To Fight or Not to Fight: Examining Violence as an Organizational Choice

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Abstract: Non-governmental organizations have become a key concern for international relations theorists and comparative thinkers. While most NGO’s promote their social, political, and economic interests through peaceful means, some use violence; this study seeks to understand why. I assert that the use of violence is a tactical decision made at the dyadic level in consideration of resources that are vital to the organization’s survival. This investigation uses principles from the theory of resource dependency to analyze cases where one NGO uses violence in the same ‘system’ as another that does not. I conclude that organizations dependent on social actors for vital resources are less likely to use violent tactics to achieve their goals. These results and future studies built upon them could be used to compile a behavioral model for both violent and nonviolent organizational behavior.

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Leaders of organizations are constantly making operational choices based on their needs: “should we add a new office in this neighborhood?” “Should we change our marketing campaign to reach a younger demographic?” “Would we be better served by reaching out to other sources for funding?” For those organizations with political objectives, there is often another deliberation: “should we use violence to make our point?” I am not claiming that the leadership sits down in a conference room and drafts the pros and cons of a violent strategy on a color-coded white board, but there is certainly a calculus that shapes how different organizations behave. As these non-state become increasingly important in understanding the dynamics of the international system, understanding the factors that drive them is inherently important for modern policymakers. The goal of this investigation is to discern what factors contribute to this decision-making process through a comparative case study analysis of violent and nonviolent organizations.

My theoretical contention is simple: because non-state actors in similar environments with similar goals use both violence and nonviolence, the reasoning behind this divergence cannot be explained by variables at the systemic level. As I will discuss in greater detail later, many theorists have examined variables at this level of analysis (e.g. oppression) to find a trend in the behavior of violent non-state actors. I argue that the choice to use violence is made at the dyadic level using an informal cost-benefit analysis. Resource dependency theory, which is often applied to peaceful organizations by scholars within the business and public administration disciplines, may hold some explanatory power here. Advocacy groups’ goals’ center around a popular movement. As Pfeffer and Salancik put it, “because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, the environment must be relied upon to provide support” (1978, p. 41). In other words, organizations’ actions are governed to an extent by external demands.
To explore this theory and its applicability to the behavior of violent non-state actors, I examine the organizations themselves to discern what factors specifically drive their decision-making processes. I conduct an in-depth analysis of an individual organization, comparing it to another that works toward the same goals in a similar environment with an opposite perspective on the use of force. The analysis is then expanded to other pairs of organizations in an attempt to test the applicability of the results. While other studies have looked at both violent and non-violent organizations, none have examined them in this way. By controlling for exogenous systemic variables, my research design will help me understand how organizations really answer the question “to fight or not to fight?”

The Effectiveness of Nonviolent Tactics

Studies of non-violence focus mainly on the relative success of this approach (Martin, Varney, & Vickers, 2001). Mohandas Gandhi is often credited with the first concerted use of nonviolence as a tactic against a perceived threat. In alluding to this case, it is important to note that non-violence does not mean non-contention. Gandhi was still working against the British colonial power structure; he simply was not using violence to do so. The power of Gandhi’s movement, like most successful instances of peaceful resistance, can be found in the organizational structure (Boulding, 1999).

Several key factors contribute to the success of non-violent movements. In South Africa, many of those oppressed by the apartheid government were workers in the highly lucrative (and indeed, economically necessary) diamond mines in the country. Because the anti-apartheid movement controlled the means of production in this manner, it had tremendous leverage over the government (Zunes, 1999; Greer, 2007). The size of the organization also plays a role. In larger groups, the focus on solidarity and communication diminish in complement to the returns.
A caveat to this theory is that increased electronic communication has made it easier for groups to organize, and so the size of an organization that can be successful is growing (Boulding, 1999; Holzscheiter, 2005; Greer, 2007). This theory is supported by the success of the Golanian Druze, a small group that has slowly gained influence in the struggle against the Israeli state through concerted solidarity (Kennedy, 1984).

The structure around the organization can also have a crucial impact. Self-determinist movements in Scotland and Catalonia have achieved relatively high levels of political autonomy through peaceful mechanisms. This is because in both instances, the central governments outsourced direct regional control through democratic participation anyway, and so these groups were presented with the opportunity for regional control (Greer, 2007). An interesting question that arises from this study is that if the prospect for political autonomy through a representative system is indeed an explanatory variable for non-violent resistance, why is there still daily violence in Northern Ireland? The complex struggle in this region suggests that there are other factors at work here.

While successful attempts at non-violent resistance dominate the literature, they are not the only examples of this approach that may help explain its dynamics. An examination of non-violent resistance in Indonesia against the repressive Suharto regime in the 1960’s and 1990’s provide examples of failed and successful attempts (respectively) at subverting a regime through international support (Martin et al., 2001). Aptly referred to as ‘political jiu-jitsu,’ this process involves a tactical lack of violent resistance to violent repression. Theoretically, using the regime’s own aggression against it in this manner should aid in the development of international backlash, as it changes the conversation from one about civil conflict to one about political genocide.
Political jiu-jitsu was unsuccessful for the movement against the Jakarto Garrison commander, General Suharto, during his rise to power in the late 1960’s. A widespread fear of the spread of communism among western powers allowed Suharto to exterminate hundreds of thousands of communists within Indonesia without much international backlash (and even with some levels of international support). In contrast, the international environment in the 1990’s provided an ideal opportunity for the political jiu-jitsu tactic. While western powers had originally been supportive of Suharto, protests resulting from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s caused an influx of international activists and NGO’s to support the anti-Saharto movement, leading to further repressive measures against internal dissidents. This increase in violence by the regime coupled with international support emboldened dissenters, eventually leading to Suharto’s resignation (Martin et al., 2001).

