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### On the semantic expression of mental acts

William Grimes

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
Mr. Gregory Roberts  
SUNY Albany Philosophy Dept.  
Humanities 257  
140 Washington Ave.  
Albany, NY

Dear Mr. Roberts

Enclosed is the manuscript from William Grimes', professor emeritus from SUNYA, that we discussed by telephone. It was his *magnum opus*. It has hand corrections throughout, so would have needed a final typing, and several pages are missing, including the title and table of contents. I did my best in listing a possible title, and each section of this book. I am hoping that there is a safe place for it in your library, and that someone may find it worthwhile to use in research and as a reference.

Professor Grimes passed away on November 14, 2014. I was his wife's sister, and his executor. I am grateful to you that you are willing to see whether this work can be preserved. Please contact me if you have any questions. 941-486-0362.

Sincerely yours,

  
Martha G. King

Untitled manuscript by SUNY Professor Emeritus, William Van Grimes, 1924 - 2014.

This book was written while he was at the State University of New York at Albany. While the title and first 17 pages are missing, the rest of it is nearly intact. There are hand corrections throughout, so it had not had a final typing.

The subject (as stated in the Conclusion) **is to develop the concept of the language of the semantical expression of mental acts.**

The title and table of contents are missing. Listed below are all section headings with their page numbers in the hope that this document will be more useful than it otherwise would have been.

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#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

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4. Language as a Presentational Medium of Mind

In the last two sections we sought some clarification of the notion that language functions as the medium of manifestation of discursive mental activity. However, our discussion did not focus on the actual relationship between the mental act and meaning in language. We did note that it did not seem that we could say that all mental discursive acts must be mediated by language, for the behavior of animals and very young children indicates that there is thinking (identifications, recognition of causal relationships, appraisals, deductions) without language. Goal directed behavior itself appears to function as the presentational medium of such non-linguistic judgmental and directive acts. However, language appears to be quite necessary for the higher mental functions, both discursive and non-discursive, and appears to become the medium of all discursive acts of language-using human beings. Thus, it seems justified to conclude that language plays a peculiarly central and necessary role in the manifestations of developed mentality in human beings.

I want now to consider more closely and specifically the relationship between the mental act and the semantic pronouncement formally made by a language use. This will lead us to further clarification of what a mental act is

by bringing us to consider the roles in it of consciousness and physical (i.e. publicly observable) behavior.

We have noted that Susanne Langer has described the role of the art object in aesthetic experience as that of being a medium which, in a sine qua non way, both presents the aesthetic experience and constitutes a central part of it. The art object is the presentational medium of mind as manifested in aesthetic experience. As I have noted, I think it justified to describe language in an analgous way as the presentational medium of mind as manifested in semantic functions. Language is both the sine qua non medium of presentation of developed mental pronouncement activity and a central part of the mind so manifested. This relationship was suggested to me, not directly by Miss Langer who limits her discussion of presentational media to art objects, but by Maynard Adams and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Professor Adams has suggested that we conceive of the mental activity of a person as being like an animated language, like a self-asserting semantic field.<sup>9</sup> He is not,

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<sup>9</sup>E. M. Adams, "Mental Causality," Mind, Vol. LXXV, N.S. No. 300, July, 1966, pp. 559-561. Prof. Adams notes that this concept of the dependency of mental activity on the physical ground of language was suggested to him by Everett W. Hall in his book, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value (Chapel Hill, 1961).

I think, identifying mental activity with language-in-use: he makes very clear that language-in-use cannot be understood purely in terms of descriptions of behavior patterns; this is a basic point of his article. He appears to be saying that mental activity is like, i.e. isomorphic in structure and function, with language interpreted in an intensional way. Mind, he emphasizes (not considering its non-discursive functions), has the functional structure of a language, thus is like a language that is capable of acting of itself. If we ignored the element of metaphor here we would be into a category mistake, identifying things of two logically different kinds: mental activity cannot be identified with language--even language-in-use--for mental activity is a psychological process but language is an abstraction composed of types of linguistic formulae with language-rule established meanings, i.e. concepts which are semantic pronouncements, and language-in-use is this abstraction in an instantiation in mental activity. The mental activity is made possible and given its form by the abstraction, but the abstraction can only exist as the product of a mental activity of abstracting, in this case a matter of thinking the concrete act as an instance of the universal. It is a case of the traditionally recognized mutual dependency between instance and abstraction. Seman-

190,

(13)

Distinctions ?  
 'Language' ?  
 'objects'  
 useful here.



tic meanings in language (abstractions) can only be understood by their relations to mental acts of stating and asserting (instances of these abstractions), but these mental acts are made possible (in their developed forms at least) only by there being a language medium with semantic forms which are isomorphic with the mental-act stating and asserting capabilities. Thus, developed language and developed mental activity are indispensable each to the other in the manner of each being the medium of manifestation of the other. Mental pronouncement acts (statings and assertings) are embodied in language use, but language can perform this embodying function only because of its abstract significance. But this abstract significance is conceivable only as an imaginative function of mind, an abstracting from the significance of instances of use.

Obviously there is a kind of circularity here, but it is that basic to all developed thought: thinking is essentially and fundamentally abstracting and specifying instances of abstractions, but these mental processes require the midwifery of language; the role of language is to provide, through the behavior of language use, the medium of manifestation of abstractive and specifying activity, and language performs this role by means of language units (sentence forms) having abstract significance.

This section puts clearly stated

93

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96  
 Summary

96

97  
 This abstract significance (intension, or semantic meaning, in language) both (a) enables the individual to think abstractly and specifyingly (i.e. to think in terms of class and member of a class), and (b) enables individuals to coordinate their abstractive and specifying thinking, i.e. to communicate.

Thus intension is the central and sine qua non mode of meaning in language. An incredible amount of vagueness and creation of pseudo-problems has come into contemporary philosophical analysis from losing sight of the elemental fact that the function of language is as the medium of abstractive thinking and as the public coordinating medium. Recognizing intensions involves nothing more than recognizing the modes of abstract thinking which language makes possible. Intensions as meanings involve a double order of abstraction: an intension is a similarity class whose instances are abstractions thought by individuals, i.e. it is a class of such abstractions.

19  
 It is in view of this concept of how language functions that I find it illuminating to say, as Professor Adams does, that mind is like an animated semantic field, like a self-stating and asserting language; and that I find it also illuminating to say that language presents mind as an art object presents an art experience, i.e. as

(in some of the most often discussed passages of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein makes clear why he thinks there are insuperable epistemological problems with any attempt in language to describe or report such inner states)<sup>17</sup> but rather we present the consciousness to ourselves and others by presenting and talking about behavior. Thus, Wittgenstein's linguistic behaviorism is not a reductivist psychological behaviorism. We can see a basic theme of the Tractatus carried over into the later writings: the object of philosophical understanding is ultimately a matter of vision rather than something that can be made an explicit semantic referent; the behavioral semantic referent is the ladder which in understanding is transcended.<sup>18</sup>

I am not contending, and certainly Wittgenstein does not, that mental activity is to be identified with states of consciousness. I shall presently argue (and I think this is Wittgenstein's position) that it is the logical

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<sup>17</sup>In later discussion I consider reasons for not accepting Wittgenstein's conclusions on this point.

<sup>18</sup>Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (New York, 1961, orig. pub. 1921), note especially 4.121, 2.1212, and 6.54.

original

(17) floor

Don't see the connection

nature of what is referred to as mental activity to be both behavioral and non-behavioral. If behavior is the necessary presenting medium of consciousness, but the behavior alone cannot be mental activity without its conjunction with consciousness (as I shall argue), then both aspects are necessary parts of anything called mental activity.

I think this interpretation of mental activity provides a basis for resolving what has often been taken to be a basic problem in John Dewey's philosophy. Like Wittgenstein, Dewey's writings on the problems of knowledge and value refer almost totally to behavior, though Dewey, like Gilbert Ryle, does allow for occasional references to episodic sensory states in these writings. However, in his book on aesthetics, Art As Experience, he talks unabashedly of textures and structures of consciousness, and furthermore makes clear that he holds that such experiences are integral to all dimensions of mental activity, noetic as well as normative.<sup>19</sup> I am not aware of any direct comments Dewey himself made on this problem, but he could establish the consistency of his total position by taking

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<sup>19</sup> Compare Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922) and his Theory of Valuation (Chicago, 1939), especially pp. 10-11 and 15, with his Art As Experience (New York, 1934).

the behavioral analysis to be presentative of the non-behavioral in the manner discussed above.

And I would say the same thing in regard to an interpretation of Wittgenstein's total position. I readily admit that Wittgenstein's severe critique of all claims of reference to private states of consciousness in Philosophical Investigations hardly prepares the reader for the kind of position he seems quite clearly to set forth in his aesthetic lectures. My main concern is not the historical one--I would have reservations about saying that Wittgenstein consistently held a presentational theory of consciousness throughout his later writings (i.e. from 1933 on) but for some mysterious reason only clearly tipped his hand in the aesthetic lectures--but I would contend that such a theory could give a consistency and acceptability to his later thought that I find impossible to achieve without the presentational thesis.

As I have already indicated, human behavior, but in a special way language behavior, is presentational of mind in two ways which are related as genus and species. Mental activity is presented by language use and other behavior, and this generically includes both states of consciousness and logically associated behavior. Within a process that is presentational of mental activity there

*I think Wittgenstein  
was of a presentational  
theory?*

1

(18)

These words of  
in hand?

will be behavior that is presentational of the consciousness (awareness) components. This presentational behavior, which is also related to consciousness as its schema in the Kantian sense (this schematic function will be discussed in the following sections) and which is logically a part of the mental activity, is also part of what is logically presented by the physical act of using language formulae in accordance with rules. The conventional physical act as convention presents itself as a part of mental activity which in turn presents the consciousness part. Let us consider further the logical character of these two components of language presentational activity.

= 2/3?

then?

No pattern of physical behavior by itself can constitute mental activity. That which is only behavioral is by ordinary logic of use (thus by definition) not mental. If that definition is questioned, the best justification for the claim here is to show that in our discourse about mental behavior we presuppose that the mental is that which is in some manner under the control of volitional activity, which is a categorially distinct kind of action (to be discussed later) which has as logical conditions of its occurrence that volitional acts be mediated by awareness of alternative ways of acting (thus some awareness of logical and causal relationships) and awareness of propensities of

the self to prefer certain kinds of activity to others. In addition there is characteristically awareness of associated feelings and ideas. In Part II detailed attention will be given to these factors. The point of concern here is that the idea of a mental act requires the manifestation of such processes in consciousness. They are the basis of distinguishing mental causality from physical and of the meaningfulness of speaking of actions as well-reasoned or poorly reasoned. Physical behavior of the self which is not rooted in such consciousness-characterized mental activity lacks the distinguishing marks of the mental, however like consciousness-controlled behavior it may appear. A robot with an operating tape-recorder speaker in its mouth is not using language. An action to be mental must have some history of volitional control and still be open to it in the future.

By putting the matter in this way we can allow that habit responses are mental activity. A habit must have some history of being adopted through the agent's having some awareness of his surroundings and his wants and having awareness of some means-ends relationships here, and thus of possible alternative ways of acting that would have led to different habits.

Thus, to sum up the point here, mental activity must include both behavioral and consciousness components in logically mutually dependent relationships (mental behavior requires consciousness components to be mental, and consciousness requires mental behavior <sup>to be</sup> manifested), and this mental activity (at least in its higher development in man) is in a mutual dependency relationship with language (mental activity requires language as its medium of actualization and language requires mind for its conventional and abstractive symbolizing functions to exist).

(1A)  
 mental?  
 physical?  
 logical?  
 5  
 22

There being a transitive relationship involved above, we can clearly speak of language use as presenting consciousness (keeping in mind that consciousness is only a part of mental activity). Let us focus on this specific relationship. There are two distinct ways in which language behavior manifests consciousness: (1) By presenting it as the art object presents aesthetic experience, as a sponge soaked in phosphorescent liquid presents that phosphorescence; and (2) by schematizing it. Let us take up #(1) first.

?

Language use presents consciousness to the user in a different way from that in which it presents it to the observer. The user's consciousness, as we've seen, is intimately related to language use, so much so that for the

U!



7. Disagree  
56

discuss

developed language user there does not appear to be any thinking at all that is not a using of language. It would seem appropriate to speak of consciousness as (a) saturated into the language-using activity, and to say (b) that the language-using activity gives the awareness its concrete mode of being, its thinkable form. The first description here seems to be especially illuminating of the user's perspective in public utterance and the second of his thinking to himself.

57

directly experiencing

For the observer the language use of another presents consciousness in an <sup>redundant?</sup> imaginatively projective way. That is, knowing the intimate relationship of consciousness and language behavior in one's own experience, the observer responds to the language use of another person as a presentational medium of consciousness. Again examples from aesthetics are helpful: as we experience wistfulness as in the wistful music or pathos as in the tragedy, so we see joy or sadness in the behavior of another. It would seem phenomenologically false to say that we always infer the joy or the sadness from the behavior, though of course we can do this also; but an explication depending solely on inference here does scant justice to the imaginative projective capacities of the human mind. Phenomenologically we experience consciousness in language behavior in

58

a very immediate way, as we experience feelings and ideas as being presented parts of an aesthetic object. Linguistically, we often use vision language in such cases, not just inference language. There is a difference in meaning (i.e. function)<sup>20</sup> between:

(1a) How happy he is.

(1b) He looks happy.

and:

(2) He acted as though he were happy.

The #(1) sentences would appear to be most adequately explicated as reports on the presentational character of the happiness, but #(2) seems clearly to emphasize the process of inference, plus an awareness of fallibility in such inferences.

<sup>Let us</sup>  
~~Let's~~ go back to the user perspective on the presentation-of-consciousness character of language use. The claim that thinking for the developed mind necessarily

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<sup>20</sup> While functions and concepts are in a one-to-one relationship, they are not identical in meaning. They both designate both mental acts and parts of language. The notion of a function characterizes its referent as an instrument for doing a particular job, while the notion of a concept is that of an act of conceiving or in language a semantic pronouncement which in either case is the "shape" or "form" of the instrument which gives it its conventionally determined instrumental value.

involves language using has as a corollary that thinking to oneself requires using language silently. This claim has a long history in philosophical and psychological theory--Bruce Aune notes that it occurs at least as early as the 14th century<sup>21</sup>--and it has been defended by a number of contemporary philosophers, among them Wilfred Sellars, Peter Geach, J. H. Findlay, and Aune himself.<sup>22</sup> Called the "analogy theory," its central claim, as stated by Aune, is that "elements of silent thought are formally analogous to elements of a corresponding line of intelligent [public] speech";<sup>23</sup> that "the overt and the covert are not different in kind."<sup>24</sup>

Yes  
 because  
 of function

Some philosophers and psychologists have taken the analogy theory as providing a way to account for thought without bringing in processes of consciousness, inner mental activities. As Aune notes, such a reductionism can

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<sup>21</sup>Bruce Aune, Knowledge, Mind and Nature (New York, 1967), p. 180.

<sup>22</sup>Wilfred Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in H. Feigl and M. Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, I (Minneapolis, 1956), 253-329; P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London, 1957); J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961), Ch. 2 and 4.

<sup>23</sup>Aune, p. 184.

<sup>24</sup>Aune, p. 189.

only achieve a patina of credibility by ignoring a very fundamental circularity.<sup>25</sup> Private use, it is stated, derives its significance from public use. This is true in a quite obvious way: language use develops, and there are good reasons (which we will examine) to say it logically must develop, in public contexts, so thinking via language use is thinking by using the concepts of public language. But then it is claimed that meaning in public language is constituted totally by publicly observable processes, i.e. patterns of use of sentence forms. Saying this is somehow supposed to dispense with the necessity of talking about mental processes in terms of consciousness, intensions, & other such notions that are red herring to this line of rarified empiricism. But there are certain questions consistent adherents to this approach do not get around to answering, for example: What is involved in observing or interpreting a pattern of use? Aren't observing and interpreting matters of an individual being aware of perceptions and identifying these by abstractive processes, and don't these identifications involve such things as recognizing that a word has such and such a function (i.e. by making a conventional word-concept association)? And can

Why does  
it?

What is  
observable?

Private

What is involved  
in observing or  
interpreting?

Why, or why not?

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<sup>25</sup>Aune, pp. 195-196.

the notion of a function of a word be made sense of without reference to mental acts of intending, and can intendings be understood apart from their relationships to attention experience, i.e. states of consciousness which are immediate awareness of data and of performing of mental acts such as abstracting, specifying and exhibiting pro and con responses to things?

The reductivist position seems in a very obvious way circular: private meanings derive from public meanings, but public meanings exist as abstracts from private experiences of perceiving, abstracting, applying abstractions, recognizing the significance of intensions by reference to intentions, and intentions by reference to attentions, etc. Thus, while there is good reason to conclude that private language use is in ways parasitic upon public language use, it appears even more obviously true that public language significance is parasitic upon privately comprehended significances. Certainly, without getting into really bizarre metaphysical assumptions, it makes no sense to speak of a public language observation that is not a perspective achieved by abstraction from private consciousness experiences. Aune suggests that Wittgenstein can be seen as pointing out the circularity in the denial of this:

*Wittgenstein*

*Beane - and  
the response!*

(61)

(62)

...there remains an important sense in which words can be said to possess meaning only because people mean things by them. If we look to the later work of Wittgenstein, we can easily develop this sense without commitment to prelinguistic concepts. Using his terminology, we can say that words have meaning because they are caught up in a system of characteristic human activities, because they play a special role in a certain "form of life."<sup>26</sup>

Aune makes his meaning in this passage explicit in such comments as the following:

...in order actually to mean something by a form of words a man must utter them in a certain frame of mind, which will involve a readiness to recognize other utterances as relevant or irrelevant to the content of what he said.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, we have good reason to reject the stance of false logical modesty which proclaims that one can have no inductive evidence for the existence of that which is logically unobservable by the person making the claim. Carried out consistently, such a position can only conclude in a pastless solipsism, for logically no one can observe specifically what another observes or observe again what he has observed in the past. "But (to use the old chestnut) it is logically impossible for me to be aware of your feeling of pain; thus when I talk of your pain I must be referring to your pain behavior." Such a conclusion does not square

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<sup>26</sup>Aune, p. 195.

<sup>27</sup>Aune, p. 180.

③  
These are  
logical  
concepts

physically  
which?

with the logic or phenomenology of the use of pain concepts and appears to ignore the basic dependency of all public meaning on private experiences. The reductio ad absurdum of the position would appear to be established by noting that if logical unobservability keeps us from speaking of another's private pain experiences, it also should bar us from any justified use of so-called public concepts, for these, as we have noted, are but abstractions from private states of consciousness. Of course it is logically impossible for me to be aware of your feeling of pain, but not logically impossible for me to imagine a pain similar to your pain and to have empirical grounds, on the basis of argument by analogy, for believing that the similarity holds in a particular situation of observing and inferring something of the character of the pain. All assumptions of meanings held in common (public meanings) presuppose that such analogical inferences are empirically reasonable assumptions. All meaningfulness is ultimately something grasped in a private state of consciousness. What is understanding the significance of an extensional pattern of use? How can one take as a primitive assumption a common world of meanings without being philosophically naive?

meaningful?

its only logically under the terms

not so

empirical predicament to a logical determination of it?

?

The inductive postulate that mental behavior is a reliable basis of inference to mental states unless there is contrary evidence would seem eminently justified by the wide success of theories incorporating the postulate. Wittgenstein's "hang up" here seems to derive either from a failure to take sufficiently into account the distinction between what William Kneale calls "primary" and "secondary induction" ("first order" and "second order" hypotheses)<sup>28</sup> or a refusal to accept the empirical respectability of second order hypotheses. The nature of his argumentation suggests this second alternative. The nature of this distinction in kinds of induction is discussed at length in Prof. Kneale's book and is given in a summary way in a later section of this study. For second order hypotheses specific decisively confirmatory experiences are not required, though of course such hypotheses must meet presupposed (empirical) criteria of meaningfulness; second order hypotheses are justified by the simplicity and explanatory power they contribute to a systematic explanation. I shall call an empirical methodology in which second order hypotheses are rejected a linear empiricism (it character-

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<sup>28</sup>William Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), Part IV.



istically seeks or claims there are incorrigible experience-grounded pronouncements and methodological principles) and one in which they are accepted coherence empiricism (in which all claims are considered to require justification by considering their role in a comprehensive explanation). Quite a few recent studies support the claim that linear empiricisms cannot be made adequate bases of empirical explanation.<sup>29</sup> Linear empiricism, I think we can say, reflects a failure to break sufficiently with older rationalistic methodologies which are characterized, as Dewey notes, by "a quest for certainty."<sup>30</sup>

Extensionalistic approaches to meaning seem to me to carry their refutations upon their face. They are, I believe, particularly inadequate for the explication of the language of valuation, as I shall discuss at various points in the study.

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<sup>29</sup>In addition to Kneale's study, we can note here that of Aune referred to above, as well as the positions of Pierre Duhem, W. V. Quine, Morton White, W. H. Werkmeister, and even Carl Hempel. Professor Hempel's concept of scientific methodology continues to move in this direction: cf. his updating of two of his articles in his 1965 anthology, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1965) pp. 101-122; the two articles are incorporated into one entitled "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes."

<sup>30</sup>John Dewey, The Quest For Certainty (New York, 1929).

It is one of the perils of philosophical analysis that to criticize an approach in the totalistic way I am criticizing extensionalism here calls for standing outside that approach and inside some other. Since the criteria of conceivability are defined within a specific approach, the totalistic criticism from outside always has something of a question-begging character. The most effective kind of critique is, thus, I think, the development of a counter position, providing an opportunity for comparative appraisal of the ~~adequacy of each of the approaches by comparing the explicative capabilities of each approach, as~~ *These* ~~experienced from inside of each. This study as a whole~~ *is my fundamental argument against extensionalism. can only be provided by this study as a whole.*

We have seen that interpreting thinking as private language use, rather than supporting extensionalism, provides a well-defined challenging ground on which the question-begging character of <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ position can be pinned down. Language retains its nature as the presentational medium of mind both for silent thought and for public utterance, though we have seen that the character of the presentation is different in the two cases. To the user the presentation is immediate: consciousness in silent thought is consciousness of concepts thought by using locutions, i.e. language formulae with conventionally es-

established intensions. Intensions, which are abstractions, in instantiation in language use become <sup>both</sup> attentions (qualities of immediate experience) and intentions (purposes, principles of action). Thus, language use is the medium of the occurrence of conscious thinking and feeling analogous to the way the sound pattern is the medium of music and the soaked sponge is the medium of a phosphorescence. To the observer this light of consciousness in the observed person is also presented by language use, but in a projective way, as sadness is experienced ~~as~~ in the music heard.

The sponge metaphor is a dangerous one, ~~as the reader has perhaps already taken note.~~ <sup>it</sup> It might seem to invite the Cartesian peril. I hasten now to show the groundlessness of that fear lest my attestations to empiricism be ~~for certain declared fraudulent.~~ <sup>However,</sup> There is nothing that has been said so far in this study and nothing, I think, that will be said that lends any support to the thesis that consciousness is a manifestation of a distinct kind of substance. Also, granted, probably nothing has been or will be said which absolutely rules ~~it~~ <sup>that thesis</sup> out, though the very extensive dependencies of manifestations of consciousness on behavior would appear by itself to make such an hypothesis highly suspect. But let us grant that it might

be possible (possibly possible<sup>31</sup>) that consciousness could be manifested in language-using activity as the phosphorescent liquid is manifested in the soaked sponge. But it appears clear that there is nothing in the logic of use of mental concepts that requires such a substantival concept. Consciousness can with much greater theoretical simplicity, and less strain on the mental powers of conceiving, be considered to be manifested adverbially as a dimension of emergent properties of brain processes. However, I do not think that there is any philosophical way (i.e. through conceptual or language analysis) of answering this ontological or possibly scientific question. Some have thought that the logical requirement of freedom for mental causality did provide a way, but I think it can be shown (and I shall seek to do this showing in Part II) that the two-language perspective--i.e. cognitive language-conative language--is all we need to handle this conceptual problem; ethical freedom is a concept in a different language from that in which <sup>statements</sup> pronounce-

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<sup>31</sup>The first 'possible' here is a methodological notion, the second a logical one. I shall argue later that decisions about conceivability are a probability matter. If so then 'possibly possible' is a quite meaningful phrase, rephrasable as 'with some probability conceivable.'

ments of efficient causal determinism are made.

In the sponge metaphor, let us consider that the sponge is our analogue of the brain and the liquid our analogue of public language-use behavior manifested via brain processes. The metaphor is improved if we think of the liquid as capable of existing as a distinct entity only in the sponge and thus we think of the emergent phosphorescence of the liquid as appearing only in the saturated sponge. The phosphorescent property is then our analogue of consciousness; as sponge and liquid are necessary media for the manifestation of the phosphorescence, both brain and brain-process-controlled physical behavior of a self are necessary for manifestations of consciousness.

##### 5. Presentational Functions of Schemas

We have been for some pages now discussing the first part of a two-part classification. It was stated above that there are two distinct ways in which language use manifests consciousness: (1) as presentational medium (as the art object presents the aesthetic experience, as the soaked sponge presents ~~phosphorescence~~ <sup>phosphorescent</sup>), and (2) as a schema. Let us now turn our attention to this second way.

I shall use 'schema' here in a precisely Kantian

The claim that a language use involves a manifesting of a correlative mental-act pronouncement might seem to be true only of expressatory uses, where in a straightforward sense the language use manifests the mental act; however, it is also true of performatory uses though these involve more sophisticated mental acts and language conventions-- which is to say more devious. In these uses one is officially permitted to say X, giving the appearance of that saying being a manifestation of the correlative expressatory pronouncement X; but in the case of performatives this is not in itself deceptive for the language rules officially establish the appearance-act of saying X as the mental-act ground of the performative, i.e. the logical success of a performative depends upon its being recognized as a performative, which is to say it is recognized as a semantic representation of the appearing-to-say mental act. This interpretation would seem to raise serious problems as a generalized account of the meaning of performatory sentences. It might appear to fit better pronouncements like "I welcome you" and "I congratulate you" than assertions like "I appoint," "I christen," etc. However, I think it can be shown that the interpretation does fit all performatory uses. To appoint in a performatory way is to appear to make the expressatory assertion but with

the question of whether the expressatory assertion is really made rendered irrelevant by the appearance being made linguistically the official pronouncement.

Semantic meaning is an idea in mind in the instance of use, but meaning itself is not a mental state: it is an abstraction from mental states; the form, the universal, instantiated in mental states; it is discursive mental acts considered in abstractio and as an abstraction<sup>s</sup> that can be participated in by any mind using the same language.

The assumptions <sup>made here</sup> in regard to the metaphysic of experience include no more than the barest minimum presupposed for coherent thought: in addition to the categorial conceptual capacities manifested in intelligent use of *the language of* basic logical constants (e.g. conjunction, negation, unity, universality) and concepts of space and time, it requires only the categorial conceptual capacity of similarity recognition, and possibly categorial concepts of substance and cause; i.e. it requires only the basic concepts needed for comprehensive and adequate empirical class formation. We do need the fundamental operation of existential generalization (abstracting) and universal instantiation (identifying instances of abstractions), but these are totally analyzable in terms of the above listed categorial concepts. In addition the concept of meaning presupposes

that there are reliable empirical grounds for one person, A assuming that another person, B, has a certain idea in mind, and for assuming that A and B agree on their classification of that idea as an instance of a particular kind of abstraction. As I have noted, I find no reason not to accept as an inductive hypothesis (a second-order hypothesis, perhaps better called an inductive postulate), a principle of reasoning by analogy which will give empirical basis to such commonly made and commonly successful assumptions. If the ideas of abstraction and instantiation, using at least sensory observations, logical constants, space, time, and similarity, were not coherent, thinking would be impossible. There are also good grounds, as we've noted, for concluding that communication among language-using persons is necessary for thought. An empiricism which does not allow as meaningful and verifiable such claims as that A can confidently assume that B has the same kind of instance of an abstraction in mind as A has in using linguistic formula X, by that disallowance condemns itself by reductio ad absurdum. This is the contemporary epistemological Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore there is a self (no specific metaphysical assumptions) that abstracts, recognizes instances of abstractions, thus uses language, thus presupposes other

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Response

(51)



selves. These latter two<sup>sets</sup>/together presuppose meanings as intensions. Thus, there is really no epistemological problem of universals or of meanings over and beyond recognition of the most undisputed categorial capacities of the human mind plus recognition of the dependence of thinking on inter-personal communication via development of a public language.

Frege, Meinong and the early Russell got into metaphysical assumptions of universals as "subsistents" because they did not start out with an adequate analysis of what must be assumed about mental functions and the metaphysical neutrality of this. I am not sure how much sense the metaphysical problem of universals makes. There seems to be no logical reason to assume that because the mind has the capacity of imagination to think instances as members of a class, which involves thinking abstractly the defining property of the class, that there must be some mysterious status of metaphysical being of universals. Thus, considering the fundamental presuppositions of thought, meanings as intensions are hardly mysterious or dispensable entities.

However, there is another kind of objection that is sometimes made to referring to<sup>the</sup> abstractions-in-mind that must necessarily be a part of intelligent language use as <sup>the</sup>

meanings. This is the objection, not to the intelligibility or the supposed extravagance in such a proposed use of the word 'meaning', but a pragmatic question of the value of such talk. Granting that language use involves some kind of being aware of the significance of the use, thus of being aware of abstractions which are language-rule correlated to kinds of linguistic formulae, what need have we to single out these abstractions and talk about them as meanings? Why not talk simply about uses, functions? This is the only way of putting the attack on intensions which will allow us to say (assuming that the argument made for intensions above is sound) that the attack is not just incoherent, based on an inadequate explication of the fundamental conditions of thought. Here the argument is over strategies in formulating proposals where each of the alternants is coherent, each does account for the basic conditions of thought, but they seek to label structural features in different ways so as to throw emphasis on different parts of the structure.

As I've noted, I find the tactic of talking exclusively about uses or functions of language and not about meanings to be a misleading simplification, open to ambiguity and not providing tools for precise enough talk about what a language function is and how such functions

can be logically interrelated. But this is a criticism that can only be backed up by a showing of a developed proposal and a comparing of that with alternative proposals. It is such a showing that I am attempting to develop in this study.

(23)

I suspect the flight from talk about meanings to talk about uses has a more illuminating sociological than philosophical explanation. <sup>In the past</sup> Those who talked of meanings and states of mind often did get caught up in metaphysical assumptions and controversies which others were able to show were very suspect as factors necessarily involved or presupposed in any coherent speech in our ordinary uses of discourse. <sup>An</sup> ~~Those who in an~~ Occamite spirit <sup>of rebellion</sup> rebelled against metaphysically encumbered meaning talk <sup>& for the sake of achieving</sup> sought more empirically grounded approaches to language <sup>open to being</sup> and ~~in the process~~ <sup>became denied many philo-</sup> of this quest there came an increasing awareness of, <sup>and</sup> <sup>and then ~~from~~ very ~~few~~ focus of interest led to</sup> <sup>phen</sup> ~~interest in,~~ the rich varieties of language, <sup>The long road</sup> which can be <sup>policy among philosophers of treating all semantic significance in language as</sup> ~~treated as cognitive only by someone very procrustianly~~ <sup>basically formulaic as ~~the~~ cognitive in nature some sincerely well</sup> ~~dedicated to making the cognitive model reign supreme.~~ <sup>attack by the empirical model.</sup>

In a not too logical way the rebellion against meanings and the rebellion against the tyranny of the cognitive model became joined. There was this relationship: that those who proposed elaborate meaning theories were often among those who sought to show that all language use that

is not "merely emotive" is cognitive. At any rate, the two rebellions appear to have supported each the other, and the very considerable successes of the liberalized approach to language analysis carried the pendulum of philosophical fashion past the plumb point of rational appraisals of the roles of intensions in language and into an atmosphere where one of the hallmarks of contemporaneity in philosophical analysis was often assumed to be a refusal to be concerned with intensions.

7. Language Rules and Meaning Schemas

We have noted basis for saying that all meanings are abstractions from mental pronouncement acts, the meanings of terms being understood by their roles in pronouncements. While such abstractions have their material ground in psychological pronouncement acts, their logical ground is the language rules which establish these abstractions as meanings in a language by designating them as conventional functional significances of sentence functions.

Since language rules are directives, an explication of them calls for using a theory of the language of practical discourse, which is what this study is out to develop. Thus, the discussion of language rules here will necessarily be incomplete, requiring the rest of the study for

its full explication. However, some indication of how such rules are conceived in the study and how they are thought to exist and function in discourse is needed at this stage in our explicative journey.

Language rules are, of course, themselves pronouncements and thus meanings, but these are not to be confused with the meanings they establish in language as the products of their assertive significance. Meanings are not language rules, though they are formed or schematized by them and given official status in a language by them.

Language rules are prescriptions, i.e. directives of an authoritative nature where from a logical standpoint (but obviously not a causal one here) the agent is free to accept <sup>v</sup> or reject the authoritative prescription without the authority having a logical sanction to take punitive action for a failure to comply.<sup>37</sup> Language rules are clearly participatory pronouncements of a social contract character, i.e. the authoritative issuer is the body of users who choose to play that language game.<sup>38</sup> (The meaning of

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<sup>37</sup>Language rules also have an enstative function, more specifically a postulative function (cf. types of assertions in the Introduction). The postulative role and its relation to the prescriptive role will be discussed in Part III.

<sup>38</sup>The notion of a participatory pronouncement was introduced on p. xiv.

*of choice*

'choice' will concern us later; obviously I am not limiting it to conscious, i.e. self-conscious, choosing; to come to use language through a process of habit development mediated by some reasoning qualifies as choosing.) Those who adopt the language, <sup>by all the acts of abiding by ~~the rules~~ its rules</sup> ~~issue its directives~~, speaking as <sup>in effect a function or issuer of the rules (directives),</sup> delegate-voices of the language using body, and one obeys when he finds that functioning as a member of that language using body is a justified course of action for himself. As in the case of all directives, language rule issuance and obedience requires justification by appeal to value judgments--ultimately individual valuations. I think it a mistake to think of a language-rule prescription as itself <sup>directly</sup> a valuation; the reasoning here will come out in due course.

One of the most fundamental distinctions among language rules is that between concept-forming rules and concept schematizing rules. Among the latter a particularly important class is that of rules which schematize ultimate concepts. A language rule can form a concept by relating two or more concepts in a logically distinct way and establishing this definition-created unity as the meaning of a linguistic formula, <sup>This is obvious, however, that</sup> ~~but~~ obviously the language rules applying to ultimate simples cannot function in this way. Such basic concepts are either ultimate

particularities in conceiving (phenomena) or ultimate concepts of unity among particulars (categories).<sup>39</sup> Clearly language rules cannot form such concepts, but they can perform two functions: (a) indicate where these occur in experience, i.e. give the sensory conditions for the correct use of the concepts, which is to say schematize them, and (b) make the concept the meaning of a linguistic formula. The function of a schema of a category is to present that category to us by the method of ostension. As Kant noted, a category is not a self-sufficient unit of meaning; it is always understood by the mind in conjunction with its schema. The category is a part of its schema; apart from ~~it~~ <sup>the</sup> it cannot be understood, for it is only grasped as a categorial aspect of a sensory relational context. But the schema minus the category is simply a rule-formed concept.<sup>40</sup> ~~And~~ <sup>But</sup> despite the logical dependence of a category

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<sup>39</sup> Note that this is a somewhat wider use of the word category than the Kantian use which limits it to ultimate concepts of unity in understanding. For simplicity I am allowing space and time as categories, and if there is ~~one~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~or more~~ <sup>more than one</sup> ultimate concepts of normative requiredness (deontic necessity), then this, or these, would also be categories.

<sup>40</sup> A main point of the labor of Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" is to show that there is something irreducible in each of the categorial schemas, something necessary for coherent explication of experience but knowable only as an aspect of a schema. In the later

on its schema, the meaning does not include the schema; the meaning, as part of a pronouncement (we have seen that meanings of terms are always understood by their roles in pronouncements), is an abstraction from the schema.

parts of the Transcendental Analytic, when Kant is relating categorial schemas to modes of time consciousness, he has appeared to both Norman Kemp Smith and <sup>Reverend</sup> Paul Wolff to undercut any basis of distinguishing the categories of substance and cause and their schemas. Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', 2nd ed. (London, 1928), pp. 88-98, 195, 335-336, 340; and R. P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Chicago, 1962), pp. 206-223, 306-307, 312-316. If Kant did this, then he would have reduced causation and substance from categorial concepts to rule-formed concepts. It is just incoherent to speak of a category being identified with its schema. Wolff's critical comments run an odd course indeed: Kant explicitly rejected both intuitionism and sense-data phenomenalism ("subjective idealism"), but Wolff makes it a basic thesis of his study to present Kant as vacillating between a Leibnizian intuitionism about substance and cause, reflected in the early parts of the First Critique, and a complete identification of categories and schemas in the latter parts of the Critique. He even carries this latter reductionism to the point of concluding that all of Kant's categories are identical with their schemas (cf. pp. 217, 306). It would follow from this that there are no ultimate concepts only derivative ones. What Wolff has done is to appraise Kant from the standpoint of an extensionalistic theory of meaning, in which one does not have to talk about ultimate concepts, or concepts at all taken as intensions. Such entities are pushed out of the circle of philosophically relevant matters into the limbo of "psychological matters"--if they are given any status at all. All sentences come to be understood by coming to know their extensionally understood patterns of use, so the problem of grasping the meaning of specific ultimate concepts just does not arise. For a systematic statement of the kind of extensionalism which Prof. Wolff uses in his critique of Kant cf. Morton White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).





pain, even for the person thinking and speaking of his own pain.

There is a third function of the schema that is of great significance in language use, especially in expressive valuations: this is the schema as (a) the abstract part of a meaning plus (b) the context of use--the two together serving to schematize, and thus present, a fullness of concreteness in meaning. It is in this way that very abstract terms become rich in their particular communicative significance. "I love you," "It is beautiful," "That is not the right thing to do," etc. carry a fullness and specificity of meaning in specific contexts of use of which the formal, definitional aspect is but the skeletal structure of what is intended and understood in the verbal communication.

One common and easy philosophical response here is not, I think, a satisfactory one, namely the claim that all this concreteness of significance can be neatly pushed into the perlocutionary realm. But it is not adequately dealt with by calling it part of the connotation, i.e. causal associations of a use. The concreteness is what is meant in saying X--i.e. it is part of the semantic content of the pronouncement. Language is of such a nature that it can be used to express--logically to express--this

Susanne Langer, who quotes these passages in Philosophy in a New Key, comments:

Language, our most faithful and indispensable picture of human experience, of the world and its events, of thought and life and all the march of time, contains a law of projection of which philosophers are sometimes unaware, so that their reading of the presented 'facts' is obvious and yet wrong, as a child's visual experience is obvious yet deceptive when his judgment is ensnared by the trick of the flattened map.<sup>43</sup>

My specific interest in the quotes from the Tractatus is somewhat different from Miss Langer's in the context in which she gives them in Philosophy in a New Key, but her comment is fitting as a criticism of that trend in philosophical analysis which takes the meaning officially in a language use as including only what I have called the abstract schema of a meaning. But as Wittgenstein notes, this abstract schema is to the full meaning as a musical score is to the music. The schema is a law of projection: it projects the empirical experience involved in the mental pronouncement act into a semantic meaning. As Kant put it, it is the "logical subject" which applied yields the "empirical subject," i.e. the schematized meaning.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup>Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 64.

<sup>44</sup>Cf. Bruce Aune's discussion of this point, Knowledge, Mind and Nature, pp. 228 and 279.

not true that because thought is necessarily mediated by language, and because that mediating language is necessarily basically one's natural or ordinary language, that the conceptual capabilities of the human mind are limited to the repertory of concepts needed for ordinary stating and asserting concerns. Waismann and Ernest Gelner have both noted as an example here that the philosophical question of what concepts are involved in the idea of a physical object is not completely settled by determining what concepts are involved, or logically presupposed, in the ordinary use of physical object language.<sup>47</sup> For example, to show that a transcendental phenomenalist analysis provides an adequate explication of meaning in ordinary language does not, I would think, rule out the meaningfulness or possible justification of a Kantian-type claim of the irreducibility of the substance concept to its schema or a claim that an eidetic intuition is involved, or could be involved, in a concept of substance, as has been argued, for example, by Leibniz and Jacques Maritain.

The reference to phenomenism and kinds of phenomenism in the above paragraph calls for clarification. I take as definitive of transcendental phenomenism the

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<sup>47</sup>Waismann, p. 395; and Ernest Gelner, Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology (Boston, 1960), pp. 27, 255.

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claim that substance and cause cannot be adequately defined  
 in terms of logical constructs from sense data. <sup>The context</sup> ~~The latter~~

~~claim, defining the position of sense-data phenomenalism,~~ <sup>that their ~~own~~ definition of</sup> ~~This~~

was espoused by Hume and the logical positivists (logical  
 atomists) but has been largely rejected today. However,

to reject sense-data phenomenalism is not to reject phe-  
 nomenalism. Phenomenalism is generically the position

that an explication of experience does not require more  
 conceptually than basic sensory observations and the cate-  
 gorial concepts of logical relatedness. Phenomenalism so

conceived is not denied by proving that substance and  
 cause concepts are apriori ultimate forms of order in ex-

perience. Substance and cause concepts can be concepts  
 of ultimate forms of order in experience without involving  
 distinct categorial concepts. (cf. the above criticism of

Paul Wolff's analysis of Kant's treatment of substance and  
 cause.) The difference between a transcendental phenom-

alist analysis of substance and cause and an analysis which  
 concludes that these are categorial concepts is that for

the former the apriori distinct ordering of observations  
 is the meaning of the substance and cause concepts while

for the latter it is only the schema of the meaning. Kant  
 draws this distinction by calling the first "synthesis in

imagination" and the second "intellectual synthesis."

of  
 Phenomenalism

Sense-data phenomenalism and transcendental phenomenalism provide rival kinds of syntheses in imagination for the ideas of substance and cause; neither makes them categorial concepts, i.e. Kantian intellectual syntheses.

Does it make sense to say that those who insist that a philosophically adequate understanding of the ideas of substance and cause calls for what Kant describes as an intellectual synthesis might be correctly interpreted as claiming (or ought to claim) that while categorial concepts of substance and cause might not be logically required for the explicating of the meaning in ordinary uses of substance and cause language, they are required for the explication of the full range of meaning involved in any intellectually developed and clarified concept of substance and cause? But if a concept is presupposed in the philosophical clarification, then isn't it logically presupposed in the ordinary use? This I think is not as simple a question to answer as it has often been taken to be; the answer has usually been taken to be "yes," especially by ordinary language philosophers. But isn't it conceivable that concepts perfectly adequate--logically adequate--to account for the significance normally presupposed in uses of substance and cause language may be found inadequate when further philosophical issues are raised

of Peirce's  
concept of  
"significant  
precision"

which are not at all raised by the significance presupposed for sentences in ordinary uses? Might we not say that ordinary physical object language does not presuppose a substratum concept, for a transcendental phenomenalist explanation of ordinary language seems complete and consistent, but this does not settle automatically the question as to whether ordinary physical object language might not function in the grid fashion suggested by Waismann to schematize a categorial concept of substance that may play a very essential role in making a transcendent metaphysical theory coherent and thus possibly justifiable? And the same sort of thing might be said of the ordinary language function of sentences which make causal predications. But there are less controversial examples than these. The ordinary meaning of 'certainty' and 'doubt' would appear not to settle one way or the other the questions about theoretical ("Cartesian") certainty and doubt; Norman Malcolm's arguments to the contrary neglect quite entirely the grid or schematizing function of ordinary language to make possible the entertaining of unordinary concepts.<sup>48</sup> Equally unconvincing, I find, are those arguments which would


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<sup>48</sup>Norman Malcolm, "The Verification Argument," Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, 1950), pp. 49-67; reprinted as Chapter 1 of Malcolm's Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, 1963).

circumscribe the notions of "voluntary" and "involuntary" by appeal to the range of ordinary uses; the ordinary criteria for determining when an act is freely willed (voluntary) are just irrelevant to the libertarian-determinist controversy. And ability to account for the ordinary meaning of valuations without appeal to a categorial concept of value does not close the issue of whether a philosophically developed concept of meaning in valuation will lead to a justification of the claim that some valuations involve such categorial predications (though I myself do not find adequate grounds for accepting any such claims).  
~~about valuations).~~

Explication of the logic of <sup>relevant properties formalized</sup> [use of concepts] in ordinary language, however essential it is to the explication of meaning in discourse, is not necessarily sufficient. Claims about additional elements of meaningfulness can, it seems to me, be coherently and thus possibly justifiably made. Meaning in ordinary language functions as the grid or schema for ostensibly locating such additional elements of conceivability. However, justification of such claims of concepts that have not passed into the logic of use of ordinary language concepts is a precarious matter because one of the most powerful tools of justification is not available, i.e. evidence that the concept is




 required for an explication of ordinary language. However, other procedures of justification are available. Generally speaking, these are procedures distinctive of coherence empiricism: of showing that the assumption of the concept in question leads to a more adequate (systemically simple, phenomenologically complete) explication of experience than can be achieved without the concept. Of course arguments here are usually considerably less conclusive than those which depend on proving the necessity of a concept for the explication of ordinary language (but characteristically even these are not very conclusive, especially if what is being argued for is a very specific mode of formulation).

It has sometimes been stated that the task of analytic philosophy is the explication of what "the metaphysic of experience" requires, i.e. determining what must be presupposed conceptually in order to make a coherent explication of experience. This statement is itself ambiguous. The pronouncement functions of the human mind divide naturally into three groupings:

- I. Functions necessarily involved in any coherent conceiving of experience.
- II. Functions conceivably not a part of human conceptual activity in ordering experience but based on strong existential necessity.
- III. Contingent functions lacking the existential necessity of #II.

In the first grouping clearly go such categorial functions as conceiving of unities, universalities, conjunctions, negations, and similarity, as well as spatiality and temporality, and also probably such possibly non-categorial functions as conceiving substantivally and causally. Probably we should include in this grouping (which, note, very likely includes more than categories) the function of valuing, both prizing and intending-- though it is possibly conceivable that one could have a purely theoretical experience without a valuative dimension, and if this is so then valuing becomes a part of the second grouping.

In the second grouping would go not only substantival, causal and valuative pronouncements if excluded from the first grouping <sup>and</sup> also a number of other functions or concepts including such fundamental distinctions as that between the physical and the mental; the distinctions of good, ought and right; of moral valuations from purely self-interest valuations; and of such modes of practical discourse as commanding, prescribing, requesting, etc. It is characteristic of this second grouping of mental functions that while experience could abstractly be conceived without these, in actuality they are universally present in human discourse, or well-nigh so. A strong case can

be made that they have essentialistic grounding in human nature, their very lack of cultural relativity being strong argument for this.

In the third grouping are all the pronouncement functions which are culturally and temporally relative. The functions in discourse of words like 'toothbrush,' 'atom smasher,' and 'shaman' are clear examples here. As we have already noted, explication of this third group of functions is only peripherally a task of analytic philosophy, though strictly speaking one could say that explication here is a part of achieving that conceptual ability necessary for a completely coherent understanding of experience at a given time in a given culture.

But the notion of what "the metaphysic of experience" requires is limited in philosophical discussion to the first and second groupings, sometimes just to the first. Kant definitely limits it to the first. Often philosophers have spoken as though they are talking about the first grouping only, but in their analyses include the second grouping also.

From the very definitions of the first and second groupings it follows that the ordinary language of a developed culture will include functional distinctions comprehensive of all the general functions in each of these

two groups. But I have sought to indicate that it does not follow from this that all specific functional distinctions of Groups I and II that one is justified to make will necessarily be reflected in the logic of use of ordinary language. I can see no logical necessity for such a claim--that all pronouncement functions of the human mind are necessarily reflected in the logic of use of parts of ordinary language--and there would seem to be a weighty body of ~~counter~~ evidence. *evidence against making that assumption.*

As is well known, Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations has argued that we cannot make an explication of conceptual abilities of the human mind that is not comprehensively and exhaustively an explication of ordinary language for any thought about an object, he claims, necessarily involves conceiving it in terms of modes of assertion provided by ordinary language, for thought is possible only via the use of language, and the modes of thought are thus already totally set for an individual by the language he uses in his thinking. The notion of thinking something first and then constructing a part of language to express it involves a circularity: language is required for the primal thinking, thus is already there. Since we come to entertain concepts by learning how to use language intelligibly, a constructed aspect of language

can only be an abstraction from the already present medium of natural language. Thus, no sense can be made of the notion of constructing a language richer than natural language, for no sense can be made of the notion of thinking or experiencing a reality outside the medium of natural language. To know what is meant by the world, mind, substance, value, etc. is to know how to use linguistic expressions in a natural language. The notion of constructing an ideal language which can more correctly and adequately represent the conceptualizing possibilities of mind fails to take account of the fact that the basic forms of thought are set by natural language and thus language construction can only be an abstraction from this.

As I have noted, such a theory of the total encapsulation of thought in the established forms of a language at a given time seems to me to fail to take into consideration the schematizing (or grid-function) way in which existent forms of language permit new concepts, even enriched basic structural concepts, to be conceived. With this grid function of natural language in mind we can explain how language can evolve and also how a philosophically developed language can be conceptually richer than a natural language in its basic structural concepts

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 this  
 formulation ?

(Groupings I and II above). Certainly such a theory intuitively appears richer when we compare the significance of the ordinary language uses of an uneducated individual talking of physical objects, minds, causes, values, etc. with the significance of the language used by a philosopher in formulating an epistemology, ontology, value theory, or substantive ethic.

Thus, there would appear to be justification in Ernest Gelner's indictment of some linguistic philosophy that "...seeks to reduce thought to a move within an established language game" and considers that "...to seek to change the rules, to think outside of them, is the essence of the pathology of thought."<sup>49</sup> Gelner concludes that such linguistic philosophy "...treats genuine thought as disease and dead thought as the paradigm of health."<sup>50</sup>

But it is not difficult to push this kind of criticism *can easily* too far. Jonathan Cohen in The Diversity of Meaning writes:

*be pushed*

The whole doctrine of logical grammar is a mistake...It suggests that the study of meaning is concerned with something that is timeless, unchanging, clear, consistent, useful. It suggests that the relations of meanings among

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<sup>49</sup>Gelner, p. 110.

<sup>50</sup>Gelner, p. 97.

*behind the  
"in the background"  
was the word  
themselves*

culture words is as timeless as the logical relations among ideas.<sup>51</sup>

I am not in any sense suggesting that the study of the logical grammar of ordinary language is a mistake (and Cohen in his book seems to make it quite clear he doesn't think so either). Rather I have argued that philosophical analysis must be oriented primarily to that explication to get at the basic functional structure of thought because, as Professor Maynard Adams states, "...[the] structure of a [natural] language is the structure of a mind"<sup>52</sup> and mind functions in discursive (thinking: stating, asserting) ways only by using as a medium an isomorphically structured language. I am suggesting only, that while the natural language of a developed culture must be basically complete in its structural mirroring of mental functions, it is somewhat like a map or a skeletal structure in its relation to developed philosophical thought, thus not strictly like a mirror or photograph, even in regard to its presentation of basic structural concepts in human experience. But for any discursive conceptual abilities over and beyond those reflected in the logic of use of sentences in ordinary

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<sup>51</sup>(London, 1962), p. 9.

<sup>52</sup>E. M. Adams, "A Defense of Value Realism", The Southern Journal of Philosophy, IV (Fall, 1966), p. 165.

in word  
mind can  
do (not be)

language, this language must serve as the schematizer, the grid.

### 9. On Explicating a Structure of Functions

We are now in a position to speak of what can change and what cannot from language culture to language culture among developed peoples. That which reflects the basic functional structure of the mind will be changeless and that which reflects culturally conditioned factors will be changeable. In terms of the grouping given above, Group I concepts are to us changeless for we logically cannot conceive of change here. Group II concepts seem existentially changeless because of their reflection of fundamental existential functions of the human mind, though through an historical perspective we can see changes here. Alasdair MacIntyre has noted the evolution of the concept of justice from the Greek period to the modern period,<sup>53</sup> and various Christian writers, Paul Tillich among them,<sup>54</sup> have talked of the emergence in the concept of love of agape out of the Greek ideas of eros and philia. We can push the paleontology of moral

<sup>53</sup>Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York, 1966), Chapter 2.

<sup>54</sup>Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2 vols., I (Chicago, 1951), pp. 280-282. This derivation was developed more fully in a lecture, apparently not published.

where given?

cf. A.S.  
Lewis A  
Study of  
Words on  
"Structure in  
Sub. Culture  
A.S. etc.  
also  
"concern"  
or others



concepts back even beyond this to Hobbesian man. Note that this sort of evolution of concepts available in a culture, or functional to an individual, is a different sort of thing from simply a shift in the role characteristically given to a concept by a people or an individual. For example, W. D. Falk notes that morality has had two distinct meanings in the English language, designating both (1) the classical Greek idea of ways of acting that fulfill ~~reason-mediated~~ <sup>reason-comprehended & reason-shaped</sup> human nature and (2) the altruistic idea of having as a basic value to act with an other-regarding concern.<sup>55</sup> This ambiguity in the use of the word 'moral' does not appear to reflect so much an evolution in a concept as shifts in the roles given to two distinct concepts which in English have been ambiguous <sup>expressed</sup> ~~referred to~~ by one word, however, ~~certainly~~ both <sup>the</sup> evolutions and <sup>the</sup> shifts of ~~this sort~~ <sup>these sorts</sup> account largely for the continuing ambiguities in the meanings of words in our culture.

The making of this latter distinction (i.e. between evolution in the body of concepts available in a culture or to an individual and simply shifts in the roles of concepts in dominant substantive theories) illustrates that we now

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<sup>55</sup>W. D. Falk, "Morality, Self and Others," in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Naknikian (Detroit, 1963), pp. 25-47.

have a basis for distinguishing aspects of logic of use from what is merely language idiom. In explicating logic of use we are seeking to set forth a structure of functions. An aspect of usage of language which is not integrally tied to functional distinctions is only an idiomatic characteristic of a specific culture language. There is, for example, no functional necessity for the word 'morality' to have the two distinct meanings Professor Falk notes that it has in our culture. We would not expect this duality to be a universal characteristic of languages for it does not reflect a functional relationship. I shall argue later in a similar way that the fact that in English we have special grading terms in regard to good but not for right is largely an idiomatic feature of culture language rather than a variation in use reflecting a distinction in logic of use.

*mean?*

The philosopher's job of analysis is basically one of delineating the conceptual capabilities of the mind, and especially the stating and asserting capabilities as these are manifested in uses of language. Thus, articulating the range and structure of the conceivable is in every fundamental part a matter of explicating the functions in language and their <sup>into</sup> relationships. The ideal of language analysis is the delineation of a structure of pronouncement functions of the mind. This is what philosophers have called

*How individual?*

getting at the logical grammar of the language, and what linguists and sociologists today are coming to call a structural analysis of language. <sup>& cultural</sup> 56

When language is conceived as a medium through which discursive functions of the mind are performed--both in a semantic and a perlocutionary way, the latter depending on the former--we can recognize sharp functional distinctions and at the same time recognize that instances of use are characteristically polyfunctional. Semantic and perlocutionary functions can be distinguished for almost every use, but often the semantic significance will itself <sup>be</sup> polyfunctional. For example, sentences with secondary value words, such as honest, industrious, degenerate, etc. both describe and value. And one and the same sentence use can semantically be a resolve, a prescription, and a commendation, and have both individual and participatory agency significance, as in a minister's pronouncement from the pulpit, "Let us serve God more diligently."

Sometimes distinctions of functions will be demarkings of points on a continuum. Attentions grade into intentions.

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<sup>56</sup>Cf. Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structure (The Hague, 1957); and for a discussion of the philosophical significance of Levi-Strauss' "structuralism" cf. Peter Caws, "What is Structuralism," Partisan Review, XXXV No. 1 (Winter, 1968), pp. 75-91.

Ethical (life-value) valuations grade into aesthetic valuations. Commands grade into prescriptions, and these into commendations, and these into requests. Where such functional continua are involved I shall speak of models, or archtypes, of functions, recognizing that the instance of use may have a functional significance lying between two models. Such an empirical platonism will allow us to give due respect to the functional richness of language--to the infinite gradations of functional significance in instances of use. Instances of use will often involve textures of functions, some dominant, some recessive, some semantic, some perlocutionary. This polyfunctional approach, combined with a recognition of the various modes of practical (conative) language in addition to theoretical (cognitive) language, gives us a vastly more adequate concept of meaning in language and in language use than the old exclusively cognitive-emotive meaning approaches which dominated philosophical analysis before the appearance of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1945) and which characteristically sought to assign one definite cognitive or one cognitive-emotive-amalgam function to each sentence use.

#### 10. Norms of Language Explication

We have noted that while an explicated language might

be conceptually richer than a natural language, it nevertheless is undeniably the case that the philosopher's job is primarily that of explicating his natural language. This is not only because one's natural language provides necessary points of orientation in naming, relating, and expressing all that he can be discursively aware of, and not only that approach to the conceivable through a natural language provides the only practical matrix for communication, but more basically that awareness in the developed mind is mediated through functions of language in such a fundamental way, as we have seen, that it is highly problematic that one could get at something he could be aware of as a basic feature of structure or content of his experience except through explicating the structure and content of his natural language. We have noted that this point could be--and has been--pushed so far as to make it impossible to explain how a people or an individual could develop or acquire a language, and it could be--and has been--pushed to the point of concluding that the range of the conceivable is the range of ordinary non-philosophical concerns in a culture; but these excesses in application need not blind us to the soundness of the principle that the only feasible way to reach the destination of explicating what the mind can conceive in a discursive way is to journey by ordinary language analysis; if

2-7 65

mental pronouncement functions and ordinary language functions are not coterminous, then the only way one could knowingly bring reports from that beyond is to explore first to the boundaries of meaning in ordinary language. Thus, at least the bulk of the philosopher's work of conceptual analysis is analysis of ordinary language. It follows from this that the fundamental criterion of adequacy for a proposed explication of the conceivable is correctness: how well does the proposal account for the actual logic of use of expressions in ordinary discourse? A proposal must explicate meanings the way they are, i.e. the way they are given through one's natural language.

However, we have seen that it would be incorrect to consider that justifying a proposed explication of functions or meaning in a natural language is altogether a matter of comparing the precise delineation of meaning constituting that proposal with the equally precise meanings reflected in the ordinary logic of use of expressions in a natural language. Such a "mirror image" concept of the process of ascertaining meaning in language, and even more the range of discursive conceivability of the human mind, does not fit the situation the philosopher encounters in seeking to make an explication. The logic of use of expressions in a natural language is in places ambiguous, vague, incomplete,

and even on occasion inconsistent. Any proposed explication which renders meanings precise cannot avoid being in some measure a recommending of a way meanings ought to be conceived. It will be a selection of ways to make the indeterminate specific and of factors to emphasize and factors to make secondary.

R. M. Hare has aptly described the philosopher's task of analyzing meaning in a natural language as like the task of someone who knows how to do a certain folk dance setting out to write an explanation of it. If he knows how to dance the "eightsome reel" then he knows it has a determinate structure, though it may take some effort for him to be able to analyze just what this is. Furthermore, and this is the philosophically more significant point, there is no specific interpretation of the dance which is not also a fixing of it in a more specific style than it could be said to have as a naturally acquired part of a folk culture. The specific set of motions which will count as an instance of doing the dance can vary within the limits of a general pattern; there can be different styles of doing the dance, each equally correct in the light of the tradition of use defining what it means to do that specific dance.

A proposed explication of a natural language, however accurate it is judged to be, will be in addition a way of

*R. M. Hare*

giving the language and experience a specific form and content which they could not be said to have clearly exhibited before the analysis became a basis for interpreting them. Analysis of what is there and what is the creation of a specific form in which to conceive what is there will be so interrelated that a complete separation would be impossible. Any analysis will always be an impoverishment of the concrete experience of use, for it will always be a selection, but it will also be an addition to what was experienced before the analysis became a way of approaching the experience; the analysis itself helps give the experience precise form and content. Thus, "explication" is necessarily a creative specification: a proposal whose adequacy cannot be judged purely in terms of correctness, but also must be judged in terms of its efficacy for achieving the purposes for which languages are used.

If this account of the problem of explicating natural languages is correct, then clearly no such meaning proposal can be completely neutral. It is inescapably involved in valuations, not only in presupposing that clarity, precision in meaning, and ease of use, for example, are standards of explication, but also in proposing the fittingness of conceiving language from one perspective rather than another that might have been used. Such contrasts as that between

*Handwritten notes:*  
 of meaning  
 after analysis  
 of how things  
 are used?



the patterning of experience by Indo-European and by Oriental languages have been especially noted, but within these language cultures the differences in the shaping of experience by language can be significant and conspicuous, as the differences among French, German, and English <sup>language cultures</sup> illustrate. Even among users of the same natural language there are selections of language perspectives, and the sense of fittingness of any one of these is not something wholly fixed by the ordinary language of the culture; rather it is a fittingness rooted in temperament and particular sub-culture background. Individuals of fundamentally different emotional orientations to experience are apt to differ in their judgments as to what type of meaning theory constitutes the optimum explication of ordinary language, because they are presupposing different orientations to experience, and thus differences in the specific nature of the experience itself. For example, an individual dominantly responsive to pragmatic, or existential, or mystical, or romantic attitudes toward experience will tend to find more adequate those analyses which put emphasis on the volitional and subjective aspects of experience, whereas an individual dominantly responsive to rationalistic, or positivistic, or pietistic, or classical attitudes will tend to see as more fitting those ways of conceiving language which put emphasis on factors of

objectivity and play down factors of subjective response or choice.

Thus, in a very elementary sense an explication of a natural language, and especially a systematic and comprehensive one, is necessarily conceptually richer than the natural language itself if one counts the conversion of endemic ambiguity into precise meaning and incomplete logical structures into complete ones as gains in richness. Furthermore, the articulation of a semantic structure in a philosophical theory of meaning almost certainly will go beyond what could be said to be already there in the unplicated natural language.

The observation that general theories of meaning in a natural language tend to modify the experience of that which is taken as the object of the analysis has been to some philosophers a reason for eschewing highly abstractive analyses in favor of piecemeal explications, i.e. a reason for turning away from concern with developing comprehensive theories of meaning to a focusing of attention on delineating the logic of use of specific terms in specific contexts without seeking to fit these explications into some comprehensive theory. Granting the risks of highly abstractive approaches, I believe it can be shown that the piecemeal approach runs its own special risks of being misleading, and that there is

reason to believe that these are in the long run more of a problem to securing an adequate explication of a natural language than are the more systematic, comprehensive analyses. What critical and open-minded student of language has not, in attempting to determine "the meaning" of an expression, frequently come up against the idolatry problem which Bacon so well described: the psychological tendency, once an hypothesis has been fixed upon which fits some evidence to give that hypothesis a privileged status in confronting all additional evidence, so that all evidence is seen as especially confirmatory to the chosen hypothesis, even though the same evidence would have an equally confirmatory effect for another hypothesis had it been hit upon to provide the initial orientation? Often each of several "explications" of a meaning will be found to fit the evidence if one impartially seeks to see how experience would be conceived in terms of each. The rational procedure for resolving such problems in language analysis, as in any area of scientific inquiry, is to accept as most adequate that explication which fits best into a comprehensive system of explications which overall function most adequately.

George Kerner, in Revolution in Ethical Theory, contrasts "abstract system building" with "logical analysis of ordinary moral language,"<sup>57</sup> and Stewart Hampshire in his

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<sup>57</sup>(Oxford, 1966), p. 2.

△ and agree that the more systematic philosophical analysis of the latter sort.

1949 article "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" <sup>Agree in the sense</sup> suggests the way for moral philosophy which focuses on specific language application problems, ~~same kind of contrast.~~ <sup>58</sup> However, in Hampshire's more recent writing he has come much more to defend by explicit statement and practice the necessity of constructing systematic and comprehensive theories in explication of practical discourse to achieve an adequate understanding of particular language use. <sup>59</sup>

Once we see that the task of analytic philosophy is the explication of a structure of functions, the "ordinary language" and the "rational reconstructionist" approaches to philosophical <sup>application</sup> explanation are no longer seen as incompatible alternatives, but as necessarily <sup>complementary</sup> supplementary approaches. A good rational reconstruction will approach the concreteness of the ordinary language analysis, and a good ordinary language analysis will approach the precision and comprehensiveness <sup>of system integration</sup> of the rational reconstruction. <sup>approach</sup> I strongly question the possibility of making reliable and adequate explications of small classes of sentences in discourse ~~just~~ by focusing on these alone. A general framework of meaning and language theory must be presupposed and specific explications

<sup>58</sup>In Mind, N.S., LVIII, No. 232 (Oct. 1949), p. 481.

<sup>59</sup>Cf. his Thought and Action (London, 1959) and his "Introduction" in his anthology, Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1966).

judged by how well they fit together to form a body of explanations which, formulated in terms of a general theory of meaning in language, are judged as a whole as to how well this comprehensive proposal accounts for the observable data of language use.

*Consciousness?*

When is something really conceivable and when does it just seem to be so because one is tricked by an unclarified language? This is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophical analysis. A comment of Professor Maynard Adams, given in part above, is especially appropriate here: "One often sees what one's semantic field normatively requires one to see even though it is not there. Also, one may fail to see something that is there because one's semantic field does not require the experience."<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, a perplexity about meaning is apt to be psychologically relieved by any proposal that offers a coherent resolution of ambiguity and indecision, but to treat the psychological symptom is not necessarily to achieve the most adequate solution to the philosophical problem. And a treatment that works well for some individuals (psychologically "getting the fly out of the bottle") may only leave another in a greater state of perplexity. How are we to decide when the latter is suffering

*This is what I mean  
as The Secret  
of Psychoanalysis!*

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<sup>60</sup>E. M. Adams, "Mental Causality," p. 562.

from a stubborn case of linguistic neurosis and when he is simply refusing a philosophical tranquilizer that would mask the irritation of the difficulty without really resolving it?

