Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

Abstract

In Margaret Cavendish's view, her Philosophical Letters are the "building" (1664, preface; hereafter Letters) that rests upon the foundation already laid in her Philosophical and Physical Opinions (first edition 1655; second edition 1663; hereafter Opinions). In the Letters, she criticizes Descartes, Hobbes, More, van Helmont, and others by arguing for the superiority of her philosophical system in its ability to explain various phenomena and to avoid the objections she highlights.

Comments

Adams, Marcus P. 2016. “Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 33: 193-214.

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