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**Funding Terrorism:  
A Closer Look at Organized Crime Activity and Lethality**

**Jimmy Levy**

## **I. Introduction**

Why are some terrorist organizations lethal while others are not? This question has been asked by many scholars and there have been several possible explanations from the literature such as ideology, size, state sponsorship and many others (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Drake 1998; Laqueur 2000; Hoffman 2006; Boyns and Ballard 2004; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Byman 2005; Quillen 2002; Wilkinson 2001). There has also been much research on the connection between organized crime and terrorism (Croissant and Barlow 2007; Makarenko 2001; Roth and Sever 2007; Sanderson 2004). However, there has been little research done on whether or not funding through use of organized crime activity will affect the lethality of an organization. Which leads to my question: does funding a terrorist organization through the use of organized crime activity increase the organization's lethality?

Determining whether funding from organized crime activity affects an organization's lethality is an important question for several reasons. There has been a recent growth of literature that shows that organized crime and terrorism are linked in several ways. Organized crime groups and terrorist organizations have learned from each other and use similar tactics even though terrorist organizations' goals are political while organized crime groups are usually not (Shelley and Picarelli 2005; Schmid 1996; Makarenko 2004, 2001; Sanderson 2004). Also, a main part of the international fight against terrorism has been the "war against terrorist financing". The reason behind attacking terrorist financing is because of the belief that by cutting the financing of an organization, the organization's ability to function will be crippled. Which makes the question of organized crime activities possible relation to lethality that much more important. However, there are several different sources of funding terrorist organizations receive such as: state sponsorship, organized crime activities, and donations from charities and

wealthy individuals (Abuza 2003; Billingslea 2004; Byman 2005; Croissant and Barlow 2007; de Goede 2003; Ehrenfeld 2005; Roth and Sever 2007). Organized crime activities that some terrorist groups are known to use include money laundering, weapons and drug trafficking and other such activities(Billingslea 2004; Roth and Sever 2007; Sanderson 2004; Abuza 2003). It has been shown by several scholars that when a terrorist organizations funding from state sponsorship gets disrupted it will resort to organized crime activity in order to receive its funding(Abuza 2003; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Croissant and Barlow 2007; Sanderson 2004). Much of the effort to combat terrorist financing has focused on attempting to stop states from funding these organizations. However, while some scholars believe that state sponsorship is strongly correlated with lethality (Byman 2005; Quillen 2002; Wilkinson 2001) others have shown that state sponsorship has no significant correlation with lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). While there has been much research done on the topic of state sponsorship in regards to lethality there is a clear lack of literature regarding a possible link between organized crime activity as a source of funding and lethality. If in fact funding from organized crime activities affects an organization's lethality it may be worth the international community's time to focus less on state sponsorship of terrorism and more on thwarting these organizations' ability to gain funding through organized crime. In order to determine the answer to this question I will examine several organizations in a quantitative study to determine how funding from organized crime activity will affect an organization's lethality if it has any significant affect at all.

## **II. Literature Review**

In order to fully understand the background behind my question and why it is important examining the literature and what is missing from it is essential. The three parts of the terrorism literature we must examine is the connection between terrorism and organized crime, how

terrorist organizations are funded, and what makes some organizations lethal and while others are not. Once we fully understand these topics I can explain what is missing from the literature and hopefully begin to fill this gap myself.

The first part of the literature that is important to examine is the link between terrorism and organized crime. Understanding organized crime's connections to terrorism is necessary to understand why I believe there will be a correlation between a terrorist group's lethality and whether or not it uses organized crime as a source of funding. It will also serve as tool to understand the ever evolving techniques that terrorist organizations use and how they learn from other groups and organizations.