In many cases one can settle a question of conceivability by examining specific features of the logic of use of parts of language, but basic problems about conceivability are often not capable of being settled in this way--this being one reason they are basic philosophical problems. In a set of philosophical explications, commitment to a meaning criterion should certainly not have the logical status of an arbitrary fiat of the will. On the contrary, it as much, or more than any other one judgment requires for its justification the bringing together of all that one has claimed to be able to understand, including even to imagine. It calls for considering the systematic interrelationships of meanings that become one's explication of language upon accepting a particular meaning criterion and of appraising how well as a whole that criterion allows analysis of all the facts of the logic of use of language expressions and of all that seems to be fact in a substantive way. Adoption of a meaning criterion is rational insofar as one has clear basis for judging it the criterion which accounts for the logic of ordinary use in the way which gives maximum overall fulfillment of the norms of language explication, and thus maximum

ease, credibility and illuminatingness in formulating and defending substantive theories. Further, a rational choice here calls for comparing the consequences of seeking to use one proposed meaning criterion with the consequences of seeking to use other proposals. The mode of reasoning called for is admittedly an inductive process of a high order. The point here is that justification of a meaning criterion is one of the most basic kinds of ultimate justification in human experience, and as W. V. Quine and Herbert Feigl have insisted: ultimate justifications in all dimensions of judgment must be totalistic; the ideal is to bring all judgments, as Quine states, "before the tribunal of experience as a body"; the commitments that one is moved to make in that situation of totalistic confrontation would be rational as fully as any judgments could conceivably be.<sup>61</sup> This ultimate justificatory norm of enlightened choice is called by Herbert Feigl vindication;<sup>62</sup> it will receive much attention in Part III.

Since a philosophical explication of a natural language is necessarily more than purely descriptive, for it is :

<sup>61</sup>W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic, rev. (New York, 1959), xii.

<sup>62</sup>Herbert Feigl, "De Principii...", in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, 1950), pp. 113-147. *See*

Feigl's "Vindication & Validation".

Let there  
be a copy  
of Halls  
of Lewis  
Carroll

(Be sure  
specific)

unavoidably pervaded with proposals for which the justification cannot be found in the concept of correctness alone, what further norm, or norms, are to be appealed to? I propose the following as the norms of adequacy presupposed by the very function of a language:

1. Correctness
2. Comprehensiveness
3. Neutrality ?
4. Precision (sharp functional distinctions)
5. Usefulness

*6. Any number  
of separate  
ideas can  
make use  
of only concepts  
if the concepts  
are present*

It can easily be seen that each of these generally requires the others for its implementation. Basically we begin by seeking to ascertain correctness and appeal to the other criteria to resolve ambiguities, to fill in gaps, and to judge among competing explicating proposals where the norm of correctness is not in itself decisive.

The norm of comprehensiveness is the requirement that an adequate language be one in which every conceivable discursive (pronouncement) function can be semantically expressed. Since language is the medium of discursive thought and communication, comprehensiveness is an obvious requirement for a language that is to serve that function adequately.

The neutrality norm is really an aspect of the norm of comprehensiveness: to be comprehensive the instrument of



thought and communication should exert the minimum possible influence on the content of what is communicated. It should be as substantively neutral as possible. For example, the language of valuation should pre-judge the minimum conceivable of issues as to what kinds of things can be called valuable and what can constitute a rational ground of valuation. And cognitive language should pre-judge the minimum conceivable of issues as to what exists or what could exist. I take it as a strong point of this proposal of the nature of practical language that a language matrix is provided that is adequate to formulate rationalistic as well as empirical substantive theories. The controversy between ethical intuitionism and ethical empiricism (i.e. valuations interpreted in a way compatible with a naturalistic world view) is deposed from a meta-ethical controversy to one within substantive ethics. Also, practically all claims about the nature of man (essentialist theories) are shown to be relevant at the substantive level but not to conceptual analysis.

The fourth norm, precision, is implied by the fact that language, being the instrument of thought, must have precise delineations of functions if thought is to be clear, detailed, and comprehensive in all of its possible uses.

The fifth norm, usefulness, is also implied as an ideal

by the very functions of language and, of course, implies the other four ideals. Let us consider it to include all pragmatic factors relevant to judging the adequacy of the explication of language which are not contained in the first four norms. The following passage from a discussion by J. N. Findlay of the ideals of language explication touch on much that is relevant here:

...[the explication] should not make us draw distinctions where we are not, even on reflexion, disposed to draw any, and that it should not make it difficult or impossible for us to draw distinctions that we cannot help wanting to draw. We may add, further, that it should be a way of speaking that brings the maximum of unity and perspicuity into the subject matters we are dealing with, that it disposes us to say, for instance--without more than an initial shock of uttering something 'queer' or 'clumsy'--that things not previously regarded as having great affinity are 'really only different forms' of one thing, that things previously said to be causally or externally connected, are 'deeply bound together,' and so on. And a good way of speaking should also, plainly, be one that removes linguistic difficulties that are general, which most speakers feel when provoked by certain statements or questions. It should be a way of speaking which removes difficulties durably, which does not merely intoxicate us with a temporary sense of brilliant clarity which afterwards evaporates. These, and a large number of less readily formulable characteristics, would readily recommend themselves to reflective speakers as 'good points' in a way of speaking.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>J. N. Findlay, "Recommendations Regarding the Language of Introspection," Clarity is Not Enough: Essays Criticism of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. H. D. Lewis (London, 1962), pp. 353-354.

This passage itself indicates how closely interrelated all five criteria are. Value in a language analysis is very much a matter of achieving a valuable gestalt.

The pragmatic or instrumental values can, I think, be taken to include the aesthetic values of an explication, for the aesthetic values in this case are not being judged in their own right but in their contribution to a language analysis. However, I could grant the point of a <sup>seemingly agreeing</sup> ~~contention~~ that, despite the functional character of the aesthetic in language, we logically have here a sixth norm. The aesthetic component of experience, taken here in the broadest sense of an appreciating of the shape, flow, texture (in general, form) of human experience for itself is such a fundamental part of human value, and language is such a central and pervasive factor in that aesthetic shaping, that the judgment of language from the aesthetic standpoint is much more significant than we are prone to realize.

In the application of all of these norms of language adequacy, correctness remains primal, as I have noted, and the others become applicable in most cases as ways of supplementing that criterion in judging which of alternative proposals is most correct in the most valuable way. The supplementary criteria both assist in judging correctness and in appraising the value of the creative element necessarily

involved in any natural language explication.

The <sup>five</sup> ~~five~~ ideals of language explication noted above indicate <sup>five</sup> ~~five~~ ways a philosophical analysis can be defective.

I want to comment on the first four types of defects.

(1) Violation of Correctness. This occurs primarily, I think, from two causes: (a) approaching a part of discourse with an inadequate concept of the various modes of language, or (b) seeking to make a piecemeal approach. The fallacies of cognitive naturalism and the limitations of emotivism would seem clearly to stem primarily from the first source, though they are also related to the second.<sup>64</sup> The exclusive identification of valuations with commendations, or prescriptions, or emotive expressions, or cognitive predictions are probably due primarily to the second cause.


(2) Violation of Comprehensiveness. What is involved here that is of philosophical concern is omission in an explication of language forms adequate to account fully for all basic dimensions of experience. The ethical non-naturalist claims an error of this sort in the purely naturalistic (empirical) analysis of values. In this study I find the

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<sup>64</sup>The fallacies and limitations referred to here are discussed in Part III of this study, though they are now so much a part of the accepted background of philosophical discussion of the meta-ethical problem that explanation of what is meant here would seem not necessary.

most serious violation of this kind to be incurred by those analyses which do not provide, or provide adequately, for language reference to states of consciousness, including structures and textures of consciousness. An analysis such as Hume's<sup>65</sup> or Gilbert Ryles',<sup>66</sup> which allow for non-behavioral references only to episodic sensory phenomena, are, I shall seek to show, quite drastically inadequate for explication of the language and phenomenological processes of valuing-- both ethical and aesthetic--where these involve attention experiences. This is to say they are inadequate for full explication of most value language and experience.

I have sought in this study to be strictly faithful to the canons of empiricism, which is to say to seek an explication of observed data which makes the fewest possible assumptions consistent with accounting for that data via a coherent and systemically integrated theory. To do this I think requires disowning some shibboleths that have often been taken as part of the defining characteristics of 20th century empiricism. I have in mind especially here the contention that references to states of consciousness in an



<sup>65</sup>David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2 vols., Everyman's Library (London, 1911), pp. 238-249.

<sup>66</sup>Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, ad passim.

empirical analysis are references to behavior plus occasional sensory episodes, or private thought and imagination are at most shadowy inner processes totally dependent upon observable behavioral processes for their content or significance.<sup>67</sup>

Y. H. Krikorian states, "...behavior is the only aspect of mind which is open to experimental examination,"<sup>68</sup> to which Eliseo Vivas in a more adequate empirical spirit replies:

"...Krikorian forgets to tell [the reader] what the naturalist does about those aspects of mind which are <sup>not</sup> open to the behavioristic approach."<sup>69</sup>

The contortions in 20th century analytic philosophy to make extensional (i.e. non-intensional) theories of meaning adequate and to make all references to mental states fit public observation patterns is a scenario of a philosophical fantasy world worthy of an Ionesco, but it is not, I think, a bright chapter in the history of the empirical philosophical spirit. I hope that this study will provide strong evidence of the inadequacies in such approaches in the area of practical language explication.

(3) Violations of Neutrality. It would appear a definite mark of clumsiness in a philosophical analysis to

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<sup>67</sup>Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 155-165.

<sup>68</sup>Y. H. Krikorian, ed., Naturalism and the Human Spirit (New York, 1944), p. 252.

<sup>69</sup>Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (New York, 1955), p. 78.

to seek to incorporate into the fabric of language matters that are not a part of the necessary conditions for conceiving of experience in a comprehensive and coherent way. Language includes only necessary conditions of full conceivability.<sup>70</sup> In later parts of the study I shall take up the question of what circumstances would justify compromise of the neutrality norm in the interests of overall greatest achievable adequacy in a language proposal. We must allow the possibility that the guilt of violating any one of the norms of language explication can be exonerated by showing that there is clearly a gain in overall adequacy in explication. However (to anticipate the conclusion of that later discussion), I do not find that there are sufficient grounds to justify compromises of the neutrality ideal.

There have been two very conspicuous kinds of violations of this canon in 20th century philosophical value theory: (a) the incorporation of good-making characteristics into the meaning of good (and mutatis mutandis ought and right), and (b) the incorporation of substantive standards into the language-established concept of rationality.

G. E. Moore has made conspicuous for us the guilt of

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<sup>70</sup> This sentence is to be interpreted in the broad way which includes all three groupings of concepts listed in section 8.

Do. Feb  
The?

cognitive naturalism on the first count,<sup>71</sup> and to establish (as this study attempts to do) that value can be defined without reference to intuited non-natural properties, relations or statuses is to prove that non-naturalism formulated as a metaethic ~~is also guilty~~ <sup>must also be indicted for</sup> of this kind of violation of the neutrality norm.

An approach to the nature of reasoning in value discourse which I shall call, following Maynard Adams, "logical naturalism," flouts the neutrality norm very flagrantly in incorporating substantive norms into language itself as Rules of Inference, and as such constitutive of the language-rule established concept of rationality in valuation. Stephen Toulmin's proposal of this sort in his book, The Place of Reason in Ethics,<sup>72</sup> was one of the earliest and remains one of the best known, though Kurt Baier,<sup>73</sup> Paul Taylor,<sup>74</sup> and George Kerner<sup>75</sup> have made similar kinds of analyses of reasoning in normative discourse. It is distinctive of these analyses to seek to show that there is a point where common

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<sup>71</sup>Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. 1.

<sup>72</sup>(Cambridge, 1950).

<sup>73</sup>Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, 1958).

<sup>74</sup>Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, 1961).

<sup>75</sup>George Kerner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory.



acceptance of a norm in a culture sanctions viewing that norm as a part of the fabric of language itself, that it functions as a rule of inference and thus as a part of the logic of use of value concepts. Thus, to show that an action is an instance of a code of principles or standards of a society (Toulmin),<sup>76</sup> or tends to produce a harmony of interests in society (also Toulmin),<sup>77</sup> or tends to produce pain (Baier),<sup>78</sup> is in each case to give a "good reason" for doing the action purely by the nature of the logic of practical language. I shall seek to show in the study that there is no justification for this breaking down of the very fundamental distinction between the purely formal, logical, language-rule sanctioned elements in inferences and inferences based on the presupposition of substantive principles, thus principles which have no formal status in language whatsoever. The issue is brought to a focus in the study in the examination of the logic of use of secondary value words (e.g. honest, identical, etc.) which is the point where the logical naturalist appears to have his strongest case.

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<sup>76</sup>Toulmin, pp. 155-160.

<sup>77</sup>Toulmin, pp. 155-160.

<sup>78</sup>Baier, pp. 266-275.

(4) Violation of Precision. Like violation of neutrality, violation of the norm of precision has been systemically espoused in 20th century philosophy. The challenge here has come in the form of rejection of sharp-functional distinctions between, for examples, fact and value, the analytic and the synthetic (more generally the verbal and the substantive), the postulative and the derived, and other such traditional dichotomies in the conceptualizing of experience. Dewey, Quine, Morton White, and J. L. Austin are some of the more well-known of the philosophers who have concluded that sharp functional distinctions cannot in the final analysis be defended. It is, I think, in the final analysis that they are defensible. The counsels of failure, of lack of usefulness of the distinctions, have seemed to me to come from a confusion of the distinction between (a) explicating a structure of functions and (b) explicating the meaning of specific instances of use. Granted, as we have already noted and will consider further, that instances of language use are typically polyfunctional. There are no instances of analytic assertions that do not also serve as instances of synthetic assertions in at least recessive ways. There are no conative language valuations which are not also instances of making, in at least recessive ways, cognitive *claims* assertions. There are no instances of postulates which do

(a) identifying instances that are of a concept

not stand in some relationships of being conclusions of inferences. But these complexities of instances of use do not constitute any attack on the possibility of delineating sharply and precisely structures of functions in discourse; rather the complexity of the instance of use can be understood only by noting the sharply distinguished elements that give the use its textural significance.

The thesis of gradualism--that there are no sharp functional distinctions in language or in discursive mental acts--is on one interpretation obviously true and on another circular. It is obviously true if it is no more than the claim that instances of use of language are probably always polyfunctional, and it is ~~the second~~ <sup>second</sup> if it is the claim that sharp functional distinctions cannot be drawn. Note the logical oddness of saying that the idea, or function, of valuing cannot be distinguished from the idea, or function, of fact stating, or that the idea (function) of analyticity cannot be distinguished from the idea (function) of a synthetic pronouncement, or that the idea (function) of postulation cannot be distinguished sharply from the idea (function) of being a conclusion inferred from premises: we cannot speak coherently of a blend of two ideas (functions) without having a clear, sharp idea of the elements of the blend.

The conclusions of gradualism have usually been formulated within the framework of extensionalistic theories of meaning, or significance in language use, and it is to be granted that within this framework it is very likely impossible to resolve the problem in a coherent way.

I will not add further comment here, beyond what was given above, on the fifth norm, usefulness, or on the possible sixth norm, aesthetic adequacy. At the conclusion of the study I shall consider how well the explication developed in the study fulfills each of these norms as compared with other approaches.

#### 11. Language Explication and Substantive Proposal

There has been a tendency in contemporary philosophy to talk of the inability to draw sharp distinctions between linguistic and substantive functions in practice--except in regard to the philosophical function itself. Here the trend has been of an opposite sort, i.e. toward emphasizing the purely linguistic (or analytic) and non-substantive nature of the philosophical job: philosophy is explication of functions in language, and thus of concepts.<sup>79</sup> It is appropriate to the philosopher to propose explications,

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<sup>79</sup>I will not repeat the criticism made of this statement as a formulation of the generic analytic job of philosophy, cf. ~~Section 2~~.

appraise the explications of others, and even to analyze the conceptual presuppositions of specific substantive theories, but it is not his job to propose substantive theories. This concept of philosophy does not square with the history of use of the term either by philosophers or others: traditionally philosophy has had a speculative function as well as an analytic one, the speculative function being the proposal and defense of basic substantive theories of both cognitive and normative types. Ironically, on the contemporary philosophical scene those most explicitly concerned with faithful explications of ordinary language have characteristically been among the staunchest advocates of the position that the philosophical function is in itself a purely explicative one.<sup>80</sup>

My concern here is to note that this is a quite radical modification of what has ordinarily through history been taken to be the range of functions of philosophy per se and to raise some questions about the wisdom of so limiting the professional philosophical preoccupation. Certainly the analytic function is the primal and fundamental philosophical concern, but there are dangers, I think, when professional

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<sup>80</sup>As I noted above, some very substantive things have at times been gathered within the explicative function.

philosophy becomes too exclusively concerned with linguistic explication in abstraction from activities of proposing and appraising basic substantive theories--and I mean the full range of appraisal, not just consideration of the linguistic-conceptual presuppositions of specific substantive proposals, though even this kind of involvement with substantive theories is becoming an increasingly minor part of philosophical activity in the U.S.A. and England. The danger here is to the adequacy of the analytic function itself. Without the kind of sensitivity to problems, structural relationships, range of alternative ways of approaching issues, etc. that perhaps comes fully only with involvement in operations of developing, defending, and appraising substantive theories, the philosopher is not apt to be able to do the analytic job well. Language and concept analysis of an area of experience need very much to be performed by someone keenly aware of the substantive theories and problems in that area.

It is one of the ironies of 20th century philosophy of practical language that more explicit attention has been given to the problem of language explication than probably at any previous time, and very complex procedures of language analysis have been developed, yet it is not without point to say that in many ways practical language explication in the 20th century has been less adequate than in many past

centuries; I have in mind especially the classical Greek period and 18th and 19th century Anglo-American and Continental philosophy. Such a claim requires specific supporting argumentation and in the course of the study I will seek to indicate my reasons for feeling the claim is based on reasonable comparisons. The divorcing of analytic philosophical activity from its historical substantive complement in the existentially extensive way this has been done in the 20th century Anglo-American philosophy is, I believe, a questionable development both as ordinary language explication of the role of the philosopher qua philosopher and (much more serious) as a development which may often lead the analytic philosopher not to have the intimate acquaintance with his subject matter he needs to have to do the analytic job adequately.

The purpose of this study is to develop a concept of practical language that is as radically uninvolved substantively (i.e. is as neutral) as can possibly be achieved, but to bring out this neutrality it is important to show that all kinds of substantive theories can be adequately formulated in the language. I shall seek to show how consideration of substantive issues have at various points had a bearing on the explication that is made. This will be especially important for what I earlier called Group II

concepts, i.e. those which are not logically necessary conditions for the conceivability of experience in general but do have an existential necessity, i.e. they are, or contribute to, conceptual structures which are essential to the performance of fundamental human purposive activities, such as justifying, commanding, commending, being moral, promising, postulating, etc. It is a purpose of the study to achieve some clarification of the intricate relationships of linguistic-conceptual matters to substantive matters.

## 12. The Field of Theories

One of the difficulties in doing philosophy is that basic issues in one area of human experience cannot be dealt with adequately without taking a stand on a broad range of basic issues. Development of a theory of practical language requires developing positions at least on the nature of meaning in language, the nature of rationality in argumentation, the nature of logic, philosophy of mind, the nature of a scientific theory of human action and motivation, and the possible relevance of speculative metaphysical claims to normative judgments.

In this section I want to indicate briefly my understanding of the field of theories and their more obvious interrelationships. The very schematic presentation set



others. A meaning theory takes form under the guidance of both a rationality theory and the desire to make specific kinds of substantive assertions, and of course rationality theory and substantive theories presuppose meaning theory for their formulation. Any kind of pronouncement must have both a meaning and a mode of justification, and while the two are not identical, its having the one presupposes its having the other.

Meaning theory and rationality theory are each comprehensive of both theoretical and practical language. Validation norms and substantive theories, however, are of course different for each of these dimensions of discourse--but are closely interrelated.

## FIELD OF THEORIES

### I. MEANING THEORY

(A specific definition under I-C establishes the subject matter of meaning theory, namely the meaning of semantic meaning. Its development and content is based primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, on logic of use of sentences in ordinary language.)

#### A. Theory of the Range of Conceivability

##### 1. Classification-inventory of ultimate concepts

a. Concepts of ultimate concrete particulars

b. Concepts of ultimate modes of unity in experience (categories)

→ c. Basic resemblance-formed concepts

*Clarify*  
*add*

d. Basic status-of-being concepts

2. Meaning Criterion: A generalization based on the above classification-inventory.

B. Theory of Language

An explication of the nature of a language: e.g. what a sentence is and how it has meaning, modes of meaning in language, nature of a language rule, etc.

C. Body of Definitions

Explications of the meanings of specific linguistic expressions

II. RATIONALITY THEORY

(A specific definition under I-C establishes the meaning of being rational, of being justified. It is a Group I concept.)

A. Vindication Norm: Make all pronouncements from the standpoint of maximum achievable awareness of all there is to be aware of.

B. Validation Norms:

(As noted above, from this point on the classification is actually dual, except for the meaning criterion.)

1. Methodological Norms

a. Primary

i. Fundamental principles of deductive logic

ii. Basic principles of induction

iii. Meaning criterion (i.e. I-A-2)

b. Secondary

Includes norms (ideals) for theories beyond the primary norms of deductive and inductive logic.

2. Substantive Norms:

These function as standards (criteria) of substantive claims. Any not-in-question and well-established general principle under III can function as a standard.

III. SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES

A. Second Order Theories

Comprehensive theories in which justification is chiefly by vindication. Crucial experiments not a common mode of testing.

1. Basic laws of nature (operational formulations) and basic substantive ethical principles.
2. Basic metaphysical claims (Speculative metaphysics, not simply "metaphysics of experience" which is constituted of basic parts of meaning and rationality theory.)

B. First Order Theories

Substantive theories in which justification is chiefly by validation, i.e. where there is an established (accepted, not in question) justification procedure which yields a decision among alternatives, usually, and where vindication plays a relatively minor role. If vindication is needed, it is used to choose among alternative claims where major theoretical issues are not in question.

With this general presentation of background theories and presuppositions on the nature of philosophy, language and mental activity in its relationship to language, we are now ready to turn back to direct work on the central project of the study: the development of conative language. As I noted earlier, we will return to some of the issues in this

chapter toward the end of the study when, with a developed language of practical discourse on hand, we will be able to add to the explications of this part of the study. However, throughout the study concepts and approaches developed in this part will be presupposed, used, and even, in some cases, further developed.

## PART II

### MENTAL ACT AND VALUATIVE ACT

#### Introduction

In this part of the study I want to present a conceptual analysis of the nature of mental acts as an approach to an understanding of the nature of valuation, and thus value language, by examining its roots. Valuing responses play very central and basic roles<sup>6</sup> in mental activity, and thus the analysis made here is also necessarily a proposal of a way of conceiving of valuing acts.

I have already noted that I find it necessary for an adequate explication of practical discourse to distinguish the genus of valuing acts (and their correlative valuing pronouncements) from its centrally important species, valuations (value judgments). Any valuing act or its correlative linguistic expression as pronouncement I am referring to as a valuative. A valuation is a valuative taken by the user to be the most reason-grounded (i.e. justified) response the user can practically achieve at the time of use. "I like X, but I don't think it is good" is a paradigmatic form of sentence in which a valuative that is not ingredient in

*advantage?*

valuation is contrasted with one that is. A valuation, I shall argue shortly, is more than just a reason-grounded valiative, for it includes as a part of its meaning the cognitive claim that the valiative is reason-grounded. For simplicity of expression, I shall use the word 'valiative' to refer to non-judgmental valiatives only, but it should be kept in mind that value judgments include valiatives as parts. ~~As I stated early in the study,~~ <sup>Very</sup> roughly speaking, valiative acts are to valuations as perceptions are to knowledge.

Valuatives are discursive manifestations of mind for they establish a distinctive relationship between a predicate and a subject or among predicates or subjects, the concept of the particular relationship being the definition of the nature of the act. The kinds of acts that can be expressed semantically via language use were classified and described briefly in the Introduction to the study, pp. ~~7-10~~ <sup>xvi - xvii</sup>; I recommend that the reader review that classification at this point for it will be used throughout the remainder of the study.

*in the study?*

Discursive mental acts ~~directly~~ <sup>equivalent of being</sup> expressed in language as ~~mental acts~~ I have referred to as mental-act assertions, and the correlative linguistic pronouncements <sup>(semantic)</sup> as semantic assertions; ~~noting that~~ an unqualified reference to an assertion is to be taken as a reference to the linguistic entity. Conative language is the language of assertion; a use of a

conative language sentence constitutes the performing (in a performatory use) or claiming to perform (in an expressatory use) of an asserting act. I have noted that conative language does not have the semantic homogeneity of cognitive language: that it is really a family of languages, and that even the major sub-divisions--directives, conatives, enstatives, and beliefs--are themselves in every instance except the last family names. But all and only conative sentences among kinds of language have as their meaning the semantic expression of mental acts.

It is vital to an understanding of assertions, and especially valuative assertions, that the logical and existential interrelationship of mental act and correlative semantic meaning be clearly understood. Thus, I request the reader's indulgence of the following brief recapitulation of this relationship. I have argued that any language use has two closely interrelated basic functions: (1) to present the semantic (i.e. conventional) meaning of the sentence to those who are intended to comprehend the use (the presenting of the meaning to X is the comprehending by X of the communication), and (2) to <sup>express</sup> present the mental act which is the ground of the meaning, this <sup>expressing</sup> presentation being to the user a direct manifestation of consciousness and mind-controlled behavior and for observers a projective and/or inferred

occurrence. However, the rule-governed character of a language-use makes possible a fully meaningful use even where the correlative mental act ground is partially or wholly absent in a particular time-stretch of use, i.e. one can, at least for brief periods, talk meaningfully without thinking of what one is saying, let alone heeding (being self-conscious of) what one is saying, and, analogously, one can respond to language read or heard as meaningful for periods of time without being aware of what is read or heard as a presentation of mental activity of the issuer. Nevertheless, meaning in language is only explicable by reference to the mental act that must characteristically be manifested in the use of it. One cannot for long talk or write and not be thinking what one is saying without this behavior losing its character of being mental activity; and, while one can for much longer periods read or listen to language without being aware that the language is an expression of mental activity, that abstractive level of following the sense of a written or spoken passage cannot be generalized and taken as constitutive of an explanation of meaning in use. A language use must be conceived as a medium of communication between or among minds for its functions to be explicable.

Thus, the mind-presentational and the (semantic) meaning-presentational functions of language are mutually dependent



aspects of a meaningful use of language: in a successful use the language-using act must function over a period of time as a presentational medium of mental activity of the user and of those who comprehend the use, and this presentational activity functions as the instantiation of the meaning-as-abstraction, which itself provides the basis of the instance of use being experienced by users and receivers as a presentation of meaning, i.e. as a meaningful use.

#### A. ASSERTION AND INTENTIONALITY

##### 1. Three Uses of 'Assertion'

An assertion has been taken in the study to be a kind of mental act that can be expressed semantically in language; as a part of language an assertion is a kind of sentential meaning, namely that expressed by a sentence whose use constitutes semantically a performing or claiming to perform of a mental act. Assertions in this use are contrasted with statements, which are sentential meanings which describe something as being the case or not being the case but do not semantically represent or express the mental describing act, or any other mental act. To use a belief sentence is to express semantically--i.e. through a linguistic medium--the mental act of asserting what the correlative statement

describes. Within this terminological framework all sentence meaning is either statemental or assertional.

But this concept of assertion as discursive mental act and semantic expression of such an act is only one of three different uses philosophers have made of the word, and not the most common of the three. I want now to talk about the other two uses, both to forestall the kind of confusion that would arise from the reader reading into the use I am making one of the alternative meanings or some inapplicable aspect of one of these, and to clarify some issues involved in understanding what semantic assertion is. ~~I believe this clarification will make clear why I have adopted the specific use I have.~~ <sup>I want to show that</sup> The particular adoption I have made is, ~~I am convinced,~~ <sup>radically more</sup> ~~a much more solidly grounded than being merely the indulgence~~ <sup>than a whimsical</sup> of a preference for one kind of labeling over another; if the use I am proposing is correct, then the other two involve conceptual confusions.

Many philosophers, including very notably Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, have used 'assertion' to designate the operation of using a sentence to express its meaning as contrasted with employing it in such a way as to mention its meaning, <sup>which is the other to be to</sup> ~~i.e.~~ talk about it or consider its nature and characteristics in abstraction from the act of semantically expressive use. In Russell and Whitehead's

See Introduction for purpose

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rather than 'instructions'

(assertion as meaning of a cognitive language sentence) throughout the section of 131

Empirical Analysis

notation the sign "†" indicates a sentence that is to be taken as "asserted" in this sense. I shall hereinafter use the subscript "2" to distinguish this concept of assertion and in this section the subscript "1" for the use I am adopting, In this study I have referred to the assertion<sub>2</sub> function simply as a language use; speaking in this way permits us to make the "use-mention" distinction, I think, clearly and without introducing special terminology: a "mentioning" use is using language to talk about a language use; the language use that is being mentioned, talked about, has the character of being the object referred to by another use. Note that all asserting acts are the same, and the assertion operation (using the sentence) adds nothing to the meaning of the sentence. To assert a sentence is simply to take the meaning of the sentence as applicable in the situation in which the sentence is used. Thus to assert a statement is to use the statement to describe and thus to make a truth claim and belief claim. Though Russell and Whitehead, and most others who have employed this usage, have concerned themselves only with cognitive assertions, the usage seems generalizable to designate the using of any kind of sentence. Thus, one could describe issuing a command as asserting a command pronouncement by using a command sentence, and describe in a similar way the using of any mode of conative

postscript "11"

of "used"

from

which I will refer to as conative<sub>3</sub>

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or to indicate a relationship of meaning

language sentence.

Let us take a closer look at the notion of asserting a statement by using a cognitive sentence. What is the relationship between asserting a statement and believing the statement? Of course one can assert and not believe, but so can one say "I believe..." and not believe.

Is there any difference in meaning between asserting of the statement X and making a belief claim, i.e. a belief judgment? The nature of a judgment and kinds of judgment will be discussed shortly, in Section 3, but we need only a prima facie awareness of what we mean by a belief claim to realize that the justification of such a claim consists, not in showing that the person making the claim holds the belief, but rather in showing that the belief is justified. And this is to say that justifying the assertion (the use in this study) "I believe X" with the assertion "I believe I believe X", which requires for justification only that there be adequate evidence that my belief exists. And we must distinguish between "subjective" justification of belief and "objective" justification. One can show that he was justified in believing X on the grounds practically available to him for judgment even though X is false; in fact we can see that there will be circumstances in which it would be irrational to believe what is true. But we are not now talking about justification of

is quite a different matter from justifying the judgment

Something else out here (32)

specified?

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belief under the limiting conditions of available evidence (i.e. "subjective" justification), but rather of the ideal of belief justification, thus the foundation of the idea: within this "objective" framework we can see that there is no difference in procedure in justifying belief in X and establishing X as true.

But, one might object, there is a problem of difference of intentionality here between establishing the truth of ~~P~~ and justifying belief in ~~P~~, even though the justifying conditions are materially equivalent. I agree. In asserting ~~P~~ <sup>or</sup> ~~P~~ (using the sentence 'p') one is asserting <sup>that</sup> "'p' is true'. And in this Tarskian equivalence there is an equivalence of meaning, of intension, and thus of intention between using 'p' and using "'p' is true'. But here one is not <sup>focus on</sup> talking about belief, even justified belief: one is <sup>focus on</sup> talking about what is believed. Thus, <sup>the utterance</sup> using 'p' or "'p' is true' focuses attention on the statement "p" as a truth claim and not on the believing act, though asserting "p" is a belief assertion. The difference between the pronouncements "p" and "I (we<sup>1</sup>) believe<sup>P</sup> is not in the semantic content but in the focus of

<sup>1</sup> Such pronouncements are usually made as participatory judgments, e.g. in truth claims we commonly seek to make assertions as the voice of rational beings, or the voice of the scientific community, etc.

Asserting 'P' is asserting ~~the~~ P. The function of asserting must be taken on the meaning a use of a sentence (proposition) to be intelligible.

following remarks will, I believe, make clear the significance of this difference of use.

On Lewis' analysis we can say that a proposition functions like a predicate clause, i.e. as a sentential concept functions as a non-sentential part of a more inclusive sentence. In the terminology of formal logic, a proposition functions as a bound sentential variable (this may be a sentence variable or any sentence-form in which the inner logical structure of the sentence is articulated in logical notation). The proposition can be treated as sentential, i.e., as the meaning of a complete sentence form, only within the range of its bracketing; as a whole it is not sentential but functions as a predicate within the larger sentence framework of which it is a part. An assertion (the meaning of a conative language sentence) always involves a proposition as a part, i.e., it always involves a cognitive content as a description of a state of affairs or relationship of meanings.

However, <sup>an assertion</sup> an assertion does not <sup>evaluate</sup> contain a statement (i.e., the meaning of a cognitive sentence) as a part; a proposition does not have this logical or conceptual independence. We

shall find that this limitedness of the proposition is very essential to the character of its role in assertions; we shall be aware of this especially in considering the logic

This limitation, I shall seek to indicate shortly, is essential for the explanation of the logic of assertions.

Ornith for Pope

37

of assertions <sup>SM</sup>

Our immediate concern is explicating the relationship between (i) asserting<sup>d</sup> the meaning of a cognitive sentence (asserting<sup>d</sup> a statement) and (ii) asserting<sup>SM</sup> the correlative belief (using the belief sentence). As I noted very early in the study, it seems to me the relationship is this: (i) is an abstraction from (ii). A proposition considered in abstraction from its context as a predicate in an assertion<sup>SM</sup>

Begin →

(i.e. as the meaning of a bound sentential formula in an assertion<sup>SM</sup> sentence form) is the meaning of a <sup>cognitive</sup> sentence and

such a meaning is what I am calling a statement<sup>SM</sup>. That is,

A

a statement<sup>SM</sup> is a proposition with its bracketing ignored, not attended to. But the bracketing is still there; the appearance of independence of the statement is a trick of the abstractive imagination. A statement, though the meaning of a <sup>selected cognitive unit</sup> complete sentence form, is not semantically (that is not <sup>there</sup> logically) independent. It is radically ambiguous apart from some established relationship to some assertion<sup>SM</sup>: Is it being believed? <sup>valued?</sup> denied? contemplated? postulated? questioned? The idea of a statement is just not a concept that can stand alone conceptually--it can only be thought as an abstraction from an assertion<sup>SM</sup> and remains syncategorematic, i.e. logically requiring a context as a propositional element in an assertion<sup>SM</sup> to be pinned down precisely as to its

~~to the world~~  
~~whichever~~  
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significance in any instance of use. Thus, there is no such thing as simply asserting a statement, which is not asserting a belief.

*assertion a statement in the notion of making a belief assertion.*  
*- but a people moment -*

*W.V. Quine!*  
*I am advised!*  
*Yes! No!*

We shall pause for only a moment of Byronic reflection on the irony of this conclusion about the so-lately tyrannical cognitive model, whose ~~adulators~~ insisted that every sentence

must show its cognitive meaning credentials, however disguised, or be relegated to the limbo of a "merely emotively significant pseudo-sentence". There it is: cognitive awareness itself carries the truth that there is no cognitive claim except as an abstraction from a non-cognitive, *(i.e. conative language)* ~~assertion~~ claim. Cognitive language exists as a conceptually distinct entity only as a kind of Hobbesian epiphenomenon from conative language-use functions. However, the role of cognitive language sentence meanings as the propositional elements in conative language sentence meanings *(i.e. in assertion)* is anything but epiphenomenal, of course.

While ~~assertion~~ is basically an abstraction from ~~assertion~~, it does involve a distinctive semantic element--even though this is not a distinctiveness of concepts; rather it is a distinctiveness of focus of attention. To assert<sub>2</sub> p is to claim to believe p, but to focus attention on p as believed, i.e., as thought to be true, and not to focus attention on the act of believing. In contrast, the explicitly formulated

*Put aside?*

*Put this away as a way of saying "assertion"!*



belief assertion focuses attention on both the expressing of belief and on that which is believed. We shall have to develop a theory of mental intentionality which will be adequate for formulating this way of talking, and that I plan to do shortly, beginning in Section 4.

Note that I have not suggested that the concept of ~~stating is definable in terms of some assertional concept of~~ stating is definable in terms of some assertional concept, or group of concepts, in such a way that we would conclude that stating is not an irreducible concept in human experience. [To the contrary, as I noted in Part I,] <sup>I</sup>if the idea of stating, of describing something as being the case or not being the case, is not itself categorial, it must be a generalization involving similar categorial concepts. The coherence of the meaning of any assertion requires the irreducibility of the idea of a cognition or cognitive claim. The later analysis will, for example, show that we cannot make sense of the idea of valuing without granting the conceptual distinctness of the idea of cognition; and the idea of belief, it would seem, clearly makes no sense apart from the idea of a cognition believed. Those philosophers who have suggested that the idea of cognition, belief and valuation are not conceptually distinct, or that some one of these could be defined in terms of the others, have, I think, talked nonsense--one is tempted

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more convenient use for <sup>our</sup> philosophical purposes than the "corrected" use would be. We need a name for the meaning of a cognitive sentence considered in abstraction from assertions, as an independently conceived (though not conceptually independent) entity. We have no special need for another name for the cognitive meaning that is a part of what is asserted in an instance of use of a belief assertion; we already have the word 'proposition'. I suggested in Part I that the phrase 'cognitive assertion' even though taking it literally it might <sup>also be allowed for name for belief assertions</sup> be seen as a phrase involving a category mistake, since <sup>each</sup> ~~each~~ word has its basic ~~one~~ <sup>one</sup> in a different language. Some astute hard-line ordinary language philosopher may turn up a good reason why we shouldn't temporize with the canon of correctness in the uses of 'statement' and 'cognitive assertion' in the minor ways I am condoning, <sup>of that</sup> but in the absence of such reasons, I propose we indulge these (I presume) venial sins.

<sup>I now want to describe the two other but closely related</sup>  
~~The third use of 'assertion' I alluded to above has been~~  
~~popular among an outstanding list of recent philosophers, and~~  
~~was born out of a recognition that is very fundamental to the~~  
 present study, namely, that language is made up of a variety of modes besides the cognitive. Some of the philosophers whose writings have been basic shaping influences on this study have adopted this use--often not the word, but nevertheless the functional concept distinctive of this third



*[Handwritten signatures and scribbles over the bottom portion of the text]*

*"assertion" or "asserting one" use "face of one" of a  
proposition under neutral proposition*

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differentiated concept of assertion ~~thus creating a different~~

~~concept, assertions~~ -- that I want to analyze and appraise. *I shall*

*refer to it as assertion M: assertion as a mode of use.*  
Note that the concern here is not fundamentally to

analyze a particular use of a word, or argue for and against such a use, but to understand and appraise a functional structure proposed as explicative of ordinary language use. The "non-verbal" character of the problem here can be illustrated by some observations on our conclusions about the Russell-Whitehead use of assertion, i.e. assertion<sub>W</sub>. I noted that assertion<sub>W</sub> was a particular and abstract aspect of assertion as semantic expression of mental act (i.e. assertion<sub>SM</sub>), namely it was a particular kind of abstraction from belief assertions<sub>SM</sub>. I could have, without great difficulty, decided to accept the limited Russell-Whitehead use of the word 'assertion' explicated in this way and sought another word as a generic name of the meaning of sentences which express mental acts. I think the general use of the verb "to assert" in discourse justifies the assignment of word function I have adopted more than it does the Russell-Whitehead assignment (e.g. we "assert" questions, beliefs, laws, value judgments, etc). But this philological claim is only peripherally a philosophical concern since it can be relatively divorced in this case (but very often cannot be) from the basic philosophical concern to delineate a structure of

functions. Thus, to come back to our analysis of assertion,  
 I am not here much concerned with how philosophers have used  
 the word 'assertion' (some avoid it altogether) but with how  
 they have analyzed the function of using a sentence to convey  
a particular significance.

What distinguishes the third approach is the claim that  
 the conventional significance of the use of a sentence de-  
 rives from two factors in the language-using act: (1) com-  
 municating a mode-neutral descriptive component (the presenta-  
 tion--Brentano; the ascriptor--Sheffer; the proposition--Lewis;  
 the phrastic--Hare; the meaning of the locution--Austin),  
 combined with (2) communicating a mode of assertion (the  
 affirmation, denial, love or hate--Brentano; the ascriptive--  
 Sheffer; the way of using the proposition--Lewis; the neustic--  
 Hare; the illocutionary force--Austin). The general approach  
 is subject to two different interpretations, and proponents  
 have sometimes been vague as to which they intended to defend.  
 On one interpretation, the mode of assertion is taken to be  
 part of the semantic meaning of the sentence--Sheffer and  
 Hare seem to make this kind of analysis--and on the other, the  
 mode of assertion, while considered conventionally determined,  
 is taken to be a factor external to the meaning of the sentence,  
 the conventional significance of the use thus becoming some-  
 thing more inclusive than its meaning. Lewis (but not very

clearly) suggests such an interpretation, but it has been very explicitly set forth by Austin--and I think it would be accurate to say that this limitation of the significance of the meaning to the Fregean "sense and reference" component of the significance of the use also reflects Wittgenstein's ~~use~~. *way of talking*

I want to take this latter interpretation <sup>(B2)</sup> ~~of the third~~ approach first, because I think it is the least defensible, and also because in analyzing the problems here we will also have noted problems (though not so many) with <sup>the</sup> first interpretation. <sup>(P1)</sup>

Here <sup>or earlier</sup> ~~again~~, much the smaller part of my concern is what one might take to be the oddness of talking about the meaning of the use as only one aspect of the conventional significance of the use. I suspect that only long habituation to some particular philosophical employment, such as the Fregean concept of meaning strictly being sense and reference, would lead one to hang on to a use that so conspicuously flaunts the conventions of ordinary discourse. But philosophically <sup>relatively</sup> this is a <sup>in the present case (it just comes up always)</sup> minor point, and, as I have argued, if such mild tamperings with the canon of correctness serve significantly the canon of simplicity and convenience in presenting a functional structure in discourse, the abrogation would seem justified.

But there are very important reasons for concluding that the significance of a use cannot be split up in this way. The most basic and conspicuous reason <sup>the subject</sup> is that mode-of-assertion determines the logical relationships among a set of sentences. <sup>If this is established by the case,</sup> This being the case (and I shall present some basic evidence shortly) and a systematic development of the logic of obligation assertion in Part III-E), then mode-of-assertion must be considered to be determinative of the meaning of the <sup>basic</sup> basic form of the sentence used.

Characteristically, where philosophers have divided the descriptive "content" of the meaning of a sentence from the mode-of-assertion they have argued for the relative semantic autonomy of the descriptive component by seeking to show that formal relationships among sentences of a mode derive solely from the descriptive component, the mode operator having as its sole formal significance to establish the range of sentences taken to belong to <sup>a</sup> the particular logical set, i.e. to establish <sup>a</sup> the logical universe of discourse. Professor Sheffer's and Professor Hare's approaches to formal analysis both reflect this presupposition. That it is very wrong-headed is, I think, established by the many analyses which show that mode-of-assertion makes a great difference, not in the nature (i.e. meaning) of a logical relationship ~~per se~~ <sup>per se</sup>, but in the structure (calculus) of formal relation-

ships exhibited in and among the meanings of sentences of a mode. It is tautological to note that changing the nature of the meaning of a sentence-form changes its formal characteristics. Considering that it is the very nature of logic to exhibit meaning relationships, it would be <sup>logically</sup> odd indeed if a change in the meaning of a form of sentence was not a change of formal characteristics. The non-isomorphism of logics is particularly radical between the logic of statement and the logic of assertion, but there are <sup>more than</sup> minor differences in formal characteristics among modes of assertion. <sup>We must, of course,</sup> Some explication ~~of these differences will be undertaken in Part III-E, but a~~ <sup>forego all the pleasure of extreme explication of these ~~logical~~ <sup>formal</sup> features</sup> ~~of these differences will be undertaken in Part III-E, but a~~ few comments about the roots of the radical differences between statemental and assertional logic are, I believe, in order, here.

The lack of isomorphism stems, of course, from the semantic difference between a statement and an assertion. Cognitive logic answers the question: if A is stated, what other propositions are also stated because they are equivalent to or implied by A? Conative logic, in contrast, answers the question: if B is asserted, what other forms of assertion are also made because they are equivalent to or implied by B? This is semantically quite a different thing, i.e. to determine from a given set of assertions what else implicitly is asserted than to determine from a given

set of statements what else is implicitly stated. For example, as has often been noted, the Rule of Addition, " $p \supset (p \vee q)$ ", a tautology in cognitive truth-functional logic, is in no sense a tautology in justification-functional logic of assertions<sup>4</sup>; i.e., if 'p' is asserted (whether or not justifiably) one is not justified in taking 'p  $\vee$  q' as an implied assertion. As Everett Hall notes, a judge's command, "Fine the man five dollars" does not imply the assertion "Fine him five dollars or hang him." But the formal difference between the two logics is not simply one reflecting the absence of an isomorphic analogue of truth-functional logic in conative language. Even where we are concerned only with logic of strict implication, the lack of parallel in logical structure is fundamental. For example, " $p \vee \neg p$ " is not a tautology in assertional logic, for there are actually five possibilities of monadic assertion in regard to a subject p: (1) affirmation, (2) neutrality in regard to the doing of p, (3) neutrality in regard to the not doing of p, (4) asserting of the negation of p, and (5) no assertion on the subject at all. Each of the following pronouncements by a court of law

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<sup>4</sup>The assertional logic analogue of truth-functional logic is justification-functional logic. For example "material implication" is defined: " $p \supset q$ " asserts that it cannot be the case that "p" is justifiably asserted and "q" not justifiably asserted.



has a meaning and implications quite distinct from the others:

- (1) Segregation is required.
- (2) Segregation is permitted.
- (3) Non-segregation is permitted.
- (4) Segregation is prohibited.
- (5) We have made no ruling in regard to segregation.

There are also great formal differences within a mode of assertion between a conditional in which the antecedent is cognitive and one in which both antecedent and consequent are non-cognitive assertions. Consider the following examples of these two basic types of conditionals:

- (1) If you are a U. S. citizen, you ought to pay U. S. taxes.
- (2) If you ought to be a U. S. citizen, then you ought to pay U. S. taxes.

These illustrations should be ample to establish the extensive differences between the logic of statements and the logic of assertions, though we are talking about logics in the same basic and strict sense of the word. This in itself would seem to provide conclusive evidence that we must treat assertion as itself a basic sentential concept *greater than or a mode operator.*

We must keep in mind here that conative language, as a language of semantically expressing (i.e. performing or claiming to perform) actions--i.e. the language of assertion--

is distinct from the language of describing these assertions. <sup>41</sup>  
 Of course a sentence <sup>whose meaning is</sup> which is a description of an assertion  
 may be physically the same as a sentence <sup>whose meaning is</sup> expressing the per-  
 formance. The context, including other sentences taken to  
 be inferred from the given sentence, will be important in  
 establishing the specific function of a particular use of  
 such a sentence. For many uses it will not make any differ-  
 ence whether the sentence is taken to be cognitive or cona-  
 tive or both, but a full explication of functions of language,  
 including an explication of logical relationships in language,  
 requires that we recognize both kinds of uses--and recognize  
 that conative language is as semantically and syntactically  
 developed as cognitive language; in fact we shall find that  
<sup>assertion is more fully developed, so that it will be seen to have</sup>  
its semantic-syntactic structure is considerably more complex in  
 than that of cognitive language.

We shall find in formally developing the basic logic of  
 assertion that the cognitive element in an assertion (the  
 proposition--Lewis) can be accommodated as a predicate in  
 assertional sentence forms. Cognitive formulae within cona-  
 tive language sentence forms function as bound sentential  
 variables. Thus, cognitive logical relatedness is confined  
 to the range of bracketing of each cognitive formula; it does  
 not apply to the sentence as a whole.

While this character of a mode of assertion as

logical form of the meaning of a 151

determining the basic meaning of the sentence in any sentential use is in itself sufficient to reduce to nonsense

*make very questionable*  
*supposedly any analysis of the conventional*

the notion of the significance of a use as composed of the meaning of the locution plus a modal force ("illocutionary force" in Austin's terminology), there are yet other reasons

to reject it. Even if it had proved possible to explicate a mode-neutral logic confined to the propositional element in an assertion, this breaking up of the conventional significance into a descriptive element (act) plus a "force of use" or "way of use" element (act) would appear a rather artificial and clumsy way of explicating the significance of sentence uses. For example, how are we to distinguish a

*very nature greater mystery*  
*The approach to the*  
stating use from a belief-expressing use? To go to the basic problem, the approach leaves us with a mystery as to just

what an illocutionary force is, and how such forces are to be distinguished, *and how they are related to meaning*. The locution, Austin tells us, conventionally communicates Fregean meaning, i.e. a Lewisian propositional concept. What is it to communicate an illocutionary force?

This, it would appear, must be another concept that is communicated by the form of the sentence, plus, perhaps, in some sense the form of the context of use, for it is a conventional communication. Austin says it is always performatory. Taking into account that refinement made earlier in this study (page-

5) of Austin's concept of the performatory in which expressatory

*Amal this page &*

uses are distinguished from performatory uses, we can see that even an expressatory use does not require any psychological manifestation of the "force" of use in the instance of use. As J. N. Findlay notes, and clearly Austin agrees:

It is of all distinctively human properties the most amazing and most rich in consequence that we can plan meals without being hungry, can buy pictures without being aesthetically stirred, can marry suitably without being ruttish or on heat, and can consult our own good and that of our neighbors while stirred by neither fear nor love.<sup>5</sup>

To deny this would put us back into the blatant crudities of the old ~~emotive-cognitive~~<sup>amalgam</sup> interpretation of significance in language use. Very patently Austin is not concerned to deny but to elaborate on the "amazing" quality of language Findlay refers to. This being so, his illocutionary force must, it would seem, be part of the concept communicated in using a sentence--i.e. it is an ideational content communicated not ~~as a psychological~~<sup>as a</sup> psychological significance. This being so, it is misleading to speak of the "meaning" communicated plus the "force". This "force" is not different in semantic nature from what is called the meaning. What is needed is a way of showing how the two are communicated as a semantic unit-- and also how the various ideas of force can be made precise in significance, and the idea of "force of a use" can itself

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<sup>5</sup>Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 182.

be made less mysterious by explicating how various kinds of mental acts can themselves become parts of the meanings of sentences, as in the explication of the mental act-semantic assertion relationship I have developed in this study.

This quite poorly thought-out part of Austin's generally very astute analysis in his book, How To Do Things With Words, derives, I suspect, from an overly extensionalistic approach to the nature of meaning in language and the related tendency to leave unclarified the nature of the necessary involvement of mental activity in meaningful uses of language.<sup>6</sup> I shall ~~seek to show shortly that Austin needs for an adequate ex-~~ plication of the concept of illocutionary force, ~~not only~~ the concept of language-use as the medium of mind-presenting-meaning and meaning-presenting-mind which I have been ~~de-~~ <sup>presented briefly earlier in the paper. And</sup> ~~veloping in this study,~~ but as a part of this, he needs something like Brentano's concept of the fundamental role of consciousness in mental acts in providing content to mental intentionality.

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<sup>6</sup>In the Fall of 1963 I attended a seminar at Oxford devoted entirely to this one work. Participants in the seminar included J. O. Urmson (presiding), P. F. Strawson, R. M. Hare, and Jonathan Cohen, among others. The single topic receiving the greatest amount of attention was Austin's "illocutionary force vs. meaning" distinction. All active participants found difficulty with the distinction, and only Urmson felt it was possibly defensible.

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at at

The Lewis-Austin account of the significance of a sentence use amounts to splitting its semantic significance (i.e. the language-rule determined ideational significance) into two parts and conjoining one of these (the mode-of-assertion significance) with an intrinsically non-ideational aspect of the use, namely with the process of using the sentence, i.e. the Russell-Whitehead assertion<sup>U</sup>. Involved here is a semantically unholy divorce and marriage. Functionally, using a sentence is the act which conveys the conventional significance of the sentence. It is a quite pointless and obfuscating tactic to conceive the use act as itself impregnated with differentiating semantic significance. What is gained? Note how ~~much~~ is lost in clarity of conceiving the significance of a use. Of course, when we add the problem of accounting for the differences of logical relatedness among modes of language (and particularly between statements and assertions), the whole bifurcating approach--whether it makes the mode of assertion a content in the act of using a locution or an "operator"-like subsentential part of the meaning--just becomes monstrously inappropriate to the functional character of the situation of language use.

## 2. Assertion and Attitude

Some philosophers, for example Bertrand Russell, have

referred to assertion in the sense I am using the term as the expression of "propositional attitudes." Particularly in mind in this description (exclusively in mind in some cases) have been what I have called valuative, commendive, and belief assertions. When all semantic significance was practically without exception taken to be cognitive, such assertions were recognized to have distinctive formal characteristics. These caused special concern in attempts to make all logic cognitive and truth functional, for one could not in a straightforward way take them as substitution instances in truth-value formulae without getting into trouble. I shall seek to show later that the problems of logical function involved are resolvable when we recognize the distinction between cognitive and conative language. What I want to note here is that the relationship between assertion and attitude is not a simple one-to-one correlation. (I am not suggesting that philosophers who have spoken of "propositional attitudes" have thought it was. While some assertions are describable as expressions of attitudes, we could not say that all are without extending the notion of an attitude well beyond the bounds of its natural use, for it is linguistically odd, I think, to speak of the issuing of orders or of requests or of the performing of enstatements as attitude expressing. On the other hand, we probably cannot interpret all manifestations

Do they?

attitudes," or as expressing attitudes conventionally, but this seems a rather strained employment of the notion and I shall not indulge in it.

What is most naturally referred to in ordinary discourse as attitudes are dispositions for expressatory valuatives plus the manifestations of these dispositions. Commendations can also commonly (but not always) be described as attitude-expressing, for what is commended is characteristically also valued by the issuing agent, though this is not logically required; what is logically required for a correct use of a commendation sentence is that the issuing agent believe the act commended to be an act justified for the agent addressed to do.

Some support could be gained from ordinary use, and also from philosophical practice, for interpreting attitude expression as the making of a judgment. I shall argue that (1) valuations, (2) commendations, and (3) belief assertions are the modes of judgment in discourse. Statements in isolation from belief are not judgmental and all modes of conative language other than valuations and commendations are non-judgmental. Since these three forms of assertion correspond roughly to what philosophers such as Russell have called "propositional attitudes," we can see that, at least implicitly, they have tended to identify "propositional

*is this  
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(30)



attitudes" with judgmental assertions.

### 3. Assertion and Judgment

To make a judgment, I want to contend, is to make a claim conjoined with the further claim that the first is rationally justified. That is to say, it is to make an assertion of the type that is directly claim-making plus making the further claim-type assertion that the first assertion is justified. This making of a claim of rational justification is itself a part of the meaning of a judgment. All sentence uses pre-suppose by contextual implication that the user has adequate justification for his use, but in a judgment that justification is not simply contextually presupposed: it is part of the meaning.

This gives us three distinguishing marks of a judgment: (1) that it is an assertion, (2) it is directly claim-making, and (3) involves the further claim that the explicitly made one is rationally justified. Direct claims are of two basic types: (a) that something is the case, or (b) that something ought to be the case (or would be good to be): the noetic (cognitive) claim and the normative (valuational) claim.

Beliefs, valuations, and commendations (the latter being <sup>involves</sup> valuations for others) <sup>or</sup> <sup>specific</sup> <sup>being directly asserted</sup> are the three forms of judgment <sup>are</sup> claim making in a direct way that is not the case with other

modes of assertion, such as issuing orders or making enstate-  
ments. Orders and enstatements do not directly claim anything,  
though they are justifiably used only in situations sanctioned  
by presupposed claims.

The double-claim nature of a judgment makes it <sup>logically</sup> the case  
that judgments are never simple assertions; they are always  
dual assertions; ~~is~~ sentences expressing judgments are of  
logical necessity polyfunctional.

One terminological conclusion arrived at in Section 1  
above was that there were good reasons to call the meaning of  
a cognitive sentence a statement only when this was considered  
in abstraction from an assertion, otherwise--i.e. as a part of  
an assertion--it would be called a proposition. However, con-  
sidering the close relationship between a proposition in a  
belief assertion made and the notion of a statement used, we  
can see why it is quite natural to speak of believing state-  
ments. There is no need to attempt the futile philosophical  
task of declaring a ban on this mode of speech. We only need  
to keep in mind that strictly speaking--for the reasons dis-  
cussed in Section 1--we will not say that a belief judgment  
involves a statement in addition to a belief. Thus we will  
analyze a belief judgment as composed of two assertions: (1)  
a primary contentual belief assertion (assertion of p) plus  
(2) a secondary justificatory belief, namely the assertion

that the primary belief assertion is justified (assertion of "p is justifiably believed to be true").

There is an issue conspicuous in this description of a belief judgment that threatens to play havoc with the analysis unless it can be shown to be a threat only in appearance. Obviously I believe this can be shown. If believing p involves believing that believing p is justified, then aren't we off on an infinite regress? Thus, hadn't we better take the tack of saying that there really isn't but one believing here, that one cannot make sense of believing X without believing that one is justified in taking X to be true; in fact isn't that what believing is?

Let's take first the question of reducing our analysis of belief judgment to one believing, for if this can be accomplished we will not need to consider the infinite regress threat. There is this problem with the lure of simplicity of the reductive analysis: there are considerable grounds for concluding that we can believe without believing that we are justified in believing. Consider the case of sheer culturally conditioned belief--the extreme limit in Plato's dichotomy between opinion and knowledge. Consider the act of faith in which rational ground for the belief is explicitly denied. Consider the meaningfulness, and very real possibility of achievement (though not at the time accomplished), in Pascal's

famous prayer, "I believe Lord! Oh heal thou my unbelief." Thus, let us grant that there is a difference between simple belief assertion and belief judgment. But granting this, we must face the dragon of that threatened infinite regress.

I believe we can find this to be a Chinese dragon--that is, a sign of the prospering of the analysis. The challenge is this: if judgmental belief involves both believing X and believing that believing X is justified, then won't the condition of rational grounding which is essential to the ideas of judgment require that the second believing itself be grounded in a third believing, and thus in a fourth, and so on? I am sure that there are persons whose beliefs logically, even if never psychologically involve a three-fold hierarchical grounding, i.e. the belief that believing that believing X is justified is justified. Logically, one can construct, and existentially we can uncover, even more complex structures of belief. However, at some point, both logically and existentially (the latter much sooner of course) the belief incorporates all belief commitments, so that any commitment that is a logical ground of the incorporating belief is no longer a belief but a valuation. We can put this in a simpler way: Believing that believing X is justified can only occur in conditions in which believing X is prompted by grounds (reasons) of belief which are believed to be adequate. At

Ethical (life-value) valuations grade into aesthetic valuations. Commands grade into prescriptions, and these into commendations, and these into requests. Where such functional continua are involved I shall speak of models, or archtypes, of functions, recognizing that the instance of use may have a functional significance lying between two models. Such an empirical platonism will allow us to give due respect to the functional richness of language--to the infinite gradations of functional significance in instances of use. Instances of use will often involve textures of functions, some dominant, some recessive, some semantic, some perlocutionary. This polyfunctional approach, combined with a recognition of the various modes of practical (conative) language in addition to theoretical (cognitive) language, gives us a vastly more adequate concept of meaning in language and in language use than the old exclusively cognitive-emotive meaning approaches which dominated philosophical analysis before the appearance of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1945) and which characteristically sought to assign one definite cognitive or one cognitive-emotive-amalgam function to each sentence use.

#### 10. Norms of Language Explication

We have noted that while an explicated language might

be conceptually richer than a natural language, it nevertheless is undeniably the case that the philosopher's job is primarily that of explicating his natural language. This is not only because one's natural language provides necessary points of orientation in naming, relating, and expressing all that he can be discursively aware of, and not only that approach to the conceivable through a natural language provides the only practical matrix for communication, but more basically that awareness in the developed mind is mediated through functions of language in such a fundamental way, as we have seen, that it is highly problematic that one could get at something he could be aware of as a basic feature of structure or content of his experience except through explicating the structure and content of his natural language. We have noted that this point could be--and has been--pushed so far as to make it impossible to explain how a people or an individual could develop or acquire a language, and it could be--and has been--pushed to the point of concluding that the range of the conceivable is the range of ordinary non-philosophical concerns in a culture; but these excesses in application need not blind us to the soundness of the principle that the only feasible way to reach the destination of explicating what the mind can conceive in a discursive way is to journey by ordinary language analysis; if

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mental pronouncement functions and ordinary language functions are not coterminous, then the only way one could knowingly bring reports from that beyond is to explore first to the boundaries of meaning in ordinary language. Thus, at least the bulk of the philosopher's work of conceptual analysis is analysis of ordinary language. It follows from this that the fundamental criterion of adequacy for a proposed explication of the conceivable is correctness: how well does the proposal account for the actual logic of use of expressions in ordinary discourse? A proposal must explicate meanings the way they are, i.e. the way they are given through one's natural language.

However, we have seen that it would be incorrect to consider that justifying a proposed explication of functions or meaning in a natural language is altogether a matter of comparing the precise delineation of meaning constituting that proposal with the equally precise meanings reflected in the ordinary logic of use of expressions in a natural language. Such a "mirror image" concept of the process of ascertaining meaning in language, and even more the range of discursive conceivability of the human mind, does not fit the situation the philosopher encounters in seeking to make an explication. The logic of use of expressions in a natural language is in places ambiguous, vague, incomplete,

and even on occasion inconsistent. Any proposed explication which renders meanings precise cannot avoid being in some measure a recommending of a way meanings ought to be conceived. It will be a selection of ways to make the indeterminate specific and of factors to emphasize and factors to make secondary.

R. M. Hare has aptly described the philosopher's task of analyzing meaning in a natural language as like the task of someone who knows how to do a certain folk dance setting out to write an explanation of it. If he knows how to dance the "eightsome reel" then he knows it has a determinate structure, though it may take some effort for him to be able to analyze just what this is. Furthermore, and this is the philosophically more significant point, there is no specific interpretation of the dance which is not also a fixing of it in a more specific style than it could be said to have as a naturally acquired part of a folk culture. The specific set of motions which will count as an instance of doing the dance can vary within the limits of a general pattern; there can be different styles of doing the dance, each equally correct in the light of the tradition of use defining what it means to do that specific dance.

A proposed explication of a natural language, however accurate it is judged to be, will be in addition a way of

*R. M. Hare*



giving the language and experience a specific form and content which they could not be said to have clearly exhibited before the analysis became a basis for interpreting them. Analysis of what is there and what is the creation of a specific form in which to conceive what is there will be so interrelated that a complete separation would be impossible. Any analysis will always be an impoverishment of the concrete experience of use, for it will always be a selection, but it will also be an addition to what was experienced before the analysis became a way of approaching the experience; the analysis itself helps give the experience precise form and content. Thus, "explication" is necessarily a creative specification: a proposal whose adequacy cannot be judged purely in terms of correctness, but also must be judged in terms of its efficacy for achieving the purposes for which languages are used.

If this account of the problem of explicating natural languages is correct, then clearly no such meaning proposal can be completely neutral. It is inescapably involved in valuations, not only in presupposing that clarity, precision in meaning, and ease of use, for example, are standards of explication, but also in proposing the fittingness of conceiving language from one perspective rather than another that might have been used. Such contrasts as that between

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how pass  
needed?*

the patterning of experience by Indo-European and by Oriental languages have been especially noted, but within these language cultures the differences in the shaping of experience by language can be significant and conspicuous, as the differences among French, German, and English <sup>language cultures</sup> illustrate. Even among users of the same natural language there are selections of language perspectives, and the sense of fittingness of any one of these is not something wholly fixed by the ordinary language of the culture; rather it is a fittingness rooted in temperament and particular sub-culture background. Individuals of fundamentally different emotional orientations to experience are apt to differ in their judgments as to what type of meaning theory constitutes the optimum explication of ordinary language, because they are presupposing different orientations to experience, and thus differences in the specific nature of the experience itself. For example, an individual dominantly responsive to pragmatic, or existential, or mystical, or romantic attitudes toward experience will tend to find more adequate those analyses which put emphasis on the volitional and subjective aspects of experience, whereas an individual dominantly responsive to rationalistic, or positivistic, or pietistic, or classical attitudes will tend to see as more fitting those ways of conceiving language which put emphasis on factors of

objectivity and play down factors of subjective response or choice.

Thus, in a very elementary sense an explication of a natural language, and especially a systematic and comprehensive one, is necessarily conceptually richer than the natural language itself if one counts the conversion of endemic ambiguity into precise meaning and incomplete logical structures into complete ones as gains in richness. Furthermore, the articulation of a semantic structure in a philosophical theory of meaning almost certainly will go beyond what could be said to be already there in the unplicated natural language.

The observation that general theories of meaning in a natural language tend to modify the experience of that which is taken as the object of the analysis has been to some philosophers a reason for eschewing highly abstractive analyses in favor of piecemeal explications, i.e. a reason for turning away from concern with developing comprehensive theories of meaning to a focusing of attention on delineating the logic of use of specific terms in specific contexts without seeking to fit these explications into some comprehensive theory. Granting the risks of highly abstractive approaches, I believe it can be shown that the piecemeal approach runs its own special risks of being misleading, and that there is

reason to believe that these are in the long run more of a problem to securing an adequate explication of a natural language than are the more systematic, comprehensive analyses. What critical and open-minded student of language has not, in attempting to determine "the meaning" of an expression, frequently come up against the idolatry problem which Bacon so well described: the psychological tendency, once an hypothesis has been fixed upon which fits some evidence to give that hypothesis a privileged status in confronting all additional evidence, so that all evidence is seen as especially confirmatory to the chosen hypothesis, even though the same evidence would have an equally confirmatory effect for another hypothesis had it been hit upon to provide the initial orientation? Often each of several "explications" of a meaning will be found to fit the evidence if one impartially seeks to see how experience would be conceived in terms of each. The rational procedure for resolving such problems in language analysis, as in any area of scientific inquiry, is to accept as most adequate that explication which fits best into a comprehensive system of explications which overall function most adequately.

