible explanations about change in their mind. Through such collective sensemaking, organizational members create their social reality, which subsequently becomes an organizational reality (Boyce, 1995). Thus, collective sensemaking as a cognitive and social process plays a critical role in the change process by making it an emergent and unpredictable process rather than a top-down initiative (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Therefore, studies of sensemaking during organizational change should analyze both cognitive and social processes of sensemaking (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).

Organizational members continuously interpret events in their surroundings in order to make sense of what is going on in their environment (Weick, 1979; Apker, 2004). Sensemaking activities continually occur in organizations; however, when a surprise or change emerges, sensemaking becomes a more conscious and less automatic activity for organizational members in order to find the gap between their schema and existing reality (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Organizational change serves as a catalyst for organizational members to engage in sensemaking collectively (Apker, 2004; Maitlis, 2005). Balogun and Johnson (2004) stated that, when individuals encounter a change in their organizations, they try to make sense of what is happening around them in order to adapt their cognitive understanding to a new state in the organization and find appropriate responses to a change initiative.

According to Corley and Gioia (2004), change is challenging for organizational members because it disrupts organizational identity, which is organization members’ collective sense about their organization’s distinctiveness and uniqueness. Due to ambiguities and uncertainties in the change process, organizational members try to make
sense of how new initiatives will affect their organizational identity in order to see whether changes fit their collective understanding of organizational identity. Therefore, organizational members’ sensemaking process will play a critical role in revising organizational reality embedded in organizational identity.

The term “identity” has been the subject of research for psychologists and was recently applied to groups and organizations (Brown, 2001). Organization members’ answers to the questions of “Who are we as an organization?” and “Who do we want to be as an organization?” (Albert & Whetten, 1985) form the meaning of organizational identity in their minds (Corley & Gioia, 2004). Albert and Whetten (1985) defined organizational identity as members’ beliefs about their organizations’ central, distinctive, and enduring characteristics. Ravasi and Schultz (2006) stated that, although Albert and Whetten’s organizational identity definition is widely accepted among researchers, two different perspectives on organizational identity have emerged: social actor perspective and social constructivist perspective. According to the social actor perspective, which is theoretically based on institutional theory, organizational identity can be traced to official institutional claims because they define what are central, enduring, and distinctive features for organizations. Organizational leaders engage in sensegiving in order to influence their members’ perceptions of collective identity by providing them with consistent and legitimate narratives to construct their identity. On the other hand, social constructionists view organizational identity as a shared collective schema that is constructed through negotiation and sensemaking among organizational members. Elstak (2008) argued that organizational identity has mainly been approached from the social constructivist view in the literature while studies from the social actor perspective are
rare. However, in order to understand the relationship between the perceived organizational identity and institutionally claimed identity, there should be more research about how organizational members interpret and negotiate institutionally claimed organizational identities.

According to Gioia and Thomas (1996), although organizational change and identity are considered as independent phenomena in the literature, major changes in organizations require a serious reconsideration of current identity and image. Moreover, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) state that, in order to deal with environmental threats, organizations need to achieve a strategic change that requires a change in organizational members’ way of current thinking. Gioia et al. (1994) defined this change as a cognitive reorientation of organization directly related to changes in identity. In order to achieve cognitive reorientation, organizational members—including top management—need to engage in sensemaking and sensegiving processes. While the sensemaking process helps participants of a strategic change to construct and reconstruct their collective identity, sensegiving serves as a tool to influence others (both insiders and outsiders of an organization) in redefining the organizational reality during the change process (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).

In earlier studies, organizational identity was viewed as stable and resistant to change (Fox-Wolffgramm, Boal, & Hunt, 1998). However, subsequent studies (Chreim, 2005; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000) suggested that organizational identity can be viewed as a fluid and unstable concept in order to explain adaptation and change in organizations. Gioia et al. (2000) referred to Gagliardia’s explanation of “the firm must change in order to preserve its identity” (Gagliardia, 1986,
p. 125), defining this explanation as a paradoxical statement because they think that, if organizational identity needs to adapt to changes in its environment, it cannot be stable and rigid. Moreover, Gustafson and Reger (1995) asserted that organizations need to engage in fundamental changes in order to be successful in the turbulent environment; however, at the same time, they have to maintain their organizational identity to provide stability and continuity for their members. Similarly, Fiol (2002) says that a paradoxical relationship exists between organizational identity and change. Although organizational success depends on having a sense of strong identity among organizational members, organizational change requires loose ties with organizational identity in order not to anchor too deeply into the features of organizational identity to initiate change. In order to cope with this paradoxical issue, Corley and Gioia (2003) argued that organizations maintain consistent labels to explain their identity while the meanings of these labels are continuously reinterpreted according to current changes in the environment. Thus, organizational members ensure a sense of continuity in their identity while being flexible by interpreting the emergent issues differently.

Recent studies about organizational identity have shown that organizational identity could change due to several factors, such as “construed external image discrepancies, social referent change and temporal identity discrepancies” (Corley & Gioia, 2004, p. 185). Although construed external image discrepancies occur due to incongruities among organizational members’ perceptions of their organization and outsiders’ views, social referent change happens when organizations lose their referencing organizations used for identity comparison. In addition, temporal identity discrepancies arise when a significant inconsistency occurs between current
organizational identity and future organizational identity. All these factors trigger identity ambiguity among organizational members and cause revisions in organizational identity.

The relationship between organizational identity and organizational image has been well studied in the literature, and organizational image is viewed as a trigger of an organizational identity change. Dutton and Drukerich (1991) defined organizational image as the way organizational members believe others see their organization, later calling this “the construed external image” (Dutton, Drukerich, & Harquil, 1994). According to the case study at the Port Authority, Dutton and Drukerich (1991) stated that, if an organization’s construed external image is deteriorated, organizational members take actions to improve their damaged image. These actions aim to improve an organization’s future image, causing identity change. In addition, Elsbach and Kramer (1996) analyzed how eight prestigious business schools responded the top-20 U.S. business school rankings as determined by *Business Week* magazine biennially. According to the authors, the ranking created identity threats for the members of universities and caused identity dissonance due to the discrepancy between university members’ perceptions of their university’s identity and their ranking in *Business Week*. In order to restore their image and protect positive perceptions of their organizational identity, university members used several distinct strategies to re-categorize themselves, using alternative attributions and justifications. Thus, they aimed to protect not only their personal perceptions of organizational identity, but also external perceptions of their organizations. Both of these case studies indicate that organizational members seriously care about their organizational image and take the necessary actions to reduce
inconsistencies between their self-perceptions and others’ perceptions about their organizations.

Moreover, Gioia et al. (2000) asserted that organizational image functions as a destabilizing force for organizational members to review their organizational identity and reconstruct their sense of self as an organization if necessary. Organizational members constantly compare their perceptions about their organization with outsiders’ views of their organization. If a significant difference occurs between these perceptions, this discrepancy creates identity concerns for organizational members. Thus, organizational members foster changes in their organizational identity in order to reduce discrepancies between the construed external image and the reputation of their organization in the minds of people (Dutton et al., 1994).

Although considerable research has been conducted on the role of organizational image in effecting organizational identity, as previously noted, the relationship between organizational culture and organizational identity has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature (Brown, 2001). Hatch (1993) indicated that cultural assumptions shape organizational identity by providing a symbolic context in which organizational members interpret and form their identity. According to Hatch and Schultz (1997), organizational identity is formed by ongoing interactions with outsiders; organizational members’ interpretations of these interactions are based on organizational culture. Moreover, Ravasi and Schultz (2006) stated that, in highly ambiguous situations, organizational culture provides cues for organizational members to make sense of what their organizational identity is. Organizational culture serves as a platform for giving sense to organizational members about the core features of their organization. Therefore, organizational culture
is an important context for organizational identity that influences both managers’ sensengiving efforts and organizational members’ sensemaking process.

Hatch and Schultz (2002) further created the organizational identity dynamics model in order to theorize the relationship among identity, culture, and image (see Figure 8 below). Their model explains how culture as an internal definition of organizational identity and image as an external definition of organizational identity dynamically interact. In addition, this model illustrates four different processes—mirroring, reflecting, expressing, and impressing—which provide ongoing interactions among culture, identity, and image. These four interrelated processes explain how organizational identity is created, sustained, and changed. Mirroring transfers what others think about the organizations, while reflecting provides feedback to organizational culture about what organizational members’ perception about themselves. In addition, whereas organizational culture is represented through identity via expressing process, identity is projected to stakeholders through the process of impressing. This model clearly illustrates the relationship among culture, identity, and image that was lacking in the previous literature.
Resistance to Change from the Perspective of Sensemaking

Bartunek et al. (2006) argued that organizational change studies have not given enough attention to change recipients who did not initiate the change. Their experience of change is viewed as resistance and the creation of obstacles to change initiative. Change studies have analyzed organizational change and responses to change from change agents’ perspectives, assuming that change agents and change recipients share the same goals and understandings in a change initiative but change initiative may be interpreted differently by change agents and change recipients as their sensemaking related to change differ significantly. Moreover, Bartunek et al. concluded that change recipients do not play passive roles in the change process as they try to make sense of the change initiative and adjust their cognitive thinking according to new changes. Studies about resistance to change define these efforts to make sense of change as resistance because, although individuals engage in sensemaking activities, they need time to grasp what is going on around them. This creates inertia in the change process and frustrates change agents due to their inability to change swiftly (George & Jones, 2001). Change implementers need to
consider change recipients’ sensemaking regarding a change in order to avoid surprises in the process (Griffith, 1999). Similarly, Weber and Manning (2001) asserted that existing models and theories of organizational change fail to capture cognitive perspective while current research in organizational change does not focus sufficient attention on organizations’ sensemaking processes. Exploring individual sensemaking during a change effort in order to understand organizational change is vital as it will help analyze how organizational members interpret, understand, and make sense of change (Ericson, 2001; Weber & Manning 2001).

Sensemaking is an important phenomenon for analyzing how individuals in an organization perceive organizational change (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003; Ericson, 2001; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Isabella, 1990). Weick argued that no one accurate way exists for perceiving organizational change; rather, several interpretations can exist according to individuals’ sensemaking of change (Apker, 2004; Grill & Carver, 2008; Taylor, 1999). Gioia and Thomas (1996) argued that organizational members’ views about their organizational identity and image can result in varying interpretations of envisioned image and identity. Due to their different roles and responsibilities, organizational members can interpret change differently (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Top managers have more relationships with higher levels of organizational environment, whereas rank-and-file employees interact with organizations’ actual customers on the ground, meaning that their sense-givers will signal different issues in changes and will make sense of changes in a different manner (Taylor, 1999). When a change occurs in an organization, members make more effort to make sense of what is going on because change challenges
shared understanding, institutionalized practices, and organizational schemata (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; George & Jones, 2001).

Brown and Starkey (2000) stated that, in order to maintain self-esteem and preserve organizational identity, organizations apply several defense mechanisms—just like individuals use to protect their egos. They determined that organizations can use most defense mechanisms identified for individuals. In addition, they believe that an organization’s degree of self-esteem (from high to low) determines its inclination to engage in defense mechanisms. High self-esteem leads to overprotection of an organization, whereas low self-esteem results in inadequate protection. Brown and Starkey believe that, in healthy organizations, ego defenses increase confidence and decrease confusion and fear related to solving complex problems. However, they can be dysfunctional during organizational change if organizational members use these mechanisms to resist change.

Humphreys and Brown (2002) analyzed organizational narratives to understand how faculty members respond to the efforts of organizational leaders to create a monological and hegemonic organizational identity in the case of a British higher education institution. According to the authors, organizational identities are constructed and reconstructed through polyphonic dialogues; organizational members have some capacity to author their own reality, which may oppose organizational reality as envisioned by organizational elites. Individual identity narratives may conflict with organizational identity narratives imposed by organizational elites. Following Elsbach (1999), Humphreys and Brown asserted that organizational members experience identity
ambiguity, which causes different organizational identification phenomena such as identification, dis-identification, schizo-identification, and neutral identification.

Reger et al. (1994a) analyzed total quality management cases as fundamental change efforts in organizations to understand their reasons for failing. According to the results of their analysis, total quality programs challenge organizational identity; thus, they create cognitive opposition and resistance among organizational members. According to Reger et al. (1994a), a schema—an individual’s construction of reality—provides cognitive frameworks for interpreting new information, such as a planned change. Organizational members use their schema to incorporate new information into their extant knowledge. Organizational identity, an important schema for organizational members, serves as a filter for acquiring new information or new actions. When new information or actions do not fit into members’ organizational identity schema, they challenge organizational members’ taken-for-granted assumptions. As stated by Bartunek (1984), although environmental changes initiate change, organizational members’ interpretive schemas define the type of change in organizations.

In addition, Reger et al. (1994b) stated that fundamental change initiatives encounter two kinds of resistance that arise from the conflict with organizational identity: passive resistance and active resistance. Passive resistance occurs when organizational members do not fully comprehend the initiative; active resistance happens due to cognitive opposition. In passive resistance, organizational members cannot interpret the change using their current identity schema and cannot fit it into their current organizational identity; thus, they feel apathy or anxiety about the change initiative. In active resistance, organizational members directly oppose the change initiative because
they think it is in conflict with the current organizational identity. This opposition creates strong negative emotions, such as antagonism, anger, and fear of change efforts. In order to overcome the mental barriers that create passive and active resistance, change initiatives should be introduced as a series of mid-range steps and anchored in current organizational identity.

Similarly, Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998) discovered two different types of resistance against an act that requires nondiscriminative action against consumers in two Texas banks: identity resistance and virtuous resistance. Whereas identity resistance arises from the inconsistency between current organizational identity and proposed change, virtuous resistance occurs due to indifferences between current organizational identity and proposed change. According to the results of their analysis, the plasticity of organizational identity is a survival mechanism for organizations that allows organizational identities to be flexible enough to adjust to changes in their environment without changing their core values fundamentally. Thus, the degree of plasticity of an organization’s identity will determine its adaptability to change.

According to Reger et al. (1994b), organizational members need to see change as necessary and attainable when they compare it with their organizational identity in order to accept change. As depicted in the following model by Reger et al. (1994b), small differences between current identity and ideal identity create cognitive inertia while big differences between current identity and ideal identity generate high stress among organizational members; both lead to the denial of change. According to Reger et al. (1994b), in order to achieve organizational identity change, rather than incremental or radical change processes, tectonic change process should be applied by the management.
Incremental change creates a narrow identity gap, and radical change causes a wide identity gap; however, tectonic change creates enough stress to leave the comfort zone and cognitive inertia but not too much stress stemming from the total replacement of organizational identity (Reger et al., 1994b).

![Graph showing the probability of change acceptance](image)

*Figure 9. Probability of change acceptance (Roger et al., 1994b, p.576)*

In the police management literature, changing police departments is viewed as a difficult task and police culture is cited as the primary impediment (Brown, 1988; Chan, 1997; HRW, 1998). The extant literature on police organization change approaches change from a structural or cultural view (Chan, 1997). Proponents of the structural view believe that change can be achieved by tightening rules while followers of the cultural view argue that changing the police’s cultural understandings can bring about genuine change in police practices (Brogden & Shearing, 1993). Although the cultural view proposes analyzing shared understandings of police officers in order to successfully reform police, it does not attach sufficient importance to the sensemaking process of change by police members. In addition, the police management literature has studied
resistance to change from the managerial perspective, leading scholars to define resistance as an obstacle that needs to be removed in order to achieve a change using appropriate strategies. However, police members’ sensemaking processes as change recipients have been not studied enough (see Chan, 2007) and the role of organizational identity during a change process has not received attention from police scholars. Thus, this research will be the first study to explore the sensemaking process of police members to understand their organizational identity reconstruction during a change initiative. Particularly, this study will analyze how CTD members interpreted, negotiated and responded to the idea of being respectful to human rights of terror suspects as an institutionally claimed organizational image to adapt their organizational identity. With presenting this analysis, this study will illustrate the relationship between the perceived organizational identity and institutionally claimed organizational identity to fill the gap in the literature (Elstak, 2008; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).

In conclusion, this literature review indicates that there has been little empirical research that analyzes police deviance as well as change in police deviance from the perspective of organizational members. This dissertation study will contribute to the literature by analyzing rationalizing techniques of police deviance, MPD members’ sensemaking process of the reform and the current counterterrorism practices from the perspective of MPD members by using the ethnographic method as a research methodology.
CHAPTER III - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This is an ethnographic study of police deviance and police reform. To conduct this research, I did an ethnographic study by using the grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This dissertation project has two aims to accomplish. First, this study analyzed the rationalization techniques of torture in the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of a metropolitan police department (MPD) in one of the prospective member states of the EU to understand how police officers and managers justify their deviant practices they did in the past. Second, this study investigated the perception of police officers and managers on the reform process to identify change factors as well as the resistance to change. To find the answers to these three research questions, first I did an observation in the counterterrorism division of the MPD to understand how this special division operates and what the current counterterrorism practices are. Then, I did deep-interviews with police officers and managers by considering to have a representative sample for my data. From these deep-interviews, I aimed to learn how police officers and managers of the CTD rationalize the torture practices they were involved in and how they perceive the reform process. To give detailed information about the research methodology of this dissertation project, I will explain the research sample, data collection process, and data analysis below.
Sample

The data of this dissertation project consists of research findings from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of the MPD in one of the prospective member states of the EU. The MPD is one of the biggest city police departments in this prospective member state. During the last fifteen years, there were lots of changes related to human rights issues in the MPD. These changes mainly occurred in order to meet the requirements to join the EU. This change process has dramatically improved the human rights conditions in the MPD. All these efforts to improve human rights conditions have positively affected police practices. Therefore, I will look at one special division in the MPD to understand this reform process from the perspective of its members.