**Killing to Prove a Point**

In the post-Cold War era, the increasing relevance of non-state and sub-state actors has put them at the center of the political violence debate. As such, scholars have argued about why these organizations use violence from a plethora of perspectives. Violent non-state actors (VNSA’s) can both weaken and halt the rise in the power of individual states depending on the states’ resources. For these groups to be successful in this venture, however, they need to have a strong network and a steady stream of “human and material resources” (Bogatyrenko, 2006a, 2006b).

To cope with this emergent force in international relations, rationalists needed to adjust their argument. One contention is that some VNSA’s are not acting rationally at all. Corey evaluates terrorism (as a specific type of violence) as ultimately self-destructive; therefore, groups that use terrorism fall outside conventional rational-actor theory (Martin et al., 2001).
Other theorists rely on the “modified rational actor model,” which accounts for the increasing variance in organizational goals and contends that a group’s motivation is defined by “factors that influence and constrain the course followed” (Kriesberg, 1973; Jabri, 1996). These factors could be “misunderstood signals, perceived changes in the balance of advantage…and the input of allies and others” (Jabri, 1996). This means that while these organizations may not seem to be acting rationally through the perspective of an American college student, for example, they may be influenced by seemingly unconventional goals or their own perceptions of the power structure within the situation.

As an addendum to this capacity argument, theorists claim that organizational history can contribute to the development of violence. If an organization has had failed negotiations in the past, it is more likely to resort to violence. This contributes to a greater cycle where violent conditions lead to negotiations and failed negotiations lead to more violent conflict. This is especially true in U.K./Irish relations, which have experienced periods of both heavy violence and relative peace. This theory suggests that non-violent groups can emerge when violent groups and the government are in heavy conflict and that violent groups can emerge when non-violent groups have failed at negotiating (Tilly, 2003).

Literature focusing on the structural components of political violence discusses both the internal makeup and external influences surrounding violent organizations. Among the most compelling of these arguments is that socio-economic repression is a strong determinant in the outbreak of violence (Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007). As a result, groups that do not have a say in government or are not allowed basic freedoms afforded to other groups are much more likely to become violent. Others claim that the situation is slightly more complicated. Post, Ruby, and Shaw test 32 variables in an attempt to gain a broad
understanding of the structural components of political violence. They conclude that “group ideology and goals; experience with violence; authoritarian leadership and decision making; organizational processes such as recruitment, training, and attrition; and group psychological processes such as humiliation and need for revenge; and sense of threat and negative characterization of the enemy were rated consistently as highly important” (2002).

There has been an ongoing debate about the role of culture, specifically religion, in the choice to use violence. Ghadbian provides the most compelling argument against this explanation, contending that in the case of political Islam, both non-violent and violent groups use the Quran to justify their respective approaches (2000). This is an interesting argument because it distinguishes between the role of religion as an explanatory variable and as a tool for organizational leaders to garner support, claiming the latter. This claim is supported by Zaidise, et al. who conclude that religion is a strong factor in the level of support for violent tactics, which points to Ghadbian’s explanation (2007).

Interestingly, an exception to the cultural and structural arguments may exist in the case of the Golan Heights Druze, which was previously mentioned as a situation where non-violence has worked well. Because the Druze do not really fit into the Christian, Muslim, or Jewish belief structures, they are in a different, possibly worse situation than groups that fall into those categories. Despite the fact that they are persecuted against as much as if not more than violent Muslim groups in the area, they remain nonviolent (Kennedy, 1984). This provides an interesting counter to the argument that repression causes violence. Furthermore, Zaidise, et al. contend that cultural differences between dominant and repressed groups act as a catalyst for violence, and yet the Druze are non-violent. While this case can certainly be written off as an outlier when viewed on its own, it is part of a general trend that cannot be ignored.
As previously mentioned, most of the literature focuses on why non-violent organizations develop into violent groups. Sambanis and Zinn conclude that cultural repression is a strong reason, and non-violent political protest is a strong indicator (2005). While this is a theoretically interesting model, it does not directly compare violent organizations with non-violent organizations; therefore, it overlooks the fact that an organization could chose violence under much the same systemic conditions as one that does not. Raines attacks the question more directly using case studies of violent and non-violent terrorist organizations, and concludes that non-violent tactics are probabilistically more effective. She adds that the objective of violent tactics is exposure, and they are utilized when the organization does not have as much support (Raines, 2005). This conclusion misses the main point, however, as organizations still continually chose violence over peaceful mechanisms even if they have a strong base (e.g. the IRA).

Graham’s case study analysis on the decision to use violence over nonviolence is the closest to what I am trying to achieve. She examines several cases where organizations have shifted between violent and non-violent tactics, concluding that “political exclusion, state repression and sources of support” determine these organizations’ decision-making process at any given time (2008). Nevertheless, Graham fails to explain the phenomenon I plan to study, that groups in similar situations make opposite decisions using violence.

Overall, the literature has failed to adequately explain what causes groups to become violent; nevertheless, there has been an increased emphasis on the topic, especially in the literature on terrorism. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) database project focuses on socially, politically, or economically oppressed ethnic groups and the organizations they use to mobilize. The MAR Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset examines these organizations and could
be used to compare nonviolent and violent organizations that are in the same ethnic group. In the way of materialized studies, Asal and Rethemeyer conclude that “ideology, capabilities, and ‘dilettantism’ explain a significant proportion of the variation in whether an organization chooses to kill or not to kill” (2008, p. 1). It is important to note, however, that all of the NGO’s analyzed in this study are terrorist organizations (which, based on the authors’ definition, do not need to kill) (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). For my study, I expand the analysis to all NGO’s in an attempt to address the broader context of the choice between violence and nonviolence.