George Kerner, in Revolution in Ethical Theory, contrasts "abstract system building" with "logical analysis of ordinary moral language,"<sup>57</sup> and Stewart Hampshire in his

<sup>57</sup>(Oxford, 1966), p. 2.

I don't agree that this was significant philosophical analysis. The latter part

1949 article "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" <sup>agrees in the same</sup> suggests ~~the~~ <sup>way for moral philosophy which poses a specific language application problem,</sup> ~~same kind of contrast.~~ <sup>58</sup> However, in Hampshire's more recent writing he has come much more to defend by explicit statement and practice the necessity of constructing systematic and comprehensive theories in explication of practical discourse to achieve an adequate understanding of particular language use. <sup>59</sup>

Once we see that the task of analytic philosophy is the explication of a structure of functions, the "ordinary language" and the "rational reconstructionist" approaches to philosophical <sup>application</sup> ~~explanation~~ are no longer seen as incompatible alternatives, but as necessarily <sup>complementary</sup> ~~supplementary~~ approaches. A good rational reconstruction will approach the concreteness of the ordinary language analysis, and a good ordinary language analysis will approach the precision and comprehensiveness <sup>& system integration</sup> of the rational reconstruction. <sup>approach</sup> I strongly question the possibility of making reliable and adequate explications of small classes of sentences in discourse ~~just~~ by focusing on these alone. A general framework of meaning and language theory must be presupposed and specific explications

<sup>58</sup>In Mind, N.S., LVIII, No. 232 (Oct. 1949), p. 481.

<sup>59</sup>Cf. his Thought and Action (London, 1959) and his "Introduction" in his anthology, Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1966).

judged by how well they fit together to form a body of explanations which, formulated in terms of a general theory of meaning in language, are judged as a whole as to how well this comprehensive proposal accounts for the observable data of language use.

*Causality?*

When is something really conceivable and when does it just seem to be so because one is tricked by an unclarified language? This is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophical analysis. A comment of Professor Maynard Adams, given in part above, is especially appropriate here: "One often sees what one's semantic field normatively requires one to see even though it is not there. Also, one may fail to see something that is there because one's semantic field does not require the experience."<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, a perplexity about meaning is apt to be psychologically relieved by any proposal that offers a coherent resolution of ambiguity and indecision, but to treat the psychological symptom is not necessarily to achieve the most adequate solution to the philosophical problem. And a treatment that works well for some individuals (psychologically "getting the fly out of the bottle") may only leave another in a greater state of perplexity. How are we to decide when the latter is suffering

*This is what's known  
as The Secret  
of Psychological Causality!*

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<sup>60</sup>E. M. Adams, "Mental Causality," p. 562.

from a stubborn case of linguistic neurosis and when he is simply refusing a philosophical tranquilizer that would mask the irritation of the difficulty without really resolving it?

In many cases one can settle a question of conceivability by examining specific features of the logic of use of parts of language, but basic problems about conceivability are often not capable of being settled in this way--this being one reason they are basic philosophical problems. In a set of philosophical explications, commitment to a meaning criterion should certainly not have the logical status of an arbitrary fiat of the will. On the contrary, it as much, or more than any other one judgment requires for its justification the bringing together of all that one has claimed to be able to understand, including even to imagine. It calls for considering the systematic interrelationships of meanings that become one's explication of language upon accepting a particular meaning criterion and of appraising how well as a whole that criterion allows analysis of all the facts of the logic of use of language expressions and of all that seems to be fact in a substantive way. Adoption of a meaning criterion is rational insofar as one has clear basis for judging it the criterion which accounts for the logic of ordinary use in the way which gives maximum overall fulfillment of the norms of language explication, and thus maximum

ease, credibility and illuminatingness in formulating and defending substantive theories. Further, a rational choice here calls for comparing the consequences of seeking to use one proposed meaning criterion with the consequences of seeking to use other proposals. The mode of reasoning called for is admittedly an inductive process of a high order. The point here is that justification of a meaning criterion is one of the most basic kinds of ultimate justification in human experience, and as W. V. Quine and Herbert Feigl have insisted: ultimate justifications in all dimensions of judgment must be totalistic; the ideal is to bring all judgments, as Quine states, "before the tribunal of experience as a body"; the commitments that one is moved to make in that situation of totalistic confrontation would be rational as fully as any judgments could conceivably be.<sup>61</sup> This ultimate justificatory norm of enlightened choice is called by Herbert Feigl vindication;<sup>62</sup> it will receive much attention in Part III

Since a philosophical explication of a natural language is necessarily more than purely descriptive, for it is

<sup>61</sup>W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic, rev. (New York, 1959), xii.

<sup>62</sup>Herbert Feigl, "De Principii...", in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, 1950), pp. 113-147. Also

Feigl "Vindication & Validation".

but then  
imp. crit.  
of. Lewis  
crit.

(Revised  
specific)



unavoidably pervaded with proposals for which the justification cannot be found in the concept of correctness alone, what further norm, or norms, are to be appealed to? I propose the following as the norms of adequacy presupposed by the very function of a language:

1. Correctness
2. Comprehensiveness
3. Neutrality ?
4. Precision (sharp functional distinctions)
5. Usefulness

*6. Aesthetic Value*  
*34000000*  
*new / 1 to*  
*make use of*  
*only concepts of*  
*the complement*

It can easily be seen that each of these generally requires the others for its implementation. Basically we begin by seeking to ascertain correctness and appeal to the other criteria to resolve ambiguities, to fill in gaps, and to judge among competing explicating proposals where the norm of correctness is not in itself decisive.

The norm of comprehensiveness is the requirement that an adequate language be one in which every conceivable discursive (pronouncement) function can be semantically expressed. Since language is the medium of discursive thought and communication, comprehensiveness is an obvious requirement for a language that is to serve that function adequately.

The neutrality norm is really an aspect of the norm of comprehensiveness: to be comprehensive the instrument of

thought and communication should exert the minimum possible influence on the content of what is communicated. It should be as substantively neutral as possible. For example, the language of valuation should pre-judge the minimum conceivable of issues as to what kinds of things can be called valuable and what can constitute a rational ground of valuation. And cognitive language should pre-judge the minimum conceivable of issues as to what exists or what could exist. I take it as a strong point of this proposal of the nature of practical language that a language matrix is provided that is adequate to formulate rationalistic as well as empirical substantive theories. The controversy between ethical intuitionism and ethical empiricism (i.e. valuations interpreted in a way compatible with a naturalistic world view) is deposed from a meta-ethical controversy to one within substantive ethics. Also, practically all claims about the nature of man (essentialist theories) are shown to be relevant at the substantive level but not to conceptual analysis.

The fourth norm, precision, is implied by the fact that language, being the instrument of thought, must have precise delineations of functions if thought is to be clear, detailed, and comprehensive in all of its possible uses.

The fifth norm, usefulness, is also implied as an ideal

by the very functions of language and, of course, implies the other four ideals. Let us consider it to include all pragmatic factors relevant to judging the adequacy of the explication of language which are not contained in the first four norms. The following passage from a discussion by J. N. Findlay of the ideals of language explication touch on much that is relevant here:

...[the explication] should not make us draw distinctions where we are not, even on reflection, disposed to draw any, and that it should not make it difficult or impossible for us to draw distinctions that we cannot help wanting to draw. We may add, further, that it should be a way of speaking that brings the maximum of unity and perspicuity into the subject matters we are dealing with, that it disposes us to say, for instance--without more than an initial shock of uttering something 'queer' or 'clumsy'--that things not previously regarded as having great affinity are 'really only different forms' of one thing, that things previously said to be causally or externally connected, are 'deeply bound together,' and so on. And a good way of speaking should also, plainly, be one that removes linguistic difficulties that are general, which most speakers feel when provoked by certain statements or questions. It should be a way of speaking which removes difficulties durably, which does not merely intoxicate us with a temporary sense of brilliant clarity which afterwards evaporates. These, and a large number of less readily formulable characteristics, would readily recommend themselves to reflective speakers as 'good points' in a way of speaking.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>J. N. Findlay, "Recommendations Regarding the Language of Introspection," Clarity is Not Enough: Essays Criticism of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. H. D. Lewis (London, 1962), pp. 353-354.

This passage itself indicates how closely interrelated all five criteria are. Value in a language analysis is very much a matter of achieving a valuable gestalt.

The pragmatic or instrumental values can, I think, be taken to include the aesthetic values of an explication, for the aesthetic values in this case are not being judged in their own right but in their contribution to a language analysis. However, I could grant the point of a <sup>semantic inquiry</sup> ~~contention~~ that, despite the functional character of the aesthetic in language, we logically have here a sixth norm. The aesthetic component of experience, taken here in the broadest sense of an appreciating of the shape, flow, texture (in general, form) of human experience for itself is such a fundamental part of human value, and language is such a central and pervasive factor in that aesthetic shaping, that the judgment of language from the aesthetic standpoint is much more significant than we are prone to realize.

In the application of all of these norms of language adequacy, correctness remains primal, as I have noted, and the others become applicable in most cases as ways of supplementing that criterion in judging which of alternative proposals is most correct in the most valuable way. The supplementary criteria both assist in judging correctness and in appraising the value of the creative element necessarily

involved in any natural language explication.

The <sup>five</sup> ~~five~~ ideals of language explication noted above indicate <sup>five</sup> ~~five~~ ways a philosophical analysis can be defective. I want to comment on the first four types of defects.

(1) Violation of Correctness. This occurs primarily, I think, from two causes: (a) approaching a part of discourse with an inadequate concept of the various modes of language, or (b) seeking to make a piecemeal approach. The fallacies of cognitive naturalism and the limitations of emotivism would seem clearly to stem primarily from the first source, though they are also related to the second.<sup>64</sup> The exclusive identification of valuations with commendations, or prescriptions, or emotive expressions, or cognitive predictions are probably due primarily to the second cause.

(2) Violation of Comprehensiveness. What is involved here that is of philosophical concern is omission in an explication of language forms adequate to account fully for all basic dimensions of experience. The ethical non-naturalist claims an error of this sort in the purely naturalistic (empirical) analysis of values. In this study I find the

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<sup>64</sup>The fallacies and limitations referred to here are discussed in Part III of this study, though they are now so much a part of the accepted background of philosophical discussion of the meta-ethical problem that explanation of what is meant here would seem not necessary.

most serious violation of this kind to be incurred by those analyses which do not provide, or provide adequately, for language reference to states of consciousness, including structures and textures of consciousness. An analysis such as Hume's<sup>65</sup> or Gilbert Ryles',<sup>66</sup> which allow for non-behavioral references only to episodic sensory phenomena, are, I shall seek to show, quite drastically inadequate for explication of the language and phenomenological processes of valuing-- both ethical and aesthetic--where these involve attention experiences. This is to say they are inadequate for full explication of most value language and experience.

I have sought in this study to be strictly faithful to the canons of empiricism, which is to say to seek an explication of observed data which makes the fewest possible assumptions consistent with accounting for that data via a coherent and systemically integrated theory. To do this I think requires disowning some shibboleths that have often been taken as part of the defining characteristics of 20th century empiricism. I have in mind especially here the contention that references to states of consciousness in an




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<sup>65</sup>David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2 vols., Everyman's Library (London, 1911), pp. 238-249.

<sup>66</sup>Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, ad passim.

empirical analysis are references to behavior plus occasional sensory episodes, or private thought and imagination are at most shadowy inner processes totally dependent upon observable behavioral processes for their content or significance.<sup>67</sup>

Y. H. Krikorian states, "...behavior is the only aspect of mind which is open to experimental examination,"<sup>68</sup> to which Eliseo Vivas in a more adequate empirical spirit replies:

"...Krikorian forgets to tell [the reader] what the naturalist does about those aspects of mind which are <sup>not</sup> open to the behavioristic approach."<sup>69</sup> The contortions in 20th century analytic philosophy to make extensional (i.e. non-intensional) theories of meaning adequate and to make all references to mental states fit public observation patterns is a scenario of a philosophical fantasy world worthy of an Ionesco, but it is not, I think, a bright chapter in the history of the empirical philosophical spirit. I hope that this study will provide strong evidence of the inadequacies in such approaches in the area of practical language explication.

(3) Violations of Neutrality. It would appear a definite mark of clumsiness in a philosophical analysis to

<sup>67</sup>Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 155-165.

<sup>68</sup>Y. H. Krikorian, ed., Naturalism and the Human Spirit (New York, 1944), p. 252.

<sup>69</sup>Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (New York, 1955), p. 78.

to seek to incorporate into the fabric of language matters that are not a part of the necessary conditions for conceiving of experience in a comprehensive and coherent way. Language includes only necessary conditions of full conceivability.<sup>70</sup> In later parts of the study I shall take up the question of what circumstances would justify compromise of the neutrality norm in the interests of overall greatest achievable adequacy in a language proposal. We must allow the possibility that the guilt of violating any one of the norms of language explication can be exonerated by showing that there is clearly a gain in overall adequacy in explication. However (to anticipate the conclusion of that later discussion), I do not find that there are sufficient grounds to justify compromises of the neutrality ideal.

There have been two very conspicuous kinds of violations of this canon in 20th century philosophical value theory: (a) the incorporation of good-making characteristics into the meaning of good (and mutatis mutandis ought and right), and (b) the incorporation of substantive standards into the language-established concept of rationality.

G. E. Moore has made conspicuous for us the guilt of

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<sup>70</sup> This sentence is to be interpreted in the broad way which includes all three groupings of concepts listed in section 8.



cognitive naturalism on the first count,<sup>71</sup> and to establish (as this study attempts to do) that value can be defined without reference to intuited non-natural properties, relations or statuses is to prove that non-naturalism formulated as a metaethic ~~is also guilty of~~ <sup>must also be indicted for</sup> this kind of violation of the neutrality norm.

An approach to the nature of reasoning in value discourse which I shall call, following Maynard Adams, "logical naturalism," flouts the neutrality norm very flagrantly in incorporating substantive norms into language itself as Rules of Inference, and as such constitutive of the language-rule established concept of rationality in valuation. Stephen Toulmin's proposal of this sort in his book, The Place of Reason in Ethics,<sup>72</sup> was one of the earliest and remains one of the best known, though Kurt Baier,<sup>73</sup> Paul Taylor,<sup>74</sup> and George Kerner<sup>75</sup> have made similar kinds of analyses of reasoning in normative discourse. It is distinctive of these analyses to seek to show that there is a point where common

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<sup>71</sup>Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. 1.

<sup>72</sup>(Cambridge, 1950).

<sup>73</sup>Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, 1958).

<sup>74</sup>Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, 1961).

<sup>75</sup>George Kerner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory.

acceptance of a norm in a culture sanctions viewing that norm as a part of the fabric of language itself, that it functions as a rule of inference and thus as a part of the logic of use of value concepts. Thus, to show that an action is an instance of a code of principles or standards of a society (Toulmin),<sup>76</sup> or tends to produce a harmony of interests in society (also Toulmin),<sup>77</sup> or tends to produce pain (Baier),<sup>78</sup> is in each case to give a "good reason" for doing the action purely by the nature of the logic of practical language. I shall seek to show in the study that there is no justification for this breaking down of the very fundamental distinction between the purely formal, logical, language-rule sanctioned elements in inferences and inferences based on the presupposition of substantive principles, thus principles which have no formal status in language whatsoever. The issue is brought to a focus in the study in the examination of the logic of use of secondary value words (e.g. *honest, industrious etc.*) which is the point where the logical naturalist appears to have his strongest case.

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<sup>76</sup>Toulmin, pp. 155-160.

<sup>77</sup>Toulmin, pp. 155-160.

<sup>78</sup>Baier, pp. 266-275.

(4) Violation of Precision. Like violation of neutrality, violation of the norm of precision has been systemically espoused in 20th century philosophy. The challenge here has come in the form of rejection of sharp-functional distinctions between, for examples, fact and value, the analytic and the synthetic (more generally the verbal and the substantive), the postulative and the derived, and other such traditional dichotomies in the conceptualizing of experience. Dewey, Quine, Morton White, and J. L. Austin are some of the more well-known of the philosophers who have concluded that sharp functional distinctions cannot in the final analysis be defended. It is, I think, in the final analysis that they are defensible. The counsels of failure, of lack of usefulness of the distinctions, have seemed to me to come from a confusion of the distinction between (a) explicating a structure of functions and (b) explicating the meaning of specific instances of use. Granted, as we have already noted and will consider further, that instances of language use are typically polyfunctional. There are no instances of analytic assertions that do not also serve as instances of synthetic assertions in at least recessive ways. There are no conative language valuations which are not also instances of making, in at least recessive ways, cognitive *claims* assertions. There are no instances of postulates which do

(a) identifying instances that are of a concept

not stand in some relationships of being conclusions of inferences. But these complexities of instances of use do not constitute any attack on the possibility of delineating sharply and precisely structures of functions in discourse; rather the complexity of the instance of use can be understood only by noting the sharply distinguished elements that give the use its textural significance.

The thesis of gradualism--that there are no sharp functional distinctions in language or in discursive mental acts--is on one interpretation obviously true and on another circular. It is obviously true if it is no more than the claim that instances of use of language are probably always poly-functional, and it is <sup>similar</sup> ~~the second~~ if it is the claim that sharp functional distinctions cannot be drawn. Note the logical oddness of saying that the idea, or function, of valuing cannot be distinguished from the idea, or function, of fact stating, or that the idea (function) of analyticity cannot be distinguished from the idea (function) of a synthetic pronouncement, or that the idea (function) of postulation cannot be distinguished sharply from the idea (function) of being a conclusion inferred from premises: we cannot speak coherently of a blend of two ideas (functions) without having a clear, sharp idea of the elements of the blend.

The conclusions of gradualism have usually been formulated within the framework of extensionalistic theories of meaning, or significance in language use, and it is to be granted that within this framework it is very likely impossible to resolve the problem in a coherent way.

I will not add further comment here, beyond what was given above, on the fifth norm, usefulness, or on the possible sixth norm, aesthetic adequacy. At the conclusion of the study I shall consider how well the explication developed in the study fulfills each of these norms as compared with other approaches.

#### 11. Language Explication and Substantive Proposal

There has been a tendency in contemporary philosophy to talk of the inability to draw sharp distinctions between linguistic and substantive functions in practice--except in regard to the philosophical function itself. Here the trend has been of an opposite sort, i.e. toward emphasizing the purely linguistic (or analytic) and non-substantive nature of the philosophical job: philosophy is explication of functions in language, and thus of concepts.<sup>79</sup> It is appropriate to the philosopher to propose explications,

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<sup>79</sup>I will not repeat the criticism made of this statement as a formulation of the generic analytic job of philosophy; cf. Section 2.

appraise the explications of others, and even to analyze the conceptual presuppositions of specific substantive theories, but it is not his job to propose substantive theories. This concept of philosophy does not square with the history of use of the term either by philosophers or others: traditionally philosophy has had a speculative function as well as an analytic one, the speculative function being the proposal and defense of basic substantive theories of both cognitive and normative types. Ironically, on the contemporary philosophical scene those most explicitly concerned with faithful explications of ordinary language have characteristically been among the staunchest advocates of the position that the philosophical function is in itself a purely explicative one.<sup>80</sup>

My concern here is to note that this is a quite radical modification of what has ordinarily through history been taken to be the range of functions of philosophy per se and to raise some questions about the wisdom of so limiting the professional philosophical preoccupation. Certainly the analytic function is the primal and fundamental philosophical concern, but there are dangers, I think, when professional

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<sup>80</sup>As I noted above, some very substantive things have at times been gathered within the explicative function.

philosophy becomes too exclusively concerned with linguistic explication in abstraction from activities of proposing and appraising basic substantive theories--and I mean the full range of appraisal, not just consideration of the linguistic-conceptual presuppositions of specific substantive proposals, though even this kind of involvement with substantive theories is becoming an increasingly minor part of philosophical activity in the U.S.A. and England. The danger here is to the adequacy of the analytic function itself. Without the kind of sensitivity to problems, structural relationships, range of alternative ways of approaching issues, etc. that perhaps comes fully only with involvement in operations of developing, defending, and appraising substantive theories, the philosopher is not apt to be able to do the analytic job well. Language and concept analysis of an area of experience need very much to be performed by someone keenly aware of the substantive theories and problems in that area.

It is one of the ironies of 20th century philosophy of practical language that more explicit attention has been given to the problem of language explication than probably at any previous time, and very complex procedures of language analysis have been developed, yet it is not without point to say that in many ways practical language explication in the 20th century has been less adequate than in many past

centuries; I have in mind especially the classical Greek period and 18th and 19th century Anglo-American and Continental philosophy. Such a claim requires specific supporting argumentation and in the course of the study I will seek to indicate my reasons for feeling the claim is based on reasonable comparisons. The divorcing of analytic philosophical activity from its historical substantive complement in the existentially extensive way this has been done in the 20th century Anglo-American philosophy is, I believe, a questionable development both as ordinary language explication of the role of the philosopher qua philosopher and (much more serious) as a development which may often lead the analytic philosopher not to have the intimate acquaintance with his subject matter he needs to have to do the analytic job adequately.

The purpose of this study is to develop a concept of practical language that is as radically uninvolved substantively (i.e. is as neutral) as can possibly be achieved, but to bring out this neutrality it is important to show that all kinds of substantive theories can be adequately formulated in the language. I shall seek to show how consideration of substantive issues have at various points had a bearing on the explication that is made. This will be especially important for what I earlier called Group II



concepts, i.e. those which are not logically necessary conditions for the conceivability of experience in general but do have an existential necessity, i.e. they are, or contribute to, conceptual structures which are essential to the performance of fundamental human purposive activities, such as justifying, commanding, commending, being moral, promising, postulating, etc. It is a purpose of the study to achieve some clarification of the intricate relationships of linguistic-conceptual matters to substantive matters.

## 12. The Field of Theories

One of the difficulties in doing philosophy is that basic issues in one area of human experience cannot be dealt with adequately without taking a stand on a broad range of basic issues. Development of a theory of practical language requires developing positions at least on the nature of meaning in language, the nature of rationality in argumentation, the nature of logic, philosophy of mind, the nature of a scientific theory of human action and motivation, and the possible relevance of speculative metaphysical claims to normative judgments.

In this section I want to indicate briefly my understanding of the field of theories and their more obvious interrelationships. The very schematic presentation set

forth here will, I hope, render comments made later in the study on the relationships of various theories in discourse easier to follow, and thus more available to critical appraisal. I have hoped in the study to heed the advice of Selby-Bigge that it is a point of merit in a philosopher to present his material in such a way that its errors and other defects can be easily found out. Defense of such a classification as this will lie in the explanatory value it is found to have and the absence of problems raised by it. In the present study it will remain largely without direct defense, except where issues involved bear directly on the development of the language of practical discourse.

The classification seems to me to bring out distinctions and hierarchical relationships as well as <sup>interdependency</sup> independency relationships that I think it is important to keep in mind in going about an undertaking as basic and comprehensive as proposing and appraising a theory of the nature of practical language. I have sought to list the theories in some order of logical priority, but this could have been done in other ways. I take it to be a fundamental characteristic of the basic sets of pronouncements constituting the mind's semantically articulated organization of its experience that each set makes some logical presupposition of the others, so that no one set can be explicated and justified apart from the

others. A meaning theory takes form under the guidance of both a rationality theory and the desire to make specific kinds of substantive assertions, and of course rationality theory and substantive theories presuppose meaning theory for their formulation. Any kind of pronouncement must have both a meaning and a mode of justification, and while the two are not identical, its having the one presupposes its having the other.

Meaning theory and rationality theory are each comprehensive of both theoretical and practical language. Validation norms and substantive theories, however, are of course different for each of these dimensions of discourse--but are closely interrelated.

## FIELD OF THEORIES

### I. MEANING THEORY

(A specific definition under I-C establishes the subject matter of meaning theory, namely the meaning of semantic meaning. Its development and content is based primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, on logic of use of sentences in ordinary language.)

#### A. Theory of the Range of Conceivability

##### 1. Classification-inventory of ultimate concepts

a. Concepts of ultimate concrete particulars

b. Concepts of ultimate modes of unity in experience (categories)

→ c. Basic resemblance-formed concepts

*Clarify*  
*off*

d. Basic status-of-being concepts

2. Meaning Criterion: A generalization based on the above classification-inventory.

B. Theory of Language

An explication of the nature of a language: e.g. what a sentence is and how it has meaning, modes of meaning in language, nature of a language rule, etc.

C. Body of Definitions

Explications of the meanings of specific linguistic expressions

II. RATIONALITY THEORY

(A specific definition under I-C establishes the meaning of being rational, of being justified. It is a Group I concept.

A. Vindication Norm: Make all pronouncements from the standpoint of maximum achievable awareness of all there is to be aware of.

B. Validation Norms:

(As noted above, from this point on the classification is actually dual, except for the meaning criterion.)

1. Methodological Norms

a. Primary

i. Fundamental principles of deductive logic

ii. Basic principles of induction

iii. Meaning criterion (i.e. I-A-2)

b. Secondary

Includes norms (ideals) for theories beyond the primary norms of deductive and inductive logic.

2. Substantive Norms:

These function as standards (criteria) of substantive claims. Any not-in-question and well-established general principle under III can function as a standard.

III. SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES

A. Second Order Theories

Comprehensive theories in which justification is chiefly by vindication. Crucial experiments not a common mode of testing.

1. Basic laws of nature (operational formulations) and basic substantive ethical principles.
2. Basic metaphysical claims (Speculative metaphysics, not simply "metaphysics of experience" which is constituted of basic parts of meaning and rationality theory.)

B. First Order Theories

Substantive theories in which justification is chiefly by validation, i.e. where there is an established (accepted, not in question) justification procedure which yields a decision among alternatives, usually, and where vindication plays a relatively minor role. If vindication is needed, it is used to choose among alternative claims where major theoretical issues are not in question.

With this general presentation of background theories and presuppositions on the nature of philosophy, language and mental activity in its relationship to language, we are now ready to turn back to direct work on the central project of the study: the development of conative language. As I noted earlier, we will return to some of the issues in this

chapter toward the end of the study when, with a developed language of practical discourse on hand, we will be able to add to the explications of this part of the study. However, throughout the study concepts and approaches developed in this part will be presupposed, used, and even, in some cases, further developed.

## PART II

### MENTAL ACT AND VALUATIVE ACT

#### Introduction

In this part of the study I want to present a conceptual analysis of the nature of mental acts as an approach to an understanding of the nature of valuation, and thus value language, by examining its roots. Valuing responses play very central and basic roles<sup>o</sup> in mental activity, and thus the analysis made here is also necessarily a proposal of a way of conceiving of valuing acts.

I have already noted that I find it necessary for an adequate explication of practical discourse to distinguish the genus of valuing acts (and their correlative valuing pronouncements) from its centrally important species, valuations (value judgments). Any valuing act or its correlative linguistic expression as pronouncement I am referring to as a valuative. A valuation is a valuative taken by the user to be the most reason-grounded (i.e. justified) response the user can practically achieve at the time of use. "I like X, but I don't think it is good" is a paradigmatic form of sentence in which a valuative that is not ingredient in

adequately?

valuation is contrasted with one that is. A valuation, I shall argue shortly, is more than just a reason-grounded valuate, for it includes as a part of its meaning the cognitive claim that the valuate is reason-grounded. For simplicity of expression, I shall use the word 'valuative' to refer to non-judgmental valuatives only, but it should be kept in mind that value judgments include valuatives as parts. ~~As I stated early in the study,~~ <sup>Very</sup> roughly speaking, valuate acts are to valuations as perceptions are to knowledge.

(A)  
 ?  
 ?

Valuatives are discursive manifestations of mind for they establish a distinctive relationship between a predicate and a subject or among predicates or subjects, the concept of the particular relationship being the definition of the nature of the act. The kinds of acts that can be expressed semantically via language use were classified and described briefly in the Introduction to the study, pp. <sup>xvi - xvii.</sup> ~~7-10~~; I recommend that the reader review that classification at this point for it will be used throughout the remainder of the study.

Notes

in the study?

Discursive mental acts ~~as~~ <sup>capable of being</sup> directly expressed in language ~~as~~ <sup>(meaning)</sup> ~~mental acts~~ I have referred to as mental-act assertions, and the correlative linguistic pronouncements as semantic assertions; ~~noting that~~ an unqualified reference to an assertion is to be taken as a reference to the linguistic entity. Conative language is the language of assertion; a use of a



conative language sentence constitutes the performing (in a performatory use) or claiming to perform (in an expressatory use) of an asserting act. I have noted that conative language does not have the semantic homogeneity of cognitive language: that it is really a family of languages, and that even the major sub-divisions--directives, conatives, enstatives, and beliefs--are themselves in every instance except the last family names. But all and only conative sentences among kinds of language have as their meaning the semantic expression of mental acts.

It is vital to an understanding of assertions, and especially valuative assertions, that the logical and existential interrelationship of mental act and correlative semantic meaning be clearly understood. Thus, I request the reader's indulgence of the following brief recapitulation of this relationship. I have argued that any language use has two closely interrelated basic functions: (1) to present the semantic (i.e. conventional) meaning of the sentence to those who are intended to comprehend the use (the presenting of the meaning to X is the comprehending by X of the communication), and (2) to <sup>express</sup> present the mental act which is the ground of the meaning, this <sup>expressing</sup> presentation being to the user a direct manifestation of consciousness and mind-controlled behavior and for observers a projective and/or inferred

occurrence. However, the rule-governed character of a language-use makes possible a fully meaningful use even where the correlative mental act ground is partially or wholly absent in a particular time-stretch of use, i.e. one can, at least for brief periods, talk meaningfully without thinking of what one is saying, let alone heeding (being self-conscious of) what one is saying, and, analogously, one can respond to language read or heard as meaningful for periods of time without being aware of what is read or heard as a presentation of mental activity of the issuer. Nevertheless, meaning in language is only explicable by reference to the mental act that must characteristically be manifested in the use of it. One cannot for long talk or write and not be thinking what one is saying without this behavior losing its character of being mental activity; and, while one can for much longer periods read or listen to language without being aware that the language is an expression of mental activity, that abstractive level of following the sense of a written or spoken passage cannot be generalized and taken as constitutive of an explanation of meaning in use. A language use must be conceived as a medium of communication between or among minds for its functions to be explicable.

Thus, the mind-presentational and the (semantic) meaning-presentational functions of language are mutually dependent

aspects of a meaningful use of language: in a successful use the language-using act must function over a period of time as a presentational medium of mental activity of the user and of those who comprehend the use, and this presentational activity functions as the instantiation of the meaning-as-abstraction, which itself provides the basis of the instance of use being experienced by users and receives as a presentation of meaning, i.e. as a meaningful use.

#### A. ASSERTION AND INTENTIONALITY

##### 1. Three Uses of 'Assertion'

An assertion has been taken in the study to be a kind of mental act that can be expressed semantically in language; as a part of language an assertion is a kind of sentential meaning, namely that expressed by a sentence whose use constitutes semantically a performing or claiming to perform of a mental act. Assertions in this use are contrasted with statements, which are sentential meanings which describe something as being the case or not being the case but do not semantically represent or express the mental describing act, or any other mental act. To use a belief sentence is to express semantically--i.e. through a linguistic medium--the mental act of asserting what the correlative statement

describes. Within this terminological framework all sentence meaning is either statemental or assertional.

But this concept of assertion as discursive mental act and semantic expression of such an act is only one of three different uses philosophers have made of the word, and not the most common of the three. I want now to talk about the other two uses, both to forestall the kind of confusion that would arise from the reader reading into the use I am making one of the alternative meanings or some inapplicable aspect of one of these, and to clarify some issues involved in understanding what semantic assertion is. ~~I believe this clarification will make clear why I have adopted the specific use I have.~~ <sup>I want to show that</sup> The particular adoption I have made is, ~~I am convinced,~~ <sup>radically more</sup> ~~a much more solidly grounded than being merely the indulgence of a preference for one kind of labeling over another; if~~ <sup>than a whimsical</sup> the use I am proposing is correct, then the other two involve conceptual confusions.

Many philosophers, including very notably Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, have used 'assertion' to designate the operation of using a sentence to express its meaning as contrasted with employing it in such a way as to mention its meaning, ~~i.e.~~ <sup>which is to be to</sup> talk about it or consider its nature and characteristics in abstraction from the act of semantically expressive use. In Russell and Whitehead's

See Introduction for paper

rather than "instructions".

(mention or mention of a sentence language either through the section of 131)

Empirical Analysis.

notation the sign "F" indicates a sentence that is to be taken as "asserted" in this sense. I shall hereinafter use the subscript "2" to distinguish this concept of assertion and in this section the subscript "1" for the use I am adopting, In this study I have referred to the assertion function simply as a language use; speaking in this way permits us to make the "use-mention" distinction, I think, clearly and without introducing special terminology: a "mentioning" use is using language to talk about a language use; the language use that is being mentioned, talked about, has the character of being the object referred to by another use. Note that all asserting acts are the same, and the asserting operation (using the sentence) adds nothing to the meaning of the sentence. To assert a sentence is simply to take the meaning of the sentence as applicable in the situation in which the sentence is used. Thus to assert a statement is to use the statement to describe, and thus to make a truth claim and belief claim. Though Russell and Whitehead, and most others who have employed this usage, have concerned themselves only with cognitive assertion, the usage seems generalizable to designate the using of any kind of sentence. Thus, one could describe issuing a command as asserting a command pronouncement by using a command sentence, and describe in a similar way the using of any mode of conative

postscript - W

which I will refer to as mention

operation

or to indicate a relationship of meaning

language sentence.

Let us take a closer look at the notion of asserting a statement by using a cognitive sentence. What is the relationship between asserting a statement and believing the statement? Of course one can assert and not believe, but so can one say "I believe..." and not believe.

Is there any difference in meaning between asserting of the statement X and making a belief claim, i.e. a belief judgment?

The nature of a judgment and kinds of judgment will be discussed shortly, in Section 3, but we need only a prima facie awareness of what we mean by a belief claim to realize that the

justification of such a claim consists, not in showing that the person making the claim holds the belief, but rather in showing that the belief is justified. And this is to say

that justifying the assertion (the use in this study) "I believe X" with the assertion "I believe I believe X", which

requires for justification only that there be adequate evidence that my belief exists. And we must distinguish between "subjective" justification of belief and "objective" justification.

One can show that he was justified in believing X on the grounds practically available to him for judgment even though X is false; in fact we can see that there will be

circumstances in which it would be irrational to believe what is true. But we are not now talking about justification of

is quite a different matter from justifying the

Something left out here (32)

specified?

missed piece

Omit for paper

a callist

SN

belief under the limiting conditions of available evidence (i.e. "subjective" justification), but rather of the ideal of belief justification, thus the foundation of the idea: within this "objective" framework we can see that there is no difference in procedure in justifying belief in X and establishing X as true.

But, one might object, there is a problem of difference of intentionality here between establishing the truth of  $P$  and justifying belief in  $P$  <sup>(believing  $P$ )</sup> even though the justifying conditions are materially equivalent. I agree. In asserting  $P$  <sup>(using the sentence ' $P$ ')</sup> one is asserting <sup>50</sup> "' $P$ ' is true'. And in this Tarskian equivalence there is an equivalence of meaning, of intension, and thus of intention between using ' $P$ ' and using "' $P$ ' is true'. But here one is not <sup>focus</sup> talking <sup>focus on</sup> about belief, even justified belief: one is <sup>the subject</sup> talking about what is believed. Thus, <sup>(using ' $P$ ' or "' $P$ ' is true')</sup> focusing attention on the statement " $P$ " as a truth claim and not on the believing act, though asserting " $P$ " is a belief assertion.  $\Delta$

The difference between the pronouncements " $P$ " and "I (we<sup>1</sup>) believe<sup>R</sup>" is not in the semantic content but in the focus of

<sup>1</sup> Such pronouncements are usually made as participatory judgments, e.g. in truth claims we commonly seek to make assertions as the voice of rational beings, or the voice of the scientific community, etc.

$\Delta$  Assertion of  $P$  in asserting  $P$ . The function of assertion must be taken on the way of a verbal cognitive act to be intelligible.

following remarks will, I believe, make clear the significance of this difference of use.

On Lewis' analysis we can say that a proposition functions like a predicate clause, i.e. as a sentential concept functions as a non-sentential part of a more inclusive sentence. In the terminology of formal logic, a proposition functions as a bound sentential variable (this may be a sentence variable or any sentence-form in which the inner logical structure of the sentence is articulated in logical notation). The proposition can be treated as sentential, i.e., as the meaning of a complete sentence form, only within the range of its bracketing; as a whole it is not sentential but functions as a predicate within the larger sentence framework of which it is a part. An assertion (the meaning of a conative language sentence) always involves a proposition as a part, i.e., it always involves a cognitive content as a description of a state of affairs or relationship of meanings. However, an assertion does not contain a statement (i.e., the meaning of a cognitive sentence) as a part; a proposition does not have this logical or conceptual independence. We

shall find that this limitedness of the proposition is very essential to the character of its role in assertions; we shall be aware of this especially in considering the logic

Then limitation, I shall seek to indicate shortly, is essential for the explanation of the logic of assertions.

omit for paper

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SM



of assertions <sup>SM</sup>

Our immediate concern is explicating the relationship between (i) asserting<sup>Q</sup> the meaning of a cognitive sentence (asserting<sup>Q</sup> a statement) and (ii) asserting<sup>SM</sup> the correlative belief (using the belief sentence). As I noted very early in the study, it seems to me the relationship is this: (i) is an abstraction from (ii). A proposition considered in abstraction from its context as a predicate in an assertion <sup>SM</sup> (i.e. as the meaning of a bound sentential formula in an assertion<sup>SM</sup> sentence form) is the meaning of a <sup>logically</sup> sentence and <sup>semantically</sup> such a meaning is what I am calling a statement. That is, <sup>SM</sup> a statement is a proposition with its bracketing ignored, not attended to. But the bracketing is still there; the appearance of independence of the statement is a trick of the abstractive imagination. A statement, though the meaning of a <sup>selected linguistic unit</sup> complete sentence form, is not semantically (that is not, logically) independent. It is radically ambiguous apart from some established relationship to some assertion<sup>SM</sup>: Is it being believed? <sup>believed?</sup> denied? contemplated? postulated? questioned? The idea of a statement is just not a concept that can stand alone conceptually--it can only be thought as an abstraction from an assertion<sup>SM</sup> and remains syncategorematic, i.e. logically requiring a context as a propositional element in an assertion<sup>SM</sup> to be pinned down precisely as to its

~~As the world is what it is~~ 30

significance in any instance of use. Thus, there is no such thing as simply asserting a statement, which is not asserting a belief.

*assertion a statement in the notion of making a belief assertion. - but a people assumed*

*W.V. Quine! I am advised! you! No!*

We shall pause for only a moment of Byronic reflection on the irony of this conclusion about the so-lately tyrannical cognitive model, whose adulators insisted that every sentence

must show its cognitive meaning credentials, however disguised, or be relegated to the limbo of a "merely emotively significant pseudo-sentence". There it is: cognitive awareness itself carries the truth that there is no cognitive claim except as an abstraction from a non-cognitive, *(i.e. emotive language)* assertion claim. Cognitive language exists as a conceptually distinct entity only as a kind of Hobbesian epiphenomenon from conative language-use functions. However, the role of cognitive language sentence meanings as the propositional elements in conative language sentence meanings *(i.e. in assertions)* is anything but epiphenomenal, of course.

While assertions is basically an abstraction from assertions, it does involve a distinctive semantic element--even though this is not a distinctiveness of concepts; rather it is a distinctiveness of focus of attention. To assert<sub>2</sub> p is to claim to believe p, but to focus attention on p as believed, i.e., as thought to be true, and not to focus attention on the act of believing. In contrast, the explicitly formulated

*Put p in?*

*Put this as a way of saying "assertion is"*

belief assertion focuses attention on both the expressing of belief and on that which is believed. We shall have to develop a theory of mental intentionality which will be adequate for formulating this way of talking, and that I plan to do shortly, beginning in Section 4.

Note that I have not suggested that the concept of ~~stating is definable in terms of some assertional concept of~~ stating is definable in terms of some assertional concept, or group of concepts, in such a way that we would conclude that stating is not an irreducible concept in human experience.

[To the contrary, as I noted in Part I,] if the idea of stating, of describing something as being the case or not being the case, is not itself categorial, it must be a generalization involving similar categorial concepts. The coherence of the meaning of any assertion requires the irreducibility of the idea of a cognition or cognitive claim. The later analysis will, for example, show that we cannot make sense of the idea of valuing without granting the conceptual distinctness of the idea of cognition; and the idea of belief, it would seem, clearly makes no sense apart from the idea of a cognition believed. Those philosophers who have suggested that the idea of cognition, belief and valuation are not conceptually distinct, or that some one of these could be defined in terms of the others, have, I think, talked nonsense--one is tempted

(R)

Propose

State is a single and  
way

↓

to say "circular nonsense" since cognition, belief and valuing are each concepts that logically require the other two for explication. But, as Kant very clearly demonstrated, I believe, in his reply to Hume's analysis of substance and cause, conceptual irreducibility cannot be equated with conceptual independence. Our concept of a simple logical connective like conjunction would seem to establish this clearly: the idea of conjunction can be grasped only as a part of a more inclusive set of concepts but it is nevertheless an irreducible idea in the schema which presents it. So for the idea of cognition.

Use? It would, I suspect, fit more closely with ordinary use if we used the word 'statement' as Lewis does, to name an asserted proposition, i.e. a proposition considered in a context of belief assertion, but without giving attention to the believing act. "I challenge (agree with, deny, etc.) that statement" involves, I think it is clear, reference to a proposition as part of the belief assertion someone has made. However, the lure of expediency in this case is to continue speaking with the hoi polloi of the philosophical world (Lewis has been an exception) rather than the hoi aristoi of the world of ordinary use, for identification of "statement" with "meaning of a cognitive sentence" is a deeply engrained philosophical tradition, and besides, this use is ~~a~~ a

more convenient use for <sup>an</sup> philosophical purposes than the "corrected" use would be. We need a name for the meaning of a cognitive sentence considered in abstraction from assertions, as an independently conceived (though not conceptually independent) entity. We have no special need for another name for the cognitive meaning that is a part of what is asserted in an instance of use of a belief assertion; we already have the word 'proposition'. I suggested in Part I that the phrase 'cognitive assertion' even though taking it literally it might <sup>also be allowed for name for belief assertions</sup> be seen <sup>could</sup> as a phrase involving a category mistake, since <sup>The meaning</sup> each word has its basic <sup>of cognitive sentences are not assertions</sup> one in a different language. Some astute hard-line ordinary language philosopher may turn up a good reason why we shouldn't temporize with the canon of correctness in the uses of 'statement' and 'cognitive assertion' in the minor ways I am condoning, <sup>at the</sup> but in the absence of such reasons, I propose we indulge these (I presume) venial sins.

<sup>I now want to describe the two other facts closely related</sup>  
~~The third use of 'assertion' I alluded to above has been~~  
~~popular among an outstanding list of recent philosophers, and~~  
~~was born out of a recognition that is very fundamental to the~~  
~~present study, namely, that language is made up of a variety~~  
~~of modes besides the cognitive. Some of the philosophers~~  
~~whose writings have been basic shaping influences on this~~  
~~study have adopted this use--often not the word, but never-~~  
~~theless the functional concept distinctive of this third~~



"assertion" or "asserting one" use "face of one" of a  
~~proposition~~ ~~under mental proposition~~

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differentiated concept of ~~assertion~~ ~~--thus creating a different~~  
~~concept, assertions--~~ that I want to analyze and appraise. I shall  
refer to it as ~~assertion~~ ~~M: assertion as a mode of use.~~

Note that the concern here is not fundamentally to  
analyze a particular use of a word, or argue for and against  
such a use, but to understand and appraise a functional  
structure proposed as explicative of ordinary language use.  
The "non-verbal" character of the problem here can be illus-  
trated by some observations on our conclusions about the  
Russell-Whitehead use of assertion, i.e. ~~assertion<sub>y</sub>~~. I noted  
that ~~assertion<sub>y</sub>~~ was a particular and abstract aspect of  
assertion as semantic expression of mental act (i.e. ~~asser-~~  
~~tion<sub>y</sub>~~<sup>SM</sup>), namely it was a particular kind of abstraction from  
belief assertions<sup>SM</sup>. I could have, without great difficulty,  
decided to accept the limited Russell-Whitehead use of the  
word 'assertion' explicated in this way and sought another  
word as a generic name of the meaning of sentences which  
express mental acts. I think the general use of the verb  
"to assert" in discourse justifies the assignment of word  
function I have adopted more than it does the Russell-Whitehead  
assignment (e.g. we "assert" questions, beliefs, laws, value  
judgments, etc). But this philological claim is only peri-  
pherally a philosophical concern since it can be relatively  
divorced in this case (but very often cannot be) from the  
basic philosophical concern to delineate a structure of

functions. Thus, to come back to our analysis of assertion, I am not here much concerned with how philosophers have used the word 'assertion' (some avoid it altogether) but with how they have analyzed the function of using a sentence to convey a particular significance.

*W.B.*  
*had two concepts of assertion (S and M)*

What distinguishes the third approach is the claim that the conventional significance of the use of a sentence derives from two factors in the language-using act: (1) communicating a mode-neutral descriptive component (the presentation--Brentano; the ascriptor--Sheffer; the proposition--Lewis; the phrastic--Hare; the meaning of the locution--Austin), combined with (2) communicating a mode of assertion (the affirmation, denial, love or hate--Brentano; the ascriptive--Sheffer; the way of using the proposition--Lewis; the neustic--Hare; the illocutionary force--Austin). The general approach is subject to two different interpretations, and proponents have sometimes been vague as to which they intended to defend. On one interpretation, the mode of assertion is taken to be part of the semantic meaning of the sentence--Sheffer and Hare seem to make this kind of analysis--and on the other, the mode of assertion, while considered conventionally determined, is taken to be a factor external to the meaning of the sentence, the conventional significance of the use thus becoming something more inclusive than its meaning. Lewis (but not very

*accepted or denied toward.*

*(S)*

*(S)*

*deriving from language rules (i.e. the semantic component)*

clearly) suggests such an interpretation, but it has been very explicitly set forth by Austin--and I think it would be accurate to say that this limitation of the significance of the meaning to the Fregean "sense and reference" component of the significance of the use also reflects Wittgenstein's use. *way of talking* (D2)

I want to take this latter interpretation ~~of the third~~ approach first, because I think it is the least defensible, and also because in analyzing the problems here we will also have noted problems (though not so many) with <sup>the</sup> first interpretation. (D1)

Here ~~again~~ <sup>or earlier</sup>, much the smaller part of my concern is what one might take to be the oddness of talking about the meaning of the use as only one aspect of the conventional significance of the use. I suspect that only long habituation to some particular philosophical employment, such as the Fregean concept of meaning strictly being sense and reference, would lead one to hang on to a use that so conspicuously flaunts the conventions of ordinary discourse. But philosophically this is a <sup>relatively</sup> minor point, <sup>in the present sense (it's never perfect anyway)</sup> and, as I have argued, if such mild tamperings with the canon of correctness serve significantly the canon of simplicity and convenience in presenting a functional structure in discourse, the abrogation would seem justified.



But there are very important reasons for concluding that the significance of a use cannot be split up in this way. The most basic and conspicuous reason <sup>the evidence</sup> is that mode-of-assertion determines the logical relationships among a set of sentences. <sup>If this is established by the case,</sup> ~~This being the case (and I shall present some basic evidence shortly)~~ and a systematic development of the ~~logic of obligation assertion in Part III-E~~, then mode-of-assertion must be considered to be determinative of the meaning of the <sup>basic</sup> basic form of the sentence used.

Characteristically, where philosophers have divided the descriptive "content" of the meaning of a sentence from the mode-of-assertion they have argued for the relative semantic autonomy of the descriptive component by seeking to show that formal relationships among sentences of a mode derive solely from the descriptive component, the mode operator having as its sole formal significance to establish the range of sentences taken to belong to <sup>a</sup> the particular logical set, i.e. to establish <sup>a</sup> the logical universe of discourse. Professor Sheffer's and Professor Hare's approaches to formal analysis both reflect this presupposition. That it is very wrong-headed is, I think, established by the many analyses which show that mode-of-assertion makes a great difference, not in the nature (i.e. meaning) of a logical relationship ~~in itself~~, <sup>per se</sup>, but in the structure (calculus) of formal relation-

ships exhibited in and among the meanings of sentences of a mode. It is tautological to note that changing the nature of the meaning of a sentence-form changes its formal characteristics. Considering that it is the very nature of logic to exhibit meaning relationships, it would be <sup>logically</sup> odd indeed if a change in the meaning of a form of sentence was not a change of formal characteristics. The non-isomorphism of logics is particularly radical between the logic of statement and the logic of assertion, but there are <sup>more than</sup> minor differences in formal characteristics among modes of assertion. <sup>We must, of course,</sup> Some explication ~~of these differences will be undertaken in Part III-E, but a~~ <sup>forego here the pleasure of extensive explication of these differences with forethought</sup> ~~of these differences will be undertaken in Part III-E, but a~~ few comments about the roots of the radical differences between statemental and assertional logic are, I believe, in order, here.

The lack of isomorphism stems, of course, from the semantic difference between a statement and an assertion. Cognitive logic answers the question: if A is stated, what other propositions are also stated because they are equivalent to or implied by A? Conative logic, in contrast, answers the question: if B is asserted, what other forms of assertion are also made because they are equivalent to or implied by B? This is semantically quite a different thing, i.e. to determine from a given set of assertions what else implicitly is asserted than to determine from a given

set of statements what else is implicitly stated. For example, as has often been noted, the Rule of Addition, " $p \supset (p \vee q)$ ", a tautology in cognitive truth-functional logic, is in no sense a tautology in justification-functional logic of assertions<sup>4</sup>; i.e., if 'p' is asserted (whether or not justifiably) one is not justified in taking 'p  $\vee$  q' as an implied assertion. As Everett Hall notes, a judge's command, "Fine the man five dollars" does not imply the assertion "Fine him five dollars or hang him." But the formal difference between the two logics is not simply one reflecting the absence of an isomorphic analogue of truth-functional logic in conative language. Even where we are concerned only with logic of strict implication, the lack of parallel in logical structure is fundamental. For example, " $p \vee \neg p$ " is not a tautology in assertional logic, for there are actually five possibilities of monadic assertion in regard to a subject p: (1) affirmation, (2) neutrality in regard to the doing of p, (3) neutrality in regard to the not doing of p, (4) asserting of the negation of p, and (5) no assertion on the subject at all. Each of the following pronouncements by a court of law

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<sup>4</sup>The assertional logic analogue of truth-functional logic is justification-functional logic. For example "material implication" is defined: " $p \supset q$ " asserts that it cannot be the case that "p" is justifiably asserted and "q" not justifiably asserted.

has a meaning and implications quite distinct from the others:

- (1) Segregation is required.
- (2) Segregation is permitted.
- (3) Non-segregation is permitted.
- (4) Segregation is prohibited.
- (5) We have made no ruling in regard to segregation.

There are also great formal differences within a mode of assertion between a conditional in which the antecedent is cognitive and one in which both antecedent and consequent are non-cognitive assertions. Consider the following examples of these two basic types of conditionals:

- (1) If you are a U. S. citizen, you ought to pay U. S. taxes.
- (2) If you ought to be a U. S. citizen, then you ought to pay U. S. taxes.

These illustrations should be ample to establish the extensive differences between the logic of statements and the logic of assertions, though we are talking about logics in the same basic and strict sense of the word. This in itself would seem to provide conclusive evidence that we must treat assertion as itself a basic sentential concept. *possibly then be a mode operator.*

We must keep in mind here that conative language, as a language of semantically expressing (i.e. performing or claiming to perform) actions--i.e. the language of assertion--

is distinct from the language of describing these assertions. <sup>41</sup>  
 Of course a sentence <sup>whose meaning is</sup> ~~which is~~ a description of an assertion  
 may be physically the same as a sentence <sup>whose meaning</sup> ~~expressing~~ the per-  
 formance. The context, including other sentences taken to  
 be inferred from the given sentence, will be important in  
 establishing the specific function of a particular use of  
 such a sentence. For many uses it will not make any differ-  
 ence whether the sentence is taken to be cognitive or cona-  
 tive or both, but a full explication of functions of language,  
 including an explication of logical relationships in language,  
 requires that we recognize both kinds of uses--and recognize  
 that conative language is as semantically and syntactically  
 developed as cognitive language; in fact <sup>when ~~we~~ the logic of</sup> ~~we shall find that~~  
<sup>assertion is more fully developed, to which it will be ~~seen~~ ~~to~~ ~~have~~</sup>  
its semantic-syntactic structure is considerably more complex <sup>in</sup>  
 than ~~that of~~ cognitive language.

We shall find in formally developing the basic logic of  
 assertion that the cognitive element in an assertion (the  
 proposition--Lewis) can be accommodated as a predicate in  
 assertional sentence forms. Cognitive formulae within cona-  
 tive language sentence forms function as bound sentential  
 variables. Thus, cognitive logical relatedness is confined  
 to the range of bracketing of each cognitive formula; it does  
 not apply to the sentence as a whole.

While this character of a mode of assertion as

logical form of the meaning of a 151

determining the basic meaning of the sentence in any sentential use is in itself sufficient to reduce to nonsense

~~the notion of the significance of a use as composed of the meaning of the locution plus a modal force~~ ("illocutionary force" in Austin's terminology)

in Austin's terminology, there are yet other reasons to reject it. Even if it had proved possible to explicate a mode-neutral logic confined to the propositional element in an assertion, this breaking up of the conventional significance into a descriptive element (act) plus a "force of use" or "way of use" element (act) would appear a rather artificial and clumsy way of explicating the significance of sentence uses.

For example, how are we to distinguish a stating use from a belief-expressing use? To go to the basic problem, the approach leaves us with a mystery as to just

what an illocutionary force is and how such forces are to be distinguished. The locution, Austin tells us, conventionally communicates Fregean meaning, i.e. a Lewisian propositional concept. What is it to communicate an illocutionary force?

This, it would appear, must be another concept that is communicated by the form of the sentence, plus, perhaps, in some sense the form of the context of use, for it is a conventional communication. Austin says it is always performatory. Taking into account that refinement made earlier in this study (page

5) of Austin's concept of the performatory in which expressatory

Amend this page #.

uses are distinguished from performatory uses, we can see that even an expressatory use does not require any psychological manifestation of the "force" of use in the instance of use. As J. N. Findlay notes, and clearly Austin agrees:

It is of all distinctively human properties the most amazing and most rich in consequence that we can plan meals without being hungry, can buy pictures without being aesthetically stirred, can marry suitably without being ruttish or on heat, and can consult our own good and that of our neighbors while stirred by neither fear nor love.<sup>5</sup>

To deny this would put us back into the blatant crudities of the old ~~emotive-cognitive~~<sup>amalgam</sup> interpretation of significance in language use. Very patently Austin is not concerned to deny but to elaborate on the "amazing" quality of language Findlay refers to. This being so, his illocutionary force must, it would seem, be part of the concept communicated in using a sentence--i.e. it is an ideational content communicated not ~~as a psychological~~<sup>as a psychological</sup> significance. This being so, it is misleading to speak of the "meaning" communicated plus the "force". This "force" is not different in semantic nature from what is called the meaning. What is needed is a way of showing how the two are communicated as a semantic unit--and also how the various ideas of force can be made precise in significance, and the idea of "force of a use" can itself

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<sup>5</sup>Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 182.

be made less mysterious by explicating how various kinds of mental acts can themselves become parts of the meanings of sentences, as in the explication of the mental act-semantic assertion relationship I have developed in this study.

This quite poorly thought-out part of Austin's generally very astute analysis in his book, How To Do Things With Words, derives, I suspect, from an overly extensionalistic approach to the nature of meaning in language and the related tendency to leave unclarified the nature of the necessary involvement of mental activity in meaningful uses of language.<sup>6</sup> I shall ~~seek to show shortly that Austin needs for an adequate ex-~~ ~~plication of the concept of illocutionary force, not only~~ ~~the concept of language-use as the medium of mind-presenting-~~ ~~meaning and meaning-presenting-mind which I have been de-~~ ~~veloping in this study,~~ <sup>presented briefly earlier in the paper. And</sup> but as a part of this, he needs something like Brentano's concept of the fundamental role of consciousness in mental acts in providing content to mental intentionality.

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<sup>6</sup>In the Fall of 1963 I attended a seminar at Oxford devoted entirely to this one work. Participants in the seminar included J. O. Urmson (presiding), P. F. Strawson, R. M. Hare, and Jonathan Cohen, among others. The single topic receiving the greatest amount of attention was Austin's "illocutionary force vs. meaning" distinction. All active participants found difficulty with the distinction, and only Urmson felt it was possibly defensible.



The Lewis-Austin account of the significance of a sentence use amounts to splitting its semantic significance (i.e. the language-rule determined ideational significance) into two parts and conjoining one of these (the mode-of-assertion significance) with an intrinsically non-ideational aspect of the use, namely with the process of using the sentence, i.e. the Russell-Whitehead assertion<sup>u</sup>. Involved here is a semantically unholy divorce and marriage. Functionally, using a sentence is the act which conveys the conventional significance of the sentence. It is a quite pointless and obfuscating tactic to conceive the use act as itself impregnated with differentiating semantic significance. What is gained? Note how ~~much~~ is lost in clarity of conceiving the significance of a use. Of course, when we add the problem of accounting for the differences of logical relatedness among modes of language (and particularly between statements and assertions), the whole bifurcating approach--whether it makes the mode of assertion a content in the act of using a locution or an "operator"-like subsentential part of the meaning--just becomes monstrously inappropriate to the functional character of the situation of language use.

## 2. Assertion and Attitude

Some philosophers, for example Bertrand Russell, have

referred to assertion in the sense I am using the term as the expression of "propositional attitudes." Particularly in mind in this description (exclusively in mind in some cases) have been what I have called valuative, commendive, and belief assertions. When all semantic significance was practically without exception taken to be cognitive, such assertions were recognized to have distinctive formal characteristics. These caused special concern in attempts to make all logic cognitive and truth functional, for one could not in a straightforward way take them as substitution instances in truth-value formulae without getting into trouble. I shall seek to show later that the problems of logical function involved are resolvable when we recognize the distinction between cognitive and conative language. What I want to note here is that the relationship between assertion and attitude is not a simple one-to-one correlation. (I am not suggesting that philosophers who have spoken of "propositional attitudes" have thought it was. While some assertions are describable as expressions of attitudes, we could not say that all are without extending the notion of an attitude well beyond the bounds of its natural use, for it is linguistically odd, I think, to speak of the issuing of orders or of requests or of the performing of enstatements as attitude expressing. On the other hand, we probably cannot interpret all manifestations

*Doyle*

of attitudes as assertions without unduly limiting what is called an attitude. Could an unacknowledged but unmistakably manifested attitude of hostility, or racial prejudice, on the part of a person be called an assertion of the person?

We could find support from philosophical and ordinary language use ~~are~~ for considering that an attitude is a disposition to manifest a particular kind of (a) valuative or (b) belief behavior and consciousness, i.e. a disposition to manifest pro, neutral, and con responses to things in either a normative or noetic way plus the logically associated valuative attentions. I do not think it is an adequate explanation of the ordinary significance of an attitude to make it a purely behavioral concept, as some philosophers have done (e.g. C. W. Morris, C. L. Stevenson, G. Ryle) for the word is used commonly with the specific significance of indicating a tendency of an agent to manifest certain kinds of states of consciousness, i.e. feelings; but this is more a development than an alteration of the significance commonly assigned the word by philosophers.

This common philosophical usage of the word raises some fundamental questions: If an attitude expression is taken to be either a valuative or belief assertion, wherein lies the unity of the idea of being an attitude? In its being a pro, neutral, or con response, either normative or noetic? But

this description is equivocal. What do a pro-valuative response and a pro-belief response have in common? A pro-belief (i.e. believing something to be the case) is quite compatible with a neutral or con-valuative response, and vice versa. Grounds for considering that beliefs are not valuatives or valuations, we have already considered; the irreducible character of each should be made clear by our common-sense awareness of the difference in what we mean in believing and in valuing, and this is supported by the simple observation that a belief can remain constant while an evaluation swings from pro to con, and an evaluation can remain constant though belief be changed to disbelief. In no simple sense does a belief fluctuate with variations in the valuing of what is believed--or even in the valuing of truth itself. Where then is the functional unity in this philosophical concept of an attitude as an expression of valuing or believing?

Furthermore, ordinary use lends practically no support to the philosophical practice of referring to beliefs as attitudes. Of course attitudes are involved in any context of belief assertion, for all such assertions are prompted by at least the valuing of ways to attain justified belief. Performatory valuatives, especially benedictives and maledictives, have been described as expressing "conventional

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attitudes," or as expressing attitudes conventionally, but this seems a rather strained employment of the notion and I shall not indulge in it.

What is most naturally referred to in ordinary discourse as attitudes are dispositions for expressatory valuatives plus the manifestations of these dispositions. Commendations can also commonly (but not always) be described as attitude-expressing, for what is commended is characteristically also valued by the issuing agent, though this is not logically required; what is logically required for a correct use of a commendation sentence is that the issuing agent believe the act commended to be an act justified for the agent addressed to do.

Some support could be gained from ordinary use, and also from philosophical practice, for interpreting attitude expression as the making of a judgment. I shall argue that (1) valuations, (2) commendations, and (3) belief assertions are the modes of judgment in discourse. Statements in isolation from belief are not judgmental and all modes of conative language other than valuations and commendations are non-judgmental. Since these three forms of assertion correspond roughly to what philosophers such as Russell have called "propositional attitudes," we can see that, at least implicitly, they have tended to identify "propositional

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attitudes" with judgmental assertions.

### 3. Assertion and Judgment

To make a judgment, I want to contend, is to make a claim conjoined with the further claim that the first is rationally justified. That is to say, it is to make an assertion of the type that is directly claim-making plus making the further claim-type assertion that the first assertion is justified. This making of a claim of rational justification is itself a part of the meaning of a judgment. All sentence uses pre-suppose by contextual implication that the user has adequate justification for his use, but in a judgment that justification is not simply contextually presupposed: it is part of the meaning.

This gives us three distinguishing marks of a judgment: (1) that it is an assertion, (2) it is directly claim-making, and (3) involves the further claim that the explicitly made one is rationally justified. Direct claims are of two basic types: (a) that something is the case, or (b) that something ought to be the case (or would be good to be): the noetic (cognitive) claim and the normative (valuational) claim.

Beliefs, valuations, and commendations (the latter being <sup>involves</sup> valuations for others) <sup>or</sup> <sup>specific</sup> <sup>They ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>judgment</sup></sup> are claim making in a direct way that is not the case with other

modes of assertion, such as issuing orders or making enstate-  
ments. Orders and enstatements do not directly claim anything,  
though they are justifiably used only in situations sanctioned  
by presupposed claims.

The double-claim nature of a judgment makes it <sup>logically</sup> the case  
that judgments are never simple assertions; they are always  
dual assertions; ~~the~~ sentences expressing judgments are of  
logical necessity polyfunctional.

One terminological conclusion arrived at in Section 1  
above was that there were good reasons to call the meaning of  
a cognitive sentence a statement only when this was considered  
in abstraction from an assertion, otherwise--i.e. as a part of  
an assertion--it would be called a proposition. However, con-  
sidering the close relationship between a proposition in a  
belief assertion made and the notion of a statement used, we  
can see why it is quite natural to speak of believing state-  
ments. There is no need to attempt the futile philosophical  
task of declaring a ban on this mode of speech. We only need  
to keep in mind that strictly speaking--for the reasons dis-  
cussed in Section 1--we will not say that a belief judgment  
involves a statement in addition to a belief. Thus we will  
analyze a belief judgment as composed of two assertions: (1)  
a primary contentual belief assertion (assertion of p) plus  
(2) a secondary justificatory belief, namely the assertion

that the primary belief assertion is justified (assertion of "p is justifiably believed to be true").

There is an issue conspicuous in this description of a belief judgment that threatens to play havoc with the analysis unless it can be shown to be a threat only in appearance. Obviously I believe this can be shown. If believing p involves believing that believing p is justified, then aren't we off on an infinite regress? Thus, hadn't we better take the tack of saying that there really isn't but one believing here, that one cannot make sense of believing X without believing that one is justified in taking X to be true; in fact isn't that what believing is?

Let's take first the question of reducing our analysis of belief judgment to one believing, for if this can be accomplished we will not need to consider the infinite regress threat. There is this problem with the lure of simplicity of the reductive analysis: there are considerable grounds for concluding that we can believe without believing that we are justified in believing. Consider the case of sheer culturally conditioned belief--the extreme limit in Plato's dichotomy between opinion and knowledge. Consider the act of faith in which rational ground for the belief is explicitly denied. Consider the meaningfulness, and very real possibility of achievement (though not at the time accomplished), in Pascal's



famous prayer, "I believe Lord! Oh heal thou my unbelief." Thus, let us grant that there is a difference between simple belief assertion and belief judgment. But granting this, we must face the dragon of that threatened infinite regress.