My research subjects are from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of the MPD. This division was chosen as a research site because of two main reasons. First, torture cases were more prevalent in the Counterterrorism Divisions of city police departments in the prospective member state and the CTD is among the biggest counterterrorism divisions in the country. In addition, the CPT delegations visited city police departments of the prospective member state 14 times since 1990. Among these visits, they visited the CTD nine times because of both the high prevalence of torture in the CTD and the political nature of terrorism as a crime. My sample consists of 30 police officers and managers from this special division. I did my research in the CTD and interviewed 30 police officers and managers with considering a representative sample for the dissertation project between February and May 2008.
Data Collection

This study relies on three primary sources of data: archival data, observational data, and interview data. Archival data consists of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments related to the police of the prospective member state, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) Reports, and European Union Annual Progress Reports about the prospective member state. In addition, old and current laws related to counterterrorism, official correspondences between the MPD and its divisions related to human rights issues, news about the MPD related to human rights issues in the media were also analyzed.

Observational data comes from participant observation in the CTD. I collected the observational data from the CTD during the four-month period of the research by observing police officers and managers as a participant observer in the CTD. I took extensive notes while watching police officers and managers in different settings, such as their offices, the canteen, and the CTD detention center. I witnessed numerous interactions such as formal and informal talks between police officers and their managers as well as interactions between police officers and terror suspects. All observations provided invaluable ideas to me about the current practices of the CTD.

Interview data comes from in-depth interviews with police officers and managers in the CTD. I arranged interview appointments with 21 police officers and 9 police managers during the first month of my observations. Informants were chosen among experienced police officers and managers who were engaged in torture or had knowledge about torture practices in the past. In order to have a representative sample, informants
were also defined not only among different ranks from a sergeant to a police chief, but also from different subdivisions of the CTD. Before starting the interviews, all interviewees were informed that the goal of the research was to understand the change in torture in the MPD. In addition, informants were notified that their participation was absolutely voluntary. Interviews took an average of one to one and half hours to complete. They took place in interviewees’ offices or the CTD canteen. Notes were taken during all interviews, and interviews were tape-recorded if informants gave permission for recording. Interviews started with warm-up questions, which led to the questions about the old practices, current practices, and change factors that affected the CTD. Rather than asking predetermined questions, informants were allowed to talk about the topic freely. Questions were only asked to clarify the topic and continue the interview if an informant stopped talking. In order to ensure confidentiality of my informants, I did not note their names on my notebook and if they mentioned any name or identifiable information, I erased them from my notebook and from tape-recording.

**Data Analysis**

In order to prepare the data for analysis, tape-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and all field notes and memos were logged into the computer in order to analyze the data. The Atlas-ti qualitative software package was used to conduct an ethnographic analysis in which Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) grounded theory approach was systematically used. The analysis of the data consists of three major phases: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. In the open coding, the researcher codes the emerging categories according to their properties and dimensions in order to conceptualize the data. In this first phase, I defined emerging codes in the data to group
similar items according to their properties and dimensions. Meanwhile, axial coding is a process of developing and relating categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 142). In the axial coding phase, I defined subcategories under major categories by reading the notes again and again and reviewing the codebook several times in order to categorize the codes systematically. Finally, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 143), selective coding is the process of integrating and refining the theory. In this last phase, I analyzed the codes again in order to find the core category in the last step of coding process. I spent enough time with coding the data, defining categories and subcategories, and relating them to each other. With these iterative interactions, the data became more clear and sensible to me.

In addition, I analyzed memos and diagrams written and drawn during the research process. This analysis helped me to understand how my conceptual thinking about the research changed during the research process. Although earlier memos and diagrams were written and drawn by hand in a notebook, later memos and diagrams were created using computer programs. Memos written during the research helped me to understand the relationship between codes, while those written during the coding process helped me to classify codes according to their categories and subcategories. Moreover, diagrams helped me to clarify my thinking about the research.

In order to ensure the quality of this work and develop a convincing written explanation, the writing process focuses on addressing the issues of authenticity, plausibility, and criticality, which were proposed by Brower, Abolafia, and Carr (2000) as crucial elements defining the quality of qualitative studies. To create authenticity, the author needs to convince readers of the need to be in the field and faithfully reflect the
native views of people in the research setting. To ensure authenticity, I provided detailed information about my research process while trying to reflect the native paradigms of MPD members. To have a plausible study, the results need to be reasonable for readers so they are able to relate the findings with their own experiences. To ensure plausibility, I attempted to explain the topic while keeping in my mind the need for a reasonable and understandable narrative. Finally, criticality can be fulfilled by challenging taken-for-granted assumptions and presenting the topic from a critical viewpoint. In order to fulfill these criteria, I analyzed the data with considering alternative viewpoints in order to have a better picture of the data.

Finally, this study was conducted in a country that English is not a native language of informants. Thus, the quotes from interviews were translated to English with being cautious in delivering the message right and not distorting the original meaning. To achieve this, quotes were translated to English by a native speaker of informants’ language and edited by a native speaker of English.

**Limitations of Research Method**

This study applies an ethnographic approach to analyze the perception of police officers and managers in their deviant practices they perpetuated in the past, the change process, and the results of the change. It is relevant and necessary to use the ethnographic method in this kind of study because of the nature of the research topic. First of all, the ethnographic method is the common method to conduct these kinds of analyses because it provides a researcher to get “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of the research context and research subjects. In addition, doing an ethnographic study is also a useful method to
study sensitive topics such as deviance in my case. Since an ethnographer gets a chance to become acquainted with his/her informants by spending enough time in the research setting and has opportunities to develop robust relationships with his/her informants, s/he can explore deviant behaviors and get sincere explanations about deviant practices from informants. In my case, because of being a police member and having good connections in the MPD, the “getting in” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995) process of my research was smooth. Police officers and managers in the CTD welcomed me as one of their colleagues rather than as an outside researcher. They also gave sincere explanations about their old practices, the change process, and their current practices.

This study also has some limitations. First, this study analyzes only one special division in one of the metropolitan police departments; thus, findings from this study cannot be generalized in other police departments. However, the ethnographic method does not claim that findings from an ethnographic study can be generalized to other settings. It’s up to readers to assess what extent findings from this study can be generalized to other settings according to their knowledge and experience. Second, this study reflects the perceptions of MPD members about their old practices, the change process, and the results of the change. Thus, there is no claim for the objectivity of the data. Rather than accepting findings as objective truths, it is better to approach the findings as subjective understandings of the informants. Lastly, although being a police member and having good connections in the MPD facilitated my access, it also bears the risk of going too native in my research. Therefore, the results of my research should be approached by considering these limitations.
Conclusion

This dissertation project analyzed how police officers rationalize torture in their former practices and the reform process in one metropolitan police department (MPD) in one of the prospective member states of the European Union (EU). To carry out this project, an ethnographic method was used. The Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of the MPD was observed as a participant observer to understand the current practices in this division and in-depth interviews were conducted with the members of CTD to understand the rationalization techniques of torture and the reform process. As a result, this dissertation project contributes to the literature about how police deviance is normalized and what factors are important to change the police from the perspective of organizational members.
CHAPTER IV – RATIONALIZATION OF TORTURE

Introduction

This section will explore how torture practices were rationalized in the CTD. CTD members used several rationalization techniques when they were explaining their deviant practices in the past. However, their intentions were to explain why they behaved like that in the past and why they abandoned these unethical practices. Although at the time, they did not seem defensive, the analysis of interviews revealed a range of rationalizing techniques to justify their torture practices. When we analyzed the explanations of our informants about torture, we realized that our informants’ explanations aimed to justify torture and alleviate the guilt of engaging inhumane conduct. In order to develop theoretical sensitivity (Strauss & Corbin, 1996), we started to review the literature to find similarities and differences between our emergent rationalization techniques and techniques mentioned in the literature. The iterative interaction between our data and the extant rationalization literature led us to find three out of the five techniques of neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) as well as two others not identified in the techniques of neutralization. These rationalization techniques of torture are denial of responsibility, condemning of condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, expedience and nationalism.

II. Literature Review

Human beings tend to protect their self-image and self-respect by providing logical explanations and reasonable excuses for failures or undesirable facts. People use
defense mechanisms to protect themselves from disorganization and pain (Fehr, 2003). In order to avoid the feeling of guilt, individuals rationalize their improper acts by using plausible justifications and socially acceptable excuses (Clark, 1998). Although individuals are not much aware of using rationalization as a defense mechanism, it helps them to get rid of the anxiety that comes from moral conflicts (Milliken & Honeycutt, 2004).

Clark (1998) states that the term rationalization first appeared in psychology literature at the First Psychoanalytic Conference when Ernest Jones delivered the paper titled “Rationalisation in Every-day Life” in 1908 in Salzburg, Austria. Jones defined rationalization as a way of justifying unacceptable behavior by using plausible explanations without being conscious of doing it (Clark, 1998). In addition, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychology, mentioned rationalization in his studies but scholars are not sure whether he considered rationalization as a defense mechanism. According to psychoanalytical theory developed by Sigmund Freud, the personality of an individual consists of three aspects, which are the id, the ego, and the superego. Freud states that the ego deals with neurotic, real, and moral anxieties that emerge from the id and superego. In order to struggle with painful and stressful ideas, the ego uses several defense mechanisms that reduce conflict between the ego, the id and the superego. Anna Freud (1946) defined ten defense mechanisms that were derived from Sigmund Freud’s writings about psychoanalysis. These are regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal, and sublimation. Even though A. Freud did not mention rationalization as a defense mechanism in her book, she used this term in her later studies (Clark, 1998).
In a seminal study of deviance, Sykes and Matza (1957) developed the theory of neutralization to explain how juvenile delinquents deflect a sense of guilt or shame that occurs as a result of their delinquent behavior. Sykes and Matza state that delinquent behavior is a social behavior and delinquents learn deviant behavior in the process of social interaction. They believe that delinquents experience guilt or shame due to their deviant behavior. According to Sykes and Matza, delinquents also make a distinction between who they can victimize and who they cannot. In addition, they say that delinquents are not entirely immune from the pressure of social order that demands conformity to social norms.

After making the statements above about delinquent behavior, Sykes and Matza (1957) state that delinquents develop justifications in order to neutralize their deviant behavior before and after the act. According to Sykes and Matza, there are five major types of techniques that delinquents apply to rationalize their deviant actions: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. The denial of responsibility as a justification technique helps delinquents to deny their responsibility in deviant action by blaming circumstances or presenting their action as an accident. Delinquents claim that their deviant behavior is a result of external forces that beyond their control. Thus, delinquents view themselves “as more acted upon than acting” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667) to reduce their personal accountability in deviant actions. The second technique of neutralization, the denial of injury, is used by delinquents to claim that their deviant actions do not cause any real harm even though they are illegal. The denial of injury provides justification for delinquents to break the link between their deviant action and its consequences. By using
the denial of the victim as a technique of neutralization, delinquents rationalize their action by presenting it as a fair revenge or reprimand although they accept their responsibility in a deviant action and admit the injury as a result of their action. Delinquents view themselves as retaliators and present victims as wrong-doers who deserve punishment. The fourth technique of neutralization, the condemnation of condemners, helps delinquents to shift attention from their deviant action to the sincerity of critics who blame delinquents for their deviant actions. By using this technique, delinquents shift the focus of a conversation from their own deviant actions to the integrity of condemners. In the last technique of neutralization, the appeal to higher loyalties, delinquents rationalize their deviant actions by disregarding the demands from larger society norms to obey the demands of smaller group norms. This shift from universalistic demands to particularistic demands helps delinquents to solve role conflicts and dilemmas that occur due to discrepancy between social ideals and social practice. By applying all these techniques of neutralization, delinquents try to diminish the effects of social control and rationalize their deviant action to avoid feeling guilty.

Building on Sykes and Matza, Ashforth and Anand (2003) define eight types of rationalization used by organizational members to justify deviance in organizations. Four of these rationalizations techniques were proposed by Sykes and Matza (1957) as techniques of neutralization. Different rationalization techniques identified by Ashforth and Anand are legality, social weighting, metaphor of the ledger, and refocusing attention. Legality occurs due to the lack of legal rules regulating some unethical behaviors, which provides an excuse for organizational members to argue that their practices are not illegal. For social weighting, Ashforth and Anand propose two
rationalization techniques, one is the condemnation of condemners from techniques of neutralization, and the other is selective social comparisons. Selective social comparisons is used for ameliorating the negative image of deviant behavior by directing focus at more corrupt groups and practices. In the metaphor of ledger as rationalization strategy, organizational actors rationalize their improper acts by thinking that they can be tolerated due to their past credits and positive contributions to the organization. In the last type of rationalization, organizational actors try to shift attention from negative parts of their work to positive parts to justify their dirty work.

The concept of rationalization was first applied to police by Kappeler et al. (1998). They explain that it is necessary to know the difference between motive and motivation in order to understand the rationalization of deviance. According to Kappeler et al. (1998, p.111), motivation is “an inner drive or impulse that causes a person to act in a particular way, but motive is a device used to bring structure, organization, and meaning to behavior.” Thus, motive explains the acts that give social meanings to behaviors. Motive can arise before, during, or after performing an act. Before the act, police officers can explain their motives to locate their act in the normative system of society. Motives can also be expressed during the acts that derive from police officers’ past frames and experiences. Finally, motives can be explained after the behavior and these explanations give a better idea of the social construction of the behavior than does motive before and during the act. According to Kappeler et al. (1998, p.112), in motive after the fact, people use “excuses, mitigations and justifications” to locate their acts in social context. Motives after the fact not only provide a framework within which police
officers can interpret their actions, but also present behaviors as socially acceptable. All these explanations help police officers to believe that their deviant behavior is normal.

Moreover, in order to explain the techniques used by the police for neutralizing deviance, Kappeler et al. (1998) use the techniques of neutralization that were identified by Sykes and Matza (1957). According to Kappeler et al. (1998), the normalization of deviant behavior helps police officers to justify their deviant behavior before and after the fact. These techniques and their application to police deviance are depicted in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sykes and Matza's Neutralization Technique</th>
<th>Verbalization</th>
<th>Techniques in the Police Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Denial of Responsibility</td>
<td>“They made me do it.”</td>
<td>Police use of excessive force in arresting a citizen who challenges police authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Denial of Injury</td>
<td>“No innocent got hurt.”</td>
<td>Police use of perjury to justify an illegal search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Denial of Victim</td>
<td>“They deserved it.”</td>
<td>Failure of police to uncover drugs during an illegal search of a “known” drug dealer is rationalized because he didn’t have drugs “this” time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Condemning the Condemners</td>
<td>“They don’t know anything.”</td>
<td>Police rejection of legal and department control and sanction of deviant behavior.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. Police Techniques of Neutralizing Deviance (Kappeler et al., 1998, p.114)*
In order to extend the rationalization literature to torturers, it is useful to apply the recent work of Albert Bandura on moral disengagement. Bandura (1990) developed a cognitive theory of selective moral disengagement which defines several moral disengagement techniques for avoiding self-sanctions as depicted in the figure below (see Figure 10). According to Bandura, individuals who engage in inhumane behavior use different moral disengagement techniques at different points in the self-regulatory process in order to disengage moral sanctions. These techniques are moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and attribution of blame. While moral justification, advantageous comparison, and euphemistic language are used for redefining reprehensible conduct as moral conduct, diffusion and displacement of responsibility assist individuals to minimize their role in causing harm and misrepresent detrimental effects of their inhumane conduct. In addition, individuals apply dehumanization and attribution of blame as psychosocial mechanisms to shift the blame on victims.
According to Bandura (2004), these mechanisms of moral disengagement can be used in terrorism as well as in counterterrorism. He states that both the members of terrorist organizations and members of security forces in counterterrorism may apply these mechanisms of moral disengagement to legitimize their actions. As depicted in the first part of the model, the members of security forces justify their reprehensible conduct against terrorists by portraying their actions as socially worthy and necessary for their society. Moral justifications are used to redefine moral standards in the minds of people. Counterterrorism officials can use advantageous comparison as a mechanism of moral disengagement by comparing their retaliatory violence with atrocious terrorist activities. Thus, they try to justify their violent responses with arguing its effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks in the future. Lastly, violent counterterrorism activities can be presented as less harmful than they are by using euphemistic language.
In the second part of the model, Bandura (2004) states that counterterrorism officials can see their actions as following the wills and commands of authorities rather than seeing themselves as responsible. Thus, they obscure or minimize their role in inhumane behavior and they shift responsibility by redefining their role from being an active agent to being a passive adherent. In addition, in order to avoid self-sanctions, the responsibility of harmful actions can be diffused among people. Division of labor and group decision making are tools that enable the diffusion of responsibility and make individuals feel less guilty of inhumane conduct. Furthermore, disregarding or distortion of harmful consequences lessen the effect of moral self-sanctions. If people do not see the harmful consequence of their conduct, they feel less guilt. However, if they have to see the detrimental effects, they try to ignore, minimize or distort them in order to avoid self-censure.

