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In July 1963, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk held a private meeting with Dr. Willem Naude, the ambassador of South Africa. "A rough time [is] ahead," Rusk explained as the representative sat down in his office. "We are under enormous pressure but do not intend to give in." Several members of the UN African group states at the United Nations had successfully protested the practice of apartheid—South Africa’s system of institutionalized racial discrimination—in the Security Council that year and pressure was rapidly mounting in the General Assembly for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The ambassador looked across Rusk’s desk and noted that it was “ironical” that ten years earlier they had been allies in the Cold War and now his country was being isolated in its struggle against a “common enemy.” He went on to assert: “The United States [is] to a large degree responsible for releasing these revolutionary forces in the world. The goal of a great power should be to play down tensions and try to get people to talk together, but the United States without even opening its mouth [has] released dangerous forces in the world.” Rusk paused for a moment before responding: “[I wonder] if these forces [are] not deeply rooted in the nature of man. [I wonder] if this discourse has not been going on for 2,000 years. Did not man, like most animals, not like to be pushed around too much?”
The secretary of state's comments were meant as a subtle jab at the ambassador, but they reflected the fact that new themes were reshaping how politicians approached international affairs. In many ways, the world was in the midst of a revolutionary transformation. Since the end of World War II, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had formed the parameters of world conflict and dominated global forums like the United Nations. For many American elites, the foremost accomplishments of the postwar era had been the solidification of US power in Western Europe and the Pacific Rim, while the greatest threats were the Soviet Union's dominance over Eastern Europe and the rise of Communist China. The concept of containment seemed unassailable and few questioned the overriding importance of the Cold War. Under the surface, however, advocates for the decolonization of Africa and Asia were articulating a systematic rebuttal of this paradigm. With the onset of first-wave decolonization in the late 1940s, these actors gained a voice at the United Nations and established the foundation for what would become the postcolonial critique. Rather than focusing on national security issues or great power politics, they placed precedence on the problems of white racism and economic exploitation. The Cold War, to their minds, was a diversion from the more important struggles being waged along the North-South axis.

This thesis came into focus as dozens of African and Asian states gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Concepts of sovereignty, freedom, and development—long defined in reference to European history—reemerged as contested ideas in these years, with actors using discourses of human rights, racial equality, and nationalism to expand their authority at the United Nations. As Rusk surveyed these developments in the summer of 1963, he no doubt recognized that South Africa's internal policies were placing it at the epicenter of this new drama. The issue of apartheid not only monopolized debate at the General Assembly that year; it also shaped how the “2,000-year-old” struggle of humankind against its oppressor was being presented to the world community. The choice between order and justice that subtly permeated Rusk's conversation with the South African ambassador, in effect, was a choice between the Cold War narrative of postwar events and the emerging story of postcolonial emancipation.

This chapter examines the apartheid debate from an international perspective. Focusing on the brief moment between 1960 and 1963, it looks at how three influential actors—the African group at the UN, the US government, and the South African government—framed the stakes and meaning of apartheid in the immediate wake of second-wave or African decolonization. Sitting at the nexus of Cold War politics and decolonization, apartheid was the quintessential border of the postcolonial decade. For symbolic and
political reasons, each side in this story tried to police, reconceptualize, and control legitimate forms of knowledge about South Africa. As this contest unfolded, the apartheid question became a microcosm of the postcolonial era, revealing the deep-seated differences between actors in the First and Third Worlds, as well as the paradoxical nature of change in the late twentieth century.

In explicating this story, this chapter forwards three interlocking arguments. First, resistance to apartheid subtly influenced how anticolonial sentiment was expressed in the years after decolonization. Couched in the language of Third World nationalism and Cold War neutrality, the actions of African nation-states vis-à-vis South Africa did not illustrate political immaturity, but rather a latent effort to reconstitute global politics in ways that embraced universal human rights and nonracialism. Black nationalists, quite literally, used their influence in the United Nations to broaden the definition of legitimate international behavior. Second, the United States reacted to these efforts with an agenda born from the Cold War. America's own national myth worked in conjunction with the UN Charter to buttress anti-apartheid efforts on a rhetorical level, but US officials were always more concerned with maintaining America's hegemony at the United Nations than with confronting racism in South Africa. Finally, as world opinion turned definitively against the Nationalist government in the early 1960s, Afrikaner elites tried retooling their country's image in ways that transcended debate at the UN and strengthened ties with Western nations. Their efforts were not entirely successful, but they did expose important connections between older forms of racial paternalism and the new discourse of modernization in the post-World War II years.

When taken together, these points offer insight on the complex relationship between the Cold War and decolonization. The African bloc's inability to elicit support for economic sanctions was tied most directly to the divergence between its political goals and the security and economic priorities of Western policy makers. Equally important, however, was the shifting nature of political space in the postcolonial moment. As African elites grew more adept at using their numbers to shape discourse at the United Nations, US leaders began to pull away subtly from the organization and the idea that it could be a bulwark of American global power. This shift—and the underlying attitudes that supported it—both eroded the tentative authority of new nation-states at the international level and opened the door for subsequent South African propaganda initiatives at the nonstate level. Although the language of empire changed undeniably in the postcolonial years, global politics continued to reflect and reinforce older forms of pan-European hegemony.
Internationalizing Apartheid

On January 27, 1960, the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, arrived in the Union of South Africa to deliver a stern message. Having spent much of the late 1950s managing decolonization movements within the British Commonwealth, he sought to warn the white population of South Africa that a “wind of change” was blowing through their continent. Speaking before a special joint session of Parliament on February 3, he argued: “Whether we like it or not, [the] growth of [African] national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it.” Macmillan went on to explain that the world was being divided into three groups, with the Western powers and Communists now competing to garner loyalty from newly independent nonwhite peoples. In his words, “The great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the east or to the west.” When placed against this backdrop, the situation in South Africa was becoming vitally important. “It is the basic principle for our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other’s sovereignty in matters of internal policy,” Macmillan declared. “[But] we must recognize that, in this shrinking world in which we live today, the internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it.” The British prime minister, in short, was asking the Union of South Africa to recognize that it was becoming a liability to the West in the postcolonial era of world politics.

