Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-2015

DOI

10.1086/679555

Abstract

We maintain that in many contexts promising to try is expressive of responsibility as a promiser. This morally significant application of promising to try speaks in favor of the view that responsible promisers favor evidentialism about promises. Contra Berislav Marusˇic´, we contend that responsible promisers typically withdraw from promising to act and instead promise to try, in circumstances in which they recognize that there is a significant chance that they will not succeed.

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Publisher Acknowledgment

© 2015 by The University of Chicago.

Jason D’Cruz and Justin Kalef, "Promising to Try," Ethics 125, no. 3 (April 2015): 797-806. DOI:10.1086/679555

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