I believe we can find this to be a Chinese dragon--that is, a sign of the prospering of the analysis. The challenge is this: if judgmental belief involves both believing X and believing that believing X is justified, then won't the condition of rational grounding which is essential to the ideas of judgment require that the second believing itself be grounded in a third believing, and thus in a fourth, and so on? I am sure that there are persons whose beliefs logically, even if never psychologically involve a three-fold hierarchical grounding, i.e. the belief that believing that believing X is justified is justified. Logically, one can construct, and existentially we can uncover, even more complex structures of belief. However, at some point, both logically and existentially (the latter much sooner of course) the belief incorporates all belief commitments, so that any commitment that is a logical ground of the incorporating belief is no longer a belief but a valuation. We can put this in a simpler way: Believing that believing X is justified can only occur in conditions in which believing X is prompted by grounds (reasons) of belief which are believed to be adequate. At

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some point in appraising the adequacy of a belief of adequacy, all available grounds will have been considered. Logically this comes at the point of judging, as Spinoza described it, sub specie aeternitatis; existentially for any given finite person it comes when all evidence practically available has been considered. A <sup>case</sup> belief of believing X justified that is prompted by consideration of all practically available grounds contains its own methodological interior moment of justification; a belief that that belief is justified would not be a belief requiring any additional grounds of justification.

For simplicity, I shall hereinafter consider that since we are concerned with beliefs only as they occur in belief-judgments, we can speak simply of beliefs as a class of judgment. Should possibility of ambiguity arise, we can always revert to the unabbreviated language.

Psychologically, every belief judgment contains that interior moment of justification in its one justificatory belief, for this is the belief that believing X is justified and this means believing that grounds have been adequately considered. Of course, not all beliefs are belief judgments. Some may be conditioned responses and others recognized to be beliefs not adequately grounded. Following the tradition of Plato's translators--and a major stream of ordinary language usage but not all of it--we can call the latter opinions.

Going back from the perspective of a particular belief judgment, hierarchies can often be constructed or uncovered, but each level will always involve only two beliefs: (1) believing X and (2) believing that believing X is justified. Thus we need not ascribe further complexity than this to any individual belief.

Now let us consider valuations and commendations as forms of judgment. I am arguing that all valuations are judgments; thus a valuation is logically always a dual assertion: (a) an expression of a valuative and (b) an expression of a belief that the valuative assertion is justified as a principle of action or as the basis of a principle of action. (The first disjunct here applies to valuations centering on valuative intentions and the second to valuations centering on valuative attentions. The issues here will, of course, be discussed in later sections.) In an analogous way, all commendations are judgments, i.e. each is dually (a) a commending plus (b) a belief that what is commended is justified as a principle of action for the agent(s) to whom the commendation is made.

Note that there is this difference of logical structure between valuations and commendations: Valuations result from valuatives (pro, neutral, con responses) plus reasoning, but there are no proto-forms of commendation that are not

judgments. To commend without believing that one's commendation is the most justified way of acting for the agent(s) addressed is to use language deceptively; a rule of correct use is violated, namely B-1 of the rules given on page 12 in the Introduction to the study. However, valuatives that are not valuations are perfectly correct and very common in discourse, as we have noted, e.g. "I really want to, but I shouldn't," "I like smoking, but I don't think it is a good thing to do."

As evidence for, and illustration of, this analysis that belief, valuation, and commendation are the forms of judgment in the above defined sense and other modes of assertion are not, consider the following examples. Note that for a judgment the assertion about justification cannot without contradiction be made extraneous to the meaning, but for non-judgments the justification assertion is clearly external to the meaning.

Belief judgment:

(1) I believe X, but I doubt the belief is justified.

I submit that this is contradictory unless it is interpreted in some such way as:

(1') I have belief feelings about X [a product of conditioning or a rational prompting of some evidence] but I don't really believe X. [and to this might be added, "...but I don't disbelieve it either."]

Value judgment:

- (2) X is good, but I don't believe I am justified in doing X.

This, I think, is contradictory unless interpreted in some such way as the following:

- (2') X is good for most people [or: is generally believed to be good], but I don't believe it is good (i.e. the best thing) for me.

Or:

- (2'') I like X, but it really wouldn't be good for me to take X as a goal of action [...at this time].

Commendation judgment:

- (3) It would be good for you to take that course, but I don't think that it is a justified thing to do.

This, too, is contradictory, I believe, unless we interpret it:

- (3') Taking the course would do you some good, but I don't think it is the good (i.e. the best) thing for you to do.

If the latter part of number 3 were done sotto voce, we could make this interpretation:

- (3'') It is my official duty to advise you to take the course, but personally I don't think it is a justified thing for you to do. [i.e. it is not my personal advice].

The notion here of a self acting as more than one agency we shall consider later.

In contrast to the above three examples, in the following

cases the justificatory factors seem clearly external to the meaning:

Valuative vs. valuation, thus belief:

- (4) I like (want, desire, wish for) it, but it would not be good to get it.

Command vs. valuation, thus belief:

- (5) Lieutenant: We will attack at midnight, (then in sotto voce) but I suspect it is a damn fool thing to do.

Note that it is not logically necessary to consider that the lieutenant is passing on orders here to avoid contradiction; there is no incoherence in originating a command that one does not think good to issue, though it is logically odd in a contextual implication sense, and this we shall consider later.

Exercitive enstatement vs. valuation and/or belief:

- (6) Justice of the peace: By the authority vested in me by the state, I hereby pronounce you husband and wife, (then to himself) but I doubt this one will last.

Postulative enstatement vs. belief:

- (7) Logician, beginning a reductio ad absurdum argument: Let us suppose that p is equivalent to q....

These examples would seem to make clear that judgments analytically require belief in the justification of the assertion, but non-judgmental forms do not, though valuations operative in the context may make a justification

logically required.

Obviously there are close logical and existential relationships among the three kinds of judgment. Commendations presuppose valuations, and valuations presuppose beliefs; but beliefs in turn presuppose commendations accepted (establishing public policies in regard to language use and truth-seeking), and these in turn presuppose valuations. There is a clear sense in which valuations and beliefs are more basic in justification processes than commendations, but which of the two is more basic? Neither, I shall argue later: they are equally basic in the justificatory process.

#### 4. Assertion and Intentionality

If the cognitive element in human discourse can only occur as a part of some context of assertion, than in seeking to understand linguistic pronouncement and its relationship to mental activity, we can focus our attention on assertion. Discursive mental activity, i.e. that which is semantically expressible in language, must be basically act-assertional, even though we can focus attention on abstract aspects of such activity which need not be; one (perhaps the) prime example of such abstractive awareness is, we have seen, statemental consciousness, i.e., that awareness which is an instantiation of the meaning of the cognitive sentence

considered apart from any mode of assertion.

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 An assertion is always a response of an agent to some object--an expressing of some mental-act relationship between the agent as a center of active response and that which is responded to. Believing, valuing, directing action, and enstating are, I have claimed, the four basic modes of mental discursive activity. To describe mental discursive activity in this way is to adopt the concept of mind presented by Franz Brentano in the 19th Century: mind is manifested in modes of intentionality, ways of being directed to an object.<sup>7</sup> This directiveness to objects is basically something known to each conscious agent as the fundamental form of every state of consciousness. To be conscious, aware, is to be a self which is conscious of something and responding in some active way to the object of consciousness. There is no such thing as a purely passive consciousness, for to be aware is to have acted upon or reacted to what is given as the object of consciousness in at least cognitive classificatory ways if not also normative ways, the latter being acts of valuing and of initiating action on the basis of some combination of cognitive and valuing responses. Believing, valuing, directing, and enstating are the basic modes of conscious intentionality.

<sup>7</sup>Franz Brentano, Psychologie, vol. I, bk. 2.



However, an intentionality of mind is more than a certain directedness or "posture" of consciousness. It also includes the self-controlled goal-directive behavior in which consciousness is manifested and which is woven together with consciousness in intricate causal patterns which flow from dominantly conscious orientations of mind into dominantly behavioral orientations and vice versa.

Every kind of intentionality has its behavioral correlates, of course, but the notion that one can define intentionality behaviorally would seem on the face of it confused in a question begging way, for how could we understand something as belief behavior or valuing behavior or directing or enstating behavior if we had no fundamental states of consciousness which gave meaning and coherence to what is physically observable? We could not read such significances into patterns of behavior if we were not provided with such modalities of intentionality in the immediacies of our conscious experience. Professor Roderick Chisholm has done an extraordinarily clear and thorough job of analyzing the various kinds of circularity involved in attempts to define intentionality behaviorally.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>R. M. Chisholm, Perceiving (Ithaca, 1957), pp. 168-185; Also cf. his Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Glencoe, 1960). On the same topic cf. J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions, pp. 36-43.

This is not to say that the four basic modes of intentionality, or any of their immediate sub-modes, are categorial concepts. As I am using the word 'category' it applies only to ultimate concepts of unity in human experience. Believing, valuing, etc. are basic kinds of similarity generalization, but not categorial. (In terms of the classification given on page 92 in Part I, they are instances of I-A-c, not I-A-b). The concept of intentionality itself, of a state of consciousness, I would describe as a conceptual ultimate, as Brentano, Chisholm, and Findlay do, though it is neither a concrete particular, nor an ultimate form of conceptual unity (category), nor a basic similarity generalization. Like space and time, and perhaps some other ideas involved in the concept of existence, such as "world" or "nature" I would describe it as an ultimate status of being concept, leaving to one's intuitional awareness the grasping of the quite conspicuous difference between a concept of an ultimate status of being and a concept of an ultimate mode of relatedness in human experience.<sup>9</sup> (Cf. I-A-1-d in Part I, Sec. 12.)

<sup>9</sup>Some philosophers, J. N. Findlay, E. M. Adams and Everett Hall, for example, take the word 'category' to include both what I have called concepts of ultimate forms of unity and concepts of ultimate status of being in experience. However, in his book What Is Value? Professor Hall goes to great lengths to establish the meaningfulness of speaking of the two kinds of ultimate concepts, existence and value being ultimate status concepts for him. Cf. Findlay, Values and Intentions, pp. 35-36; E. M.

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At this point in the study I am more concerned to present as clearly as possible this concept of mind, patterned on the approach of Brentano, which is presupposed and used throughout the study that I am to present systematically the evidence for the theory. I am proceeding on the assumption that one of the most effective ways to argue for a theory of this sort is to show how it contributes to an adequate and illuminating explication of an area of discourse--in this case that fundamental dimension called the language of practical discourse. Toward the end of the study we will turn explicitly to the question of justification in appraising the general theory of mental activity in language presented in the study.

I have noted that while intentional awareness is central in the mind's intentionality, the latter is a broader concept, including in addition both dispositions and physical behavior which is explainable by reference to mental causality, i.e. by reference to conscious orientations of the mind as crucial factors in the causal explanation of actions. Intentionality so conceived, as a composite of intentional awareness and intention-manifesting physical behavior, calls

Adams, "A Defense of Value Realism," Southern Journal of Philosophy, IV, 3 (Fall, 1966), 164 f; Everett Hall, What Is Value? (New York, 1952). Also Cf. his Philosophical Systems: A Categorical Analysis (Chicago, 1960).

for recognition of the distinction between attentions and intentions.

(48) An attention is a focusing of awareness. It necessarily involves a cognitive element in the distinction and recognition of the "that" which is focused upon. If such an awareness constitutes the total content of the attention, I shall call it a cognitive attention. It is conceiving of something in a particular cognitive way--how the thing is seen--as a state of consciousness. The object of conscious attention is what is described in the propositional element in every assertion. As is obvious, the state of affairs fulfilling this cognitive awareness may or may not exist. The relation of its existence to the justification of a particular assertion expressing semantically the mental intentional state will depend both on the nature of the assertion and the relationship of that mental state to the achieved and achievable body of knowledge and the achieved and achievable body of values of the agent.

(49) If the conclusion reached above about the necessarily abstractive nature of cognition is correct, then cognitive attention will always be an abstraction <sup>aspect of</sup> in a state of intentionality, which will include in addition some assertional state of mind in regard to the cognitive attention. The assertional element is a manifestation of the mind's

conative response to something cognized. The conative response may be, in part, ingredient in a state of awareness. As a part of an awareness, I shall call it a conative attention. Conative attentions are either valuative or dispositional in their conative character. A valuative attention is an immediate feeling texture of experience describable as a pro or con response to the cognitive aspect of the situation. I think we can speak meaningfully of a neutral conative attention, meaning an attention occurring without a pro or con response where the agent has consciously provided an opportunity for such a response. This pro or con response is usually described as the feeling component of an emotion. The relationship of emotions, such as love (pro) or anger (con) to designata of the words 'pleasure' (pro) and 'pain' (con) will be considered later.

I shall consider an attention conative but non-valuative when the conative aspect (motivating aspect) consists, not in a pro or con feeling or response, but in an expression of a dispositional tendency. A state of consciousness very often lacks the direct valuative character but is nevertheless conative, either through the experiencing of a particular tendency to act in a certain way in response to what is cognitively presented or through experiencing a dispositional tendency to do what is cognitively judged to be the rational

or prudential thing to do. That is, the experienced conative factor may be itself the experiencing of the dispositional tendency to do what is judged to be a fulfillment of one's rational intentions, and these may be directed toward valuative attentions in the future, though the valuative character is not directly experienced at the time of acting. Professor Findlay describes this very common situation very aptly in the passage quoted earlier.

One may object that in such a situation there is no conative experiencing, only cognitive awareness which includes awareness of one's dispositional tendencies. This is probably in some circumstances true, but I do not believe that it can be taken as a description that is always complete. It does seem to me to make sense to say that there can be an immediate experiential aspect of disposition manifestation. However, this is not a point of any structural significance in our analysis; since its truth or falsity is irrelevant to the development of the analysis, I am content to show how a conclusion either way could be handled within the explication being made in this study, and leave the matter there.

It might seem that we could speak of mental acts which are purely cognitive attention acts without any involvement of conative (and thus assertional) factors. Certainly by

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the abstractive powers of selective attention we can be mindful, heeding, in only a cognitive attention way, this constituting the total of our conscious experience at a particular time. But the conscious experience is only part of the mental act involved. The attention experience would not occur or continue if there were not conative factors involved, such as end-and-means valuations, and possibly belief or an enstative or directive act, such as thinking of the proposition in a postulating way or questioning way. In a specific frame of mental activity these aspects may be present only as dispositional tendencies, but the cognitive attention would not, and could not, occur without them. Of course conative mental activity does not require for its occurrence overt physical behavior (we can wish, postulate, question, etc. silently without making an observable movement), though I have argued that mature and complex mental activity does require the activity of language using, which does require the operation of a number of mental processes in the imagination, such as remembering, recognizing instances of abstraction, envisaging, accepting conventions and following directives, etc.

This discussion of why there are no purely cognitive attention mental acts clearly indicates that mental intentionality includes much more than attentions. Complementary

to attentions are intentions. An intention is an accepting of a directive to action. It is the generalizing process which is natural and may or may not be rational. It is natural for conative pro attentions to give rise to pro intentions and for con attentions to generate con intentions. For example, a painful experience tends naturally to give rise to an intention to avoid such experiences. However, such a movement from conative attention to conative intention can be irrational, as when one imprudently seeks or indulges a type of pleasure experience which is destructive of more or a higher value than is gained, or avoids a painful way of acting which would be justified for the values it leads to.

On the other hand, the generalization would seem justified (I shall consider it further later) that every rationally justified conative intention has its ground in valuative attentions. However, as John Stuart Mill noted (<sup>using other</sup> ~~in other~~ language) conative intentions are not necessarily so grounded: a person's consciousness and behavior can manifest dispositions to actions, i.e. conscious and subconscious tendencies in choosing, which are not governed by their relationship to valuative attention experiences.<sup>10</sup> Conditioned-response frames of mind are prime examples here.

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<sup>10</sup>J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 4.



Such manifesting of conative intentions independent of valuative attentions can occur (and do occur very extensively) even through extended processes of making reasoned choices. That which serves as a motive or reason of action is that which prompts action when <sup>taken account of</sup> ~~considered~~, and since there can be a conditioned-response relationship between the prompting ground and the action, very elaborate "reasoning" processes can be carried out and acted on where valuative attentions do not function as the determining grounds. <sup>Fixed has made us very aware of this character of human</sup> ~~Of course, valu-~~ action <sup>ation</sup> ~~ative attentions can function as the determining grounds of action and the "choice" still be correctly describable as a dominantly conditioned-response process. This whole issue of the factual and justificatory relationship of grounds of action to action needs much explication, which it is a prime function of ensuing sections to undertake. The point here is to note that, while conative (including valuative) attentions and conative intentions usually occur in intricate complexes, manifesting the intentionality of an agent, valuative attentions do not necessarily lead to their corresponding valuative intentions, and conative intentions are not necessarily derived from any valuative attentions.~~

One may well ask whether every intention is not by its very nature conative and thus whether there is not a redundancy in speaking of conative intentions. But there is a

kind of intentionality (where the mind is directed to an object) that is independent of any direct manifestation of motivational tendency toward the object. It is the intentionality manifested in (using Findlay's description) "what something is conceived as, or how it is conceived," which is distinguishable from "what our state of mind is moving towards, and how it is moving towards this."<sup>11</sup> Findlay demarks this as a distinction between primary and secondary intentionality respectively; I am describing it as a distinction between purely cognitive intentionality and conative intentionality, noting that the former is always isolable only as an abstraction from some context of conative intentionality. Within conative intentionality there is a distinction between that which is valuative intentionality and that which is not, which is roughly parallel to the distinction drawn among conative attentions. A valuative intention is any conative intention either (a) directly conjoined with valuative attentions or (b) consciously accepted on the basis of valuative attentions. We have noted that there are also conative intentions which are manifestations of dispositions not reflecting such valuative attention conjunctiveness or grounding.

Leaving much unresolved at this point about the nature of conative attentions and conative intentions, to be worked

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<sup>11</sup>Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 136.

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on in later sections, I want to turn attention now to some further delineation of the general structural features of intentionality, this structure also to be worked over in detail in later sections. Intentionality manifests the following four basic structural components:

- (1) A proposition
- (2) A conative ground
- (3) A directive
- (4) A volition

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7  
The proposition, the cognitive element in intentionality, characteristically involves a cognitive attention in a very dominant and central way (i.e. awareness of what one is intending to do), but since we can describe intentional behavior which is goal-directive, and thus involves in its concept a propositional element but which can be manifested without the occurrence of cognitive attention, it would seem advisable not to identify the propositional element with the cognitive attention experience. The conative ground is the motivating and direction-giving part of the intentionality. We have seen that it can be either a conative attention or a conative intention, the latter being either directly or indirectly a manifestation of one or more dispositions to act. The directive element in intentionality must have the form either of a command or a prescription (i.e., it cannot be a

commendation or request),<sup>12</sup> for in a mental act there must be an aspect of the self which functions as the authority giving a directive to action.<sup>13</sup> Essential to intentionality is the accepting of a directive. The most controversial part of the analysis of intentionality made in this study is the explication made of the concept of volition, the act of willing something. I shall argue in later sections that volition cannot be analyzed in terms of the other elements of intentionality, but rather constitutes a manifestation of causal efficacy of the self in a categorially ultimate way.

The general presentation of the nature and structure of intentionality made in this section and the following one, are intended to set forth the general theoretical framework for the detailed discussions for the remaining sections of this Part II.

### 5. Intentionality and Modes of Consciousness

*I have noted that the concept developed in*

Professor J. N. Findlay, in Values and Intentions, also,

*this study has one which follows the general*  
 as I have noted, develops a concept of mind along the lines  
*of the approach of Brentano. In the course of doing this he*  
 presents what he refers to as an analysis of modes of

<sup>12</sup>Cf. Introduction for a description of the four kinds of directives.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. III-D for discussion of the choosing self.

*1 Values & Intentions*

*mental activity*

consciousness. Since a state of consciousness is a manifestation of intentionality on the Brentano approach, this analysis could also be considered as a further kind of explication of intentionality. Findlay takes note of five modes, each a distinctive kind of structuring or "posing" of consciousness which constitutes a dimension exhibiting a polarity in terms of which a particular state of consciousness is made significantly determinate. The general validity of the analysis appears to be <sup>readily</sup> ~~easily~~ confirmable by appeal to each individual's awareness of <sup>obvious</sup> ~~patent~~ structural features within his <sup>own</sup> conscious experience, <sup>The applicability of the analysis to</sup> ~~and it will be obvious that~~ <sup>some features of consciousness which are relevant to</sup> ~~the classification has considerable relevance for an ex-~~ <sup>plaining</sup> ~~plication~~ of human activity which is pursuant to an explication of the language and experience of valuation.

These are the five modes of consciousness Professor Findlay distinguishes:

(1) Focused versus non-focused aspects of attention:

Within any attention state there is that which is clearly in focus as the center of attention and that which is present only peripherally, not in focus. Findlay describes this as a distinction between what is clearly present to mind and what is obscurely present, but his terminology seems to me more misleading than one in terms of focus within an intentional experience.

(2) Fulfilled versus unfulfilled awareness:

In description of this structural dimension, Professor Findlay states:

"Conscious orientations have as their one extreme a state in which that of which they are conscious is fully and concretely present, actually apprehended or 'given': at their other extreme they have a state in which what they are of is merely indicated, foreshadowed, vestigially suggested, present merely in a reduced, attenuated or surrogate form. Husserl's metaphor of an 'empty' conscious intention to which certain intuitive materials provide the appropriate 'filling', hits the distinction as well as possible. For in both cases we have fundamentally the same consciousness, with the same scope and the same range of near or remote application, but in the one case it grasps, as it were, vainly in the void, whereas in the other case it is 'fulfilled' or 'satisfied'. What it is important to stress is that both poles of the above antithesis are essential to anything that we should care to call 'consciousness' or 'awareness', and not only both poles, but also a continuous, restless shuttling between them. To be consciously alive to anything is to move constantly, at least in intention or by approximation, towards a pole where all that we are conscious of will be adequately displayed, illustrated or envisaged: it is equally a state in which the shown is always surrounded by a great deal that is merely prefigured or foreshadowed. Without some limit of fully realized presence or authentic givenness towards which we at least always aspire, and at which we at least in some partial or fragmented fashion at times arrive, our states of mind could not be said to be really of anything, nor could they in consequence merit the designation of 'conscious'.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions, pp. 51-52.

(3) Variations of conscious "light" or sense:

The range of variability here in regard to the propositional element in intentionality is that of "conscious intent."

Findlay notes:

This is the sort of variability brought out by asking the somewhat sophisticated question 'As what are you conscious of whatever thing or set of things or field of things you are conscious of?' The question may be sophisticated, but the kind of datum it is intended to elicit is anything but recondite: such data are alike characteristic of the most commonplace observational as of the most remotely discursive situation. Obviously it makes a world of difference whether we see what is before us as merely being there, or as being a number of solid material objects, or as consisting of brick houses interspersed with persons, or as being different from what we saw the moment before, or as being likely to collapse on attack, etc. etc.<sup>15</sup>

Findlay considers only purely descriptive variability here, but we might also well include the kind of normative variation which Meinong refers to as the variation in "emotional presentation," e.g. the night may seem "sombre," or as "soft," "terrifying" or "inviting."

(4) Reflexive versus projective modes:

This is the simple but patent distinction between outward-turned consciousness and inward-turned, self-directed or

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<sup>15</sup>J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 57.

introspective consciousness.

(5) "Drifts" of consciousness:

(59) This is the nisus of the mind to move, on the one hand, toward greater analysis, greater acquaintance with details of structure, towards "exhaustive determination," and on the other hand to move toward a more encompassing synthesis of data, tentatively "finalized" at most given times in the endless quest by the acceptance of some systematic organization of the data as the "totality" as conceived at that time. Like Kant and James, Findlay sees these polar nisi of the mind (toward determinateness and toward totalistic synthesis) as providing the basis of the reasoning and ordering activities of the mind. This character of consciousness tends to bring the other modes into its service. Development of one's understanding of any subject or object calls for becoming acquainted with the object of understanding through variation of foci of attention (#1), variation of the light in which the object is seen (#3), movement from unfulfilled to fulfilled awareness (#2), and relating one's inner experiences to outer experiences and vice versa and behavior of other selves to their inner experiences (#4).

(60) In the course of a very excellent description of the importance to mental functioning of the synthesis-seeking modality of mind, Findlay makes these observations:



...if consciousness has a natural nisus towards reflection and projection, it will have also, we may hold, a tendency to use these to sharpen its notion of objectivity by rendering to the object the things that are the object's, and to its own activity those that are its own.<sup>16</sup>

(6)

If consciousness thus presses towards experiences where the pattern of objects resists and quarrels with our own purely subjective tendencies, and so makes conformity to the object's pattern a curious mixture of painful constraint and overriding satisfaction, it must also necessarily seek to secure conformity with the conscious orientations of others. What is objective, in the sense of constraining us to think in a certain manner, and showing marked indifference to some of our conscious variations (clearness, fullness, angle, order, etc.), must also, we feel, constrain others as it does ourselves, and must show as marked an indifference to their conscious variations as it does to our own. In other words, we cannot help extending the objective pattern that constrains us to those with whom we people the social space around us, and we must make it constrain them as it constrains us.<sup>17</sup>

(6)

[Thus, there is a] two-way nisus towards communication: a tendency on the one hand to impose our conscious orientations on others, and, on the other hand, to conform our orientations to theirs. By either route we achieve the characteristic goal of consciousness, the having of an object which is more of an object because it is an object for many or for all. Even vagrant fancy seeks to spread its notions to wider ranges of auditors or readers, and all speech subserves this single aim. Conscious experience may therefore be said by

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<sup>16</sup>Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 86.

<sup>17</sup>pp. 87-88.

its very nature to pursue and prefer what is public and open: the real physical thing or situation which is patently there for many persons, as opposed to the private illusion or hallucination, which is only deviously connected with what is patently there, the thought-content that can be unambiguously communicated and readily applied, as opposed to the thought-content which is hard in either respect, the thought-development that follows rules as opposed to the thought-development that seems arbitrary and idiosyncratic, etc. etc. Even in solitary discourse we must after a fashion pluralize ourselves: we vary viewpoints, we raise objections, we accommodate approaches that are independent and diverse. And what is most personal in our subjective life achieves importance, even for ourselves, to the extent that it can be widely communicated, brought down by analogy and metaphor into the arena of common discussion and shown to involve a predicament common to all. We value our inner life above everything not because it is unsharable, but because its sharing is so rewardingly difficult, because its communication represents the last victory of articulate universality over particular privacy. It in fact brings to full publicity the very privacy which characterizes us all.

If all conscious experience, to the extent that it is conscious, may be held to involve a nisus towards the open and common, it may be held also to involve a nisus away from all arbitrary one-sided dwelling in particular conscious approaches. Since an object is essentially such as to reveal itself through a multitude of approaches, and to be unaffected by many of their peculiarities, it would be running counter to the whole direction of consciousness to prefer one such approach arbitrarily to another.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>pp. 88-89.

...the interest of consciousness in what is objective must tend to make it lay equal weight on, or make equal use of, all its impressions of one object, rather than concentrate this weight or use on some of them.<sup>19</sup>

A tendency, therefore, towards an impartial equalization of the 'lights' in which things are viewed or thought of by different persons, or by the same person on different occasions, is accordingly to be reckoned as part and parcel of a conscious orientation to objects.<sup>20</sup>

He concludes:

Mind is nothing if not a viewing of things in lights that are general, which extend themselves naturally to ever further cases, and the thought of things in an explicitly universal perspective is in a sense merely a making plain of a spirit in which we have always operated, and a seeing of things in terms of it.<sup>21</sup>

It is not my point to present Findlay's analysis of modes of consciousness as something to be accepted in the study without further question. I bring it in at this point in the study because we are about to launch upon a study of the nature of mental intentionality in some detail, and it will be useful to us to have Findlay's analysis for points of reference. His last mentioned modality raises most questions and some very significant ones for the concerns of this

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<sup>19</sup>p. 89.

<sup>20</sup>pp. 89-90.

<sup>21</sup>p. 92.

study. One can strongly challenge whether the drifts towards determinateness and totalistic synthesis are as endemic of the very nature of intentionality, as strongly "necessary" and pervasive features in the functioning of the mind as Findlay takes them to be. Perhaps, as Mill suggests, and the existentialists even more explicitly, these are given at most as tendencies or even as capacities that require conscious and environmental development. We shall be especially concerned at some later points in the study with appraising the significance of such theories of nisi--especially in considering the issue of the rational grounding of values, the grounds of participatory valuation, and the grounds of radical individuality in basic valuation. Our more immediate concern, however, is with their possible contribution to our understanding of intentionality itself.

62 B. VALUATIVE ATTENTIONS AND INTENTIONS

6. Valuative Assertion

Valuative assertions are the heart of practical discourse--as a matter of fact of all discourse. They manifest the dynamic element of human experience in its fundamental forms and establish the goal-directiveness, the sense of purpose, in all human action. "It is a character of the

What is the static element?

↳ The receptive, intuitive, "inner" elements.

human mind to be for or against things," Ralph Barton Perry noted, <sup>22</sup> ~~in his Theory of Value and I would agree that this character is the basis of all valuations.~~ Value has its roots in the pros and cons of human response to what is presented or imagined in human experience. The reason-mediated pro responses are the matter of judgments of good, right, and ought; and reason-mediated con responses are the substance of judgments of badness, wrong, and ought not. Neutrality as a valuative concept applies in situations where an agent's awareness brings neither a pro nor a con response. Thus a neutral valuative is distinguished from no valuative at all by the fact that the agent has given attention to making a valuative response but no pro or con response resulted from this attention. Valuative assertions, <sup>are constituted</sup> I have noted, ~~is~~ composed of valuative attentions and intentions. Let us consider each of these in turn and then their interrelationship.

### 7. Valuative Attentions

Valuative attentions are kinds of states of consciousness, schematized by behavior and manifested through behavior, but essentially non-behavioral. Generally, an attention is a

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<sup>22</sup> (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 115.

particular focusing in consciousness. A valuative attention is a focusing of consciousness which manifests the character of an immediate feeling response to something presented in consciousness which can be characterized as a feeling of prizing or disprizing, appreciating or disappreciating. This pro or con response is necessarily passive in its immediate character, for one cannot directly choose to have a pro or con response; it is something that just happens. However, within bounds one can choose to develop capabilities and dispositions of having certain kinds of valuative attentions, and in this broader sense we can speak of choice here.

*This answer to me correct.*

*The roots of all valuation*

The roots of all valuation lie specifically in valuative attentions. Valuative intentions--goal-directedness or commitment to principle--are derived, when they are rationally developed and controlled, from valuative attentions. But to say thus that value has its <sup>ultimate source</sup> ~~nexus~~ in pro and con responses as characteristics of states of consciousness is not to espouse analytic hedonism, though it might be considered to come close to it. A pro response is not of clear conceptual (i.e. logical) necessity a response of pleasure, nor is a con response clearly one of displeasure or pain. Rather, as some philosophers have argued, the achieving of pleasure might presuppose a sustained pro response that functions as a basis of gratification, and pain might in many cases--

though certainly not in all--presuppose a con response as a cause. On this analysis, pleasure and pain are resultant phenomena, not part of the very meaning of a pro response-- even if a pro response is itself pleasurable and a con response not pleasant.

Whether or not a valuative attention response itself has hedonic character, this is not that which is conceptually fundamental to it: rather its basic content consists in the manifestation of an emotion, such as a feeling of love, anger, respect, indignation, liking, etc.<sup>23</sup> The pro and con classification is established by the character of the emotional response, not by the pleasure or pain supervenient upon this. Anger is still a con response, even when one finds being angry pleasant and love still a pro response even when one experiences pain in it. However, in some cases the pleasure and pain may not be supervenient, but rather these terms may designate the pro or con emotion itself. Can one distinguish the pleasure of a love experience from the emotional quality of the experience itself? Even talk of supervenience would seem a multiplication of entities.

<sup>23</sup>I am not suggesting that these feelings could exist or have identity except as components of patterns of behavior; valuatives characteristically exist as attention-intention complexes, each aspect in intricate existential dependency on the other.

*Reverts*

beyond what is necessary to account for the full character of the experience. But in other cases there may seem to be no emotion involved except what could be called the pleasure or pain response to what is experienced. Clive Bell notwithstanding, non-expressive esthetic experiences would appear to be examples of such pure pleasure response, and pain from bodily injury may involve no other kind of feeling than the pain itself. Granting this, we can say that 'pleasure' and 'pain' can refer to specific kinds of pro and con response, but these are not words whose meanings are logically definitive of a response being pro or con.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, we do not conceptually eliminate the possibility of psychological hedonism ~~or~~ ethical hedonism but show them to be substantive claims. Ethical hedonism is the claim that the rational thing to do is to develop pro and con attentions and intentions on the basis of the principle to maximize (in a qualitative and quantitative way) all kinds of feelings commonly called feelings of pleasure and minimize all kinds called feelings of pain. The basing of valuation

*These should not be considered.*

*Of not least, psych. hed. is false. But if hedonism is not a regulation of ethical hedonism, a thing to do.*

*? Old complaint findings?*

*sb*

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<sup>24</sup>Findlay, and others, have sought to define pleasure and pain so that analytic hedonism becomes true but trivial, i.e. to equate them with pro and con responses respectively. (Cf. Findlay, Values and Intentions, pp. 176-178.) My remarks above I hope indicate why I believe this an unjustified terminological procedure. There are important substantive issues involved.



on pro and con valuative attentions thus leaves quite coherent (whether or not justified) the claim of the non-intuitional deontologist that one can respond to a way of acting or a principle of action, or a set of principles, with a pro or con emotion which is not pro because one finds pleasure in acting on the principle or contemplating it or finds pleasure in the way of life that leads to, or con because one finds pain in acting upon it, but rather the response is pro or con simply because rational awareness results in a pro feeling (love, sense of respect, sense of importance, sense of beauty, etc.) or a con feeling (dislike, sense of repugnance, sense of unimportance, ugliness, etc.), and thus pleasure and pain are at most consequential phenomena of the pro and con responses.

On such an understanding of pro and con responses, the consequential pleasure and pain may or may not be considered to be universal or correlated in any strict way of quality of pleasure or pain with the basicness of the response. That is, there would be no logical necessity to say that a pro response to a principle that made <sup>the principle</sup> it very basic in one's reason-grounded hierarchy of values must necessarily be correlated with achieving a correspondingly summum quality of pleasure in acting on the principle. For example, (and this is one of the examples most commonly given to illustrate

this kind of non-hedonic interpretation of pro and con response), one could have a very highly reason-mediated response of respect for the principle of justice (taken, let us say, as a principle of acting always with fairness), or the principle of humanitarian concern, without that experience of importance or respect being also an experience of pleasure or without its being accompanied by the belief that acting on these principles will give maximum pleasure.

This conclusion--that pro and con responses seem coherently conceivable in a non-hedonistic way--cannot itself be taken as establishable absolutely. Sometimes the evidence for a conceptual analysis permits us to make the strong claim that alternate analyses must be incoherent, but there are many cases--and I think the issue at hand is one--in which it would seem wise to make conceptual proposals in a probabilistic spirit (though it has <sup>not</sup> been <sup>an</sup> ~~far from~~ a common practice in philosophy to do this). I have argued that it appears to be conceivable that pro and con responses can be ~~conceived non-hedonistically~~ <sup>in character</sup>, but this may ~~be an error in~~ <sup>not be so</sup> conceptual analysis: possibly a pro-attention response is of conceptual necessity a "finding-pleasure-in" response. In classifying a love feeling as a pro response and an anger feeling as a con response, have we already taken into account the pleasure in the love feeling and the pain in the anger?

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Are pleasure and pain ingredient in these emotions in such a way that <sup>the structure</sup> they are inconceivable apart from their hedonic character? Here is a point where analysis of ordinary language ~~patterns of use~~ is, I suspect, of no real help in resolving the conceptual problem: a phenomenological approach is required. This is notoriously less reliable, but it is not therefore dispensable if we are committed to a methodology of clarification that adopts the empirical procedural norm that less reliable analytic and confirmatory operations are acceptable if they are the best available to us <sup>for better</sup> to take adequate account of the data. It would seem a less consistently empirical and more rationalistically oriented procedure to legislate the problem out of the realm of meaningful discourse or "settle it" by a shallow kind of ordinary language appeal rather than risk further compromise in a quest for certainty.

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I am concerned in this analysis to remain as close to conceptual and phenomenological necessities as possible, <sup>but</sup> basing distinctions as far as possible on analysis of patterns of language uses. Our prime question is: What must we say about the nature of mental activity, the processes of valuing, and the language we use in valuing, in order to explicate the meaning of value language in a way that is fitting and illuminating?

In summary, I have argued in this section that valuing has its roots in certain states of consciousness, namely those feelings states which have the character of being pro or con responses. I have argued that such feeling states are aspects of emotions (aspects because emotions as a whole are processes involving conative intentions, including dispositions, as well as the occurrent phenomena of states of consciousness). The justification of this analysis will be most fully given in the course of analyzing what is involved in giving a rational justification of a value judgment. I shall seek to show that appeal to conative attention is always required in such a justificatory process, and that in certain contexts it has a kind of ultimacy that no other kind of reason can have. At this point in the study this analysis of attentions and assigning to them of a fundamental role in valuations may appear ungrounded, except as one's common sense awareness of the process of valuation ~~and indicates that justification, which I hope to make explicit as~~ ~~the study develops.~~

I shall seek to show that the roles which valuative attentions play in valuation require, or at least strongly justify, our conceiving of pro and con feeling states on textural patterns rather than episodic patterns. They are not Rylean sensation-like twinges, pangs, and throbs, but

textures of consciousness, feeling states. We noted earlier that a sensation-like phenomenon (a twinge, throb, etc.) logically cannot be a state of consciousness on the Brentano approach adopted in this study, for a state of consciousness is a manifestation of intentionality, thus of a self responding in a distinctive ~~mental~~ way to an object. Thus, what Ryle takes to be the whole content of consciousness--the sensory and sensory-like phenomena--can only be aspects of consciousness. The fact that states of consciousness are intricately interrelated with correlative behavior, and presented through that behavior (cf. discussion in Part I of how a consciousness requires a physical medium of manifestations and is "saturated" into physical behavior) has made superficially plausible those analyses, such as Ryle's, which identify the feeling states with the behavior they impregnate plus occasional sensory phenomena. Also the fact that our language references are commonly to the feeling-behavior complexes as presenting specific states of consciousness (cf. Wittgenstein's comments, Part I, Sec. 4) and only in special circumstances directly to the feeling states alone has contributed to the sense of sufficiency in behavior-oriented analyses. As Wittgenstein so well illustrated in the passage referred to, we can best talk about states of consciousness by talking about the correlated

without  
reminders?

The as is!

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behavior--or better still, present the consciousness we are concerned with by presenting the behavior. Direct designative reference to states of consciousness are relatively unusual in discourse--but not, Wittgenstein notwithstanding, unachievable. But we tend to speak ostensively: designating the state of consciousness by talking about its schema, the behavioral context which presents the state and ties down the appropriate referential language. In regard to the general tendency of recent philosophers and psychologists to ignore such textural feeling states in their analyses, I remind the reader once again of the comment of Professor Adams: "One often sees what one's semantic field normatively requires one to see even though it is not there. Also, one may fail to see something that is there because one's semantic field does not require the experience."<sup>25</sup>

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In the conceptual realm of the creative arts (poetry, music, drama, painting, etc.) and in the perspective of being a human self living through a life-value experience the "texture of feelings states" aspect of our experience cannot be factored out without radically and conspicuously reducing the concept of that reality. Without the possibilities and actualities of richly developed and intricately structured

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<sup>25</sup>E. M. Adams, "Mental Causality," p. 562.

textures of feeling-ideational states making up a human  
 being's "subjective life," the significance of the arts in  
 human experience would be unexplainable in any rational way--  
 as would the myriad patterns of life-value behavior if  
 divorced in our explanatory systems from its manifestations  
 in the protean structures of feeling-states making up the  
 "vital dimension" of human experience. It is a basic thesis  
 of this study that much of twentieth century philosophy of  
 value has in fact been incredibly unempirical in its  
 rationalistic and ivory-towered way of approaching value  
 language and value experience with assumptions which have  
 a-priori blanked out or ignored basic dimensions of observ-  
 able data, or forced the response to and recording of data  
 into a priori atomistic and almost wholly extensionalist  
 classification systems which themselves make impossible  
 adequate philosophical explication of [language] and [the  
 human experience] presented through it. ]

### 8. Valuative Intentions

A valuative intention I have defined as an accepting  
 (willing) of a directive. Thus <sup>only an intention</sup> it has the character of being  
 a principle, or rule, or maxim of action for the agent. It  
 is that which is in a mentally causal sense a directive of  
 the agent's actions. The purposefulness, mind-directiveness,

94 of any action derives from an agent's <sup>valutive</sup> intention. Whereas valutive attentions are states of consciousness, <sup>valutive</sup> intentions are necessarily much more than <sup>states</sup> ~~states of consciousness,~~ though they may (and usually do) include states of consciousness along with dispositional characteristics.

Are all conative intentions valutive? The answer is no if it makes sense to speak of acting on a directive without that action manifesting either a pro or con feeling response or an attitude (disposition to have such responses) toward the goal of the directive or the way of acting manifested in the directive. I shall consider that an intention, to be valutive, must be conjoined with valutive attentions, either in the manner that manifestation of the intention characteristically incorporates correlative valutive attentions or that these are the reason-mediated motivational ground of the intention. There can be intentions without valutive significance; a purely habitual way of acting that nevertheless is still a mind-controllable or voluntary way of acting, can be intentional without being valutive. Any purely instrumental intention which has no distinctive valutive significance in its particular nature may be said to be non-valutive. Of two ways of getting to a destination, A and B, one chooses A rather than B, but has no preference; each is equally good or bad. In using a sentence the user



intends to communicate a particular meaning; this intention leads him to use a sentence with the appropriate intension; there may be neither pro nor con attentions associated with this particular intention, though of course there will be with the larger intention to communicate successfully and with other intentions which are furthered by the language-using instrumentality. In these cases <sup>one might</sup> ~~I would~~ classify the purely instrumental intentionality as conative but not valuat-  
<sup>if this classification could be argued about</sup> ~~ive~~, <sup>pro</sup> valuat-  
 ive. A pro valuat-  
 ive intention is one which seeks to bring about or continue the pro attentions which were in actuality or imagination the motive or mental cause of the intentional commitment, and mutatis mutandis for con valuat-  
 ive intentions. Of course, one and the same intention can be both pro and con valuat-  
 ive or conative at the same time, for it can be instrumental to both pro and con attention experiences.

### 9. Valuative Attention-Intention Complexes

Valuative intentions are thus logically dependent on  
 valuative attentions; by this fact no behavioral description of an intention can be a complete or adequate description of its valuative character. On the other hand, valuative attentions have a very strong existential dependency on valuative intentions. A valuative attention experience, either actual or anticipated, tends to generate a correlative intention

△ In such cases it becomes rather arbitrary, & quite insignificant, whether a particular intention of this kind is called valuat-ive or not.

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experience: a pro attention expressed or anticipated tends to bring about the desire to seek or maintain conditions in which the pro attention will be manifested, unless this is opposed by a stronger conflicting desire, itself derived from pro or con attentions. ~~For example, taking desire as a valuatve attention-intention complex,~~ A desire for an easeful existence may be opposed by a desire for a life of significant accomplishment; a desire for psych<sup>2</sup>o<sup>2</sup>delic experiences may be opposed by a desire not to run the risk of injuring one's health or developing habits of passivity in pleasure expectations.

Of course the development of a valuatve attention-intention complex in an individual's character ~~(development of a desire or attitude)~~ does not establish that this complex manifests a valuation (value judgment) of the individual.

~~As we noted in the previous section,~~ A valuation is a valuatve conjoined with the belief that the valuatve is a justified part of the individual's <sup>opinion</sup> ~~principles~~ of action.

"I like (enjoy, desire, want) X but I do not think it is good." has been our paradigm <sup>for</sup> ~~sentence~~ for indicating the contrast <sup>between</sup> ~~between~~ valuatve and valuation.

Valuatve attentions and intentions are woven into intricate cause and effect relationships in human experience. For example the experience of having and manifesting a

valuative intention can itself come to have a valuative attention character, i.e.: one can come to have very strong pro or con feelings associated with acting on a directive. Purposive action engenders distinctive forms of feeling life; and acting on deeply-cherished principles has an accompaniment of states of feeling that constitute a fundamental part of what is meant in saying that these actions are cherished forms of life.

10. Conation and Vision Elements  
in Valuative Attentions

The above descriptions of the dependence of valuative intentions on valuative attentions is not intended to suggest that every particular instance of expressing a valuative intention (a desire) is an instance of manifesting valuative attentions (pro or con feeling responses<sup>in states of awareness</sup>). Human beings learn to control their emotions, which is at least to say that they can express their feelings semantically without exhibiting or even experiencing them psychologically at the time of the semantic expression. An intention does not cease to be valuative because of these instances in which it is manifested purely as a conative intention, i.e. a cognitive awareness of a chosen way of action plus a disposition to act on that cognition. The description also is not intended

to deny that desires can come about in non-rational ways, i.e. through cultural conditioning, without deriving from or being directed toward valuative feelings, which is to say without being valuative intentions. I am contending that wherever desires are rationally developed or controlled, they are grounded in valuative feeling states: These determine the desirableness and the undesirableness of goals and ways of acting. Thus, feeling-state valuative experiences (valuative attentions) are, as factors in a justification process, more fundamental than desire experiences (conative attention-intention complexes).<sup>26</sup>

Iris Murdoch, in a very intriguing article which I have already referred to, "The Idea of Perfection," takes as a fundamental contrast among concepts of valuing those in which value is taken to have its foundation in "a movement of the will" and those in which it is taken as a "vision phenomenon."<sup>27</sup>

I want to argue that no adequate explication of the fundamental experience of value can make that experience one of

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<sup>26</sup>Note there is an ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of 'desire' which I have left standing in the above discussion: Sometimes 'desire' names only valuative attention-intention complexes but sometimes it is used in a broader way to name any conative attention-intention experience.

<sup>27</sup>pp. 344, 348 ff.

these without the other, though there can be, as we have noted, instances in which a desire that is generally grounded in valuative attention experiences can be only a conative attention-intention complex, i.e. only ideational-dispositional without accompanying valuative attention experiences. Recall the quote from Findlay given earlier which illustrates this point. A pro feeling response is describable both as a pro conation and as a response to something experienced as having value. That is, the conation is a response to a certain kind of vision: Liking something or desiring it is in some way "seeing it as good," seeing it in a way that calls forth the liking, desiring, wanting, i.e. the pro feeling response. Someone who responds to something with a pro feeling is seeing it differently from the person who responds to the same thing with no feeling or a con feeling. The person seen as an object of love is experienced differently from the person seen without a valuative response or as an object of dislike. This is a common psychological phenomenon. Meinong refers to it as "emotional presentation,"<sup>28</sup> Findlay as "extraspective inversion."<sup>29</sup> The emotions felt toward an

<sup>28</sup>J. N. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values (Oxford, 1963), pp. 235, 304, 307 ff.

<sup>29</sup>Findlay, Values and Intentions, pp. 175-176; 207-208.

object, person, or situation modify how the referent of the emotion is seen; but also how the object is seen modifies the feeling response. This seeing of the object of a feeling which is seeing the object in a way modified by the feeling I shall call the normative vision of the object, and the object as modified by such vision I shall call the normative reality. We shall at various later points in the study consider further the significance of this phenomenon in the understanding of value language and value experience. Our present concern is simply to note that when a conative response becomes a valuative response, and there is both valuative attention and normative reality experience involved, we cannot say without qualification either that value originates in the conation or in the normative experience which prompts the conation: valuative conation and valuative vision (normative reality experience) can each function as a prompting ground of the manifestation and development of the other.

Of course this mutual dependency of value to feeling response and normative vision is not complete. A pro or con feeling response will in most cases be influenced, even predominantly influenced, by "outside" factors; these will in typical cases determine the initial pro or con character of the feeling and desire response, and normative vision

modifications will normally take their direction from this external orientation. Examples such as these indicate that there can be conative, perhaps even valuative, attention response, without normative modification of the object responded to. However, I do not believe this undermines the point made in the previous paragraph: where both conative response and normative reality modification occur (and they tend to be characteristics of our more significant valuations), the valuing lies in the conation-vision experience as a unity; the value response is to the object as experienced. This kind of an analysis avoids certain reductivisms that have often been characteristic of voluntaristic approaches to value meaning. In analyzing aesthetic experience the defectiveness of such reductive analyses seems particularly conspicuous.

11. Attention Without Intention and  
Vice Versa: The Quasi-mental

"My world is the product of the temporal involvement of my subjectivity with the world. It is to my world that values belong."<sup>30</sup> This statement by Peter Caws expresses well, I believe, why valuative attentions are the fundamental and

<sup>30</sup>Peter Caws, Science and the Theory of Value (New York, 1967), pp. 75-76.

*But is also made the separation of Attention of approach to value.*

(102)

↓

*we show showing earlier* →

sine qua non manifestations of valuing. Through conditioning, conative intentions can exist without a grounding in valuative attention experiences, but they can have no role in valuations for an individual until they have the sanction of enlightened rational choice; and it is, I want to show, logically inconceivable that this status as a valuation could be achieved without showing that the intention is an integral part of some process of achieving reason-sanctioned valuative attentions.

We have seen from the analysis of valuative attentions that a particular valuative attention does not logically presuppose a conative intention (it has its own internal structure of intentionality, i.e. mode of response to a content), but a valuative attention not integrated with any conative intention (willing of a direction of action, mental or behavioral) would be an extraordinarily (but not completely) passive awareness: It would not be related to any goal-directed activity of the self, in a mind-controlled action. Perhaps catatonic schizophrenia exhibits some such states of disassociation. Perhaps normal human beings experience moments of such awareness, especially in dreams. If we are to call such states "mental" at all it would seem justified to refer to them as only "quasi-mental."

Should we say the same for the more commonly occurring



phenomena of conative intentions not combined with valuative intentions either in their manifestations or in their goals? I am not referring to intentional behavior not accompanied by cognitive attentions, i.e. acting purposively without being aware of what one is doing, as in carrying out a skill "automatically"; that, too, I think we might call only "quasi-mental" activity (and mental at all only so long as it is intentional behavior initiated in and overall controlled through conscious states), but our present concern is with conative intentions disassociated from valuative attentions. Such intentions must be manifestations of dispositions, and these dispositions must be the product of purely passive conditioning, for what could motivate one to choose a course of action not associated with the achieving of valuative attentions other than pure conditioning? Of course, as I noted above, such conditioned-response motivation may not be direct. A person may freely and with some reasoning about alternatives and the basis of the judgment, choose a course of action  $C_1$  because it is a way of acting on a more general and basic principle in his system of values,  $C_2$ , which in turn may stand in the same relationship to  $C_3$ , and this to  $C_4$ , back to the individual's existentially basic principles of action. But if  $C_b$  (the basic principle) was itself a purely conditioned response and each subprinciple chosen

*note that your definition of behavior is that  
I note that we have concluded that the valuative attention  
are not necessarily to be interpreted as hedonistic patterns.*

purely because it was a means (ultimately) to C<sub>b</sub>, then what are we to say about the whole process: Is it mental activity in a full sense? A simple intention (principle of action) maintained as a part of an individual's character by purely conditioned response we might feel justified in describing as only quasi-mental (it could be controlled by conscious orientations of the mind but it isn't), but where such a principle is maintained unquestioned through developed processes of conscious activity leading to choices of means principles, we, I think, would have some hesitation about describing the intentionality as only quasi-mental. *But we could also have hesitation about not doing so.*

One of the ideals of an explication is to minimize the influence of substantive judgments on meta-level terminological legislation. We might compromise by calling the basic intention itself only quasi-mental but the intentions based on it fully mental because they involve conscious reasoning. But even this may seem an emotively loaded use of the phrase "quasi-mental." After all, we are talking here about one of David Riesman's characterological "ideal types" (descriptive ideal, not valuative ideal), namely what he called "inner directed man."<sup>31</sup> Of course we could note that in practice probably no human beings are completely

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<sup>31</sup>David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City, 1953) Doubleday Anchor Book, pp. 29-32.

passive in regard to their accepting of basic principles,  
 though many may seem to approach being so.

*mind's volition*  
*As some injustice for our analysis of A*

This terminological problem arises in this way. Included in the concept of mental activity is a notion that it must be activity of a self that is controlled at least over a period of time by conscious orientations of the mind. Purely conditioned-response principles of behavior would then seem to become only quasi-mental for they involve conscious conative orientations only as experiencings of dispositional tendencies, though intentions functioning as parts of activity undertaken to implement the conditioned-response grounded principle will involve conscious reasoning and perhaps even normative attentions. If we hold strictly to our conditions for activity to be fully mental, we will be led to refer to what can be quite basic parts of a person's functioning ethical principles as only "quasi-mental" activity. But as long as we keep clear what we mean by using the phrase, I do not see sufficient reason here to modify our concept of the conditions necessary for an activity to be fully mental, i.e. the condition that fully mental activity is that which over a period of time is under the control of conscious mental orientations. But an activity is under such control only if it is affected by rational evaluation, i.e. choice. But if a conative intention can survive such open conscious

orientations only if it is grounded on valuative attention, i.e. only if it is itself a valuative intention, then we can conclude (must conclude to be consistent with our adopted terminology) that conative intentions that are not valuative intentions are only quasi-mental.

Further, <sup>I believe,</sup> it is a characteristic of our terminology that a conative attention that is not a valuative attention is not even a valuative of the individual let alone a valuation. This, when properly understood, is an acceptable consequence. We do not normally, I believe, call character traits which are not sanctioned or supported by conscious choices a part of an individual's values. <sup>For</sup> ~~Are~~ a person's being lazy, or quick to take offense, or having a temperamental preference for action modes of life over contemplated <sup>or</sup> modes, parts of his system of values? This is not an easy question to answer, because we must know first how much these behavior propensities have been mediated by conscious choice. An essentialistically based valuative or valuation is not for that grounding less a value--or reduced to any quasi state as a mental act. Henry James describes ~~his protagonist~~ Isabel Archer as, "Displaying in temperament a swift courage of a dark night." We could not in a simple way answer the question: Is this or isn't this trait a part of her system of values? And we may, or may not, want to describe the

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<sup>1</sup> Henry James, Portrait of a Lady

This section needs further development.

influence of this trait on her actions as a "mental act";  
*what would seem most appropriate to conclude is that there is a*  
~~we may conclude that its influence was only "quasi-mental."~~  
*"quasi-mental" trait.*

12. Intentions Distinguished by  
the Nature of the Directive

The character of an intention is set in a very fundamental way by the nature of its directive. Command intentions are experienced as expressatory obligations. The authority is fundamentally that part of the self accepted by the self as the authoritative voice. We will note later (III-D and E) various forms this can take. But the command accepted by the self need not be taken as one directly given by the self. The individual can internalize (introject) what he accepts as social or religious authority voices. This gives such command intentions a distinctive emotional and logical character. In prescriptive intentions the authority grounding is more muted and is grounded more directly on the prudential value to the individual of obeying the authority. Intentions of a prudential character derived from active reasoning and reason-controlled habit normally will have the character of individual prescriptive intentions. Internalized social authorities (other than moral and legal authority) where acceptance is usually dominantly by conditioning but is strongly prudential when actively reasoned, will normally

*Key*  
*we shall give attention in*  
*Section III-D and E*  
*A character of expressatory*  
*intentions is conditioning and*  
*prudential character.*

have the character of participatory prescriptive intentions. Etiquette rules and language rules are almost always of this type for an individual.

These, I think, are the only two types of directives in intentions there are. The idea of a commending intention appears on first consideration to make sense, for the notion of commending to oneself seems coherent and common enough but there are problems with taking such talk in other than an analogical way. In the first place, commending is the logical function of directing another, or others, without force of authority as ordering them, for the other's benefit. But cannot one part of the self, for example "the rational self," commend to another part? Only analogically. Such "commending" to oneself is really prescribing to oneself that certain data be considered as part of a reasoning process leading to decision. This "commending" has the character of pre-decisional consideration. But there is no deliberate intending of the self without a choosing, a deciding, and there can be no choosing without an authoritative act of the self for itself. (The concepts of "choosing," "deciding" and commitment" will be given explicit attention very shortly.) Some aspect of the self functions as an authority wherever there is choice. It may be some body of conditioned habit--a "super-ego"--or it may be the active

reasoning self, motivationally aligned with such a superego. But intention requires choice, which requires authority function. Thus, the directive in an intention cannot be a commending, though of course it can be a directive (command or prescribing) to commend.

For similar reasons a directive in an intention cannot be a requesting, though it can be an intention to request. Again, in analogical ways we speak of requesting ourselves to do things, but here, as in commending to ourselves, it is only a muted way of giving orders to the self. Nothing gets done, even intended, without some part of the self performing the legislating function.

### 13. Relationships of Intentions to Other Kinds of Pronouncement

*Voluntaristic*

*Remnants to clarify:  
Incorporate footnote  
into text.*

~~Conative~~ intentions are an element in the normal situation of use of every kind of assertion, excepting only, as I have noted, some very elementary abnormal attentions. To publicly command, commend, ~~or~~ prescribe, enstate, believe, etc. is to intend to do these acts. They are fulfillment manifestations of intention. Of all assertions, only self-given directives, i.e. intentions themselves, are not fulfillment manifestations of logically prior intentions.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Note this priority is like that of cause to effect: its tempered aspect can diminish toward zero, perhaps even

The volitional directive act of giving oneself an intention is not typically a fulfillment of an intention to give oneself an intention, though that "double intention" act is not only meaningful but not uncommon in practical life: I can intend to develop a particular interest. Even higher orders of intending might, I think, be traced, but since there are no philosophical issues at stake in doing so, we shall forebear.

### C. VOLITION

#### 14. The Categorical Ultimacy of the Volitional Function

An intention I have described as an accepting, or willing, of a directive. I want to consider now the nature of this volitional component: the "accepting" or "willing" act that is involved not only in accepting a directive but in acting on the directive. These are different acts, or different kinds of occasion of volition, for one can accept a directive that <sup>is next to be acted on</sup> ~~does not call for acting on~~ the directive until a later

be simultaneous with its fulfillment manifestation. For example, the initial manifestation of an intention to issue a command can certainly come very close to the manifestation of the fulfillment, i.e. the making of the command.



But attitude as mental acts !!

time; if it is a conditional directive, then the conditions of "acting on" may never arise. On the other hand, there is <sup>it</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>decision</sup> mental act of a self that is not intentional, thus that does not involve accepting a directive.

What is an act of will? It is, I submit, a necessary ingredient in any behavior of the self that is correctly describable as an action of the self, i.e. behavior that is controlled, directly or indirectly, by mental acts. And anything describable as a mental act is describable in terms of mental causality, which is to say that it is volition-controlled purposive behavior. Volition is thus essential to the concept of the self, of individual human agency. Aristotle defined the self very specifically in terms of volitional capability: A self, he said, is "an originating cause," i.e. a source of self-caused actions.<sup>33</sup> Aristotle does not resolve the question of whether he thought that an action with a mental cause is eo ipso not fully explainable in terms of efficient causation, or possibly not fully explainable in such terms. Such a claim would, I believe, go beyond what can be established by conceptual analysis. While to say that an instance of behavior is an action of the self, i.e. is a mental act, is to say that it involves

<sup>33</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. 3.

some volition of the self, and that this volition functions as a part of a mental cause process, it is to say nothing about whether mental causes can be fully accounted for in terms of efficient cause. We shall return to this issue of the conceptually ascertainable range of possible causal relationships of mental and <sup>efficient</sup> physical cause later.

Human action is willing a change i.e. it is manifesting an intention which is willing that the self act on a directive. The willing is distinct from the directive and distinct from the consequence of the willing, i.e. what the willing makes happen. A. I. Melden describes this distinction well:

We cannot identify what one does with what one makes happen. When I flex the biceps brachii of my arm many things are brought to pass, made to happen. Nerve impulses are transmitted to the muscles, neural circuits in the brain are opened and closed, protein molecules in the brain are set into oscillation, and many more things of which I have not the faintest intimation.... If someone points to the biceps brachii of my arm and asks me to flex it, this I can easily do. So it is tempting to say that when I raise my arm, I do so by moving certain muscles just as when I signal, I do so by raising my arm.

But how do I move certain muscles? There is a difference between my biceps becoming flexed and my flexing my biceps, just as there is a difference between my arm getting raised and my raising my arm. The flexing of my biceps may occur through no doing of mine (someone might raise my arm and in doing so cause my biceps to be flexed), just as my arm getting raised may be something that happens to me through the action of another person who raises my arm and

not through anything I do. And what can the difference be between the occurrence of a muscle movement in my arm and my moving that muscle, except that in the latter case it is by doing something that I bring the muscle movement to pass? In short, if it is sensible to say that I raise my arm by moving certain muscles, it is equally sensible to hold that I move those muscles by doing something that brings those muscle movements to pass. And what can this latter doing be that has these muscle movements as effect?<sup>34</sup>

I do not think there is any other way to answer this question satisfactorily than to say that "the doing" that has muscle movement as its effect is an act of willing, a performing of a volition, which is to say that willing cannot be reductively defined in terms of other aspects in a process of mental causality. I find it necessary to agree with H. A. Prichard that we cannot analyze the concept of volition in terms of any other factors involved in acting without leaving out that which is essential to behavior for it to be a human act: i.e. volition is an ultimate and indefinable concept in human experience.<sup>35</sup> Melden considers but shies away from this conclusion; in due course we shall give attention to his reasons for doing so.

I think we must say that volition is a categorial

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<sup>34</sup>I. A. Melden, "Willing," The Philosophical Review, vol. 69 (1960), pp. 475-476.

<sup>35</sup>H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford, 1949), p. 189.

concept: that is, a fundamental form of structural unity in human experience. This is to say that it is ultimate, not in the way a basic sensory particular is, but in the way, for example, that conjunction, similarity, and (in the Kantian non-positivistic interpretations) substance and cause are in human experience. It is an ultimate structural concept that it is necessary to recognize in order to account adequately for the nature of human experience. But it is not an ultimate intuition or object of intuition. It is a concept that can only be grasped through its sensory schema, though it is not reducible to that schema: The schema presents it as a relational concept necessary for understanding the schema as schema and necessary for explicating some aspect of experience. (This role of the schema was discussed in Part I, Sec. 5. This discussion presupposes that explication of the function of a categorial schema.) When one decides to raise his arm and does, decides to speak and does, etc., there is commonly nothing involved that can be called a sensation of willing. If there is resistance, such that the act of will calls for straining, trying (i.e. if one tries to lift his hand and finds it is caught, tries to speak and finds no words will come, etc.), then there will be sensations associated with tension in the muscles which we might describe as sensations of "exerting effort,"

*for the distinctive language ~~is not~~ we use to describe*

*mental  
coactivity*

*check*

I would now want to say: the efficient cause of the self: the self's dynamism.

but these are obviously not themselves a volition but effects of volition. As Hume and Berkeley both noted, sensations are in their nature passive phenomena. But the concept of volition, like its close analogue the categorial efficient cause concept of efficacy or force, is in its nature dynamic. In fact without the categorial concept of efficient cause and volition we are totally unable to account for the dynamic element in human experience, as Hume's analysis in its defaults so clearly illustrated.

It is ironic that in this context of analysis of the will Hume plays the role of the "intuitionist":

By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of the mind.<sup>36</sup>

What more apt comment can we make on this passage than to paraphrase the following from the Treatise; <sup>these</sup> comments are a <sup>quite a</sup> slight revision of <sup>Hume's</sup> the famous opening remarks on the subject of <sup>self</sup> physical identity (IV-6): <sup>□</sup>

"There are some philosophers who imagine that we are at every moment of acting intimately conscious of what we call our will; that we feel its existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. To

<sup>36</sup>David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, (London, 1888), p. 399.

<sup>37</sup>Treatise, pp. 238-239.

□ Remits: → the word 'self' in this passage (the word 'will' is substituted for occurrence)

attempt a further proof were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be derived from any fact of which we are so intimately conscious.

"Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for them; nor have we any idea of will, after the manner it is here explained. Or, from what <sup>imp</sup> expression could this idea be derived? This question it is impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity....But will is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference....After what manner do they belong to will and how are they connected with it? 37

Sic! The \$  
 comments on this  
 quote are not  
 quite correct!

*Cf. previous page  
 for 37*

*make*  
 (1) This passage illustrates the absurdity of identifying will with any particular sensation or other kind of intuition a self may claim to have, ~~but~~ it also points to another possible way of accounting for the idea of will without giving it the status of a categorial concept: possibly it is what Kant called a synthesis in imagination, and thus explainable in the manner in which Hume considered he had found an adequate explanation of self, physical object, and efficient cause.<sup>38</sup> *to do* This is to identify will with what I have called the schema of the will. *such as* Is ~~this~~ reductive analysis plausible? Let's take a look at what the sensory schema is.

<sup>38</sup>The kind of explanation Paul Wolff claims to have found in Kant's analysis of substance and cause. Cf. Part I, Sec. 7.

### 15. The Sensory Schema of Volition

Purposeful action where there is evidence that the individual considered reasons for his action and consciously chose his way of acting, and could have acted otherwise if he had wanted to is the general empirical situation which schematizes a volition. However, the considering of reasons and conscious choosing need not occur at the time of action: An action is volitional, i.e. a mental act, if conscious orientations of mind are involved in establishing and maintaining a form of intentional behavior, even though a particular situation of action may involve no more than what would be described as an actualizing of a disposition. But the establishing and maintaining of such mental-act dispositions must involve conscious volitional activity. The individual considers alternatives of action, relating these to his attained body of knowledge and values. He perhaps calculates means-ends relationships, perhaps seeks further knowledge, or a clearer awareness of his own accepted value principles and what kind of hierarchical relationships they have to each other. He perhaps seeks to give all relevant dispositions of preference a chance to be actually experienced. The choosing situation is thus made up of one's awareness of (a) reasons for acting one way or another and

(b) motivational grounds in the form of dispositions and actually present valuative attention experiences; out of this situation there comes the choice, the acting.