**Adjusting the Lens: Studying Organizations as Organizations**

To adapt the old adage, “violent NGO’s are people too.” There has been an unwritten yet highly practiced dichotomy in the literature between organizations that fight and ones that do not. To study NGO’s in this disjointed manner creates the risk of overlooking key explanatory variables that may be found in other areas of study. Despite the fact that combined studies have not caught on in a broad sense, some theorists have begun to combine the study of violent NGO’s with theories applied to peaceful groups. Asal, Nussbaum, and Harrington apply Keck and Sikkink’s discussion of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to their own observations on terrorist network behavior (2007). This type of analysis “will allow comparison of violent and nonviolent TANs, increasing variance and allowing researchers to ask why some TANs turn to violence and others do not” (Asal et al., 2007). Studying nonviolent and violent NGO’s together can have a similar effect.

**Resource Dependency**

An aspect of resource dependence theory focusing on social actors’ control of organizations is particularly useful in examining political NGO’s decision making processes. Many organizations are dependent on their constituencies for resources (usually in the form of
money). A political party in the United States, for example, depends on its core constituency to make donations in order to build up its election coffers. A party candidate will often shift his or her agenda to make sure it falls in line with his or her constituency. If, however, the candidate is retiring, he or she will be less likely to conform if his or her beliefs are slightly different. This is because the candidate will not need the funds to be re-elected for the following term. While this is an oversimplification of the dynamics of money and resources in American politics, it suffices in outlining the basic principles of resource dependency theory.

Pfeffer and Salancik provide a ten-criterion framework for evaluating the extent to which an organization is dependent on a social actor; i.e. “the extent to which the organization will comply with control attempts” (1978, p. 44). The list of criteria can be found in Figure 1. It is worth noting that not every criterion needs to be fulfilled for the organization to be considered dependent on the social actor; rather, they are used to assess the extent to which the organization is beholden to the social actor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The focal organization is aware of the demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The focal organization receives some resources from the social actor making the demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The resource is a critical or important aspect of the focal organization’s operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The social actor controls the allocation, access, or use of the resource; alternative sources for the resource are not available to the focal organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The focal organization does not control the allocation, access, or use of other resources critical to the social actor’s operation and survival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The actions or outputs of the focal organization are visible and can be assessed by the social actor to judge whether the actions comply with its demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The focal organization’s satisfaction of the social actor’s requests are not in conflict with the satisfaction of demands from other components of the environment with which it is interdependent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The focal organization does not control the determination, formulation, or expression of the social actor’s demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The focal organization is capable of developing actions or outcomes that will satisfy the external demands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. The organization desires to survive.</td>
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</table>

Figure 1: Criteria pointing to external control from a social actor (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 p.44)
So what is this ‘social actor’ Pfeffer and Salancik discuss and how does it apply to political NGO’s? McCarthy and Zald provide an interesting answer in their discussion of social movements and resource mobilization. Social movements usually depend on outside sources of income, and have two groups associated with them, adherents and constituents. “Adherents are those individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of the movement,” constituents provide the resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1221). For this investigation, the constituents are the social actors. This is not to say that there is a static line between a constituent and an adherent; after all, someone who provides resources can believe in the cause very deeply. For the most part, however, constituents are sympathizers from the societal elite (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Here again, there is a line to be drawn. Sympathizers support causes that line up with their beliefs, meaning that if the organization also supporting the cause strays from their social mores, they will not follow it. Adherents, on the other hand, believe what the organization believes and will change their social mores in allegiance to the organization. As I will demonstrate later when discussing the cases in detail, the distinction between constituent and adherent has a significant impact on whether or not an organization is dependent on a social actor.

This framework is largely based on the assertion that resources are critical to an organization. While Pfeffer and Salancik adequately support this from a business standpoint, it is important to reframe it from a political perspective. They note that “an organization that creates variety of outputs that are being disposed of in a variety of markets” are particularly susceptible to outside influence. They use the example of universities, which primarily cater to high school graduates between the ages of 18 and 22. If there were to be a drop in educated students aged 18-22, this would be an issue for universities (1978, p. 46). This type of discussion is where the bridge between business and political science becomes slightly murky because political groups
do not produce a ‘product,’ per se. To discuss McCarthy and Zald’s analysis in a business context, the constituents are the customers looking for a product. Most constituents are probably not following the organization on a daily basis; rather, they noticed them in some major, agreed with the cause, and decided to provide resources. As a result, they simply expect the organization to remain active in support of the greater cause. Tactics become a question in this case, as we will later explore, as many constituents do not want to be associated with certain tactics that are socially unsavory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

Research dependency theory can be usefully applied to both violent and nonviolent organizations through a discussion of social actors’ influence. As already stated, it is my assertion that organizations that are dependent on social actors are less likely to use violent tactics. This is because social actors, defined herein as constituents rather than adherents, will not support violent tactics by an NGO en masse. This is because “potentially sympathetic publics perceive violent militants as having maximalist or extremist goals beyond accommodation, but they perceive nonviolent resistance groups as less extreme, thereby enhancing their appeal and facilitating the extraction of concessions through bargaining” (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 9). As a result, organizations dependent on social actors for resources will be more reluctant to use violence, lest they lose the support of their constituents. Pfeffer and Salancik’s framework for gauging organizations’ dependence will be particularly useful in testing this hypothesis.

**Research Design**

My research design is set up to achieve two goals in testing my hypothesis: remove systemic variables from the discussion and test the relationship between social actor dependence and the use of violence. The most effective way to do this would be with a multivariate regression analysis on data compiled from hundreds of organizations; however, such data do not
exist. Instead, I take a qualitative approach relying largely on interpretive data rather than statistical coding. Because I cannot do a formal statistical significance test on the relationship outlined in my hypothesis, my goal is to discern whether or not the relationship warrants further study.

