Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-2003

DOI

10.1093/bjps/54.3.465

Abstract

Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiricism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic.

Comments

Publisher Acknowledgment:

This is the Author's Accepted Manuscript of a peer reviewed paper made available by Oxford University Press © 2003.

The published version appears here: Magnus, P.D. (2003). Success, truth, and the Galilean Strategy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3): 465–474. September 2003. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.3.465

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