Macmillan’s words reverberated throughout South African society. Since gaining its independence in 1910, the Union had worked from the assumption that its position among the Western powers was unassailable. The basis of this partnership, in the minds of many South African elites, was the inherent superiority of white civilization and a common commitment to racial paternalism. As European countries like France and Great Britain relinquished control of their colonial holdings in Africa and Asia, however, these twin principles receded from global discourse. In their place emerged concepts of development, universal equality, and political self-determination. Although India and other Asian states subjected the Nationalist government to criticism as early as 1946, its economic and strategic niche in the Cold War alliance system insulated it from concrete action through the 1950s.

Macmillan’s speech was interpreted widely as the harbinger of major change. “South Africa can only have one answer to this challenge,” contended Cape Town’s Die Burger the day after the British prime minister’s speech. “We cannot hand over any part of Africa for which we are responsible. . . . The state of emergency we have been plunged into by Western panic can only be fought with united forces. It is a struggle for civilization.” As a colonial nation in an increasingly postcolonial world, South Africa had essentially reached a
crossroads between nonracial reform and continued minority domination. Its response was made clear in mid-February, when South African prime minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd publicly declared: “The world is suffering from a psychosis which makes it think only of the brown and black man and disregard the role of the White man.” Claiming that Western countries were “sacrificing their only real and stable friend... for something that will not succeed,” Verwoerd emphatically concluded that there would be “no mixing of the races.”7

South Africa’s decision to embrace white domination was born from policies dating back to 1948. Capitalizing on a general climate of anxiety after World War II, the Afrikaner Nationalist party had achieved electoral supremacy that year by explicitly promising to reinforce laws that segregated the country’s various ethnic groups.8 While Macmillan conceptualized the dilemma of decolonization through the lens of the Cold War, most white South Africans were more concerned with the concrete task of holding on to political and economic power in the Union. On a basic level, apartheid institutionalized state control over the movement of black African laborers in white urban centers. After 1948, the government invested enormous state resources in robbing nonwhites of their remaining civil liberties, criminalizing various forms of labor activism, and forcing black Africans into overcrowded ghettos at the outskirts of cities. To support these programs, the Nationalist party not only expanded the government’s military capabilities, but also forced blacks to carry identification cards whenever they left local townships to work in industrial centers.

Dissatisfaction among black South Africans exploded only a month after Macmillan departed the country in early 1960. On March 21, twenty thousand Africans surrounded a small police station in the township of Sharpeville and demanded to be arrested for not carrying their travel passes. Led by a political group called the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and inspired by the lessons of India’s independence, they hoped to overflow South Africa’s jails and provoke a crisis within the government. The police responded by opening fire on the crowd. Within a half hour, sixty-seven people were killed and nearly two hundred were injured.9

The Sharpeville Massacre triggered a sense of panic within the Nationalist party. Acknowledging that the protests were only one part of a nationwide upheaval involving hundreds of thousands of Africans, the minister of justice declared a state of emergency on March 22 and warned ominously that the country was on the brink of a race revolution. Mass arrests occurred in the following weeks as riots spread throughout the country.10 Standing before the House of Assembly a week after the initial outburst, Prime Minister Verwoerd explained: “These disturbances we are experiencing must be seen against the background... of similar occurrences in this country, in the whole of Africa, and around
the world.” The “wind of change” that Macmillan had described had arrived on the shores of South Africa. And the Union’s response was dramatically clear.

Language of Dissent

The protests were indeed closely related to broader changes in African politics during the postwar era. For over five decades, the dominant nonwhite political organization in the Union of South Africa was the African National Congress (ANC). Subscribing to a nonracial social platform, the group worked steadily to unite the country’s various blacks, Indians, and Coloreds under an inclusive political banner. In 1959, Robert Sobukwe, an activist from Johannesburg, created the Pan Africanist Congress to challenge directly the ANC’s leadership position in South Africa. His goal was straightforward—to incorporate more confrontational methods into the struggle against the Nationalist party and accelerate the assault on apartheid. But the language he used to frame these efforts broke radically with ANC dogma. Arguing that “government must be of the African, by the African, and for the African,” the PAC explicitly rejected the utility of cooperation between racial groups and declared that black Africans would have “complete political independence by 1963.”

The assertiveness and race consciousness of this platform was tied closely to developments occurring in the rest of Africa. Sobukwe was keenly in tune with the ideas of political leaders like Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah. The independence of Ghana in 1957, in many ways, legitimized the political demands of other African territories and spread Nkrumah’s unique version of African nationalism through intellectual circles in the late 1950s. Linked with pan-African ideas of an older generation of diaspora intellectuals like W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, African nationalism provided a language to address the challenges of postcolonialism in ways that were uniquely African. For Sobukwe and his supporters, it provided “the only liberatory creed” that could “weld the illiterate and semi-literate masses ... into a solid, disciplined and united fighting force; provide them with a loyalty higher than that of the tribe; and give formal expression to their desire to be a nation.”