**Defining ‘Violence’ and ‘Dependence’**

As already mentioned, this investigation will be designed to study the dynamics of non-state and sub-state organizations. In order to draw as sharp a distinction as possible, I define a violent organization as having been responsible for a fatality. Conversely, a non-violent organization is defined as not having been involved in any violent incident. Involvement includes actually carrying out an attack or supporting one through financial or logistical means. Regarding explicit or implicit support of a violent organization, there is a great deal of gray area, which will be addressed on a case by case basis. I recognize that “violence” as a broader concept exists as a spectrum rather than a simple black and white dichotomy, but drawing this sharp distinction in my case selection will provide more efficient results.

First, I discuss whether or not the organization is dependent on a social actor for resources. Because much of what I am discussing as ‘resources’ is monetary, a small amount can come from donations without the organization being beholden to the donators. To establish the extent to which an organization is dependent on a social actor, I use Pfeffer and Salancik’s ten indicators designed to gauge this very phenomenon (outlined above). For simplicity’s sake, an organization fulfilling none of the criteria is defined as not dependent; 1-3 is a low level of dependency\(^1\), 4-6 is medium, and 7-9 is high. In addition to this basic rubric, the case studies discuss the organization’s dependence in greater detail.

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\(^1\) The criterion “the organization desires to survive” is not considered in the calculation of dependence, as this is assumed of all of the organizations in this case study. As a result, organizations are measured on a scale of 1-9.
Sources of Information

Structuring my research design as a comparative case study allows me to investigate each organization very closely with information from a wide range of data. For violent organizations, I primarily use data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS) compiled by the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) and furnished by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). For non-violent organizations and any data on violent ones not contained in the aforementioned databases, I will retrieve this information through other open-source resources, such as organization websites, journal articles, and news article databases.

Methodology

The basis of my study is the analysis of two organizations with similar goals in similar situations that use divergent tactics. I will do this using the “Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD),” which “seeks to control for those factors that are similar across the [subjects of] the study, while focusing on only those factors that are different” (Landman, 2007; Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Additionally, I will expand this study to other pairs of similar organizations with divergent tactics in an attempt to see if my results are replicated in these cases.

A successful implementation of MSSD is predicated on controlling for relevant variables so that the differences discerned in the data analysis can reasonably be seen as causal and not spurious (Landman, 2007). To do so, I will utilize a selective range of cases based on their country or region, ideology, religion (if applicable), and goals. The objective here is to make sure that the organizations being compared represent the same group of people in conditions that are as similar as possible. Controlling for these variables removes many of the external variables that
are seen as causal in the literature, especially level of repression (Graham, 2008; Zaidise et al., 2007).

In addition to controlling for alternative variables that are potentially causal, it is important to diversify the pairs of cases I am analyzing. If I were to look simply at separatist groups, for example, I would be building a theory on separatist violence, not violence in general; therefore, in my case selection, I will be sure to diversify my pairs of cases as much as possible. This objective, however, is tertiary to ensuring that I effectively utilize my control variables and maintain the stark contrast between violence and nonviolence.

Case Selection

Pro-Life Organizations in the United States

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision on Roe v. Wade in 1973 that a woman’s choice to abort a pregnancy falls under individual privacy rights, there has been an influx of ‘pro-life’ organizations advocating against the legality of abortion in the United States. Many of the pro-life movements that have emerged are religious, and can often have additional goals (independent of abortion policy) which are also based on their religious beliefs. Most of these organizations focus on resources for women to dissuade them from choosing abortion coupled with strong denouncement of pro-choice policies through protest (Neitz, 1981). Some, however, have turned to violence to further their agenda.

The organizations I focus on within this group are the Army of God and the Gospel of Life Ministries. The Army of God is a religious anti-abortion organization that perceives itself as an army with “God as its commander in chief” and sees violence as necessary to ‘save’ the United States (START, 2008). The Gospel of Life Ministries, on the other hand, sees itself as simply an “interdenominational effort to end abortion,” which it sees as the “greatest crisis of
modern times” (Gospel of Life Ministries, 2009). Both of these organizations are based in inter-denominational Christian beliefs and share the same goals, making them ideal for this case study.

**Sunni Islamic Organizations in the Middle East**

With the United States’ conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Middle East has become central to any discussion of violent conflict. At the center of violence in the Middle East is an organization known as al-Qaeda, which seeks to remove western influence from the region and establish an Islamic Caliphate. The leader of the organization, Osama bin-Laden, is a self-proclaimed imam who interprets Islamic scripture to support violence against non-Muslims (START, 2008). Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the other hand, exists in tactical contrast to al-Qaeda. This organization characterizes western influence as repressive and anti-Islamic, seeking its removal and calling for the establishment of a caliphate, similarly to al-Qaeda (Hizb ut Tahrir, 2006). The difference, of course, is that al-Qaeda is violent while Hizb ut-Tahrir is not. Both organizations, while based in the Middle East, have very strong global networks.

As I will discuss later, al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-Tahrir came from two different parts of the Middle East. Analyzing them as two organizations founded under the same level of repression is not an attempt to gloss over the political situation in the region as uncomplicated (which any scholar of Middle Eastern politics would say is far from the truth). I had two options in this case. The first was to evaluate Hizb ut-Tahrir as Karagiannis and McCauley did, by discussing its regional operations alongside another regional actor (I could also have done the same for al-Qaeda) (2006). For this case study, this is a dangerous choice because it ignores the global organizational dynamic while attempting to discuss matters of organizational capacity and resource flow. I opted, therefore, for the second option, which is to consider the levels of repression for the two groups to be similar based on their goals. While Palestine and Afghanistan
(Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Qaeda’s regions of origin, respectively) are dynamically different, they are both areas where anti-western sentiment was developed in response to intervention. The United States maintains its material support for Israel in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and currently controls the central government in Afghanistan. Being that both organizations share a common main grievance against the United States, I would argue that the repression is similar enough to be coded as a control variable.

