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P.D. Magnus:

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Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.


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This is the Author's Accepted Manuscript. The version of record can be found here: Magnus, P.D., & Mandle, J. (2017). What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(4), 373-393. doi:



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