As an ideological framework, African nationalism had two parts. Domestically, its advocates embraced the fair distribution of wealth through society and government investment in local infrastructures. “What other countries have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive,” Nkrumah explained in the mid-1950s. “Capitalism is a difficult system for a newly independent nation, hence the need for a more socialistic society.” The goal was not to reject the tenets of modern industrialism, but to remedy the problems of
underdevelopment in ways that strengthened communities and rejected economic exploitation. African nationalists hoped to promote development by balancing the needs of urban industrialism with their own mythic, precolonial African past. As Sobukwe explained at the PAC's Inaugural Conference, African nationalists would borrow the “best from the East” and “the best from the West” while “retain[ing] and maintain[ing]” the continent’s “distinctive personality.”

At the international level, anticolonialism was the conceptual linchpin of African nationalism. According to Nkrumah, “[Africa’s] safety [could] not be assured until the last vestiges of colonialism [were] swept from Africa.” Political independence was the gateway to economic and social progress. Ghana’s foreign minister, Alex Quaison-Sackey, tied this theme directly to the superpower struggle: “Colonialism is the source of all the troubles which afflict mankind in our age. It is the root cause of the desire to possess arms. Therefore, it is the root cause of the arms race and the problem of disarmament.” Rather than locating global turmoil in the subversive nature of Communism or the political economy of capitalism, African nationalists focused on the dangers of white colonialism. This racialized explanation of power was ubiquitous in the years surrounding decolonization. By flattening visions of the pan-European world (in ways that ironically mirrored the intellectual processes discussed in Edward Said’s Orientalism), it buttressed the larger political project known as the Third World.

The year 1960 was a moment of confluence. The Sharpeville Massacre occurred just as thirteen new African states emerged onto the global stage. While countries like India had criticized the Union’s treatment of Indians and other nonwhites through much of the 1950s, decolonization opened space for a more forceful confrontation with the South African government. For many of these African states, the system of apartheid represented a direct affront to the very notion of black liberation. Not only did it blatantly exploit Africans for economic advancement, but also it embraced the logic and methods of colonial domination. By modernizing the methods of white domination, the Union essentially positioned itself as the chief antagonist of the burgeoning African nationalist movement.

Young South African activists in the PAC and ANC rallied to the idea that their struggle was at the forefront of a worldwide revolution. “The beginning of the end of an era has begun,” claimed the ANC’s Congress Voice in 1960. “The day for which the oppressed and exploited people throughout the world have yearned and struggled so long, has at long last arrived...[W]ith the recent accession of thirteen new independent African states...the [United Nations], which up to [now] has been a stronghold of the big imperialists and colonial powers, has now become the stronghold of the anticolonial forces.”
Believing that they could garner support for international sanctions by expos­
ing the brutality of the Nationalist regime, the ANC and PAC put aside many of their differences in the months after Sharpeville and sent foreign repre­
sentatives abroad. As they established offices in Cairo, Accra, Dar es Saalam, London, and New York, both organizations exhibited newfound confidence in the potential for change in South Africa.  

This energy was also captured in a speech by Kwame Nkrumah before the UN General Assembly in September. Introduced by W. E. B. Du Bois as “the undisputed voice of Africa,” Nkrumah claimed that “the United Nations [was] the only organization that [held] out any hope for the future of mankind.” Although “the flowing tide of African nationalism” had the potential to “sweep away” everything in its path, new African nations wanted only to eliminate colonialism on their continent. Referring specifically to South Africa, the Ghanaian president argued, “The interest of humanity compels every nation to take steps against such inhuman policy and barbarity and to act in concert to eliminate it from the world.” The events at Sharpeville were tragic, but they provided evidence that the “wall of intense hate” that protected South Africa was beginning to crumble. 

The time for change had arrived.

The American Pivot

As the most powerful member of the Western bloc and the dominant state at the United Nations, the United States played an important role in determining whether African nationalist demands would actually affect the government of South Africa. In late 1958, the Union’s foreign minister, Eric Louw, acknowledged to the American ambassador: “I wish to be frank. A specific and strong resolution against South Africa voted for by a majority of nations in [the] U.N. does not matter so much as one might expect. What matters more than . . . all other votes put together is [the position] of [the] U.S. in view of its predominant position of leadership in [the] Western world.” As new African states gained their independence in 1960 and railed at the United Nations against the system of apartheid, Louw’s statement grew increasingly relevant. Functioning as the pivot between the old colonial order that South Africa supposedly epitomized and the new visions of world order that African nationalists embraced, the approach of American policy makers became tremendously important in the early 1960s. Although the United States viewed the African continent as peripheral to its Cold War interests, its policies nonetheless shaped the boundaries of the debate on apartheid.