A large amount of literature linking terrorism and organized crime has emerged in the scholarly community. The literature on this topic has evolved greatly, but tends to focus on either the similarities and differences between organized crime groups and terrorist groups or on the usage of organized crime activity by terrorist organizations in an effort to fund their organization (Makarenko 2001, 2004; Roth and Sever 2007; Schmid 1996; Shelley and Picarelli 2005; Levitt 2002). Activities such as engaging in or taxing the drug trade, weapons trafficking, money laundering and credit fraud have become common place among several terrorist organizations (Abuza 2003; Billingslea 2004; Makarenko 2004). For example Levitt explains that:

Al-Qa'ida and Hizballah also raise millions of dollars in drug money to support their operations. By one account, al-Qa'ida raised as much as 35 percent of its operating funds from the drug trade. Hizballah benefits from the drug business in Lebanon, much as al-Qa'ida did from the drug business in Afghanistan. Hizballah not only used the Biqa'a Valley's poppy crop for funds, but also to buy support from Israeli Arabs (Levitt 2002).

There is also the use of alliances between terrorist organizations and organized crime groups that have different goals, but both need each other in order to succeed (Makarenko 2004). Expanding on that some literature suggests that the line between terrorist groups and organized crime groups has become “blurred” in recent years (Sanderson 2004; Makarenko 2004, 2001; Roth and Sever 2007). Because of this Makarenko suggests that “Security, as a result, should now be viewed as a cauldron of traditional and emerging threats that interact with one another, and at times, converge”(Makarenko 2004). In a case study of the PKK Roth and Sever note that “if one accepts the United Nations definition of organized crime, the PKK would be considered both a terrorist group and a transnational criminal organization” (Roth and Sever 2007). The most important thing to take out of this part of the literature is that the usage of organized crime activities and tactics among terrorist organizations is real and increasingly prevalent. Other lethal terrorist groups that use organized crime as a source of funding include: Hamas, FARC, AUC (of Colombia), ASG, MILF, and JI (Sanderson 2004; Croissant and Barlow 2007; Roth and Sever 2007).

The next part of the literature that is significant to my study is how terrorist organizations are funded. If all organizations were funded in the same way it wouldn't matter if funding made them more lethal because it would affect every organization in the same way. However, due to the fact that organizations use different methods to fund their group the possibility exists that these different methods could account for other differences between organizations including whether or not they are lethal. Understanding how organizations are funded is also important because much of the literature considers funding to be the “life blood” of terrorism.

There has been a lot of research on where terrorist organizations receive funding, the affects of such funding and the efforts to try and combat terrorist financing. Some of the literature

focuses specifically on state sponsorship as a form of funding; some specifically on organized crime activities and others try to embody all forms of funding that different organizations receive (Abuza 2003; Basile 2004; Billingslea 2004; Byman 2005; Croissant and Barlow 2007; Ehrenfeld 2005; Roth and Sever 2007; Quillen 2002; Hoffman 1999; Simon and Benjamin 2001; Levitt 2002). According to Levitt, “Terrorism in the Middle East is financed by an array of states, groups, fronts, individuals, businesses, banks, criminal enterprises and nominally humanitarian organizations”(Levitt 2002). With all of these sources of funding efforts to combat terrorist financing has been a difficult task for the international community. Much of the effort in the “War on Terrorist Financing” has focused on stopping state sponsors from funding terrorism. State sponsorship can fund terrorist organizations in many ways. These sponsors can give money directly to the organizations, supply them with weapons, or a home base for the organizations’ activities (Byman 2005; Quillen 2002). State Sponsors can also provide terrorist organizations with military training which is another source of funding (Byman 2005; Wilkinson 2001). State Sponsorship is an important aspect of the literature for my study due to the fact that I will use it as one of my many variables as it is one of the other aspects from the literature in regards to what makes a terrorist organization lethal. Organized crime activity as a source of funding includes money laundering, weapons trafficking and drug trafficking (Billingslea 2004; Roth and Sever 2007; Sanderson 2004; Abuza 2003). The literature also tends to agree that efforts to combat the funding of terrorist organizations have had little effects on organizations’ ability to function so far and suggest new approaches to combating it including: tighter oversight on offshore accounts and money laundering, transparency of charities, keeping law enforcement at all levels counter-financing aware, and seeking civil litigation against individuals, banks, charities and other organizations that are in the chain of terrorist financing (Abuza 2003; Basile

