Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-1-2011

DOI

10.1086/662269

Abstract

The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism. In this article, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals with autism and argue that they are best explained by positing a higher-level, domain-specific ToM module.

Comments

Publisher Acknowledgement

Submitted for publication to Philosophy of Science on 04/24/2011.

Marcus P. Adams. "Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder." Philosophy of Science 2011; 78(5), 763-773. DOI: 10.1086/662269

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