The American approach was both conflicted and complex. On the one
hand, the United States had important political and financial investments in the Union. A report from the early 1960s explained the economic importance of South Africa: “The international standing of the U.S. dollar and, by extension, the stability of the integrated Western monetary system, is to a degree dependent on the orderly marketing of gold.” South Africa accounted for about 65 percent of the Western bloc’s gold production, the loss of which could put considerable strains on the US gold supply and the integrated Western monetary system.25 When placed against the backdrop of the establishment of a NASA tracking station in 1960 and nearly $600 million worth of private American investment in the Union, these ties represented tangible and substantial links between the United States and South Africa.26

On the other hand, US leaders were cognizant that these ties might affect America’s containment strategy in Africa. In discussing the issue at the first tripartite talks on Africa between the United States, Great Britain, and France in 1959, one participant stated: “In the world-wide political and strategic context, Africa is both a prize and a battlefield. If the Communists occupy or infiltrate too many countries we will lose the Battle for the Atlantic, Europe will be in danger, our communications in the Far East will be cut, and we will lose a tremendous source of raw materials.”27 While not all American policy makers agreed with such vaguely threatening assessments, they recognized that South Africa was “one of the West’s greatest propaganda liabilities” in the new era of decolonization because it embodied “the most flagrant kind of ‘colonialism.”28 Stated plainly, the United States viewed the debate over South Africa through the lens of the Cold War. South Africa’s racial policies were not so much morally reprehensible as they were strategically inconvenient.

This underlying apathy over the morality of apartheid was buttressed by the general view that African nationalism was more an emotional outburst than a cogent alternative to the East-West global narrative. As historian Matthew Connelly and others have demonstrated, American policies during the period of decolonization often relied on older assumptions to support views on containment. In Connelly’s words, “Even at the height of the Cold War, discourses about development and civilizational conflict helped delineate the shifting borders between North and South, the ‘West’ and ‘the rest.’”29 Against the backdrop of African independence and the debate over apartheid, traditional white American assumptions about blacks as being backward and uncivilized often permeated discussions among policy makers.30

During a National Security Council meeting in mid-1958, for example, one official commented: “The Spirit of 1776 is running wild throughout [Africa]. The various states and colonies want independence now, whether they are ready for it or not.” Specifically referencing Ghana’s President Nkrumah, he called such trends “terrifying.”31 During another NSC meet-
ing in 1960, Vice President Nixon commented that “some of the peoples of Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years” and suggested that “politically sophisticated diplomats” could easily subvert black nationalism and reorient “the African people toward the Free World.” President Dwight Eisenhower argued similarly that South Africa was the only country in the entire continent that could actually govern itself. Relying on a binary that subtly undercut the logic of African nationalism, he said that African leaders were “putting the cart before the horse” by placing more precedence on political independence than economic development. These views—grounded in the vocabulary of prewar race relations—helped structure American assumptions about South Africa. The situation was noteworthy because it triggered the ire of new African countries, but beyond its symbolic importance many policy makers actually shared the racialist attitudes that buttressed the Union’s policy of apartheid.

When President Eisenhower first heard that the US Department of State had issued a statement expressing “regret” about the Sharpeville Massacre, he called a meeting with Secretary of State Christian Herter. Learning that the statement was made by a bureau chief working on his own accord, Eisenhower said that if it were his decision, he would “find another post for the bureau chief” and recommended that the State Department apologize immediately to the Union government. Concurring with the president’s comments, Secretary Herter framed the statement as a “breach of courtesy between two nations.” When pressure built for the UN Security Council to address the violence in South Africa during the following week, Eisenhower and Macmillan held a private meeting at Camp David to formulate a response. To the president’s mind: “One could not sit in judgment on a difficult social and political problem six thousand miles away.” Noting that the United States had its “own problem” with race and indicating his sympathy with his “friends in Atlanta on some of their difficulties,” the president promised that the Security Council resolution would “express regret about the disturbances” without committing the Western bloc to a serious confrontation with South Africa.

The president’s comments revealed a deeper dimension of the US approach toward apartheid. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, American society was effectively standing on the brink of its own revolution in race relations. As Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann have noted, many non-whites viewed the ascension of John Kennedy in 1961 as the harbinger of new policies toward black political demands. During the presidential campaign he not only referred to Africa as “the most important area in the world” but also indicated his belief that “the lands of the rising peoples” would play a critical role in “the defense and expansion of freedom.” For many African national-
ists, the central question of 1961 became whether the new president would back up his rhetoric with decisive action.

The Battleground

Indications that the debate over South Africa was entering a new stage became increasingly apparent as 1961 proceeded. Frustrated by Macmillan’s earlier overtures and eager to garner more political autonomy, the Union withdrew from the British Commonwealth that March in order to create an independent republic. When it applied for reentry a few days later, several African member states established preconditions that made its readmission contingent on domestic political reform. “South Africa is one of the senior members of the Commonwealth,” Verwoerd said during a Commonwealth meeting in London on March 23. “No self-respecting member of any voluntary organization could . . . be expected to retain membership in what is now becoming a pressure group.” South Africa withdrew permanently the following day and began fostering closer relations with Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories.

Pressures mounted again when African and Asian countries joined together on July 18 to force the issue of apartheid onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly. Diplomatic warfare carried over into a resolution that was submitted by thirty-two African and Middle Eastern nations in October. Rejecting the passive language that had characterized previous resolutions against South Africa, the resolution proposed that all UN member states break their diplomatic ties with the republic, close their ports to South African ships, boycott South African goods, deny passage to South African aircraft, and recognize apartheid as a direct threat to “international peace and security.” The resolution was withdrawn in November because an Indian resolution against South Africa garnered more support, but the events that autumn revealed that African nations were beginning to use their numbers to place new pressure on South Africa. The United Nations and the British Commonwealth were becoming the diplomatic battlegrounds where African nationalists confronted the forces of colonialism and racism.