2004; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Croissant and Barlow 2007; Giraldo and Trinkunas 2005; Sanderson 2004; Shapiro and Siegel 2009; Makarenko 2004). The literature has also shown that while state sponsorship has been cut down organizations have adapted and in order to continue funding their organization some have moved towards the use of organized crime activity (Abuza 2003; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Croissant and Barlow 2007; Sanderson 2004). “Increasingly since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, organised criminal activities have become a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide” (Makarenko 2004). So as state sponsorship becomes less prevalent and organized crime activity as a source of funding becomes more common my question becomes even more important. If organizations are likely to be more lethal when they use organized crime activity as a source of funding and more organizations are beginning to use it due to lack of state sponsors then stopping the usage of organized crime activity by terrorist organizations becomes that much more important to the international community that is trying to combat terrorism.

The last portion of the literature that needs to be reviewed in order to understand why my question is important is literature regarding why some organizations are lethal and others are not. There are several different factors that have been studied or theorized about in the scholarly community, and to fully understand the topic of lethality we must examine them thoroughly. Once we have considered this last part of the literature we can begin to determine what is missing from the literature on terrorism in regards to my topic.

One of the most common arguments is the affect of an organization’s ideology on its lethality, so when the ideology of the organization is permissive of violence it will likely be more lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Drake 1998; Laqueur 2000; Hoffman 2006). Some of this literature focuses on religious ideologies as being more lethal and quantitative tests have shown



that in fact “organizations that seek to impress a supernatural audience tend to kill more” (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Also, Hoffmann points out that “Groups motivated in part or in whole by a salient religious or theological motivation committed ten of the 13 terrorist spectaculars recorded in 1996” (Hoffman 1999). The tests by Asal and Rethemeyer found that organizations with “religious-ethnonationalist ideologies” are also likely to be lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Ideology is a very important factor -as shown by the literature and other tests- that affects the lethality of an organization, but there are many more possible factors that have been observed.

Another argument in the literature is that the size of an organization will influence lethality, the argument here is when an organization has more people this will increase its lethality (Boyns and Ballard 2004; Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). “Human capital” as a resource to engage in killings is an important aspect in this argument (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Boyns and Ballard 2004). If an organization has more people, they will have a greater ability to kill. This is because: “The larger an organization becomes, the more likely that its membership includes individuals (a) skilled at the methods of death and destruction, (b) capable of raising and managing money, and (c) possessed of access to restricted information, places, and materials. In short, bigger organizations should be more capable” (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). There is also literature that argues that smaller organizations will likely be more lethal because as they argue when an organization is too large it will waste more resources (Oots 1986), however, Asal and Rethemeyer determined in their testing that in fact larger organizations are more likely to be lethal when everything is correctly controlled for.

A third argument is that terrorist organizations that maintain control of territory are more likely to be lethal than organizations without territorial control (Inbar 2006; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Inbar argues that with Hamas’ control of parts of the Gaza

Strip “has facilitated the smuggling of dangerous weapons into the PA, and has intensified the need for increased vigilance against terrorists and criminals attempting to infiltrate from Palestinian and Egyptian controlled land and waters into Israel”(Inbar 2006). Controlling territory also allows organizations to run training camps and arm depots (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). With the added ability to run training camps and arm depots, coupled with being able to easily smuggle weapons it is easy to see why the literature would argue that organizations that control land are likely to be more lethal than those that do not.

Another argument from some scholars is that the age of a terrorist organization may have something to do with lethality. Some of the literature argues that older organizations will have more resources and will therefore be more lethal (Hoffman 1999). Other literature argues that new organizations are likely to be more lethal because they argue that “New Terrorism” is more lethal. New Terrorism literature argues that because of these new organizations are religiously ideological in nature and when an organization is religious is likely to be more lethal, then new organizations will likely be more lethal than older organizations. While, it is debated throughout the literature whether older organizations or newer organizations are likely to be more lethal the quantitative study by Asal and Rethemeyer showed that there was no significance between lethality and an organizations age.