In the final part of the model, Bandura (2004) says that counterterrorism officials can use attribution of blame and dehumanization as psychosocial mechanisms to justify their reprehensible conduct. They can blame their opponents or forceful situations in order to represent themselves not guilty of conducting inhumane acts. Counterterrorism officials can also dehumanize terrorists by portraying them as subhuman creatures. Thus, they get rid of empathetic feelings toward other human beings and become insensitive to their harmful effects.

However, Maruna and Copes (2004) criticize Bandura’s moral disengagement techniques because of not taking into consideration the techniques of neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza (1957). Benefiting from Howard and Levinson (1985), Maruna and Copes state that because research in other disciplines has been ignored,
duplicative research studies become unavoidable. In fact, when we compare the moral disengagement techniques with the techniques of neutralization, we can see several similarities. The first technique of neutralization, denial of responsibility, encompasses three moral disengagement techniques, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility and attribution of blame. Moreover, the third technique of neutralization, denial of victim, is similar to dehumanization techniques of moral disengagement. Therefore, when we present the results of our research, we will take into consideration the similarities and differences suggested by the two different theories of rationalizing deviance.

This paper will describe how CTD members rationalize torture in their old practices by using both techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement. We will present how police officers and managers in the CTD use the similar or different techniques to justify torture. Thus, this paper will make two main contributions to the literature. First, this study will analyze the ways in which police officers rationalize torture; this topic has received little attention from researchers. Second, this study will conduct empirical research on police deviance, a topic that has rarely been studied empirically (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004).

III. Analysis

This section will explore how torture practices were rationalized in the CTD. CTD members used several rationalization techniques when they were explaining their deviant practices in the past. However, their intentions were to explain why they behaved like that in the past and why they abandoned these unethical practices. Although at the
time, they did not seem defensive, the analysis of interviews revealed a range of rationalizing techniques to justify their torture practices. When we analyzed the explanations of our informants about torture, we realized that our informants’ explanations aimed to justify torture and alleviate the guilt of engaging inhumane conduct. In order to develop theoretical sensitivity (Strauss and Corbin, 1996), we started to review the literature to find similarities and differences between our emergent rationalization techniques and techniques mentioned in the literature. The iterative interaction between our data and the extant rationalization literature led us to find three out of the five techniques of neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) as well as two others not identified in the techniques of neutralization. These rationalization techniques of torture are denial of responsibility, condemning of condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, expedience and nationalism.

**Rationalization Techniques of Torture in the CTD**

**Denial of responsibility**

Sykes and Matza (1957) explained that deviants generally use denial of responsibility as a technique of rationalization to make people believe that there was not any other choice and they had to act like they did. In this rationalization, they represent themselves as helpless individuals in a situation beyond their control. They portray themselves as “billiard balls on a pool table” (Kappeler et al., 1998, p.113). By using this technique of neutralization, police officers try to deny their responsibility.

CTD members claim that torture occurred because of external factors that they could not control or internal factors that they could not prevent. They characterize
themselves as powerless individuals who cannot change the system. They say that they had to follow policies that were developed to protect their country and they had no choice but to bow to the pressure in the division. One officer commented on this:

If there is a strategy of counterterrorism in your division, you have to behave according to this strategy. If you say you will not conform to this strategy, you spoil the system here. If this is the strategy, I have to take it into consideration while working here. In the past, our strategy was developed with considering the critical situation of our country at that time. People in this division thought that tough policing could bring better results in fighting terrorism. People couldn’t work with the current mentality in the past. Our country’s imperative situation forced us to behave like that. I think tough policing was a system in our division and people didn’t make any individual mistake by acting according to the strategy in the division. They just did what they had to do.

Their rationalization comes close to Eichmann’s rationalization technique that he was only doing his job when he was explaining his role in the Holocaust under the Nazi regime. Arendt (1992, p.137) states that, although Eichmann supervised atrocious killings, he did his duty according to the characteristics of a perfect bureaucrat. Eichmann was a law-abiding citizen who obeyed the orders handed down from his superiors. Arendt also coined the term banality of evil, which refers to the idea that ordinary people are responsible for mass killings and genocides, such as the Holocaust, rather than people who have sadistic and fascist personality characteristics. Similar to explanations of Eichmann, CTD members characterized themselves as small cogs in the system and they claimed they only followed orders.

A second aspect of denial of responsibility for torture is to blame the urgency of the situation. When interviewing CTD members about torture practices in the old days, most of them commented that “if you were in my shoes, you would do the same.” They believe that because of the urgency of circumstances, they had to behave like that. They
mentioned that they were in desperate to protect their country and their society. One officer stated that the peak of terrorism was the reason for their deviant practices to justify torture:

During the 1990s, especially from 1993 to 1995, we lost many people, including citizens, police officers, and other public officials. For example, one of the leftist terrorist organizations was carrying out terrorist attacks, especially against police officers and soldiers, on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of every week. We were trying to prevent them but unfortunately they were easily finding ways to achieve their evil thinking. Think about the psychological environment in this division at that time. With this psychology, you would do everything to stop the cruel individuals out there.

A third aspect of denial of responsibility for torture involves blaming the victim. According to Kappeler et al. (1998), police can present victims as provocateurs who induced the police to take illegal action. Police try to justify their deviant behavior by claiming that they had no control over the situation and victims force them to perform deviant behavior. Thus, the police try to avoid criticism by accusing victims of being irresponsible citizens.

CTD members said that terrorist suspects wanted to treat them badly and resisted obeying commands to get harsh treatment. They said that terrorist suspects were trained by terrorist organizations to act like that to show themselves as downtrodden in society and to get the police in trouble. According to CTD members, this was the strategy of terrorist organizations. Therefore, they think terrorist suspects elicited the torture. One seasoned officer commented on that:

When we were arresting terrorist suspects, they were resisting us and they were even trying to frustrate us to use excessive force on them. They wanted us to treat them badly in order to claim that they were tortured during their custody. Thus, they aimed to view themselves as oppressed by the state and to reflect ourselves as torturers in society.
Another officer told a similar story which he says it is still true:

Legal factions of terrorist organizations gather in the city centre to read out press releases to the public almost every week. However, some of their members want to see bad treatment from us in order to get attention from the media and the public. When we ask them, “We are in the Internet age, why don’t you put your press releases on the Web instead of reading them out in the city centre?”, they say that “We will read out our press release in the city centre and you will come and take us under custody by using excessive force. Thus, media will pay attention to us. Our voices will be heard.”

**Condemnation of condemners**

According to Sykes and Matza, deviants use the condemnation of condemners as a rationalization technique to challenge the credibility of their accusers. Using this technique of neutralization, a deviant “shifts the focus of attention from his own deviant acts to the motives and behavior of those who disapprove of his violations” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668). Thus, deviants try to divert people’s attention from their deviant practices to the integrity of critics.

CTD members question the credibility of the EU because of its critique of the police with respect to human rights. The EU has criticized the prospective member state for having problems in human rights especially related to law enforcement. The European Court of Human Rights (E CtHR) also made rulings that found human rights abuses in the police. In addition, the European Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT) made several visits to law enforcement agencies of the prospective member state to inspect the conditions of human rights in these agencies, and reported several human rights abuses and poor conditions in the law enforcement agencies. Even though CTD members accept the change they have been forced to make in their practices by the EU, they blame the EU
for having double standards and not applying the same rules to its member states. One officer commented on this:

The EU forces us to obey the rules and regulations that are related to human rights. But they do not obey these rules. If our police officers do the same things that European officers do, they will be fired from the job. It is apparent that they have double standards. I resent that they demand from us what they don’t do. They try to force us to obey rules that they don’t follow. They come here to inspect us but they have more problems than us in their country.

Moreover, CTD members rationalize their past by accusing their accusers of hypocrisy. They claim that some European states foster terrorism by not taking seriously the action against terrorist organizations that aim to harm their country. They say that terrorist organizations they are fighting have legal and illegal structures in some European states and they collect money for their terrorist organizations in these states.

According to CTD members, governments of these European states do not take precautions to stop these activities in their states even though they take measures against terrorist organizations that aim to harm European states. One manager talked about this:

I don’t have positive feelings about some European countries because they allow some terrorist organizations that specifically aim to divide our country. These terrorist organizations easily collect money, punish people, and sell drugs to provide financial support for their illegal organizations. Although these activities are illegal in these countries, European authorities don’t take enough precautions to prevent these illegal activities. But they are too tough with terrorist organizations that aim to harm their countries. Thus, I think European countries require us to do something but they do not obey it. However, it is good for me to have a country that has better democracy and human rights. I am glad to see my country at the top of the list in the most democratic states. But I resent that the EU insists on some requirements from us that are not actualized in its member states. I see the EU as the hypocrite of democracy.

A second type of condemning the condemners is addressed to the victims themselves. The police question the honesty of victims who complain about them. The police blame the victim as an opportunistic individual who aims to benefit from the gaps in the justice system by making complaints against them. In order to rationalize torture,
CTD members blame victims for being deceitful. According to CTD members, even though some terrorist suspects did not see bad treatment during their custody time, they accused them in the court. CTD members believe that terrorist suspects acted like that for two purposes. First, terrorist suspects blamed them to get rid of accusations. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, if police acquire evidence and statements from the suspect illegally, they are not accepted by the court as valid. Therefore, CTD members believe that suspects strategically accused them with the guidance of their lawyers to avoid punishment. Moreover, CTD members stated that terrorist suspects accused them of torture in order to discourage them from fighting terrorism. This was a strategy of terrorist organizations that was taught to their members. Therefore, CTD members accused terrorist suspects of using this strategy even when they were not treated badly by the police. One officer commented on this:

In the old days, when terrorist suspects went to the court, they were complaining about us even if we did not do anything to them. This was a really irritating process for us because we had to go to the court to get rid of these accusations. Also, they were trying to acquit themselves by denying the statement they gave to us. We were taking 40 to 50 pages of statements from suspects but it was not accepted by the judge due to allegations of torture while in custody. Even if the judge considered our summary of proceedings and arrested the suspect, it was revoked by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in three to five years. These events demoralized us and we sometimes lost our motivation to work.

Moreover, police officers and managers in the CTD stated that in the old system, although they treated some terrorist suspects badly and hurt them physically, terrorist suspects used torture claims to falsify their evidence and were released by the court because of torture claims. Therefore, according to the CTD members, although some terrorist suspects were hurt, they took advantage of it to get rid of accusations and punishment.
In the old days, we were questioning suspects harshly and they told about the activities they were involved in. However, they were not punished as they deserved by the court because their statements were not enough to punish them. There would have to be other evidence to support their statements to punish them. Therefore, although they could have been punished with life imprisonment according to their illegal activities, they were free after three to five hearings because of our poor investigation.

**Appeal to higher loyalties**

According to Sykes and Matza (1957), internal and external controls can be neutralized by prioritizing the subgroups’ norms instead of societal norms. According to Kappeler et al. (1998), this is the most powerful neutralization technique used by the police because police officers face dilemmas of involving situations, where there is a conflict between group norms and larger societal norms. Police officers generally adhere to expectations that come from police culture while disregarding larger social norms. Police culture provides a suitable environment to justify deviant behavior by referring to group norms. Because of that, police officers sometimes engage in deviant behavior to meet the expectations of their culture rather than considering the broader expectations of society.

Police who engage in torture may be particularly susceptible to group norms because of their extreme isolation from the larger community. Extensive evidence in the policing literature shows that occupational and organizational environments of the police isolate officers from society and bond them to each other to cope with strains in their environment (Crank, 1998; Harrison, 1995; Paoline, 2003; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Skolnick, 1994). The CTD exhibits an extreme version of isolation from society and peer group loyalty because of being a special unit to fight terrorism. The CTD members said
that, in the past, they could not build good relationships with their community because of being too suspicious as well as having a negative image in society. In addition, they did not have enough time to develop social relationships with other people in the community because of irregular and long working hours.

In the past, we were isolated from society. Although we had good relationships in the division with our colleagues, we didn’t have any connection with other people in our social life. You know we generally worked more than 12 hours in a day. Therefore, it was impossible to develop relations with other people. Sometimes, I felt we were behind society because of not having relationships with other people in society. People had changed really fast and we couldn’t catch up with their change.

Moreover, the constant fight against terrorist organizations creates a strong sense of “us-them” among CTD members and the imminent possibility of danger that comes from being the target of terrorist organizations amplifies this sense. Therefore, they have strong relationships with their colleagues in the division and some officers even said that they did and still feel more comfortable in the division than at their home.

I believe this is the best place I can work. I cannot think of working any other place other than the CTD. I sometimes think I am more comfortable here than home. Our working environment appeals to me here to work. Most of my friends also have social relationships with each other. We generally avoid developing relationships with citizens. I think this comes from the characteristics of our job. We have to be suspicious and vigilant as counterterrorism officers because we are the first target of terrorist organizations. To harm any of us in this division is the main priority of terrorist organizations. If they kill any of us, they will be proud of it. As you see, we work in really risky situations, so we always have to be watchful.

Because of being a member of this kind of a cohesive group, some officers said that they felt a high level of social influence from the members in the division. They had to bow to the expectations of their close-knit group. Thus, CTD members as a cohesive group oriented themselves toward their particularistic views and they disregarded...
universalistic views. As a result, CTD members deviated from societal norms and justified their deviant practices by orienting themselves to the micro culture of their division.

**Expedience**

Different from Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization, expedience, as a rationalization technique to justify torture, was found in the CTD. In the police deviance literature, it is argued that to rationalize deviant practices and to make people believe the inevitability of their improper action, police can argue that although their action might not be morally right, it is necessary to get quick results in fighting crime. They can manipulate the public into believing that, without their deviant practices, criminals cannot be caught (Kappeler et al., 1998). Police can use their success in fighting crime to offset their deviant behavior. Police generally use their crime-fighting image to define their role in the society as a crime-fighter who catches wrongdoers (Paoline, 2003). They can also use this image to create tolerance in society for their unethical practices by publicizing their achievements in crime-fighting. This kind of deviance is defined as a “noble cause corruption” in the literature (Crank & Caldero, 2000; Crank, Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2007; Kleinig, 2002). According to Crank and Caldero (2000), the noble cause is the heart of police culture. The motivation behind the noble cause corruption is the moral commitment of a police officer to fight against injustice in the world. Moreover, related to the noble cause corruption, the Dirty Harry dilemma, named by the sociologist Carl B. Klockars after a Warner Brothers film, is frequently discussed in the police culture literature. According to Klockars (1980), police officers constantly face situations that force them to achieve good ends by using dirty
means as depicted in the film. It has been discussed in the literature that police officers regularly face means-ends dilemmas while performing their duty because police culture supports the idea that in order to reach good ends for the safety of society, police can use dirty means.

CTD members said that they had to use tough policing techniques in the past in order to get confessions from terror suspects because they were desperate to get information from suspects about imminent threats to their country and their citizens. In addition, they said that their department’s capability to follow an evidence-based approach was poor. Thus, they had to depend solely on confessions from terror suspects to get quick results. In order to prevent terrorist attacks and solve terror cases, they used harsh interrogation techniques. One officer noted a good example of their means-ends dilemma:

I remember, one day we caught a terrorist who was plotting a bombing attack. He was planning to bomb a crowded place in the city to kill lots of people. We captured him before actualizing his cruel plan. We made him speak about his plan and his connection in a short time. Some journalist asked our chief, “How were you able to get a confession from the terrorist about his activities so quickly?”, implying bad treatment to the terrorist. Our chief said “Was it better not to get information from him and let the bomb blow up?”

Moreover, police officers and middle-level managers in the CTD said that their torture practices were supported by the top management in order to get quick results. They think their managers who were promoted from lower levels of the department saw torture practices as the usual way of combating terrorism. According to their managers, it was the natural method of fighting terrorism. They also mentioned that their managers saw them as incapable officers if suspects did not confess their crimes. One of the
officers explained the role of their managers in giving importance on ends and disregarding due process:

In the old days, our managers wanted us to solve cases as soon as possible, without considering due process. They just focused on the end product. If you could not make a suspect speak up, you were seen as incapable of doing your job by your managers. Therefore, without having any other evidence, we had to force suspects to confess. Using expedience as a rationalization technique, CTD members emphasized the necessity of torture in counterterrorism by shifting attention from immoral means to quick results. Rather than talking about the physical and psychological results of torture on suspects, they focused on the functional results of torture, which bring vital information about terrorist activities. As widely discussed in the literature, as in the ticking bomb scenario (Brecher, 2007; Dershowitz, 2004; Dratel, 2006; Gross, 2004; Holmes, 2006; Levinson, 2004; Luban, 2006; Posner, 2004; Scarry, 2004), CTD members used a sense of urgency as an argument for their torture. The ticking bomb is a hypothetical scenario that is used for rationalizing the necessity of torture in extreme cases. Similar to proponents of torture in extreme cases where there is a need to get critical information to prevent death and injuries, CTD members justified their torture by arguing that they tortured terror suspects to get crucial information about terrorist activities in order to protect their country and citizens. Thus, CTD members resorted to the philosophy of utilitarianism to justify their torture and they disregarded the philosophy of deontology which never permits using devil means to reach good ends (Elshtain, 2004).
Nationalism

The final rationalization technique found in the CTD was also not identified by Sykes and Matza but is similar to causal explanations of torture in the literature. According to Hajjar (2002), the root causes of rationalization for torture can be traced to the national interest (*rasions d’état*) of a state because states generally view terrorist activities as a threat to their national security. In order to protect national boundaries of their country, state officials categorize people either as good citizens whose interests need to be protected or as enemies of the state who deserve to be tortured according to their inclusion/exclusion criterion of a citizenship. Similarly, police officers can rationalize their deviant behavior by claiming that although they engaged in deviant behavior, the victim deserved it because of being an immoral individual according to their classification (Van Maanen, 2005). Rather than accepting their behavior as unethical and illegal, police define their torture as necessary retaliation or punishment for the sake of their community (Kappeler et al., 1998; Sykes & Matza, 1957).