The debate over whether the United Nations could take action against South Africa pivoted largely on an interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations. While Article 2(7) forbade the United Nations from “intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” Article 14 gave the General Assembly the ability to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation . . . it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations between nations.” African nationalists came to believe that if they could demonstrate that South Africa represented a
danger to “the maintenance of international peace and security,” the Security Council would be obligated to take action under the provisions of Chapter VII, which outlined the Council’s role in dealing with member-state aggression.40

In pursuing this goal, they offered a revealing twofold rationale that framed apartheid as both transnationally violent and innately expansionistic. In arguing the first point, African nationalists consistently referred to notions of pan-Africanism and asserted that brutality against South African blacks was a provocation against all Africans. Ali Mazrui, a young East African scholar who went on to help establish the field of African studies, framed the point well in a 1962 article to the Times of London. To his mind, the tendency to define black South Africans as “Bantu” was an epistemological byproduct of colonialism. “The term ‘Bantu’ is not territorially restrictive. And in any case the word ‘African’ has now assumed greater dignity, and is therefore preferred by many of the leaders of Africa.” Pointing toward specific speeches by African leaders such as Robert Sobukwe and Kwame Nkrumah, he explained that most blacks now viewed their efforts “as part of a continental struggle in a more real sense than ever Nehru or Sukarno saw themselves as part of an Asian struggle.” Apartheid was not just an assault against blacks in South Africa; it was an attack on Africa as a whole. Using a line of logic that laid a foundation for what would become postmodern theory, he approached the fluidity of African identity as “an excellent example” of how “semantics” could “create myths and symbols” that “changed the map of realities” at the international level.41

In supporting the case that apartheid was expansionistic, African nationalists were more concrete, drawing attention to the colonial relationship between South Africa and the neighboring region of South-West Africa (Namibia). South Africa had been granted a League of Nations mandate over the region after World War I, but such ties were widely seen as illegitimate in the postcolonial era. In early 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia—the only African nations with historical connections to the League of Nations—formally challenged the basis of this mandate with litigation at the International Court of Justice.42 Paul Proehl, a professor of law at UCLA in the 1960s, suggested at the time that the case was “symbolic” of the broader “confrontation between black and white.”43 However, its meaning was more concrete. The South-West Africa case was a contest over the terms of legitimacy in the decolonized world. And although the final decision was not reached until 1966, the African bloc’s ability to win the first phase of the trial in 1962 was interpreted widely as a step toward changing the traditional balance between universal human rights and national sovereignty at the international level.44

These initiatives did not go unnoticed by the United States. In June 1962, the State Department—in a policy paper entitled “The White Redoubt”—cast these breakthroughs in dire terms. Connecting events in South Africa directly
to the revolution in Algeria, officials noted that blacks now faced whites "across a sea of developing hate." The language used was telling: "[South Africa] is, in effect, a last white stronghold against black invasion from the north and racialist-inspired upheavals from within."15 Like the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration subtly cast Africans as barbarians at the gates of whiteness, treating the tensions in southern Africa as an outgrowth of black extremism rather than a byproduct of South Africa's system of racial injustice. During a briefing just before the General Assembly in 1962, Undersecretary of State George Ball relayed this message to the president, saying that the United States was facing "a series of dilemmas with mounting pressures from the Africans and Asians for rapid solutions to the most complicated 'hard core' colonial problems." Although he predicted that support for sanctions and action in South-West Africa would expand in the next General Assembly, he argued that the president needed to "vigorously oppose" such "irresponsible" action.16

When Ghana and other African countries indeed submitted an expanded version of their 1961 resolution during the seventeenth General Assembly, American representatives accused them of "casting doubt on the efficacy of the sanction process," causing "dissension among Member States," and "seriously weakening the authority of the United Nations."17 A circular telegram from the State Department explained that while the "United States continues to favor the achievement of self-determination by dependent peoples throughout the world," the actions of anticolonial nations at the United Nations reflected an "unjustified doctrinaire extremism and impracticality" that was making the United States look "soft on colonialism."18 For Americans, it was a forum for establishing consensus on Cold War issues; for new anticolonial states it was a mechanism for transforming the existing world order. As new African nations grew more adept at using their numbers to shape the United Nations' political agenda, American officials became increasingly frustrated by their inability to control the terms of global politics.

This underlying divergence expanded into a direct confrontation in 1963. In late May, various African governments assembled at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to establish the Organization of African Unity and formulate a unified front against apartheid. In their opening resolution, they not only reaffirmed their commitment to the UN resolution they had passed the previous year, but also expressed "deep concern" with the racial discrimination against African Americans in the United States. Indeed, as the American civil rights movement garnered more media attention and the US government took concrete steps toward civil rights legislation, African nationalists retooled their strategy toward the United States. In a meeting at the State Department over the status of South-West Africa, one African diplomat went so far as to assert that the US government had "an obligation" to address
the situation in the Republic of South Africa because it was willing to support civil rights activists in the American South.48

African nationalists understood that meaningful success was contingent on US willingness to support the resolutions they were passing at the UN General Assembly. When the issue of apartheid went before the Security Council in August 1963, it appeared that a breakthrough might be at hand. In a statement before the Council that dramatically departed from previous US admonitions, representative Adlai Stevenson declared:

We all suffer from the disease of discrimination in various forms, but at least most of us recognize the disease for what it is: a disfiguring blight. In many countries, government policies are dedicated to rooting out this dread syndrome of prejudice and discrimination, while in South Africa we see the anachronistic spectacle of the Government of a great people which persists in seeing the disease as the remedy, prescribing for the malady of racism the bitter toixic of apartheid.