Despite the differences in their origins, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Qaeda provide an important contrast in attempting to understand why some organizations fight and others do not. The two groups not only use divergent tactics, they condemn each other for it, further dividing them. I examine the roots and development of these organizations in the regions, as well as their current actions and statements in order to paint a more accurate picture. Then, as with the pro-life organizations, I analyze them through the lens of my hypotheses.

Communist Organizations in Colombia

The conflict for legitimacy in Colombia has been particularly ugly. Since the mid 1940’s, Colombia has been engulfed in both bilateral and unilateral violence. In the early 1960’s, left wing military groups started to emerge and push their agendas (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2008). One such organization is known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was established in 1964. This organization acts as a destabilizing force for the Colombian democratic government and has advocated a shift to communist control, though its recent activities also suggest territorial goals (START, 2008).

The complicated nature of this conflict has resulted in many shifting alliances. One such alliance was between FARC and the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), which existed until the early 1990’s, when the two organizations parted along tactical lines. It is this split that I am
interested in examining for these cases. While FARC and the PCC had always utilized divergent tactics, they supported each other until the PCC began to take a less hard-line approach. The reasoning behind this shift may provide valuable insight into the answer of my question.

Loyalists in Northern Ireland

The conflict between Ireland and the United Kingdom (Britain) and Ireland dates back centuries, and is multi-faceted. On one hand, there is a political conflict over territory and allegiance, on the other, there is a deeply-rooted tension between Catholics and Protestants, which also defines the conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2008). In order to remove the religious variable from the equation, I intend to look at Protestant loyalist organizations based in Northern Ireland that advocate continued allegiance to the U.K.

The current strongest unionist party in Northern Ireland is also the most hard-line: the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Because it is an established political party in a democratic system, DUP focuses heavily on domestic issues in its current policy priorities, but has never abandoned its founding loyalist philosophy, which drives both its decisions and its actions. The violent organization is more complicated. Until the late nineties, the Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) organization was the most prevalent violent organization in Northern Ireland. When the UDA/UFF signed peace accords, it is believed that their more violent members were shared between the Red Hand Defenders and, to a lesser degree, the Orange Volunteers.
## 2: ORGANIZATIONS and CONTROL VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Organization</th>
<th>Non-violent Organization</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Goal(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army of God</td>
<td>Gospel of Life Ministries</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Christian (both are multi-denominational)</td>
<td>Pro-Life / Anti-Abortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Hizb ut-Tahrir</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Islamic Caliphate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</td>
<td>Colombian Communist Party (PCC)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Communist Government in Colombia</td>
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<td>Violent Loyalist Organizations*</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)</td>
<td>U.K. (Northern Ireland)</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>U.K. Loyalist, Anti-Catholic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UDA/UFF, Red Hand Defenders, and Orange Volunteers (as explained).

### Pan-Islamic Groups in the Middle East

The long-term goal of both al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-Tahrir has been the reestablishment of a Caliphate in the Middle-East similar to that of Muhammad and his early successors. Both organizations see this as the only way for an Islamic government to exist in accordance with the Quran, as current Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia fall short of expectations. This transformation can only occur with a dismantling of the current state structure (rather than with the gradual infusion of Islamic ideals) (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; START, 2008). This argument has mass appeal in a region where the current state system was developed by colonial powers around a highly tribal society with little regard for these tribes. In the case of the Arabian Peninsula, for example, colonial governments largely ignored tribes in the more desolate areas, allowing them to persist. Furthermore, tribes that were largely divided ideologically were
consolidated within single states; for example, in Iraq, Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds were all brought under the same flag, laying the groundwork for conflict and unrest (Tibi, 1990).

*Hizb ut-Tahrir*

Since 9/11, Islamic Extremist movements have become the face of international terrorism. One organization, however, has seemed to have kept its hands clean of violence in the struggle. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) has existed since 1953, when it was founded by a Palestinian Islamic scholar named Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. Initially, HUT gained most of its supporters from the Arabian Peninsula, but its appeal quickly spread throughout the Arab states. Today, HUT operates globally, with influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America. The central leadership has remained Palestinian since its founding, but the organization has become more localized in its day-to-day operations worldwide. The current focal point of HUT’s efforts is believed to be in the highly volatile post-Soviet states in Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan. To this point, HUT has not been involved in any violent activity and has actively condemned jihadist efforts by other Islamic groups (Baran, 2004; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006).

HUT’s peaceful operations have their ideological roots in its members’ interpretation of the Quran. They claim that only the Caliph may call for jihad against western states, which would mean that current jihadist movements are fundamentally against Islamic teachings. To become a member, one has to both study and accept this doctrine. Nevertheless, there is a growing fear that because HUT’s goals cannot logically be achieved without military action, the organization will eventually become violent. Baran, for one, points to a recent increase in extremist rhetoric as signs that the group will militarize (2004). It is worth noting, however, that while HUT’s anti-western rhetoric is a threat to the United States and its western allies, it does
not necessarily lead to violence. Furthermore, for a violent shift to occur, HUT would have to undergo a major organizational change from the indoctrination that has been necessary to maintain its peaceful operations. HUT believes that its mass appeal in the Middle East will only grow, and in doing so will provide the foundation for its success (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; Mayer, 2004). Regardless, for our purposes, HUT has been a peaceful organization since its founding and shows no signs of shifting in the near future.

For HUT, the central resource for its success is money. The organization’s global coordination relies on the successful implementation of information technology coupled with the efficient distribution of printed literature in the less developed areas of the Middle East and Central Asia. While information technology is not necessarily expensive, HUT uses IT services in countries where they are less prevalent and thus harder to implement. The sources of this funding are less clear than its importance. Scholars believe that resources come from a combination of discreet donations and membership fees (Baran, 2004; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; Mayer, 2004). As a result, measuring the importance of the social actor is more difficult in this case. I submit, however, that a hypothetical view of the situation can shed some light on the subject.