In our data, CTD members stated that they treated terror suspects as criminals without waiting for the court decisions about them. They viewed suspects as traitors to the country, the enemies of the nation. Therefore, they believed that the suspects did not deserve human rights as citizens of the country but they deserved revenge as enemies of the country. One seasoned officer noted:

>You know, in the past we couldn’t think that anybody in our society might love our country as much as we did. We thought of ourselves as the sole protector of this country and gave tough reactions to any action that we deemed harmful to our country. We saw suspects who came here as betrayers of our country so we treated them harshly.
According to CTD members, their thinking about terrorist suspects as traitors was culturally embedded. They say that because of having a strong patriotic background, they were too sensitive about national issues in the past. One of the officers explained the reason for their thinking:

We generally come from small cities or small towns of this country. Therefore, we have powerful patriotic feelings and we show quick reflexes against any activity that intends to harm our country. In the past, we perceived terrorist suspects as traitors of this country and we didn’t treat them well. We were impatient to punish them.

CTD members also said that they were trying to decide whether a suspect deserved torture in their early questioning in the past. If they thought they could get valuable information about terrorist activities, they forced the suspect to speak. Otherwise, if a suspect seemed a novice or knew nothing about terrorist activities according to their judgment, they sent them to the court without treating them badly.

In the past, we were trying to define suspects according to their past records and their attitudes and behaviors while in custody to make the decision to torture them or not. If we thought they engaged in important terrorist activities and they knew something important, we harshly interrogated them and forced them to speak up. If we believed that they were beginners and knew little or nothing, we frightened them into abandoning the terrorist organization and sent them to the trial.

Moreover, counterterrorism has been seen as the most important priority for society since 1980s due to the chronic terrorism problem in the country. Since then, counterterrorism divisions have been viewed as more important divisions in police departments by the management as well as by society and police departments have given more importance to their counterterrorism activities than their other law enforcement duties. Thus, counterterrorism divisions have received better resources than other divisions in police departments in order to fight terrorism effectively. Giving priority to fight terrorism provided autonomy to counterterrorism divisions not only in their usual
practices but also in their deviant practices. Therefore, CTD members used this national priority to justify their deviant practices. CTD members referred to this sort of noble cause to justify torture in their old culture. CTD members believe that they serve their society and country before their self-interest. They believe that their working conditions are extremely difficult and only patriotic individuals who do not think about their self-gain would work in their division. Therefore, they say that in the past they treated suspects badly to protect their country and their society from terrorism. One manager commented on this:

In the old days, we did not treat suspects badly to satisfy our egos but to protect our country from terrorist attacks. Everybody knows that there is no self-interest here. If you decide to work here, you need to put your country’s priorities in front of yourself. Otherwise, you cannot work here. There is no motivation to work here other than loving your nation and your country. Finally, in the CTD, police officers and managers believe that they paid a high cost to protect their country in the past and they prevented lots of terrorist attacks that could have killed innocent people. They also say that working conditions in the CTD were not good because they were working overtime without any compensation. They would work several days without going home to solve terrorist attacks on some days, but they did not complain about it. They believe that they sacrificed their private life to protect their country. One manager commented on his working schedule:

In the past, we were really busy. Especially, when terrorist activities intensified, we stayed in our division to solve incidents. I remember sometimes I didn’t go home and see my family for a whole week to find the terrorists who carried out horrible terrorist attacks. Nowadays, we still have to work overtime. For example, yesterday I left the division 1 a.m in the morning and reached home at 3 a.m. and came back today at 9 a.m. to the division. Even then, I couldn’t sleep at home when I got home because my squads sent urgent messages about terrorist activities. I had to direct them. But I have gotten to work like that. This is a way of life here.
IV. Discussion

Our analysis of data shows that CTD members use three out of five techniques of neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza (1957), one that is discussed as the ticking bomb scenario in the torture literature and another that is a variant of explanation of police corruption. In order to rationalize torture, CTD members use the denial of responsibility, the condemnation of condemners, and the appeal to higher loyalties but not the denial of injury and the denial of victim from the techniques of neutralization. By using the denial of responsibility as a rationalization technique of torture, CTD members represented themselves as helpless individuals who succumbed to pressures that came from external or internal forces. They also blamed terror suspects as provocateurs who forced them to use brutal force and torture in order to shift the responsibility from themselves to victims. In the condemnation of condemners, CTD members condemned the EU as being hypocritical and dishonest, applying double standards against their country as a condition for their country to join the EU and not giving enough support to fight terrorism. They also condemned victims for being deceitful, making torture complaints in order to get rid of punishment even though they did not receive any bad treatment from the police. In the appeal to higher loyalties, CTD members bowed to the expectation of their divisional culture which fostered torture practices and they disregarded social expectations that demand human rights and lawful treatment of suspects under custody. Expedience, as a rationalization technique, allows CTD members to claim that although torture is an immoral behavior, it is necessary and convenient for the sake of protecting country. Finally, by applying the nationalism as a rationalization technique, CTD members viewed terror suspects as traitors of their country who deserved
retaliation and punishment rather than citizens who deserved human rights. They also classified terror suspects as veteran terrorists and novice terrorists in order to decide whether or not to apply torture.

However, CTD members did not use the denial of injury and the denial of the victim identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) as rationalization techniques to justify torture because physical and psychological results of exposing torture were so obvious that CTD members could not put themselves aside from encountering the detrimental results of torture. As explained by Bandura (2004), counterterrorism officers who torture suspects try not to see the detrimental effects of their inhumane action. If they have to see them, they try to ignore, minimize, or distort the effects by dehumanizing victims or attributing the blame to victims as CTD members did. However, the consequences of torture cannot be restored easily. Thus, CTD members did not use the denial of injury and the denial of the victim to justify their torture practices.

In addition, CTD members did not use legality, selective social comparisons, metaphor of the ledger, and refocusing attention as rationalization techniques offered by Ashforth and Anand (2003) to justify torture. First, they knew that there were strict rules that prohibit torture and maltreatment. Second, they could not use selective social comparisons due to the negative image of their division and their acknowledgement of being among the worst divisions that applied tough policing practices in the past. Finally, the metaphor of ledger and refocusing attention were not used as a rationalization technique by CTD members because they accepted the wrongness of their actions they did in the past.
This analysis of rationalization techniques of torture illustrates how police officers and managers in the CTD use several techniques of rationalization in order to justify torture they perpetuated in the past. This study indicates that although there are some rationalization techniques from organizational deviance literature such as denial of responsibility, condemnation of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties can be found in the counterterrorism context, there can be other rationalization techniques such as expedience and nationalism that can be used by individuals due to the nature of counterterrorism. By using all these techniques, CTD members do not only try to get rid of self-blame and feeling of guilt, but also try to keep the positive image of being a decent individual in front of their peers as well as in the public’s view.

This analysis makes major contributions to the rationalization literature. First, it provides a detailed analysis of what kinds of rationalization techniques were used by the police to justify torture. By defining these techniques, this article shows that three out of five rationalization techniques of torture are similar to techniques of neutralization first identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) and applied to the organizational context by Ashforth and Anand (2003). However, expedience and nationalism, which have some support from the police deviance literature as well as the rationalization literature, are new rationalization techniques of torture identified in the data. Therefore, this study contributes to the rationalization literature by discovering three techniques of neutralization in the counterterrorism context and proposing two new rationalization techniques of torture.

This research also provides an empirical analysis of rationalizing torture which has rarely been studied in the literature. Both the rationalization literature and the police
deviance literature have little empirical research on techniques of rationalization in torture. Although there are some theoretical studies on rationalizing torture, these studies need empirical research to test their applicability in the real world. Thus, this empirical study which addresses this need, begins to fill the gap in the literature.

In addition, this research also offers ideas to police reformers about the causes of police deviance. If police reformers want to change deviant practices in the police, they should spend their efforts to eradicate the reasons of rationalization that provide justification for a deviant behavior. To achieve a genuine change in police departments, they need to focus on underlying assumptions, beliefs, and ideas that support the root causes of rationalization.

As a limitation of this study, we analyzed only the rationalization pillar of the normalized corruption model developed by Ashforth and Anand (2003). The other two pillars, institutionalization and socialization, also play major roles in normalizing deviance in police departments. Thus, in order to explore how torture is institutionalized, roles of leaders and police culture can be analyzed as a future research. Moreover, the third pillar of model, socialization, explains how new members are introduced to deviant practices by seasoned officers. This can also be an interesting study to explore the socialization process of torture to understand how new officers bow the expectations of group pressure while disregarding broader social expectations.

In conclusion, this research indicates that to justify torture in counterterrorism, CTD members use several rationalization techniques most of which were identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) among juvenile delinquents. In order to get rid of the sense of
guilt, counterterrorism officers in a metropolitan police department of a prospective member state of the European Union use the denial of responsibility, the condemnation of condemners, the appeal to higher authorities, expediency and nationalism as rationalization techniques for torture practices they perpetuated in the past. Analyzing how torture is rationalized by the counterterrorism officers contributes to literature about the rationalization techniques of torture and also provides insightful information to practitioners and police reformers to understand the root causes of torture in the police.
CHAPTER V – IDENTITY CHANGE PROCESS

When I review the period of my work time here, I see lots of change in my ideas and practices. Now, I think totally opposite what I was thinking in my earlier career here. You know, I was a truthful supporter of tough policing in the past, and I was thinking that terrorists deserved more than what we did. Let me give you a good example for the revolution in my thinking about counterterrorism. When I started to work here, most of the people were applying tough policing and torture was common. But one of my bureau chiefs was different. He was trying to reach terrorists and treat them well. Honestly, I was thinking and also some of my friends were thinking that this chief might be a communist and prone to ideas of terrorist organizations. However, now I’m doing more than what my chief did in the past to terror suspects. Hence, according to my old thinking, I am a communist too (laughs) (An experienced police manager from the CTD).

Introduction

This chapter will analyze CTD members’ explanations of their organizational identity change to understand how they reconstructed their organizational identity in order to meet the demands of human rights improvements mandated from above—namely, from the EU. In order to understand how CTD members make sense of human rights improvements that require major shifts not only in their human rights practices but also in their cognitive understanding of self, this chapter will examine CTD members’ explanations about the change process they experienced. First, the following analysis benefits from prior research on identity change. Therefore a brief review will highlight the conclusions from earlier research. Next, CTD members’ explanations about the causes of identity change, the identity change process, and the results of identity change will be analyzed to make contributions to the organizational identity literature.
II. Literature Review

The term “identity” has been the subject of research for psychologists and was recently applied to groups and organizations (Brown, 2001). Organization members’ answers to the questions of “Who are we as an organization?” and “Who do we want to be as an organization?” (Albert & Whetten, 1985) form the meaning of organizational identity in their minds (Corley & Gioia, 2004). Albert and Whetten (1985) defined organizational identity as members’ beliefs about their organizations’ central, distinctive, and enduring characteristics.

According to Corley and Gioia (2004), change is challenging for organizational members because it disrupts organizational identity, which is organization members’ collective sense about their organization’s distinctiveness and uniqueness. Due to ambiguities and uncertainties in the change process, organizational members try to make sense of how new initiatives will affect their organizational identity in order to see whether changes fit their collective understanding of organizational identity. Therefore, organizational members’ sensemaking process will play a critical role in revising organizational reality embedded in organizational identity.

According to Gioia and Thomas (1996), while organizational change and identity are considered as independent phenomena in the literature, major changes in organizations require a serious reconsideration of current identity and image. Moreover, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) state that, in order to deal with environmental threats, organizations need to achieve a strategic change that requires a change in organizational members’ way of current thinking. Gioia et al. (1994) defined this change as a cognitive
reorientation of organization directly related to changes in identity. In order to achieve
cognitive reorientation, organizational members—including top management—need to
engage in sensemaking and sensegiving processes. While the sensemaking process helps
participants of a strategic change to construct and reconstruct their collective identity,
sensegiving serves as a tool to influence others (both insiders and outsiders of an
organization) in redefining the organizational reality during the change process (Gioia &

In earlier studies, organizational identity was viewed as stable and resistant to
change (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). However, subsequent studies (Chreim, 2005;
Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al., 2000) suggested that organizational identity can be
viewed as a fluid and unstable concept in order to explain adaptation and change in
organizations. Gioia et al. (2000) referred to Gagliardia’s explanation of “the firm must
change in order to preserve its identity” (Gagliardia, 1986, p. 125), defining this
explanation as a paradoxical statement because they think that, if organizational identity
needs to adapt to changes in its environment, it cannot be stable and rigid. Moreover,
Gustafson and Reger (1995) asserted that organizations need to engage in fundamental
changes in order to be successful in the turbulent environment; however, at the same
time, they have to maintain their organizational identity to provide stability and
continuity for their members. Similarly, Fiol (2002) says that a paradoxical relationship
exists between organizational identity and change. Although organizational success
depends on having a sense of strong identity among organizational members,
organizational change requires loose ties with organizational identity in order not to
anchor too deeply into the features of organizational identity to initiate change. In order
to cope with this paradoxical issue, Corley and Gioia (2003) argued that organizations maintain consistent labels to explain their identity while the meanings of these labels are continuously reinterpreted according to current changes in the environment. Thus, organizational members ensure a sense of continuity in their identity while being flexible by interpreting the emergent issues differently.

Recent studies about organizational identity have shown that organizational identity could change due to several factors, such as “construed external image discrepancies, social referent change and temporal identity discrepancies” (Corley & Gioia, 2004, p. 185). Although construed external image discrepancies occur due to incongruities among organizational members’ perceptions of their organization and outsiders’ views, social referent change happens when organizations lose their referencing organizations used for identity comparison. In addition, temporal identity discrepancies arise when a significant inconsistency occurs between current organizational identity and future organizational identity. All these factors trigger identity ambiguity among organizational members and cause revisions in organizational identity.

The relationship between organizational identity and organizational image has been well studied in the literature, and organizational image is viewed as a trigger of an organizational identity change. Dutton and Drukerich (1991) defined organizational image as the way organizational members believe others see their organization, later calling this “the construed external image” (Dutton et al., 1994). According to the case study at the Port Authority, Dutton and Drukerich (1991) stated that, if an organization’s construed external image is deteriorated, organizational members take actions to improve their damaged image. These actions aim to improve an organization’s future image,
causing identity change. In addition, Elsbach and Kramer (1996) analyzed how eight prestigious business schools responded the top-20 U.S. business school rankings as determined by Business Week magazine biennially. According to the authors, the ranking created identity threats for the members of universities and caused identity dissonance due to the discrepancy between university members’ perceptions of their university’s identity and their ranking in Business Week. In order to restore their image and protect positive perceptions of their organizational identity, university members used several distinct strategies to re-categorize themselves, using alternative attributions and justifications. Thus, they aimed to protect not only their personal perceptions of organizational identity, but also external perceptions of their organizations. Both of these case studies indicate that organizational members seriously care about their organizational image and take the necessary actions to reduce inconsistencies between their self-perceptions and others’ perceptions about their organizations.

Moreover, Gioia et al. (2000) asserted that organizational image functions as a destabilizing force for organizational members to review their organizational identity and reconstruct their sense of self as an organization if necessary. Organizational members constantly compare their perceptions about their organization with outsiders’ views of their organization. If a significant difference occurs between these perceptions, this discrepancy creates identity concerns for organizational members. Thus, organizational members foster changes in their organizational identity in order to reduce discrepancies between the construed external image and the reputation of their organization in the minds of people (Dutton et al., 1994).
In the police management literature, changing police departments is viewed as a difficult task and police culture is cited as the primary impediment (Brown, 1988; Chan, 1997; HRW, 1998). The extant literature on police organization change approaches change from a structural or cultural view (Chan, 1997). Proponents of the structural view believe that change can be achieved by tightening rules while followers of the cultural view argue that changing the police’s cultural understandings can bring about genuine change in police practices (Brogden & Shearing, 1993). Although the cultural view proposes analyzing shared understandings of police officers in order to successfully reform police, it does not attach sufficient importance to the sensemaking process of change by police members. In addition, the police management literature has studied resistance to change from the managerial perspective, leading scholars to define resistance as an obstacle that needs to be removed in order to achieve a change using appropriate strategies. As emphasized by some organizational scholars (Bartunek et al., 2006; George & Jones, 2001 Gtiffith, 1999; Weber & Manning, 2001), organizational members spend some time while engaging in sensemaking during a change initiative in order to adjust their cognitive thinking. However, police members’ sensemaking processes as change recipients have been not studied enough (see Chan, 2007) and the role of organizational identity during a change process has not received attention from police scholars. Thus, this research will be the first study to explore the sensemaking process of police members to understand their organizational identity reconstruction during a change initiative.