There is also literature emerging that examines terrorist networks and alliances among groups in relation to lethality. It suggests that terrorist organizations that have “extensive alliance connections with peers” are likely to be more lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Alliances have been used throughout history by states and groups in order to complete common goals or support each other in completing separate goals. It is no different for terrorist organizations according to Asal and Rethemeyer:

Yet like most modern organizations, those with a terrorist bent do engage in relationships with other organizations in their environment. The benefits from working as allies with other terrorists are potentially enormous. Networked organizations can access knowledge, information, personnel, financial reserves, and material that might otherwise be unavailable (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).

More specifically relating to the question about financing and lethality there has also been some literature and research on this topic. Some of it suggests that state sponsorship is specifically correlated with lethality (Byman 2005; Quillen 2002; Hoffman 1999) and that state sponsorship allows for terrorist organizations to obtain higher levels of firepower and training (Wilkinson 2001). In regards to state sponsorship Hoffman argues that:

It places greater resources in the hands of terrorists, thereby enhancing planning, intelligence, logistical capabilities, training, finances, and sophistication. Moreover, since state-sponsored terrorists do not depend on the local population for support, they need not be concerned about alienating popular opinion or provoking a public backlash.”

Others have found that there might be a “state restraint” effect on organizations that have state sponsorship (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Simon and Benjamin 2001). Specifically, Asal and Rethemeyer find that state sponsorship has no significant correlation with the lethality of an organization. However, they do state that “State sponsorship may indeed restrain their clients from killing too promiscuously, but the provision of resources and support may enable an organization to engage in some killing” (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).

I have referenced the quantitative studies by Asal and Rethemeyer many times while reviewing the literature on lethality. This is because their study is the most comprehensive study regarding the lethality of terrorist; so I believe it is necessary to include the conclusion from their study in order to get a full grasp of lethality:

Using the best –though limited – data available in the public domain, we believe the answer is that (1) large organizations, (2) organizations that address supernatural audiences through religious ideologies,(3) organizations with religious-ethnonationalist ideologies – ideologies that define another and play to the supernatural, (4) organizations that build and maintain extensive alliance connections with peers, and (5) organizations that maintain control over territory are the primary actors in this story (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).

The literature has gone a long way in showing the link between terrorism and organized crime, how terrorist organizations are funded, what has been done to stop funding and determining what makes an organization lethal. With all of this literature, however, I have not found any research or study that has examined the relationship between funding from organized crime and the lethality of terrorist groups. It is important to say that I am not rejecting these other factors that may influence lethality in my study, just arguing that another factor (organized crime activity) has been overlooked. With the increasing links between organized crime activity and terrorism I believe this is a definite hole in the literature and examining whether or not an organization's lethality is affected by different sources of funding is important. Considering that organizations have shown the ability to adapt to current attempts of cutting state sponsorship by moving towards organized crime activity this link becomes even more important. If this type of activity affects the lethality of an organization then the international community can better

determine how they should focus their attack on terrorist financing. Beginning to fill this void in the literature is a major goal of this prospectus.

### **III. Hypothesis**

The hypothesis I'd like to test is: *Terrorist organizations that receive funding through their own organized crime activities are likely to be more lethal than those that do not.*

For this hypothesis the dependent variable will be the lethality of an organization. The most important independent variable for the test will be funding through organized crime activity. I will also use various other variables for lethality of terrorist organizations that have been mentioned in the literature when conducting my study. One of these variables will have to be state sponsorship. This is because I believe the state sponsorship of the organization will have a restraining affect that will outweigh the other affects that some scholars believe sponsorship has. The possibility of a restraining affect has been observed by other researchers when examining the relationship between state sponsorship and lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Simon and Benjamin 2001). However, other literature argues that state sponsorship would likely make an organization more lethal than it would be otherwise due to the extra perks such as weapons, training, and a home base that state sponsorship would provide (Byman 2005; Quillen 2002; Wilkinson 2001). The other variables will include size, ideology, control of territory, and organizational connections (according to BAAD1).