What would happen if HUT decided to shift to violent tactics? If Stephan and Chenoweth are correct, moderate supporters will abandon HUT, resulting in a decrease in both membership fees and donations (2008). As I will discuss later, the small amount of potential donors who advocate violence in the pursuit of an Islamic Caliphate already contribute to al-Qaeda, so they are less likely to donate to HUT if it emerges as a violent actor. This sharp decrease in resource flow would come at the same time that the organization is trying to purchase weapons. HUT,
therefore, could not use violent tactics even if it wanted to because it is beholden to a moderate Islamic social actor for resources.

\textit{al-Qaeda}

In sharp contrast to Hizb ut-Tahrir, members of al-Qaeda see violence against western oppressors as the only path to an Islamic Caliphate. Al-Qaeda was founded in the late 1980’s by the now infamous Osama bin-Laden to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The organization shifted its policy toward a general anti-western focus after the USSR withdrew. As the main source of intervention in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has become al-Qaeda’s main target. Since the 1990’s, al-Qaeda has successfully networked with many other Islamic militant groups worldwide, which it uses as proxies in regional conflicts. Additionally, al-Qaeda is believed to have its own cells operating in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and North America (START, 2008).

Such a vast network requires both supplies and monetary resources. The supplies are mainly drawn from stockpiles held over from the conflict with the Soviets. In sustaining regional conflict, al-Qaeda mostly supplies money and training. To support these efforts, al-Qaeda utilizes an extremely sophisticated financial network that uses “fraud and legitimate businesses to support [itself]”. Furthermore, “the decentralized nature of Al Qaeda makes the overall financial structure very self-sufficient and potentially regenerative” (Basile, 2004, pp. 170-171). In other words, al-Qaeda’s resource stream flows mostly through members whom the organization controls. As a result, al-Qaeda is not beholden to a more moderate social actor that might protest to its violent actions.

\textbf{The U.S. Pro-Life Movement}

\textit{The Gospel of Life Ministries}
The Gospel of Life Ministries is a well-organized, peaceful coalition of pro-life activists rooted in multi-denominational religious morals. Its leaders contend that the majority of U.S. citizens are against abortion, but elected leaders and “out of control judges” are not following through on the majority’s wishes. They advocate motivation through voting and peaceful forms of protest, including lobbying elected officials, sidewalk counseling, and seeking intervention in school curriculum (among many other things). Effective prayer is central to these efforts; many of their ‘action items’ include proscribed prayers. Each week, Gospel of Life runs a 30-minute show discussing abortion from a “biblical perspective” on several religious networks. The organization also supports numerous publications and radio spots with both religious and scientific perspectives on the abortion debate. “The long-term objective is to build a Culture of Life, which reflects the Biblical morals that all true Christians hold in common. The short-term objective is to equip, train and resource Christians of all denominations to use the stewardship of the vote to assure that elected and appointed officials support and defend life” (Gospel of Life Ministries, 2009). There is no open-source evidence of any violence or support of violence by the Gospel of Life Ministries.

In a discussion of resources for an organization like the Gospel of Life Ministries, money is the central issue. Despite the fact that the weekly television show is on obscure networks that are not included in basic packages, it still costs money to produce and air. The radio spots and literature are also expensive. The organization raises money from private donations and the sale of books, bumper stickers, and other materials directly related to its cause. Many of these goods are available as contingents of donations (Gospel of Life Ministries, 2009). Because of this, it is reasonable to see pro-life Christians within the United States as the organization’s social actor.
Gospel of Life needs two things from this constituency: money and votes. Without these two things, the organization can neither survive nor achieve its goals.

The other issue that needs to be addressed is whether or not the Gospel of Life Ministries controls the demands of its constituents. Maxwell discusses nonviolent pro-life activists as having a deep ‘conviction’ in the movement. This conviction is often derived from a dramatic personal experience, such as watching a movie that demonstrates abortions, hearing real-life testimonies from women who have had abortions, or coming to the conclusion that if life begins at conception, a fetus is a person just as they are (Maxwell, 2002). As a result, pro-life activists are committed to the movement, not a specific organization. If it is their belief that violence is an appropriate countermeasure to abortion (as is the more widely-held opinion), activists will condemn a violent movement. Gospel of Life Ministries, therefore, does not control the demands of its constituents.

*The Army of God*

The Army of God is a radical Christian anti-abortion terrorist organization. Like the Gospel of Life Ministries, the Army of God believes that the federal judiciary is to blame for the United States’ unacceptable tolerance of abortion. Unlike Gospel of Life, however, they maintain that the best way to deal with this injustice is to take matters into their own hands. The Army of God’s leaders advocate the maiming and even killing of doctors who perform abortions, claiming that these actions would put the rhetoric of the pro-life movement into practice (“Army of God Website,” 2009). As previously mentioned, AoG members believe that their actions are of divine mandate, and therefore are not governed by secular laws.

While the Army of God is a unified organization, it does not call for unified action. Attacks are carried out by individuals largely based on their own capabilities. The central
leadership provides both the rationalization and the logistics for an attack on a doctor that performs abortions, but does not supply attackers with resources. While AoG does receive some funding from donors, therefore, these resources are not used in the violent central mission of the organization (“Army of God Website,” 2009; START, 2008). In general, violent pro-lifers are highly indoctrinated in their organizations and their respective missions (Mason, 2002). For AoG, there is a strong following behind Paul Hill, an early member executed for killing a doctor who performed abortions. Hill authored much of the AoG manual, which has been used by other members in violent acts against abortion supporters.

