Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2446-3494

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2022

DOI

10.1111/meta.12536

Abstract

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social, political, and historical.

Comments

This is the Author's Accepted Manuscript. The version of record can be found here: Magnus, P. D. 2022. The scope of inductive risk. Metaphilosophy 53: 17– 24. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12536

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