Particularly, this study will analyze how CTD members interpreted, negotiated and responded to the idea of being respectful to the human rights of terror suspects as an
institutionally claimed organizational image to adapt their organizational identity. This study will illustrate the relationship between the perceived organizational identity and institutionally claimed organizational identity to fill the gap in the literature (Elstak, 2008; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). More Specifically, this study will analyze the relationship between broader identity change factors that come from the CTD political, social, economic and legal environments and the divisional factors that arise from discrepancies between CTD members’ perceptions and others’ perceptions of their organization (Gioia et al., 2000). Thus, this study illustrates the interaction between macro and meso level causes of identity change which provide a context for identity change and the micro level causes of identity change which emerge from CTD members’ perceptions about their organizational images which is currently missing in the organizational identity research.

III. Analysis

Perceived Causes of Identity Change in the CTD

According to CTD members, there are several factors that affected the changes in identity of CTD. These factors can be classified in three different levels according to their roles in the identity change process: Macro level factors, meso level factors, and micro level factors. While macro level factors include general factors that are associated with political, social, economic, and legal factors in the general society, meso level factors refer to organizational factors initiated by the MPD. Micro level factors are divisional factors that are related to the causes of identity change in the division. As depicted in the picture below (see Figure 11), macro, meso, and micro level factors have played crucial
roles in the identity change of the CTD. On the one hand, CTD members stated that macro and meso factors that come from political, social, legal, and organizational environments of the CTD (Chan, 1997) have influenced the context of identity change in their division. In fact, Gioia et al. (2000) state that although the organizational environment serves as an initiator of identity change in the beginning, it limits the extent of identity change within an organization later. On the other hand, CTD members explained their causes of identity change as political and strategic actions that aimed to restore the image of their state and their organization in the international arena as an effort and to repair the image of their state and the police among citizens in their country (Gioia & Thomas, 1996).

Figure 11. Perceived Identity Change Factors of the CTD
Macro Level Factors: Structural Conditions

During the interviews, CTD members talked about the changes in the structural conditions of counterterrorism which stemmed from social, economic, political, and legal factors. According to CTD members, if we look at the issue from a broader perspective, these changes in structural conditions have influenced their identity changes which resulted in changes in counterterrorism practices. The important changes are influenced by the European Union (EU) and its human rights organizations, government, laws, and society which is explained in detail below.

European Union (EU): The prospective member state has a long history about being a member of the EU. The candidacy process and negotiations about full membership forced the prospective member state to complete many necessary tasks. The EU demanded lots of changes in the structure of the government and its policies. Particularly, the Commission of the European Communities has prepared Annual Progress Reports for the prospective member state to define its deficiencies and improvements in order to join the EU. In these reports, the EU has criticized the prospective member state for its human rights abuses, and the prospective member state has been advised to correct its policies and practices against human rights (Commission of the European Communities, 2005, 2006 & 2007).

CTD members believe that the EU is an important factor in the human rights practices change of the CTD. They said that the EU has played a critical role in their identity change by forcing their state to change its laws and policies in order to secure membership in the EU. In addition, the desire of society to join the EU forced the government to align its policies according to EU standards. Police officers and managers
in the CTD defined the role of the EU in the change process as a “wind,” “synergy,” and “driving force.” One of police managers explained the role of the EU in this process:

I think the most important factor in our change is the EU because the EU has played an important role in changing laws that are related to human rights. I think if the EU wasn’t a driving force in this process, we could not have such transparent laws. We saw crucial changes with the implementations of adaptation packages. I think the EU became a synergy for our country on the way to democracy and freedom.

*European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR):* The prospective member state accepted the authority of the ECtHR to review human rights complaints at the end of 1980s. Since then, the ECtHR has sanctioned the prospective member state to pay compensation to prosecutors due to human rights abuses. To date, more than 1,800 cases related to the prospective member state have been reviewed by the ECtHR, whose decisions have directly affected the prospective member state. In addition, more than 10,000 cases related to human rights issues in the prospective member state are currently pending at the ECtHR. The prospective member state ranks at the top on the list of pending cases among countries that have accepted the judicial authority of the ECtHR (ECtHR, 2009).

CTD police officers believe that the ECtHR has also played important role in their identity change. Due to negative judgments about the police in the ECtHR, police officers say that they started to focus on avoiding mistakes that could create a problem if a suspect applied to the ECtHR. In addition, prosecutors and judges started to give decisions according to the principles of the ECtHR to avoid having their rulings overturned by the ECtHR. One of the officers shared his experience with the ECtHR:

Because of not collecting evidence according to the legal procedure, our evidence lost its reliability at the objections of defendants’ lawyers. Also,
suspects started to use the ECtHR in order to get rid of accusations. The ECtHR handed down decisions against us and our state paid lots of compensation. These punishments made us feel depressed. Let me give you a specific example. There was a terror suspect and we went her house to arrest her again. When we went her house, she said, “I bought this house, thanks to you. The ECtHR compensated me 30 Million Euro because of your mistreatment of me and I bought this house with this money.” Think about this situation. You go to a house to catch a terrorist and she says to you “I earned this house by your mistakes.”

*European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT):* The prospective member state has accepted the authority of the CPT regarding its visits to public organizations to inspect human rights conditions in 1990. The CPT has carried out more than 20 visits to the prospective member state since 1990 to determine whether human rights implementations have advanced enough to fulfill the EU requirements. At the end of each visit, the CPT prepared reports highlighting the deficiencies of visited organizations related to human rights conditions. The CPT also visited the CTD in some of these visits. One officer told of his experience related to these visits:

In the past, people from the EU came here several times to inspect how we were working. They checked our detention facilities and also they spoke with suspects in order to determine our treatment of suspects. They also asked us questions about recent changes in due process laws. Honestly, there was some tension when they visited us. I can say that every inspection had some impact on our practices. If I said there was no impact, this would be a lie. However, I haven’t seen anybody from the EU in this division recently. They were coming more often before.

*Government:* The pressure from the EU and society led the government to try to address its human rights problems. First of all, the government changed its laws in order to reach EU standards. Until now, 10 Adaptation Packages, which authorize changes to the law, have been enacted by the government. The government provided more freedom and democracy to society by enacting these packages. In addition, the government implemented a “zero tolerance for torture policy” in order to eliminate torture in the
country. Such efforts have affected the policies and practices of the police. One of the officers talked about the influence of the government:

I think the ruling party has played the role of catalyst in the change. The government has changed lots of things with the enactments of adaptation packages. To give an example for better illustration, it is like replacing the engine of an old car with a new one. New laws enabled us to work according to the standards of the EU. In addition, the new government provided more freedom and democracy to the people by expanding individual rights in the country. Thus, terrorist organizations lost their arguments in several areas and they could not propagate against the state by using deficiencies in individual rights.

Laws: Many adaptations have been made to laws in the prospective member state, following European law, to eliminate human rights abuses in police departments. These adaptations have radically affected policing practices. Police departments have changed their rules and standards according to the new laws. Significant changes include the reduction of custody time in police stations, the right to inform relatives when a member of the family is taken into custody, the provision of a defense attorney for suspects who are in custody, and increased punishment for human rights abuses. All of these changes in laws have affected the practices of police officers in the CTD. One of the police managers explained the role of laws in their identity change:

The enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2005 has changed the mentality of the police 180 degrees. According to new law, there is no criminal, only suspects. In order to arrest a person, you should answer the following questions. Why are you arresting this person? Who wants to arrest this person? Is there a high possibility of detention at the end of trial? If you cannot answer these questions, prosecutors do not allow you to arrest a suspect because there is a right of recourse against prosecutors if there is no arrest at the end of hearing. What did all these changes bring us? First of all, arbitrariness in arrest decisions has been minimized. Working with a project and having a plan for every operation have become a routine part of our business. Every operation is now assigned to a specific manager who takes responsibility for conducting it according to the new law.
As a result of the changes in laws, the punishment for torture increased and the time limit for hearing a torture case was abolished. The government also initiated a policy of zero tolerance for torture to minimize human rights abuses in law enforcement agencies. CTD members think that these new precautions affected their practices as they abandoned their old methods to avoid punishment. One officer explained the role of punishment in their identity change:

Another factor that contributes to change is the bitter experiences of our colleagues. For example, one of our colleagues collected evidence without following the right process or he did not pay attention to the paperwork carefully. He did not follow the procedure properly. Hence, he had trouble later and he was tried and punished. This trial process is really stressful. You stand there alone and you have to defend yourself. Judges sometimes accept your explanations and excuses, but they sometimes do not listen to you. Therefore, you may easily get into trouble because of not following due process. Some of my colleagues were punished for not considering the legal process and some of us are still awaiting torture trials.

Another police officer illustrated the importance of punishment in the change of CTD:

Nobody is foolish here to risk himself while questioning suspects. There is no need to use force for a confession. Everybody has a family and children to take care of. Why would I put myself at risk for punishment because of unnecessary actions? There is no need to be emotional here.

Society: Police officers and managers in the CTD think that changes in the society have also affected their organizational identity. They say that developments at educational, cultural, and economic levels of society have changed citizens’ expectations of the police. In addition, society’s awareness about civil rights influenced interactions with the police. According to police officers and managers, with the invention and expansion of the Internet and the effects of globalization, citizens are more aware of developments in the world and can compare public and private services in their county with developed countries—especially European countries. One officer commented:
There are essential changes in society that directly affect us. Our society is more educated and they know their rights better. In the past, we generally saw fewer educated people here, but now we see people who have graduated from high school at least. I also think that people in our society read more and people are more aware of what is going on in the world. They access all necessary information using the Internet. Therefore, when they come here, they know their rights and they demand their rights. They do not speak and they want their lawyers. When we look at our society, they want more democracy, they want more freedom, and they want us to be a professional police department like in developed countries.

In conclusion, the macro level factors have affected the identity of the CTD as explained above. First, the ‘candidacy process’ of the EU has affected the prospective member state counterterrorism policy by emphasizing prospective member states must pay attention to human rights issues. The EU, the ECtHR and the CPT have demanded several changes in the prospective member state’s laws, policies, and rules to improve human rights conditions in law enforcement agencies. Laws and policies related to counterterrorism changed several times in order to meet the requirements and expectations of the EU. Secondly, the government made significant changes to improve the rights of citizens, especially for minorities. The new government also adopted a “zero tolerance for torture policy” and strengthened the punishment for torture and ill-treatment. Globalization pressures and the spread of the Internet in the prospective member state has increased the availability and speed of information about what is going on in the world; thus, it is likely citizens have become more aware of their civil rights.

All these changes directly influence changes in the identity of the CTD and the context of counterterrorism.
Meso Level Factors: Institutional factors

In addition to macro level factors, CTD members mentioned several institutional factors related to identity change that can be defined as meso level factors. According to CTD members, recruiting more qualified personnel, providing better education, and increasing the capabilities of investigators to use electronic surveillance and crime scene investigation, have led to improvements in human rights practices. All of these have contributed positively to enable the CTD to change embedded tough policing practices.

Qualified Personnel: Police officers and managers think that the improvements in the requirements to be a police officer and a police manager have affected to the police positively. They say that more qualified individuals become a police officer or a police manager with new requirements. In addition, they believe that because of the unemployment problem in the country and improvements in the police work have appealed more qualified people to choose policing as career. One police manager explained the role of qualified personnel in change process:

I think the Police Academy and Police College have affected the police very much in recent years because their admission requirements are too high. For instance, you have to get a better score from the Student Selection Exam to be admitted to the Police Academy than a medical school or military school. I can give myself as an example. I did a good score in the High School Entrance Exam and I could go to a High School of Science. But I decided to go to the Police College. When we look at the managers here, they have similar stories. They are among the intelligent people of this society. With having an excellent capacity and willingness to do something, you start thinking about how to solve the problem of terrorism. Thus, you create something beneficial while working here. In addition, when we look at the quality of police officers here, there is also improvement. When I started to work here in 1997, there were only 4 police officers who graduated from the university. When we look at now, most of new officers are graduated from universities. If you ask them, you will see they did undergraduate studies in different majors such as public administration, management, mathematics, chemistry, and biology. After graduating from the university, they tried to
follow their careers in their majors but they couldn’t get a chance because of the unemployment problem in our country. Therefore, they decided to be a police officer. I think this will affect the police and our division positively in the near future as the Police Academy and the Police College did in the past.

**Police Education:** CTD members also argued that improvements in the content of police education have affected the identity change in the CTD. They believe that taking qualified personnel in to the Police Academy and Police Vocational Schools and providing them a good education has changed the profile of personnel in the police. With having qualified talents and getting good education, police officers and managers started to think about alternative solutions to terrorism. Therefore, their ideas and views have affected the identity of the CTD. One police manager explained the importance of education in changing their strategies of counterterrorism:

Improvements in police education have led people to find new methods in fighting against terrorism. ‘cause educated person is a thinking individual. When he thinks about problems, he finds solutions and starts to produce good results. I am talking about people who graduated from Police Academy and Police Vocational Schools. With increasing the education time from one year to two years in Police Vocational Schools, police officers have started to get better education. For example, we tried to teach police officers how to use computers in the past but now they learn it at the school. I strongly believe that police officers and managers should be well-educated people in order to have a professional law enforcement service in the country.

According to CTD members, the other educational factor that affected the identity change in the CTD is in-service training. Police officers and managers said that they had intensive in-service trainings especially after 1999. They believe that these in-service trainings facilitated their give and take with each other and they think that these trainings assisted them to see the mistakes they did in the past. By reviewing their past, police officers and managers developed new strategies in order to be successful in fighting against terrorism. One of the seasoned police officer described the training process in the division:
We did lots of in-service training during the change process and we are still doing it. In these sessions, we asked ourselves what we did wrong and what we did right. I can say that we criticized ourselves in order to find better tactics in fighting against terrorism. We also did brainstorming and we shared our ideas to get better results. Thus, we developed better strategies in counterterrorism.

In addition, the CTD still continues its in-service training with getting people from outside the police to enhance the skills of police officers and managers.

Interestingly, police officers are generally more eager than police managers to participate in these trainings. They think that these trainings are useful and necessary for their job enhancement. One of the experienced officers commented on in-service training:

I can easily communicate with an individual from the southeast region. I owe this to our in-service training. I think that in-service training should continue and the amount of this education should be increased. We don’t have to find people among us to teach. We need to bring more people from outside. We should find professors from universities who have an authority in their field. If we need to improve our public relations, we should find an expert in public relations. We should invite people who are specialists in sociology, psychology and medicine to gain new knowledge. Thus, we can see other people’s perspective and we can get rid of our blinkers.

*Electronic Surveillance:* Police officers and managers also think that the developments in electronic surveillance capability of the police and the changes in the electronic surveillance laws have facilitated their fight against terrorism. With the help of electronic surveillance, they can easily monitor the activities of terrorist organizations. They use wiretapping, closed-circuit television system, and undercover surveillance cars to get intelligence about terrorist activities. Before, the CTD did not have the authority of using electronic surveillance but the Intelligence Division of the MPD and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) supported them about counterterrorism intelligence. However, this intelligence could not be used as evidence in the trial because it was not considered as evidence in the law. This intelligence was used for only operational purposes. Therefore, in order to get confession from terrorists about their activities to use as
evidence in the trial, CTD members forced terror suspects to speak up. However, the
CTD has a Surveillance Unit and they do their own surveillance now. One officer
explained the benefits of new system:

Before, only the Intelligence Unit had the electronic surveillance authority
and capability. They were gathering all information about terrorist
organizations and they were filtering the information according to their own
judgment and giving us a summary of terrorist activities. This was
preventing us to have a grasp of what was going on in a terrorist
organization. We were missing lots of crucial information. Worse than that,
we could not use the intel that the Intelligence Unit collected as an evidence
in the trial. But now, we have the surveillance unit and we do it with our own
personnel. We wiretap terrorist suspects. Thus, we have instant information
and we know more details about terrorist activities. We are more aware of
what is going on in terrorist organizations and we can give better decisions.
We also use these wiretaps as evidence in the trial. This helps us a lot.