Communism in Colombia

The conflict in Colombia goes back decades. Anti-government violence began in the 1960’s, when insurgent groups began to spring up to combat the democratic leadership. One such organization is known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In its early years, the FARC existed as the armed wing for the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), which participated in the democratic government. As time has passed and the FARC has increased its autonomy, it has essentially split from the PCC. It is this relationship coupled with the development of FARC as it has increasingly built up its own resource stream that provides an interesting case to this study.

The Colombian Communist Party (PCC)

To start, there is not very much open-source information on the PCC or on political parties in Colombia in general. The data that exist indicate that the PCC has not held more than 10 percent of the vote at any given time since the 1960’s, and there is no indication of greater support before then. Initially, however, the PCC maintained control over the FARC until the 1960’s, when it began to drift away. As Ortiz puts it, the problem was “that an excessive
proximity to the insurgents could prejudice the communists in the legal political arena. This proved a rather worrying possibility for a party that considered electoral participation as the key to mobilizing the urban population and this as the only possible way of effecting a revolutionary change in Colombia.” As a result, the PCC stated that because the majority of the people leaned toward “mass action,” it was the “principle form of struggle” in the period, rather than guerilla warfare (Ortiz, 2002, p. 133).

It is clear, in retrospect, that the PCC was incorrect. The FARC have been the most instrumental group in bringing about change in Colombia (for better or worse) while the PCC has faded into relative obscurity (Molano, 2000; Ortiz, 2002). Regardless, we can assume that the PCC was dependent on a social actor that it believed was in favor of an electoral change, rather than an insurgent one. To support this, I return to a discussion of modified rational actor theory, which I laid out earlier in this paper. The resources the PCC needed to institute change were votes; therefore, since the PCC believed that its constituency (i.e. communist voters) wanted electoral change, it acted rationally in that consideration (Jabri, 1996; Kriesberg, 1973). In other words, despite the fact that a strong voting contingent that believed in electoral change did not exist, the PCC acted as though it did, meaning that it was dependent on a social actor when it decided to distance itself from the FARC’s violent tactics.

The FARC

Unlike the PCC, the FARC has seen increasing success and prosperity in the pursuit of its goals. Its skillful manipulation of the drug trade in Colombia has allowed it to achieve a high level of resource autonomy with a financial network that far exceeds any other insurgent movement in the country. Operationally, the FARC conducts attacks against the government through terrorist actions on both infrastructure and civilians. The organization also provides
protection for the drug cartels operating in the country in return for ‘taxes’ (Ortiz, 2002). To conduct its operations, the FARC need a constant supply of funds and resources as well as an efficient means of communication.

As the FARC have developed, they have achieved autonomy in three key areas. “First, it has managed to achieve a state of complete self-finance.” In 1998, the FARC brought in over $275 million of revenue. A little over 50% of this funding comes from the duties it assesses on drug cartels operating in its territory. The rest is collected through illegal kidnapping and extortion practices (Ortiz, 2002, p. 137). Second, they have a self-sufficient flow of arms and technology. Regionally, homemade weapons fashioned from civil technologies have allowed them to keep up with the government in the quality of their firearms. Globally, it is believed that the FARC frequently tap into the black market of Cold War arms trade, which provides most of the rest of its logistical resources. Finally, the insurgents have been able to continually hone their military tactics thanks to terrorist groups worldwide. Evidence suggests that the FARC receive training from Hezbollah, the Japanese Red Army, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army in exchange for drugs and other resources (Ortiz, 2002). In summation, the FARC are a well-funded, well-networked organization that has achieved resource autonomy from any social actors in the region.

In what seems to be an almost optimistic appraisal, Ortiz suggests that the FARC have become a provisional government in the regions they control, providing protection and basic social services to the population. The ‘taxes’ the FARC collect, he claims, are in response to these services (2002). This may lead to the conclusion that the FARC is becoming increasingly beholden to the population it controls in the region. While this may be true in later years, it is probably not the case now. The revolutionary tax assessed on FARC-controlled territories is an
imposed tax, not a voluntary one. The FARC need to protect their territories in order to maintain them. In regard to the social services, the FARC still have a central mission to help the peasantry in Colombia (START, 2008). The services they provide, therefore, are in response to their own organizational mission rather than the behest of a social actor.

The Fight for Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland has gone on for a long time. The key players have been those who believe that Northern Ireland should join the south as an autonomous state, and those who feel that the citizenry would be better-served as part of the United Kingdom. Underneath the political conflict lies a religious battle between Protestants and Catholics that goes back centuries in the region. While the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 has succeeded in dialing down the conflict from what was essentially an all-out intrastate war, violent organizations are still active in the country (UCDP, 2008). Violent groups on both sides of the conflict, including splinter groups from the IRA, are still perpetrating attacks in the region (START, n.d.). As has been the case for decades, political parties are also involved in the conflict on the legal side.

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

The DUP was founded in 1971 in the wake of the Protestant Unionist Party’s collapse. Since then, the party has gradually established itself as the most popular in Northern Ireland. Originally, the DUP’s platform was the continuity of the Northern Ireland/UK relationship. After the Good Friday Accords ended the wider conflict, the party shifted its message to a more traditional political platform, in line with the other parties on the British mainland (“DUP Website,” 2010). It is important to note here that the DUP is currently operating under the system
it supported. In other words, had the Good Friday Accords ended with Belfast in Irish hands, the DUP would most likely have retained its unionist stance. Despite the religiously charged conflict, the highly Protestant DUP never supported or used violence to perpetuate its message.