To say that the acting is simply the "strongest" disposition (a la Hobbes) or valuative attention that determines the action does not answer the basic question: What is it for a disposition to become active, for a valuative attention to cause action? What is it to be prompted by reasons plus present motivational grounds (conative factors) into acting? It would appear that all of these that are present in a situation of acting can be present and the action not take place. But even if we say (what is questionable) that action occurs automatically (as an efficient cause consequence) when dispositions and valuative attentions in the choosing situation are combined with cognitive judgment of appropriate circumstances of action--even if we accepted such a Hobbesian view of volition--we still have the problem of what is involved in a disposition or conative attention becoming action producing when combined with appropriate cognitive attentions.

We need clarification of three different kinds of situations: (1) a disposition determining action on an occasion where there is involved no conscious intending or choosing, (2) action where conscious intentionality is involved but



no conscious choosing, and (3) where there are dispositions, conscious intentionality, and conscious choosing. These are the three basic schemas of volition.

In none of these cases does the description of the schema itself account for the causal efficacy involved in a self acting. How can a description of what is done in willing, using language which speaks of dispositions or of a person choosing to act, doing, giving reasons for doing, believing he could have done otherwise, etc., be taken as a description of willing itself? The passage quoted above from Melden focuses precisely on the problem: to describe what is done in willing is not to describe the willing. None of the above descriptions give any account or explanation of how a self produces an effect and how the self could possibly have produced a different effect. It is the essential dynamicism of the self that is left out of any description which does not give willing a categorial status analogous to a categorial concept of efficacy in efficient causation.

It is the very nature of a volition conceived as a categorial concept that it is not a logically independent concept, since it can only be conceived through its schema, but the concept it does not include its schema; there is no analyticity in the relationship between concept and schema; the concept qua concept is logically independent of its

schema, but it is logically dependent on its schema for presentation. This is the distinctively Kantian intellectual synthesis a priori, where an explication of a necessary condition for coherent conceiving of experience provides the ground and nature of the conceptual necessity.

Thus, the incompleteness here is like the incompleteness many of us find in any phenomenalist analysis of efficient causation--either sense data phenomenism or the recently more popular types in which substance and cause are considered to be a priori syntheses in imagination. (Cf. Part I, Sec. 8 for fuller discussion of the issues here.) Those who find such phenomenalist accountings of the dynamicism in human experience acceptable will probably find no special problems in accepting a phenomenalist account of volition. Whatever in a categorial analysis of volition constitutes an adequate account of the schema of volition should be sufficient as an analysis of the concept in a phenomenalist approach. Thus, those who reject the arguments given in this study for a categorial volition can still appraise the analysis of intention, and thus of valuation, being made here, with that conceptual addition subtracted. However, I have not yet completed the argumentation for the categorial nature of volition.

*accept to*  
*section*  
*stated for*  
*in the study*  
*I hope to make the same*  
*had to reject*

In regard to the categorial supposition of volition as

mental efficacy, I suspect that if we had a more accurate concept of efficient cause which recognized the central categorial role of efficacy here, we would, I believe, come to realize that only one category of efficacy is involved in the two applications of mental cause and efficient cause. This need not reduce one concept to a mode of the other nor would it conceptually settle the freedom-determinism issue. If we think of the self in both its mental and physical manifestations as all together a manifestation of an organization of energy, then it should be, from a scientific standpoint, an open question whether the higher organizations of brain processes might not have an emergent type of causal pattern, i.e. mental or teleological causation, which is not totally explainable in terms of lower order patterns of causal organization, i.e. the efficient cause patterns.

#### 16. The Unitary Nature of Volitional Agency

I find no reason to think of volitional agency in an individual other than as unitary or to think of one volitional act as distinguished from another by anything other than the distinctiveness of what is willed. The concept of volition is the concept of a self as accepting or subscribing to (i.e. willing) a directive. The distinctiveness of

a particular volition lies first in the directive accepted and secondly in the consequences of the acceptance. There is no reason to think of one acceptance act qua acceptance (willing qua willing) as different from another, just as there is no reason to think of one physical object qua physical object as different from another, or one cause qua cause, or one conjunction qua conjunction, etc. <sup>or different</sup> One conjunction differs from another, not in the nature of its conjunctiveness, but in its application, its sensory schema instantiated. It follows from the very fact that we are concerned with a basic structural concept in human experience that the concept itself does not vary in its instantiations.

There are two uses in discourse of the phrase "act of will": In one use it names simply the categorial volitional act and in the other it names this plus the conjoined directive. This distinction of use is illustrated in the simple difference between the two sentences:

(i) He chose (willed) to stay.

(ii) His choice (will) was to stay.

The intimate relationship between a volition and its directive--the latter being a part of the sensory schema of the former--accounts, I think, for the two uses of the word 'will' illustrated by these two sentences.

It has sometimes been argued that there are two kinds of volition manifested by a self: (1) decidings and (2) overt actings. I can choose now, silently, without behavioral accompaniments, to perform a particular publicly observable action next month. The mental deciding may have a history with no behavioral manifestations, for a person can decide at one time to do an action on a certain day in the future, tell no one, and then find reason to change his mind ~~just~~ before his decision issues in a publicly observable act. But in the distinction between deciding and acting we do not have involved two kinds of volition but only a difference in the directive distinguishing two volitional acts of the same kind. If we assume (as I am inclined to do, though this is not something that can be established by conceptual analysis) that every volition as a mental act is a manifestation of a particular energy state in the brain, then the brain state that simply activates another brain state <sup>(a deciding)</sup> and the one that leads to a contracting of muscles, <sup>(an overt acting)</sup> etc. need not differ in basic neurological structure or basic functional character. Conceptually, it would appear clear that there is no basic functional distinction qua volition, i.e. as a willing of a directive, in the two cases: the difference is in the nature of the action called for to

(60)  
 fulfill the directive.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, I see no reason not to conclude that volition is unitary in nature.

17. Melden and Anscombe's Arguments  
Against Volition as a Categorical  
Concept

In making the claim that volition is an ultimate categorical concept (or perhaps one manifestation of a generic categorical concept of causal efficacy of which the other manifestation is efficient causation), I noted that objections to such a categorical explication would be analyzed. I want now to turn to that task.

As I noted earlier, the position of taking volition as an ultimate concept in human experience has been associated ~~by recent philosophers~~ <sup>contemporary philosophy why</sup> most prominently with H. A. Prichard,

<sup>39</sup>Professor Morton White suggests that a distinction between "deciding that" and "deciding to," is helpful in accounting for the distinction between the non-behavioral and the physical enactment act. "Deciding that," he notes, is only believing, not willing, whereas "deciding to" is willing. (White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy, pp. 234-236.) But even if we could accept an analysis of "deciding that" in terms of believing, there is still the volition involved in "deciding to" believe. Thus, a non-behavioral "deciding that" always involves at least one "deciding to," i.e. the deciding to believe. But believing that one will do something and deciding to act to effect it are patently quite different acts (on this distinction cf. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 111-113). Thus, Professor White's analysis is of no help to us.

*surely*  
 (which is clearly not plausible if the analysis of 'deciding to believe' made in the study is correct),

<sup>also</sup> though C. A. Campbell <sup>who has</sup> ~~has also~~ argued for such an ultimate concept in his <sup>often ontological</sup> analysis of the problem of freedom of the will.<sup>40</sup> Neither Prichard nor Campbell clearly characterize volition as ultimate in a categorial (i.e. ultimate relational or structural) way. In fact Prichard quotes Hume's "ultimate sensory datum" concept with at least implicit approval.<sup>41</sup> We have noted that since the function of volition in human experience is as the factor of dynamicism in reason-mediated action, the intuited-datum approach seems utterly beside the point. What is involved is a concept that can only be understood as an aspect of a process of sensory change; <sup>but it must</sup> ~~but that which~~ necessarily must be thought as a part of that process to make it coherent, explainable, understandable. The process of mental causality--of a self considering facts and norms as reasons for acting and choosing to act in a certain way, against a background of dispositions and valuative attentions--requires, ~~I think,~~ the idea of personal causal efficacy (volition) to be understood: volition is a necessary ingredient in the process of mental causality.

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<sup>40</sup>C. A. Campbell, "Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?", Mind, New Series, LX (1951), 441-465.

<sup>41</sup>Prichard, Moral Obligation, p. 89.

Objections to the Prichard-Campbell approach have generally been focused on its character as making volition an indefinable rather than on the nature ascribed to the indefinability, and thus such objections are also directed to the kind of position I have developed. I want to consider specifically two essays which I believe between them cover the range of critical commentary quite well: A. I. Melden's article "Willing" (referred to above) and G. E. M. Anscombe's article "Intention."<sup>42</sup> I shall consider Melden's criticisms first.

Melden's first criticism is expressed in the following passage:

Grant for a moment that an event labelled 'an act of volition' produces a muscle movement; there is a difference surely between the occurrence of such an event and my producing it. We saw that there is a difference between the occurrence of a muscle movement and my moving that muscle; hence it was that the supposition of acts of volition was invoked. But equally there would seem to be a difference between the occurrence of an act of volition and my performing such an act. Who can say that volitions may not occur through no doing of the subject and in consequence of interior mental events deep within the hidden recesses of the self? If so, willing the muscle movement is not enough; one must will the willing of the muscle movement, and so on ad infinitum. Here someone may retort impatiently: 'When I

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<sup>42</sup>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 57 (1956-7), 321-32.



will a muscle movement, I will it and that is the end of the matter; there is no other doing by virtue of which this act of volition gets done--I simply will the movement.' But even if this reply were correct it would not serve to explain what an action is, as distinguished from a mere happening. It explains the 'action' of raising the arm in terms of an internal action of willing, and hence all it does at best is to change the locus of action. Indeed it invites the view argued by Prichard that, strictly speaking, one does not raise one's arm at all; all one does or can do is will and by means of this action produce various effects such as the rising of one's arm. In any case if willing is some sort of doing which one performs not by means of any other doing--one wills and that is the end of the matter--why not say the same with respect to the muscle movement itself, or the tensing of one's biceps? One simply tenses it and there is no doing by virtue of which the tensing gets done.<sup>43</sup>

Melden's recommendation here simply leaves the problem unsolved: How does one distinguish flexing one's muscles from the muscles flexing? More generally, how does one distinguish action of a self from behavior that just happens without being willed? How does one distinguish mental causality from the purely physical? Melden's criticism here would seem to be valid as directed against any analysis of volition that makes it a specific sensory event, but we have seen that the act of volition cannot by its nature and function be identified with any such sensory event or even any

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<sup>43</sup>Melden, "Willing," pp. 71, 72.

temporal series of such events: The distinctive quality as act, the elements of dynamicism, is omitted and one has left only the description of a specific sensory sequence of such events. Melden's criticism points to the need for recognizing the categorial dynamic element. Once recognized, the difference between the occurrence of the act and my performing it is describable either (a) as the difference between a category and its schema, or (b) as the difference of perspective in describing the act. Certainly there is only a semantic hand-up involved if Melden's point becomes the old Parmenidean (Zenoan) paradox: How can one ever perform an act if he must first perform the act of performing that act; the existential fact of acts occurring proves the sophistic character of this criticism.

Melden's second criticism is this:

How shall we describe the alleged action of willing? Surely a description of this action independently of the consequence alleged for it--the production of a muscle movement--must be forthcoming. Let us call the act of willing, A; then A produces B (a muscle movement), this being taken to be a causal sequence. Now in general if A causes B, a description of A other than that it has the causal property of producing B must be forthcoming; otherwise 'A causes B' degenerates into 'the thing that produces B produces B.' But what description of the act of volition can be offered?<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Melden, "Willing," p. 72.

...we are faced with the following dilemma: If in thinking of  $v_1$  (some particular act of volition) we are of necessity to think of it as the willing of  $m_1$  (some particular muscle movement), then  $v_1$  cannot be any occurrence, mental or physiological, which is causally related to  $m_1$ , since the very notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are intelligible without any logically internal relation of the one to the other. If, on the other hand, we think of  $v_1$  and  $m_1$  as causally related in the way in which we think of the relation between the movements of muscles and the raising of one's arm, then we must conclude that when first we perform  $v_1$  we should be taken completely by surprise to find that  $m_1$  does in fact ensue. If to avoid this latter consequence we maintain that the thought of the muscle movement enters into the very character of the act of volition (as Prichard puts it, 'the thinking enters into the character of the willing'), no description of the act of volition can be given that does not involve an account of the muscle movement, and hence we must abandon the idea that the act of volition  $v_1$  is a cause that produces  $m_1$ , the muscle movement. Prichard's predicament is that his conclusion that 'an act of will requires an idea of something which we may cause if we perform the act' is nothing less than self-contradictory.<sup>45</sup>

...no account of the alleged volitions is intelligible that does not involve a reference to the relevant bodily phenomena. And no interior cause, mental or physiological, can have this logical feature of act of volition. Let the interior event which we call 'the act of volition' be mental or physical (which it is will make no difference at all), it must be logically distinct from the alleged effect: this surely is one lesson we can derive from

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<sup>45</sup>Melden, "Willing," p. 76.

a reading of Hume's discussion of causation. Yet nothing can be an act of volition that is not logically connected with that which is willed; the act of willing is intelligible only as the act of willing whatever it is that is willed.<sup>46</sup>

It is a presupposition of the study that one of the main lessons to be learned from the reading of Kant is that Hume's account of logical relatedness is hopelessly inadequate, for he does not take into account the kind of necessary relationship that can hold between a schema and the categorial concept it presents. If one accepts the correctness of the Kantian analysis, then Melden's argument simply ignores the basic problem, which is: Do we have need to recognize such a category-presenting schematic function in our analysis of volition in order to make a coherent analysis of the distinction between mental and non-mental behavior? I believe I have given the evidence that we do.

The next criticism he puts in this way:

...the appeal to indefinables is a desperate defense that purchases immunity from further attack only at the expense of unintelligibility. If all that can be said about the alleged act of volition by virtue of which a muscle movement is produced is that it is the sort of thing that produces a muscle movement, there is every uncertainty that anyone has understood what is meant by 'the act of volition.' And if an attempt to rescue this doctrine is made by

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<sup>46</sup>Melden, "Willing," pp. 76, 77.

appealing to something with which, it is alleged, each of us is intimately familiar and hence will have no difficulty in recognizing--the act of volition that produces the muscle movement--the retort must surely be 'What do I recognize when I recognize an act of volition?' Unless I can recognize this act by having some description in mind that applies to such acts and only to these, it is at best a simple begging of the question to insist that all of us really understand what is being referred to;....<sup>47</sup>

This, of course, would be a conclusive criticism if we had no conceptual need to assume an indefinable concept of volition here. Surely Melden does not intend to mount a general attack on claims of indefinables. How can there be concepts at all without there being ultimate simple concepts, and thus "indefinables" in the sense in question? Of course, as I noted in Part I in discussing the concept of language function of Paul Wolff and Morton White (Part I, Sec. 7), it certainly is possible to design a linguistic new-speak in which it is not possible to refer to ultimate simples, but there are, I believe, grave problems in making any reasonable case that such a language proposal meets norms of adequacy--specifically that of comprehensiveness (Cf. Part I, Sec. 10)--which we must appeal to in judging the significance of the proposal.

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<sup>47</sup>Melden, "Willing," p. 73.

Professor Melden's next criticism he puts as follows:

Surely the act of volition involved in the production of one muscle movement must be distinguished from the act of volition in the production of any other. There will then be different acts of volition,  $v_1$ ,  $v_2$ ,  $v_3$ , and so forth, which, respectively, move muscles  $m_1$ ,  $m_2$ ,  $m_3$ , and so forth. If  $v_1$   $m_1$ ,  $v_2$   $m_2$ ,  $v_3$   $m_3$ , and so forth, represent causal relations, then just as  $m_1$ ,  $m_2$ ,  $m_3$  are distinguishable, so  $v_1$ ,  $v_2$ ,  $v_3$  will need to be different in kind. And if I am to learn how to produce  $m_1$  by performing the act of volition  $v_1$ , I must not only recognize the difference between  $v_1$  and other acts of volition that have other effects; I must also recognize the causal relation holding between  $v_1$  and  $m_1$ . Now this would seem to imply at least two things: (1) It must be possible to offer a set of characterizations of these acts of volition each different from the other, corresponding to the set of characterizations that can be given, surely, for the muscle movements  $m_1$ ,  $m_2$ ,  $m_3$ ,  $m_4$ , and so forth. (2) I can learn only from experience that  $m_1$  is produced by  $v_1$ ,  $m_2$  by  $v_2$ ,  $m_3$  by  $v_3$ , and so on. Hence, unless I suppose myself to have been endowed with superhuman prescience, I cannot but have been surprised or astonished the first time I performed the act of volition  $v_1$  to discover that muscle movement  $m_1$  occurred, and antecedently I should have no reason for ruling out the possibility that  $m_2$  would occur; I should have no reason, for example, to suppose that when I performed the act of volition by which in fact my biceps became flexed, my right leg would not have been raised.<sup>48</sup>

The problem here seems to arise from confusing two different relationships:

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<sup>48</sup>Melden, "Willing," pp. 73, 74.

- (1) That between a volition and a directive.
- (2) That between an intention and a consequence of intentional action.

In regard to #(1), I earlier discussed the absurdity of thinking a categorial concept must be different just because different sensory conditions schematize its occurrence.

There is no difference in the concept of willing qua willing involved in deciding to scratch one's ear, deciding to push a button that launches nuclear warhead, deciding to marry, or deciding to accept a particular statement as true. The element of mentally acting to produce a physical change is the same, but where the causal efficacy is applied would depend on the directive and the situation. There is no volition that is not an acting on a directive, and it is the directive acted on that gives the distinguishing character to a volition. A volition producing X differs from one producing Y by the nature of the intention involved, and also, of course the circumstances in which the intention is manifested.

This covers, I believe, all of Professor Melden's criticisms. Miss Anscombe's article is of interest here because her analysis of actions--including her analysis of intention, motive, and mental cause--very closely parallels the analysis which I have made, except she does not recognize

a categorial concept of volition. An act of will is an instance of mental causality on her analysis, but mental causality is not taken to be a kind of causal efficacy: It is a matter of seeing a situation in a certain light. She states that when we refer to an event that precedes an action as giving a reason for the action, or giving significance to it, then we speak of the thought of the event as a motive, and perhaps as a "mental cause." But this use has no reference to causal efficacy. Of course reasons or motives often are causes, i.e. efficient causes, so often both mental cause and efficient cause language are used. But there are not two kinds of causation involved.

This analysis, I think, amounts to reducing the idea of volition to the idea of its schema. I do not think it accounts for the distinctive causal efficacy we at least mean to refer to in talking about acts of will, intentions, mental causality. Thus, does it really explain the significance of our ordinary language uses in this area? More significantly, does it give us a coherent account of what distinguishes mental action from purely physical occurrence?

As an illustration of the inadequacy of reducing the concept of volition to its schema, consider the following not-very-far-fetched example. Miniaturized electronic devices are now in process of development which will control the



flexing of muscles in limbs where nerve damage has made the limb inoperable by a person's own volition. With such a device an individual will be able to electronically move a leg or arm in a specific way, for example by pushing a button. Without the device the individual can think of moving his leg and have the desire (conative ground plus directive) to move the leg, but no capacity of volition. The normal sensory schema is present but not the categorial occurrent normally schematized. With the electronic device, the individual is still not able to perform the specific volition a person with normal control of his leg muscles would perform, but he must go through the intermediary of a further intention, with its distinct volition (i.e. acting to push a button) in order to accomplish the goal of the normal leg-movement intention.

Also, can we speak meaningfully, on Miss Anscombe's analysis, of the distinction between a person who merely thinks he is free (but is really deeply culturally conditioned or being directed under hypnosis) and the person whose actions conform well with the ideal of ethical freedom? Granted that the actions of both may in the final analysis be equally explainable in efficient cause language; nevertheless in conceiving of persons acting as persons rather than as robots, we must think of them as manifesting causal efficacy in their acts that a robot does not manifest. To conceive of the

robot as manifesting causal efficacy in the manner that its actions are modified by awareness of cognitive grounds which activate conative grounds, which in turn result in choice through the medium of volitional efficacy, is to think of the robot as manifesting mental activity. In terms of this conceptual framework we can at least conceive of how the causal efficacy of the relatively ethically free person is much more independent in concept from efficient cause than is the apparent causal efficacy of the deeply conditioned person. No purpose-exhibiting behavior, no matter how intelligent or semi-intelligent, no matter how much like mind-controlled behavior, can be called an expression of the fully mental without the presupposition of acts of volition. To drop the volitional presupposition is to think of the behavior in a different way, e.g. as extraordinarily mind-like efficient cause behavior that is at best quasi-mental. For example, consider the person under hypnosis carrying out the instructions of the hypnotist, or consider the "thinking" behavior of a computer. The first example here illustrates that activity can exhibit conscious states with an apparent intentionality and still not be fully mental. The second example simply illustrates that no amount of fidelity of behavior to mental activity patterns qualifies it to be called mental unless we have grounds to infer an accompanying

volitional consciousness.

#### D. INTENTION AND REASON-MEDIATION

##### 18. The Environment of an Intention and Reason-mediation

I have analyzed an intentionality as containing four basic factors: (1) the cognitive element (proposition), (2) the conative ground, (3) the directive, and (4) the volition. I want now to discuss how intentionality can in various ways reflect reason-mediation.

Basically, of course, reason-mediation modifies the relationship between the cognitive element and the conative ground. This modification comes about fundamentally through a modification of the cognitive and conative environment of a given intention-attention complex. The cognitive environment is the body of beliefs which the agent holds and the conative environment is the body of intentions of the agent plus occurrent valuative attentions during the period the intention is being assessed. Intentions can be quite stable parts of an agent's character, but even the most stable are subject to some modification by changes in their cognitive and conative environment. The word 'environment' is intended to suggest that there are near, middle, and distant

neighbors to any particular intention. Roughly speaking, intentions clearly related by similarity and normal causal association form a near conative environment and beliefs directly influential on the conative ground of an intention form its near cognitive environment. We describe the conative ground of an intention as the motivating factor in the intention (disposition or valuative attention) though it would also be meaningful to speak of the "conative ground" in a more comprehensive sense, i.e. as including the set of related motivations which shape and contain as a center the motivating factor which is in a more restricted sense the explicit conative ground of the intention. The cognitive ground of an intention, the reasons prompting the intentionality, is not itself a part of the intention but it too is best conceived as a center of explicit cognitive ground surrounded by others which also exercise some influence on the intention in more or less indirect ways--these factors forming a near, middle, and distant cognitive environment.

The cognitive factor in an intention (the proposition) establishes the particular nature of an intention, i.e. gives the subject matter of the intention, but the cognitive ground and the conative ground (in the restricted sense of the terms) establish the rationality of the intention. The more the reasons given for a way of acting reflect an awareness of

This must apply, for how something is covered is a primary ground of a return kind of response.

and selection from all cognitive grounds that would influence the conative ground, and the more the conative ground is shaped by full consideration of all cognitive grounds that could influence it, the more fully reason-mediated the intention is. This is tautological, it would seem. However, this relationship of degree of reason-mediation to rationality in an intention is one that we will examine in detail in Part III.

A conative ground--which in its basic use in this study does not include volitional acts and consists only of motivating factors in an intention--I earlier described as composed either or both of dispositions and valuative attentions. It may consist of only one of each of these, depending on the nature and generality or particularity of the intention. The disposition involved in an intention can be of one of two types: (1) a conative disposition, i.e. a disposition to act in a certain way, or (2) a valuative attention disposition, i.e. a disposition to have a certain kind of valuative attention. Having these distinctions established will be helpful for our discussion of the ways in which intentions can be reason-mediated.

19. Choice; Decision, Commitment

I shall consider that the word 'choice' in its fundamental use designates an expressatory value judgment, though, as I noted in the original classification of modes of conative language in the Introduction, there are also performatory choices. Unless otherwise noted, let us consider that in this discussion of choice we are talking about expressatory valuation. To take this as the basic meaning of choice conforms, I believe, with Aristotle's use<sup>49</sup> and with the basic functional significance of this word in ordinary discourse. This is to say that choosing involves (1) a valuative intention plus (2) a belief that acting on the intention is a justified way of acting for the agent. Choosing is, thus, acting under the ideal of reason--is judgmental. I shall argue in Part III for what I have assumed already in several places in Parts I and II, namely that the ideal of rational action is action that will lead to the pro and con attentions one in a maximum state of enlightenment would <sup>manifest</sup> prefer; I have referred earlier to this as the vindication ideal, developing a use of the word recently made popular among philosophers by Herbert Feigl. A choice, thus, is always subjectively right, for it is by definition the willing of a way of acting

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<sup>49</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. 2-3.

that the individual believes is rationally justified. I shall give attention in Part III to the question of the relationship of the two acts, or assertions, formally involved in a choice--(a) willing a directive and (b) believing the way of acting justified--but I will note here that I do not find basis for ascribing any kind of practical synthetic a priori relationship between (a) and (b). It is, of course, tautological to say that in the rational (continent) person item (a) existentially entails (b); (a) not conjoined with (b) can be explained by two factors: (1) power of non-reason controlled habit and (2) absence of a strong rational concern. Incontinence stems from the strength of (1) and the weakness of (2). Thus intentions that are choices involve minimally: (i) a directive, (ii) a volition, (iii) a belief that acting on the directive will have certain valuative attention effects, and, as a condition of rational grounding of this latter belief, (iv) some history (it need not be the agent's own) of valuative attentions experienced in regard to the goal and way of acting of the directive. This latter requirement must be quite liberally interpreted to allow for the projective powers of human imagination, but it would seem to be empirically required to avoid conclusions that one can, purely on the basis of cognitive evidence, have rational grounds for believing that specific ways of acting will

produce specific pro and con attentions.

It would appear that a volition cannot occur without some cognitive factor and some conative factor being involved; there must be a cognitive factor for there must be a significant understanding of the alternatives of action for some part of this understanding to function as a motive or reason, i.e. that part of the cognitive awareness which, when considered, prompts the volition, i.e. causes the agent to will in a specific way.<sup>50</sup> But a cognition plus volitional capacity is not sufficient, for there must be some conative factor which provides the motivating ground of the agent being moved in one way by his cognitive awareness and not another. Prichard, and others, express this point by noting that volition always occurs within a context of desire. Aristotle, in regard to the same problem, noted that choice presupposes some essentialistic givenness of the self: we cannot choose all our principles of acting, for even where there is optimum reason-mediation of volition, there must be that which determines the self to choose one way rather than

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<sup>50</sup>Note that the word 'motive' is radically ambiguous in discourse: It can with equal naturalness refer to a cognitive ground (a reason) or a conative factor (a motivating ground, e.g. "The Court established a motive of jealousy."). For this reason I am avoiding extensive use of the word 'motive,' but where it is used it refers to the cognitive ground; I am using 'motivating factor' to refer to the conative ground.



another. Sartre and Gide notwithstanding, the act gratuit-- the completely arbitrary act--would appear a conceptual and metaphysical impossibility, as Buridan illustrated so succinctly with his fable; i.e. one must have some motivation for willing one way rather than another, even if this<sup>is</sup>/no more than the concern (desire) not to remain in a state of indecision. No cognitive factor by itself can function as a motivating factor for, as philosophers from Plato to the present have noted (Hume with a special impact on the history of philosophical thought), cognition can be only a handmaiden of conative and volitional elements: there must be that which moves the self to action in a selective and directive way. Volition by itself as functionally defined has no directive significance: it is simply the action-producing aspect of the self. This is not to say that volition exists as some independent "part" of the self that has only external relations to other parts; such a concept is probably sheer nonsense. But whatever its existential, and even logical, unity with other functional aspects of the self, it is itself functionally distinct.

The conative factor in an intention can be any one or a combination of the other factors: thus it can be simply a conative disposition developed under the control of reason or established purely by conditioning in the individual, or

some combination of these two factors, or it can be a presently experienced valuative attention, or a disposition to have certain valuative attentions. The specific functioning or activation of these conative factors of course depends on the cognitive environment.

The question may be raised as to whether the dynamic factor in an intention has not been fractionalized here in an existentially false way. Are dispositions, valuative attention responses, and volitions really three separate things? I would say in all likelihood not. They are three aspects of dynamic agency, and certainly their logical unity as dynamic factors reflects in all probability some kind of existential unity. We could have spoken here--as I noted above--of all as aspects of volition, but it proved more useful for explication to distinguish volition as specifically the active causal efficacy function, i.e. mental causality in the more restricted use of that phrase. This efficacy is distinguishable, as we have noted, both from what is merely a disposition and from what has the character of (passive) feeling response.

I am identifying expressatory choice with volition made under the ideal of reason, i.e. where the individual believes he is acting in a justified way. Thus, an intention is a choice in those cases where volition occurs in a context in

Avoid per-son, notes require example of causal efficacy 3  
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which the agent believes he has achieved the maximum awareness of the alternatives of action it is practicable to achieve in the circumstances. As Aristotle notes (expressed in my terminology), in a rationally developed character there will be highly developed conative- and attention- dispositions (habits), this development taking place through the mediation of continuing states of developed cognitive awareness, i.e. an enriched cognitive environment.<sup>51</sup>

This, of course, does not by a very long shot rule out irrational choices. While a choice by definition requires some thought before action and judgment on the basis of this, the justifying process may be very inadequately carried out, and the choice may be irrational. We would call a choice rationally made if the reasoning that provided grounds of the volition was as complete as could be practically expected under the circumstances--and this is so even if the consequences turn out not to be good due to unforeseen factors that theoretically might have been anticipated or just bad luck (i.e. the factors unanticipatable).

I think that taking expressatory choice as necessarily a value judgment conforms to the basic stratum of meaning of the term in discourse (its fundamental function), but by metonymy 'choice' has come to be used to refer to performatory

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<sup>51</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bks. II-VI.

valuations (which will be discussed later) and even to valuative intentions that are not valuations, e.g. "He knew when he made that choice that it was not a good thing to do."; note that this sentence more naturally refers to a performative than an expressatory choice. Within the valuative intention, 'choice' can be used, as was noted above, to refer purely to the volitional element or function, or to the intention itself, i.e. one can speak of choosing a directive or of the choice as a directive accepted. An expressatory choice can have a history of one instance of reason-controlled willing of a directive or it can be a particular disposition (habit) for such willing; i.e. we can speak of "standing choices," "continuing choices," which are for the agent expressions of his value principles.

These are the kinds of ambiguities one must expect to encounter in any attempt to explicate a natural language. It would seem justifiable in a philosophical explication, which is basically concerned with delineating of structural functions, to take as the meaning that part of the range of uses of a word which constitutes the most distinctive functional role in discourse. The philosophical norm in language explication is to be as faithful to ordinary use as one can while delineating as clearly and illuminatingly as one can the structure of mental function manifested through language.

Basically, when we refer to a choice as a decision we are referring to its character as initiating or altering a way of acting of an individual, but we also call a choice a decision in virtue of its being the outcome of a deliberative (evaluating) process even if this verdict is simply a re-affirmation of standing principles.

A commitment is choice under the aspect of obligation-- both obligation to oneself and others. Further explication of commitment will thus come with discussion of the concept of obligation (Part III-E). We will note here only that obligation is concerned with constraint to the rational and the moral and that use of the word 'commitment' puts emphasis on these constraints. C. I. Lewis has observed that choice tends to become commitment when it passes into publicly observable enactment behavior.<sup>52</sup> This is consistent with its obligation-oriented significance. A choice affecting obligation to others becomes a choice in the public domain only when it is publicly presented, i.e. acted on or pronounced in a performatory way. Up to that point the agent can change his mind without affecting his existent social obligations. However, with commitments to oneself, i.e. choices which are

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<sup>52</sup>C. I. Lewis, The Ground and the Nature of the Right (New York, 1955), pp. 43-46.

acceptings of obligations to oneself, the expressatory act of choosing is coincident with the act of commitment, even though this act be a silent one, unknown in the public domain.

## 20. Desire, Liking, Attitude

A valiative not a valuation is any combination of conative factors conjoined with a directive not made under or sanctioned by an agent's application of the rational ideal. There is traffic both ways across the line between valiative and valuation, and to the degree an individual's value judgments are not rationally stabilized this shift from one category to the other can occur merely by change of the situation--thus of the cognitive and conative environment of an intention. Any conative can be called a desire, or want, or wish, though these terms are most naturally applicable where valiative attentions and attention-dispositions are involved. As Miss Anscombe notes, when one responds to a knock on the door by going to it and opening it, it may seem odd to speak of this intentional behavior as manifesting a desire. However, on the other hand, it would be perfectly natural, if asked why one answered the door, to say "Because I desired to know who was there" or "Because I desired not to be rude." A liking usually connotes the involvement of an attention disposition, but it can be a particular manifestation of a

*Anscombe*

valuative pro attention-intention without the involvement of a disposition. As I have noted, philosophers have most characteristically thought of attitudes as intentions involving conative dispositions, but in ordinary use the word characteristically puts emphasis on attention dispositions, and can even be used to refer to particular valuative attention-intention complexes where there is not only no direct presupposition of developed dispositions involved at all, but they are explicitly denied; e.g. the remark, "Your attitude this afternoon towards X has been uncharacteristic of you" reflects no unnatural or strained use of the word.

21. Intentions Not Accompanied  
By Valuative Attentions

I have noted that conative intentions are not necessarily accompanied by valuative attentions and that they may not be grounded in (i.e. motivated by) such experiences, though they cannot be justified by the agent if they are not so grounded. However, the norm of rationality does not require that valuative attentions accompany every manifestation of an intention. An intention must involve some attention experiences (i.e. consciousness, awareness of what one is doing) during periods of its active manifestation, and if it does not, or these are minimal, we may feel justified in

describing the activity as only quasi-mental (i.e. doing something merely by habit or conditioning without consciousness of what one is doing). But we also noted that an intention that is not deficient in cognitive attention but lacking valuative attention might also be called only quasi-mental, for it reflects activity not motivated by deliberative choice, i.e. the mind's causality.

A particular instance of manifesting an intention in action not accompanied by feeling (pro or con) may or may not be rationally justified. There are these different situations that might be reflected in such instances of manifestation without valuative attention accompaniment: (1) The instance is a manifestation of a conative disposition which is a habit response not under the control or sanction of reason-mediated conscious orientations of the self, or (2) the instance is the manifestation of a conative disposition that is reason-sanctioned and correlated with an attention disposition, but even in the reason-controlled self every manifestation of a conative disposition need not be accompanied by a manifestation of the correlative attention disposition. Cognitive and conative language make possible manifestations of the first without the second, even when both dispositions are part of the character of the agent. As we have noted several times



before, a person can report or express his convictions through use of language without at the time causally expressing or experiencing any feelings whatsoever. A conative assertion, I remind the reader, is correctly semantically expressatory as long as the mental-act ground is a part of the agent's <sup>set of</sup> valuation<sup>s</sup>; that mental-act ground need not be manifested in pro or con attentions at the time of making an expressatory assertion. Note that the assertion is still expressatory and not performatory even in instances where the ground is not manifested. Here the saying is not in itself the valuing, though it is the semantic expressing of an attention disposition--but not necessarily as an instance of psychological manifestation of such a disposition.

## 22. On Choice Not Acted Upon

When a choice (reason-mediated intention) is not acted upon in the appropriate realization circumstances, one of the following types of explanation must be fitting:

(1) The choice was cancelled by choosing not to continue volitional support of the directive (willing not to will). The choice may then be replaced by another choice, i.e. a choice over and beyond the cancellation act.

(2) The choice was overcome by a non-reason-controlled intention. We shall have to consider later how often and in what circumstances this can happen and it still be

meaningful to speak of the choice as continuing to be a part of the agent's values.

(3) The choice was not enacted because the agent was physically (including physiologically) unable to perform the enactment behavior.

(4) The choice was never really made. "My tongue swore but there was no oath upon my heart" is meaningful of choices, where they are expressatory valuations (the only kind we are considering in this part of the analysis). For a choice (i.e. value judgment) really to be made there must be the volitional act of accepting a directive, and the belief act that acting on the directive is justified.

Sometimes it will be difficult to determine whether an individual's failure to act on a professed choice is a case of weak will or insincerity, and this may be true even for the agent. In such a situation we could say, I think, that <sup>the two</sup> ~~they~~ are conceptually indistinguishable.

### 23. Mental Causality and Efficient Causality

I have stated that a modification of consciousness and/or behavior of a self should be considered a mental act (an action of the self) if conscious orientations, including volitions, are directly involved or if the dispositional response is directly modifiable by such conscious volitional states. Consideration by the agent of reasons for acting and no strong evidence that the action has a kind of efficient cause explanation that nullifies the volitional character of the

act are prima facie evidence that the act is an instance of mental causality. Of course, this characterization can still leave us undecided whether a particular act is mental or not, but this is to be expected for it makes empirical sense to speak of a continuum between the mental act and the non-mental, with some acts referred to as only quasi-mental or questionably mental. A mental act must involve directly or indirectly control of the behavior by mental causality, i.e. causality involving volitional response to alternatives of action. To ask for or give the cause--i.e. mental cause--of an act is not usually to ask whether a volition is involved, but to presuppose this and ask what factors that the agent was aware of caused him (motivated him, prompted him) to accept (will) a certain directive. We have noted that this cognitive ground of the action can be called the motive or the reason of the action. It is normally referred to as a motive if one is giving a mental or efficient causal explanation and as a reason if one is giving a justification. It follows from this that in mental causality (choice) the agent must be conscious (but not necessarily self-conscious) of the motive (i.e. cognitive ground) of his action.

We can draw a sharper distinction here between mental-cause ground (motive) and justificatory ground (reason): They are two kinds of reference, even though the referent

is the same. Justifying grounds are factors thought of which would prompt an agent acting rationally (i.e. with maximal achievable awareness) to act in a particular way. Thus, justifying grounds may also be mental causes (when they actually function as motives), but a cognitive ground recognized as a mental cause might not be capable of functioning as a justifying ground; this will be the case where one later decides that he ought not to have been motivated or prompted to act by a particular cognitive factor, or ought to have been prompted more by other factors. In such a case the motive, or mental cause, in question would likely be referred to in explaining why one acted as one did, but only in a special sense would it be a "justification" of the action. Consider the dialogue: "Why did you do such a stupid thing?" Reply: "It was stupid, but I thought..."

We should not confuse such mental-cause explanations with purely efficient cause explanations. Taken as such they beg some very fundamental and as yet unanswered factual questions as to whether mental causes are (or sometimes are) explainable fully as instances of efficient causation. Neither the purely causal explanation nor the justificatory account here refers to efficient causality. A reference to a mental cause is a reference to a volition or (more commonly) to that which prompts volition, i.e. it is a reference to a

process of thought (usually considering alternative possibilities of action) which activates conative grounds, a process which normally culminates in an act of will. There must be some thought preceding response for the response to be classified as volitional (however inadequate this is to make the response even subjectively rational) and thus a fully mental act. But obviously, again, we have a gradation from the volitional (mental cause) act to the non-volitional (only efficient cause explainable) response. About some acts we will be undecided whether they can be called mental, though our concept of the mental is as sharp as its functional significance will allow. We know precisely what functions an agent must perform for his behavior to be mental, but empirically there may be no sharp demarcation between the behavior in which the function is manifested and that in which it is not.

One can also talk of any act in terms of efficient causality. Here we are talking either about what regular sequences in behavior our observations can establish as law-like, or we are talking about these regular sequences as manifestations of a categorial concept of causal efficacy or necessity. It is important to keep in mind that a mental cause explanation is different in its procedure from an efficient cause explanation, even if the efficient cause

explanation (atypically) includes a claim of an efficient cause relationship between idea in mind and resultant volition, and between this and the physical and mental consequences of the volition.

Since there is nothing in conceptual analysis which can establish whether a mental cause is or is not always an efficient cause, we are still faced here, I think, with the dilemma Kant pointed out: From the standpoint of efficient causality it does not make sense to speak of an occurrence that is not completely explainable in efficient cause terms, for such an explanation is part of what we mean by having a coherent concept of our experience; but on the other hand, from the standpoint of mental causality it does not seem compatible with the significance of choice, or valuation, in human experience, or the facts of creative mental response, to speak of mental causes as always parts of a complete efficient cause explanation. As Kant noted, the problem may not be rationally resolvable. However, if we assume (as it seems empirically reasonable to do) that all phenomena of consciousness are emergent properties of energy-field processes, then a more adequate understanding of how such fields can function in higher levels of organization may give some answer to how a human being can be, as Aristotle described him "an originating cause of action" in a sense that gives

to mental causation (Aristotle's "final" or "teleological causation") a causal significance that can occur independently of efficient causation.

This metaphysical freedom-determinism problem is, of course, conceptually quite distinct from the ethical freedom-determinism problem. The latter distinction focuses on the degree of enlightenment involved in a mental-cause process. If an agent were able to act completely under the rational ideal (vindication norm), he would then perform his acts of will with awareness of all there is to be aware of and a motivational openness to all possible ways of responding to what he was aware of. This latter openness means that whatever essential nature the human being has would be capable of determining goals and principles of action without distortion by established habit structures. (Issues raised here are pursued in later parts of the study.) This would be complete ethical freedom.

24. The Ideal of Rationality (Ethical Freedom) As Basis of a Classification of Valuative Intentions

Of course such a standpoint of choice is far from realizable in human action, but the ideal provides a very practical norm for determining the relative freedom and

▽, though probably modified by the full application of reason-mediation process to ~~the~~ the various features of the basic quinesis.

↑ This loop and basic question. Perhaps human beings can be said to have their "essence" (Pragmatically) defined only through a future social construction.  
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rationality of any given human action. We can see the conceptual necessity of the Kantian claim (actually implicit in the thought of Plato and Aristotle and many other philosophers before Kant) that the ideal of ethical freedom and the ideal of rationality in choice are conceptually identical. The significance of this for ethical theory (meta-ethics and substantive ethics) we shall consider in several ways later in the study. My present concern is to present what I think is one of the most significant ways to classify intentions, namely in terms of the manner, capability, and actuality of their being reason-mediated. It is a hierarchical classification on the basis of the ideal of reason--or ethical freedom.

In examining the following classification, one should keep in mind that each class is a functional model representing an idealized type. Thus, application of the classification does not yield a neat parceling of actual actions each into a class. The classification provides standards of measurement, analysis, and appraisal of each action in regard to the degree of rationality or freedom manifested in it. However, it may well be the case that each of the classifications applies to some extent to every action, and thus the application of the classification to any actual action will yield an analysis in terms of dominant and recessive elements.



of prob: these (etc) I reorganize the rational  
 mind does not call for ~~study~~ study outside of habit  
 response  
 Adequate choice require controlled habit self

We should also note that while the classification begins with the least free and generally moves toward the ideal, this is not true without exception. As Aristotle pointed out, for human beings the rational state of being to be aimed at is that of rationally developed character, which means that in any given situation of choice, habit responses should be a major determining factor. That is, the rational ideal for man is not that of reasoning capacities maximally developed and active, and habit determination of action at a minimum; rather, the man of rational character is he who, in addition to developed reasoning capabilities and active mind, has strongly developed rational habits and thus is one who can act largely "intuitively" in situations of choice, where there is usually not opportunity to do much active reasoning and often not a need to beyond the point of rationally appraising that need. Thus, the man with rationally formed and controlled habits is closer to the ideal of freedom than an individual with identical enlightenment and freedom from irrational habits who has not developed rational habits. Using Freud's language (but not his particular conclusions), the individual with a reason-shaped superego has a greater reason-controlled character than an individual for whom all acts are reason-controlled at the ego level. Freud himself appears not to have recognized, or not to have accepted,

this basic concept of the vital role of rational habit in the rational life. This "Aristotelian" concept of rationality is also very ably presented and argued by Henri Bergson in Two Sources of Morality in Religion.<sup>53</sup>

CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS AND BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF NATURE AND DEGREE OF REASON MEDIATION OF INTENTIONALITY

I. NON-VOLITIONAL BEHAVIOR: (Avoluntary)

Not reason-mediabile: Behavior and attentions not subject to change via reasoning and conditioning. (Not mental acts.)

- A. Ontogenetically Avoluntary: No history of direct mental causation.
- B. Existentially Avoluntary: Have become avoluntary through conditioning or physiological malfunctioning.

II. ACTS: VOLITIONAL BEHAVIOR (i.e. involve reason-mediabile mental causality)

A. Habit Responses: (Quasi-Voluntary)

May not be directly reason mediabile, i.e. may not be subject to ~~rational action conation~~ at time of acting, but can be modified by reasoning and conditioning over a period of time.

1. Essentialistic ground: Reflecting individual's nature (temperament) or human nature.
2. Existential ground: Reflecting cultural conditioning and dispositions resulting from repeated individual choices.

<sup>53</sup>(New York, 1935), Doubleday Anchor Books, pp. 47-52.

- B. Active Choices: (i.e. mental causality under the ideal of reason)
1. Involuntary: Acts that have an unintended result that would not have been chosen in a more enlightened act of choosing.
  2. Semi-Voluntary: Acts that have an intended result that would not have been chosen in a more enlightened act of choosing. (Aristotle calls these "non-voluntary,"<sup>54</sup> but this seems a misleading label.)
  3. Fully Voluntary: Acts that are manifestations of enlightened volition. (ideal rational action)

We are now ready to turn to a more direct consideration of the nature of valuation--using the analysis of the nature of philosophical explication, of mind, and of meaning-in-language developed in Part I and the analysis of the nature of mental acts that has been developed in this Part II.

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<sup>54</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. 1.

## PART III

### VALUATION

#### A. VALUING AND REASONING

##### 1. Valuation and the Rational Ideal

*and would not*  
Valuative acts, I said earlier, are to valuation as perceptions are to knowledge. If this is so we cannot talk about valuations without talking of the nature of reason-grounded judgment. A valuation by its logical character claims to be a product of reasoning. Fundamentally, I have argued, a valuation is a reason-grounded valuative intention-attention complex. We can speak more simply of a valuation of an agent at a given time as any valuative, or set of valuatives, which constitute the most enlightened responses of the agent on the subject of the valuative at that time. I have noted that a pronouncement such as, "I would like to do it, but it wouldn't be good (but I ought not)," reflects the contrast between two valuatives of an agent on the same subject with only one being taken as the valuation. The desired becomes for an agent at a given time the desirable only by securing the sanction of the agent's rational awareness at

that time. In that transition the desire itself becomes judgmental by coming under the rational ideal. Thus, a valuation is a value judgment, which is to say that in addition to being a valiative--an expression of an intention with attendant attentions or an attention with attendant intentions, or both--it is also a cognitive claim that the expressed valiative is the result of the maximal consideration of rational grounds for the choice that the agent had practically achieved at the time. Thus, a valuation can be challenged either by showing that this claim is not true or by showing that there are further grounds which, upon being considered by the agent, would modify the judgment. To establish the incorporated cognitive claim is to show that the valuation was the subjectively right one for the agent to make, even if it was not overall a justified judgment. The distinction of the two dimensions of justification is important in appraising the character of the agent--an issue which we will go into later.

A valuation itself, even in its most elementary form, is a quite complex pronouncement. It is a combination of valiative assertion and belief assertion, and the valiative itself must be a valiative intention that includes attention dispositions. The belief assertion, or cognitive claim, is itself based on a valuation: it is a claim that a norm has been fulfilled to the maximum extent practicable in the

circumstances, namely the norm of ideally rational action. This cognitive claim is a part of the meaning and not just a presupposition, for it is a part of what is directly meant, asserted, in using a sentence to express a valuation; it is a part of the intentionality of the valuation act.

## 2. Vindication and Validation

We have noted that the concept of ideally rational action (completely justified action) is the same as the concept of ideal ethical freedom: the concept of the action willed from a state of complete enlightenment--the state of being fully aware of everything there is to be aware of--and where all conative grounds have been fully reason-mediated, thus all dispositions are shaped and controlled under the ideal of acting with maximum cognitive awareness and maximum conative openness (feeling and dispositional sensitivity) of responsiveness to the cognitive awareness. This, I believe, is an empirical formulation of the Kantian Ideal of Reason, as the ideal of volition from the standpoint of "the unconditioned ground of the conditioned." It is Spinoza's ideal of conatus sub specie aeternitatus. It is the Platonic ideal of eros united with dialectic in the ultimate vision of absolute beauty in measure. It is the nineteenth and twentieth century voluntarist ideal of the state of subjective volition that chooses the stable vision of normative and noetic form. As I noted in Part I, Herbert Feigl, in making

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 (104)  
 ALSO: RESPONSIBILITY  
 IDEAL OF  
 DELIBERATED CHOICE

(105) a quite positivistic approach to the ideal, called it the norm of vindication, the ultimate ground of justification of all other claims, cognitive and valuational. Norms as principles justified by appeal to the vindication ideal or by derivation from other norms or principles he calls norms of validation. I am adopting his terminology. Though it is a thoroughly empirical and metaphysically neutral standard of measurement, it can be described methodologically as the ideal of volition from the standpoint of God.

(106) The norm of vindication is the norm of enlightened choice. Validation norms are justified by deductive and inductive methods to a great extent, but the norms of these methods are in turn justified by the vindication norm, and where these methods are inconclusive validation procedures give way to the vindication procedure: the procedure of seeking the enlightened response of acceptance or rejection. Thus, vindication is not only the logically ultimate procedure in justification but is applied regularly throughout the spectrum of validational justification both in regard to cognitive claims and value claims. That is, established norms of fact and value often do not uniquely settle an issue on which some resolution is sought, and vindication must close the gap. This is especially true in valuational reasoning: Shall we use particle formulae or wave formulae for the problem at hand? Shall I seek a contemplative life

or a life of action? Where shall we build a new arterial?  
 Who will make the best president? Whom shall I marry?  
 What shall I wear today? etc.

But our concern at this point is not that the vindication procedure has practical application throughout the spectrum of justification, but that it is in itself the foundation of all concepts of rational procedure: it embodies the root idea in the concept of rational action (thus including rational belief). The idea of rational action is of action conforming to all justified norms, or where norms conflict to the most basic, and insofar as norms cannot be justified by subsuming the less basic under the more basic, ~~and~~ to choose in an enlightened way what are to function as basic norms. What could conceivably be a rational procedure of justification other than to make commitment to the norms which one is moved to accept in a maximumly achievable state of awareness of all there is to be aware of? What grounds could there be for challenging the rationality of such a choice other than an appeal to more adequately conceived grounds of choice? Does it make any sense to ask whether a choice made in ideal awareness of all there is to be aware of can fail to be an ideally rational choice? Since it is by definition the choice that has taken into account everything there is to take into account, the notion that an agent in such an ideal state of choice could still manifest an irrational bias in his choices



cannot be made out. One shows that a person is biased by showing he doesn't have a full awareness and/or openness to the facts, this state thus including not only knowing what there is to know but being open to all the ways there are of feeling about the facts. The notion of the ideally rational chooser is not the notion of the ideally detached observer, but of the ideally involved observer. There is no perspective of knowing the data and no perspective of responding to it emotively that the observer is not aware of and responsive to. What Archimedean point could provide a basis of challenge of the action of such a chooser as not ideally rational? I think we can conclude that such an ideal is the foundation of the concept of the rational--the root idea of rationality, its logical essence.

These observations would appear to justify the conclusion that the idea of rationality is fundamentally a norm defining the concept of rational action and derivatively a justification of the norm of rational assertion, and derivative from this the norm of rational grounding of statements. From our analysis of the status of statements (cognitive language) as a kind of abstraction from assertional discourse, we would logically expect the concept of rationality in cognitive discourse to be fundamentally derived from the norm of rationality in conative language. That this is so is pretty obvious already, but we will give attention to the specific character

3. The Question of Apriori Norms of Rationality

But what about the principles defining consistency: Are these not a part of the essence of rationality? "Be consistent and seek the unconditioned ground of the conditioned" are the two norms we can abstract as the Ideas of Reason Kant arrives at in his Critique of Pure Reason--these defining the Idea of Reason.<sup>1</sup> We must tread carefully here to avoid vitiating circularity (there is, I believe, a non-vitiating kind), but I believe it makes sense to say that the norms of consistency are logically implied in the vindicational ideal. To be aware of everything there is to be aware of is, of course, to be aware of <sup>& to employ</sup> the necessary conditions of clear and coherent awareness, thus awareness <sup>to be aware of all forms of</sup> of logical relatedness, and to be aware that the laws definitive of consistency and implication (thus of deductive logic) are the necessary conditions of coherent thought that they are. Thus the vindication ideal sets the end in regard to which the consistency principles become binding norms, while the principles themselves serve only as means functions in regard to conceiving the ideal. Thus, I think we do not need to speak

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<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York, 1929), pp. 485-495; 629-645.

conjunctively here in delineating the root idea in rationality but can consider that consistency norms are in a clear sense apriori derivative from the vindicational norm.

Are any other norms apriori derivative? Let us call the norm of vindication Tier I in the notion of rationality, and take consistency principles as constituting Tier II. Our question here is: Is there a third tier of principles (or a principle) that can be derived from the first two either deductively or by a kind of Kantian transe<sup>n</sup>dental deduct-~~ion~~ ion, i.e. by showing that they are necessarily conceived in conceiving and applying the others in a manner that gives us a coherent concept of experience? Four fundamental valuations have been assigned this empyrean status by philosophers whose arguments for their synthetic apriori status deserves serious consideration:

- III<sub>1</sub> Claim that the norm of rationality is itself necessarily binding on all human beings. (The norm of rationality is defined by Tier I, and its logical entailments, thus Tier II and any contents of Tier III.)  
Ideal of the Normative Univers<sup>ality</sup> of the Norm of Rationality.
- III<sub>2</sub> Law to each agent to rationally establish a clear hierarchy of conduct-regulating principles adequate to all situations.  
Ideal of a Codified Ethic.
- III<sub>3</sub> Law to each agent to maximize pleasure experience.  
Ideal of Individual Ethical Hedonism.

III<sub>4</sub> Law to each agent to consider all persons equally in regard to attainment of value. Moral Ideal.

I shall seek to show in due course why I believe the claim of apriority fails in each of these cases, leaving Tier III empty. Note that a Tier III justification would raise serious questions about the normative neutrality of language. Thus the emptiness of Tier III reflects what I described in Part I as the radical neutrality of natural language. Let us take Tier IV as the slot for value principles that are contingently apriori or existentially apriori. There is a nice twist in this last name considering that the question of whether there are existentially apriori norms is the question of whether there are norms all enlightened agents by the very nature of man plus the human condition would--if enlightened--espouse, i.e. it is a question of essentialism in human nature. The question as to whether this class has members will concern us to some extent later, i.e. to the extent that it is a conceptual issue. While questions about individual or universal essentialisms in human nature are not analytic philosophical questions (questions of concept analysis), it is a responsibility of the analytic philosopher to make clear wherein this is not a philosophical question and also to note the implications of various assumptions and hypotheses made in regard to this issue, especially those that have played

*Note this "showing" is a matter. Should have been inserted between Sec 3.6 & 4. p 270.*

important roles in the history of ethics.

Let us consider Tier V of rationality as made up of any norm that would be universally espoused in an ideally developed culture, but where there are no assumptions that this universality derives from a universal human nature in some quite specific and culturally independent way. I rather suspect that this Tier does not make much sense without some principles established on the fourth Tier, Sartre's notorious claims notwithstanding. It is in way of considering such conceptual problems as this one that we shall give some attention to a possible membership in the Tier V class.

Tiers I-V contain, I think, all the logically possible kinds of claims of rational universality in valuations. Ethical intuition claims can be considered special cases of Tier IV or V, depending on the particular theory and particular interpretation of Tier IV.

Some further comment is in order at this point, I think, on why III<sub>1</sub> (the normative universality of the norm of rationality) is not itself tautological. It is tautological, of course, to say that in order to be rational one must accept the norm of rationality, but this does not in itself make the norm of logical~~ly~~ categorical (Kant notwithstanding). Why should I be rational? is a substantive normative issue, even though it is logically necessary that one be rational to some extent to even consider the question and it is

tautological that one can only fully appraise the question by making full commitment to the rational norm during the period of appraisal. But the question can be reformulated: Why should I make the rational norm a universal norm of my conduct? I do not think we can find a pure a priori answer here. The best we can hope for is a contingent a priori (Tier IV) norm. Lewis and Findlay, as I have noted, have offered very compelling arguments for such a Tier IV norm, which I shall consider very shortly. If argument at this level fails, we can drop back to Tier V. Here, in response to the question, "Why adopt as a universal principle the norm of rationality?" (or: "Why a through-and-through commitment to the vindicational ideal?"), one can answer: "Because, insofar as you do not, you're likely to be sorry." This fundamental pragmatic justification is one Lewis came back to in his writings, even after presenting what he took to be more formally compelling arguments.<sup>2</sup>

Suppose we formulated this pragmatic answer in this way: Because only through a rational commitment can one intelligently seek the good. For my analysis there would appear to be two blatant petitios here: (1) "intelligent seeking" can only mean a thoroughly reason-controlled seeking, and (2) the good has been analyzed in this proposal to be a

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<sup>2</sup> C.I. Lewis, The Ground and the Nature of the Right (New York, 1955), pp. 85-97.

*manifestation*

good of rational choice. These petitios are there, but they do not destroy the significance of the argument for it can be taken as a presenting of what it means to seek goals intelligently: a pointing out of the role of rationality in human experience, not only in the logical sense, for this would be simply to presuppose what was to be proved, but in the way in which a salesman may demonstrate his product ("See, this is what it does.") or the way a musician shows the virtues of a musical composition by playing it. A judgment can "sell itself," present its own virtues for vindicational acceptance. In this way the norm of vindication performs without logical scullduggery that rare kind of act, a rational self-justification; but this feat, we can see, is an absolute logical must for an ultimate norm of justification.

*Refer to M. Mac Donald's  
article on aesthetic  
substance*

4. No Formal Basis of Universality  
of the Norm of Rationality

*Sections  
omitted showing  
that Toulmin  
is empty!*

But note that we have not here argued "X is a norm presupposed by the very structure of language, therefore it would be logically odd--or unanswerable--to ask: 'Why ought I to adopt X?'" As I noted in Part I, the antithesis of the approach I am making here to analysis of the concept of rationality and the basis of its authority for human action is the sort of analysis offered by "logical naturalists" such as Stephen Toulmin, Kurt Baier, and Paul Taylor. They

have argued that we cannot find any universal answer to the general question "What is rationality?" other than by making a list of the norms normally appealed to in practical discourse in justifying assertions. They argue (or presuppose) that such norms are part of the logical structure of language itself: that it is a language rule which establishes the justification of going from evidence A to conclusion B. Such an approach may succeed in intimidating the philosophical pursuer of the basis of commitment to norms of rationality, or in other ways direct attention from the fundamental justificatory problem, but as a final resolution of the problem it is egregiously question begging. Why is it rational to accept a body of "inference tickets" commonly accepted in a particular culture? Any particular culture norm requires rational justification and cannot be part of the basic meaning of it. Not because thought presupposes language and these norms reflect the basic structure of thought or some part of it are we linguistically called upon to accept culture norms as part of the meaning of rationality, for one is not called upon to move outside of the general framework of rules of language use to make a rejection of any such "inference rules" and seek rational grounds for any value principles one accepts. How can a language rule be a norm of conduct other than to establish the functions of words? But a set of substantive norms which are commonly presupposed as grounds of justification logically cannot be definitive of

why is it justifiable to accept words in normally taken to be the function of a word?

(Needs something)



the meaning (use, function) of rationality, for there is no logical contradiction, no inconceivability, in rejecting any of the norms or even the whole set, and adopting other "uncommon" norms. Moore's naturalistic fallacy criticism would appear to apply in full force here. Nothing can be a requirement of language except what is necessary for clear conceivability. This is the radical neutrality of language.

I have tried to show that the dialectic of conceivability establishes the vindication norm as the meaning of rationality, but this does not settle the question of why it should be accepted as a principle universally applicable to one's actions. There is nothing formally inconsistent about my using the principle only to the extent of coherently conceiving it, and considering the question of accepting it as universally binding on my actions, and then deciding rationally not to accept it in this universal way. If the norm of rationality is presupposed in every valuation, then obviously every valuation presupposes it. But it is not logically necessary that a person constantly and universally value, making every response and the conative intention of every action a valuation. One can just respond and act without attempting to "really choose". While one logically cannot justify specific actions on such a policy, he could have periods in which the policy was subjected to procedures of justification. But there would appear to be no a priori obligation even to justify such a policy.

*Bad  
transition*

*if fully understood & realized*

*make the choice as enlightened as possible*

*fully*

"Why justify every way of acting" is the very question for which we are seeking an answer. We can give very persuasive pragmatic answers, but this is no basis of formal universal bindingness here. To sum up: The question "Why be rational?" is a substantive one. We cannot by concept analysis establish either the conclusion that one ought to accept the norm of rationality as a universal norm of action, or any conclusion to the effect that specific substantive norms are part of the "idea of rationality."

## B. OBJECTIVITY IN VALUATION

### 5. Agent Relativity (Subjectivity) and Vindication Groundedness (Objectivity)

Let us now consider the question: How much objectivity in valuation can the vindication norm give us? This formulation could be misleading for it might suggest that there is some norm of objectivity for values distinct from that defined by the vindication norm, i.e. the concept of a value claim becoming more "objective" the more fully it is vindicated. However, the suggestion is understandable for value objectivity has through history been closely associated with cognitive objectivity, and the two are logically closely associated, but values are never reducible to cognitions, not even to idealized ones. Thus, values can never have the kind

*How pragmatic against agenthood  
consciously opening maximum participation  
of my action? [Is → rule itself?]*

of objectivity cognitive claims can have. However, this is not to suggest (as it often has both in popular and philosophical thought) that value objectivity is somehow of a lower or less "objective" order. The issues here are complex, but I think it can be shown that any such relegating of value objectivity to a second class status is highly suspect.

'Subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are words to which the cliché that they should never be out without a guardian is certainly applicable. Suppose we start off by meaning by a subjective valuation one that is an expression of the subjective state of the agent making the assertion, and by an objective valuation one that is rationally justified (not just claims to be). These two are not logical opposites, either as contradictories or as contraries in either cognitive discourse or conative, though in popular thought, and even some philosophical discussion, they have been treated as though they were.

Valuations as analyzed in this study are obviously necessarily subjective in the above sense for, while they are valuatives made under the ideal of reasoning, they are basically valuatives, which is to say pro or con responses of the agent. Valuations cannot be "universalized" or "depersonalized" or <sup>made</sup> "objective" (the logical opposite of <sup>in the sense that is</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>presently being discussed</sup> ~~this meaning of~~ "subjective") in the sense that they can be considered as claims which it would be meaningful to speak

of as justified or unjustified for an agent without reference to his pro or con responses, actual or projected. Of course that agent may be a group, or all of society, or all rational beings, or God, or the individual functioning as a voice of any of these groups or metaphysical agencies, but nevertheless a valuation is by its logical nature an expression of some agent's valuative intentions and associated valuative attentions. Objectivity (i.e. justification) in a valuation must always fundamentally be vindicational objectivity. It is that kind of objectivity I want now to examine. It takes on a number of complex semblances of the other kind (i.e. the agent de-relationized kind) which I want to note and discuss.

6. Value Objectivity and  
Prediction of Rational  
Choice

One might say of the analysis that has been made, either in the manner of destructive or supportive observation, that it really shows that values are kinds of facts: what is with ideal objectivity a value for A is what A would choose if A were ideally enlightened. What is practically objective as a value for A at time T is what A would choose at T if he took advantage of his practically available

*For  
 showing - One  
 can make predictions  
 about what would  
 be valued -*

opportunities to act with maximal awareness.<sup>3</sup> A valuation is thus, it may be said, a claim to correspondence with fact, thus a factual claim. It is true that from the spectators standpoint (and this includes the agent observing himself "objectively," "scientifically",) values as I have defined them are simply what people would call values under certain factual conditions; or to judge things valuatively is to judge them in relation to the degree of realization of those ideal conditions. Thus the practical use of a predicate of value is like a practical use of a predicate such as being circular or being fictionless.

What tends to be overlooked in such an analysis that would reduce value judgments to factual statements is that the ability to describe a valuation does not make the description itself a valuation. *An B. John Dewey noted, regarding this point,* "Judgments about potatoes are not potato judgments" Dewey notably observed. Valuations as  
 → {  
 occurrent acts of attention and manifested intentions cannot be expressed in cognitive language--i.e. semantically expressed in it--though they are of course expressible in a

<sup>3</sup>A very significant third sense of objectivity can be distinguished which normally will lie between these two, though practical objectivity might be coincident with it, namely ideal practical objectivity (or we could call it scientific practical objectivity): V has ideal practical objectivity for A at time T if V is what A would choose at T if A's knowledge resources and habit responses were developed in a practically maximal way, i.e. if A had taken advantage of all practically available opportunities to act with maximal awareness. This ideal can, of course, be distinguished into several species.

~~in a~~ perlocutionary way at times through using (or by using) cognitive language. As valuations they are of logical necessity not descriptive functions but act-expressive functions in which intentionality, with its (volitional) mental causality, is manifested. Valuation itself is thus necessarily a different perspective on experience from description of valuation: it is the perspective of the involved agent responding, acting, consciously choosing within the milieu of his lived experience. Even the descriptive language of "subjective response" is a stage removed and different in perspective from that of the lived intentionality. Thus only ~~the~~ <sup>an act-expressive value</sup> ~~conative~~ <sup>with the</sup> language has the semantic structure to be directly expressive of valuation. <sup>sets of</sup> ~~It~~ <sup>would be recognized:</sup> is the language of the lived experience, even though it commonly presents this experience semantically and not psychologically. If a person were limited only to the describing perspective he could not have a value experience (we found reason to believe such a one-dimensional cognitive perspective is logically impossible, but that is beside the present point) or know what it meant to describe one. *Skip to 289: Valuation...*

As illustration of the significance of distinguishing semantically these two perspectives, let us take a look at an analysis of value that, roughly speaking, is like the one being developed in this study, except that it is considered only in terms of a cognitive language description, namely

the position in which value is defined as "what an agent desires to desire." G. E. Moore refers to this "cognitive naturalist" position, noting that it would appear to offer one of the best possibilities of being a cognitive naturalist position that avoids the naturalistic fallacy criticism; however, he concludes that it does not for it make sense to ask: "Why is what we desire to desire good?" Had Moore considered this question, not as an analysis of value formulated totally within the semantic resources of cognitive language, but as a description of valuation which is expressed within another language, he would not have found it so easy to dismiss the position as logically question begging. Identifying the idea of value with what an agent desires to desire could only mean, I should think, identifying it with the idea of completely enlightened choice. Considered from the perspective of an agent seeking to make a justified choice, the question "Why is what I choose to do good when I act with maximum awareness, noetic and conative, of all there is to be aware of?" has no open-question argument force, for it does not make sense. The reason it does not is significantly more and different from the Toulminesque one that the language we speak happens to define this as the good and we are going beyond the point of what can be philosophically discussed if we try to challenge our de facto

language.<sup>4</sup> The reason we cannot challenge this concept of good is that the function of the word 'good' in our language is to express claims made under the ideal of a justified action and there is no coherent alternative to the concept of an action as ideally justified when it is made in complete awareness of all there is to be aware of. There is no consistent way of ~~refuting this~~. *By saying "good" again in the position.* Thus we have a delineation of a specific character of the conceivable as related to the function the word 'good' has in language. This is what justified the analysis.

