Author ORCID Identifier
P.D. Magnus: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2446-3494
Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.
Magnus, P.D. and Mandle, Jon, "What kind of is-ought gap is there and what kind ought there be?" (2017). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 56.