Currently, political parties in the United Kingdom spend tens of millions of Pounds to maintain their campaigns. Financing comes from several sources. While the government provides base funds in the hundreds of thousands of Pounds for policy development, the vast majority of funding for political parties in the UK comes from private donations (constituents, in other words). There has been increased concern that for much of the last few decades, parties in the UK have been competitive largely on the money they raise (Phillips, 2007). As a result, money and votes are crucial to the DUP’s survival in the political arena. The party is also supported by a population that became increasingly frustrated with the violent conflict in Northern Ireland, especially in the 1990’s (Wichert, 1999). The fact that the DUP did not participate in the conflict as the political wing of some armed groups (as was the norm for both sides of the conflict in Ireland) most likely contributed to its success following the Good Friday Agreement.

*Violent Loyalist Groups*

The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was founded in the early 1970’s with the initial goal of protecting Protestants and loyalists from IRA attacks while ideologically supporting continued Irish ties with the United Kingdom. This defensive stance quickly resulted in retaliatory actions, including attacks on Catholic civilians and institutions. As these attacks continued to intensify, another group, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) emerged. This organization continued attacks, allowing the UDA to retain its legal status. It is unclear whether
or not these were ever two different organizations. Regardless, the UDA ‘merged’ with the UFF in the early 1990’s. The UDA/UFF is now a designated terrorist organization (START, 2008).

To carry out attacks, the UDA/UFF needs monetary resources. These come from criminal/paramilitary activities carried out by the organization itself. These activities include drug trafficking, extortion, and counterfeiting. This is the normal *modus operandi* for violent organizations in the conflict over Ireland, so the fact that UDA/UFF is self-funded is not surprising (FitzGerald, 2003; START, 2008). As a result, UDA/UDF was never beholden to the social actor it claimed to be protecting. Nevertheless, UDA/UFF has been involved in several peace talks. In accordance with the decrease in violence following the Good Friday Agreement, the UDA/UDF has begun to purge its ranks and reorganize. It is unclear at this point how the organization will develop in the future (START, 2008).

As the UDA/UFF scaled down its violence beginning in the late 1990’s, new organizations run by the more violent members began to emerge. The two major groups that have emerged are the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Gang. While the connection between these two organizations and UDA/UFF is unclear, they are believed to have shared membership. It is possible that the UDA/UFF is using these organizations similarly to the way in which the UDA used the UFF in the 1980’s. The main organization is not instigating violence, while these ‘splinter’ organizations continue violent operations. While the funding source for these organizations is unknown, if scholars’ suspicions about their relationship with UDA/UFF are correct, they are benefiting from that organizations continued paramilitary criminal activity (START, 1998).

**Results and Discussion**
The case analysis has shown that the violent organizations studied receive the bulk of their vital resources from internal funding sources, while the non-violent organizations do so from social actors. As indicated below, the organizations that receive their resources from these social actors are highly dependent on them. For the violent organizations, the critical mass of resources comes from an internal network of resources through both legal and criminal activities. These results have some interesting implications on the different theories discussed in this paper and on the broader policy community.

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1: Levels of dependency for parties receiving resources from social actors.

Two of the studies already mentioned hinted at this result from a different perspective. Though
Graham does not examine organizations in the same systemic conditions, she does note “sources of support” as a causal variable (2008). Asal and Rethemeyer also note “resources” as important in predicting the lethality of terrorist organizations (2008). While these results are not coming from identical research foci, the repeated emergence of ‘resources’ as a significant variable in studies of violent conflict suggest that it bears further scrutiny. The existence of social actors and other variables having to do with the flow of resources need to be further discussed if scholars are to truly understand violent organizational behavior.

Regarding systemic variables, the very existence of two organizations from the same oppressed group with divergent views on violence makes their relevance suspect. To be clear, however, studies that have pointed to systemic variables have discussed predictors of violent behavior, rather than the direct motivations (Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Zaidise et al., 2007). The results from this investigation do not discredit these authors’ work; rather, they point to the fact that systemic variables do not tell the whole story. A similar argument can be made about ideology, which is another predictor of violent behavior (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Certainly, if an organization’s ideology forbids violence and the leadership follows that ideology, the organization will probably not be violent.

The problem here is determining whether ideology is a governing doctrine or a tool used by the organization to indoctrinate its followers. As an example, let us reexamine al-Qaeda. On the one hand, Osama bin-Laden and the other leaders may believe that the Quran definitively calls for jihad against the west. On the other, the leadership may have determined that violence is the best tactic for achieving its goals and used the Quran to justify their decision and bring more followers. In order to determine which theory is more plausible, organizational-level variables must be examined.
Issues with this Investigation

While I stand by the results of this study, there are some methods that can be improved upon in future investigations that would further substantiate my results. Similar quantitative analyses can have a more focused universe of analysis in regards to the dates. For this study, the existing data was prohibitive in honing in on a specific time-period. Ideally, a database on nonviolent NGO’s may be compiled to monitor resource flows just as START has done for violent organizations. In that case, the databases can be combined into a singular quantitative study that examines both violent and nonviolent NGO’s to discern the major differences between the two.

Conclusion

The goal of this investigation was to gain insight into the decision by some NGO’s to use violence in the pursuit of their goals. To determine this, I compared violent and nonviolent organizations while controlling for systemic variables. All of the organizations using violent tactics accrued vital resources through internal mechanisms, while all of those remaining nonviolent were highly dependent on social actors. This leads to the conclusion that organizations dependent on social actors for resources are less likely to be violent. Based on this conclusion, there are two major problems with the existing literature on violent conflict. The first is that authors have the propensity to separate violent NGO’s from nonviolent organizations. Logically, it is unreasonable to assume, for example, that nonviolent organizations in highly repressive situations have never considered violence when deciding on tactics. The second is that the impact of resources and other dyadic on the decision to use violence is widely understudied. Scholars should make an increased effort to use the insight from studies on nonviolent NGO’s inner workings to analyze violent NGO’s if they are to better understand the latter.
Sources


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