Moreover, police officers and managers think that developments in technology
made their work easier and they believe that the quality of their work has increased with
using technology. According to them, the most important contribution of technology in
fighting against terrorism is easier access to information. With the assistance of the
computer and the Internet, the police are able to reach information about terrorist suspects
without spending too much time and effort. Thus, they have instant information about
terrorist suspects and their activities. One of the officers illustrated the benefits of new
technology:

Most of the changes became available with the developments in technology.
We use technology more than before to reach information. For example,
with the implementation of the City Security Management Project, we can
see most of the streets in the city from our chairs here. When we start an
operation, we get real and on-time information about the operation site. Also,
we use the automated population registration systems in order to reach
personal information about people with using our computers. Thus, we get
information about people in a second without doing a tiresome research. In
addition, with using the computerized search warrant system, we don’t have
to wait a response from our Archive Unit to see the criminal history of a
person. It is just a click away. As you see, all these capabilities are available
with the advances in the IT.
**Crime Scene Investigation (CSI):** In order to improve the investigation capability of the police, the MPD established a Crime Scene Investigation Unit in 1996. Before that, the MPD did not have crime scene investigation specialists and this job was performed by patrol officers. Therefore, some of the evidence was not collected appropriately and some of it was not even realized by patrol officers. After the professionalization of the crime scene investigation, police started to solve crimes according to scientific evidence. Thus, the police started to give up using illegal methods during the interrogation to confess crimes and they have started to rely on the evidence. One seasoned police manager explained the contribution of improvements in CSI on their working practices:

Part of the reason why we could not do our job better in the past was about the poor CSI capability that the police had. For example, when we got evidence from the suspects, we had the results in 2-3 days from the Crime Lab. We had problems in collecting and analyzing evidences. We did not have an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). We were taking fingerprints from suspects and sending them to the capital city with a coach in order to compare these fingerprints with the national fingerprint database. We were sending one of our officers to the capital city and he was staying there at least two days to look at the national database. You see how much change we had in CSI. Now, we just click the keyboard and we see the results in seconds.

In conclusion, while some organizational factors such as qualified personnel and police education indicate the role that improving human resource practices in police organizations plays in the identity change process. Other factors such as electronic surveillance and crime scene investigations point out the role that financial and technical resources play in the identity change process. Whereas increasing the quality of human resources has changed the ‘standard profile’ of police officers, making financial and technical investments to improve police officers’ investigation capabilities during an investigation has deterred officers from using illegal and unethical interrogation methods.
Micro Level Factors: Divisional factors

Micro level factors of the CTD’s identity change relate directly to the disturbing image of the CTD (Drukerich & Carter, 2001; Dutton & Drukerich, 1991) and the state. Gioia and Thomas’ (1996) article, which explains how educational managers make sense of important issues for their organization, helps explain the divisional causes of identity change in this case. According to Gioia and Thomas, public university managers interpret issues according to strategic and political categorizations rather than perceiving them as threats and opportunities as common categories in the business world. As explained in this discussion, CTD members explained their divisional causes of identity change as political and strategic issues that aimed to restore the image of their state and their organization in the international arena as a political action and to repair the image of their state and the police among citizens in the country as a strategic action.

Image as a Political Issue. The EU has criticized the prospective member state because of its deficiencies in human rights; thus, improvements in human rights have become a precondition for the prospective member state to start membership negotiations. Several EU organizations such as the Council of the European Union, the European Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) evaluated the human rights conditions in law enforcement agencies of the prospective member state and identified significant human rights problems. All these negative reports and decisions have stained not only the image of the country, but also the image of the police, generally in the international arena but specifically among the EU countries. In addition, besides EU organizations, international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, have prepared several reports, made press releases, and sent letters to the prospective member state about human rights issues. These international organizations’ publications and activities related to the prospective member state’s human rights conditions have also tarnished the image of the prospective member country as well as the image of the police in the international arena. In particular, torture and maltreatment allegations in counterterrorism divisions of law enforcement agencies in the prospective member state received more attention than other divisions of law enforcement agencies due to its political nature. Thus, the counterterrorism divisions suffered the stigma of torture and maltreatment.

CTD members stated that, one of their main reasons to abandon tough practices is to repair the disturbing image of their state and rid themselves of the stigma of torture. They said that European authorities identified human rights issues as the major problem affecting the joining of the EU and harshly criticized the police because of its tough practices against suspects. They said they realized that their government got in trouble and had a negative image of a human rights abuser among other countries due to their tough practices and their mistakes. They understood that they had harmed their country’s interest even though their intention was to protect it against terrorism. In addition, they stated that their image as a police organization had been negatively affected by news and publications related to torture in the international arena. Thus, besides other change factors, they decided to change their practices to repair both their country’s and their organization’s image. One manager explained his ideas:

You know, when we were at the Police Academy, our professors mentioned the attitude of the EU against our government because of human rights problems we had in the police. We also read and discussed the judgments of
the European Courts of Human Rights related to our country. Honestly, I was thinking that the EU was unfair against our state. When I was appointed here, I understood the problem better. I started to think about what we were doing and then discussed with my colleagues our negative contribution to our country’s image. In order not to put our country in a difficult situation among European countries, we collectively decided to abandon torture and mispractices against suspects. Although we still have a somewhat negative image because of tough practices in the past, I think we got rid of most of it.

Moreover, CTD members said that their ideas about following due process have changed radically. In the past, they thought that—to protect their country—they needed to get a confession from terror suspects by using every possible means (legal or illegal). However, now they believe in the necessity of following due process to protect both their self-interests and their country’s interests. They emphasized that, if they abide by the rules and regulations, they do not face any allegations and punishment. Moreover, their efforts to follow due process will restore their country’s image in the international arena.

One officer explained his thinking:

The idea of following due process and not using harsh interrogation techniques was promoted by some of our supervisors. They insistently told us, “We are not lawmakers, but law enforcers. So we have to enforce what laws tell us to do, no more no less. We cannot step outside this borderline.” This idea became prevalent in the division. We started to think that we should enforce what is written in the book. We don’t have to show overconcern about our duty. We need to do what lawmakers want us to do. Moreover, same supervisors were saying that, “It is better not to get in trouble than to engage in illegal affairs to solve a case that will bring problems in the future for us. If you get in trouble, this will harm not only you but also our division, our department, and even our country.”

*Image as a Strategic Issue:* CTD members think that although they did not intend it, they fueled terrorism by using tough policing techniques against terror suspects. They realized that they contributed the vicious circle of terrorism (see Figure 10). According to CTD members, their negative attitudes and tough policing tactics increased terror suspects’ hate and enmity against the state and the police. Terror suspects who were initially less willing to participate in terrorist activities became more active in the terrorist
organization and participated in such activities more willingly once released from prison. As a result, sympathizers of terrorist organizations became militants after seeing the police’s negative attitudes and behaviors during their interrogation. Moreover, because of seeing torture, suspects shared their negative experiences with their friends, relatives, and others. Thus, the images of the police and the state deteriorated among citizens, especially among people who were at the risk of joining terrorism. Therefore, for CTD members, losing one citizen to a terrorist organization meant his/her family and relatives also became the sympathizers of terrorism. After this recognition, police officers and managers started to think about how to turn this “vicious circle” to a “virtuous circle.” Recognizing the vicious circle served as one of the main factors promoting identity change in the CTD. One police manager described the vicious circle very well:

When we were talking to the members of terrorist organizations during an interrogation in the 1990s, they repeatedly told us that they became terrorists because of the torture they endured during the military coup in 1980. They were saying that they developed hatred against the state due to their torture and maltreatment during the coup, and this was the motivation behind their activities. When we look at terrorism from this perspective, we see that one of the major terrorist movements started with 20 people, and this movement has more than two million people now. The main reason for the expansion of this movement is the torture in a military prison during the coup. Therefore, torture and maltreatment played into the hands of terrorist organizations. They want us to treat their members rudely in order to propagate their ideology and to discredit the state in the eyes of their members and people. If we behave harshly to terror suspects, we unintentionally confirm terrorist organizations’ propaganda about us. Thus, terrorist organizations gain a point in this fight.
Similarly, one officer explained his thoughts about the vicious circle:

When we talked to suspects badly and treated their families rudely, we unintentionally helped terrorist organizations spread their propaganda. I conducted research about terrorists in our country and I developed a computer program in which to store and search for personal information of terrorists. I know more than 4,000 terrorists by their names and pictures. When I was developing this program, I realized that more than 50 percent of actual terrorists had a prison record. Although we can think that they were deceived by terrorist organizations, they actually gained their hate against the state when they were in custody or in prison, so they joined the terrorist organization. I believe individuals who encountered torture or were demeaned in front of their families by officials turned their faces to the mountains in order to join terrorist organizations.

Indeed, CTD members realized that they facilitated the goals of terrorist organizations when they applied tough policing techniques. Terrorist organizations used this as propaganda to motivate their members against the state and gain public support. Terrorist organizations tried to describe themselves as oppressed groups to their members and society by claiming that the police were torturing and maltreating their members. They
also used this propaganda to scare their members from going to police to confess about their activities.

Because of showing people negative attitudes and behaviors in the division, suspects disliked us and they showed negative reactions and attacked us. They raged against us. When you tried to speak them, they did not tell you anything about their illegal activities. Some of them revealed that the terrorist organization told them not to confess to the police. If they confessed, the police would torture them and treat them poorly.

In conclusion, CTD members realized that the disturbing images of their state and their organization put them in an unfavorable position as a country in the international arena as well as in a disadvantageous situation in fighting terrorism. In order to restore the image of their country and their organization (Dutton & Drukerich, 1991), CTD members changed their policing approach from tough policing to soft policing, which requires not only practice change but also cognitive reorientation (Gioia et al., 1994). The following section will explain this identity change process of the CTD from tough policing to soft policing as well as resistance to identity change from the perspective of its members.
Perceived Identity Change Process and Resistance in the CTD

I think that, although the death of the suspect in custody facilitated our change, some people still wanted to use harsh interrogation techniques sometimes. However, when the laws changed in 2005, everybody understood the seriousness of the situation. Nobody could put himself at risk anymore by treating suspects badly. Also, as time passed, soft policing techniques proved successful, and most of the people in the division were convinced of their necessity in fighting terrorism (*A seasoned police manager in the CTD*).

This section analyzes how CTD members explain their division’s identity change process, moving from tough policing to soft policing, as well as their resistance to this change. In order to explain this process, first the sensemaking literature is reviewed. Then, we will explain the identity change process from the perspective of CTD members.

According to the sensemaking literature, organizational members continuously interpret events in their surroundings in order to make sense of what is going on in their environment (Weick, 1979; Apker, 2004). Sensemaking activities continually occur in organizations; however, when a surprise or change emerges, sensemaking becomes a more conscious and less automatic activity for organizational members in order to find the gap between their schema and existing reality (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Organizational change serves as a catalyst for organizational members to engage in sensemaking collectively (Apker, 2004; Maitlis, 2005). Balogun and Johnson (2004) stated that, when individuals encounter a change in their organizations, they try to make sense of what is happening around them in order to adapt their cognitive understanding to a new state in the organization and find appropriate responses to a change initiative.
Sensemaking is an important phenomenon for analyzing how individuals in an organization perceive organizational change (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003; Ericson, 2001; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Isabella, 1990). Weick argued that no one accurate way exists for perceiving organizational change; rather, several interpretations can exist according to individuals’ sensemaking of change (Apker, 2004; Grill & Carver, 2008; Taylor, 1999). Gioia and Thomas (1996) argued that organizational members’ views about their organizational identity and image can result in varying interpretations of envisioned image and identity. Due to their different roles and responsibilities, organizational members can interpret change differently (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Top managers have more relationships with higher levels of organizational environment, whereas rank-and-file employees interact with organizations’ actual customers on the ground, meaning that their sense-givers will signal different issues in changes and will make sense of changes in a different manner (Taylor, 1999). When a change occurs in an organization, members make more effort to make sense of what is going on because change challenges shared understanding, institutionalized practices, and organizational schemata (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; George & Jones, 2001).

Bartunek et al. (2006) argued that organizational change studies have not given enough attention to change recipients who did not initiate the change. Their experience of change is viewed as resistance and the creation of obstacles to change initiative. Change studies have analyzed organizational change and responses to change from change agents’ perspectives, assuming that change agents and change recipients share the same goals and understandings in a change initiative but change initiative may be interpreted differently by change agents and change recipients as their sensemaking related to change
differ significantly. Moreover, Bartunek et al. concluded that change recipients do not play passive roles in the change process as they try to make sense of the change initiative and adjust their cognitive thinking according to new changes. Studies about resistance to change define these efforts to make sense of change as resistance because, although individuals engage in sensemaking activities, they need time to grasp what is going on around them. This creates inertia in the change process and frustrates change agents due to their inability to change swiftly (George & Jones, 2001). Change implementers need to consider change recipients’ sensemaking regarding a change in order to avoid surprises in the process (Griffith, 1999). Similarly, Weber and Manning (2001) asserted that existing models and theories of organizational change fail to capture cognitive perspective while current research in organizational change does not focus sufficient attention on organizations’ sensemaking processes. Exploring individual sensemaking during a change effort in order to understand organizational change is vital as it will help analyze how organizational members interpret, understand, and make sense of change (Ericson, 2001; Weber & Manning 2001).

According to Reger et al. (1994a), a schema—an individual’s construction of reality—provides cognitive frameworks for interpreting new information, such as a planned change. Organizational members use their schema to incorporate new information into their extant knowledge. Organizational identity, an important schema for organizational members, serves as a filter for acquiring new information or new actions. When new information or actions do not fit into members’ organizational identity schema, they challenge organizational members’ taken-for-granted assumptions. As
stated by Bartunek (1984), although environmental changes initiate change, organizational members’ interpretive schemas define the type of change in organizations.

In the analysis section below, the identity change process is explained from the perspective of CTD members in order to understand how change efforts which were originally initiated from the top levels of the organization have been perceived and adjusted within the organizational identity of the CTD by its members.

**Analysis**

CTD’s identity change process from tough policing to soft policing can be divided into four different time periods according to CTD members’ perspective (see Figure 11). “Tough policing” and “soft policing” as terms used by informants to define what they did before – their old identity and what they do now – their new identity.

![Timeline of Identity Change](image)

**Figure 13.** The identity change process from the perspective of CTD members

As explained in the first part of this analysis, change factors come from three different levels (macro, meso, and micro) that can affect the identity change process of the CTD. While macro level factors, such as EU and its human rights organizations, government, laws, and society, constitute broader political, social, economic, and legal
contexts of identity change at the CTD, meso level factors such as qualified personnel, police education, electronic surveillance, and crime scene investigation capabilities compose organizational factors that arise from the institutionalized environments of the MPD and the CTD. In addition, micro level factors arise from the images of the state and the police as political and strategic issues. Micro level factors come from the environment at the division-level of the CTD and emerge from the collective understanding of CTD members. After identifying three levels of identity change factors, CTD members explained the identity change process of their division within this complex context of the identity change.

According to CTD members, the starting point for the identity change process occurred with the appointments of police middle managers from the Police Academy in 1995. Prior to this time, being a CTD police manager required a middle school diploma. After the appointment of more educated police managers, the identity of the CTD started to change. In 1991, in order to comply with the EU’s advice on police education, human rights courses were taught at the Police Academy. As a consequence, police managers who graduated from the Police Academy were more aware of human rights issues. With the changes in the requirements of being a police manager and the quality of education in the Police Academy, new police managers became more qualified when they appointed their job. When they started to take crucial positions in the CTD, they questioned the success and necessity of tough policing methods. When they became a supervisor of subunits in the CTD, they took a stand against tough policing methods and they prevented their subordinates from engaging these kinds of illegal and unethical behaviors. One police manager explained this change process:
When we appointed here in 1995, there were only police managers who graduated from the middle school. Even the head of subunits were police captains who graduated from the middle school. When police managers who graduated from the Police Academy became the head of subunits here, the change started. If I need to give an exact date for the change, I can say 1999. When the view of police managers about fighting terrorism changed, the counterterrorism strategies of the CTD started to change.

However, CTD members defined their resistance as very high at the time the idea of the soft policing approach was first mentioned in the division in 1995, when new police middle managers were appointed to the division. Police officers showed active resistance against the idea of soft policing because of their collective cognitive opposition (Reger et al., 1994b). They said that they did not believe the new approach would be successful in fighting terrorism. One officer explained his feelings when he first heard the new approach:

When new sergeants were appointed from the Police Academy in 1995, they started to criticize our tough policing practices and they tried to refrain from torture practices. I thought that they were novices and they would learn how to work in six months. Honestly, I did not believe that soft policing could be successful in counterterrorism. However, as the years went by, our sergeants were promoted and became the heads of subunits in the division and they found the opportunity to apply their ideas. They ordered us not to treat people badly and follow due process.

Similarly, police middle managers said that, when they first came into the division, they witnessed how torture practices were common tools used for questioning people. They said that, although they did not find these practices appropriate, they did not have enough power in the management of the CTD to increase their voices against these practices. Mills (2003) stated that power plays an important role in making sense of change in organizations, specifically in hierarchical organizations. Powerful employees employ a good deal of influence on defining the sensemaking context in which organizational members shape their identity schema. Hatch and Schultz (2002) also indicated that the relationship between power and organizational identity is so important.
that powerful organizational members have the greatest influence on organizational identity and powerless members have to sell their issues in order to change their organizational identity. As explained by Dutton and Penner (1993), an issue raised by organizational members can become a strategic issue for an organization if it fits the collective understanding of organizational members and reflects their beliefs about organizational identities. Organizational members decide which issues are legitimate, important and feasible for their organizations often referring to their collective understandings of organizational identity. Dutton and Penner (1993) also said that there are two ways of building a strategic agenda in organizations: issue selling and coalition mobilizing. While issue selling is an individual action that aims to get the attention of others on an issue (Dutton & Ashforth, 1993), coalition mobilizing is a collective action of getting issue attention (Dutton & Penner, 1993). CTD middle managers used both of these methods in order to influence the strategic agenda of their organization. However, when they tried to explain their negative ideas about tough policing, some of their managers and veteran officers in the division suspected they were sympathizers of terrorist ideologies. One of the managers explained this reaction:

> When we came here in 1995, there were lots of tough policing practices. People were not treated well in this division. Although we were against these practices, we couldn’t do anything to stop it. When we criticized torture practices, we were seen as inexperienced managers and nobody cared about our ideas. Even some people in the division saw us as sympathizers of violent ideologies. They asked us, “What are you trying to do? Why do you so care about these evil people?”