Valuing can be defined in terms of desiring, because desire is more than its aspect as fact: it is also its aspect as *choosing* ~~as~~ *attentive* ratiocinative valuative attention and intention and the resultant mental causality. Aristotle took cognizance of this dual character of desire quite explicitly in his ethic (*epistēmē* specifically rejecting cognitive naturalism) and it forms the basis of his distinction between theoretical and practical discourse. Two recent philosophers, Everett Hall and Maynard Adams have in explicit and developed ways sought to give this two-perspective character of desire a contemporary semantic formulation, though I am unable to accept or see the point in their strenuous efforts to make value objectivity

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<sup>4</sup>"What we desire to desire" is not Toulmin's specific analysis; I think Toulmin's position would have had considerably more philosophical defensibility if he had defined good in this way rather than in terms of the two functions he does ascribe to the word.

*Put this in footnote?*



parasitic upon intuitional cognitive objectivity.<sup>5</sup>

We cannot say, in the kind of reductivism which Plato seemed to assume, that if a value is what would be ideally willed, then value exists as eternal fact <sup>unchanging Ideas on a level of unchanging Ideas,</sup> ~~only~~ <sup>only (!) complete</sup> needing more wisdom to uncover it. This would seem a wrong concept of the situation on two counts: (1) Even if there were such knowledge, the valuing and the justification of value would logically lie in a different dimension from the knowing of these and the justification of this knowing; they are different kinds of justificatory operations. The knowing of value could only become that through some prediction of what would be valued under more or completely ideal conditions. Thus the cognitive language justification cannot be formulated independently of the conative language process of valuing and justifying a valuing act. Also, (2), as that great existentialist Aristotle noted, the ideal good can only exist as a projection from some state of willing. The notion that the ideal already exists as the goal of an already fully formed nisus is a notion often attributed to Aristotle <sup>in relation to the nature of human beings.</sup> but one he seems explicitly to repudiate. There is a nisus of human nature but this is general and indeterminate enough to make much room for, in fact to require, the self-

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<sup>5</sup> Everett Hall, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value (Chapel Hill, 1969), Part II: E. M. Adams, Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World View (Chapel Hill, 1960), pp. 168-200.

creative act.<sup>6</sup> The ideal of an individual he tells us, is <sup>over</sup> modified by the creativeness of the choosing act. Based on achieved wisdom, the self projects an ideal, but in living toward that ideal (guided by it as a principle) <sup>under the principle of production</sup> a modified ideal emerges. Thus, wisdom-shaped self is also creative-act shaped self, creating a new <sup>product</sup> (wisdom and thus a new <sup>product</sup> self) out of the old wisdom and the old self. Rodin's statue chipping itself into being is a fitting Aristotelian metaphor here and the art response in the selection and appreciation of forms of order <sup>in</sup> ~~from~~ human experience is perhaps the ultimate kind of valuative choosing. Plato too talks in this way (in fact even more so) but presents the valuing response as a "copying" of the ideal presented through the vision of dialectical reason; his "Heaven of Forms" forces the valuing response into the form of observation and imitation. There is no place for the creative valuing act. The emotions, or passional self ("eros" or "spirit"), in the rational soul support the goals of action given in dialectical vision, i.e. motivate the soul to pursue the goals, but they do not themselves enter into the goal-determining process. The artist who copies the bed is deprecated by Plato, not because he is a copier, but because he copies particulars rather than <sup>significant</sup> universals, <sup>i. e. ideal forms (of music, love, social organization, etc.)</sup> ~~or only insignificant~~ universals.

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<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethic, Bk. III, Ch. 2-5; Bk. VI, Ch. 2, 5, 8-13.

If I have done justice to Plato (and however figuratively one takes his talk of a Heaven of Forms, it is still the vision of the static ideal to be known and imitated), then the Aristotelian existentialist vision is far more realistic and captivating as a concept of ideals: the ideal is not there simply to be discovered in some higher dialectic; it has got to be wrought in the smithy of the soul and from the raw materials of a given human condition and given generic intentionality that provides the structural directiveness necessary to make genuine creativity possible. <sup>9f</sup> This point of comparison of Plato and Aristotle has a certain irony, for from what we discern of the temperaments of the men in their work, we would rationally have expected, I think, exactly the opposite from each in his theory of the possibilities and functions of creativity in human life: Plato the imaginative artist and Aristotle the meticulous, order-loving scientist. For Aristotle the moment of birth for tomorrow's specific ideal of a self has not yet come round. The analytic Aristotle hoists the artist Plato on Plato's own "Idealizing" petard--along with all those who tend to think of value as already there in some factual way only needing to be discovered. To think of value objectively as in some sense identical with fact objectivity (even ideal fact) is to set out on a journey to discover something conceived to be already there--in the conceptual Heavens or the

Notes that Aristotle is a more coherent intellectual than Socrates!

~~Aristotle is a~~  
~~philosopher?~~

motivational depths of the soul--when the problem is as much to create as to cognitively find.

Because we can describe the conditions under which a value would be objective, and even set up predictive hypotheses about what would be justified valuations for a particular agent, does not mean that we can assimilate value objectivity to fact objectivity. What would be the reasoned valutive response of a person, A, to a situation can never logically be identified with what is scientifically predicted to be A's choice--and this logical distinction would remain even if the science of predicting human choices were to become absolutely reliable--for the valuation is not basically the fact of a choice made under certain conditions, but basically the choosing of the agent as <sup>a</sup> response <sup>to</sup> his awareness of the situation. That is, value in the first order sense--in contrast to description of value--can only exist in the realm of mental causality and as this is experienced in and expressed through conative language. It can become a fact only as something described as occurring in this mental-semantic domain.

This is to say that value as reasoned choice is a fact only in a second order sense. This is why the position is not validly subject to the naturalistic fallacy criticism. Value is not logically derived from fact, nor value object-

I'm not sure the follow under the conditions  
condition of perfect predictability. Then, it would  
logically follow.

A

ivity from fact objectivity. The two-language approach provides the solution to Hume's and to Moore's puzzlings over the non-reductiveness of value experience and language to fact experience and language.

But in this description of the way a valuation is related to description and prediction we have presented one way in which value objectivity is clearly related to fact objectivity: Even though a valuation cannot be logically identified with or derived from a prediction, it is possible to make empirically sound predictions about what would be the rational thing for an agent to value. The logical relationship between objective prediction and objective valuation is vindicational and not deductive or inductive. The objective prediction of what it would be rational to value is logically required by the vindicational criterion to be a ground of choice--and by its very nature will function as a major ground of choice--but the agent is not logically coerced by it. It is always logically possible for him to respond contrary to the prediction and for that response to be what is objectively valuable for the agent. The unpredictable creativeness that the choice could manifest, combined with the fact that the valuer is in a privileged perspective when making the valuation that neither he nor anyone else could precisely predict, give two basic reasons why the most

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strongly grounded predictions may be wrong. Of course, it is also very possible for the prediction to be correct and the conflicting valuation to be wrong, but this would have to be a judgment theoretically confirmable by some future value experience taken to be vindicationally more adequate.

Language provides for the genuinely self-creating act, the existentialist (i.e. non-essentialist) self-choosing act, the act of genuine freedom, even if nature does not.

Our basic concern here has been to see how fact objectivity in the sense of cognitive predictions about what is or would be rational choice is related to value objectivity, the making of reason-grounded choices. This has led us to consider some of the fundamental relationships between conative language and cognitive language, and thus between value and fact.

#### 7. Value Objectivity and Essentialist Claims

In the history of ethical thought the cognitive claims of fact that have been most often set forth as giving objectivity to valuations have been psychological or psychological-metaphysical claims about the nature of man or about the nature of a specific person. Insofar as it can be established that man, or individual A, is of such a nature that if he acts rationally he will choose Y because Y is the kind of

thing that is naturally attractive to human beings, or to A, when acting in full awareness of alternatives, then--if such a claim can be established--this fact can be described as providing the objective ground of the value. (This position is often expressed more esoterically by saying that Y is something that man, or A, basically strives for, or that Y is a basic need.) We can say that Y is a value for A because of A's nature or Y is a value for all men because of human nature. Undoubtedly claims of a universal human nature have been the most commonly appealed to facts in support of claims for the universal validity <sup>of</sup> in specific values. Beginning in the western tradition at least with the classical Greek philosophers, the central concern of the overwhelming majority of pre-twentieth century philosophers doing ethics (though today there is a tendency to say they really were not doing philosophical ethics at all) has been analysis of the nature of man with the objective of establishing evidence of some kind of basic human nature which, it is claimed, will manifest itself in a hierarchy of natural motivations <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>determining</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>enlightened choices,</sup> ~~thus choices, whenever the individual acts with adequate enlightenment.~~

I do not see any reason to challenge the soundness of this approach to objectivity in values, so long as the formulation avoids the reductivism of cognitive naturalism. The good cannot mean what is as a matter of fact basically

striven for, for it is perfectly meaningful to ask, "Why is fulfilling basic strivings good?"--consider the original sin doctrine. But it also makes eminent sense to observe that when an individual chooses in a state of rational awareness there must be some propensity in his nature not totally shaped by cultural conditioning that causes him to make the choices he does.

ND 97.  
 ↪ As George Santayana notes in commenting on the fundamental character of all Greek ethics to take good as that at which nature aims, "The [fundamental] demands of life cannot be radically perverse, since they are the judges of every excellence."<sup>7</sup>

I shall seek to show later that while it is probably not a logical necessity that we ascribe to human beings in general, and especially in specific, some measure of primary human nature, to radically deny or call in question all such essentialist theses is to try to work within a theoretical context in which it is extremely difficult--I suspect impossible--to account adequately for much data pointing to several kinds of fundamental directiveness in human behavior.

The significance of essentialistic theses for establishing objectivity of value is obvious but not as logically

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<sup>7</sup> George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, (Garden City, 1954) Doubleday Anchor Books, P. 101.



simplistic as some have tried to make it: the more a cognitive essentialistic claim is made objective (i.e. strengthened in its grounds of verification), the more this statement becomes a determining ground of an agent's rational choice (i.e. the correlative valuation is strengthened in its vindicational grounds). But for reasons sketched in the previous section, we can never logically infer value from fact, no matter how well established the fact. However, there are situations where it would clearly be irrational to question the prediction of what would be valuable for an individual, or for mankind, where the prediction is made on the basis of a very well-established essentialistic hypothesis. If we keep in mind that a prediction of valuation, no matter how irrational it would be to question it is not itself a valuation, then there would seem to be no basis for denying that objective cognitive essentialist claims can be rational grounds for inferring (making predictions about) what is really objectively valuable for an agent, i.e. what he would choose if he acted with greater rational awareness. Thus value can be rationally inferred from fact if we are careful how we do it.

8. Value Objectivity and NormativeReality: Phenomenological and  
Intuitionist Explications

As we noted, the pro or con character of a valuative influences how a person sees the object of the valuative in a sense that seems definitely cognitive. To see a person as an object of love and worthy of love is to see the person with quite different eyes from seeing him as an object of hate and deserving of it. We may say that the difference is in the character of the seeing and not in what is seen, but this is a distinction which cannot be made out in talking about what is as a matter of fact seen. It is not just that the agent feels differently about what he sees but that the object is seen differently. Seeing is a complex of both valuative attention and intention responses and it would appear to be variations in the character of the valuative attentions which produce this phenomenological difference, though these attentions can be in turn modified by changes in continuing valuative intentions whose character will, of course, be influenced by fulfillment and non-fulfillment experiences.

The intuitionist, thus, has a point when he notes that when we desire or approve of something, even or

especially in more objective ways, the desire and approval have a character of being responses to seeing the object as good or the way it ought to be that make it phenomenologically false to say that the use of the value terminology has totally the function of expressing the pro feeling or attitude. Calling something good, or the way it ought to be, has a directly descriptive aspect of meaning, one distinct from the predictive description of what would be rational choice, which was discussed in the previous two sections. This direct descriptive claim I have referred to as a claim about normative reality. The intuitionist, I believe, tends to misinterpret the significance of this normatively descriptive element in the use of value words. He seeks to ascribe to this factor of cognition-in-conation a kind of cognitive claim which cannot be reductively analyzed as a projection of the significance of an initial conative act into the cognitive mode and the ensuing mutually modifying development (reinforcement) of conative and vision elements. That is, in the approach I am developing we are led to say that conative elements and normative vision elements modify each other in a process of psychological development that has no significance as a grounding of value over and beyond its intrinsic value as a certain kind of valuative experience. It is precisely this "reductivism" that the intuitionist

wants to deny. He contends that the cognition-in-conation has some autonomy from conation creation as a cognitive claim, though he may grant (and I think it is a mark of the more sophisticated intuitionist approaches to do so) that the prima facie cognitive value claim necessarily occurs as a part of a valuative intention-attention process.

For example A. C. Ewing has insisted that what is intuitive is the fittingness of an attitude to a situation.<sup>8</sup> In his discussions of the act of intuition he at times suggests that the distinctive normative cognitive awareness occurs as a part of the attitude-response experience. Professors Everett Hall and Maynard Adams have argued that the cognition that is central to the distinctive meaning and objectivity of a value judgment is necessarily a cognition manifested as a part of an emotive or attitudinal response.<sup>9</sup> How this cognition in valuative attention-intention experience is manifested and related to value judgment is presented very precisely in Professor Adams's analysis, in which he argues for a very literal interpretation of the analogy "perception :

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<sup>8</sup> A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York, 1947) pp. 84-85, 133-140, 195, 201.

<sup>9</sup> Hall, Fact and Value, Part II; Adams, Ethical Naturalism, pp. 168-200.

↑  
(W.C. Adams  
1926)

knowledge = normative cognition in conative experience :  
value judgment."<sup>10</sup> He contends that there is a kind of cognitive valuative perception in elementary conative responses that stand to valuative cognitive judgments as perceptions stand to knowledge of physical objects. Thus he comes out with a kind of value realism. However, since Professor Adams apparently realizes as meaningful only those metaphysical claims which can be shown to be parts of a metaphysics of experience (i.e. logically required for explication of experience) he evidently does not mean for this "realist" designation to be understood as one would take it within the framework of a speculative metaphysics, as for example in contrasting idealists and realists claims. Therefore, a referential claim in the realist metaphysical sense apparently is not involved. He explicitly rejects both idealist and phenomenological interpretations also. He apparently accepts what I call in Part I a transcendental phenomenalist approach to the referential significance of knowledge claims. While, for example, substance and cause are accepted as irreducible modes of organization in human experience (apriori syntheses in imagination--Kant), substance and cause concepts are not categorial in the

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<sup>10</sup>Adams, Ethical Naturalism, 192-195.

sense in which I am using the word.<sup>11</sup> Thus for Professor Adams language employing substance and cause concepts does not have a clearly establishable transphenomenal reference though substance and cause may be experienced in a phenomenologically "realistic" way, e. g. it is the logical character of an experience of a substance or cause that is an experience of a reality, not an experience of concepts.

It is not clear to me what a realist claim about an ultimate valuative cognition amounts to within this context; how, for example, does it differ from a universalized phenomenological claim? And this question is closely related to that more fundamental of questions about the value intuitionist's position (a question at least as ancient as Aristotle's critique of Plato's "good is a form" position):<sup>12</sup> how can the intuited valuative datum function as a justifying ground for the conative response in the existential context of which it is given or which it is supposed to prompt? It seems to remain a mystery how any such intuition could have intrinsically dejure significance for human conduct. As has often been noted, Moore's naturalistic fallacy criticism appears to apply with

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<sup>11</sup> Professor Adams gives the word 'category' a broader range of application, including, I believe, application to some fundamental apriori syntheses in imagination such as substance and cause.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 6.

equal force against the non-naturalist, or intuitionist, position.

The kind of position Professor Adams develops makes sense to me only when put in the context of a speculative idealism, with its inherent dialectical movement to a theological ordering principle. Within this framework the distinctive phenomenological experience of value--the normative-reality experience described above--coming in a context of enlightened intentionality, could be meaningfully interpreted as a kind of objective cognitive awareness of value analogous to enlightened perceptual awareness. A. C. Ewing and Brand Blanshard are two ethical intuitionists who ground their "value realism" in this way in a metaphysical idealism.<sup>13</sup> It is the only framework within which I can find the approach coherent. But Professor Adams explicitly rejects any such interpretation.

His rejection of what he calls "axiological idealism" includes not only rejection of speculative idealist interpretations but also the kind of phenomenological reductivism of the normative reality experience which I have made in this study, i.e. in which the valuative cognition phenomenon in valuative intention-attention experiences is accounted for by a psychological explanation in terms of the projection of

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<sup>13</sup>A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (London, 1959), Ch. IV; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. II (London, 1939), Ch. 26.

conative response into a cognitive-type experience which then reinforces the conative response, this mutual interaction becoming a developmental process. Professor Adams does not make clear just how the value cognition experience in an emotive-attitudinal response is related to this psychological normative reality experience.<sup>14</sup> This is important, for he must show why the phenomenological analysis is not adequate to account for all the normative cognitive experiences which occur in valuative intention-attention complexes. I am unable to see that it is not adequate. Of course, the intuitionist can always respond that it is only from within the intuitional experience of the intrinsically de jure character of an emotive-attitudinal experience that the inadequacy of any analysis leaving this out can be seen. While some intuitionists have given themselves such an insularity from criticism, most have argued, as Professor Adams has, that the logic of practical discourse requires the value realist interpretation. I am seeking to show in this

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<sup>14</sup>Professor Maurice Mandelbaum, in his analysis of moral experience leaves a different but related kind of ambiguity. He gives very explicit attention to the phenomenology of what I have called the "normative reality experience," especially as it relates to moral experience, but then fails, I think, to make clear how this phenomenological objectivity is related to rational value objectivity. Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glencoe, 1955), Ch. 2 and 6.



study that this is not so; that meaning and objectivity in valuation can be accounted for without appeals to such intuitions.

One of the fundamental motives for the development of intuitional positions in ethics has been, I think it will be granted, that they have appeared to many to offer the only approach which would account for the objectivity we feel very deeply to be a character of some of our valuations. I hope before this part of the study is completed to show that valuations can be made very objective without the intuitional approach. In this connection, I think we should note that the intuitionist approach would not help toward solving the practical problem of objectivity in valuation even if it were justifiable on other grounds. P. H. Nowell-Smith presents the problem here very succinctly in his book Ethics: there is no objective criterion for distinguishing reliable from unreliable intuitional claims other than the very same methods, i.e. vindicational procedure, that would be used for judging a choice rational or irrational without the intuitional presuppositions about meaning and objective reference.<sup>15</sup> A. C. Ewing, in discussing how one distinguishes putative from genuine value intuitions, and how one makes a decision where there are conflicting intuitions, offers

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<sup>15</sup> (Hammandsworth, 1954), Ch. 3.

precisely the vindicational procedures described above.<sup>16</sup>  
 Thus, in justificatory procedures, claims of intuitions are of no help in establishing the objectivity of value, but can be a definite hinderance by preventing individuals from employing vindicative and validative procedures with an open mind.

I have noted that "value realism" seems to me only coherent when developed within the speculative metaphysical framework of idealism. Let us pursue further its significance as a kind of axiological idealism. It has often been noted that metaphysical idealism, whether of the Berkleyan "subjective" <sup>or</sup> ~~are~~ Absolutist "objective" variety, cannot be coherently formulated without the assumption of a God: He is at least needed as the very powerful organizer of the universe of ideas called nature. Thus, in discussing metaphysical idealism we are considering an essentially theological position. The basic objection to an intuitionist concept of the ground of values within such a framework seems to me to be this: it just is not the simplest and most coherent formulation of the objective grounding of values that the intuitionist seems to be trying to get at. Why say that values are intuited as objective features of nature, (nature being what is conceived as, i.e. in human intellectual

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<sup>16</sup>Ewing, Second Thoughts, Ch. 4; cf. also Definition of Good, 85-96, 203-212.

imagination, thought as, efficient-cause ordered non-mental reality) which are necessarily apprehended as a cognition in a valuative intention-attention? Why should value here be thought of as a part of nature at all, when the same objective grounding of values can be explained more simply on the lines of the "logos" or "moral sense" approach! To analyze valuations in the non-intuitional manner I have suggested in this study, i.e. where a valuation is an attention-intention conation response justified under the ideal of reason, does not undermine what the metaphysical idealist intuitionist wants to say about the objective grounding of values but I believe clarifies it. The model of objectivity becomes vindicational-essentialist. The rational individual's experiences of normative reality are objective logically because they are his responses under the vindicational norm, but metaphysically because God has so programmed man's motivations and motivationally dependent cognitions that all men when acting rationally will respond as God wills. In an incarnation theology, where an individual acts in an enlightened state (recall the specific criteria of this--it involves radically more than intellectual enlightenment, namely passional enlightenment,) his intentionality becomes a channel of Gods intentionality. In such an enlightened state the individual's normative

reality experience is cognitively correct because of the enlightenment of the intentionality. Paul Tillich has described the ideal of the divine-human valuative relatedness in just this way. I think it will be recognized that this has been the fundamental pattern for analysis of the objectivity of values in the metaphysical-theological tradition in general, though it has had some special significance in the incarnation theologies that have played major roles in Vedanta Hindu, Mahayana Buddhist, and Pauline-Augustinian-Thomistic traditions of Christian thought.

Intuitionism, I think it can be said, is a hothouse product of a quite specifically and culturally conditioned kind of ivory tower philosophical horticulture. It has played practically no role in the history of the philosophy of value except as a very minor part of the genteel tradition of British post-seventeenth century analytical rationalism. It seems to have been almost totally a product of the eighteenth century and onward Oxford and Cambridge moral philosophy alchemists who were reacting to the modes of value analysis practiced by the British empiricists who were seen by the intuitionists (usually distortedly) as trying to manufacture values almost whole-clay out of the emotive-dispositional stuff of the self, assigning the intellectual

functions only a lowly means role. Birthed almost without historical precedent in the eighteenth century by Richard Price,<sup>17</sup> the intuitionist tradition was a slender one indeed until <sup>Henry Sidgwick</sup> G. E. Moore<sup>18</sup> and C. D. Broad<sup>19</sup> trumpeted it into the language analysis tradition of the twentieth century where it has drawn much strength from the ~~logical-semantic~~ crudity of philosophical analyses of value in the dominant analytic tradition (I have in mind here especially the "cognitive-emotive" controversies) and that tradition's obsession in the first half of the century with making logical-semantic analyses in the cognitive mode serve as the pattern for all language explication. To these two non-cause celebres in contemporary philosophical value analysis might be added a third: the growing professional disinterest within the analytic tradition in history of philosophy and the deliberate disassociation of the philosopher of value from professional concern with substantive theories, this out of the conviction that such a concern is not properly a part of

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<sup>17</sup> Richard Price, "Review of the Principle Questions in Morals." British Moralists, Vol. II, Ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1897).

<sup>18</sup> G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903), "Preface" and Ch. 1.

<sup>19</sup> C. D. Broad, "Is 'Goodness' a Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?" Aristotelean Proceedings, 34 (1933-4) 114-132.

philosophy, the philosophical occupation being conceived as strictly concept or language analysis. What tends to be lost sight of here is that language analysis is not apt to be adequate if it is not undertaken with the kind of comprehensive vision, sensitiveness to issues, and detailed analytic awareness that can only come with careful study of substantive theories in ways that include the perspectives of the involved agent. As Stuart Hampshire observed, we cannot understand value theories purely from the standpoint of the critic, the detached observer; we must approach them from the standpoint of the agent. This study will, I hope, contribute towards making clear why this is so. As I have stated earlier, let us grant that the analytic concern is the fundamental and sine qua non philosophical function, but let us also be aware that we are encouraging a new scholasticism (in the derogatory sense of that term) when philosophers seek to perform the analytic function from a standpoint that is abstracted from a detailed interest in, and concern with, substantive theories. The self-defeating character of the overly detached perspective has come to be realized perhaps more fully in the areas of developing formal systems and philosophies of science than it has in developing philosophies of value. Let us seek, as Buddha advised, the middle way in philosophical value analysis.

As I have already suggested, Professor Maynard Adams's value realism lies so much outside the traditional metaphysics-oriented pattern that it must be dealt with by itself, and I think it will be helpful for the present study to examine his position further. I have already confessed that I am intrigued by the similarities of his approach to the one being developed here--and the basic differences. The latter center on the nature of the direct valuative cognitive claim that is contained in a valuation. Since Professor Adams rejects speculative metaphysical interpretations of this claim, it must be given a phenomenalist interpretation, though, as we have noted, of the transcendental kind. What this means is that the meaning and verification of the claim must be derived from what can be directly presented in experience as ordered by the categories of the mind. Professor Adams describes value as a categorial concept presented in the emotive-attitudinal act of valuing, i.e. what I have called the valuative attention-intention situation. How is the category presented in the valuing experience? Professor Adams seems to agree with his late colleague Professor Everett Hall that the categorial presentation is not of an ultimate property or relation but as a status of being--something presented by the meaning of the value sentence-form itself. We understand it in understanding the meaning of "oughting

to be" or "it would be good to be" where these are taken to be analogous in semantic status to "is the case" or "exists." I am not sure I understand such a claim. I think I can say that it is not the claim that there is a unique category of value instantiated in valuing that makes this position incompatible with the one being developed here, but it is the additional claims that valuing cannot be (a) understood or (b) justified apart from such a categorial instantiation. Note that (a) and (b) are two different claims. One might conclude that phenomenologically the mind does operate with an ultimate categorial concept of "oughting to be" or "would be good to be" which is instantiated in, and schematized by, valuative intentionality but conclude also that this central factor in the meaning of a valuing act does not in the least alter the nature of value justification as explicated in this study in terms of the norm of vindication. I can see no way of settling this conceptual issue by appeal to the nature of language uses, though I will shortly consider some evidence in this area that Professors' Adams and Hall found to be persuasive, if not determinative, for a categorial analysis.

But we must keep in mind that giving evidence that there is such a categorial value concept does not eo ipso establish any distinctive role for the category in value justification, any more than admitting a categorial



concept of substance or cause alters verification procedures for substantival and causal claims. I do not see that one has given categorial value instantiations any distinctive role in justification by speaking of the prima facie evidence of primary desires as bases of value claims analogous to the prima facie evidence of basic perceptions as bases of knowledge claims. A stick half immersed in water still looks bent even when one knows it isn't, and a primal desire can continue to be a part of one's valuative response even when one judges it to be bad to act on it. I cannot see that anything whatsoever is as a matter of fact altered in a justification procedure by considering valuative responses as cognitive analogues of perceptual claims. But if nothing is changed in the justification, and we find that value pronouncements taken as expressions of valuative attention-intention experiences under the ideal of reason accounts well for all functions of value sentence uses in discourse, then what basis is there for the categorial claim? As Wittgenstein noted, "A wheel that doesn't move anything is not part of the machinery." Thus, the Occamic spirit seems to say no to this categorial approach.

But this conclusion, as I noted, is contingent upon showing that the logical functions of value terms and sentences do not require a categorial approach for

adequate explication. The following seem to me to be the basic cases Professor Adams presents as evidence that language explication requires supposition of a value category.

*Ask*

Professor Adams asks how, without the cognitive claim that a desire serves as instrument in presenting, a desire could function as a logical ground of justification of a valuation.<sup>20</sup> I have suggested that the claim of the valuation to be a choice of a way of acting or of a goal of action resulting from maximum practical consideration of all that could influence the choice (i.e. judgment under the vindication norm) provides the logical ground of the relevance of giving any desire as a reason for a valuation. But, Professor Adams notes, as far as this norm itself goes, its logical form is quite compatible, as Hume observed, with an agent preferring destruction of the world to a scratching of his finger.<sup>21</sup> True, considered totally in the abstract. The norm is not a source of norms as a quiver is of arrows: it is substantively neutral as one would expect any formal logical concept to be, but brought into relationship with all the factually interrelated aspirations and aversions of human beings, what is rational,

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<sup>20</sup> Adams, Ethical Naturalism, 167-171.

<sup>21</sup> Pp. 176-187.

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incomplete

even for the very aberrant personality, becomes a quite pervasively "fixed" set of norms. Basic norms are "logically arbitrary" only when the formal norm is considered without any relationship to the existential context of application. R. M. Hare has put their existential non-arbitrariness very well in the following oft-quoted passage:

The truth is that, if asked to justify as completely as possible any decision, we have to bring in both effects--to give content to the decision--and principles, and the effects in general of observing those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied our inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effects of observing those principles--for, of course, it is the effects (what obeying them in fact consists in) which give content to the principles too. Thus, if pressed to justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way of life of which it is a part. This complete specification it is impossible in practice to give; the nearest attempts are those given by the great religions, especially those that can point to historical persons who carried out the way of life in practice. Suppose, however, that we can give it. If the inquirer still goes on asking 'But why should I live like that?' then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, said everything that could be included in this further answer. We can only ask him to make up his own mind which way he ought to live; for in the end everything rests upon such a decision of principle....To describe such ultimate decisions as arbitrary because ex hypothesi everything which could be used to justify them has already been included in the decision, would be like saying that a complete description of the universe was utterly unfounded because no further fact could be called upon in corroboration of it. This is not how we use the words 'arbitrary' and 'unfounded'.

Far from being arbitrary, such a decision would be the most well-founded of decisions, because it would be based upon a consideration of everything upon which it could possibly be founded.<sup>22</sup>

Professor Adams notes that it is a part of the logic of discourse that we approve of things because we see them to be good--that it is a reversal of the meaning to analyze valuation so that something is called good because of the pro response. There is, I think, as I noted above, a very significant issue involved here, but its explication seems satisfactorily found, not in analyzing the seeing of something as good on the lines of ethical realism, but in realizing, in Russellian fashion, that the form of a sentence can be deceptive as a guide to the functions it serves in discourse. When an individual feels he has made a point, said something of significance, he is likely in this kind of situation to say that he approved of something because he saw it as good. The significance of such a form of assertion, I think, can be accounted for by one or a combination of the following explications:

(1) The person using such a sentence is emphasizing that his approval was a well grounded one. A more explicit statement of intent in this case might be put as follows: "I approved it (judged it good) because I had a chance to

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<sup>22</sup> R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, (Oxford, 1952) pp. 68-69.

go over the reasons for approving and disapproving, and the good-making qualities outweigh the others by a considerable margin."

(2) The user is emphasizing that the approving is a response to a prized normative reality awareness, which in turn was created by past valuative attentions and intentions. He is emphasizing that the approval is based on a recognition of the object as having already been well established in his system of values. The present approval is a reaffirmation of an established valuation.

(3) (A special, but very significant, Case of (1) and (2).) The user approves of the object in question because he recognizes that it is something that fulfills his moral commitment. Thus, the significance could be expressed in this way: "My personal approval was based on realizing that this was an instance of a principle I take to be universally valid for human beings, a moral principle."

Professor Adams bases his "value realism" very centrally on the argument that the logic of moral discourse requires that we treat "...feelings, and indeed the whole range of affective-conative experience as epistemic."<sup>23</sup> He states, "If we take this approach, we not only understand how moral judgments can be logically developed

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<sup>23</sup> E. M. Adams, "Freedom and Reason in Morality," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, III, (Summer, 1965), 101.

in their implications until they confront experience in such a way that sometimes experience refutes them, but also how experience can positively confirm them."<sup>24</sup> For illustration he discusses an example R. M. Hare uses in Freedom and Reason:<sup>25</sup> A is considering whether he ought to have B put in jail for failing to pay a debt, when he himself has failed, under similar circumstances to pay a debt to C. Adams states,<sup>26</sup>

The important question for A is not whether he has an inclination not to be put in prison by C, but whether he would disapprove--whether he would feel that it was wrong for C to have him put in jail. What is at issue here is whether A's feeling that he ought to put B in jail is objective and valid. He tests it by seeing whether he feels the same way about a similar situation in which he is in B's position. This is a way of discovering whether one's moral feelings are colored by one's wants and inclinations or whether they are objective and impartial. Is this not a matter of moving from what it appears one ought to do to a corroboration or refutation of this appearance through other appearances, namely, how one feels about the same thing from different perspectives? When A considers his proposed act from the perspective of the one to whom it is done, his feelings about the rightness of it may be different. This is the point, or so it seems to me, of the golden-rule argument.

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24 P. 101.

25 (New York, 1963).

26 P. 101.

This, of course, treats feelings, and indeed the whole range of affective-conative experience, as epistemic. If we take this approach, we not only understand how moral judgments can be logically developed in their implications until they confront experience in such a way that sometimes experience refutes them, but also how experience can positively confirm them.

I think the first thing to note about this argument is that it can only be valid for one species of valuation, namely moral valuation in the sense that the word is being used in this study. If Professor Adams is using the word 'moral' in a more comprehensive sense, then the argument is into trouble on the ground that it is not universally a confirming reason for a valuation that others would make the same if in the valuer's situation--unless being in that situation includes "having the motivational propensities of the valuer", but of course the "criterion" then becomes trivial. That I am justified in choosing philosophy as a profession, or Mary Jane as a wife, does not entail that all other persons in my situation should make the same value judgments.

Considered as a moral valuation, the requirement that I test the morality of a valuative response towards another by imaginatively putting myself in his position to see if I, in the circumstances, would feel the response was justified--i.e. the golden rule test--is a very useful testing procedure contributing toward establishing the

morality of a judgment but logically insufficient unless we presuppose that only fully developed moral beings are involved, which actually of course we can never be completely justified in doing. Moral judgment, judgment under the moral principle, is a claim that a way of acting is right (morally right) and a goal of action good (morally good) because it is, insofar as can be practically determined, the judgment that a person of maximally developed ~~other-regarding~~ <sup>other-regarding</sup> concern would make. In most substantive moral philosophies this is taken to imply the principle: "Act to maximize personal feelings of respect of each person for the humanity of others," and this to imply, "Act to maximize personal freedom generally in society," From these principles follow (inductively if not deductively) principles of fairness and justice. The principle, "Act only on those principles one can universalize," i.e. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," has its proper place as a maxim of fairness or justice, but strictly speaking is a universal principle here only when the proviso is added: "...when you judge with fully developed moral responses." Without this proviso the golden rule principle is, logically speaking, quite empty, for anything can follow from it, limited only by the psychological limits of aberrant feeling responses.



Suppose it to be true, as reported, that Caligula could only enjoy his breakfast after he had watched someone being tortured. There is nothing in this behavior that is logically, or even psychologically, incompatible with Caligula's accepting the golden rule principle that if he were in the position of the tortured that it would be only just for the person in the ruler position to torture him to tone up the ruler's system for breakfast.

On the other hand, the fact that I wouldn't like it if another did to me what I am doing to him does not at all mean that what I am doing is morally wrong--unless I also suppose that my moral responses are fully developed. Suppose I sue another individual for default in paying a debt (since there are no longer debtor's prisons, let us revise the Hare-Adams example slightly) after he has repeatedly not kept his promises in regard to paying. However, I recall a time I too repeatedly broke such promises, always finding reasons to put off paying. I realize that if I were in his position I would very likely feel that the suit stemmed from a deficiency of humanitarian feeling on the part of the suer. But even knowing I would feel this way, I might still go ahead and press charges for non-payment and be morally justified in doing so--even if I felt guilty about it. A prediction of how one would as

a matter of fact feel in a given set of circumstances is not necessarily logically determinative of moral correctness--that is, unless we assume that the standpoint of the prediction is that of maximal achievement under the rational ideal. Many other less rigorously controlled standpoints of response are of course possible and may be very useful in an informal way toward determining moral correctness.

The rule "X is morally right if one would still feel it morally right after considering the action from perspectives of all persons involved" is one of our most valuable every-day guides to moral correctness. But it is like Aristotle's "means" maxim and his "To know the good, look to the good people" maxim: helpful guides at the level of cracker-barrel substantive moral philosophy, but unsuited to serve as logically determinative criteria of what is or is not moral action.

Let us examine further the question of the parity between value judgments and fact judgments which Professor Adams suggests. We determine the "real" perceptual qualities of object X by correlating the observations of a number of observers observing X from various perspectives. However, a reality judgment about a perceptual quality does not at all depend on all observers having the same perceptual experience at each perspective. Lighting changes will be expected to alter the perceptual judgment, and also

physiological differences such as color-blindness. Angle of vision and physiological conditions of the eye and corrective-lens factors will influence experience of shape. The real color and the real shape are not determined in any simpliciter way by a commonality of perceptual experience. The real color is the color a person with normal vision would see under ideal lighting conditions. Real shape is also what would be perceived under some idealized perceptual conditions. These "reality conditions" can be taken either as criteriological or--in a phenomenalist or operationalist frame of reference--as definitive. Analogous "justificatory conditions" can be stated for moral judgments; however, in this case, I am arguing, the conditions are (logically must be) sufficient for moral rightness: X is morally right if X would be experienced as morally right by a person of ideal moral development. under normal conditions of emotive response.

*(Why is this needed?)* ⇒

But while this illustrates the logical inadequacy of the "golden rule" as a criterion of either perceptual or moral rightness, it may suggest some support for Professor Adams' contention that it is appropriate to speak in epistemic (i.e. cognitive) terms of moral judgment, for we have said that an appearance-judgment of moral rightness is like a judgment of reality made on the basis of a perceptual experience, and thus the appearance judgment

becomes a justified claim when it is a judgment under certain conditions and corroborated by appearance judgments of others made under these conditions. This parallelism of justificatory procedure for cognitive judgments and value judgments is what we would expect in light of the vindication norm which is basic to the justification of both, but there are very basic problems we bring upon ourselves if we seek to conclude from this that value judgment is fact judgment of a special kind, namely a fact designated by a reason-mediated feeling response, the mediation being of the vindicating type described above.

Let me note two of the more fundamental problems raised by analyzing value judgments in this epistemic way:

(1) The absorption of value judgment into epistemic language overlooks the fundamental difference of intentionality. To perceive a pen as blue is to think "blue pen" in a cognitive way, i.e. to think of the pen as appearing blue. We must be careful not to say that to perceive the pen as blue is to think it (i.e. believe it) blue, for that belief judgment does not follow; one may know one's perceptual judgment is in error while having it, as perceiving a stick half in and half out of the water as bent does not imply thinking the stick is bent. Analogously, to experience a pro feeling toward X is not to think in any

cognitive way about X, though thinking X is cognitive (i.e. propositional) in character, and to judge that X is good involves the cognitive judgment that the pro feeling about X is justified. But there is no cognitive intentionality logically required in the pro feeling response, i.e. in the response. I have already at various places in the study discussed the conceptual confusion that results from analyses that would collapse the value-fact conceptual dichotomy and it is discussed further in Part III below.

The fundamental point of this discussion can be put in this way: The ideal appearance judgment in a cognitive judgment is by intentionality a judgment that something is the case, but an ideal appearance judgment of value is by intentionality a judgment that feeling in such and such a way is justified. The correspondence-to-fact, i.e. truth relationship, of the first is not a logically required part of the second; while a metaphysical claim (including intuitional claim) may coherently impart such a correspondence, and thus truth, factor, it cannot be derived from the logic of valuation.

(2) As Nowell-Smith very succinctly points out in his criticism of intuitional claims, we can set up public-observation criteria which can be rationally accepted by all persons either as inductively justified or (in the

case of phenomenalist and operationalist theories) as definitive of what are to count as sufficient criteria of a justified reality judgment, but we cannot do an analogous thing for value judgments.<sup>27</sup> For example, if 99 people see a painted surface as blue and one person sees it as gray, and that person is found not to be able to pass color-blindness tests, it would be only rational for the person of deviant perceptual judgment to say, "I still see it as gray, but, because of the evidence of others and the color-blindness test, it really must be blue." But suppose that 99 people in a group of 100 feel that white supremacy is right, only one person in the group feeling it is wrong. Where is our moral-blindness test that would show the 99 wrong or the individual wrong? If the individual said, "I have examined all the evidence, and I do not see that I am any more deficient than any of the others in applying vindicational procedures, but I still feel that white supremacy is wrong; however, because all the others disagree I must be wrong," i.e. if the individual reasoned in this way, we could only conclude that he did not understand the criteria of rational justification for value judgments--or else that he was lacking in moral courage.

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<sup>27</sup> Nowell-Smith, Ethics, Ch. 3.

Thus, while the reasoning process whereby a valuative can become a valuation has some similarity with the process whereby a perceptual claim becomes a reality claim, to take this as grounds for interpreting the value judgment as a kind of cognitive claim is, I believe, seriously in error.

These, it seems to me, are the basic reasons Professor Adams gives for considering that making a cognitive intuitionist analysis of value is necessary in order to account for the logic of use of value language in ordinary discourse.

9. Value Objectivity and Normative Reality :  
Significance of the Phenomenological  
Approach

I think the psychological phenomenon of normative reality has had much to do with giving intuitionism a phenomenological sense of correctness. I shall have more to say about the role of the normative reality phenomenon in the valuative life of man later in this study. Our present concern has been to consider the kind of objectivity given to values by the direct cognitive normative element in a valuation--i.e. the psychologically explainable normative reality phenomenon which I am considering to be the only such factor present. Its contributions to objectivity in values might be described as basically

▽, i.e. affective "sense" of objectivity,

the contribution to the psychological sense of objectivity.

But let us not overlook the importance of this function.

Objectivity in valuation is appearance of objectivity under special conditions, namely the condition of enlightened

response. The satisfyingness of a valuation, the quality of the valuative attentions, is <sup>in part</sup> logically and psychologically

a function of normative reality and the sense that this reality character is the way things ought to look (valuative intentions based upon but controlling valuative attentions).

As Aristotle emphasized, rationality in the life of conduct has much to do with the kind of habits one has developed, for these give the character to ones eudaemonistic experiences, i.e. one's valuative attentions.

And they do so, we can see, by creating and shaping our normative reality. Philosophers, and artists functioning philosophically, have throughout the history of our culture spoken of the profound way our values determine how we structure our world and establish our capability to relate to it prizingly. I think especially here of Plato, the

18th century Romantic poets (especially Coleridge and Shelley), T. S. Eliot, and George Santayana--and one should also mention <sup>in this connection</sup> ~~here~~ the pragmatists, especially John Dewey and C. I. Lewis. Normative reality might be called our values projected into the world, creating a value impreg-

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Chapin



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 nated world to which we constantly respond in a cognitively recognizing way. By the shaping feeling-pervaded imagination we endow the world with value as fact: the terrible and <sup>the</sup> lovely, the quaint and the wistful, etc. <sup>This</sup> ~~the~~ "pathetic fallacy" propensity is one of the most vibrantly non-pathetic characteristics of homo sapiens. This "value objectifying" of the world is, as Nietzsche and Santayana have so forcefully reminded us, a fundamental part of the human spirit's triumph over the non-human world of sheer fact.<sup>28</sup>

#### 10. Value Objectivity and Participatory Agency

We have seen that valuations logically presuppose a determinate issuing agent: that the meaning and justification of a specific use can logically only be established relative to the use being a specific agent's valuation. However, we have also noted that there could be grounds which would justify speaking of universally valid valuations, but these

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<sup>28</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power (London, 1910); George Santayana, "Preface," Realms of Being (New York, 1942), pp. iii-xix. This transformation of the "meaningless" world of sheer fact into value-saturated concepts of reality was, of course, a dominant theme--some would say the dominant theme--of nineteenth century aesthetic consciousness in England and on the continent. Cf. M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, (New York, 1953).

are not formal grounds: they would be empirical grounds justifying the prediction that anyone choosing his values in an enlightened way would choose these. This pattern of explication would seem to account for much of the significance of the kind of argumentation in which one person makes the claim to another: "You are wrong in holding X to be the good thing for you to do (or: what you ought to do); what would be really good for you to do in this matter (what you really ought to do) is Y." Here the claim is advice based on a cognitive rational valuation prediction which in turn is based on beliefs as to what would be really gratifying of basic motivational propensities (natural or developed) of the person being advised or of human beings in general. However, the advice pattern just is not adequate, and in many cases not even appropriate, to account for the significance that a value pronouncement often has. And this is true even if the pattern of advising is interpreted to include such actions as warnings and just telling someone what the facts are. To be a warning<sup>x</sup><sub>j</sub> some indication of the consequences of not doing Y would have to be part of the context. But this whole advice-and-stating approach seems inappropriate in some cases, prime examples being typical moral valuations. I shall discuss later the problem of fixing precisely the meaning of "moral", but

(((Why not take the main idea of the moral or concern for the other. Take other features as derivative from this.))

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are

let us take the word to name actions and judgments which manifest a commitment to value the securing of equal + maximum freedom for value-securing of all individuals; the class of moral actions and judgments will thus include this norm and all norms based upon it. There will be norms with a moral function in some context which will not have this character in other contexts.

It is most important to realize that when an individual makes a moral judgment usually he is not expressing an individual valuation but rather speaking as the voice of a participatory agency. (Cf. the description of participatory valuation in the Introduction.) Moral participatory agencies can be of either of the two basic kinds:

(1) social contract agency, or (2) metaphysical agency (usually interpreted theologically). Moral social contract agency is presupposed wherever an individual makes a moral judgment with the sense of acting as the voice of the moral body, the moral body being made up of all the individuals who both (a) make commitment to the moral norm and (b) join (become a part of) the moral body. This joining consists simply in making moral judgments from the standpoint of individual valuation or as the voice of some other kind of group (such as family, social group, society, etc.).

Thus joining is basically a matter of a certain logical structuring in the intentionality of the issuer of the

To this necessary feature?

Reiterate

✓

moral judgment. However, there is more involved than this particular kind of private mental act in the normal moral judgment. One speaks as a delegate voice of a body hallowed by tradition and wielding great power. The voice of the moral body is the voice of authority, established by the general willing that it be accounted as such, a willing manifested in the strong cultural conditioning that introjects the authority into each member and instills also an emotively distinct kind of respect for this authority. But cultural conditioning, while a major source of the mental acts of commitment which give the moral body its status as authority, is not the only source. There is also commitment intensified by rational awareness, which issues in bringing to the support of the moral commitment both the motive of prudence and the more profoundly moral motives of genuine caring. The motives for <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ commitment of prudence are immensely strengthened when the moral body is able to exercise power, through the vote or other means of public control and support, to create and direct governmental authority and power.

In addition, the moral body has often been conceived as the agency of human group unity with the function of manifesting or implementing the will of God--the bindingness of His will being based on motives of fear or love or both.

*That the latter may be itself an offspring of the former, in some fundamental sense a function of sub, downward, I believe, disintegrates it from the superiorly bound status.*

*(More development needed) →*

The moral body might even be considered the incarnated presence of the Divine Power itself, as <sup>in</sup> the Pauline or Johannine concepts of the Mystical Body of Christ, the Logos, present in the world as the instantiated directing and redeeming power of Divine love.

Of course, the standpoint of moral pronouncement may not be participatory on any of these patterns where membership is open to all who are motivated to participate. Members of a priestly group may make judgments speaking as the voice of the priest group, the group only being taken as the incarnate will of God. Outsiders then may make their moral judgments out of individual prudence or individual response of love or fear and thus desire to do the bidding of the religious group and of God who's will is considered to be known through the <sup>priestly</sup> group.

With all of these sources of support in reenforcement of the concept of the individual speaking as the voice of a moral body when he utters a moral judgment, it is not surprising that the moral judgment should be felt and responded to in such an emotively powerful and distinctive way by moral persons, and it is obvious why the personal judgment pattern, even when combined with the personal advice and exhortation patterns, are hopelessly inadequate by themselves to account for moral meaning in the functioning of moral judgment in discourse. However, I have

Add Pauline, Johannine, Logos concepts

✓  
M  
or

already indicated that I do not think we can say that it is part of the logic of moral judgments to be necessarily of the nature of social contract judgments or theological participatory judgments or both. Moral judgments as individual expressions of personal commitment to the moral norm are not logically odd, though they are, I think, atypical. The individual in a social context who feels called upon to take a lonely stand of conscience or be a moral Prometheus is probably not making a judgment simply as an individual decision but is likely to experience and intend his act as participatory in some way: most typically he will speak as the voice of an ideally moral being, conceived on the social contract <sup>pattern, or the</sup> or metaphysical pattern or both.

The pattern of reasoning in ordinary discourse in regard to moral judgments reveals that participatory judgments are logically presupposed in most cases. Questions like "Why is murder wrong?", "Why is cheating wrong?", when cleared of their tautological elements, are usually not questions which are properly answered by (or simply by) giving evidence to the questioner that these forms of behavior are prudentially not advisable. He can be convinced that they are unprudential and still meaningfully ask: "But why are they wrong?" And they are not fully

Reminds, changing  
the explanation.

Clarity &  
deserve (clearer)  
the underlying  
concept.

answered by convincing the questioner that to cultivate a morally caring character is what he would choose to do if he considered the issue with fullest achievable rational awareness. These types of evidence bear more directly on the question "Why be moral?". Questions like "Why is murder, cruelty, and cheating wrong?" should they ever be asked, would call logically for the answer "Because they are immoral!" plus some explanation of how they violate the moral principle. That they are immoral is not a matter of showing that they are not what the individual would rationally choose to do, but rather it is a matter of showing that they are not what the moral body would choose to do, conceived either as social contract agency or as God.

I am noting a logical distinction here which has some analogue to Stephen Toulmin's analysis in The Place of Reason in Ethics, but I am drawing the distinctions in a very significantly different way. Toulmin noted that the question "Why is X wrong?" <sup>falls</sup> ~~falls~~ under one of two patterns of reasoning:<sup>29</sup> If X is a particular action, then the question is answered by noting that X is disapproved,

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<sup>29</sup> Stephen Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, pp. 150-152.

△ action the moral principle directly or conventionally prescribed, i.e. in the  
was typical form of moral commitment, they are

called wrong in the society in which the question is asked. Toulmin notes that one can go on to question a social practice by judging it under a particular formulation of of the utilitarian norm ("the harmonizing of social interest"), However, one cannot in turn question this norm, for he considers it is definitive of the basic value function in a society. I have already noted that the analysis seems to me quite confused in its concept of the norms in language itself and its distorted<sup>ish</sup> simplification of normative functions in language. Of course, in a particular context of use, when one asks "Is this wrong?," he may be asking whether society disapproves, but he as well may be asking whether some other group, or even individuals disapprove, or whether it would be disapproved from the moral-body point of view (the most likely intent of the question). Nothing about language itself establishes the agency to be appealed to or examined to answer the question asked. We must depend on context, or explicit pinning down of the questioner as to what he is asking. Further, to challenge a group authority, including the authority of prevailing social opinion, is not by the rules of language to appeal to a utilitarian norm. One can challenge prevailing group opinion by appeal to the moral norm--note I did not give a specifically utilitarian interpretation to

*Round 1/2*

*Remite*



this norm--or the norm of any other group or individual agency. Except in special contexts, such as the use of secondary value words, language in itself does not determine any agency that a norm given or challenged must be accepted as issued by--unless these are designated by name or context, as for example in speaking of etiquette rules. We shall see that even the logic of use of secondary value words has a way of preserving the substantive normative neutrality of language.

Showing that a directive is moral, within a context in which morality itself is not in question is only incidentally and at no stage logically a matter of appealing to what is commonly accepted as moral. If an individual responds to the question "Why is cheating wrong?" with the answer "Because it just is," we have no logical justification (however factually true it may be) to take him as holding cheating to be wrong because this judgment is part of a publicly accepted code. <sup>①</sup> The answer more plausibly expresses the conviction of the agent that cheating is obviously counter to the goals of morality: that it is not what an individual acting from the standpoint of <sup>the</sup> moral body would do. As Hume noted, in moral judgment the individual "...parts from his private situation and

① better than this is your intentional kind of answer, the response with any appeal for the natural reason would respond because it is pronounced by the same principle;

chooses a point of view common to him with others."<sup>30</sup>

The sense of injustice, Mill noted, is the sense of "... those hurts which wound us through or in common with society at large."<sup>31</sup> One acts morally or responds to something morally or judges morally--in most contexts--when he acts, responds, and judges, not as an individual, but, as

~~Adam Smith and Emil Durkheim said, as a socialized self.~~

*Adam Smith & Emil Durkheim have also noted that on a lower degree of socialization*  
Professor Henry Aiken has described very well this concept *of socialization.*

of the moral standpoint:

...no ethical theory that regards ethical judgments as merely expressions of personal decisions or as individual incitements of attitudes can possibly be regarded as providing an adequate general analysis of the normative functions of ethical judgments. Whether we like it or not, an impersonal, public authoritativeness is frequently claimed for and perhaps voiced in moral judgments that is independent of and indeed precisely opposed to the private inclinations of preferences of either the person judging or the person judged.<sup>32</sup>

30 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), Book III, Part III, Sec. 1, pp. 581-582; cf also Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1894), Sec. V, Part I.

31 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 5.

32 H. D. Aiken, "The Authority of Moral Judgments," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. xii, 4 (June, 1952), 516.



*This statement is particularly interesting light of Mill's explicit rejection of social contract theory. He goes on to recognize a major part of the significance the advocacy of social contract has sought to give, recognized to be proposing a social contract theory.*

The person voicing a moral judgment is, or is usually regarded as, merely the spokesman of morality; and the person judged is singled out for reprobation primarily as the violator of a rule that applies not merely to him but to all members of a certain class or group.<sup>33</sup>

What is questioned is that the kind of authority expressed in and exerted by the moral judgment is adequately characterized in terms of the emotional dispositions of the particular individuals engaged in a moral discussion. On the contrary, just as what we call "the" meaning of a word in ordinary language is an inter-personal rule which thereby functions prescriptively for those who use the word, so also the moral authority of an ethical judgment is primarily due to the fact that it is a general rule of conduct which is binding upon the individual only because it is binding upon all.<sup>34</sup>

J. A. Findlay describes this perspective of "impersonality" characteristic (but not at all limited to) moral judgments as "that comprehensive ambient 'We' that we may be said, in a manner of speaking, to carry about with us, whoever may occupy it."<sup>35</sup> He states "...I show it by speaking for everyone on behalf of everyone...something claiming to be said for an 'us' and by a 'we'."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Aiken, p. 516.

<sup>34</sup> Aiken, p. 517.

<sup>35</sup> Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 215.

<sup>36</sup> Findlay, Values and Intentions, p. 429.

It is what Kant had in mind when he spoke of acting from the standpoint of the "Kingdom of Ends,"<sup>37</sup> though he erred <sup>at least seemingly</sup> in thinking it logically derivative from the participatory commitment of rationality, as well as in thinking this commitment inescapable for a human being. John F. A. Taylor, in The Masks of Society, described the "moral covenant" as "the fundamental covenant of humanity, the condition essential to men standing in the dignity of persons in each others presence."<sup>38</sup>

Of course, it is to Rousseau that we owe a very special debt for his explication in 1791 of the social contract aspect of the logic of moral judgment. A great deal of nonsense has been, and continues to be, written about Rousseau's notions of the "social contract," the "moral body," and the "general will"--most of it nonsense for taking him to be making some kind of substantive moral proposal in his presentation of these concepts rather than his doing a superb piece of analytic moral philosophy. Of course this bit of language-use clarification had great

<sup>37</sup> Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, trans. O. Manthey-Zorn (New York, 1938), P. 51.

<sup>38</sup> John F. A. Taylor, The Masks of Society (New York, 1966), p. 12.

Put in a note on this narrow logical derivation; refer to section to do added note.

This part is independent of what he thought he was doing. (Because this concept!)

practical consequences, for it showed that operative in the language of morals was a standpoint of valuation which made it possible to reject Hobbesian ethical atomism and account for the objectivity and impartiality of moral judgments without resorting to the conceptual and cognitive extravagances of embracing intuitionism or even some strong essentialist "natural law" basis of the objectivity of morals. It was Shelley who noted that creative imagination legislates the world of the higher mental faculties:<sup>39</sup> this is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in man's capacity to linguistically create and act from a "moral point of view" in the sense Rousseau so well explicated. Consider the following well-known passages from his Social Contract:

"A people," says Grotius, "can give themselves to a king." According to Grotius, then, they are a people before they give themselves to a king. The donation itself is a civil act, and supposes a public consultation. It would therefore be better before we examine the act by which they elected a king, to enquire into that by which they became a people; for that act, being necessarily anterior to the other, is the true foundation of society.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> P. B. Shelley, "A Defense of Poetry," The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Vol. II, ed. M. H. Abrams et al. (New York, 1962), pp. 473-486.

<sup>40</sup> J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York, 1948) Hafner Classics, pp. 13-14.

Each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.

From that moment, instead of as many separate persons as there are contracting parties, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are votes in the assembly, which from this act receives its unity, its common self, its life, and its will. This public person, which is thus formed by the union of all other persons, took formerly the name of "city," and now takes that of "republic" or "body politic." It is called by its members "State" when it is passive, "Sovereign" when in activity, and, whenever it is compared with other bodies of a similar kind, it is denominated "power." The associates take collectively the name of "people," and separately, that of "citizens," as participating in the sovereign authority, and of "subjects,"<sup>41</sup> because they are subjected to the laws of the State.

The passing from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. It is then only that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what is right, to the incitements of appetite. Man, who had till then regarded none but himself, perceives that he must act on other principles, and learns to consult his reason before he listens to his inclinations.<sup>42</sup>

Man loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses. That we may not be deceived in the value of these compensations, we must

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41 Pp. 15-16.

42 Pp. 18-19.

distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of the individual from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or of the right of the first occupant, from property, which must be founded on a positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves.<sup>43</sup>

Here we have a marvelous example of the opening up of possibilities for clearer development of substantive theories--and thus the showing up of weakness in some and strength in others--by an achievement in language analysis. By analyzing the role of participatory commitment in moral and political judgments, Rousseau revealed the conceptual limitations of the Hobb<sup>i</sup>sesan ethical atomist analysis of the foundation of social contract and the lack of necessity for either strong natural law (essentialist theories) or intuitionist theories to account for the logic of moral discourse. It is ironically incompatible with our (unfortunately quite well grounded) concept of the irrationality of Rousseau to give credit to him for this outstanding insight in the area of linguistic philosophy, but I think it fair to say that he saw more clearly and profoundly the significance of participatory commitment for

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43 P. 19.

the explication of the logic of moral discourse than any philosopher of the past one can point to. He considerably outstrips <sup>the</sup> modest insights of David Hume and Adam Smith in this area. *regard*

An agent's moral injunction spoken to another "You ought to do X," together with the reasons he gives in support of the pronouncement, can have, and commonly will have, three quite different kinds of significance:

- (1) REMINDRING FUNCTION  
It can have the function of calling the person addressed to his moral commitments, where the agent speaks as a voice of the moral body to a member of the body. This intra-moral-body dialogue is analagous to intra-self dialogue: the self calling itself to its own commitments.
- (2) EXHORTING FUNCTION  
It can have the function of exhorting the person addressed to heed the moral command, bringing to awareness the internal and external sanctions of the moral authority: the respect and love felt for action from the moral point of view and also the capability of the moral body, through control of social attitude and penal power, to punish. Here the agent speaks as the voice of the moral authority exhorting those addressed to act as members of the body, or at least conform to the body's laws, or suffer the penalties of disregard.

(3) It can have the function of advising the agent as individual to individual in the manner discussed under (1)



and (2). This may include the kind of persuasiveness that could be the giving of grounds for making the moral commitment.

Through this examination of the logic of moral judgment (which will be discussed further in a later part of the study III-E), we can see, I think, a very distinct kind of value objectivity which is manifested by participatory valuation. Such valuation is objective in the sense of being non-personal: the issuing agency being either or both generalized and metaphysically (theologically) identified. But the objectivity here lies in more than this supra personal character of the issuing agent: it also resides, perhaps principally resides, as actual increase in objectivity, in the much extended range of justificatory evidence that can be claimed in support of such a judgment. A participatory valuation is backed up, not simply by the agent's vindicating capabilities, but also by all of those of the group (which may well include an extensive historical tradition of justification) and, in addition, in the case of theological agency, by the supreme wisdom, power, and passionate sensitivity of God. However, taking a claim to be only as strong as its weakest link, we must temper claims to objectivity through appeals to Divine-power grounding of norms by consideration of the objectivity

not awarded with a consequence of justification

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of the evidence for (a) the existence of the Divine Power and (b) the judgment that the norm in question is really an expression of the Divine valuative intentionality.

Social contract participatory valuation plays other very important roles in discourse, I believe. I have already noted that I think recognition of it is necessary for an adequate explication of several basic aspects of objectivity in language (the concept of analyticity being one of these), as well as for explication of the objectivity of public-observation standpoints so important in scientific methodology. I will give some attention to these in a later part of the study.

#### 11. Value Objectivity Compared With Fact Objectivity

We have now considered four different aspects of the concept of objectivity in valuation. They do not constitute four senses of objectivity, but four ways in which application of the vindication norm can yield results in "objectifying" valuations. I want now to draw some comparisons between achieving objectivity in valuation and in cognitive claims.

I have analyzed justification as being a first-order concept only in the valuative mode of conative language,

If this is correct, then to call a cognitive assertion justified is necessarily to judge it in regard to the fulfillment of an applicable value norm. In general, we say one is prima facie justified in making a cognitive assertion (i.e. belief claim) if there are adequate grounds for holding the statement to be true, granting that there are cases in which making the assertion can be justified in the absence of adequate truth grounds and even where evidence indicates that the statement is false. But these are cases of one value norm being overridden by another with a stronger claim. The prima facie justification of making a cognitive assertion where there is adequate evidence for claiming the truth of the statement involved derives from two norms: (1) the norm establishing the meaning of truth (language rule being a class of social contract participatory valuations, or, more precisely, a class of participatory prescriptions based on participatory valuations), and (2) the norm affirming the value of belief in verified statements. As I have noted, efforts of some pragmatists, and others, to get away from a correspondence concept of truth appear to me to be mistaken. I propose that it is necessary for an adequate explication of meaning in cognitive discourse to take as the meaning of 'true' that it designates those statements

whose claim of something being the case corresponds with what is the case. "Being the case" here may need to be analyzed as an ultimate categorial concept manifested in the cognitive mode of mental awareness and the semantic representation of this, or perhaps we should say that generic "being the case" is a basic generalization concept based upon classing together two similar but different ultimate concepts, namely (a) being the case about relationships of meaning (conceptually or analytically or logically being the case) and (b) being the case as to what exists, either in experience or in reality (defined as constituted by what exists independently of any experience of it). Perhaps only (b) here requires a categorial concept of "being the case," (a) being definable in terms of categorial logical concepts such as conjunction, negation, unity, universality, etc. The purposes of the study do not require that we take a position on this conceptual problem other than to indicate the grounds for contending that truth and value are distinct in concept however intimately they may be related in actual assertions.

Though truth is distinct in concept from value, the methodology of establishing a truth claim is definitely a normative matter. It is a procedure that is justified by

justifying the valuation: Beliefs as to what is true will have the greatest probability of being correct if they are adopted in accordance with the following procedure:

(followed by a listing of verifying procedures). The norms of verification (cognitive validation norms) are justifiable only by normative validation and vindication. Such fundamental procedures of verification as that expressed by the Occam's Razor principle are notoriously justifiable only by vindication. Whether this is to say that verification procedures are necessarily pragmatic in nature depends on how broadly pragmatism is defined.

Warranted assertability of truth claims (i.e. belief claims) is thus a normative concept which derives its significance from the meaning of truth taken together with the value of it to human beings. Any attempt to reduce truth in meaning to warranted assertability would appear to make nonsense of both ideas. How could we make sense of the notion apart from the idea of truth as correspondence? We have already examined a variety of ways "warranted assertability" of a norm presupposes an ability to distinguish fact as rational ground of assertion. We have seen that the very concept of valuation involves cognitive elements in these ways: (1) as the proposition delineating the goal of intentionality, (2) as grounds of

reason-mediated conative response, and (3) as the claim that the vindicational norm has been fulfilled as completely as was practicable in the circumstances of acting. The proposal that has sometimes been made in contemporary philosophy that we operate with an ultimate concept of justified assertion which is neither truth justification or value justification but something which serves both functions is a proposal to adopt a mode of explication in which fundamental functional distinctions remain only ambiguously and imprecisely delineated.<sup>44</sup>

For both knowledge and value reality, as manifested in and constructed from ideal awareness, is the ground of warranted assertability. However, the relation of this ideal to the meaning of the assertions appears to be different in two cases: Ideal valuation is essentially the same in concept as the upper limit of vindication, but

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44 The pseudo character of this kind of reductivism is, I think, analogous to that reflected in a joke Professor Henry Sheffer of Harvard played on his nominalist colleagues in suggesting that the stroke function reduces the number of logical primitives needed since conjunction and negation or alternation and negation, can be defined in terms of it. Only in the most nominal sense (Sheffer's phrase: "Markist" sense) is the functional significance of, for example, conjunction and negation in an interpreted system definable in terms of the single more elementary function symbolized by the stroke. However, the nominalists naturally have claimed the proposal a significant breakthrough in reducing logical primitives. Cf. W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York, 1950) pp. 11-12.

the ideal set of cognitive claims (truth perfectly describing Truth, i.e. reality) is not identical in meaning with the upper level of verification. Consider the following:

There is no logical guarantee that two ideally enlightened agents would agree in their valuations. If they should disagree there would be no ground to appeal to to rationally judge one better than the other. Also, there is no logical guarantee that ideal enlightenment would settle all problems of choice. It is logically possible for the agent in a state of complete awareness to still be undecided, or forced to make "acts gratuit." The notion that those decisions which would establish basic values of an individual would have such an arbitrary character even for an ideal chooser is a concept definitive of that form of existentialism which distinguishes itself most fundamentally by its complete rejection of any essentialism in regard to the higher mental faculties of man.