He went on to assert that "just as the United States was determined to wipe out discrimination" on its domestic front, it would "support efforts to bring about a change in South Africa." Acknowledging that apartheid was preventing the full independence of Africa, Stevenson’s declaration was accompanied with a US pledge that the Security Council would help "end the sale of all military equipment" to the republic by the end of the calendar year.49 The statesman’s words represented the strongest condemnation against South Africa that any Western government had ever made.

However, the new US position ignored the broader political platform of African nationalists and said nothing about the issue of economic sanctions. The true sentiment of American policy makers was captured well in private conversations between the summer and fall of 1963. In a meeting with the South African ambassador, Dr. Willem Naude, on the eve of the UN sanctions debate, Secretary of State Rusk spoke frankly about attitudes within the Kennedy administration. Keeping his comments strictly off the record, Rusk admitted that the United States was willing to embrace a nonintegrationist solution to South Africa’s problems. "A breath-taking step has a better chance of success than something small and pedestrian,” the secretary of state explained with candor. By shifting South Africa to a "federal or confederal" political system, whites would be able to eliminate local discrimination against blacks while maintaining exclusive control over "external affairs and defence." The South African ambassador—who interpreted this plan as a sign of "fresh
thinking and an abandonment of the hackneyed clichés of the New Frontier"—responded with enthusiasm. Writing to Pretoria the following evening, Naude noted that if South Africa could "present [its] situation in terms of [Mr. Rusk's] own terminology [it] might be able to make a great deal of ‘progress’ in getting the U.S. to understand [its] situation, without moving an inch from [its] declared policies.” From South Africa’s perspective, the overture was a sign that the Americans were “willing to agree—albeit reluctantly—to explore, if not yet to follow, [the] road of separate development” in South Africa.²⁹

Such a sentiment was echoed by President Kennedy himself during an October meeting with British officials about African demands for economic sanctions against the Nationalist government. In his words, the United States had “gone along on the arms embargo” but “would not go beyond that and would not support sanctions.” The question, to his mind, was now “how best to stop them.”³³ A memo from the National Security Council staff later that month cast the situation in policy terms: “In the past several years...we have sailed an improvised, often erratic course between the antagonists, with a series of minor concessions to the Africans as the pressures mounted, while avoiding an irreparable break with the...South Africans. While this has been the most sensible—indeed the only sensible—course open to us, we are beginning to run out of sailing room. I think we can gain some space for maneuver, and continue to defer the dilemma, if we raise our present tactic to a deliberate, systematic policy.”³⁴

Shifting the Debate

The South African government watched the global apartheid debate with a mixture of anxiety and resentment. “[This] goes deeper than a ‘publicity problem with political overtones,’” explained one high-ranking official in January 1961. “[These attacks] have become a full scale international political problem affecting the survival of South Africa itself.”³⁵ To the minds of many Afrikaner elites, criticism from abroad was pushing South Africa toward economic collapse. Indeed, the foreign capital that had propelled the country’s manufacturing growth during the postwar years evaporated rapidly in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre, as global investors grew wary that unrest was a sign of a coming racial war. In the months that followed the riots, more than seven hundred million pounds disappeared from South Africa’s economy.³⁶ At the end of 1960, banking officials lamented openly that “the net outflow of capital” was having “an appreciably adverse effect on the country’s monetary reserves and financial markets.” To address these problems, they encouraged the government to “exert itself in every possible way to revive the confidence of foreign investors.”³⁶
Toward this end, the government vastly expanded its propaganda machine and implemented an ambitious “programme of action” in the years after Sharpeville. Hoping to transcend their difficulties at the United Nations, South African officials focused their attention on nongovernment actors and global capitalists. “This total war against South Africa is being waged on the publicity front,” explained the director of intelligence, P. J. Nel, in late 1960. Stepping back from the situation, he noted resentfully that “when we put forward our case, our words and good intentions are doubted. . . . Our country is stable, our economy healthy and our people are better off than in other parts of the continent. We are a Christian country, democratic, and free from corruption. Why are we being attacked about things which are glossed over in . . . embryonic dictatorships such as Ghana?” For Nel, the answer was tied to the insights of social psychology: “It is clear that the resistance against our message, at least in the U.S.A., can be ascribed to hidden, subconscious factors.”57 With the “survival” of South Africa contingent on economic integration with the West, the task before the South African Information Service was clear—to attack these “subconscious factors” in tangible and incremental ways.