I believe that this hypothesis is important due to the fact that a study of the affects of organized crime activities used by terrorist organizations as a source of funding on an organization's lethality has not been done at least not to this level of quantitative analysis. If it is correct it suggests that the international community should focus its efforts in fighting terrorist

financing on stopping organizations' ability to conduct these activities. It will also add to the literature regarding what makes an organization lethal, which is very important for its own reasons. Knowing what makes some organizations lethal and others not lethal is of much interest to those studying terrorism and I hope this will expand on what has already been written and researched.

#### **IV. Research Design**

I plan taking a quantitative approach in my testing of this hypothesis. I will run a Negative Binomial Regression using organized crime activity and some of the variables tested by Asal and Rethemeyer. I can find most of the data I need such as if an organization has a state sponsor and how many fatalities an organization has caused using the BAAD database (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008), but will need to do more research on which organizations use organized crime activity as a source of funding.

I must be clear in my operationalization and coding of my variables along with other terms that are important to my study. First it is important to explain what exactly I will consider as terrorism or terrorist organizations. The definition of what exactly is terrorism is widely debated among the literature, but for my purposes I will use the definition from Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism "Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desire to take" (MIPT's Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Terrorism). Due to the fact that the Big Allied and Dangerous data base also uses the definition provided by MIPT, I can consider a terrorist organization any organization that is in BAAD1 to be a terrorist organization.

I will also need to define organized crime and organized crime activity, however once again the definition of organized crime is contested within the literature and there is not one firm definition. I will adapt the definition used by Jay Albanese “Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illegal activities; its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials” (Albanese 2000). I will consider organized crime activity to be any involvement in the drug trade, weapons trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigrant smuggling, or credit fraud used by a terrorist organization in an effort to fund their organization.

I can operationalize lethality by looking at the amount of fatalities an organization caused. These numbers are available for fatalities caused between 1998 and 2005 in the BAAD1 database (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). The operationalization of most of the other variables can be done very simply using the BAAD database as well. For example to operationalize state sponsorship I would simply need to look at whether or not each organization has a state sponsor and since this information is already available to me it is a very simple process. However the operationalization of organized crime activity is a much tougher task because there is no comprehensive database or list of all terrorist organizations that have been linked to organized crime activity. In order to complete my analysis I required such a database, so using BAAD1 as my main database I added a column for organized crime. I muddled through all of the literature (academic articles and books) I could find that reported links between terrorist organizations and organized crime activity. In all I found links to organized crime being used as a source of funding in 36 of the terrorist organizations from the BAAD1 database. The organizations I found with such links are:

al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, FARC, LRA, Armed Islamic Group, Hamas, Taliban, UNITA, al-Fatah, AUC, LTTE, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu Hafs al-Masri

Brigade, Tawhid and Jihad, Abu Sayyaf Group, LeT, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Communist Party of India-Maoist, National Liberation Army (Colombia), MILF, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists, Basque Fatherland and Freedom, Shining Path, PKK, RIRA, Hezbollah, Hizb-I-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Irish Republican Army, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Kosovo Liberation Army, Revolutionary United Front, Free Papua Movement, and April 19 Movement.

Obviously there is a chance that more than just these organizations use organized crime to fund their operations. However, due to the limited data available on terrorist organizations I had to rely on previous academic research that has shown which organizations have used organized crime.

## V. **Research and Analysis**

Now that I had a functional database to test my hypothesis I decided to run a Negative Binomial Regression on all of the terrorist organizations in BAAD1 using R. I decided to run the regression using my Organized Crime variable and all of the variables that Asal and Rethemeyer found to be significant in *The Nature of the Beast*. These variables included: Size, Religious Ideology, Ethnonationalist Ideology, Religious and Ethnonationalist, Organizational Connections, Control of Territory. I also included State Sponsorship as mentioned earlier even though Asal and Rethemeyer found it to not have a very significant relationship to lethality. Like Asal and Rethemeyer I ran this regression both with Al Qaeda and without Al Qaeda. Both of these regressions yielded very similar results. The results for the negative binomial regression including Al Qaeda can be found in Table 1 (without Al Qaeda can be found in the appendix):