Now, it also seems conceivable that there can be two ideally verified bodies of cognitive statements, but no complete set of transformation rules achievable to show that one is but a variant formulation of the other. Each has complete descriptive capabilities in relation to the observable and they satisfy equally well such methodological

criteria as the Occam's Razor principle. Would it make sense to speak of an ideal ground of truth, i.e. Truth or Reality, in terms of which a choice could be made between the two proposals? No, for the possibility of such a selective principle would only indicate that the verification procedure presupposed was not ideal. We are considering the possibility that an ideal verification procedure ideally implemented could justify more than one comprehensive cognitive theory. We have no logical way of eliminating the possibility of plurality. Thus, even under conditions of ideal verification, truth can be plural. Such a plurality could possibly be as extensive as ideal knowers. However, it would still seem to be meaningful to say that though ideal truth is plural, Truth is not; i.e. reality is not made plural by the fact there may be no one ideal way of describing it. Logically, in cognitive discourse, because of the meaning of truth, we have the presupposition of the ding an sich. The conclusion here is precisely that of Kant in the First Critique: though it is part of the logic of knowing that we can know that we cannot know ~~or~~ (or know that we know) the ding an sich, it is also part of that logic that <sup>we must presuppose that</sup> there is one. Thus the concept of ideal knowledge as what is achieved at the upper limit of verification is different from the concept of the real-



ity which is its ground.

But it is precisely the idea of such a ground that is lacking in the consideration of the possibility of a plurality of ideal valuers. Unlike verification, normative justification provides us with no logical ground to presuppose a juris an sich analogous to the ding an sich of cognitive discourse. It is characteristic (definitive?) of theological theories to argue for a juris an sich; in Tillich's terminology, ethical autonomy ideally becomes theonomy;<sup>45</sup> but this is a speculative metaphysical claim.<sup>46</sup>

Perhaps we should say that not only theological theories but every essentialist value theory presupposes some measure of juris an sich, this from the standpoint

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<sup>45</sup> Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago, 1951) pp. 54, 83, 85-86, 147-150.

<sup>46</sup> Note that our analysis brings us to give support to what has been one of the distinctive claims of Tillich's thought, a thesis of his religious existentialism: that presupposition of a juris an sich does not logically imply that there is only one absolutely correct sense of values or truths; there is logical room for the historical-cultural factor to have an influence on what would be an ideal set of values or an ideal system of beliefs.

of non-religious essentialism being some bedrock of human nature. This would provide a unifying ground of ideal viewers. But even where there are strong substantive claims about reality-grounded--i.e. essentialist--motivation that would be determinative of the value response in an ideal awareness, a theory runs into serious problems if it seeks to make this ideal reality which is already existent and only to be discovered a total determinant of the valuation that would be made in ideal awareness. As I noted above, what happens to the values of creative freedom--genuine creativity and individuality--within the framework of these suppositions? There is a kind of inconsistency in the notion that the ideal ground of valuation could be something already totally existent and only to be discovered and cognitively expressed in ideal choice. We touched on this problem earlier in discussing the role in value objectivity of an ideal cognitive prediction; there we noted that this was an issue on which Aristotle had long ago taken guard against this structural defect in the Utopianism of Plato's Heaven of Ideas. An interpretation which makes the Heaven of Ideas already existent, needing only to be possessively known, makes Plato radically essentialistic in ways which challenge the importance he ascribes to the higher forms of creativity in human

experience. Enlightened valuation essentially involves the activities of trying to create an ideal "reality" through the activity of the ~~Colridgean~~ secondary imagination. This being so, the ideal reality which is the normative reality experienced in ideal valuation is no concept of an already existent entity but evolves with man's spiritual development and his individuality. Some idealists, through such a dialectic as this, have come to think of even the Absolute as necessarily in process--e.g. Hegel, Hocking, Whitehead, Berdjaev, and Tillich--but I am seeking to show here that this open-texturedness of the valuative ideal and the ideal of truth is a part of the simple logic of the norm of justification--the norm presupposed in the structure of ordinary language. The notion of a completed, thus static, juris an sich (Platonic "Heaven of <sup>Normative</sup> Archtypes") is unsatisfactory, for such a concept necessarily violates a basic norm of substantive valuational ideality, namely the norm of creativity.

But despite the fact that the juris an sich, the concept of an ideal unifying ground of valuation, logically cannot be existentially complete (en soir--Sartre) as the ding an sich logically must be, it is nevertheless an extremely valuable and empirically significant concept.

Whatever one may say about the evidence for the existence

Characteristics of  
creativity in  
language

Characteristics: How actual this kind of an ideal

of a God, there are clearly very well grounded empirical theories about a bedrock of basic human nature which would, and do, function as a unifying ground of human valuations regarding the ideal development of the higher mental faculties, and function more fully as a unifying ground the more enlightened human actions are.

But apart from such <sup>empirical</sup> substantive essentialist theories, we have no logical ballast for our e pluribus unum faith which accompanies the idea of enlightened valuation even so much as we have in our quest for an e pluribus unum achievement in cognitive theories. Thus, in this very refined and abstract sense we can speak of value claims as logically more relative than truth claims--"logically arbitrary" as Charner Perry described them.<sup>47</sup> But in a somewhat less abstract sense we can say that value theory and truth theory are in analogous situations in regard to unresolvable relativities in theory: in both cases even ideal fulfillments of justificatory criteria do not eliminate possibilities of plurality.

At less abstract levels arguments over which <sup>is in</sup> ~~is in~~ *knowledge or value*

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<sup>47</sup> Charner Perry, "The Arbitrary As the Basis for Rational Morality," Ethics, 43 (1932-33) 128-153.

<sup>is</sup> general more relative are probably unresolvable. We are not here talking about comparing variations in what has been believed true vs what has been taken to be good and right; such a general sociological comparison would probably be impossible to make and <sup>only somewhat relevant</sup> ~~certainly quite irrelevant~~ to the issue of which, from the standpoint of achievabilities in rational judgment, is more relative. If this latter is sociology, it is the sociology of comparing objectivity in enlightened belief with objectivity in enlightened valuing. Of course there is the logical relativity of valuing to valuing agency that is present only at a much more abstract level in verification. But strong universal essentialist theories, which are almost always present in basic-level substantive value argumentation, tend to put value and fact objectivity on similar footings here: unresolved problems in regard to the objectivity of a value usually points to some unresolved problems in achieving objectivity in cognitive judgment.

What I think emerges from these considerations is grounds for concluding that a tremendous amount of conceptual confusion has persisted popularly and in philosophical circles enshrined in the belief that if values are analyzed in a conative way rather than a cognitive way they are necessarily seen as more "relative." Some philosophers,

for example Brand Blanchard<sup>48</sup> and C.E.M. Joad<sup>49</sup> have implied that conative approaches are philosophically condemned by the very "fact" that they necessarily undermine practically needed senses of objectivity about our values. In addition to the confusion as to the philosopher's function reflected in such comments, they derive, I have tried to show in this section, from an inadequate understanding of the functional achievabilities and limits of objectivity in conative as compared with cognitive discourse. We have seen that cognitive claims are as logically and causally significant to value objectivity when values are analyzed conatively as they could possibly be if values were analyzed cognitively, ignoring for the moment the logical problems cognitive naturalism and non-naturalism encounter--which of course we cannot do for more than a moment.

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48 Brand Blanchard, "The New Subjectivism in Ethics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IX (1949) 511.

49 C.E.M. Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism (London, 1950).

## C. FUNCTIONS OF DISTINCTIVE VALUING LANGUAGE

12. Basic and Derivative Forms of Value Judgment

Valuing we have taken to be fundamentally the function of expressing pro, neutral, or con attentions and intentions which are taken by the issuing agent to be the most justified he can achieve under the circumstances. This concept of valuation as a combination of valuative plus belief-claim about the vindicational justification of the valuative makes all valuation judgmental. I noted earlier that there are several other kinds of pronouncements that could also be called valuations, but it is obvious that they derive their value significance from value judgment in the above basic sense. One of these is the cognitive language claim as to what it would be (or would have been) good for X to choose in a given set of circumstances. This kind of cognitive claim, which is usually a prediction, makes sense only as a description of what it would be rational for an agent to value. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not a first-order valuation, but it is a form of judgment so intricately related to the fundamental valuing function that any attempt to so restrict the ordinary, or even philosophical, use of the notion of a valuation so that it

did not apply to such judgments would be artificial and engender more confusion than would be compensated for by the gain of a functionally pure use of the word 'valuation' or 'value judgment.'

In the case of a second derivative use, namely commendation, the relationship to the basic function of expressing reason-grounded valuatives is, if anything, even closer. To commend is to propose to someone that he values something, and this presupposes for correct use that the commending agent believes that the valuation would be a justified one for the agent(s) address to make. Correct commending also logically involves valuing the act of assisting someone else with his valuations though this valuation may be purely of an instrumental nature. Even so, it brings an element of moral action (but not necessarily moral motivation) into every commendation. Thus commendation involves valuations in multiple ways. Consequently any terminological proposal which left commendation out of the circle of pronouncements called valuations would be unnatural and inconvenient.

But on the other hand, there are quite clear reasons why we should <sup>not</sup> follow Charles Stevenson<sup>50</sup> and

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<sup>50</sup> C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944), 81-110.



Understand
Rewrite
 R. M. Hare<sup>51</sup> in making commendation (or exhortation, insofar as this is something else) a basic part of the meaning of a first-order valuation. The analysis above of commendation brings out that to commend is to propose that someone value something, so that incorporation of commending into the basic valuing act would make every commendation by implication a commendation of an infinite series of commendations. I see nothing out of line here from the standpoint of logical possibility, but it appears to be conspicuously out of line existentially. Every valuation is not a valuing of a broadcast recommendation of that valuation. In fact, it would seem quite obvious that there are many valuations with no clear semantic commendation function at all. It is clearly logically possible, as well as existentially common, that a person can value something without having the slightest interest in communicating a commendation--as natural as the commending spirit is to man, both from motives of other-regarding concern and as a procedure of shoring up his own valuations. Where is the semantic commending function in such value judgments as these: "It would be good for me to marry Mary Jane;" "I ought to buy as much of that stock now as I can afford (and before word of its value sends the price up)";

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<sup>51</sup> Hare, The Language of Morals, Ch. 6 and 8.

"It would be good if I had the only one like it (car, dress, etc.) in the area?"

Of course it is always possible to say that these valuing, like all valuing by and exclusively for a particular agent, are instances of commending to oneself. But what is commending to oneself but an analogical way of speaking of the manifestation of conative grounds in a vindicational reasoning process leading towards the acceptance of a directive? To start off with commending as a basic function is going to leave aspects of personal valuation only clumpishly explicated, i.e. not explicated precisely at all.

Another common use of the words 'value judgment' is simply as a name of a descriptive use of a basic valuation, a value judgment prediction, or a commendation. This use is, I think, most justified when it is the valuing agent reporting his own valuation in the cognitive mode. I have already noted that in many uses it makes no difference of practical function whether a sentence is interpreted as a cognitive assertion about some other mode of assertion or a first-order semantic expression of the conative assertion. This descriptive use, however, gets quite questionable and confusing when it becomes a description of the values of someone else or some group. Let us

*Clarify*

proscribe this as a derivative use of 'value judgment',  
for it is likely to be employed only by individuals who,  
having failed to get clear on the distinction between  
valuation and description of valuation, proceed to confound  
the two. Those who identify what is good with what is  
accepted as good in society exemplify the confusion in one  
of its more popular forms.

Despite having found several justifiable uses of the  
word 'valuation' or 'value judgment' beyond the basic use,  
I shall in this study continue to mean only the basic use  
when I employ these terms. I want in this part of the  
study (III-C) to give attention especially to the function  
of distinctive valuing words. However it is important to  
be aware that value judgments need not involve distinctive  
valuing words at all. Consider the following examples:

- (1) I choose to remain with you.
- (2) I do. (Spoken in a marriage ceremony)
- (3) I like him very much.
- (4) I desire to register.
- (5) We will remain on the job until it is completed.

Of course all of these sentences, as I have noted, have  
descriptive as well as valuative interpretations. While,  
as the examples illustrate, valuing does not require  
distinctive valuing language, important functional  
structures in value discourse are most adequately gotten

at--in some cases necessarily gotten at--in an explication by giving attention to the function and modes of functioning of distinctive value terminology. There are the primary value words, i.e. 'good,' 'ought,' 'right,' and 'beautiful' and their correlative words of disvalue, 'bad,' 'ought not,' 'wrong,' and (aesthetically) 'ugly.' To this list we could add the grading words 'better' and 'best,' and cognates of 'oughtness' such as 'responsibility,' 'obligation,' 'duty,' 'should,' 'must,' and 'necessary' where these name normative concepts. In addition to these few primary valuing words there is an extensive body of secondary valuing words, such as 'noble,' 'honest,' 'industrious,' 'dynamic,' etc., which explicitly refer to--and in typical cases presuppose--specific standards or justifying grounds of valuation. Let us consider the primary words first, and then we will give some further attention to the logic of use of secondary value words and to evaluations, appraisals, and verdicts.

### 13. Good and Ought

"Good" has the generic function of designating what are to be taken as the most justified objects of pro attention and intention in a given situation, and 'ought' has the correlative generic function of being used to express ways of acting which it is believed will achieve the good.

Thus, for every use of 'good' there is a correlative appropriate use of 'ought' and vice versa. This complete correlation is often obscured by two factors: (1) In any given situation there may be reasons to throw emphasis on the goal of acting rather than the way of acting that will achieve the goal, or vice versa, and (2) in any given valuing situation more than one kind of value predication is commonly appropriate. The most important and conspicuous range of cases in which the way of acting typically receives dominant emphasis over the goal is that in which obligation is expressed. Obligation is the sense of constraint to principle, especially to the more fundamental principles in one's hierarchy of values, and has a more particular application insofar as the sense of constraint is accompanied by a sense that failure to do the obligatory is to be deserving of some kind of punishment. Among obligations we are usually aware of a definite distinction between obligations purely to oneself and obligations to others, the latter usually being manifestations of a moral commitment, i.e. a commitment to manifest an other-regarding concern.

Because of (1) the distinction between uses in which the object (goal) is stressed versus those in which the way of acting is stressed, combined with (2) the fact that

'ought' has its most important, conspicuous, and emotively charged uses in expressing obligation, plus (3) the fact that any situation can be valuatively judged from more than one point of view (e.g. as purely personal value or as moral value), it often appears to be the case that good and ought are not in the one-to-one logical correlation I have suggested; that is, there seem to be cases in which we appropriately call something good without it being appropriate to speak of one oughting to do it, and, vice versa, cases in which we speak of something being what we ought to do without its being what we would consider the maximally good thing to do. However, when we examine the situation in light of the above distinctions, we find that the parallelism of "good" and "ought" remains complete. Where we judge something good but it would not be a clear and definite violation of fundamental obligations to self and others not to do it, the "ought" formulation seems less appropriate, but if an agent did want to throw emphasis on the way of acting, perhaps to bring out the element of obligation to oneself involved in any choice of something as good--i.e. the general obligation to self-realization--he could appropriately use "ought" language. Note the near synonymy but difference of emphasis in the following pairs

of examples:

- (1) It is a good show.
- (1') You really ought to see it.
- (2) A good way to go would be to take the river road.
- (2') You ought to take the river road.
- (3) If you promised to do it, then you ought to.
- (3') If you promised, then it would be the morally good thing to do.
- (4) I ought to take you to task for that.
- (4') It would be good if I took you to task for that.

I am not denying that there can be differences of meaning between these formulations which is more than simply a difference between putting emphasis on the goal or the principle. For example 'good' often suggests that other goals or ways of acting could with equal justification be taken, but 'ought' suggests that the particular obligation at hand has its own claim. But this <sup>it would seem,</sup> is a matter of history-of-use associated suggestions rather than of what is semantically asserted. (3') and (4') are no less specific than (3) and (4), though by changing 'the' to 'a' good in each case they would become much less so. Putting emphasis on the way of acting by using 'ought' brings in some element of obligation. Corresponding to the shift from "the good" to "a good" is a shift in obligation from the more specific and direct to the more general and derived. However,

as obligation moves in this direction it comes to hardly seem like obligation at all (cf. (1') and (2')).

This would seem to account for those uses of 'good' in which it has been said not to be appropriate to say one ought to do it. However, let us consider an example illustrating a point that has received special attention in philosophical discussions. "I thought it was a good thing to help Joe out, but I had no obligation to do so." If the approach I am suggesting cannot preserve the important distinction between "good" applications and "ought" applications, what J. S. Mill points out has been described misleadingly by philosophers as a distinction between "imperfect" and "perfect" obligation, then the approach is in serious trouble. I think it can be handled. In saying one is not under obligation, one is saying that moral principles do not designate the specific act as a direct moral obligation, but in the particular circumstances when one decided "that it would be good to help Joe" he also decided "that helping Joe was what he ought to do in those circumstances." The "good" and the "ought" here are parts of judgments at a more particular level than the "good" which is expressed as "It is good to do acts of benevolence, which are not direct moral obligations," which has as its correlative "ought" judgment: "One ought



to do acts of benevolence which are not direct moral obligations."

Thus, the sense of there being uses of one of the two value words without a corresponding application of the other has derived, I believe, in all cases from not considering pairs of judgments that are really correlative. Unless carefully kept in check, an "ought" formulation especially is apt to suggest the application of inappropriately heavy obligation machinery; that is, inappropriate if it was not intended as a part of the meaning of a particular use at all.

To establish a complete parallelism between "good" and "ought," we must also take account of the sort of case where we appear to be able to speak of something as being what one ought to do without its being the maximally good thing to do. Situations with this appearance typically arise where the agent's moral commitments, and especially his commitment to justice, call for an action which appears to entail a sacrifice of personal good and also possibly even social good. Let us consider the stronger kind of case: where the just action appears to call for a sacrifice of personal and social good. For our show horses here let's trot out the old examples of "The Robinhood Bank Clerk" and "The Doctor in the Lifeboat."

A bank clerk finds a foolproof way to take \$50,000 from a bank with 50,000 stockholders. He reasons that if he takes the money no stockholder will lose more than the price of a martini, and since the stockholders are all five-figure income people this is hardly a noticeable loss for any one person. But he genuinely plans to use the money for charitable causes. In the "Lifeboat" example the doctor is faced with the decision of whether to push some weak but not critically ill men within the boat with him overboard so that at least one person can survive, it being part of the example to consider that it is a well-grounded prediction of the doctor that if water and food is shared equally all will die before rescue comes. Are these cases where moral obligation might be seen to conflict with judgments of goodness? I think not. What is being weighed in each case is the relative goodness of two practices: (1) the practice of making a particular moral principle a well-nigh absolute inherent value in the consciences of individuals, versus (2) the practice of weighing the odds wherever a case appears to arise where personal or social good would be better served by the non-just action. I.e. we are weighing two orders of goods, two highly general kinds of goals of action. The question the clerk and the doctor face is that of which practice

is better, when we weigh in all the goods coming from each practice, including the good accruing to the individual and to society by making the chosen practices a fundamental part of each individual's sense of personal identity and integrity. Note that the argument here need not be put in hedonistic-utilitarian terms, but only in talk about the kind of goods logically involved wherever there are "oughts" asserted. A fundamental deontological commitment is as easily expressible fundamentally in terms of "goods" as it is in terms of "oughts"; i.e. the deontologist's basic valuation can be expressed: "The state of affairs in which basic principles are abided by is the fundamental good." One cannot assert "one ought to do X" without correlatively valuing the state of affairs in which X's are achieved. The notion that the "oughts" applicable in a situation can outweigh the "goods" can only reflect some sense of confusion about the basic logical relationships of the two terms.

This is not to deny that a significant distinction can be drawn between a deontological and a teleological ethic: this distinction is most coherently understood,

I think, as based on a difference between (1) a substantive ethic in which the fundamental goods are taken to be the fulfillment of certain practices, the fulfillments being states of affairs of principles being fundamental inherent values of individuals, and these principles being acted upon (a deontological ethic), and (2) a substantive ethic in which abiding principles is only or chiefly a means to achievement of what is fundamentally valued (a teleological ethic).<sup>52</sup> But with the distinction drawn in this way, few substantive theories will be clearly one or the other, but rather the typical description of a theory in relation to the deontological-teleological issue will be in terms of dominant and recessive emphases.

If this analysis of the fundamental functional distinctiveness of "good" and "ought" is accepted, does it

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<sup>52</sup> I am following C. I. Lewis here in drawing the following terminological distinctions: intrinsic value is any ultimate value experience, having no character of being a means. Inherent value is anything the having of which in itself provides intrinsic value. Instrumental value is means value which is not inherent value. Cf. his Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, pp. 384-393.

make sense to hold that one or the other is more basic? I really do not think one could justify a yes answer here without appealing to some quite insignificant kind of priority. One might argue that in the voluntaristic type of approach such as I am developing value is created by the conative act--the attention-intention act--and this makes value primally an expression of a way of acting, thus principles are made more basic than goals in valuation, "oughts" more basic than "goods."<sup>53</sup> Possibly one could recognize a kind of logical priority of the "ought" over the "good" here, but I cannot see any significance of a priority so finely drawn, except as a very real source of temptation to a false generalization. If one is led to go from that technical point of logical priority to a description of the existential valuing act as one in which the conative response totally creates the normative value response, then this would be indeed existentially false, for we have noted that the normal value development process is more adequately described in terms of conative ground and normative-reality experience each serving as a prompting ground of the development and expression of the other.

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. D. C. Williams, "Ethics as Pure Postulate," The Philosophical Review, vol. 42, 1933; reprinted in W. Sellars and J. Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory (New York, 1952), pp. 656-666.

↑  
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In a pro attention the pro response and the seeing-as-good are one existential reality in which the only proper answer to the question "Which produces which?" is: both.

#### 14. Right

Pinning down the functional significance of good and ought helps in locating the distinctive functional significance of the word 'right.' But we cannot make as simple a generalization here as our Occamic impulses would like. 'Right,' like 'good,' is primarily a designating word, a noun-use word, rather than a verb-use word as "ought" is. But its noun use is to name valued ways of acting and activity; thus in significance it is closer to "ought." The right way to act is the way one ought to act. However, 'right' has lost some of the universality of application of 'good' and 'ought': its use is restricted to the area where the principle of action is enough of an obligation for the use of 'right' to have the implication: "You are very liable for some bad consequences if you do not do right," with the further suggestion (sometimes implication) that in not doing the right you will be (at least somewhat) deserving of these bad consequences. We must be careful here not to limit the meaning we ascribe to 'right' solely to its moral meaning, though admittedly the significance of a use--like a use of 'ought'--tends to

gravitate in that direction unless explicitly pinned down otherwise by context. However, there are many common non-moral uses, e.g.:

(1) This is the right road (the road one ought to take to avoid difficulties, the most efficient means to a chosen end).

(2) This is the right course for you to take (the one you ought to take to stay out of unnecessary academic difficulties, and to move efficiently towards achieving your objectives of being in school).

(3) According to the law (or: the rules), that is the right thing to do.

(4) Rights presuppose duties.

In #(1) and #(2) the "right" way or thing is that which functions as efficient means to a chosen goal, thus in these cases 'right' has the same general use as the causally instrumental 'ought,' In such uses we speak of "right" quite divorced from accepted value: "This is the right explosive to use to blow a safe"; "1940 was the right time for Hitler to invade England." Instance #(3) illustrates that very broad range of uses in which 'right' has the significance of "correct," in accordance with the rules of the activity one is involved in. As a player of a game and as a participant in social contracts, one has explicit obligations to obey the rules. Consider: "That is not the right way to play"; "Did you use (or spell) the word

right?"; "In this society (court, social group) that is not right (the right way to do it), but in another society (court, group) it might be right."

The fourth example in the above list of sentences ("rights presuppose duties") illustrates an enlargement of a use of a word by metonymy. When people have an obligation to do what is right (correct according to the

laws of the game or social contract), there are rights, <sup>which other</sup> ~~members of the group have, in order pertaining to other action ways,~~ *i.e. capabilities of correct action (in accordance with the* ~~rules) which depend on others keeping the rules.~~ *Rights, used in, depend on people doing what is right.*

When it is a social contract involved, and not just a game, we speak of keeping to one's contract, especially in the face of motives not to do so, as doing one's duty. We can apply the social contract language of rights and duties to ourselves (we speak of doing right by ourselves and of having a duty to ourselves), because, as I have mentioned earlier (and will dwell on later), we often use a societal or political concept of the self, speaking as though even a personal ethic were a kind of social contract among a community of selves. Such analogical talk is, I think, illuminating of some very fundamental issues in regard to the functional structure of an individual's system of values, issues which will be discussed later in the study (III-D).



## 15. Grading Language

Since rightness is so closely associated with correctness, and correctness is a matter of either keeping or not keeping a rule, we can understand why it is less natural to speak of degrees of rightness rather than it is degrees of goodness, i.e. right functions less easily as a grading term. However, this difference can easily be exaggerated into false generalizations which if they were true would throw in question the parallelism and interchangeability I have argued for between good and ought, for I have argued that the function of 'right' is derivative from the function of ought. I want to argue that the fact that we have language to speak more directly and simply of degrees of goodness than of degrees of rightness has some logical ground but might also be considered largely a matter of accident of usage. Let's take a look at grading language, focusing for the moment on the basic trinity 'good,' 'better,' 'best,' though <sup>role in the section I will depend</sup> I ~~will eventually, in this section, get~~ <sup>referring to</sup> ~~back to talk about~~ the meaningfulness of gradations of right.

On the surface, grading language would appear to offer an objection to the distinction drawn in this study between valuative and valuation. I have argued that the

class of valuations includes only those valuatives considered by the agent to be the most rationally justified for him to act upon. I have given the sentence "I would like to, but it wouldn't be good" as paradigmatic of the distinction between a valuative not a valuation and one that is. Granting that assertions in which value words are used in a semantically expressive way are always valuations (and not just valuatives)--and I do, of course, grant this; otherwise the analysis made of valuations in the study would be rather pointless and philosophically naive--do we not have a problem in the fact that grading language seems to deny this limitation on the use of good, for that which is not best is still good?

But it is not difficult to show that the problem is only apparent. Grading language is the language of conditional choice:

Good: Best under limiting circumstances.  
Right to choose under those circumstances.

Better: Best under less limiting circumstances  
(etc.).

Best: Best under <sup>even less limiting</sup> ~~practically optimum~~ circumstances. Right to choose under these circumstances of choice.

Thus there is no suggestion in grading language that "the good" does not always designate the rationally preferred.

And this explication also brings out that it is to a great extent an accident of usage, rather than basic to the logic of use, that we have special language idioms to designate degrees of goodness but not degrees of right. It is true that something is either in accordance with a rule or not, and when we use rule expressions and referential language it often is the "conforming or not conforming" duality we are interested in. However, in an analogous sense, something is either a justified goal of action or not. But in talking of such goals--thus of "goods"--we are usually very much interested in the practical question: Good to seek (choose, etc.) under what conditions? It is this question that has given rise to grading language oriented to "goods." But analogously we can be--and often are--interested in grading "rights": Right to follow under what conditions? We can, but with less linguistic directness and economy, order rules of rights in the same hierarchical way we do goods:

Right (absolutely right): The way to act if you can.

Almost right: If you can't do the absolutely right choose this principle, i.e. the closest one to it.

"Considerably not right," "very much not right," and "absolutely wrong" are phrases with which we could con-

tinue to develop this grading series. Of course a principle is either fulfilled or not fulfilled, but it is equally true that something is either good or not good. The less good is not the good if one is in a position, without the loss of a greater good, to choose the better or the best. But the less good is less divergent from the good than is the bad, and under certain circumstances will become the good.

Proximity gradings, i.e. gradings in terms of proximity to a standard, are always ways of expressing conditional gradings, i.e. gradings of conditions under which an item is the best. In choosing a lesser graded item one is always choosing, if the choice is rational, the best under the circumstances. We can say analogous things about right. To do the "almost right" is to do the "right" when the "absolutely right" is not achievable. To do the "almost right" when one could have done the "right" is, of course to do what was wrong--but not as wrong as to have done what is very much not right.

16. Polyfunctionalism and Contextual Relativity  
in Meaning and Use of Value Words

With these distinctions in mind, we can now talk reasonably intelligibly, I think, about the very complex

issue of the polyfunctionalism of primary valuing words. Good, ought, and right have their valuatively most fundamental uses in expressing valuative attention-intention judgments, both individual and participatory, both expressive and performatory. They have a very direct valuative function in expressing commendations, both individual and participatory. They are used in making cognitive assertions about what would be rational valuations. They are used in descriptions of actual valuations, i.e. subjective reports and observations. They have less natural but not logically odd functions in the expressing of prescriptions and commands--prescriptions more naturally than commands. A doctor is still prescribing, neither commanding nor just advising (commending), if he says: "You ought to take one of these after each meal, and it would be good to do these exercises at least twice a day." When a foreman or a captain functioning actively in an area of his authority says to a subordinate, "It would be good for you to do X" or "You ought to do X" these are functionally commands. Single uses of sentences can, of course, have multifunctional semantic significance. Consider for example a minister speaking from his pulpit to his congregation, saying: "We ought to serve God more faithfully." Without strain we can find here significances as a participatory

attention-intention judgment, a commendation, a prescription, and even command in the cases where the spiritual leader is accorded <sup>an</sup> ~~such~~ authoritative <sup>spoken for</sup> ~~voice-of-God~~ status. In addition there are the cognitive significances mentioned above, some of which could be taken as asserted here.

It is not difficult to see the logical absurdity in the statements of those who have talked unqualifiedly about the meaning of value words as being culturally and contextually relative. How could we know what words were being compared if we were not concerning ourselves with the same meaning, or the same function, in each cultural use or context? But also we can see that within this framework of a general identity of meaning or function, there is plenty of room for "relativity": relativity of specific meaning of a use to context, and thus much basis for talking about very pervasive differences in aspects of meanings of terms with the same general functional significance. Professor Carl Wellman has made an excellent analysis of these, noting how they derive both from the kinds of multi-functionalism described above and also from cultural differences in the qualities and character of the attention and intention experiences involved. Thus, both because of polyfunctionalism and these cultural and contextual relativities, the specific significance of a use of a value word can vary greatly with

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culture and context. The discussion in Part I of how an abstract language-rule determined meaning of a term can become the schema of a greatly enriched concreteness of meaning in a particular context of use indicates further the great relativity of the meaning of value words to their particular context of use.

### 17. Secondary Value Words

Iris Murdoch notes that primary valuing words could be dispensed with entirely and all valuing done through use of the specialized secondary value words, i.e. words used to express or refer to specific objects of emotions and attitudes in a valuing way, such as "I love you," "He is honest, and "He is delightful." Actually, as I illustrated above, neither primary nor secondary value words are required for formulating a valuation: any language expressive of reason-mediated choosing is valuational. However, secondary value words, by the very character of their concreteness of meaning, play particularly vital roles in the valuing experience of individuals--roles which I will consider in some detail in a later part of the study (III-E). Our present concern is to map the general functional character of such modes of valuing.

Secondary value words can be verbs, either express-atory ("I love you") or performatory ("I congratulate you"); or nouns, either with public observation referents ("He is industrious") or valuative-attention normative reality referents ("He is delightful"). These different types have distinctive logical characteristics of use which we will examine, but let us consider first the general characteristics of secondary value words. What is most basic to them is the dual (a) specific valiative and (b) specific descriptive meaning. A sentence with a secondary value word polyfunctionally both expresses a specific valiative and designates the cognitive ground of the valiative response. "He is honest" can be analyzed into the two pronouncements: "He tells the truth" and "I like him for having that character trait." Actually, we can see that there is a double valiative act involved: (i) the valuing of the character trait in general and (ii) the valuing of an individual for possessing the trait; thus we could consider that three atomic sentences are necessarily involved in each simple valiative sentence-form formulated with a secondary value word.

Secondary value word sentences are valuations unless this judgmental character is specifically denied, as in "He is honest to a fault" or "If he were less conscientious,



he would do a better job." The normal valuative significance of a secondary value word can not only be overridden by a more basic or more strongly supported value judgment, it can be totally renounced. There is no logical oddness in the pronouncements: "I detest industrious people" or "Show me an honest man and you will show me a fool." Here again the language rule appears clearly to be that secondary value word sentences function as valuations unless the valuation is explicitly challenged--which they can be either by being reduced to valuatives or by being denied even this second-class valuing status. This language rule is important for preserving the basic neutrality of language itself. Recall that in my critique of Stephen Toulmin's analysis of value language, in which he makes substantive norms a part of the structure of language itself, I noted that the closest language came to violating the norm of neutrality was in the logic of use of secondary value words, but I noted that I would indicate how the "violation" here was more apparent than real. While it is the logic of use of secondary value words that a use presupposes the validity of the culture norm it applies when this presupposition is not explicitly challenged, the linguistic complete openness to challenge preserves the fundamental neutrality of language itself. While the

meaning structure of language flirts with the norms of its culture in secondary value word uses, it nevertheless retains its uncommitted status by showing forth its fickleness under challenge.

Actually this pattern is reflected even in uses of primary value words. As R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell-Smith, and Stephen Toulmin point out, when one says, "This is a good car" or "This is a good rake," we linguistically have a right to expect the car and the rake to have the features normally prized in such objects in our culture unless alternative features are designated as the specifically valued ones and the normal valuations explicitly or implicitly repudiated.<sup>54</sup>

Toulmin goes part way in recognizing such a manner in which language preserves its neutrality in that he notes that it is always meaningful to challenge any particular principle of a code of ethics operative in society. However, he says two things about this challenge which seem to me to be false. For one, he contends that any such challenge is always an appeal to the basic utilitarian

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<sup>54</sup> Hare, Language of Morals, Ch. 6-7; Nowell-Smith, Ethics, Ch. 8; Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, Ch. 10.

meaning or function of value words which itself cannot be challenged, for this would be to challenge the value function itself and with it the basic meaning of reasoning about values, because for Toulmin the utilitarian norm is the basic "inference rule" in language in terms of which valuational inferences are judged fundamentally rational or irrational.<sup>55</sup> I have already shown that explication of value reasoning does not call for any such appeal to a substantive norm as a part of the idea of rationality.

A second aspect of Toulmin's analysis which requires challenge here, because of its similarity to a claim I have made about the logic of secondary value words, is his insistence that a value judgment always presupposes the validity of the culture norms and appeals to these as grounds of justification unless this validity and appeal are questioned.<sup>56</sup> I have noted that this is true for secondary-value-word judgments and even for those primary-value-word judgments where there is a strong presupposition that the same good-making characteristics are accepted by practically everyone, exceptions being very unusual and

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<sup>55</sup> Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, Ch. 11 & 14.

<sup>56</sup> Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, Ch. 11.

indicative of strange tastes or special uses. Thus, "This is a good car" or "This is a good rake" function in the same norm-presupposing manner that secondary value words do unless explicitly challenged. But it is a very serious conceptual error to think that this characteristic can be generalized for all primary value word uses. Consider: "Nixon will make a good president"; "We ought to escalate our Vietnam military operations"; "He is a good man." Language does not require in such cases that one understanding such sentences fix upon some norms of appraisal which are culturally established or presupposed standards which we are to take as giving the meaning and justification intended for these pronouncements unless these standards are explicitly challenged. The Toulminesque fallacy here is not just that language does not have this built-in radically status-quo preserving, thus conservative and establishmentarian, orientation, but that to presuppose common criteria here is to presuppose what in considerable measure does not exist. Who would want to say there is anything like a stable and precise set of culture norms for judging goodness in a president, grounds for escalating a war, or judging a man as good? Some very basic and commonly presupposed norms one would be linguistically justified in supposing to be grounds of an agent's judgment unless

*be more specific*

*Make a clear statement of the point.*

*And also?*

he explicitly disowned them, but Toulmin's cut-and-dried analysis which has every valuation presupposing culture norms until explicitly challenged appears patently false.

This discussion of the logic of secondary value words has focused so far on the roles of these words in valuatives and valuations. We should note that there are derivative uses in descriptions of valuations and in directives, but these raise no special conceptual problems for explication. There are important functional issues to be distinguished, however, between verb and noun uses, and between cases in which the reference of such words is open to public observation and cases in which they are characteristics of states of consciousness, specifically of valuative attentions. I want now to consider these matters and in the order mentioned.

Generally, verb uses express an attitude (a valuative attention-intention complex) without a descriptive reference by the verb to the object of the attitude. When a sentence such as "I love you" is taken as descriptive rather than as expressive, it describes the feeling or

attitude of the agent, not, of course, the object.<sup>57</sup>

Noun uses, on the other hand, while they have the expressive significance of verb uses when taken as valuatives, refer to the object of the attitude in a describing way, e.g. "He is industrious, delightful, etc." I have noted that the noun uses divide into two very significantly different types (1) those in which the presupposed good-making characteristic referred to is definable in public observation language, and (2) those in which the good-making character is a feature of a pro attention experience, thus not directly definable by public observation language, though the latter serves to schematize it. Examples of the first type would be words such as honest, industrious, noble, etc., and examples of the second type are handsome, charming, delightful, disgusting.

The first type offers the fewest philosophical problems and has received most attention in philosophical discussions. There has been a tendency, because of strongly

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Verb uses can be performatory, rather than expressatory, in their conative assertional form, e.g. "I congratulate you," "I apologize." Note that here the descriptive reference would not be to the attitude as a psychological process but to the semantic expression itself, e.g. "I congratulated him" refers to the semantic significance of the sentence-use act.

behavioristic approaches to meaning, to lump the second type of noun use with the verb use and analyze both on the cognitive-emotive pattern proposed by Stevenson, i.e. to take "I love you" and "He is delightful" as both assertions which dually describe and causally express attitudes. To do full justice to the semantic and phenomenological issues involved we need to bring to bear more refined models of explication.

In the first type of noun use the good-making characteristic is, much more strongly than in the second type, presupposed as an instance of a generally accepted norm. However, a use both (a) values the norm and presupposes its justification and (b) uses the norm in valuing the specific object, person, or group. It does the second in the characteristic manner of asserting a valuative attention-intention and designating the primary vindicational ground of the conative response. By the example-setting and psychological contagion of this affirmation, plus the presupposition made that the valuative is a generally vindicated and validated one, the assertion has a strong perlocutionary persuasive significance, as Stevenson has well noted and described.<sup>58</sup> That is, it can be deliber-

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<sup>58</sup> Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 277-279.

ately used with the intention to persuade others to agree in attitude and very often has this effect.

It is characteristic of typical instances of this type of noun use that there is a positive delineatable descriptive function that can be both specified and isolated by use of public observation language and can even be the sole function of an assertion in some specialized context, such as a scientific study. There is no problem, for example, in delineating what honesty is and treating it purely descriptively. "Industrious" offers only a slightly more difficult problem of cognitive isolation, but "noble," "intelligent," "having integrity," etc. present quite serious problems when one sets about to isolate the purely descriptive component. They appear functionally to lie between the two types of noun uses, seeming to have some general publicly designatable descriptive component of meaning but deriving some essential part of their meaning from the character of individual or sub-language group intentionality, and while this generally remains a significance designatable in public-observation predicate language, at times such words can derive a part of their meaning from the character of the evaluative attention responses of the user, i.e. in the manner of the second

Need family members  
 "concepts" of  
 definition here



type of noun use.

It is definitive of the second type of noun use that descriptive conditions can only be stated negatively and that the attitude involved is primarily an expression of a valuative attention and/or attention disposition. Frank Sibley has made an excellent study of the use of these concepts in aesthetic valuations, where they occur much more predominantly than in ethical discourse. Iris Murdoch has discussed their very fundamental role in the discourse <sup>??</sup> presentative and expressive of life-value experiences. She gives particular attention to their role in person-of-person valuing experience in language. Since I plan later in the study to give detailed attention to the roles of valuative attentions in ethics, I will limit discussion at this time to the more general functional characteristics of this type of secondary value language use.

When someone is called "delightful" or "disgusting" we cannot set grounds of positive characterization of the person or object so described as logically necessary for these terms to be used correctly, though we can often, at least with great inductive reliability if not logical necessity, indicate negative conditions. For example, there would be an oddness approaching incoherence to describe a person as

delightful and consistently cruel, or disgusting and consistently thoughtful in an enlightened way of others.

What is positive in this type of noun valuative is that it does, like the verb valuative, have the significance of expressing an attitude of the valuer. This is why the two kinds of secondary value word assertions are often classed together, but they are significantly different in their functions despite this common characteristic. The verb form ("I love you") expresses the emotion or attitude without any descriptive reference to the normative reality involved, i.e. to the valuative way of seeing the object. The noun form, on the other hand, specifically seeks to describe the normative reality character of the object valued. It is about a normative way of seeing. To analyze "He is delightful" as meaning no more than "He causes me to feel delight" is to leave out the basic designative significance of the first sentence. Such an assertion is not primarily about how one feels but about how one sees; in Miss Murdoch's terminology it is "vision language" and not "movement (i.e. conation) language." Granted, as we have already discussed earlier, conation and normative reality, normative intentionality and normative vision, are logically and causally united, and that, while there can be conative attentions without normative

[I don't want to state too strongly?]

reality experience, the opposite logically and causally cannot occur. Nevertheless, the conation and the vision aspects of the experience are not only conceptually distinct but provide the basis of very distinct kinds of focus of consciousness, which are distinctive kinds of valuing and describing experiences, and an adequate explication of the language involved will take account of this. The distinction of meaning of "I am delighted by his presence" and "He is delightful" illustrates the difference: the verb form throws the focus of attention on the feeling and the noun form puts the focus on the specific normative way of seeing.

Secondary value words whose primary function is to present a feature of normative reality seek to communicate that which cannot be described in public observation--i.e. behavior oriented--language, not because it is esoteric but because it is a character of immediate experience which cannot be communicated by simple designative and naming language but is communicated only by schematizing it. This schematizing can take two forms: (a) by designating the sensory experience which is the context--often the necessary context--within which the particular character of conative attention reliably occurs, or (b) by seeking to communicate the character by analogy (simile metaphor)

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with public observation language. In both cases the function of the schematizing is to present the character of the experience, i.e. cause the person(s) with whom one is seeking to communicate to understand the experience. Both kinds of schematizing occur most extensively and unmixed with other models in aesthetic discourse, so let us consider first some examples from that area. A reviewer describes a work of art as somber, meaning roughly that the quality of the aesthetic experience it produces on the sensitive observer (the valuative attention-normative reality experience) is that usually produced by dark colors and tragic scenes. He may seek a much more specific description of the context within which the valuative experience is manifested, which at one extreme calls for presenting the publicly observable context, i.e. showing the painting, playing the music, reading the poem, etc. But this full-bodied presenting may not be possible, or if provided, not sufficient. He who takes on the task of aesthetic communication may feel the need to do further schematizing of the aesthetic experience to communicate it. This he can do by pointing out relevant features of the art object to secure appropriate foci of cognitive and valuative attention, but in order to accomplish this he may find use of metaphor valuable or even essential: he talks of

"dynamic" sections, "delicate" developments of themes or handling of material, of "balance," and the like. By a many-faceted presentation of context and metaphorical description he may succeed in getting the person he is seeking to communicate with to have the experience. He will take as evidence that he has communicated the fact that his hearer finds the description offered to him fitting and adds others that they both can agree on. General doubts about the possibility of establishing that a communication was successful here would appear to be irrational. Recall the very relevant remarks of Wittgenstein on this issue, quoted from his aesthetics lectures in Part I,

Now, with this discussion of the function of noun-use normative reality descriptive secondary value words in mind, let us consider some analogous examples from ethical (life-value) discourse. Here the purely normative reality designative use is probably rare; rather noun-use secondary value words characteristically have mixed public observation and valuative attention referential functions. To describe someone as "vulgar" or "lovable," "bumptious" or "gay" is both to refer to observable kinds of behavior and to qualities of the valuative seeing. However, it is the normative reality significance that is basically controlling of the applicability of the predicates, however, for the publicly observable descriptive conditions logically

can vary (even though they characteristically do not) within such wide ranges that we are forced to conclude, with Sibley,<sup>59</sup> that these controlling conditions are largely negative; this is clearly the case when culture-norm controls are explicitly set aside. As Ryle so well documents, we talk about character traits, even of this especially state-of-consciousness designative kind (of course Ryle does not consider that they are states of consciousness designative, at least not with the sense of state of consciousness presupposed in the study), by talking about the schematizing behavior;<sup>60</sup> the behavior both provides the means of designative reference and provides justifying grounds of a description that something is "vulgar," "lovable," "bumptious," or "gay." We talk about how the person acts, including the things he says, I am arguing, following the Wittgenstein of the aesthetics lectures (and a few parts of the Philosophical Investigations), because this is the effective way to communicate the normative reality experience. The behavior of the person (or thing) being described plus the agent's dis-

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<sup>59</sup> Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," The Philosophical Review, LXVIII (1949) 173-194; reprinted in W.G. Kennick, ed; Art and Philosophy (New York, 1964), pp. 351-373.

<sup>60</sup> Ryle, Concept of Mind, ad passim.

dispositional behavior and language-use behavior are the physical media presenting the normative reality experience in the first place.

Later in the study(III-D) I will pursue further the significance of these uses of secondary value words which present and communicate valuative attention states. At that time we will examine particularly Iris Murdoch's analysis of developmental processes in normative reality experience and their relation to developments in conative processes and to observable behavior.

18. Standards, Principles, Points of View  
Appraisals, and Verdicts

In this section we want to give attention to language used to establish the <sup>forms</sup> forms of reference within which a valuation is made. I shall take up terminology here in the order it is listed in the section-title above.

A standard is basically a value judgment in which there is specified what are to be taken as good-making characteristics for a class of objects. Thus, standards give the grounds on the basis of which objects of the class are valued. They express criteria of goodness, and thus are the basis of grading judgments. Standards are, of course,

relative to the issuing agent, but may be individual or participatory in all the ways described in earlier parts of the study. The "objectivity" of a standard may derive from (1) the fact that it has been a long-established standard for a long-established group, or (2) the fact that vindictory evidence has been collected over a long time and by many people, or (3) the fact (insofar as it can be established as such) that the standard reflects what would be the valuation of any sufficiently enlightened person (or most of these) of the relevant class, or (4) the fact of the normative reality experience of the standard--or any combination of these factors.

Of course, standards can be reported and described as well as expressed as first-order valuations. I can <sup>for a while</sup> agree with Bernard Mayo that the process of applying standards to objects is itself cognitive activity rather than directly valuative activity, though he suggests an existential separateness in the two functions which I have, I think, given reason to believe is false.<sup>61</sup> As secondary value language illustrates, valuing and evaluating, or

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<sup>61</sup> Bernard Mayo, Ethics and The Moral Life (London, 1958), pp. 201-202.



appraising, are characteristically concurrent activities, and language uses reflect this fact very strongly. We shall have occasion very shortly to examine such a conjunction in analyzing the notion of verdicts.

While standards are criteria-of-goodness judgments, putting emphasis on the goal of valuation and the promptive grounds for valuing the goal, principles, or rules, are basically "oughtness" and "rightness" valuations: They express what are taken to be justified ways of acting where these are stable and continuing judgments for the issuing agent and of a relatively general nature. Transitory and particular valuational directives to action we refer to simply as directives, or imperatives, or (from translators of Kant) maxims.<sup>62</sup>

Like standards (in fact any valuations), principles are always agent-relative and agency either individual or participatory. Within any agency frame of reference,

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<sup>62</sup> Bernard Mayo argues that the logical difference between rules, or principles, and directives is that the latter presuppose persons as authorities and the former do not (cf. Ethics and The Moral Life, p. 161). But principles and rules can be principles or rules of individuals, and, on the other hand, all principles presuppose an authoritative issuing agency, though this may be a group or metaphysical agency.

principles tend to be ordered into a hierarchy in terms of basicness and derivativeness within the agency's system of values. Characteristically, individual value principles are ordered through the individual's participation in some group agency which dictates ordering principles, such as rational being agency or moral being agency. What Samuel Butler calls "magisterial and architectonic principles" will most characteristically be participatory agent principles of one of these two types.

Principles and standards are related in this way:

Principles direct individuals to act in certain ways, which involve achieving specific kinds of goods. Standards specify the nature of the goals which principles direct us to. I noted earlier that "good" and "oughts" are in a pervasive one-to-one relationship, thus principles and standards must be if that analysis is correct. It is not difficult to see that this is the case. Principles direct action for the achievement of valued goals; standards specify the grounds on the basis of which the goals are called "good" and the principles "right."

The notion of a point of view of judgment is quite equivocal. Most often, I believe, philosophers have used the phrase in regard to value judgments to indicate the kind of principle or standard being adopted, or considered, as

a validational basis of judgment. Thus, we speak of judgment from the "moral point of view," or "economic point of view," or "self-realization point of view," or "aesthetic point of view." The fact, of course, that a point of view is established definitionally as a part of language does not mean that there is any time when an individual logically must make judgments from that point of view.<sup>63</sup>

In addition to the above use of "point of view" (let us call it #(1)), we could use this phrase to refer to differences of frames of reference of each of the following kinds:

(2) Type of agency point of view, i.e. individual judgment versus  $PA_1$  judgment, versus  $PA_2$  judgment, etc. (PA-participatory agency.) Note that this is not the same as point of view distinguished by the nature of the

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<sup>63</sup> This would seem too obvious to note were it not the case that some "logical naturalist" have talked as though specific situations could linguistically require judgment from a specific point of view, without reference to whether the individual user had made commitment to that point of view. Cf. Toulmin, Place of Reason in Ethics, Ch. 11 and 13; Baier, The Moral Point of View, Ch. 5, 7, 8; and P. Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), pp. 107-124.

standard, but the two are closely related. The notion of a point of view is often a conjunction of #(1) and #(2), e.g. the judgment from the moral point of view may be taken to be adoption of a specific principle or standard and a particular kind of participatory agency, such as a Rousseauian social contract "moral body."

(3) Particular agency point of view, e.g. John Jones' point of view, a particular court's point of view, a company's point of view, etc.

(4) Agent versus spectator point of view. Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Mayo have referred to this as the "agent versus critic or judge" point of view, but I think comments later in this section will indicate that valuing and appraisal are not so neatly separable existentially or logically as their analyses suggest.

(5) Conative language versus cognitive language point of view. This is the #(4) distinction given a specific interpretation by being formulated as a difference in the language perspective on the valuing act: the semantically expressive perspective versus the descriptive perspective.

(6) Vindicational point of view versus validation point of view in justification. In undertaking a justifica-

tion of a valuation it would often clear up confusion to make clear when vindicational patterns are dominantly employed and when validational patterns are to be taken as dominant.

An appraisal, or evaluation, can mean any one or a combination of the following four things:

- I. The process of appraisal:
  - A. The search for reasons.
  - B. The giving of what are accepted as reasons (vindicational or validational).
- II. The conclusion of the process: a value judgment made as an outcome as a reasoning process.
  - A. An intention judgment: principle, standard, directive, maxim.
  - B. An attention judgment: e.g. "It is beautiful," "You are repulsive," "I like it."<sup>64</sup>

Appraisals and evaluations can also be expressed purely in descriptive language but they are then talk about applying standards and principles, thus are in function practical

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<sup>64</sup> Of course, as I have noted in Part II, attention judgments are almost always also intention judgments, though we can recognize situations in which the attention judgment is functionally dominant.

or normative discourse.

The conclusion of any appraisal process can be meaningfully referred to as a verdict, though the use takes on a metaphorical cast insofar as three conditions are absent or only weakly present: (1) an authoritative status of the appraiser(s), (2) a conventional (perhaps ritual) procedure for arriving at a conclusion, and (3) the announced conclusion a performatory utterance. Official judges (of courts, beauty contests, etc.) or groups deliberating in an official judgmental capacity, likely following a prescribed procedure, but definitely seeking to apply established principles and standards of judgment, provide the contexts of our paradigm cases of verdicts.

We can distinguish normative verdicts ("We exonerate him") and descriptive verdicts ("The bridge is unsafe"), but verdictive language, being a species of appraisal language, is always practical discourse: the judgment is for action and based on action-directive norms. Most typically, verdicts are both normative and descriptive pronouncements, functioning, as I noted above, like secondary-value-word pronouncements. Verdicts like "He is guilty" and "We choose X as most qualified" express both (a) a factual conclusion, arrived at by applying fact-establishing criteria in a standard way, and (b)

Paradigm by  
app. process by  
ontology context.

Normative  
descriptive  
practical

a value judgment, i.e. an affirmation of a way of acting (or goal of action) as justified, the conclusion being arrived at by seeking to apply established norms, though the application typically requires considerable use of vindicational procedures as well as validational ones. Thus, like secondary-value-word pronouncements, verdicts presuppose the contextually given conventional principles and standards unless these are challenged. Courts do modify their own standards--especially higher courts modify those of lower courts. Also, the pronouncement "He is guilty but I think what he did was right" is linguistically perfectly acceptable as a rejection of a culture-relative substantive norm of judgment. Thus, verdictive language, like secondary-value-word language, retains its substantive neutrality.

#### 19. Expressatory versus Performatory Valuing

Our attention so far has been given primarily to expressatory valuing, i.e. where a condition of correct use of the valuing assertion is the possession by the using agent of the mental-act ground which is a psychological, or characterological, correlative of the mental act which is semantically expressed. 'X is good' or 'X ought to be done' as value sentences have the function of expressing

valuative judging acts of the issuer. This does not mean, of course, that every instance of use must be an instance of manifestation of the mental-act ground in a psychologically expressive way, but in expressatory valuing the mental act which the sentence claims to express semantically must be at least dispositionally a part of the agent's intentionality at the time of using the value judgment. The derivative forms of value judgment we have talked about--i.e. commendations, predictions of what would be valued after adequate reason-mediation, and descriptions by an agent of his valuations--each also are grounded on expressatory valuations.

But there are also very significant valuative assertions which are not expressatory but performatory. These also might be called "derivative" forms, but in a quite different sense from the derivative forms above. Performatory valuatives, recall, were classified in the Introduction as a sub-class of enstatives.

All performatory sentences are either directives or enstatives, for these are the two classes of sentences in which the saying is the doing and not just the claiming to do. To use a directive sentence is to issue a directive and to use an enstative sentence, under the proper authority and authority-subject conditions, is to accomplish



an enstatement, i.e. establish something in a conventional status which is over and beyond the conventional status any semantic meaning of a sentence has as a consequence of using that sentence; that is, the conventional status achieved by an enstatement sentence is distinct from that of something having been conventionally meant by using a certain sentence. Postulatives establish pronouncements as parts of theories. Exercitives establish things in a (non-semantic) conventional status or persons in a conventional status, e.g. they are used to give a name to something or someone, or a marriage status to some couple, or to establish a person in an official position, etc. A use of a performative valuative establishes a valuation in a conventional way as part of the issued valuations of the user. All performative valuatives appear to be valuations in their context of immediate use, though they may become only valuatives, or even disvaluations, in a subsequent and more comprehensive context.

Just what this "conventional way" is needs clarification. This is more difficult to give for performatory judgments of goodness and badness ("benedictives" and maledictives") than it is for performatory expressions of obligation ("contractual obligations"), so let us start with the latter, though it is considerably the more

complex of the two. Since contractual obligation is to be discussed in some detail later (Section E), I shall only state its most general character at this point.

To be a member of a social organization such as a nation, or political group, or company, or university, or players of a game is to enter into some contractual agreement--this being definitive of the existence of the organization and of membership in it. The contractual agreement is the agreement to abide by the laws or rules in terms of which the group identity and unity are defined. Obligation, it was stated earlier in the study, generally is constraint to accepted principles, whatever the nature of the constraint. Contractual obligation is constraint to the rules of a social contract which one has entered into. The constraint may be "moral" in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. constraint of an individual by his own motivation to hold to his rationally developed principles accepted for their intrinsic value, or it may be purely prudential, e.g. to be in some situations is to be taken to be under the contractual agreements of groups involved and not to abide by these "agreements" is to risk punishment by the members of the contract agency or their delegated enforcement authorities. For example, simply to be in a country is to be subject to the laws of the country. To attend a

meeting of a group is very commonly to be taken by the membership as subject to the laws of the group during this attendance. To join a game is to be subject to its rules while playing, etc.

The nature of authoritative agency in such contract agencies has already been discussed to some extent in considering the concept of participatory agency and will be developed further in subsequent sections. What we want to take note of here is that to come under a contract agency is to conventionally be subject to the rules of the agency as obligations. Characteristically these contract-rules make certain utterances, which outside the contract would be expressatory valuations, into performatory valuations: to utter valuation sentence  $V_1$  in a delimitable range of conditions is to be taken by the group as having made valuation  $V_1$  in a way revokable only under conditions established by the rules of the group. To say "I choose" is in many contexts to have chosen. To say "I promise.." is to have taken on the contract obligation to do what the promiser said he resolved to do. Etc.

The very important social functions performed by such performatory obligations are obvious. They play absolutely vital roles in all kinds of social action. The sense in which such an obligation has existence conventionally by

creating group expectations and by serving as a ground of group-sanctioned action is clear enough.

But the significance (i.e. functions) of benedictives and maledictives is more elusive. These are the "valuations" which have been sometimes described by philosophers as "conventional expressions of attitudes," e.g. performatory uses of "I congratulate you, " "I apologize,..," "We welcome you, " "We endorse...," "We condemn...," and "We protest...". Insofar as such sentences are taken as presenting expressives their significance is, I think, clear and easily explicated on the patterns of value-judgment analysis given above. But what is their significance as performatives only, i.e. where they are taken to stand as "valuations" of the issuing agent regardless of whether there is a supporting mental-act ground such as is required for their correct expressatory use? As Austin has very forcefully made us aware, to say one apologizes is to have done so by the saying. To say is to do. It is logically odd to acknowledge hearing someone say the words and then to ask "But did he really apologize?"; that is, unless the questioner means: "But did he, in addition to apologizing, really feel apologetic?" In analogous ways, to say one welcomes is to welcome, and (it seems) to say one protests is to protest. Etc.

Such utterances are valuations in some sense, for they have equivalent formulations with primary value words. To say "I apologize for doing X" is to say "My doing of X was wrong." To say "I warn you about doing Y" is to say "Doing Y would be bad for you to do." To say "I congratulate you on your doing Z" is to say "Your doing Z was a good (praiseworthy) thing to do." To say "I welcome you" is to say "It is good that you are here."

But what is the significance of these sentences as valuations and how are they logically related to their correlative expressatory forms? What is it to have expressed an attitude conventionally? If we describe this as an instance of conventionally appearing to express an attitude we shall have to go on to say that the "appearing to express an attitude" is what itself constitutes the semantic significance. There logically cannot be deception, for the appearance is the meaning. But what then is the significance of such an appearance-judgment.

This would seem to be to ask, what is, or are, the perlocutionary uses or functions, for the semantic function of the sentence is to express the appearance-judgment. I think we shall have to say that there is no one use in this sense, though we may note that ceremonial uses with the object of inducing a certain mood among person(s)

*Expressive attitudes.*

addressed underlie many (perhaps most) performatory valuations of this kind. In addition to the playing of the band, there is the Mayor's greeting--similar functions. A Mayor's official welcome <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ opening conventions and <sup>to</sup> visiting dignitaries serves the function of inducing a sense of warm and active camaraderie among those addressed; thus the Mayor's actual feelings are relatively irrelevant to the perlocutionary use and totally irrelevant to the judgment of the linguistic correctness of the use. It is only required that he should sound sincere--though deception is not the point.

A personal congratulation may serve a similar function, or it may, instead or in addition, have some more devious personal perlocutionary significance, e.g. the issuer desires to secure the favor of the person addressed. Clearly, at least part of the value of this kind of perlocutionary use derives from the ambiguity in context as to whether the pronouncement is not also expressatory.

The relationship between performatory and expressatory is particularly close with sentences such as "We endorse...", "We condemn...", and "We protest...". These seem to fit basic performatory criteria, in that to say is, it seems, to do. The performatory-use signifying word 'hereby' is employed naturally enough in each case. But I am not

sure I understand what a "conventional appearance-judgment" means in these cases. Suppose someone says "I endorse..." not really wanting to endorse, or says "I condemn.." or "I protest..." not wanting to do these activities. The perlocutionary significance of appearance-judgments in these cases is not hard to detect, especially where the issuer has some official status which enhances the effect on his hearers of the pronouncement. And it is easy enough to say that the semantic significance is the appearance-judgment of endorsement, condemnation, or protest, but I am much less sure I grasp a content of meaning here. What is it conventionally--as contrasted with causally or behaviorally--to make an appearance-judgment in these cases? I think I know what it means to make an appearance judgment of welcome or congratulations (though I have my doubts even here), but what is asserted in performatory endorsement, condemnation, protest?

Some critics will say here, I suspect: "This is what comes of looking for meanings rather than uses. These sentences have clear uses, as you have recognized." Yes. Clear perlocutionary uses. But if I were clear about the conventional (semantic, illocutionary) use, I could give the meaning--so that objection fails to strike home. Shall we take some Austinian holy water and pass

*old totally  
perlocutionary*

on to more significant problems? One parting shot. We seem to have an antinomy: to say one endorses, condemns, protests, seems in some sense to be the doing of these acts in the saying however the sayer feels; but, on the other hand, is it meaningful to speak of a conventional-appearance-judgment in these cases, one which has no grounding in expressatory meaning? Perhaps--and this is the parting shot--we shall simply have to say that the meaning of such uses cannot be explicated for there is no clear meaning: such pronouncements involve an endemic incoherence at the level of precise specification--the problem here being somewhat like that Heisenberg noted about the attempts to delineate precisely the properties of sub-atomic particles in process. Such sentences, we shall have to say derive their perlocutionary uses from their appearing to be both performatory and expressatory, though they hang inexplicably between these two functional concepts. But it is only in relationship to the meaning ambiguities that there can be perlocutionary uses. If this is so, there would appear to be only a Pyrrhic victory here for the let's-have-no-meaning-nonsense ordinary languagers.



## D. THE VALUING SELF

20. The Choosing Self

Plato and Aristotle's basic bifurcation of the distinctively mental functions of the self into the reasoning (intuiting, ordering, calculating) functions and the desiring (motivational) functions remains, I think, central in any conceptual understanding of the nature of a self. Also their recognition of the value of political models for understanding the functional organization of the self is, I think, a procedure we do well to follow. Reason-mediated desire of a self is manifested in a diversity of, often conflicting, goal-directed and principle-committed strivings of the self, and effective action for value achievement demands that there be that part of the self which speaks as authority for the whole or the basic self: this I shall call the choosing (deciding, affirming) self. We noted in analyzing intentionality in Part II that the directive in an intention must be an ordering directive, a command or prescription; it cannot be a commendation or request, for then

we would not have a choosing, i.e. an accepting of a directive. Authority function in the self is logically required for purposive action.

What is the self that chooses? If it is not to be identified with some basic organization of reason-mediated desire plus associated volitional capacity, then this, I think, must constitute the basic schema of whatever else is to be included in the notion of the essential self. We must keep in mind that a desire has been defined as an intentionality minus only the volitional component, and thus it includes both intention and cognitive and valuative attentions. Consequently, to talk of the choosing self as an organization of desire plus volitional capacity is to include dispositions as well as cognitive and valuative states of consciousness. The self is an intention-attention complex, composed of more specific intention-attention complexes--or, as a possible alternative, the self is these plus some "more" that is schematized by these. I shall give attention later to the question of what arguments there could be for a "more" here, but I shall speak as though the choosing self could be identified with a basic organization of desire plus volitional

capacity until and unless this description is shown to be inadequate.

How are we to designate this basic organization of desire? Generally, we can say, I think, that it is composed of the fundamental actual desires of the self, meaning those desires which as a matter of fact establish basic goals of action for the self, and which in normal deliberative situations are basic determining factors of actions made by the self. There are several factors here that need more clarification, and I shall now undertake to give this, at least in the measure commensurate with the purposes of the study.

Let me note first, that what I am calling "the choosing self" is what Gordon Allport calls "the proprium self,"<sup>65</sup> what the classical Greeks called "the spirited part of the self" ("thymos"), and what I think Samuel Butler had in mind in his reference to the "magisterial and architectonic desires."<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Samuel Butler, "Dissertation II: Of the nature of Virtue," British Moralists, Vol. I, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (New-York, 1965), Dover Books, pp. 245-254.

There is a long popular and philosophical tradition of identifying <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ concept with conscience (cf. B. Mayo Ethics and The Moral Life, pp. 169-172), but this is a misleading usage, for 'conscience' has also been popularly and philosophically used in other ways--which I will in due time note. Aristotle's definition of the self as a source of directed effort, an originating (mental) cause, is, I think, a very good description of what I am calling the choosing self, for it encompasses the motivation which sets the fundamental goals of action of the self and the correlative volition. That fundamental part of Hume's analysis of personal identify which finds this to be established by the basic and characteristic principles of action of the self known both through classifications of behavior and associated states of consciousness also accords well with what I understand by the choosing self. Marcel's distinction between the desires and associated consciousness which constitute one's "being" versus the desires and consciousness which are what the self "has" (i.e. possesses

as contingent parts) is excellently fitting,<sup>66</sup> as is Henry Bugbee's distinction between "commitments" and "decisions": as Bugbee uses these terms, commitments are choices directly springing from and affecting that part of our valuing and conceiving with which we identify our personal being, whereas decisions concern more peripheral and contingent parts of our sense of selfhood.<sup>67</sup>

#### 21. Rational Commitment and the Choosing Self

The commitments which constitute a choosing self ideally include a developed commitment to the ideal of rationality, but the problems philosophers generally find with Kant's ethics amply illustrate, I believe, that the choosing self cannot be identified with its commitment to

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<sup>66</sup>Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katherine Farrer (Glasgow, 1949).