Government officials advanced a plan that was layered and subtle. In South Africa, the government would begin a systematic effort of “planned internal press canvassing.” In Nel’s words: “The press should become priority number one. It was the press that conditioned the adverse popular opinion against South Africa; the press is the major means to be used to remedy the situation.” Conceiving this work as the “top commitment of the Information Service of South Africa,” he recommended the development of intimate relationships with “important internal correspondents” and “manageable foreign correspondents.” Members of the press were to be treated literally as guests of the Nationalist party. To reinforce the authority of the state, cabinet members and other officials were instructed to release information to the public through press conferences rather than “impersonal” news releases. For the director, these initiatives would not simply dampen the influence of South Africa’s critics—they guaranteed better understanding of South Africa’s race problems. Demanding in “the strongest terms” that this program be kept secret from “the press, the Parliament and the public,” the director confidently asserted that it provided an “answer to press control.”58

Conceived as “the first bulwark of counter-attack,” this program was coupled with an aggressive public relations campaign in Washington, DC, and New York City. On one level, South Africa’s goal was political. As the director of intelligence explained: “Everything indicates that the Kennedy regime is going to be strongly influenced by liberal and progressive elements. An influential P.R. man can assist us in mustering a strong group of sympathetic people.
around Vice President Johnson and Senators Fulbright and Mansfield.” On a deeper level, however, the South African government hoped to fundamentally change US perceptions of apartheid. Claiming that Americans were conditioned to “accept the simplistic solution of an eventual explosion as the only possible outcome” in South Africa, officials turned to private organizations like the Institute for Motivational Research for guidance in their approach to propaganda. Using newly developed social science concepts and research methods, the Institute and its “team of Ph.D.s” analyzed the “latent” and “emotional” reasons for anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States. South African officials embraced the organization’s findings. First, many Americans viewed the Nationalist government as a “colonial power” in South Africa. Second, everyday Americans tended to juxtapose the rigidity of apartheid with America’s “progressive” approach toward race. And third, few Americans understood the “economic realities” of South African society. “Armed with these data,” the director of intelligence declared, “we can now apply a strengthened information service with a new prospect of success and new techniques to swing public opinion within the foreseeable time into our favour.”

By 1965, the annual budget of South Africa’s Information Service exceeded a million pounds and it was distributing periodicals, educational pamphlets, and propaganda movies in a variety of languages around the world, in addition to coordinating regular speaking tours by various government officials. On one level, the Information Agency worked to disconnect the country’s domestic race policies from the narrative of anticolonialism. Keywords like “stability,” “coexistence,” and “self-government” permeated South African information pamphlets. To strengthen their case, propagandists juxtaposed the situation in South Africa with the supposed immaturity and volatility of other African nations. This effort was premised on South African exceptionalism: “Neither in Algeria nor in [Kenya] can the white communities be regarded as constituting a unique, separate and self-contained nation.”

The South Africa Digest editorialized: “It is essential to remember that the forces and influences that have arisen in Algeria, West Africa, the Congo, and East Africa are not coordinated. To believe this would be to misunderstand the confused, shifting and immature character of the African.” Similarly, in a speech before European capitalists, South Africa’s foreign minister argued that economic pressures from African nations like Ghana were signs of “political immaturity—the sort expected from small boys or a certain modern type of irresponsible teenager.” Unrest in places like the Congo, to his mind, would have a “healthy effect” on the Western world by reminding foreigners that “[South Africa] is the only country with the necessary knowledge to ensure positive trade relations.” Relying on highly paternalistic language, the government tried to convince Western authorities that the rest of
Africa was fundamentally different from South Africa. Black African states were inherently “unstable” and “unpredictable,” while the Union remained a bastion of modern capitalism.

When addressing the unrest inside their own borders, government officials dwelled often on the specter of Communism. The African National Congress had long-standing ties with the South African Communist Party, but few African nationalists—especially within the PAC—counted themselves genuine Communists in the early 1960s. As criticism of apartheid mounted, however, South African propagandists made the case that black activism and Communism were a singular phenomenon. “Nothing would satisfy the Communists except a successful revolution in South Africa, and nothing would satisfy the extremist Africans except the introduction of one-man-one-vote into the constitution,” explained an official in 1963. For many white South Africans these two dangers were interconnected. By positioning themselves between the Western bloc and imaginary Communist masses, government advocates conveyed the message that they were defenders of Western values in the African continent.

Most importantly, South African propagandists lauded the merits of their industrial society. Nearly every propaganda item from the early 1960s made some reference to the country’s high standard of living and complex manufacturing sector. The goal, according to the information Service, was to “present to the world the true picture of South Africa” by focusing on themes like “industrial and social progress; science and education; cultural development; opportunities for investment; tourist attractions; and the way of life of South Africans at work and play.” Recognizing that colonial themes of white civilization no longer resonated abroad, the South African government used concepts of industrialization and modernization to reestablish its place in the capitalist world. The goal was not to engage directly the African nationalists in a debate over apartheid, but to manipulate underlying Western assumptions about blacks and emphasize the pragmatic importance of social stability and economic vitality. Understanding that economic integration with countries like the United States and Great Britain was the key to South Africa’s place in the postcolonial world, Afrikaner elites worked deliberately outside the parameters of the United Nations to influence the nature of the debate on their country. Their efforts revealed important aspects of how the gap between older modes of “civilizational” thinking and the newer discourse of “modernization” was bridged in the years after the Second World War. Explicit racial paternalism receded from global discourse in the wake of decolonization, but racialist thinking still offered subtle reference points that helped frame economic, political, and cultural relations in the Cold War.
Conclusion

By the mid-1960s, the economy of South Africa was vibrant and strong, but the country was politically isolated from the world community. Although it remains difficult to measure the exact impact of South Africa’s information campaign, it seems telling that the country had little difficulty receiving a series of loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the early 1960s to deal with its economic downturn. According to Reserve Bank officials, the ability to secure such loans “indicate[d] the beginning of an increase in foreign confidence in the maintenance of order, stability and prosperity in South Africa.”