**Table 1 Negative Binomial Regression with State Sponsorship and Control of Territory**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>P-Value</b>
Size	1.319	0.178	1.36e-13
Religious Ideology	2.002	0.374	8.37e-08
Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.863	0.321	0.007147
Ethnonationalist and Religious	2.740	0.355	1.33e-14
State Sponsorship	-0.051	0.474	0.914903
Control of Territory	0.572	0.456	0.209688
Organized Crime	1.574	0.495	0.001483
Organizational Connections	0.1631	0.051	0.001295

All figures for Coefficient and Standard Error are rounded to the nearest thousandth

According to my Negative Binomial Regression it appears that when an organization uses organized crime activity as a source of funding they are more likely to be lethal than those that do not, confirming my hypothesis. The variable seems to be very significant and have a relatively large effect on lethality when compared to the other variables. Organized crime activity was the 3<sup>rd</sup> most influential variable behind only Religious ideology and Religious + Ethnonationalist. Both of those variables have a significant impact on lethality, but it appears that with the addition of the organized crime variable that both seem to have a somewhat lesser impact than what was found by Asal and Rethemeyer. You will also notice that when I ran the regression with organized crime added in I found that neither Control of Territory (p value of > .2) nor State Sponsorship (p value of >.9) appeared to be significant. Since state sponsorship was only significant in the “High Confidence” tests run by Asal and Rethemeyer it seems reasonable that my test also found it to have no significant relationship to lethality. However, in

all of the tests Asal and Rethemeyer ran they found that control of territory was significant. The highest p value they achieved in their tests for control of territory was .076 in the “High Confidence” test with the exclusion of Al Qaeda. In looking at the data it seems as though many of the organizations that control territory but do NOT use organized crime as a source of funding have committed a relatively small number of fatalities or none at all. There were 23 such terrorist groups according to my data and all but one of these organizations (PWG at 112 fatalities) committed less than 40 fatalities between 1998 and 2005 and 14 of them committed between 0 and 5 fatalities. On the other hand there were 15 organizations that used organized crime but did NOT control territory. Of these groups 7 committed over 100 fatalities between 1998 and 2005, only 5 committed between 0 and 5 fatalities and the most fatalities caused by one of these groups was 1543. I believe it was due to these reasons that my regression found control of territory to not be significant even though besides the addition of organized crime activity all of my data was the same as that used by Asal and Rethemeyer. All of the other variables seem to have a very similar effect on lethality as was found by Asal and Rethemeyer so there is not much else to say about these variables.

## **VI. Conclusion**

Fighting the financing of terrorist organizations has been a major part of the international effort to combat terrorism. There has been a lot of literature that shows where organizations receive funding from such as: state sponsorship, organized crime activities, charities and wealthy individuals (Abuza 2003; Billingslea 2004; Byman 2005; Croissant and Barlow 2007; de Goede 2003; Ehrenfeld 2005; Roth and Sever 2007). What makes some organizations likely to be lethal and others not has also been discussed extensively within the scholarly literature. The literature has come up with several different factors that could affect an organization’s lethality including:

the organizations ideology, the size of the organization, if the organization has extensive alliances, whether the organization has control of territory (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).

Regarding financing there has been conflicting literature regarding the affect of state sponsors on organizations lethality. Some argue that an organization is likely to be more lethal if it has a state sponsor (Byman 2005; Wilkinson 2001); while other literature argues that there is a restraining affect on the organizations ability to kill by its state sponsor (Simon and Benjamin 2001). However, my tests were consistent with the findings of Asal and Rethemeyer and found that state sponsorship is likely not significantly correlated with lethality.

In all my data has found that organized crime activity used for the funding of an organization does have a significant impact on an organization's lethality. In fact, according to my tests it was the third most influential factor behind only Religious ideology and Ethnonationalist + Religious ideology. Obviously, with the limited data available on terrorist organizations it may be that more organizations use organized crime activity for funding than the 36 I found evidence of. If there is evidence of more organizations using organized crime activity my data will need to be updated to account for these changes. However, I believe even if it were to be found that more organizations use organized crime activity that it would hold true that organizations that use organized crime activity are likely to be more lethal than those who do not.

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