<sup>67</sup>Henry Bugbee, The Inward Morning (New-York, 1961) Collier Books, p. 75.

rationality. This latter is, I argued in III-A, a commitment to the vindicational norm and thus the commitment to make those validational commitments which are established by practically maximal employments of vindicational procedures. But the commitment to rationality is, strictly speaking, only the commitment to the vindicational norm itself--entailing, of course, the apriori derivative norms of consistency. Strictly speaking, one's rational being includes only the desire which is this vindicational commitment.

However, following Aristotle's lead, we can also speak of "rational being" in a much broader sense: i.e. take it to include all of the self that is developed and controlled by the (strictly conceived) rational commitment. In this broadened sense, the rational being of a self includes all reason-controlled and shaped desire plus all reason controlled and shaped truth claims. When the word 'moral' is used in the very unordinary way adopted by Aristotle's translators to describe reason-shaped desire, and thus a self insofar as its desires are reason shaped, we can describe the rational being of the self as composed of its moral being (or virtues) plus its intellectual being (or virtues). Since I am using the word 'moral' in a very different way--one which seems more fitting with common popular and philosophical use, i.e. in

*complete with Rational*

which moral being consists of one's other-regarding commitments--the relationship of rational being and moral being are here analysed in a different way.

We noted in Part II, and again in III-A, that a self must make some commitment to the ideal of rationality to function as a human mind, but through-and-through commitment is not a part of the concept of a self (of mental activity) and in fact has to be justified as a substantive (i.e. not formally establishable) commitment. Thus, a choosing self only to a degree necessarily includes rational being (strict sense) as a part. Of course, the rational ideal is for rational commitment to be total in the self and for this to lead to rational being in the broader sense.

The rational commitment in the self functions as "the impartial spectator," providing the motivation to consider all the facts and all the possible ways of responding to the facts one can before deciding. But the rational commitment is itself uncommitted: its passion is cool, dispassionate (detached) "objective" appraisal. Thus, as Findlay notes (without commenting on the paradox), the passion of pure reason seems to press toward the arbitrary "acte gratuit,"

the commitment made in awareness of all there is to be aware of but without an intrinsic ground for any specific commitment.<sup>68</sup> Iris Murdoch takes Stuart Hampshire's analysis of the rational will (rational intentionality) to lead to such a paradox of "the movement of the enlightened but empty will."<sup>69</sup>

This "paradox" is really no paradox at all (as Miss Murdoch notes, though I think her criticism of Hampshire on this point is mistaken, as I shall seek to show later). We arrive at a paradox here only if we set out with contradictory concepts. The very idea of rational commitment is to the norm for determining commitments, but no substantive commitment follows from that commitment to the norm of reason. The vindicational procedures can lead to validational norms only when applied as procedures for shaping passions (desires) from within the perspective of passion itself. Goals of passion emerging from the interaction of

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<sup>68</sup>Findlay, Values, and Intentions, pp. 204, 218-219.

<sup>69</sup>Murdoch "Idea of Perfection," pp.346-8, 371-2.



passion, knowledge, and vindicational procedures are our "derivation" of validational norms--our substantive values. Of course, Aristotle said this--it is clearly a fundamental theme of the Nicomachean Ethics--and Hume said it very forcefully ("reason is and must be the slave of the passions") for a later audience, but we each must discover it in the idioms to which our era-conditioned understandings are most responsive.

The pure rational will (commitment) is passionately dispassionate (i.e. pressing for fulfilled awareness before commitment) but it cannot provide the commitment for which it prepares. Only the substantive desirings which emerge as basic in the vindicational process can provide the "matter," the specific intentionality, of our substantive valuations. Thus, as Miss Murdoch notes, the ethically free will's response--"arbitrary" response of the maximally reason-mediated will--is a response of obedience, i.e. obedience to the directiveness that emerges in the vindicational process.<sup>70</sup> In Aristotle's words, we do not choose this response--this nisus that ressurects from vindicational baptism--we can only hope to rightly wish it: which is to say, to wish with a wish

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<sup>70</sup>Murdoch, "Idea of Perfection," p.376.

that would not be altered by a more vindicationally complete wishing.

The choosing self, thus, is made up of (a) the rational commitment--to whatever degree made--plus (b) the substantive commitments that emerge as hierarchically basic in the vindicational process.

There are at least three directions it would be rational for our dialectic to move in at this point: (1) to the essentialism issue--the question of the possible sources and natures of the directiveness that emerges out of vindicational processes--or (2) to the codification issue--the question of to what extent vindicational procedures should result in established sets of validational norms--or (3) to incontinence and akrasia issues--the questions that arise as to what is involved conceptually when one speaks of determining commitments as not coincident with ruling commitments. Let us consider first the last topic and then [ we will take up the other two together.

*I seem to like  
 or (1) = w (w/w)  
 follow action (w/w)*

22. The Choosing Self as Basic Ratiocinative  
Desire or Desiderative Reason

We noted in the previous section (and earlier in III-A) that rational commitment, in the strict sense, does not directly establish any end of action other than the ideal of establishing ends by enlightened choice. All substantive ends of action are rationally established by using vindicational procedures as fully as is practicable. Thus, we have a distinction between "cool reason" itself--which is uncommitted except to a norm for determining commitments--and rationalized substantive desire, which determines a way of life and may be experienced with "warm" passion. In the following section, as I have noted, we will consider the essentialism-existentialism issue in regard to the determination of reason <sup>mediated</sup> desire in man, or particular persons, to the extent that is relevant to a conceptual analysis. In this section we will pursue further the role of reason-shaped substantive desire in constituting an essential self, i.e. a choosing self.

The motivation of the choosing self must be manifestations of habits, for conative responses occur only as parts of intentionality and the notion of a goal-setting intentionality which was not the manifestation of an es-

tablished disposition in responses would not make sense. "Active reasoning" we have seen does not establish goals, and pro and con feelings are supervenient upon established dispositional tendencies, and the range of volitional capacity cannot exceed the range of dispositions made active in the situation of acting. Thus habits are necessary bases of actions.

Other roles of the habits basic to the choosing self can be distinguished: they not only make action possible, but rational action, for in the situation of choice there is often not time for much actual reasoning; habits manifest the funded rationality of the self at the time of acting. But they do more than provide this kind of "rational inertia" in the choosing self. Habit development also creates the self's capacities for valuative response, for these capabilities are functions of the self's set of developed habits. Edmund Burke, Henri Bergson, and T. S. Eliot have notably discussed this creative function of habit development:<sup>71</sup> I have already suggested that it is an important aspect of Aristotle's ethic,<sup>12</sup> ~~though not ex-~~

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<sup>71</sup> Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York, 1960) Gateway Books; Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 43-44; T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," The Norton Anthology, Vol. II, pp. 1501-1508.

~~explicitly discussed.~~<sup>72</sup> For example, for Eliot the "primitive terror" is man denuded of the structure of intricately wrought dispositions--i.e. developed sensitivities--writ into his nerve system as propensities for richly differentiated modes of feeling response.<sup>73</sup> This is the priceless corpus of inheritable tradition or culture; that man can immerse himself in this higher cultural "dance" is what makes the more profound and enriching human experiences achievable. In the character of his developed habits man creates himself, i.e. his higher emotive response propensities.

Habit, by thus creating emotive response propensities, creates normative reality, which in turn modifies and prompts further development of emotional sensitivities. These two factors of creation and response are well illustrated, though unduly set apart from one another in the following passage from Bergson's Two Sources of Morality and Religion:

We must distinguish between two kinds of emotion, two varieties of feeling, two manifestations of sensibility which have this one feature in common, that they are emotional

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<sup>72</sup>Cf. Part III, Sec. 8. In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics cf. especially Bk. VI, ch. 12 and 13.

<sup>73</sup>T. S. Eliot "Tradition and the Individual Talent" and "The Four Quartets."

*Added  
more references  
1/17*

states distinct from sensation, and cannot be reduced, like the latter, to the psychical transposition of a physical stimulus. In the first case the emotion is the consequence of an idea, or of a mental picture; the "feeling" is indeed the result of an intellectual state which owes nothing to it, which is self-sufficient, and which, if it does experience a certain reaction from the feeling, loses more than it gains. It is the stirring of sensibility by a representation, as it were, dropped into it. But the other kind of emotion is not produced by a representation which it follows and from which it remains distinct. Rather is it, in relation to the intellectual states which are to supervene, a cause and not an effect; it is pregnant with representations, not one of which is actually formed, but which it draws or might draw from its own substance by an organic development. The first is infra-intellectual; that is the one with which the psychologist is generally concerned, and it is this we have in mind when we contrast sensibility with intelligence, and when we make of emotions a vague reflection of the representation. But of the other we should be inclined to say that it is supra-intellectual, if the word did not immediately and exclusively evoke the idea of superiority of value; it is just as much a question of priority in time, and of the relation between that which generates and that which is generated. Indeed, the second kind of emotion can alone be productive of ideas.<sup>74</sup>

Clearly the first kind is what Coleridge meant by "fancy" and the second by "secondary imagination."<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 43-44.

<sup>75</sup> S. T. Coleridge, "Biographia Literaria," The Norton Anthology, Vol. II, p. 239.

Thus the character of the choosing self (the proprium self, the essential self) is the character of the habits embodying it: as a set of basic desires (commitments to principles), as a body of valuative dispositions, and as a center of creative action (including self-creative action). This body of intentionality is the choosing self.

### 23'. Two Basic Problems in Achieving

#### A Rationally Developed Self

There are two basic problems in achieving a rationally developed self--problems of practical wisdom--each with sub-problems:

#### I. Problem of Adequate Wisdom:

Problem of achieving "right principles" of action, i.e. vindicationally well-founded principles.

##### A. Problem of Knowledge Development:

1. Scientific Knowledge
2. Calculative Knowledge  
Knowledge of human goals-means relationships.

##### B. Problem of Imagination Development:

1. Primary Imagination and Fancy (Coleridge)
2. Secondary Imagination (Coleridge)

*Max  
Appelstein  
is needed*

II. Problem of Adequate Passion (Thymos) Adequately Aligned With Wisdom:

A. Problem of Thymos Development

B. Problem of Rightly Dispositioned Thymos

#I is the problem of achieving "right principles" of action, as Aristotle calls it. It includes, as noted, achievement both of adequate knowledge and of adequate development of the imagination. Both scientific knowledge and knowledge of possible ways of life that can become ideals of character development depend very heavily upon adequate development of the imagination. Scientific knowledge is especially important to the development of what Coleridge calls "primary imagination" and "fancy," which determine one's capability to conceive fully of alternative ways of action--thus ways of life--and their achievability. The "secondary imagination" is the emotion-creating, -unifying, -infusing capability of the self: it builds upon but goes beyond primary imagination and fancy in shaping experience in creative ways and establishing the emotive significance of these ways. "It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate:...it struggles to idealize and unify. It is essentially vital...."<sup>76</sup> It

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<sup>76</sup> Coleridge, "Biographia Literaria," The Norton Anthology, Vol. II, Ch. 8, p. 239.



is the Platonic-Nietzschean ultimate shaping principle of art (measure) in action.<sup>77</sup>

#II is the problem of right desire, or feeling, which, as Aristotle notes, must be wedded to right principle to achieve the good life. Plato and Aristotle both note that this is a twofold problem: the problem of adequate passion or spirit (thymos) and the problem of shaping this adequately under the rational ideal.

While #I may be called the problem of wisdom in the Aristotelian sense (note how it is more than simply the achievement of knowledge), the second is the problem of prudence, continence, the avoidance of akrasia. Aristotle argues (and I have already expressed my strong affirmation of this point) that, in regard to achievement of rational character, which in action is the good life, and wisdom + prudence are in a mutual dependency relationship: wisdom or "right principles" is a projection from achieved emotive self (thymos), and prudence is character shaped by the principles one accepts as ideal. Thus, ideal and

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<sup>77</sup> In Plato's dialogues cf. last pages of the Phaedrus. For the role of art in Nietzsche's thought cf. The Will To Power, trans. W. Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, 1968), Vintage Books, pp. 68-79; also "The Gay Science," The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. W. Kaufman (New York, 1964), pp. 98-99.

*Phaedrus?*

shaped emotive self are in a mutual feedback relationship which establishes the creative order of their rational development.<sup>78</sup>

The ideal of desire shaped by reason does not imply as the practical ideal a state of character in which all conflicting desires are eliminated from the motivation system of the self. If knowledge of right principles is uncertain and right principles themselves constantly in a process of evolution, it would appear a more rational state of character for an individual to retain at least some reserve of reason-rejected desires (motivations) at the reason-controlled state of valuatives rather than valuations to provide a healthy milieu of challenge to any set of desires which at a particular time are reason-sanctioned. The notion that in the reason-controlled character desires conflicting with reason are speedily rooted out, is grossly unrational; such a "rooting out" would not only take away an invaluable "checks and balances" system in appraising rational desire, but would also stultify the emotional development of the self.

This latter point can be expressed either in Whiteheadian

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78 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 12 and 13.

*system that the reason  
 interpretation of Aristotle  
 that reason requires more  
 of Aristotle  
 Aristotle  
 who is from  
 Power Res.*

or Nietzschean terms: the first when we consider conflicting desires as possible matter for a future more adequate synthesis of the passional self; and the latter when we consider conflicting desires as providing a psychologically needed sense of contrast or polarity within the self in terms of which the struggle for self-discipline, self-shaping, becomes itself a passion-intensifying value experience.<sup>79</sup>

#### 24. Hierarchy in the Desiderative Self

Basic desires of the self I have taken to be those which as a matter of fact establish the basic goals and principles of action of the self. Those goals and principles are basic which establish the general direction and the activity of the self. The basic principles and goals need not be <sup>the</sup> strongest desires, or specifically directed. Typically, as philosophers have occasionally noted, we are more strongly committed to derivative values than to logically basic ones. This is not necessarily irrational; it is not irrational if the basic goals are

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<sup>79</sup> Quite relevant to the issues here is Kant's distinction between a "rational will" and a "holy will": cf. his Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. L. W. Beck (Chicago, 1949), pp. 73, 189ff. *I am assuming that for man there are definite advantages — as well as disadvantages — to the former.*

*Model,  
for example.*

arrived at as organizing and unifying generalizations from a set of practically more specifically applicable principles. For example, it is not necessarily irrational that attachment to the principle to seek the general good, or to act with an other-regarding concern, is much less intense--as a direct passional commitment--than attachment to specific principles of justice and benevolence. The body of specific commitments establish the ruling and determining commitment to the logically basic principle.

A ruling commitment is a desire which as a matter of fact is explicitly accepted by the self as a part of the self's valuations, and which in normal circumstances generally determine the actions of the self. A determining desire is a desire in the role of actually determining acts, i.e. providing the motivating factor which gives direction to the occurrent volition in the situation.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Paul Taylor refers to directives manifested in the two orders of desires as "standards of precedence" and "standards of strength" respectively; cf. his Normative Discourse, pp. 319-320. R. M. Hare refers to ruling commitments as "decisions of principle": The Language of Morals, Ch. 4. Findlay refers to ruling desires as "cool whole minded desires" and tends to refer to determining desires by contrast as the "warm passions." This is a misleading use, I think. In addition his analysis becomes confusing (and I suspect confused) when he runs together with this use of 'cool' and 'warm' another, namely, 'cool' taken to refer to the rational commitment itself

In the ideal rational self all determining desires are ruling desires, and all ruling desires are developed under maximal enlightenment. In this state there is ideal con-  
ation, i.e. all pro, neutral, and con responses are those a fully rational self would develop, and ideal normative  
reality, i.e. reality as the fully developed rational self would experience it. Though unachievable, these are essential concepts for assessing rational development in a self.

When does a ruling commitment lose its status as such because it is not reflected in the individual's actions, i.e. its role as a determining desire is too weak? The answer from the logic of ordinary usage here appears quite indeterminate and vague. Generally, it would seem to be: ruling desires and determining desires should coincide in the situation of rational choice. Thus the fact of an individual's having a ruling commitment is not seriously challenged by contrary behavior where he can show that there were factors limiting his normal ethical freedom, such as (a) unusual emotional stimulation, or (b) pressure to choose quickly which caused the individual

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(the desire for rational action) and 'warm' to reason-shaped substantive desire. Cf. Values and Intentions contrasting pp. 166-175 with 179-189.

not to contemplatively consider, and thus bring to bear, all the relevant parts of his hierarchical structure of motivations.

But what about a strongly developed habit or addiction that the individual regularly allows to be a determining desire though he opposes it in his verbal accounts of his ruling commitments? Let us consider the following as the range of plausible answers to this question:

- (1) He says he has certain values but his behavior belies this. Actions speak louder than words.
- (2) He is in conflict in his value system. (There must be some considerable struggle in deliberation for this description to be justified.)
- (3) His real values are those decisions he arrives at in contemplative, non-pressured moments. He has good intentions, but he is terribly weak-willed. Thus, once the problem of insincerity is ruled out, we must say he has the values he says stem from these most reasoned decisions, even though he is weak-willed, not able to live by his rational commitments.

In regard to the last alternative, is it meaningful to say one has made a commitment where there is no supporting behavior other than the verbal statement? If one's philosophy of mind allows meaningful reference to private decisional acts (as that developed in the present study does), then one has much greater scope to speak of akrasia

here. However, I think we can rule out the notion that there can be a choice that does not determine action or even struggle behavior; one who claims values unsupported by behavior other than verbal assertions is not manifesting the logical conditions that must hold for a valiative to be a valuation. By the very definition of value a conative intentionality is a value only when it is a part of the intentionality rationally sanctioned by the individual. Such rational sanction means some rational control of behavior. Not finding this, we say the person is not being honest, possibly even with himself. Simply

to say and to feel that one has chosen (expressatory choice) is not to choose. The volitional act logically

must have a schema (cf. II-C). There must be supportive behavior <sup>manifested at least in the agent's more fully reason-mediated actions.</sup> which tends to be most manifest in the more rational moments of action. Therefore the purely private <sup>motion of a</sup> ~~decision~~ choice without supportive behavior cannot be accepted.

I know what I have really decided in some measure by observing how I try (certain behavior) to implement principles. Both the (a) experience of decisional intentionality and (b) the observation of oneself as tending to behave in certain ways are necessary identifying criteria of a choice. But neither is sufficient without the other.

Consider again the three possibilities of interpretation listed above where ruling commitment and determining desire are divergent. Where private decisional acts are allowed, #(1) becomes vague and insufficient. Some behavior successfully undercuts verbal assertion, other behavior does not, for, as #(2) recognizes, values can be in conflict and still be existent values of a self. But #(3) is too strong. Sincere affirmation can still be only verbal, i.e. not indicative of the individual's actual values. The logical conditions of a valuative being a valuation requires that there be supporting behavior. But note that this behavioral condition is not a denial of private decisional acts.

This still leaves vague how much supporting behavior is needed for one to say of an individual that he really has value  $V_1$  though he is weak-willed and often does not act on the value. But this is perhaps not itself a conceptual issue but rather one to be settled within a specific substantive ethic. However, we can say this very general sort of thing: If there is no significant supportive behavior in situations where there is time for rational deliberation we can logically say that the individual does not have the value he says he has; however,



this judgment does not imply insincerity--the individual just does not fulfill the logical conditions for a valuation, which require that a valuative be supported by a deliberative reasoning process, which logically implies that action, or at least struggle behavior, will be prompted by that process. In an analogous way one logically cannot consistently deny values which are strongly supported by behavior in situations allowing rational deliberation without showing how the behavior in question is generally consistent with the claim made that it actually manifests a different kind of intentionality.

25. Subjectivity and "Universals" in the Rational Determination of Value

Valuative attentions are experiences of intrinsic value and disvalue. They constitute or determine the ultimate goal of valuating activity, which is to maximize the quantity and quality of pro attentions and minimize corresponding con attentions. To simplify the following discussion, let us concern ourselves only with valuative pro attentions, recognizing that the discussion indicates that appropriately reversed things can be said about valuative con attentions.

The standard for grading qualities of pro attentions is, of course, enlightened preference, i.e. vindicational procedure. Essentialistic theories become relevant to the determination of value through causal theses about the conditions under which a person will achieve rationally preferable valuative attention activity. ~~That something is a natural property of man, or an individual,~~ <sup>If</sup> a state of enlightened choice leads <sup>or</sup> ~~the~~ individual to reject <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ propensity as a basis of valuative attention experiences, ~~then~~ the propensity has only a con valuative status, <sup>no</sup> matter how "basic" the propensity is in the individual's motivational system. Of course, there is a factual limit to this possibility of rejection of an essentialistic character of one's given motivational structure: there comes a point where the centrality and basicness of the propensity makes it factually the case that it will function as the motivating ground of the agent's reason<sup>ed</sup> choices, no matter what its consequences for other possibilities of value experience. But it is logically and factually possible to rationally reject as bases of valuation experiences very fundamental propensities of "one's nature" in order that other given and developed propensities will be able to thrive as foundations of value experiences.

As I noted earlier in the study, it is very questionable that it makes sense logically or existentially to contend that man has no given propensities over and beyond those directed toward physical gratification. Can there be developed propensities which do not have some function as means of manifesting natural propensities? Could man have any gratifications of the higher mental faculties (J. S. Mills' phrase to refer to the gratifications of understanding, of achievements in human community, e.g. love, friendship, humanitarian feeling, and of aesthetic experiences) if there were not some "givenness" in human nature which may develop propensities of these types particularly rewarding in the character of the valuative attentions which they brought about? I agree with Aristotle that this does not seem causally possible.<sup>81</sup> But in accepting the above described "Greek trinity" of human essences, let us note that they are so general in character that they rule out practically nothing in the order of specific ways of life, but let us grant that Aristotle's attempt to make noetic contemplative experience the highest of human value experiences is manifestly unjustified

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<sup>81</sup> Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. 3.

as a universal claim about human nature. Let us grant further that rather than restricting human freedom for self-creative activity, the "Greek trinity" provide the motivational ground that makes that creativity richly possible. Were it not the case that it is the character of human beings with developed sensitivities to derive their higher orders of valuative attention experiences from understanding, human community, and aesthetic experience, the higher forms of human life as we know them would not be possible. The motivational ennui of Sartre's protagonist Roquentien in his novel Nausea suggests the dirth of value experience possibilities that would lie in a human nature "free" of any givenness of propensities towards the higher order gratifications of the mental faculties. This is, of course, not to say that we can argue for equal endowments of these given propensities: individual human beings may have very weak capabilities for developing in some one or more of these three dimensions of higher human value, or even be totally lacking in some one or more of these. What I have said is, I think, quite compatible with almost any of the theories about the basic harmonies or disharmonies in human motivations. It points only to the conceptual presuppositions of what have quite universally been recognized as the higher

orders of value experience.

What are we to say of the Kierkegaardian thesis that in valuation responses the ethical as universal is of necessity transcended in the particular valuational affirmation?<sup>82</sup> From a logic-of-valuation point of view Kierkegaard's position seems a mixture of tautologies, or near tautologies, and conceptual unclarities. One can, I think, make sense of what he says about the valuational act of faith as an individual act "unmediated" by universals (ethical principles), but he seems to be wanting to say

more than he logically can. *Let me see if I can clarify what I mean here.*

It is a part of the very logic of vindicational procedures that there must be a particular response of will in every rational agent's subjectivity which is logically prior to basic ethical principles for it is required for the commitment to a principle. Thus, logically there must be the "unmediated" subjective response at the motivational foundation of every rationally articulated value experience, for validational norms are all derivative from vindicational procedures.

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<sup>82</sup> Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), p. 82; cf. also his chapter "Truth is Subjectivity" in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. F. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), pp. 537-544.

*Don't make this statement without clarification!*

Logically, the basic ethical-principle creating acts, i.e. vindicational responses, are necessarily particular acts not totally mediated by established norms, which is to say not derivative from established norms. The act of accepting the vindication norm would appear to be the only norm-choice that can be completely unmediated by other norms, i.e. is totally self-vindicating. But even this act is not "unmediated by universals" in any absolute or total sense if the analysis of preceding paragraphs is correct. We have noted that a particular act must derive its directiveness, at least in a very general way, from the given propensities of human nature as modified by knowledge and prior valuation at the time of choice. The "universals"--i.e. law-like motivational propensities--manifested in these goal-establishing choices certainly factually mediate the choices.

Let us consider that the necessarily given propensity is singular, though probably it is plural, and let us assume maximum ethical freedom of the agent in expressing it in basic norm-establishing choices so that the "mediation" is reduced to a logical minimum. It would seem that the norm chosen can be more specific in nature than the factually mediating directive. Perhaps it can only be more specific because there are several such propensities

present which make any norm-choice more specific than any particular propensity yet completely determined by the propensities as a group. Or perhaps there can be genuinely creative, or originaive choice, within the framework of a given general propensity. I do not see a clear-cut logical or factual basis for deciding between these alternative possibilities, though I am aware of the "sufficient cause" requirement arguments for the first alternative.

Whatever answer one arrives at in regard to this alternation, it remains true that at the level of conscious vindicational choice, from the perspective of the chooser, the promptive grounds do not, from the standpoint of his mental causality, logically determine the principle he chooses. Furthermore, when he seeks to make a general principle more specific through adopting a range of more specific norms, it is more the exception than the rule that the relationship between the more universal and the more specific principle is deductive or established by scientific induction plus accepted norms. Rather, general ethical principles achieve specificity through repeated applications of vindicational procedures within the framework of a body of accepted general norms and knowledge claims.

The points made in the last two paragraphs help clarify, I think, what is logically involved when we speak-- as has been done in this study--of norms as established by subjective choice. Subjective choice is never totally "unmediated by universals." It is always to some extent mediated in the sense of being prompted by given propensities of the agent, and there are always norm mediators involved--though it remains an open question whether these two, or the first alone, provide a complete mediation such as to deny the subjective choice in a character of genuine originativeness or creativity.

The logical nature of the very ancient ethical position which in current talk is referred to as a "situation ethic" can be illumined, I think, by use of the above distinctions. A "situation ethic" appears to be defined as one in which value distinctions are determined by the enlightened response of the individual in the situation of choice. This does not imply a basic relativism of values; in fact the most prominent contemporary exponents of the ethic, such as Joseph Fletcher,<sup>83</sup> have argued that it is <sup>the</sup> way of applying most effectively the basic Christian in-

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<sup>83</sup> Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, 1966).



junction for man to live out of love. The assumption here is that of St. Paul: If man accepts the principle of love as one's basic motivational propensity (for Paul this can become man's basic motivational principle only upon man's being "reborn" in the mystical Body of Christ, the Pauline logos), then the principle will be more fully and accurately acted upon if one decides in each situation what is the action that maximally fulfills the principle than if the agent seeks to set up a code of implementing abstract principles. Whether this is true depends upon a number of factors, perhaps chief among them being the enlightenment of the individual choosers, the rationality of the code being supplanted, and the complexity of situations in which choice must be made. "Situation ethics" does have this logical feature of rational norm-establishing procedures in its favor: Seldom can we determine that any given norm is a total or totally faithful norm-manifestation of a given propensity or that it is totally and faithfully an implementation of a more basic norm. Thus a number of sets of ethical laws (codes) are compatible--at least from the standpoint of achievable knowledge--with any assumed propensity or basic norm. Consequently, it would seem to be a methodological dictate of the rational ideal never to take any codified ethic as

final. There is a methodological naivete in doing so. From the standpoint of rational choice, rational subjectivity can never be completely mirrored in any specific code of ethical laws. Note that this is so even if we do not consider the factor of genuinely creative choice, but it becomes radically more the case if we do admit genuine creativity in choice.

Thus, it is a dictate of the norm of rationality that ethical subjectivity remains in some measure "unmediated by universals," i.e. (a) not totally explainable in terms of any cognitive analysis of motivational propensities, and (b) not totally committed to, or manifested in, any set of ethical principles. Of course this is not to say (a) that some scientific explication of the relationship between existent motivational grounds in choice may not be acceptable as a good explanation, or (b) that there cannot be <sup>a relatively</sup> an adequate code ethic, but historically, considering the complexity of human motivational propensities and the complexity of the human situations an ethic must serve <sup>then</sup> (consider <sup>the</sup> the intricate evolutions in culture and human responsiveness), code ethics generally stand out as very schematic and incomplete, or, if developed in great specificity as fixations of logically and ethically

undeveloped individuals and institutions. All too often such codes become tragic impedimenta to the development of rational value-consciousness and rational personal and social value practices. The rigid code ethics characteristic of the more orthodox and fundamental religious institutions are notable illustrations of this.

How much these conclusions about code ethics add up to an indictment of philosophical intuitionist and strictly deontological analyses of ethical judgments I find difficult to appraise. There is no simple incompatibility that the intuitionist or deontologist cannot with ingenuity avoid, but the general platonic character (i.e. assumption that there is a complete code of goodness in some conceptual heaven) of the two approaches brings them under suspicion. The more one follows out the significance of the vindicational ideal--the root ideal of rationality in acts--the more it seems to become clear that these positions cannot be models for ideal fulfillment of the norm of rationality in human action.

## 26. Valuative Attentions and the Rational Ideal

I have argued that valuative intentions derive their valuative significance from their relationship to valuative attentions; the rational goal of any valuing process is

*In certain respects  
rationally aimed with respect  
to the "world" as to be my object  
of attention, following naturally from the  
implications of fundamentalism.*

the achievement and enrichment of personal experiences of value, i.e. those states of consciousness which I have referred to as pro valuative attentions. The rational ideal--vindication ideal--applied in the development of valuative intentions leads toward the development of that body of commitments to principle which <sup>with</sup> acted on provide the maximum richness in pro-attention experience. Of course, enlightened choice is itself the grading principle of enrichments.

I want now to consider (necessarily briefly and incompletely in this study) the process of rational development in valuative attention experiences--these considered from the standpoint of appraising the quality of the immediate experience itself. Without this analysis our explication of the process of achieving rationally justified intentions would be incomplete in a very fundamental way, and the most basic and significant dimension of the valuing process would be left without any direct analytic treatment. As will become obvious, in the following remarks I am much indebted to Iris Murdoch's article "The Idea of Perfection," already referred to several times in the course of the study.

How the process  
begins to  
develop?

Valuative attentions are not atomistic and episodic "epiphenomena" of purposive behavior, though, like all states of consciousness, they are presented by and schematized by those behavioral processes which can be called mental (cf. Part I, Sec. 4-7). But they are <sup>more typical</sup> textural in nature <sup>rather than</sup> ~~not~~ sense-data or sensation-like ~~s~~ and are integral parts of structures of intentionality (cf. Part II, Sec. 4 and 7). Valuative attentions manifest two fundamental kinds of inner structure: that of aesthetic experience and that of life-value (or ethical) experience.

Any valuative experience insofar as it has the structure of being an appreciation or disappreciation of form (i.e. any content) is an aesthetic experience. We can distinguish three species of aesthetic experience: (I) that which has no other complexity than the response of appreciation or disappreciation of form, (II) that in which form evokes an emotion or mood and what is appreciated or disappreciated is the total experience of form plus the emotion or mood evoked, and (III) that in which form evokes emotion or mood which is then projected into (united with) the form, this total experience viewed as the aesthetic object.<sup>84</sup> In #(III) (expressivism) when

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<sup>84</sup> Note that this threefold distinction is quite independent of the formalist/non-formalist controversy, which

the projected emotion is a life-value response, the kind of structuring in intentionality is required which Edward Bullough called "psychical distancing," i.e. the total aesthetic experience is in a distinct way "detached" from one's life-value experiences, though the emotions involved are still deeply felt; however they are not felt as ego experiences: the sadness, terror, pity, grandeur, etc. are felt as in the aesthetic object.<sup>85</sup> Also #(I) and #(II) types of aesthetic experience may on occasion involve such distancing, though certainly at times aesthetic and life-value experiences are intimately conjoined. We can distinguish the beauty of a tragic experience from its lived value quality, but can we distinguish the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of a pro life-value experience, e.g. the beauty and the intrinsic ethical

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concerns the presence or absence of noetic or life-value meanings in the structure of forms taken as the aesthetic object. If there is purely formal art, and I suspect there is, but this is a psychological question, then it could be of any one of the three types. The notoriety of Clive Bell's position in his book Art (New York, 1958) has tended to lead philosophers to identify formalism with the first or the second types listed above.

<sup>85</sup> Bullough, "Psychical Distance," pp. 394-411.

value of an experience of love, or the gratifications of a good lecture?

It is not our concern here to follow through these distinctions in aesthetic experience, but only to note that explication of aesthetic experiences requires that we delineate textures and structures in consciousness. To attempt to account for the distinctive character of aesthetic experience purely in terms of distinctive patterns of language used, such as by distinguishing kinds of valuation by the kinds of reasons given,<sup>86</sup> is, I am arguing, manifestly incomplete; such an "explicating" thesis fails to include the basic data in terms of which a mental activity is an aesthetic experience, or in terms of which a reason is a reason.

Extensionalistic language analyses with their behavioral-episodic analyses of consciousness are also grossly inadequate for the explication of life-value experiences. To see someone as an object of love or disgust, or to see someone as delightful or vulgar, as gay or as bumptious, is surely not a matter of experiencing any Rylean twinges,

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<sup>86</sup> J. O. Urmson, "What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol XXXI (1957); reprinted in Art and Philosophy: Readings in Aesthetics, ed. W. E. Kennick (New York, 1964), pp. 552-564.





The tradition of British Empiricism, which has so pervasively molded the categorial framework of the empirical approach to experience since the 18th century, distorts our "philosophical" and "scientific" concept of emotions and feelings in an outlandish way. The attempt to force the character of consciousness into sensationalistic categorial forms can only result in the concept of mind Ryle comes out with in his well-known analysis: for Ryle mind is, even to the agent, more or less ordered dispositional processes manifesting occasional episodic sensory-like aspects.<sup>88</sup> Ryle notes that talk about feelings is not the same as talk about sensations,<sup>89</sup> but he fails to see the basic reason why they are different: it is not just that sensations can function as objects of reference and feelings can only be referred to as aspects of behavioral processes of persons. This fact of the logic of use of mental terms is rightly noted, but Ryle quite totally misses the basic significance of this character of the use of language referring to feelings: namely that the feelings can only be indicated by refer-

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<sup>88</sup> Ryle, Concept of Mind, ad passim.

<sup>89</sup> Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 135-149, 154-167, 222-234.

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ence to their schematizing behavior. The behavior, including language-use behavior, is the presentational medium--both to agent and observers--of the feelings and associated ideas which it is the object of the behavior as mental activity (including language-use behavior) to present (cf. Part I, Sec. 4-7).

In arguing in Part I that behavior, and especially language-use behavior, functions as the presentational medium of mind both to the using agent and to those to whom the communication is successful, I did not rule out the fact that presentational behavior can often be private to the language user. One can use language silently, thus presenting to the user's consciousness alone the conventionally and causally associated states of consciousness. Thus, we can accept as parts of the mental life of persons--and very significant parts they are--highly complex states and processes of cognitive and conative (thus valuative) attentions. These can be very extensively developed and modified without the person manifesting any correlative public behavior. Earlier in the study I noted that we would consider an example given by Iris Murdoch to illustrate such inner development in attention states not reflected in publicly

observable behavioral processes, and that I would like to do now.

Miss Murdoch presents this situation:

A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does not like D's accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath him. Let us assume for purposes of the example that the mother, who is a very "correct" person, behaves beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to appear in any way. We might underline this aspect of the example by supposing that the young couple have emigrated or that D is now dead: the point being to ensure that whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in M's mind.

Thus much for M's first thoughts about D. Time passes, and it could be that M settles down with a hardened sense of grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned (if I may use a question-begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married a silly vulgar girl. However, the M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her. M tells herself: "I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again." Here I assume that M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters. If we take D to be now absent or dead this can make it clear that the change is not in D's behavior but in M's mind. D is discovered to be not vulgar

but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on. And as I say, ex hypothesi, M's outward behavior, beautiful from the start, in no way alters.

I used above words such as "just" and "intelligent" which implied a favorable value judgment on M's activity; and I want in fact to imagine a case where one would feel approval of M's change of view. But of course in real life, and this is of interest, it might be very hard to decide whether what M was doing was proper or not, and opinions might differ. M might be moved by various motives: a sense of justice, attempted love for D, love for her son, or simply reluctance to think of him as unfortunate or mistaken. Some people might say "she deludes herself" while others would say she was moved by love or justice. I am picturing a case where I would find the latter description appropriate.<sup>90</sup>

In regard to the adequacy of a totally dispositional analysis of the change in valuation of M, Miss Murdoch comments:

It would be possible of course to give a hypothetical status to M's inner life, as follows. "M's vision of D has altered means that if M were to speak her mind about D now she would say different things from the things she would have said three years ago." This analysis avoids some difficulties but, like phenomenalism, encounters others. The truth of the hypothetical proposition could be consistent with nothing in the interim having

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<sup>90</sup> Murdoch, "The Idea of Perfection," pp. 356-357.

occurred in M's mind at all. And of course a change of mind often does take the form of the simple announcement of a new view without any introspectible material having intervened. But here ex hypothesi there is at least something introspectible which has occurred, however hazy this may be, and it is the status of this which is in question. At any rate the idea which we are trying to make sense of is that M has in the interim been active, she has been doing something, something which we approve of, something which is somehow worth doing in itself. M has been morally active in the interim: this is what we want to say and to be philosophically permitted to say.<sup>91</sup>

Miss Murdoch considers various possibilities of understanding M's development in valuative character where M is understood "from the outside in," i.e. where M's character or individuality is taken as given by her "patterns of movement," i.e. her volitional dispositions. Miss Murdoch comments:

[This] analysis makes no sense of M as continually active, as making progress, or of her inner acts as belonging to her or forming part of a continuous fabric of being: it is precisely critical of metaphors such as "fabric of being." Yet can we do without such metaphors here? Further, is not the metaphor of vision almost irresistibly suggested to anyone who, without philosophical prejudice, wishes to describe the situation? Is it not the natural metaphor? M looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her attention. M is engaged in an internal struggle. She may for

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<sup>91</sup> p. 358.

instance be tempted to enjoy caricatures of D in her imagination. (There is curiously little place in the other picture for the idea of struggle.) And M's activity here, so far from being something very odd and hazy, is something which, in a way, we find exceedingly familiar. Innumerable novels contain accounts of what such struggles are like. Anybody could describe one without being at a loss for words. This activity, as I said, could be described in a variety of ways, but one very natural way is by the use of specialized normative words, what one might call the secondary moral words in contrast to the primary and general ones such as "good." M stops seeing D as "bump-tious" and sees her as "gay" etc.<sup>92</sup>

As Murdoch notes, this is:

...an activity which can only be performed privately....Hampshire says that 'anything which is to count as a definite reality must be open to sense observations.' But can this quasi-scientific notion of individuation really be applied in a case like this?...M's activity is hard to characterize not because it is hazy but precisely because it is moral.<sup>93</sup>

This inner "moral activity" of M she describes in this way:

What M is ex hypothesi attempting to do is not just to see D accurately but to see her justly or lovingly. Notice the rather different image of freedom which this at once suggests. Freedom is not the sudden jumping of the isolated will in and out of an impersonal logical complex, it is a function of the progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly. M's activity is

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<sup>92</sup> Pp. 360-361.

<sup>93</sup> P. 361.

essentially something progressive, something infinitely perfectible. So far from claiming for it a sort of infallibility, this new picture has built in the notion of a necessary fallibility. M is engaged in an endless task. As soon as we begin to use words such as "love" and "justice" in characterizing M, we introduce into our whole conceptual picture of her situation the idea of progress, that is the idea of perfection: and it is just the presence of this idea which demands an analysis of mental concepts which is different from the genetic one.<sup>94</sup>

She continues:

Let me try now to explain more positively what it is about moral concepts which puts them entirely out of relation with the behaviorist view with its genetic explanation of mental phenomena. I want here to connect two ideas: the idea of the individual and the idea of perfection. Love is knowledge of the individual. M confronted with D has an endless task. Moral tasks are characteristically endless not only because "within," as it were, a given concept our efforts are imperfect, but also because as we move and as we look our concepts themselves are changing. To speak here of an inevitable imperfection, or of an ideal limit of love or knowledge which always recedes, may be taken as a reference to our "fallen" human condition, but this need be given no special dogmatic sense. Since we are neither angels nor animals, but human individuals our dealings with each other have this aspect; and this may be regarded as an empirical fact or, by those who favor such terminology, as a synthetic a priori truth.

The entry into a mental concept of the notion of an ideal limit destroys the genetic

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<sup>94</sup> P. 361.

analysis of its meaning. (Hampshire allowed the idea of perfection to touch one concept only, that of intention; but he tried to save this concept from morality by making the ideal limit a scientific one.) Let us see how this is. Is "love" a mental concept, and if so can it be analyzed genetically?...Words may mislead us here since words are often stable while concepts alter: we have a different image of courage at forty from that which we had at twenty. A deepening process, at any rate, an altering and complicating process, takes place. There are two senses of "knowing what a word means," one connected with ordinary language and the other very much less so. Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, and not in terms of switching on to some given impersonal network. Moreover, if morality is essentially connected with change and progress we cannot be as democratic about it as some philosophers would like to think. We do not simply through being rational and knowing ordinary language "know" the meaning of all necessary moral words. We may have to learn the meaning; and since we are human historical individuals, the movement of understanding is onward into increasing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back toward a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language.<sup>95</sup>

She comments: "My view might be put by saying: moral terms must be treated as universals," and "the central concept of morality is the individual thought as knowable by love," adding: "We ordinarily conceive of and apprehend goodness in terms of virtues which belong to a continuous fabric of being. And it is just the historical, individual

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<sup>95</sup> Pp. 365-366.



nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person."<sup>96</sup>

Her comments on the role of secondary value words (bumptious, gay, vulgar, spontaneous, etc.) in this learning process are, I think, very illuminating and to the point:

By means of these words there takes place what we might call "the siege of the individual by concepts." Uses of such words are both instruments and symptoms of learning. Learning takes place when such words are used, either aloud or privately, in the context of particular acts of attention (M attending to D.) This is a point to be emphasized. That words are not timeless, that word-utterances are historical occasions, has been noted by some philosophers for some purposes. (Strawson notes it when attacking the Theory of Descriptions.) But the full implications of this fact, with its consequences for the would-be timeless image of reason, have not, in our modern philosophy, been fully drawn....Words said to particular individuals at particular times may occasion wisdom. Words, moreover, have both spatio-temporal and conceptual contexts. We learn through attending to contexts; vocabulary develops through close attention to objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some extent share their contexts. (Often we can't.) Uses of words by persons grouped round a common object is a central and vital human activity. The art critic can help us if we are in the presence of the same object and if we know something about his scheme of concepts. Both contexts are relevant to our ability

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<sup>96</sup> p. 367.

to move toward "seeing more," toward "seeing what he sees." Here, as so often, an esthetic analogy is helpful for morals. M could be helped by someone who both knew D and whose conceptual scheme M could understand or in that context begin to understand. Progress in understanding of a scheme of concepts often takes place as we listen to normative-descriptive talk in the presence of a common object.<sup>97</sup>

Thus the rational ideal for valuative attentions is those attentions developed toward maximum concreteness under optimum vindicational conditions of awareness, openness, and sensitive responsiveness.

Such extensive quotes from Miss Murdoch's article I can only seek to justify by noting that I believe she succeeds in expressing with extraordinary clarity and succinctness the central character of value experience and its relation to language which the philosopher who would present an adequate and complete explication of value language must take account of. It seems to me overwhelmingly obvious, as I have noted before in the study, that 20th century "empirical" philosophies of value language have tended to be grossly unempirical: not sensitive to the logical character of the language structures which are the instruments of presentation and communication of value

*Like M. Murdoch on  
aesthetics. In  
book 1*

experience. I have sought in this study to present a concept of value language which would have the semantic structure and resources needed to account for the value-expressive functions such language has. Miss Murdoch has, I believe, presented the basic dimension of these value-expressive functions very well.

One statement Miss Murdoch makes in the above quoted material I would like to raise a question about, namely the statement "love is knowledge of the individual." Let us agree that increase in depth (quality) of the valuative attention experience requires the kind of "knowledge" she is referring to here, perhaps less misleadingly described in Martin Buber's terminology as a growth toward a fullness-in-concreteness of a person-to-person "I-thou" relationship.<sup>98</sup> But we cannot assume *apriori* that such a growth of feelingful awareness will be a growth in the specific character of the emotion experience manifested at some earlier stage in the developmental process. It is true that development of a specific normative reality perspective tends to establish a direction of development that

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<sup>98</sup> Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd Ed., trans. R. G. Smith (New York, 1958).

is reinforced at each stage by the previous stage. However, the growth in content of awareness can alter, or even reverse, such a development. Love can change to revulsion, or vice versa in a process of development toward more fulfilled awareness of an individual. Increase in the intrinsic value of an attention state will normally--perhaps always--be a function of increase of concreteness in the experience, but the logical principle of conversion does not, I think, hold here. It certainly is not logically required to hold.

## E. OBLIGATION

27. Expressatory Obligation

Obligation I have described earlier in the study as restraint to law: more specifically it is restraint to the law of what is accepted as justified authority. Of course, we are here talking about obligation judgment and not just obligation feelings. There is a distinction here analogous to that between belief feelings and belief judgment (cf. Part II, Sec. 3). Experience of constraint to law, or principle, manifests a distinct range of feeling experiences (conative attention experiences), and man being a creature of habit, the conative attention dispositions he develops in regard to principles of action can be disassociated from his rational judgment. Experience of obligation--also called experience of conscience--will be parts of obligation-judgment only insofar as these emotive aspects of an agent's character are in fact reason shaped and controlled, i.e. conform to the agent's current achievements of rational commitments to principles. A Southerner deeply conditioned to White supremacy principles who comes to reject these is likely to experience some "bad conscience" about accepting Negroes as social equals however clearly he rationally recognizes the "conscience" as the

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residuum of past conditioning and as having no status, except as rejected principles, among his current ruling commitments. Such a conditioned-response "conscience," if completely rejected and thus only a conditioned response, will not even be a valuative for the agent.

In the following discussion "obligation" is to be taken as obligation judgment unless reference simply to obligation feeling is specifically indicated. Obligation as restraint <sup>to proper action when in conflict</sup> to justified authority has two basic modes, as I have already indicated in the Introduction and in Part III, Section 19: expressatory and performatory obligation. In this section we will consider expressatory obligation and in the following section performatory.

The constraint to what is accepted as justified authority in expressatory obligation is constraint to the agent's ruling commitments. Obligation necessarily involves an authority-obedience pattern, and the expressatory obligations of an agent are the constraints the agent experiences <sup>in his periods of maximal rational awareness of the authority</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>authentic to</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>function in</sup> the agency. Of course the agency can be an individual or any kind of group or metaphysical agency. Let us consider first obligation within a self.

The ruling commitments in a self, we have seen (III-D), establish the essential self, the proprium self. This "choosing self" is the authority-function of the self. The commitments (ratiocinative desires, decisions of principle) which make up this self basically define the self--or are basic constituents of that which is essential to self identity--and it is in reference to motivation supporting these ruling commitments that we can speak of obligations to oneself. A para-political model in conceiving of the self is very essential to the explication of obligation.

In analysing expressatory obligation of a self, we need to keep distinct the following concepts:

- (1) obligations feelings
- (2) de facto obligation judgments
- (3) putative ideal obligation judgments
- (4) commendive judgments
- (5) individual vs. participatory obligation judgments.

We have already noted that obligation feeling may or may not be parts of obligation judgments, and we shall shortly give attention to the distinctive character of such feelings.

De facto obligation judgments are judgments made relative to actual ruling commitments of a self--the principles the self espouses and makes some action toward implementing in its more fully reason-mediated choices and descriptions of the values of the self. Note that such an obligation judgment can be:

- (a) an expression of a basic value principle, e.g. "I ought to abide by the will of God," etc.
- (b) an expression of a derivative value principle, grounded deductively, inductively, or vindicationally on basic principles, e.g. "I ought to keep my promises," "...perform my religious duties," etc.
- (c) an expression of a particular maxim of action, rationally grounded on ruling commitments, e.g. "I ought to pay this bill," "...marry Mary Jane," etc.
- (d) a description of any one of these value principles.

De facto obligations, it can be seen, change as actual ruling commitments change and as one's knowledge of means-ends relationships alter. One can only be obligated to do what one is capable of recognizing as an implementation of one's basic value principles. Thus, as Max Scheler points out, the obligations (duties, responsibilities) of an individual are relative to the depths of his character, the profundity of his moral insight. In the course of an excellent discussion of the na-



ture of the tragic, Scheler writes:

...individual men have quite different microcosms of values, dependent on the extent of their actual moral awareness and even on the extent of their possible moral awareness.... How deep his gaze...penetrates into the macrocosm of moral value, which contains the entire extent of the realm of possible good and evil, and how deep a hold he takes within this macrocosm, are in no way to be decided by the extent to which each individual dutifully produces the "best" of the realm of values with which he has been endowed. It is not duty and the performance of it that "ennoble"--as the Kantian short-sighted ethic puts it--but rather "noblesse oblige": this is the original nobility of man, which establishes for him quite varied arrays of possible duties--duties which stand in varied relationships to the moral world and are variously "significant" for it.

It makes a difference whether the man doing his duty is a grocer or a noble king; the first one in a vague way obeys a few moral value-distinctions, doing his "duty" with a couple of poor concepts of choice, while the other, living in the fullness of manifold human and other moral relationships, with a finely articulated and higher realm of moral value-distinctions before his eyes, does his "duty" while he demonstrates the highest value given to him, and in will and deed realizes this value. The latter man in this action must conduct himself as occasionally opposed to duty, while the man blind to value blandly performs his "duty." If we were now to say that in a true tragic presentation everyone must do his "duty," or at least that it would be prudent so to do, and that--even if everyone has done his duty--the destruction of value and the consequent lessening of the total moral value of the world must nevertheless take place, we would thereby still not know how to exclude this quite different dimension of the moral value-distinction of the

individual and of his being taking part in the tragedy. It is rather a quite different species of the tragic which, in this dimension of being, bruises "noble" individuals against the strongly articulated "duties" of the mob. And it appears to be a particular melancholy-ironic glory of this kind of tragedy that the noble individual should accept a moral guilt that his companions do not accept. To the extent that the noble person can more easily become "guilty" than the ignoble--in accord with his richer and higher realm of duties--he is susceptible to a moral "risk" which ever bears with it something potentially tragic, as this risk simultaneously praises and blames his noble nature. The Prometheus of technic, who stole fire from Zeus, is a tragic figure; but even more tragic are the moral Prometheuses in whose eyes a moral world comes with the brilliance of lightning, a moral world that never previously existed. . . . While they are realizing values and acquiring duties which the vulgar do not yet know how to see as value or to feel as duty, the vulgar are themselves only doing their "duty" while the noble see as "evil" what may still be "good" for the vulgar.<sup>99</sup>

As Aristotle points out, we do to some degree hold an individual responsible for the adequacy of his actual principles,<sup>100</sup> and an individual also may hold himself responsible in this regard. That is, obligation is measured not only relative to de facto value principles but

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<sup>99</sup>Max Scheler, "On the Tragic," Cross Currents, IV (1954) 188-189; reprinted in L. Michel and R. Sewall, eds., Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), pp. 27-44; material quoted pp. 40-41.

<sup>100</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. 1.

also relative to putative ideal value principles. Considering for the moment only the obligations which a self imposes upon itself, we can see that de facto obligations themselves create in an individual the bindingness of ideals. Our actual value principles are directives to realize ideals. Thus, for an individual to conclude that his valuative vision has been more limited than it should have been, given his capabilities and resources, is for him to experience guilt, i.e. a sense of having violated valid obligation judgments.

Putative ideal obligation judgments are, for the self, tied to de facto obligation judgments in an obvious way: we can only experience a principle as ideal in relation to actually accepted principles. But these moments of recognizing that our concept of our obligations has been more restricted than it should have been provides the basis of recognizing that there can be a distinction between de facto and putative ideal judgments. But they evolve as the self develops in depth in its feeling and normative vision capacities. I have already discussed the nature of this characterological evolution, accepting and developing the analysis given of it in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

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Commendive obligation judgments are always judgments of one agency about and for another. I have argued that it can only be analogical talk for us to speak of commending to ourselves. Commending judgments can be directly expressive or can be descriptive of direct conative language commending judgments. Usually they will be expressions of putative ideal obligations, claimed as ideals the agent addressed should have if he (or it) does not already accept the idea, though a commending can be a calling of a person to his de facto commitments. We have already noted the logical problems of drawing this line sharply.

The ruling commitments of a self can be individual valuations or participatory valuations, the latter being valuations in which the individual expresses a judgment as the voice of a more comprehensive agency (group social contract agency or metaphysical agency, such as God). Any such group or metaphysical agency must functionally have those principles which constitute logically the authoritative pronouncements of the group, even if there is not an individual or sub-group with the specific function of establishing or clarifying what are authoritative rulings of the group. Those authoritative rulings of the group

define its valuational group identify, its character as a participatory agency. Thus all that is said above about self-obligation can be said about group-obligation--that is, insofar as the obligation is expressatory. Performatory obligation, though it requires a group context and certain expressatory obligations, is quite a different dimension of meaning.

Let us return to our focus on obligation within the self and seek some clarification of the distinctive character of the valuative attentions associated with obligation, i.e. obligation feelings, or "sense" of obligation (duty, responsibility). The definition of obligation gives us our cue here, as is only rational. If obligation is constraint to what is recognized as justified authority, the feelings of obligation as Kant noted, will be basically (a) feelings of respect for the law of the authority (derivative from, or a mode of expression of the authority itself) and (b) other pre-feelings toward acting on the law, this second group of feelings providing the experience of the "practical necessity" of acting on the law, i.e. the distinct character of awareness of obligation or duty as motivational constraint and propulsion. (a) and (b) may, of course, constitute an insepar-

able existential unit of feeling response. The quality of these obligation-attention experiences will, naturally, depend upon the depth of the affective development of the individual. As Iris Murdoch notes, moral development is necessarily in a basic dimension a process of development in the character of the attentions of the agent. The quote from Max Scheler given above also puts emphasis on this point. Bergson contrasts the conditioned-response experience of obligation ("I must because I must") in a "pressure morality" with the obligation feelings that constitute a part of an "aspiration morality," i.e. the constraint to principle that is one with (often joyous) affirmation of principle, where there is an autonomous choosing of a principle of action.<sup>101</sup>

If we thus identify obligation feeling with any feeling of constraint to justified authority, then we must reject those analyses in which obligation is identified with feelings of constraint to principles in a context where there is significant conflict with other desires. For example, W. D. Falk argues that to feel something as an obligation, or duty, logically requires a context in which

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<sup>101</sup>Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 47-66.

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holding to the principle is contested by the presence of contrary motivations. He notes that it is perfectly natural to say, "For the first month it was a duty, but after that it ceased to be a duty and became a pleasure."<sup>102</sup> Granting the acceptability of this particular usage, I would want to note two things: (1) there would seem to be a clear distinction between being a duty and being experienced as a duty (though in the moment of maximally achievable rational awareness they must be one), and (2) it is also clearly acceptable in ordinary use to speak of enjoying one's duties. Philosophers such as Confucius and Aristotle have made a point of insisting that the morally developed person is one who takes deep pleasure in his duties, i.e. in conforming to his ruling commitments.<sup>103</sup> We can resolve this problem by noting that both uses of obligation are permissible in discourse, for there is an

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<sup>102</sup>W. D. Falk, "Morality, Self, and Others," Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. H. Castaneda and G. Naknikian (Detroit, 1965), p. 46.

<sup>103</sup>The Analects of Confucius, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and the works of Mencius, trans. Charles A. Wong. Translation published in China without imprint of a publisher or date. The reference here is to a passage quoted by John B. Noss, Man's Religions, 3rd edition, (New York, 1963), pp. 391-392; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 8, Bk. II, Ch. 3 and 4.

element of vagueness in the ordinary measuring, allowing equivocation among uses acceptable in ordinary discourse. It is not difficult to see how this has come about. <sup>while</sup> Where it is a logical distinction of a rational person, or a person in his moments of rationally developed and manifested awareness, to enjoy his obligations, we are often not in such postures of rational character, and thus we often experience our obligations in contexts of struggle of ruling desires with tempting conflicting desires. As I have already noted, a certain amount of such struggle is a distinguishing character of the "rational will" as contrasted with a "holy will," taking the latter as sub specie aeternitatis volition.

This brings us to ~~the ancient and honorable problem~~ <sup>experience</sup> of the relationship between obligation and desire. Considering any possible candidate for the accolade "principle of obligation," Selby-Bigge comments: "It may move or attract me, as a matter of fact, more than anything else, but does it oblige me?"<sup>104</sup> H. A. Prichard, in his well-known article "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" argues that the argument Plato gives in The Republic that the enlightened individual will desire justice

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<sup>104</sup>L. A. Selby-Bigge, "Introduction," British Moralists, vol. I (New York, 1965) Dover Books, p. xlv.



is logically irrelevant to establishing the obligatoriness of justice; the concept of obligation, he argues, is by its nature distinct from the concept of enlightened desiring; thus, obligations must be known by immediate cognitive intuition.<sup>105</sup> Maurice Mandelbaum notes that moral obligation is always experienced as "objective demand" coming from outside the self: "A [moral] ideal does not operate upon as in the manner of a subjective wish."<sup>106</sup> The absolute gulf which Kant draws between obligation and desire is well-known.<sup>107</sup>

If the concept of valuation developed in this study is correct, then, of course, there can be no such absolute gulf. An expressatory obligation is a certain kind of desire, namely a ruling commitment, a reason-sanctioned commitment. Conflict between obligation and desire is conflict between desires, the obligation being by definition the most reason-mediated and reason-sanctioned desire in the situation. In the rational self, obligation and de-

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<sup>105</sup>H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligations: Essays and Lectures (Oxford, 1949), pp. 1-17.

<sup>106</sup>Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p. 91.

<sup>107</sup>Kant, Fundamental Principles, pp. 3-5, 13-16.

termining desire coincide. Of course, obligation-desire may have the character of a participatory commitment: one may be expressing the desire as a voice of the moral body, or of God, and as such a delegate voice affirming a supra-personal ideal. It seems to me that when obligation is contrasted with "desire," or "attraction," or "subjective preference" the person drawing the contrast is thinking of desire other than as ruling commitment (with its essential character of constraint to principle) or other than this as a form of participatory commitment. As we have noted, desire--a conative attention-intention complex--can be very deontological in character (III-13), i.e. be a love of principle and a love of the state of affairs of principles being respected and obeyed. Such an affective deontologism is certainly integral to the fully developed idea of expressatory obligation, i.e. the sense of constraint to justified law grounded in respect for law. Intuitionism presents the only theoretical alternative to such a desire-obligation analysis, and we have examined reasons for questioning the intellectual justifiableness of that alternative.

Of course not all obligation is moral obligation, i.e. constraint to principles of other-regarding concern. There

are various other kinds of obligation to oneself, including purely personal obligation as well as many other kinds of obligation springing from the participatory commitments which are part of an individual's ruling commitments. Because a participatory commitment is, as an expressatory valuation, a personal valuation--a part of an individual's ruling commitments--the contrast between obligation to oneself and obligation to others is not a simple one to draw. In the rationally developed person, obligations to others are also obligations to oneself.

We must distinguish point-of-view obligations (cf. III-18) as analytic concepts and as commitments. From "X is an instance of a moral obligation" it does not follow that for any given individual that individual is morally obligated to do X. This will depend on whether the individual accepts moral obligation as a personal ruling commitment. ~~Again,~~ It is only the advent of the amazing claims of the "logical naturalist" about obligations following from the nature of language rules that prompt the trotting out of such obvious logical points about the ethical neutrality of language. Usually what is behind such analyses is a confusion of expressatory and performatory, i.e. contractual, obligation. In the latter sense

one may justifiably accuse an individual of violations of moral principles and justifiably punish him on the bases of these regardless of whether he has any expressatory moral commitments. We shall pursue this issue in the following section.

The parallelism which I argued for in III-13 between "good" and "ought" raises the question as to whether, on the present analysis, there can be any valuations which do not have a dimension of obligatoriness. I have argued that 'good' is used to refer to what are taken to be justified goals of action and 'ought' to express principles for achieving such goals. On this analysis there is not a direct analytic relationship between "ought" assertions and obligation assertions; however, there is an indirect one. Every valuation is by definition a claim of a reason-mediated choice of a goal or way of acting. Thus every valuation claims to be, directly or indirectly, an expression of a mode of implementation of the agent's ruling commitments. Since all ruling commitments have the character of constraints to basic principles of action, all have a strong character as obligations. But this obligatoriness, by the nature of the rational ideal, filters down to every valuation. Every valuation has some claim

of being a way of being "true to oneself," i.e. one's proprium self, thus one's ruling commitments. However, since the concrete rational ideal of the self reflected in its ruling commitments is capable of exemplification in many alternative particular ways of life, the "obligatory" character of a particular valuation may be very slight indeed. "That was a good show" or "That was a good dessert" are instances in which it would be clearly wrong and disturbing to think of seeing the show or eating the dessert as in any strong sense obligatory. But their character as valuations still allows these sentences some function as fulfilling ways of action of the obligation to oneself to achieve a way of life in which such gratifications play a part. Clearly the rules which are specifically required by one's ruling commitments have a vastly stronger obligatory character than those which do not. This is a point philosophers in the past were concerned to note in distinguishing "perfect" and "imperfect" obligations.

#### 28. Performatory (Contractual) Obligations

The phrase "performatory obligation" is misleading. Performatory pronouncements are never themselves obligation assertions, though in the appropriate context they

can establish obligations. I have noted earlier--especially III-19--that to make an expressatory participatory commitment is to enter into a contractual agreement with members of the participatory group to abide by the rules of the group. These contract-rules make certain utterances, which outside the contract context would be simple expressatory valuatives or valuations, into performatory valuations with a distinctive obligatory character. To be under a contract agency is to be, as a matter of convention, subject to the rules of the agency as obligations. The agency rules also establish the conditions under which the individual is considered to be released from the obligation.

Let's begin with a simple example. One chooses to play a game, this intention being a part of the individual's expressatory valuation as long as he chooses to continue playing the game. This expressatory choice makes him a member of a group with contract-rules about "choice" pronouncement which make these performatory. He says he chooses white, and he has chosen in the saying; he moves his chess piece when it is his turn to move and he has performatorily made that chess move; etc. When he decides to stop playing, this expressatory choice consti-

tutes a withdrawal from membership in the social contract group of players of that game. Of course, if it is a gambling game, and the individual has just made a large winning, his fellow players may bring pressure to insist he continue playing--either noting that this is a rule of the game, or by bringing into the situation factors (threats, for example) which make it prudential for the individual to continue his membership in the group.<sup>91</sup> Now let us consider some legally recognized obligations: first the obligation of a person residing or even just traveling in a country to obey the laws of the country. To be in a country is by the conventions of that country to be obliged to keep its laws, i.e. to be taken as expressing the valuation (resolve, commitment, promise) to keep the laws. A promise is any such performatory or contractual commitment. The expressatory commitment which makes one subject to the laws of a country is not the valuing of those laws in any expressatory way (though this may be taken to be a condition of "true," or moral, citizenship), but rather the simple choice to be in the country. That act brings one under the contractual rules of the country: one has the contractual "obligation" to abide by the rules, and these rules can make certain acts become further "obligations."

The contract-convention governed expectations of other residents in the country, made specific in what the authorities take as legally required of any person in the country, are one's "obligations." E.g., to say in writing with witnesses that one will repay a certain sum in such and such a way is to have that "obligation."

This "obligation," i.e. contractual obligation can coincide with expressatory obligation--and this, Rousseau reminds us, is the way to be free though under social authority. Two factors distinguish such an "obligation" from being simply something one prudentially had better do to avoid undesirable consequences: (1) its conventional, i.e. social-contract character, and (2) the possibility that the contract obligation can become an expressatory obligation. The ideal of a moral and rational society is for contractual obligation to become expressatory for each individual, manifesting basic moral commitments. At the other extreme "obligation" loses all contract character and becomes simply the causal or prudential need to abide by the rules of established authority to achieve one's goals including the goal to avoid punishment. In between there is the recognized role of the linguistic performatory: to say certain things is to take on "con-



Concluding Remarks

The purpose of the present study has been to develop a concept of the language of the semantic expression of mental acts. I have sought to show that adequate development of such a language requires using insights and methods of both ordinary language analysis, such as is exemplified in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin, and intensionalistic and "rational reconstructionist" analyses, such as is exemplified in the writings of Bertrand Russell and C. I. Lewis. In the course of developing an intensionalistic theory of meaning as a basis of explication of the language of practical discourse, I have sought to show the compatibility of intensionalism with general empirical epistemological presuppositions. I have sought to indicate the mutual dependency of mental-act expression and language use.

I have sought to make a detailed analysis of the nature and modes of mental acts, showing how the logic of language use supports the analysis made. I have concluded that there are four basic modes of mental act, and thus of practical (or conative) language; these modes are reflected in the following kinds of act-expressive uses: (1) directives, (2) conatives, (3) enstatives,

and (4) beliefs. Conatives are the linguistic media of expressing intentionality, both <sup>radical</sup> conative intentions (commitments to principles) and ~~valuative attentions (immediate valuing experiences)~~.

A central part of the study has been an explication of the language of valuation. I have sought to show how the idea of valuing and the idea of acting rationally are analytically related. I have taken as the root of the idea of rational action (or justified action) the ideal of acting in awareness of everything that there is to be aware of (the vindicational ideal). I have sought to develop the consequences of this concept of rationality, along with the concept of meaning in assertional language, for the development of an adequate language of valuation. I have sought to show that that language, like all natural language, is radically neutral, allowing the formulation of any conceivable normative ethical theory of either naturalistic or non-naturalistic type. I have sought to show that no language of valuation is adequate which does not provide adequate forms for expression and reference to the textural and structural (rather than episodic) character of value experience as felt quality of experience.

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