According to CTD members, although the soft policing idea was introduced to the division in 1995, resistance to this idea remained strong until 1999 due to a big identity gap between the current identity of the CTD and envisioned identity of soft policing (Reger et al., 1994b). However, when a suspect died while in custody in 1999, the court
punished two officers and one manager for being responsible for the death. The trial ended in 2000 and the police officers were imprisoned. Before this trial, although there was punishment for torture in the Penal Code and some of the CTD members were tried on torture allegations, they did not receive any punishment. Due to the increased attention from the EU, especially from the CPT and the national media, the culture of impunity regarding torture started to change (Roht-Arriaza, 1995). This incident became a horrible example which created an “identity crisis” (Fombrun & Rindova, 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002) among CTD members and forced them to review their organizational identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985) and engage in a reactive identity change (Gioia et al., 2000). After this tragic event, police officers and managers realized that they would be punished for not following the due process of the law. This incident reduced the resistance against the soft policing approach, which became more prevalent in the division. One of the officers explained the role of this incident:

When a suspect died in custody in our detention center, our colleagues were tried and punished harshly by the court. This trial and the punishment forced us to review our practices. We had some meetings with our managers and we decided that we had to obey the rules and follow due process in order to protect ourselves from penalty in the future. I remember that one of our senior managers told us, “I don’t want you to put yourself at risk to solve a crime. Just work within the limits of the law. I want you think of yourself first.” After that, we decided to abandon old methods and developed the new approach.

After this terrible incident, even though CTD members realized that they had to change, this identity change process was not smooth. As emphasized by Bartunek et al. (2006), organizational members are not passive adherents of a change initiative because they need to make sense of the change to adjust their collective identity. CTD members said that they had disagreements and arguments about the new practices during this process. Although CTD managers and officers decided to give torture practices up, they
still used these practices sometimes, especially when they could not find enough evidence about the case. CTD members said that even though they decided to abandon torture, they sometimes forced some suspects to confess their illegal activities.

In addition, some police officers did not adapt the new mentality and resisted change. According to several police officers, they did not initially believe that soft policing techniques would be successful in the fight against terrorism. In order not to spoil the new system, police managers excluded them from important duties to keep them away from suspects. Thus, police officers understood that they had to change their practices to keep themselves in the CTD. As discussed by Feldman and Rafaeli (2002), excluding some organizational members from routine tasks sends them message that their ideas and practices are not central for the organization. On the other hand, including some other members sends signals to all members about the importance of these people and their views for the organization. As a result of being subjected to exclusion and inclusion strategies, CTD police officers understood that they could be accepted by their managers and colleagues if they embraced the new approach. One of the middle managers explained the adaptation process:

Normally, when you see that somebody doesn’t want to adapt the new system, you start to think about changing his workplace or sending him to another division. However, this was not the case in here. Because people who couldn’t adapt to the new system had lots of contributions to this division in the past. Therefore, we were patient about them and we gave them time to change. But we did not let them spoil our new system. We told them to stay behind for a while. If they made a transition and changed their ideas and practices, we then added them our team. Otherwise, we sent small number of them to passive duties in our division or in the MPD.

When the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure were revised in 2005, CTD members totally abandoned torture practices. Police officers and managers think
that changes in the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure have provided an official template for all law enforcement agencies in the country. They defined these changes as a “revolution” in the national criminal justice system indicating that law enforcement agencies have achieved a professional structure in the criminal justice system with these changes. They also said the practices they developed to fight terrorism fall within a legal framework with the changes in the laws. They said that these laws shifted the interrogation power from the police to prosecutors and also increased the punishment for torture. These changes reduced resistance and made the identity change a division-wide change as explained by a seasoned police manager’s quote in the epigraph. However, although resistance to change has diminished over the years, it has not been completely eliminated. Soft policing identity has been well-accepted among CTD members and has been institutionalized; however, a small number of members said that they still sometimes think tough policing techniques are necessary for exceptional cases. One officer explained his feelings:

You know, I believe that soft policing techniques bring better results in fighting terrorism and I don’t want to return to our old days. However, I sometimes think we need some tough policing in some exceptional situations. For instance, we captured three terrorists who killed our three patrol officers and we couldn’t do anything to them. We did their paperwork and sent them to court. They were imprisoned. If we were in old times, we would apply a different treatment. But now, we have to be professional and put aside our emotions.

This quote demonstrates that some CTD members are still under the influence of their old identity. Thus, although the soft policing identity is the dominant identity in the division, there needs to be continuous support to keep it there.

When we look at the identity change process of the CTD from tough policing to soft policing, there was a very high resistance prior to 1995 because the CTD had a
strong identity with tough policing. When soft policing ideas were introduced by new middle managers in 1995, CTD members started to experience identity ambiguity—albeit weakly (Corley & Gioia, 2004). From 1995 to 1999, although CTD members continued to experience some degree of identity ambiguity, tough policing identity remained the dominant identity in the division and resistance to the idea of soft policing was still high. However, a tragic incident in 1999 resulted in the soft policing identity gaining more power and gradually becoming prevalent in the division. From 1999 to 2005, although resistance to soft policing declined dramatically, CTD members still experienced some amount of identity ambiguity as they could not make sense of the necessity for change entirely (Bartunek et al., 2006; George & Jones, 2001; Weber & Manning, 2001).

However, new laws enacted in 2005 led CTD members to completely shift to the soft policing identity, thereby minimizing their resistance. After 2005, CTD members became explicit supporters of their new identity, which promotes the use of soft power techniques to combat terrorism. As previously mentioned, although soft policing became the dominant identity in the CTD, some memories of tough policing still remain in the minds of CTD members along with some traits of police culture, such as solidarity and loyalty (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Crank, 1998; Kappeler et al., 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993), which support some sort of tough policing techniques in exceptional cases. According to my observations, these ideas cannot be actualized due to the dominance of soft policing and new official standards related to human rights; however, they raise red flags for the CTD managers to be cautious about the potential for a reversal of identity change. Therefore, CTD managers and members need to support their new identity to sustain their human rights improvements in their division.
The analysis of the identity change process of the CTD indicates that changes in human rights practices did not happen as an episodic change, but as a continuous and adaptive change. As discussed by Weick and Quinn (1999) and Orlikowski (2002), organizational change is an ongoing, evolving, and continuous process in which organizational members try to interpret changes in their environment as sensemakers. In addition, Weick (2000) states that rather than unfreeze-change-refreeze processes as assumed in planned change models (Lewin, 1958), refreeze-balance-unfreeze processes provide more plausible explanations for change process in organizations. In the first process of continuous change perspective, it is necessary to analyze ongoing cycle to define causes of incongruity between assumptions and results in order to understand causal factors of what is happening in an organization that creates vicious circle. After assessing the root causes of ineffectiveness, efforts need to be spent for reinterpreting, relabeling and reordering steps in vicious circle to balance the system. In the final process of continuous change, it is necessary to unfreeze the system for ensuring emergent changes that come from local initiatives and providing organizational environment for improvisation and learning.

In the CTD case, although torture was a crime that resulted in severe punishment according to existing laws and the MPD had an official policy of banning torture practices, CTD members applied torture to their suspects during interrogations in order to get confessions until they totally made sense of the necessity of change. When they realized that they were contributing to the vicious circle of terrorism, they tried to change this vicious circle to the virtuous circle. In addition, it seems that CTD members’ cognitive adjustments to new changes took time; they gradually accepted new rules and
standards of human rights according to changes in their environment (Bartunek et al., 2006; Griffith, 1999; Weber & Manning, 2001).

Perceived Results of Identity Change

This last section will explain how CTD members perceive the results of their identity change. As explained herein, CTD members stated that—as a result of identity change—the soft policing approach has become their primary identity, bringing successful results for their counterterrorism strategy. In addition, they believe that the new identity not only restored their disturbing image, but also improved their work environment.

In the literature, it is argued that organizational members try to reduce cognitive dissonance between their perceived organizational identity and outsiders’ view of their organization (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Druckerich, 1991; Giaoi et al., 2000). To achieve this, they change their organizational identity (Dutton & Druckerich, 1991; Hatch & Schultz, 2004). When they accomplish identity change, ambiguity about core and distinctive characteristics of their organization reduces (Corley & Gioia, 2004). In addition, benefiting from Erez and Earley (1993), Weick (1995) stated that organizational members change their sense of self in order to promote their self-enhancement, self-efficacy, and self-consistency. If a negative image of an organization threatens any of these presentations of self, organizational members redefine their organizational identity to restore their images.

When we look at the explanations of CTD members regarding the results of the identity change in their division, their interpretation of results indicates that they have
changed in order to satisfy the needs of self-enhancement, self-efficacy, and self-consistency. As explained below, CTD members represented themselves successfully in counterterrorism practices with new strategies to meet their self-enhancement, self-efficacy, and self-consistency needs. In addition, when they talked about their state’s and their organization’s better image, they satisfied their needs for congruence between their perceived image and outsiders’ images of their organization.

**Decrease in terrorism:** CTD members believe that military and police cannot be successful in solving the problem of terrorism in the country by themselves. They think that using tough strategies to combat terrorism make the problem worse. They believe that counterterrorism strategies applied in last 20 years in their country could not alleviate the problem but made it more complex and difficult to solve. Because of these bad experiences, CTD members believe that rather than authoritarian strategies, using soft power should assist to ease the problem of terrorism. They define their new policing as “soft policing” which includes strategies such as gaining hearts and minds, treating terrorists suspects as human beings, and empathizing with terror suspects and their families as explained in the directory knowledge of the CTD. One manager noted:

> According to our experience in counterterrorism, military and police cannot eradicate terrorism. Military and police as the forces of the state make the situation even worse. There should be other ways to approach this problem. I think we need to find political, social, economic, and legal remedies to solve this problem. Otherwise, our operations create more insurgency in the region. Because of recognizing this, we got beyond our classical role as the police and developed some techniques to lessen the problem of terrorism which we called “soft power strategies.”

According to CTD members, when they show positive attitudes and behaviors toward suspects, they are able to develop a good relationship with them and can communicate with them to highlight their mistakes. Upon seeing the police’s positive
approach, terror suspects start to question their wrong ways and regret their past actions, ultimately deciding to leave terrorist organizations. With using this new approach, CTD members think that they can save people without increasing hate and antagonism against the police or the state. In addition, terror suspects share their positive experiences with their friends, relatives and other peoples which restore and the image of the police and the state. Thus, police officers and managers believe that they have assisted in decrease in terrorism by reconstructing their identity from tough policing to soft policing. One officer commented on the idea behind the virtuous circle:

When you treat people rudely and use tough policing techniques against them, this doesn’t help solve the problem but aggravate it. Terrorists see the police as fascists, infidels, and wicked people. Therefore, if they see negative behaviors from the police, they stick to their ideology more and they have more hate against the state and the police. By using tough policing techniques, we not only lose suspects but also their families and relatives. Therefore, we should treat them well and show them that the state is merciful to them. In addition, we have to think about not gaining new terrorists because of our negative attitudes and behaviors. For example, if I were a child of a terrorist and somebody hits my father in front of my eyes, I would think he is a bad person. It doesn’t matter if he is a public official or a police officer. Nobody can erase this scene from my mind. Moreover, we understood that we were catching lots of people every day, but this may be the first time for them to meet the police and they will not forget it ever. This may the first and the last visit to the police for them. Therefore, every individual is important and special for us. We pay attention to this.

According to CTD members, new methods are successful in fighting terrorism because terror suspects confess their activities when the police question them. Police officers and managers say that terror suspects tell them about their illegal activities because they are treated as human beings and their values are respected. Whereas the tough policing techniques of the past made terror suspects shut down, soft policing techniques make them open and speak.

You don’t gain anything when you treat people rudely, but if you behave well, you see the positive results. For example, there was a terror suspect
who bombed the shopping centre in 1996. When we took him into custody, he did not talk about why and how they did this bombing. On the last day of his custody, the suspect was still not telling us anything and he was looking to the floor. He used his right to silence until one of my colleagues shared his cup of tea with him. Then, he started to tell everything about bombing. You see how one cup of tea might influence people? Similarly, we arrested a university student for swinging the flag of a terrorist organization in a protest march recently. When she was sent to a prosecutor after staying here four days, she told the persecutor that she was shocked by how well she was treated by the police. She said that one of the police middle managers shared his lunch with her and they also gave her a sweater in order to keep her warm. All of these affected her very much and she confessed to everything about the terrorist organization and she left it.

Moreover, police officers and managers said that, because of the soft power techniques being used, terror suspects do not hate the state and the police. They are shocked to see the police’s positive attitudes and behaviors. Most of them decide to leave terrorist organization while in prison. Some terrorists who decided to leave terrorist organizations and regret their past activities have written letters and sent gifts to the police officers in the CTD. They have written about how they joined the terrorist organizations, their regrets about what they did in the past and their plans for the future. They generally ended their letters by thanking police officers and managers in the CTD for their sincere approaches and positive behaviors. They also sent several handmade gifts, which they made in prison, in order to show their gratefulness. These gifts are displayed in the offices of the CTD. One terrorist wrote the following from prison:

…One of my friends asked me to go support a famous writer while he was giving a speech in the downtown. I agreed and we went together. But, after a long walk in a neighborhood that I didn’t know, I found myself in the middle of an illegal demonstration. While I was trying to understand where I was, one of the police officers grabbed me and put into a police car. I was shocked and ashamed of myself for being arrested by the police. Later, when I came to your division, one of your managers asked me if I was hungry and he shared his lunch with me without waiting for my response. I was shocked. Another police manager bought a toothbrush and shampoo for me to clean myself. During my custody time, I understood that human psychology is important for counterterrorism officers even if the suspect is a criminal. It was also surprising for me when a policewoman helped me wash my hair
without thinking that I was a criminal. She treated me like a friend. Everybody treated me as a guest, not a criminal, there. In addition, nobody forced me to speak during the interrogation. I want to call it an interview because interrogation as a word is too cold for this talk. I can say we just chatted. I wish every police officer could be like you. I will not forget my four days in the CTD. Thanks a lot. You helped me return to my life again. I cannot find the words to thank you. Please give my warm “Hellos” to everybody in the division. Good luck.

In addition, CTD members think that their new approach strengthens their counterterrorism strategy because terrorist organizations lose their main argument of presenting the police and the state as human rights abusers. CTD members believe that, if they continue their new approach, terrorism will diminish and terrorist organizations will lose their power. One officer commented on this:

Terrorist organizations are afraid. Why? Terror suspects who came here before compare their experience from the past to now. They say that we have changed drastically and this place is much better now. They are surprised. As a result, they collaborate and do not resist. They give their fingerprints easily; they let us take their picture without resistance. They start talking to you. Because of not seeing negative attitude here, they behave positively. However, terrorist organizations are afraid because of this new approach. They think that, if the police approach their members in a good way, they will lose members and lose their main argument of torture to accuse of the police and the government.

With realizing the vicious circle of terrorism, CTD members developed a soft power approach which aims to gain hearts and minds of terrorists to persuade them to leave terrorist organizations. In applying soft power approach, CTD members believe that they are breaking down the vicious circle of terrorism. As Figure 13 indicates, police officers and managers have realized that they turned the vicious circle to the virtuous circle.
All these new strategies and tactics of the CTD relate to the “hearts and minds (HAM) theory” in the counterinsurgency literature and “the theory of soft power” in international relations literature. The HAM theory argues that, in order to be successful against insurgency, governments should win the hearts and minds of the people in the problematic region. To gain support for the government, the government should think about how to reduce negative consequences of the insurgency for the region and simultaneously how to enhance the standards of living, provide more political rights, and reduce the abuse of government power in the region (Long, 2006). Similarly, political scientist Joseph S. Nye developed the concept of “soft power” to use in foreign policy in the 1990s and subsequently revised it after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In his new book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye (2004) stated that soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (p. x).
In order to win the war against terrorism, counterterrorism strategies should not depend solely on military power; countries should consider soft power to gain the ultimate victory.