By the end of 1963, despite the Security Council’s arms embargo and near universal condemnation of apartheid at the UN General Assembly, South African officials reflected that events had turned out “better than expected.” The situation had demonstrated “the value of positive, non-political propaganda” in creating “an effect essentially political.”

On October 18, a delegation from Pretoria privately notified the US secretary of state that South Africa was “seriously and urgently” considering withdrawal from the United Nations. Although the Nationalist government had made similar declarations in the mid-1950s, its latest overture was coupled with a revealing qualifier. Noting that the organization only embarrassed and harassed their country, representatives argued that withdrawal would “reduce the difficulties for certain countries with whom South Africa has had long and friendly ties.” The message was clear—positive relations were not contingent on developments at the United Nations.

For a unique but fleeting moment in the early 1960s, African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah genuinely believed they could change South Africa and destroy the remnants of colonialism by mobilizing support in the United Nations. Such confidence was inspired by the sense that a racial revolution was occurring around the world that placed African interests at the vanguard of human progress. Motivated by a set of priorities that centered on North-South issues of white racism and economic exploitation, nationalists throughout the Third World were similarly working from within the United Nations to transform world opinion and the world order. Their concerns, however, were not shared by dominant international actors like the United States. In the minds of many American leaders, the political demands of Africans and Asians were inconvenient outbursts that distracted from the more important concerns of the Cold War. The inability of African countries to garner support for economic sanctions against South Africa at the United Nations exposed important realities about the limited nature of political change in the postcolonial era.
Equally important, it revealed the paradoxes that emerged as the Cold War superpowers supplanted traditional European empires in the years after World War II. Political space emerged for the articulation of alternative visions of world order—visions rooted in themes of racial justice, national sovereignty, and human rights—but actual initiatives were compromised by the imperatives of national security ideology and world capitalism. These points were not lost on people living in the Third World. By the late 1960s, as it became increasingly obvious that the Afro-Asian coalition and its nationalist leaders could not deliver on promises of change, political momentum in southern Africa (as well as the Middle East and Southeast Asia) began shifting toward leaders outside the traditional nation-state system. By the late 1960s, with war raging in Vietnam, the optimism once associated with the “postcolonial moment” was supplanted widely by feelings of frustration and disillusionment. And the United States, in the minds of many, stood imaginatively as the world’s cynical “New Empire.”

Notes
1. This chapter was previously published as an article in Diplomatic History 33, no. 5 (November 2009): 897–925, and is reprinted with the permission of Diplomatic History and Wiley Periodicals Inc. The author thanks Robert McMahon, Peter Hahn, and Tim Borstelmann for early feedback on the essay, as well as the George C. Marshall Foundation, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the Mershon Center, and the Kirwin Institute for their generous financial support.
4. For the best overview of this process, see Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).


8. The term “Afrikaner” (or “Boer”) refers to South Africans of Dutch heritage. They constituted the majority of the white population, but British settlers were also present in the country. The two groups clashed frequently during the first part of the twentieth century. In many ways, the 1948 election was crucial because it marked the moment when Afrikaners took control of the government. They maintained control until 1994. The divisions within the white South African community and the emergence of white nationalism in South Africa are important and relevant topics, but they will not be explored here. See Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); and William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).


15. The State of the Nation, August 2, 1959, Robert Sobukwe Collection, Liberation Archives, University of Fort Hare (UFH).


17. Opening Address, April 4, 1959, Robert Sobukwe Collection, Liberation Archives, UFH.


26. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, July 13, 1963, National Security Files, Countries Series: South Africa, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), Boston, MA.


36. Kennedy campaign speech, November 1, 1960, JFKL, www.jfklink.com/speeches (accessed December 13, 2006); and John Kennedy’s Special Appeal to Congress, May 25, 1961, Office Files: Speeches, Box 34, JFKL.


38. As mentioned earlier, it was on the agenda periodically throughout the 1950s but focused mostly on the rights of Indian laborers in South Africa. The relations between African nationalists and the broader Non-Aligned Movement warrant significant analysis but fall outside the parameters of this chapter. This tension is examined in my broader work. It seems enough to say that India was a key member
of the Non-Aligned Movement and its decision to support the more radical platform of African nationalists in 1962 was an important moment in the anti-apartheid initiative at the United Nations. For further information, consult documents in UN Office of Information, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994*, 221–42.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.


44. The relationship between legitimacy and power is crucial to this argument. Although international historians are only beginning to approach this topic seriously, international relations theorists have made positive headway in recent years. See Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). For further information on legal strategy, see Richard Falk, *Reviving the World Court* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986).


46. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, August 16, 1962, National Security Files, Subjects Series: United Nations (General), 7/62–8/62, Box 311, JFKL.


53. Memorandum from William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, October 29, 1963, National Security Files, Countries Series: South Africa, JFKL.


56. Ibid., 13–15.

57. Program om Openbare Betrekkinge in die V.S.A. te verbeter, November 30, 1960, South African Public Relations Activities in USA, Vol. 1, BTS 1/33/3/1, NARS.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Persoonlik en Vertroulik, Maart 4, 1960, Mr. Harold MacMillan: Visit to the Republic as Guest of the Republic Government, BTS 22/2/20, Volume 2, ASAMFA.


64. “Praemonitus, Praemonitus,” September 21, 1962, Advertising Campaigns and Reactions, BKL, 318–25, NARS.

65. Memorandum to Secretary for Information, December 1, 1962, Advertising Campaigns and Reactions, BKL, 318–25, NARS.


67. Ibid. (1963), 10.


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