*Better images of the state and the police.* CTD members think that because of abandoning torture practices, their state’s image has improved in the international arena, specifically in the EU. They also believe that the image of the police and the CTD have improved by using soft power techniques. Police officers and managers think that their image in the public eye was not good before, and people were afraid of the police. With the decline in human rights abuses and the use of new methods in fighting terrorism, they say that people started to see the police as being friendlier, and the police gained more trust from the public. People started to communicate with the police more easily and are less fearful of the police. Thus, families of terrorists inform the police of their children and share information with the police to rescue their children from terrorist organizations. Moreover, the improved image of the police helps police officers of the CTD in collaboration with the public to fight terrorism. One officer explained the benefits of this improved image:

The new system has lots of benefits. First of all, families are not concerned about their children when their children are in custody. Some families brought their children to the police because they know that their children are in a safe place. Also, people write letters to us from prison even though they are imprisoned. Because they are satisfied with our new approach and they think that the police do their job. We hear from terrorists that this new approach may take apart the terrorist organization if we can promote our new image. Most terrorists are not aware of our new approach.

Furthermore, CTD members believe the effectiveness of word of mouth in restoring their image. They think that if they treat suspects well, they will share their positive experience with other people—especially their friends in terrorist organizations,
their families, and their relatives. They will create propaganda for the police and state.

Thus, the number of people who want to join the terrorist organization will decrease and the number of terrorists who want to leave terrorist organizations will increase. One middle manager explained the logic of this thinking:

If you treat a suspect well, he may not tell you the truth here, but he will tell other people that he went to the police and they treated him to tea, they spoke with him, and they treated him like a human being. Thus, he will promote the state to other people and the state will gain a better reputation in people’s eyes. We witnessed how suspects who experienced a positive approach here started advocating for us to friends in a terrorist organization. We also heard that terrorist organizations are worried about our new approach because they think that, if we continue to use soft power in fighting against terrorism, they will lose their members and their sympathizers in society.

One officer shared similar ideas with giving a good example:

We are getting good results from contacting the families of terrorists. There was a suicide bomber who plotted to bomb in the city centre. We called his father from a city in the east part of our country. His father came here with an old coat and black rubber shoes. He was a really poor man. When his child saw him in the division, he shouted at his father and swore him because he did not want to see his father in this division. This old man was 90 years old. We raised money among ourselves to buy a new coat, new shoes, and a plane ticket for this poor old man. This old man stayed here four days as our guest. When he left, he thanked us and prayed for us. We thought that this man went his town and told his family, his friends, and other people what he experienced here. This is just one example. We did this with more than 1,000 people. It doesn’t matter who they are—even the relatives of a person who has thrown a Molotov cocktail at our patrol car.

Police officers and managers are also happy to have a positive image as law enforcement personnel in society. Previously, they felt isolated from society due to the implementation of tough policing techniques; however, now they feel they have better relations with people and believe they are a welcomed component of society. Moreover, dealing with terror suspects in a positive manner makes them think positively and be optimistic about life; they feel they have effectively served for the citizens and the
country. CTD members feel more inspired to work because they think that their efforts will lead to positive results for the country.

If you ask me why I abandoned treating people rudely, I can say that we were isolated from society and we couldn’t integrate into the society due to our past rude behavior. Some of my colleagues experienced depression in the past. Because of treating people rudely, we couldn’t speak with our friends and our relatives about work-related issues. We had a double personality: one was in our job and one was in our social life. Our human feelings were hurt in the past because of not treating people nicely. However, we are the same as we appear now. We are full of positive energy by helping people and sharing their problems. Now, I am happy to do my job right and I think I am doing good things to improve my society.

IV. Discussion

This analysis explains the identity change process of the CTD from tough policing to soft policing according to the perspective of its members. CTD members defined macro and meso level factors that come from political, social, legal, and organizational environments of their organization. All these factors formed the context of the identity change of the CTD. CTD members also stated that their causes of identity change came from political and strategic issues of their disturbing image as a country in the international arena and as the police in society. They stated that their state’s image had been deteriorated in the world because of human rights problems in the country and their organization’s image was also bad in society due to torture allegations. Besides the major influence of macro and meso factors, CTD members abandoned torture practices to strengthen their country’s image as a political action and improve the image of their organization as a strategic action. They stated that, although the identity change process from tough policing to soft policing was not smooth because of cognitive resistance in the
division, the results of change have brought not only political and strategic benefits to the state and the police, but also positive improvements in CTD’s working conditions.

This research shows that organizational environment has a major influence in defining the context of identity change (Gioia et al., 2000). While change factors from an organization’s political, social, economic, and legal environment cause organizational members to make sense of discrepancies between their perception and outsiders’ perception of their organization’s image, they also define the limits of identity change within the organization. Thus, organizational environment functions not only as a trigger of identity change, but also as a boundary determiner of the change (Gioia et al., 2000).

This study also indicates that organizational members care about their organization’s distorted image not only because of their cognitive dissonance between their self-perceptions (the construed external image) and others’ perceptions about their organizations (Dutton & Drukerich, 1991; Dutton, Drukerich, & Harquil, 1994; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), but also due to their interpretation of their disturbing image as political and strategic issues (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Due to intensive international attention, CTD members changed their tough policing practices to avoid from increased punishment. CTD members also realized their disturbing image in society weakened their counterterrorism strategy. Moreover, because of their patriotic feelings (Crank & Caldero, 2000; Kleinig, 2002), CTD members engaged in identity change to improve their country’s image through intensive international attention to human rights problems in the country. By recognizing the vicious circle of terrorism, CTD members focused on improving their image to turn the vicious circle into a virtuous circle. Thus, this study
makes a significant contribution to the organizational identity literature by presenting organizational image as political and strategic issues that trigger identity change.

When CTD members first heard the idea of soft policing from new middle managers, they displayed active resistance (Reger et al., 1994b). They denied the idea—even accused new managers of being prone to violence and terrorism. When a suspect died in their custody and their colleagues were punished by the court in 1999, they started to think about exploring soft policing techniques. This incident caused identity crisis (Fombrun & Rindova, 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002) for CTD members and they had to revise their identity according to new conditions (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Gioia et al., 2000). The increased possibility of punishment deterred CTD members from tough policing practices and forced them to find alternative strategies in counterterrorism. After achieving successful results and doing better using soft policing techniques, commitment to the new philosophy increased; the change in the laws in 2005 also facilitated institutionalizing the new approach. All these shifts from one phase to the other demonstrates that organizational members need to make sense of change and need time to understand how to adjust themselves according to the changes in their environment (Bartunek et al., 2006; George & Jones, 2001; Weber & Manning, 2001).

Moreover, looking at the causes of resistance in the CTD, CTD members view their resistance as a result of their identity, which consists of patriotic feelings to protect their country against terrorism rather than their self-interests. CTD members resisted the change due to their noble cause of nationalism (Crank & Caldero, 2000; Kleinig, 2002). CTD members put themselves in risky situations by applying tough interrogation techniques; most of them were punished or tried in court for allegations of torture. Thus,
this case supports the discussion in the organizational literature that identity causes resistance to change and contributes to the police management literature that resistance to change occurs in the police due to collective cognitive oppositions of police members that arise from organizational identity.

In addition, CTD members stated that the results of their identity change brought success in decreasing counterterrorism and improved their state and their organization’s image in their country as well as in the international stage. Moreover, CTD members think that, although their initial opposition to the change gradually decreased, they as individuals also benefited from the results of change. The identity change enabled CTD members to follow due process in order not to get in trouble while positively affecting their work environment, which resulted in being well connected to society and having a self-perception of making a meaningful contribution to society.

When we look at the results of identity change from tough policing to soft policing from a counterterrorism perspective, the CTD’s new identity captures the essence of the HAM theory and the theory of soft power (Long, 2006; Nye, 2004). CTD members repeatedly stated that they cannot solve the problem of terrorism by themselves; however, if a government policy requires all government agencies to approach terrorism in a similar manner, terrorism will diminish and the idea of insurgency will not be favored by the people. The new strategies developed to end terrorism not only include people in the problematic regions, but also terrorist suspects and convicted terrorists. Thus, this new approach expands both the HAM theory and the theory of soft power, contributing an example of a successful counterterrorism strategy to the counterinsurgency literature. In other words, the discussion herein constitutes a
contribution of a new theory to the counterterrorism literature, which can be defined as the “Soft Power Theory.”

For a future research, the relationship between organizational identity and organizational culture should be studied to explore the changes in organizational identity affected by the organizational culture (Brown, 2001; Hatch & Schultz, 2002; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). In addition, CTD members’ resistance strategies can be analyzed to determine what kinds of strategies they use to prevent or slow change as well as what kinds of sensegiving strategies were used by middle managers to sell their idea of soft policing to officers as well as top managers (Dutton & Asforth, 1993; Dutton & Penner, 1993; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). In addition, similar research can be replicated in other divisions of the MPD in order to see how change efforts affected the other divisions’ identity. Research in this area would give ideas about the possibility of multiple identities (Albert & Whetten, 1985) in the police departments as a result of a top-down change initiative.

In conclusion, this study found that the demands of the EU led to CTD members to be respectful to human rights as an institutionally claimed identity. These demands also made sense for CTD members when they interpreted their disturbing image as political and strategic issues. Thus, this study contributed to the literature by determining that, if congruence exists between institutionally claimed identity and the perceived organizational identity on the necessity of identity change, identity change in organizations may result. Otherwise, organizational members will actively resist change due to their cognitive oppositions. In addition, in order to war against terrorism
effectively and find lasting solutions to the problem of terrorism, governments should consider soft power in their counterterrorism strategy to gain hearts and minds of people.
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

This ethnographic study of torture in a counterterrorism division (CTD) of a metropolitan police department (MPD) analyzed how counterterrorism officers rationalized the torture carried out in the past, how they made sense of their change process as well as their resistance to change. Analyzing rationalization techniques of counterterrorism provides ideas about how torture practices were justified by police officers; meanwhile, explaining how they make sense of the change gives ideas about identity change and resistance to change arising from CTD members’ cognitive oppositions.

The results of this study made several contributions to the literature. First, the analysis of rationalization techniques of torture identified two new techniques of rationalization—expedience and nationalism—as well as discovering three rationalization techniques—denial of responsibility, condemnation of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties—originally identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) and applied to the organizational context by Ashforth and Anand (2003). Second, the research of rationalizing torture also provided an empirical analysis to the police deviance literature, which has thus far been lacking. As such, the first empirical chapter of this dissertation study filled gaps in both the rationalization literature and the police deviance literature.

The first part of the empirical analysis also provided practical ideas about police reform. Police reformers face struggles when they try to curb police deviance and generally blame such problems on resistance from line officers. This study demonstrated that, in order to change deviant practices in police departments, police reformers need to
understand the reasons for rationalization, which provides excuses and justifications for deviance and allows for efforts to minimize the causes of rationalization.

This analysis also warrants further research in police deviance. Only the rationalization pillar of the normalized corruption model developed by Ashforth and Anand (2003) was analyzed. As discussed in the literature, the other two pillars—institutionalization and socialization—also play major roles in normalizing deviance in police departments. Thus, in order to understand how torture is institutionalized, the roles of leaders and culture should be analyzed. Moreover, the third pillar of the model—socialization—explains how new members are introduced to deviant practices by seasoned officers. This also provides an interesting opportunity to study what kinds of tactics are used by seasoned officers to induce rookie officers to engage in deviant practices.

The second empirical chapter of this dissertation study explained the identity change process of the CTD from the perspective of its members. This chapter analyzed how CTD members make sense of their identity change from tough policing to soft policing. The results of this study demonstrated that the identity change process was triggered by CTD members’ interpretation of the image as a political and strategic issue while macro and meso level factors that come from political, social, legal, and organizational environments of the CTD provided a context for identity change. Human rights abuses have deteriorated both the image of the state in the international arena and the image of the police in society. Thus, CTD members engaged in the identity change in order to improve their country’s image in the international arena as a political action and to restore the image of their organization in society as a strategic action. This study
contributes to the literature that the disturbing image causes changes in the identity of an organization due to not only cognitive dissonance arising from the gap between organizational members’ perception of their organization and others’ perception about them (Dutton & Drukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), but also organizational members’ interpretation of their disturbing image as political and strategic issues.

Moreover, the identity change process from tough policing to soft policing has not happened as an episodic and revolutionary change, but rather as a continuous and adaptive change (Orlikowski, 2002; Weick & Quinn, 1999). CTD members’ sensemaking process of the change in their environment took time; their cognitive opposition to the idea of soft policing in the beginning of the change slowed the process (Bartunek et al., 2006; George & Jones, 2001; Weber & Manning, 2001). This analysis contributed to the organizational identity literature by determining that, if congruence exists between institutionally claimed identity and perceived organizational identity about the need for change, identity change can happen; otherwise, it will be resisted due to collective cognitive oppositions of organizational members. In addition, this analysis provided new insights into police management regarding resistance to change in police organizations, which can occur because of its members’ cognitive oppositions arising from organizational identity.

These findings also have some practical implications. In changing the identity of an organization, organizational image triggers a change if members see the disturbing image as political and strategic issues. Police managers and reformers can play a critical role as sensegivers (Gioia & Chittipedia, 1991) during the change to sell the disturbing
image as political and strategic issues (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001) to their organization. If managers and reformers are not able to succeed in their sensegiving efforts, their claimed identity change will be resisted and halted by police members due to their strong cognitive oppositions.

Future research should examine the relationship between organizational identity and organizational culture to understand how changes in organizational identity affect the culture of the CTD during this process and vice versa (Brown, 2001; Hatch & Schultz, 2002; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). In this way, researchers can understand the interactive relationship among culture, identity, and image. In addition, CTD members’ resistance strategies can be analyzed to determine what kinds of strategies they use to prevent or slow change as well as what kinds of sensegiving strategies were used by middle managers to sell their idea of soft policing to officers as well as top managers (Dutton & Asforth, 1993; Dutton & Penner, 1993; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Finally, similar research can be replicated in other divisions of the MPD in order to see how change efforts affected the other divisions’ identity. Research in this area would give ideas about the possibility of multiple identities (Albert & Whetten, 1985) in the police departments as a result of a top-down change initiative.

However, there might be some skepticism that there has been a reduction in torture at the CTD. There are three different possibilities about the reduction in torture in the CTD. The first is the possibility of location displacement. Although CTD members claimed that they changed their practices seen as harsh and they do not use torture during interrogations anymore, the possibility of executing torture and harsh practices outside of the division and outside of the police department, is possible. However, during my study
I did not encounter any activities or verbal cues that imply CTD members use other locations to torture suspects. There is a possibility that my informants are not disclosing this information or they are somehow disguising harsh practices. Therefore, future research should examine the possibility of torture practices outside the formal structures of the police department. One method of data collection could be to examine complaints levied against CTD members that refer to torture practices that occur in locations other than the department. Official data can be obtained from the Personnel Bureau of the MPD or the Complaints Bureau of the Ministry of Interior. In addition, torture complaints to the ECtHR and torture complaints to national human rights NGOs can be traced to crosscheck the validity of the official data. By doing this analysis, the CTD members’ claims about the eradication of torture can be assessed.

Moreover, a second possibility is that the improvements in human rights and the reduction of torture is the unique experience of the CTD. Other divisions in the MPD and other police departments in the prospective member state may have different situations. This research provides some support for this conclusion. For example, as explained in the Chapter V, although there are macro and meso level factors that affect all police departments, the CTD has been engaged in a unique identity change process. The change process began with the attention directed at the CTD from national and European organizations concerning the death of a suspect in CTD custody. The attention put pressure on the CTD to change their practices. The CTD is also among the largest counterterrorism divisions in the prospective member state which puts a spotlight on its activities. The CTD receives more attention from the EU and its human rights organizations, the government, national human rights organizations, and the media. In
addition, the members of the CTD believe that terrorism is different than other crimes because of its political nature, therefore, this supports the possibility that CTD members are a unique group compared to other divisions. CTD members expressed that they have a different role than the police because they think that terrorism is a political crime and cannot be solved using ordinary policing strategies. Thus, they developed the soft policing idea in order to solve the problem of terrorism. In order to see whether the soft policing approach is a unique approach of the CTD, future research should replicate this study in other divisions of the MPD, as well as other police departments in the prospective member state. Doing a comparative study about the reduction of torture across different divisions will give better idea about the generalizability of the research findings from this study.

The last possibility is related to decreasing torture practices. There may be a steady decrease in torture in the CTD during times when pressure is high from the macro level factors as explained in the Chapter V. According to my observation and interviews with CTD members, these macro level factors do influence them in changing their practices, otherwise they could be reprimanded. As explained in the identify change process chapter, CTD members changed their practices both because of coercive factors coming from the broader environment of the CTD as well as because of normative factors which arose from the identity of the CTD. In fact, there is a body of evidence from outside sources that indicates the practices of the CTD have changed. First, the EU and its human rights organizations have recognized such change efforts and improvements in minimizing torture and maltreatment in the CTD. They acknowledge such changes in their latest reports. Moreover, during the four months of my ethnographic study, I did not
encounter any tough policing practices at the CTD. I was allowed to visit CTD detention centers and interrogation rooms as needed, as well as at any time, without obtaining permission. According to my observations, CTD members have change their practices due to the mix of coercive and normative factors as explained in the analysis above.

In conclusion, I can say that the results of this ethnographic research show how CTD members rationalized their torture practice when they talked about their old practices, they also explained their identity change process which provided detailed information about the causes, processes, and results of the identity change process. However, this ethnographic research warrants further research to assess the claims of the CTD members about the reduction of torture as well as its generalizability in other divisions of the MPD and other police departments in the prospective member state.
References


